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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The judgment is reversed. The petitioner’s notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals from a judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of New York, together with his appeal bond, was received at the office of the Clerk of the District Court within the 30 days prescribed by 28 U. S. C. § 2107 for filing a notice of appeal. In dispatching these papers the petitioner inadvertently failed to include the $5 fee required by 28 U. S. C. § 1917 to be paid “upon the filing” of a notice of appeal. The Clerk notified the petitioner of his omission, and declined to “file” the notice of appeal until he received the $5 fee three or four days later. By that time the 30-day period for appeal had expired. Upon petitioner’s motion the District Court made a nunc pro tunc order according the notice of appeal a filing date as of the date it was originally received by the Clerk.
The Court of Appeals, without opinion, dismissed the appeal as untimely. We think that the Clerk's receipt of the notice of appeal within the 30-day period satisfied the requirements of § 2107, and that untimely payment of the § 1917 fee did not vitiate the validity of petitioner’s notice of appeal. Anything to the contrary in such cases as Mondakota Gas Co. v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 194 F. 2d 705 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1952), we disapprove. Our conclusion does not leave § 1917 without other sanctions.
Reversed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Eligibility and benefit levels in the federal food stamp program are determined on a “household” rather than an individual basis. The statutory definition of the term “household,” as amended in 1981 and 1982, generally treats parents, children, and siblings who live together as a single household, but does not treat more distant relatives, or groups of unrelated persons who live together, as a single household unless they also customarily purchase food and prepare meals together. Although there are variations in the facts of the four cases that were consolidated in the District Court, they all raise the question whether the statutory distinction between parents, children, and siblings, and all other groups of individuals violates the guarantee of equal treatment in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
l-H
Appellees are families who generally buy their food and prepare their meals as separate economic units; each family will either lose its benefits or have its food stamp allotment decreased as a result of the 1981 and 1982 amendments. Moreover, as appellees’ counsel eloquently explained, in each case the loss or reduction of benefits will impose a severe hardship on a needy family, and may be especially harmful to the affected young children for whom an adequate diet is essential.
Appellees accordingly filed these lawsuits to invalidate the 1981 and 1982 amendments and to be treated as separate households for the purpose of determining eligibility and allotment of food stamps. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court considered the merits of appel-lees’ challenge to the constitutionality of the “household” definition.
The District Court was persuaded that the statutory definition had a rational basis. It observed that the amendment made it more difficult for individuals who live together to “manipulate” the rules “so as to obtain separate household status and receive greater benefits”; that the administrative burden of “attempting to make individual household determinations as to ‘household’ status” was time consuming; and that unrelated persons who live together for reasons of economy or health are more likely “ ‘to actually be separate households’ ” than related families who live together. App. to Juris. Statement 5a-6a. It held, however, that “a stricter standard of review than the ‘rational basis’ test” was required. Id., at 7a. Relying primarily on United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534 (1973), a case which it construed as holding that a “congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group” could not justify the exclusion of household groups which contained unrelated persons, the District Court reasoned that “if the Supreme Court is willing to protect unpopular political groups it should even be more willing to protect the traditional family value of living together.” App. to Juris. Statement 8a.
We noted probable jurisdiction, 474 U. S. 994 (1985), and now reverse.
II
The District Court erred in judging the constitutionality of the statutory distinction under “heightened scrutiny.” The disadvantaged class is that comprised by parents, children, and siblings. Close relatives are not a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class. As a historical matter, they have not been subjected to discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they are not a minority or politically powerless. See, e. g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 313-314 (1976) (-per curiam). In fact, quite the contrary is true.
Nor does the statutory classification “directly and substantially” interfere with family living arrangements and thereby burden a fundamental right. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 386-387, and n. 12 (1978). See id., at 403-404 (Stevens, J., concurring); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 58 (1977). The “household” definition does not order or prevent any group of persons from dining together. Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of cases it probably has no effect at all. It is exceedingly unlikely that close relatives would choose to live apart simply to increase their allotment of food stamps, for the cost of separate housing would almost certainly exceed the incremental value of the additional stamps. See 50 Fed. Reg. 36641, 36642 (1985). Thus, just as in United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno — the decision which the District Court read to require “heightened scrutiny” — the “legislative classification must be sustained if the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.” 413 U. S., at 533. See id., at 533-538.
Under the proper standard of review, we agree with the District Court that Congress had a rational basis both for treating parents, children, and siblings who live together as a single “household,” and for applying a different standard in determining whether groups of more distant relatives and unrelated persons living together constitute a “household.”
As a general matter, the economies of scale that may be realized in group purchase and preparation of food surely justified Congress in providing additional food stamp benefits to households that could not achieve such efficiencies. Moreover, the Legislature’s recognition of the potential for mistake and fraud and the cost-ineffectiveness of case-by-ease verification of claims that individuals ate as separate households unquestionably warrants the use of general definitions in this area.
The question that remains is whether Congress could accommodate the wishes of distant relatives and unrelated individuals to dine separately without invidiously discriminating against close relatives. The question, in other words, is whether Congress could “[l]imi[t] the availability of the ‘purchase and prepare food separately’ rule to those most likely to actually be separate households, although living together with others for reasons of economy or health (i. e., [distant relatives and] unrelated persons).” S. Rep. No. 97-504, p. 25 (1982).
So stated, the justification for the statutory classification is obvious. Congress could reasonably determine that close relatives sharing a home — almost by definition — tend to purchase and prepare meals together while distant relatives and unrelated individuals might not be so inclined. In that event, even though close relatives are undoubtedly as honest as other food stamp recipients, the potential for mistaken or misstated claims of separate dining would be greater in the case of close relatives than would be true for those with weaker communal ties, simply because a greater percentage of the former category in fact prepare meals jointly than the comparable percentage in the latter category. The additional fact that close relatives represent by far the largest proportion of food stamp recipients might well have convinced Congress that limited funds would not permit the accommodation given distant relatives and unrelated persons to be stretched to embrace close relatives as well. Finally, Congress might have reasoned that it would be somewhat easier for close relatives — again, almost by definition — to accommodate their living habits to a federal policy favoring common meal preparation than it would be for more distant relatives or unrelated persons to do so. Because of these differences, we are persuaded that Congress could rationally conclude that the two categories merited differential treatment. Neither the decision to take “one step” in 1981— when the rule was applied to parents and children — nor the' decision to take a second step in 1982, when the rule was extended to siblings as well — was irrational because Congress did not simultaneously take a third step that would apply to the entire food stamp program.
The judgment of the District Court is therefore
Reversed.
Section 3(i) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 703, as redesig-nated and amended, 7 U. S. C. § 2012(i), provides in part:
"‘Household' means (1) an individual who lives alone or who, while living with others, customarily purchases foods and prepares meals for home consumption separate and apart from the others, or (2) a group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for home consumption; except that parents and children, or siblings, who live together shall be treated as a group of individuals who customarily purchase and prepare meals together for home consumption even if they do not do so, unless one of the parents, or siblings, is an elderly or disabled member.”
The italicized language was added to the definition by § 101(1) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 358. The clause extending the proviso to siblings, which appears in boldface, was added by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-253, 96 Stat. 772.
“The federal sovereign, like the States, must govern impartially. The concept of equal justice under law is served by the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, as well as by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 100 (1976). Accord, e. g., United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 533, n. 5 (1973); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954).
In United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, we held that the definition of the term “household” in the Food Stamp Act as amended in 1971, 84 Stat. 2048, was unconstitutional. That definition drew a distinction between households composed entirely of persons who are related to one another and households containing one or more members who are unrelated to the rest. Unlike the present statute, the 1971 definition completely disqualified all households in the latter category. Not only were all groups of unrelated persons ineligible for benefits, but even groups of related persons would lose their benefits if they admitted one nonrelative to their household. We concluded that this definition did not further the interest in preventing fraud, or any other legitimate purpose of the Food Stamp Program.
“Thus, in practical operation, the 1971 amendment excludes from participation in the food stamp program, not those persons who are ‘likely to abuse the program’ but, rather, only those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.” 413 U. S., at 538.
The House Committee Report on the Food Stamp Act of 1977 made this reference to the 1971 amendment invalidated in Moreno:
“This proviso was essentially an attempt to ban food stamp participation by communal households (so-called ‘hippie communes’). In 1973 the Supreme Court in Moreno v. U. S. Department of Agriculture, 413 U. S. 528, upheld an earlier ruling by a lower court to the effect that this provision was unconstitutional. It had been implemented for only a brief period in a few states.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-464, p. 140 (1977).
The 1971 definition was, therefore, “wholly without any rational basis” and “invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” 413 U. S., at 538.
See S. Rep. No. 97-504, p. 24 (1982) (“Because of economics of scale, small (one-, two-, and three-person) households are provided more food stamps per person than larger households. For example, current benefit levels are $70 for 1-, $128 for 2-, $183 for 3-person households”); S. Rep. No. 97-128, p. 31 (1981) (“It should be noted that because of economics of scale, small (one, two, or three persons) households are provided more food stamps per person than larger households — for example, $70 for one, $128 for two, $183 for three, and $233 for four”).
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 97-504, p. 25 (1982) (“Thus, for larger households that are able to fragment into separate, smaller households simply by purchasing and preparing food separately, or claiming to do so, benefits can be significantly increased. In 1981, Congress took a first step toward limiting this potential manipulation of food stamp rules by requiring that parents and children living together apply together, except for elderly or disabled parents. This year’s Committee proposal would take the next logical step”); H. R. Rep. No. 97-106, pp. 118-119 (1981) (“Currently, the program definition of household states, in part, that a household may consist of an individual or group of individuals who, while living with others, customarily purchase food and prepare meals for home consumption separate and apart from others. This can result in some closely related individuals claiming separate household status for purposes of obtaining food stamp benefits to which they would not otherwise be entitled. For example, an individual over 18 years old, who is living with his parents and has no visible means of support, could be eligible to participate, even though his parents would not be eligible, if the individual were to claim separate household status and indicate that he has zero gross income. The individual could, under existing law, be certified as a separate household, although in fact he was being supported by his parents”); S. Rep. No. 97-128, p. 31 (1981) (“[Cjurrent law . . . enables large households to fragment into separate households, resulting] in increased food stamp benefits”); S. Rep. No. 97-139, pp. 52-53 (1981) (“Under present law, family units may apply as separate households and receive larger benefits if they claim to purchase food and prepare meals separately, even though the children are totally supported by the parents”).
“Limiting the availability of the ‘purchase and prepare food separately’ rule to those most likely to actually be separate households, although living together with others for reasons of economy or health (i. e., unrelated persons and the elderly or disabled), would place a reasonable control on a situation that State and local administrators have identified as one which r[e]quires congressional action. In fact, tightening of the household definition was the leading recommendation for change made in response to a recent survey by the Committee. Suggestions for revision were received from Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, and numerous local administrators, including several who testified before the Committee.
“A further problem with the existing household definition occurs when members of a household ‘claim’ to purchase and prepare food separately, but, in fact, do not. Verification of a household’s claim can be difficult and administratively burdensome as noted in the following examples from State administrators.” S. Rep. No. 97-604, pp. 24-25 (1982).
See, e. g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 53 (1977) (“General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases”); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970) (“ ‘The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require rough accommodations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific’ ” (quoting Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70 (1913))). See also, e. g., Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181, 189 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 785 (1975).
Although the origin of the distinction is not entirely clear, the Report of the House Agriculture Committee suggests that its decision not to “ex-pan[d] the single household concept to the entire ease load, requiring all individuals living in the same home to be treated as one household,” was based on its concern over “the impact of the amendment upon various types of living arrangements.” H. R. Rep. No. 97-106, p. 256 (1981).
Cf. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Economic Characteristics of Households in the United States: Fourth Quarter 1984, pp. 24, 34 (1986) (statistical table indicating that more than 87% of households receiving food stamps are families related by blood, marriage, or adoption who live and eat together); U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Economic Characteristics of Households in the United States: Third Quarter 1984, pp. 26, 36 (1985) (same); U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Economic Characteristics of Households in the United States: Second Quarter 1984, pp. 26, 36 (1985) (same); U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Economic Characteristics of Households in the United States: First Quarter 1984, pp. 26, 36 (1985) (same).
“[A]n open-ended rule that allows most or all households to fragment simply by changing food purchasing and eating habits is too subject to manipulation.” S. Rep. No. 97-504, p. 25 (1982). Even a small percentage of error — given the millions of families involved and the fact that Congress believed that almost all of them could purchase food jointly— could result in the improper expenditure of many millions of dollars. See Budget of the United States Government FY 1985, p. 8-43 (in 1983, approximately 21 million participants received food stamp assistance valued at nearly $12 billion); U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985, pp. 122-123 (105th ed.) (same). Congress “expect[ed] that eligibility workers could effectively question claims” of “ ‘separateness’ ” submitted by distant relatives and unrelated individuals. S. Rep. No. 97-504, p. 26 (1982).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
While serving a term of imprisonment in a North Carolina penitentiary, the respondent Perry became involved in an altercation with another inmate. A warrant issued, charging Perry with the misdemeanor of assault with a deadly weapon, N. C. Gen. Stat. §14-33 (b)(1) (1969). Under North Carolina law, the District Court Division of the General Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction for the trial of misdemeanors. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-272. Following a trial without a jury in the District Court of Northampton County, Perry was convicted of this misdemeanor and given a six-month sentence, to be served after completion of the prison term he was then serving.
Perry then filed a notice of appeal to the Northampton County Superior Court. Under North Carolina law, a person convicted in the District Court has a right to a trial de novo in the Superior Court. N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-290, 15-177.1. The right to trial dé novo is absolute, there being no need for the appellant to allege error in the original proceeding. When an appeal is taken, the statutory scheme provides that the slate is wiped clean ; the prior conviction is annulled, and the prosecution and the defense begin anew in the Superior Court.
After the filing of the notice of appeal, but prior to the respondent’s appearance for trial de novo in the Superior Court, the prosecutor obtained an indictment from a grand jury, charging Perry with the felony of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflict serious bodily injury, N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32 (a) (1969). The indictment covered the same conduct for which Perry had been tried and convicted in the District Court. Perry entered a plea of guilty to the indictment in the Superior Court, and was sentenced to a term of five to seven years in the penitentiary, to be served concurrently with the identical prison sentence he was then serving.
A number of months later, the respondent filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. He claimed that the indictment on the felony charge in the Superior Court constituted double jeopardy and also deprived him of due process of law. In an unreported opinion, the District Court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust available state remedies. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that resort to the state courts would be futile, because the Supreme Court of North Carolina had consistently rejected the constitutional claims presented by Perry in his petition. 453 F. 2d 856. The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
On remand, the District Court granted the writ. It held that the bringing of the felony charge after the filing of the appeal violated Perry’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784. The District Court further held that the respondent had not, by his guilty plea in the Superior Court, waived his right to raise his constitutional claims in the federal habeas corpus proceeding. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in a brief per curiam opinion. We granted certiorari, 414 U. S. 908, to consider the seemingly important issues presented by this case.
I
As in the District Court, Perry directs two independent constitutional attacks upon the conduct of the State in baling him into court on the felony charge after he took an appeal from the misdemeanor conviction. First, he contends that the felony indictment in the Superior Court placed him in double jeopardy, since he had already been convicted on the lesser included misdemeanor charge in the District Court. Second, he urges that the indictment on the felony charge constituted a penalty for his exercising his statutory right to appeal, and thus contravened the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We find it necessary to reach only the latter claim.
Perry’s due process arguments are derived substantially from North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, and its progeny. In Pearce, the Court considered the constitutional problems presented when, following a successful appeal and reconviction, a criminal defendant was subjected to a greater punishment than that imposed at the first trial. While we concluded that such a harsher sentence was not absolutely precluded by either the Double Jeopardy or Due Process Clause, we emphasized that “imposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy would be ... a violation of due process of law.” Id., at 724. Because “vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial,” id., at 725, we held that an increased sentence could not be imposed upon retrial unless the sentencing judge placed certain specified findings on the record.
In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, the Court was called upon to decide the applicability of the Pearce holding to Kentucky's two-tiered system of criminal adjudication. Kentucky, like North Carolina, allows a misdemeanor defendant convicted in an inferior trial court to seek a trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction. The appellant in Colten claimed that the Constitution prevented the court of general jurisdiction, after trial de novo, from imposing a sentence in excess of that imposed in the court of original trial. This Court rejected the Pearce analogy. Emphasizing that Pearce was directed at insuring the absence of “vindictiveness” against a criminal defendant who attacked his initial conviction on appeal, the Court found such dangers greatly minimized on the facts presented in Colten. In contrast to Pearce, the court that imposed the increased sentence after retrial in Colten was not the one whose original judgment had prompted an appellate reversal; thus, there was little possibility that an increased sentence on trial de novo could have been motivated by personal vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge. Hence, the Court thought the prophylactic rule of Pearce unnecessary in the de novo trial and sentencing context of Colten.
The Pearce decision was again interpreted by this Court last Term in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17, in the setting of Georgia's system under which sentencing responsibility is entrusted to the jury. Upon retrial following the reversal of his original conviction, the defendant in Chaffin was reconvicted and sentenced to a greater term than had been imposed by the initial jury. Concentrating again on the issue of vindictiveness, the Court found no violation of the Pearce rule. It was noted that the second jury was completely unaware of the original sentence, and thus could hardly have sought to “punish” Chaffin for his successful appeal. Moreover, the jury, unlike a judge who had been reversed on appeal, could hardly have a stake in the prior conviction or any motivation to discourage criminal defendants from seeking appellate review. Hence, it was concluded that the danger of vindictiveness under the circumstances of the case was “de minimis,” id., at 26, and did not require adoption of the constitutional rule set out in Pearce.
The lesson that emerges from Pearce, Colten, and Chaffin is that the Due Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of “vindictiveness.” Unlike the circumstances presented by those cases, however, in the situation here the tíentral figure is not the judge or the jury, but the prosecutor. The question is whether the opportunities for vindictiveness in this situation are such as to impel the conclusion that due process of law requires a rule analogous to that of the Pearce case. We conclude that the answer must be in the affirmative.
A prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake in discouraging convicted misdemeanants from appealing and thus obtaining a trial de novo in the Superior Court, since such an appeal will clearly require increased expenditures of prosecutorial resources before the defendant's conviction becomes final, and may even result in a formerly convicted defendant’s going free. And, if the prosecutor has the means readily at hand to discourage such appeals — by “upping the ante” through a felony indictment whenever a convicted misdemeanant pursues his statutory appellate remedy — the State can insure that only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards of a de novo trial.
There is, of course, no evidence that the prosecutor in this case acted in bad faith or maliciously in seeking a felony indictment against Perry. The rationale of our judgment in the Pearce case, however, was not grounded upon the proposition that actual retaliatory motivation must inevitably exist. Rather, we emphasized that “since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his' first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.” 395 U. S., at 725. We think it clear that the same considerations apply here. A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570.
Due. process of law requires that such a potential for vindictiveness must not enter into North Carolina’s two-tiered appellate process. We hold, therefore, that it was not constitutionally permissible for the State to respond to Perry’s invocation of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him prior to the trial de novo.
II
The remaining question is whether, because of his guilty plea to the felony charge in the Superior Court, Perry is precluded from raising his constitutional claims in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. In contending that such is the case, petitioners rely chiefly on this Court’s decision last Term in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258.
The precise issue presented in Tollett was “whether a state prisoner, pleading guilty with the advice of counsel, may later obtain release through federal habeas corpus by proving only that the indictment to which he pleaded was returned by an unconstitutionally selected grand jury.” Id., at 260. The Court answered that question in the negative. Relying primarily on the guilty-plea trilogy of Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, the Court characterized the guilty plea as “a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.” 411 U. S., at 267. Accordingly, the Court held that when a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, “he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Ibid. Rather, a person complaining of such “antecedent constitutional violations,” id., at 266, is limited in a federal habeas corpus proceeding to attacks on the voluntary and intelligent nature of the guilty plea, through proof that the advice received from counsel was not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” See McMann, supra, at 771.
While petitioners’ reliance upon the Tollett opinion is understandable, there is a fundamental distinction between this case and that one. Although the underlying claims presented in Tollett and the Brady trilogy were of constitutional dimensions, none went to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him. The defendants in McMann v. Richardson, for example, could surely have been brought to trial without the use of the allegedly coerced confessions, and even a tainted indictment of the sort alleged in Tollett could have been “cured” through a new indictment by a properly selected grand jury. In the case at hand, by contrast, the nature of the underlying constitutional infirmity is markedly different. Having chosen originally to proceed on the misdemeanor charge in the District Court; the State of North Carolina was, under the facts of this case, simply precluded by the Due Process Clause from calling upon the respondent to answer to the more serious charge in the Superior Court. Unlike the defendant in Tollett, Perry is not complaining of “antecedent constitutional violations” or of a “deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” 411 U. S., at 266, 267. Rather, the right that he asserts and that we today accept is the right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge. The very initiation of the proceedings against him in the Superior Court thus operated to deny him due process of law.
Last Term in Robinson v. Neil, 409 U. S. 505, in explaining why the Double Jeopardy Clause is distinctive, the Court noted that “its practical result is to prevent a trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that govern the conduct of a trial.” Id., at 509. While our judgment today is not based upon the Double Jeopardy Clause, we think that the quoted language aptly describes the due process right upon which our judgment is based. The “practical result” dictated by the Due Process Clause in this case is that North Carolina simply could not permissibly require Perry to answer to the felony charge. That being so, it follows that his guilty plea did not foreclose him from attacking his conviction in the Superior Court proceedings through a federal writ of habeas corpus.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed. R sQ
See generally State v. Spencer, 276 N. C. 535, 173 S. E. 2d 765; State v. Sparrow, 276 N. C. 499, 173 S. E. 2d 897.
The respondent’s guilty plea was apparently premised on the expectation that any sentence he received in the Superior Court would be served concurrently with the sentence he was then serving, as contrasted with the consecutive sentence imposed in the District Court. That expectation was fulfilled, but it turned out that the guilty plea resulted in increasing the respondent’s potential term of incarceration. Under applicable North Carolina law, the five- to seven-year assault sentence did not commence until the date of the guilty plea, October 29, 1969. By that time, Perry had already served some 17 months of the sentence he was serving at the time of the alleged assault. Thus, the effect of the five- to seven-year concurrent sentence on the assault charge was to increase his potential period of confinement by these 17 months, as opposed to the six-month increase envisaged by the District Court’s consecutive sentence.
The Court of Appeals further instructed the District Court to await the ruling of this Court in Rice v. North Carolina, 434 F. 2d 297 (CA4), cert. granted, 401 U. S. 1008. Rice involved a challenge to the constitutionality of an enhanced penalty received after a criminal defendant had sought a trial de novo under North Carolina’s two-tiered misdemeanor adjudication system. This Court did not reach the merits of this issue in Rice, instead vacating and remanding to the Court of Appeals for consideration as to whether the case had become moot. 404 U. S. 244.
Subsequently, in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, we dealt with the merits of this issue, and held that the imposition of an increased sentence on trial de novo did not violate either the Due Process or the Double Jeopardy Clause. The District Court in the present case had the benefit of the Colten decision before issuing its opinion granting habeas corpus relief.
This Court has never held that the States are constitutionally-required to establish avenues of appellate review of criminal convictions. Nonetheless, “it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts.” Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305, 310. See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12; Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353; Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 477; Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 724-725; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17, 24 n. 11.
For a more exhaustive list of States employing similar two-tiered procedures, see Colten, supra, at 112 n. 4.
Moreover, even putting to one side the potentiality of increased incarceration, conviction of a “felony” often entails more serious collateral consequences than those incurred through a misdemeanor conviction. See generally Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929, 955-960; Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 Va. L. Rev. 403, 406-408. Cf. O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U. S. 524 (involving New York law under which convicted misdemeanants retain the right to vote).
This would clearly be a different case if the State had shown that it was impossible to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset, as in Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442. In that case the defendant was originally tried and convicted for assault and battery. Subsequent to the original trial, the assault victim died, and the defendant was then tried and convicted for homicide. Obviously, it would not have been possible for the authorities in Diaz to have originally proceeded against the defendant on the more serious charge, since the crime of homicide was not complete until after the victim’s death.
Contrary to the dissenting opinion, our decision today does not “assure that no penalty whatever will be imposed” on respondent. Post, at 39. While the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars trial of Perry on the felony assault charges in the Superior Court, North Carolina is wholly free to conduct a trial de novo in the Superior Court on the original misdemeanor assault charge. Indeed, this is precisely the course that Perry has invited, by filing an appeal from the original judgment of the District Court.
The dissenting opinion also seems to misconceive the nature of the due process right at stake here. If this were a case involving simply an increased sentence violative of the Pearce rule, a remand for resentencing would be in order. Our holding today, however, is not that Perry was denied due process by the length of the sentence imposed by the Superior Court, but rather by the very institution of the felony indictment against him. While we reach this conclusion in partial reliance on the analogy of Pearce and its progeny, the due process violation here is not the same as was involved in those cases, and cannot be remedied solely through a resentencing procedure in the Superior Court. Cf. n. 6, supra.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Claiming he was the original and sole inventor of a mechanical device, the respondent Kepner asked the United States Patent Office for a patent. Later the petitioner Sanford filed a similar application making the same claim. As authorized by R. S. § 4904, 35 U. S. C. § 52, the Commissioner of Patents directed a board of interference examiners to hold hearings and determine the dispute over priority of invention — which of the two first used the device. The Board decided for respondent Kep-ner. Sanford’s application for patent was accordingly refused. As authorized by R. S. § 4915, 35 U. S. C. § 63, Sanford brought this bill in equity praying that he be adjudged inventor of the device and entitled to a patent. Sanford also prayed that Kepner’s claims be adjudged unpatentable, charging that many previous patents had been granted on Kepner’s device, some of which had expired. Agreeing with the Board of Interference Examiners, the District Court found against Sanford on the issue of prior use. Since this was enough to justify refusal to issue Sanford a patent, the District Court declined to go further and consider Kepner’s claim to a patent. Accordingly Sanford’s bill was dismissed. 99 F. Supp. 221. Agreeing with the District Court, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 195 F. 2d 387. The circuits have different views concerning the duty of district courts to consider and adjudicate questions of invention and patentability when parties urge them in R. S. § 4915 proceedings. To settle these differences we granted certiorari. 343 U. S. 976.
So far as relevant to the precise question here, R. S. § 4915, as now contained in 35 U. S. C. § 63, reads:
“. . . whenever any applicant is dissatisfied with the decision of the board of interference examiners, the applicant . . . may have remedy by bill in equity . . . and the court . . . may adjudge that such applicant is entitled, according to law, to receive a patent for his invention .... And such adjudication, if it be in favor of the right of the applicant, shall authorize the commissioner to issue such patent on the applicant filing in the Patent Office a copy of the adjudication and otherwise complying with the requirements of law.”
The obvious purpose of the quoted part of R. S. § 4915 is to give a judicial remedy to an applicant who has been finally denied a patent because of a Patent Office decision against him and in favor of his adversary on the question of priority. When the trial court decides this factual issue of priority against him and thus affirms the refusal of the patent by the Patent Office, he has obtained the full remedy the statute gives him. Only if he wins on priority may he proceed. In that event, the statute says, the court may proceed to “adjudge that such applicant is entitled, according to law, to receive a patent for his invention . . . .” So adjudging, it may authorize issuance of the patent. But judicial authorization of issuance implies judicial sanction of patentability and for this reason this Court has said, “It necessarily follows that no adjudication can be made in favor of the applicant, unless the alleged invention for which a patent is sought is a patentable invention.” Hill v. Wooster, 132 U. S. 693, 698. The principle of the Hill case is that the court must decide whether claims show patentable inventions before authorizing the Commissioner to issue a patent. No part of its holding or wording nor of that in Hoover Co. v. Coe, 325 U. S. 79, requires us to say R. S. § 4915 compels a district court to adjudicate patentability at the instance of one whose claim is found to be groundless. Sanford’s claim was found to be groundless.
It is unlikely that this equity proceeding would develop a full investigation of validity. There would be no attack on the patent comparable to that of an infringement action. Here the very person who claimed an invention now asks to prove that Kepner’s similar device was no invention at all because of patents issued long before either party made claim for his discovery. There is no real issue of invention between the parties here and we see no reason to read into the statute a district court’s compulsory duty to adjudicate validity.
Affirmed.
In accord with the Court of Appeals, Heston v. Kuhlke, 179 F. 2d 222; Smith v. Carter Carburetor Corp., 130 F. 2d 555; Cleveland Trust Co. v. Berry, 99 F. 2d 517. Contra: Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Milwaukee Gas Specialty Co., 174 F. 2d 203; Knutson v. Gallsworthy, 82 U. S. App. D. C. 304, 164 F. 2d 497.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Fourth Amendment permits police officers to approach bus passengers at random to ask questions and to request their consent to searches, provided a reasonable person would understand that he or she is free to refuse.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991). This case requires us to determine whether officers must advise bus passengers during these encounters of their right not to cooperate.
I
On February 4, 1999, respondents Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown, Jr., were traveling on a Greyhound bus en route from Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, to Detroit, Michigan. The bus made a scheduled stop in Tallahassee, Florida. The passengers were required to disembark so the bus could be refueled and cleaned. As the passengers reboarded, the driver checked their tickets and then left to complete paperwork inside the terminal. As he left, the driver allowed three members of the Tallahassee Police Department to board the bus as part of a routine drug and weapons interdiction effort. The officers were dressed in plain clothes and carried concealed weapons and visible badges.
Once onboard Officer Hoover knelt on the driver’s seat and faced the rear of the bus. He could observe the passengers and ensure the safety of the two other officers without blocking the aisle or otherwise obstructing the bus exit. Officers Lang and Blackburn went to the rear of the bus. Blackburn remained stationed there, facing forward. Lang worked his way toward the front of the bus, speaking with individual passengers as he went. He asked the passengers about their travel plans and sought to match passengers with luggage in the overhead racks. To avoid blocking the aisle, Lang stood next to or just behind each passenger with whom he spoke.
According to Lang’s testimony, passengers who declined to cooperate with him or who chose to exit the bus at any time would have been allowed to do so without argument. In Lang’s experience, however, most people are willing to cooperate. Some passengers go so far as to commend the police for their efforts to ensure the safety of their travel. Lang could recall five to six instances in the previous year in which passengers had declined to have their luggage searched. It also was common for passengers to leave the bus for a cigarette or a snack while the officers were on board. Lang sometimes informed passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate. On the day in question, however, he did not.
Respondents were seated next to each other on the bus. Drayton was in the aisle seat, Brown in the seat next to the window. Lang approached respondents from the rear and leaned over Drayton’s shoulder. He held up his badge long enough for respondents to identify him as a police officer. With his face 12-to-18 inches away from Drayton’s, Lang spoke in a voice just loud enough for respondents to hear:
“I’m Investigator Lang with the Tallahassee Police Department. We’re conducting bus interdiction [sic], attempting to deter drugs and illegal weapons being transported on the bus. Do you have any bags on the bus?” App. 55.
Both respondents pointed to a single green bag in the overhead luggage rack. Lang asked, “Do you mind if I check it?,” and Brown responded, “Go ahead.” Id., at 56. Lang handed the bag to Officer Blackburn to check. The bag contained no contraband.
Officer Lang noticed that both respondents were wearing heavy jackets and baggy pants despite the warm weather. In Lang’s experience drug traffickers often use baggy clothing to conceal weapons or narcotics. The officer thus asked Brown if he had any weapons or drugs in his possession. And he asked Brown: “Do you mind if I check your person?” Brown answered, “Sure,” and cooperated by leaning up in his seat, pulling a cell phone out of his pocket, and opening up his jacket. Id., at 61. Lang reached across Drayton and patted down Brown’s jacket and pockets, including his waist area, sides, and upper thighs. In both thigh areas, Lang detected hard objects similar to drug packages detected on other occasions. Lang arrested and handcuffed Brown. Officer Hoover escorted Brown from the bus.
Lang then asked Drayton, “Mind if I check you?” Id., at 65. Drayton responded by lifting his hands about eight inches from his legs. Lang conducted a patdown of Dray-ton’s thighs and detected hard objects similar to those found on Brown. He arrested Drayton and escorted him from the bus. A further search revealed that respondents had duct-taped plastic bundles of powder cocaine between several pairs of their boxer shorts. Brown possessed three bundles containing 488 grams of cocaine. Drayton possessed two bundles containing 295 grams of cocaine.
Respondents were charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of § 841(a)(1). They moved to suppress the cocaine, arguing that the consent to the patdown search was invalid. Following a hearing at which only Officer Lang testified, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied their motions to suppress. The District Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive and respondents’ consent to the search was voluntary. The District Court pointed to the fact that the officers were dressed in plain clothes, did not brandish their badges in an authoritative manner, did not make a general announcement to the entire bus, and did not address anyone in a menacing tone of voice. It noted that the officers did not block the aisle or the exit, and stated that it was “obvious that [respondents] can get up and leave, as can the people ahead of them.” App. 132. The District Court concluded: “[Everything that took place between Officer Lang and Mr. Drayton and Mr. Brown suggests that it was cooperative. There was nothing coercive, there was nothing confrontational about it.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant respondents’ motions to suppress. 231 F. 3d 787 (2000). The court held that this disposition was compelled by its previous decisions in United States v. Washington, 151 F. 3d 1354 (1998), and United States v. Guapi, 144 F. 3d 1393 (1998). Those cases had held that bus passengers do not feel free to disregard police officers’ requests to search absent “some positive indication that consent could have been refused.” Washington, supra, at 1357.
We granted certiorari. 534 U. S. 1074 (2002). The respondents, we conclude, were not seized and their consent to the search was voluntary; and we reverse.
II
Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen. See, e. g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion); see id., at 523, n. 3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S. 1, 5-6 (1984) (per curiam) (holding that such interactions in airports are “the sort of consensual encounters] that implicate] no Fourth Amendment interest”). Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage — provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S., at 434-435 (citations omitted). If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.
The Court has addressed on a previous occasion the specific question of drug interdiction efforts on buses. In Bos-tick, two police officers requested a bus passenger’s consent to a search of his luggage. The passenger agreed, and the resulting search revealed cocaine in his suitcase. The Florida Supreme Court suppressed the cocaine. In doing so it adopted a per se rule that due to the cramped confines on-board a bus the act of questioning would deprive a person of his or her freedom of movement and so constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
This Court reversed. Bostick first made it clear that for the most part per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context. The proper inquiry necessitates a consideration of “all the circumstances surrounding the encounter.” Id., at 439. The Court noted next that the traditional rule, which states that a seizure does not occur so long as a reasonable person would feel free “to disregard the police and go about his business,” California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621, 628 (1991), is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of a bus encounter. A passenger may not want to get off a bus if there is a risk it will depart before the opportunity to reboard. Bostick, 501 U. S., at 434-436. A bus rider’s movements are confined in this sense, but this is the natural result of choosing to take the bus; it says nothing about whether the police conduct is coercive. Id., at 436. The proper inquiry “is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Ibid. Finally, the Court rejected Bostick’s argument that he must have been seized because no reasonable person would consent to a search of luggage containing drugs. The reasonable person test, the Court explained, is objective and “presupposes an innocent person.” Id., at 437-438.
In light of the limited record, Bostick refrained from deciding whether a seizure occurred. Id., at 437. The Court, however, identified two factors “particularly worth noting” on remand. Id., at 432. First, although it was obvious that an officer was armed, he did not remove the gun from its pouch or use it in a threatening way. Second, the officer advised the passenger that he could refuse consent to the search. Ibid.
Relying upon this latter factor, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted what is in effect a per se rule that evidence obtained during suspicionless drug interdiction efforts aboard buses must be suppressed unless the officers have advised passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to a search. In United States v. Guapi, supra, the Court of Appeals described “[t]he most glaring difference” between the encounters in Guapi and in Bostick as “the complete lack of any notification to the passengers that they were in fact free to decline the search request.... Providing [this] simple notification ... is perhaps the most efficient and effective method to ensure compliance with the Constitution.” 144 F. 3d, at 1395. The Court of Appeals then listed other factors that contributed to the coerciveness of the encounter: (1) the officer conducted the interdiction before the passengers disembarked from the bus at a scheduled stop; (2) the officer explained his presence in the form of a general announcement to the entire bus; (3) the officer wore a police uniform; and (4) the officer questioned passengers as he moved from the front to the rear of the bus, thus obstructing the path to the exit. Id., at 1396.
After its decision in Guapi the Court of Appeals decided United States v. Washington and the instant case. The court suppressed evidence obtained during similar drug interdiction efforts despite the following facts: (1) the officers in both cases conducted the interdiction after the passengers had reboarded the bus; (2) the officer in the present ease did not make a general announcement to the entire bus but instead spoke with individual passengers; (3) the officers in both cases were not in uniform; and (4) the officers in both cases questioned passengers as they moved from the rear to the front of the bus and were careffil not to obstruct passengers’ means of egress from the bus.
Although the Court of Appeals has disavowed a per se requirement, the lack of an explicit warning to passengers is the only element common to all its cases. See Washington, 151 F. 3d, at 1357 (“It seems obvious to us that if police officers genuinely want to ensure that their encounters with bus passengers remain absolutely voluntary, they can simply say so. Without such notice in this case, we do not feel a reasonable person would have felt able to decline the agents’ requests”); 231 F. 3d, at 790 (noting that “[t]his case is controlled by” Guapi and Washington, and dismissing any factual differences between the three cases as irrelevant). Under these cases, it appears that the Court of Appeals would suppress any evidence obtained during suspicion-less drug interdiction efforts aboard buses in the absence of a warning that passengers may refuse to cooperate. The Court of Appeals erred in adopting this approach.
Applying the Bostick framework to the facts of this particular case, we conclude that the police did not seize respondents when they boarded the bus and began questioning passengers. The officers gave the passengers no reason to believe that they were required to answer the officers’ questions. When Officer Lang approached respondents, he did not brandish a weapon or make any intimidating movements. He left the aisle free so that respondents could exit. He spoke to passengers one by one and in a polite, quiet voice. Nothing he said would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was barred from leaving the bus or otherwise terminating the encounter.
There were ample grounds for the District Court to conclude that “everything that took place between Officer Lang and [respondents] suggests that it was cooperative” and that there “was nothing coercive [or] confrontational” about the encounter. App. 132. There was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice. It is beyond question that had this encounter occurred on the street, it would be constitutional. The fact that an encounter takes place on a bus does not on its own transform standard police questioning of citizens into an illegal seizure. See Bostick, 501 U. S., at 439-440. Indeed, because many fellow passengers are present to witness officers’ conduct, a reasonable person may feel even more secure in his or her decision not to cooperate with police on a bus than in other circumstances.
Respondents make much of the fact that Officer Lang displayed his badge. In Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S., at 5-6, however, the Court rejected the claim that the defendant was seized when an officer approached him in an airport, showed him his badge, and asked him to answer some questions. Likewise, in INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 212-213 (1984), the Court held that Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents’ wearing badges and questioning workers in a factory did not constitute a seizure. And while neither Lang nor his colleagues were in uniform or visibly armed, those factors should have little weight in the analysis. Officers are often required to wear uniforms and in many circumstances this is cause for assurance, not discomfort. Much the same can be said for wearing sidearms. That most law enforcement officers are armed is a fact well known to the public. The presence of a holstered firearm thus is unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter absent active brandishing of the weapon.
Officer Hoover’s position at the front of the bus also does not tip the scale in respondents’ favor. Hoover did nothing to intimidate passengers, and he said nothing to suggest that people could not exit and indeed he left the aisle clear. In Delgado, the Court determined there was no seizure even though several uniformed INS officers were stationed near the exits of the factory. Id., at 219. The Court noted: “The presence of agents by the exits posed no reasonable threat of detention to these workers,. . . the mere possibility that they would be questioned if they sought to leave the buildings should not have resulted in any reasonable apprehension by any of them that they would be seized or detained in any meaningful way.” Ibid.
Finally, the fact that in Officer Lang’s experience only a few passengers have refused to cooperate does not suggest that a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the bus encounter. In Lang’s experience it was common for passengers to leave the bus for a cigarette or a snack while the officers were questioning passengers. App. 70, 81. And of more importance, bus passengers answer officers’ questions and otherwise cooperate not because of coercion but because the passengers know that their participation enhances their own safety and the safety of those around them. “While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.” Delgado, supra, at 216.
Drayton contends that even if Brown’s cooperation with the officers was consensual, Drayton was seized because no reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter with the officers after Brown had been arrested. The Court of Appeals did not address this claim; and in any event the argument fails. The arrest of one person does not mean that everyone around him has been seized by police. If anything, Brown’s arrest should have put Drayton on notice of the consequences of continuing the encounter by answering the officers’ questions. Even after arresting Brown, Lang addressed Drayton in a polite manner and provided him with no indication that he was required to answer Lang’s questions.
We turn now from the question whether respondents were seized to whether they were subjected to an unreasonable search, i. e., whether their consent to the suspicionless search was involuntary. In circumstances such as these, where the question of voluntariness pervades both the search and seizure inquiries, the respective analyses turn on very similar facts. And, as the facts above suggest, respondents’ consent to the search of their luggage and their persons was voluntary. Nothing Officer Lang said indicated a command to consent to the search. Rather, when respondents informed Lang that they had a bag on the bus, he asked for their permission to check it. And when Lang requested to search Brown and Drayton’s persons, he asked first if they objected, thus indicating to a reasonable person that he or she was free to refuse. Even after arresting Brown, Lang provided Drayton with no indication that he was required to consent to a search. To the contrary, Lang asked for Drayton’s permission to search him (“Mind if I check you?”), and Dray-ton agreed.
The Court has rejected in specific terms the suggestion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search. See, e. g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33, 39-40 (1996); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 227 (1973). “While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.” Ibid. Nor do this Court’s decisions suggest that even though there are no per se rules, a presumption of invalidity attaches if a citizen consented without explicit notification that he or she was free to refuse to cooperate. Instead, the Court has repeated that the totality of the circumstances must control, without giving extra weight to the absence of this type of warning. See, e. g., Sckneckloth, supra; Robinette, supra, at 39-40. Although Officer Lang did not inform respondents of their right to refuse the search, he did request permission to search, and the totality of the circumstances indicates that their consent was voluntary, so the searches were reasonable.
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of coercion.
We need not ask the alternative question whether, after the arrest of Brown, there were grounds for a Terry stop and frisk of Drayton, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), though this may have been the case. It was evident that Drayton and Brown were traveling together — Officer Lang observed the pair reboarding the bus together; they were each dressed in heavy, baggy clothes that were ill-suited for the day’s warm temperatures; they were seated together on the bus; and they each claimed responsibility for the single piece of green carry-on luggage. Once Lang had identified Brown as carrying what he believed to be narcotics, he may have had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop and frisk on Drayton as well. That question, however, has not been presented to us. The fact the officers may have had reasonable suspicion does not prevent them from relying on a citizen’s consent to the search. It would be a paradox, and one most puzzling to law enforcement officials and courts alike, were we to say, after holding that Brown’s consent was, voluntary, that Drayton’s consent was ineffectual simply because the police at that point had more compelling grounds to detain him. After taking Brown into custody, the officers were entitled to continue to proceed on the basis of consent and to ask for Drayton’s cooperation.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires that we again consider the standard district courts must apply when deciding whether to grant summary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case.
I — I
Stating the facts of this case is a daunting task. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit runs to 69 pages; the primary opinion of the District Court is more than three times as long. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. 2d 238 (CA3 1983); 513 F. Supp. 1100 (ED Pa. 1981). Two respected District Judges each have authored a number of opinions in this case; the published ones alone would fill an entire volume of the Federal Supplement. In addition, the parties have filed a 40-volume appendix in this Court that is said to contain the essence of the evidence on which the District Court and the Court of Appeals based their respective decisions.
We will not repeat what these many opinions have stated and restated, or summarize the mass of documents that constitute the record on appeal. Since we review only the standard applied by the Court of Appeals in deciding this case, and not the weight assigned to particular pieces of evidence, we find it unnecessary to state the facts in great detail. What follows is a summary of this case’s long history.
A
Petitioners, defendants below, are 21 corporations that manufacture or sell “consumer electronic products” (CEPs)— for the most part, television sets. Petitioners include both Japanese manufacturers of CEPs and American firms, controlled by Japanese parents, that sell the Japanese-manufactured products. Respondents, plaintiffs below, are Zenith Radio Corporation (Zenith) and National Union Electric Corporation (NUE). Zenith is an American firm that manufactures and sells television sets. NUE is the corporate successor to Emerson Radio Company, an American firm that manufactured and sold television sets until 1970, when it withdrew from the market after sustaining substantial losses. Zenith and NUE began this lawsuit in 1974, claiming that petitioners had illegally conspired to drive American firms from the American CEP market. According to respondents, the gist of this conspiracy was a “ ‘scheme to raise, fix and maintain artificially high prices for television receivers sold by [petitioners] in Japan and, at the same time, to fix and maintain low prices for television receivers exported to and sold in the United States.’” 723 F. 2d, at 251 (quoting respondents’ preliminary pretrial memorandum). These “low prices” were allegedly at levels that produced substantial losses for petitioners. 513 F. Supp., at 1125. The conspiracy allegedly began as early as 1953, and according to respondents was in full operation by sometime in the late 1960’s. Respondents claimed that various portions of this scheme violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, §2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, § 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916.
After several years of detailed discovery, petitioners filed motions for summary judgment on all claims against them. The District Court directed the parties to file, with preclu-sive effect, “Final Pretrial Statements” listing all the documentary evidence that would be offered if the case proceeded to trial. Respondents filed such a statement, and petitioners responded with a series of motions challenging the admissibility of respondents’ evidence. In three detailed opinions, the District Court found the bulk of the evidence on which Zenith and NUE relied inadmissible.
The District Court then turned to petitioners’ motions for summary judgment. In an opinion spanning 217 pages, the court found that the admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of the alleged conspiracy. At bottom, the court found, respondents’ claims rested on the inferences that could be drawn from petitioners’ parallel conduct in the Japanese and American markets, and from the effects of that conduct on petitioners’ American competitors. 513 F. Supp., at 1125-1127. After reviewing the evidence both by category and in toto, the court found that any inference of conspiracy was unreasonable, because (i) some portions of the evidence suggested that petitioners conspired in ways that did not injure respondents, and (ii) the evidence that bore directly on the alleged price-cutting conspiracy did not rebut the more plausible inference that petitioners were cutting prices to compete in the American market and not to monopolize it. Summary judgment therefore was granted on respondents’ claims under § 1 of the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff Act. Because the Sherman Act §2 claims, which alleged that petitioners had combined to monopolize the American CEP market, were functionally indistinguishable from the § 1 claims, the court dismissed them also. Finally, the court found that the Robinson-Patman Act claims depended on the same supposed conspiracy as the Sherman Act claims. Since the court had found no genuine issue of fact as to the conspiracy, it entered judgment in petitioners’ favor on those claims as well.
B
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The court began by examining the District Court’s eviden-tiary rulings, and determined that much of the evidence excluded by the District Court was in fact admissible. 723 F. 2d, at 260-303. These evidentiary rulings are not before us. See 471 U. S. 1002 (1985) (limiting grant of certiorari).
On the merits, and based on the newly enlarged record, the court found that the District Court’s summary judgment decision was improper. The court acknowledged that “there are legal limitations upon the inferences which may be drawn from circumstantial evidence,” 723 F. 2d, at 304, but it found that “the legal problem... is different” when “there is direct evidence of concert of action.” Ibid. Here, the court concluded, “there is both direct evidence of certain kinds of concert of action and circumstantial evidence having some tendency to suggest that other kinds of concert of action may have occurred.” Id., at 304-305. Thus, the court reasoned, cases concerning the limitations on inferring conspiracy from ambiguous evidence were not dispositive. Id., at 305. Turning to the evidence, the court determined that a factfinder reasonably could draw the following conclusions:
1. The Japanese market for CEPs was characterized by oligopolistic behavior, with a small number of producers meeting regularly and exchanging information on price and other matters. Id., at 307. This created the opportunity for a stable combination to raise both prices and profits in Japan. American firms could not attack such a combination because the Japanese Government imposed significant barriers to entry. Ibid.
2. Petitioners had relatively higher fixed costs than their American counterparts, and therefore needed to operate at something approaching full capacity in order to make a profit. Ibid.
3. Petitioners’ plant capacity exceeded the needs of the Japanese market. Ibid.
4. By formal agreements arranged in cooperation with Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), petitioners fixed minimum prices for CEPs exported to the American market. Id., at 310. The parties refer to these prices as the “check prices,” and to the agreements that require them as the “check price agreements.”
5. Petitioners agreed to distribute their products in the United States according to a “five company rule”: each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five American distributors. Ibid.
6. Petitioners undercut their own check prices by a variety of rebate schemes. Id., at 311. Petitioners sought to conceal these rebate schemes both from the United States Customs Service and from MITI, the former to avoid various customs regulations as well as action under the antidumping laws, and the latter to cover up petitioners’ violations of the check-price agreements.
Based on inferences from the foregoing conclusions, the Court of Appeals concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find a conspiracy to depress prices in the American market in order to drive out American competitors, which conspiracy was funded by excess profits obtained in the Japanese market. The court apparently did not consider whether it was as plausible to conclude that petitioners’ price-cutting behavior was independent and not conspiratorial.
The court found it unnecessary to address petitioners’ claim that they could not be held liable under the antitrust laws for conduct that was compelled by a foreign sovereign. The claim, in essence, was that because MITI required petitioners to enter into the check-price agreements, liability could not be premised on those agreements. The court concluded that this case did not present any issue of sovereign compulsion, because the check-price agreements were being used as “evidence of a low export price conspiracy” and not as an independent basis for finding antitrust liability. The court also believed it was unclear that the check prices in fact were mandated by the Japanese Government, notwithstanding a statement to that effect by MITI itself. Id., at 315.
We granted certiorari to determine (i) whether the Court of Appeals applied the proper standards in evaluating the District Court’s decision to grant petitioners’ motion for summary judgment, and (ii) whether petitioners could be held liable under the antitrust laws for a conspiracy in part compelled by a foreign sovereign. 471 U. S. 1002 (1985). We reverse on the first issue, but do not reach the second.
J — I 1 — I
We begin by emphasizing what respondents’ claim is not. Respondents cannot recover antitrust damages based solely on an alleged cartelization of the Japanese market, because American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations’ economies. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 443 (CA2 1945) (L. Hand, J.); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ¶ 236d (1978). Nor can respondents recover damages for any conspiracy by petitioners to charge higher than competitive prices in the American market. Such conduct would indeed violate the Sherman Act, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 223 (1940), but it could not injure respondents: as petitioners’ competitors, respondents stand to gain from any conspiracy to raise the market price in CEPs. Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477, 488-489 (1977). Finally, for the same reason, respondents cannot recover for a conspiracy to impose non-price restraints that have the effect of either raising market price or limiting output. Such restrictions, though harmful to competition, actually benefit competitors by making supra-competitive pricing more attractive. Thus, neither petitioners’ alleged supracompetitive pricing in Japan, nor the five company rule that limited distribution in this country, nor the check prices insofar as they established minimum prices in this country, can by themselves give respondents a cognizable claim against petitioners for antitrust damages. The Court of Appeals therefore erred to the extent that it found evidence of these alleged conspiracies to be “direct evidence” of a conspiracy that injured respondents. See 723 F. 2d, at 304-305.
Respondents nevertheless argue that these supposed conspiracies, if not themselves grounds for recovery of antitrust damages, are circumstantial evidence of another conspiracy that is cognizable: a conspiracy to monopolize the American market by means of pricing below the market level. The thrust of respondents’ argument is that petitioners used their monopoly profits from the Japanese market to fund a concerted campaign to price predatorily and thereby drive respondents and other American manufacturers of CEPs out of business. Once successful, according to respondents, petitioners would cartelize the American CEP market, restricting output and raising prices above the level that fair competition would produce. The resulting monopoly profits, respondents contend, would more than compensate petitioners for the losses they incurred through years of pricing below market level.
The Court of Appeals found that respondents’ allegation of a horizontal conspiracy to engage in predatory pricing, if proved, would be a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 723 F. 2d, at 306. Petitioners did not appeal from that conclusion. The issue in this case thus becomes whether respondents adduced sufficient evidence in support of their theory to survive summary judgment. We therefore examine the principles that govern the summary judgment determination.
Ill
To survive petitioners’ motion for summary judgment, respondents must establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioners entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused respondents to suffer a cognizable injury. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e); First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U. S. 253, 288-289 (1968). This showing has two components. First, respondents must show more than a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws; they must show an injury to them resulting from the illegal conduct. Respondents charge petitioners with a whole host of conspiracies in restraint of trade. Supra, at 582-583. Except for the alleged conspiracy to monopolize the American market through predatory pricing, these alleged conspiracies could not have caused respondents to suffer an “antitrust injury,” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S., at 489, because they actually tended to benefit respondents. Supra, at 582-583. Therefore, unless, in context, evidence of these “other” conspiracies raises a genuine issue concerning the existence of a predatory pricing conspiracy, that evidence cannot defeat petitioners’ summary judgment motion.
Second, the issue of fact must be “genuine.” Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 56(c), (e). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. See DeLuca v. Atlantic Refining Co., 176 F. 2d 421, 423 (CA2 1949) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 943 (1950); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2727 (1983); Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 504-505 (1950). Cf. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U. S. 620, 627 (1944). In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e) (emphasis added). See also Advisory Committee Note to 1963 Amendment of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 626 (purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial”). Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no “genuine issue for trial.” Cities Service, supra, at 289.
It follows from these settled principles that if the factual context renders respondents’ claim implausible — if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense — respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary. Cities Service is instructive. The issue in that case was whether proof of the defendant’s refusal to deal with the plaintiff supported an inference that the defendant willingly had joined an illegal boycott. Economic factors strongly suggested that the defendant had no motive to join the alleged conspiracy. 391 U. S., at 278-279. The Court acknowledged that, in isolation, the defendant’s refusal to deal might well have sufficed to create a triable issue. Id., at 277. But the refusal to deal had to be evaluated in its factual context. Since the defendant lacked any rational motive to join the alleged boycott, and since its refusal to deal was consistent with the defendant’s independent interest, the refusal to deal could not by itself support a finding of antitrust liability. Id., at 280.
Respondents correctly note that “[o]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts... must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654, 655 (1962). But antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a § 1 case. Thus, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 752 (1984), we held that conduct as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy. Id., at 764. See also Cities Service, supra, at 280. To survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence “that tends to exclude the possibility” that the alleged conspirators acted independently. 465 U. S., at 764. Respondents in this case, in other words, must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed respondents. See Cities Service, supra, at 280.
Petitioners argue that these principles apply fully to this case. According to petitioners, the alleged conspiracy is one that is economically irrational and practically infeasible. Consequently, petitioners contend, they had no motive to engage in the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy; indeed, they had a strong motive not to conspire in the manner respondents allege. Petitioners argue that, in light of the absence of any apparent motive and the ambiguous nature of the evidence of conspiracy, no trier of fact reasonably could find that the conspiracy with which petitioners are charged actually existed. This argument requires us to consider the nature of the alleged conspiracy and the practical obstacles to its implementation.
IV
A
A predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative. Any agreement to price below the competitive level requires the conspirators to forgo profits that free competition would offer them. The forgone profits may be considered an investment in the future. For the investment to be rational, the conspirators must have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits, more than the losses suffered. As then-Professor Bork, discussing predatory pricing by a single firm, explained:
“Any realistic theory of predation recognizes that the predator as well as his victims will incur losses during the fighting, but such a theory supposes it may be a rational calculation for the predator to view the losses as an investment in future monopoly profits (where rivals are to be killed) or in future undisturbed profits (where rivals are to be disciplined). The future flow of profits, appropriately discounted, must then exceed the present size of the losses.” R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 145 (1978).
See also McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. Law & Econ. 289, 295-297 (1980). As this explanation shows, the success of such schemes is inherently uncertain: the short-run loss is definite, but the long-run gain depends on successfully neutralizing the competition. Moreover, it is not enough simply to achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may breed quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the excess profits. The success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both to recoup the predator’s losses and to harvest some additional gain. Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly will materialize, and that it can be sustained for a significant period of time, “[t]he predator must make a substantial investment with no assurance that it will pay off.” Easter-brook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 268 (1981). For this reason, there is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful. See, e. g., Bork, supra, at 149-155; Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 699 (1975); Easterbrook, supra; Roller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing — An Empirical Study, 4 Antitrust Law & Econ. Rev. 105 (1971); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N. J.) Case, 1 J. Law & Econ. 137 (1958); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. Law & Econ., at 292-294. See also Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 651 F. 2d 76, 88 (CA2 1981) (“[N]owhere in the recent outpouring of literature on the subject do commentators suggest that [predatory] pricing is either common or likely to increase”), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 943 (1982).
These observations apply even to predatory pricing by a single firm seeking monopoly power. In this case, respondents allege that a large number of firms have conspired over a period of many years to charge below-market prices in order to stifle competition. Such a conspiracy is incalculably more difficult to execute than an analogous plan undertaken by a single predator. The conspirators must allocate the losses to be sustained during the conspiracy’s operation, and must also allocate any gains to be realized from its success. Precisely because success is speculative and depends on a willingness to endure losses for an indefinite period, each conspirator has a strong incentive to cheat, letting its partners suffer the losses necessary to destroy the competition while sharing in any gains if the conspiracy succeeds. The necessary allocation is therefore difficult to accomplish. Yet if conspirators cheat to any substantial extent, the conspiracy must fail, because its success depends on depressing the market price for all buyers of CEPs. If there are too few goods at the artificially low price to satisfy demand, the would-be victims of the conspiracy can continue to sell at the “real” market price, and the conspirators suffer losses to little purpose.
Finally, if predatory pricing conspiracies are generally unlikely to occur, they are especially so where, as here, the prospects of attaining monopoly power seem slight. In order to recoup their losses, petitioners must obtain enough market power to set higher than competitive prices, and then must sustain those prices long enough to earn in excess profits what they earlier gave up in below-cost prices. See Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, at 89; Areeda & Turner, 88 Harv. L. Rev., at 698. Two decades after their conspiracy is alleged to have commenced, petitioners appear to be far from achieving this goal: the two largest shares of the retail market in television sets are held by RCA and respondent Zenith, not by any of petitioners. 6 App. to Brief for Appellant in No. 81-2331 (CA3), pp. 2575a-2576a. Moreover, those shares, which together approximate 40% of sales, did not decline appreciably during the 1970⅛. Ibid. Petitioners’ collective share rose rapidly during this period, from one-fifth or less of the relevant markets to close to 50%. 723 F. 2d, at 316. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found, however, that petitioners’ share presently allows them to charge monopoly prices; to the contrary, respondents contend that the conspiracy is ongoing — that petitioners are still artificially depressing the market price in order to drive Zenith out of the market. The data in the record strongly suggest that that goal is yet far distant.
The alleged conspiracy’s failure to achieve its ends in the two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact exist. Since the losses in such a conspiracy accrue before the gains, they must be “repaid” with interest. And because the alleged losses have accrued over the course of two decades, the conspirators could well require a correspondingly long time to recoup. Maintaining supracompetitive prices in turn depends on the continued cooperation of the conspirators, on the inability of other would-be competitors to enter the market, and (not incidentally) on the conspirators’ ability to escape antitrust liability for their minimum price-fixing cartel. Each of these factors weighs more heavily as the time needed to recoup losses grows. If the losses have been substantial — as would likely be necessary in order to drive out the competition — petitioners would most likely have to sustain their cartel for years_simply to break even.
Nor does the possibility that petitioners have obtained supracompetitive profits in the Japanese market change this calculation. Whether or not petitioners have, the means to sustain substantial losses in this country over a long period of time, they have no motive to sustain such lósses'abséñt "some strong likelihood that the alleged conspiracy in this country will eventually pay off. The courts below found no evidence of any such success, and — as indicated above — the facts actually are to the contrary: RCA and Zenith, not any of the petitioners, continue to hold the largest share of the American retail market in color television sets. More important, there is nothing to suggest any relationship between petitioners’ profits in Japan and the amount petitioners could expect to gain from a conspiracy to monopolize the American market. In the absence of any such evidence, the possible existence of supracompetitive profits in Japan simply cannot overcome the economic obstacles to the ultimate success of this alleged predatory conspiracy.
B
In Monsanto, we emphasized thatcourts should notnermit factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are implausible, because the effect of such practices is often~tcTdeter procompetitive conduct. Monsanto, 465 U. S., at 762-764. Respondents, petitioners’ competitors, seek to hold petitioners liable for damages caused by the alleged conspiracy to cut prices. Moreover, they seek to establish this conspiracy indirectly, through evidence of other combinations (such as the check-price agreements and the five company rule) whose natural tendency is to raise prices, and through evidence of rebates and other price-cutting activities that respondents argue tend to prove a combination to suppress prices. But cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition. Thus, mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. See Monsanto, supra, at 763-764. “[W]e must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging legitimate price competition.” Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 234 (CA1 1983).
In most cases, this concern must be balanced against the desire that illegal conspiracies be identified and punished. That balance is, however, unusually one-sided in cases such as this one. As we earlier explained, supra, at 588-593, predatory pricing schemes require conspirators to suffer losses in order eventually to realize their illegal gains; moreover, the gains depend on a host of uncertainties, making such schemes more likely to fail than to succeed. These economic realities tend to make predatory pricing conspiracies self-deterring: unlike most other conduct that violates the antitrust laws, failed predatory pricing schemes are costly to the conspirators. See Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1, 26 (1984). Finally, unlike predatory pricing by a single firm, successful predatory pricing conspiracies involving a large number of firms can be identified and punished once they succeed, since some form of minimum price-fixing agreement would be necessary in order to reap the benefits of predation. Thus, there is little reason to be concerned that by granting summary judgment in cases where the evidence of conspiracy is speculative or ambiguous, courts will encourage such conspiracies.
V
As our discussion in Part IV-A shows, petitioners had no motive to enter into the alleged conspiracy. To the contrary, as presumably rational businesses, petitioners had every incentive not to engage in the conduct with which they are charged, for its likely effect would be to generate losses for petitioners with no corresponding gains. Cf. Cities Service, 391 U. S., at 279. The Court of Appeals did not take account of the absence of a plausible motive to enter into the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy. It focused instead on whether there was “direct evidence of concert of action.” 723 F. 2d, at 304. The Court of Appeals erred in two respects: (i) the “direct evidence” on which the court relied had little, if any, relevance to the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy; and (ii) the court failed to consider the absence of a plausible motive to engage in predatory pricing.
The “direct evidence” on which the court relied was evidence of other combinations, not of a predatory pricing conspiracy. Evidence that petitioners conspired to raise prices in Japan provides little, if any, support for respondents’ claims: a conspiracy to increase profits in one market does not tend to show a conspiracy to sustain losses in another. Evidence that petitioners agreed to fix minimum prices (through the check-price agreements) for the American market actually works in petitioners’ favor, because it suggests that petitioners were seeking to place a floor under prices rather than to lower them. The same is true of evidence that petitioners agreed to limit the number of distributors of their products in the American market — the so-called five company rule. That practice may have facilitated a horizontal territorial allocation, see United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596 (1972), but its natural effect would be to raise market prices rather than reduce them. Evidence that tends to support any of these collateral conspiracies thus says little, if anything, about the existence of a conspiracy to charge below-market prices in the American market over a period of two decades.
That being the case, the absence of any plausible motive to engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant to whether a “genuine issue for trial” exists within the meaning of Rule 56(e). Lack of motive bears on the range of permissible conclusions that might be drawn from ambiguous evidence: if petitioners had no rational economic motive to conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy. See Cities Service, supra, at 278-280. Here, the conduct in question consists largely of (i) pricing at levels that succeeded in taking business away from respondents, and (ii) arrangements that may have limited petitioners’ ability to compete with each other (and thus kept prices from going even lower). This conduct suggests either that petitioners behaved competitively, or that petitioners conspired to raise prices. Neither possibility is consistent with an agreement among 21 companies to price below market levels. Moreover, the predatory pricing scheme that this conduct is said to prove is one that makes no practical sense: it calls for petitioners to destroy companies larger and better established than themselves, a goal that remains far distant more than two decades after the conspiracy’s birth. Even had they succeeded in obtaining their monopoly, there is nothing in the record to suggest that they could recover the losses they would need to sustain along the way. In sum, in light of the absence of any rational motive to conspire, neither petitioners’ pricing practices, nor their conduct in the Japanese market, nor their agreements respecting prices and distribution in the American market, suffice to create a “genuine issue for trial.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e).
On remand, the Court of Appeals is free to consider whether there is other evidence that is sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact to find that petitioners conspired to price predatorily for two decades despite the absence of any apparent motive to do so. The evidence must “ten[d] to exclude the possibility” that petitioners underpriced respondents to compete for business rather than to implement an economically senseless conspiracy. Monsanto, 465 U. S., at 764. In the absence of such evidence, there is no “genuine issue for trial” under Rule 56(e), and petitioners are entitled to have summary judgment reinstated.
<! ) — I
Our decision makes it unnecessary to reach the sovereign compulsion issue. The heart of petitioners’ argument on that issue is that MITI, an agency of the Government of Japan, required petitioners to fix minimum prices for export to the United States, and that petitioners are therefore immune from antitrust liability for any scheme of which those minimum prices were an integral part. As we discussed in Part II, supra, respondents could not have suffered a cognizable injury from any action that raised prices in the American CEP market. If liable at all, petitioners are liable for conduct that is distinct from the check-price agreements. The sovereign compulsion question that both petitioners and the Solicitor General urge us to decide thus is not presented here.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
NUE had filed its complaint four years earlier, in the District Court’for the District of New Jersey. Zenith’s complaint was filed separately in 1974, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The two eases were consolidated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1974.
The inadmissible evidence included various government records and reports, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125 (ED Pa. 1980), business documents offered pursuant to various hearsay exceptions, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980), and a large portion of the expert testimony that respondents proposed to introduce. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (ED Pa. 1981).
The District Court ruled separately that petitioners were entitled to summary judgment on respondents’ claims under the Antidumping Act of 1916. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980). Respondents appealed this ruling, and the Court of Appeals reversed in a separate opinion issued the same day as the opinion concerning respondents’ other claims. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. 2d 319 (CA3 1983).
Petitioners ask us to review the Court of Appeals’ Antidumping Act decision along with its decision on the rest of this mammoth case. The Antidumping Act claims were not, however, mentioned in the questions presented in the petition for certiorari, and they have not been independently argued by the parties. See this Court’s Rule 21.1(a). We therefore decline the invitation to review the Court of Appeals’ decision on those claims.
As to 3 of the 24 defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of summary judgment. Petitioners are the 21 defendants who remain in the case.
In addition to
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent, Carbon Black Export, Inc., a Delaware corporation, brought a libel in admiralty in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas for damage sustained to a shipment of carbon black during an ocean voyage from Houston and New Orleans to various Italian ports. The libel was one in rem against the vessel in question, the S. S. Monrosa, then in the port of Houston on another voyage, and in personam against the Monrosa’s-owner, Navigazione Alta Italia, an Italian corporation. The latter filed an appearance in response to the libel in personam, and, as owner of the vessel, filed a claim to it, and prayed to defend the libel in rem. In respect to the libel in rem, a stipulation to abide the decree, in the penal sum of $100,000, was filed by the claimant and the National Surety Company, its surety, and approved by the present respondeat. . Navigazione Alta Italia then moved that the District Court decline'jurisdiction over the cause, on the grounds that the parties had agreed, by a provision in the bills of lading covering the shipment, that controversies in regard to cargo damage shoúld be settled only in the courts of Genoa, Italy. The District Court granted the motion, subject to the filing of a bond by Navigazione Alta Italia in the sum of $100,000 to respond to whatever judgment might finally be rendered on the cause of action in question. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. It found the provision in the bill of lading in terms inapplicable to suits in rem,- and it declined to enforce its terms to require a dismissal of the libel in personam. 254 F. 2d 297. 'We granted certiorari, 358 U. S. 809, because of an indicated conflict in principle between the Fifth Circuit’s views as to enforceability of such provisions and those taken by the Second Circuit, primarily in William H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F. 2d 806.
We do not believe that this case affords us an appropriate instance to pass upon the extent to which effect can be given to such stipulations in ocean bills of lading not to resort to. the courts of this country. The provision in this case was one of many printed provisions in a form bill of lading prepared by the carrier and presented by it for use in shipments on its vessel. It reads:
“27. — ALSO, that no legal proceedings may be brought against the Captain or Shipowners or their Agents in respect to any loss of or damage to any goods herein specified except in Genoa, it being understood and agreed that every other Tribunal in the place or places where the goods were shipped or landed is incompetent, not withstanding that the ship may be legally represented there.”
We find ourselves in agreement with the views of the Court of Appeals below that this clause should not be read as limiting the maintenance of an action in rem, cf. The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. 435, 449-450, against the vessel to enforce a maritime lien for proper carriage. The initial words are particularly appropriate to a restriction of the clause to in personam actions, and the rest of the language is intelligible on this premise. In accord-anee with the familiar rule in such circumstances, we will not stretch the language when the party drafting such a form contract has not included a provision it easily might have. The Caledonia, 157 U. S. 124, 137; The Majestic, 166 U. S. 375, 386; Compania de Navigacion La Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U. S. 104, 118. Considerations involved in construing exemptions from carriers’ liability provided by Acts of Congress are, we think, quite different. See Consumers Import Co. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Kawasaki Zosenjo, 320 U. S. 249. It is a form contract, not a statute, that we construe here.
Accordingly, after oral argument, we have concluded that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the libel in rem was properly maintainable. Both parties approved a secured stipulation to release thé vessel from seizure under, the libel, in an amount substantially the same as the recovery demanded by the libellant. This same amount the District Court denominated as proper security against a recovery elsewhere. We need not conjure up doubts in this regard that the parties never •expressed. While the parties were entitled to have the judgments of the courts below as to whether the libel in personam was also maintainable, we do not .believe.it a proper exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction to pass on that aspect of the case, which alone presents the question which led us to grant certiorari. It appears that in any event the respondent will be able to try its claim in the District Court.
In the light of these circumstances, which “were not... fully apprehended at the time. certiorari was granted,” Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U. S. 521, 559 (separate opinion), the writ of certiorari will be dismissed as improvidently granted. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U. S. 70, 75; Goins v. United States, 306 U. S. 622; Moor v. Texas & New Orleans R. Co., 297 U. S. 101; Southern Power Co. v. North Carolina Public Service Co., 263 U. S. 508. Cf. Hammerstein v. Superior Court of California, 341 U. S. 491, 492; McCarthy v. Bruner, 323 U. S. 673; Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 U. S. 387, 392-393; Tyrrell, v. District of Columbia, 243 U. S. 1. Examination of a case on the merits, on oral argument, may bring into “proper focus” a consideration which, though present in the record at the time of granting the writ, only later indicates that the grant was improvident. See Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., supra, at 73. While this Court decides questions of public importance, it decides them in the context of meaningful litigation. Its function in resolving conflicts among the Courts of Appeals is judicial, not simply administrative or managerial. Resolution here of the extent to which these bill of lading provisions may be given effect by our courts can await a day when the issue is posed less abstractly.
Writ of certiorari dismissed.
We note that in another place the bill of lading makes specific recognition of suits both in rem and in 'personam. Clause 35 provides:
“35. — In any event the Carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of dess or damage unless suit is brought within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. Suit shall not be deemed brought until jurisdiction shall have been obtained over the Carrier and/or the ship by service of process or by an agreement to appear.”
While the first sentence is verbatim from § 3 (6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1209, 46 U. S. C. § 1303 (6), the language nevertheless reinforces the fact that if both categories of suit were to be included under Clause 27, apt words to accomplish this were readily available, and were in fact used in another clause of the bill.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. V) provides: “The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” This case presents the question whether a federal habeas corpus petition is an “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” within the meaning of this provision.
I
In 1992, several judgments of conviction for robbery were entered against respondent Sherman Walker in the New York state courts. The last of these convictions came in June 1992, when respondent pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree in the New York Supreme Court, Queens County. Respondent was sentenced to 7 to 14 years in prison on this conviction.
Respondent unsuccessfully pursued a number of state remedies in connection with his convictions. It is unnecessary to describe all of these proceedings herein. Respondent’s last conviction was affirmed on June 12, 1995. Respondent was later denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. Respondent also sought a writ of error coram nobis, which the Appellate Division denied on March 18,1996. Respondent’s last conviction became final in April 1996, prior to the April 24, 1996, effective date of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214.
In a single document dated April 10,1996, respondent filed a complaint under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. §2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. On July 9, 1996, the District Court dismissed the complaint and petition without prejudice. With respect to the habeas petition, the District Court, citing § 2254(b), concluded that respondent had not adequately set forth his claim because it was not apparent that respondent had exhausted available state remedies. The District Court noted that, for example, respondent had failed to specify the claims litigated in the state appellate proceedings relating to his robbery convictions.
On May 20, 1997, more than one year after AEDPA’s effective date, respondent filed another federal habeas petition in the same District Court. It is undisputed that respondent had not returned to state court since the dismissal of his first federal habeas filing. On May 6, 1998, the District Court dismissed the petition as time barred because respondent had not filed the petition within a “reasonable time” from AEDPA’s effective date.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment, reinstated the habeas petition, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Walker v. Artuz, 208 F. 3d 357 (2000). The Court of Appeals noted at the outset that, because respondent’s conviction had become final prior to AEDPA’s effective date, he had until April 24,1997, to file his federal habeas petition. The court also observed that the exclusion from the limitation period of the time during which respondent’s first federal habeas petition was pending in the District Court would render the instant habeas petition timely.
The Court of Appeals held that respondent’s first federal habeas petition had tolled the limitation period because it was an application for “other collateral review” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). The court characterized the disjunctive “or” between “post-conviction” and “other collateral” as creating a “distinct break” between two kinds of review. Id., at 359. The court also stated that application of the word “State” to both “post-conviction” and “other collateral” would create a “linguistic oddity” in the form of the construction “State other collateral review.” Id., at 360. The court further reasoned that the phrase “other collateral review” would be meaningless if it did not refer to federal habeas petitions. The court therefore concluded that the word “State” modified only “post-conviction.”
The Court of Appeals also found no conflict between its interpretation of the statute and the purpose of AEDPA. The court found insteád that its construction would promote the goal of encouraging petitioners to file their federal habeas applications as soon as possible.
We granted certiorari, 531 U. S. 991 (2000), to resolve a conflict between the Second Circuit’s decision and the decisions of three other Courts of Appeals. See Jiminez v. Rice, 222 F. 3d 1210 (CA9 2000); Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F. 3d 488 (CA5 1999) (per curiam); Jones v. Morton, 195 F. 3d 153 (CA3 1999). One other Court of Appeals has since adopted the Second Circuit’s view. Petrick, v. Martin, 236 F. 3d 624 (CA10 2001). We now reverse.
II
Our task is to construe what Congress has enacted. We begin, as always, with the language of the statute. See, e. g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 431 (2000); Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U. S. 158, 175 (1989); Watt v. Energy Action Ed. Foundation, 454 U. S. 151, 162 (1981). Respondent reads § 2244(d)(2) to apply the word “State” only to the term “post-conviction” and not to the phrase “other collateral.” Under this view, a properly filed federal habeas petition tolls the limitation period. Petitioner contends that the word “State” applies to the entire phrase “post-conviction or other collateral review.” Under this view, a properly filed federal habeas petition does not toll the limitation period.
We believe that petitioner’s interpretation of § 2244(d)(2) is correct for several reasons. To begin with, Congress placed the word “State” before “post-conviction or other collateral review” without specifically naming any kind of “Federal” review. The essence of respondent’s position is that Congress used the phrase “other collateral review” to incorporate federal habeas petitions into the class of applications for review that toll the limitation period. But a comparison of the text of § 2244(d)(2) with the language of other AEDPA provisions supplies strong evidence that, had Congress intended to include federal habeas petitions within the scope of § 2244(d)(2), Congress would have mentioned “Federal” review expressly. In several other portions of AEDPA, Congress specifically used both the words “State” and “Federal” to denote state and federal proceedings. For example, 28 U. S. C. §2254(i) (1994 ed., Supp. V) provides: “The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.” Likewise, the first sentence of 28 U. S. C. § 2261(e) (1994 ed., Supp. V) provides: “The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during State or Federal post-conviction proceedings in a capital case shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.” The second sentence of § 2261(e) states: “This limitation shall not preclude the appointment of different counsel, on the court’s own motion or at the request of the prisoner, at any phase of State or Federal post-conviction proceedings on the basis of the ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel in such proceedings.” Finally, 28 U. S. C. § 2264(a)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. V) excuses a state capital prisoner’s failure to raise a claim properly in state court where the failure is “based on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence in time to present the claim for State or Federal post-conviction review.”
Section 2244(d)(2), by contrast, employs the word “State,” but not the word “Federal,” as a modifier for “review.” It is well settled that “‘[wjhere Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’ ” Bates v. United States, 522 U. S. 23, 29-30 (1997) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983)). We find no likely explanation for Congress’ omission of the word “Federal” in § 2244(d)(2) other than that Congress did not intend properly filed applications for federal review to toll the limitation period. It would be anomalous, to say the least, for Congress to usher in federal review under the generic rubric of “other collateral review” in a statutory provision that refers expressly to “State” review, while denominating expressly both “State” and “Federal” proceedings in other parts of the same statute. The anomaly is underscored by the fact that the words “State” and “Federal” are likely to be of no small import when Congress drafts a statute that governs federal collateral review of state court judgments.
Further, were we to adopt respondent’s construction of the statute, we would render the word “State” insignificant, if not wholly superfluous. “It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.’” United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883)); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 (2000) (describing this rule as a “cardinal principle of statutory construction”); Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 115 (1879) (“As early as in Bacon’s Abridgment, sect. 2, it was said that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant’”). We are thus “reluctan[t] to treat statutory terms as surplusage” in any setting. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 698 (1995); see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 140 (1994). We are especially unwilling to do so when the term occupies so pivotal a place in the statutory scheme as does the word “State” in the federal habeas statute. But under respondent’s rendition of § 2244(d)(2), Congress’ inclusion of the word “State” has no operative effect on the scope of the provision. If the phrase “State post-conviction or other collateral review” is construed to encompass both state and federal collateral review, then the. word “State” places no constraint on the class of applications for review that toll the limitation period. The clause instead would have precisely the same content were it to read “post-conviction or other collateral review.”
The most that could then be made of the word “State” would be to say that Congress singled out applications for “State post-conviction” review as one example from the universe of applications for collateral review. Under this approach, however, the word “State” still does nothing to delimit the entire class of applications for review that toll the limitation period. A construction under which the word “State” does nothing more than further modify “post-conviction” relegates “State” to quite an insignificant role in the statutory provision. We believe that our duty to “give each word some operative effect” where possible, Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U. S. 202, 209 (1997), requires more in this context.
The Court of Appeals characterized petitioner’s interpretation as producing the “linguistic oddity” of “State other collateral review,” which is “an ungainly construction that [the Court of Appeals did] not believe Congress intended.” 208 F. 3d, at 360. But nothing precludes the application of the word “State” to the entire phrase “post-conviction or other collateral review,” regardless of the resulting construction that one posits. The term “other collateral” is easily understood as a unit to which “State” applies just as “State” applies to “post-conviction.” Moreover, petitioner’s interpretation does not compel the verbal formula hypothesized by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the ungainliness of “State other collateral review” is a very good reason why Congress might have avoided that precise verbal formulation in the first place. The application of the word “State” to the phrase “other collateral review” more naturally yields the understanding “other State collateral review.”
The Court of Appeals also reasoned that petitioner’s reading of the statute fails to give operative effect to the phrase “other collateral review.” The court claimed that “the phrase ‘other collateral review’ would be meaningless if it did not refer to federal habeas petitions.” Ibid. This argument, however, fails because it depends on the incorrect premise that there can be no form of state “collateral” review “other” than state “post-conviction” review within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). To the contrary, it is possible for “other collateral review” to include review of a state court judgment that is not a criminal conviction.
Section 2244(d)(l)’s 1-year limitation period applies to “an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” Section 2244(d)(2) provides for tolling during the pendency of “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” Nothing in the language of these provisions requires that the state court judgment pursuant to which a person is in custody be a criminal conviction. Nor does 28 U. S. C. §2254 (1994 ed. and Supp. V) by its terms apply only to those in custody pursuant to a state criminal conviction. See, e.g., § 2254(a) (“a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court”); § 2254(b)(1) (“a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court”); § 2254(d) (“a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court”); § 2254(e)(1) (“a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court”).
Incarceration pursuant to a state criminal conviction may be by far the most common and most familiar basis for satisfaction of the “in custody” requirement in §2254 cases. But there are other types of state court judgments pursuant to which a person may be held in custody within the meaning of the federal habeas statute. For example, federal habeas corpus review may be available to challenge the legality of a state court order of civil commitment or a state court order of civil contempt. See, e. g., Francois v. Henderson, 850 F. 2d 231 (CA5 1988) (entertaining a challenge brought in a federal habeas petition under §2254 to a state court’s commitment of a person to a mental institution upon a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity); Leonard v. Hammond, 804 F. 2d 838 (CA4 1986) (holding that constitutional challenges to civil contempt orders for failure to pay child support were cognizable only in a habeas corpus action). These types of state court judgments neither constitute nor require criminal convictions. Any state collateral review that is available with respect to these judgments, strictly speaking, is not post-conviction review. Accordingly, even if “‘“State post-conviction review” means all collateral review of a conviction provided by a state/ ” 208 F. 3d, at 360 (quoting Barrett v. Yearwood, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1250 (ED Cal. 1999)), the phrase “other collateral review” need not include federal habeas petitions in order to have independent meaning.
Congress also may have employed the construction “post-conviction or other collateral” in recognition of the diverse terminology that different States employ to represent the different forms of collateral review that are available after a conviction. In some jurisdictions, the term “post-conviction” may denote a particular procedure for review of a conviction that is distinct from other forms of what conventionally is considered to be postconviction review. For example, Florida employs a procedure that is officially entitled a “Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence.” Fla. Rule Crim. Proe. 3.850 (2001). The Florida courts have commonly referred to a Rule 3.850 motion as a “motion for post-conviction relief” and have distinguished this procedure from other vehicles for collateral review of a criminal conviction, such as a state petition for habeas corpus. See, e. g., Bryant v. State, 780 So. 2d 978, 979 (Fla. App. 2001) (“[A] petition for habeas corpus cannot be used to circumvent the two-year period for filing motions for post-conviction relief”); Finley v. State, 394 So. 2d 215, 216 (Fla. App. 1981) (“[T]he remedy of habeas corpus is not available as a substitute for post-conviction relief under Rule 3.850”). Congress may have refrained from exclusive reliance on the term “post-conviction” so as to leave no doubt that the tolling provision applies to all types of state collateral review available after a conviction and not just to those denominated “post-conviction” in the parlance of a particular jurisdiction.
Examination of another AEDPA provision also demonstrates that “other collateral” need not refer to any form of federal review in order to have meaning. Title 28 U. S. C. §2268 (1994 ed., Supp. V) establishes the limitation period for filing § 2254 petitions in state capital cases that arise from jurisdictions meeting the “opt-in” requirements of §2261. Section 2263(b)(2) provides that the limitation period “shall be tolled from the date on which the first petition for post-conviction review or other collateral relief is filed until the final State court disposition of such petition.” The reference to “the final State court disposition of such petition” makes it clear that only petitions filed in state court, and not petitions for federal review, toll the limitation period in capital cases. Congress therefore used the phrases “post-conviction review” and “other collateral relief” in a disjunctive clause where the term “other collateral,” whatever its precise content, could not possibly include anything federal within its ambit. This illustration vitiates any suggestion that “other collateral” relief or review must include federal relief or review in order for the term to have any significance apart from “post-conviction” review.
Consideration of the competing constructions in light of AEDPA’s purposes reinforces the conclusion that we draw from the text. Petitioner’s interpretation of the statute is consistent with “AEDPA’s purpose to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.” Williams, 529 U. S., at 436. Specifically, under petitioner’s' construction, § 2244(d)(2) promotes the exhaustion of state remedies while respecting the interest in the finality of state court judgments. Under respondent’s interpretation, however, the provision would do far less to encourage exhaustion prior to seeking federal habeas review and would hold greater potential to hinder finality.
The exhaustion requirement of § 2254(b) ensures that the state courts have the opportunity fully to consider federal-law challenges to a state custodial judgment before the lower federal courts may entertain a collateral attack upon that judgment. See, e. g., O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U. S. 838, 845 (1999) (“[Tjhe exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts”); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 518-519 (1982) (“A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error”). This requirement “is principally designed to protect the state courts’ role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings.” Id., at 518. The exhaustion rule promotes comity in that “ ‘it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 204 (1950)); see also O’Sullivan, supra, at 844 (“Comity thus dictates that when a prisoner alleges that his continued confinement for a state court conviction violates federal law, the state courts should have the first opportunity to review this claim and provide any necessary relief”).
The 1-year limitation period of § 2244(d)(1) quite plainly serves the well-recognized interest in the finality of state court judgments. See generally Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 555-556 (1998). This provision reduces the potential for delay on the road to finality by restricting the time that a prospective federal habeas petitioner has in which to seek federal habeas review.
The tolling provision of § 2244(d)(2) balances the interests served by the exhaustion requirement and the limitation period. Section 2244(d)(2) promotes the exhaustion of state remedies by protecting a state prisoner’s ability later to apply for federal habeas relief while state remedies are being pursued. At the same time, the provision limits the harm to the interest in finality by according tolling effect only to “properly filed application^] for State post-conviction or other collateral review.”
By tolling the limitation period for the pursuit of state remedies and not during the pendency of applications for federal review, § 2244(d)(2) provides a powerful incentive for litigants to exhaust all available state remedies before proceeding in the lower federal courts. But if the statute were construed so as to give applications for federal review the same tolling effect as applications for state collateral review, then § 2244(d)(2) would furnish little incentive for individuals to seek relief from the state courts before filing federal habeas petitions. The tolling provision instead would be indifferent between state and federal filings. While other statutory provisions, such as § 2254(b) itself, of course, would still provide individuals with good reason to exhaust, § 2244(d)(2) would be out of step with this design. At the same time, respondent’s interpretation would further undermine the interest in finality by creating more potential for delay in the adjudication of federal law claims.
A diminution of statutory incentives to proceed first in state court would also increase the risk of the very piecemeal litigation that the exhaustion requirement is designed to reduce. Cf. Rose, 455 U. S., at 520. We have observed that “strict enforcement of the exhaustion requirement will encourage habeas petitioners to exhaust all of their claims in state court and to present the federal court with a single habeas petition.” Ibid. But were we to adopt respondent’s construction of § 2244(d)(2), we would dilute the efficacy of the exhaustion requirement in achieving this objective. Tolling the limitation period for a federal habeas petition that is dismissed without prejudice would thus create more opportunities for delay and piecemeal litigation without advancing the goals of comity and federalism that the exhaustion requirement serves. We do not believe that Congress designed the statute in this manner.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that its interpretation of the statute would further Congress’ goal “to spur defendants to file their federal habeas petitions more quickly.” 208 F. 3d, at 361. But this view fails to account sufficiently for AEDPA’s clear purpose to encourage litigants to pursue claims in state court prior to seeking federal collateral review. See, e.g., §§ 2254(b), 2254(e)(2), 2264(a). Section 2244(d)(l)’s limitation period and §2244(d)(2)’s tolling provision, together with §2254(b)’s exhaustion requirement, encourage litigants first to exhaust all state remedies and then to file their federal habeas petitions as soon as possible.
Respondent contends that petitioner’s construction of the statute creates the potential for unfairness to litigants who file timely federal habeas petitions that are dismissed without prejudice after the limitation period has expired. But our sole task in this case is one of statutory construction, and upon examining the language and purpose of the statute, we are convinced that § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the limitation period during the pendency of a federal habeas petition.
We also note that, when the District Court dismissed respondent’s first federal habeas petition without prejudice, respondent had more than nine months remaining in the limitation period in which to cure the defects that led to the dismissal. It is undisputed, however, that petitioner neither returned to state court nor filed a nondefective federal habeas petition before this time had elapsed. Respondent’s May 1997 federal habeas petition also contained claims different from those presented in his April 1996 petition. In light of these facts, we have no occasion to address the alternative scenarios that respondent describes. We also have no occasion to address the question that Justice Stevens, raises concerning the availability of equitable tolling.
We hold that an application for federal habeas corpus review is not an “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2). Section 2244(d)(2) therefore did not toll the limitation period during the pendency of respondent’s first federal habeas petition. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The motion of Legal Defense Fund for Unborn Children for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, is denied.
The motion of David Gaetano for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, is granted.
Appellee was indicted by a grand jury of Richland County, S. C., for criminal abortion and murder in connection with the abortion of a 25-week-old fetus. The District Court enjoined the prosecution, concluding that under Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), there was no possibility of obtaining a constitutionally binding conviction of appellee. 440 F. Supp. 535 (1977). Because the District Court may have reached this conclusion on the basis of an erroneous concept of “viability,” which refers to potential, rather than actual, survival of the fetus outside the womb, Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 388-389 (1979), the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina for further consideration in light of Colautti.
In addition, it is suggested, in view of the alternative constructions of the South Carolina criminal statutes that are available, that the District Court give further consideration to the possibility of abstention, at least in part, in deference to the pendency of the state-court proceeding.
Vacated and remanded.
Mr. Justice Stewart dissents.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Certiorari, 348 U. S. 808, to the Supreme Court of Indiana.
Per Curiam:
Affirmed on the authority of Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissent.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
This case presents the question whether creditors who submit a claim against a bankruptcy estate and are then sued by the trustee in bankruptcy to recover allegedly preferential monetary transfers are entitled to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. This action was brought by petitioner Langenkamp, successor trustee to Republic Trust & Savings Company and Republic Financial Corporation (collectively debtors). Debtors were uninsured, nonbank financial institutions doing business in Oklahoma. Debtors filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions on September 24, 1984. At the time of the bankruptcy filings, respondents held thrift and passbook savings certificates issued by debtors, which represented debtors’ promise to repay moneys the respondents had invested.
Within the 90-day period immediately preceding debtors’ Chapter 11 filing, respondents redeemed some, but not all, of debtors’ certificates which they held. Thus, upon the bankruptcy filing, respondents became creditors of the now-bankrupt corporations. Respondents timely filed proofs of claim against the bankruptcy estates. Approximately one year after the bankruptcy filing, the trustee instituted adversary proceedings under 11 U. S. C. § 547(b) to recover, as avoidable preferences, the payments which respondents had received immediately prior to the September 24 filing. A bench trial was held, and the Bankruptcy Court found that the money received by respondents did in fact constitute avoidable preferences. In re Republic Trust & Savings Co., No. 84C-01461, Adversary No. 85-0337 (ND Okla., June 26, 1987), App. to Pet. for Cert. A-45; In re Republic Trust & Savings Co., No. 84-01461, Adversary No. 85-0319 (ND Okla., June 26, 1987), App. to Pet. for Cert. A-64. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma affirmed. Republic Financial Corp. v. Langenkamp, Nos. 87-C-616-C, 87-C-618-C, 87-C-619-C (June 30, 1988), App. to Pet. for Cert. A-67. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the District Court’s judgment on three grounds, but reversed on the issue of the holders’ entitlement to a jury trial on the trustee’s preference claims. In re Republic Trust & Savings Co., 897 F. 2d 1041 (1990). Relying on our decisions in Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33 (1989), and Katchen v. Landy, 382 U. S. 323 (1966), the Tenth Circuit correctly held that “those appellants that did not have or file claims against the debtors’ estates undoubtedly [were] entitled to a jury trial on the issue whether the payments they received from the debtors within ninety days of the latter’s bankruptcy constitute^] avoidable preferences.” 897 F. 2d, at 1046. The Court of Appeals went further, however, concluding:
“Although some of the appellants did file claims against the estates because they continued to have monies invested in the debtors at the time of bankruptcy, ... we believe they likewise are entitled to a jury trial under the rationale of Granfinanciera and Katchen. Despite these appellants’ claims, the trustee’s actions to avoid the transfers, consolidated by the bankruptcy court, were plenary rather than a part of the bankruptcy court’s summary proceedings involving the ‘process of allowance and disallowance of claims.’” Id., at 1046-1047.
Petitioner contends that the Tenth Circuit erred in holding that those creditors of the debtors who had filed claims against the estate were entitled to a jury trial. We agree.
In Granfinanciera we recognized that by filing a claim against a bankruptcy estate the creditor triggers the process of “allowance and disallowance of claims,” thereby subjecting himself to the bankruptcy court’s equitable power. 492 U. S., at 58-59, and n. 14 (citing Katchen, supra, at 336). If the creditor is met, in turn, with a preference action from the trustee, that action becomes part of the claims-allowance process which is triable only in equity. Ibid. In other words, the creditor’s claim and the ensuing preference action by the trustee become integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship through the bankruptcy court’s equity jurisdiction. Granfinanciera, supra, at 57-58. As such, there is no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. If a party does not submit a claim against the bankruptcy estate, however, the trustee can recover allegedly preferential transfers only by filing what amounts to a legal action to recover a monetary transfer. In those circumstances the preference defendant is entitled to a jury trial. 492 U. S., at 58-59.
Accordingly, “a creditor’s right to a jury trial on a bankruptcy trustee’s preference claim depends upon whether the creditor has submitted a claim against the estate.” Id., at 58. Respondents filed claims against the bankruptcy estate, thereby bringing themselves within the equitable jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. Consequently, they were not entitled to a jury trial on the trustee’s preference action. The decision by the Court of Appeals overlooked the clear distinction which our cases have drawn and in so doing created a conflict among the Circuits on this issue. For this reason we grant the petition for certiorari, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Douglas,
announced by Mr. Justice Harlan.
Petitioner, a native of Hungary, was admitted to citizenship by a decree of the District Court in 1940. Respondent filed a complaint to revoke and set aside that order as authorized by § 340 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 260, as amended, 68 Stat. 1232, 8 U. S. C. § 1451 (a), on the ground that it had been procured “by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.” The complaint stated that petitioner had falsely denied membership in the Communist Party and that by virtue of that membership he lacked the requisite attachment to the Constitution, etc., and the intent to renounce foreign allegiance. It also alleged that petitioner had procured his naturalization by concealing and misrepresenting a record of arrests. The District Court cancelled petitioner’s naturalization, finding that he had concealed and misrepresented three matters — his arrests, his membership in the Communist Party, and his allegiance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reaching only the question of the concealment of the arrests. 270 F. 2d 179. The case is here on a writ of certiorari. 362 U. S. 901.
One question, on a form petitioner filled out in connection with his petition for naturalization, asked if he had ever been “arrested or charged with violation of any law of the United States or State or any city ordinance or traffic regulation” and if so to give full particulars. To this question petitioner answered “no.” There was evidence that when he was questioned under oath by an examiner he gave the same answer. There was also evidence that if his answer had been “yes,” the investigative unit of the Immigration Service would check with the authorities at the places where the arrests occurred “to ascertain . . . whether the full facts were stated.”
The District Court found that from 10 to 11 years before petitioner was naturalized he had been arrested three times as follows:
(1) On July 30, 1929, he was arrested for distributing handbills in New Haven, Connecticut, in violation of an ordinance. He pleaded not guilty and was discharged.
(2) On December 21, 1929, he was arrested for violating the park regulations in New Haven, Connecticut, by making “an oration, harangue, or other public demonstration in New Haven Green, outside of the churches.” Petitioner pleaded not guilty. Disposition of the charge is not clear, the notation on the court record reading “Found J. S.” which respondent suggests may mean “Judgment Suspended” after a finding of guilt.
(3) On March 11, 1930, he was again arrested in New Haven and this time charged with “General Breach of the Peace.” He was found guilty by the City Court and fined $25. He took an appeal and the records show “nolled April 7, 1930.”
Acquisition of American citizenship is a solemn affair. Full and truthful response to all relevant questions required by the naturalization procedure is, of course, to be exacted, and temporizing with the truth must be vigorously discouraged. Failure to give frank, honest, and unequivocal answers to the court when one seeks naturalization is a serious matter. Complete replies are essential so that the qualifications of the applicant or his lack of them may be ascertained. Suppressed or concealed facts, if known, might in and of themselves justify denial of citizenship. Or disclosure of the true facts might have led to the discovery of other facts which would justify denial of citizenship.
On the other hand, in view of the grave consequences to the citizen, naturalization decrees are not lightly to be set aside — the evidence must indeed be “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” and not leave “the issue ... in doubt.” Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 125, 158; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665, 670. The issue in these cases is so important to the liberty of the citizen that the weight normally given concurrent findings of two lower courts does not preclude reconsideration here, for we deal with “judgments lying close to opinion regarding the whole nature of our Government and the duties and immunities of citizenship.” Baumgartner v. United States, supra, 671. And see Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 612 and (concurring opinion) 617.
While disclosure of them was properly exacted, the arrests in these cases were not reflections on the character of the man seeking citizenship. The statute in force at the time of his naturalization required that “he has behaved as a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States” during the previous five years. These arrests were made some years prior to the critical five-year period. They did not, moreover, involve moral turpitude within the meaning of the law. Cf. Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223. No fraudulent conduct was charged. They involved distributing handbills, making a speech, and a breach of the peace. In one instance he was discharged, in one instance the prosecution was “nolled,” and in the other (for making a speech in a park in violation of city regulations) he apparently received a suspended sentence. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the offenses charged makes them of extremely slight consequence. Had they involved moral turpitude or acts directed at the Government, had they involved conduct which even peripherally touched types of activity which might disqualify one from citizenship, a different case would be presented. On this record the nature of these arrests, the crimes charged, and the disposition of the cases do not bring them, inherently, even close to the requirement of “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence that naturalization was illegally procured within the meaning of § 340 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
It is argued, however, that disclosure of the arrests made in New Haven, Connecticut, in the years 1929 and 1930 would have led to a New Haven investigation at which leads to other evidence — more relevant and material than the arrests — might have been obtained. His residence in New Haven was from February 1929 to November 1930. Since that period was more than five years before his petition for naturalization, the name of his employer at that time was not required by the form prepared by the Service. It is now said, however, that if the arrests had been disclosed and investigated, the Service might well have discovered that petitioner in 1929 was “a district organizer” of the Communist Party in Connecticut. One witness in this denaturalization proceeding testified that such was the fact. An arrest, though by no means probative of any guilt or wrongdoing, is sufficiently significant as an episode in a man’s life that it may often be material at least to further enquiry. We do not minimize the importance of that disclosure. In this case, however, we are asked to base materiality on the tenuous line of investigation that might have led from the arrests to the alleged communistic affiliations, when as a matter of fact petitioner in this same application disclosed that he was an employee and member of the International Workers’ Order, which is said to be controlled by the Communist Party. In connection with petitioner’s denial of such affiliations, respondent argues that since it was testified that the IWO was an organization controlled and dominated by the Communist Party, it is reasonable to infer that petitioner had those affiliations at the time of the application. But by the same token it would seem that a much less tenuous and speculative nexus with the Communist Party, if it be such, was thereby disclosed and was available for further investigation if it had been deemed appropriate at the time. Cf. United States v. Anastasio, 226 F. 2d 912. It is said that IWO did not become tainted with Communist control until 1941. We read the record differently. If the Government’s case is made out, that taint extended back at least as far as 1939. Had that disclosure not been made in the application, failure to report the arrests would have had greater significance. It could then be forcefully argued that failure to disclose the arrests was part and parcel of a project to conceal a Communist Party affiliation. But on this record, the failure to report the three arrests occurring from 10 to 11 years previously is neutral. We do not speculate as to why they were not disclosed. We only conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, the Government has failed to show by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence either (1) that facts were suppressed which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship.
There are issues in the case which we do not reach and which were not passed upon by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded to it so that the other questions raised in the appeal may be considered.
It is so ordered.
The section provides in relevant part:
“It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any court specified in subsection (a) of section 310 of this title [§ 1421 of 8 U. S. C.] in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit, for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation, and such revocation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship and such canceling of certificate of naturalization shall be effective as of the original date of the order and certificate, respectively
Section 4 of the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 598, as amended, 45 Stat. 1513-1514.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Whittaker
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuing its statutory powers and duties to investigate subversive activities in Ohio, the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission scheduled a hearing to commence at the Stark County Courthouse on the morning of October 21, 1953, and subpoenaed these five appellants to appear and testify before it at that time and place. Each appeared with counsel, was sworn and examined. Though having both constructive and actual knowledge of Ohio’s immunity statute, each objected to most of the questions propounded on the ground that an answer would compel him to be a witness against himself, in violation of the Ohio Constitution and of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellants were not, in most instances, directed to answer, but in a few instances some of them (Perry, Cooper and Mladajan) were directed to answer the question, yet flatly refused to do so.
Acting pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 103.35, the members of the Commission who sat at the hearing authorized the chairman to cause contempt proceedings to be initiated against appellants under Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2705.02 to 2705.09, and on December 24, 1953, each appellant was separately indicted in the court of common pleas of Stark County on 10 counts — each count charging willful failure, in violation of § 2705.02, to answer a question propounded by the Commission. Upon a joint trial to the court, each appellant was convicted and sentenced on some of the counts. On consolidated appeals, the Stark County Court of Appeals affirmed, the Supreme Court of Ohio, finding no debatable constitutional question presented, dismissed appellants’ appeals to that court, 170 Ohio St. 216, 163 N. E. 2d 177, and, on appeals to this Court, we postponed further consideration of our jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 364 U. S. 811.
Appellants simply assert that we have jurisdiction over these appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). Despite the plain import of our postponing order, see Rule 16, par. 4, of this Court, they have entirely failed to show that any “timely insistence [was made] in the state courts that a state statute, as applied, is repugnant to the federal Constitution, treaties or laws.” Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 185. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423, 435. But since various federal constitutional claims were made below and are renewed here, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3), we consider the appeal papers as petitions for certiorari and, in view of the public importance of at least one of the questions presented, grant certiorari, 28 U. S. C. § 2103.
Appellants’ principal contention here is that the judgments, finding them guilty of willful refusal to answer the Commission’s questions although the Commission did not overrule their timely objections to the questions nor direct that they be answered, but appeared to sustain, or at least to acquiesce in, those objections, deprive appellants of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the peculiar factual situation presented, and limited to the questions which they were not directed to answer, we have concluded that appellants are right in this contention.
Surely traditional notions of fair play contemplate that a person summoned to testify before any adjudicatory or investigatory body, including a legislative investigatory committee, may object to any question put to him upon any available ground, however tenuous. And the Ohio Commission, several times and in many ways, clearly gave appellants to understand that such was their right at this hearing. Exercising that right, if not actually accepting the Commission’s invitation, appellants, except for a few preliminary'questions, objected to most of the questions put to them, principally on the ground of the Fifth Amendment (but see note 4). With important exceptions to be noted, instead of overruling the objection or in any way directing the witness to answer the question, the Commission gave every indication that it sustained, or at least acquiesced in, the objection by immediately passing on to the next question. That process was scores of times repeated.
But, and lending emphasis to its normal acquiescence in the objections, the Commission, at times, adopted another and very different procedure. When the Commission’s counsel advised the Commission that he considered a particular question to be competent and important and asked that the witness be directed to answer it, the chairman, in each such instance, directed the witness to answer the question. And in every such instance care was taken, either by the Commission’s counsel or its chairman, to have the record show that at least a quorum of the Commission were then present and sitting. In that manner, as more fully shown in note 5, Slagle was directed to answer one question, and thereupon promptly answered it, but he was not directed to answer any other question; Bohus was not directed to answer any question; Perry was thus directed to answer the two questions that were made the subjects of Counts 1 and 2 of her indictment (she was acquitted on Count 2), but was not directed to answer the questions upon which the other eight counts of her indictment were based; Cooper was thus directed to answer the four questions that were made the subjects of Counts 1, 2, 5 and 6 of her indictment, but was not directed to answer the questions Upon which the other six counts of her indictment were based; and Mladajan was thus directed to answer the question that was made the subject of Count 6 of her indictment, but was not directed to answer the questions upon which the other nine counts of her indictment were based.
No particular form of words is necessary either to sustain or overrule an objection and thus either to excuse or require an answer to the question. All that is necessary is that the hearing tribunal make plain its disposition of the objection and whether or not an answer to the question is expected and required. If, as frequently happens, after an objection has been made, the hearing officer, addressing the examiner, merely says, “Pass on to your next question,” it would indeed be plain that he had, at least temporarily, sustained or acquiesced in the objection and was not requiring an answer to be given. That is almost precisely what happened here. Though, upon these objections being made, the Commission did not formally direct its counsel to pass on to his next question, either the counsel or some member of the Commission did in fact immediately pass on to the next question. Those objections must therefore be regarded as sustained or acquiesced in by the Commission. To hold that these witnesses, in these circumstances, willfully and contumaciously refused to answer those questions would deeply offend traditional notions of fair play and deprive them of due process.
That “a clear disposition of the witness’ objection is a prerequisite to prosecution for contempt is supported by long-standing tradition here and in other English-speaking nations. In this country the tradition has been uniformly recognized in the procedure of both state and federal courts.” Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, 167-168, and cases cited. See also Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190, 202; Bart v. United States, 349 U. S. 219, 223. “Because of the [Commission’s] consistent failure to advise [appellants] of [its] position as to [their] objections, [appellants were] left to speculate about the risk of possible prosecution for contempt; [they were] not given a clear choice between standing on [their] objection [s] and compliance with a committee ruling.” Bart v. United States, supra, at 223.
In these circumstances, to hold that these witnesses willfully and contumaciously refused to answer the questions to which they objected but which they were not directed to answer would deprive them of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As to appellants’ remaining contentions, including, (1) that because the Ohio immunity statute (see note 2) does not afford immunity from federal prosecution, they could not lawfully be compelled to answer questions over their Fifth Amendment objections to them, (2) that the questions which they refused to answer were not pertinent to the inquiry, and (3) that the Commission’s investigation was without legislative purpose, the Court is equally divided.
It follows that the judgments against Slagle and Bohus must be reversed-; that the judgment against Perry must be reversed as to Counts 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, and affirmed, by an equally divided Court, as to Count 1; that the judgment against Cooper must be reversed as to Counts 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9, and affirmed, by an equally divided Court, as to Counts 1, 2, 5 and 6; and that the judgment against Mladajan must be reversed as to Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10, and affirmed, by an equally divided Court, as to Count 6.
Appeals dismissed and certiorari granted.
On writs of certiorari, judgments reversed as to Slagle and Bohus; judgments reversed in part and affirmed, by an equally divided Court, in part as to Perry, Cooper and Mladajan.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Ohio Rev. Code § 103.34 provides:
“POWERS AND DUTIES.
“The un-American activities commission shall:
“(A) Investigate, study, and analyze:
“(1) All facts relating to the activities of persons, groups, and organizations whose membership includes persons who have as their objective or may be suspected of having as their objective the overthrow or reform of our constitutional governments by fraud, force, violence, or other unlawful means ;
“ (2) All facts concerning persons, groups, and organizations, known to be or suspected of being dominated by or giving allegiance to a foreign power or whose activities might adversely affect the contribution of this state to the national defense, the safety and security of this state, the functioning of any agency of the state or national government, or the industrial potential of this state;
“(3) The operation and effect of the laws of this state, of the several other states, and of the United States, which purport to outlaw and control the activities enumerated in this section and to recommend such additional legislation or revision of existing laws as may seem advisable and necessary;
“(B) Maintain a liaison with any agency of the federal, state, or local governments in devising and promoting means of disclosing those persons and groups who seek to alter or destroy the government of this state or of the United States by force, violence, intimidation, sabotage, or threats of the same.
“The commission has such additional right, duties, and powers as are necessary to enable it fully to exercise those specifically set forth in this section and to accomplish its lawful objectives and purposes.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 101.44 provides:
“Except a person who, in writing, requests permission to appear before a committee or subcommittee of the general assembly, or of either house thereof, or who, in writing, waives the rights, privileges, and immunities granted by this section, the testimony of a witness examined before a committee or subcommittee shall not be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding against such witness, nor shall a person be prosecuted or subjected to a penalty or forfeiture on account of a transaction, matter, or thing, concerning which he testifies, or produces evidence. This section does not exempt a witness from the penalties for perjury.”
Except for a few preliminary questions, each appellant objected to and declined to answer most of the questions propounded — Slagle, 97 of the next 129 questions; Bohus, 97 of the next 99 questions; Perry, 110 of the next 118 questions; Cooper, 76 of the next 103 questions; and Mladajan, 88 of the next 123 questions.
In addition to various state grounds, each appellant based his objections to the questions on the Fifth Amendment, but Slagle also invoked the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Perry also invoked the First, Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, and appellant Cooper also invoked the Fourth and Ninth Amendments, to the United States Constitution.
Appellant Slagle, too, was directed by the chairman to answer one question, but he thereupon answered it. He was not directed to answer any other question.
- Appellant Bohus was not directed to answer any of the questions.
Appellant Perry was directed by the chairman to answer the question, “What is your husband’s name?” but refused to answer and that refusal was made the subject of Count 1 of the indictment against her. She was also directed to answer the question, “What are your parents’ names?” but refused to answer and that refusal was made the subject of Count 2 of the indictment. However, the trial court acquitted her on that count on the ground that the question was immaterial. She was not directed to answer any other question. •
Appellant Cooper was directed to answer the following questions:
“Where did you reside prior to September, 1948?” (Count 1.)
“What was your name at the time you were born; what was the name given you on baptism?” (Count 2.)
“Did you ever live in the City of St. Louis, Missouri?” (Count 5.)
“What is your husband’s name, Mrs. Cooper?” (Count 6.)
But she nevertheless refused to answer in each instance and those refusals were made the subjects of Counts 1, 2, 5 and 6, respectively, of the indictment against her. Although she refused, when directed, to answer another question, she was not indicted for that refusal. She was not directed to answer the questions on which Counts 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the indictment were based.
Appellant Mladajan was directed to answer the question, “Mrs. Mladajan, have you ever been in meetings at the Croatian Hall at any time except in your capacity as an employee?” but she refused to answer and that refusal was made the subject of Count 6 of the indictment against her. She was not directed to answer any other question.
Ohio Rev. Code § 103.35 provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n case of . . . the refusal of any person ... to testify to any matters regarding which he may be lawfully interrogated . . . the chairman may be authorized by a majority of the members sitting at the time the alleged offense is committed, to cause a proceeding for contempt to be filed and prosecuted in the court of common pleas of any county under sections 2705.03 to 2705.09, inclusive, of the Revised Code. . . .”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2705.02 provides, in pertinent part:
“A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for a contempt:
“(C) A failure ... to answer as a witness, when lawfully required.”
Ohio Rev. Code §2705.05 provides:
“Upon the day fixed for the trial in a contempt proceeding the court shall investigate the charge, and hear any answer or testimony which the accused makes or offers.,
“The court shall then determine whether the accused is guilty of the contempt charge. If it is found that he is guilty, he may be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten days, or both.”
Appellant Slagle was convicted on Counts 3 to 10, inclusive; Bohus was convicted on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9; Perry was convicted on Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9; Cooper was convicted on Counts 1 to 9, inclusive; Mladajan was convicted on Counts 1 to 8, inclusive, and 10. Each was sentenced to imprisonment for 10 days on each count — the sentences on all counts, in each instance, to run concurrently — and was fined $500 on each count, but the fines, other than the first one, were remitted in each instance.
The opinion of the Stark County Court of Appeals is not reported.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue here is the ownership of a tract of land on the east bank of the Missouri River in Iowa. Respondent Omaha Indian Tribe, supported by the United States as trustee of the Tribe’s reservation lands, claims the tract as part of reservation lands created for it under an 1854 treaty. Petitioners, including the State of Iowa and several individuals, argue that past movements of the Missouri River washed away part of the reservation and the soil accreted to the Iowa side of the river, vesting title in them as riparian landowners.
Two principal issues are presented. First, we are faced with novel questions regarding the interpretation and scope of Rev. Stat. § 2126, as set forth in 25 U. S. C. § 194, a 145-year-old, but seldom used, statute that provides:
“In all trials about the right of property in which an Indian may be a party on one side, and a white person on the other, the burden of proof shall rest upon the white person, whenever the Indian shall make out a presumption of title in himself from the fact of previous possession or ownership.”
Second, we must decide whether federal or state law determines whether the critical changes in the course of the Missouri River in this case were accretive or avulsive.
I
In 1854, the Omaha Indian Tribe ceded most of its aboriginal lands by treaty to the United States in exchange for money and assistance to enable the Tribe to cultivate its retained lands. Treaty of Mar. 16, 1854, 10 Stat. 1043; see United States v. Omaha Indians, 253 U. S. 275, 277-278 (1920). The retained lands proved unsatisfactory to the Tribe, and it exercised its option under the treaty to exchange those lands for a tract of 300,000 acres to be designated by the President and acceptable to the Tribe. The Blackbird Hills area, on the west bank of the Missouri, all of which was then part of the Territory of Nebraska, was selected. The eastern boundary of the reservation was fixed as the center of the main channel of the Missouri River, the thalweg. That land, as modified by a subsequent treaty and statutes, has remained the home of the Omaha Indian Tribe.
In 1867, a survey by T. H. Barrett of the General Land Office established that the reservation included a large peninsula jutting east toward the opposite, Iowa, side of the river, around which the river flowed in an oxbow curve known as Blackbird Bend. Over the next few decades, the river changed course several times, sometimes moving east, sometimes west. Since 1927, the river has been west of its 1867 position, leaving most of the Barrett survey area on the Iowa side of the river, separated from the rest of the reservation.
As the area, now on the Iowa side, dried out, Iowa residents settled on, improved, and farmed it. These non-Indian owners and their successors in title occupied the land for many years prior to April 2, 1975, when they were dispossessed by the Tribe, with the assistance of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Four lawsuits followed the seizure, three in federal court and one in state court. The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Iowa consolidated the three federal actions, severed claims to damages and lands outside the Barrett survey area, and issued a temporary injunction that permitted the Tribe to continue possession. The court then tried the case without a jury. At trial, the Government and the Tribe argued that the river’s movement had been avul-sive, and therefore the change in location of the river had not affected the boundary of the reservation. Petitioners argued that the river had gradually eroded the reservation lands on the west bank of the river, and that the disputed land on the east bank, in Iowa, had been formed by gradual accretion and belonged to the east-bank riparian owners. Both sides sought to quiet title in their names.
The District Court concluded that state rather than federal law should be the basis of decision. United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. 57 (1977). The court interpreted the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1652, as not requiring the application of federal law in land disputes, even though the United States and an Indian tribe were claimants, unless the Constitution, a treaty, or an Act of Congress specifically supplanted state law. The court found no indication in those sources that federal law was to govern. It then went on to conclude that 25 U. S. C. § 194 was not applicable to the case because it was impossible for the Tribe to make out a prima facie case that it possessed the disputed lands in the past without proving its case on the merits. Thus, § 194 had no significance because it was “inextricably entwined with the merits.” 433 F. Supp., at 66.
Applying Nebraska law, which places the burden of proof on the party seeking to quiet title, the court concluded that the key changes in the river had been accretive, and that the east-bank riparians, the petitioners, were thus the owners of the disputed area. 433 F. Supp. 67 (1977).
The Court of Appeals reversed. 575 F. 2d 620 (CA8 1978). It began by ruling that the District Court should have applied federal rather than state law for two distinct reasons. First, the boundary of the reservation was coincidental with an interstate boundary at the time the river moved. Therefore, under Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U. S. 363, 375 (1977), and other cases of this Court, the governing law is federal because
“[t]he rendering of a decision in a private dispute which would ‘press back’ an interstate boundary sufficiently implicates the interests of the states to require the application of federal common law.” 575 F. 2d, at 628.
Second, the Court of Appeals construed our decision in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 677 (1974), as requiring the application of federal law because the Tribe asserted a right to reservation land based directly on the 1854 treaty and therefore arising under and protected by federal law.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the District Court had erred by refusing to apply 25 U. S. C. § 194. Because the Tribe had proved that the 1854 treaty included the land area within the Barrett survey, it had made a sufficient showing of “previous possession or ownership” to invoke the statute and place the burden of proof on petitioners. Adopting the District Court’s construction “would negate the application of the § 194 statutory burden upon a pleading that simply recites Indian land had been destroyed by the erosive action of a river.” 575 F. 2d, at 631.
Reviewing what it perceived to be the federal common law of accretion and avulsion and with no more than passing reference to Nebraska law on the issue, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court had based its ruling on a too narrow definition of avulsion. The court then applied the law to the evidence and found that the evidence was in equipoise. Because § 194 placed the burden of proof on the non-Indians, however, the court ruled that judgment must be entered for the Tribe.
We granted separate petitions for certiorari filed by the State of Iowa and its Conservation Commission in No. 78-161 and by the individual petitioners in No. 78-160, but limited to the questions whether 25 U. S. C. § 194 is applicable in the circumstances of this litigation, in particular with respect to the State of Iowa, and whether federal or state law governs the substantive aspects of these cases. 439 U. S. 963 (1978). We are in partial, but serious, disagreement with the Court of Appeals, and vacate its judgment.
II
Petitioners challenge on several grounds the Court of Appeals’ construction and application of § 194 to these cases. First, they argue that by its plain language the section does not apply when an Indian tribe, rather than one or more individual Indians, is the litigant. We think the argument is untenable. The provision first appeared in slightly different form in 1822, Act of May 6, 1822, 3 Stat. 683, as part of an Act amending the 1802 Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, Act of Mar. 30, 1802, 2 Stat. 139, which was one of a series of Acts originating in 1790 and designed to regulate trade and other forms of intercourse between the North American Indian tribes and non-Indians. Because of recurring trespass upon and illegal occupancy of Indian territory, a major purpose of these Acts as they developed was to protect the rights of Indians to their properties. Among other things, non-Indians were prohibited from settling on tribal properties, and the use of force was authorized to remove persons who violated these restrictions. The 1822 provision was part of this design ; and with only slight change in wording, it was incorporated in the 1834 consolidation of the various statutes dealing with Indian affairs. Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729. Section 22 of that Act is now 25 U. S. C. § 194, already set out in this opinion. Although the word “Indian” in the second line of § 22 of the 1834 Act replaced the word “Indians” in the 1822 provision, there is no indication that any change in meaning was intended; and none should be implied at this late date, particularly in light of 1 U. S. C. § 1, which provides that unless the context indicates otherwise, “words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things.”
Even construed as including the plural, however, it is urged that the word “Indians” does not literally include an Indian tribe, and that it is plain from other provisions of the Act that Congress intended to distinguish between Indian tribes and individual Indians. But as we see it, this proves too much. At the time of the enactment of the predecessors of § 194, Indian land ownership was primarily tribal ownership; aboriginal title, a possessory right, was recognized and was extinguishable only by agreement with the tribes with the consent of the United States. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S., at 669-670. Typically, this was accomplished by treaty between the United States and the tribe, and typically the land reserved or otherwise set aside was held in trust by the United States for the tribe itself. “ 'Whatever title the Indians have is in the tribe, and not in the individuals, although held by the tribe for the common use and equal benefit of all the members.’ ” United States v. Jim, 409 U. S. 80, 82 (1972), quoting Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 294, 307 (1902). It is clear enough that, when enacted, Congress intended the 1822 and 1834 provisions to protect Indians from claims made by non-Indian squatters on their lands. To limit the force of these provisions to lands held by individual Indians would be to drain them of all significance, given the historical fact that at the time of the enactment virtually all Indian land was tribally held. Legislation dealing with Indian affairs “cannot be interpreted in isolation but must be read in light of the common notions of the day and the assumptions of those who drafted [it].” Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, 206 (1978). Furthermore, “'statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes... are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.' ” Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 392 (1976), quoting Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U. S. 78, 89 (1918).
The second argument, presented in its most acute form by the State of Iowa, is that § 194 applies only where the Indians' antagonist is an individual white person and has no force at all where the adverse claimant is an artificial entity. We cannot accept this broad submission. The word “person” for purposes of statutory construction, unless the context indicates to the contrary, is normally construed to include “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” 1 U. S. C. § 1. And in terms of the protective purposes of the Acts of which § 194 and its predecessors were a part, it would make little sense to construe the provision so that individuals, otherwise subject to its burdens, could escape its reach merely by incorporating and carrying on business as usual. As we said in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 687 (1978), “by 1871, it was well understood that corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis.” It stands to reason that in re-enacting this provision in the Revised Statutes, now codified in the United States Code, Congress was fully aware that it would be interpreted to cover artificial entities as well as individuals.
It nevertheless does not follow that the “white persons” to whom will be shifted the burden of proof in title litigation with Indians also include the sovereign States of the Union. “[I]n common usage, the term 'person’ does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it.” United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604 (1941); accord, United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 275 (1947). Particularly is this true where the statute imposes a burden or limitation, as distinguished from conferring a benefit or advantage. United States v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 315 (1840). There is nevertheless “no hard and fast rule of exclusion,” United States v. Cooper Corp., supra, at 604-605; and much depends on the context, the subject matter, legislative history, and executive interpretation. The legislative history here is uninformative, and executive interpretation is unhelpful with respect to this dormant statute. But in terms of the purpose of the provision — that of preventing and providing remedies against non-Indian squatters on Indian lands — it is doubtful that Congress anticipated such threats from the States themselves or intended to handicap the States so as to offset the likelihood of unfair advantage. Indeed, the 1834 Act, which included § 22, the provision identical to the present § 194, was “intended to apply to the whole Indian country, as defined in the first section.” H. R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1834). Section 1 defined Indian country as being “all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the Mississippi River, and not within any state to which the Indian title has not been extinguished... 4 Stat. 729. Although this definition was discarded in the Revised Statutes, see Rev. Stat. § 5596, it is apparent that in adopting § 22 Congress had in mind only disputes arising in Indian country, disputes that would not arise in or involve any of the States.
Nor have we discovered anything since its passage or in connection with the definition of Indian country now contained in the Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. § 1151, indicating that Congress intended the words “white person” in § 194 to include any of the original or any of the newly admitted States of the Union. We hesitate, therefore, to hold that the State of Iowa must necessarily be disadvantaged by § 194 when litigating title to the property to which it claims ownership, particularly where its opposition is an organized Indian tribe litigating with the help of the United States of America. It may well be that a State, like other litigants and like the State of Iowa did in this case, will often bear the burden of proof on various issues in litigating the title to real estate. But § 194 operates regardless of the circumstances once the Tribe or its champion, the United States, has demonstrated that the Tribe was once in possession of or had title to the area under dispute.
Petitioners also defend the refusal of the District Court to apply § 194 on the grounds that a precondition to applying it is proof of prior possession or title in the Indians and that this involves the merits of the issue on which this case turns— whether the changes in the river were avulsive or accretive. We think the Court of Appeals had the better view of the statute in this regard. Section 194 is triggered once the Tribe makes out a prima facie case of prior possession or title to the particular area under dispute. The usual way of describing real property is by identifying an area on the surface of the earth through the use of natural or artificial monuments. There seems to be no question here that the area within the Barrett survey was once riparian land lying on the west bank of the Missouri River and was long occupied by the Tribe as part of the reservation set apart for it in consequence of the treaty of 1854. This was enough, it seems to us, to bring § 194 into play. Of course, that would not foreclose the State of Iowa from offering sufficient evidence to prove its own title or from prevailing on any affirmative defenses it may have.
Petitioners also assert that even if § 194 is operative and even if the Tribe has made out its prima facie case, only the burden of going forward with the evidence, and not the burden of persuasion, is shifted to the State. Therefore they, the petitioners, should prevail if the evidence is in equipoise. The term “burden of proof” may well be an ambiguous term connoting either the burden of going forward with the evidence, the burden of persuasion, or both. But in view of the evident purpose of the statute and its use of the term “presumption” which the “white man” must overcome, we are in agreement with the two courts below that § 194 contemplates the non-Indian’s shouldering the burden of persuasion as well as the burden of producing evidence once the tribe has made out its prima facie case of prior title or possession.
Ill
A
In Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U. S. 363 (1977), this Court held that, absent an overriding federal interest, the laws of the several States determine the ownership of the banks and shores of waterways. This was expressive of the general rule with respect to the incidents of federal land grants:
“ 'We hold the true principle to be this, that whenever the question in any Court, state or federal, is, whether a title to land which had once been the property of the United States has passed, that question must be resolved by the laws of the United States; but that whenever, according to those laws, the title shall have passed, then that property, like all other property in the state, is subject to state legislation; so far as that legislation is consistent with the admission that the title passed and vested according to the laws of the United States.' ” Id., at 377, quoting Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 517 (1839) (emphasis added by the Corvallis Court).
The Court’s conclusion in the particular dispute before it in Corvallis was that state law governed the rights of the riparian owner because there was no claim of an applicable federal right other than the equal-footing origin of the State’s title.
As the Court of Appeals held, however, the general rule recognized by Corvallis does not oust federal law in this case. Here, we are not dealing with land titles merely derived from a federal grant, but with land with respect to which the United States has never yielded title or terminated its interest. The area within the survey was part of land to which the Omahas had held aboriginal title and which was reserved by the Tribe and designated by the United States as a reservation and the Tribe’s permanent home. The United States continues to hold the reservation lands in trust for the Tribe and to recognize the Tribe pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et se.q.
In these circumstances, where the Government has never parted with title and its interest in the property continues, the Indians’ right to the property depends on federal law, “wholly apart from the application of state law principles which normally and separately protect a valid right of possession.” Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S., at 677. It is rudimentary that “Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be extinguished only with federal consent” and that the termination of the protection that federal law, treaties, and statutes extend to Indian occupancy is “exclusively the province of federal law.” Id,., at 670. Insofar as the applicable law is concerned, therefore, the claims of the Omahas are “clearly distinguishable from the claims of land grantees for whom the Federal Government has taken no such responsibility.” Id., at 684 (RehNQUIst, J., concurring). This is not a case where the United States has patented or otherwise granted lands to private owners in a manner that terminates its interest and subjects the grantees’ incidents of ownership to determination by the applicable state law. The issue here is whether the Tribe is no longer entitled to possession of an area that in the past was con-cededly part of the reservation as originally established. That question, under Oneida, is a matter for the federal law to decide.
B
Although we have determined that federal law ultimately controls the issue in this case, it is still true that “[c]ontro-versies... governed by federal law, do not inevitably require resort to uniform federal rules.... Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial policy 'dependent upon a variety of considerations always relevant to the nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon them of applying state law.' ” United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U. S. 715, 727-728 (1979), quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 310 (1947). The Court of Appeals, noting the existence of a body of federal law necessarily developed by this Court in the course of adjudicating boundary disputes between States having their common border on a navigable stream, purported to find in those doctrines the legal standards to apply in deciding whether the changes in the course of the Missouri River involved in this case had been avulsive or ac-cretive in nature.
The federal law applied in boundary cases, however, does not necessarily furnish the appropriate rules to govern this case. No dispute between Iowa and Nebraska as to their common border on or near the Missouri River is involved here. The location of that border on the ground was settled by Compact in 1943 and by further litigation in this Court, Nebraska v. Iowa, 406 U. S. 117 (1972). The federal interest in this respect has thus been satisfied, except to the extent that the Compact itself may bear upon a dispute such as this. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra, advises that at this juncture we should consider whether there is need for a nationally uniform body of law to apply in situations comparable to this, whether application of state law would frustrate federal policy or functions, and the impact a federal rule might have on existing relationships under state law. An application of these factors suggests to us that state law should be borrowed as the federal rule of decision here.
First, we perceive no need for a uniform national rule to determine whether changes in the course of a river affecting riparian land owned or possessed by the United States or by an Indian tribe have been avulsive or accretive. For this purpose, we see little reason why federal interests should not be treated under the same rules of property that apply to private persons holding property in the same area by virtue of state, rather than federal, law. It is true that States may differ among themselves with respect to the rules that will identify and distinguish between avulsions and accretions, but as long as the applicable standard is applied evenhandedly to particular disputes, we discern no imperative need to develop a general body of federal common law to decide cases such as this, where an interstate boundary is not in dispute. We should not accept “generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting state law would adversely affect [federal interests].” United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra, at 730.
Furthermore, given equitable application of state law, there is little likelihood of injury to federal trust responsibilities or to tribal possessory interests. On some occasions, Indian tribes may lose some land because of the application of a particular state rule of accretion and avulsion, but it is as likely on other occasions that the tribe will stand to gain. The same would be the case under a federal rule, including the rule that the Court of Appeals announced in this case. The United States fears a hostile and unfavorable treatment at the hands of state law, but, as we have said, the legal issues are federal and the federal courts will have jurisdiction to hear them. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661 (1974). Adequate means are thus available to insure fair treatment of tribal and federal interests.
This is also an area in which the States have substantial interest in having their own law resolve controversies such as these. Private landowners rely on state real property law when purchasing real property, whether riparian land or not. There is considerable merit in not having the reasonable expectations of these private landowners upset by the vagaries of being located adjacent to or across from Indian reservations or other property in which the United States has a substantial interest. Borrowing state law will also avoid arriving at one answer to the avulsive-accretion riddle in disputes involving Indians on one side and possibly quite different answers with respect to neighboring land where non-Indians are the disputants. Indeed, in this case several hundred acres of land within the Barrett survey are held in fee, and concededly are not Indian property. These tracts would not be governed by the federal rule announced by the Court of Appeals.
We have borrowed state law in Indian cases before. In Board of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U. S. 343 (1939), the question was what law, federal or state, would apply in a claim to recover taxes improperly levied by a political subdivision of a State upon Indians’ trust lands. The Court observed that “[s]ince the origin of the right to be enforced is the Treaty, plainly whatever rule we fashion is ultimately attributable to the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States, and does not owe its authority to the law-making agencies of Kansas.” Id., at 349-350. The Court, nevertheless, elected to adopt state law as the federal rule of decision. There was no reason in the circumstances of the case for the beneficiaries of federal rights to have a privileged position over other aggrieved taxpayers, and “[t]o respect the law of interest prevailing in Kansas in no wise impinges upon the exemption which the Treaty of 1861 has commanded Kansas to respect and the federal courts to vindicate.”
The importance of attending to state law, once an interstate boundary has been determined, is underlined by Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158 (1918). In that case, because the disputed boundary between Arkansas and Tennessee had been determined, the question of title to riparian land and to the river bottom was a matter to be determined by local law:
“How the land that emerges on either side of an interstate boundary stream shall be disposed of as between public and private ownership is a matter to be determined according to the law of each State, under the familiar doctrine that it is for the States to establish for themselves such rules of property as they deem expedient with respect to the navigable waters within their borders and the riparian lands adajacent to them.... But these dispositions are in each case limited by the interstate boundary, and cannot be permitted to press back the boundary line from where otherwise it should be located.” Id., at 175-176.
Likewise, in the present case, the Compact of 1943 settled the location of the interstate boundary, within and without the river; and the question of land ownership within or adjacent to the river is best settled by reference to local law even where Indian trust land, a creature of the federal law, is involved.
C
The passage quoted above from Arkansas v. Tennessee was quoted with approval in Nebraska v. Iowa, 406 U. S., at 126-127, where the central question was the interpretation of the Interstate Compact determining the location of the entire border between Nebraska and Iowa. Our opinion in Nebraska v. Iowa is also instructive with respect to which state law, Iowa or Nebraska, the federal court should refer to in determining the federal standard applicable to this case.
Under § 2 of the Compact, each State ceded to the other and relinquished jurisdiction over all lands within the Compact boundary of the other State. Under § 3, “Titles, mortgages, and other liens” affecting such lands that are “good in” the ceding State “shall be good in” the other State. Thus, ceded lands east of the Compact line came under Iowa jurisdiction; but Iowa was obligated to respect title to any-ceded land east of the new boundary if that title was “good in” Nebraska. Accepting the Special Master’s recommendations in this respect, the Court ruled that one claiming a Nebraska title to land east of the Compact line need show only “good title” under Nebraska law and need not also prove either the location of the original boundary between the two States or that the land at issue was on the Nebraska side of that original boundary. The Court further ruled, in agreement with the Special Master, that in litigating with private claimants seeking to prove good Nebraska title to land east of the Compact line, the State of Iowa was disentitled to rely on certain doctrines of Iowa common law bearing on riparian land ownership.
In this case, the District Court ruled that even though the United States and an Indian tribe rather than private parties were plaintiffs, title to the Barrett survey land, which was once in Nebraska but is now unquestionably in Iowa, should be governed by Nebraska law in accordance with the terms of the Compact. Proceeding to adjudicate the case in accordance with Nebraska law, the District Judge found that the Tribe and the Government, respondents here, had failed to prove that the Blackbird Bend area had been separated from the rest of the reservation by avulsive changes in the Missouri River and that the defendants, petitioners here, without the aid of any presumption of accretion available under Iowa law if applicable, had instead proved that the river changes had been by accretion. In the course of arriving at this conclusion, the District Court, relying on Nebraska cases, rejected the Government’s definition of avulsion, later embraced by the Court of Appeals, as contrary to the common law of Nebraska. The defendants, petitioners here, having carried the burden of proving their good title to the land at issue, were entitled to a decree quieting title in them.
Although we have already held that the District Court erred in concluding that determination of titles to reservations lands is not a matter for the federal law, we have also indicated that the federal law should incorporate the applicable state property'law to resolve the dispute. Therefore, it seems to us that the District Court reached the correct result in ruling that under the construction of the Compact in Nebraska v. Iowa, Nebraska law should be applied in determining whether the changes in the river that moved the Blackbird Bend area from Nebraska to Iowa had been avulsive or accretive. It should also be noted that the District Court, although wrong in wholly rejecting the applicability of § 194, concluded as a matter of fact and law that the defendants, petitioners here, had carried the burden of persuasion normally incumbent upon a plaintiff in a quiet-title action, and had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the reservation lands had eroded and had accreted to the Iowa shoreline. Apparently for this reason, the trial judge observed at the end of his memorandum opinion that were he wrong in refusing to apply § 194, his findings and conclusions “would not be altered by any different allocation of the burden of persuasion.” 433 F. Supp., at 67.
IV
In sum, the Court of Appeals was partially correct in ruling that § 194 was applicable in this case. By its terms, § 194 applies to the private petitioners but not to petitioner State of Iowa. We also agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that federal law governed the substantive aspects of the dispute, but find it in error for arriving at a federal standard, independent of state law, to determine whether there had been an avulsion or an accretion. Instead, the court should have incorporated the law of the State that otherwise would have been applicable which, as we have said, is the law of Nebraska. Of course, because of its view of the controlling law, the Court of Appeals did not consider whether'the District Court had correctly interpreted Nebraska law and had properly applied it to the facts of this case. These tasks are still to be performed, and we vacate the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
In Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413 (1912), the Court explained the source and nature of this trust relationship. In the exercise of its plenary authority over Indian affairs, Congress has the power to place restrictions on the alienation of Indian lands. Where it does so, it continues guardianship over Indian lands and “[d]uring the continuance of this guardianship, the right and duty of the Nation to enforce by all appropriate means the restrictions designed for the security of the Indians cannot be gainsaid.... A transfer of the [Indian land] is not simply a violation of the proprietary rights of the Indian. It violates the governmental rights of the United States.” Id., at 437-438. Accordingly, the United States is entitled to go into court as trustee to enforce Indian land rights. “It [is] not essential that it should have a pecuniary interest in the controversy.” Id., at 439. See also Morrison v. Work, 266 U. S. 481, 485 (1925); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 678 (1912); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 94-96 (1942).
The State of Iowa claims title to certain lands deeded to it by quitclaim and to the bed of the Missouri between the thalweg (see n. 3, infra) and the ordinary high-water mark, any
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is a sequel to Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130 (1982), in which we held that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe (Tribe) has the power to impose a severance tax on the production of oil and gas by non-Indian lessees of wells located on the Tribe’s reservation. We must now decide whether the State of New Mexico can continue to impose its severance taxes on the same production of oil and gas.
I
All 742,135 acres of the Jicarilla Apache Reservation are located in northwestern New Mexico. Id., at 133. In 1887, President Cleveland issued an Executive Order setting aside this tract of public land “as a reservation for the use and occupation of the Jicarilla Apache Indians.” 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 875 (1904). The only qualification contained in the order was a proviso protecting bona fide settlers from defeasance of previously acquired federal rights. Ibid. The land is still owned by the United States and is held in trust for the Tribe.
The Tribe, which consists of approximately 2,500 enrolled members, is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act. 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. §461 et seq. The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (1938 Act) grants the Tribe authority, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary), to execute mineral leases. 52 Stat. 347, 25 U. S. C. § 396a et seq. Since at least as early as 1953, the Tribe has been leasing reservation lands to nonmembers for the production of oil and gas. See Merrion, supra, at 135. Mineral leases now encompass a substantial portion of the reservation and constitute the primary source of the Tribe’s general operating revenues. In 1969, the Secretary approved an amendment to the Tribe’s Constitution authorizing it to enact ordinances, subject to his approval, imposing taxes on nonmembers doing business in the reservation. See Revised Constitution of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Art. XI, § 1(e) (Equity). The Tribe enacted such an ordinance in 1976, imposing a severance tax on “any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands.” Oil and Gas Severance Tax, Ordinance No. 77-0-02, Jicarilla Apache Tribal Code (hereinafter J. A. T. C.), Tit. 11, ch. 1 (1987) (Equity); see also Merrion, supra, at 135-136. The Secretary approved the ordinance later that year, and in. 1982 this Court upheld the Tribe’s power to impose a severance tax on pre-existing as well as future leases. See Merrion, supra. Subsequently, the Tribe enacted a privilege tax, which the Secretary also approved. See Oil and Gas Privilege Tax, Ordinance No. 85-0-434, J. A. T. C., Tit. 11, ch. 2 (1985).
In 1976, Cotton Petroleum Corporation (Cotton), a non-Indian company in the business of extracting and marketing oil and gas, acquired five leases covering approximately 15,000 acres of the reservation. There were then 15 operating wells on the leased acreage and Cotton has since drilled another 50 wells. The leases were issued by the Tribe and the United States under the authority of the 1938 Act. Pursuant to the terms of the leases, Cotton pays the Tribe a rent of $125 per acre, plus a royalty of 1214 percent of the value of its production. In addition, Cotton pays the Tribe’s oil and gas severance and privilege taxes, which amount to approximately 6 percent of the value of its production. Thus, Cotton’s aggregate payment to the Tribe includes an acreage rent in excess of $1 million, plus royalties and taxes amounting to about 1814 percent of its production.
Prior to 1982, Cotton paid, without objection, five different oil and gas production taxes to the State of New Mexico. The state taxes amount to about 8 percent of the value of Cotton’s production. The same 8 percent is collected from producers throughout the State. Thus, on wells outside the reservation, the total tax burden is only 8 percent, while Cotton’s reservation wells are taxed at a total rate of 14 percent (8 percent by the State and 6 percent by the Tribe). No state tax is imposed on the royalties received by the Tribe.
At the end of our opinion in Merrion, 455 U. S., at 158-159, n. 26, we added a footnote rejecting the taxpayer’s argument that the tribal tax was invalid as a “multiple tax burden on interstate commerce” because imposed on the same activity already taxed by the State. One of the reasons the argument failed was that the taxpayer had made no attempt to show that the Tribe was “seek[ing] to seize more tax revenues than would be fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe.” Ibid. After making that point, the footnote suggested that the state tax might be invalid under the Commerce Clause if in excess of what “the State’s contact with the activity would justify.” Ibid, (emphasis in original).
In 1982, Cotton paid its state taxes under protest and then brought an action in the District Court for Santa Fe County challenging the taxes under the Indian Commerce, Interstate Commerce, Due Process, and Supremacy Clauses of the Federal Constitution. App. 2-15. Relying on the Merrion footnote, Cotton contended that state taxes imposed on reservation activity are only valid if related to actual expenditures by the State in relation to the activity being taxed. Record 421. In support of this theory, Cotton presented evidence at trial tending to prove that the amount of tax it paid to the State far exceeded the value of services that the State provided to it and that the taxes paid by all nonmember oil producers far exceeded the value of services provided to the reservation as a whole. Cotton did not, however, attempt to prove that the state taxes imposed any burden on the Tribe.
After trial, the Tribe sought, and was granted, leave to file a brief amicus curiae. Id., at 128. The Tribe argued that a decision upholding the state taxes would substantially interfere with the Tribe’s ability to raise its own tax rates and would diminish the desirability of on-reservation oil and gas leases. Id., at 124. The Tribe expressed a particular concern about what it characterized as a failure of the State “to provide services commensurate with the taxes collected.” Ibid.
After the Tribe filed its brief, the New Mexico District Court issued a decision upholding the state taxes. App. to Juris. Statement 14. The District Court found that “New Mexico provides substantial services to both the Jicarilla Tribe and Cotton,” and concluded that the State had a valid interest in imposing taxes on non-Indians on the reservation Squarely rejecting Cotton’s theory of the case, the court stated that “[t]he theory of public finance does not require expenditures equal to revenues.” Id., at 17. Turning to the question whether the state taxes were inconsistent with the federal interest in fostering the economic development of Indian tribes, the District Court found that the “economic and legal burden of paying the state taxes falls on Cotton or its buyers” and that “[n]o economic burden falls on the tribe by virtue of the state taxes.” Id., at 15. More specifically, it found that the state taxes had not affected the Tribe’s ability to collect its taxes or to impose a higher tax, and had “not in any way deterred production of oil and gas” on the reservation. Id., at 16-17. It concluded that the taxes had no adverse impact on tribal interests and that they were not pre-empted by federal law. Id., at 17-18. Finally, the District Court held that the taxes were fully consistent with the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the Federal Constitution. Ibid.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed. 106 N. M. 517, 745 P. 2d 1170 (1987). Like the District Court, it was left unpersuaded by Cotton’s contention that the New Mexico taxes are invalid because the State’s expenditures on reservation activity do not equal the revenues collected. The Court of Appeals correctly noted that the Merrion footnote, 455 U. S., at 159, n. 26, “intimate[s] no opinion on the possibility of such a challenge,” but simply suggests that a state tax “might” be invalid if greater than the State’s “contact with the [on-reservation] activity would justify.” 106 N. M., at 520, 745 P. 2d, at 1173. Finding no support for Cotton’s position in Merrion, the Court of Appeals looked instead to our opinion in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609 (1981), and concluded that a State’s power to tax an activity connected to interstate commerce is not limited to the value of the services provided in support of that activity. 106 N. M., at 521, 745 P. 2d, at 1174. Agreeing with the trial court that the New Mexico taxes were fairly related to the services provided to Cotton, the Court of Appeals rejected Cotton’s Commerce Clause challenge. Ibid.
The Tribe, again participating as an amicus curiae, urged a different approach to the case. Unlike Cotton, the Tribe argued that the state taxes could not withstand traditional pre-emption analysis. The Tribe conceded that state laws, to the extent they do not interfere with tribal self-government, may control the conduct of non-Indians on the reservation. It maintained, however, that the taxes at issue interfered with its ability to raise taxes and thus with its right to self-government. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument because the record contained no evidence of any adverse impact on the Tribe and, indeed, indicated that the Tribe could impose even higher taxes than it had without adverse effect.
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted, but then quashed, a writ of certiorari. 106 N. M. 511, 745 P. 2d 1159 (1987). We then noted probable jurisdiction and invited the parties to brief and argue the following additional question:
“Does the Commerce Clause require that an Indian Tribe be treated as a State for purposes of determining whether a state tax on nontribal activities conducted on an Indian Reservation must be apportioned to account for taxes imposed on those same activities by the Indian Tribe?” 485 U. S. 1005 (1988).
We now affirm the judgment of the New Mexico Court of Appeals.
II
This Court’s approach to the question whether a State may tax on-reservation oil production by non-Indian lessees has varied over the course of the past century. At one time, such a tax was held invalid unless expressly authorized by Congress; more recently, such taxes have been upheld unless expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress. The changed approach to these taxes is one aspect of the evolution of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity that we recently discussed in detail in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U. S. 505 (1988).
During the first third of this century, this Court frequently invalidated state taxes that arguably imposed an indirect economic burden on the Federal Government or its instrumentalities by application of the “intergovernmental immunity” doctrine. That doctrine “was based on the rationale that any tax on income a party received under a contract with the government was a tax on the contract and thus a tax ‘on’ the government because it burdened the government’s power to enter into the contract.” Id., at 518. In a case decided in 1922, the Court applied the intergovernmental immunity doctrine to invalidate a state tax on income derived by a non-Indian lessee from the sale of his interest in oil produced on Indian land. See Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501. Consistently with the view of intergovernmental immunity that then prevailed, the Court stated that “a tax upon such profits is a direct hamper upon the effort of the United States to make the best terms that it can for its wards.” Id., at 506 (citing Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 468 (1829)). The same reasoning was used to invalidate a variety of other state taxes imposed on non-Indian lessees at that time.
Shortly after reaching its zenith in the Gillespie decision, the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity started a long path in decline and has now been “thoroughly repudiated” by modern case law. South Carolina v. Baker, supra, at 520. In 1932, four Members of this Court argued that Gillespie was unsound and should be overruled. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 401 (Stone, J., dissenting); id., at 405 (Brandéis, J., dissenting). Five years later, the Court took a substantial step in that direction, rejecting the view that a nondiscriminatory state tax on a private party contracting with the Government is invalid because the economic burden of the tax may fall on the Government. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937). “With the rationale for conferring a tax immunity on parties dealing with another government rejected, the government contract immunities recognized under prior doctrine were, one by one, eliminated.” South Carolina v. Baker, supra, at 522. Specifically, in Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376, 386-387 (1938), the Court squarely overruled Gillespie, supra. Thus, after Mountain Producers Corp., supra, was decided, oil and gas lessees operating on Indian reservations were subject to nondiscriminatory state taxation as long as Congress did not act affirmatively to pre-empt the state taxes. See ibid. See also Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Texas Co., 336 U. S. 342 (1949).
In sum, it is well settled that, absent express congressional authorization, a State cannot tax the United States directly. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). It is also clear that the tax immunity of the United States is shared by the Indian tribes for whose benefit the United States holds reservation lands in trust. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U. S. 759, 764 (1985). Under current doctrine, however, a State can impose a nondiscriminatory tax on private parties with whom the United States or an Indian tribe does business, even though the financial burden of the tax may fall on the United States or tribe. See id., at 765; South Carolina v. Baker, supra, at 523. Although a lessee’s oil production on Indian lands is therefore not “automatically exempt from state taxation,” Congress does, of course, retain the power to grant such immunity. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 150 (1973). Whether such immunity shall be granted is thus a question that “is essentially legislative in character.” Texas Co., supra, at 365-366.
The question for us to decide is whether Congress has acted to grant the Tribe such immunity, either expressly or by plain implication. In addition, we must consider Cotton’s argument that the “multiple burden” imposed by the state and tribal taxes is unconstitutional.
Ill
Although determining whether federal legislation has preempted state taxation of lessees of Indian land is primarily an exercise in examining congressional intent, the history of tribal sovereignty serves as a necessary “backdrop” to that process. Cf. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713, 719 (1983) (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164, 172 (1973)). As a result, questions of pre-emption in this area are not resolved by reference to standards of preemption that have developed in other areas of the law, and are not controlled by “mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty.” White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 145 (1980). Instead, we have applied a flexible pre-emption analysis sensitive to the particular facts and legislation involved. Each case “requires a particularized examination of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests.” Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U. S. 832, 838 (1982). Moreover, in examining the pre-emptive force of the relevant federal legislation, we are cognizant of both the broad policies that underlie the legislation and the history of tribal independence in the field at issue. See ibid. It bears emphasis that although congressional silence no longer entails a broad-based immunity from taxation for private parties doing business with Indian tribes, federal pre-emption is not limited to cases in which Congress has expressly — as compared to impliedly — pre-empted the state activity. Finally, we note that although state interests must be given weight and courts should be careful not to make legislative decisions in the absence of congressional action, ambiguities in federal law are, as a rule, resolved in favor of tribal independence. See ibid.
Against this background, Cotton argues that the New Mexico taxes are pre-empted by the “federal laws and policies which protect tribal self-government and strengthen impoverished reservation economies. ” Brief for Appellants 16. Most significantly, Cotton contends that the 1938 Act exhibits a strong federal interest in guaranteeing Indian tribes the maximum return on their oil and gas leases. Moreover, Cotton maintains that the Federal and Tribal Governments, acting pursuant to the 1938 Act, its accompanying regulations, and the Jicarilla Apache Tribal Code, exercise comprehensive regulatory control over Cotton’s on-reservation activity. Cotton describes New Mexico’s responsibilities, in contrast, as “significantly limited.” Brief for Appellants 21. Thus, weighing the respective state, federal, and tribal interests, Cotton concludes that the New Mexico taxes unduly interfere with the federal interest in promoting tribal economic self-sufficiency and are not justified by an adequate state interest. We disagree.
The 1938 Act neither expressly permits state taxation nor expressly precludes it, but rather simply provides that “unallotted lands within any Indian reservation or lands owned by any tribe... may, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, be leased for mining purposes, by authority of the tribal council..., for terms not to exceed ten years and as long thereafter as minerals are produced in paying quantities.” 25 U. S. C. §396a. The Senate and House Reports that accompanied the Act, moreover — even when considered in their broadest possible terms — shed little light on congressional intent concerning state taxation of oil and gas produced on leased lands. See S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); H. R. Rep. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). Both Reports reflect that the proposed legislation was suggested by the Secretary and considered by the appropriate committees, which recommended that it pass without amendment. Beyond this procedural summary, the Reports simply rely on the Secretary’s letter of transmittal to describe the purpose of the Act. That letter provides that the legislation was intended, in light of the disarray of federal law in the area, “to obtain uniformity so far as practicable of the law relating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining purposes,” and, in particular, was designed to “bring all mineral leasing matters in harmony with the Indian Reorganization Act.” Id., at 1, 3; S. Rep. No. 985, supra, at 2, 3. In addition, the letter contains the following passage:
“It is not believed that the present law is adequate to give the Indians the greatest return from their property. As stated, present law provides for locating and taking mineral leases in the same manner as mining locations are made on the public lands of the United States; but there are disadvantages in following this procedure on Indian lands that are not present in applying for a claim on the public domain. For instance, on the public domain the discoverer of a mineral deposit gets extralateral rights and can follow the ore beyond the side lines indefinitely, while on the Indian lands under the act of June 30, 1919, he is limited to the confines of the survey markers not to exceed 600 feet by 1,500 feet in any one claim. The draft of the bill herewith would permit the obtaining of sufficient acreage to remove the necessity for extralateral rights with all of its attending controversies.” Id., at 2; H. R. Rep. No. 1872, supra, at 2 (emphasis added).
Relying on the first sentence in this paragraph, Cotton argues that the 1938 Act embodies a broad congressional policy of maximizing revenues for Indian tribes. Cotton finds support for this proposition in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U. S. 759 (1985). That case raised the question whether the 1938 Act authorizes state taxation of a tribe’s royalty interests under oil and gas leases issued to nonmembers. Applying the settled rule that a tribe may only be directly taxed by a State if “Congress has made its intention to [lift the tribe’s exemption] unmistakably clear,” id., at 765, we concluded that “the State may not tax Indian royalty income from leases issued pursuant to the 1938 Act,” id., at 768. In a footnote we added the observation that direct state taxation of Indian revenues would frustrate the 1938 Act’s purpose of “ensur[ing] that Indians receive ‘the greatest return from their property,’ [S. Rep. No. 985, supra, at] 2; H. R. Rep. No. 1872, supra, at 2.” Id., at 767, n. 5.
To the extent Cotton seeks to give the Secretary’s reference to “the greatest return from their property” talismanic effect, arguing that these words demonstrate that Congress intended to guarantee Indian tribes the maximum profit available without regard to competing state interests, it overstates its case. There is nothing remarkable in the proposition that, in authorizing mineral leases, Congress sought to provide Indian tribes with a profitable source of revenue. It is however quite remarkable, indeed unfathomable in our view, to suggest that Congress intended to remove all state-imposed obstacles to profitability by attaching to the Senate and House Reports a letter from the Secretary that happened to include the phrase “the greatest return from their property.” Read in the broadest terms possible, the relevant paragraph suggests that Congress sought to remove “disadvantages in [leasing mineral rights] on Indian lands that are not present in applying for a claim on the public domain.” S. Rep. No. 985, supra, at 2; H. R. Rep. No. 1872, supra, at 2. By 1938, however, it was established that oil and gas lessees of public lands were subject to state taxation. See Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 268 U. S. 45 (1925). It is thus apparent that Congress was not concerned with state taxation, but with matters such as the unavailability of extralateral mineral rights on Indian land. Nor do we read the Blackfeet footnote, 471 U. S., at 767, n. 5, to give the Secretary’s words greater effect. We think it clear that the footnote simply stands for the proposition that the Act’s purpose of creating a source of revenue for Indian tribes provides evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize direct state taxation of Indian royalties.
We thus agree that a purpose of the 1938 Act is to provide Indian tribes with badly needed revenue, but find no evidence for the further supposition that Congress intended to remove all barriers to profit maximization. The Secretary’s letter of transmittal, even when read permissively for broad policy goals and even when read to resolve ambiguities in favor of tribal independence, supports no more.
Our review of the legislation that preceded thé 1938 Act provides no additional support for Cotton’s expansive view of the Act’s purpose. This history is relevant in that it supplies both the legislative background against which Congress enacted the 1938 Act and the relevant “backdrop” of tribal independence. Congress first authorized mineral leasing on Indian lands in 1891. See Act of Feb. 28, 1891, §3, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U. S. C. §397 (1891 Act). That legislation, which empowered tribes to enter into grazing and mining leases, only applied to lands “occupied by Indians who have bought and paid for the same,” and was thus interpreted to be inapplicable to Executive Order reservations. See British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization of Montana, 299 U. S. 159, 161-162, 164 (1936). Mineral leasing on reservations created by Executive Order — like the Jicarilla Apache Reservation — was not authorized until almost four decades later. After years of debate concerning whether Indians had any right to share in royalties derived from oil and gas leases in Executive Order reservations, Congress finally enacted legislation in 1927 that authorized such leases. See Indian Oil Act of 1927, 44 Stat. (part 2) 1347, 25 U. S. C. §398a (1927 Act).
While both the 1891 and 1927 Acts were in effect, Gillespie was the prevailing law and, under its expansive view of intergovernmental tax immunity, States were powerless to impose severance taxes on oil produced on Indian reservations unless Congress expressly waived that immunity. Just two years after Gillespie was decided, Congress took such express action and authorized state taxation of oil and gas production in treaty reservations. See Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 244 (1924 Act), current version at 25 U. S. C. §398. See also British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, supra (applying 1924 Act to uphold state tax imposed on the production of oil and gas in the Blackfeet Indian Reservation). More significantly for purposes of this case, when Congress first authorized oil and gas leasing on Executive Order reservations in the 1927 Act, it expressly waived immunity from state taxation of oil and gas lessees operating in those reservations. See 44 Stat. (part 2) 1347, 25 U. S. C. § 398c. Thus, at least as to Executive Order reservations, state taxation of nonmember oil and gas lessees was the norm from the very start. There is, accordingly, simply no history of tribal independence from state taxation of these lessees to form a “backdrop” against which the 1938 Act must be read.
We are also unconvinced that the contrast between the 1927 Act’s express waiver of immunity and the 1938 Act’s silence on the subject suggests that Congress intended to repeal the waiver in the 1938 Act and thus to diametrically change course by implicitly barring state taxation. The general repealer clause contained in thé 1938 Act provides that “[a]ll Act[s] or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.” 52 Stat. 348. Although one might infer from this clause that all preceding, nonconflicting legislation in the area, like the 1927 Act’s waiver provision, is implicitly incorporated, we need not go so far to simply conclude that the 1938 Act’s omission demonstrates no congressional purpose to close the door to state taxation. Moreover, the contrast between the 1927 and 1938 Acts is easily explained by the contemporaneous history of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. In 1927, Gillespie prevailed, and States were only permitted to tax lessees of Indian lands if Congress expressly so provided. By the time the 1938 Act was enacted, however, Gillespie had been overruled and replaced by the modern rule permitting such taxes absent congressional disapproval. Thus, Congress’ approaches to both the 1927 and 1938 Acts were fully consistent with an intent to permit state taxation of nonmember lessees.
Cotton nonetheless maintains that our decisions in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U. S. 136 (1980), and Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U. S. 832 (1982), compel the conclusion that the New Mexico taxes are pre-empted by federal law. In pressing this argument, Cotton ignores the admonition included in both of those decisions that the relevant preemption test is a flexible one sensitive to the particular state, federal, and tribal interests involved. See id., at 838; Bracket, supra, at 145.
In Bracket, we addressed the question whether Arizona could impose its motor carrier license and use fuel taxes on a nonmember logging company’s use of roads located solely within an Indian reservation. Significantly, the roads at issue were “built, maintained, and policed exclusively by the Federal Government, the Tribe, and its contractors,” 448 U. S., at 150, and the State was “unable to identify any regulatory function or service [it] performed... that would justify the assessment of taxes for activities on Bureau and tribal roads within the reservation,” id., at 148-149. See also id., at 174 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The State has no interest in raising revenues from the use of Indian roads that cost it nothing and over which it exercises no control”). Moreover, it was undisputed in Bracket that the economic burden of the taxes ultimately fell on the Tribe. Id., at 151. Based on these facts and on our conclusion that collection of the taxes would undermine federal policy “in a context in which the Federal Government has undertaken to regulate the most minute details” of the Tribe’s timber operations, we held that the taxes were pre-empted. Id., at 149.
Ramah Navajo School Bd. involved a similar factual scenario. In the late 1960’s, New Mexico closed the only public high school that served the Ramah Navajo children. The State then sought to tax two nonmember construction firms hired by the Tribe to build a school in the reservation. As in Bracket, the State asserted no legitimate regulatory interest that might justify the tax. Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 843-846. Also as in Bracket, the economic burden of the tax ultimately fell on the Tribe. And finally, again as in Bracket, we noted that federal law imposed a comprehensive regulatory scheme. Ramah Navajo School Bd., 458 U. S., at 839-842. We concluded: “Having declined to take any responsibility for the education of these Indian children, the State is precluded from imposing an additional burden on the comprehensive federal scheme intended to provide this education — a scheme which has ‘left the State with no duties or responsibilities.’” Id., at 843 (quoting Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U. S. 685, 691 (1965)).
The factual findings of the New Mexico District Court clearly distinguish this case from both Bracket, supra, and Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra. After conducting a trial, that court found that “New Mexico provides substantial services to both the Jicarilla Tribe and Cotton,” costing the State approximately $3 million per year. App. to Juris. Statement 16. Indeed, Cotton concedes that from 1981 through 1985 New Mexico provided its operations with services costing $89,384, but argues that the cost of these services is disproportionate to the $2,293,953 in taxes the State collected from Cotton. Brief for Appellants 13-14. Neither Bracket, nor Ramah Navajo School Bd., however, imposes such a proportionality requirement on the States. Rather, both cases involved complete abdication or noninvolvement of the State in the on-reservation activity. The present case is also unlike Bracket and Ramah Navajo School Bd., in that the District Court found that “[n]o economic burden falls on the tribe by virtue of the state taxes,” App. to Juris. Statement 15, and that the Tribe could, in fact, increase its taxes without adversely affecting on-reservation oil and gas development, id., at 17. Finally, the District Court found that the State regulates the spacing and mechanical integrity of wells located on the reservation. Id., at 16. Thus, although the federal and tribal regulations in this case are extensive, they are not exclusive, as were the regulations in Bracket and Ramah Navajo School Bd.
We thus conclude that federal law, even when given the most generous construction, does not pre-empt New Mexico’s oil and gas severance taxes. This is not a case in which the State has had nothing to do with the on-reservation activity, save tax it. Nor is this a case in which an unusually large state tax has imposed a substantial burden on the Tribe. It is, of course, reasonable to infer that the New Mexico taxes have at least a marginal effect on the demand for on-reservation leases, the value to the Tribe of those leases, and the ability of the Tribe to increase its tax rate. Any impairment to the federal policy favoring the exploitation of on-reservation oil and gas resources by Indian tribes that might be caused by these effects, however, is simply too indirect and too insubstantial to support Cotton’s claim of pre-emption. To find pre-emption of state taxation in such indirect burdens on this broad congressional purpose, absent some special factor such as those present in Bracket and Ramah Navajo School Bd., would be to return to the pre-1937 doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. Any adverse effect on the Tribe’s finances caused by the taxation of a private party contracting with the Tribe would be ground to strike the state tax. Absent more explicit guidance from Congress, we decline to return to this long-discarded and thoroughly repudiated doctrine.
<J
Cotton also argues that New Mexico’s severance taxes — “insofar as they are imposed without allocation or apportionment on top of Jicarilla Apache tribal taxes” — impose “an unlawful multiple tax burden on interstate commerce.” Brief for Appellants 33. In support of this argument, Cotton relies on three facts: (1) that the State and the Tribe tax the same activity; (2) that the total tax burden on Cotton is higher than the burden on its off-reservation competitors who pay no tribal tax; and (3) that the state taxes generate revenues that far exceed the value of the services it provides on the reservation.
As we pointed out in the Merrion footnote, see n. 5, supra, a multiple taxation issue may arise when more than one State attempts to tax the same activity. If a unitary business derives income from several States, each State may only tax the portion of that income that is attributable to activity within its borders. See, e. g., Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 447 U. S. 207 (1980). Thus, in such a case, an apportionment formula is necessary in order to identify
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In early 1970, Clay L. Shaw filed a civil rights action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Four years later, before trial had commenced, Shaw died. The question presented is whether the District Court was required to adopt as federal law a Louisiana survivorship statute, which would have caused this action to abate, or was free instead to create a federal common-law rule allowing the action to survive. Resolution of this question turns on whether the state statute is “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 42 U. S. C. § 1988.
I
In 1969, Shaw was tried in a Louisiana state court on charges of having participated in a conspiracy to assassinate President John F. Kennedy. He was acquitted by a jury but within days was arrested on charges of having committed perjury in his testimony at the conspiracy trial. Alleging that these prosecutions were undertaken in bad faith, Shaw’s § 1983 complaint named as defendants the then District Attorney of Orleans Parish, Jim Garrison, and five other persons, including petitioner Willard E. Robertson, who was alleged to have lent financial support to Garrison’s investigation of Shaw through an organization known as “Truth or Consequences.” On Shaw’s application, the District Court enjoined prosecution of the perjury action, Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390 (1971), and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 467 F. 2d 113 (CA5 1972).
Since Shaw had filed an action seeking damages, the parties continued with discovery after the injunction issued. Trial was set for November 1974, but in August 1974 Shaw died. The executor of his estate, respondent Edward F. Wegmann (hereafter respondent), moved to be substituted as plaintiff, and the District Court granted the motion. Petitioner and other defendants then moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it had abated on Shaw’s death.
The District Court denied the motion to dismiss. It began its analysis by referring to 42 U. S. C. § 1988; this statute provides that, when federal law is “deficient” with regard to “suitable remedies” in federal civil rights actions, federal courts are to be governed by
“the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of [the] civil . . . cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”
The court found the federal civil rights laws to be “deficient in not providing for survival.” Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 1361 (1975). It then held that, under Louisiana law, an action like Shaw’s would survive only in favor of a spouse, children, parents, or siblings. Since no person with the requisite relationship to Shaw was alive at the time of his death, his action would have abated had state law been adopted as the federal rule. But the court refused to apply state law, finding it inconsistent with federal law, and in its place created “a federal common law of survival in civil rights actions in favor of the personal representative of the deceased.” Id., at 1368.
On an interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court first noted that all parties agreed that, “if Louisiana law applies, Shaw’s § 1983 claim abates.” 545 F. 2d 980, 982 (1977). Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals applied 42 U. S. C. § 1988, found federal law “deficient” with regard to survivorship, and held Louisiana law “inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes embodied in the Civil Rights Acts.” 545 F. 2d, at 983. It offered a number of justifications for creating a federal common-law rule allowing respondent to continue Shaw’s action: Such a rule would better further the policies underlying § 1983, 545 F. 2d, at 984r-985; would “foste[r] the uniform application of the civil rights laws,” id., at 985; and would be consistent with “[t]he marked tendency of the federal courts to allow actions to survive in other areas of particular federal concern,” ibid. The court concluded that, “as a matter of federal common law, a § 1983 action instituted by a plaintiff prior to his death survives in favor of his estate.” Id., at 987.
We granted certiorari, 434 U. S. 983 (1977), and we now reverse.
II
As both courts below held, and as both parties here have assumed, the decision as to the applicable survivorship rule is governed by 42 U. S. C. § 1988. This statute recognizes that in certain areas “federal law is unsuited or insufficient 'to furnish suitable remedies’ ”; federal law simply does not “cover every issue that may arise in the context of a federal civil rights action.” Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 703, 702 (1973), quoting 42 U. S. C. § 1988. When federal law is thus “deficient,” § 1988 instructs us to turn to “the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the [forum] State,” as long as these are “not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” See n. 1, supra. Regardless of the source of the law applied in a particular case, however, it is clear that the ultimate rule adopted under § 1988 “ 'is a federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is impaired.’ ” Moor v. County of Alameda, supra, at 703, quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 240 (1969).
As we noted in Moor v. County of Alameda, and as was recognized by both courts below, one specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to “the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.” 411 U. S., at 702 n. 14. State statutes governing the survival of state actions do exist, however. These statutes, which vary widely with regard to both the types of claims that survive and the parties as to whom survivorship is allowed, see W. Prosser, Law of Torts 900-901 (4th ed. 1971), were intended to modify the simple, if harsh, 19th-century common-law rule: “[A]n injured party’s personal claim was [always] extinguished . . . upon the death of either the injured party himself or the alleged wrongdoer.” Moor v. County of Alameda, supra, at 702 n. 14; see Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 67 (1913). Under § 1988, this state statutory law, modifying the common law, provides the principal reference point in determining survival of civil rights actions, subject to the important proviso that state law may not be applied when it is “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Because of this proviso, the courts below refused to adopt as federal law the Louisiana survivorship statute and in its place created a federal common-law rule.
Ill
In resolving questions of inconsistency between state and federal law raised under § 1988, courts must look not only at particular federal statutes and constitutional provisions, but also at “the policies expressed in [them].” Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., supra, at 240; see Moor v. County of Alameda, supra, at 703. Of particular importance is whether application of state law “would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action under consideration.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 465 (1975). The instant cause of action arises under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, one of the “Reconstruction civil rights statutes” that this Court has accorded “ 'a sweep as broad as [their] language.’ ” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 97 (1971), quoting United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 801 (1966).
Despite the broad sweep of § 1983, we can find nothing in the statute or its underlying policies to indicate that a state law causing abatement of a particular action should invariably be ignored in favor of a rule of absolute survivorship. The policies underlying § 1983 include compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal rights and prevention of abuses of power by those acting under color of state law. See, e. g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 254 (1978); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 238-242 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172-187 (1961). No claim is made here that Louisiana’s survivorship laws are in general inconsistent with these policies, and indeed most Louisiana actions survive the plaintiff’s death. See La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., Art. 428 (West 1960); La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2315 (West 1971). Moreover, certain types of actions that would abate automatically on the plaintiff’s death in many States — for example, actions for defamation and malicious prosecution — would apparently survive in Louisiana. In actions other than those for damage to property, however, Louisiana does not allow the deceased’s personal representative to be substituted as plaintiff; rather, the action survives only in favor of a spouse, children, parents, or siblings. See 391 F. Supp., at 1361-1363; La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2315 (West 1971); J. Wilton Jones Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 1970 and 1971) (en banc). But surely few persons are not survived by one of these close relatives, and in any event no contention is made here that Louisiana’s decision to restrict certain survivorship rights in this manner is an unreasonable one.
It is therefore difficult to see how any of § 1983’s policies would be undermined if Shaw’s action were to abate. The goal of compensating those injured by a deprivation of rights provides no basis for requiring compensation of one who is merely suing as the executor of the deceased’s estate. And, given' that most Louisiana actions survive the plaintiff’s death, the fact that a particular action might abate surely would not adversely affect § 1983’s role in preventing official illegality, at least in situations in which there is no claim that the illegality caused the plaintiff’s death. A state official contemplating illegal activity must always be prepared to face the prospect of a § 1983 action being filed against him. In light of this prospect, even an official aware of the intricacies of Louisiana survivorship law would hardly be influenced in his behavior by its provisions.
It is true that § 1983 provides “a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation.” Mitchum v. Foster, supra, at 239. That a federal remedy should be available, however, does not mean that a § 1983 plaintiff (or his representative) must be allowed to continue an action in disregard of the state law to which § 1988 refers us. A state statute cannot be considered “inconsistent” with federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. If success of the § 1983 action were the only benchmark, there would be no reason at all to look to state law, for the appropriate rule would then always be the one favoring the plaintiff, and its source would be essentially irrelevant. But § 1988 quite clearly instructs us to refer to state statutes; it does not say that state law is to be accepted or rejected based solely on which side is advantaged thereby. Under the circumstances presented here, the fact that Shaw was not survived by one of several close relatives should not itself be sufficient to cause the Louisiana survivorship provisions to be deemed “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 42 U. S. C. § 1988.
IY
Our holding today is a narrow one, limited to situations in which no claim is made that state law generally is inhospitable to survival of § 1983 actions and in which the particular application of state survivorship law, while it may cause abatement of the action, has no independent adverse effect on the policies underlying § 1983. A different situation might well be presented, as the District Court noted, if state law “did not provide for survival of any tort actions,” 391 F. Supp., at 1363, or if it significantly restricted the types of actions that survive. Cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S., at 258 (failure of common law to “recognize an analogous cause of action” is not sufficient reason to deny compensation to § 1983 plaintiff). We intimate no view, moreover, about whether abatement based on state law could be allowed in a situation in which deprivation of federal rights caused death. See supra, at 592, and n. 10; cf. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F. 2d 401 (CA5 1961) (deceased allegedly beaten to death by policemen; state survival law applied in favor of his widow and estate).
Here it is agreed that Shaw’s death was not caused by the deprivation of rights for which he sued under § 1983, and Louisiana law provides for the survival of most tort actions. Respondent’s only complaint about Louisiana law is that it would cause Shaw’s action to abate. We conclude that the mere fact of abatement of a particular lawsuit is not sufficient ground to declare state law “inconsistent” with federal law.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1988 provides in pertinent part:
“The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so- far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party -found guilty.”
The Court of Appeals held that this Court's decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), did not bar the enjoining of the state perjury prosecution, since the District Court’s “finding of a bad faith prosecution establishes irreparable injury both great and immediate for purposes of the comity restraints discussed in Younger." 467 F. 2d, at 122.
See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 25 (a)(1). As the Court of Appeals observed, this Rule “does not resolve the question [of] what law of survival of actions should be applied in this case. [It] simply describes the manner in which parties are to be substituted in federal court once it is determined that the applicable substantive law allows the action to survive a party’s death.” 545 F. 2d 980, 982 (CA5 1977) (emphasis in original).
The dissenting opinion argues that, despite this lack of coverage, “the laws of the United States” are not necessarily “[un] suitable” or “deficient in the provisions necessary.” 42 U. S. C. § 1988; see post, at 595. Both courts below found such a deficiency, however, and respondent here agrees with them. 545 F. 2d, at 983; Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 1358-1361 (1975); Brief for Respondent 6.
There is a survivorship provision in 42 U. S. C. § 1986, but this statute applies only with regard to “the wrongs . . . mentioned in [42 U. S. C.] section 1985.” Although Shaw’s complaint alleged causes of action under §§ 1985 and 1986, the District Court dismissed this part of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 391 F. Supp., at 1356, 1369-1371. These dismissals were not challenged on the interlocutory appeal and are not at issue here.
Section 1988’s reference to “the common law” might be interpreted as a reference to the decisional law of the forum State, or as a reference to the kind of general common law that was an established part of our federal jurisprudence by the time of § 1988’s passage in 1866, see Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842); cf. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S., at 702 n. 14 (referring to the survivorship rule “at common law”). The latter interpretation has received some judicial and scholarly support. See, e. g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F. 2d 74, 85-86, n. 10 (CA3 1965); Theis, Shaw v. Garrison: Some Observations on 42 U. S. C. § 1988 and Federal Common Law, 36 La. L. Rev. 681, 684-685 (1976). See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 258 n. 13 (1978). It makes no difference for our purposes which interpretation is the correct one, because Louisiana has a survivor-ship statute that, under the terms of § 1988, plainly governs this case.
An action for defamation abates on the plaintiff’s death in the vast majority of States, see W. Prosser, Law of Torts 900-901 (4th ed. 1971), and a large number of States also provide for abatement of malicious prosecution actions, see, e. g., Dean v. Shirer, 547 F. 2d 227, 229-230 (CA4 1976) (South Carolina law); Hall v. Wooten, 506 F. 2d 564, 569 (CA6 1974) (Kentucky law). See also 391 F. Supp., at 1364 n. 17. In Louisiana, an action for defamation or malicious prosecution would apparently survive (assuming that one of the relatives specified in La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2315 (West 1971), survives the deceased, as discussed in text infra); such an action seems not to fall into the category of “strictly personal” actions, La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., Art. 428 (West 1960), that automatically abate on the plaintiff’s death. See Johnson, Death on the Calíais Coach: The Mystery of Louisiana Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 37 La. L. Rev. 1, 6 n. 23, 52, and n. 252 (1976). See also Official Revision Comment (c) to La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., Art. 428.
For those actions that do not abate automatically on the plaintiff’s death, most States apparently allow the personal representative of the deceased to be substituted as plaintiff. See 391 F. Supp., at 1364, and n. 18.
The reasonableness of Louisiana’s approach is suggested by the fact that several federal statutes providing for survival take the same approach, limiting survival to specific named relatives. See, e. g., 33 U. S. C. § 908 (d) (1970 ed., Supp. V) (Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act); 45 U. S. C. § 59 (Federal Employers’ Liability Act). The approach taken by federal statutes in other substantive areas cannot, of course, bind a federal court in a § 1983 action, nor does the fact that a state survivorship statute may be reasonable by itself resolve the question whether it is “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 42 U. S. C. § 1988.
This does not, of course, preclude survival of a § 1983 action when such is allowed by state law, see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S., at 702-703, n. 14, nor does it preclude recovery by survivors who are suing under § 1983 for injury to their own interests.
In order to find even a marginal influence on behavior as a result of Louisiana’s survivorship provisions, one would have to make the rather farfetched assumptions that a state official had both the desire and the ability deliberately to select as victims only those persons who would die before conclusion of the § 1983 suit (for reasons entirely unconnected with the official illegality) and who would not be survived by any close relatives.
In addition to referring to the policies underlying § 1983, the Court of Appeals based its decision in part on the desirability of uniformity in the application of the civil rights laws and on the fact that the federal courts have allowed survival “in other areas of particular federal concern . . . where statutory guidance on the matter is lacking.” 545 F. 2d, at 985; see supra, at 588. With regard to the latter point, however, we do not find “statutory guidance . . . lacking”; § 1988 instructs us to turn to state laws, unless an “inconsistency” with federal law is found. While the courts below found such an inconsistency, we do not agree, as discussed in text supra, and henee the survivorship rules in areas where the courts are free to develop federal common law — without first referring to state law and finding an inconsistency — can have no bearing on our decision here. Similarly, whatever the value of nationwide uniformity in areas of civil rights enforcement where Congress has not spoken, in the areas to which § 1988 is applicable Congress has provided direction, indicating that state law will often provide the content of the federal remedial rule. This statutory reliance on state law obviously means that there will not be nationwide uniformity on these issues.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
After finding that the primary employer was not in commerce and ruling that the pre-emption rule of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, was therefore not applicable, the state court enjoined picketing at the premises of the secondary employer. The judgment must be reversed. The jurisdictional standards established by the National Labor Relations Board (see 23 N. L. R. B. Ann. Rep. 8 (1958)) may be satisfied by reference to the business operations of either the primary or the secondary employer. Truck Drivers Local No. 649, 93 N. L. R. B. 386; Teamsters Local No. 554, 110 N. L. R. B. 1769; Madison Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 134 N. L. R. B. 517. Here, as the record clearly shows, the secondary employer’s operations met the jurisdictional requirements. Since the union’s activities in this case were arguably an unfair labor practice, Sailors’ Union of the Pacific, 92 N. L. R. B. 547, the state court had no jurisdiction to issue the injunction. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236; Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question to be decided is whether a judgment in a class action determining that an employer did not engage in a general pattern or practice of racial discrimination against the certified class of employees precludes a class member from maintaining a subsequent civil action alleging an individual claim of racial discrimination against the employer.
On March 22, 1977, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission commenced a civil action against respondent, the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. Respondent operates a branch in Charlotte, N.. C. (the Bank), where during the years 1974-1978 it employed about 350-450 employees in several departments. The EEOC complaint alleged that the Bank was violating § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by engaging in “policies and practices” that included “failing and refusing to promote blacks because of race.” App. 9a.
Six months after the EEOC filed its complaint, four individual employees were allowed to intervene as plaintiffs. In their “complaint in intervention,” these plaintiffs alleged that the Bank's employment practices violated 42 U. S. C. § 1981, as well as Title VII; that each of them was the victim of employment discrimination based on race; and that they could adequately represent a class of black employees against whom the Bank had discriminated because of their race. In due course, the District Court entered an order conditionally certifying the following class pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 28(b)(2) and (3):
“All black persons who have been employed by the defendant at its Charlotte Branch Office at any time since January 3, 1974 [6 months prior to the first charge filed by the intervenors with EEOC], who have been discriminated against in promotion, wages, job assignments and terms and conditions of employment because of their race.”
After certifying the class, the District Court ordered that notice be published in the Charlotte newspapers and mailed to each individual member of the class. The notice described the status of the litigation, and plainly stated that members of the class “will be bound by the judgment or other determination” if they did not exclude themselves by sending a written notice to the Clerk. Among the recipients of the notice were Phyllis Baxter and five other individuals employed by the Bank. It is undisputed that these individuals — the Baxter petitioners — are members of the class represented by the intervening plaintiffs and that they made no attempt to exclude themselves from the class.
At the trial the intervening plaintiffs, as well as the Baxter petitioners, testified. The District Court found that the Bank had engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination from 1974 through 1978 by failing to afford black employees opportunities for advancement and assignment equal to opportunities afforded white employees in pay grades 4 and 5. Except as so specified, however, the District Court found that “there does not appear to be a pattern and practice of discrimination pervasive enough for the court to order relief.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 193a-194a. With respect to the claims of the four intervening plaintiffs, the court found that the Bank had discriminated against Cooper and Russell, but not against Moore and Hannah. Finally, the court somewhat cryptically stated that although it had an opinion about “the entitlement to relief of some of the class members who testified at trial,” it would defer decision of such matters to a further proceeding. Id., at 194a.
Thereafter, on March 24, 1981, the Baxter petitioners moved to intervene, alleging that each had been denied a promotion for discriminatory reasons. With respect to Emma Ruffin, the court denied the motion because she was a member of the class for which relief had been ordered and therefore her rights would be protected in the Stage II proceedings to be held on the question of relief. With respect to the other five Baxter petitioners, the court also denied the motion, but for a different reason. It held that because all of them were employed in jobs above the grade 5 category, they were not entitled to any benefit from the court’s ruling with respect to discrimination in grades 4 and 5. The District Court stated: “The court has found no proof of any classwide discrimination above grade 5 and, therefore, they are not entitled to participate in any Stage II proceedings in this case.” Id., at 287a. The court added that it could “see no reason why, if any of the would be intervenors are actively interested in pursuing their claims, they cannot file a Section 1981 suit next week . . . .” Id., at 288a.
A few days later the Baxter petitioners filed a separate action against the Bank alleging that each of them had been denied a promotion because of their race in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1981. The Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that each of them was a member of the class that had been certified in the Cooper litigation, that each was employed in a grade other than 4 or 5, and that they were bound by the determination that there was no proof of any classwide discrimination above grade 5. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, but certified its order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b). The Bank’s interlocutory appeal from the order was then consolidated with the Bank’s pending appeal in the Cooper litigation.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment on the merits in the Cooper litigation, concluding that (1) there was insufficient evidence to establish a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in grades 4 and 5, and (2) two of the intervening plaintiffs had not been discriminated against on account of race. EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F. 2d 633 (1983). The court further held that under the doctrine of res judicata, the judgment in the Cooper class action precluded the Baxter petitioners from maintaining their individual race discrimination claims against the Bank. The court thus reversed the order denying the Bank’s motion to dismiss in the Baxter action, and remanded for dismissal of the Baxter complaint. We granted certiorari to review that judgment, 464 U. S. 932 (1983), and we now reverse.
I — \ > — I
Claims of two types were adjudicated in the Cooper litigation. First, the individual claims of each of the four intervening plaintiffs have been finally decided in the Bank’s favor. Those individual decisions do not, of course, foreclose any other individual claims. Second, the class claim that the Bank followed “policies and practices” of discriminating against its employees has also been decided. It is that decision on which the Court of Appeals based its res judicata analysis.
There is of course no dispute that under elementary principles of prior adjudication a judgment in a properly entertained class action is binding on class members in any subsequent litigation. See, e. g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. B56 (1921); Restatement of Judgments § 86 (1942); Restatement (Second) of Judgments §41(l)(e) (1982); see also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(c)(3); see generally Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions — Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 555 (1938). Basic principles of res judicata (merger and bar or claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) apply. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff class extinguishes their claim, which merges into the judgment granting relief. A judgment in favor of the defendant extinguishes the claim, barring a subsequent action on that claim. A judgment in favor of either side is conclusive in a subsequent action between them on any issue actually litigated and determined, if its determination was essential to that judgment.
Ill
A plaintiff bringing a civil action for a violation of § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a), has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that his employer discriminated against him on account of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. A plaintiff meets this initial burden by offering evidence adequate to create an inference that he was denied an employment opportunity on the basis of a discriminatory criterion enumerated in Title VII.
A plaintiff alleging one instance of discrimination establishes a prima facie case justifying an inference of individual racial discrimination by showing that he (1) belongs to a racial minority, (2) applied and was qualified for a vacant position the employer was attempting to fill, (3) was rejected for the position, and (4) after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants of the plaintiff’s qualifications. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 (1973). Once these facts are established, the employer must produce “evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 254 (1981). At that point, the presumption of discrimination “drops from the case,” id., at 255, n. 10, and the district court is in a position to decide the ultimate question in such a suit: whether the particular employment decision at issue was made on the basis of race. United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 714-715 (1983); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S., at 253. The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff regarding the particular employment decision “remains at all times with the plaintiff,” ibid., and in the final analysis the trier of fact “must decide which party’s explanation of the employer’s motivation it believes.” United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S., at 716.
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co, 424 U. S. 747 (1976), the plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, alleged that the employer had engaged in a pervasive pattern of racial discrimination in various company policies, including the hiring, transfer, and discharge of employees. In that class action we held that demonstrating the existence of a discriminatory pattern or practice established a presumption that the individual class members had been discriminated against on account of race. Id., at 772. Proving isolated or sporadic discriminatory acts by the employer is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of a pattern or practice of discrimination; rather it must be established by a preponderance of the evidence that “racial discrimination was the company’s standard operating procedure — the regular rather than the unusual practice.” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 336 (1977) (footnote omitted). While a finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination itself justifies an award of prospective relief to the class, additional proceedings are ordinarily required to determine the scope of individual relief for the members of the class. Id., at 361.
The crucial difference between an individual’s claim of discrimination and a class action alleging a general pattern or practice of discrimination is manifest. The inquiry regarding an individual’s claim is the reason for a particular employment decision, while “at the liability stage of a pattern- or-practice trial the focus often will not be on individual hiring decisions, but on a pattern of discriminatory deci-sionmaking.” Id., at 360, n. 46. See generally Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 575, n. 7 (1978).
This distinction was critical to our holding in General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U. S. 147 (1982), that an individual employee’s claim that he was denied a promotion on racial grounds did not necessarily make him an adequate representative of a class composed of persons who had allegedly been refused employment for discriminatory reasons. We explained:
“Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individual’s claim that he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds, and his otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a class of persons who have suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the individual’s claim and the class claims will share common questions of law or fact and that the individual’s claim will be typical of the class claims. For respondent to bridge that gap, he must prove much more than the validity of his own claim. Even though evidence that he was passed over for promotion when several less deserving whites were advanced may support the conclusion that respondent was denied the promotion because of his national origin, such evidence would not necessarily justify the additional inferences (1) that this discriminatory treatment is typical of petitioner’s promotion practices, (2) that petitioner’s promotion practices are motivated by a policy of ethnic discrimination that pervades petitioner’s Irving division, or (3) that this policy of ethnic discrimination is reflected in petitioner’s other employment practices, such as hiring, in the same way it is manifested in the promotion practices.” Id., at 157-158.
After analyzing the particulars of the plaintiff’s claim in that case, we pointed out that if “one allegation of specific discriminatory treatment were sufficient to support an across-the-board attack, every Title VII case would be a potential companywide class action.” Id., at 159. We further observed:
“In this regard it is noteworthy that Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices, not an abstract policy of discrimination. The mere fact that an aggrieved private plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class of persons of the same race or national origin is insufficient to establish his standing to litigate on their behalf all possible claims of discrimination against a common employer.” Id., at 159, n. 15.
Falcon thus holds that the existence of a valid individual claim does not necessarily warrant the conclusion that the individual plaintiff may successfully maintain a class action. It is equally clear that a class plaintiff’s attempt to prove the existence of a companywide policy, or even a consistent practice within a given department, may fail even though discrimination against one or two individuals has been proved. The facts of this case illustrate the point.
The District Court found that two of the intervening plaintiffs, Cooper and Russell, had both established that they were the victims of racial discrimination but, as the Court of Appeals noted, they were employed in grades higher than grade 5 and therefore their testimony provided no support for the conclusion that there was a practice of discrimination in grades 4 and 5. Given the burden of establishing a prima facie case of a pattern or practice of discrimination, it was entirely consistent for the District Court simultaneously to conclude that Cooper and Russell had valid individual claims even though it had expressly found no proof of any classwide discrimination above grade 5. It could not be more plain that the rejection of a claim of classwide discrimination does not warrant the conclusion that no member of the class could have a valid individual claim. “A racially balanced work force cannot immunize an employer from liability for specific acts of discrimination.” Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S., at 579.
The analysis of the merits of the Cooper litigation by the Court of Appeals is entirely consistent with this conclusion. In essence, the Court of Appeals held that the statistical evidence, buttressed by expert testimony and anecdotal evidence by three individual employees in grades 4 and 5, was not sufficient to support the finding of a pattern of bankwide discrimination within those grades. It is true that the Court of Appeals was unpersuaded by the anecdotal evidence; it is equally clear, however, that it did not regard two or three instances of discrimination as sufficient to establish a general policy. It quite properly recognized that a “court must be wary of a claim that the true color of a forest is better revealed by reptiles hidden in the weeds than by the foliage of countless freestanding trees.” NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 934 (1982). Conversely, a piece of fruit may well be bruised without being rotten to the core.
The Court of Appeals was correct in generally concluding that the Baxter petitioners, as members of the class represented by the intervening plaintiffs in the Cooper litigation, are bound by the adverse judgment in that ease. The court erred, however, in the preclusive effect it attached to that prior adjudication. That judgment (1) bars the class members from bringing another class action against the Bank alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination for the relevant time period and (2) precludes the class members in any other litigation with the Bank from relitigating the question whether the Bank engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination against black employees during the relevant time period. The judgment is not, however, dispositive of the individual claims the Baxter petitioners have alleged in their separate action. Assuming they establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, the Bank will be required to articulate a legitimate reason for each of the challenged decisions, and if it meets that burden, the ultimate questions regarding motivation in their individual cases will be resolved by the District Court. Moreover, the prior adjudication may well prove beneficial to the Bank in the Baxter action: the determination in the Cooper action that the Bank had not engaged in a general pattern or practice of discrimination would be relevant on the issue of pretext. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S., at 804-805.
The Bank argues that permitting the Baxter petitioners to bring separate actions would frustrate the purposes of Rule 23. We think the converse is true. The class-action device was intended to establish a procedure for the adjudication of common questions of law or fact. If the Bank’s theory were adopted, it would be tantamount to requiring that every member of the class be permitted to intervene to litigate the merits of his individual claim.
It is also suggested that the District Court had a duty to decide the merits of the individual claims of class members, at least insofar as the individual claimants became witnesses in the joint proceeding and subjected their individual employment histories to scrutiny at trial. Unless these claims are decided in the main proceeding, the Bank argues that the duplicative litigation that Rule 23 was designed to avoid will be encouraged, and that defendants will be subjected to the risks of liability without the offsetting benefit of a favorable termination of exposure through a final judgment.
This argument fails to differentiate between what the District Court might have done and what it actually did. The District Court did actually adjudicate the individual claims of Cooper and the other intervening plaintiffs, as well as the class claims, but it pointedly refused to decide the individual claims of the Baxter petitioners. Whether the issues framed by the named parties before the court should be expanded to encompass the individual claims of additional class members is a matter of judicial administration that should be decided in the first instance by the District Court. Nothing in Rule 23 requires as a matter of law that the District Court make a finding with respect to each and every matter on which there is testimony in the class action. Indeed, Rule 23 is carefully drafted to provide a mechanism for the expeditious decision of common questions. Its purposes might well be defeated by an attempt to decide a host of individual claims before any common question relating to liability has been resolved adversely to the defendant. We do not find the District Court’s denial of the Baxter petitioners’ motion for leave to intervene in the Cooper litigation, or its decision not to make findings regarding the Baxter petitioners’ testimony in the Cooper litigation, to be inconsistent with Rule 23.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Marshall concurs in the judgment.
Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case.
The Bank is organized pursuant to a federal statute, 12 U. S. C. § 341, that enables it to sue and be sued, to appoint its own employees, and to define their duties.
Sylvia Cooper, Constance Russell, Helen Moore, and Elmore Hannah, Jr., sometimes referred to by the District Court as the “intervening plaintiffs” and by the parties as the “Cooper petitioners.” In our order granting certiorari, we declined to review two questions that were presented by these parties. 464 U. S. 932 (1983).
App. to Pet. for Cert. 200a (brackets in original). Certification was also sought for a class of female employees, but the District Court concluded that the evidence did not warrant the certification of a class with respect to the claims of sex discrimination. Id., at 200a, n. 1.
The actual text of the critical paragraphs of the notice read as follows:
“3. The class of persons who are entitled to participate in this action as members of the class represented by the plaintiff-intervenors, for whom relief may be sought in this action by the plaintiff-intervenors and who will be bound by the determination in this action is defined to include: all black persons who were employed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond at its Charlotte Branch Office at any time since January 3, 1974.
“4. If you fit in the definition of the class in paragraph 3 you are a class member. As a class member, you are entitled to pursue in this action any claim of racial discrimination in employment that you may have against the defendant. You need to do nothing further at this time to remain a member of the class. However, if you so desire, you may exclude yourself from the class by notifying the Clerk, United States District Court, as provided in paragraph 6 below. “5. If you decide to remain in this action, you should be advised that: the court will include you in the class in this action unless you request to be excluded from the class in writing; the judgment in this case, whether favorable or unfavorable to the plaintiff and the plaintiff-intervenors, will include all members of the class; all class members will be bound by the judgment or other determination of this action; and if you do not request exclusion, you may appear at the hearings and trial of this action through the attorney of your choice. “6. If you desire to exclude yourself from this action, you will not be bound by any judgment or other determination in this action and you will not be able to depend on this action to toll any statutes of limitations on any individual claims you may have against the defendant. You may exclude yourself from this action by notifying the Clerk in -writing that you do not desire to participate in this action. The Clerk’s address is: Clerk, United States District Court, Post Office Box 1266, Charlotte, North Carolina 28232.” App. 35a-37a.
In addition to Baxter, they were Brenda Gilliam, Glenda Knott, Emma Ruffin, Alfred Harrison, and Sherri MeCorkle. All of these individuals, sometimes referred to as the “Baxter petitioners,” stipulated that they received the notice. See id., at 95a.
As noted, n. 2, swpra, our limited grant of certiorari does not encompass the questions raised by the Cooper petitioners concerning the Court of Appeals’ disposition of the merits of their case.
Two of those claims were rejected by the District Court and two by the Court of Appeals: all four of those determinations are now equally final.
The District Court rejected all of the class claims except that pertaining to grades 4 and 5; the claim on behalf of that subclass was rejected by the Court of Appeals. Again, that distinction between subclasses is no longer significant for the entire class claim has now been decided.
Although Teamsters involved an action litigated on the merits by the Government as plaintiff under § 707(a) of the Act, it is plain that the elements of a prima facie pattern-or-practice case are the same in a private class action. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S., at 358-360.
The Court of Appeals wrote:
“In denying the motion the District Court stated that all intervenors ‘in grades higher than grade 5’ were not members of the class in whose favor the District Court had found ‘classwide discrimination.’ By this test, Cooper, Moore, Russell, Baxter, Gilliam, Knott and McCorkle were not members of the class in which discrimination was found and their testimony could not have been included within the District Court’s term ‘oral testimony of class members,’ complaining of promotion out of either pay grade 4 or pay grade 5; only the testimony of Ruffin and Harrison met that qualifying standard.” EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F. 2d 633, 644 (1983).
It wrote:
“The claim here is a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination against an entire group by treating it less favorably because of race. That is the typical disparate treatment case. This case should accordingly be properly treated as such. However, the result reached by us would not be substantially different whether the class action be considered as a disparate impact or a disparate treatment case.” Id., at 639.
“This case accordingly presents quite a contrast with Teamsters where the ‘oral testimony of class members’ demonstrated 40 cases of specific instances of discrimination in support of the statistical evidence offered by plaintiffs or with that in our own case of Chisholm v. United States Postal Service, 665 F. 2d 482, 495 (4th Cir. 1981), where there were 20 ‘class members’ testifying of individual discrimination. Here all we have is the testimony of but two class members testifying of individual discrimination in promotion out of either pay grade 4 or pay grade 5 on which a finding of discriminatory practices can be rested. This is even less of a presentation of oral testimony in support of a pattern of discrimination than that found wanting in Ste. Marie v. Eastern R. Ass’n., 650 F. 2d 395, 405-06 (2d Cir. 1981), where the Court declared that the small number of incidents of discrimination in promotion over a period of years in that case ‘would be insufficient to support the inference of a routine or regular practice of discrimination . . . ,’ or, in Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F. 2d 593, 597 (5th Cir. 1982), where the Court held that ‘even if all three witnesses’ accounts of racial discrimination were true, this evidence would not have been enough to prove a pattern or practice of company-wide discrimination by Conoco.’ It follows that these two incidents of failure to promote Ruffin or Harrison, even if regarded as discriminatory, (which we assume only arguendo), would not support the District Court’s finding of a pattern of class discrimination in promotions out of grades 4 and 5.” Id., at 643-644 (footnotes omitted).
We find the Bank’s contention that the District Court actually found against the Baxter petitioners on the basis of the testimony in the Cooper action wholly without merit.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
During petitioner's trial on state criminal charges, the courtroom was occupied by potential jurors and closed to the public for two days of the jury selection process. Defense counsel neither objected to the closure at trial nor raised the issue on direct review. And the case comes to the Court on the assumption that, in failing to object, defense counsel provided ineffective assistance.
In the direct review context, the underlying constitutional violation-the courtroom closure-has been treated by this Court as a structural error, i.e., an error entitling the defendant to automatic reversal without any inquiry into prejudice. The question is whether invalidation of the conviction is required here as well, or if the prejudice inquiry is altered when the structural error is raised in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
I
In 2003, a 15-year-old boy was shot and killed in Boston. A witness saw a young man fleeing the scene of the crime and saw him pull out a pistol. A baseball hat fell off of his head. The police recovered the hat, which featured a distinctive airbrushed Detroit Tigers logo on either side. The hat's distinctive markings linked it to 16-year-old Kentel Weaver. He is the petitioner here. DNA obtained from the hat matched petitioner's DNA.
Two weeks after the crime, the police went to petitioner's house to question him. He admitted losing his hat around the time of the shooting but denied being involved. Petitioner's mother was not so sure. Later, she questioned petitioner herself. She asked whether he had been at the scene of the shooting, and he said he had been there. But when she asked if he was the shooter, or if he knew who the shooter was, petitioner put his head down and said nothing. Believing his response to be an admission of guilt, she insisted that petitioner go to the police station to confess. He did. Petitioner was indicted in Massachusetts state court for first-degree murder and the unlicensed possession of a handgun. He pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.
The pool of potential jury members was large, some 60 to 100 people. The assigned courtroom could accommodate only 50 or 60 in the courtroom seating. As a result, the trial judge brought all potential jurors into the courtroom so that he could introduce the case and ask certain preliminary questions of the entire venire panel. Many of the potential jurors did not have seats and had to stand in the courtroom. After the preliminary questions, the potential jurors who had been standing were moved outside the courtroom to wait during the individual questioning of the other potential jurors. The judge acknowledged that the hallway was not "the most comfortable place to wait" and thanked the potential jurors for their patience. 2 Tr. II-103 (Apr. 10, 2006). The judge noted that there was simply not space in the courtroom for everybody.
As all of the seats in the courtroom were occupied by the venire panel, an officer of the court excluded from the courtroom any member of the public who was not a potential juror. So when petitioner's mother and her minister came to the courtroom to observe the two days of jury selection, they were turned away.
All this occurred before the Court's decision in Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010) (per curiam ). Presley made it clear that the public-trial right extends to jury selection as well as to other portions of the trial. Id., at 213-215, 130 S.Ct. 721. Before Presley, Massachusetts courts would often close courtrooms to the public during jury selection, in particular during murder trials.
In this case petitioner's mother told defense counsel about the closure at some point during jury selection. But counsel "believed that a courtroom closure for [jury selection] was constitutional." Crim. No. 2003-11293 (Super. Ct. Mass., Feb. 22, 2013), App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a. As a result, he "did not discuss the matter" with petitioner, or tell him "that his right to a public trial included the [jury voir dire ]," or object to the closure. Ibid.
During the ensuing trial, the government presented strong evidence of petitioner's guilt. Its case consisted of the incriminating details outlined above, including petitioner's confession to the police. The jury convicted petitioner on both counts. The court sentenced him to life in prison on the murder charge and to about a year in prison on the gun-possession charge.
Five years later, petitioner filed a motion for a new trial in Massachusetts state court. As relevant here, he argued that his attorney had provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the courtroom closure. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court recognized a violation of the right to a public trial based on the following findings: The courtroom had been closed; the closure was neither de minimis nor trivial; the closure was unjustified; and the closure was full rather than partial (meaning that all members of the public, rather than only some of them, had been excluded from the courtroom). The trial court further determined that defense counsel failed to object because of "serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention." Id., at 63a (quoting Massachusetts v. Chleikh, 82 Mass.App. 718, 722, 978 N.E.2d 96, 100 (2012) ). On the other hand, petitioner had not "offered any evidence or legal argument establishing prejudice." App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a. For that reason, the court held that petitioner was not entitled to relief.
Petitioner appealed the denial of the motion for a new trial to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. The court consolidated that appeal with petitioner's direct appeal. As noted, there had been no objection to the closure at trial; and the issue was not raised in the direct appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court then affirmed in relevant part. Although it recognized that "[a] violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial constitutes structural error," the court stated that petitioner had "failed to show that trial counsel's conduct caused prejudice warranting a new trial." 474 Mass. 787, 814, 54 N.E.3d 495, 520 (2016). On this reasoning, the court rejected petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
There is disagreement among the Federal Courts of Appeals and some state courts of last resort about whether a defendant must demonstrate prejudice in a case like this one-in which a structural error is neither preserved nor raised on direct review but is raised later via a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Some courts have held that, when a defendant shows that his attorney unreasonably failed to object to a structural error, the defendant is entitled to a new trial without further inquiry. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sherry, 586 F.3d 439, 447 (C.A.6 2009) ; Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64-65 (C.A.1 2007) ; Littlejohn v. United States, 73 A.3d 1034, 1043-1044 (D.C.2013) ; State v. Lamere, 327 Mont. 115, 125, 112 P.3d 1005, 1013 (2005). Other courts have held that the defendant is entitled to relief only if he or she can show prejudice. See, e.g., Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734, 738 (C.A.11 2006) ; United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 79-80 (C.A.2 2013) ; Reid v. State, 286 Ga. 484, 487, 690 S.E.2d 177, 180-181 (2010). This Court granted certiorari to resolve that disagreement. 580 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 809, 196 L.Ed.2d 595 (2017). The Court does so specifically and only in the context of trial counsel's failure to object to the closure of the courtroom during jury selection.
II
This case requires a discussion, and the proper application, of two doctrines: structural error and ineffective assistance of counsel. The two doctrines are intertwined; for the reasons an error is deemed structural may influence the proper standard used to evaluate an ineffective-assistance claim premised on the failure to object to that error.
A
The concept of structural error can be discussed first. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), this Court "adopted the general rule that a constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a conviction." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (citing Chapman,supra ). If the government can show "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained," the Court held, then the error is deemed harmless and the defendant is not entitled to reversal. Id., at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824.
The Court recognized, however, that some errors should not be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 23, n. 8, 87 S.Ct. 824. These errors came to be known as structural errors. See Fulminante, 499 U.S., at 309-310, 111 S.Ct. 1246. The purpose of the structural error doctrine is to ensure insistence on certain basic, constitutional guarantees that should define the framework of any criminal trial. Thus, the defining feature of a structural error is that it "affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds," rather than being "simply an error in the trial process itself." Id., at 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246. For the same reason, a structural error "def[ies] analysis by harmless error standards." Id., at 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The precise reason why a particular error is not amenable to that kind of analysis-and thus the precise reason why the Court has deemed it structural-varies in a significant way from error to error. There appear to be at least three broad rationales.
First, an error has been deemed structural in some instances if the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest. This is true of the defendant's right to conduct his own defense, which, when exercised, "usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant." McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177, n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). That right is based on the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Because harm is irrelevant to the basis underlying the right, the Court has deemed a violation of that right structural error. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149, n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006).
Second, an error has been deemed structural if the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure. For example, when a defendant is denied the right to select his or her own attorney, the precise "effect of the violation cannot be ascertained." Ibid. (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986) ). Because the government will, as a result, find it almost impossible to show that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," Chapman, supra, at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, the efficiency costs of letting the government try to make the showing are unjustified.
Third, an error has been deemed structural if the error always results in fundamental unfairness. For example, if an indigent defendant is denied an attorney or if the judge fails to give a reasonable-doubt instruction, the resulting trial is always a fundamentally unfair one. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-345, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (right to an attorney); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (right to a reasonable-doubt instruction). It therefore would be futile for the government to try to show harmlessness.
These categories are not rigid. In a particular case, more than one of these rationales may be part of the explanation for why an error is deemed to be structural. See e.g., id., at 280-282, 113 S.Ct. 2078. For these purposes, however, one point is critical: An error can count as structural even if the error does not lead to fundamental unfairness in every case. See Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, at 149, n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (rejecting as "inconsistent with the reasoning of our precedents" the idea that structural errors "always or necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair and unreliable" (emphasis deleted)).
B
As noted above, a violation of the right to a public trial is a structural error. See supra, at 1905, 1906 - 1907. It is relevant to determine why that is so. In particular, the question is whether a public-trial violation counts as structural because it always leads to fundamental unfairness or for some other reason.
In Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984), the state court prohibited the public from viewing a weeklong suppression hearing out of concern for the privacy of persons other than those on trial. See id., at 41-43, 104 S.Ct. 2210. Although it recognized that there would be instances where closure was justified, this Court noted that "such circumstances will be rare" and that the closure in question was unjustified. Id., at 45, 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210. Still, the Court did not order a new trial. Id., at 49-50, 104 S.Ct. 2210. Instead it ordered a new suppression hearing that was open to the public. Id., at 50, 104 S.Ct. 2210. If the same evidence was found admissible in that renewed pretrial proceeding, the Court held, no new trial as to guilt would be necessary. Ibid. This was despite the structural aspect of the violation.
Some 25 years after the Waller decision, the Court issued its per curiam ruling in Presley v. Georgia. 558 U.S. 209, 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675. In that case, as here, the courtroom was closed to the public during jury voir dire. Id., at 210, 130 S.Ct. 721. Unlike here, however, there was a trial objection to the closure, and the issue was raised on direct appeal. Id., at 210-211, 130 S.Ct. 721. On review of the State Supreme Court's decision allowing the closure, this Court expressed concern that the state court's reasoning would allow the courtroom to be closed during jury selection "whenever the trial judge decides, for whatever reason, that he or she would prefer to fill the courtroom with potential jurors rather than spectators." Id., at 215, 130 S.Ct. 721 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Court expressly noted that courtroom closure may be ordered in some circumstances, the Court also stated that it was "still incumbent upon" the trial court "to consider all reasonable alternatives to closure." Id., at 215-216, 130 S.Ct. 721.
These opinions teach that courtroom closure is to be avoided, but that there are some circumstances when it is justified. The problems that may be encountered by trial courts in deciding whether some closures are necessary, or even in deciding which members of the public should be admitted when seats are scarce, are difficult ones. For example, there are often preliminary instructions that a judge may want to give to the venire as a whole, rather than repeating those instructions (perhaps with unintentional differences) to several groups of potential jurors. On the other hand, various constituencies of the public-the family of the accused, the family of the victim, members of the press, and other persons-all have their own interests in observing the selection of jurors. How best to manage these problems is not a topic discussed at length in any decision or commentary the Court has found.
So although the public-trial right is structural, it is subject to exceptions. See Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2173, 2219-2222 (2014) (discussing situations in which a trial court may order a courtroom closure). Though these cases should be rare, a judge may deprive a defendant of his right to an open courtroom by making proper factual findings in support of the decision to do so. See Waller, supra, at 45, 104 S.Ct. 2210. The fact that the public-trial right is subject to these exceptions suggests that not every public-trial violation results in fundamental unfairness.
A public-trial violation can occur, moreover, as it did in Presley, simply because the trial court omits to make the proper findings before closing the courtroom, even if those findings might have been fully supported by the evidence. See 558 U.S., at 215, 130 S.Ct. 721. It would be unconvincing to deem a trial fundamentally unfair just because a judge omitted to announce factual findings before making an otherwise valid decision to order the courtroom temporarily closed. As a result, it would be likewise unconvincing if the Court had said that a public-trial violation always leads to a fundamentally unfair trial.
Indeed, the Court has not said that a public-trial violation renders a trial fundamentally unfair in every case. In the two cases in which the Court has discussed the reasons for classifying a public-trial violation as structural error, the Court has said that a public-trial violation is structural for a different reason: because of the "difficulty of assessing the effect of the error." Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S., at 149, n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2557 ; see also Waller, supra, at 49, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210.
The public-trial right also protects some interests that do not belong to the defendant. After all, the right to an open courtroom protects the rights of the public at large, and the press, as well as the rights of the accused. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 508-510, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) ; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-573, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980). So one other factor leading to the classification of structural error is that the public-trial right furthers interests other than protecting the defendant against unjust conviction. These precepts confirm the conclusion the Court now reaches that, while the public-trial right is important for fundamental reasons, in some cases an unlawful closure might take place and yet the trial still will be fundamentally fair from the defendant's standpoint.
III
The Court now turns to the proper remedy for addressing the violation of a structural right, and in particular the right to a public trial. Despite its name, the term "structural error" carries with it no talismanic significance as a doctrinal matter. It means only that the government is not entitled to deprive the defendant of a new trial by showing that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman, 386 U.S., at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824. Thus, in the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to "automatic reversal" regardless of the error's actual "effect on the outcome." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999).
The question then becomes what showing is necessary when the defendant does not preserve a structural error on direct review but raises it later in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. To obtain relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant as a general rule bears the burden to meet two standards. First, the defendant must show deficient performance-that the attorney's error was "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Second, the defendant must show that the attorney's error "prejudiced the defense." Ibid.
The prejudice showing is in most cases a necessary part of a Strickland claim. The reason is that a defendant has a right to effective representation, not a right to an attorney who performs his duties "mistake-free." Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S., at 147, 126 S.Ct. 2557. As a rule, therefore, a "violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not 'complete' until the defendant is prejudiced." Ibid.
(emphasis deleted); see also Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 128, 131 S.Ct. 733, 178 L.Ed.2d 649 (2011) ; Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 370, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).
That said, the concept of prejudice is defined in different ways depending on the context in which it appears. In the ordinary Strickland case, prejudice means "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 466 U.S., at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. But the Strickland Court cautioned that the prejudice inquiry is not meant to be applied in a "mechanical" fashion. Id., at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052. For when a court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on "the fundamental fairness of the proceeding." Ibid. Petitioner therefore argues that under a proper interpretation of Strickland, even if there is no showing of a reasonable probability of a different outcome, relief still must be granted if the convicted person shows that attorney errors rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. For the analytical purposes of this case, the Court will assume that petitioner's interpretation of Strickland is the correct one. In light of the Court's ultimate holding, however, the Court need not decide that question here.
As explained above, not every public-trial violation will in fact lead to a fundamentally unfair trial. See supra, at 1910. Nor can it be said that the failure to object to a public-trial violation always deprives the defendant of a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Thus, when a defendant raises a public-trial violation via an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Strickland prejudice is not shown automatically. Instead, the burden is on the defendant to show either a reasonable probability of a different outcome in his or her case or, as the Court has assumed for these purposes, see supra, at 1910 - 1911, to show that the particular public-trial violation was so serious as to render his or her trial fundamentally unfair.
Neither the reasoning nor the holding here calls into question the Court's precedents determining that certain errors are deemed structural and require reversal because they cause fundamental unfairness, either to the defendant in the specific case or by pervasive undermining of the systemic requirements of a fair and open judicial process. See Murray, A Contextual Approach to Harmless Error Review, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1791, 1813, 1822 (2017) (noting that the "eclectic normative objectives of criminal procedure" go beyond protecting a defendant from erroneous conviction and include ensuring " 'that the administration of justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested' " (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 869-870, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) )). Those precedents include Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S., at 278-279, 113 S.Ct. 2078 (failure to give a reasonable-doubt instruction); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (biased judge); and Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S., at 261-264, 106 S.Ct. 617 (exclusion of grand jurors on the basis of race). See Neder, supra, at 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (describing each of these errors as structural). This Court, in addition, has granted automatic relief to defendants who prevailed on claims alleging race or gender discrimination in the selection of the petit jury, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 145-146, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), though the Court has yet to label those errors structural in express terms, see, e.g., Neder, supra, at 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827. The errors in those cases necessitated automatic reversal after they were preserved and then raised on direct appeal. And this opinion does not address whether the result should be any different if the errors were raised instead in an ineffective-assistance claim on collateral review.
The reason for placing the burden on the petitioner in this case, however, derives both from the nature of the error, see supra, at 1910 - 1912, and the difference between a public-trial violation preserved and then raised on direct review and a public-trial violation raised as an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. As explained above, when a defendant objects to a courtroom closure, the trial court can either order the courtroom opened or explain the reasons for keeping it closed. See supra, at 1909 - 1910. When a defendant first raises the closure in an ineffective-assistance claim, however, the trial court is deprived of the chance to cure the violation either by opening the courtroom or by explaining the reasons for closure.
Furthermore, when state or federal courts adjudicate errors objected to during trial and then raised on direct review, the systemic costs of remedying the error are diminished to some extent. That is because, if a new trial is ordered on direct review, there may be a reasonable chance that not too much time will have elapsed for witness memories still to be accurate and physical evidence not to be lost. There are also advantages of direct judicial supervision. Reviewing courts, in the regular course of the appellate process, can give instruction to the trial courts in a familiar context that allows for elaboration of the relevant principles based on review of an adequate record. For instance, in this case, the factors and circumstances that might justify a temporary closure are best considered in the regular appellate process and not in the context of a later proceeding, with its added time delays.
When an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is raised in postconviction proceedings, the costs and uncertainties of a new trial are greater because more time will have elapsed in most cases. The finality interest is more at risk, see Strickland, 466 U.S., at 693-694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (noting the "profound importance of finality in criminal proceedings"), and direct review often has given at least one opportunity for an appellate review of trial proceedings. These differences justify a different standard for evaluating a structural error depending on whether it is raised on direct review or raised instead in a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
In sum, "[a]n ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial," thus undermining the finality of jury verdicts. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). For this reason, the rules governing ineffective-assistance claims "must be applied with scrupulous care." Premo, 562 U.S., at 122, 131 S.Ct. 733.
IV
The final inquiry concerns the ineffective-assistance claim in this case. Although the case comes on the assumption that petitioner has shown deficient performance by counsel, he has not shown prejudice in the ordinary sense, i.e., a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted him if his attorney had objected to the closure.
It is of course possible that potential jurors might have behaved differently if petitioner's family had been present. And it is true that the presence of the public might have had some bearing on juror reaction. But here petitioner offered no "evidence or legal argument establishing prejudice" in the sense of a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for counsel's failure to object. App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a; see Strickland, 466 U.S., at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
In other circumstances a different result might obtain. If, for instance, defense counsel errs in failing to object when the government's main witness testifies in secret, then the defendant might be able to show prejudice with little more detail. See ibid. Even in those circumstances, however, the burden would remain on the defendant to make the prejudice showing, id., at 694, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, because a public-trial violation does not always lead to a fundamentally unfair trial, see supra, at 1910.
In light of the above assumption that prejudice can be shown by a demonstration of fundamental unfairness, see supra, at 1910 - 1911, the remaining question is whether petitioner has shown that counsel's failure to object rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Strickland, supra, at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052 The Court concludes that petitioner has not made the showing. Although petitioner's mother and her minister were indeed excluded from the courtroom for two days during jury selection, petitioner's trial was not conducted in secret or in a remote place. Cf. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 269, n. 22, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). The closure was limited to the jury voir dire ; the courtroom remained open during the evidentiary phase of the trial; the closure decision apparently was made by court officers rather than the judge; there were many members of the venire who did not become jurors but who did observe the proceedings; and there was a record made of the proceedings that does not indicate any basis for concern, other than the closure itself.
There has been no showing, furthermore, that the potential harms flowing from a courtroom closure came to pass in this case. For example, there is no suggestion that any juror lied during voir dire ; no suggestion of misbehavior by the prosecutor, judge, or any other party; and no suggestion that any of the participants failed to approach their duties with the neutrality and serious purpose that our system demands.
It is true that this case comes here on the assumption that the closure was a Sixth Amendment violation. And it must be recognized that open trials ensure respect for the justice system and allow the press and the public to judge the proceedings that occur in our Nation's courts. Even so, the violation here did not pervade the whole trial or lead to basic unfairness.
In sum, petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for counsel's failure to object, and he has not shown that counsel's shortcomings led to a fundamentally unfair trial. He is not entitled to a new trial.
* * *
In the criminal justice system, the constant, indeed unending, duty of the judiciary is to seek and to find the proper balance between the necessity for fair and just trials and the importance of finality of judgments. When a structural error is preserved and raised on direct review, the balance is in the defendant's favor, and a new trial generally will be granted as a matter of right. When a structural error is raised in the context of an ineffective-assistance claim, however, finality concerns are far more pronounced. For this reason, and in light of the other circumstances present in this case, petitioner must show prejudice in order to obtain a new trial. As explained above, he has not made the required showing. The judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice GORSUCH joins, concurring.
I write separately with two observations about the scope of the Court's holding. First, this case comes to us on the parties' "assumption[s]" that the closure of the courtroom during jury selection "was a Sixth Amendment violation" and that "defense counsel provided ineffective assistance" by "failing to object" to it. Ante, at 1905, 1913. The Court previously held in a per curiam opinion-issued without the benefit of merits briefing or argument-that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to jury selection. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213, 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010) ; id., at 216, 130 S.Ct. 721 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). I have some doubts about whether that holding is consistent with the original understanding of the right to a public trial, and I would be open to reconsidering it in a case in which we are asked to do so.
Second, the Court "assume[s]," for the "analytical purposes of this case," that a defendant may establish prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has been judicially found to have violated the Fifth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in connection with the selection of sites for public housing in the city of Chicago. The issue before us is whether the remedial order of the federal trial court may extend beyond Chicago’s territorial boundaries.
I
This extended litigation began in 1966 when the respondents, six Negro tenants in or applicants for public housing in Chicago, brought separate actions on behalf of themselves and all other Negro tenants and applicants similarly situated against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and HUD. The complaint filed against CHA in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleged that between 1950 and 1965 substantially all of the sites for family public housing selected by CHA and approved by the Chicago City Council were “at the time of such selection, and are now,” located “within the areas known as the Negro Ghetto.” The respondents further alleged that CHA deliberately selected the sites to “avoid the placement of Negro families in white neighborhoods” in violation of federal statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment. In a companion suit against HUD the respondents claimed that it had “assisted in the carrying on and continues to assist in the carrying on of a racially discriminatory public housing system within the City of Chicago” by providing financial assistance and other support for CHA's discriminatory housing projects.
The District Court stayed the action against HUD pending resolution of the CHA suit. In February 1969, the court entered summary judgment against CHA on the ground that it had violated the respondents' constitutional rights by selecting public housing sites and assigning tenants on the basis of race. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907. Uncon-tradicted evidence submitted to the District Court established that the public housing system operated by CHA was racially segregated, with four overwhelmingly white projects located in white neighborhoods and with 99%% of the remaining family units located in Negro neighborhoods and 99% of those units occupied by Negro tenants. Id,., at 910. In order to prohibit future violations and to remedy the effects of past unconstitutional practices, the court directed CHA to build its next 700 family units in predominantly white areas of Chicago and thereafter to locate at least 75% of its new family public housing in predominantly white areas inside Chicago or in Cook County. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736, 738-739. In addition, CHA was ordered to modify its tenant-assignment and site-selection procedures and to use its best efforts to increase the supply of dwelling units as rapidly as possible in conformity with the judgment. Id., at 739-741.
The District Court then turned to the action against HUD. In September 1970, it granted HUD’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered the District Court to enter summary judgment for the respondents, holding that HUD had violated both the Fifth Amendment and § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, by knowingly sanctioning and assisting CPIA’s racially discriminatory public housing program. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F. 2d 731, 739-740.
On remand, the trial court addressed the difficult problem of providing an effective remedy for the racially segregated public housing system that had been created by the unconstitutional conduct of CHA and HUD. The court granted the respondents’ motion to consolidate the CHA and HUD cases and ordered the parties to formulate “a comprehensive plan to remedy the past effects of unconstitutional site selection procedures.” The order directed the parties to “provide the Court with as broad a range of alternatives as seem... feasible” including “alternatives which are not confined in their scope to the geographic boundary of the City of Chicago.” After consideration of the plans submitted by the parties and the evidence adduced in their support, the court denied the respondents’ motion to consider metropolitan area relief and adopted the petitioner’s proposed order requiring HUD to use its best efforts to assist CHA in increasing the supply of dwelling units and enjoining HUD from funding family public housing programs in Chicago that were inconsistent with the previous judgment entered against CHA. The court found that metropolitan area relief was unwarranted because “the wrongs were committed within the limits of Chicago and solely against residents of the City” and there were no allegations that “CHA and HUD discriminated or fostered racial discrimination in the suburbs.”
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with one judge dissenting, reversed and remanded the case for “the adoption of a comprehensive metropolitan area plan that will not only disestablish the segregated public housing system in the City of Chicago... but will increase the supply of dwelling units as rapidly as possible.” 503 F. 2d 930, 939. Shortly before the Court of Appeals announced its decision, this Court in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, had reversed a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that had approved a plan requiring the consolidation of 54 school districts in the Detroit metropolitan area to remedy racial discrimination in the operation of the Detroit public schools. Understanding Milliken “to hold that the relief sought there would be an impractical and unreasonable overresponse to a violation limited to one school district,” the Court of Appeals concluded that the Milliken decision did not bar a remedy extending beyond the limits of Chicago in the present case because of the equitable and administrative distinctions between a metropolitan public housing plan and the consolidation of numerous local school districts. 503 F. 2d, at 935-936. In addition, the appellate court found that, in contrast to Milli-ken, there was evidence of suburban discrimination and of the likelihood that there had been an “extra-city impact” of the petitioner's “intra-city discrimination.” Id., at 936-937, 939-940. The appellate court’s determination that a remedy extending beyond the city limits was both “necessary and equitable” rested in part on the agreement of the parties and the expert witnesses that “the metropolitan area is a single relevant locality for low rent housing purposes and that a city-only remedy will not work.” Id., at 936-937. HUD subsequently sought review in this Court of the permissibility in light of Milliken of “inter-district relief for discrimination in public housing in the absence of a finding of an inter-district violation.” We granted certio-rari to consider this important question. 421 U. S. 962.
II
In Milliken v. Bradley, supra, this Court considered the proper scope of a federal court’s equity decree in the context of a school desegregation case. The respondents in that case had brought an action alleging that the Detroit public school system was segregated on the basis of race as the result of official conduct and sought an order establishing “ 'a unitary, nonracial school system.’ ” 418 U. S., at 723. After finding that constitutional violations committed by the Detroit School Board and state officials had contributed to racial segregation in the Detroit schools, the trial court had proceeded to the formulation of a remedy., Although there had been neither proof of unconstitutional actions on the part of neighboring school districts nor a demonstration that the Detroit violations had produced significant segregative effects in those districts, the court established a desegregation panel and ordered it to prepare a remedial plan consolidating the Detroit school system and 53 independent suburban school districts. Id., at 733-734. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the desegregation order on the ground that, in view of the racial composition of the Detroit school system, the only feasible remedy required “the crossing of the boundary lines between the Detroit School District and adjacent or nearby school districts.” 484 F. 2d 215, 249. This Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the multidistrict remedy contemplated by the desegregation order was an erroneous exercise of the equitable authority of the federal courts.
Although the Milliken opinion discussed the many practical problems that would be encountered in the consolidation of numerous school districts by judicial decree, the Court’s decision rejecting the metropolitan area desegregation order was actually based on fundamental limitations on the remedial powers of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and state governmental entities. That power is not plenary. It “may be exercised ‘only on the basis of a constitutional violation.’ ” 418 U. S., at 738, quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 377. Once a constitutional violation is found, a federal court is required to tailor “the scope of the remedy” to fit “the nature and extent of the constitutional violation.” 418 U. S., at 744; Swann, supra, at 16. In Milliken, there was no finding of unconstitutional action on the part of the suburban school officials and no demonstration that the violations committed in the operation of the Detroit school system had had any significant segregative effects in the suburbs. See 418 U. S., at 745, 748. The desegregation order in Milliken requiring the consolidation of local school districts in the Detroit metropolitan area thus constituted direct federal judicial interference with local governmental entities without the necessary predicate of a constitutional violation by those entities or of the identification within them of any significant segregative effects resulting from the Detroit school officials’ unconstitutional conduct. Under these circumstances, the Court held that the interdistrict decree was impermissible because it was not commensurate with the constitutional violation to be repaired.
Since the Milliken decision was based on basic limitations on the exercise of the equity power of the federal courts and not on a balancing of particular considerations presented by school desegregation cases, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals erred in finding Milliken inapplicable on that ground to this public housing case. The school desegregation context of the Milliken case is nonetheless important to an understanding of its discussion of the limitations on the exercise of federal judicial power. As the Court noted, school district lines cannot be “casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience” because they separate independent governmental entities responsible for the operation of autonomous public school systems. 418 U. S., at 741-743. The Court’s holding that there had to be an interdistrict violation or effect before a federal court could order the crossing of district boundary lines reflected the substantive impact of a consolidation remedy on separate and independent school districts. The District Court’s desegregation order in Milliken was held to be an impermissible remedy not because it envisioned relief against a wrongdoer extending beyond the city in which the violation occurred but because it contemplated a judicial decree restructuring the operation of local governmental entities that were not implicated in any constitutional violation.
Ill
The question presented in this case concerns only the authority of the District Court to order HUD to take remedial action outside the city limits of Chicago. HUD does not dispute the Court of Appeals’ determination that it violated the Fifth Amendment and § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by knowingly funding CHA’s racially discriminatory family public housing program, nor does it question the appropriateness of a remedial order designed to alleviate the effects of past segregative practices by requiring that public housing be developed in areas that will afford respondents an opportunity to reside in desegregated neighborhoods. But HUD contends that the Milliken decision bars a remedy affecting its conduct beyond the boundaries of Chicago for two reasons. First, it asserts that such a remedial order would constitute the grant of relief incommensurate with the constitutional violation to be repaired. And, second, it claims that a decree regulating HUD’s conduct beyond Chicago’s boundaries would inevitably have the effect of “ consolidating] for remedial purposes” governmental units not implicated in HUD’s and CHA’s violations. We address each of these arguments in turn.
A
We reject the contention that, since HUD’s constitutional and statutory violations were committed in Chicago, Milliken precludes an order against HUD that will affect its conduct in the greater metropolitan area. The critical distinction between HUD and the suburban school districts in Milliken is that HUD has been found to have violated the Constitution. That violation provided the necessary predicate for the entry of a remedial order against HUD and, indeed, imposed a duty on the District Court to grant appropriate relief. See 418 U. S., at 744. Our prior decisions counsel that in the event of a constitutional violation “all reasonable methods be available to formulate an effective remedy,” North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46, and that every effort should be made by a federal court to employ those methods "to achieve the greatest possible degree of [relief], taking into account the practicalities of the situation.” Davis v. School Comm’rs of Mobile County, 402 U. S. 33, 37. As the Court observed in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education: "Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” 402 U. S., at 15.
Nothing in the Milliken decision suggests a per se rule that federal courts lack authority to order parties found to have violated the Constitution to undertake remedial efforts beyond the municipal boundaries of the city where the violation occurred. As we noted in Part II, supra, the District Court’s proposed remedy in Milliken was impermissible because of the limits on the federal judicial power to interfere with the operation of state political entities that were not implicated in unconstitutional conduct. Here, unlike the desegregation remedy found erroneous in Milliken, a judicial order directing relief beyond the boundary lines of Chicago will not necessarily entail coercion of uninvolved governmental units, because both CHA and HUD have the authority to operate outside the Chicago city limits.
In this case, it is entirely appropriate and consistent with Milliken to order CHA and HUD to attempt to create housing alternatives for the respondents in the Chicago suburbs. Here the wrong committed by HUD confined the respondents to segregated public housing. The relevant geographic area for purposes of the respondents’ housing options is the Chicago housing market, not the Chicago city limits. That HUD recognizes this reality is evident in its administration of federal housing assistance programs through “housing market areas” encompassing “the geographic area 'within which all dwelling units...’ are in competition with one another as alternatives for the users of housing.” Department of Housing and Urban Development, FHA Techniques of Housing Market Analysis 8 (Jan. 1970), quoting the Institute for Urban Land Use and Housing Studies, Housing Market Analysis: A Study of Theory and Methods, c. 2 (1953). The housing market area “usually extends beyond the city limits” and in the larger markets “may extend into several adjoining counties.” FHA Techniques of Housing Market Analysis, supra, at 12. An order against HUD and CHA regulating their conduct in the greater metropolitan area will do no more than take into account HUD’s expert determination of the area relevant to the respondents’ housing opportunities and will thus be wholly commensurate with the “nature and extent of the constitutional violation.” 418 U. S., at 744. To foreclose such relief solely because HUD’s constitutional violation took place within the city limits of Chicago would transform Milliken’s principled limitation on the exercise of federal judicial authority into an arbitrary and mechanical shield for those found to have engaged in unconstitutional conduct.
B
The more substantial question under Milliken is whether an order against HUD affecting its conduct beyond Chicago’s boundaries would impermissibly interfere with local governments and suburban housing authorities that have not been implicated in HUD’s unconstitutional conduct. In examining this issue, it is important to note that the Court of Appeals’ decision did not endorse or even discuss “any specific metropolitan plan” but instead left the formulation of the remedial plan to the District Court on remand. 503 F. 2d, at 936. On rehearing, the Court of Appeals characterized its remand order as one calling “for additional evidence and for further consideration of the issue of metropolitan area relief in light of this opinion and that of the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley.” Id., at 940. In the current posture of the case, HUD’s contention that any remand for consideration of a metropolitan area order would be impermissible as a matter of law must necessarily be based on its claim at oral argument “that court-ordered metropolitan relief in this case, no matter how gently it’s gone about, no matter how it’s framed, is bound to require HUD to ignore the safeguards of local autonomy and local political processes” and therefore to violate the limitations on federal judicial power established in Milliken. In addressing this contention we are not called upon, in other words, to evaluate the validity of any specific order, since no such order has yet been formulated.
HUD’s position, we think, underestimates the ability of a federal court to formulate a decree that will grant the respondents the constitutional relief to which they may be entitled without overstepping the limits of judicial power established in the Milliken case. HUD’s discretion regarding the selection of housing proposals to assist with funding as well as its authority under a recent statute to contract for low-income housing directly with private owners and developers can clearly be directed toward providing relief to the respondents in the greater Chicago metropolitan area without preempting the power of local governments by undercutting the role of those governments in the federal housing assistance scheme.
An order directing HUD to use its discretion under the various, federal housing programs to foster projects located in white areas of the Chicago housing market would be consistent with and supportive of well-established federal housing policy. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial discrimination in federally assisted programs including, of course, public housing programs. Based upon this statutory prohibition, HUD in 1967 issued site-approval rules for low-rent housing designed to avoid racial segregation and expand the opportunities of minority group members “to locate outside areas of [minority] concentration.” Department of Housing and Urban Development, Low-Rent Housing Manual, §205.1, ¶4g (Feb. 1967 rev.). Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 expressly directed the Secretary of HUD to “administer the programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further" the Act's fair housing policy. 82 Stat. 85, 42 U. S. C. §3608 (d)(5).
Among the steps taken by HUD to discharge its statutory duty to promote fair housing was the adoption of project-selection criteria for use in “eliminating clearly unacceptable proposals and assigning priorities in funding to assure that the best proposals are funded first.” HUD Evaluation of Rent Supplement Projects and Low-Rent Housing Assistance Applications, 37 Fed. Reg. 203. (1972). In structuring the minority housing opportunity component of the project-selection criteria, HUD attempted “to assure that building in minority areas goes forward only after there, truly exist housing opportunities for minorities elsewhere” in the housing market and to avoid encouraging projects located in substantially racially mixed areas. Id., at 204. See 24 CFR § 200.710 (1975). See generally Maxwell, HUD's Project Selection Criteria — A Cure for “Impermissible Color Blindness”?, 48 Notre Dame Law. 92 (1972). More recently, in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Congress emphasized the importance of locating housing so as to promote greater choice of housing opportunities and to avoid undue concentrations of lower income persons. See 88 Stat. 633, 42 U. S. C. §§ 5301 (c) (6), 5304 (a) (4) (A), (C) (ii) (1970 ed., Supp. IY); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1114, p. 8 (1974).
A remedial plan designed to insure that HUD will utilize its funding and administrative powers in a manner consistent with affording relief to the respondents need not abrogate the role of local governmental units in the federal housing-assistance programs. Under the major housing programs in existence at the time the District Court entered its remedial order pertaining to HUD, local housing authorities and municipal governments had to make application for funds or approve the use of funds in the locality before HUD could make housing-assistance money available. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1415 (7)(b), 1421b (a)(2). An order directed solely to HUD would not force unwilling localities to apply for assistance under these programs but would merely reinforce the regulations guiding HUD’s determination of which of the locally authorized projects to assist with federal funds.
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, amending the United States Housing Act of 1937, 88 Stat. 653, 42 U. S. C. § 1437 et seg. (1970 ed., Supp. IV), significantly enlarged HUD’s role in the creation of housing opportunities. Under the § 8 Lower-Income Housing Assistance program, which has largely replaced the older federal low-income housing programs, HUD may contract directly with private owners to make leased housing units available to eligible lower income persons. As HUD has acknowledged in this case, “local governmental approval is no longer explicitly required as a condition of the program’s applicability to a locality.” Brief for Petitioner 33-34. Regulations governing the § 8 program permit HUD to select “the geographic area or areas in which the housing is to be constructed,” 24 CFR § 880.203 (b) (1975), and direct that sites be chosen to “promote greater choice of housing opportunities and avoid undue concentration of assisted persons in areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons.” §§ 880.112 (d), 883.209 (a)(3). See §§ 880.112 (b), (c), 883.209 (a)(2), (b)(2). In most cases the Act grants the unit of local government in which the assistance is to be provided the right to comment on the application and, in certain specified circumstances, to preclude the Secretary of HUD from approving the application. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1439 (a)-(c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Use of the § 8 program to expand low-income housing opportunities outside areas of minority concentration would not have a coercive effect on suburban municipalities. For under the program, the local governmental units retain the right to comment on specific assistance proposals, to reject certain proposals that are inconsistent with their approved housing-assistance plans, and to require that zoning and other land-use restrictions be adhered to by builders.
In sum, there is no basis for the petitioner’s claim that court-ordered metropolitan area relief in this case would be impermissible as a matter of law under the Milliken decision. In contrast to the desegregation order in that case, a metropolitan area relief order directed to HUD would not consolidate or in any way restructure local governmental units. The remedial decree would neither force suburban governments to submit public housing proposals to HUD nor displace the rights and powers accorded local government entities under federal or state housing statutes or existing land-use laws. The order would have the same effect on the suburban governments as a discretionary decision by HUD to use its statutory powers to provide the respondents with alternatives to the racially segregated Chicago public housing system created by CHA and HUD.
Since we conclude that a metropolitan area remedy in this case is not impermissible as a matter of law, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court “for additional evidence and for further consideration of the issue of metropolitan area relief.” 503 F. 2d, at 940. Our determination that the District Court has the authority to direct HUD to engage in remedial efforts in the metropolitan area outside the city limits of Chicago should not be interpreted as requiring a metropolitan area order. The nature and scope of the remedial decree to be entered on remand is a matter for the District Court in the exercise of its equitable discretion, after affording the parties an opportunity to present their views.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding this case to the District Court is affirmed, but further proceedings in the District Court are to be consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The original complaint named the Housing Assistance Administration, then a corporate agency of HUD, as the defendant. Although the petitioner in this case is the current Secretary of HUD, this opinion uses the terms “petitioner” and “HUD” interchangeably.
The complaint sought to enjoin HUD from providing funds for 17 projects that had been proposed by CHA in 1965 and 1966 and from making available to CHA any other financial assistance to be used in connection with the racially discriminatory aspects of the Chicago public housing system. In addition, the respondents requested that they be granted “such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable.”
Before the stay of the action against HUD, the District Court had certified the plaintiff class in the CHA action and had rejected CHA's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the counts of the complaint alleging that CHA had intentionally selected public housing sites to avoid desegregating housing patterns. 265 F. Supp. 582.
CHA admitted that it had followed a policy of informally clearing proposed family public housing sites with the alderman in whose ward the proposed site was located and of eliminating each site opposed by the alderman. 296 F. Supp. 907, 910, 913. This procedure had resulted in the rejection of 99%% of the units proposed for sites in white areas which had been initially selected as suitable for public housing by CHA. Id., at 912.
With regard to tenant assignments, the court found that CHA had established a racial quota to restrict the number of Negro families residing in the four CHA family public housing projects located in white areas in Chicago. The projects, all built prior to 1944, had Negro tenant populations of 7%, 6%, 4%, and 1% despite the fact that Negroes composed about 90% of the tenants of CHA family housing units and a similar percentage of the waiting list. A CHA official testified that until 1968 the four projects located in white areas were listed on the Authority’s tenant-selection form as suitable for white families only. Id., at 909.
In July 1968, CHA had in operation or development 54 family housing projects with a total of 30,848 units. Statistics submitted to the District Court established that, aside from the four overwhelmingly white projects discussed in n. 4, supra, 92% of all of CHA’s family housing units were located in neighborhoods that were at least 75% Negro and that two-thirds of the units were situated in areas with more than 95% Negro residents. Id., at 910.
The District Court's remedial decree divided Cook County into a “General Public Housing Area” and a “Limited Public Housing Area.” The “Limited Public Housing Area” consisted of the area within census tracts having a 30% or more nonwhite population or within one mile of the boundary of any such census tract. The remainder of Cook County was included in the “General Public Housing Area.” 304 F. Supp., at 737. Following the commencement of construction of at least 700 family units in the General Public Housing Area of the city of Chicago, CHA was permitted by the terms of the order to locate up to one-third of its General Public Housing Area units in the portion of Cook County outside of Chicago. See id., at 738-739.
The Court of Appeals found that "HUD retained a large amount of discretion to approve or reject both site selection and tenant assignment procedures of the local housing authority” and that the Secretary had exercised those powers "in a manner which perpetuated a racially discriminatory housing system in Chicago.” 448 F. 2d, at 739. Although the appellate court stated that it was “fully sympathetic” with the “very real ‘dilemma’ ” presented by the need for public housing in Chicago, it ruled that the demand for housing did not justify “the Secretary’s past actions [which] constituted racially discriminatory conduct in their own right.” Ibid.
The court’s July 1969 order directing CHA to use its best efforts to increase public housing opportunities in white areas as rapidly as possible had not resulted in the submission of a single housing site to the Chicago City Council. A subsequent order directing the submission of sites for 1,600 units by September 20, 1970, had eventually prompted CHA to submit proposed sites in the spring of 1971, but inaction by the City Council had held up the approval of the sites required for their development. See Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366, 368.
The District Court subsequently took additional measures in an attempt to implement the remedial orders entered against CHA. In May 1971, the city of Chicago and HUD agreed to a letter of intent that provided that the city would process sites suitable for use by CHA to permit the Authority to commence acquisition of sites for 1,700 units in accordance with a specified timetable. HUD then released certain Model Cities funds on the condition that the City Council and CHA continue to show progress toward meeting the goals set forth in the May letter. After the city fell far behind schedule, the District Court granted the respondents’ request for an injunction directing HUD to withhold $26 million in Model Cities funds until the city remedied its existing deficit under the timetable. See id., at 368-370. The Court of Appeals reversed the injunction, holding that the District Court had abused its discretion in ordering funding cut off. 457 F. 2d 124.
Between July 1971 and April 1972, the City Council failed to conduct any hearings with respect to acquisition of property for housing sites and did not approve land acquisition for any sites. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 342 F. Supp. 827, 829. Following the filing of a supplemental complaint naming the mayor and the members of the City Council as defendants, the District Court found that their inaction had prevented CHA from providing relief in conformity with the court’s prior orders. In a further effort to effectuate relief, the court ruled that the provision of Illinois law requiring City Council approval of land acquisition by CHA “shall not be applicable to CHA’s actions... taken for the purpose of providing Dwelling Units.” Id., at 830. The Court of Appeals upheld this decision. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F. 2d 210.
Although CHA participated in the proceeding before the Court of Appeals, it did not seek review of that court's decision and has not participated in the proceedings in this Court.
Although the trial court’s desegregation order in Milliken did not direct the adoption of a specific metropolitan area plan, it did contain detailed guidelines for the panel appointed to draft the desegregation plan. 345 F. Supp. 914 (ED Mich.). The framework for the plan called for the division of the designated 54-school-district desegregation area into 15 clusters, each containing a part of the Detroit school system and two or more suburban districts. Within this framework, the court charged the panel with the responsibility for devising a plan that would produce the maximum actual desegregation. Id., at 918, 928-929. See 418 U. S., at 733-734.
The Court of Appeals interpreted the Milliken opinion as limited to a determination that, in view of the administrative complexities of school district consolidation and the deeply rooted tradition of local control of public schools, the balance of equitable factors weighed against metropolitan area school desegregation remedies. See 503 F. 2d, at 935-936. But the Court’s decision in Milliken was premised on a controlling principle governing the permissible scope of federal judicial power, a principle not limited to a school desegregation context. See 418 U. S., at 744.
In addition, the Court of Appeals surmised that either an inter-district violation or an interdistrict segregative effect may have been present in this case. There is no support provided for either conclusion. The sole basis of the appellate court’s discussion, of alleged suburban discrimination was the respondents’ Exhibit 11 illustrating the location of 12 public housing projects within the portion of the Chicago Urbanized Area outside the city limits of Chicago. That exhibit showed that 11 of the 12 projects were located in areas that, at the time of the hearing in November 1972, were within one mile of the boundary of a census tract with less than a 70% white population. The exhibit was offered to illustrate the scarcity of integrated public housing opportunities for the plaintiff class and for lower income white families and to indicate why the respondents did not "expect cooperation from the suburban areas” in providing housing alternatives in predominately white areas. In discussing the data underlying the exhibit, counsel for the respondents in the trial court expressly attempted to avoid the “possible misconception” that he was then asserting that the suburban municipalities and housing authorities were “guilty of any discrimination or wrongdoing.” In view of the purpose for which the exhibit was offered and the District Court’s determination that “the wrongs were committed within the limits of Chicago,” it is apparent that the Court of Appeals was mistaken in supposing that the exhibit constitutes evidence of suburban discrimination justifying metropolitan area relief.
In its brief opinion on rehearing, the Court of Appeals asserted that “it is reasonable to conclude from the record” that the intra-city violation “may well have fostered racial paranoia and encouraged the ‘white flight’ phenomenon which has exacerbated the problems of achieving integration.” 503 F. 2d, at 939-940. The Court of Appeals’ speculation about the effects of the discriminatory site selection in Chicago is contrary both to expert testimony in the record and the conclusions of the District Court. Such unsupported speculation falls far short of the demonstration of a “significant segregative effect in another district” discussed in the Milliken opinion. See 418 U. S., at 745.
The Court in Milliken required either a showing of an inter-district violation or a significant segregative effect “[b]efore the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes.” Id., at 744. In its amicus memorandum in Milliken, the United States argued that an interdistrict remedy in that case would require “the restructuring of state or local government entities” and result in “judicial interference with state prerogatives concerning the organization of local governments.”
Although the State of Michigan had been found to have committed constitutional violations contributing to racial segregation in the Detroit schools, 418 U. S., at 734-735, n. 16, the Court in Milliken concluded that the interdistrict order was a wrongful exercise of judicial power because prior cases had established that such violations are to be dealt with in terms of "an established geographic and administrative school system,” id., at 746, and because the State's educational structure vested substantial independent control over school affairs in the local school districts. See id., at 742-744. In Milliken, a consolidation order directed against the State would of necessity have abrogated the rights and powers of the suburban school districts under Michigan law. See id., at 742 n. 20. Here, by contrast, a metropolitan area remedy involving HUD need not displace the rights and powers accorded suburban governmental entities under federal or state law. See Part III-B, infra.
Illinois statutes permit a city housing authority to exercise its powers within an “
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to consider two questions concerning the remedial powers of federal district courts in school desegregation cases, namely, whether a District Court can, as part of a desegregation decree, order compensatory or remedial educational programs for schoolchildren who have been subjected to past acts of de jure segregation, and whether, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court can require state officials found responsible for constitutional violations to bear part of the costs of those programs.
I
This case is before the Court for the second time, following our remand, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I); it marks the culmination of seven years of litigation over de jure school segregation in the Detroit public school system. For almost six years, the litigation has focused exclusively on the appropriate remedy to correct official acts of racial discrimination committed by both the Detroit School Board and the State of Michigan. No challenge is now made by the State" oFihelocal school board to the prior findings of de jure segregation.
A
In the first stage of the. remedy proceedings, which we reviewed in Milliken I, supra, the District Court, after reviewing several “Detroit-only” desegregation plans, concluded that an interdistrict plan was required to “ 'achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation... [so that] no school, grade or classroom [would be] substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil racial composition.’ ” 3451. Supp. 914, 918 (ED Mich. 1972), quoted in Milliken I, supra, at 734. On those premises, the District Court ordered the parties to submit plans for “metropolitan desegregation” and appointed a nine-member panel to formulate a desegregation plan, which would encompass a “desegregation area” consisting of 54 school districts,
. In June 1973, a divided Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, upheld, 484 F. 2d 215 (CA6), the District Court’s determination that a metropolitanwide plan was essential to bring about what the District Court had described as “the greatest degree of actual desegregation....” 345 F. Supp., at 918. We reversed, holding that the order exceeded appropriate limits of federal equitable authority as defined in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 24 (1971), by concluding that “as a matter of substantive constitutional right, [a] particular degree of racial balance” is required, and by subjecting other school districts, uninvolved with and unaffected by any constitutional violations, to the court’s remedial powers. Milliken I, supra. Proceeding from the Swann standard “that the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation,” we held that, on the record before us, there was no interdistrict violation calling for an interdistrict remedy. Because the District Court’s “metropolitan remedy” went beyond the constitutional violation, we remanded the case for further proceedings “leading to prompt formulation of a decree directed to eliminating the segregation found to exist in the Detroit city schools, a remedy which has been delayed since 1970.” 418 U. S., at 753.
B
Due to the intervening death of Judge Stephen J. Roth, who had presided over the litigation from the outset, the case on remand was reassigned to Judge Robert E. DeMascio. Judge DeMascio promptly ordered respondent Bradley and the Detroit Board to submit desegregation plans limited to the Detroit school system. On April 1, 1975, both parties submitted their proposed plans. Respondent Bradley’s plan was limited solely to pupil reassignment; the proposal called for extensive transportation of students to achieve the plan’s ultimate goal of assuring that every school within the district reflected, within 15 percentage points, the racial ratio of the school district as a whole. In contrast to respondent Bradley’s proposal, the Detroit Board’s plan provided for sufficient pupil reassignment to eliminate “racially identifiable white elementary schools,” while ensuring that “every child will spend at least a portion of his education in either a neighborhood elementary school or a neighborhood junior and senior high school.” 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1116 (1975). By eschewing racial ratios for each school, the Board’s plan contemplated transportation of fewer students for shorter distances than respondent Bradley’s proposal.
In addition to student reassignments, the Board’s plan called for implementation of 13 remedial or compensatory programs, referred to in the record as “educational components.” These compensatory programs, which were proposed in addition to the plan’s provisions for magne/Lschools and vocational high schools, included three of the four components at issue in ’this 'case — in-service training for teachers and administrators, guidance and counseling programs, and revised testing procedures. Pursuant to the District Court’s direction, the State Board of Education on April 21, 1975, submitted a critique of the Detroit Board’s desegregation plan; in its report, the State Board opined that, although “[i]t is possible that none of the thirteen ‘quality education’ components is essential... to correct the constitutional violation...,” 8 of the 13 proposed programs nonetheless deserved special consideration in the desegregation setting. Of particular relevance here, the State Board said:
“Within the context of effectuating a pupil desegregation plan, the in-service training [and] guidance and counseling... components appear to deserve special emphasis.” 4 Record, Doc. 591, pp. 38-39.
After receiving the State Board’s critique, the District Court conducted extensive hearings on the two plans over a two-month period. Substantial testimony was adduced with respect to the proposed educational components, including testimony by petitioners’ expert witnesses. Based on this evidence and on reports of court-appointed experts, the District Court on August 11, 1975, approved, in principle, the Detroit Board’s inclusion of remedial and compensatory educational components in the desegregation plan.
“We find that the majority of the educational com- / ponents included in the Detroit Board plan are essential / for a school district undergoing desegregation. While it is ¡ true that the delivery of quality desegregated educational | services is the obligation of the school board, nevertheless ’t this court deems it essential to mandate educational com- \ ponents where they are needed to remedy effects of past \ segregation, to assure a successful desegregative effort and \ to minimize the possibility of resegregation.” 402 F. \^upp., at 1118.
The District Court expressly found that the two components of testing and counseling, as then administered in Detroit’s schools, were infected with the discriminatory bias of a segregated school system:
“In a segregated setting many techniques deny equal protection to black students, such as discriminatory testing [and] discriminatory counseling... Ibid.
The District Court also found that, to make desegregation work, it was necessary to include remedial reading programs and in-service training for teachers and administrators:
“In a system undergoing desegregation, teachers will require orientation and training for desegregation.... Additionally, we find that... comprehensive reading programs are essential... to a successful desegregative effort.” Ibid.
Having established these general principles, the District Court formulated several “remedial guidelines” to govern the Detroit Board’s development of a final plan. Declining “to substitute its authority for the authority of elected state and local officials to decide which educational components are beneficial, to the school community,” id., at 1145, the District Judge laid down the following guidelines with respect to each of the four educational components at issue here:
(a) Reading. Concluding that “[t]here is no educational component more directly associated with the process of desegregation than reading,” id., at 1138, the District Court directed the General Superintendent of Detroit’s schools to institute a remedial reading and communications skills program “[t]o eradicate the effects of past discrimination....” Ibid. The content of the required program was not prescribed by the court; rather, formulation and implementation of the program was left to the Superintendent and to a committee to be selected by him.
(b) In-Service Training. The court also directed the Detroit Board to formulate a comprehensive in-service teacher training program, an element “essential to a system undergoing desegregation.” Id,., at 1139. In the District Court’s view, an in-service training program for teachers and administrators, to tram professional and instructional personnel to cope with the desegregation process in Detroit, would tend to ensure that all students in a desegregated system would be treated equally by teachers and administrators able, by virtue of special training, to cope with special problems presented by desegregation, and thereby facilitate Detroit’s conversion to a unitary system.
(c) Testing. Because it found, based on record evidence, that Negro children “are especially affected by biased testing procedures,” the District Court determined that, frequently, minority students in Detroit were adversely affected by discriminatory testing procedures. Unless the school system’s tests were administered in a way “free from racial, ethnic and cultural bias,” the District Court concluded that Negro children in Detroit might thereafter be impeded in their educar tional growth. Id., at 1142. Accordingly, the court directed the Detroit Board and the State Department of Education to institute a testing program along the lines proposed by the local school board in its original desegregation plan. Ibid.
(d) Counseling and Career Guidance. Finally, the District Court addressed what expert witnesses had described as psychological pressures on Detroit’s students in a system undergoing desegregation. Counselors were required, the court concluded, both to deal with the numerous problems and tensions arising in the change from Detroit’s dual system, and, more concretely, to counsel students concerning the new vocational and technical school programs available under the plan through the cooperation of state and local officials.
Nine months later, on May 11, 1976, the District' Court A entered its final order. Emphasizing that it had “been careful to order only what is essential for a school district undergoing desegregation,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 117a, the court ordered the Detroit Board and the state defendants to institute comprehensive programs as to the four educational components by the start of the September 1976 school term. The cost of these four programs, the court concluded, was to be equally borne by the Detroit School Board and the State. To / carry out this cost sharing, the court directed the local board to calculate its highest budget allocation in any prior year for/ the several educational programs and, from that base, any/ excess cost attributable to the desegregation plan was to be paid equally by the two groups of defendants responsible for prior constitutional violations, i. e., the Detroit Board and the state defendants.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order concerning the implementation of and cost sharing for the four educational components. 540 F. 2d 229 (1976). The Court of Appeals expressly approved the District Court’s findings as to the necessity for these compensatory programs:
“This finding... is not clearly erroneous, but to the contrary is supported by ample evidence.
“The need for in-service training of the educational staff and development of nondiscriminatory testing is obvious. The former is needed to insure that the teachers and administrators will be able to work effectively in a desegregated environment. The latter is needed to insure that students are not evaluated unequally because of built-in bias in the tests administered in formerly segregated schools.
“We agree with the District Court that the reading and counseling programs are essential to the effort to combat the effects of segregation.
“Without the reading and counseling components, black students might be deprived of the motivation and achievement levels which the desegregation remedy is designed to accomplish.” Id., at 241.
After reviewing the record, the Court of Appeals confirmed that the District Court relied largely on the Detroit School Board in formulating the decree:
“This is not a situation where the District Court ‘appears to have acted solely according to its own notions of good educational policy unrelated to the demands of the Constitution.’ ” Id., at 241-242, quoting Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 521 F. 2d 465, 483 (CA10 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1066 (1976).
After upholding the remedial-components portion of the plan, the Court of Appeals went on to affirm the District Court’s allocation of costs between the state and local officials. Analyzing this Court’s decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), which reaffirmed the rule that the Eleventh Amendment bars an ordinary suit for money damages against the State without its consent, the Court of Appeals held:
“[The District Court’s order] imposes no money judgment on the State of Michigan for past de jure segregation practices. Rather, the order is directed toward the State defendants as a part of a prospective plan to comply with a constitutional requirement to eradicate all vestiges of de jure segregation.” 540 F. 2d, at 245. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further consideration of the three central city regions untouched by the District Court’s pupil reassignment plan. See n. 12, supra.
The state defendants then sought review in this Court, challenging only those portions of the District Court’s comprehensive remedial order dealing with the four educational components and with the State’s obligation to defray the costs of those programs. We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 958 (1976), and we affirm.
II
This Court has not previously addressed directly the question whether federal courts can order remedial education programs as part of a school desegregation decree. However, the general principles governing our resolution of this issue are well settled by the prior decisions of this Court. In the first case concerning federal courts’ remedial powers in eliminating de jure school segregation, the Court laid down the basic rule which governs to this day: “In fashioning and effectuating the [desegregation] decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles.” Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II).
A
Application of those “equitable principles,” we have held, requires federal courts to focus upon three factors. In the first place, like other equitable remedies, the nature of the desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S., at 16. The remedy must therefore be related to “the condition alleged to offend the Constitution....” Milliken I, 418 U. S., at 738. Second, the decree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it must be designed as nearly as possible “to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.” Id., at 746. Third, the federal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution. In Brown II the Court squarely held that “[sjchool authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems... 349 U. S., at 299. (Emphasis supplied.) If, however, “school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations... judicial authority may be invoked.” Swann, supra, at 15. Once invoked, “the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” Ibid.
B
In challenging the order before us, petitioners do not specifically question that the District Court’s mandated programs are designed, as nearly as practicable, to restore the schoolchildren of Detroit to the position they would have enjoyed absent constitutional violations by state and local officials. And, petitioners do not contend, nor could they, that the prerogatives of the Detroit School Board have been abrogated by the decree, since of course the Detroit School Board itself proposed incorporation of these programs in the first place. Petitioners’ sole contention is that, under Swann, the District Court’s order exceeds the scope of the constitutional violation. Invoking our holding in Milliken I, petitioners claim that, since the constitutional violation found by the District Court was the unlawful segregation of students on the basis of race, the, court’s decree must be-limited to remedying unlawful pupil assignments. This contention misconceives the principle petitioners seek to invoke, and we reject their argument.
The well-settled principle that the nature and scope of the remedy axe to be determined by the violation means simply that federal-court decrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself. Because of this inherent limitation upon federal judicial authority, federal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or does not flow from such a violation, see Pasadena Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976), or if they are imposed upon governmental units that were neither involved in nor affected by the constitutional violation, as in Milliken I, supra. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U. S. 284, 292-296 (1976). But where, as here, a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy does not “exceed” the violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the “ ‘condition that offends the Constitution.' ” Milliken I, supra, at 738. (Emphasis supplied.)
The “condition” offending the Constitution is Detroit's de jure segregated school system, which was so pervasively and persistently segregated that the District Court found that the need for the educational components flowed directly from constitutional violations by both state and local officials. These specific educational remedies, although normally left to the discretion of the elected school board and professional educators, were deemed necessary to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have enjoyed in terms of education had these four components been provided in a nondiscriminatory manner in a school system free from pervasive de jure racial segregation.
In the first case invalidating a de jure system, a unanimous Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown /): “Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” And in United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U. S. 225 (1969), the Court concerned itself not with pupil assignment, but with the desegregation of faculty and staff as part of the process of dismantling a dual system. In doing so, the Court, there speaking through Mr. Justice Black, focused on the reason for judicial concerns going beyond pupil assignment: “The dispute... deals with faculty and staff desegregation, a goal that we have recognized to be an important aspect of the basic task of achieving a public school system wholly free from racial discrimination.” Id., at 231-232. (Emphasis supplied.)
Montgomery County therefore stands firmly for the proposition that matters other than pupil assignment must on occasion be addressed by federal courts to eliminate the effects of prior segregation. Similarly, in Swann we reaffirmed the principle laid down in Green v. County School Bd., 391 U. S. 430 (1968), that “existing policy and practice with regard to faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities were among the most important indicia of a segregated system.” 402 U. S., at 18. In a word, discriminatory student assignment policies can themselves manifest and breed other inequalities built into a dual system founded on racial discrimination. Federal courts need not, and cannot, close their eyes to inequalities, shown by the record, which flow from a longstanding segregated system.
C
In light of the mandate of Brown I and Brown II, federal courts have, over the years, often required the inclusion of remedial programs in desegregation plans to overcome the inequalities inherent in dual school systems. In 1966, for example, the District Court for the District of South Carolina directed the inclusion of remedial courses to overcome the effects of a segregated system:
“Because the weaknesses of a dual school system may have already affected many children, the court would be remiss in its duty if any desegregation plan were approved which did not provide for remedial education courses. They shall be included in the plan.” Miller v. School District 2, Clarendon County, S. C., 256 F. Supp. 370, 377 (1966).
In 1967, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, then engaged in overseeing the desegregation of numerous school districts in the South, laid down the following requirement in an en banc decision:
“The defendants shall-provide remedial education programs which permit students attending or who have previously attended segregated schools to overcome past inadequacies in their education.” United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F. 2d 385, 394, cert. denied, 389 U. S. 840 (1967). (Emphasis supplied.)
See also Stell v. Board of Public Education of Savannah, 387 F. 2d 486, 492, 496-497 (CA5 1967); Hill v. Lafourche Parish School Board, 291 F. Supp. 819, 823 (ED La. 1967); Redman v. Terrebonne Parish School Board, 293 F. Supp. 376, 379 (ED La. 1967); Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458, 489 (MD Ala. 1967); Graves v. Walton County Board of Education, 300 F. Supp. 188, 200 (MD Ga. 1968), aff’d, 410 F. 2d 1153 (CA5 1969). Two years later, the Fifth Circuit again adhered to the rule that district courts could properly seek to overcome the built-in inadequacies of a segregated educational system:
“The trial court concluded that the school board must establish remedial programs to assist students who previously attended all-Negro schools when those students transfer to formerly all-white schools.... The remedial programs... are an integral part of a program for compensatory education to be provided Negro students who have long been disadvantaged by the inequities and discrimination inherent in the dual school system. The requirement that the School Board institute remedial programs so far as they are feasible is a proper exercise of the court’s discretion.” Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F. 2d 817, 831 (1969). (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same year the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana required school authorities to come forward with a remedial educational program as part of a desegregation plan. “ 'The defendants shall provide remedial education programs which permit students... who have previously attended all-Negro schools to overcome past inadequacies in their education.’ ” Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, 302 F. Supp. 106, 110 (1969), aff’d, 448 F. 2d 414 (CA5 1971). See also Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 304 F. Supp. 244, 253 (ED La. 1969); Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, 302 F. Supp. 362, 367 (ED La. 1969).
In the 1970’s, the pattern has been essentially the same. The Fifth Circuit has, when the fact situation warranted, continued to call for remedial education programs in desegregation plans. E. g., United States v. Texas, 447 F. 2d 441, 448 (1971), stay denied sub nom. Edgar v. United States, 404 U. S. 1206 (1971) (Black, J., in chambers). To that end, the approved plan in United States v. Texas required:
''[Curriculum offerings and programs shall include specific educational programs designed to compensate minority group children for unequal educational opportunities resulting from past or present racial and ethnic isolation....” 447 F. 2d, at 448.
See also George v. O’Kelly, 448 F. 2d 148, 150 (CA5 1971). And, as school desegregation litigation emerged in other regions of the country, federal courts have likewise looked in part to remedial programs, when the record supported an order to that effect. See, e. g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 235 (Mass. 1975), aff’d, 530 F. 2d 401 (CA1), cert. denied sub nom. White v. Morgan, 426 U. S. 935 (1976); Hart v. Community School Board of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699, 757 (EDNY 1974), aff’d, 512 F. 2d 37 (CA2 1975); cf. Booker v. Special School Dist. 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 351 F. Supp. 799 (Minn. 1972).
Finally, in addition to other remedial programs, which could, if circumstances warranted, include programs to remedy deficiencies, particularly in reading and communications skills, federal courts have expressly ordered special in-service training for teachers, see, e. g., United States v. Missouri, 523 F. 2d 885, 887 (CA8 1975); Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, supra, at 110; Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, supra, at 253, and have altered or even suspended testing programs employed by school systems undergoing desegregation. See, e. g., Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F. 2d 1211, 1219 (CA5 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1032 (1970); Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 444 F. 2d 1400, 1401 (CA5 1971); Arvizu v. Waco Independent School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 1264 (WD Tex. 1973), rev’d in part on other issues, 495 F. 2d 499 (CA5 1974).
Our reference to these cases is not to be taken as necessarily approving holdings not reviewed by this Court. However, they demonstrate that the District Court in the case now before us did not break new ground in approving the School Board’s proposed plan. Quite the contrary, acting on abundant evidence in this record, the District Court approved a remedial plan going beyond mere pupil assignments, as expressly approved by Swann and Montgomery County. In so doing, the District Court was adopting specific programs proposed by local school authorities, who must be presumed to be familiar with the problems and the needs of a system undergoing desegregation.
We do not, of course, imply that the order here is a blueprint for other cases. That cannot be; in school desegregation cases, “[t]here is no universal answer to complex problems... ; there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case.” Green, 391 U. S., at 439. On this record, however, we are bound to conclude that the decree before us was aptly tailored to remedy the consequences of the constitutional violation. Children who have been thus educationally and culturally set apart from the larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes reflecting their cultural isolation. They are likely to acquire speech habits, for example, which vary from the environment in which they must ultimately function and compete, if they are to enter and be a part of that community. This is not peculiar to race; in this setting, it can affect any children who, as a group, are isolated by force of law from the mainstream. Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974).
Pupil assignment alone does not automatically remedy the impact of previous, unlawful educational isolation; the consequences linger and can be dealt with only by independent measures. In short, speech habits acquired in a segregated system do not vanish simply by moving the child to a desegregated school. The root condition shown by this record must be treated directly by special training at the hands of teachers prepared for that task. This is what the District Judge in the case drew from the record before him as to the consequences of Detroit’s de jure system, and we cannot conclude that the remedies decreed exceeded the scope of the violations found.
Nor do we find any other reason to believe that the broad and flexible equity powers of the court were abused in this case. The established role of local school authorities was maintained inviolate, and the remedy is indeed remedial, The order does not punish anyone, nor does it impair or jeopardize the educational system in Detroit. The District Court, in short, was true to the principle laid down in Brown II:
“In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power.” 349 U. S., at 300 (footnotes omitted).
Ill
Petitioners also contend that the District Court’s order, even if otherwise proper, violates the Eleventh Amendment. In their view, the requirement that the state defendants pay one-half the additional costs attributable to the four educational components is, “in practical effect, indistinguishable from an award of money damages against the state based upon the asserted prior misconduct of state officials.” Brief for Petitioners 34. Arguing from this premise, petitioners conclude that the “award” in this case is barred under this Court’s holding in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974).
Edelman involved a suit for money damages against the State, as well as for prospective injunctive relief. The suit was brought by an individual who claimed that Illinois officials had improperly withheld disability benefit payments from him and from the members of his class. Applying traditional Eleventh Amendment principles, we held that the suit was barred to the extent the suit sought “the award of an accrued monetary liability...” which represented “retroactive payments.” Id., at 663-664. (Emphasis supplied.) Conversely, the Court held that the suit was proper to the extent it sought “payment of state funds... as a necessary consequence of compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question determination....” Id., at 668. (Emphasis supplied.)
The decree to share the future costs of educational components in this case fits squarely within the prospective-compliance exception reaffirmed by Edelman. That exception, which had its genesis in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), permits federal courts to enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to requirements of federal law, notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury. 415 U. S., at 667. The order challenged here does no more than that. The decree requires state officials, held responsible for unconstitutional conduct, in findings which are not challenged, to eliminate a de jure segregated school system. More precisely, the burden of state officials is that set forth in Swann — -to take the necessary steps “to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.” 402 U. S., at 15. The educational components, which the District Court ordered into effect prospectively, are plainly designed to wipe out continuing conditions of inequality produced by the inherently unequal dual school system long maintained by Detroit.
These programs were not, and as a practical matter could not be, intended to wipe the slate clean by one bold stroke, as could a retroactive award of money in Edelman. Rather, by the nature of the antecedent violation, which on this record caused significant deficiencies in communications skills— reading and speaking — the victims of Detroit’s de jure segregated system will continue to experience the effects of segregation until such future time as the remedial programs can help dissipate the continuing effects of past misconduct. Reading and speech deficiencies cannot be eliminated by judicial fiat; they will require time, patience, and the skills of specially trained teachers. That the programs are also “compensatory” in nature does not change the fact that they are part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits of a unitary school system. We therefore hold that such prospective relief is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Finally, there is no merit to petitioners’ claims that the relief ordered here violates the Tenth Amendment and general principles of federalism. The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). Nor are principles of federalism abrogated by the decree. The District Court has neither attempted to restructure local governmental entities nor to mandate a particular method or structure of state or local financing. Cf. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). The District Court has, rather, properly enforced the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment consistent with our prior holdings, and in a manner that does not jeopardize the integrity of the structure or functions of state and local government.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Affirmed.
The violations of the Detroit Board of Education, which included the improper use of optional attendance zones, racially based transportation of schoolchildren, improper creation and alteration of attendance zones, grade structures, and feeder school patterns, are described in the District Court’s initial “Ruling on Issue of Segregation.” 338 F. Supp. 582, 587-588 (ED Mich. 1971). The District Court further found that “[t]he State and its agencies... have acted directly to control and maintain the pattern of segregation in the Detroit schools.” Id., at 589. Indeed, when the Detroit School Board attempted to voluntarily initiate an intradistriet remedy to ameliorate the effect of the past segregation practices, the Michigan Legislature enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of this remedy. Those conclusions as to liability were affirmed on appeal, 484 F. 2d 215, 221-241 (CA6 1973), and were not challenged in this Court. 418 U. S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I).
Separate opinions were filed in Milliken I. Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring, stated that the metropolitanwide remedy contemplated by the District Court was “in error for the simple reason that the remedy... was not commensurate with the constitutional violation found.” 418 U. S., at 764. Dissenting opinions were filed by Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall. The dissenting opinions took the position, in brief, that the remedy was appropriate, given the State’s undisputed
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners brought two separate class actions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against respondent Director of the Michigan Department of Social Services, claiming that respondent’s calculations of benefits under the federal Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program violated certain provisions of that federal law. Before a final determination on the merits of either case could be made, Congress amended the relevant statutory provisions. It is undisputed that respondent’s calculations thereafter have conformed to federal law. Notwithstanding this fact, petitioners claim that they were entitled to have the District Court award them both “notice relief” and a declaration that respondent’s prior conduct violated federal law. The District Court denied petitioners both forms of relief, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. We now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and applicable principles governing the issuance of declaratory judgments forbid the award of either form of relief.
The two class actions involved in this case were brought on behalf of recipients of benefits disbursed under the AFDC program. See 42 U. S. C. §§601-615. The AFDC program uses a person’s earned income in determining eligibility for, and the amount of, benefits. See §602. The complaints alleged that certain of respondent’s policies and regulations violated 42 U. S. C. § 1983 by inflating their respective class members’ earned income and thereby causing a reduction or termination of AFDC benefits contrary to the applicable federal law.
One putative class challenged respondent’s policy of prohibiting the deduction of child care costs in the calculation of earned income. While the case was pending in the District Court, Congress changed the relevant provisions of the AFDC program to expressly require participating States to deduct child care expenses up to a specified amount. Respondent thereafter brought state policy into compliance with this amendment and began deducting child care expenses in the calculation of earned income. There is no claim that respondent’s current child care deduction policy violates federal law.
The other putative class challenged respondent’s policy of automatically including stepparents’ income in the calculation of earned income. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing respondent from enforcing its automatic inclusion policy. But again, while the matter was pending on the merits, Congress amended the relevant section of the AFDC program to expressly require States to include stepparent income in the calculation of earned income. The parties thereafter stipulated that the District Court should terminate its preliminary injunction as of the effective date of the amendment. Here, too, there is no claim that respondent has not complied with federal law since that time.
The District Court granted respondent’s motions to dismiss in each case. It held in each that the changes in federal law rendered moot the claims for prospective relief, and that the remaining claims for declaratory and notice relief related solely to past violations of federal law. Such retrospective relief, the court determined, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a consolidated appeal. Banas v. Dempsey, 742 F. 2d 277 (1984). It agreed that the changes in federal law rendered moot the claims for prospective relief. Id., at 281-283. It also agreed that because the sought-after notice and declaratory relief was retrospective in nature, the relief was barred by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). 742 F. 2d, at 286-288. It reasoned that when there is no prospective relief to which notice can be ancillary, even notice of the sort approved in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), cannot escape the Eleventh Amendment bar. 742 F. 2d, at 287-288. Declaratory relief is similarly barred under such circumstances, it explained, because such relief could relate solely to past violations of federal law. Id., at 288.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits over whether federal courts may order the giving of notice of the sort approved in Quern v. Jordan, supra, or issue a declaratory judgment that state officials violated federal law in the past when there is no ongoing violation of federal law. The decision by the Court of Appeals in this case agrees with the result in Colbeth v. Wilson, 554 F. Supp. 539 (Vt. 1982), aff’d, 707 F. 2d 57 (CA2 1983) (per curiam), but it conflicts with the decisions in Appleyard v. Wallace, 754 F. 2d 955, 959-963 (CA11 1985); Randall v. Lukhard, 729 F. 2d 966 (CA4) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 872 (1984); Beltran v. Myers, 701 F. 2d 91, 94 (CA9) (per curiam), cert. denied, 462 U. S. 1134 (1983); and Silva v. Vowell, 621 F. 2d 640, 650-654 (CA5 1980), which all allowed notice relief even though changes in state policy or federal law rendered moot any claim for injunctive relief stopping ongoing violations of federal law. We now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Eleventh Amendment confirms that “the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III.” Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 98 (1984). Because of the Eleventh Amendment, States may not be sued in federal court unless they consent to it in unequivocal terms or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity. Id., at 99. The landmark case of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), created an exception to this general principle by asserting that a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s action in enforcing state law is not one against the State. Id., at 159-160. The theory of Young was that an unconstitutional statute is void, id., at 159, and therefore does not “impart to [the official] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.” Id., at 160. Young also held that the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent federal courts from granting prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law. Id., at 155-156, 159. We have refused to extend the reasoning of Young, however, to claims for retrospective relief. See Pennhurst, supra, at 102-103; Quern v. Jordan, supra, at 337; Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 668.
Both prospective and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh Amendment concerns, but the availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law. See Pennhurst, supra, at 102. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267 (1977). But compensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment. Petitioners concede that any claim they might have had for the specific type of injunctive relief approved in Ex parte Young was rendered moot by the amendments to the AFDC program. They nevertheless seek “notice relief” of the type approved in Quern v. Jordan, arguing that notice is an independent form of prospective relief protected against the Eleventh Amendment bar by Ex parte Young. In taking this position, we think petitioners misconceive our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and our decision in Quern.
Quern was the last chapter in the litigation that initially gave rise to Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The plaintiffs in that litigation challenged a State’s administration of the federal-state program for Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled (AABD). The District Court issued a declaratory judgment that current state regulations governing the administration of the program violated federal regulations then in effect. It therefore permanently enjoined the state officials from continuing to violate federal law. Although the language of the declaratory judgment was no broader than necessary to complement the injunction against the current violation of federal law, it implied that the defendants had violated federal law in the past. The District Court therefore issued a second injunction ordering the defendants to release and remit all AABD benefits that they had wrongfully withheld on account of their past violations of federal law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F. 2d 985 (CA7 1973), but we reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the injunction ordering retroactive benefits because it was effectively an award of money damages for past violations of federal law. Edelman v. Jordan, 451 U. S., at 666-669.
On remand, the District Court ordered the defendants to send notice to the plaintiff class informing individual class members that they were wrongfully denied benefits in a particular amount, together with a returnable form for filing claims with the appropriate state agency. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court’s proposed notice violated the Eleventh Amendment because it would effectively result in a federal adjudication of state liability for past violations of federal law. Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F. 2d 873, 875 (CA7 1977) (en banc). At the same time, the Court of Appeals determined that the Eleventh Amendment would not bar an order requiring state officials to send “a mere explanatory notice to applicants advising them that there is a state administrative procedure available if they desire to have the state determine whether or not they may be eligible for past benefits.” Ibid.
We affirmed in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), holding that although Edelman v. Jordan, supra, retained continuing vitality after Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), see 440 U. S., at 338-345, the specific notice order approved by the Court of Appeals did not violate the Eleventh Amendment. Id., at 346-349. We explained that the appellate court’s particular notice order fell “on the Ex parte Young side of the Eleventh Amendment line rather than on the Edelman side.” Id., at 347. We reasoned that “unlike [the notice] ordered by the District Court, [this notice was] more properly viewed as ancillary to the prospective relief already ordered by the court,” id., at 349, and it did no more than “simply infor[m] class members that their federal suit is at an end, that the federal court can provide them with no further relief, and that there are existing state administrative procedures which they may wish to pursue.” Ibid. We also stressed that the state defendants had not objected to the expense of providing such notice, state agencies rather than federal courts would be the final arbiters of whether retroactive payments would be ordered, and the notice would not automatically lead to any particular action. Id., at 347-348.
Our review of the long, drawn-out Jordan litigation convinces us that neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court conceived of the requested notice allowed in that case to be an independent form of relief. We simply held that the specific order fell within the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment principle of sovereign immunity because it was ancillary to a valid injunction previously granted and was sufficiently narrow to retain its character as a mere case-management device. The notice in Quern v. Jordan did nothing other than inform a diverse and partially victorious class concerning the extent of the judgment in its favor, cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(d)(2), and that the federal courts could do no more for them. There was no suggestion that the notice itself would bind state officials in any way, or that such notice would be routinely available as a form of relief in other cases. Because “notice relief” is not the type of remedy designed to prevent ongoing violations of federal law, the Eleventh Amendment limitation on the Art. Ill power of federal courts prevents them from ordering it as an independent form of relief.
Measured by the standards of Quern, however, a request for a limited notice order will escape the Eleventh Amendment bar if the notice is ancillary to the grant of some other appropriate relief that can be “noticed.” Because there is no continuing violation of federal law to enjoin in this case, an injunction is not available. Therefore, notice cannot be justified as a mere case-management device that is ancillary to a judgment awarding valid prospective relief. Petitioners argue, however, that they are entitled to a declaratory judgment that respondent violated federal law in the past. Only if petitioners are correct in this assertion can they properly nlaim a right to “notice” of a judgment under the principles of Quern.
The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U. S. C. § 2201, permits a federal court to declare the rights of a party whether or not further relief is or could be sought, and we have held that under this Act declaratory relief may be available even though an injunction is not. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 462 (1974). But we have also held that the declaratory judgment statute “is an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.” Public Service Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U. S. 237, 241 (1952). The propriety of issuing a declaratory judgment may depend upon equitable considerations, see Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66, 73 (1971), and is also “informed by the teachings and experience concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power.” Wycoff, supra, at 243; cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 44-45 (1971).
In applying these principles, we have held that a declaratory judgment is not available in a number of instances. In Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943), we held that a declaratory judgment was not available to obtain a determination of the constitutionality of a state tax even though the relevant federal statute prohibited federal courts only from issuing injunctions against the collection of such taxes. Id., at 299. We held in Samuels v. Mackell, supra, that a declaratory judgment declaring a state criminal statute unconstitutional was unavailable where it would have much the same effect as an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the statute, and the latter was barred by traditional principles of equity, comity, and federalism. Id., at 69-73. In Wycoff, we held that it was inappropriate to issue a declaratory judgment deciding whether the plaintiff’s business was interstate commerce and therefore potentially immune from state regulation. 344 U. S., at 244, 247-249. We reasoned that if the federal judgment were res judicata in subsequent state proceedings, then the federal court will have lifted the case out of the state court before the state agency or court can hear it. Id., at 247. On the other hand, if the federal judgment would not have such an effect, then it would “serv[e] no useful purpose as a final determination of rights.” Ibid.
We think that these cases demonstrate the impropriety of the issuance of a declaratory judgment in this case. There is no claimed continuing violation of federal law, and therefore no occasion to issue an injunction. Nor can there be any threat of state officials violating the repealed law in the future. Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, supra, at 454. There is a dispute about the lawfulness of respondent’s past actions, but the Eleventh Amendment would prohibit the award of money damages or restitution if that dispute were resolved in favor of petitioners. We think that the award of a declaratory judgment in this situation would be useful in resolving the dispute over the past lawfulness of respondent’s action only if it might be offered in state-court proceedings as res judicata on the issue of liability, leaving to the state courts only a form of accounting proceeding whereby damages or restitution would be computed. But the issuance of a declaratory judgment in these circumstances would have much the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or restitution by the federal court, the latter kinds of relief being of course prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. The teachings of Huffman, Samuels, and Wycoff are that a declaratory judgment is not available when the result would be a partial “end run” around our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974).
Justice Brennan’s dissent contends that because the injunction and declaratory judgment in Quern implied past violations of federal law, declaratory judgments expressly adjudicating the question of past violations are routinely available. We think he is mistaken. The District Court’s injunction and declaratory judgment against continuing and future violations of federal law in Quern implied that similar violations had occurred in the past because neither state nor federal policy had varied through the time of judgment. Here, by contrast, there are no present violations under the amended statute, and even if there were, an injunction against them would not imply that past practice violated the repealed federal law. Thus, a declaratory judgment that respondent violated federal law in the past would have to stand on its own feet as an appropriate exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case. This it cannot do for the reasons we have previously stated.
We hold that the District Court was correct in concluding that neither the “notice” proposed by petitioners nor a declaratory judgment should have issued in a case of this type. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Affirmed.
The declaratory judgment was embodied in paragraph 4 of the District Court’s judgment, which stated:
“Illinois Categorical Assistance Manual, Section 4004, and subsections thereunder, as applied to applicants for AABD are invalid insofar as they are inconsistent with the requirements of [federal law as construed in] paragraphs 1 and 2.” Jordan v. Weaver, No. 71 C 70, p. 3 (ND Ill., Mar. 15, 1972) (emphasis added).
If, of course, petitioners would make no claim that the federal declaratory judgment was res judicata in later commenced state proceedings, the declaratory judgment would serve no purpose whatever in resolving the remaining dispute between the parties, and is unavailable for that reason. Wycoff, 344 U. S., at 247.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellees were charged by information with violation of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 60 Stat. 812, 839, 2 U. S. C. §§ 261-270. Relying on its previous decision in National Association of Manufacturers v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510, vacated as moot, 344 U. S. 804, the District Court dismissed the information on the ground that the Act is unconstitutional. 109 F. Supp. 641. The case is here on direct appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3731.
Seven counts of the information are laid under § 305, which requires designated reports to Congress from every person “receiving any contributions or expending any money” for the purpose of influencing the passage or defeat of any legislation by Congress. One such count charges the National Farm Committee, a Texas corporation, with failure to report the solicitation and receipt of contributions to influence the passage of legislation which would cause a rise in the price of agricultural commodities and commodity futures and the defeat of legislation which would cause a decline in those prices. The remaining six counts under § 305 charge defendants Moore and Harriss with failure to report expenditures having the same single purpose. Some of the alleged expenditures consist of the payment of compensation to others to communicate face-to-face with members of Congress, at public functions and committee hearings, concerning legislation affecting agricultural prices; the other alleged expenditures relate largely to the costs of a campaign to induce various interested groups and individuals to communicate by letter with members of Congress on such legislation.
The other two counts in the information are laid under § 308, which requires any person “who shall engage himself for pay or for any consideration for the purpose of attempting to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation” to register with Congress and to make specified disclosures. These two counts allege in considerable detail that defendants Moore and Linder were hired to express certain views to Congress as to agricultural prices or to cause others to do so, for the purpose of attempting to influence the passage of legislation which would cause a rise in the price of agricultural commodities and commodity futures and a defeat of legislation which would cause a decline in such prices; and that pursuant to this undertaking, without having registered as required by § 308, they arranged to have members of Congress contacted on behalf of these views, either directly by their own emissaries or through an artificially stimulated letter campaign.
We are not concerned here with the sufficiency of the information as a criminal pleading. Our review under the Criminal Appeals Act is limited to a decision on the alleged “invalidity” of the statute on which the information is based. In making this decision, we judge the statute on its face. See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 6, 12. The “invalidity” of the Lobbying Act is asserted on three grounds: (1) that §§ 305, 307, and 308 are too vague and indefinite to meet the requirements of due process; (2) that §§ 305 and 308 violate the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right to petition the Government; (3) that the penalty provision of § 310 (b) violates the right of the people under the First Amendment to petition the Government.
I.
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.
On the other hand, if the general class of offenses to which the statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7. Cf. Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, 231. And if this general class of offenses can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of the statute, this Court is under a duty to give the statute that construction. This was the course adopted in Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, upholding the definiteness of the Civil Rights Act.
The same course is appropriate here. The key section of the Lobbying Act is § 307, entitled “Persons to Whom Applicable.” Section 307 provides:
“The provisions of this title shall apply to any person (except a political committee as defined in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, and duly organized State or local committees of a political party), who by himself, or through any agent or employee or other persons in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, solicits, collects, or receives money or any other thing of value to be used principally to aid, or the principal purpose of which person is to aid, in the accomplishment of any of the following purposes:
“(a) The passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States.
“(b) To influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States.”
This section modifies the substantive provisions of the Act, including § 305 and § 308. In other words, unless a “person” falls within the category established by § 307, the disclosure requirements of § 305 and § 308 are inapplicable. Thus coverage under the Act is limited to those persons (except for the specified political committees) who solicit, collect, or receive contributions of money or other thing of value, and then only if “the principal purpose” of either the persons or the contributions is to aid in the accomplishment of the aims set forth in § 307 (a) and (b). In any event, the solicitation, collection, or receipt of money or other thing of value is a prerequisite to coverage under the Act.
The Government urges a much broader construction— namely, that under § 305 a person must report his expenditures to influence legislation even though he does not solicit, collect, or receive contributions as provided in § 307. Such a construction, we believe, would do violence to the title and language of § 307 as well as its legislative history. If the construction urged by the Government is to become law, that is for Congress to accomplish by further legislation.
We now turn to the alleged vagueness of the purposes set forth in § 307 (a) and (b). As in United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 47, which involved the interpretation of similar language, we believe this language should be construed to refer only to “lobbying in its commonly accepted sense” — to direct communication with members of Congress on pending or proposed federal legislation. The legislative history of the Act makes clear that, at the very least, Congress sought disclosure of such direct pressures, exerted by the lobbyists themselves or through their hirelings or through an artificially stimulated letter campaign. It is likewise clear that Congress would have intended the Act to operate on this narrower basis, even if a broader application to organizations seeking to propagandize the general public were not permissible.
There remains for our consideration the meaning of “the principal purpose” and “to be used principally to aid.” The legislative history of the Act indicates that the term “principal” was adopted merely to exclude from the scope of § 307 those contributions and persons having only an “incidental” purpose of influencing legislation. Conversely, the “principal purpose” requirement does not exclude a contribution which in substantial part is to be used to influence legislation through direct communication with Congress or a person whose activities in substantial part are directed to influencing legislation through direct communication with Congress. If it were otherwise — if an organization, for example, were exempted because lobbying was only one of its main activities— the Act would in large measure be reduced to a mere exhortation against abuse of the legislative process. In construing the Act narrowly to avoid constitutional doubts, we must also avoid a construction that would seriously impair the effectiveness of the Act in coping with the problem it was designed to alleviate.
To summarize, therefore, there are three prerequisites to coverage under §307: (1) the “person” must have solicited, collected, or received contributions; (2) one of the main purposes of such “person,” or one of the main purposes of such contributions, must have been to influence the passage or defeat of legislation by Congress; (3) the intended method of accomplishing this purpose must have been through direct communication with members of Congress. And since § 307 modifies the substantive provisions of the Act, our construction of § 307 will of necessity also narrow the scope of § 305 and § 308, the substantive provisions underlying the information in this case. Thus § 305 is limited to those persons who are covered by § 307; and when so covered, they must report all contributions and expenditures having the purpose of attempting to influence legislation through direct communication with Congress. Similarly, § 308 is limited to those persons (with the stated exceptions) who are covered by § 307 and who, in addition, engage themselves for pay or for any other valuable consideration for the purpose of attempting to influence legislation through direct communication with Congress. Construed in this way, the Lobbying Act meets the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
II.
Thus construed, §§ 305 and 308 also do not violate the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment — freedom to speak, publish, and petition the Government.
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly subjected. Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected representatives depends to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public weal. This is the evil which the Lobbying Act was designed to help prevent.
Toward that end, Congress has not sought to prohibit these pressures. It has merely provided for a modicum of information from those who for hire attempt to influence legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose. It wants only to know who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much. It acted in the same spirit and for a similar purpose in passing the Federal Corrupt Practices Act — to maintain the integrity of a basic governmental process. See Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, 545.
Under these circumstances, we believe that Congress, at least within the bounds of the Act as we have construed it, is not constitutionally forbidden to require the disclosure of lobbying activities. To do so would be to deny Congress in large measure the power of self-protection. And here Congress has used that power in a manner restricted to its appropriate end. We conclude that §§ 305 and 308, as applied to persons defined in § 307, do not offend the First Amendment.
It is suggested, however, that the Lobbying Act, with respect to persons other than those defined in § 307, may as a practical matter act as a deterrent to their exercise of First Amendment rights. Hypothetical borderline situations are conjured up in which such persons choose to remain silent because of fear of possible prosecution for failure to comply with the Act. Our narrow construction of the Act, precluding as it does reasonable fears, is calculated to avoid such restraint. But, even assuming some such deterrent effect, the restraint is at most an indirect one resulting from self-censorship, comparable in many ways to the restraint resulting from criminal libel laws. The hazard of such restraint is too remote to require striking down a statute which on its face is otherwise plainly within the area of congressional power and is designed to safeguard a vital national interest.
III.
The appellees further attack the statute on the ground that the penalty provided in § 310 (b) is unconstitutional. That section provides:
“(b) In addition to the penalties provided for in subsection (a), any person convicted of the misdemeanor specified therein is prohibited, for a period of three years from the date of such conviction, from attempting to influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any proposed legislation or from appearing before a committee of the Congress in support of or opposition to proposed legislation; and any person who violates any provision of this subsection shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
This section, the appellees argue, is a patent violation of the First Amendment guarantees' of freedom of speech and the right to petition the Government.
We find it unnecessary to pass on this contention. Unlike §§ 305, 307, and 308 which we have judged on their face, § 310 (b) has not yet been applied to the appellees, and it will never be so applied if the appellees are found innocent of the charges against them. See United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396, 399; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 9-12.
Moreover, the Act provides for the separability of any provision found invalid. If § 310 (b) should ultimately be declared unconstitutional, its elimination would still leave a statute defining specific duties and providing a specific penalty for violation of any such duty. The prohibition of § 310 (b) is expressly stated to be “In addition to the penalties provided for in subsection (a) . . subsection (a) makes a violation of § 305 or § 308 a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. Consequently, there would seem to be no obstacle to giving effect to the separability clause as to § 310 (b), if this should ever prove necessary. Compare Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 303 U. S. 419, 433-437.
The judgment below is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 305 provides:
“(a) Every person receiving any contributions or expending any money for the purposes designated in subparagraph (a) or (b) of section 307 shall file with the Clerk between the first and tenth day of each calendar quarter, a statement containing complete as of the day next preceding the date of filing—
“(1) the name and address of each person who has made a contribution of $500 or more not mentioned in the preceding report; except that the first report filed pursuant to this title shall contain the name and address of each person who has made any contribution of $500 or more to such person since the effective date of this title;
“(2) the total sum of the contributions made to or for such person during the calendar year and not stated under paragraph (1) ;
“ (3) the total sum of all contributions made to or for such person during the calendar year;
“ (4) the name and address of each person to whom an expenditure in one or more items of the aggregate amount or value, within the calendar year, of $10 or more has been made by or on behalf of such person, and the amount, date, and purpose of such expenditure;
“(5) the total sum of all expenditures made by or on behalf of such person during the calendar year and not stated under paragraph (4);
“(6) the total sum of expenditures made by or on behalf of such person during the calendar year.
“(b) The statements required to be filed by subsection (a) shall be cumulative during the calendar year to which they relate, but where there has been no change in an item reported in a previous statement only the amount need be carried forward.”
The following are “the purposes designated in subparagraph (a) or (b) of section 307”:
“(a) The passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States.
“(b) To influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States.”
Section 308 provides:
“(a) Any person who shall engage himself for pay or for any consideration for the purpose of attempting to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States shall, before doing anything in furtherance of such object, register with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate and shall give to those officers in writing and under oath, his name and. business address, the name and address of the person by whom he is employed, and in whose interest he appears or works, the duration of such employment, how much he is paid and is to receive, by whom he is paid or is to be paid, how much he is to be paid for expenses, and what expenses are to be included. Each such person so registering shall, between the first and tenth day of each calendar quarter, so long as his activity continues, file with the Clerk and Secretary a detailed report under oath of all money received and expended by him during the preceding calendar quarter in carrying on his work; to whom paid; for what purposes; and the names of any papers, periodicals, magazines, or other publications in which he has caused to be published any articles or editorials; and the proposed legislation he is employed to support or oppose. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any person who merely appears before a committee of the Congress of the United States in support of or opposition to legislation; nor to any public official acting in his official capacity; nor in the case of any newspaper or other regularly published periodical (including any individual who owns, publishes, or is employed by any such newspaper or periodical) which in the ordinary course of business publishes news items, editorials, or other comments, or paid advertisements, which directly or indirectly urge the passage or defeat of legislation, if such newspaper, periodical, or individual, engages in no further or other activities in connection with the passage or defeat of such legislation, other than to appear before a committee of the Congress of the United States in support of or in opposition to such legislation.
“(b) All information required to be filed under the provisions of this section with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate shall be compiled by said Clerk and Secretary, acting jointly, as soon as practicable after the close of the calendar quarter with respect to which such information is filed and shall be printed in the Congressional Record.”
A third count under § 308 was abated on the death of the defendant against whom the charge was made.
18 U. S. C. § 3731. See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 5. For “The Government’s appeal does not open the whole case.” United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 193.
See Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, 230-232; Quarles, Some Statutory Construction Problems and Approaches in Criminal Law, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 531, 539-543; Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 77.
Cf. Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273; Musser v. Utah, 333 U. S. 95; Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510.
This rule as to statutes charged with vagueness is but one aspect of the broader principle that this Court, if fairly possible, must construe congressional enactments so as to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407-408; United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U. S. 106, 120-121; United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 47. Thus, in the C. I. O. case, supra, this Court held that expenditures by a labor organization for the publication of a weekly periodical urging support for a certain candidate in a forthcoming congressional election were not forbidden by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, which makes it unlawful for “. . . any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any [congressional] election . . . .” Similarly, in the Rumely case, supra, this Court construed a House Resolution authorizing investigation of “all lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation” to cover only “ ‘lobbying in its commonly accepted sense,’ that is, ‘representations made directly to the Congress, its members, or its committees.’ ”
Section 302 (c) defines the term “person” as including “an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, and any other organization or group of persons.”
The Government’s view is based on a variance between the language of § 307 and the language of § 305. Section 307 refers to any person who “solicits, collects, or receives” contributions; §305, however, refers not only to “receiving any contributions” but also to “expending any money.” It is apparently the Government’s contention that § 307 — since it makes no reference to expenditures — is inapplicable to the expenditure provisions of § 305. Section 307, however, limits the application of § 305 as a whole, not merely a part of it.
Both the Senate and House reports on the bill state that “This section [§ 307] defines the application of the title S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 28; Committee Print, July 22, 1946, statement by Representative Monroney on Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 34. See also the remarks of Representative Dirksen in presenting the bill to the House: “The gist of the antilobbying provision is contained in section 307.” 92 Cong. Rec. 10088.
The Lobbying Act was enacted as Title III of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which was reported to Congress by the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. The Senate and House reports accompanying the bill were identical with respect to Title III. Both declared that the Lobbying Act applies “chiefly to three distinct classes of so-called lobbyists:
“First. Those who do not visit the Capitol but initiate propaganda from all over the country in the form of letters and telegrams, many of which have been based entirely upon misinformation as to facts. This class of persons and organizations will be required under the title, not to cease or curtail their activities in any respect, but merely to disclose the sources of their collections and the methods in which they are disbursed.
“Second. The second class of lobbyists are those who are employed to come to the Capitol under the false impression that they exert some powerful influence over Members of Congress. These individuals spend their time in Washington presumably exerting some mysterious influence with respect to the legislation in which their employers are interested, but carefully conceal from Members of Congress whom they happen to contact the purpose of their presence. The title in no wise prohibits or curtails their activities. It merely requires that they shall register and disclose the sources and purposes of their employment and the amount of their compensation.
“Third. There is a third class of entirely honest and respectable representatives of business, professional, and philanthropic organizations who come to Washington openly and frankly to express their views for or against legislation, many of whom serve a useful and perfectly legitimate purpose in expressing the views and interpretations of their employers with respect to legislation which concerns them. They will likewise be required to register and state their compensation and the sources of their employment.”
S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 27; Committee Print, July 22, 1946, statement by Representative Monroney on Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 32-33. See also the statement in the Senate by Senator La Follette, who was Chairman of the Joint Committee, at 92 Cong. Rec. 6367-6368.
See the Act’s separability clause, note 18, infra, providing that the invalidity of any application of the Act should not affect the validity of its application “to other persons and circumstances.”
Both the Senate and House reports accompanying the bill state that the Act "... does not apply to organizations formed for other purposes whose efforts to influence legislation are merely incidental to the purposes for which formed.” S. Hep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 27; Committee Print, July 22, 1946, statement by Representative Monroney on Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 32. In the Senate discussion preceding enactment, Senator Hawkes asked Senator La Follette, Chairman of the Joint Committee in charge of the bill, for an explanation of the “principal purpose” requirement. In particular, Senator Hawkes sought assurance that multi-purposed organizations like the United States Chamber of Commerce wopld not be subject to the Act. Senator La Follette refused to give such assurance, stating: “So far as any organizations or individuals are concerned, I will say to the Senator from New Jersey, it will depend on the type and character of activity which they undertake. ... I cannot tell the Senator whether they will come under the act. It will depend on the type of activity in which they engage, so far as legislation is concerned. ... It [the Act] affects all individuals and organizations alike if they engage in a covered activity.” (Italics added.) 92 Cong. Rec. 10151-10152. See also Representative Dirksen’s remarks in the House, 92 Cong. Rec. 10088.
Such a criterion is not novel in federal law. See Int. Rev. Code, § 23 (o) (2) (income tax), § 812 (d) (estate tax), and § 1004 (a) (2) (B) (gift tax), providing tax exemption for contributions to charitable and educational organizations “no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.” For illustrative cases applying this criterion, see Sharpe’s Estate v. Commissioner, 148 F. 2d 179 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Marshall v. Commissioner, 147 F. 2d 75 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Faulkner v. Commissioner, 112 F. 2d 987 (C. A. 1st Cir.); Huntington National Bank v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 760, 769. Cf. Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F. 2d 108 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Leuhuscher v. Commissioner, 54 F. 2d 998 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Weyl v. Commissioner, 48 F. 2d 811 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F. 2d 184 (C. A. 2d Cir.). See also Annotation, 138 A. L. R. 456.
For the three exceptions, see note 2, supra.
Under this construction, the Act is at least as definite as many other criminal statutes which this Court has upheld against a charge of vagueness. E. g., Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U. S. 337 (regulation providing that drivers of motor vehicles carrying explosives “shall avoid, so far as practicable, and, where feasible, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and dangerous crossings”); Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (Smith Act making it unlawful for any person to conspire “to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence . . . ."); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (statute forbidding coercion of radio stations to employ persons “in excess of the number of employees needed ... to perform actual services”); Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, and Williams v. United States, 341 U. S. 97 (statute forbidding acts which would deprive a person of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States”); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396 (statute forbidding any candidate for Congress or any officer or employee of the United States to solicit or receive a “contribution for any political purpose whatever” from any other such officer or employee); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343 (statute forbidding pasturing of sheep “on any cattle range previously occupied by cattle, or upon any range usually occupied by any cattle grower”); Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273 (state statute imposing criminal sanctions on “Every person who shall wilfully print, publish, edit, issue, or knowingly circulate, sell, distribute or display any book, paper, document, or written or printed matter, in any form, advocating, encouraging or inciting, or having a tendency to encourage or incite the commission of any crime, breach of the peace or act of violence, or which shall tend to encourage or advocate disrespect for law or for any court or courts of justice . . . .”); Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (Sherman Act forbidding “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations”). Cf. Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223 (statute providing for deportation of persons who have committed crimes involving “moral turpitude”).
Similar legislation has been enacted in over twenty states. See Notes, 56 Yale L. J. 304, 313-316, and 47 Col. L. Rev. 98, 99-103.
Similarly, the Hatch Act probably deters some federal employees from political activity permitted by that statute, but yet was sustained because of the national interest in a nonpolitical civil service. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75.
60 Stat. 812, 814:
“If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and of the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider together the above two cases. Both involve suits to recover sums exacted from businesses by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as employment taxes on employers under the Social Security Act. In both instances the taxes were collected on assessments made administratively by the Commissioner because he concluded the persons here involved were employees of the taxpayers. Both cases turn on a determination as to whether the workers involved were employees under that Act or whether they were independent contractors. Writs of certiorari were granted, 329 U. S. 702 and 329 U. S. 709, because of the general importance in the collection of social security taxes of deciding what are the applicable standards for the determination of employees under the Act. Varying standards have been applied in the federal courts.
Respondent in No. 312, Albert Silk, doing business as the Albert Silk Coal Co., sued the United States, petitioner, to recover taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed and collected from respondent for the years 1936 through 1939 under the Social Security Act. The taxes were levied on respondent as an employer of certain workmen some of whom were engaged in unloading railway coal cars and the others in making retail deliveries of coal by truck.
Respondent sells coal at retail in the city of Topeka, Kansas. His coalyard consists of two buildings, one for an office and the other a gathering place for workers, railroad tracks upon which carloads of coal are delivered by the railroad, and bins for the different types of coal. Respondent pays those who work as unloaders an agreed price per ton to unload coal from the railroad cars. These men come to the yard when and as they please and are assigned a car to unload and a place to put the coal. They furnish their own tools, work when they wish and work for others at will. One of these unloaders testified that he worked as regularly “as a man has to when he has to eat” but there was also testimony that some of the unloaders were floaters who came to the yard only intermittently.
Respondent owns no trucks himself but contracts with workers who own their own trucks to deliver coal at a uniform price per ton. This is paid to the trucker by the respondent out of the price he receives for the coal from the customer. When an order for coal is taken in the company office, a bell is rung which rings in the building used by the truckers. The truckers have voluntarily adopted a call list upon which their names come up in turn, and the top man on the list has an opportunity to deliver the coal ordered. The truckers are not instructed how to do their jobs, but are merely given a ticket telling them where the coal is to be delivered and whether the charge is to be collected or not. Any damage caused by them is paid for by the company. The District Court found that the truckers could and often did refuse to make a delivery without penalty. Further, the court found that the truckers may come and go as they please and frequently did leave the premises without permission. They may and did haul for others when they pleased. They pay all the expenses of operating their trucks, and furnish extra help necessary to the delivery of the coal and all equipment except the yard storage bins. No record is kept of their time. They are paid after each trip, at the end of the day or at the end of the week, as they request.
The Collector ruled that the unloaders and truckers were employees of the respondent during the years 1936 through 1939 within the meaning of the Social Security Act and he accordingly assessed additional taxes under Titles VIII and IX of the Social Security Act and Sub-chapters A and C of Chapter 9 of the Internal Revenue Code. Respondent filed a claim for a refund which was denied. He then brought this action. Both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals thought that the truckers and unloaders were independent contractors and allowed the recovery.
Respondent in No. 673, Grey van Lines, Inc., a common carrier by motor truck, sued the petitioner, a Collector of Internal Revenue, to recover employment taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed and collected from it under similar provisions of the Social Security Act involved in Silk’s case for the years or parts of years 1937 through the first quarter of 1942. From a holding for the respondent in the District Court petitioner appealed. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The chief question in this case is whether truckmen who perform the actual service of carrying the goods shipped by the public are employees of the respondent. Both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals thought that the truckmen were independent contractors.
The respondent operates its trucking business under a permit issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the “grandfather clause” of the Motor Carrier Act. 32 M. C. C. 719, 723. It operates throughout thirty-eight states and parts of Canada, carrying largely household furniture. While its principal office is in Chicago, it maintains agencies to solicit business in many of the larger cities of the areas it serves, from which it contracts to move goods. As early as 1930, before the passage of the Social Security Act, the respondent adopted the system of relations with the truckmen here concerned, which gives rise to the present issue. The system was based on contracts with the truckmen under which the truckmen were required to haul exclusively for the respondent and to furnish their own trucks and all equipment and labor necessary to pick up, handle and deliver shipments, to pay all expenses of operation, to furnish all fire, theft, and collision insurance which the respondent might specify, to pay for all loss or damage to shipments and to indemnify the company for any loss caused it by the acts of the truckmen, their servants and employees, to paint the designation “Greyvan Lines” on their trucks, to collect all money due the company from shippers or consignees, and to turn in such moneys at the office to which they report after delivering a shipment, to post bonds with the company in the amount of $1,000 and cash deposits of $250 pending final settlement of accounts, to personally drive their trucks at all times or be present on the truck when a competent relief driver was driving (except in emergencies, when a substitute might be employed with the approval of the company), and to follow all rules, regulations, and instructions of the company. All contracts or bills of lading for the shipment of goods were to be between the respondent and the shipper. The company’s instructions covered directions to the truckmen as to where and when to load freight. If freight was tendered the truckmen, they were under obligation to notify the company so that it could complete the contract for shipment in its own name. As remuneration, the truckmen were to receive from the company a percentage of the tariff charged by the company varying between 50 and 52% and a bonus up to 3% for satisfactory performance of the service. The contract was terminable at any time by either party. These truckmen were required to take a short course of instruction in the company’s methods of doing business before carrying out their contractual obligations to haul. The company maintained a staff of dispatchers who issued orders for the truckmen’s movements, although not the routes to be used, and to which the truckmen, at intervals, reported their positions. Cargo insurance was carried by the company. All permits, certificates and franchises “necessary to the operation of the vehicle in the service of the Company as a motor carrier under any Federal or State Law” were to be obtained at the company’s expense.
The record shows the following additional undisputed facts, not contained in the findings. A manual of instructions, given by the respondent to the truckmen, and a contract between the company and Local No. 711 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America were introduced in evidence. It suffices to say that the manual purported to regulate in detail the conduct of the truckmen in the performance of their duties, and that the agreement with the Union provided that any truckman must first be a member of the union, and that grievances would be referred to representatives of the company and the union. A company official testified that the manual was impractical and that no attempt was made to enforce it. We understand the union contract was in effect. The company had some trucks driven by truckmen who were admittedly company employees. Operations by the company under the two systems were carried out in the same manner. The insurance required by the company was carried under a blanket company policy for which the truckmen were charged proportionately.
The Social Security Act of 1935 was the result of long consideration by the President and Congress of the evil of the burdens that rest upon large numbers of our people because of the insecurities of modern life, particularly old age and unemployment. It was enacted in an effort to coordinate the forces of government and industry for solving the problems. The principal method adopted by Congress to advance its purposes was to provide for periodic payments in the nature of annuities to the elderly and compensation to workers during periods of unemployment. Employment taxes, such as we are here considering, are necessary to produce the revenue for federal participation in the program of alleviation. Employers do not pay taxes on certain groups of employees, such as agricultural or domestic workers but none of these exceptions are applicable to these cases. §§ 811 and 907. Taxes are laid as excises on a percentage of wages paid the nonexempt employees. §§ 804 and 901; I. R. C. §§ 1410, 1600. “Wages” means all remuneration for the employment that is covered by the Act, cash or otherwise. §§ 811, 907; I. R. C. §§ 1426,1607 (b). “Employment” means “any service, of whatever nature, performed... by an employee for his employer, except... Agricultural labor” et cetera. §§ 811 (b), 907 (c); I.- R. C. §§ 1426 (b), 1607 (c). As a corollary to the coverage of employees whose wages are the basis for the employment taxes under the tax sections of the social security legislation, rights to benefit payments under federal old age insurance depend upon the receipt of wages as employees under the same sections. 53 Stat. 1360, §§ 202, 209 (a), (b), (g), 205 (c) (1). See Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358. This relationship between the tax sections and the benefit sections emphasizes the underlying purpose of the legislation — the protection of its beneficiaries from some of the hardships of existence. Helvering v. Davis, supra, 640. No definition of employer or employee applicable to these cases occurs in the Act. See § 907 (a) and I. R. C. § 1607 (a). Compare, as to carrier employment, I. R. C. § 1532 (d), as amended by 60 Stat. 722, § 1. Nothing that is helpful in determining the scope of the coverage of the tax sections of the Social Security Act has come to our attention in the legislative history of the passage of the Act or amendments thereto.
Since Congress has made clear by its many exemptions, such as, for example, the broad categories of agricultural labor and domestic service, 53 Stat. 1384,1393, that it was not its purpose to make the Act cover the whole field of service to every business enterprise, the sections in question are to be read with the exemptions in mind. The very specificity of the exemptions, however, and the generality of the employment definitions indicates that the terms “employment” and “employee,” are to be construed to accomplish the purposes of the legislation. As the federal social security legislation is an attack on recognized evils in our national economy, a constricted interpretation of the phrasing by the courts would not comport with its purpose. Such an interpretation would only make for a continuance, to a considerable degree, of the difficulties for which the remedy was devised and would invite adroit schemes by some employers and employees to avoid the immediate burdens at the expense of the benefits sought by the legislation. These considerations have heretofore guided our construction of the Act. Buckstaff Bath House Co. v. McKinley, 308 U. S. 358; Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358.
Of course, this does not mean that all who render service to an industry are employees. Compare Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 520. Obviously the private contractor who undertakes to build at a fixed price or on cost-plus a new plant on specifications is not an employee of the industry thus served nor are his employees. The distributor who undertakes to market at his own risk the product of another, or the producer who agrees so to manufacture for another, ordinarily cannot be said to have the employer-employee relationship. Production and distribution are different segments of business. The purposes of the legislation are not frustrated because the Government collects employment taxes from the distributor instead of the producer or the other way around.
The problem of differentiating between employee and an independent contractor, or between an agent and an independent contractor, has given difficulty through the years before social legislation multiplied its importance. When the matter arose in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act, we pointed out that the legal standards to fix responsibility for acts of servants, employees or agents had not been reduced to such certainty that it could be said there was “some simple, uniform and easily applicable test.” The word “employee,” we said, was not there used as a word of art, and its content in its context was a federal problem to be construed “in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.” We concluded that, since that end was the elimination of labor disputes and industrial strife, “employees” included workers who were such as a matter of economic reality. The aim of the Act was to remedy the inequality of bargaining power in controversies over wages, hours and working conditions. We rejected the test of the “technical concepts pertinent to an employer’s legal responsibility to third persons for acts of his servants.” This is often referred to as power of control, whether exercised or not, over the manner of performing service to the industry. Restatement of the Law, Agency, § 220. We approved the statement of the National Labor Relations Board that “the primary consideration in the determination of the applicability of the statutory definition is whether effectu-ation of the declared policy and purposes of the Act comprehend securing to the individual the rights guaranteed and protection afforded by the Act.” Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 120, 123, 124, 128, 129, 131.
Application of the social security legislation should follow the same rule that we applied to the National Labor Relations Act in the Hearst case. This, of course, does not leave courts free to determine the employer-employee relationship without regard to the provisions of the Act. The taxpayer must be an “employer” and the man who receives wages an “employee.” There is no indication that Congress intended to change normal business relationships through which one business organization obtained the services of another to perform a portion of production or distribution. Few businesses are so completely integrated that they can themselves produce the raw material, manufacture and distribute the finished product to the ultimate consumer without assistance from independent contractors. The Social Security Act was drawn with this industrial situation as a part of the surroundings in which it was to be enforced. Where a part of an industrial process is in the hands of independent contractors, they are the ones who should pay the social security taxes.
The long-standing regulations of the Treasury and the Federal Security Agency (H. Doc. 595, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.) recognize that independent contractors exist under the Act. The pertinent portions are set out in the margin. Certainly the industry’s right to control how “work shall be done” is a factor in the determination of whether the worker is an employee or independent contractor. The Government points out that the regulations were construed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to cover the circumstances here presented. This is shown by his additional tax assessments. Other instances of such administrative determinations are called to our attention.
So far as the regulations refer to the effect of contracts, we think their statement of the law cannot be challenged successfully. Contracts, however “skilfully devised,” Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111, 115, should not be permitted to shift tax liability as definitely fixed by the statutes.
Probably it is quite impossible to extract from the statute a rule of thumb to define the limits of the employer-employee relationship. The Social Security Agency and the courts will find that degrees of control, opportunities for profit or loss, investment in facilities, permanency of relation and skill required in the claimed independent operation are important for decision. No one is controlling nor is the list complete. These unloaders and truckers and their assistants are from one standpoint an integral part of the businesses of retailing coal or transporting freight. Their energy, care and judgment may conserve their equipment or increase their earnings but Greyvan and Silk are the directors of their businesses. On the other hand, the truckmen hire their own assistants, own their trucks, pay their own expenses, with minor exceptions, and depend upon their own initiative, judgment and energy for a large part of their success.
Both lower courts in both cases have determined that these workers are independent contractors. These inferences were drawn by the courts from facts concerning which there is no real dispute. The excerpts from the opinions below show the reasons for their conclusions.
Giving full consideration to the concurrence of the two lower courts in a contrary result, we cannot agree that the unloaders in the Silk case were independent contractors. They provided only picks and shovels. They had no opportunity to gain or lose except from the work of their hands and these simple tools. That the unloaders did not work regularly is not significant. They did work in the course of the employer’s trade or business. This brings them under the coverage of the Act. They are of the group that the Social Security Act was intended to aid. Silk was in a position to exercise all necessary supervision over their simple tasks. Unloaders have often been held to be emplees in tort cases.
There are cases, too, where driver-owners of trucks or wagons have been held employees in accident suits at tort or under workmen’s compensation laws. But we agree with the decisions below in Silk and Greyvan that where the arrangements leave the driver-owners so much responsibility for investment and management as here, they must be held to be independent contractors. These driver-owners are small businessmen. They own their own trucks. They hire their own helpers. In one instance they haul for a single business, in the other for any customer. The distinction, though important, is not controlling. It is the total situation, including the risk undertaken, the control exercised, the opportunity for profit from sound management, that marks these driver-owners as independent contractors.
No. 312, United States v. Silk, is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
No. 673, Harrison v. Greyvan Lines, Inc., is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Murphy are of the view that the applicable principles of law, stated by the Court and with which they agree, require reversal of both judgments in their entirety.
Mr. Justice Rutledge.
I join in the Court’s opinion and in the result insofar as the principles stated are applied to the unloaders in the Silk case. But I think a different disposition should be made in application of those principles to the truckers in that case and in the Greyvan case.
So far as the truckers are concerned, both are borderline cases. That would be true, I think, even if the so-called “common law control” test were conclusive, as the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals in each case seem to have regarded it. It is even more true under the broader and more factual approach the Court holds should be applied.
I agree with the Court’s views in adopting this approach and that the balance in close cases should be cast in favor of rather than against coverage, in order to fulfill the statute’s broad and beneficent objects. A narrow, constricted construction in doubtful cases only goes, as indeed the opinion recognizes, to defeat the Act’s policy and purposes pro tanto.
But I do not think it necessary or perhaps in harmony with sound practice, considering the nature of this Court’s functions and those of the district courts, for us to undertake drawing the final conclusion generally in these borderline cases. Having declared the applicable principles of law to be applied, our function is sufficiently discharged by seeing to it that they are observed. And when this has been done, drawing the final conclusion, in matters so largely factual as the end result must be in close cases, is more properly the business of the district courts than ours.
Here the District Courts and the Circuit Courts of Appeals determined the cases largely if not indeed exclusively by applying the so-called “common law control” test as the criterion. This was clearly wrong, in view of the Court’s present ruling. But for its action in drawing the ultimate and largely factual conclusion on that basis, the error would require remanding the causes to the District Courts in order for them to exercise that function in the light of the present decision.
I would follow that course, so far as the truckers are concerned.
Titles VIII and IX, Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 636 and 639, as repealed in part 53 Stat. 1.
See Internal Revenue Code, chap. 9, subchap. A and C.
Texas Co. v. Higgins, 118 F. 2d 636; Jones v. Goodson, 121 F. 2d 176; Deecy Products Co. v. Welch, 124 F. 2d 592; American Oil Co. v. Fly, 135 F. 2d 491; Glenn v. Beard, 141 F. 2d 376; Magruder v. Yellow Cab Co., 141 F. 2d 324; United States v. Mutual Trucking Co., 141 F. 2d 655; Glenn v. Standard Oil Co., 148 F. 2d 51, 53; McGowan v. Lazeroff, 148 F. 2d 512; United States v. Wholesale Oil Co., 154 F. 2d 745; United States v. Vogue, Inc., 145 F. 2d 609, 612; United States v. Aberdeen Aerie No. 24., 148 F. 2d 655, 658; Grace v. Magruder, 148 F. 2d 679, 680-81; Nevins, Inc. v. Rothensies, 151 F. 2d 189.
155 F. 2d 356.
156 F. 2d 412.
Message of the President, January 17, 1935, and Report of the Committee on Economic Security, H. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619.
See 53 Stat. 1384,1393, “The term 'employment’ means any service performed prior to January 1,1940, which was employment as defined in this section prior to such date, and any service, of whatever nature, performed after December 31, 1939, within the United States by an employee for the person employing him, irrespective of the citizenship or residence of either, except—....” Compare 49 Stat. 639 and 643.
Nothing to suggest tax avoidance appears in these records.
Treasury Regulations 90, promulgated under Title IX of the Social Security Act, Art. 205:
“Generally the relationship exists when the person for whom services are performed has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control of the emploj'-er not only as to what shall be done but how it shall be done.... The right to discharge is also an important factor indicating that the person possessing that right is an employer. Other factors characteristic of an employer are the furnishing of tools and the furnishing of a place to work, to the individual who performs the services. In general, if an individual is subject to the control or direction of another merely as to the result to be accomplished by the work and not as to the means and methods for accomplishing the result, he is an independent contractor, not an employee.
“If the relationship of employer and employee exists, the designation or description of the relationship by the parties as anything other than that of employer and employee is immaterial. Thus, if two individuals in fact stand in the relation of employer and employee to each other, it is of no consequence that the employee is designated as a partner, coadventurer, agent, or independent contractor.
“The measurement, method, or designation of compensation is also immaterial, if the relationship of employer and employee in fact exists.
“Individuals performing services as independent contractors are not employees. Generally, physicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians, contractors, subcontractors, public stenographers, auctioneers, and others who follow an independent trade, business, or profession, in which they offer their services to the public, are independent contractors and not employees.” 26 C. F. R. § 400.205. See also Treasury Regulations 91, 26 C. F. R. §401.3. (Emphasis added.)
The citation of these cases does not imply approval or disapproval of the results. The cases do show the construction of the regulation by the agency. United States v. Mutual Trucking Co., 141 F. 2d 655; Jones v. Goodson, 121 F. 2d 176; Magruder v. Yellow Cab Co., 141 F. 2d 324; Texas Co. v. Higgins, 118 F. 2d 636; American Oil Co. v. Fly, 135 F. 2d 491; Glenn v. Standard Oil Co., 148 F. 2d 51.
See also note 2.
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465; Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 355; Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331.
United, States v. Silk, 155 F. 2d 356, 358-9: “But even while they work for appellee they are not subject to his control as to the method or manner in which they are to do their work. The undisputed evidence is that the only supervision or control ever exercised or that could be exercised over the haulers was to give them the sales ticket if they were willing to take it, and let them deliver the coal. They were free to choose any route in going to or returning. They were not required even to take the coal for delivery.
“We think that the relationship between appellee and the unloaders is not materially different from that between him and the haulers. In response to a question on cross examination, appellee did testify that the unloaders did what his superintendent at the coal yard told them to do, but when considered in the light of all his testimony, all that this answer meant was that they unloaded the ear assigned to them into the designated bin....
“The undisputed facts fail to establish such reasonable measure of direction and control over the method and means of performing the services performed by these workers as is necessary to establish a legal relationship of employer and employee between appellee and the workers in question.”
Greyvan Lines v. Harrison, 156 F. 2d 412, 414-16. After stating the trial court’s finding that the truckmen were not employees, the appellate court noted:
“Appellant contends that in determining these facts the court failed to give effect to important provisions of the contracts which it asserts clearly show the reservation of the right of control over the truckmen and their helpers as to the methods and means of their operations which, it is agreed, furnish the test for determining the relationship here in question....”
It then discussed the manual and concluded:
“While it is true that many provisions of the manual, if strictly enforced, would go far to establish an employer-employee relationship between the Company and its truckmen, we agree with appellee that there was evidence to justify the court’s disregarding of it. It was not prepared until April, 1940, although the tax period involved was from November, 1937, through March, 1942, and there was no evidence to show any change or tightening of controls after its adoption and distribution; one driver testified that he was never instructed to follow the rules therein provided; an officer of the Company testified that it had been prepared by a group of three men no longer in their employ, and that it had been impractical and was not adhered to.”
After a discussion of the helper problem, this statement appears: “... the Company cannot be held liable for employment taxes on the wages of persons over whom it exerts no control, and of whose employment it has no knowledge. And this element of control of the truck-men over their own helpers goes far to prevent the employer-employee relationship from arising between them and the Company. While many factors in this case indicate such control as to give rise to that relationship, we think the most vital one is missing because of the complete control of the truckmen as to how many, if any, and what helpers they make use of in their operations....”
Cf. Grace v. Magruder, 148 F. 2d 679.
I. R. C., chap. 9, subchap. A, § 1426 (b), as amended, 53 Stat. 1384:
“The term 'employment’ means any service performed... by an employee for the person employing him... except—
“(3) Casual labor not in the course of the employer’s trade or business;...”
Swift & Co. v. Alston, 48 Ga. App. 649, 173 S. E. 741; Holmes v. Tennessee Coal, I. & R. Co., 49 La. Ann. 1465, 22 So. 403; Muncie Foundry Co. v. Thompson, 70 Ind. App. 157, 123 N. E. 196; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Bennett, 36 Okla. 358, 128 P. 705; Murray’s Case, 130 Me. 181, 154 A. 352; Decatur R. Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 472, 114 N. E. 915; Benjamin v. Fertilizer Co., 169 Miss. 162, 152 So. 839.
Western Express Co. v. Smeltzer, 88 F. 2d 94; Industrial Commission v. Bonfils, 78 Colo. 306, 241 P. 735; Coppes Bros. & Zook v. Pontius, 76 Ind. App. 298, 131 N. E. 845; Burruss v. B. M. C. Logging Co., 38 N. M. 254, 31 P. 2d 263; Bradley v. Republic Creosoting Co., 281 Mich. 177, 274 N. W. 754; Rouse v. Town of Bird Island, 169 Minn. 367, 211 N. W. 327; Industrial Commission v. Hammond, 77 Colo. 414, 236 P. 1006; Kirk v. Lime Co. & Insurance Co., 137 Me. 73, 15 A. 2d 184; Showers v. Lund, 123 Neb. 56, 242 N. W. 258; Burt v. Davis-Wood Lumber Co., 157 La. 111, 102 So. 87; Dunn v. Reeves Coal Yards Co., Inc., 150 Minn. 282, 184 N. W. 1027; Waters v. Pioneer Fuel Co., 52 Minn. 474, 55 N. W. 52; Warner v. Hardwood Lumber Co., 231 Mich. 328, 204 N. W. 107; Frost v. Blue Ridge Timber Corp., 158 Tenn. 18, 11 S. W. 2d 860; Lee v. Mark H. Brown Lumber Co., 15 La. App. 294, 131 So. 697.
See particularly Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518.
Compare United States v. Mutual Trucking Co., 141 F. 2d 655; Glenn v. Standard Oil Co., 148 F. 2d 51.
The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Greyvan case stated, after referring to United States v. Mutual Trucking Co., 141 F. 2d 655: “It is true that the facts there do not present as close a question as in the case at bar.” And see note 3.
It is not at all certain that either Silk or Greyvan Lines would not be held liable in tort, under application of the common law test, for injuries negligently inflicted upon persons or property of others by their truckers, respectively, in the course of operating the trucks in connection with their businesses. Indeed this result would seem to be clearly indicated, in the case of Greyvan particularly, in view of the fact that the trucks bore its name, in addition to other factors including a large degree of control exercised over the trucking operations. For federal cases in point see Silent Automatic Sales Corp. v. Stayton, 45 F. 2d 471 (applying Missouri law); Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Thompson, 101 F. 2d 301 (applying Nebraska law); Young v. Wilky Carrier Corp., 54 F. Supp. 912, aff’d, 150 F. 2d 764 (applying Pennsylvania law). And see for a general collection of state cases, 9 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice (1941) § 6056.
Certainly the question of coverage under the statute, as an employee, should not be determined more narrowly than that of employee status for purposes of imposing vicarious liability in tort upon an employer, whether by application of the control test exclusively or of the Court’s broader ruling.
In the Silk case formal findings of fact and conclusions of law by the District Court do not appear in the record. But a “Statement by the Court” recites details of the arrangements with the truckers and unload
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
Endeavoring to root out corporate fraud, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745 (Sarbanes-Oxley), and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 124 Stat. 1376 (Dodd-Frank). Both Acts shield whistleblowers from retaliation, but they differ in important respects. Most notably, Sarbanes-Oxley applies to all "employees" who report misconduct to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission), any other federal agency, Congress, or an internal supervisor. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). Dodd-Frank delineates a more circumscribed class; it defines "whistleblower" to mean a person who provides "information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). A whistleblower so defined is eligible for an award if original information he or she provides to the SEC leads to a successful enforcement action. § 78u-6(b) - (g). And, most relevant here, a whistleblower is protected from retaliation for, inter alia, "making disclosures that are required or protected under" Sarbanes-Oxley, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the criminal anti-retaliation proscription at 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e), or any other law subject to the SEC's jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
The question presented: Does the anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank extend to an individual who has not reported a violation of the securities laws to the SEC and therefore falls outside the Act's definition of "whistleblower"? Pet. for Cert. (I). We answer that question "No": To sue under Dodd-Frank's anti-retaliation provision, a person must first "provid [e]... information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission." § 78u-6(a)(6).
I
A
"To safeguard investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets following the collapse of Enron Corporation," Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, ----, 134 S.Ct. 1158, 1161, 188 L.Ed.2d 158 (2014). Most pertinent here, Sarbanes-Oxley created new protections for employees at risk of retaliation for reporting corporate misconduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. Section 1514A prohibits certain companies from discharging or otherwise "discriminat[ing] against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because" the employee "provid[es] information... or otherwise assist[s] in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation" of certain criminal fraud statutes, any SEC rule or regulation, or "any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders." § 1514A(a)(1). An employee qualifies for protection when he or she provides information or assistance either to a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, Congress, or any "person with supervisory authority over the employee." § 1514A(a)(1)(A)-(C).
To recover under § 1514A, an aggrieved employee must exhaust administrative remedies by "filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor." § 1514A(b)(1)(A) ; see Lawson, 571 U.S., at ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1163-1164. Congress prescribed a 180-day limitation period for filing such a complaint. § 1514A(b)(2)(D). If the agency "does not issue a final decision within 180 days of the filing of [a] complaint, and the [agency's] delay is not due to bad faith on the claimant's part, the claimant may proceed to federal district court for de novo review." Id., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1163 (citing § 1514A(b) ). An employee who prevails in a proceeding under § 1514A is "entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole," including reinstatement, backpay with interest, and any "special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination," among such damages, litigation costs. § 1514A(c).
B
1
At issue in this case is the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision enacted in 2010, eight years after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. Passed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Dodd-Frank aimed to "promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system." 124 Stat. 1376.
Dodd-Frank responded to numerous perceived shortcomings in financial regulation. Among them was the SEC's need for additional "power, assistance and money at its disposal" to regulate securities markets. S. Rep. No. 111-176, pp. 36, 37 (2010). To assist the Commission "in identifying securities law violations," the Act established "a new, robust whistleblower program designed to motivate people who know of securities law violations to tell the SEC." Id., at 38. And recognizing that "whistleblowers often face the difficult choice between telling the truth and... committing 'career suicide,' " Congress sought to protect whistleblowers from employment discrimination. Id., at 111, 112.
Dodd-Frank implemented these goals by adding a new provision to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. Section 78u-6 begins by defining a "whistleblower" as "any individual who provides... information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission." § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added). That definition, the statute directs, "shall apply" "[i]n this section"-i.e., throughout § 78u-6. § 78u-6(a).
Section 78u-6 affords covered whistleblowers both incentives and protection. First, the section creates an award program for "whistleblowers who voluntarily provid[e] original information to the Commission that le[ads] to the successful enforcement of [a] covered judicial or administrative action." § 78u-6(b)(1). A qualifying whistleblower is entitled to a cash award of 10 to 30 percent of the monetary sanctions collected in the enforcement action. See § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)-(B).
Second, § 78u-6(h) prohibits an employer from discharging, harassing, or otherwise discriminating against a "whistleblower" "because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower" in three situations: first, "in providing information to the Commission in accordance with [ § 78u-6 ]," § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i) ; second, "in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or... action of the Commission based upon" information provided to the SEC in accordance with § 78u-6, § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(ii) ; and third, "in making disclosures that are required or protected under" either Sarbanes-Oxley, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the criminal anti-retaliation prohibition at 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e), or "any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission," § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Clause (iii), by cross-referencing Sarbanes-Oxley and other laws, protects disclosures made to a variety of individuals and entities in addition to the SEC. For example, the clause shields an employee's reports of wrongdoing to an internal supervisor if the reports are independently safeguarded from retaliation under Sarbanes-Oxley. See supra, at 772 - 773.
The recovery procedures under the anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley differ in critical respects. First, unlike Sarbanes-Oxley, which contains an administrative-exhaustion requirement and a 180-day administrative complaint-filing deadline, see 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A), (2)(D), Dodd-Frank permits a whistleblower to sue a current or former employer directly in federal district court, with a default limitation period of six years, see § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i), (iii)(I)(aa). Second, Dodd-Frank instructs a court to award to a prevailing plaintiff double backpay with interest, see § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii), while Sarbanes-Oxley limits recovery to actual backpay with interest, see 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(B). Like Sarbanes-Oxley, however, Dodd-Frank authorizes reinstatement and compensation for litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorneys' fees. Compare § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(i), (iii), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(A), (C).
2
Congress authorized the SEC "to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of [ § 78u-6 ] consistent with the purposes of this section." § 78u-6(j). Pursuant to this authority, the SEC published a notice of proposed rulemaking to "Implemen[t] the Whistleblower Provisions" of Dodd-Frank. 75 Fed.Reg. 70488 (2010). Proposed Rule 21F-2(a) defined a "whistleblower," for purposes of both the award and anti-retaliation provisions of § 78u-6, as one or more individuals who "provide the Commission with information relating to a potential violation of the securities laws." Id., at 70519 (proposed 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a) ). The proposed rule, the agency noted, "tracks the statutory definition of a 'whistleblower' " by requiring information reporting to the SEC itself. 75 Fed.Reg. 70489.
In promulgating the final Rule, however, the agency changed course. Rule 21F-2, in finished form, contains two discrete "whistleblower" definitions. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a) - (b) (2017). For purposes of the award program, the Rule states that "[y]ou are a whistleblower if... you provide the Commission with information... relat[ing] to a possible violation of the Federal securities laws." § 240.21F-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). The information must be provided to the SEC through its website or by mailing or faxing a specified form to the SEC Office of the Whistleblower. See ibid. ; § 240.21F-9(a)(1)-(2).
"For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections," however, the Rule states that "[y]ou are a whistleblower if... [y]ou possess a reasonable belief that the information you are providing relates to a possible securities law violation" and "[y]ou provide that information in a manner described in" clauses (i) through (iii) of § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(i)-(ii). "The anti-retaliation protections apply," the Rule emphasizes, "whether or not you satisfy the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an award." § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(iii). An individual may therefore gain anti-retaliation protection as a "whistleblower" under Rule 21F-2 without providing information to the SEC, so long as he or she provides information in a manner shielded by one of the anti-retaliation provision's three clauses. For example, a report to a company supervisor would qualify if the report garners protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provision.
C
Petitioner Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (Digital Realty) is a real estate investment trust that owns, acquires, and develops data centers. See Brief for Petitioner 3. Digital Realty employed respondent Paul Somers as a Vice President from 2010 to 2014. See 119 F.Supp.3d 1088, 1092 (N.D.Cal.2015). Somers alleges that Digital Realty terminated him shortly after he reported to senior management suspected securities-law violations by the company. See ibid. Although nothing impeded him from alerting the SEC prior to his termination, he did not do so. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. Nor did he file an administrative complaint within 180 days of his termination, rendering him ineligible for relief under Sarbanes-Oxley. See ibid. ; 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D).
Somers brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California alleging, inter alia, a claim of whistleblower retaliation under Dodd-Frank. Digital Realty moved to dismiss that claim, arguing that "Somers does not qualify as a 'whistleblower' under [ § 78u-6(h) ] because he did not report any alleged law violations to the SEC." 119 F.Supp.3d, at 1094. The District Court denied the motion. Rule 21F-2, the court observed, does not necessitate recourse to the SEC prior to gaining "whistleblower" status under Dodd-Frank. See id., at 1095-1096. Finding the statutory scheme ambiguous, the court accorded deference to the SEC's Rule under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). See 119 F.Supp.3d, at 1096-1106.
On interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 850 F.3d 1045 (2017). The majority acknowledged that Dodd-Frank's definitional provision describes a "whistleblower" as an individual who provides information to the SEC itself. Id., at 1049. But applying that definition to the anti-retaliation provision, the majority reasoned, would narrow the third clause of § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)"to the point of absurdity": The statute would protect employees only if they "reported possible securities violations both internally and to the SEC." Ibid. Such dual reporting, the majority believed, was unlikely to occur. Ibid. Therefore, the majority concluded, the statute should be read to protect employees who make disclosures privileged by clause (iii) of § 78u-6(h)(1)(A), whether or not those employees also provide information to the SEC. Id., at 1050. In any event, the majority held, the SEC's resolution of any statutory ambiguity warranted deference. Ibid. Judge Owens dissented. In his view, the statutory definition of whistleblower was clear, left no room for interpretation, and plainly governed. Id., at 1051.
Two other Courts of Appeals have weighed in on the question before us. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that employees must provide information to the SEC to avail themselves of Dodd-Frank's anti-retaliation safeguard. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (2013). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, over a dissent by Judge Jacobs. See Berman v. Neo @Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2015). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 582 U.S. ---- (2017), and now reverse the Ninth Circuit's judgment.
II
"When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition," even if it varies from a term's ordinary meaning.
Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 130, 128 S.Ct. 1572, 170 L.Ed.2d 478 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). This principle resolves the question before us.
A
Our charge in this review proceeding is to determine the meaning of "whistleblower" in § 78u-6(h), Dodd-Frank's anti-retaliation provision. The definition section of the statute supplies an unequivocal answer: A "whistleblower" is "any individual who provides... information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission." § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added). Leaving no doubt as to the definition's reach, the statute instructs that the "definitio[n] shall apply" "[i]n this section," that is, throughout § 78u-6. § 78u-6(a)(6).
The whistleblower definition operates in conjunction with the three clauses of § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) to spell out the provision's scope. The definition first describes who is eligible for protection-namely, a whistleblower who provides pertinent information "to the Commission." § 78u-6(a)(6). The three clauses of § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) then describe what conduct, when engaged in by a whistleblower, is shielded from employment discrimination. See § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). An individual who meets both measures may invoke Dodd-Frank's protections. But an individual who falls outside the protected category of "whistleblowers" is ineligible to seek redress under the statute, regardless of the conduct in which that individual engages.
Reinforcing our reading, another whistleblower-protection provision in Dodd-Frank imposes no requirement that information be conveyed to a government agency. Title 10 of the statute, which created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), prohibits discrimination against a "covered employee" who, among other things, "provide[s]... information to [his or her] employer, the Bureau, or any other State, local, or Federal, government authority or law enforcement agency relating to" a violation of a law subject to the CFPB's jurisdiction. 12 U.S.C. § 5567(a)(1). To qualify as a "covered employee," an individual need not provide information to the CFPB, or any other entity. See § 5567(b) ("covered employee" means "any individual performing tasks related to the offering or provision of a consumer financial product or service").
"[W]hen Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another[,]... this Court presumes that Congress intended a difference in meaning." Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2384, 2390, 189 L.Ed.2d 411 (2014) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Congress placed a government-reporting requirement in § 78u-6(h), but not elsewhere in the same statute. Courts are not at liberty to dispense with the condition-tell the SEC-Congress imposed.
B
Dodd-Frank's purpose and design corroborate our comprehension of § 78u-6(h)'s reporting requirement. The "core objective" of Dodd-Frank's robust whistleblower program, as Somers acknowledges, Tr. of Oral Arg. 45, is "to motivate people who know of securities law violations to tell the SEC, " S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 38 (emphasis added). By enlisting whistleblowers to "assist the Government [in] identify[ing] and prosecut[ing] persons who have violated securities laws," Congress undertook to improve SEC enforcement and facilitate the Commission's "recover[y][of] money for victims of financial fraud." Id., at 110. To that end, § 78u-6 provides substantial monetary rewards to whistleblowers who furnish actionable information to the SEC. See § 78u-6(b).
Financial inducements alone, Congress recognized, may be insufficient to encourage certain employees, fearful of employer retaliation, to come forward with evidence of wrongdoing. Congress therefore complemented the Dodd-Frank monetary incentives for SEC reporting by heightening protection against retaliation. While Sarbanes-Oxley contains an administrative-exhaustion requirement, a 180-day administrative complaint-filing deadline, and a remedial scheme limited to actual damages, Dodd-Frank provides for immediate access to federal court, a generous statute of limitations (at least six years), and the opportunity to recover double backpay. See supra, at 774 - 775. Dodd-Frank's award program and anti-retaliation provision thus work synchronously to motivate individuals with knowledge of illegal activity to "tell the SEC." S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 38.
When enacting Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower regime, in comparison, Congress had a more far-reaching objective: It sought to disturb the "corporate code of silence" that "discourage[d] employees from reporting fraudulent behavior not only to the proper authorities, such as the FBI and the SEC, but even internally." Lawson, 571 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1162 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provision covers employees who report fraud not only to the SEC, but also to any other federal agency, Congress, or an internal supervisor. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
C
In sum, Dodd-Frank's text and purpose leave no doubt that the term "whistleblower" in § 78u-6(h) carries the meaning set forth in the section's definitional provision. The disposition of this case is therefore evident: Somers did not provide information "to the Commission" before his termination, § 78u-6(a)(6), so he did not qualify as a "whistleblower" at the time of the alleged retaliation. He is therefore ineligible to seek relief under § 78u-6(h).
III
Somers and the Solicitor General tender a different view of Dodd-Frank's compass. The whistleblower definition, as they see it, applies only to the statute's award program, not to its anti-retaliation provision, and thus not, as the definition plainly states, throughout "this section," § 78u-6(a). See Brief for Respondent 30; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10-11. For purposes of the anti-retaliation provision alone, they urge us to construe the term "whistleblower" in its "ordinary sense," i.e., without any SEC-reporting requirement. Brief for Respondent 18.
Doing so, Somers and the Solicitor General contend, would align with our precedent, specifically Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 69 S.Ct. 503, 93 L.Ed. 611 (1949), and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014). In those decisions, we declined to apply a statutory definition that ostensibly governed where doing so would have been "incompatible with... Congress' regulatory scheme," id., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2443 (internal quotation marks omitted), or would have "destroy[ed] one of the [statute's] major purposes," Suwannee Fruit, 336 U.S., at 201, 69 S.Ct. 503.
This case is of a piece, Somers and the Solicitor General maintain. Applying the statutory definition here, they variously charge, would "create obvious incongruities," Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19 (internal quotation marks omitted), "produce anomalous results," id., at 22, "vitiate much of the [statute's] protection," id., at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted), and, as the Court of Appeals put it, narrow clause (iii) of § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)"to the point of absurdity," Brief for Respondent 35 (quoting 850 F.3d, at 1049 ). We next address these concerns and explain why they do not lead us to depart from the statutory text.
A
It would gut "much of the protection afforded by" the third clause of § 78u-6(h)(1)(a), Somers and the Solicitor General urge most strenuously, to apply the whistleblower definition to the anti-retaliation provision. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20 (internal quotation marks omitted); Brief for Respondent 28-29. As earlier noted, see supra, at 773 - 774, clause (iii) prohibits retaliation against a "whistleblower" for "making disclosures" to various persons and entities, including but not limited to the SEC, to the extent those disclosures are "required or protected under" various laws other than Dodd-Frank. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Applying the statutory definition of whistleblower, however, would limit clause (iii)'s protection to "only those individuals who report to the Commission." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22.
The plain-text reading of the statute undoubtedly shields fewer individuals from retaliation than the alternative proffered by Somers and the Solicitor General. But we do not agree that this consequence "vitiate[s]" clause (iii)'s protection, id., at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted), or ranks as "absur [d]," Brief for Respondent 35 (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, our reading leaves the third clause with "substantial meaning." Brief for Petitioner 32.
With the statutory definition incorporated, clause (iii) protects a whistleblower who reports misconduct both to the SEC and to another entity, but suffers retaliation because of the latter, non-SEC, disclosure. That would be so, for example, where the retaliating employer is unaware that the employee has alerted the SEC. In such a case, without clause (iii), retaliation for internal reporting would not be reached by Dodd-Frank, for clause (i) applies only where the employer retaliates against the employee "because of" the SEC reporting. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). Moreover, even where the employer knows of the SEC reporting, the third clause may operate to dispel a proof problem: The employee can recover under the statute without having to demonstrate whether the retaliation was motivated by the internal report (thus yielding protection under clause (iii)) or by the SEC disclosure (thus gaining protection under clause (i)).
While the Solicitor General asserts that limiting the protections of clause (iii) to dual reporters would "shrink to insignificance the [clause's] ban on retaliation," Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22 (internal quotation marks omitted), he offers scant evidence to support that assertion. Tugging in the opposite direction, he reports that approximately 80 percent of the whistleblowers who received awards in 2016 "reported internally before reporting to the Commission." Id., at 23. And Digital Realty cites real-world examples of dual reporters seeking Dodd-Frank or Sarbanes-Oxley recovery for alleged retaliation. See Brief for Petitioner 33, and n. 4 (collecting cases). Overlooked by Somers and the Solicitor General, in dual-reporting cases, retaliation not prompted by SEC disclosures (and thus unaddressed by clause (i)) is likely commonplace: The SEC is required to protect the identity of whistleblowers, see § 78u-6(h)(2)(A), so employers will often be unaware that an employee has reported to the Commission. In any event, even if the number of individuals qualifying for protection under clause (iii) is relatively limited, "[i]t is our function to give the statute the effect its language suggests, however modest that may be." Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 270, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010).
B
Somers and the Solicitor General express concern that our reading would jettison protection for auditors, attorneys, and other employees subject to internal-reporting requirements. See Brief for Respondent 35; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21. Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, requires auditors and attorneys to report certain information within the company before making disclosures externally. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1(b), 7245 ; 17 C.F.R. § 205.3. If the whistleblower definition applies, Somers and the Solicitor General fear, these professionals will be "le[ft]... vulnerable to discharge or other retaliatory action for complying with" their internal-reporting obligations. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our reading shields employees in these circumstances, however, as soon as they also provide relevant information to the Commission. True, such employees will remain ineligible for Dodd-Frank's protection until they tell the SEC, but this result is consistent with Congress' aim to encourage SEC disclosures. See S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 38 ; supra, at 773 - 774, 777 - 778. Somers worries that lawyers and auditors will face retaliation quickly, before they have a chance to report to the SEC. Brief for Respondent 35-36. But he offers nothing to show that Congress had this concern in mind when it enacted § 78u-6(h). Indeed, Congress may well have considered adequate the safeguards already afforded by Sarbanes-Oxley, protections specifically designed to shield lawyers, accountants, and similar professionals. See Lawson, 571 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1182.
C
Applying the whistleblower definition as written, Somers and the Solicitor General further protest, will create "an incredibly unusual statutory scheme": "[I]dentical misconduct"-i.e., retaliating against an employee for internal reporting-will "go punished or not based on the happenstance of a separate report" to the SEC, of which the wrongdoer may "not even be aware." Brief for Respondent 37-38. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24. The upshot, the Solicitor General warns, "would [be] substantially diminish[ed] Dodd-Fran[k] deterrent effect." Ibid.
Overlooked in this protest is Dodd-Frank's core objective: to prompt reporting to the SEC. Supra, at 773 - 744, 777 - 778. In view of that precise aim, it is understandable that the statute's retaliation protections, like its financial rewards, would be reserved for employees who have done what Dodd-Frank seeks to achieve, i.e., they have placed information about unlawful activity before the Commission to aid its enforcement efforts.
D
Pointing to another purported anomaly attending the reading we adopt today, the Solicitor General observes that neither the whistleblower definition nor § 78u-6(h)
contains any requirement of a "temporal or topical connection between the violation reported to the Commission and the internal disclosure for which the employee suffers retaliation." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25. It is therefore possible, the Solicitor General posits, that "an employee who was fired for reporting accounting fraud to his supervisor in 2017 would have a cause of action under [ § 78u-6(h) ] if he had reported an insider-trading violation by his previous employer to the Commission in 2012." Ibid. For its part, Digital Realty agrees that this scenario could arise, but does not see it as a cause for concern: "Congress," it states, "could reasonably have made the policy judgment that individuals who report securities-law violations to the SEC should receive broad protection over time against retaliation for a variety of disclosures." Reply Brief 11.
We need not dwell on the situation hypothesized by the Solicitor General, for it veers far from the case before us. We note, however, that the interpretation offered by Somers and the Solicitor General-i.e., ignoring the statutory definition when construing the anti-retaliation provision-raises an even thornier question about the law's scope. Their view, which would not require an employee to provide information relating to a securities-law violation to the SEC, could afford Dodd-Frank protection to an employee who reports information bearing no relationship whatever to the securities laws. That prospect could be imagined based on the broad array of federal statutes and regulations cross-referenced by clause (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (criminalizing retaliation for "providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission... of any Federal offense " (emphasis added)); see supra, at 774, and n. 2. For example, an employee fired for reporting a coworker's drug dealing to the Federal Bureau of Investigation might be protected. Brief for Petitioner 38. It would make scant sense, however, to rank an FBI drug-trafficking informant a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank, a law concerned only with encouraging the reporting of "securities law violations." S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 38 (emphasis added).
E
Finally, the interpretation we adopt, the Solicitor General adds, would undermine not just clause (iii) of § 78u-6(h)(1)(A), but clause (ii) as well. Clause (ii) prohibits retaliation against a whistleblower for "initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or... action of the Commission based upon" information conveyed to the SEC by a whistleblower in accordance with the statute. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(ii). If the whistleblower definition is applied to § 78u-6(h), the Solicitor General states, "an employer could fire an employee for giving... testimony [to the SEC] if the employee had not previously reported to the Commission online or through the specified written form"-i.e., the methods currently prescribed by Rule 21F-9 for a whistleblower to provide information to the Commission. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20-21 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-9(a)(1)-(2) ).
But the statute expressly delegates authority to the SEC to establish the "manner" in which information may be provided to the Commission by a whistleblower. See § 78u-6(a)(6). Nothing in today's opinion prevents the agency from enumerating additional means of SEC reporting-including through testimony protected by clause (ii).
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we find the statute's definition of "whistleblower" clear and conclusive. Because "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue," Chevron, 467
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered discovery orders directing the Vice President and other senior officials in the Executive Branch to produce information about a task force established to give advice and make policy recommendations to the President. This case requires us to consider the circumstances under which a court of appeals may exercise its power to issue a writ of mandamus to modify or dissolve the orders when, by virtue of their overbreadth, enforcement might interfere with the officials in the discharge of their duties and impinge upon the President’s constitutional prerogatives.
I
A few days after assuming office, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum establishing the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG or Group). The Group was directed to “develo[p]... a national energy policy designed to help the private sector, and government at all levels, promote dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound production and distribution of energy for the future.” App. 156-157. The President assigned a number of agency heads and assistants — all employees of the Federal Government — to serve as members of the committee. He authorized the Vice President, as chairman of the Group, to invite “other officers of the Federal Government” to participate “as appropriate.” Id., at 157. Five months later, the NEPDG issued a final report and, according to the Government, terminated all operations.
Following publication of the report, respondents Judicial Watch, Inc., and the Sierra Club filed these separate actions, which were later consolidated in the District Court. Respondents alleged the NEPDG had failed to comply with the procedural and disclosure requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA or Act), 5 U. S. C. App. §2, p. 1.
FACA was enacted to monitor the “numerous committees, boards, commissions, councils, and similar groups [that] have been established to advise officers and agencies in the executive branch of the Federal Government,” § 2(a), and to prevent the “wasteful expenditure of public funds” that may result from their proliferation, Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 453 (1989). Subject to specific exemptions, FACA imposes a variety of open-meeting and disclosure requirements on groups that meet the definition of an “advisory committee.” As relevant here, an “advisory committee” means
“any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof..., which is—
“(B) established or utilized by the President,... except that [the definition] excludes (i) any committee that is composed wholly of full-time, or permanent part-time, officers, or employees of the Federal Government....” 5 U. S. C. App. §3(2), p. 2.
Respondents do not dispute the President appointed only Federal Government officials to the NEPDG. They agree that the NEPDG, as established by the President in his memorandum, was “composed wholly of full-time, or permanent part-time, officers or employees of the Federal Government.” Ibid. The complaint alleges, however, that “non-federal employees,” including “private lobbyists,” “regularly attended and fully participated in non-public meetings.” App. 21 (Judicial Watch Complaint ¶ 25). Relying on Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F. 2d 898 (CADC 1993) (AAPS), respondents contend that the regular participation of the non-Government individuals made them de facto members of the committee. According to the complaint, their “involvement and role are functionally indistinguishable from those of the other [formal] members.” Id., at 915. As a result, respondents argue, the NEPDG cannot benefit from the Act’s exemption under subsection B and is subject to FACA’s requirements.
Vice President Cheney, the NEPDG, the Government officials who served on the committee, and the alleged de facto members were named as defendants. The suit seeks declaratory relief and an injunction requiring them to produce all materials allegedly subject to FACA’s requirements.
All defendants moved to dismiss. The District Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The court acknowledged FACA does not create a private cause of action. On this basis, it dismissed respondents’ claims against the non-Government defendants. Because the NEPDG had been dissolved, it could not be sued as a defendant; and the claims against it were dismissed as well. The District Court held, however, that FACA’s substantive requirements could be enforced against the Vice President and other Government participants on the NEPDG under the Mandamus Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1361, and against the agency defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 706. The District Court recognized the disclosure duty must be clear and nondiscretionary for mandamus to issue, and there must be, among other things, “final agency actions” for the APA to apply. According to the District Court, it was premature to decide these questions. It held only that respondents had alleged sufficient facts to keep the Vice President and the other defendants in the case..
The District Court deferred ruling on the Government’s contention that to disregard the exemption and apply FACA to the NEPDG would violate principles of separation of powers and interfere with the constitutional prerogatives of the President and the Vice President. Instead, the court allowed respondents to conduct a “tightly-reined” discovery to ascertain the NEPDG’s structure and membership, and thus to determine whether the de facto membership doctrine applies. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54 (DC 2002). While acknowledging that discovery itself might raise serious constitutional questions, the District Court explained that the Government could assert executive privilege to protect sensitive materials from disclosure. In the District Court’s view, these “issues of executive privilege will be much more limited in scope than the broad constitutional challenge raised by the government.” Id., at 55. The District Court adopted this approach in an attempt to avoid constitutional questions, noting that if, after discovery, respondents have no evidentiary support for the allegations about the regular participation by lobbyists and industry executives on the NEPDG, the Government can prevail on statutory grounds. Furthermore, the District Court explained, even were it appropriate to address constitutional issues, some factual development is necessary to determine the extent of the alleged intrusion into the Executive’s constitutional authority. The court denied in part the motion to dismiss and ordered respondents to submit a discovery plan.
In due course the District Court approved respondents’ discovery plan, entered a series of orders allowing discovery to proceed, see CADC App. 238, 263, 364 (reproducing orders entered on Sept. 9, Oct. 17, and Nov. 1, 2002), and denied the Government’s motion for certification under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b) with, respect to the discovery orders. Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals to vacate the discovery orders, to direct the District Court to rule on the basis of the administrative record, and to dismiss the Vice President from the suit. The Vice President also filed a notice of appeal from the same orders. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974).
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus and the Vice President’s attempted interlocutory appeal. In re Cheney, 334 F. 3d 1096 (CADC 2003). With respect to mandamus, the majority declined to issue the writ on the ground that alternative avenues of relief remained available. Citing United States v. Nixon, supra, the majority held that petitioners, to guard against intrusion into the President’s prerogatives, must first assert privilege. Under its reading of Nixon, moreover, privilege claims must be made “‘with particularity.’” 334 F. 3d, at 1104. In the majority’s view, if the District Court sustains the privilege, petitioners will be able to obtain all the relief they seek. If the District Court rejects the claim of executive privilege and creates “an imminent risk of disclosure of allegedly protected presidential communications,” “mandamus might well be appropriate to avoid letting ‘the cat... out of the bag.’ ” Id., at 1104-1105. “But so long as the separation of powers conflict that petitioners anticipate remains hypothetical,” the panel held, “we have no authority to exercise the extraordinary remedy of mandamus.” Id., at 1105. The majority acknowledged the scope of respondents’ requests is overly broad, because it seeks far more than the “limited items” to which respondents would be entitled if “the district court ultimately determines that the NEPDG is subject to FACA.” Id., at 1105-1106; id., at 1106 (“The requests to produce also go well beyond FACA’s requirements”); ibid. (“[Respondents’] discovery also goes well beyond what they need to prove”). It nonetheless agreed with the District Court that petitioners “ ‘shall bear the burden’ ” of invoking executive privilege and filing objections to the discovery orders with “‘detailed precision.’” Id., at 1105 (quoting Aug. 2, 2002, Order).
For similar reasons, the majority rejected the Vice President’s interlocutory appeal. In United States v. Nixon, the Court held that the President could appeal an interlocutory subpoena order without having “to place himself in the posture of disobeying an order of a court merely to trigger the procedural mechanism for review.” 418 U. S., at 691. The majority, however, found the case inapplicable because Vice President Cheney, unlike then-President Nixon, had not yet asserted privilege. In the majority’s view, the Vice President was not forced to choose between disclosure and suffering contempt for failure to obey a court order. The majority held that to require the Vice President to assert privilege does not create the unnecessary confrontation between two branches of Government described in Nixon.
Judge Randolph filed a dissenting opinion. In his view A APS’ de facto membership doctrine is mistaken, and the Constitution bars its application to the NEPDG. Allowing discovery to determine the applicability of the defacto membership doctrine, he concluded, is inappropriate. He would have issued the writ of mandamus directing dismissal of the complaints. 334 F. 3d, at 1119.
We granted certiorari. 540 U. S. 1088 (2003). We now vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the ease for further proceedings to reconsider the Government’s mandamus petition.
II
As a preliminary matter, we address respondents’ argument that the Government’s petition fór a writ of mandamus was jurisdictionally out of time or, alternatively, barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. According to respondents, because the Government’s basic argument was one of discovery immunity — that is, it need not invoke executive privilege or make particular objections to the discovery requests — the mandamus petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals within 60 days after the District Court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss. Sée Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(B) (“When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered”). On this theory, the last day for making any filing to the Court of Appeals was September 9, 2002. The Government, however, did not file the mandamus petition and the notice of appeal until November 7, four months after the District Court issued the order that, under respondents’ view, commenced the time for appeal.
As even respondents acknowledge, however, Rule 4(a), by its plain terms, applies only to the filing of a notice of appeal. Brief for Respondent Sierra Club 23. Rule 4(a) is inapplicable to the Government’s mandamus petition under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651. Because we vacate the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand the case for further proceedings for the court to consider whether a writ of mandamus should have issued, we need not decide whether the Vice President also could have appealed the District Court’s orders under Nixon and the collateral order doctrine. We express no opinion on whether the Vice President’s notice of appeal was timely filed.
Respondents’ argument that the mandamus petition was barred by laches does not withstand scrutiny. Laches might bar a petition for a writ of mandamus if the petitioner “slept upon his rights..., and especially if the delay has been prejudicial to the [other party], or to the rights of other persons,” Chapman v. County of Douglas, 107 U. S. 348, 355 (1883). Here, the flurry of activity following the District Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss overcomes respondents’ argument that the Government neglected to assert its rights. The Government filed, among other papers, a motion for a protective order on September 3; a motion to stay pending appeal on October 21; and a motion for leave to appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b) on October 23. Even were we to agree that the baseline for measuring the timeliness of the Government’s mandamus petition was the District Court’s order denying the motion to dismiss, the Government’s active litigation posture was far from the neglect or delay that would make the application of laches appropriate.
We do not accept, furthermore, respondents’ argument that laches should apply because the motions filed by the Government following the District Court’s denial of its motion to dismiss amounted to little more than dilatory tactics to “delay and obstruct the proceedings.” Brief for Respondent Sierra Club 23. In light of the drastic nature of mandamus and our precedents holding that mandamus may not issue so long as alternative avenues of relief remain available, the Government cannot be faulted for attempting to resolve the dispute through less drastic means. The law does not put litigants in the impossible position of having to exhaust alternative remedies before petitioning for mandamus, on the one hand, and having to file the mandamus petition at the earliest possible moment to avoid laches, on the other. The petition was properly before the Court of Appeals for its consideration.
Ill
We now come to the central issue in the case — whether the Court of Appeals was correct to conclude it “ha[d] no authority to exercise the extraordinary remedy of mandamus,” 334 F. 3d, at 1105, on the ground that the Government could protect its rights by asserting executive privilege in the District Court.
The common-law writ of mandamus against a lower court is codified at 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a): “The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” This is a “drastic and extraordinary” remedy “reserved for really extraordinary causes.” Ex parte Fahey, 332 U. S. 258, 259-260 (1947). “The traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine [the court against which mandamus is sought] to a lawful exercise of its prescribed juris-’ diction.” Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U. S. 21, 26 (1943). Although courts have not “confined themselves to an arbitrary and technical definition of ‘jurisdiction,’ ” Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 95 (1967), “only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial ‘usurpation of power,’ ” ibid., or a “clear abuse of discretion,” Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U. S. 379, 383 (1953), “will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy,” Will, 389 U. S., at 95.
As the writ is one of “the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal,” id., at 107, three conditions must be satisfied before it may issue. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal, 426 U. S. 394, 403 (1976). First, “the party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires,” ibid. — a condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process, Fahey, supra, at 260. Second, the petitioner must satisfy “‘the burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ is “clear and indisputable.’”” Kerr, supra, at 403 (quoting Bankers Life & Casualty Co., supra, at 384). Third, even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. Kerr, supra, at 403 (citing Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112, n. 8 (1964)). These hurdles, however demanding, are not insuperable. This Court has issued the writ to restrain a lower court when its actions would threaten the separation of powers by “embarrassing] the executive arm of the Government,” Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 588 (1943), or result in the “intrusion by the federal judiciary on a delicate area of federal-state relations,” Will, supra, at 95 (citing Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U. S. 9 (1926)).
Were the Vice President not a party in the case, the argument that the Court of Appeals should have entertained an action in mandamus, notwithstanding the District Court’s denial of the motion for certification, might present different considerations. Here, however, the Vice President and his comembers on the NEPDG are the subjects of the discovery orders. The mandamus petition alleges that the orders threaten “substantial intrusions on the process by which those in closest operational proximity to the President advise the President.” App. 343. These facts and allegations remove this case from the category of ordinary discovery orders where interlocutory appellate review is unavailable, through mandamus or otherwise. It is well established that “a President’s communications and activities encompass a vastly wider range of sensitive material than would be true of any ‘ordinary individual.’” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 715. Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as a trial judge, recognized the unique position of the Executive Branch when he stated that “[i]n no case... would a court be required to proceed against the president as against an ordinary individual.” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14, 694) (CC Va. 1807). See also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 698-699 (1997) (“We have, in short, long recognized the ‘unique position in the constitutional scheme’ that [the Office of the President] occupies” (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 749 (1982))); 520 U. S., at 710-724 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). As United States v. Nixon explained, these principles do not mean that the “President is above the law.” 418 U. S., at 715. Rather, they simply acknowledge that the public interest requires that a coequal, branch of Government “afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice,” ibid., and give recognition to the paramount necessity of protecting the Executive Branch from vexatious litigation that might distract it from the energetic performance of its constitutional duties.
These separation-of-powers considerations should inform a court of appeals’ evaluation of a mandamus petition involving the President or the Vice President. Accepted mandamus standards are broad enough to allow a court of appeals to prevent a lower court from interfering with a coequal branch’s ability to discharge its constitutional responsibilities. See Ex parte Peru, supra, at 587 (recognizing jurisdiction to issue the writ because “the action of the political arm of the Government taken within its appropriate sphere [must] be promptly recognized, and... delay and inconvenience of a prolonged litigation [must] be avoided by prompt termination of the proceedings in the district court”); see also Clinton v. Jones, supra, at 701 (“We have recognized that ‘[e]ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself... the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties’ ” (quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. 748, 757 (1996))).
IV
The Court of Appeals dismissed these separation-of-powers concerns. Relying on United States v. Nixon, it held that even though respondents’ discovery requests are overbroad and “go well beyond FACA’s requirements,” the Vice President and his former colleagues on the NEPDG “ ‘shall bear the burden’ ” of invoking privilege with narrow specificity and objecting to the discovery requests with “ ‘detailed precision.’ ” 334 F. 3d, at 1105-1106. In its view, this result was required by Nixon’s rejection of an “absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.” 418 U. S., at 706. If Nixon refused to recognize broad claims of confidentiality where the President had asserted executive privilege, the majority reasoned, Nixon must have rejected, a fortiori, petitioners’ claim of discovery immunity where the privilege has not even been invoked. According to the majority, because the Executive Branch can invoke executive privilege to maintain the separation of powers, mandamus relief is premature.
This analysis, however, overlooks fundamental differences in the two cases. Nixon cannot bear the weight the Court of Appeals puts upon it. First, unlike this case, which concerns respondents’ requests for information for use in a civil suit, Nixon involves the proper balance between the Executive’s interest in the confidentiality of its communications and the “constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding.” Id., at 713. The Court’s decision was explicit that it was “not... concerned with the balance between the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in civil litigation.... We address only the conflict between the President’s assertion of a generalized privilege of confidentiality and the constitutional need for relevant evidence in criminal trials.” Id., at 712, n. 19.
The distinction Nixon drew between criminal and civil proceedings is not just a matter of formalism. As the Court explained, the need for information in the criminal context is much weightier because “our historic[al] commitment to the rule of law... is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that ‘the twofold aim [of criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.’ ” Id., at 708-709 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935)). In light of the “fundamental”. and “comprehensive” need for “every man’s evidence” in the criminal justice system, 418 U. S., at 709, 710, not only must the Executive Branch first assert privilege to resist disclosure, but privilege claims that shield information from a grand jury proceeding or a criminal trial are not to be “expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth,” id., at 710. The need for information for use in civil cases, while far from negligible, does not share the urgency or significance of the criminal subpoena requests in Nixon. As Nixon recognized, the right to production of relevant evidence in civil proceedings does not have the same “constitutional dimensions.” Id., at 711.
The Court also observed in Nixon that a “primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch [is] to do justice in criminal prosecutions.” Id., at 707. Withholding materials from a tribunal in an ongoing criminal case when the information is necessary to the court in carrying out its tasks “conflict[s] with the function of the courts under Art. III.” Ibid. Such an impairment of the “essential functions of [another] branch,” ibid., is impermissible. Withholding the information in this case, however, does not hamper another branch’s ability to perform its “essential functions” in quite the same way. Ibid. The District Court ordered discovery here, not to remedy known statutory violations, but to ascertain whether FACA’s disclosure requirements even apply to the NEPDG in the first place. Even if FACA embodies important congressional objectives, the only consequence from respondents’ inability to obtain the discovery they seek is that it would be more difficult for private complainants to vindicate Congress’ policy objectives under FACA. And even if, for argument’s sake, the reasoning in Judge Randolph’s dissenting opinion in the end is rejected and FACA’s statutory objectives would be to some extent frustrated, it does not follow that a court’s Article III authority or Congress’ central Article I powers would be impaired. The situation here cannot, in fairness, be compared to Nixon, where a court’s ability to fulfill its constitutional responsibility to resolve cases and controversies within its jurisdiction hinges on the availability of certain indispensable information.
A party’s need for information is only one facet of the problem. An important factor weighing in the opposite direction is the burden imposed by the discovery orders. This is not a routine discovery dispute. The discovery requests are directed to the Vice President and other senior Government officials who served on the NEPDG to give advice and make recommendations to the President. The Executive Branch, at its highest level, is seeking the aid of the courts to protect its constitutional prerogatives. As we have already noted, special considerations control when the Executive Branch’s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its communications are implicated. This Court has held, on more than one occasion, that “[t]he high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive... is a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the timing and scope of discovery,” Clinton, 520 U. S., at 707, and that the Executive’s “constitutional responsibilities and status [are] factors counseling judicial deference and restraint” in the conduct of litigation against it, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 753. Respondents’ reliance on cases that do not involve senior members of the Executive Branch, see, e. g., Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 426 U. S. 394 (1976), is altogether misplaced.
Even when compared against United States v. Nixon’s criminal subpoenas, which did involve the President, the civil discovery here militates against respondents’ position. The observation in Nixon that production of confidential information would not disrupt the functioning of the Executive Branch cannot be applied in a mechanistic fashion to civil litigation. In the criminal justice system, there are various constraints, albeit imperfect, to filter out insubstantial legal claims. The decision to prosecute a criminal case, for example, is made by a publicly accountable prosecutor subject to budgetary considerations and under an ethical obligation, not only to win and zealously to advocate for his client but also to serve the cause of justice. The rigors of the penal system are alsp mitigated by the responsible exercise of prosecuto-rial discretion. In contrast, there are no analogous checks in the civil discovery process here. Although under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, sanctions are available, and private attorneys also owe an obligation of candor to the judicial tribunal, these safeguards have proved insufficient to discourage the filing of meritless claims against the Executive Branch. “In view of the visibility of” the Offices of the President and the Vice President and “the effect of [their] actions on countless people,” they are “easily identifiable target[s] for suits for civil damages.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, supra, at 753.
Finally, the narrow subpoena orders in United States v. Nixon stand on an altogether different footing from the overly broad discovery requests approved by the District Court in this case. The criminal subpoenas in Nixon were required to satisfy exacting standards of “(1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; (3) specificity.” 418 U. S., at 700 (interpreting Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17(c)). They were “not intended to provide a means of discovery.” 418 U. S., at 698. The burden of showing these standards were met, moreover, fell on the party requesting the information. Id., at 699 (“[I]n order to require production prior to trial, the moving party must show [that the applicable standards are met]”). In Nixon, the Court addressed the issue of executive privilege only after having satisfied itself that the special prosecutor had surmounted these demanding requirements. Id., at 698 (“If we sustained this [Rule 17(c)] challenge, there would be no occasion to reach the claim of privilege asserted with respect to the subpoenaed material”). The very specificity of the subpoena requests serves as an important safeguard against unnecessary intrusion into the operation of the Office of the President.
In contrast to Nixon's subpoena orders that “precisely identified” and “specific[ally]... enumerated” the relevant materials, id., at 688, and n. 5, the discovery requests here, as the panel majority acknowledged, ask for everything under the sky:
“1. All documents identifying or referring to any staff, personnel, contractors, consultants or employees of the Task Force.
“2. All documents establishing or referring to any Sub-Group.
“3. All documents identifying or referring to any staff, personnel, contractors, consultants or employees of any Sub-Group.
“4. All documents identifying or referring to any other persons participating in the preparation of the Report or in the activities of the Task Force or any Sub-Group.
“5. All documents concerning any communication relating to the activities of the Task Force, the activities of any Sub-Groups, or the preparation of the Report....
“6. All documents concerning any communication relating to the activities of the Task Force, the activities of Sub-Groups, or the preparation of the Report between any person... and [a list of agencies].” App. 220-221.
The preceding excerpt from respondents’ “First Request for Production of Documents,” id., at 215 (emphasis added), is only the beginning. Respondents’ “First Set of Interrogatories” are similarly unbounded in scope. Id., at 224. Givén the breadth of the discovery requests in this case compared to the narrow subpoena orders in United States v. Nixon, our precedent provides no support for the proposition that the Executive Branch “shall bear the burden” of invoking executive privilege with sufficient specificity and of making particularized objections. 334 F. 3d, at 1105. To be sure, Nixon held that the President cannot, through the assertion of a “broad [and] undifferentiated” need for confidentiality and the invocation of an “absolute, unqualified” executive privilege, withhold information in the face of subpoena orders. 418 U. S., at 706, 707. It did so, however, only after the party requesting the information — the special prosecutor — had satisfied his burden of showing the propriety of the requests. Here, as the Court of Appeals acknowledged, the discovery requests are anything but appropriate. They provide respondents all the disclosure to which they would be entitled in the event they prevail on the merits, and much more besides. In these circumstances, Nixon does not require -the Executive Branch to bear the onus of critiquing the unacceptable discovery requests line by line. Our precedents suggest just the opposite. See, e. g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681 (1997); id., at 705 (holding that the Judiciary may direct “appropriate process” to the Executive); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 753.
The Government, however, did in fact object to the scope of discovery and asked the District Court to narrow it in some way. Its arguments were ignored. See App. 167, 181-183 (arguing “this case can be resolved far short of the wide-ranging inquiries plaintiffs have proposed” and suggesting alternatives to “limi[t]” discovery); id., at 232 (“Defendants object to the scope of plaintiffs’ discovery requests and to the undue burden imposed by them. The scope of plaintiffs’ requests is broader than that reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence”); id., at 232, n. 10 (“We state our general objections here for purposes of clarity for the record and to preclude any later argument that, by not including them here, those general objections have been waived”). In addition, the Government objected to the burden that would arise from the District Court’s insistence that the Vice President winnow the discovery orders by asserting specific claims of privilege and making more particular objections. Id., at 201 (Tr. of Status Hearing (Aug. 2, 2002)) (noting “concerns with disrupting the effective functioning of the presidency and the vice-presidency”); id., at-274 (“[C]ompliance with the order of the court imposes a burden on the Office of the Vice President. That is a real burden. If we had completed and done everything that Your Honor has asked us to do today that burden would be gone, but it would have been realized”). These arguments, too, were rejected. See id., at 327, 329 (Nov. 1, 2002, Order) (noting that the court had, “on numerous occasions,” rejected the Government’s assertion “that court orders requiring [it] to respond in any fashion to [the] discovery requests creates an ‘unconstitutional burden’ on the Executive Branch”).
Contrary to the District Court’s and the Court of Appeals’ conclusions, Nixon does not leave them the sole option of inviting the Executive Branch to invoke executive privilege while remaining otherwise powerless to modify a party’s overly broad discovery requests. Executive privilege is an extraordinary assertion of power “not to be lightly invoked.” United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 7 (1953). Once executive privilege is asserted, coequal branches of the Government are set on a collision course. The Judiciary is forced into the difficult task of balancing the need for information in a judicial proceeding and the Executive’s Article II prerogatives. This inquiry places courts in the awkward position of evaluating the Executive’s claims of confidentiality and autonomy, and pushes to the fore difficult questions of separation of powers and checks and balances. These “occasion[s] for constitutional confrontation between the two branches”.should be avoided whenever possible. United States v. Nixon, supra, at 692.
In recognition of these concerns, there is sound precedent in the District of Columbia itself for district courts to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, when they are asked to enforce against the Executive Branch unnecessarily broad subpoenas. In United States v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. 1501 (1989), defendant Poindexter, on trial for criminal charges,
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether the accused, who is under a sentence of death, imposed by a Pennsylvania court and jury for murder committed during the course of an armed robbery, was tried under such prejudicial circumstances and improper influences that he was denied the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The charges in this federal habeas corpus proceeding are that an atmosphere of hysteria and prejudice prevailed at the state trial, including the prejudicial conduct and frequent presence in the courtroom of another judge of the same court, who recently had presided over a trial of two associates of petitioner and which had resulted in a like conviction and sentence for the murder committed. For the reasons hereafter stated, we agree with the considered judgments of the state court, Pennsylvania ex rel. Darcy v. Claudy, 367 Pa. 130, 79 A. 2d 785; the Federal District Court, 130 F. Supp. 270; and the Court of Appeals, 224 F. 2d 504; holding that the accused was not denied due process of law.
Late on December 22, 1947, petitioner Darcy and three associates, Foster, Zeitz and Capone, armed with revolvers, held up a tavern in Feasterville, near Doyles-town, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. During the robbery two patrons of the tavern were shot and severely wounded. As petitioner and his companions left the scene, Zeitz fired at and killed a bystander, William Kelly. About a half hour later, petitioner and his companions committed another armed robbery in which shots also were fired but no one was injured. Before 2 a. m., they were arrested by Philadelphia police. While in that custody, they voluntarily admitted their participation not only in the above robberies but in seven others committed since November 30. In these a total of seven persons had been shot or otherwise injured.
On January 5,1948, petitioner and his three companions were brought to Bucks County, charged with the murder of William Kelly and committed, without bail, to await action by the grand jury. On February 10, all four being present and all but one being represented by counsel of his own choice, they were severally indicted for murder. The District Attorney moved for a continuance because Foster was without counsel, and because one prosecution witness was in a critical condition from the wound received at the time of the robbery. The continuance was granted. On March 1, counsel for petitioner and Capone moved for a severance and separate trials. Judge Keller of the nisi prius or trial court (Court of Oyer and Terminer and General Jail Delivery of Bucks County) suggested the advisability of a combination trial, but granted the motions when counsel insisted on their right to them. On March 3, Judge Boyer, of the same court, appointed two local attorneys to represent Foster.
In March, defense counsel were advised that the Foster-Zeitz case would be called first, petitioner’s case the following week, and then Capone’s case.
When it became apparent that the Foster-Zeitz trial, which began May 24, would continue into the week of June 1, the court directed the sheriff’s office to notify the prospective jurors who had been summoned for June 1 not to appear until June 7. They were so notified and, with one exception, did not appear for duty until the latter date. For the Foster-Zeitz and petitioner’s trials, the prospective jurors waited outside the main courtroom, were called in individually and were subjected to a searching examination on voir dire. While neither Foster, Zeitz nor petitioner exercised all of his peremptory challenges, two extra venires were called in order to complete the two juries. No jurors sat in both cases. Once accepted, the respective juries were kept together during each trial under the supervision of court officials. The jurors were not permitted to see newspapers, listen to radios, or see television programs, and were kept free from any outside influence or contact.
At no time during either the Foster-Zeitz trial or petitioner’s trial was the courtroom filled to capacity and at no time was there any need for the court to call for order. No outbursts, disturbances or untoward incidents occurred in the courtroom or elsewhere in the county. The proceedings were reported daily in the press and, on occasion, by radio. The reporting was factual, with some editorials. The news coverage diminished a few weeks after the robbery, increased and subsided again after the grand-jury proceedings, and increased just before the trials.
In Pennsylvania, the jury fixes the penalty for murder in the first degree. No question was raised as to identity or as to petitioner’s participation in the robbery. The strategy of the defense in both trials was to seek to keep the punishment down to life imprisonment. On Friday, June 4, the jury in the Foster-Zeitz trial returned a verdict of guilty and fixed the penalty at death. After receiving the verdict, the trial judge, Judge Boyer, was, on June 5, quoted in the local newspaper as having said to that jury:
“ T don’t see how you could, under the evidence, have reached any other verdict. Your verdict may have a very wholesome effect on other young men in all vicinities who may come to realize the seriousness of the folly in which so many young men indulge in these days. The only hope of stemming the tide of such crime by youth is to enforce the law which you have indicated by your decision.’ ” 130 F. Supp., at 291-292.
A few moments earlier, Judge Keller, in discharging the remainder of the May 24 panel, had, in the same courtroom, commended them for their satisfactory verdicts, the last one of which had been an acquittal on a charge of rape.
On Monday, June 7, petitioner’s trial began. The court opened at 10 a. m., with both Judge Boyer and Judge Keller presiding. As usual, miscellaneous business, unrelated to the impending trial, was first disposed of by the court. Petitioner was then arraigned. He pleaded not guilty and, upon Judge Keller’s direction, the selection of the jury was commenced. At various times during petitioner’s trial, although it was presided over by Judge Keller, Judge Boyer was in attendance, sitting either on the bench with Judge Keller or in the courtroom within the enclosure reserved for attorneys, the parties and the press. In this connection, the Federal District Court found that—
“By long established tradition in Bucks County, each morning and afternoon at the opening of court both judges take the bench to entertain motions and other miscellaneous matters in the Criminal, Common Pleas — law and equity — and Orphans Court. Once this work is completed, one of the judges, if engaged in a trial in that court room, remains on the bench; the other judge leaving to perform duties in another court room or in chambers. The practice used in many Pennsylvania courts . . . was continued daily no matter what court was in session or the nature of the trial [but] not on June 4 when Judge Boyer charged the jury [trying Foster and Zeitz]; and . . . not on June 8 and 10.
“The criminal docket ... a record of individual trials, shows both judges on the bench at 10:00 A. M. May 24 . . . 9:30 A. M. June 2 . . . 10:00 A. M. June 7 ... . The court reporter’s notes of testimony show only one instance of Judge Boyer taking any part whatsoever in the Darcy trial, i. e., during a sidebar discussion out of the hearing of the jury shortly after court convened on Saturday morning, June 12 ... . Under consideration was a difficult question of law on the admissibility of evidence of other offenses ... in view of the Act of July 3,1947, P. L. 1239, 19 P. S. Pa. § 711 note. Judge Boyer indicated his thinking on the matter. Upon objection by counsel the discussion ended; Judge Keller ruled; Judge Boyer left the bench shortly after and did not return during the remainder of the trial. It may be that during the Foster-Zeitz trial Judge Keller shortly after 9:30 A. M. June 2 . . . listened to but did not express any opinion during a similar discussion.
“Honorable Hiram H. Keller . . . who presided . . . throughout the trial, has certified . . . that after the miscellaneous business was completed, 'On several occasions . . . Judge Boyer remained for brief periods while evidence was presented . . and that with the exception of the incident [noted above], 'At no other time, during the course of the trial, did Judge Boyer assist, volunteer to assist, or make any suggestions to or otherwise aid the undersigned in the trial of this case.’
“The District Attorney . . . testified, and we find as a fact, that Judge Boyer did not at any time during the Darcy trial assist, attempt to assist, make any suggestion to or in any other manner aid the Commonwealth in the prosecution of the case against David Darcy; that Judge Boyer did not pass any note or message of any kind to the District Attorney in connection with the trial for the use of the District Attorney or Judge Keller.
“On several occasions during the Darcy trial — not on Friday evening or during the charge of the court on Monday, June 14 — Judge Boyer sat for brief intervals on a chair just inside the court room door from the judges’ chambers, apparently listening to the proceedings. . . .
“During the Darcy trial Judge Boyer did not at any time sit at or near the table reserved for the press; at or near the table reserved for the District Attorney; at no time did Judge Boyer sit on a chair next to or anywhere near a chair occupied by the District Attorney.
“Throughout the trial, the only chairs occupied by the District Attorney or his assistant were at the table reserved for that purpose, or in chairs immediately in front of the table reserved for the press.
“At no time other than that noted [above] did Judge Boyer take any part whatsoever in the proceedings of the Darcy trial.” 130 F. Supp., at 296-297.
On Monday, June 14, petitioner’s case went to the jury. It returned a verdict of guilty and fixed the penalty at death. The subsequent proceedings in this case, extending over eight years, are summarized in the margin. Those proceedings uniformly sustained the State, but we granted certiorari to review the charge now made by petitioner that he was denied due process. 350 U. S. 872.
Petitioner’s charge is that (a) the news coverage of the robbery and of the proceedings prior to his trial, including the Foster-Zeitz trial and Judge Boyer’s reported remarks to the jury in that case, created such an atmosphere of hysteria and prejudice that it prevented him from having a fair trial, (b) notwithstanding that he was granted a severance, he was forced to go to trial within one week of the trial of his companions, Foster and Zeitz, and (c) in the light of (a) and (b) above, Judge Boyer’s presence and participation in petitioner’s trial prevented him from being fairly tried since Judge Boyer, in effect, acted as an “overseer judge” and effectively guided and influenced petitioner’s jury.
Petitioner has been given ample opportunity to prove that he has been denied due process of law. While this Court stands ready to correct violations of constitutional rights, it also holds that “it is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential unfairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality.” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 281. See also, Buchalter v. New York, 319 U. S. 427, 431; Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181, 198. Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court in Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 251, cautioned that “If the mere opportunity for prejudice or corruption is to raise a presumption that they exist, it will be hard to maintain jury trial under the conditions of the present day.”
We have examined petitioner’s allegations, the testimony and documentary evidence in support thereof, and his arguments. We conclude that the most that has been shown is that, in certain respects, opportunity for prejudice existed. From this we are asked to infer that petitioner was prejudiced. The law recognizes that prejudice may infect any trial and provides protection against it. For example, provision is made for the voir dire examination and for challenges of jurors who indicate that they may be prejudiced. In addition, a substantial number of peremptory challenges is allowed. This gives to each party a large discretion to exclude jurors deemed objectionable for any reason or no reason. Another protection is available through the severance of the trials of the defendants and through continuances of the respective trials. Still another means of protection is that of a change of venue for proper cause.
In the instant case, notwithstanding the fact that competent counsel for petitioner did not use all of his peremptory challenges after a searching examination of prospective jurors on voir dire, and did not seek a continuance of the trial or a change of venue, petitioner asks this Court, in effect, to infer that the news coverage of the robbery and proceedings prior to petitioner’s trial, including the Foster-Zeitz trial, created such an atmosphere of prejudice and hysteria that it was impossible to draw a fair and impartial jury from the community or to hold a fair trial. The failure of petitioner’s counsel to exhaust the means provided to prevent the drawing of an unfair trial jury from a community allegedly infected with hysteria and prejudice against petitioner, while not dis-positive, is significant. Here, the issue was not raised until almost three years after the trial, yet we are asked to read the news reports and the testimony as to other incidents and to find, contrary to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and two federal courts, that these reports and incidents did create such an atmosphere that it infected the jurors and deprived petitioner of a fair trial on the evidence presented to them. We see no justification in the record to warrant our so finding.
On the other hand, the Federal District Court, familiar with the local conditions, has found, on the evidence before it, that petitioner’s trial was conducted in a calm judicial manner, without any disturbances, and that the news coverage was “factual, with an occasional descriptive word or phrase, and, on occasion, words of compassion or commendation.” 130 F. Supp., at 286. It has found that counsel for petitioner conducted a thorough voir dire examination. In all, 49 persons were challenged for cause or excused — 14 for fixed opinion or bias. Petitioner used 10 of the 20 peremptory challenges allowed him, the Commonwealth only eight. The record shows that counsel for petitioner was informed almost three months before petitioner’s trial that petitioner would be tried immediately after Foster and Zeitz, but he made no motion for a continuance or for a change of venue. Of the prospective jurors called for service at petitioner’s trial, only one was found to have attended the Foster-Zeitz trial and that person was challenged for cause. There is nothing in the record to show, as a “demonstrable reality,” that petitioner was denied due process of law because of community hysteria and prejudice. The District Court’s findings, sustained by the Court of Appeals and supported by the record, dispose of this aspect of the case.
Nor do we conclude that petitioner was prevented from obtaining a fair jury trial by reason of Judge Boyer’s commendatory remarks to the Foster-Zeitz trial jury, reported in the local press two days before petitioner’s trial. At most, petitioner has shown that this created a possible opportunity for prejudice. There is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he was “forced” to trial immediately after the Foster-Zeitz trial or in his claim that the trial judge should have, sua sponte, changed the venue or continued the trial. See 130 F. Supp., at 292-295.
Petitioner’s remaining claim rests largely upon facts which the District Court has found against him. Petitioner alleges that, during the charge to the jury, Judge Boyer passed a note to the District Attorney, who immediately interposed an objection to Judge Keller’s charge, and the latter allegedly corrected himself. Petitioner argues that the testimony of the District Attorney and his assistant that they had no recollection of such an incident is insufficient to offset the direct testimony of petitioner’s witnesses that the incident did occur, that Judge Boyer did sit at the table reserved for the press, and that the District Attorney and his assistant sat immediately in front of Judge Boyer. The issue thus raised is largely one of credibility to be determined by the trier of the facts. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271, 279. The District Court’s positive findings on this aspect of the case (at 458-460, supra) find support in the record. We are not justified in upsetting them.
We also are asked to find that the presence of Judge Boyer on the bench at the beginning of each session of the court, his remaining on the bench after the miscellaneous business was disposed of, and his presence thereafter in the courtroom created such a prejudicial effect upon the jury that it became impossible for it to return a fair verdict and penalty. Except for the one incident where Judge Boyer participated in a sidebar conference out of the hearing of the jury, the District Court found that he did not participate in petitioner’s trial. Petitioner’s counsel objected to Judge Boyer’s participation in the sidebar conference and he left the bench shortly thereafter.
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals states that Judge Boyer’s conduct showed a “striking manifestation of extraordinary interest in the proceedings,” and that the jury knew who he was and it was “very probable” they knew that he had just completed the Foster-Zeitz trial. 224 F. 2d, at 508. We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner attaches too much significance to Judge Boyer’s conduct. Judge Boyer’s presence on the bench, particularly in the light of the long-established practice for both judges to sit on the bench at the beginning of each session to dispose of miscellaneous business, did not amount to a denial of due process. Nor did his subsequent presence on the bench or in the courtroom make out a denial of due process. Under the cases cited earlier, petitioner must show that he was prejudiced in some way by the judge’s presence. Aside from the sidebar conference and the contested note-passing incident, petitioner relies upon Judge Boyer’s statement to the Foster-Zeitz jury and his subsequent remarks made on June 11, in another case, in sentencing another Philadelphia youth, to show that Judge Boyer was “hostile” to petitioner and that the jury recognized such hostility. But the remarks on June 11 could not have prejudiced petitioner’s jury since that jury had no access to any source of news that reported the incident. Petitioner, thus, is left with Judge Boyer’s commendatory remark to the Foster-Zeitz trial jury. This, read in its proper context and examined in the light of Judge Keller’s remarks made to the remainder of the jury panel, does not raise a substantial due process question. Petitioner seeks to have this Court speculate that the jurors knew that Judge Boyer had made this statement and that they were prejudiced by it or by Judge Boyer’s presence. We can no more speculate on this aspect of the case than on the others. Petitioner’s counsel must have been aware of Judge Boyer’s statement and of its possible effect, if any, on the jury, and the possible effect of Judge Boyer’s manifestation of interest. However, he took no action to prevent this possibility from infecting petitioner’s trial. Accordingly, we may as well speculate that he did not deem it necessary to take any such action because the possibility of prejudice was too remote to justify it. It is not necessary for this Court to enter into such speculations. Petitioner has not sustained the burden resting upon him to show that his trial was essentially unfair in a constitutional sense and that the several courts which have reviewed it are all in error. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, therefore, is
Affirmed.
This statement of facts and review of the relevant procedural steps in the case are taken largely from the opinion rendered in the instant case by the two judges constituting the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 130 F. Supp. 270. They conducted a full hearing on the petition for habeas corpus. It lasted eight days. More than 30 witnesses testified and much documentary evidence was introduced.
130 F. Supp., at 283-285, n. 39-42.
130 F. Supp., at 285-289, n. 43-47.
Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann., 1945, Tit. 18, §4701.
Motion for new trial, denied; appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, conviction affirmed, 362 Pa. 259, 66 A. 2d 663; petition for habeas corpus to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, denied, without opinion; petition for certiorari to review those judgments, denied, 338 U. S. 862; applications to the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons for commutation of sentence, denied; second petition for habeas corpus to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court filed April 2, 1951, raising for the first time the constitutional questions now before us; on the same day, a similar petition for habeas corpus filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania; second petition for habeas corpus to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, denied, 367 Pa. 130, 79 A. 2d 785 (after passing on the merits of the petition); petition to the United States District Court, dismissed, 97 F. Supp. 930; petition for certiorari to review the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s denial of the writ of habeas corpus, denied, 342 U. S. 837; appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from the District Court’s dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus, heard en banc, reversed by a divided court and remanded for hearing, 203 F. 2d 407; after rehearing denied by the Third Circuit, the State sought certiorari in this Court, denied, 346 U. S. 865; after hearing before Chief Judge Watson and District Judge Murphy, of the District Court, petition for habeas corpus denied, 130 F. Supp. 270; on appeal to the Third Circuit, heard en banc, the District Court’s judgment was affirmed, 4-3, 224 F. 2d 504. Throughout these proceedings, petitioner has been represented by competent counsel.
See Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181, 193-194.
Counsel for Capone sought and was granted a continuance on May 17, 1948, one week prior to the Foster-Zeitz trial.
The ruling made following this incident was in favor of petitioner, since the statements of prior offenses then before the court were admitted for a purpose more limited than the Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved on appeal. See Pennsylvania v. Darcy, 362 Pa. 259, 283, 66 A. 2d 663, 675.
The ground for this objection was that Judge Boyer had “disqualified himself from sitting in on this case, and it is prejudicial to the defendant [petitioner].” See 130 F. Supp., at 296, n. 54.
See cases cited at 462, supra.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns pre-emption. A Michigan law imposes “an annual fee of $100.00” upon each Michigan license-plated truck that is “operating entirely in interstate commerce.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §478.2(2) (West 2002) (hereinafter MCL). A federal statute states that “a State registration requirement,.. is an unreasonable burden” upon interstate commerce when it imposes so high a fee. 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b) (emphasis added); see also § 14504(e)(2)(B)(iv)(III). Does this federal statutory provision pre-empt the Michigan law? We conclude that the Michigan fee requirement is not the kind of “State registration requirement” to which the federal statute refers. And for that reason, the statute does not pre-empt it.
I
A
Federal law has long required most motor carriers doing interstate business to obtain a permit — which we shall call a Federal Permit — that reflects compliance with certain federal requirements. See 49 U. S. C. § 13901 et seq.; 49 CFR § 365.101 et seq. (2004). In 1965, Congress authorized States to require proof that the operator of an interstate truck had secured a Federal Permit. 49 U. S. C. § 302(b)(2) (1976 ed.); see generally Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U. S. 36, 39 (2002). By 1991, 39 States demanded such proof by requiring some form of what we shall call State Registration (of the Federal Permit). Those States typically would require truckers to file with a state agency evidence that each interstate truck was covered by a Federal Permit. They would require the trucker to pay a State Registration fee of up to $10 per truck. And they would issue a State Registration stamp that the trucker would affix to a multistate “bingo card” carried within the vehicle. See 49 CFR §§ 1023.32, 1023.33 (1990); Yellow Transp., 537 U. S., at 39.
In 1991, Congress focused upon the fact that the “bingo card” system required a trucking company to obtain a separate stamp from each State through which an interstate truck traveled. It found this scheme inefficient and burdensome. See id., at 39-40. And it enacted a statute setting forth a new system, the Single State Registration System (SSRS), which remains in effect today. Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), 49 U. S. C. § 14504. The SSRS allows a trucking company to fill out one set of forms in one State (the base State), and by doing so to register its Federal Permit in every participating State through which its trucks will travel. § 14504(c); 49 CFR § 367.4(b) (2004).
The SSRS statute says that the base State can demand: (1) proof of the trucking company’s possession of a Federal Permit, (2) proof of insurance, (3) the name of an agent designated to receive “service of process,” and (4) a total fee (charged for the filing of the proof of insurance) equal to the sum of the individual state fees. 49 U. S. C. §§ 14604(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv); 49 CFR §§ 367.4(c)(1)-(4) (2004). Each individual state fee, it adds, cannot exceed the amount the State charged under the “bingo card” system, and in no event can it exceed $10 per truck. 49 U. S. C. § 14504(c) (2)(B)(iv)(III). After a truck owner registers, base state officials provide the owner with a receipt to be kept in the cab of each registered truck. 49 CFR §§ 367.5(a), (b), (e) (2004). The base State distributes to each participating State its share of the total registration fee. § 367.6(a).
The SSRS statute specifies that a State may not impose any additional “registration requirement.” It states specifically, in the statutory sentence at issue here, that when a State Registration requirement imposes further obligations, “the part in excess is an unreasonable burden.” 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b). It adds that a State may not require “decals, stamps, cab cards, or any other means of registering... specific vehicles.” § 14504(c)(2)(B)(iii). And it provides that the “charging or collection of any fee under this section that is not in accordance with the fee system established [in this provision] shall be deemed to be a burden on interstate commerce.” § 14504(c)(2)(C). At the same time, the statute makes clear that a State that complies with the SSRS system need not fear Commerce Clause attack, for it says that a state requirement that an interstate truck “must register with the State” is “not an unreasonable burden on transportation,” provided that “the State registration is completed” in accordance with the SSRS statute. § 14504(b).
B
The state law at issue here, §478.2(2) of the Michigan Motor Carrier Act, reads as follows:
“A motor carrier licensed in this state shall pay an annual fee of $100.00 for each vehicle operated by the motor carrier which is registered in this state [i e., which has a Michigan license plate] and operating entirely in interstate commerce.”
Related state rules and regulations require a carrier paying the $100 fee to identify each interstate truck by make, type, year, serial number, and unit number. See Equipment List Form P-344-T, App. to Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Disposition in No. 95-15628-CM etc. (Mich. Ct. Cl.) (hereinafter Equipment List Form P-344-T). They also make clear that, upon payment of the fee, the carrier will receive a decal that must be affixed to the truck. App. 24 (Affidavit of Pub. Serv. Comm’n. official Thomas R. Lonergan). And they provide that a carrier who pays this fee need not pay the $10 SSRS registration fee if the carrier chooses Michigan as its SSRS base State. See, e.g., id., at 67, n.; Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 255 Mich. App. 589, 603-604, n. 6, 662 N. W. 2d 784, 790-792, n. 6 (2003); Reply Brief for Petitioners 14-15, n. 8.
C
Petitioners are interstate trucking companies with trucks that bear Michigan license plates and operate entirely in interstate commerce. Hence they are subject to Michigan’s $100 fee. MCL § 478.2(2) (West 2002). They asked a Michigan court to invalidate § 478.2(2) as pre-empted by the federal SSRS statute. 255 Mich. App., at 592, 662 N. W. 2d, at 789-790. The Michigan Court of Claims rejected their claim. Id., at 593-594, 662 N. W. 2d, at 789-790. And the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Id., at 604, 662 N. W. 2d, at 795.
The Court of Appeals wrote that the $100 fee is a “regulatory fee” — a “fee imposed for the administration” of the State’s Motor Carrier Act and for enforcement of Michigan “safety regulations.” Ibid. As such, it falls outside the scope of the term “registration requirement” as used in the federal SSRS statute, 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b). 255 Mich. App., at 604, 662 N. W. 2d, at 795. The federal statute, according to the Michigan court, consequently does not pre-empt it. Ibid.
Petitioners sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court; leave was denied. Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 469 Mich. 976, 673 N. W. 2d 752 (2003). We granted their petition for certiorari and consolidated the case with American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, ante, p. 429, a case in which interstate truckers sought review of a separate Michigan fee. We now affirm the Michigan court’s judgment in this case, though for other reasons.
II
A
The first legal question before us concerns the meaning of the federal statutory words “State registration requirement.” They appear in a subsection that reads in relevant part as follows:
“The requirement of a State that a motor carrier, providing [interstate transportation] in that State, must register with the State is not an unreasonable burden on transportation... when the State registration is completed under standards of the Secretary [of Transportation] under subsection (c). When a State registration requirement imposes obligations in excess of the standards of the Secretary, the part in excess is an unreasonable burden.” 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b) (emphasis added).
What is the scope of the italicized words?
Petitioners ask us to give these words a broad interpretation, sweeping within their ambit every state requirement involving some form of individualized registration that affects an interstate motor carrier. Brief for Petitioners 15 (federal statute’s limits apply “to all interstate motor carriers compelled to register their operations with any State regulatory commission under any State law” (emphasis in original)). The United States argues for a somewhat narrower interpretation, submitting that the words apply to “state registration requirements that are imposed on interstate carriers by reason of their operation in interstate commerce.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19-20 (emphasis in original). In our view, however, the language, read in context, is yet more narrow.
Reference to text, historical context, and purpose discloses that the words “State registration requirement” do not apply to every State Registration requirement that happens to cover interstate carriers, nor to every such requirement specifically focused on a trucking operation’s interstate character. Rather, they apply only to those state requirements that concern SSRS registration — that is, registration with a State of evidence that a carrier possesses a Federal Permit, registration of proof of insurance, or registration of the name of an agent “for service of process.” § 14504(c)(2)(A)(iv). Thus, the federal provision pre-empts only those state requirements that (1) concern the subject matter of the SSRS and (2) are “in excess” of the requirements that the SSRS imposes in respect to that subject matter. See § 14504(b).
To begin with, statutory language makes clear that the federal provision reaches no further. Section 14504(b)’s first sentence says that a state “requirement” that an interstate motor carrier must “register with the State is not an unreasonable burden... when the State registration is completed under standards of the Secretary under subsection (c).” Ibid. It is clear from the text as a whole that “State registration” cannot cover all registration requirements, but only some. Cf. post, at 464-465 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The first sentence’s reference to the “standards of the Secretary” (as well as the focus of the entire statute) tells us which. Those “standards,” set forth in subsection (c) — which is titled “Single State Registration System” — exclusively relate to State Registration of “evidence of” a Federal Permit, “proof of” insurance, and the “name of a local agent for service of process,” and state fees “for the filing of proof of insurance.” §§ 14504(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv); § 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv). And the rest of the statute similarly deals exclusively with SSRS matters. See § 14504(a) (“standards” mean “the specification of forms and procedures required” to prove that a motor carrier is in compliance with federal requirements). Thus, the words “State registration” in the pre-emption provision’s first sentence refer only to state systems that seek evidence that a trucker has complied with specific, federally enumerated, SSRS obligations. Cf. 49 U. S. C. § 13908(d) (§ 14504’s fees relate specifically to state efforts to obtain proof of insurance under the SSRS); §§ 13908(b)(2) — (3) (indicating that § 14504 refers to state requirements having this purpose).
How could the same words in the second sentence refer to something totally different? We have found no language here or elsewhere in the statute (which we reproduce in the Appendix, infra) suggesting that the term “State registration requirement” in sentence two refers to all State Registration requirements “imposed on interstate carriers by reason of their operation in interstate commerce.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20 (emphasis in original). Indeed, to read the words “by reason of... ” into § 14504, a linguistic stretch, would be wholly inconsistent with the statute’s basic purposes, because it would leave a State free to implement a regulation in excess of specific SSRS limitations as long as it did not single out interstate carriers (say, a neutral rule that all truckers must pay $50, or $500, per truck for proof of insurance, or must designate multiple agents for service of process). See post, at 463 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
To avoid this severely incongruous result, the dissent (which adopts the Government’s view) must resort to interpretive acrobatics. After first reading subsection (b) to say that a neutral base state requirement, despite being “in excess” of SSRS standards, is not an “unreasonable burden on” commerce, it then reads subsection (c) to say that such a requirement, because it is “in excess” of SSRS standards, is nonetheless prohibited by the statute (in effect, an unreasonable burden on commerce). Post, at 466-468. Aside from imposing significant complexities on the statute where otherwise none would exist, this reading stretches subsection (c)’s function beyond that which its structure and language will allow.
Similarly, we see no language elsewhere in the statute suggesting that the term “State registration requirement” refers to any kind of State Registration whatsoever that might affect interstate carriers. And even the Government concedes that certain registration obligations — those in “traditional areas of state regulation” — are beyond the preemptive reach of the statute. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19. Finally, the implementing regulations do not support these broader constructions. See 49 CFR §367.1 et seq. (2004).
Our reading of the text finds confirmation in historical context. Congress enacted §14504 to simplify the old “bingo card” system. See Yellow Transp., 537 U. S., at 39-40. Under the “bingo card” scheme, each State could independently demand the same separate filings (evidence of a Federal Permit, proof of insurance, and a service-of-process agent) as well as separate fees. 49 U. S. C. § 302(b)(2) (1976 ed.); §11506 (1988 ed.); 49 CFR §§ 1023.11, 1023.21, 1023.32, 1023.51 (1990). Federal law governing that scheme placed no express constraints on any state filings or fees other than those concerning Federal Permit and insurance requirements. Indeed, federal regulations specified that the federal “bingo card” statute did not “affect” the “collection or [the] method of collection of taxes or fees by a State” from interstate truckers “for the operation of vehicles within” its “borders.” § 1023.104. And they further provided that the statute did not “affect” state requirements “as to the external identification of vehicles to indicate the payment of a State tax or fee imposed for revenue purposes or for any other purpose” not governed by the “bingo card” system. §1023.42.
When Congress created the new SSRS, it did not indicate (in the text, structure, or divinable purpose of the new provision) that the pre-emptive scope of the new scheme would be any broader than that of the old. See ISTEA, 105 Stat. 1914. The relevant differences between the SSRS and the “bingo card” regime were that: (1) one State, rather than many, would collect the relevant filings; (2) one State, rather than many, would collect the relevant fees; and (3) these fees, limited to the same amount as before, would relate to filing of proof of insurance rather than to filing of the Federal Permit. Compare 49 U. S. C. § 11506 (1988 ed.) with § 14504 (2000 ed.); see also § 11506 (1988 ed., Supp. IV). These modifications merely sought more efficient, not greater, federal regulation. See Yellow Transp., supra; see also 49 U. S. C. §§ 13908(a), (d) (authorizing the Secretary to replace the SSRS with a yet more streamlined system and pre-empting only those State “insurance filing requirements or fees that are for the same purposes as filings or fees the Secretary requires under the new system” (emphasis added)). And while the new regulations implementing the SSRS do not explicitly exempt unrelated state requirements from the statute’s pre-emptive reach, neither they nor the rulemaking that produced them suggest any change to pre-existing practice in this respect. See 49 CFR §367.1 et seq. (2004); see also Single State Insurance Registration, 9 I. C. C. 2d 610 (1993) (Interstate Commerce Commission decision announcing new regulations); Single State Insurance Registration, No. MC-100 (Sub-No. 6), 1993 WL 17833 (I. C. C., Jan. 13, 1993) (proposing regulations, providing justifications, and soliciting farther comments).
Finally, we have found nothing in the statute’s basic purposes or objectives — improving the efficiency of the “bingo card” system and simplifying a uniform scheme for providing States with certain vital information — that either requires a broader reading of the statutory term, or that impliedly pre-empts other, non-SSRS-related state rules. Cf. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 881 (2000) (federal statutes by implication pre-empt state law that stands “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution” of their federal objectives (internal quotation marks omitted)). That is, we can find no indication that Congress sought to use this narrowly focused statute to forbid state fee or registration obligations that have nothing to do with basic SSRS (or earlier “bingo card”) objectives — say, for example, a State Registration requirement related to compliance by interstate carriers with rules governing the introduction of foreign pests into the jurisdiction, or with a State’s version of the Amber Alert system, or with size, weight, and safety standards. The Constitution’s Commerce Clause may (or may not) forbid some such rules. But this statute — which identifies and regulates very specific items — says nothing about them, and there is no reason to believe that Congress wished to resolve that kind of Commerce Clause issue in this provision. Cf. 49 U. S. C. § 13908 (indicating that the SSRS may well be only a temporary system and similarly focusing on limited, federally enumerated requirements without discussing broad pre-emption).
We conclude, as we have said, that the term “State registration requirement,” as used in the second sentence of the SSRS statute, covers only those State Registration requirements that concern the subject matter of that statutory provision, namely, the registration of a Federal Permit, proof of insurance, and the name of an agent for service of process. See supra, at 446-447. It neither explicitly nor implicitly reaches unrelated matters.
B
The second legal question involves the Michigan statute imposing the $100 fee on Michigan-plated trucks operating entirely in interstate commerce. MCL §478.2(2) (West 2002). Do the requirements set forth in that statute concern the SSRS statute’s subject matter? We think that they do not.
For one thing, the Michigan statute imposing the $100 fee makes no reference to evidence of a Federal Permit, to any insurance requirement, or to an agent for receiving service of process. Nor, as far as we can tell, do any state rules related to the $100 fee require the filing of information about these matters. See Equipment List Form P-344-T (requiring information about truck make, type, year, unit number, and serial number).
For another thing, Michigan law imposed a separate fee on interstate motor carriers with trucks license plated in Michigan before the SSRS existed and before Michigan began to participate in the “bingo card” system. See App. 24-25; Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Partial Summary Disposition in No. 95-15628-CM etc. (Mich. Ct. Cl.), p. 5; Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief on Appeal, in No. 226052 etc. (Mich. Ct. App.), pp. 5-6; MCL § 478.7(4) (West 2002). Hence such a fee does not represent an effort somehow to circumvent the limitations imposed in connection with federal laws governing State Registration of Federal Permits.
Finally, Michigan rules provide that a Michigan-plated interstate truck choosing Michigan as its SSRS base State can apparently comply with Michigan’s SSRS requirements even if it does not comply with Michigan’s $100 fee requirement. The owner of that truck can fill out Michigan form RS-1, thereby providing Michigan with evidence that it has a Federal Permit. App. 65-66. It can also fill out form RS-2, on which it indicates the total SSRS fees it owes to all participating States whose borders the truck will cross. Id., at 67. Upon submission of the two forms and payment of the fees, Michigan apparently will give the owner form RS-3, an SSRS receipt, a copy of which the owner can place in the vehicle of the truck, thereby complying with Michigan’s (and all other participating States’) SSRS-related “State registration requirements.” If that owner fails to pay Michigan’s $100 fee for that truck, the owner will not receive a state fee decal. But that owner will have violated only Michigan’s $100 fee statute here at issue, MCL §478.2(2) (West 2002). Petitioners have provided us with nothing that suggests the owner will have violated any other provision of Michigan law. See § 478.7(4). And they have not demonstrated that Michigan law in practice holds hostage a truck owner’s SSRS compliance until the owner pays §478.2(2)’s $100 fee.
On the other hand, we recognize that Michigan form RS-2, the form that lists all SSRS-participating States together with their SSRS-related fees, places an asterisk next to Michigan and states that “[vjehicles base-plated in Michigan need not” pay any SSRS fee but “are required to have a $100.00” Michigan decal. App. 67. Michigan thereby forgives Michigan-plated interstate trucks (which must pay Michigan $100) payment of the $10 Michigan SSRS fee that would otherwise be due. And to that extent, there is a connection between the $100 fee and the SSRS.
Michigan appears to forgive its $10 SSRS fee, however, only for the Michigan-plated interstate trucks of a carrier that has chosen Michigan as its SSRS “base” State. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 14-15, n. 8. Michigan-plated trucks operating out of a different SSRS base State, say, Ohio, must pay the fee, which is remitted back to Michigan. Thus, the $10 reduction can be seen simply as an effort to provide modest, administratively efficient (because Michigan itself is handling both fees) recompense to those motor carriers that operate Michigan-plated trucks and choose Michigan as their SSRS base State. That subsidiary connection cannot transform Michigan’s $100 fee, which exclusively involves non-SSRS subject matter (and was created for non-SSRS-related reasons), into a requirement that concerns the subject matter of the SSRS statute.
* * *
For these reasons, we conclude that 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b) does not pre-empt Michigan’s $100 fee. The judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
Title 49 U. S. C. § 14504 provides:
“Registration of motor carriers by a State
“(a) Definitions. — In this section, the terms ‘standards’ and ‘amendments to standards’ mean the specification of forms and procedures required by regulations of the Secretary to prove the lawfulness of transportation by motor carrier referred to in section 13501.
“(b) General Rule. — The requirement of a State that a motor carrier, providing transportation subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I of chapter 135 and providing transportation in that State, must register with the State is not an unreasonable burden on transportation referred to in section 13501 when the State registration is completed under standards of the Secretary under subsection (c). When a State registration requirement imposes obligations in excess of the standards of the Secretary, the part in excess is an unreasonable burden.
“(c) Single State Registration System.—
“(1) In general. — The Secretary shall maintain standards for implementing a system under which—
“(A) a motor carrier is required to register annually with only one State by providing evidence of its Federal registration under chapter 139;
“(B) the State of registration shall fully comply with standards prescribed under this section; and
“(C) such single State registration shall be deemed to satisfy the registration requirements of all other States.
“(2) Specific requirements.—
“(A) Evidence of federal registration; proof OF insurance; payment of fees. — Under the standards of the Secretary implementing the single State registration system described in paragraph (1) of this subsection, only a State acting in its capacity as registration State under such single State system may require a motor carrier registered by the Secretary under this part—
“(i) to file and maintain evidence of such Federal registration;
“(ii) to file satisfactory proof of required insurance or qualification as a self-insurer;
“(iii) to pay directly to such State fee amounts in accordance with the fee system established under subpara-graph (B)(iv) of this paragraph, subject to allocation of fee revenues among all States in which the carrier operates and which participate in the single State registration system; and
“(iv) to file the name of a local agent for service of process.
“(B) Receipts; pee system. — The standards of the Secretary—
“(i) shall require that the registration State issue a receipt, in a form prescribed under the standards, reflecting that the carrier has filed proof of insurance as provided under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this paragraph and has paid fee amounts in accordance with the fee system established under clause (iv) of this subparagraph;
“(ii) shall require that copies of the receipt issued under clause (i) of this subparagraph be kept in each of the carrier’s commercial motor vehicles;
“(iii) shall not require decals, stamps, cab cards, or any other means of registering or identifying specific vehicles operated by the carrier;
“(iv) shall establish a fee system for the filing of proof of insurance as provided under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this paragraph that—
“(I) is based on the number of commercial motor vehicles the carrier operates in a State and on the number of States in which the carrier operates;
“(II) minimizes the costs of complying with the registration system; and
“(III) results in a fee for each participating State that is equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that such State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991; and
“(v) shall not authorize the charging or collection of any fee for filing and maintaining evidence of Federal registration under subparagraph (A)(i) of this paragraph.
“(C) Prohibited fees. — The charging or collection of any fee under this section that is not in accordance with the fee system established under subparagraph (B)(iv) of this paragraph shall be deemed to be a burden on interstate commerce.
“(D) Limitation on participation by States.— Only a State which, as of January 1, 1991, charged or collected a fee for a vehicle identification stamp or number under part 1023 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, shall be eligible to participate as a registration State under this subsection or to receive any fee revenue under this subsection.”
Justice Kennedy,
with whom The Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor join,
dissenting.
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in my view, erred in holding that Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §478.2(2) (West 2002) (hereinafter MCL) is not a registration requirement. Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 255 Mich. App. 589, 603-605, 662 N. W. 2d 784, 795 (2003). Our Court, too, errs by concluding that the term “State registration requirement” in 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b) includes only those state registration requirements that “concern the [same] subject matter” as the Single State Registration System (SSRS) established by § 14504(c). Ante, at 447, 451. This respectful dissent explains my reasons for rejecting these two holdings.
I
Title 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b) provides:
“The requirement of a State that a motor carrier, providing [interstate transportation] in that State, must register with the State is not an unreasonable burden on transportation... when the State registration is completed under standards of the Secretary [of Transportation] under [§ 14504(c)]. When a State registration requirement imposes obligations in excess of the standards of the Secretary, the part in excess is an unreasonable burden.”
The dispositive question in the instant case is whether MCL §478.2(2) is a “State registration requirement” within the meaning of the second sentence of 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b). The Michigan Court of Appeals said the answer is no because MCL § 478.2(2) is not a registration requirement at all. The Court also says the answer is no, but for a different reason. It concludes that, even though § 478.2(2) is a registration requirement, the term “registration requirement” in 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b) includes only the subset of registration requirements that concern the same subject matter as the SSRS. Neither the Court’s reason, nor the different reason given by the Michigan Court of Appeals, is persuasive.
A
The Michigan Court of Appeals adopted a categorical rule: “If the purpose of a fee is to regulate an industry or service, it can be properly classified as a regulatory fee,” not a registration fee. 255 Mich. App., at 605, 662 N. W. 2d, at 795. Proceeding to apply the rule so announced, the Court of Appeals held that the $100 fee imposed by MCL § 478.2(2) on Michigan-plated interstate carriers is a regulatory fee rather than a registration fee because the fee is “imposed for the administration of the [Michigan Motor Carrier Act], particularly covering costs of enforcing safety regulations.” Id., at 604, 662 N. W. 2d, at 795.
The majority affirms the judgment below, but “for other reasons.” Ante, at 446. The Court’s reluctance to adopt the Michigan Court of Appeals’ rationale is understandable. MCL §478.2(2) and related state rules and regulations require a motor carrier that wants to operate Michigan-plated vehicles in interstate commerce in Michigan to fill out a form providing detailed identifying information for each vehicle and to pay a $100-per-vehicle fee. In return, the State provides the carrier with decals that it must place on its trucks. See ante, at 444-445. If this is not a “State registration requirement” in the general and ordinary sense of the term, it is hard to conceive of what is.
The Court of Appeals’ holding would allow the State to convert any registration fee into a regulatory fee simply by declaring a regulatory purpose or spending some portion of the money collected on regulation or administration. The logic of this approach excludes from the coverage of 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b) almost all state requirements, including those dealing with similar subject matter as the SSRS. The purpose of SSRS requirements, after all, is to regulate the interstate motor carrier industry; and the fees collected are used to administer the system. The Court’s disapproval of the Michigan Court of Appeals’ reasoning is implicit in the Court’s decision to affirm on a different ground. Ante, at 446. Yet the Court’s affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ decision, coupled with the Court’s failure to make its apparent disagreement with the reasoning explicit, will result in the Michigan Court of Appeals’ broad rule surviving to work additional mischief in future cases, a most undesirable result in this area, where fees and regulatory requirements are so pervasive.
B
1
Although the Court' appears to agree that MCL §478.2(2) imposes a state registration requirement on interstate motor carriers, it holds, nonetheless, that the provision is not preempted by 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b). This, according to the Court, is because the phrase “State registration requirement” in § 14504(b) refers not to state registration requirements generally, but only to those state registration requirements that concern the same subject matter as the SSRS: registration of a federal permit, proof of insurance, and designation of an agent for service of process. Ante, at 451. Section 14504(b) simply cannot bear the narrowing construction the Court seeks to impose upon it.
The first sentence of § 14504(b) authorizes States to impose registration requirements on interstate motor carriers if the registration “is completed under standards of the Secretary under [§ 14504(c)],” i. e., under the SSRS. The second sentence of § 14504(b) pre-empts “a State registration requirement” that imposes “obligations in excess” of the SSRS. There ought to be no question that MCL § 478.2(2) is a state registration requirement. The Court seems to agree, at least when the phrase “State registration requirement” is used in its ordinary and general sense. It should also be apparent that the obligations imposed by § 478.2(2) are in excess of those authorized by the standards of the Secretary under 49 U. S. C. § 14504(c). The plain text of § 14504(b), then, would appear to pre-empt MCL §478
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
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sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, has given the National Labor Relations Board such exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of a common-law tort action for damages as to preclude an appropriate state court from hearing and determining its issues where such conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice under that Act. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it has not.
November 16, 1949, Laburnum Construction Corporation, a Virginia corporation, respondent herein, filed a notice of motion for judgment in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, against petitioners United Construction Workers, affiliated with United Mine Workers of America; District 50, United Mine Workers of America; and United Mine Workers of America. The proceeding was a common-law tort action for compensatory and punitive damages totaling $500,000. The notice contained substantially the following allegations: While respondent was performing construction work in Breathitt County, Kentucky, under contracts with Pond Creek Pocahontas Company and others, July 26-August 4, 1949, agents of the respective petitioners came there. They demanded that respondent’s employees join the United Construction Workers and that respondent recognize that organization as the sole bargaining agent for respondent’s employees on the project. They added that, if respondent and its employees did not comply, respondent would not be allowed to continue its work. Upon respondent’s refusal and that of many of its employees to yield to such demands, petitioners’ agents threatened and intimidated respondent’s officers and employees with violence to such a degree that respondent was compelled to abandon all its projects in that area. The notice further alleged that, as the result of this conduct of petitioners’ agents, respondent was deprived of substantial profits it otherwise would have earned on those and other projects. After trial, a jury found petitioners jointly and severally liable to respondent for $175,437.19 as compensatory damages, and $100,-000 as punitive damages, making a total of $275,437.19.
Petitioners moved for a new trial claiming numerous errors of law, and for a dismissal on the ground that the Labor Management Relations Act had deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the subject matter. Both motions were overruled and the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia granted a writ of error and supersedeas. After argument, it struck out $146,111.10 of the compensatory damages and affirmed the judgment for the remaining $129,326.09. 194 Va. 872, 75 S. E. 2d 694. Because of . the importance of the jurisdictional issue to the enforcement of common-law rights and to the administration of the Labor Management Relations Act, we granted certiorari limited to the following question:
“ Tn view of the type of conduct found by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia to have been carried out by Petitioners, does the National Labor Relations Board have exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter so as to preclude the State Court from hearing and determining the issues in a common-law tort action based upon this conduct?’ ” 346 U. S. 936.
We are concerned only with the above-stated jurisdictional question. We accept the view of the National Labor Relations Board that respondent’s activities affect interstate commerce within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act. The “type of conduct found by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia” is set out in the margin. Although the notice for judgment does not mention the Labor Management Relations Act or unfair labor practices as such, we assume the conduct before us also constituted an unfair labor practice within the following provisions of that Act:
“Sec. 8. . . .
“(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
“(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: . . .
61 Stat. 140, 141, 29 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 158 (b) (1) (A).
“Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 157.
Petitioners contend that the Act of 1947 has occupied the labor relations field so completely that no regulatory agency other than the National Labor Relations Board and no court may assert jurisdiction over unfair labor practices as defined by it, unless expressly authorized by Congress to do so. They claim that state courts accordingly are excluded not only from enjoining future unfair labor practices and thus colliding with the Board, as occurred in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, but that state courts are excluded also from entertaining common-law tort actions for the recovery of damages caused by such conduct. The latter exclusion is the issue here. In the Garner case, Congress had provided a federal administrative remedy, supplemented by judicial procedure for its enforcement, with which the state injunctive procedure conflicted. Here Congress has neither provided nor suggested any substitute for the traditional state court procedure for collecting damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct. For us to cut off the injured respondent from this right of recovery will deprive it of its property without recourse or compensation. To do so will, in effect, grant petitioners immunity from liability for their tortious conduct. We see no substantial reason for reaching such a result. The contrary view is consistent with the language of the Act and there is positive support for it in our decisions and in the legislative history of the Act.
In the Garner case, we said:
“The national Labor Management Relations Act, as we have before pointed out, leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible.
“This is not an instance of injurious conduct which the National Labor Relations Board is without express power to prevent and which therefore either is 'governable by the State or it is entirely ungoverned.’ In such cases we have declined to find an implied exclusion of state powers. International Union v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 245, 254. Nor is this a case of mass picketing, threatening of employees, obstructing streets and highways, or picketing homes. We have held that the state still may exercise ‘its historic powers over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order and the use of streets and highways.’ Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740, 749.” 346 U. S., at 488.
To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive procedure against unfair labor practices, that case recognized that the Act excluded conflicting state procedure to the same end. To the extent, however, that Congress has not prescribed procedure for dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there is no ground for concluding that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated. The care we took in the Garner case to demonstrate the existing conflict between state and federal administrative remedies in that case was, itself, a recognition that if no conflict had existed, the state procedure would have survived. The primarily private nature of claims for damages under state law also distinguishes them in a measure from the public nature of the regulation of future labor relations under federal law.
The Labor Management Relations Act sets up no general compensatory procedure except in such minor supplementary ways as the reinstatement of wrongfully discharged employees with back pay. 61 Stat. 147, 29 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 160 (c). See also, Labor Board v. Electrical Workers, 346 U. S. 464.
One instance in which the Act prescribes judicial procedure for the recovery of damages caused by unfair labor practices is that with reference to the jurisdiction of federal and other courts to adjudicate claims for damages resulting from secondary boycotts. In that instance the Act expressly authorizes a recovery of damages in any Federal District Court and “in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties.” By this provision, the Act assures uniformity,- otherwise lacking, in rights of recovery in the state courts and grants jurisdiction to the federal courts without respect to the amount in controversy. To recover damages under that section is consistent with the existence of jurisdiction in state courts to enforce criminal penalties and common-law liabilities generally. On the other hand, it is not consistent to say that Congress, in that section, authorizes court action for the recovery of damages caused by tortious conduct related to secondary boycotts and yet, without express mention of it, Congress abolishes all common-law rights to recover damages caused more directly and flagrantly through such conduct as is before us.
Considerable legislative history supports this interpretation. Under the National Labor Relations Act, 1935, there were no prohibitions of unfair labor practices on the part of labor organizations. Yet there is no doubt that if agents of such organizations at that time had damaged property through their tortious conduct, the persons responsible would have been liable to a tort action in state courts for the damage done. See Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740.
The 1947 Act has increased, rather than decreased, the legal responsibilities of labor organizations. Certainly that Act did not expressly relieve labor organizations from liability for unlawful conduct. It sought primarily to empower a federal regulatory body, through administrative procedure, to forestall unfair labor practices by anyone in circumstances affecting interstate commerce. The fact that it prescribed new preventive procedure against unfair labor practices on the part of labor organizations was an additional recognition of congressional disapproval of such practices. Such an express recognition is consistent with an increased insistence upon the liability of such organizations for tortious conduct and inconsistent with their immunization from liabilty for damages caused by their tortious practices.
The language declaring the congressional policy against such practices is phrased in terms of their prevention:
“Sec. 10. (a) The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: . . . .” 61 Stat. 146, 29 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 160 (a).
Section 10 (c) directs the Board to issue a cease-and-desist order after an appropriate finding of fact. There is no declaration that this procedure is to be exclusive.
The history of the enactment of § 8 (b)(1)(A) lends further support to this interpretation. Senate Report No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50, as to S. 1126, said in part:
“Since this bill establishes the principle of unfair labor practices on the part of unions, we can see no reason whatever why they should not be subject to the same rules as the employers. The committee heard many instances of union coercion of employees such as that brought about by threats of reprisal against employees and their families in the course of organizing campaigns; also direct interference by mass picketing and other violence. Some of these acts are illegal under State law, hut we see no reason why they should not also constitute unfair labor practices to he investigated hy the National Labor Relations Board, and at least deprive the violators of any protection furnished hy the Wagner Act.” (Emphasis added.)
Senator Taft, one of the sponsors of the bill, added later:
“But suppose there is duplication in extreme cases; suppose there is a threat of violence constituting violation of the law of the State. Why should it not be an unfair labor practice? It is on the part of the employer. If an employer proceeds to use violence, as employers once did, if they use the kind of goon-squad tactics labor unions are permitted to use— and they once did — if they threaten men with physical violence if they join a union, they are subject to State law, and they are also subject to be proceeded against for violating the National Labor Relations Act. There is no reason in the world why there should not he two remedies for an act of that kind.” (Emphasis added.) 93 Cong. Rec. 4024.
If Virginia is denied jurisdiction in this case, it will mean that where the federal preventive administrative procedures are impotent or inadequate, the offenders, by coercion of the type found here, may destroy, property without liability for the damage done. If petitioners were unorganized private persons, conducting themselves as petitioners did here, Virginia would have had undoubted jurisdiction of this action against them. The fact that petitioners are labor organizations, with no contractual relationship with respondent or its employees, provides no reasonable basis for a different conclusion.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia is, therefore, sustained and its judgment
Affirmed.
Me. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
61 Stat. 136 et seq., 29 U. S. C. (1952 e d.) § 141 et seq.
Our order also stated that—
“The Government is invited to submit a memorandum setting forth the policy of the National Labor Relations Board in regard to: (1) the proviso in § 10 (a), 61 Stat. 146, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 160 (a); and (2) other cases, apart from those in § 10 (a), in which the Board declines to exercise its statutory jurisdiction. The memorandum should indicate by what standards the Board declines to act and whether the standards are applied by rule or regulation or on a case-by-case method.”
The Government filed a memorandum stating that it had found it “not feasible under the limitations prescribed by the Act to consummate agreements ceding jurisdiction” under the proviso in § 10 (a). It stated also that “Under the standards which the Board is currently continuing to apply, it would assert jurisdiction over an enterprise similar to [that of] respondent company herein.” It found that respondent’s enterprises came within at least the following categories of the Board’s jurisdictional standards:
“4. Enterprises producing or handling goods destined for out-of-State shipment, or performing services outside the State in which the firm is located, valued at $25,000 a year.
“5. Enterprises furnishing goods or services of $50,000 a year or more to concerns in categories 1, 2, or 4 [supra].”
See also, Mimeograph Release of National Labor Relations Board, dated October 6, 1950, entitled “N. L. R. B. Clarifies and Defines Areas In Which It Will and Will Not Exercise Jurisdiction”; Labor Board v. Denver Building Council, 341 U. S. 675, 684-685.
See note 2, supra.
“During the period from September 6, 1947 to December 1, 1949, the plaintiff performed work in West Virginia and Kentucky for Pond Creek Pocahontas Company, Island Creek Coal Company, and their subsidiary companies, under twelve separate contracts amounting to more than $650,000, from which it derived an annual profit slightly over $25,000. . . .
“In October, 1948, the two coal-producing companies determined to open a mine in Breathitt county, Kentucky, and Bryan [president of respondent] was asked to undertake the building of the preparation plant there. Because of the undeveloped condition of the roads and lack of living accommodations for the laborers, Bryan was told that if Laburnum would undertake the project it would be awarded additional work which would be required for the operation of another mine in Breathitt county, amounting to more than $600,000, on the basis of cost plus a fee of five per cent.
“On October 28, 1948, Pond Creek Pocahontas Company awarded the plaintiff a contract for construction of the preparation plant on the basis of cost plus a fee of five per cent, the total fee not to exceed the sum of $12,000. The estimated cost of the project was $200,000. Work on this project was commenced November 1, 1948, and was approximately ninety-five per cent completed when it was interrupted on July 26, 1949. Pursuant to their agreement the coal companies also awarded Laburnum several projects included in the additional work to which reference has been made.
“Upon commencing the work in Breathitt county, Laburnum, in compliance with its agreement with Richmond Building & Construction Trades Council, procured skilled laborers through the nearest local affiliates of the American Federation of Labor. With the knowledge and consent of these affiliates it employed local unskilled laborers who were not members of any labor organization.
“Laburnum proceeded with its work on these several projects without trouble until July 14, 1949, when William O. Hart, speaking from Pikeville, Kentucky, telephoned Bryan who was in Richmond. According to the testimony of Bryan, which was accepted by the jury, Hart identified himself as a 'field representative of the United Construction Workers and District 50 of the United Mine Workers of America,’ working under David Hunter, ‘Regional Director of Region 58 of United Construction Workers and District 50/ with headquarters in Pikeville. Hart told Bryan that he was familiar with the work which Laburnum was doing and about to do in Breathitt county, that the plaintiff was ‘working in United Mine Workers territory,’ and that he (Hart) would close down this work unless the plaintiff recognized the United Construction Workers in the employment of its workers. Bryan told Hart of Laburnum’s agreement with the American Federation of Labor affiliate at Richmond, under which it was to employ members of that union, and that consequently it would not be able to comply with Hart’s demand and make an agreement with the United Construction Workers. Hart replied that he was going ‘to take over’ the plaintiff’s work, that he intended to ‘organize’ all of its workers, ‘including the carpenters, electricians, pipefitters, ironworkers, millwrights, laborers, and everybody else,’ and that if the plaintiff failed to make an agreement ‘recognizing the United Construction Workers, he (Hart) would close down’ all of the plaintiff’s work in Breathitt county, as had been done in other instances within his (Hart’s) territory.
“On Monday, July 25, about 7:30 p. m., Delinger [in respondent’s employ] telephoned Bryan that he had been informed that on the next day, at noon, the United Construction Workers were coming to the job site with a large group of men, that they would be armed, and would stop the plaintiff’s employees from working on the projects.
“. . . When he [Bryan] arrived there [July 26] he found that all work on the several projects in which his men were engaged had stopped. It developed that about noon on that day Hart had arrived at the job site accompanied by a crowd variously estimated at from 40 to 150 men. There is evidence that this was ‘a very rough, boisterous crowd,’ that some of the men used abusive language, that some were drunk, and that some carried guns and knives.
“Hart and his men went to the coal preparation plant and told the Laburnum workers there that he was taking over the job and that the Laburnum workers would have to ‘join up with the United Construction Workers.’ He accosted other employees of the plaintiff at another site where he repeated his threats that he would ‘take over’ the job unless they joined the union which he represented. Some of the plaintiff’s employees yielded to these threats and agreed to join Hart’s labor organization, while others refused to do so.
“Bryan talked with Hart again at the job site on August 1, and, as he says, Hart ‘left no doubt in anybody’s mind that he was going to have people to stop any men from working who tried.’ ‘He continually threatened to bring a large crowd of people there from Beaver Creek and other places to stop us from working if any of our people went to work. He said he would do that unless we signed a paper recognizing his organization as the representative of the laborers.’ Bryan replied that he ‘wouldn’t do it and couldn’t do it’ because of his prior obligation to another labor organization. Moreover, Hart threatened that if the Laburnum men ‘went back to work he was going to close down the mine operations by stopping the United Mine Workers from working for Pond Creek.’
“. . . Consequently, on August 4, the coal companies, because of the dispute in which the plaintiff had become involved with representatives of these labor organizations, canceled the construction contracts with Laburnum which were then in progress.
“After the violent events of July, 1949, Pond Creek Pocahontas Company and Island Creek Coal Company abandoned the award of the additional work upon a cost plus five per cent basis which they had promised the Laburnum company. The coal companies invited bids upon this proposed construction, but Laburnum was unsuccessful in all of its bids for such work. The officials of the coal companies expressed their high regard and sympathy for Bryan, but explained that they could not run the risk of having the defendant unions shut down the mining operations because of the unions’ differences with Laburnum.” 194 Va. 872, 880-881, 882, 883, 884-885, 75 S. E. 2d 694, 700-701, 702, 703.
The cases relied upon to exclude state jurisdiction are those where a conflict with federal control has been made clear.
“[W]hen Congress does exercise its paramount authority, it is obvious that Congress may determine how far its regulation shall go. There is no constitutional rule which compels Congress to occupy the whole field. Congress may circumscribe its regulation and occupy only a limited field. When it does so, state regulation outside that limited field and otherwise admissible is not forbidden or displaced. The principle is thoroughly established that the exercise by the State of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded by federal action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict is so ‘direct and positive’ that the two acts cannot ‘be reconciled or consistently stand together.’ ” Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1, 10. See also, Amalgamated Assn. v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U. S. 383; United, Automobile Workers v. O’Brien, 339 U. S. 454; Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Board, 338 U. S. 953; La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 18; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Board, 330 U. S. 767; Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538.
“Sec. 303. . . .
“(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason or [of] any violation of subsection (a) [boycotts and other unlawful combinations] may sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 301 hereof without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdicion of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.” 61 Stat. 158, 159, 29 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 187(b).
49 Stat. 449 et seq., 29 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 151 et seq.
“. . . While the Federal Board is empowered to forbid a strike, when and because its purpose is one that the Federal Act made illegal, it has been given no power to forbid one because its method is illegal— even if the illegality were to consist of actual or threatened violence to persons or destruction of property. Policing of such conduct is left wholly to the states. In this case there was also evidence of considerable injury to property and intimidation of other employees by threats and no one questions the State’s power to police coercion by those methods.” International Union v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 245, 253. See also, pp. 255-258 distinguishing the conduct there complained of from that protected by § 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
“. . . By retaining the language which provides the Board’s powers under section 10 shall not be affected by other means of adjustment, the conference agreement makes clear that, when two remedies exist, one before the Board and one before the courts, the remedy before the Board shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, other remedies.” Conference Report on H. R. 3020, H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52.
Similarly, H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, said:
“Equal Responsibility Before the Law
“When employers violate rights that the Labor Act gives to employees or to unions, the Board can issue orders against them. When employers violate rights of employees or of unions under other laws, they must answer in court for what they do. Under the bill, when unions and their members violate rights given to employers and to employees, the new Board can issue orders protecting the employers and the employees.” (Emphasis added.)
See generally, Note, Labor Law — Federal and State Jurisdiction-Common Law Remedies, 27 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 468; Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 211, 236.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we must determine whether 40 U. S. C. § 13k, which prohibits, among other things, the “display [of] any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into pub-he notice any party, organization, or movement” in the United States Supreme Court building and on its grounds, violates the First Amendment.
HH
In May 1978 appellee Thaddeus Zywicki, standing on the sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court building, distributed leaflets to passersby. The leaflets were reprints of a letter to the editor of the Washington Post from a United States Senator concerning the removal of unfit judges from the bench. A Supreme Court police officer approached Zywicki and told him, accurately, that Title 40 of the United States Code prohibited the distribution of leaflets on the Supreme Court grounds, which includes the sidewalk. Zywicki left.
In January 1980 Zywicki again visited the sidewalk in front of the Court to distribute pamphlets containing information about forthcoming meetings and events concerning “the oppressed peoples of Central America.” Zywicki again was approached by a Court police officer and was informed that the distribution of leaflets on the Court grounds was prohibited by law. The officer indicated that Zywicki would be arrested if the leafletting continued. Zywicki left.
Zywicki reappeared in February 1980 on the sidewalk in front of the Court and distributed handbills concerning oppression in Guatemala. Zywicki had consulted with an attorney concerning the legality of his activities and had been informed that the Superior Court for the District of Columbia had construed the statute that prohibited leafletting, 40 U. S. C. § 13k, to prohibit only conduct done with the specific intent to influence, impede, or obstruct the administration of justice. Zywicki again was told by a Court police officer that he would be subject to arrest if he persisted in his leafletting. Zywicki complained that he was being denied a right that others were granted, referring to the newspaper vending machines located on the sidewalk. Nonetheless, Zywicki left the grounds.
Around noon on March 17, 1980, appellee Mary Grace entered upon the sidewalk in front of the Court and began to display a four foot by two and a half foot sign on which was inscribed the verbatim text of the First Amendment. A Court police officer approached Grace and informed her that she would have to go across the street if she wished to display the sign. Grace was informed that Title 40 of the United States Code prohibited her conduct and that if she did not cease she would be arrested. Grace left the grounds.
On May 13, 1980, Zywicki and Grace filed the present suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They sought an injunction against continued enforcement of 40 U. S. C. § 13k and a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. On August 7, 1980, the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Appellees took an appeal, arguing that the District Court’s action was improper and that the Court of Appeals should grant the relief requested in the complaint.
The Court of Appeals determined that the District Court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was erroneous and went on to strike down § 13k on its face as an unconstitutional restriction on First Amendment rights in a public place. Grace v. Burger, 214 U. S. App. D. C. 375, 665 F. 2d 1193 (1981).
The Government appealed from the Court of Appeals’ judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982).
II
Section 13k prohibits two distinct activities: it is unlawful either “to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds,” or “to display therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” Each appellee appeared individually on the public sidewalks to engage in expressive activity, and it goes without saying that the threat of arrest to which each appellee was subjected was for violating the prohibition against the display of a “banner or device.” Accordingly, our review is limited to the latter portion of the statute. Likewise, the controversy presented by appellees concerned their right to use the public sidewalks surrounding the Court building for the communicative activities they sought to carry out, and we shall address only whether the proscriptions of § 13k are constitutional as applied to the public sidewalks.
Our normal course is first to “ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932). See New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). Appellees did not make a statutory construction argument before the lower courts, but at oral argument, the question was raised whether § 13k reached the types of conduct in which appellees engaged, and we should answer it. We agree with the United States that the statute covers the particular conduct of Zywicki or Grace and that it is therefore proper to reach the constitutional question involved in this case.
The statutory ban is on the display of a “flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” 40 U. S. C. § 13k. It is undisputed that Grace’s picket sign containing the text of the First Amendment falls within the description of a “flag, banner, or device.” Although it is less obvious, it is equally uncontested that Zywicki’s leaflets fall within the proscription as well.
We also accept the Government’s contention, not contested by appellees, that almost any sign or leaflet carrying a communication, including Grace’s picket sign and Zywicki’s leaflets, would be “designed or adapted to bring into public notice [a] party, organization or movement.” Such a construction brings some certainty to the reach of the statute and hence avoids what might be other challenges to its validity.
HH hH I — I
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” There is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful picketing and leafletting are expressive activities involving “speech” protected by the First Amendment. E.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 460 (1980); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 112 (1969); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
It is also true that “public places” historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be “public forums.” See Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, supra, at 460; Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 515 (1976); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 574 (1941); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939). In such places, the government’s ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited: the government may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions “are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Perry Education Assn., supra, at 45. See, e. g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 647, 654 (1981); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 115 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965) (Cox II). Additional restrictions such as an absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest. See, e. g., Perry Education Assn., supra, at 46; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981).
Publicly owned or operated property does not become a “public forum” simply because members of the public are permitted to come and go at will. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 836 (1976). Although whether the property has been “generally opened to the public” is a factor to consider in determining whether the government has opened its property to the use of the people for communicative purposes, it is not determinative of the question. We have regularly rejected the assertion that people who wish “to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please.” Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47-48 (1966). See, e. g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 554-555 (1965) (Cox I); Cox II, supra, at 563-564. There is little doubt that in some circumstances the government may ban the entry on to public property that is not a “public forum” of all persons except those who have legitimate business on the premises. The government, “no less than a private owner of property, has the power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.” Adderley v. Florida, supra, at 47. See Cox II, supra, at 563-564.
IV
It is argued that the Supreme Court building and grounds fit neatly within the description of nonpublic forum property. Although the property is publicly owned, it has not been traditionally held open for the use of the public for expressive activities. As Greer v. Spock, supra, teaches, the property is not transformed into “public forum” property merely because the public is permitted to freely enter and leave the grounds at practically all times and the public is admitted to the building during specified hours. Under this view it would be necessary only to determine that the restrictions imposed by § 13k are reasonable in light of the use to which the building and grounds are dedicated and that there is no discrimination on the basis of content. We need not make that judgment at this time, however, because § 13k covers the public sidewalks as well as the building and grounds inside the sidewalks. As will become evident, we hold that § 13k may not be applied to the public sidewalks.
The prohibitions imposed by § 13k technically cover the entire grounds of the Supreme Court as defined in 40 U. S. C. § 13p. That section describes the Court grounds as extending to the curb of each of the four streets enclosing the block on which the building is located. Included within this small geographical area, therefore, are not only the building, the plaza and surrounding promenade, lawn area, and steps, but also the sidewalks. The sidewalks comprising the outer boundaries of the Court grounds are indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, D. C., and we can discern no reason why they should be treated any differently. Sidewalks, of course, are among those areas of public property that traditionally have been held open to the public for expressive activities and are clearly within those areas of public property that may be considered, generally without further inquiry, to be public forum property. In this respect, the present case differs from Greer v. Spock, supra. In Greer, the streets and sidewalks at issue were located within an enclosed military reservation, Fort Dix, N. J., and were thus separated from the streets and sidewalks of any municipality. That is not true of the sidewalks surrounding the Court. There is no separation, no fence, and no indication whatever to persons stepping from the street to the curb and sidewalks that serve as the perimeter of the Court grounds that they have entered some special type of enclave. In United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 133 (1981), we stated that “Congress . . . may not by its own ipse dixit destroy the ‘public forum’ status of streets and parks which have historically been public forums . . . .” The inclusion of the public sidewalks within the scope of § 13k’s prohibition, however, results in the destruction of public forum status that is at least presumptively impermissible. Traditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection and will not lose its historically recognized character for the reason that it abuts government property that has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public expression. Nor may the government transform the character of the property by the expedient of including it within the statutory definition of what might be considered a nonpublic forum parcel of property. The public sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme Court grounds, in our view, are public forums and should be treated as such for First Amendment purposes.
V
The Government submits that § 13k qualifies as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction which may be imposed to restrict communicative activities on public forum property such as sidewalks. The argument is that the inquiry should not be confined to the Supreme Court grounds but should focus on “the vicinity of the Supreme Court” or “the public places of Washington, D. C.” Brief for Appellants 16, n. 5. Viewed in this light, the Government contends that there are sufficient alternative areas within the relevant forum, such as the streets around the Court or the sidewalks across those streets to permit § 13k to be considered a reasonable “place” restriction having only a minimal impact on expressive activity. We are convinced, however, that the section, which totally bans the specified communicative activity on the public sidewalks around the Court grounds, cannot be justified as a reasonable place restriction primarily because it has an insufficient nexus with any of the public interests that may be thought to undergird §13k. Our reasons for this conclusion will become apparent below, where we decide that § 13k, insofar as its prohibitions reach to the public sidewalks, is unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently serve those public interests that are urged as its justification.
Section 13k was part of an 11-section statute, enacted in 1949, “[r]elating to the policing of the building and grounds of the Supreme Court of the United States.” 63 Stat. 616, 40 U. S. C. §§ 13f-13p. The occasion for its passage was the termination of the practice by District of Columbia authorities of appointing Supreme Court guards as special policemen for the District. This action left the Supreme Court police force without authority to make arrests and enforce the law in the building and on the grounds of the Court. The Act, which was soon forthcoming, was modeled on the legislation relating to the Capitol grounds, 60 Stat. 718, 40 U. S. C. §§ 193a-193m. It authorizes the appointment by the Marshal of special officers “for duty in connection with the policing of the Supreme Court Building and grounds and adjacent streets.” Sections 2-6 of the Act prohibit certain kinds of conduct in the building or grounds. Section 6, codified as 40 U. S. C. § 13k, is at issue here. Other sections authorize the Marshal to issue regulations, provide penalties for violations of the Act or regulations, and authorize the Court’s special police to make arrests for violation of the Act’s prohibitions or of any law of the United States occurring within the building and grounds and on the adjacent streets. Section 11 of the Act, 13 U. S. C. § 13p, defines the limits of the Court’s grounds as including the sidewalks surrounding the building.
Based on its provisions and legislative history, it is fair to say that the purpose of the Act was to provide for the protection of the building and grounds and of the persons and property therein, as well as the maintenance of proper order and decorum. Section 6, 40 U. S. C. § 13k, was one of the provisions apparently designed for these purposes. At least, no special reason was stated for its enactment.
We do not denigrate the necessity to protect persons and property or to maintain proper order and decorum within the Supreme Court grounds, but we do question whether a total ban on carrying a flag, banner, or device on the public sidewalks substantially serves these purposes. There is no suggestion, for example, that appellees’ activities in any way obstructed the sidewalks or access to the building, threatened injury to any person or property, or in any way interfered with the orderly administration of the building or other parts of the grounds. As we have said, the building’s perimeter sidewalks are indistinguishable from other public sidewalks in the city that are normally open to the conduct that is at issue here and that § 13k forbids. A total ban on that conduct is no more necessary for the maintenance of peace and tranquility on the public sidewalks surrounding the building than on any other sidewalks in the city. Accordingly, § 13k cannot be justified on this basis.
The United States offers another justification for § 13k that deserves our attention. It is said that the federal courts represent an independent branch of the Government and that their decisionmaking processes are different from those of the other branches. Court decisions are made on the record before them and in accordance with the applicable law. The views of the parties and of others are to be presented by briefs and oral argument. Courts are not subject to lobbying, judges do not entertain visitors in their chambers for the purpose of urging that cases be resolved one way or another, and they do not and should not respond to parades, picketing, or pressure groups. Neither, the Government urges, should it appear to the public that the Supreme Court is subject to outside influence or that picketing or marching, singly or in groups, is an acceptable or proper way of appealing to or influencing the Supreme Court. Hence, we are asked to hold that Congress was quite justified in preventing the conduct in dispute here from occurring on the sidewalks at the edge of the Court grounds.
As was the case- with the maintenance of law and order on the Court grounds, we do not discount the importance of this proffered purpose for § 13k. But, again, we are unconvinced that the prohibitions of §13k that are at issue here sufficiently serve that purpose to sustain its validity insofar as the public sidewalks on the perimeter of the grounds are concerned. Those sidewalks are used by the public like other public sidewalks. There is nothing to indicate to the public that these sidewalks are part of the Supreme Court grounds or are in any way different from other public sidewalks in the city. We seriously doubt that the public would draw a different inference from a lone picketer carrying a sign on the sidewalks around the building than it would from a similar picket on the sidewalks across the street.
We thus perceive insufficient justification for § 13k’s prohibition of carrying signs, banners, or devices on the public sidewalks surrounding the building. We hold that under the First Amendment the section is unconstitutional as applied to those sidewalks. Of course, this is not to say that those sidewalks, like other sidewalks, are not subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, either by statute or by regulations issued pursuant to 40 U. S. C. § 13l.
The judgment below is accordingly affirmed to the extent indicated by this opinion and is otherwise vacated.
So ordered.
The provision at issue in this case is part of a statutory scheme enacted in 1949 to govern the protection, care, and policing of the Supreme Court grounds. In its entirety § 13k provides:
“It shall be unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” 63 Stat. 617.
The case Zywicki’s counsel referred to is United States v. Ebner, No. M-12487-79 (D. C. Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 1980). The ease is currently on appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals; that court has postponed decision pending the outcome of the present appeal.
Grace v. Burger, 524 F. Supp. 815 (1980).
The court justified its action in this regard by relying primarily on the fact that the ease presented a pure question of law that had been fully briefed and argued by the parties both in the District Court and in the
Court of Appeals. Because the appellants do not take issue with the propriety of the Court of Appeals’ action in addressing the merits rather than remanding to the District Court, we will assume that such action was proper without deciding that question. Cf. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1976).
Although the Court of Appeals opinion purports to hold § 13k unconstitutional on its face without any indication that the holding is limited to that portion of the statute that deals with the display of a “flag, banner, or device,” the decision must be read as limited to that prohibition.
The First Amendment provides in full:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
The limitation on the hours during which the public is permitted in the Supreme Court building is the only regulation promulgated under 40 U. S. C. § 131. The regulation provides:
“The Supreme Court Building at 1 First Street, N. E., Washington, D. C. 20548, is open to the public Monday through Friday, from 9 a. m. to 4:30 p. m., except on Federal holidays. The building is closed at all other times, although persons having legitimate business may be admitted at other times when so authorized by responsible officials.”
Section 13p provides:
“For the purposes of sections 13f to 13p of this title the Supreme Court grounds shall be held to extend to the line of the face of the east curb of First Street Northeast, between Maryland Avenue Northeast and East Capitol Street; to the line of the face of the south curb of Maryland Avenue Northeast, between First Street Northeast and Second Street Northeast; to the line of the face of the west curb of Second Street Northeast, between Maryland Avenue Northeast and East Capitol Street; and to the line of the face of the north curb of East Capitol Street between First Street Northeast and Second Street Northeast.”
Because the prohibitions of § 13k are expressly made applicable to the entire grounds under § 13p, the statute cannot be construed to exclude the sidewalks. Thus we must consider Congress’ extension of § 13k’s prohibitions to the sidewalks to be a reasoned choice.
Section 13k does not prohibit all expressive conduct: it does not, for example, purport to prohibit any oral expression, on any subject. It is unnecessary, however, to determine what conduct other than the picketing and leafletting at issue here may be fairly within the terms of the statute because the statute at least prohibits the conduct at issue here. We do note that the current Marshal of the Court has interpreted and applied the statute to prohibit picketing and leafletting, but not other expressive conduct. See Grace v. Burger, 214 U. S. App. D. C. 375, 378, n. 7, 665 F. 2d 1193, 1196, n. 7 (1981). Interpreted and applied as an absolute ban on these two types of expressive conduct, it is clear that the prohibition is facially content-neutral.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Line Item Veto' Act (Act), 110 Stat. 1200, 2 U. S. C. § 691 et seq. (1994 ed., Supp. II), was enacted in April 1996 and became effective on January 1,1997. The following day, six Members of Congress who had voted against the Act brought suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia challenging its constitutionality. On April 10, 1997, the District Court entered an order holding that the Act is unconstitutional. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25. In obedience to the statutory direction to allow a direct, expedited appeal to this Court, see §§692(b)-(e), we promptly noted probable jurisdiction and expedited review, 520 U. S. 1194 (1997). We determined, however, that the Members of Congress did not have standing to sue because they had not “alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to have established Article III standing,” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 830 (1997); thus, “[i]n... light of [the] overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its proper constitutional sphere,” id., at 820, we remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Less than two months after our decision in that case, the President exercised his authority to cancel one provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-38, 111 Stat. 251, 515, and two provisions in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, 895-896, 990-993. Ap-pellees, claiming that they had been injured by two of those cancellations, filed these cases in the District Court. That Court again held the statute invalid, 985 F. Supp. 168, 177-182 (1998), and we again expedited our review, 522 U. S. 1144 (1998). We now hold that these appellees have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act and, reaching the merits, we agree that the cancellation procedures set forth in the Act violate the Presentment Clause, Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, of the Constitution.
I
We begin by reviewing the canceled items that are at issue in these cases.
Section J¡.722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 848, as amended, authorizes the Federal Government to transfer huge sums of money to the States to help finance medical care for the indigent. See 42 U. S. C. § 1396d(b). In 1991, Congress directed that those federal subsidies be reduced by the amount of certain taxes levied by the States on health care providers. In 1994, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) notified the State of New York that 15 of its taxes were covered by the 1991 Act, and that as of June 30, 1994, the statute therefore required New York to return $955 million to the United States. The notice advised the State that it could apply for a waiver on certain statutory grounds. New York did request a waiver for those tax programs, as well as for a number of others, but HHS has not formally acted on any of those waiver requests. New York has estimated that the amount at issue for the period from October 1992 through March 1997 is as high as $2.6 billion.
Because HHS had not taken any action on the waiver requests, New York turned to Congress for relief. On August 5, 1997, Congress enacted a law that resolved the issue in New York’s favor. Section 4722(e) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 identifies the disputed taxes and provides that they “are deemed to be permissible health care related taxes and in compliance with the requirements” of the relevant provisions of the 1991 statute.
On August 11,1997, the President sent identical notices to the Senate and to the House of Representatives canceling “one item of new direct spending,” specifying § 4722(c) as that item, and stating that he had determined that “this cancellation will reduce the Federal budget deficit.” He explained that § 4722(e) would have permitted New York “to continue relying upon impermissible provider taxes to finance its Medicaid program” and that “[t]his preferential treatment would have increased Medicaid costs, would have treated New York differently from all other States, and would have established a costly precedent for other States to request comparable treatment.”
Section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
A person who realizes a profit from the sale of securities is generally subject to a capital gains tax. Under existing law, however, an ordinary business corporation can acquire a corporation, including a food processing or refining company, in a merger or stoek-for-stock transaction in which no gain is recognized to the seller, see 26 U. S. C. §§ 354(a), 368(a); the seller’s tax payment, therefore, is deferred. If, however, the purchaser is a farmers’ cooperative, the parties cannot structure such a transaction because the stock of the cooperative may be held only by its members, see § 521(b)(2); thus, a seller dealing with a. farmers’ cooperative cannot obtain the benefits of tax deferral.
In §968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Congress amended § 1042 of the Internal Revenue Code to permit owners of certain food refiners and processors to defer the recognition of gain if they sell their stock to eligible farmers’ cooperatives. The purpose of the amendment, as repeatedly explained by its sponsors, was “to facilitate the transfer of refiners and processors to farmers’ cooperatives.” The amendment to § 1042 was one of the 79 “limited tax benefits” authorized by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and specifically identified in Title XVII of that Act as “subject to [the] line item veto.”
On the same date that he canceled the “item of new direct spending” involving New York’s health care programs, the President also canceled this limited tax benefit. In his explanation of that action, the President endorsed the objective of encouraging “value-added farming through the purchase by farmers’ cooperatives of refiners or processors of agricultural goods,” but concluded that the provision lacked safeguards and also “failed to target its benefits to small-and-medium-size cooperatives.”
hH
Appellees filed two separate actions against the President and other federal officials challenging these two cancellations. The plaintiffs in the first ease are the City of New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, and two unions representing health care employees. The plaintiffs in the second are a farmers’ cooperative consisting of about 30 potato growers in Idaho and an individual farmer who is a member and officer of the cooperative. The District Court consolidated the two cases and determined that at least one of the plaintiffs in each had standing under Article III of the Constitution.
Appellee New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (NYCHHC) is responsible for the operation of public health care facilities throughout the City of New York. If HHS ultimately denies the State’s waiver requests, New York law will automatically require NYCHHC to make retroactive tax payments to the State of about $4 million for each of the years at issue. 985 F. Supp., at 172. This contingent liability for NYCHHC, and comparable potential liabilities for the other appellee health care providers, were eliminated by § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and revived by the President’s cancellation of that provision. The District Court held that the cancellation of the statutory protection against these liabilities constituted sufficient injury to give these providers Article III standing.
Appellee Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. (Snake River) was formed in May 1997 to assist Idaho potato farmers in marketing their crops and stabilizing prices, in part through a strategy of acquiring potato processing facilities that will allow the members of the cooperative to retain revenues otherwise payable to third-party processors. At that time, Congress was considering the amendment to the capital gains tax that was expressly intended to aid farmers’ cooperatives in the purchase of processing facilities, and Snake River had concrete plans to take advantage of the amendment if passed. Indeed, appellee Mike Cranney, acting on behalf of Snake River, was engaged in negotiations with the owner of an Idaho potato processor that would have qualified for the tax benefit under the pending legislation, but these negotiations terminated when the President canceled § 968. Snake River is currently considering the possible purchase of other processing facilities in Idaho if the President’s cancellation is reversed. Based on these facts, the District Court concluded that the Snake River plaintiffs were injured by the President’s cancellation of § 968, as they “lost the benefit of being on equal footing with their competitors and will likely have to pay more to purchase processing facilities now that the sellers will not [be] able to take advantage of section 968’s tax breaks.” Id., at 177.
On the merits, the District Court held that the cancellations did not conform to the constitutionally mandated procedures for the enactment or repeal of laws in two respects. First, the laws that resulted after the cancellations “were different from those consented to by both Houses of Congress.” Id., at 178. Moreover, the President violated Article I “when he unilaterally canceled provisions of duly enacted statutes.” Id., at 179. As a separate basis for its decision, the District Court also held that the Act “imper-missibly disrupts the balance of powers among the three branches of government.” Ibid.
HH h — t
As in the prior challenge to the Line Item Veto Act, we initially confront jurisdictional questions. The appellees invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court under the section of the Act entitled “Expedited review.” That section, 2 U. S. C. § 692(a)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. II), expressly authorizes “[a]ny Member of Congress or any individual adversely affected” by the Act to bring an action for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief on the ground that any provision of the Act is unconstitutional. Although the Government did not question the applicability of that section in the District Court, it now argues that, with the exception of Mike Cran-ney, the appellees are not “individuals” within the meaning of § 692(a)(1). Because the argument poses a jurisdictional question (although not one of constitutional magnitude), it is not waived by the failure to raise it in the District Court. The fact that the argument did not previously occur to the able lawyers for the Government does, however, confirm our view that in the context of the entire section Congress undoubtedly intended the word “individual” to be construed as synonymous with the word “person.”
The special section authorizing expedited review evidences an unmistakable congressional interest in a prompt and authoritative judicial determination of the constitutionality of the Act. Subsection (a)(2) requires that copies of any complaint filed under subsection (a)(1) “shall be promptly delivered” to both Houses of Congress, and that each House shall have a right to intervene. Subsection (b) authorizes a direct appeal to this Court from any order of the District Court, and requires that the appeal be filed within 10 days. Subsection (c) imposes a duty on both the District Court and this Court “to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter brought under subsection (a).” There is no plausible reason why Congress would have intended to provide for such special treatment of actions filed by natural persons and to have precluded entirely jurisdiction over comparable cases brought by corporate persons. Acceptance of the Government’s new-found reading of § 692 “would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 574 (1982).
We are also unpersuaded by the Government’s argument that appellees’ challenge to the constitutionality of the Act is nonjusticiable. We agree, of course, that Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual “Cases” and “Controversies,” and that “the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.” Whit more v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990). Our disposition of the first challenge to the constitutionality of this Act demonstrates our recognition of the importance of respecting the constitutional limits on our jurisdiction, even when Congress has manifested an interest in obtaining our views as promptly as possible. But these eases differ from Raines, not only because the President’s exercise of his cancellation authority has removed any concern about the ripeness of the dispute, but more importantly because the parties have alleged a “personal stake” in having an actual injury redressed rather than an “institutional injury” that is “abstract and widely dispersed.” 521 U. S., at 829.
In both the New York and the Snake River cases, the Government argues that the appellees are not actually injured because the claims are too speculative and, in any event, the claims are advanced by the wrong parties. We find no merit in the suggestion that New York’s injury is merely speculative because HHS has not yet acted on the State’s waiver requests. The State now has a multibillion dollar contingent liability that had been eliminated by § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The District Court correctly concluded that the State, and the appellees, “suffered an immediate, concrete injury the moment that the President used the Line Item Veto to cancel section 4722(c) and deprived them of the benefits of that law.” 985 F. Supp., at 174. The self-evident significance of the contingent liability is confirmed by the fact that New York lobbied Congress for this relief, that Congress decided that it warranted statutory attention, and that the President selected for cancellation only this one provision in an Act that occupies 536 pages of the Statutes at Large. His action was comparable to the judgment of an appellate court setting aside a verdict for the defendant and remanding for a new trial of a multibillion dollar damages claim. Even if the outcome of the second trial is speculative, the reversal, like the President’s cancellation, causes a significant immediate injury by depriving the defendant of the benefit of a favorable final judgment. The revival of a substantial contingent liability immediately and directly affects the borrowing power, financial strength, and fiscal planning of the potential obligor.
We also reject the Government’s argument that New York’s claim is advanced by the wrong parties because the claim belongs to the State of New York, and not appellees. Under New York statutes that are already in place, it is clear that both the City of New York and the appellee health care providers will be assessed by the State for substantial portions of any recoupment payments that the State may have to make to the Federal Government. To the extent of such assessments, they have the same potential liability as the State does.
The Snake River farmers’ cooperative also suffered an immediate injury when the President canceled the limited tax benefit that Congress had enacted to facilitate the acquisition of processing plants. Three critical facts identify the specificity and the importance of that injury. First, Congress enacted § 968 for the specific purpose of providing a benefit to a defined category of potential purchasers of a defined category of assets. The members of that statutorily defined class received the equivalent of a statutory “bargaining chip” to use in carrying out the congressional plan to facilitate their purchase of such assets. Second, the President selected § 968 as one of only two tax benefits in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 that should be canceled. The cancellation rested on his determination that the use of those bargaining chips would have a significant impact on the federal budget deficit. Third, the Snake River cooperative was organized for the very purpose of acquiring processing facilities, it had concrete plans to utilize the benefits of § 968, and it was engaged in ongoing negotiations with the owner of a processing plant who had expressed an interest in structuring a tax-deferred sale when the President canceled § 968. Moreover, it is actively searching for other processing facilities for possible future purchase if the President’s cancellation is reversed; and there are ample processing facilities in the State that Snake River may be able to purchase. By depriving them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing under our precedents. See, e. g., Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 620 (1971); 3 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 18-14 (3d ed. 1994) (“The Court routinely recognizes probable economic injury resulting from [governmental actions] that alter competitive conditions as sufficient to satisfy the [Article III finjury-in-fact’ requirement].... It follows logically that any... petitioner who is likely to suffer economic injury as a result of [governmental action] that changes market conditions satisfies this part of the standing test”).
Appellees’ injury in this regard is at least as concrete as the injury suffered by the respondents in Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U. S. 352 (1980). In that case, we considered whether a rule that generally limited water deliveries from reclamation projects to 160 acres applied to the much larger tracts of the Imperial Irrigation District in southeastern California; application of that limitation would have given large landowners an incentive to sell excess lands at prices below the prevailing market price for irrigated land. The District Court had held that the 160-acre limitation did not apply, and farmers who had hoped to purchase the excess land sought to appeal. We acknowledged that the farmers had not presented “detailed information about [their] financial resources,” and noted that “the prospect of windfall profits could attract a large number of potential purchasers” besides the farmers. Id., at 367, n. 17. Nonetheless, “even though they could not with certainty establish that they would be able to purchase excess lands” if the judgment were reversed, id., at 367, we found standing because it was “likely that excess lands would become available at less than market prices,” id., at 368. The Snake Kiver appellees have alleged an injury that is as specific and immediate as that in Yellen. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72-78 (1978).
As with the New York case, the Government argues that the wrong parties are before the Court — that because the sellers of the processing facilities would have received the tax benefits, only they have standing to challenge the cancellation of § 968. This argument not only ignores the fact that the cooperatives were the intended beneficiaries of § 968, but also overlooks the self-evident proposition that more than one party may have standing to challenge a particular action or inaction. Once it is determined that a particular plaintiff is harmed by the defendant, and that the harm will likely be redressed by a favorable decision, that plaintiff has standing — regardless of whether there are others who would also have standing to sue. Thus, we are satisfied that both of these actions are Article III “Cases” that we have a duty to decide.
IV
The Line Item Veto Act gives the President the power to “cancel in whole” three types of provisions that have been signed into law: “(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit.” 2 U. S. C. § 691(a) (1994 ed., Supp. II), It is undisputed that the New York case involves an “item of new direct spending” and that the Snake River case involves a “limited tax benefit” as those terms are defined in the Act. It is also undisputed that each of those provisions had been signed into law pursuant to Article I, §7, of the Constitution before it was canceled.
The Act requires the President to adhere to precise procedures whenever he exercises his cancellation authority. In identifying items for cancellation he must consider the legislative history, the purposes, and other relevant information about the items. See 2 U. S. C. § 691(b) (1994 ed., Supp. II). He must determine, with respect to each cancellation, that it will “(i) reduee the Federal budget deficit; (ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm the national interest.” §691(a)(A). Moreover, he must transmit a special message to Congress notifying it of each cancellation within five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the enactment of the canceled provision. See § 691(a)(B). It is undisputed that the President meticulously followed these procedures in these eases.
A cancellation takes effect upon receipt by Congress of the special message from the President. See § 691b(a). If, however, a “disapproval bill” pertaining to a special message is enacted into law, the cancellations set forth in that message become “null and void.” Ibid. The Act sets forth a detailed expedited procedure for the consideration of a “disapproval bill,” see §691d, but no such bill was passed for either of the cancellations involved in these cases. A majority vote of both Houses is sufficient to enact a disapproval bill. The Act does not grant the President the authority to cancel a disapproval bill, see § 691(c), but he does, of course, retain his constitutional authority to veto such a bill.
The effect of a cancellation is plainly stated in §691e, which defines the principal terms used in the Act. With respect to both an item of new direct spending and a limited tax benefit, the cancellation prevents the item “from having legal force or effect.” §§691e(4)(B)-(C). Thus, under the plain text of the statute, the two actions of the President that are challenged in these cases prevented one section of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and one section of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 “from having legal force or effect.” The remaining provisions of those statutes, with the exception of the second canceled item in the latter, continue to have the same force and effect as they had when signed into law.
In both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each. “[R]epeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 954 (1983). There' is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes. Both Article I and Article II assign responsibilities to the President that directly relate to the lawmaking process, but neither addresses the issue presented by these cases. The President “shall from time to time give to the Congress Information on the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient_” Art. II, § 8. Thus, he may initiate and influence legislative proposals. Moreover, after a bill has passed both Houses of Congress, but “before it beeome[s] a Law,” it must be presented to the President. If he approves it, “he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.” Art. I, § 7, el. 2. His “return” of a bill, -which is usually described as a “veto,” is subject to being overridden by a two-thirds vote in each House.
There are important differences between the President’s “return” of a bill pursuant to Article I, §7, and the exercise of the President’s cancellation authority pursuant to the Line Item Yeto Act. The constitutional return takes place before the bill becomes law; the statutory cancellation occurs after the bill becomes law. The constitutional return is of the entire bill; the statutory cancellation is of only a part. Although the Constitution expressly authorizes the President to play a role in the process of enacting statutes, it is silent on the subject of unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes.
There are powerful reasons for construing constitutional silence on this profoundly important issue as equivalent to an express prohibition. The procedures governing the enactment of statutes set forth in the text of Article I were the product of the great debates and compromises that produced the Constitution itself. Familiar historical materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the power to enact statutes may only “be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.” Chadha, 462 U. S., at 951. Our first President understood the text of the Presentment Clause as requiring that he either “approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto.” What has emerged in these cases from the President’s exercise of his statutory cancellation powers, however, are truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress. They are not th.e product of the “finely wrought” procedure that the Framers designed.
At oral argument, the Government suggested that the cancellations at issue in these cases do not effect a “repeal” of the canceled items because under the special “lockbox” provisions of the Act, a canceled item “retain[s] real, legal budgetary effect” insofar as it prevents Congress and the President from spending the savings that result from the cancellation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. The text of the Act expressly provides, however, that a cancellation prevents a direct spending or tax benefit provision “from having legal force or effect.” 2 U. S. C. §§ 691e(4)(BMC). That a canceled item may have “real, legal budgetary effect” as a result of the lockbox procedure does not change the fact that by canceling the items at issue in these cases, the President made them entirely inoperative as to appellees. Section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act no longer provides a tax benefit, and § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 no longer relieves New York of its contingent liability. Such significant changes do not lose their character simply because the canceled provisions may have some continuing financial effect on the Government. The cancellation of one section of a statute may be the functional equivalent of a partial repeal even if a portion of the section is not canceled.
V
The Government advances two related arguments to support its position that despite the unambiguous provisions of the Act, cancellations do not amend or repeal properly enacted statutes in violation of the Presentment Clause. First, relying primarily on Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), the Government contends that the cancellations were merely exercises of discretionary authority granted to the President by the Balanced Budget Act and the Taxpayer Relief Act read in light of the previously enacted Line Item Veto Act. Second, the Government submits that the substance of the authority to cancel tax and spending items “is, in practical effect, no more and no less than the power to ‘decline to spend’ specified sums of money, or to ‘decline to implement’ specified tax measures.” Brief for Appellants 40. Neither argument is persuasive.
In Field v. Clark, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Tariff Act of 1890. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567. That statute contained a “free list” of almost BOO specific articles that were exempted from import duties “unless otherwise specially provided for in this act.” Id., at 602. Section 3 was a special provision that directed the President to suspend that exemption for sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides “whenever, and so often” as he should be satisfied that any country producing and exporting those products imposed duties on the agricultural products of the United States that he deemed to be “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable....” Id., at 612, quoted in Field, 143 U. S., at 680. The section then specified the duties to be imposed on those products during any such suspension. The Court provided this explanation for its conclusion that § 3 had not delegated legislative power to the President:
“Nothing involving the expediency or the just operation of such legislation was left to the determination of the President.... [W]hen he ascertained the fact that duties and exactions, reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, were imposed upon the agricultural or other products of the United States by a country producing and exporting sugar, molasses, coffee, tea or hides, it became his duty to issue a proclamation declaring the suspension, as to that country, which Congress had determined should occur. He had no discretion in the premises except in respect to the duration of the suspension so ordered. But that related only to the enforcement of the policy established by Congress. As the suspension was absolutely required when the President ascertained the existence of a particular fact, it cannot be said that in ascertaining that fact and in issuing his proclamation, in obedience to the legislative will, he exercised the function of making laws.... It was a part of the law itself as it left the hands of Congress that the provisions, full and complete in themselves, permitting the free introduction of sugars, molasses, coffee, tea and hides, from particular countries, should be suspended, in a given contingency, and that in ease of such suspensions certain duties should be imposed.” Id., at 693.
This passage identifies three critical differences between the power to suspend the exemption from import duties and the power to cancel portions of a duly enacted statute. First, the exercise of the suspension power was contingent upon a condition that did not exist when the Tariff Act was passed: the imposition of “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable” import duties by other countries. In contrast, the exercise of the cancellation power within five days after the enactment of the Balanced Budget and Tax Reform Acts necessarily was based on the same conditions that Congress evaluated when it passed those statutes. Second, under the Tariff Act, when the President determined that the contingency had arisen, he had a duty to suspend; in contrast, while it is true that the President was required by the Act to make three determinations before he canceled a provision, see 2 U. S. C. § 691(a)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. II), those determinations did not qualify his discretion to cancel or not to cancel. Finally, whenever the President suspended an exemption under the Tariff Act, he was executing the policy that Congress had embodied in the statute. In contrast, whenever the President cancels an item of new direct spending or a limited tax benefit he is rejecting the policy judgment made by Congress and relying on his own policy judgment. Thus, the conclusion in Field v. Clark that the suspensions mandated by the Tariff Act were not exercises of legislative power does not undermine our opinion that cancellations pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act are the functional equivalent of partial repeals of Acts of Congress that fail to satisfy Article I, §7.
The Government’s reliance upon other tariff and import statutes, discussed in Field, that contain provisions similar to the one challenged in Field is unavailing for the same reasons. Some of those statutes authorized the President to “suspen[d] and discontinu[e]” statutory duties upon his determination that discriminatory duties imposed by other nations had been abolished. See 143 U. S., at 686-687 (discussing Act of Jan. 7, 1824, ch. 4, §4, 4 Stat. 3, and Act of May 24, 1828, eh. Ill, 4 Stat. 308). A slightly different statute, Act of May 31, 1830, eh. 219, §2, 4 Stat. 425, provided that certain statutory provisions imposing duties on foreign ships “shall be repealed” upon the same no-discrimination determination by the President. See 143 U. S., at 687; see also id., at 686 (discussing similar tariff statute, Act of Mar. 3,1815, eh. 77, 3 Stat. 224, which provided that duties “are hereby repealed,” “[s]uch repeal to take effect... whenever the President” makes the required determination).
The cited statutes all relate to foreign trade, and this Court has recognized that in the foreign affairs arena, the President has “a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.” United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 320 (1936). “Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries.” Ibid. More important, when enacting the statutes discussed in Field, Congress itself made the decision to suspend or repeal the particular provisions at issue upon the occurrence of particular events subsequent to enactment, and it left only the determination of whether such events occurred up to the President. The Line Item Veto Act authorizes the President himself to effect the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons, without observing the procedures set out in Article I, § 7. The fact that Congress intended such a result is of no moment. Although Congress presumably anticipated that the President might cancel some of the items in the Balanced Budget Act and in the Taxpayer Relief Act, Congress cannot alter the procedures set out in Article I, § 7, without amending the Constitution.
Neither are we persuaded by the Government’s contention that the President’s authority to cancel new direct spending and tax benefit items is no greater than his traditional authority to decline to spend appropriated funds. The Government has reviewed in some detail the series of statutes in which Congress has given the Executive broad discretion over the expenditure of appropriated funds. For example, the First Congress appropriated “sum[s] not exceeding” specified amounts to be spent on various Government operations. See, e. g., Act of Sept. 29,1789, ch. 23,1 Stat. 95; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 104; Act of Feb. 11, 1791, eh. 6, 1 Stat. 190. In those statutes, as in later years, the President was given wide discretion with respect to both the amounts to be spent and how the money would be allocated among different functions. It is argued that the Line Item Veto Act merely confers comparable discretionary authority over the expenditure of appropriated funds. The critical difference "between this statute and all of its predecessors, however, is that unlike any of them, this Act gives the President the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes. None of the Act’s predecessors could even arguably have been construed to authorize such a change.
VI
Although they are implicit in what we have already written, the profound importance of these eases makes it appropriate to emphasize three points.
First, we express no opinion about the wisdom of the procedures authorized by the Line Item Veto Act. Many members of both major political parties who have served in the Legislative and the Executive Branches have long advocated the enactment of such procedures for the purpose of “ensur[ing] greater fiscal accountability in Washington.” H. R. Conf. Rep. 104-491, p. 15 (1996). The text of the Act
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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C
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA or Act) requires a state prisoner whose conviction has become final to seek federal habeas corpus relief within one year. 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The Act tolls this 1-year limitations period for the “time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending.” § 2244(d)(2). The time that an application for state postconviction review is “pending” includes the period between (1) a lower court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214 (2002).
In most States a statute sets out the number of days for filing a timely notice of appeal, typically a matter of a few days. See id., at 219. California, however, has a special system governing appeals when prisoners seek relief on collateral review. Under that system, the equivalent of a notice of appeal is timely if filed within a “reasonable time.” In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 828, n. 7, 855 P. 2d 391, 398, n. 7 (1993); see also Saffold, supra, at 221.
In this case, the Ninth Circuit found timely a California prisoner’s request for appellate review made three years after the lower state court ruled against him. Chavis v. LeMarque, 382 F. 3d 921 (2004). We conclude that the Circuit departed from our interpretation of the Act as applied to California’s system, Carey v. Saffold, supra, and we therefore reverse its judgment.
I
We begin with our holding in Carey v. Saffold. In that case we addressed three questions.
A
We initially considered the question just mentioned: For purposes of tolling AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period, is a state habeas application “pending” during the interval between (1) the time a lower state court reaches an adverse decision, and (2) the day the prisoner timely files an appeal? We answered this question “yes.” 536 U. S., at 219-221. If the filing of the appeal is timely, the period between the adverse lower court decision and the filing (typically just a few days) is not counted against the 1-year AEDPA time limit.
B
We then pointed out that in most States a prisoner who seeks review of an adverse lower court decision must file a notice of appeal in a higher court, and the timeliness of that notice of appeal is measured in terms of a determinate time period, such as 30 or 60 days. Id., at 219. As we explained, however, California has a different rule. In California, a state prisoner may seek review of an adverse lower court decision by filing an original petition (rather than a notice of appeal) in the higher court, and that petition is timely if filed within a “reasonable time.” Id., at 221. We asked whether this distinction made a difference for AEDPA tolling purposes. We answered that question “no.” Id., at 222-223. California’s system is sufficiently analogous to appellate review systems in other States to treat it similarly. See id., at 222 (“The upshot is that California’s collateral review process functions very much like that of other States, but for the fact that its timeliness rule is indeterminate”). As long as the prisoner filed a petition for appellate review within a “reasonable time,” he could count as “pending” (and add to the 1-year time limit) the days between (1) the time the lower state court reached an adverse decision, and (2) the day he filed a petition in the higher state court. Id., at 222-223. We added, “The fact that California’s timeliness standard is general rather than precise may make it more difficult for federal courts to determine just when a review application (i. e., a filing in a higher court) comes too late.” Id., at 223. Nonetheless, the federal courts must undertake that task.
C
We considered finally whether the state habeas petition at issue in the case had itself been timely filed. Saffold had filed that petition (a petition for review by the California Supreme Court) not within 30 or even 60 days after the lower court (the California Court of Appeal) had reached its adverse decision, but, rather, 4½months later. The filing was not obviously late, however, because the delay might have been due to excusable neglect — Saffold said he had taken 4½ months because he had not received timely notice of the adverse lower court decision. Id., at 226.
We sent the case back to the Ninth Circuit to decide whether the prisoner had filed his California Supreme Court petition within a “reasonable time,” thus making the filing timely under California law. We also set forth several legal propositions that set the boundaries within which the Ninth Circuit must answer this question.
First, we pointed out that if “the California Supreme Court had clearly ruled that Saffold’s 4½-month delay was ‘unreasonable,’ that would be the end of the matter.” Ibid.
Second, we noted that the California Supreme Court order denying Saffold’s petition had stated that the denial was “ ‘on the merits and for lack of diligence.’ ” Id., at 225. But, we added, these words alone did not decide the question. Id., at 225-226.
Third, we stated that the words “lack of diligence” did not prove that the California Supreme Court thought the petition was untimely. That is because those words might have referred to a totally different, earlier delay that was “irrelevant” to the timeliness of Saffold’s California Supreme Court petition. Id., at 226.
Fourth, we stated that the words “on the merits” did not prove that the California Supreme Court thought the petition was timely. That is because the California Supreme Court might have decided to address the merits of the petition even if the petition had been untimely. A “court,” we said,
“will sometimes address the merits of a claim that it believes was presented in an untimely way: for instance, where the merits present no difficult issue; where the court wants to give a reviewing court alternative grounds for decision; or where the court wishes to show a prisoner (who may not have a lawyer) that it was not merely a procedural technicality that precluded him from obtaining relief.” Id., at 225-226.
We ultimately concluded that the Ninth Circuit must not take “such words” (i. e., the words “on the merits”) as “an absolute bellwether” on the timeliness question. Id., at 226 (emphasis added). We pointed out that the Circuit’s contrary approach (i. e., an approach that presumed that an order denying a petition “on the merits” meant that the petition was timely) would lead to the tolling of AEDPA’s limitations period in circumstances where the law does not permit tolling. Ibid. And we gave as an example of the incorrect approach a case in which the Ninth Circuit had found timely a petition for review filed four years after the lower court reached its decision. Ibid, (citing Welch v. Newland, 267 F. 3d 1013 (CA9 2001)).
II
We turn now to the present case. Respondent Reginald Chavis, a California state prisoner, filed a state habeas corpus petition on May 14, 1993. The trial court denied the petition. He sought review in the California Court of Appeal, which also held against him. The Court of Appeal released its decision on September 29, 1994. Chavis then waited more than three years, until November 5,1997, before filing a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. On April 29,1998, the California Supreme Court denied the petition in an order stating simply, “Petition for writ of ha-beas corpus [i. e., review in the California Supreme Court] is DENIED.” App. G to Pet. for Cert. 1.
Subsequently, on August 30,2000 (after bringing a second round of state habeas petitions), Chavis filed a federal habeas petition. The State asked the federal court to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was untimely. After all, AEDPA gives prisoners only one year to file their federal petitions, and Chavis had filed his federal petition more than four years after AEDPA became effective. Still, AEDPA also provides for tolling, adding to the one year those days during which an application for state collateral review is “pending.” And the federal courts consequently had to calculate how many days Chavis’ state collateral review applications had been “pending” in the state courts and add those days to the 1-year limitations period.
Ultimately, after the ease reached the Ninth Circuit, that court concluded that the timeliness of the federal petition turned upon whether the “pending” period included the 3-year period between (1) the time a lower state court, the California Court of Appeal, issued its opinion (September 29, 1994), and (2) the time Chavis sought review in a higher state court, the California Supreme Court (on November 5, 1997). The Ninth Circuit held that the state collateral review application was “pending” during this time; hence, it should add those three years to the federal 1-year limitations period, and the addition of those three years, along with various other additions, rendered the federal filing timely.
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning as to why it should add the three years consists of the following:
“Under our decision in Saffold, because Chavis’s November 1997 habeas petition to the California Supreme Court was denied on the merits, it was pending during the interval between the Court of Appeal decision and the Supreme Court petition and he is entitled to tolling. See [Saffold v. Carey, 312 F. 3d 1031, 1034-1036 (2002)]. When the California Supreme Court denies a habeas petition without comment or citation, we have long treated the denial as a decision on the merits. Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F. 2d 344, 348 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the California Supreme Court’s summary denial was on the merits, and the petition was not dismissed as untimely. See id.; see also Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819, 820 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that there was no indication that a state habeas petition was untimely where the California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or citation). As a result, Chavis is entitled to tolling during [the relevant period].” 382 F. 3d, at 926 (emphasis added).
California sought certiorari on the ground that the Ninth Circuit’s decision was inconsistent with our holding in Saf-fold. We granted the writ.
III
A
California argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case is inconsistent with our decision in Saffold. Like California, we do not see how it is possible to reconcile the two cases.
In Saffold, we held that (1) only a timely appeal tolls AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period for the time between the lower court’s adverse decision and the filing of a notice of appeal in the higher court; (2) in California, “unreasonable” delays are not timely; and (3) (most pertinently) a California Supreme Court order denying a petition “on the merits” does not automatically indicate that the petition was timely filed. In addition, we referred to a Ninth Circuit case holding that a 4-year delay was reasonable as an example of what the law forbids the Ninth Circuit to do.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit in this case said in effect that the California Supreme Court’s denial of a petition “on the merits” did automatically mean that the petition was timely (and thus that a 3-year delay was reasonable). More than that, it treated an order from the California Supreme Court that was silent on the grounds for the court’s decision as if it were equivalent to an order in which the words “on the merits” appeared. 382 F. 3d, at 926. If the appearance of the words “on the merits” does not automatically warrant a holding that the filing was timely, the absence of those words could not automatically warrant a holding that the filing was timely. After all, the fact that the California Supreme Court did not include the words “on the merits” in its order denying Chavis relief makes, it less likely, not more likely, that the California Supreme Court believed that Chavis’ 3-year delay was reasonable. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s presumption (“that an order decided entirely on the merits indicates that the state court did not find the petition to be untimely,” post, at 205 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment)) is not consistent with Saffold. See supra, at 194.
Neither do the cases cited by the Ninth Circuit provide it with the necessary legal support. The Circuit’s opinion in Saffold (written on remand from this Court) said nothing about the significance of the words “on the merits.” Saffold v. Carey, 312 F. 3d 1031 (2002). Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F. 2d 344 (CA9 1992), predated AEBPA, not to mention our decision in Saffold, and in any event concerned an entirely different issue of federal habeas corpus law. Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817 (CA9 2003), addressed the timeliness issue in one sentence in a footnote, id., at 820, n. 2, and did not discuss at any length our opinion in Saffold, which must control the result here.
In the absence of (1) clear direction or explanation from the California Supreme Court about the meaning of the term “reasonable time” in the present context, or (2) clear indication that a particular request for appellate review was timely or untimely, the Circuit must itself examine the delay in each case and determine what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness. That is to say, without using a merits determination as an “absolute bellwether” (as to timeliness), the federal court must decide whether the filing of the request for state-court appellate review (in state collateral review proceedings) was made within what California would consider a “reasonable time.” See supra, at 193. This is what we believe we asked the Circuit to do in Saffold. This is what we believe it should have done.
B
The discrepancy between the Ninth Circuit’s view of the matter and ours may reflect an administrative problem. The Ninth Circuit each year must hear several hundred petitions by California prisoners seeking federal habeas relief. Some of these cases will involve filing delays, and some of those delays will require the federal courts to determine whether a petition for appellate review in a related state collateral proceeding was timely. Given the uncertain scope of California’s “reasonable time” standard, it may not be easy for the Circuit to decide in each such case whether the prisoner’s state-court review petition was timely. And it is consequently not surprising that the Circuit has tried to create rules of thumb that look to the label the California Supreme Court applied to the denial order, even where that label does not refer to timeliness. For the reasons we gave in Saffold, however, we do not believe these shortcuts remain true, either to California’s timeliness rule or to Congress’ intent in AEDPA to toll the 1-year limitations period only when the state collateral review proceeding is “pending.” 536 U. S., at 220-221, 225-226.
The California courts themselves might alleviate the problem by clarifying the scope of the words “reasonable time” in this context or by indicating, when denying a petition, whether the filing was timely. And the Ninth Circuit might seek guidance on the matter by certifying a question to the California Supreme Court in an appropriate case. Id., at 226-227. Alternatively, the California Legislature might itself decide to impose more determinate time limits, conforming California law in this respect with the law of most other States. Indeed, either state body might adopt a state-law presumption of the kind the concurrence here suggests. See post, at 209. In the absence of any such guidance, however, we see no alternative way of applying state law to a case like this one but for the Ninth Circuit simply to ask and to decide whether the state prisoner made the relevant filing within a reasonable time. In doing so, the Circuit must keep in mind that, in Saffold, we held that timely filings in California (as elsewhere) fell within the federal tolling provision on the assumption that California law in this respect did not differ significantly from the laws of other States, i. e., that California’s “reasonable time” standard would not lead to filing delays substantially longer than those in States with determinate timeliness rules. 536 U. S., at 222-223. California, of course, remains free to tell us if, in this respect, we were wrong.
IV
As we have pointed out, supra, at 195, Chavis had one year from the date AEDPA became effective (April 24, 1996) to file a federal habeas petition. Chavis did not actually file his petition in federal district court until August 30, 2000, four years and 128 days after AEDPA’s effective date. Hence Chavis’ federal petition was timely only if “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review [was] pending” for at least three years and 128 days of this time. 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2). Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning Chavis’ state collateral review proceedings were “pending” for three years and 130 days, which period (when added to the 1-year federal limitations period) makes the federal petition timely.
As we have explained, however, we find the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in conflict with our Saffold holding. And, after examining the record, we are convinced that the iaw does not permit a holding that Chavis’ federal habeas petition was timely. Chavis filed his state petition for habeas review in the California Supreme Court approximately three years and one month after the California Court of Appeal released its decision denying him relief. Chavis tries to explain this long delay by arguing that he could not use the prison library to work on his petition during this time either because (1) his prison job’s hours coincided with those of the library, or (2) prison lockdowns confined him to his cell. And, he adds, his inability to use the library excuses the three year and one month delay — to the point where, despite the delay, he filed his petition for California Supreme Court review within a “reasonable time.”
Chavis concedes, however, that in March 1996, App. 38, about a year and a half after the California Court of Appeal denied his habeas petition, he was given a new prison job. He nowhere denies California’s assertion, id., at 68, that this new job’s working hours permitted him to use the library. And he also concedes that the prison “remained relatively lockdown free” between February 1997 and August 1997, id., at 39, a 6-month period. Thus, viewing every disputed issue most favorably to Chavis, there remains a totally unexplained, hence unjustified, delay of at least six months.
Six months is far longer than the “short period[s] of time,” 30 to 60 days, that most States provide for filing an appeal to the state supreme court. Saffold, supra, at 219. It is far longer than the 10-day period California gives a losing party to file a notice of appeal in the California Supreme Court, see Cal. App. Ct. Rule 28(e)(1) (2004). We have found no authority suggesting, nor found any convincing reason to believe, that California would consider an unjustified or unexplained 6-month filing delay “reasonable.” Nor do we see how an unexplained delay of this magnitude could fall within the scope of the federal statutory word “pending” as interpreted in Saffold. See 536 U. S., at 222-223. Thus, since Chavis needs all but two days of the lengthy (three year and one month) delay to survive the federal 1-year habeas filing period, see 382 F. 3d, at 927, he cannot succeed.
The concurrence reaches the same ultimate conclusion in a different way. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, it would not count in Chavis’ favor certain days during which Chavis was pursuing a second round of state collateral review efforts. See post, at 210. Because, as the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the parties did not argue this particular matter below, 382 F. 3d, at 925, n. 3, we. do not consider it here.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The State of Nevada has moved to vacate an order of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granting a stay of the execution of Thomas E. Baal. We grant the State’s motion to vacate the stay.
I
Thomas E. Baal was convicted and sentenced to death in Nevada District Court for first-degree murder and robbery with use of a deadly weapon. Evidence indicated that after attempting to rob Frances P. Maves, Baal stabbed her numerous times, took her car, and fled. Maves was pronounced dead some hours later. Police officers arrested Baal in Reno on February 28, 1988. After being given his Miranda warnings, Baal confessed to the robbery and murder.
In March 1988, two psychiatrists examined Baal and found that Baal was competent to stand trial, able to understand right from wrong at the time of the alleged offense, and disturbed but not psychotic. In June 1988, Baal was arraigned and pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. A third psychiatrist, Dr. O’Gorman, was appointed to examine Baal, and, following an examination on August 31, 1988, concluded that Baal was competent to stand trial. On September 22, 1988, Baal pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and to robbery, both with use of a deadly weapon. A three-judge panel unanimously sentenced Baal to death. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Baal’s conviction and sentence, rejecting Baal’s contention that he was incompetent to enter a guilty plea and that it was error not to conduct a competency hearing prior to accepting his pleas. Baal v. State, 106 Nev. 69, 787 P. 2d 391 (1990).
Baal filed a petition for state postconviction relief, but, prior to the hearing, changed his mind and withdrew the petition. On May 24, 1990, the state postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing to determine Baal’s competency. At that hearing, Baal testified that he did not want to continue any postconviction proceedings. He further testified that he knew the date he would be put to death, the reason he would be put to death, and that his waiver of postconviction relief would result in his death. A state psychiatrist testified that Baal was competent; a state prison official who had observed Baal also testified as to Baal’s competence. The court also reviewed the reports of three psychiatrists who had examined Baal and concluded that he was competent to stand trial. Based on this evidence, the court held that Baal was aware of his impending execution and of the reason for it, and thus was sane under the test set forth in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399 (1986). The court further held that Baal was in control of his faculties, was competent to choose to decline to pursue an appeal, and had made an intelligent waiver of his right to pursue postconviction relief.
Approximately one week later, on May 31, 1990, and hours before Baal’s scheduled execution, Edwin and Doris Baal (Baal’s parents) filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief as “next friend” of Thomas E. Baal. As one of their grounds for relief, petitioners asserted: “Thomas Baal is not competent to waive federal review of his claims.” In support of this claim, petitioners relied on an affidavit of a nonexamining psychiatrist, Dr. Jerry Howie, and an affidavit of Doris Baal.
The United States District Court conducted a hearing and denied petitioners’ application for stay of execution, holding that, under this Court’s recent decision in Whitmore v. Arkansas, ante, p. 149, petitioners had failed to establish that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition. According to the District Court, petitioners had not provided an adequate explanation of why Baal could not appear on his own behalf to prosecute this action. Upon review of the record, the court found that all the evidence, other than the newly submitted affidavit of Dr. Howie, established that Baal was legally competent to understand the nature and consequences of his act and to represent his own interests in these proceedings. The court determined that Dr. Howie’s affidavit was not based on a first-hand examination, was conclusory, and was insufficient to warrant a psychiatric hearing or additional psychiatric examinations of Baal. The court subsequently denied petitioners’ motion for a certificate of probable cause. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals granted petitioners’ certificate of probable cause and stayed Thomas Baal’s execution. That court held that petitioners had made “some minimum showing of [Baal’s] incompetence” and evidence in the record provided “at least an arguable basis for finding that a full evidentiary hearing on competence should have been held by the district court.” Order in Baal v. Godinez, No. 90-15716 (CA9, June 2, 1990), pp. 3, 5. Judge Kozinski, in dissent, asserted that there was no substantial evidence of Baal’s incompetence to warrant a further evidentiary hearing or to upset the Nevada District Court’s finding that Baal was competent, which is entitled to a presumption of correctness upon federal habeas review. Dissent, at 6, 7.
II
In Whitmore v. Arkansas, ante, at 165, we held that “one necessary condition for ‘next friend’ standing in federal court is a showing by the proposed ‘next friend’ that the real party in interest is unable to litigate his own cause due to mental incapacity.” See also Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U. S. 273, 291 (1953). This prerequisite is not satisfied “where an evidentiary hearing shows that the defendant has given a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to proceed.” Whitmore, ante, at 165. In Whitmore, we relied on the competency findings made by the Arkansas Supreme Court and concluded that Whitmore lacked next-friend standing in federal court. Ante, at 165-166. In this case, the state court held such an evidentiary hearing just one week before petitioners brought this petition for habeas corpus. After reviewing the evidence and questioning Baal, the state court concluded that Baal had intelligently waived his right to pursue postconviction relief.
A state court’s determinations on the merits of a factual issue are entitled to a presumption of correctness on federal habeas review. A federal court may not overturn such determinations unless it concludes that they are not “fairly supported by the record.” See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(8). We have held that a state court’s conclusion regarding a defendant’s competency is entitled to such a presumption. Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U. S. 111, 117 (1983). In this case, the state court’s conclusion that Baal was competent to waive his right to further proceedings was “fairly supported by the record.” Three psychiatrists who examined Baal had determined he was competent; a psychiatrist who had the opportunity to observe and talk to Baal testified that Baal was competent at the hearing; and the trial court concluded that Baal was competent after both observing Baal and questioning him extensively on the record. Accordingly, under §2254(d)’s presumption of correctness, the state court’s factual finding as to Baal’s competence is binding on a federal habeas court. See Maggio v. Fulford, supra; see also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422 (1983) (§ 2254(d)’s presumption of correctness required federal habeas court to accept state court’s factual findings on the issue of respondent’s credibility).
The state evidentiary hearing took place on May 24, 1990. When petitioners filed their habeas petition in District Court the following week, on May 31, 1990, the only new evidence presented to the court was the affidavit of Dr. Jerry Howie, a psychiatrist who had not examined Baal. In the affidavit, Dr. Howie stated that he had examined the reports of the psychiatrists who had found Baal competent to stand trial and a 1987 admission, evaluation, and discharge summary from the Hawaii State Hospital. Dr. Howie did not directly assert that Baal was incompetent. Rather, based only on these reports, and without any opportunity personally to observe Baal, the doctor concluded that “there is reason to believe this person may not be competent to waive his legal remedies.” Petition for Habeas Corpus in Baal v. Godinez, No. 90-243 (D. Nev.), Exhibit D (emphasis added). Cf. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U. S. 312, 313 (1966) (District Court directed to make a judicial determination of petitioner’s competence after psychiatrist examined him and “filed a detailed report concluding that [petitioner] was mentally incompetent”). As the District Court determined, this affidavit is “conclusory and lacking sufficient foundation or substance to warrant either a psychiatric hearing or additional psychiatric examination of the defendant.” Order in Baal v. Godinez, No. CV-N-90-243-HDM (D. Nev., May 31, 1990), p. 3. The District Court also reviewed the state-court record and the transcript of the state-court proceeding, as well as speaking with Baal at length via telephone. Based on its review, it concluded that petitioners had failed to establish that Baal was not competent to waive further proceedings. In the absence of any “meaningful evidence” of incompetency, Whitmore v. Arkansas, ante, at 166, the District Court correctly denied petitioners’ motion for a further evidentiary hearing on the question of Baal’s competence to waive his right to proceed.
In holding that there was a “basis for finding that a full evidentiary hearing on competence should have been held,” Order in Baal v. Godinez, No. 90-15716 (CA9, June 2, 1990), p. 5, the Court of Appeals did not rely exclusively on the affidavit of Dr. Howie, the only evidence offered to indicate that Baal might have become incompetent at some time after the State’s evidentiary hearing. That affidavit, as noted, was not based on personal examination of Baal and stated only in conclusory and equivocal fashion that, based on his evaluation of the reports of the examining psychiatrists, Baal “may not be competent.” Rather, the Court of Appeals based its determination on the same evidence that had been before the State District Court — the reports of the three psychiatrists, the hospital report, and testimony regarding Baal’s prior suicide attempts. Indeed, because the Court of Appeals did not personally observe Baal, as the state court did, it had even less reason to overturn what is essentially a factual determination. See Maggio v. Fulford, supra, at 113. As there was no evidentiary basis for the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the District Court erred in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing, the stay granted by the court did not “reflect the presence of substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 895 (1983).
We realize that last minute petitions from parents of death row inmates may often be viewed sympathetically. But federal courts are authorized by the federal habeas statutes to interfere with the course of state proceedings only in specified circumstances. Before granting a stay, therefore, federal courts must make certain that an adequate basis exists for the exercise of federal power. In this case, that basis was plainly lacking. The State is entitled to proceed without federal intervention. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion to vacate the stay entered by the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens dissent and would deny the application to vacate the stay.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal tests the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission issued under § 212 (c) of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended in 1957, 71 Stat. 411, 49 U. S. C. § 312 (c), converting the appellee’s contract carrier permit into a common carrier certificate but limiting its coverage “to movements from, to, or between outlets or other facilities of particular businesses of the class of shippers with whom it may now contract.” Ap-pellee contends that this limitation violates the mandate of the Congress in § 212 (c) that any certificate so issued “shall authorize the transportation, as a common carrier, of the same commodities between the same points or within the same territory as authorized in the permit.” The Commission answers that the restrictions are necessary to maintain “substantial parity” between the appel-lee’s old and new operations. The District Court held the Commission “without statutory authority to impose the restrictions in question” and set aside the order and remanded the case for further proceedings. 206 F. Supp. 455, 461. Probable jurisdiction was noted. 372 U. S. 952. We affirm the judgment.
I.
Prior to 1957 appellee operated under a contract carrier permit originally issued in 1943 under the “grandfather” clause contained in § 209 (a) of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 543, 552. It permitted carriage of: (1) such commodities as are usually dealt in by wholesale or retail hardware and automobile-accessory business houses, and in connection therewith, equipment, materials and supplies used in the conduct of such business; (2) such commodities as are usually dealt in, or used, by meat, fruit, and vegetable packing houses; and (3) such commodities as are usually dealt in, or used, by wholesale and retail department stores. The permit contained a “Keystone restriction” which limited appellee to transporting such commodities only under contracts with persons operating the businesses specified. It permitted the carriage of a wide variety of commodities within specified territories, without limitation of consignee, but only for those shippers under contract with appellee and engaged in the specified businesses.
In 1957, at the behest of the Commission, the Congress amended the statutory definition of a contract carrier, § 203 (a)(15) of the Interstate Commerce Act, so as to thereafter read:
“The term ‘contract carrier by motor vehicle’ means any person which engages in transportation by motor vehicle of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce, for compensation (other than transportation referred to in paragraph (14) and the exception therein), under continuing contracts with one person or a limited number of persons either (a) for the furnishing of transportation services through the assignment of motor vehicles for a continuing period of time to the exclusive use of each person served or (b) for the furnishing of transportation services designed to meet the distinct need of each individual customer.”
In order to protect existing contract carrier permits, Congress enacted § 212 (c) which, as we have indicated, provided for the revocation of such a permit in appropriate proceedings before the Commission and the issuance of a common carrier certificate. In so doing, however, the Congress provided that the resulting common carrier certificate “shall authorize the transportation, as a common carrier, of the same commodities between the same points or within the same territory as authorized in the permit.”
In 1958 these proceedings were begun under this section and, after extended hearings, the Examiner found that the permit should be revoked and the common carrier certificate issued covering the same commodities and without restrictions. In addition he recommended the inclusion of authority for carriage of “materials, equipment, and supplies used by manufacturers of rubber and rubber products, from Chicago, and points in Illinois within 100 miles of Chicago, to Denver . . . The Commission adopted the latter recommendation and it was not contested in the District Court. As to the remaining authorizations, the Commission appended to the recommendations of the Examiner a restriction against combining or “tacking” appellee’s various operating rights in order to render a through service (likewise not contested), and also subjected each grant of authority to the following restriction:
“Restriction: The. authority granted immediately above is restricted to shipments moving from, to, or between wholesale and retail outlets, . . .”
The validity of this restriction is the sole challenge raised in this proceeding.
II.
The Commission contends that § 212 (c), read in the light of its background, is a “grandfather clause.” Its purpose, therefore, is merely to continue, without expanding, the authority of those contract carriers whose operations are lawful under United States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 350 U. S. 409 (1956), by revoking their contract carrier permits and issuing in lieu thereof common carrier certificates. The Commission concludes that, while the Congress specified only a continuance of the commodity and territorial limitations, Congress also intended that the effects of the “Keystone restriction” in the old permit be carried forward in the new one. Even if this is incorrect, the Commission says that it remains free to impose the restriction by reason of its general power under the Interstate Commerce Act to confine carrier operations within appropriate limits.
The difficulty with this argument is that the “Keystone restriction” under which appellee operated permitted it to carry commodities “dealt in, or used by” certain businesses without limitation, except that appellee was required to have a contract with the shipper so engaged. Although the Commission has eliminated this last requirement by certificating appellee as a common carrier, the restriction it has imposed here limits shipments “to shipments moving from, to, or between wholesale and retail outlets” and stores. Appellee insists that this restriction limits its carriage in that appellee cannot deliver from a supplier to a consumer, to or from a public warehouse or ship dock, between warehouses, to consolidation or transfer points or to a laborer or modification agent. The record does not show whether appellee exercised these claimed privileges under its contract carrier permit. We hold that if it did enjoy them or any others that we have not enumerated, then it is entitled to have the same freedom in its common carrier certificate.
The legislative history indicates that the Commission in its presentation to the Congress on § 212 (c) represented through its Chairman that the legislation would disturb no property rights of the contract carrier. Indeed, it asserted that such carriers would have “greater opportunity.” Moreover, the “Keystone restrictions” received the attention of the Congress. In the same Senate hearings, the difference between contract and common carriers was made clear, i. e., while the former were limited in the “character” of their carriage to the type of commodities named in their permits, they were not limited to particular shippers. Common carriers, on the other hand, were not limited in any way in their certificated territories. It appears to us that Congress intended to leave the converted contract carrier in as good a position as it previously enjoyed. Under the facts claimed, the Commission has not done so in this case.
We do not believe that appellee waived its rights by not proving that it had exercised the claimed privileges under its contract carrier permit. The permit has no restriction on its face in this regard, and such proof was understandably not presented in light of the recommendation of the Examiner that a common carrier permit include no restrictions whatever. At this late date it would be unfair to strip appellee of its claimed rights upon this basis.
Nor do we believe that the Commission can impose the restrictions on a rule of “substantial parity” under its general powers. Since § 212 (c) specifically commands that the Commission “shall” authorize the same carriage as was included in the contract carrier permit, we are unable to place § 212 (c) authority under the general power of other unrelated sections, such as § 208, where specific power is granted to assure “substantial parity.” The appellee carried on certain operations under its contract carrier permit. Congress intended that these operations be continued under the common carrier permit.
The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed. On remand the Commission will be free to contest appellee’s factual claims as to what service it performed under its contract carrier permit and to limit the common carrier certificate to such activity.
Affirmed.
“The Commission shall examine each outstanding permit and may within one hundred and eighty days after ... [August 22,1957] institute a proceeding either upon its own initiative, or upon application of a permit holder actually in operation or upon complaint of an interested party, and after notice and hearing revoke a permit and issue in lieu thereof a certificate of public convenience and necessity, if it finds, first, that any person holding a permit whose operations on . . . [August 22, 1957] do not conform with the definition of a contract carrier in section 203 (a) (15) as in force on and after . . . [August 22, 1957]; second, are those of a common carrier; and, third, are otherwise lawful. Such certificate so issued shall authorize the transportation, as a common carrier, of the same commodities between the same points or within the same territory as authorized in the permit.” 71 Stat. 411.
This provision is now substantially contained in 49 U. S. C. § 309 (a)(1) :
“Except as otherwise provided in this section and in section 310a of this title, no person shall engage in the business of a contract carrier by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce on any public highway or within any reservation under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States unless there is in force with respect to such carrier a permit issued by the Commission, authorizing such person to engage in such business: Provided, That, subject to section 310 of this title, if any such carrier or a predecessor in interest was in bona fide operation as a contract carrier by motor vehicle on July 1, 1935, over the route or routes or within the territory for which application is made and has so operated since that time . . . the Commission shall issue such permit, without further proceedings, if application for such permit was made to the Commission as provided in paragraph (b) of this section and within one hundred and twenty days after October 1, 1935
The phrase “Keystone restriction” comes from the title of the proceeding, Keystone Transportation Co. Contract Carrier Application, 19 M. C. C. 475. Such restrictions were approved by this Court in Noble v. United States, 319 U. S. 88 (1943).
71 Stat. 411, 49 U. S. C. § 303 (a) (15). The former § 203 (a) (15) stated the definition as follows: “The term ‘contract carrier by motor vehicle1 means any person which, under individual contracts or agreements, engages in the transportation (other than transportation referred to in paragraph (14) and the exception therein) by motor vehicle of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce for compensation.” 54 Stat. 920.
During the hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee the following colloquy ■occurred between Mr. Barton, transportation counsel of the committee, and Mr. Clarke, then chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission:
“Mr. Barton: . . .
“Mr. Clarke, do you think there is any constitutional difficulty in changing, as we say, as you propose, a contract carrier to a common-carrier status?
“Mr. Clarke: No; I can see none. It isn’t taking away from them anything that they have; it isn’t disturbing any property rights of the contract carrier. It is giving him greater opportunity. He can still serve his contract shippers, but through the conversion provisions of the bill he would also have the opportunity to serve the general public as well as the obligation.” (Emphasis added.) Hearings before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Surface Transportation — Scope of Authority of I. C. C., p. 35.
Id., at 182.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The no-interest rule is to the effect that interest cannot be recovered in a suit against the Government in the absence of an express waiver of sovereign immunity from an award of interest. In this case, attorney’s fees as well as interest on those fees were awarded to a plaintiff who prevailed against petitioner Library of Congress in a suit brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. We therefore must decide whether Congress, in enacting Title VII, expressly waived the Government’s immunity from interest.
H
Respondent Tommy Shaw is an employee of the Library of Congress. He is black. During 1976 and 1977, he filed three complaints with the Library’s Equal Employment Office alleging job-related racial discrimination. Following an investigation, Library officials rejected his complaints. Thereafter, respondent’s counsel pursued administrative relief and settlement negotiations, and eventually reached a settlement with the Library. The latter agreed to promote Shaw retroactively with backpay provided that the Comptroller General first determined that the Library had authority to do so in the absence of a specific finding of racial discrimination. The Comptroller General ruled that the Library, under the Back Pay Act, 5 U. S. C. §§5595, 5596, lacked that power; he did not address whether such relief was authorized under Title VII.
Respondent then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, contending that Title VII authorized the Library to accord the relief specified in the settlement agreement. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court agreed with respondent that the Library had the power under Title VII to settle his claim by awarding him a retroactive promotion with backpay without a formal finding of discrimination. 479 F. Supp. 945 (1979). The Library therefore was authorized to promote Shaw with backpay, and to pay a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs pursuant to §706(k) of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(k). 479 F. Supp., at 949-950.
In a separate opinion calculating the attorney’s fee, the District Court began with a lodestar of $8,435, based on 99 hours of work at $85 per hour. App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a, 62a-66a. The court then reduced the lodestar by 20 percent to reflect the quality of counsel’s representation. Id., at 66a-67a. Finally, and significantly for present purposes, the court increased the adjusted lodestar by 30 percent to compensate counsel for the delay in receiving payment for the legal services rendered. Id., at 68a. The District Court, relying on Copeland v. Marshall, 206 U. S. App. D. C. 390, 403, 641 F. 2d 880, 893 (1980) (en banc), indicated that increasing an attorney’s fee award for delay is appropriate because the hourly rates used for the lodestar represent the prevailing rate for clients who typically pay their legal bills promptly, whereas court-awarded fees are normally received long after the legal services are rendered. An increase for delay is designed to compensate the attorney for the money he could have earned had he been paid earlier and invested the funds. The District Court concluded that the period of delay ran from the time the case should have ended, which it viewed as the latter part of 1978, until just after judgment.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 241 U. S. App. D. C. 355, 747 F. 2d 1469 (1984). The court determined that, even though the adjustment was termed compensation for delay rather than interest, the no-interest rule applied because the two adjustments were functionally equivalent. The court went on to examine whether the Government expressly had waived its immunity from interest in Title VII. Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k), provides in relevant part:
“In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the [EEOC] or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the [EEOC] and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.” (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals noted that in a Title VII suit against a private employer, interest on attorney’s fees may be recovered. 241 U. S. App. D. C., at 361, 747 F. 2d, at 1475. See, e. g., Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F. 2d 760 (CA7 1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 956 (1983). Therefore, the Court of Appeals reasoned, in making the United States liable “the same as a private person,” Congress waived the United States’ immunity from interest. In the alternative, the Court of Appeals held that even if the “same as a private person” provision was not an express waiver, the District Court’s adjustment was proper; when a statute measures the liability of the United States by that of a private person, the “traditional rigor of the sovereign-immunity doctrine” is relaxed. 241 U. S. App. D. C., at 365, 747 F. 2d, at 1479.
Judge Ginsburg dissented. Id., at 371, 747 F. 2d, at 1485. She found no express waiver of immunity from interest, and declined to join what she considered to be a judicial termination of the no-interest rule. She viewed the increase for delay in this case as an award of interest, based on the manner and timing of its computation. She indicated, however, that use of current rather than historical hourly rates in order to compensate for delay, or use of historical rates that were based on expected delay, see Murray v. Weinberger, 239 U. S. App. D. C. 264, 741 F. 2d 1423 (1984), would not run afoul of the no-interest rule.
We granted certiorari to address the question whether the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with this Court’s repeated holdings that interest may not be awarded against the Government in the absence of express statutory or contractual consent. 474 U. S. 815 (1985).
rH hH
In the absence of express congressional consent to the award of interest separate from a general waiver of immunity to suit, the United States is immune from an interest award. This requirement of a separate waiver reflects the historical view that interest is an element of damages separate from damages on the substantive claim. C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 50, p. 205 (1935). Because interest was generally presumed not to be within the contemplation of the parties, common-law courts in England allowed interest by way of damages only when founded upon agreement of the parties. See De Havilland v. Bowerbank, 1 Camp. 50, 51, 170 Eng. Rep. 872, 873 (N. P. 1807); Calton v. Bragg, 15 East. 223, 226-227, 104 Eng. Rep. 828, 830 (K. B. 1812); H. McGregor, Mayne and McGregor On Damages 281 (1961). In turn, the agreement-basis of interest was adopted by American courts. See Reid v. Rensselaer Glass Factory, 3 Cow. 393 (N. Y. 1824) (reviewing treatment of interest in state courts); C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 51, p. 208 (1935). Gradually, in suits between private parties, the necessity of an agreement faded. See id., at 210.
The agreement requirement assumed special force when applied to claims for interest against the United States. As sovereign, the United States, in the absence of its consent, is immune from suit. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584 (1941). This basic rule of sovereign immunity, in conjunction with the requirement of an agreement to pay interest, gave rise to the rule that interest cannot be recovered unless the award of interest was affirmatively and separately contemplated by Congress. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Angarica v. Bayard, 127 U. S. 251, 260 (1888) (“The case, therefore, falls within the well-settled principle, that the United States are not liable to pay interest on claims against them, in the absence of express statutory provision to that effect”)- The purpose of the rule is to permit the Government to “occupy an apparently favored position,” United States v. Verdier, 164 U. S. 213, 219 (1896), by protecting it from claims for interest that would prevail against private parties. See 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 136, 137 (1842).
For well over a century, this Court, executive agencies, and Congress itself consistently have recognized that federal statutes cannot be read to permit interest to run on a recovery against the United States unless Congress affirmatively mandates that result. The no-interest rule is expressly described as early as 1819, in an opinion letter from Attorney General William Wirt to the Secretary of the Treasury. Congress had enacted a private Act to reimburse a citizen for unspecified injuries. When the citizen sought interest, in addition to the damages authorized by Congress, Attorney General Wirt stated that there is “no reason ... to depart from the usual practice of the Treasury Department” of denying interest, and directed the citizen to seek relief from Congress. 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 268.
In creating the Court of Claims, Congress retained the Government’s immunity from awards of interest, permitting it only where expressly agreed to under contract or statute. Court of Claims Act, § 7, 12 Stat. 766 (current version at 28 U. S. C. § 2516(a)). Although the Act, by its terms, addresses only those cases brought in the Court of Claims, this Court repeatedly has made clear that the Act merely codifies the traditional legal rule regarding the immunity of the United States from interest. See, e. g., Tillson v. United States, 100 U. S. 43, 47 (1879); United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U. S. 654, 658 (1947); United States v. Tillamooks, 341 U. S. 48, 49 (1951). In cases not in the Court of Claims, this Court has reaffirmed the notion: “Apart from constitutional requirements, in the absence of specific provision by contract or statute, or ‘express consent ... by Congress,’ interest does not run on a claim against the United States.” United States v. Louisiana, 446 U. S. 253, 264-265 (1980), quoting Smyth v. United States, 302 U. S. 329, 353 (1937). See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U. S. 371, 387, n. 17 (1980).
I — I HH }-H
Respondent acknowledges the longstanding no-interest rule, but argues that Congress, by § 706(k), waived the Government’s immunity from interest in making the United States liable “the same as a private person” for “costs,” including “a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
In analyzing whether Congress has waived the immunity of the United States, we must construe waivers strictly in favor of the sovereign, see McMahon v. United States, 342 U. S. 25, 27 (1951), and not enlarge the waiver “‘beyond what the language requires,”’ Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 685-686 (1983), quoting Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927). The no-interest rule provides an added gloss of strictness upon these usual rules.
“[T]here can be no consent by implication or by use of ambiguous language. Nor can an intent on the part of the framers of a statute or contract to permit the recovery of interest suffice where the intent is not translated into affirmative statutory or contractual terms. The consent necessary to waive the traditional immunity must be express, and it must be strictly construed.” United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U. S., at 659.
A
When Congress has intended to waive the United States’ immunity with respect to interest, it has done so expressly; thus, waivers of sovereign immunity to suit must be read against the backdrop of the no-interest rule. Yet respondent contends that by equating the United States’ liability to that of a private party, Congress waived the Government’s immunity from interest. We do not agree. See Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41 (1928).
Title VII’s provision making the United States liable “the same as a private person” waives the Government’s immunity from attorney’s fees, but not interest. The statute, as well as its legislative history, contains no reference to interest. This congressional silence does not permit us to read the provision as the requisite waiver of the Government’s immunity with respect to interest.
When Congress enacted Title VII in 1964, and provided in §706(k), 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(k), that the Government should be liable for attorney’s fees “the same as a private person,” it rendered the United States subject to liability only as a plaintiff for the fees of certain prevailing defendants. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978). At its inception, thus, the provision was at most a very limited waiver of sovereign immunity, establishing that the United States is liable for the fees of prevailing defendants in the same circumstances as are private plaintiffs. It was not until 1972 that Congress waived the Government’s immunity under Title VII as a defendant, affording federal employees a right of action against the Government for its discriminatory acts as an employer. See §717, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(d). That § 706(k) already contained language equating the liability of the United States for attorney’s fees to that of a private person does not represent the requisite affirmative congressional choice to waive the no-interest rule; see also n. 5, supra.
Other statutes placing the United States in the same position as a private party also have been read narrowly to preserve certain immunities that the United States has enjoyed historically. In Laird v. Nelms, 406 U. S. 797 (1972), for example, the Court held that, although the Federal Tort Claims Act made the United States liable for the “negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government ... , if a private person, would be liable to the claimant,” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), the United States nonetheless was not liable for the entire range of conduct classified as tortious under state law. Cf. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156 (1981) (jury trials are available to private, but not to Government, employees under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
B
Nor do we find the requisite waiver of immunity from interest in the statutory requirement of awarding “reasonable” attorney’s fees. There is no basis for reading the term “reasonable” as the embodiment of a specific congressional choice to include interest as a component of attorney’s fees, particularly where the legislative history is silent. The Court consistently has refused to impute an intent to waive immunity from interest into the ambiguous use of a particular word or phrase in a statute. For example, interest has been ruled unavailable under statutes or.contracts directing the United States to pay the “amount equitably due.” See Tillson v. United States, 100 U. S., at 46. And the United States is not liable for interest under statutes and contracts requiring the payment of “just compensation,” United States v. Tillamooks, 341 U. S., at 49; United States v. Goltra, 312 U. S. 203 (1941), even though it long has been understood that the United States is required to pay interest where the Constitution mandates payment under the Just Compensation Clause. See Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299 (1923).
Respondent argues, however, that the policy reasons that motivated Congress to permit recovery of a reasonable attorney’s fee require reading the statute as a waiver of immunity from interest. But policy, no matter how compelling, is insufficient, standing alone, to waive this immunity:
“[T]he immunity of the United States from liability for interest is not to be waived by policy arguments of this nature. Courts lack the power to award interest against the United States on the basis of what they think is or is not sound policy.” United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U. S., at 663.
C
Finally, we note that the provision makes the United States liable for “costs,” and includes as an element of “costs” a reasonable attorney’s fee. Prejudgment interest, however, is considered as damages, not a component of “costs.” See 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2664, pp. 159-160 (2d ed. 1983); 2 A. Sedgwick & G. Van Nest, Sedgwick on Damages 157-158 (7th ed. 1880). Indeed, the term “costs” has never been understood to include any interest component. See 28 U. S. C. §1920; see also Wright, Miller, & Kane, supra, §§2666 and 2670. A statute allowing costs, and within that category, attorney’s fees, does not provide the clear affirmative intent of Congress to waive the sovereign’s immunity.
>
In the alternative, respondent argues that the no-mterest rule does not prohibit the award of compensation for delay. But the force of the no-interest rule cannot be avoided simply by devising a new name for an old institution:
“[T]he character or nature of ‘interest’ cannot be changed by calling it ‘damages,’ ‘loss,’ ‘earned increment,’ ‘just compensation,’ ‘discount,’ ‘offset,’ or ‘penalty,’ or any other term, because it is still interest and the no-interest rule applies to it.” United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 207 Ct. Cl. 369, 389, 518 F. 2d 1309, 1322 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 911 (1976).
Respondent claims, however, that interest and delay represent more than mere semantic variations. Interest and a delay factor, according to respondent, have distinct purposes: the former compensates for loss in the use of money, while the latter compensates for loss in the value of money. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 30.
We are not persuaded. Interest and a delay factor share an identical function. They are designed to compensate for the belated receipt of money. The no-interest rule has been applied to prevent parties from holding the United States liable on claims grounded on the belated receipt of funds, even when characterized as compensation for delay. See United States v. Sherman, 98 U. S. 565, 568 (1879). Thus, whether the loss to be compensated by an increase in a fee award stems from an opportunity cost or from the effects of inflation, the increase is prohibited by the no-interest rule. See Saunders v. Clayton, 629 F. 2d 596, 598 (CA9 1980) (“In essence, the inflation factor adjustment is a disguised interest award”), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 980 (1981); Blake v. Califano, 200 U. S. App. D. C. 27, 31, and n. 9, 626 F. 2d 891, 895, and n. 9 (1980) (as a matter of economic theory, there may be a distinction between interest and a delay factor, but both are nonetheless prohibited by the no-interest rule); D. Dobbs, Remedies §3.5, p. 174 (1973) (prejudgment interest represents delay damages).
That interest and compensation for delay are functionally equivalent also is supported by Title VII decisions concerning private employers. Private-sector decisions, when they adjust for the time of payment, grant interest or a delay factor, but not both. See, e. g., Brown v. Gillette Co., 536 F. Supp. 113 (Mass. 1982); Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Industries, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 272 (Colo. 1981); Kennelly v. Lemoi, 529 F. Supp. 140 (RI 1981).
V
In making the Government liable as a defendant under Title VII, Congress effected a waiver of the Government’s immunity from suit, and from costs including reasonable attorney’s fees. Congress did not waive the Government’s traditional immunity from interest. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The lodestar component of an attorney’s fee is the product of “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433 (1983).
The institution of interest originated under Roman law as a penalty due from a debtor who delayed or defaulted in repayment of a loan. See Leadam, Interest and Usury, in 2 Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy 432 (H. Higgs ed. 1925). The measure of the penalty due for the default or delay was id quod interest — that which is between — the difference between the creditor’s current position and what it would have been if the loan had been timely and fully repaid. See also W. Ashley, An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory 196 (1966); C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 51, pp. 207-208 (1935). Because interest was conceived of as a penalty, it was generally presumed not to be within the contemplation of the parties.
Prior to the creation of the Court of Claims, a citizen’s only means of obtaining recompense from the Government was by requesting individually tailored waivers of sovereign immunity, through private Acts of Congress. The administrative responsibility of hearing many of the claims was assigned to the Treasury Department. See W. Cowen, P. Nichols, & M. Bennett, The United States Court of Claims, Part II, p. 4 (1978). Accordingly, the earliest statements of the no-interest rule appear in opinion letters of Attorneys General in response to questions posed by the Comptroller of the Treasury concerning payment of interest where a private Act of Congress authorized the Treasury Department to pay damages, with no mention of interest on the damages. See generally Wiecek, The Origin of the United States Court of Claims, 20 Admin. L. Rev. 387 (1967).
Subsequent Attorneys General consistently reiterated the no-interest rule. See, e. g., 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 390, 392 (1830) (“[C]laims against the government. . . are not payable until demanded — and then without interest”); 3 Op. Atty. Gen. 635, 639 (1841) (“It is confidently believed, that in all the numerous acts of Congress for the liquidation and settlement of claims against the government, there is no instance in which interest has ever been allowed, except only where those acts have expressly directed or authorized its allowance”); 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 14, 15-16 (1842) (“I have no objection to admit, that as between individuals, the claim for interest in such a case would be an equitable and reasonable one. . . . But nothing is better established as a general rule than that the government is not to pay damages [in the form of interest] in such cases: a stern but necessary rule, adopted everywhere in the practice of government”); 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 286, 294 (1843) (“[U]nder the established usage of the Treasury Department, over and over again sanctioned by the opinions of the law officers of the government, the Secretary has no authority to allow [interest]”).
The “constitutional requirement” arises in a taking under the Fifth Amendment. To satisfy the constitutional mandate, “just compensation” includes a payment for interest. See, e. g., Smyth v. United States, 302 U. S., at 353-354; Albrecht v. United States, 329 U. S. 599, 605 (1947). The no-interest rule is similarly inapplicable where the Government has cast off the cloak of sovereignty and assumed the status of a private commercial enterprise. See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 267 U. S. 76, 79 (1925).
See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. §2411 (expressly authorizing prejudgment and postjudgment interest payable by the United States in tax-refund cases); 31 U. S. C. § 1304 (appropriating funds for interest on certain district court judgments); 26 U. S. C. § 7426(g) (providing for interest in cases of wrongful levy by Internal Revenue Service). In other statutes, Congress has reiterated the general rule that interest cannot be allowed against the United States absent express waiver. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2516(a) (interest available in the Claims Court only under contract or by statute expressly providing for payment thereof). Title 28 U. S. C. § 2674 provides that the United States is not liable for prejudgment interest on claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. This unusual statutory exclusion was necessitated by the Federal Tort Claims Act’s specific reference to state law for the rules of decision, in order to make clear that the United States’ immunity from interest does not turn on state law.
When interest is awarded, as it was in this case, it is computed by multiplying a particular rate of interest by the amount of the award. An interest rate reflects not only the real opportunity cost of capital, but also the inflation rate. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 180 (3d ed. 1986). Thus, loss of value due to delay is an element of an interest adjustment.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), we held that a defendant is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when his codefendant’s incriminating confession is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider that confession only against the co-defendant. In Parker v. Randolph, 442 U. S. 62 (1979), we considered, but were unable authoritatively to resolve, the question whether Bruton applies where the defendant’s own confession, corroborating that of his codefendant, is introduced against him. We resolve that question today.
HH
Jerry Cruz was murdered on March 15, 1982. That is not the murder for which petitioner was tried and convicted, but the investigation of the one led to the solving of the other. On the day following Jerry Cruz’s murder, and on several later occasions, the police talked to Jerry’s brother Norberto about the killing. On April 27, Norberto for the first time informed the police of a November 29, 1981, visit by petitioner Eulogio Cruz and his brother Benjamin to the apartment Norberto shared with Jerry. (Eulogio and Benjamin Cruz were longtime friends of Norberto and Jerry Cruz, but the two sets of brothers were not related.) Norberto said that at the time of the visit Eulogio was nervous and was wearing a bloodstained bandage around his arm. According to Norberto, Eulogio confided that he and Benjamin had gone to a Bronx gas station the night before, intending to rob it; that Eulogio and the attendant had struggled; and that, after the attendant had grabbed a gun from behind a counter and shot Eulogio in the arm, Benjamin had killed him. Norberto claimed that Benjamin gave a similar account of the incident.
On May 3, 1982, the police questioned Benjamin about the murder of Jerry Cruz. He strongly denied any connection with that homicide and became frustrated when the police seemed unwilling to believe him. Suddenly, to prove that he would tell the truth about killing someone if he were guilty, Benjamin spontaneously confessed to the murder of the gas station attendant. Later that evening, he gave a detailed videotaped confession to an Assistant District Attorney, in which he admitted that he, Eulogio, Jerry Cruz, and a fourth man had robbed the gas station, and that he had killed the attendant after the attendant shot Eulogio. Benjamin and Eulogio were indicted for felony murder of the station attendant.
The brothers were tried jointly, over Eulogio’s objection. Likewise over Eulogio’s objection, the trial judge allowed the prosecutor to introduce Benjamin’s videotaped confession, warning the jury that the confession was not to be used against Eulogio. The government also called Norberto, who testified about his November 29 conversation with'Eulogio and Benjamin. Finally, the government introduced police testimony, forensic evidence, and photographs of the scene of the murder, all of which corroborated Benjamin’s videotaped confession and the statements recounted by Norberto. At the trial’s end, however, Norberto’s testimony stood as the only evidence admissible against Eulogio that directly linked him to the crime. Eulogio’s attorney tried to persuade the jury that Norberto had suspected Eulogio and Benjamin of killing his brother Jerry and had fabricated his testimony to gain revenge. Unconvinced, the jury convicted both defendants.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed Eulogio’s conviction, 66 N. Y. 2d 61, 485 N. E. 2d 221 (1985), adopting the reasoning of the plurality opinion in Parker that Bruton did not require the codefendant’s confession to be excluded because Eulogio had himself confessed and his confession “interlocked” with Benjamin’s. We granted certiorari. 476 U. S. 1168 (1986).
II
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of a criminal defendant “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” We have held that that guarantee, extended against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, includes the right to cross-examine witnesses. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 404 (1965). Where two or more defendants are tried jointly, therefore, the pretrial confession of one of them that implicates the others is not admissible against the others unless the confessing defendant waives his Fifth Amendment rights so as to permit cross-examination.
Ordinarily, a witness is considered to be a witness “against” a defendant for purposes of the Confrontation Clause only if his testimony is part of the body of evidence that the jury may consider in assessing his guilt. Therefore, a witness whose testimony is introduced in a joint trial with the limiting instruction that it be used only to assess the guilt of one of the defendants will not be considered to be a witness “against” the other defendants. In Bruton, however, we held that this principle will not be applied to validate, under the Confrontation Clause, introduction of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant, with instructions that the jury should disregard the confession insofar as its consideration of the defendant’s guilt is concerned. We said:
“[TJhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are the incrimi-nations devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect . . . .” 391 U. S., at 135-136 (citations omitted).
We had occasion to revisit this issue in Parker, which resembled Bruton in all major respects save one: Each of the jointly tried defendants had himself confessed, his own confession was introduced against him, and his confession recited essentially the same facts as those of his nontestifying codefendants. The plurality of four Justices found no Sixth Amendment violation. It understood Bruton to hold that the Confrontation Clause is violated only when introduction of a codefendant’s confession is “devastating” to the defendant’s case. When the defendant has himself confessed, the plurality reasoned, “[his] case has already been devastated,” 442 U. S., at 75, n. 7, so that the codefendant’s confession “will seldom, if ever, be of the ‘devastating’ character referred to in Bruton,” and impeaching that confession on cross-examination “would likely yield small advantage,” id., at 73. Thus, the plurality would have held Bruton inapplicable to cases involving interlocking confessions. The four remaining Justices participating in the case disagreed, subscribing to the view expressed by Justice Blackmun that introduction of the defendant’s own interlocking confession might, in some cases, render the violation of the Confrontation Clause harmless, but could not cause introduction of the nontestifying codefendant’s confession not to constitute a violation. Id., at 77-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). (Justice Blackmun alone went on to find that the interlocking confession did make the error harmless in the ease before the Court, thereby producing a majority for affirmance of the convictions. Id., at 80-81.) We face again today the issue on which the Court was evenly divided in Parker.
We adopt the approach espoused by Justice Blackmun. While “devastating” practical effect was one of the factors that Bruton considered in assessing whether the Confrontation Clause might sometimes require departure from the general rule that jury instructions suffice to exclude improper testimony, 391 U. S., at 136, it did not suggest that the existence of such an effect should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Rather, that factor was one of the justifications for excepting from the general rule the entire category of co-defendant confessions that implicate the defendant in the crime. It is impossible to imagine why there should be excluded from that category, as generally not “devastating,” codefendant confessions that “interlock” with the defendant’s own confession. “[T]he infinite variability of inculpatory statements (whether made by defendants or codefendants), and of their likely effect on juries, makes [the assumption that an interlocking confession will preclude devastation] untenable.” Parker, 442 U. S., at 84 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In this case, for example, the precise content and even the existence of petitioner’s own confession were open to question, since they depended upon acceptance of Norberto’s testimony, whereas the incriminating confession of codefen-dant Benjamin was on videotape.
In fact, it seems to us that “interlocking” bears a positively inverse relationship to devastation. A codefendant’s confession will be relatively harmless if the incriminating story it tells is different from that which the defendant himself is alleged to have told, but enormously damaging if it confirms, in all essential respects, the defendant’s alleged confession. It might be otherwise if the defendant were standing by his confession, in which case it could be said that the codefen-dant’s confession does no more than support the defendant’s very own case. But in the real world of criminal litigation, the defendant is seeking to avoid his confession — on the ground that it was not accurately reported, or that it was not really true when made. In the present case, for example, petitioner sought to establish that Norberto had a motive for falsely reporting a confession that never in fact occurred. In such circumstances a codefendant’s confession that corroborates the defendant’s confession significantly harms the defendant’s case, whereas one that is positively incompatible gives credence to the defendant’s assertion that his own alleged confession was nonexistent or false. Quite obviously, what the “interlocking” nature of the codefendant’s confession pertains to is not its harmfulness but rather its reliability: If it confirms essentially the same facts as the defendant’s own confession it is more likely to be true. Its reliability, however, may be relevant to whether the confession should (despite the lack of opportunity for cross-examination) be admitted as evidence against the defendant, see Lee v. Illinois, 476 U. S. 530 (1986), but cannot conceivably be relevant to whether, assuming it cannot be admitted, the jury is likely to obey the instruction to disregard it, or the jury’s failure to obey is likely to be inconsequential. The law cannot command respect if such an inexplicable exception to a supposed constitutional imperative is adopted. Having decided Bru-ton, we must face the honest consequences of what it holds.
The dissent makes no effort to respond to these points, urging instead a rejection of our “remorseless logic” in favor of “common sense and judgment.” See post, at 197. But those qualities, even in their most remorseless form, are not separable. It seems to us illogical, and therefore contrary to common sense and good judgment, to believe that codefen-dant confessions are less likely to be taken into account by the jury the more they are corroborated by the defendant’s own admissions; or that they are less likely to be harmful when they confirm the validity of the defendant’s alleged confession. Far from carrying Bruton “to the outer limits of its logic,” ibid., our holding here does no more than reaffirm its central proposition. This case is indistinguishable from Bruton with respect to those factors the Court has deemed relevant in this area: the likelihood that the instruction will be disregarded, Bruton, 391 U. S., at 135; the probability that such disregard will have a devastating effect, id., at 136; and the determinability of these facts in advance of trial, Richardson v. Marsh, post, at 208.
We hold that, where a nontestifying codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant, see Lee v. Illinois, supra, the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even if the defendant’s own confession is admitted against him. Of course, the defendant’s confession may be considered at trial in assessing whether his codefendant’s statements are supported by sufficient “indicia of reliability” to be directly admissible against him (assuming the “unavailability” of the codefendant) despite the lack of opportunity for cross-examination, see Lee, supra, at 543-544; Bruton, supra, at 128, n. 3, and may be considered on appeal in assessing whether any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless, see Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969).
Because the Court of Appeals analyzed petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim under an approach we have now rejected, we reverse and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The 1970 self-reapportionment of the. Louisiana Legislature was challenged in this lawsuit on the dual grounds that it offended both the one-man, one-vote principle and the prohibition against voting arrangements designed to dilute the voting strength of racial minorities. After the United States Attorney General interposed an objection to. the election law change under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, the District Court appointed a Special Master to prepare a court-imposed plan. The Master was verbally instructed to hold hearings and to devise a proposal to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions and to observe natural or historical boundaries “as nearly as possible.” He was also instructed, that “[n]o consideration whatsoever was to be given to the location of the residence of either incumbents in'office or of. announced or prospective candidates.” Opinion of Judge West, Civil Action No. 71-234,. Aug. 24, 1971.
The Special Master held four days of hearings, during which over 100 persons were heard. Proposed plans were received by him. No one was denied a hearing. He then submitted his recommendation to the District Court and after a hearing it was adopted by the court.
This dispute involves only four state senate' seats affected by the reapportionment. At the hearing held by the District Judge on the Master’s proposal, the State Attorney General presented a counterplan which differed from the 'Master’s only with respect to four senatorial districts in the New Orleans area. Although the judge found that both plans satisfied the one-man, one-vote requirement, he found that the two schemes differed in their racial composition of the four districts, as is set out in greater detail in the margin. Under the State Attorney General’s scheme, four “safe” white districts were proposed whereas the Master’s design would have created two districts of slight majorities of black voters. Also, under the counterplan each incumbent would continue to reside in his “own” district, whereas under the Master’s proposal the residences of the four incuinbents would fall evenly between the two districts to bé composed primarily of white voters, ensuring defeat for two of the four incumbents.
At the hearing the State Attorney General contended that the court’s plan would make hash of the traditional ward-and-precinct lines. The District Court acknowledged that there would be some departure from the historical patterns but concluded that the “ ‘historical’ boundaries of voting districts in Louisiana reflect [ed]. a history of racial discrimination. Adherence to the historical boundaries alluded to by objectors [had] been the prime reason why only two negroes [had] been allowed to sit in the Louisiana Legislature in the last 75 years.” 333 F. Supp.. 452, 462. The court found that the alternative proposal would “operate to diversify the negro voting population throughout the four districts and thus significantly dilute their vote” and would practically eliminate “the possibility of a negro being elected from any of the four districts,” while the court-approved plan would at least give blacks “a fair chance in two out of the four districts. . . \” Id., at 457. The court-approved plan sought “to protect the rights of the people while the primary purpose of the Senators’ plan appear[ed] to be the protection of incumbent office holders.” Id., at. 458. Accordingly, as mentioned, the District Court adopted- the Master’s recommendation.
Despite the District Court’s findings, however, the Court of Appeals reversed without opinion and adopted the Attorney General’s alternative division of New Orleans. The petitioners are the original plaintiffs and they now seek review of this summary reversal.
An examination. of the record in this case suggests that the Court of Appeals may have believed that benign districting by federal judges is itself unconstitutional gerrymandering even where (a) it is employed to overcome the residual effects of past state dilution of Negro voting strength and (b) the only alternative is to leave intact the traditional “safe” white districts. If that were in fact the reasoning of the lower court, then this petition would present an important federal question of the extent to which the broad equitable powers of a federal court, Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15, are limited by the colorblind concept of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, and Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, 57, 67 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In reapportionment . cases, as Justice Stewart has observed, “the federal courts are often going to be faced with hard remedial problems” in minimizing friction between their remedies and legitimate state policies. Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U. S. 187, 204 (dissenting opinion).
Because this record does not fully inform us of the precise nature of the litigation and because we have not had the benefit of the insight of the Court of Appeals, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Mr. Justice Blackmun concurs in the Court’s, judgment.
According to the District Judge’s opinion, the percentages of black registered voters in each of the four districts under each of the competing plans would be:
Master’s Attorney General’s
Plan Plan-
District 2. 51% 37.6%
District 3.'. 1,8% .25.7%
District 4. 58% 44.3%
District .5. 20% 24.0%
It is possible, but unlikely, that the Court of Appeals believed that benign districting, although permissible, was achievable here with less violence to the parish’s historical district lines. But had that been its view presumably the. court would have remanded' for the construction of a less drastic alternative rather than simply directing the adoption of the Attorney General’s counterplan.
Although similar in some respects, this case is not controlled by Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124. To be sure, in both cases the District Courts were writing on clean’ slates in .the sense that they were fashioning court-imposed reapportionment plans. And, in each case the equitable remedy of the court conflicted with a state policy. (There the state policy favored multi-member districts whereas here the policy favors maintenance of traditional boundaries.) The important difference, however, is that ini Whitcomb it was conceded that the State’s preference for multi-member districts was not rooted in racial discrimination, 403 U. S., at 149. Here, however, there has been no such concession and, indeed, the District Court found a long “history” of bias and franchise dilution in the State’s traditional drawing of district lines. Cf. id., at 155.
We, of course, agree that the courts of appeals should have wide latitude in their decisions of whether or how to write opinions.- That is especially true with respect to summary affirmances. See Rule 21, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. But here the lower court summarily reversed without any opinion' on a point that had been considered at length by the District- Judge. Under the special circumstances of this case, we are loath to impute to the Court of Appeals reasoning that would raise a substantial federal question when it is plausible that its actual ground of decision was of more limited importance.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These appeals challenge the constitutionality of New York statutes that authorize police officers to enter a private residence without a warrant and with force, if necessary, to make a routine felony arrest.
The important constitutional question presented by this challenge has been expressly left open in a number of our prior opinions. In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, we upheld a warrantless “midday public arrest,” expressly noting that the case did not pose “the still unsettled question... 'whether and under what circumstances an officer may enter a suspect’s home to make a warrantless arrest.’ ” Id., at 418, n. 6. The question has been answered in different ways by other appellate courts. The Supreme Court of Florida rejected the constitutional attack, as did the New York Court of Appeals in this case. The courts of last resort in 10 other States, however, have held that unless special circumstances are present, warrantless arrests in the home are unconstitutional. Of the seven United States Courts of Appeals that have considered the question, five have expressed the opinion that such arrests are unconstitutional.
Last Term we noted probable jurisdiction of these appeals in order to address that question. 439 U. S. 1044. After hearing oral argument, we set the case for reargument this Term. 441 U. S. 930. We now reverse the New York Court of Appeals and hold that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensua! entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a routine felony arrest.
We first state the facts of both cases in some detail and put to one side certain related questions that are not presented by these records. We then explain why the New York statutes are not consistent with the Fourth Amendment and why the reasons for upholding warrantless arrests in a public place do not apply to warrantless invasions of the privacy of the home.
I
On January 14, 1970, after two days of intensive investigation, New York detectives had assembled evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Theodore Payton had murdered the manager of a gas station two days earlier. At about 7:30 a. m. on January 15, six officers went to Pay-ton’s apartment in the Bronx, intending to arrest him. They had not obtained a warrant. Although light and music emanated from the apartment, there was no response to their knock on the metal door. They summoned emergency assistance and, about 30 minutes later, used crowbars to break open the door and enter the apartment. No one was there. In plain view, however, was a 30-caliber shell casing that was seized and later admitted into evidence at Payton’s murder trial.
In due course Payton surrendered to the police, was indicted for murder, and moved to suppress the evidence taken from his apartment. The trial judge held that the warrantless and forcible entry was authorized by the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the evidence in plain view was properly seized. He found that exigent circumstances justified the officers’ failure to announce their purpose before entering the apartment as required by the statute. He had no occasion, however, to decide whether those circumstances also would have justified the failure to obtain a warrant, because he concluded that the warrantless entry was adequately supported by the statute without regard to the circumstances. The Appellate Division, First Department, summarily affirmed.
On March 14, 1974, Obie Riddick was arrested for the commission of two armed robberies that had occurred in 1971. He had been identified by the victims in June 1973, and in January 1974 the police had learned his address. They did not obtain a warrant for his arrest. At about noon on March 14, a detective, accompanied by three other officers, knocked on the door of the Queens house where Riddick was living. When his young son opened the door, they could see Riddick sitting in bed covered by a sheet. They entered the house and placed him under arrest. Before permitting him to dress, they opened a chest of drawers two feet from the bed in search of weapons and found narcotics and related paraphernalia. Riddick was subsequently indicted on narcotics charges. At a suppression hearing, the trial judge held that the warrantless entry into his home was authorized by the revised New York statute, and that the search of the immediate area was reasonable under Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the denial of the suppression motion.
The New York Court of Appeals, in a single- opinion, affirmed the convictions of both Payton and Riddick. 45 N. Y. 2d 300, 380 N. E. 2d 224 (1978). The court recognized that the question whether and under what circumstances an officer may enter a suspect’s home to make a warrantless arrest had not been settled either by that court or by this Court. In answering that question, the majority of four judges relied primarily on its perception that there is a
“... substantial difference between the intrusion which attends an entry for the purpose of searching the premises and that which results from an entry for the purpose of making an arrest, and [a] significant difference in the governmental interest in achieving the objective of the intrusion in the two instances.” Id., at 310, 380 N. E. 2d, at 228-229.
The majority supported its holding by noting the “apparent historical acceptance” of warrantless entries to make felony arrests, both in the English common law and in the practice of many American States.
Three members of the New York Court of Appeals dissented on this issue because they believed that the Constitution requires the police to obtain a “warrant to enter a home in order to arrest or seize a person, unless there are exigent circumstances.” Starting from the premise that, except in carefully circumscribed instances, “the Fourth Amendment forbids police entry into a private home to search for and seize an object without a warrant,” the dissenters reasoned that an arrest of the person involves an even greater invasion of privacy and should therefore be attended with at least as great a measure of constitutional protection. The dissenters noted “the existence of statutes and the American Law Institute imprimatur codifying the common-law rule authorizing warrantless arrests in private homes” and acknowledged that “the statutory authority of a police officer to make a warrant-less arrest in this State has been in effect for almost 100 years,” but concluded that “neither antiquity nor legislative unanimity can be determinative of the grave constitutional question presented” and “can never be a substitute for reasoned analysis.”
Before addressing the narrow question presented by these appeals, we put to one side other related problems that are not presented today. Although it is arguable that the war-rantless entry to effect Payton’s arrest might have been justified by exigent circumstances, none of the New York courts relied on any such justification. The Court of Appeals majority treated both Payton’s and Riddick’s cases as involving routine arrests in which there was ample time to obtain a warrant, and we will do the same. Accordingly, we have no occasion to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as “exigent circumstances,” that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search.
Nor do these cases raise any question concerning the authority of the police, without either a search or arrest warrant, to enter a third party’s home to arrest a suspect. The police broke into Payton’s apartment intending to arrest Payton, and they arrested Riddick in his own dwelling. We also note that in neither case is it argued that the police lacked probable cause to believe that the suspect was at home when they entered. Finally, in both cases we are dealing with entries into homes made without the consent of any occupant. In Payton, the police used crowbars to break down the door and in Riddick, although his 3-year-old son answered the door,' the police entered before Riddick had an opportunity either to object or to consent.
II
It is familiar history that indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of “general warrants” were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, as originally proposed in the House of Representatives, the draft contained only one clause, which directly imposed limitations on the issuance of warrants, but imposed no express restrictions on warrantless searches or seizures. As it was ultimately adopted, however, the Amendment contained two separate clauses, the first protecting the basic right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the second requiring that warrants be particular and supported by probable cause. The Amendment provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’’
It is thus perfectly clear that the evil the Amendment was designed to prevent was broader than the abuse of a general warrant. Unreasonable searches or seizures conducted without any warrant at all are condemned by the plain language of the first clause of the Amendment. Almost a century ago the Court stated in resounding terms that the principles reflected in the Amendment “reached farther than the concrete form” of the specific cases that gave it birth, and “apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630. Without pausing to consider whether that broad language may require some qualification, it is sufficient to note that the warrantless arrest of a person is a species of seizure required by the Amendment to be reasonable. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648. Indeed, as Me. Justice Powell noted in his concurrence in United States v. Watson, the arrest of a person is “quintessential a seizure.” 423 U. S., at 428.
The simple language of the Amendment applies equally to seizures of persons and to seizures of property. Our analysis in this case may therefore properly commence with rules that have been well established in Fourth Amendment litigation involving tangible items. As the Court reiterated just a few years ago, the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313. And we have long adhered to the view that the warrant procedure minimizes the danger of needless intrusions of that sort.
It is a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Yet it is also well settled that objects such as weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the police without a warrant; The seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity. The distinction between a warrantless seizure in an open area and such a seizure on private premises was plainly stated in G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 354:
“It is one thing to seize without a warrant property resting in an open area or seizable by levy without an intrusion into privacy, and it is quite another thing to effect a warrantless seizure of property, even that owned by a corporation, situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer.”
As the late Judge Leventhai recognized, this distinction has equal force when the seizure of a person is involved. Writing on the constitutional issue now before us for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sitting en banc, Dorman v. United States, 140 U. S. App. D. C. 313, 435 F. 2d 385 (1970), Judge Leventhai first noted the settled rule that warrantless arrests in public places are valid. He immediately recognized, however, that
“[a] greater burden is placed... on officials who enter a home or dwelling without consent. Freedom from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment.” Id., at 317, 435 F. 2d, at 389. (Footnote omitted.)
His analysis of this question then focused on the long-settled premise that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrant-less entry to search for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found within. He reasoned that the constitutional protection afforded to the individual’s interest in the privacy of his own home is equally applicable to a warrantless entry for the purpose of arresting a resident of the house; for it is inherent in such an entry that a search for the suspect may be required before he can be apprehended. Judge Leventhal concluded that an entry to arrest and an entry to search for and to seize property implicate the same interest in preserving the privacy and the sanctity of the home, and justify the same level of constitutional protection.
This reasoning has been followed in other Circuits. Thus, the Second Circuit recently summarized its position:
“To be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home. This is simply too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances, even when it is accomplished under statutory authority and when probable cause is clearly present.” United States v. Reed, 572 F. 2d 412, 423 (1978), cert. denied sub nom. Goldsmith v. United States, 439 U. S. 913.
We find this reasoning to be persuasive and in accord with this Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions.
The majority of the New York Court of Appeals, however, suggested that there is a substantial difference in the relative intrusiveness of an entry to search for property and an entry to search for a person. See n. 13, supra. It is true that the area that may legally be searched is broader when executing a search warrant than when executing an arrest warrant in the home. See Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752. This difference may be more theoretical than real, however, because the police may need to check the entire premises for safety reasons, and sometimes they ignore the restrictions on searches incident to arrest.
But the critical point is that any differences in the intrusiveness of entries to search and entries to arrest are merely ones of degree rather than kind. The two intrusions share this fundamental characteristic: the breach of the entrance to an individual’s home. The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home — a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: “The right of the people to be secure in their... houses... shall not be violated.” That language unequivocally establishes the proposition that “[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511. In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.
Ill
Without contending that United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, decided the question presented by these appeals, New York argues that the reasons that support the Watson holding require a similar result here. In Watson the Court relied on (a) the well-settled commonlaw rule that, a warrantless arrest in a public place is valid if the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the suspect is a felon; (b) the clear consensus among the States adhering to that well-settled common-law rule; and (c) the expression of the judgment of Congress that such an arrest is “reasonable.” We consider each of these reasons as it applies to a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of making a routine felony arrest.
A
An examination of the common-law understanding of an officer’s authority to arrest sheds light on the obviously relevant, if not entirely dispositive, consideration of what the Framers of the Amendment might have thought to be reasonable. Initially, it should be noted that the common-law rules of arrest developed in legal contexts that substantially differ from the cases now before us. In these cases, which involve application of the exclusionary rule, the issue is whether certain evidence is admissible at trial. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383. At common law, the question whether an arrest was authorized typically arose in civil damages actions for trespass or false arrest, in which a constable's authority to make the arrest was a defense. See, e. g., Leach v. Money, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K. B. 1765). Additionally, if an officer was killed while attempting to effect an arrest, the question whether the person resisting the arrest was guilty of murder or manslaughter turned on whether the officer was acting within the bounds of his authority. See M. Foster, Crown Law 308, 312 (1762). See also West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78, 85.
A study of the common law on the question whether a constable had the authority to make warrantless arrests in the home on mere suspicion of a felony — as distinguished from an officer’s right to arrest for a crime committed in his presence— reveals a surprising lack of judicial decisions and a deep divergence among scholars.
The most cited evidence of the common-law rule consists of an equivocal dictum in a case actually involving the sheriff’s authority to enter a home to effect service of civil process. In Semayne’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-196 (K. B. 1603), the Court stated:
“In all cases when the King is party, the Sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party’s house, • either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K.’s process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors; and that appears well by the stat. of Westm. 1. c. 17. (which is but an affirmance of the common law) as hereafter appears, for the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had notice, it is to be presumed that he would obey it, and that appears by the book in 18 E. 2. Execut. 252. where it is said, that the K.’s officer who comes to do execution, &c. may open the doors which are shut, and break them, if he cannot have the keys; which proves, that he ought first to demand them, 7 E. 3. 16.” (Footnotes omitted.)
This passage has been read by some as describing an entry without a warrant. The context strongly implies, however, that the court was describing the extent of authority in executing the King’s writ. This reading is confirmed by the phrase “either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K.’s process” and by the further point that notice was necessary because the owner may “not know of the process.” In any event, the passage surely cannot be said unambiguously to endorse warrantless entries.
The cómmon-law commentators disagreed sharply on the subject. Three distinct views were expressed. Lord Coke, widely recognized by the American colonists “as the greatest authority of his time on the laws of England,” clearly viewed a warrantless entry for the purpose of arrest to be illegal. Bum, Foster, and Hawkins agreed, as did East and Russell, though the latter two qualified their opinions by stating that if an entry to arrest was made without a warrant, the officer was perhaps immune from liability for the trespass if the suspect was actually guilty. Blackstone, Chitty, and Stephen took the opposite view, that entry to arrest without a warrant was legal, though Stephen relied on Blackstone who, along with Chitty, in turn relied exclusively on Hale. But Hale’s view was not quite so unequivocally expressed. Further, Hale appears to rely solely on a statement in an early Yearbook, quoted in Burdett v. Abbot, 14 East 1, 155, 104 Eng. Rep. 501, 560 (K. B. 1811):
“ 'that for felony, or suspicion of felony, a man may break open the house to take the felon; for it is for the commonweal to take them.’ ”
Considering the diversity of views just described, however, it is clear that the statement was never deemed authoritative. Indeed, in Burdett, the statement was described as an “extrajudicial opinion.” Ibid
It is obvious that the common-law rule on warrantless home arrests was not as clear as the rule on arrests in public places. Indeed, particularly considering the prominence of Lord Coke, the weight of authority as it appeared to the Framers was to the effect that a warrant was required, or at the minimum that there were substantial risks in proceeding without one. The common-law sources display a sensitivity to privacy interests that could not have been lost on the Framers. The zealous and frequent repetition of the adage that a “man’s house is his castle,” made it abundantly clear that both in England and in the Colonies “the freedom of one’s house” was one of the most vital elements of English liberty.
Thus, our study of the relevant common law does not provide the same guidance that was present in Watson. Whereas the rule concerning the validity of an arrest in a public place was supported by cases erectly in point and by the unanimous views of the commentators, we have found no direct authority supporting forcible entries into a home to make a routine arrest and the weight of the scholarly opinion is somewhat to the contrary. Indeed, the absence of any 17th- or 18th-century English cases directly in point, together with the unequivocal endorsement of the tenet that “a man’s house is his castle,” strongly suggests that the prevailing practice was not to make such arrests except in hot pursuit or when authorized by a warrant. Cf. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 33. In all events, the issue is not one that can be said to have been definitively settled by the common law at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted.
B
A majority of the States that have taken a position on the question permit warrantless entry into the home to arrest even in the absence of exigent circumstances. At this time, 24 States permit such warrantless entries; 15 States clearly prohibit them, though 3 States do so on federal constitutional grounds alone; and 11 States have apparently taken no position on the question
But these current figures reflect a significant decline during the last decade in the number of States permitting warrantless entries for arrest. Becent dicta in this Court raising questions about the practice, see n. 1, supra, and Federal Courts of Appeals’ decisions on point, see n. 4, supra, have led state courts to focus on the issue. Virtually all of the state courts that have had to confront the constitutional issue directly have held warrantless entries into the home to arrest to be invalid in the absence of exigent circumstances. See nn. 2, 3, supra. Three state courts have relied on Fourth Amendment grounds alone, while seven have squarely placed their decisions on both federal and state constitutional grounds. A number of other state courts, though not having had to confront the issue directly, have recognized the serious nature of the constitutional question. Apparently, only the Supreme Court of Florida and the New York Court of Appeals in this case have expressly upheld warrantless entries to arrest in the face of a constitutional challenge.
A longstanding, widespread practice is not immune from constitutional scrutiny. But neither is it to be lightly brushed aside. This is particularly so when the constitutional standard is as amorphous as the word “reasonable,” and when custom and contemporary norms necessarily. play such a large role in the constitutional analysis. In this case, although the weight of state-law authority is clear, there is by no means the kind of virtual unanimity on this question that was present in United States v. Watson, with regard to warrantless arrests in public places. See 423 U. S., at 422-423. Only 24 of the 50 States currently sanction warrant-less entries into the home to arrest, see nn. 46-48, supra, and there is an obvious declining trend. Further, the strength of the trend is greater than the numbers alone indicate. Seven state courts have recently held that warrantless home arrests violate their respective State Constitutions. See n. 3, supra. That is significant because by invoking a state constitutional provision, a state court immunizes its decision from review by this Court. This heightened degree of immutability underscores the depth of the principle underlying the result.
c
No congressional determination that warrantless entries into the home áre “reasonable” has been called to our attention. None of the federal statutes cited in the Watson opinion reflects any such legislative judgment. Thus, that support for the Watson holding finds no counterpart in this case.
See also United States v. Watson, 423 U. S., at 433 (Stewart, J., concurring); id., at 432-433 (Powell, J., concurring); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 113, n. 13; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474481; Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499-500. Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38.
See State v. Perez, 277 So. 2d 778 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1064.
See State v. Cook, 115 Ariz. 188, 564 P. 2d 877 (1977) (resting on both state and federal constitutional provisions); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P. 2d 1333 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 929 (state and federal); People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 491 P. 2d 575 (1971) (federal only); State v. Jones, 274 N. W. 2d 273 (Iowa 1979) (state and federal); State v. Platten, 225 Kan. 764, 594 P. 2d 201 (1979) (state and federal); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 329 N. E. 2d 717 (1975) (federal only); State v. Olson, 287 Ore. 157, 598 P. 2d 670 (1979) (state and federal); Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (federal only); State v. McNeal, 251 S. E. 2d 484 (W. Va. 1978) (state and federal); Laasch v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 267 N. W. 2d 278 (1978) (state and federal).
Compare United States v. Reed, 572 F. 2d 412 (CA2 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Goldsmith v. United States, 439 U. S. 913; United States v. Killebrew, 560 F. 2d 729 (CA6 1977); United States v. Shye, 492 F. 2d 886 (CA6 1974); United States v. Houle, 603 F. 2d 1297 (CA8 1979); United States v. Prescott, 581 F. 2d 1343 (CA9 1978); Dorman v. United States, 140 U. S. App. D. C. 313, 435 F. 2d 385 (1970), with United States v. Williams, 573 F. 2d 348 (CA5 1978); United States ex rel. Wright v. Woods, 432 F. 2d 1143 (CA7 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 966. Three other Circuits have assumed without deciding that warrant-less home arrests are unconstitutional. United States v. Bradley, 455 F. 2d 1181 (CA1 1972); United States v. Davis, 461 E. 2d 1026 (CA3 1972); Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F. 2d 984 (CA4 1970). And one Circuit has upheld such an arrest without discussing the constitutional issue. Michael v. United States, 393 F. 2d 22 (CA10 1968).
A thorough search of the apartment resulted in the seizure of additional evidence tending to prove Payton’s guilt, but the prosecutor stipulated that the officers’ warrantless search of the apartment was illegal and that all the seized evidence ^except the shell casing should be suppressed.
“MR. JACOBS: There’s no question that the evidence that was found in bureau drawers and in the closet was illegally obtained. I’m perfectly willing to concede that, and I do so in my memorandum of law. There's no question about that.” App. 4.
“At the time in question, January 15, 1970, the law applicable to the police conduct related above was governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as applicable to this case recited: ‘A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person... 3. When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person to be arrested to have committed it.’ Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided: ‘To make an arrest, as provided in the last section [177], the officer may break open an outer or inner door or window of a building, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused admittance.’ ” 84 Misc. 2d 973, 974-975, 376 N. Y. S. 2d 779, 780 (Sup. Ct., Trial Term, N. Y. County, 1974).
“Although Detective Malfer knocked on the defendant’s door, it is not established that at this time he announced that his purpose was to arrest the defendant. Such a declaration of purpose is unnecessary when exigent circumstances are present (People v. Wojciechowski, 31 AD 2d 658; People v. Mcllwain, 28 AD 2d 711).
“ ‘Case law has made exceptions from the statute or common-law rules for exigent circumstances which may allow dispensation with the notice... It has also been held or suggested that notice is not required if there is reason to believe that it will allow an escape or increase unreasonably the physieal risk to the police or to innocent persons.’ (People v. Floyd, 26 NY 2d 558, 562.)
“The facts of this matter indicate that a grave offense had been committed; that the suspect was reasonably believed to be armed and could be a danger to the community; that a clear showing of probable cause existed and that there was strong reason to believe that the suspect was in the premises being entered and that he would escape if not swiftly apprehended. From this fact the court finds that exigent circumstances existed to justify noncompliance with section 178. The court holds, therefore, that the entry into defendant’s apartment was valid.” Id., at 975, 376 N. Y. S. 2d, at 780-781.
55 App. Div. 2d 859 (1976).
New York Crim. Proc. Law § 140.15 (4) (McKinney 1971) provides, with respect to arrest without a warrant:
“In order to effect such an arrest, a police officer may enter premises in which he reasonably believes such person to be present, under the same circumstances and in the same manner as would be authorized, by the provisions of subdivisions four and five of section 120.80, if he were attempting to make such arrest pursuant to a warrant of arrest.”
Section 120.80, governing execution of arrest warrants, provides in relevant part:
“4. In order to effect the arrest, the police officer may, under circumstances and in a manner prescribed in this subdivision, enter any premises in which he reasonably believes the defendant to be present. Before such entry, he must give, or make reasonable effort to give, notice of his authority and purpose to an occupant thereof, unless there,is reasonable cause to believe that the giving of such notice will:
“(a) Result in the defendant-escaping or attempting to escape; or
“(b) Endanger the life or safety of the officer, or another person; or
“(c) Result in the destruction, damaging or secretion of material evidence.
“5. If the officer is authorized to enter premises without giving notice of his authority and purpose, or if after giving such notice he is not admitted, he may enter such premises, and by a breaking if necessary.”
App. 63-66.
56 App. Div. 2d 937, 392 N. Y. S. 2d 848 (1977). One justice dissented on the ground that the officers’ failure to announce their authority and purpose before entering the house made the arrest illegal as a matter of state law.
45 N. Y. 2d, at 309-310, 380 N. E. 2d, at 228.
The majority continued:
“In the case of the search, unless appropriately limited by the terms of a warrant, the incursion on the householder’s domain normally will be both more extensive and more intensive and the resulting invasion of his privacy of greater magnitude than what might be expected to occur on an entry made for the purpose of effecting his arrest. A search by its nature contemplates a possibly thorough rummaging through possessions, with concurrent upheaval of the owner’s chosen or random placement of goods and articles and disclosure to the searchers
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves questions as to the application of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to certain persons who worked in a government-owned plant in which respondent produced munitions under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with the War Department. It involves such subsidiary issues as whether the plaintiffs were employees of the Government or of the private contractor, whether munitions produced for shipment across state lines in war use are produced for “commerce” and whether they are “goods” within the meaning of the Act. Substantial claims of petitioners may be denied or large sums added to the cost of the war by the answers to these questions, and many cases other than this will be controlled by its decision.
The manner in which the case has thus far developed raises the question whether as a matter of good judicial administration this Court should attempt to decide these far-reaching issues on this record.
No one questions that, taking its allegations at their face value, the complaint in this case states a cause of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Summary judgment has gone against the plaintiffs because, by affidavit and exhibits, the allegations have been found unsustainable. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “on the ground that defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” The motion, so far as the Fair Labor Standards Act was concerned, was based on an affidavit “which states facts showing that as a matter of law neither complainants nor defendant were covered” by the Act in that neither “were engaged in commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce.” Made part of the affidavit by reference were defendant’s construction and operation contract with the Government and some 22 supplements or change orders covering nearly 200 pages of the record. The complainants then filed a supplemental complaint which added by reference all regulations and interpretative bulletins of the Department of Labor and Administrator of the Fair Labor Standards Act clarifying and explaining it. And, as against defendant’s affidavit and exhibits, the plaintiffs, as recited in the District Court’s opinion, offered by reference affidavits of three former employees of the contractor showing the customs of payment and operation as bearing on the issue of whether they were government employees or those of the private contractor. The affidavits do not appear in the record, but parts deemed relevant are set out in the court’s opinion.
On this basis the District Court first denied summary judgment. 68 F. Supp. 576. It was of the view that the plaintiffs, whatever the forms of the transaction, were in reality employed by the Government and, hence, the Fair Labor Standards Act by its own terms did not cover them. But it held that they were covered by § 4 (b) of the Act of July 2, 1940, and were entitled to recover overtime under it.
On rehearing, the court concluded, however, that no remedy under this latter Act was available to them in this action as it was not pleaded. Accordingly, it granted summary judgment against them. 70 F. Supp. 929. The Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc affirmed. 164 F. 2d 1016. It held that the plaintiffs were in substance employees of the United States, that munitions were not a part of commerce within the meaning of the Act, and that in any event munitions were not “goods” within the meaning of the Act. One judge, concurring, did not pass on the question whether petitioners were employees of the Government but held only that munitions were produced for war, not for commerce. One judge dissented on the ground that the whole system “was designed and operated so that the United States should not be the employer” and considered that munitions produced for transportation to a place outside of the State were produced for commerce and those engaged therein were subject to the Act. The case is here on certiorari, 333U. S.841.
The Silas Mason Company, in a sense, is no more than a nominal defendant, for it is entitled to reimbursement from the Government. The Government, the ultimate party in interest, appears through the Department of Justice in support of the statutory basis for the claims against itself. But it advises us that “The Department of the Army is of the view that respondent's position has merit for the reasons set forth in the brief filed by respondent. The Army is concerned with the great cost to which the Government will be subjected if the numerous suits akin to this are lost, or even if it must bear the cost of defending them. Furthermore, the Army believes that the classes of employees involved in these cases were well paid, that they accepted their compensation without complaint or expectation of receiving-more until this litigation was commenced sometime after the termination of their employment, and that accordingly there is little equity in the employees’ present position.”
Three Acts of Congress require consideration. The plaintiffs and the Government say the Fair Labor Standards Act is controlling. The defendant, the Department of the Army, which handled the transaction, and the District Court consider that the Act of July 2, 1940, controls the liability. But the trial court held it cannot be the basis of adjudication of plaintiffs’ claims because no such issue was pleaded and that holding has become the law of the case since there has been no appeal. The plaintiffs pleaded their cause of action also under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, but it was held unavailable to them below and their petition for certiorari to this Court raises no question as to that Act and acquiesces in dropping it from our consideration.
On the question as to who was the employer, on which this case was decided below, the complaint makes a clear, factual and simple allegation. It says that these plaintiffs were employed by the corporate defendant itself. This allegation has been overborne by interpreting the terms of the contracts between that alleged employer and a third party, that is, the Government, which terms may or may not have been known to the employees. There is substantial controversy as to the way those two parties, the Government and defendant in actual practice, construed their contracts, both sides of the controversy being based on events of which we are asked to take judicial notice or to spell out from contracts without the tests which trial affords. The plaintiffs in turn seek to counteract whatever inferences may be drawn from the defendant’s version of dealings between defendant and the Government by contrary inferences from dealings between employees and the defendant. But they do not prove plaintiffs’ own dealings, which are not in the record, but offer affidavits which relate specifically to “laborers and mechanics” while plaintiffs were inspectors and foremen, a difference that may be material. Insofar as the allegations of the complaint are impeached by the course of dealing between defendant and the Government, they are not supported by any course of dealing to which these plaintiffs were parties. What they were paid and on what basis, whether they have already been paid for overtime on the theory that one of the other Acts applies, we do not know.
Defendant’s present position, which, for all we know, may or may not be shared by the Department of the Army, is that we do not need to settle the question as to whether defendant or the Government was the actual employer, that the effect of the war-time legislation was to set up a wholly new system of war production, which was neither private enterprise nor government operation, but an amalgamation of the two, which also prescribed a complete system of labor relation by statute which supersedes and precludes operation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. But this broad contention seems not to have been submitted to either court below, is not consistent with the theoretical basis of their decisions and appears fully presented for the first time in the reply brief in this Court.
The short of the matter is that we have an extremely important question, probably affecting all cost-plus-fixed-fee war contractors and many of their employees immediately, and ultimately affecting by a vast sum the cost of fighting the war. No conclusion in such a case should prudently be rested on an indefinite factual foundation. The case, which counsel have described as a constantly expanding one, comes to us almost in the status in which it should come to a trial court. In addition to the welter of new contentions and statutory provisions we must pick our way among over a score of technical contracts, each amending some earlier one, without full background knowledge of the dealings of the parties. The hearing of contentions as to disputed facts, the sorting of documents to select relevant provisions, ascertain their ultimate form and meaning in the case, the practical construction put on them by the parties and reduction of the mass of conflicting contentions as to fact and inference from facts, is a task primarily for a court of one judge, not for a court of nine.
We do not hold that in the form the controversy took in the District Court that tribunal lacked power or justification for applying the summary judgment procedure. But summary procedures, however salutary where issues are clear-cut and simple, present a treacherous record for deciding issues of far-flung import, on which this Court should draw inferences with caution from complicated courses of legislation, contracting and practice.
We consider it the part of good judicial administration to withhold decision of the ultimate questions involved in this case until this or another record shall present a more solid basis of findings based on litigation or on a comprehensive statement of agreed facts. While we might be able, on the present record, to reach a conclusion that would decide the case, it might well be found later to be lacking in the thoroughness that should precede judgment of this importance and which it is the purpose of the judicial process to provide.
Without intimating any conclusion on the merits, we vacate the judgments below and remand the case to the District Court for reconsideration and amplification of the record in the light of this opinion and of present contentions.
Judgments vacated.
Mr. Justice Black thinks the judgment should be reversed.
Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result.
Act of June 25, 1938, c. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. § 201.
The Act defines commerce as follows: “ ‘Commerce’ means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or from any State to any place outside thereof.”
The Act defines goods as follows: " ‘Goods’ means goods (including ships and marine equipment), wares, products, commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof, but does not include goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof.”
Rule 56 provides that the trial court may award summary judgment after motion, notice and hearing, provided the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Act of July 2,1940, c. 508,54 Stat. 712.
Act of June 30, 1936, c. 881, 49 Stat. 2036, 41 U. S. C. § 35.
Rule 56 requires that summary judgment shall be rendered if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact . . . See note 4.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to consider whether a West Virginia statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by making it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without the written approval of the juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender.
(1)
The challenged West Virginia statute provides:
“[N]or shall the name of any child, in connection with any proceedings under this chapter, be published in any newspaper without a written order of the court. ...” W. Va. Code §49-7-3 (1976);
and:
“A person who violates ... a provision of this chapter for which punishment has not been specifically provided, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,, and upon conviction shall be fined not less than ten nor more than one hundred dollars, or confined in jail not less than five days nor more than six months, or both such fine and imprisonment.” § 49-7-20.
On February 9, 1978, a 15-year-old student was- shot and killed at Hayes Junior High School in St. Albans, W. Va., a small community located about 13 miles outside of Charleston, W. Va. The alleged assailant, a 14-year-old classmate, was identified by seven different eyewitnesses and was arrested by police soon after the incident.
The Charleston Daily Mail and the Charleston Gazette, respondents here, learned of the shooting by monitoring routinely the police band radio frequency; they immediately dispatched reporters and photographers to the junior high school. The reporters for both papers obtained the name of the alleged assailant simply by asking various witnesses, the police, and an assistant prosecuting attorney who were at the school.
The staffs of both newspapers prepared articles for publication about the incident. The Daily Mail’s first article appeared in its February 9 afternoon edition. The article did not mention the alleged attacker’s name. The editorial decision to omit the name was made because of the statutory prohibition against publication without prior court approval.
The Gazette made a contrary editorial decision and published the juvenile’s name and picture in an article about the shooting that appeared in the February 10 morning edition of the paper. In addition, the name,of the alleged juvenile attacker was broadcast over at least three different radio stations on February 9 and 10. Since the information had become public knowledge, the Daily Mail decided to include the juvenile’s name in an article in its afternoon paper on February 10.
On March 1, an indictment against the respondents was returned by a grand jury. The indictment alleged that each knowingly published the name of a youth involved in a juvenile proceeding in violation of W. Ya. Code § 49-7-3 (1976). Respondents then filed an original-jurisdiction petition with the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of prohibition against the prosecuting attorney and the Circuit Court Judges of Kanawha County, petitioners here. Respondents alleged that the indictment was based on a statute that violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and several provisions of the State’s Constitution and requested an order prohibiting the county officials from taking any action on the indictment.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals issued the writ of prohibition. -W. Va.—, 248 S. E. 2d 269 (1978). Relying on holdings of this Court, it held that the statute abridged the freedom of the press. The court reasoned that the statute operated as a prior restraint on speech and that the State’s interest in protecting the identity of the juvenile offender did not overcome the heavy presumption against the constitutionality of such prior restraints.
We granted certiorari. 439 U. S. 963 (1978).
(2)
Respondents urge this Court to hold that because § 49-7-3 requires court approval prior to publication of the juvenile’s name it operates as a “prior restraint” on speech. See Ne braska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Responents concede that this statute is not in the classic mold of prior restraint, there being no prior injunction against publication. Nonetheless, they contend that the prior-approval requirement acts in “operation and effect” like a licensing scheme and thus is another form of prior restraint. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, supra, at 708. As such, respondents argue, the statute bears “a 'heavy presumption’ against its constitutional validity.” Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, supra, at 419. They claim that the State’s interest in the anonymity of a juvenile offender is not sufficient to overcome that presumption.
Petitioners do not dispute that the statute amounts to a prior restraint on speech. Rather, they take the view that even if it is a prior restraint the statute is constitutional because of the significance of the State’s interest in protecting the identity of juveniles.
(3)
The resolution of this case does not turn on whether the statutory grant of authority to the juvenile judge to permit publication of the juvenile’s name is, in and of itself, a prior restraint. First Amendment protection reaches beyond prior restraints, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829 (1978); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975), and respondents acknowledge that the statutory provision for court approval of disclosure actually may have a less oppressive effect on freedom of the press than a total ban on the publication of the child’s name.
Whether we view the statute as a prior restraint or as a penal sanction for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information is not dispositive because even the latter action requires the highest form of state interest to sustain its validity. Prior restraints have been accorded the most exacting scrutiny in previous cases. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, at 561; Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, supra, at 419; Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, supra, at 716. See also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975). However, even when a state attempts to punish publication after the event it must nevertheless demonstrate that its punitive action was necessary to further the state interests asserted. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 843. Since we conclude that this statute cannot satisfy the constitutional standards defined in Landmark Communications, Inc., we need not decide whether, as argued by respondents, it operated as a prior restraint.
Our recent decisions demonstrate that state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards. In Landmark Communications we declared unconstitutional a Virginia statute making it a crime to publish information regarding confidential proceedings before a state judicial review commission that heard complaints about alleged disabilities and misconduct of state-court judges. In declaring that statute unconstitutional, we concluded:
“[T]he publication Virginia seeks to punish under its statute lies near the core of the First Amendment, and the Commonwealth’s interests advanced by the imposition of criminal sanctions are insufficient to justify the actual and potential encroachments on freedom of speech and of the press which follow therefrom.” 435 U. S., at 838.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, supra, we held that damages could not be recovered against a newspaper for publishing the name of a rape victim. The suit had been based on a state statute that made it a crime to publish the name of the victim; the purpose of the statute was to protect the privacy right of the individual and the family. The name of the victim had become known to the public through official court records dealing with the trial of the rapist. In declaring the statute unconstitutional, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice White, reasoned:
“By placing the information in the public domain on official court records, the State must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was thereby being served. . . . States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection.” 420 U. S., at 495.
One case that involved a classic prior restraint is particularly relevant to our inquiry. In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U. S. 308 (1977), we struck down a state-court injunction prohibiting the news media from publishing the name or photograph of an 11-year-old boy who was being tried before a juvenile court. The juvenile court judge had permitted reporters and other members of the public to attend a hearing in the case, notwithstanding a state statute closing such trials to the public. The court then attempted to halt publication of the information obtained from that hearing. We held that once the truthful information was “publicly revealed” or “in the public domain” the court could not constitutionally restrain its dissemination.
None of these opinions directly controls this case; however, all suggest strongly that if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order. These cases involved situations where the government itself provided or madé possible press access to the information. That factor is not controlling. Here respondents relied upon routine newspaper reporting techniques to ascertain the identity of the alleged assailant. A free press cannot be made to rely solely upon the sufferance of government to supply it with information. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 11 (1978) (plurality opinion); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 681 (1972). If the information is lawfully obtained, as it was here, the state may not punish its publication except when necessary to further an interest more substantial than is present here.
(4)
The sole interest advanced by the State to justify its criminal statute is to protect the anonymity of the juvenile offender. It is asserted that confidentiality will further his rehabilitation because publication of the name may encourage further antisocial conduct and also may cause the juvenile to lose future employment or suffer other consequences for this single offense. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974), similar arguments were advanced by the State to justify not permitting a criminal defendant to impeach a prosecution witness on the basis of his juvenile record. We said there that “[w]e do not and need not challenge the State’s interest as a matter of its own policy in the administration of criminal justice to seek to preserve the anonymity of a juvenile offender.” Id., at 319. However, we concluded that the State’s policy must be subordinated to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Ibid. The important rights created by the First Amendment must be considered along with the rights of defendants guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S., at 561.. Therefore, the reasoning of Davis that the constitutional right must prevail over the state’s interest in protecting juveniles applies with equal force here.
The magnitude of the State’s interest in this statute is not sufficient to justify application of a criminal penalty to respondents. Moreover, the statute’s approach does not satisfy constitutional requirements. The statute does not restrict the electronic media or any form of publication, except “newspapers,” from printing the names of youths charged in a juvenile proceeding. In this very case, three radio stations announced the alleged assailant’s name before the Daily Mail decided to publish it. Thus, even assuming the statute served a state interest of the highest order, it does not accomplish its stated purpose.
In addition, there is no evidence to demonstrate that the imposition of criminal penalties is necessary to protect the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. As the Brief for Respondents points out at 29 n. **, all 50 states have statutes that provide in some way for confidentiality, but only 5, including West Virginia, impose criminal penalties on nonparties for publication of the identity of the juvenile. Although every state has asserted a similar interest, all but a handful have found other ways of accomplishing the objective. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S., at 843.
(5)
Our holding in this case is narrow. There is no issue before us of unlawful press access to confidential judicial proceedings, see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S., at 496 n. 26; there is no issue here of privacy or prejudicial pretrial publicity. At issue is simply the power of a state to punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent’s name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. The asserted state interest cannot justify the statute’s imposition of criminal sanctions on this type of publication. Accordingly, the judgment of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Respondents do not argue that the statute is a prior restraint because it imposes a criminal sanction for certain types of publication. At page 11 of their brief they state: “The statute in question is, to be sure, not a prior restraint because it subjects newspapers to criminal punishments for what they print” after the event.
So far as the Daily Mail was concerned, the statute operated as a deterrent for 24 hours and became the basis for a prosecution after the delayed publication.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-107 (6) (1973); Ga. Code § 24A-3503 (g) (1) (1978); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169:27-28 (1977); S. C. Code § 1^-21-30 (1976).
The approach advocated by the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges is based on cooperation between juvenile court personnel and newspaper editors. It is suggested that if the courts make clear their purpose and methods then the press will exercise discretion and generally decline to publish the juvenile’s name without some prior consultation with the juvenile court judge. See Conway, Publicizing the Juvenile Court: A Public Responsibility, 16 Juv. Ct. Judges J. 21, 21-22 (1965); Riederer, Secrecy or Privacy? Communication Problems in the Juvenile Court Field, 17 J. Mo. Bar 66, 69-70 (1961).
In light of our disposition of the First and Fourteenth Amendment issue, we need,not reach respondents’ claim that the statute violates equal protection by being applicable only to newspapers but not other forms of journalistic expression.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of an injunction entered by a Florida state court which prohibits antiabortion protesters from demonstrating in certain places and in various ways outside of a health clinic that performs abortions. We hold that the establishment of a 36-foot buffer zone on a public street from which demonstrators are excluded passes muster under the First Amendment, but that several other provisions of the injunction do not.
I
Respondents operate abortion clinics throughout central Florida. Petitioners and other groups and individuals are engaged in activities near the site of one such clinic in Melbourne, Florida. They picketed and demonstrated where the public street gives access to the clinic. In September 1992, a Florida state court permanently enjoined petitioners from blocking or interfering with public access to the clinic, and from physically abusing persons entering or leaving the clinic. Six months later, respondents sought to broaden the injunction, complaining that access to the clinic was still impeded by petitioners’ activities and that such activities had also discouraged some potential patients from entering the clinic, and had deleterious physical effects on others. The trial court thereupon issued a broader injunction, which is challenged here.
The court found that, despite the initial injunction, protesters continued to impede access to the clinic by congregating on the paved portion of the street — Dixie Way — leading up to the clinic, and by marching in front of the clinic’s driveways. It found that as vehicles heading toward the clinic slowed to allow the protesters to move out of the way, “sidewalk counselors” would approach and attempt to give the vehicle’s occupants antiabortion literature. The number of people congregating varied from a handful to 400, and the noise varied from singing and chanting to the use of loudspeakers and bullhorns.
The protests, the court found, took their toll on the clinic’s patients. A clinic doctor testified that, as a result of having to run such a gauntlet to enter the clinic, the patients “manifested a higher level of anxiety and hypertension causing those patients to need a higher level of sedation to undergo the surgical procedures, thereby increasing the risk associated with such procedures.” App. 54. The noise produced by the protesters could be heard within the clinic, causing stress in the patients both during surgical procedures and while recuperating in the recovery rooms. And those patients who turned away because of the crowd to return at a later date, the doctor testified, increased their health risks by reason of the delay.
Doctors and clinic workers, in turn, were not immune even in their homes. Petitioners picketed in front of clinic employees’ residences; shouted at passersby; rang the doorbells of neighbors and provided literature identifying the particular clinic employee as a “baby killer.” Occasionally, the protesters would confront minor children of clinic employees who were home alone.
This and similar testimony led the state court to conclude that its original injunction had proved insufficient “to protect the health, safety and rights of women in Brevard and Seminole County, Florida and surrounding counties seeking access to [medical and counseling] services.” Id., at 5. The state court therefore amended its prior order, enjoining a broader array of activities. The amended injunction prohibits petitioners from engaging in the following acts:
“(1) At all times on all days, from entering the premises and property of the Aware Woman Center for Choice [the Melbourne clinic]....
“(2) At all times on all days, from blocking, impeding, inhibiting, or in any other manner obstructing or interfering with access to, ingress into and egress from any building or parking lot of the Clinic.
“(3) At all times on all days, from congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering that portion of public right-of-way or private property within [36] feet of the property line of the Clinic____ An exception to the 36 foot buffer zone is the area immediately adjacent to the Clinic on the east.... The [petitioners]... must remain at least [5] feet from the Clinic’s east line. Another exception to the 36 foot buffer zone relates to the record title owners of the property to the north and west of the Clinic. The prohibition against entry into the 36 foot buffer zones does not apply to such persons and their invitees. The other prohibitions contained herein do apply, if such owners and their invitees are acting in concert with the [petitioners]....
“(4) During the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon, on Mondays through Saturdays, during surgical procedures and recovery periods, from singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other sounds or images observable to or within earshot of the patients inside the Clinic.
“(5) At all times on all days, in an area within [300] feet of the Clinic, from physically approaching any person seeking the services of the Clinic unless such person indicates a desire to communicate by approaching or by inquiring of the [petitioners]....
“(6) At all times on all days, from approaching, congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or using bullhorns or other sound amplification equipment within [300] feet of the residence of any of the [respondents’] employees, staff, owners or agents, or blocking or attempting to block, barricade, or in any other manner, temporarily or otherwise, obstruct the entrances, exits or driveways of the residences of any of the [respondents’] employees, staff, owners or agents. The [petitioners] and those acting in concert with them are prohibited from inhibiting or impeding or attempting to impede, temporarily or otherwise, the free ingress or egress of persons to any street that provides the sole access to the street on which those residences are located.
“(7) At all times on all days, from physically abusing, grabbing, intimidating, harassing, touching, pushing, shoving, crowding or assaulting persons entering or leaving, working at or using services at the [respondents’] Clinic or trying to gain access to, or leave, any of the homes of owners, staff or patients of the Clinic....
“(8) At all times on all days, from harassing, intimidating or physically abusing, assaulting or threatening any present or former doctor, health care professional, or other staff member, employee or volunteer who assists in providing services at the [respondents’] Clinic.
“(9) At all times on all days, from encouraging, inciting, or securing other persons to commit any of the prohibited acts listed herein.” Operation Rescue v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 679-680 (Fla. 1993).
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the trial court’s amended injunction. 626 So. 2d 664. That court recognized that the forum at issue, which consists of public streets, sidewalks, and rights-of-way, is a traditional public forum. Id., at 671, citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 480 (1988). It then determined that the restrictions are content neutral, and it accordingly refused to apply the heightened scrutiny dictated by Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983) (To enforce a content-based exclusion the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end). Instead, the court analyzed the injunction to determine whether the restrictions are “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Ibid. It concluded that they were.
Shortly before the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion was announced, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit heard a separate challenge to the same injunction. The Court of Appeals struck down the injunction, characterizing the dispute as a clash “between an actual prohibition of speech and a potential hinderance to the free exercise of abortion rights.” Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F. 3d 705, 711 (1993). It stated that the asserted interests in public safety and order were already protected by other applicable laws and that these interests could be protected adequately without infringing upon the First Amendment rights of others. Ibid. The Court of Appeals found the injunction to be content based and neither necessary to serve a compelling state interest nor narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Ibid., citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461-462 (1980). We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1084 (1994), to resolve the conflict between the Florida Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals over the constitutionality of the state court’s injunction.
II
We begin by addressing petitioners’ contention that the state court’s order, because it is an injunction that restricts only the speech of antiabortion protesters, is necessarily content or viewpoint based. Accordingly, they argue, we should examine the entire injunction under the strictest standard of scrutiny. See Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 45. We disagree. To accept petitioners’ claim would be to classify virtually every injunction as content or viewpoint based. An injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a particular group (or individuals) and regulates the activities, and perhaps the speech, of that group. It does so, however, because of the group’s past actions in the context of a specific dispute between real parties. The parties seeking the injunction assert a violation of their rights; the court hearing the action is charged with fashioning a remedy for a specific deprivation, not with the drafting of a statute addressed to the general public.
The fact that the injunction in the present case did not prohibit activities of those demonstrating in favor of abortion is justly attributable to the lack of any similar demonstrations by those in favor of abortion, and of any consequent request that their demonstrations be regulated by injunction. There is no suggestion in this record that Florida law would not equally restrain similar conduct directed at a target having nothing to do with abortion; none of the restrictions imposed by the court were directed at the contents of petitioner’s message.
Our principal inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech “without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (upholding noise regulations); R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 386 (1992) (“The government may not regulate [speech] based on hostility— or favoritism — towards the underlying message expressed”); see also Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 230 (1987); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U. S. 641, 648-649 (1984); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 514-515 (1981) (plurality opinion); Carey v. Brown, supra, at 466-468. We thus look to the government’s purpose as the threshold consideration. Here, the state court imposed restrictions on petitioners incidental to their antiabortion message because they repeatedly violated the court’s original order. That petitioners all share the same viewpoint regarding abortion does not in itself demonstrate that some invidious content- or viewpoint-based purpose motivated the issuance of the order. It suggests only that those in the group whose conduct violated the court’s order happen to share the same opinion regarding abortions being performed at the clinic. In short, the fact that the injunction covered people with a particular viewpoint does not itself render the injunction content or viewpoint based. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312 (1988). Accordingly, the injunction issued in this case does not demand the level of heightened scrutiny set forth in Perry Ed. Assn., 460 U. S., at 45. And we proceed to discuss the standard which does govern.
Ill
If this were a content-neutral, generally applicable statute, instead of an injunctive order, its constitutionality would be assessed under the standard set forth in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, supra, at 791, and similar cases. Given that the forum around the clinic is a traditional public forum, see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S., at 480, we would determine whether the time, place, and manner regulations were “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” Ward, supra, at 791. See also Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 45.
There are obvious differences, however, between an injunction and a generally applicable ordinance. Ordinances represent a legislative choice regarding the promotion of particular societal interests. Injunctions, by contrast, are remedies imposed for violations (or threatened violations) of a legislative or judicial decree. See United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632-633 (1953). Injunctions also carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordinances. “[TJhere is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.” Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, 112-113 (1949). Injunctions, of course, have some advantages over generally applicable statutes in that they can be tailored by a trial judge to afford more precise relief than a statute where a violation of the law has already occurred. United States v. Paradise, 480 U. S. 149 (1987).
We believe that these differences require a somewhat more stringent application of general First Amendment principles in this context. In past cases evaluating injunctions restricting speech, see, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886 (1982), Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287 (1941), we have relied upon such general principles while also seeking to ensure that the injunction was no broader than necessary to achieve its desired goals. See Carroll v. President and Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175 (1968); Claiborne Hardware, supra, at 912, n. 47. Our close attention to the fit between the objectives of an injunction and the restrictions it imposes on speech is consistent with the general rule, quite apart from First Amendment considerations, “that injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 702 (1979). See also Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 418-420 (1977). Accordingly, when evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we think that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous. We must ask instead whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest. See, e. g., Claiborne Hardware, supra, at 916 (when sanctionable “conduct occurs in the context of constitutionally protected activity... ‘precision of regulation’ is demanded”) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963)); 458 U. S., at 916, n. 52 (citing Carroll, supra, and Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 604 (1967)); Carroll, supra, at 183-184.
Both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia disagree with the standard we announce, for policy reasons. See post, at 778 (Stevens, J.); post, at 792-794 (Scalia, J.). Justice Stevens believes that “injunctive relief should be judged by a more lenient standard than legislation,” because injunctions are imposed on individuals or groups who have engaged in illegal activity. Post, at 778. Justice Scalia, by contrast, believes that content-neutral injunctions are “at least as deserving of strict scrutiny as a statutory, content-based restriction.” Post, at 792. Justice Scalia bases his belief on the danger that injunctions, even though they might not “attack content as content,” may be used to suppress particular ideas; that individual judges should not be trusted to impose injunctions in this context; and that an injunction is procedurally more difficult to challenge than a statute. Post, at 793-794. We believe that consideration of all of the differences and similarities between statutes and injunctions supports, as a matter of policy, the standard we apply here.
Justice Scalia further contends that precedent compels the application of strict scrutiny in this case. Under that standard, we ask whether a restriction is “‘necessary to serve a compelling state interest and [is] narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’ ” Post, at 790 (quoting Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 45). Justice Scalia fails to cite a single case, and we are aware of none, in which we have applied this standard to a content-neutral injunction. He cites a number of cases in which we have struck down, with little or no elaboration, prior restraints on free expression. See post, at 798 (citing cases). As we have explained, however, we do not believe that this injunction constitutes a prior restraint, and we therefore believe that the “heavy presumption” against its constitutionality does not obtain here. See n. 2, supra.
Justice Scalia also relies on Claiborne Hardware and Carroll for support of his contention that our precedent requires the application of strict scrutiny in this context. In Claiborne Hardware, we stated simply that “precision of regulation” is demanded. 458 U. S., at 916 (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Scalia reads this case to require “surgical precision” of regulation, post, at 798, but that was not the adjective chosen by the author of the Court’s opinion, Justice Stevens. We think a standard requiring that an injunction “burden no more speech than necessary” exemplifies “precision of regulation.”
As for Carroll, Justice Scalia believes that the “standard” adopted in that case “is strict scrutiny,” which “does not remotely resemble the Court’s new proposal.” Post, at 799. Comparison of the language used in Carroll and the wording of the standard we adopt, however, belies Justice Scalia’s exaggerated contention. Carroll, for example, requires that an injunction be “couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective” of the injunction. 393 TJ. S., at 183. We require that the injunction “burden no more speech than necessary” to accomplish its objective. We fail to see a difference between the two standards.
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that numerous significant government interests are protected by the injunction. It noted that the State has a strong interest in protecting a woman’s freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling services in connection with her pregnancy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); In re T. W, 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989). The State also has a strong interest in ensuring the public safety and order, in promoting the free flow of traffic on public streets and sidewalks, and in protecting the property rights of all its citizens. 626 So. 2d, at 672. In addition, the court believed that the State’s strong interest in residential privacy, acknowledged in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474 (1988), applied by analogy to medical privacy. 626 So. 2d, at 672. The court observed that while targeted picketing of the home threatens the psychological well-being of the “captive” resident, targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psychological, but also the physical, well-being of the patient held “captive” by medical circumstance. Id., at 673. We agree with the Supreme Court of Florida that the combination of these governmental interests is quite sufficient to justify an appropriately tailored injunction to protect them. We now examine each contested provision of the injunction to see if it burdens more speech than necessary to accomplish its goal.
A
1
We begin with the 36-foot buffer zone. The state court prohibited petitioners from “congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering” any portion of the public right-of-way or private property within 36 feet of the property line of the clinic as a way of ensuring access to the clinic. This speech-free buffer zone requires that petitioners move to the other side of Dixie Way and away from the driveway of the clinic, where the state court found that they repeatedly had interfered with the free access of patients and staff. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-2, B-3. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611 (1968) (upholding statute that prohibited picketing that obstructed or unreasonably interfered with ingress or egress to or from public buildings, including courthouses, and with traffic on the adjacent street sidewalks). The buffer zone also applies to private property to the north and west of the clinic property. We examine each portion of the buffer zone separately.
We have noted a distinction between the type of focused picketing banned from the buffer zone and the type of generally disseminated communication that cannot be completely banned in public places, such as handbilling and solicitation. See Frisby, supra, at 486 (“The type of focused picketing prohibited by [the state court injunction] is fundamentally different from more generally directed means of communication that may not be completely banned in [public places]”). Here the picketing is directed primarily at patients and staff of the clinic.
The 36-foot buffer zone protecting the entrances to the clinic and the parking lot is a means of protecting unfettered ingress to and egress from the clinic, and ensuring that petitioners do not block traffic on Dixie Way. The state court seems to have had few other options to protect access given the narrow confines around the clinic. As the Florida Supreme Court noted, Dixie Way is only 21 feet wide in the area of the clinic. App. 260, 305. The state court was convinced that allowing petitioners to remain on the clinic’s sidewalk and driveway was not a viable option in view of the failure of the first injunction to protect access. And allowing the petitioners to stand in the middle of Dixie Way would obviously block vehicular traffic.
The need for a complete buffer zone near the clinic entrances and driveway may be debatable, but some deference must be given to the state court’s familiarity with the facts and the background of the dispute between the parties even under our heightened review. Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U. S., at 294. Moreover, one of petitioners’ witnesses during the evidentiary hearing before the state court conceded that the buffer zone was narrow enough to place petitioners at a distance of no greater than 10 to 12 feet from cars approaching and leaving the clinic. App. 486. Protesters standing across the narrow street from the clinic can still be seen and heard from the clinic parking lots. Id., at 260,305. We also bear in mind the fact that the state court originally issued a much narrower injunction, providing no buffer zone, and that this order did not succeed in protecting access to the clinic. The failure of the first order to accomplish its purpose may be taken into consideration in evaluating the constitutionality of the broader order. National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 697-698 (1978). On balance, we hold that the 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveway burdens no more speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake.
Justice Scalia’s dissent argues that a videotape made of demonstrations at the clinic represents “what one must presume to be the worst of the activity justifying the injunction.” Post, at 785-786. This seems to us a gratuitous assumption. The videotape was indeed introduced by respondents, presumably because they thought it supported their request for the second injunction. But witnesses also testified as to relevant facts in a 3-day evidentiary hearing, and the state court was therefore not limited to Justice Scalia’s rendition of what he saw on the videotape to make its findings in support of the second injunction. Indeed, petitioners themselves studiously refrained from challenging the factual basis for the injunction both in the state courts and here. Before the Florida Supreme Court, petitioners stated that “the Amended Permanent Injunction contains fundamental error on its face. The sole question presented by this appeal is a question of law, and for purposes of this appeal [petitioners] are assuming, arguendo, that a factual basis exists to grant injunctive relief.” Appellants’ Motion in Response to Appellees’ Motion to Require Full Transcript and Record of Proceedings in No. 93-00969 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.), p. 2. Petitioners argued against including the factual record as an appendix in the Florida Supreme Court, and never certified a full record. We must therefore judge this case on the assumption that the evidence and testimony presented to the state court supported its findings that the presence of protesters standing, marching, and demonstrating near the clinic’s entrance interfered with ingress to and egress from the clinic despite the issuance of the earlier injunction.
2
The inclusion of private property on the back and side of the clinic in the 36-foot buffer zone raises different concerns. The accepted purpose of the buffer zone is to protect access to the clinic and to facilitate the orderly flow of traffic on Dixie Way. Patients and staff wishing to reach the clinic do not have to cross the private property abutting the clinic property on the north and west, and nothing in the record indicates that petitioners’ activities on the private property have obstructed access to the clinic. Nor was evidence presented that protestors located on the private property blocked vehicular traffic on Dixie Way. Absent evidence that petitioners standing on the private property have obstructed access to the clinic, blocked vehicular traffic, or otherwise unlawfully interfered with the clinic’s operation, this portion of the buffer zone fails to serve the significant government interests relied on by the Florida Supreme Court. We hold that on the record before us the 36-foot buffer zone as applied to the private property to the north and west of the clinic burdens more speech than necessary to protect access to the clinic.
B
In response to high noise levels outside the clinic, the state court restrained the petitioners from “singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other sounds or images observable to or within earshot of the patients inside the [ejlinic” during the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon on Mondays through Saturdays. We must, of course, take account of the place to which the regulations apply in determining whether these restrictions burden more speech than necessary. We have upheld similar noise restrictions in the past, and as we noted in upholding a local noise ordinance around public schools, “the nature of a place, ‘the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations... that are reasonable.’” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972). Noise control is particularly important around hospitals and medical facilities during surgery and recovery periods, and in evaluating another injunction involving a medical facility, we stated:
“‘Hospitals, after all, are not factories or mines or assembly plants. They are hospitals, where human ailments are treated, where patients and relatives alike often are under emotional strain and worry, where pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of the day’s activity, and where the patient and his family... need a restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and helpful atmosphere.’ ” NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 442 U. S. 773, 783-784, n. 12 (1979), quoting Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483, 509 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
We hold that the limited noise restrictions imposed by the state court order burden no more speech than necessary to ensure the health and well-being of the patients at the clinic. The First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests. “If overamplified loudspeakers assault the citizenry, government may turn them down.” Grayned, supra, at 116. That is what the state court did here, and we hold that its action was proper.
C
The same, however, cannot be said for the “images observable” provision of the state court’s order. Clearly, threats to patients or their families, however communicated, are proscribable under the First Amendment. But rather than prohibiting the display of signs that could be interpreted as threats or veiled threats, the state court issued a blanket ban on all “images observable.” This broad prohibition on all “images observable” burdens more speech than necessary to achieve the purpose of limiting threats to clinic patients or their families. Similarly, if the blanket ban on “images observable” was intended to reduce the level of anxiety and hypertension suffered by the patients inside the clinic, it would still fail. The only plausible reason a patient would be bothered by “images observable” inside the clinic would be if the patient found the expression contained in such images disagreeable. But it is much easier for the clinic to pull its curtains than for a patient to stop up her ears, and no more is required to avoid seeing placards through the windows of the clinic. This provision of the injunction violates the First Amendment.
D
The state court ordered that petitioners refrain from physically approaching any person seeking services of the clinic “unless such person indicates a desire to communicate” in an area within 300 feet of the clinic. The state court was attempting to prevent clinic patients and staff from being “stalked” or “shadowed” by the petitioners as they approached the clinic. See International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U. S. 672, 684 (1992) (“[F]ace-to-face solicitation presents risks of duress that are an appropriate target of regulation. The skillful, and unprincipled, solicitor can target the most vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those suffering physical impairment and who cannot easily avoid the solicitation”).
But it is difficult, indeed, to justify a prohibition on all uninvited approaches of persons seeking the services of the clinic, regardless of how peaceful the contact may be, without burdening more speech than necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic. Absent evidence that the protesters’ speech is independently proscribable (i. e., “fighting words” or threats), or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm, see Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U. S., at 292-293, this provision cannot stand. “As a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.” Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S., at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted). The “consent” requirement alone invalidates this provision; it burdens more speech than is necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic.
E
The final substantive regulation challenged by petitioners relates to a prohibition against picketing, demonstrating, or using sound amplification equipment within 300 feet of the residences of clinic staff. The prohibition also covers impeding access to streets that provide the sole access to streets on which those residences are located. The same analysis applies to the use of sound amplification equipment here as that discussed above: the government may simply demand that petitioners turn down the volume if the protests overwhelm the neighborhood. Grayned, 408 U. S., at 116.
As for the picketing, our prior decision upholding a law banning targeted residential picketing remarked on the unique nature of the home, as “ ‘the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick.’ ” Frisby, 487 U. S., at 484. We stated that “‘[t]he State’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.’ ” Ibid.
But the 300-foot zone around the residences in this case is much larger than the zone provided for in the ordinance which we approved in Frisby. The ordinance at issue there made it “ ‘unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual.’” Id., at 477. The prohibition was limited to “focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence.” Id., at 483. By contrast, the 300-foot zone would ban “[g]eneral marching through residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire block of houses.” Ibid. The record before us does not contain sufficient justification for this broad a ban on picketing; it appears that a limitation on the time, duration of picketing, and number of pickets outside a smaller zone could have accomplished the desired result.
IV
Petitioners also challenge the state court’s order as being vague and overbroad. They object to the portion of the injunction making it applicable to those acting “in concert” with the named parties. But petitioners themselves are named parties in the order, and they therefore lack standing to challenge a portion of the order applying to persons who are not parties. Nor is that phrase subject, at the behest of petitioners, to a challenge for “overbreadth”; the phrase itself does not prohibit any conduct, but is simply directed at unnamed parties who might later be found to be acting “in concert” with the named parties. As such, the case is governed by our holding in Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 9, 14 (1945). There a party subject to an injunction argued that the order was invalid because of a provision that it applied to “successors and assigns” of the enjoined party. Noting that the party pressing the claim was not a successor or assign, we characterized the matter as “an abstract controversy over the use of these words.” Id., at 15.
Petitioners also contend that the “in concert” provision of the injunction impermissibly limits their freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment. See, e. g., Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition For Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290 (1981). But petitioners are not enjoined from associating with others or from joining with them to express a particular viewpoint. The freedom of association protected by the First Amendment does not extend to joining with others for the purpose of depriving third parties of their lawful rights.
V
In sum, we uphold the noise restrictions and the 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveway because they burden no more speech than necessary to eliminate the unlawful conduct targeted by the state court’s injunction. We strike down as unconstitutional the 36-foot buffer zone as applied to the private property to the north and west of the clinic, the “images observable” provision, the 300-foot no
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mb. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly considered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner’s refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant.
I
Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne to the office of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia one day in June 1975. Government surveillance previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne was used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne’s suggestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would answer some questions. Although petitioner was present voluntarily, the investigators gave him the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). They also told him that he was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would stay, the investigators asked whether he knew “Boo” Thornton, then the principal target of the heroin investigation. Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton on several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed drug transactions with Thornton in certain intercepted telephone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code words used in the conversations. When asked to name suppliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. Although the investigators warned petitioner that the extent of his cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he provided no further information.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to distribute heroin, 21 U. S. C. §§ 841, 846, and four counts of using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21 U. S. C. § 843 (b). He retained a lawyer, who rejected the Government’s continued efforts to enlist petitioner’s assistance. In March 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of 4 to 15 years’ imprisonment, 3 years’ special parole, and a $5,000 fine. The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately disclosed to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187 U. S. App. D. C. 90, 570 F. 2d 999 (1977).
On remand, petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of telephone misuse under an agreement that permitted the Government to seek a substantial sentence. The Government filed a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of 16 to 48 months each and a $5,000 fine. The memorandum cited petitioner’s previous conviction for 10 counts of bank robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subsequent refusal to name suppliers. The memorandum also emphasized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin to support his extravagant lifestyle while unemployed and on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal and that codefendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent sentences that would result in his immediate release. He directed the court’s attention to petitioner’s voluntary confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify other members of the conspiracy because he “wasn’t that involved in it.” App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the request for probation was “ironic” in light of petitioner’s refusal to cooperate in the investigation over the course of “many, many years, knowing what he faces.” Id., at 36. Thus, the Government could not ask the court “to take into account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that the defendant has cooperated. . . .” Ibid. Stressing the seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitigation, the Government recommended a substantial prison term.
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of one to four years on each count and a special parole term of three years, but it declined to impose a fine. The court explained that these sentences were appropriate because petitioner was on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the offenses, and because he was a dealer who had refused to cooperate with the Government. Petitioner again appealed, contending for the first time that the sentencing court should not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term but otherwise affirmed the judgment. 195 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 600 F. 2d 815 (1979). We granted cer-tiorari, 444 U. S. 822 (1979), and we now affirm.
II
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the United States district courts require no extensive elaboration. Congress has directed that
“[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” 18 U. S. C. § 3577.
See also 21 U. S. C. § 850. This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy of the modern conception that “the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.” Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 45-50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the “fundamental sentencing principle” that “ ‘a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.’ ” Id., at 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 446 (1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process objections to sentences imposed on the basis of “misinformation of constitutional magnitude.” United States v. Tucker, supra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 740-741 (1948).
No such misinformation was present in this case. The sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts. There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested assistance. Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with the authorities is a “laudable endeavor” that bears a “rational connection to a defendant’s willingness to shape up and change his behavior. . . .” Brief for Petitioner 17. Unless a different explanation is provided, a defendant’s refusal to assist in the investigation of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference that these laudable attitudes are lacking.
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime has been condemned throughout our history. The citizen’s duty to “raise the ‘hue and cry’ and report felonies to the authorities,” Branzburg. v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696 (1972), was an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at least as early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522; see Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 9, p. 43 (1275); Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, chs. 1, 4, and 6, pp. 112-115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States enacted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone who, “having knowledge of the actual commission of [certain felonies,] shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and make known the same to [the appropriate] authority. . . .” Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 6, 1 Stat. 113. Although the term “misprision of felony” now has an archaic ring, gross indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship.
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished when the witness to crime is involved in illicit activities himself. Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against self-incrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal defendant no less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities. The petitioner, for example, was asked to expose the purveyors of heroin in his own community in exchange for a favorable disposition of his case. By declining to cooperate, petitioner rejected an “obligatio[n] of community life” that should be recognized before rehabilitation can begin. See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437 (1958). Moreover, petitioner’s refusal to cooperate protected his former partners in crime, thereby preserving his ability to resume criminal activities upon release. Few facts available to a sentencing judge are more relevant to “ 'the likelihood that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the hope that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with a lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or does not deem himself at war with his society.’ ” United States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States v. Hendrix, 505 F. 2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974).
III
Petitioner does not seriously contend that disregard for the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is irrelevant, to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He rather contends that his failure to cooperate was justified by legitimate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. In view of these concerns, petitioner asserts that his refusal to act as an informer has no bearing on his prospects for rehabilitation. He also believes that the District Court punished him for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
These arguments would have merited serious consideration if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge. But the mere possibility of unarticulated explanations or excuses for antisocial conduct does not make that conduct irrelevant to the sentencing decision. The District Court had no opportunity to consider the theories that petitioner now advances, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner’s appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that his intransi-gency would be used against him, neither he nor his lawyer offered any explanation to the sentencing court. Even after the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate could, be viewed as evidence of continuing criminal intent, petitioner remained silent.
Petitioner insists that he. had a constitutional right to remain silent and that no adverse inferences can be drawn from the exercise of that right. We find this argument singularly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing. At least where the Government has no substantial reason to believe that the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating, the privilege may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a timely fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653-655 (1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970) ; see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 574-575 (1976) (opinion of Burgee, C. J.); id., at 591-594 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 113 (1927), petitioner “did not assert his privilege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination. His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought.” The Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege “must be deemed waived if not in some manner fairly brought to the attention of the tribunal which must pass upon it.” Ibid. Thus, if petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged, he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court could have determined whether his claim was legitimate.
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary rule by arguing that Miranda warnings supplied additional protection for his right to remain silent. But the right to silence described in those warnings derives from the Fifth Amendment and adds nothing to it. Although Miranda’s requirement of specific warnings creates a limited exception to the rule that the privilege must be claimed, the exception does not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which it was designed. The warnings protect persons who, exposed to such interrogation without the assistance of counsel, otherwise might be unable to make a free and informed choice to remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 475-476; see Garner v. United States, supra, at 657.
There was no custodial interrogation in this case. Petitioner volunteered his confession at his first interview with investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim that he was coerced. Thereafter, petitioner was represented by counsel who was fully apprised — as was petitioner — that the extent of petitioner’s cooperation could be expected to affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner’s unwillingness to provide information vital to law enforcement was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of self-incrimination.
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have impaired his “ ‘free'choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.’ ” Garner v. United States, supra, at 657, quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 241 (1941). His conduct bears no resemblance to the “insolubly ambiguous” postarrest silence that may be induced by the assurances contained in Miranda warnings. Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, 617-618 (1976). We conclude that the District Court committed no constitutional error. If we were to invalidate petitioner’s sentence on the record before us, we would sanction an unwarranted interference with a function traditionally vested in the trial courts. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U. S. 424, 440-441 (1974). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Petitioner’s intercepted conversations with Thornton apparently could have provided the basis for 13 counts of unlawful use of a telephone. App. 36.
The maximum sentence on each count was four years’ imprisonment and a $30,000 fine. 21 U. S. C. § 843 (c). you have had prior involvement with the law. In this case you were clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity and failed to cooperate with the Government.” App. 40.
Before imposing sentence, the court explained:
“Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very carefully. We have noted again you were on parole from a bank robbery conviction, which
See, e. g., ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty § 1.8 (a)(v) (App. Draft 1968); id., at 48-49; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F. R. D. 406, 413-414 (1966); cf. R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170 (2d ed. 1975).
We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between “enhancing” the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the “leniency” he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The question for decision is simply whether petitioner’s failure to cooperate is relevant to the currently understood goals of sentencing. We do note, however, that Judge MacKinnon, author of the opinion reversing petitioner’s first conviction, observed on the basis of his “complete familiarity with the facts of this entire case” that the petitioner’s current sentence is a “very light” one. 195 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 9, 600 F. 2d 815, 823 (1979) (separate statement on denial of rehearing en banc). The sentence of two to eight years’ imprisonment certainly was not a severe penalty for a “substantial drug distributor,” ibid., who plied his trade while on parole from a prior conviction for bank robbery.
The statute, as amended, is still in effect. 18 U. S. C. § 4. It has been construed to require “both knowledge of a crime and some affirmative act of concealment or participation.” See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696, n. 36 (1972).
The Court recognized in Gamer v. United States, 424 U. S., at 656-657, that this rule is subject to exception when some coercive factor prevents an individual from claiming the privilege or impairs his choice to remain silent. No such factor has been identified in this case. See infra, at 561.
See Gamer v. United States, supra, at 658, n. 11; Hoffman v. United States, 341 V. S. 479, 486 (1951); Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362, 364-366 (1917); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F. 2d 72, 76-77 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 911 (1971). It is the duty of a court to determine the legitimacy of a witness’ reliance upon the Fifth Amendment. Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374-375 (1951). A witness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he simply would prefer not to give.
In United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977), the Court explained that “[a] 11 Miranda’s safeguards, which are designed to avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing compulsion which the Court thought was caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody.”
The District Court found that petitioner freely waived his Miranda rights when he first confessed his involvement in the conspiracy. Tr. 40 (Oct. 17, 1975); see App. 16, n. 4.
The dissenting opinion asserts that the record reflects an “improper involvement of the judicial office in the prosecutorial function.” Post, at 567. We find no basis for this contention. The District Court did not participate in the plea-bargaining process; it merely undertook a retrospective review of petitioner’s character, record, and criminal conduct in accordance with applicable law. 18 U. S. C. § 3577; Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32 (c). And a defendant who failed even to raise the possibility of self-incrimination or retaliation over a course of three years is hardly in a position to complain that he was “put to an unfair choice.” Post, at 568.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action for injunctive relief and treble damages alleging violations of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2, was brought in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against the petitioners in No. 309, American Federation of Musicians and its Local 802. The question is whether union practices of the petitioners affecting orchestra leaders violate the Sherman Act as activities in combination with a “non-labor” group, or are exempted by the Norris-LaGuardia Act as activities affecting a “labor” group which is party to a “labor dispute.” After a five-week trial without a jury the District Court dismissed the action on the merits, holding that all of the petitioners’ practices brought in question “come within the definition of the term 'labor dispute’ . . . and are exempt from the antitrust laws.” 241 F. Supp. 865, 894. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on the issue of alleged price fixing, but in all other respects affirmed the dismissal. 372 F. 2d 155. Both parties sought certiorari, in No. 309 the petitioners from the reversal of the dismissal in respect of alleged price fixing, and in No. 310 the respondents from the affirmance of the dismissal in the other respects. We granted both petitions, 389 U. S. 817. We hold that the District Court properly dismissed the action on the merits, and that the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the District Court judgment in its entirety.
I.
The petitioners are labor unions of professional musicians. The union practices questioned here are mainly those applied to “club-date” engagements of union members. These are one-time engagements of orchestras to provide music, usually for only a few hours, at such social events as weddings, fashion shows, commencements, and the like. The purchaser of the music, e. g., the father of the bride, the chairman of the events, etc., makes arrangements with a musician, or with a musician’s booking agent, for an orchestra of a conductor and a given number of instrumentalists, or “sidemen,” at a specified time and place. The musician in such cases assumes the role of “leader” of the orchestra, obtains the “sidemen” and attends to the bookkeeping and other details of the engagement. Usually the “leader” performs with the orchestra, sometimes only conducting but often also playing an instrument. When he does not personally appear, he designates a “subleader” who conducts for him and often also plays an instrument.
A musician performing “club-dates” may perform in different capacities on the same day or during the same week, at times as leader and other times as subleader or sideman. The four respondents, however, are musicians who usually act as leaders and maintain offices and employ personnel to solicit engagements through advertising and personal contacts. When two or more engagements are accepted for the same time, each of the respondents will conduct, and, except respondent Peterson, sometimes play, at one and designate a subleader to perform the functions of leader at the other.
The four respondents were members of the petitioner Federation and Local 802 when this suit was filed. Virtually all musicians in the United States and the great majority of the orchestra leaders are union members. There are no collective bargaining agreements in the club-date field. Club-date engagements are rigidly regulated by unilaterally adopted union bylaws and regulations. Under these bylaws and regulations
(1) Petitioners enforce a closed shop and exert various pressures upon orchestra leaders to become union members.
(2) Orchestra leaders must engage a minimum number of sidemen for club-date engagements.
(3) Orchestra leaders must charge purchasers of music minimum prices prescribed in a “Price List Booklet.” The prices are the total of (a) the minimum wage scales for sidemen, (b) a “leader’s fee” which is double the sideman’s scale when four or more musicians compose the orchestra, and (c) an additional 8% to cover social security, unemployment insurance, and other expenses. When the leader does not personally appear at an engagement, but designates a subleader and four or more musicians perform, the leader must pay the subleader one and one-half times the wage scale out of his “leader’s fee.”
(4) Orchestra leaders are required to use a form of contract, called the Form B contract, for all engagements. In the club-date field, however, Local 802 accepts assurances that the terms of club-date engagements comply with all union regulations and provide for payment of the minimum wage. Union business agents police compliance.
(5) Additional regulations apply to traveling engagements. The leader of a traveling orchestra must charge 10% more than the minimum price of either the home local or of the local in whose territory the orchestra is playing, whichever is greater.
(6) Orchestra leaders are prohibited from accepting engagements from or making any payments to caterers.
(7) Orchestra leaders may accept engagements made by booking agents only if the booking agents have been licensed by the unions under standard forms of license agreements provided by the unions.
The District Court assumed, and the Court of Appeals held, that orchestra leaders in the club-date field are employers and independent contractors. Respondents argue that petitioners’ involvement' of the orchestra leaders in the promulgation and enforcement of the challenged regulations and bylaws creates a combination or conspiracy with a “non-labor” group which violates the Sherman Act. Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U. S. 797, 800; Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U. S. 94; Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657. But the Court of Appeals concurred in the finding of the District Court that such orchestra leaders, although deemed to be employers and independent contractors, constitute not a “non-labor” group but a “labor” group. 372 F. 2d, at 168.
The criterion applied by the District Court in determining that the orchestra leaders were a “labor” group and parties to a “labor dispute” was the “presence of a job or wage competition or some other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests between the union members and the independent contractors. If such a relationship existed the independent contractors were a 'labor group’ and party to a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.” 241 F. Supp., at 887. The Court of Appeals held, and we agree, that this is a correct statement of the applicable principles. The Norris-LaGuardia Act took all “labor disputes” as therein defined outside the reach of the Sherman Act and established that the allowable area of union activity was not to be restricted to an immediate employer-employee relation. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 229-236; Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, supra, at 805-806; Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, supra, at 103; Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., 311 U. S. 91. “This Court has recognized that a legitimate aim of any national labor organization is to obtain uniformity of labor standards and that a consequence of such union activity may be to eliminate competition based on differences in such standards.” Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 666.
The District Court found that the orchestra leaders performed work and functions which actually or potentially affected the hours, wages, job security, and working conditions of petitioners’ members. These findings have substantial support in the evidence and in the light of the job and wage competition thus established, both courts correctly held that it was lawful for petitioners to pressure the orchestra leaders to become union members, Los Angeles Meat Drivers, supra, and Milk Wagon Drivers’, supra, to insist upon a closed shop, United States v. American Federation of Musicians, 318 U. S. 741, affirming 47 F. Supp. 304, to refuse to bargain collectively with the leaders, see Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U. S. 821, to impose the minimum employment quotas complained of, United States v. American Federation of Musicians, supra, to require the orchestra leaders to use the Form B contract, see Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 362 U. S. 605 (Oliver II), and to favor local musicians by requiring that higher wages be paid to musicians from outside a local’s jurisdiction, Rambusch Decorating Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters, 105 F. 2d 134.
The District Court also sustained the legality of the “Price List” stating, “In view of the competition between leaders and sidemen and subleaders which underlies the finding that the leaders are a labor group, the union has a legitimate interest in fixing minimum fees for a participating leader and minimum engagement prices equal to the total minimum wages of the sidemen and the participating leader.” 241 F. Supp., at 890. The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, disagreed that the “Price List” was within the labor exemption, stating that “the unions’ establishment of price floors on orchestral engagements constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Act.” 372 F. 2d, at 165. The premise of the majority’s conclusion was that the “Price List” was disqualified for the exemption because its concern is “prices” and not “wages.” But this overlooks the necessity of inquiry beyond the form. Mr. Justice White’s opinion in Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U. S. 676, 690, n. 5, emphasized that “[t]he crucial determinant is not the form of the agreement — e. g., prices or wages — but its relative impact on the product market and the interests of union members.” It is therefore not dispositive of the question that petitioners’ regulation in form establishes price floors. The critical inquiry is whether the price floors in actuality operate to protect the wages of the subleader and sidemen. The District Court found that the price floors were expressly designed to and did function as a protection of sidemen’s and subleaders’ wage scales against the job and wage competition of the leaders. The Court said:
“As a consequence of this relationship, the practices of [orchestra leaders] when they lead and play must have a vital effect on the working conditions of the non-leader members of the union. If they undercut the union wage scale or do not adhere to union regulations regarding hours or other working conditions when they perform they will undermine these union standards. They would put pressure on the union members they compete with to correspondingly lower their own demands.” 241 F. Supp., at 888.
The Court of Appeals itself expressed a similar view in saying:
“even those orchestra leaders who, as employers in club dates, lead but never perform as players, are proper subjects for membership because they are in job competition with union sub-leaders; each time a non-union orchestra leader performs, he displaces a ‘union job’ with a ‘non-union job.’ ” 372 F. 2d, at 168.
And of particular significance, the Court of Appeals noted that where the leader performs
“the services of a sub-leader would not be required and the leader may in this way save the wages he would otherwise have to pay. Consequently, he could make the services of his orchestra available at a lower price than could a non-performing leader.” 372 F. 2d, at 166.
Thus the price floors, including the minimums for leaders, are simply a means for coping with the job and wage competition of the leaders to protect the wage scales of musicians who respondents concede are employees on club-dates, namely sidemen and subleaders. As such the provisions of the “Price List” establishing those floors are indistinguishable in their effect from the collective bargaining provisions in Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283 (Oliver I), which we held governed not prices but the mandatory bargaining subject of wages. The precise issue in Oliver I was whether Article XXXII of a multi-employer, multistate collective bargaining agreement between the Teamsters Union and a bargaining organization of motor carriers dealt with a mandatory subject of bargaining. Article XXXII provided that drivers who own and drive their own vehicles should be paid, in addition to the prescribed driver’s wage, not less than a prescribed minimum rental for the use of their vehicles. We held that the article was a wage and not a price provision, saying:
“The inadequacy of a rental which means that the owner makes up his excess costs from his driver’s wages not only clearly bears a close relation to labor’s efforts to improve working conditions but is in fact of vital concern to the carrier’s employed drivers; an inadequate rental might mean the progressive curtailment of jobs through withdrawal of more and more carrier-owned vehicles from service. . . .” 358 U. S., at 294.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals that “[t]he circumstances constituting a possible threat to the employment of sub-leaders or the displacement of a sideman . . . are not at all comparable,” 372 F. 2d, at 166. The price floors here serve the identical ends served by Article XXXII in Oliver I. The Price List has in common with Article XXXII the objective to protect employees’ job opportunities and wages from job and wage competition of other union members — in the case of the Article, drivers when they drive their own vehicles, and in the case of the Price List, musicians on the occasions they are leaders and play a role as employers. Like the Article, the Price List is therefore “a direct and frontal attack upon a problem thought to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage structure . . . .” 358 U. S., at 294.
The majority of the Court of Appeals apparently regarded Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, supra, as militating against this conclusion. The majority read the opinions of Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Goldberg in that case as requiring a holding that “mandatory subjects of collective bargaining carry with them an exemption . . . ,” but that “[o]n matters outside of the mandatory area ... no such considerations govern . . . .” 372 F. 2d, at 165. Even if only mandatory subjects of bargaining enjoy the exemption — a question not in this case and upon which we express no view — nothing Mr. Justice White or Mr. Justice Goldberg said remotely suggests that the distinction between mandatory and nonmandatory subjects turns on the form of the method taken to protect a wage scale, here a price floor. To the contrary, we pointed out above that Mr. Justice White’s opinion emphasized that the “crucial determinant is not the form of the agreement . . .” and cited Oliver I as settling that proposition. 381 U. S., at 690, n. 5.
The reasons which entitle the Price List to the exemption embrace the provision fixing the minimum price for a club-date engagement when the orchestra leader does not perform, and does not displace an employee-musician. That regulation is also justified as a means of preserving the scale of the sidemen and subleaders. There was evidence that when the leader does not collect from the purchaser of the music an amount sufficient to make up the total of his out-of-pocket expenses, including the sum of his wage-scale wages and the scale wages of the sidemen, he will, in fact, not pay the sidemen the prescribed scale. The District Court found:
“It is unquestionably true that skimping on the part of the person who sets up the engagement [the leader] so that his costs are not covered is likely to have an adverse effect on the fees paid to the participating musicians. By fixing a reasonable amount over the sum of the minimum wages of the musicians participating in an engagement to cover these expenses, the union insures that ‘no part of the labor costs paid to a [leader] would be diverted by him for overhead or other non-labor costs.’ ” 241 F. Supp., at 891.
In other words, the price of the product — here the price for an orchestra for a club-date — represents almost entirely the scale wages of the sidemen and the leader. Unlike most industries, except for the 8% charge, there are no other costs contributing to the price. Therefore, if leaders cut prices, inevitably wages must be cut.
The analyses of Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Goldberg in Jewel Tea support our conclusion. Jewel Tea did not hold that an agreement respecting marketing hours would always come within the labor exemption. Rather, that case held that such an agreement was lawful because it was found that the marketing-hours restriction had a substantial effect on hours worked by the union members. Similarly, the price-list requirement is brought within the labor exemption under the finding that the requirement is necessary to assure that scale wages will be paid to the sidemen and the leader. If the union may not require that the full-time leader charge the purchaser of the music an amount sufficient to compensate him for the time he spends selecting musicians and performing the other musical functions involved in leading, the full-time leader may compete with other union members who seek the same jobs through price differentiation in the product market based on differences in a labor standard. His situation is identical to that of a truck owner in Oliver I who does not charge an amount sufficient to compensate him for the value of his labor services in driving the truck, and is a situation which the union can prevent consistent with its antitrust exemption. There can be no differentiation between the leader who appears with his orchestra and the one who on occasion hires a subleader. In either case part of the union-prescribed “leader’s fee” is attributable to service rendered in either conducting or playing and part to the service rendered in selecting musicians, bookkeeping, etc. The only difference is that in the former situation the leader keeps the entire fee while in the latter he is required to pay that part of it attributable to playing or conducting to the subleader. In this respect we agree with the view espoused by Judge Friendly in his separate opinion, 372 F. 2d, at 168-170.
We think also that the caterer and booking agent restrictions “are at least as intimately bound up with the subject of wages,” Oliver II, supra, at 606, as the price floors. The District Court found that the booking agent regulations were adopted because of experience that “many booking agents charged exorbitant fees to members and booked engagements for musicians at wages which were below union scale.” 241 F. Supp., at 881-882. On the basis of these findings, the District Court concluded:
“Because the activities of the booking agents here have and had a direct and substantial effect on the wages of the members of [the unions], I find that they are in an economic interrelationship with the members . . . such that the [unions] are justified in regulating their activities .... Furthermore, I find the regulations to be reasonably related to their interest in maintaining observance of union scale wages and working conditions.” 241 F. Supp., at 893.
The finding concerning the caterer regulations was to the same effect.
“The evidence discloses that caterers took advantage of their position before the union adopted its regulations to, in effect, book orchestras and they continue to do so, at least to some extent. Caterers recommend orchestras to customers and receive commissions from orchestra leaders. These practices actually or potentially affect the wages of the musicians involved.
“I believe that this constitutes an economic interrelationship which permits the defendants to regulate and prohibit the booking activities of the caterers without violating the Sherman Act.” 241 F. Supp., at 893.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the cases are remanded with direction to enter a judgment affirming the judgment of the District Court in its entirety.
It is so ordered.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Peterson and Carroll, respondents in No. 309, filed the first action in July 1960 and the other in December 1960. The latter was brought to challenge an increase in the musicians’ wage scale adopted after the first complaint was filed. The other respondents were allowed to intervene. By stipulation the testimony in Carroll v. Associated Musicians, 206 F. Supp. 462, 316 F. 2d 574, and Cutler v. American Federation of Musicians, 211 F. Supp. 433, 316 F. 2d 546, was made part of the record.
§ 13 (c), 47 Stat. 73, 29 U. S. C. § 113 (c); see also §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 738, 15 U. S. C. § 17, 29 U. S. C. §52.
“Musical engagements are generally classified as either ‘steady/ those lasting for longer than one week, or ‘single/ usually one day or one performance affairs but including all engagements lasting less than one week. The much sought after steady engagements are rare in comparison with the number of single engagements.
“The predominant form of single engagement is the ‘club date’.... Single engagements also include the ‘non-club date’ field, consisting of television appearances or recording engagements, etc. . . .” 372 F. 2d, at 158.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that respondents did not prove that they properly represented a class under former Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (a), 241 F. Supp., at 884-886; 372 F. 2d, at 161-163. The record sustains this conclusion. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32. Since all of the respondents either play an instrument or conduct their orchestras unless they book more than one engagement for the same time, we do not have before us a leader who merely books engagements and never appears with his orchestra.
Carroll and Peterson have since been expelled from membership. See 241 F. Supp., at 870. Both are still permitted to book engagements and hire musicians to play at them but cannot appear with their orchestra either as conductors or instrumentalists. See Carroll v. American Federation of Musicians, 310 F. 2d 325.
“The distinction, between the kinds of single engagements is vital; the non-club date engagements are ordinarily governed by collective bargaining agreements .... The same is usually true of the steady engagement field. Local 802 has collective bargaining agreements with the major users or 'purchasers’ of live music within its area such as recording companies, hotels, television and film producers, opera companies and theatres.” 372 F. 2d, at 158.
See 241 F. Supp., at 887; 372 F. 2d, at 159. We need not decide the question.
The Court of Appeals also found “no evidence of a conspiracy between Local 802, or the Federation, and orchestra leaders to eliminate competitors, fix prices or achieve any other commercial restraint, nor was such a finding made by the district judge. Rather, the record establishes that all restraints were instituted unilaterally by the unions and acquiesced in by the orchestra leaders.” 372 F. 2d, at 164; see 241 F. Supp., at 891.
“[I]n the club date and hotel steady engagement fields . . . orchestra leaders are in competition with employee members of the . . . unions regarding jobs, wages and other working conditions. As a result, they comprise a labor group in these fields.” 241 F. Supp., at 887-888.
The “Price List” establishes only a minimum charge; there is no attempt to set a maximum. Nor does the union attempt by its minimum charge to assure the leader a profit above the fair value of his labor services. The District Court found no evidence “which indicates that the increment to the [leader] is unrelated to his costs in that function.” 241 F. Supp., at 891. See also 372 F. 2d, at 170 (Friendly, J., in separate opinion): “A different result might be warranted if the floor were set so high as to cover not merely compensation for the additional services rendered by a leader but entrepreneurial profit as well. But there has been no such showing here.”
Because of the intense competition for positions as leader, the full-time leader “displaces” another union member simply by securing an engagement for himself. Union members who act principally as sidemen and subleaders but who act occasionally as leaders “bid for the same jobs as full-time leaders such as plaintiffs and perform the same musical service when they get a job. They also perform in the same places as full-time leaders.” 241 F. Supp., at 872.
Only two things can happen when the leader does not charge the specified minimum; either he works below union scale or the musicians he employs work below union scale. In either event the result is price competition through differences of standards in the labor market.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissing an indictment against the appellees here. 18 U. S. C. § 3731. That indictment, 18 U. S. C. § 1621, charged each appellee with the crime of perjury while testifying in a prior criminal trial. The former trial was on charges of using “third degree” methods to force confessions from prisoners.
In that prior trial, six defendants — the four appellees and two others not here involved — were prosecuted under an indictment, four counts of which charged them, 18 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 51, now 18 U. S. C. § 241, with conspiring “to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate [under color of state law, four citizens of the United States] in the free exercise and enjoyment of the rights and privileges secured . . . and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ,”
The other four counts of the indictment, 18 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 52, now 18 U. S. C. § 242, charged that Williams, Bombaci, Ford, and another not here involved, as police officers acting under state laws, committed substantive crimes by subjecting four persons to deprivation of certain “of the rights, privileges and immunities secured . . . and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” and that Yuhas and another wilfully aided and abetted in the commission of these substantive offenses.
In the prior trial, during which this indictment charges perjury was committed, Williams was found guilty by a jury of the substantive offenses. His conviction is affirmed today. See No. 365, Williams v. United States, post, p. 97. The jury found Bombaci and Ford not guilty of these offenses and Yuhas not guilty of aiding and abetting in the commission of these offenses. However, the jury was unable to agree on a verdict as to the four counts which charged conspiracy. Later a new indictment was presented which framed once again the conspiracy charges, and this time the appellees in this case were found guilty. The perjury charges now before us are not based on the proceedings in the second conspiracy trial. On appeal from the conviction in the second trial, and before the trial for perjury, the Court of Appeals quashed the conspiracy indictment and reversed. So far as here important, the basis for the reversal was that § 241 did not apply to the general rights extended to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment. 179 F. 2d 644, 648. This Court, today, affirms the Court of Appeals. No. 26, United States v. Williams, decided today, post, p. 70.
In dismissing the indictment in the case now before us, the District Court held, 93 F. Supp. 922, that since Williams had been convicted in the first trial of the substantive counts based upon his beating certain victims, to convict Williams of perjury for testifying that he had not beaten the victims — which is the gist of the perjury indictment against Williams — would constitute double jeopardy.
The District Court further reasoned that the jury’s finding that Yuhas, Ford and Bombaci had not been guilty of the substantive offenses in the first trial, was a determination of their innocence “whether as principals or accessories,” and therefore none of the three could be found guilty of the charge made by the perjury indictment: testifying falsely that they had not seen or observed Williams beating the victims.
Finally, the District Court reasoned that since the later indictment which repeated the conspiracy charges had been quashed on appeal, there was no jurisdiction to try the defendants on the conspiracy counts in the first criminal trial, and therefore the perjury counts based on the conspiracy counts in the prior case were bad.
The United States in its appeal urges that the District Court erred in all three grounds for quashing the perjury indictment. The federal perjury statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1621, reads as follows:
“Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
Its terms cover parties as well as other witnesses. If any incident or judgment of a former trial bars a prosecution for perjury under § 1621, that effect must be imported into the perjury trial by a legal rule distinct from the statute.
I. Former Jeopardy. — The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U. S. C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. “It is only an identity of offenses which is fatal.” Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640, 644, and cases cited. The trial court does not cite any authority for a contrary position, and appellees concede that the ground for dismissal cannot be sustained. It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. Appellees' brief treats Williams’ conviction as grounds for estoppel or res judicata.
II. Res Judicata. — Though former jeopardy by trial for the substantive crimes is not available as a defense against this perjury indictment, it could be that acquittal on the substantive charges would operate “to conclude those matters in issue which the verdict determined though the offenses be different.” Sealfon v. United States, 332 U. S. 575, 578.
Petitioner in the Sealfon case was acquitted of a conspiracy charge of defrauding the United States of its governmental function of conserving and rationing sugar. One item of evidence was a letter to an alleged co-conspirator said to furnish a basis for getting sugar illegally. On another indictment for uttering false invoices for the same sugar involved in the conspiracy, Sealfon moved to quash on the ground of res judicata. The motion was denied and Sealfon was convicted. The test of the soundness of the motion was whether the “verdict in the conspiracy trial was a determination favorable to petitioner of the facts essential to conviction of the substantive offense.” P. 578. We thought the acquittal of conspiracy determined that Sealfon did not conspire with Greenberg, the only alleged co-conspirator. Admittedly Sealfon wrote a certain letter. “As we read the records of the two trials, petitioner could be convicted of either offense only on proof that he wrote the letter pursuant to an agreement with Greenberg.” P. 580. The core of the two cases was the same. As the first trial cleared him of sending the letter pursuant to a corrupt agreement, that fact was res judicata. A like basis for res judicata does not exist here.
Ford and Bombaci were acquitted in the former trial on all counts charging substantive crimes. Yuhas was charged and acquitted of aiding and abetting. We shall assume with the District Court that Ford and Bombaci were acquitted also of that charge. 18 U. S. C. § 2 (a). In essence the first prosecution was for arrest and abuse through beatings by police officers Williams, Ford and Bombad, acting under the laws of Florida, with Yuhas aiding and abetting. The perjury charged in this present indictment, allegedly committed at that former trial in which all except Williams were acquitted of the substantive offenses, is that the three acquitted men testified falsely that they had not seen Williams abuse the prisoner. The trial court thought that “Whether they had seen or observed Williams beat the victims was a part and parcel of the charge against them in the substantive counts” of abuse and aiding and abetting the abuse. Ehrlich v. United States, 145 F. 2d 693, was cited. 93 F. Supp. 922.
We do not think the facts bring any of these defendants within the protection of res judicata, as recently expounded in Sealfon. Aiding and abetting means to assist the perpetrator of the crime. The substantive former charge against appellees here was abuse of a prisoner by police officers under color of state law. An acquittal of such a crime or of aiding and abetting was certainly not a determination that Ford, Bombaci or Yuhas did not see Williams assaulting the prisoners.
III. The counts in this indictment which charge that perjury was committed in the first conspiracy trial rely on the same facts to prove the perjury as are detailed above to support the counts of the indictment which charge perjury in the trial of the substantive counts. The trial court in the present case dismissed the counts for perjury committed in the first trial of the conspiracy charge for a different reason than it gave for dismissal of the other perjury counts. In the first trial no verdict was reached by the jury on the conspiracy counts. The trial court in this case, however, relying upon the determination of the Fifth Circuit in the second conspiracy trial, Williams v. United States, 179 F. 2d 644 (now affirmed here, No. 26, United States v. Williams, post, p. 70, decided today), ruled that the former conspiracy indictment did not state an offense, and consequently perjury could not have been committed. The court said it reached this conclusion because the court that tried the conspiracy indictment had “no jurisdiction.” Evidently, the trial court was led to this conclusion by the requirement of the perjury statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1621, that there must be a “competent tribunal” before a false statement is perjurious.
The charge in the conspiracy counts that the appellees, police officers and others, conspired to abuse a prisoner in their hands was based on 18 U. S. C. § 241. The District Court had jurisdiction of offenses against the laws of the United States. 18 U. S. C. § 3231. Hence, it had jurisdiction of the subject matter, to wit, an alleged violation of a federal conspiracy statute, and, of course, of the persons charged. This made the trial take place before “a competent tribunal”: a court authorized to render judgment on the indictment. The circumstance that ultimately it is determined on appeal that the indictment is defective does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court to determine the case presented by the indictment.
This was held as to a civil proceeding in Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678. In that case, a suit in a federal district court for damages against federal officers for violation of plaintiff's rights to due process in arrest and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments was held to give the district court jurisdiction sufficient to call for judgment on the merits, even though that judgment should dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. P. 682. “Jurisdiction is the power to decide a justiciable controversy, and includes questions of law as well as of fact.” Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291, 305. Even the unconstitutionality of the statute under which the proceeding is brought does not oust a court of jurisdiction. Chicot County District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 376. See also Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165; M’Cormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192.
It is true that there are certain essential facts that must exist to give any power to a court. Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U. S. 165, 173. As the existence of those facts are so plainly necessary, e. g. process, examples of decisions are rare. Absence of such facts makes the proceedings a nullity. Such a case was Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U. S. 433. We there held that the Federal Government, in the exercise of its plenary power over bankruptcy, had ousted state courts of all independent power over farmer bankrupts. Therefore any subsequent orders in the state courts were void. Pp. 440-444. In a criminal case we have said that a person convicted by a court without jurisdiction over the place of the crime could be released from restraint by habeas corpus where there were exceptional circumstances such as a conflict of jurisdiction between the state and the Federal Government. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 27. The kind of judicial controversies presented for adjudication in the cases cited above in this paragraph were not cognizable by the respective courts. It is absence of such basic facts of jurisdiction that has led courts to say that false testimony in the proceedings is not punishable as perjury. Where perjury charges arise from alleged false statements by the defendant in former trials, whether in that former trial he was also a defendant or only a witness, the same distinctions appear. Where the court of the first trial had no jurisdiction of the kind of judicial controversies presented for adjudication, a number of courts have held that false testimony in those proceedings is not punishable as perjury. So in a case where the court had general jurisdiction of the kind of prosecution, larceny less than felony, but not of the particular proceeding, larceny as a felony, there was no perjury. Johnson v. State, 58 Ga. 397. But where the court in the trial where the alleged perjury occurred had jurisdiction to render judgment on the merits in those proceedings, defects developed dehors the record or in the procedure, sufficient to invalidate any judgment on review, do not make a subsequent conviction for perjury in the former trial impossible.
One can find inconsistent and indeed conflicting rulings among the cases, even from the same jurisdictions, perhaps attributable to the use of the word “jurisdiction” in the heterogeneous situations that occur. The line is narrow and often wavering between errors in the proceedings and lack of jurisdiction. Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed.), § 1538. Here, however, we have a federal statute enacted in an effort to keep the course of justice free from the pollution of perjury. We have a court empowered to take cognizance of the crime of perjury and decide the issues under that statute. The effect of the alleged false testimony could not result in a miscarriage of justice in this case but the federal statute against perjury is not directed so much at its effects as at its perpetration; at the probable wrong done the administration of justice by false testimony. That statute has led federal courts to uphold charges of perjury despite arguments that the federal court at the trial affected by the perjury could not enter a valid judgment due to lack of diversity jurisdiction, or due to the unconstitutionality of the statute out of which the perjury proceedings arose.
Where a federal court has power, as here, to proceed to a determination on the merits, that is jurisdiction of the proceedings. The District Court has such jurisdiction. Though the trial court or an appellate court may conclude that the statute is wholly unconstitutional, or that the facts stated in the indictment do not constitute a crime or are not proven, it has proceeded with jurisdiction and false testimony before it under oath is perjury.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissent.
The indictment specified the following “rights and privileges”:
“. . . the right and privilege not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, the right and privilege to be secure in his person while in the custody of the State of Florida, the right and privilege not to be subjected to punishment without due process of law, the right and privilege to be immune, while in the custody of persons acting under color of the laws of the State of Florida, from illegal assault and battery by any person exercising the authority of said State, and the right and privilege to be tried by due process of law and if found guilty to be sentenced and punished in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida; ...”
The specific “rights and privileges” are the same as those listed in note 1.
In the Ehrlich case an acquittal of a charge of violation of the Price Control Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 901 et seq., by collecting more than the sale bills for meat showed was held to bar a perjury charge that Ehrlich had sworn falsely that he had not received any payment for any sale at a price in excess of that shown on the sales slips. It was held that the plea in bar of the second prosecution was good on the ground that the allegedly perjurious words were the basis of the former crime charged and therefore the acquittal barred the perjury prosecution.
A number of other cases are cited in appellees’ brief. They support the rule that an acquittal on facts essential to conviction on the subsequent charge bars a later prosecution. None deal with the situation of Williams who was convicted on the prior trial of abuse under 18 IT. S. C. § 242. He can, of course, claim no bar against prosecution on a theory of estoppel since the facts in the former trial, if applicable to the subsequent one, were found against him. The cases are: United States v. De Angelo, 138 F. 2d 466; United States v. Butler, 38 F. 498; Chitwood v. United States, 178 F. 442; Allen v. United States, 194 F. 664; Youngblood v. United States, 266 F. 795; Kuskulis v. United States, 37 F. 2d 241.
To be present at a crime is not evidence of guilt as an aider or abettor. Hicks v. United States, 150 U. S. 442, 447, 450. Cf. United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 587; 12 A. L. R. 279. The instructions at the trial of the substantive crimes followed this rule. E. g., “I can’t make it too emphatic to you, gentlemen, that mere presence when a crime is committed is, of course, not sufficient to render one guilty as aider or abettor.”
“The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.
“Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof.”
E. g., Collins v. State, 78 Ala. 433; Paine’s Case, Yel. 111, 80 Eng. Rep. 76 [1792].
82 A. L. R. 1138.
82 A. L. R. 1137.
West v. United States, 258 F. 413, 416.
Boehm v. United States, 123 F. 2d 791, 809. Cf. Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1, 6; Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181, 186, 189; Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273; United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 289-295.
The validity of § 241 has been repeatedly upheld. E. g., United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383, 386; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 293; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 667.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, before judgment, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (1), to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the petition is granted. The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana is affirmed. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U. S. 350; Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U. S. 526.
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White are of the opinion that this case is not appealable to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 but is appealable to the Court of Appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, and that this Court should dismiss the appeal for the Court of Appeals to consider and decide the appeal of this case now properly pending before it. See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31.
See Griffin v. Prince Edward County Bd., 375 U. S. 391, and eases cited.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Adam Warpouske, an Oregon resident, died in a United States Veterans’ Administration Hospital in Oregon without a will or legal heirs, leaving a net estate composed of personal property worth about $13,000. Oregon law provides that such property shall escheat to the State. A United States statute, on the other hand, provides that when a veteran dies without a will or legal heirs in a veterans’ hospital, his personal property “shall immediately vest in and become the property of the United States as trustee for the sole use and benefit of the General Post Fund . ...” In reliance upon these provisions of their respective statutes, both the State of Oregon and the Government of the United States filed claims for Warpouske’s estate in the Oregon probate court having jurisdiction of the matter.
Recognizing that the federal statute, if applicable and valid, would make the claim of the United States paramount, the State attacked the Government’s reliance upon that statute on two grounds: first, it urged that the federal statute did not apply to this case on the theory that its provisions depended upon the Government’s having made a valid contract with the veteran prior to his death and that Warpouske had made no such contract because he had been mentally incompetent to do so when he entered the hospital and at all times thereafter up to his death; and, secondly, it urged that the federal statute, even if applicable, was invalid because it pertains to the devolution of property, a matter contended to have been wholly reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.
After hearings, the probate court found as a fact that Warpouske had been unable to enter into a valid contract with the Government because of his mental incompetence. That court then accepted the State’s interpretation of the federal statute as requiring a valid contract as a prerequisite to its application and concluded that since such a contract could not, in this case, have been made, the State was entitled to Warpouske’s property by virtue of its escheat law. On appeal, the State Supreme Court affirmed on the same grounds. Because of the importance of this question of federal statutory construction and an alleged conflict between this decision and decisions previously made by other state courts of final jurisdiction, we granted certiorari.
Since we accept the findings of the two state courts that Warpouske could not and did not enter into a contract to leave his property to the United States, the crucial question is whether the Government can prevail in the absence of such a contract. We hold that it can on the grounds that the federal statute relied upon does not require a contract and that this statute does not violate the Tenth Amendment.
The controlling provision was passed in 1941 as an amendment to the Sundry Appropriations Act of 1910. The 1910 Act quite plainly and unequivocally provided that the admission of an applicant to a veterans’ home should “be and constitute a valid and binding contract between such applicant and the Board of Managers of said home that on the death of said applicant while a member of such home, leaving no heirs at law nor next of kin, all personal property owned by said applicant at the time of his death, including money or choses in action held by him and not disposed of by will . . . shall vest in and become the property of the said Board of Managers for the sole use and benefit of the post fund of said home . . . .” The contractual nature of these provisions of the 1910 Act was clear and, indeed, we expressly recognized that fact when the question of the validity of the Act was brought before this Court.
The 1910 Act was greatly amplified, however, by the amendments adopted in 1941 and the central provision of the Act, quoted above, was significantly changed. Section 1 of the new Act restates this provision without reference to the word “contract,” providing simply that when a veteran dies “while a member or patient in any facility, or any hospital while being furnished care or treatment,” all his personal property “not disposed of by will or otherwise, shall immediately vest in and become the property of the United States as trustee for the sole use and benefit of the General Post Fund . ...” The Act then goes on to supplement this basic provision with other provisions that are drawn in the language of contract. But these provisions must be read in the context of § 2 of the Act which provides that the death of a veteran in a veterans’ hospital “shall give rise to a conclusive presumption of a valid contract.” Read in this context, the language of contract which appears in these other provisions of the Act is not at all inconsistent with the provision for automatic vesting without a contract in § 1. Quite the contrary, it seems plain to us that these “contractual” provisions were included in the Act for the purpose of reinforcing rather than detracting from the provisions of § 1 — the thought apparently being that there was some chance that the Act would be attacked as unconstitutional and that it would consequently be advisable to include alternative bases upon which it could be upheld.
This natural construction we give to § 1 makes it fit well in the pattern of legislation dealing with this subject. The solicitude of Congress for veterans is of long standing. Veterans’ pensions, homes, hospitals and other facilities have been supplied on an ever-increasing scale. Many veterans, as did the deceased veteran here, have had to depend upon these benefits for long periods of their lives. Warpouske, for example, appears to have spent more than ten years of his life, at various intervals from time to time, in veterans’ homes and hospitals throughout the country. These were the only homes he had at those times. The congressional plan here is that whatever little personal property veterans without wills or kin happen to leave when they die in veterans’ homes and hospitals should be paid into the General Post Fund, to be used for the recreation and pleasure of other ex-service men and women who have to spend their days in veterans’ homes and hospitals. This idea was expressed by Representative Jennings during the discussion of the 1941 Act on the floor of the House: “And would it not be much better to let that money go into a fund that would inure to the benefit of other veterans than to let . . . it go into a fund under the escheat laws of [a] State?”
Having concluded that the provisions of § 1 are clear and unequivocal on their face, we find no need to resort to the legislative history of the Act. Since the State has placed such heavy reliance upon that history, however, we do deem it appropriate to point out that this history is at best inconclusive. It is true, as the State points out, that Representative Rankin, as Chairman of the Committee handling the bill on the floor of the House, expressed his view during the course of discussion of the bill on the floor that the 1941 Act would not apply to insane veterans incompetent to make valid contracts. But such statements, even when they stand alone, have never been regarded as sufficiently compelling to justify deviation from the plain language of a statute. They are even less so here for there is powerful countervailing evidence as to the intention of those who drafted the bill. The bill was drawn up and sent to the Speaker of the House, in the very form in which it was passed, by the Veterans’ Bureau itself. And that Bureau, we are told, has consistently interpreted the 1941 Act as making the sanity or insanity of a veteran who dies in a veterans’ hospital entirely irrelevant to the determination of the Government’s rights under the Act.
We see no merit in the challenge to the constitutionality of § 1 as construed in this natural manner. Congress undoubtedly has the power — under its constitutional powers to raise armies and navies and to conduct wars— to pay pensions, and to build hospitals and homes for veterans. We think it plain that the same sources of power authorize Congress to require that the personal property left by its wards when they die in government facilities shall be devoted to the comfort and recreation of other ex-service people who must depend upon the Government for care. The fact that this law pertains to the devolution of property does not render it invalid. Although it is true that this is an area normally left to the States, it is not immune under the Tenth Amendment from laws passed by the Federal Government which are, as is the law here, necessary and proper to the exercise of a delegated power.
The judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
Ore. Rev. Stat., § 120.010, provides: “Immediately upon the death of any person who dies intestate without heirs, leaving any real, personal or mixed property, interest or estate in this state, the same escheats to and vests in the state, subject only to the claims of the creditors and as provided in ORS 120.060 to 120.130; and the clear proceeds derived therefrom shall be paid into and become a part of the Common School Fund of this state and be loaned or invested by the State Land Board, as provided by law.”
38 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 17.
222 Ore. 40, 352 P. 2d 539.
The conflict alleged is with the decisions in Skriziszouski Estate, 382 Pa. 634, 116 A. 2d 841; and In re Gonsky’s Estate, 79 N. D. 123, 55 N. W. 2d 60.
364 U. S. 877.
36 Stat. 703, 736
“In passing the Act of June, 1910, Congress merely directed the terms and conditions under which veterans, consistently with state law, can obtain admittance to Homes built, maintained and operated by the government for the benefit of veterans. Homes for the aged, needy, or infirm, in return for the benefits bestowed by them, generally receive some benefit from any property or estates of their members.” United States v. Stevens, 302 U. S. 623, 627.
55 Stat. 868, 38 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 17 et seq.
38 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 17.
38 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 17a.
These fears doubtless arose, in part at least, from the fact that the Circuit Court of Appeals had, in the Stevens case, supra, declared even the milder provisions of the 1910 Act unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment, Stevens v. United States, 89 F. 2d 151, a holding ultimately reversed by this Court.
See the Brief History of Legislation Pertaining to Veterans’ Benefits, 38 U. S. C. A. 1.
87 Cong. Rec. 5203-5204.
Cf. United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508, 513-514; National Home v. Wood, 299 U. S. 211, 216.
87 Cong. Rec. 5203.
See H. R. Rep. No. 609, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1-2.
See, e, g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, ante, p. 187, This was also implicit in the holding in United States v. Stevens, 302 U. S. 623, See n. 11, supra. Cf. Hines v. Lowrey, 305 U. S. 85, in which this Court rejected the contention that the Federal Constitution does not confer any authority upon Congress to deal with mental incompetents.
See, e. g., Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92; Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S. 508; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
On June 5, 1969, Francisco Farkac Klementova entered the United States without declaring to United States Customs one lot of emerald cut stones and one ring. Klementova was indicted, tried, and acquitted of charges of violating 18 U. S. C. § 545 by willfully and knowingly, with intent to defraud the United States, smuggling the articles into the United States without submitting to the required customs procedures. Following the acquittal, the Government instituted a forfeiture action in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, under 18 U. S. C. § 545 and § 497 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 728, 19 U. S. C. § 1497. Klementova intervened in the proceeding and argued that his acquittal of charges of violating 18 U. S. C. § 545 barred the forfeiture. The District Court held that the forfeiture was barred by collateral estoppel and the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that a forfeiture action pursuant to 19 U. S. C. § 1497 was not barred by an acquittal of charges of violating 18 U. S. C. § 545. We grant certiorari, affirm, and thereby resolve a conflict among the circuits as to whether a forfeiture is barred in these circumstances.
Collateral estoppel would bar a forfeiture under § 1497 if, in the earlier criminal proceeding, the elements of a § 1497 forfeiture had been resolved against the Government. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 443 (1970). But in this case acquittal on the criminal charge did not necessarily resolve the issues in the forfeiture action. For the Government to secure a conviction under § 545, it must prove the physical act of unlawful importation as well as a knowing and willful intent to defraud the United States. An acquittal on the criminal charge may have involved a finding that the physical act was not done with the requisite intent. Indeed, the court that tried the criminal charge specifically found that the Government had failed to establish intent. To succeed in a forfeiture action under § 1497, on the other hand, the Government need only prove that the property was brought into the United States without the required declaration; the Government bears no burden with respect to intent. Thus, the criminal acquittal may not be regarded as a determination that the property was not unlawfully brought into the United States, and the forfeiture proceeding will not involve an issue previously litigated and finally determined between these parties.
Moreover, the difference in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The acquittal of the criminal charges may have only represented “ 'an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.’ ” Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 397 (1938). As to the issues raised, it does not constitute an adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden applicable in civil proceedings. See Murphy v. United States, 272 U. S. 630 (1926); Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178 (1897).
If for no other reason, the forfeiture is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it involves neither two criminal trials nor two criminal punishments. “Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense.” Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, at 399. See also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537 (1943). Forfeiture under § 1497 is a civil sanction. The provision was originally enacted as § 497 of the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 964. The Tariff Act of 1930 re-enacted the forfeiture remedy, 46 Stat. 728, and added § 593, 46 Stat. 751, which became 18 U. S. C. § 545. The forfeiture provision fell within Title IY of the Act, which contained the “Administrative Provisions.” Part III of that title, of which § 1497 was a part, dealt with “Ascertainment, Collection, and Recovery of Duties.” Section 545, on the other hand, was part of the “Enforcement Provisions” and became part of the Criminal Code of the United States. The fact that the sanctions were separate and distinct and were contained in different parts of the statutory scheme is relevant in determining the character of the forfeiture. Congress could and did order both civil and criminal sanctions, clearly distinguishing them. There is no reason for frustrating that design. See Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, at 404.
The § 1497 forfeiture is intended to aid in the enforcement of tariff regulations. It prevents forbidden merchandise from circulating in the United States, and, by its monetary penalty, it provides a reasonable form of liquidated damages for violation of the inspection provisions and serves to reimburse the Government for investigation and enforcement expenses. In other contexts we have recognized that such purposes characterize remedial rather than punitive sanctions. See id., at 401; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, supra, at 549-550; Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 148, 151-154 (1956). Moreover, it cannot be said that the measure of recovery fixed by Congress in § 1497 is so unreasonable or excessive that it transforms what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, supra, at 154. See Murphy v. United States, supra; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, supra.
“Forfeiture of goods or their value and the payment of fixed or variable sums of money are other sanctions which have been recognized as enforcible by civil proceedings .... In spite of their comparative severity, such sanctions have been upheld against the contention that they are essentially criminal and subject to the procedural rules governing criminal prosecutions.” Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, at 400.
The question of whether a given sanction is civil or criminal is one of statutory construction.- Id., at 399. It appears that the § 1497 forfeiture is civil and remedial, and, as a result, its imposition is not barred by an acquittal of charges of violating § 545.
Affirmed.
“Whoever knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States, smuggles, or clandestinely introduces into the United States any merchandise which should have been invoiced, or makes out or passes, or attempts to pass, through the customhouse any false, forged, or fraudulent invoice, or other document or paper; or
“Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the United States, any merchandise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise after importation, knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to law—
“Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
“Proof of defendant’s possession of such goods, unless explained to the satisfaction of the jury, shall be deemed evidence sufficient to authorize conviction for violation of this section.
“Merchandise introduced into the United States in violation of this section, or the value thereof, to be recovered from any person described in the first or second paragraph of this section, shall be forfeited to the United States.
“The term ‘United States/ as used in this section, shall not include the Philippine Islands, Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, Johnston Island, or Guam.”
Title 19 U. S. C. § 1497 provides:
“Any article not included in the declaration and entry as made, and, before examination of the baggage was begun, not mentioned in writing by such person, if written declaration and entry was required, or orally if written declaration and entry was not required, shall be subject to forfeiture and such person shall be liable to a penalty equal to the value of such article.”
In United States v. Two Hundred and One Fifty-Pound Bags of Furazolidone, No. 71-1329 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 964 (1972), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment on the basis of a previous acquittal of charges of violating § 545 in favor of the owner of property in a forfeiture action commenced by the Government under 18 U. S. C. § 545 and 19 U. S. C. § 1460. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agrees with the view of the Fifth Circuit in the present case. See Leiser v. United States, 234 F. 2d 648, cert. denied, 352 U. S. 893 (1956).
We need not, and do not, decide whether an acquittal under § 545 bars a forfeiture under § 545.
The judge at the criminal trial specifically stated:
“He is, obviously, a sophisticated dealer in emeralds and other jewelry.
“I don’t condone nor do I approve, for one minute, what he did in this instance. I think he knew that that jewelry — that that ring and those emeralds should have been declared.
“He made a declaration of some cigarettes and some whiskey, several other little odd, meager items there, but I’m not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that he did what he did with the intent to defraud the United States.”
The difference in the issues involved in the criminal proceeding, on the one hand, and the forfeiture action, on the other, serves to distinguish Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 436 (1886), relied upon by the District Court in the present case. Coffey involved a forfeiture action commenced after an acquittal. This Court noted, in holding the forfeiture barred, that “[t]he information [for forfeiture] is founded on §§3257, 3450 and 3453; and there is no question, on the averments in the answer, that the fraudulent acts and attempts and intents to defraud, alleged in the prior criminal information, and covered by the verdict and judgment of acquittal, embraced all of the acts, attempts and intents averred in the information in this suit.” Id., at 442. The Court specifically distinguished the situation where “a certain intent must be proved to support the indictment, which need not be proved to support the civil action.” Id., at 443. See also Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178 (1897).
The District Court relied upon the following language in United States v. U. S. Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715, 718 (1971):
“But as Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 634 (1886), makes clear, 'proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man’s property by reason of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal’ for Fifth Amendment purposes.” (Emphasis in United States v. U. S. Coin & Currency.)
Section 1497 does not result in a forfeiture by reason of the commission of a criminal offense. A forfeiture results from the act of importation without following customs procedures; no criminal offense, much less a criminal conviction, is required. Cf. id., at 718-722.
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693 (1965), is likewise inapposite for it dealt with a forfeiture that could not be had without a “determination that the criminal law has been violated.” Id., at 701.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368 (1981), the Court held that a pretrial denial of a motion to disqualify counsel in a civil case is not appealable prior to trial under 28 U. S. C. §1291 as a final collateral order. The Court reserved the questions of the immediate appealability of pretrial denials of disqualification motions in criminal eases and of pretrial grants of disqualification motions in both criminal and civil cases. Id., at 372, n. 8. We decide today that a District Court’s pretrial disqualification of defense counsel in a criminal prosecution is not immediately appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
I
Petitioners are four police officers who formed a “grand-pop” decoy squad in the Philadelphia Police Department. Petitioner Flanagan would pose as an aged derelict, a likely target for street criminals. When Flanagan gave the standard alarm, the other members of the decoy team would move in to make an arrest.
A federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted petitioners in September 1981. The indictment alleged that petitioners had conspired to make arrests without probable cause and had unlawfully arrested and abused eight people. One count of the indictment charged petitioners with conspiring to deprive citizens of their civil rights in violation of 18 U. S. C. §241. The remaining 12 counts charged petitioners, in various combinations, with committing substantive civil rights offenses in violation of 18 U. S. C. §242.
Prior to the return of the indictment, petitioners had retained the law firm of Sprague and Rubenstone to act as joint counsel. Petitioners decided to continue the joint representation after the indictment was handed down, even though the indictment did not make the same allegations against all petitioners. Petitioners Keweshan, Landis, and McNamee, however, moved to sever their case from petitioner Flanagan’s, arguing that the Government’s evidence against Flanagan alone was so much greater than the evidence against them that severance was necessary to avoid prejudicial spillover. In addition, based on the asserted differences in their involvement in the activities alleged in the substantive counts of the indictment, petitioners moved to dismiss the conspiracy count. The Government responded by moving to disqualify Sprague and Rubenstone from its multiple representation of petitioners and by asking the court to inquire into the representation as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c).
In early December 1981, following a hearing and briefing on the Government’s motion, the District Court disqualified the law firm from participation in the case. The court found that no actual conflict of interest had yet developed but that there was a clear potential for conflict. Most notably, the severance motion and supporting papers showed that petitioner Flanagan’s interests were likely to diverge from the other petitioners’ interests. The District Court also found that petitioners had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived their right to conflict-free representation. The court concluded, however, that it had the authority and, indeed, the obligation under Rule 44(c) to disqualify counsel when “the likelihood is great that a potential conflict may escalate into an actual conflict.” 527 F. Supp. 902, 909 (ED Pa. 1981). The court presumed that Sprague and Rubenstone had obtained privileged information from each of the petitioners and therefore disqualified the law firm from representing any of them.
Petitioners appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed the decision of the District Court in June 1982. 679 F. 2d 1072. Although jurisdiction was not challenged, the Court of Appeals noted that it had jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1291 because the disqualification order was appealable prior to trial as a collateral order within the meaning of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). The court went on to hold that the disqualification order was proper because an actual conflict of interest was very likely to arise. In July 1982 the court denied rehearing but stayed issuance of the mandate to permit filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court.
Petitioners filed their petition in September 1982, one year after the grand jury had returned the indictment against them. They contended that disqualification of counsel of their choice after they had knowingly waived conflict-free representation deprived them of their Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel and of their Fifth Amendment due process right to present a common defense through joint counsel. We granted certiorari in January 1983. 459 U. S. 1101. The parties briefed and argued both the merits and the jurisdictional question — whether the disqualification order was immediately appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals because we conclude that the court had no jurisdiction to review the disqualification order prior to entry of final judgment in the criminal case.
HH HH
“Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure.” Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 324 (1940). Thus, the jurisdictional statute applicable to this case limits the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to appeals from “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U. S. C. § 1291. This final judgment rule requires that “a party must ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S., at 374. In a criminal case the rule prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition of sentence. Berman v. United States, 302 U. S. 211, 212 (1937).
The final judgment rule serves several important interests. It helps preserve the respect due trial judges by minimizing appellate-court interference with the numerous decisions they must make in the prejudgment stages of litigation. It reduces the ability of litigants to harass opponents and to clog the courts through a succession of costly and time-consuming appeals. It is crucial to the efficient administration of justice. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, supra, at 374. For these reasons, “[t]his Court has long held that the policy of Congress embodied in [§ 1291] is inimical to piecemeal appellate review of trial court decisions which do not terminate the litigation . . . .” United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U. S. 263, 265 (1982).
The Court has also long held that “this policy is at its strongest in the field of criminal law.” Ibid. More than 40 years ago the Court noted that the reasons for the final judgment rule are “especially compelling in the administration of criminal justice.” Cobbledick v. United States, supra, at 325. Promptness in bringing a criminal case to trial has become increasingly important as crime has increased, court dockets have swelled, and detention facilities have become overcrowded.
As the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial indicates, the accused may have a strong interest in speedy resolution of the charges against him. In addition, “there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 519 (1972). As time passes, the prosecution’s ability to meet its burden of proof may greatly diminish: evidence and witnesses may disappear, and testimony becomes more easily impeachable as the events recounted become more remote. Delay increases the cost of pretrial detention and extends “the period during which defendants released on bail may commit other crimes.” United States v. MacDonald, 435 U. S. 850, 862 (1978). Delay between arrest and punishment prolongs public anxiety over community safety if a person accused of a serious crime is free on bail. It may also adversely affect the prospects for rehabilitation. See Barker v. Wingo, supra, at 520. Finally, when a crime is committed against a community, the community has a strong collective psychological and moral interest in swiftly bringing the person responsible to justice. Prompt acquittal of a person wrongly accused, which forces prosecutorial investigation to continue, is as important as prompt conviction and sentence of a person rightly accused. Crime inflicts a wound on the community, and that wound may not begin to heal until criminal proceedings have come to an end.
The importance of the final judgment rule has led the Court to permit departures from the rule “only when observance of it would practically defeat the right to any review at all.” Cobbledick v. United States, supra, at 324-325 (footnote omitted). The Court has allowed a departure only for the “limited category of cases falling within the ‘collateral order’ exception delineated in Cohen. ...” United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., supra, at 265. To come within this “narrow exception,” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, supra, at 374, a trial court order must, at a minimum, meet three conditions. First, it “must conclusively determine the disputed question”; second, it must “resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action”; third, it must “be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978) (footnote omitted).
Because of the compelling interest in prompt trials, the Court has interpreted the requirements of the collateral-order exception to the final judgment rule with the utmost strictness in criminal cases. The Court has found only three types of pretrial orders in criminal prosecutions to meet the requirements. See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U. S., at 265. Each type involves ‘“an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.’” Id., at 266 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, supra, at 860).
An order denying a motion to reduce bail may be reviewed before trial. The issue is finally resolved and is independent of the issues to be tried, and the order becomes moot if review awaits conviction and sentence. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1 (1951). Orders denying motions to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy or speech or debate grounds are likewise immediately appealable. Such orders finally resolve issues that are separate from guilt or innocence, and appellate review must occur before trial to be fully effective. The right guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause is more than the right not to be convicted in a second prosecution for an offense: it is the right not to be “placed in jeopardy” — that is, not to be tried for the offense. Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977). Similarly, the right guaranteed by the Speech or Debate Clause is more than the right not to be convicted for certain legislative activities: it is the right not to “be questioned” about them — that is, not to be tried for them. Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U. S. 500 (1979). Refusals to dismiss an indictment for violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause or of the Speech or Debate Clause, like denials of bail reduction, are truly final and collateral, and the asserted rights in all three cases would be irretrievably lost if review were postponed until trial is completed.
An order disqualifying counsel lacks the critical characteristics that make orders denying bail reduction or refusing to dismiss on double jeopardy or speech or debate grounds immediately appealable. Unlike a request for bail reduction, a constitutional objection to counsel’s disqualification is in no danger of becoming moot upon conviction and sentence. Moreover, it cannot be said that the right petitioners assert, whether based on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or on the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, is a right not to be tried. Double jeopardy and speech or debate rights are sui generis in this regard. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U. S., at 860, n. 7. Rather, just as the speedy trial right is merely a right not to be convicted at an excessively delayed trial, id., at 860-861, the asserted right not to have joint counsel disqualified is, like virtually all rights of criminal defendants, merely a right not to be convicted in certain circumstances. Unlike a double jeopardy or speech or debate claim, petitioners’ claim “would be largely satisfied by an acquittal resulting from the prosecution’s failure to cany its burden of proof.” Id., at 859. See also United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., swpra, at 268 (vindictive prosecution right fully protected by postconviction review). “Bearing the discomfiture and cost of a prosecution for crime even by an innocent person is one of the painful obligations of citizenship.” Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S., at 325. See also Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U. S. 21, 30 (1943).
A disqualification order thus is not analogous to any of the three types of interlocutory orders that this Court has found immediately appealable in criminal cases. Accordingly, Stack, Abney, and Helstoski provide no authority for petitioners’ assertion that a disqualification order satisfies the three necessary conditions for coverage by the collateral-order exception. Nor does petitioners’ jurisdictional assertion gain support from a direct inquiry into whether a disqualification order satisfies the three Coopers & Lybrand conditions. This is so regardless of the nature of the right to joint representation claimed by petitioners.
Petitioners correctly concede that postconviction review of a disqualification order is fully effective to the extent that the asserted right to counsel of one’s choice is like, for example, the Sixth Amendment right to represent oneself. See Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975). Obtaining reversal for violation of such a right does not require a showing of prejudice to the defense, since the right reflects constitutional protection of the defendant’s free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, ante, at 177-178, n. 8. Similarly, postconviction review is concededly effective to the extent that petitioners’ asserted right is like the Sixth Amendment rights violated when a trial court denies appointment of counsel altogether, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), or denies counsel’s request to be replaced because of a conflict of interest, see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 (1978). No showing of prejudice need be made to obtain reversal in these circumstances because prejudice to the defense is presumed. In sum, as petitioners concede, if establishing a violation of their asserted right requires no showing of prejudice to their defense, a pretrial order violating the right does not meet the third condition for coverage by the collateral-order exception: it is not “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” See supra, at 265.
If, on the other hand, petitioners’ asserted right is one that is not violated absent some specifically demonstrated prejudice to the defense, a disqualification order still falls outside the coverage of the collateral-order exception. We need not consider, however, whether the third Coopers & Lybrand condition is satisfied — that is, whether postconviction review is plainly ineffective. It is sufficient to note that the second Coopers & Lybrand condition — that the order be truly collateral — is not satisfied if petitioners’ asserted right is one requiring prejudice to the defense for its violation.
On this assumption, a disqualification order, though final, is not independent of the issues to be tried. Its validity cannot be adequately reviewed until trial is complete. The effect of the disqualification on the defense, and hence whether the asserted right has been violated, cannot be fairly assessed until the substance of the prosecution’s and defendant’s cases is known. In this respect the right claimed by petitioners is analogous to the speedy trial right. In United States v. MacDonald, supra, at 859, 860, the Court concluded that because impairment of the defense is an important factor in judging whether a speedy trial violation has occurred, a denial of a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds is not separable from the issues at trial. The same conclusion applies to a disqualification order if prejudice to the defense is a necessary element of petitioners’ claim. In these circumstances, the second Coopers & Lybrand condition for immediate appealability as a collateral order is not satisfied: the disqualification order does not resolve an “issue completely separate from the merits of the action.” See supra, at 265.
In short, whether or not petitioners’ claim requires a showing of prejudice, a disqualification order does not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order in a straightforward application of the necessary conditions laid down in prior cases. Further, petitioners’ claim does not justify expanding the small class of criminal case orders covered by the collateral-order exception to the final judgment rule — either by eliminating any of the Coopers & Lybrand conditions or by interpreting them less strictly than the Court’s cases have done. The costs of such expansion are great, and the potential rewards are small.
Unlike an appeal of a bail decision, see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S., at 12 (opinion of Jackson, J.), an appeal of a disqualification order interrupts the trial. In criminal cases such interruption exacts a presumptively prohibitive price. See supra, at 264-265. Moreover, an appellate court’s reversal of a disqualification order would not result in dismissal of the prosecution. The prosecution would continue, though only after long delay. The potential rewards of an immediate appeal are thus even smaller than they were in United States v. MacDonald, supra, and in United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., supra, where the Court rejected claims of immediate appealability for orders denying motions to dismiss on speedy trial and vindictive prosecution grounds even though reversal of the orders would have led to dismissal of all or some charges. See also Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U. S. 21 (1943) (no pretrial review of order denying motion to dismiss indictment for lack of jurisdiction); Heike v. United States, 217 U. S. 423, 430-431 (1910) (no pretrial review of order rejecting claim of statutory immunity from prosecution). Here, a delayed trial is a certain result of interlocutory appellate review. Allowing immediate appeal of a disqualification order thus would severely undermine the policies behind the final judgment rule.
Ill
“ ‘[T]he final judgment rule is the dominant rule in federal appellate practice.’ 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1953), 113. Particularly is this true of criminal prosecutions.” DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S. 121, 126 (1962). Nothing about a disqualification order distinguishes it from the run of pretrial judicial decisions that affect the rights of criminal defendants yet must await completion of trial court proceedings for review. Such an order fails to satisfy the stringent conditions for qualification as an immediately appealable collateral order, and the overriding policies against interlocutory review in criminal cases apply in full. The exceptions to the final judgment rule in criminal cases are rare. An order disqualifying counsel is not one.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed. On remand the appeal should be dismissed.
It is so ordered.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) provides:
“Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged ... or have been joined for trial . . . , and are represented by the same retained or assigned counsel or by retained or assigned counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant’s right to counsel.”
Among the Courts of Appeals, six Circuits in addition to the Third Circuit have allowed immediate appeal of pretrial disqualifications of criminal defense counsel. United States v. Curcio, 694 F. 2d 14, 19-20 (CA2 1982); United States v. Smith, 653 F. 2d 126 (CA4 1981) (entertaining appeal without discussion of appealability question); United States v. Garcia, 517 F. 2d 272, 275 (CA5 1975); United States v. Phillips, 699 F. 2d 798, 801 (CA6 1983); United States v. Agosto, 675 F. 2d 965, 968, n. 1 (CA8), cert. denied after remand and affirmance sub nom. Gustafson v. United States, 459 U. S. 834 (1982); United States v. Hobson, 672 F. 2d 825, 826 (CA11), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 906 (1982). The Ninth Circuit has held that such orders are not immediately appealable. United States v. Greger, 657 F. 2d 1109, 1110-1113 (1981), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 913 (1983).
Title 18 U. S. C. § 3731 provides a statutory exception to the final judgment rule for certain orders suppressing or excluding evidence. That provision is not at issue in this case, which concerns only the finality requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 1291. This case likewise does not involve the finality problems that arise in appeals from state-court decisions to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1257. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975).
We need not and do not express any view on the nature or existence of that right.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
OPINION OF THE COURT
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Justice Kagan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code enables an individual to obtain a discharge of his debts if he pays his creditors a portion of his monthly income in accordance with a court-approved plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. To determine how much income the debtor is capable of paying, Chapter 13 uses a statutory formula known as the “means test.” §§ 707(b)(2) (2006 ed. and Supp. III), 1325(b)(3)(A) (2006 ed.). The means test instructs a debtor to deduct specified expenses from his current monthly income. The result is his “disposable income”—the amount he has available to reimburse creditors. § 1325(b)(2).
This case concerns the specified expense for vehicle-ownership costs. We must determine whether a debtor like petitioner Jason Ransom who owns his car outright, and so does not make loan or lease payments, may claim an allowance for car-ownership costs (thereby reducing the amount he will repay creditors). We hold that the text, context, and purpose of the statutory provision at issue preclude this result. A debtor who does not make loan or lease payments may not take the car-ownership deduction.
I
A
“Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPAor Act) to correct perceived abuses of the bankruptcy system.” Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P. A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 231-232, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 176 L. Ed. 2d 79 (2010). In particular, Congress adopted the means test— “[t]he heart of [BAPCPA’s] consumer bankruptcy reforms,” H. R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, p. 2 (2005) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.), and the home of the statutory language at issue here—to help ensure that debtors who can pay creditors do pay them. See, e.g., ibid. (under BAPCPA, “debtors [will] repay creditors the maximum they can afford”).
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In Chapter 13 proceedings, the means test provides a formula to calculate a debtor’s disposable income, which the debtor must devote to reimbursing creditors under a court-approved plan generally lasting from three to five years. §§ 1325(b)(1)(B) and (b)(4). The statute defines “disposable income” as “current monthly income” less “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended” for “maintenance or support,” business expen-di tures, and certain charitable contributions. §§ 1325(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). For a debtor whose income is above the median for his State, the means test identifies which expenses qualify as “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended.” The test supplants the pre-BAPCPA practice of calculating debtors’ reasonable expenses on a case-by-case basis, which led to varying and often inconsistent determinations. See, e.g., In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290, 294 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Nev. 2007).
Under the means test, a debtor calculating his “reasonably necessary” expenses is directed to claim allowances for defined living expenses, as well as for secured and priority debt. §§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv). As relevant here, the statute provides:
“The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal
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Revenue Service [IRS] for the area in which the debtor resides.” § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
These are the principal amounts that the debtor can claim as his reasonable living expenses and thereby shield from creditors.
The National and Local Standards referenced in this provision are tables that the IRS prepares listing standardized expense amounts for basic necessities. The IRS uses the Standards to help calculate taxpayers’ ability to pay overdue taxes. See 26 U.S.C. § 7122(d)(2). The IRS also prepares supplemental guidelines known as the Collection Financial Standards, which describe how to use the tables and what the amounts listed in them mean.
The Local Standards include an allowance for transportation expenses, divided into vehicle “Ownership Costs” and vehicle “Operating Costs.” At the time Ransom filed for bankruptcy, the “Ownership Costs” table appeared as follows:
Ownership Costs
App. to Brief for Respondent 5a. The Collection Financial Standards explain that these ownership costs represent “nationwide
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figures for monthly loan or lease payments,” id., at 2a; the numerical amounts listed are “base[d]... on the five-year average of new and used car financing data compiled by the Federal Reserve Board,” id., at 3a. The Collection Financial Standards further instruct that, in the tax-collection context, “ [i]f a taxpayer has no car payment,... only the operating costs portion of the transportation standard is used to come up with the allowable transportation expense.” Ibid.
B
Ransom filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief in July 2006. App. 1, 54. Among his liabilities, Ransom itemized over $82,500 in unsecured debt, including a claim held by respondent FIA Card Services, N. A. (FIA). Id., at 41. Among his assets, Ransom listed a 2004 Toyota Camry, valued at $14,000, which he owns free of any debt. Id., at 38, 49, 52.
For purposes of the means test, Ransom reported income of $4,248.56 per month. Id., at 46. He also listed monthly expenses totaling $4,038.01. Id., at 53. In determining those expenses, Ransom claimed a car-ownership deduction of $471 for the Camry, the full amount specified in the IRS’s “Ownership Costs” table. Id., at 49. Ransom listed a separate deduction of $338 for car-operating costs. Ibid. Based on these figures, Ransom had disposable income of $210.55 per month. Id., at 53.
Ransom proposed a 5-year plan that would result in repayment of approximately 25% of his unsecured debt. Id., at 55. FIA objected to confirmation of the plan on the ground that it did not direct all of Ransom’s disposable income to unsecured creditors. Id., at 64. In particular, FIA argued that Ransom should not have claimed the car-ownership allowance because he does not make loan or lease payments on his car. Id., at 67. FIA noted that without this allowance, Ransom’s disposable income would be $681.55—the $210.55 he reported plus the $471 he deducted for vehicle ownership. Id.., at 71. The difference over the 60 months of the plan amounts to about $28,000.
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C
The Bankruptcy Court denied confirmation of Ransom’s plan. App. to Pet. for Cert. 48. The court held that Ransom could deduct a vehicle-ownership expense only “if he is currently making loan or lease payments on that vehicle.” Id., at 41.
Ransom appealed to the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, which affirmed. In re Ransom, 380 B.R. 799, 808-809 (2007). The panel reasoned that an “expense [amount] becomes relevant to the debtor (i.e., appropriate or applicable to the debtor) when he or she in fact has such an expense.” Id.., at 807. “[W]hat is important,” the panel noted, “is the payments that debtors actually make, not how many cars they own, because [those] payments... are what actually affect their ability to” reimburse unsecured creditors. Ibid.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In re Ransom, 577 F.3d 1026, 1027 (2009). The plain language of the statute, the court held, “does not allow a debtor to deduct an ‘ownership cost’... that the debtor does not have.” Id., at 1030. The court observed that “[a]n ‘ownership cost’ is not an ‘expense’—either actual or applicable—if it does not exist, period.” Ibid.
We granted a writ of certiorari to resolve a split of authority over whether a debtor who does not make loan or lease payments on his car may claim the deduction for vehicle-ownership costs. 559 U.S. 1066, 130 S. Ct. 2097, 176 L. Ed. 2d 721 (2010). We now affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.
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II
Our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code starts “where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S. Ct. 1026, 103 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1989). As noted, the provision of the Code central to the decision of this case states:
“The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the [IRS] for the area in which the debtor resides.” § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
The key word in this provision is “applicable”: A debtor may claim not all, but only “applicable” expense amounts listed in the Standards. Whether Ransom may claim the $471 car-ownership deduction accordingly turns on whether that expense amount is “applicable” to him.
Because the Code does not define “applicable,” we look to the ordinary meaning of the term. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Panning, 560 U.S. 505, 513, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 177 L. Ed. 2d 23 (2010). “Applicable” means “capable of being applied: having relevance” or “fit, suitable, or right to be applied: appropriate.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 105 (2002). See also New Oxford American Dictionary 74 (2d ed. 2005) (“relevant or appropriate”); 1 Oxford English Dictionary 575 (2d ed. 1989) (“[c]apable of being applied” or “[f]it or suitable for its purpose, appropriate”). So an expense amount is “applicable” within the plain meaning of the statute when it is appropriate, relevant, suitable, or fit.
What makes an expense amount “applicable” in this sense (appropriate, relevant, suitable, or fit) is most naturally understood to be its correspondence to an individual debtor’s financial circumstances. Rather than authorizing all debtors to take deductions in all listed categories, Congress established
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a filter: A debtor may claim a deduction from a National or Local Standard table (like “[Car] Ownership Costs”) if, but only if, that deduction is appropriate for him. And a deduction is so appropriate only if the debtor has costs corresponding to the category covered by the table— that is, only if the debtor will incur that kind of expense during the life of the plan. The statute underscores the necessity of making such an individualized determination by referring to “the debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts,” § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (emphasis added)—in other words, the expense amounts applicable (appropriate, etc.) to each particular debtor. Identifying these amounts requires looking at the financial situation of the debtor and asking whether a National or Local Standard table is relevant to him.
If Congress had not wanted to separate in this way debtors who qualify for an allowance from those who do not, it could have omitted the term “applicable” altogether. Without that word, all debtors would be eligible to claim a deduction for each category listed in the Standards. Congress presumably included “applicable” to achieve a different result. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12, 125 S. Ct. 377, 160 L. Ed. 2d 271 (2004) (“[W]e must give effect to every word of a statute wherever possible”). Interpreting the statute to require a threshold determination of eligibility ensures that the term “applicable” carries meaning, as each word in a statute should.
This reading of “applicable” also draws support from the statutory context. The Code initially defines a debtor’s disposable income as his “current monthly income... less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended.” § 1325(b)(2) (emphasis added). The statute then instructs that “[a]mounts reasonably necessary to be expended... shall be determined in accordance with” the means test. § 1325(b)(3). Because Congress intended the means test to approximate the debtor’s reasonable expenditures on essential items, a debtor should be required to qualify for a deduction by actually incurring an expense in the relevant category. If a debtor will not have a particular kind of expense
[562 U.S. 71]
during his plan, an allowance to cover that cost is not “reasonably necessary” within the meaning of the statute.
Finally, consideration of BAPCPA’s purpose strengthens our reading of the term “applicable.” Congress designed the means test to measure debtors’ disposable income and, in that way, “to ensure that [they] repay creditors the maximum they can afford.” H. R. Rep., at 2. This purpose is best achieved by interpreting the means test, consistent with the statutory text, to reflect a debtor’s ability to afford repayment. Cf. Hamilton, 560 U.S., at 520, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 177 L. Ed. 2d 23 (rejecting an interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code that “would produce [the] senseless resul[t]” of “denying] creditors payments that the debtor could easily make”). Requiring a debtor to incur the kind of expenses for which he claims a means-test deduction thus advances BAPCPA’s objectives.
Because we conclude that a person cannot claim an allowance for vehicle-ownership costs unless he has some expense falling within that category, the question in this case becomes: What expenses does the vehicle-ownership category cover? If it covers loan and lease payments alone, Ransom does not qualify, because he has no such expense. Only if that category also covers other costs associated with having a car would Ransom be entitled to this deduction.
The less inclusive understanding is the right one: The ownership category encompasses the costs of a car loan or lease and nothing more. As noted earlier, the numerical amounts listed in the “Ownership Costs” table are “base[d]... on the five-year average of new and used car financing data compiled by the Federal Reserve Board.” App. to Brief for Respondent
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3a. In other words, the sum $471 is the average monthly payment for loans and leases nationwide; it is not intended to estimate other conceivable expenses associated with maintaining a car. The Standards do account for those additional expenses, but in a different way: They are mainly the province of the separate deduction for vehicle “Operating Costs,” which include payments for “[v]ehicle insurance,... maintenance, fuel, state and local registration, required inspection, parking fees, tolls, [and] driver’s license.” Internal Revenue Manual §§ 5.15.1.7 and 5.15.1.9 (May 1,2004), reprinted in App. to Brief for Respondent 16a, 20a; see also IRS, Collection Financial Standards (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/ 0„id=96543,00.html. A person who owns a car free and clear is entitled to claim the “Operating Costs” deduction for all these expenses of driving— and Ransom in fact did so, to the tune of $338. But such a person is not entitled to claim the “Ownership Costs” deduction, because that allowance is for the separate costs of a car loan or lease.
The Collection Financial Standards—the IRS’s explanatory guidelines to the National and Local Standards—explicitly recognize this distinction between ownership and operating costs, making clear that individuals who have a car but make no loan or lease payments may claim only the operating allowance. App. to Brief for Respondent 3a; see supra, at 66-67, 178 L. Ed. 2d, at 609. Although the statute does not incorporate the IRS’s guidelines, courts may consult this material in interpreting the National and Local Standards; after all, the IRS uses those tables for a similar purpose—to determine how much money a delinquent taxpayer can afford to pay the Government. The guidelines of course cannot control if they are at odds with the statutory language. But here, the Collection
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Financial Standards’ treatment of the car-ownership deduction reinforces our conclusion that, under the statute, a debtor seeking to claim this deduction must make some loan or lease payments.
Because Ransom owns his vehicle free and clear of any encumbrance, he incurs no expense in the “Ownership Costs” category of the Local Standards. Accordingly, the car-ownership expense amount is not “applicable” to him, and the Ninth Circuit correctly denied that deduction.
Ill
Ransom’s argument to the contrary relies on a different interpretation of the key word “applicable,” an objection to our view of the scope of the “Ownership Costs” category, and a criticism of the policy implications of our approach. We do not think these claims persuasive.
A
Ransom first offers another understanding of the term “applicable.” A debtor, he says, determines his “applicable” deductions by locating the box in each National or Local Standard table that corresponds to his geographic location, income, family size, or number of cars. Under this approach, a debtor “consult [s] the tablets] alone” to determine his appropriate expense amounts. Reply Brief for Petitioner 16. Because he has one car, Ransom argues that his “applicable” allowance is the sum listed in the first column of the “Ownership
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Costs” table ($471); if he had a second vehicle, the amount in the second column ($332) would also be “applicable.” On this approach, the word “applicable” serves a function wholly internal to the tables; rather than filtering out debtors for whom a deduction is not at all suitable, the term merely directs each debtor to the correct box (and associated dollar amount of deduction) within every table.
This alternative reading of “applicable” fails to comport with the statute’s text, context, or purpose. As intimated earlier, supra, at 7-8, Ransom’s interpretation would render the term “applicable” superfluous. Assume Congress had omitted that word and simply authorized a deduction of “the debtor’s monthly expense amounts” specified in the Standards. That language, most naturally read, would direct each debtor to locate the box in every table corresponding to his location, income, family size, or number of cars and to deduct the amount stated. In other words, the language would instruct the debtor to use the exact approach Ransom urges. The word “applicable” is not necessary to accomplish that result; it is necessary only for the different purpose of dividing debtors eligible to make use of the tables from those who are not. Further, Ransom’s reading of “applicable” would sever the connection between the means test and the statutory provision it is meant to implement—the authorization of an allowance for (but only for) “reasonably necessary” expenses. Expenses that are wholly fictional are not easily thought of as reasonably necessary. And finally, Ransom’s interpretation would run counter to the statute’s overall purpose of ensuring that debtors repay creditors to the extent they can—here, by shielding some $28,000 that he does not in fact need for loan or lease payments.
As against all this, Ransom argues that his reading is necessary to account for the means test’s distinction between “applicable” and “actual” expenses—more fully stated, between the phrase “applicable monthly expense
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amounts” specified in the Standards and the phrase “actual monthly expenses for... Other Necessary Expenses.” § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (emphasis added). The latter phrase enables a debtor to deduct his actual expenses in particular categories that the IRS designates relating mainly to taxpayers’ health and welfare. Internal Revenue Manual §5.15.1.10(1), http ://www. irs. gov/irm/part5/ir m_05-015-001.html#d0el381. According to Ransom, “applicable” cannot mean the same thing as “actual.” Brief for Petitioner 40. He thus concludes that “an ‘applicable’ expense can be claimed [under the means test] even if no ‘actual’ expense was incurred.” Ibid.
Our interpretation of the statute, however, equally avoids conflating “applicable” with “actual” costs. Although the expense amounts in the Standards apply only if the debtor incurs the relevant expense, the debt- or’s out-of-pocket cost may well not control the amount of the deduction. If a debtor’s actual expenses exceed the amounts listed in the tables, for example, the debtor may claim an allowance only for the specified sum rather than for his real expenditures. For the Other Necessary Expense categories, by contrast, the debtor may deduct his actual expenses, no matter how high
[562 U.S. 76]
they are. Our reading of the means test thus gives full effect to “the distinction between ‘applicable’ and ‘actual’ without taking a further step to conclude that ‘applicable’ means ‘nonexistent.’ ” In re Ross-Tousey, 368 B.R. 762, 765 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Wis. 2007), rev’d, 549 F.3d 1148 (CA7 2008).
Finally, Ransom’s reading of “applicable” may not even answer the essential question: whether a debtor may claim a deduction. “[C]onsult-[ing] the tablets] alone” to determine a debtor’s deduction, as Ransom urges us to do, Reply Brief for Petitioner 16, often will not be sufficient because the tables are not self-defining. This case provides a prime example. The “Ownership Costs” table features two columns labeled “First Car” and “Second Car.” See supra, at 66, 178 L. Ed. 2d, at 609. Standing alone, the table does not specify whether it refers to the first and second cars owned (as Ransom avers), or the first and second cars for which the debtor incurs ownership costs (as FIA maintains)—and so the table does not resolve the issue in dispute. See In re Kimbro, 389 B.R. 518, 533
[562 U.S. 77]
(Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA6 2008) (Fulton, J., dissenting) (“[0]ne cannot really ‘just look up’ dollar amounts in the tables without either referring to IRS guidelines for using the tables or imposing pre-existing assumptions about how [they] are to be navigated” (footnote omitted)). Some amount of interpretation is necessary to decide what the deduction is for and whether it is applicable to Ransom; and so we are brought back full circle to our prior analysis.
B
Ransom next argues that viewing the car-ownership deduction as covering no more than loan and lease payments is inconsistent with a separate sentence of the means test that provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this clause, the monthly expenses of the debtor shall not include any payments for debts.” § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). The car-ownership deduction cannot comprise only loan and lease payments, Ransom contends, because those payments are always debts. See Brief for Petitioner 28, 44-45.
Ransom ignores that the “notwithstanding” sentence governs the full panoply of deductions under the National and Local Standards and the Other Necessary Expense categories. We hesitate to rely on that general provision to interpret the content of the car-ownership deduction because Congress did not draft the former with the latter specially in mind; any friction between the two likely reflects only a lack of attention to how an across-the-board exclusion of debt payments would correspond to a particular IRS allowance.
[562 U.S. 78]
Further, the “notwithstanding” sentence by its terms functions only to exclude, and not to authorize, deductions. It cannot establish an allowance for nonloan or nonlease ownership costs that no National or Local Standard covers. Accordingly, the “notwithstanding” sentence does nothing to alter our conclusion that the “Ownership Costs” table does not apply to a debtor whose car is not encumbered.
C
Ransom finally contends that his view of the means test is necessary to avoid senseless results not intended by Congress. At the outset, we note that the policy concerns Ransom emphasizes pale beside one his reading creates: His interpretation, as we have explained, would frustrate BAPCPA’s core purpose of ensuring that debtors devote their full disposable income to repaying creditors. See supra, at 71, 178 L. Ed. 2d, at 612. We nonetheless address each of Ransom’s policy arguments in turn.
Ransom first points out a troubling anomaly: Under our interpretation, “[d]ebtors can time their bankruptcy filing to take place while they still have a few car payments left, thus retaining an ownership deduction which they would lose if they filed just after making their last payment.” Brief for Petitioner 54. Indeed, a debtor with only a single car payment remaining, Ransom notes, is eligible to claim a monthly ownership deduction. Id., at 15, 52.
But this kind of oddity is the inevitable result of a standardized formula like the means test, even more under Ransom’s reading than under ours. Such formulas are by their nature over- and under-inclusive. In eliminating the pre-BAPCPA case-by-case adjudication of above-median-income debtors’ expenses, on the ground that it leant itself to abuse, Congress chose to tolerate the occasional peculiarity that a brighter-line test produces. And Ransom’s alternative reading of the statute would spawn its own anomalies—even placing to one side the fundamental strangeness of giving a debtor an allowance for loan or lease payments when he has
[562 U.S. 79]
not a penny of loan or lease costs. On Ransom’s view, for example, a debtor entering bankruptcy might purchase for a song a junkyard car—“an old, rusted pile of scrap metal [that would] si[t] on cinder blocks in his backyard,” In re Brown, 376 B.R. 601, 607 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SD Tex. 2007)—in order to deduct the $471 car-ownership expense and reduce his payment to creditors by that amount. We do not see why Congress would have preferred that result to the one that worries Ransom. That is especially so because creditors may well be able to remedy Ransom’s “one payment left” problem. If car payments cease during the life of the plan, just as if other financial circumstances change, an unsecured creditor may move to modify the plan to increase the amount the debtor must repay. See 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1).
Ransom next contends that denying the ownership allowance to debtors in his position “sends entirely the wrong message, namely, that it is advantageous to be deeply in debt on motor vehicle loans, rather than to pay them off.” Brief for Petitioner 55. But the choice here is not between thrifty savers and profligate borrowers, as Ransom would have it. Money is fungible: The $14,000 that Ransom spent to purchase his Camry outright was money he did not devote to paying down his credit card debt, and Congress did not express a preference for one use of these funds over the other. Further, Ransom’s argument mistakes what the deductions in the means test are meant to accomplish. Rather than effecting any broad federal policy as to saving or borrowing, the deductions serve merely to ensure that debtors in bankruptcy can afford essential items. The car-ownership allowance thus safeguards a debtor’s ability to retain a car throughout the plan period. If the debtor already owns a car outright, he has no need for this protection.
Ransom finally argues that a debtor who owns his car free and clear may need to replace it during the life of the plan; “ [g] ranting the ownership cost deduction to a vehicle that is owned outright,” he states, “accords best with economic reality.” Id., at 52. In essence, Ransom seeks an emergency
[562 U.S. 80]
cushion for car owners. But nothing in the statute authorizes such a cushion, which all debtors presumably would like in the event some unexpected need arises. And a person who enters bankruptcy without any car at all may also have to buy one during the plan period; yet Ransom concedes that a person in this position cannot claim the ownership deduction. Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. The appropriate way to account for unanticipated expenses like a new vehicle purchase is not to distort the scope of a deduction, but to use the method that the Code provides for all Chapter 13 debtors (and their creditors): modification of the plan in light of changed circumstances. See § 1329(a)(1); see also supra, at 79, 178 L. Ed. 2d, at 617.
IV
Based on BAPCPA’s text, context, and purpose, we hold that the Local Standard expense amount for transportation “Ownership Costs” is not “applicable” to a debtor who will not incur any such costs during his bankruptcy plan. Because the “Ownership Costs” category covers only loan and lease payments and because Ransom owns his car free from any debt or obligation, he may not claim the allowance. In short, Ransom may not deduct loan or lease expenses when he does not have any. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
. Chapter 13 borrows the means test from Chapter 7, where it is used as a screening mechanism to determine whether a Chapter 7 proceeding is appropriate. Individuals who file for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7 liquidate their nonexempt assets, rather than dedicate their future income, to repay creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(1), 726. If the debtor’s Chapter 7 petition discloses that his disposable income as calculated by the means test exceeds a certain threshold, the petition is presumptively abusive. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). If the debtor cannot rebut the presumption, the court may dismiss the case or, with the debtor’s consent, convert it into a Chapter 13 proceeding. § 707(b)(1).
. The National Standards designate allowances for six categories of expenses: (1) food; (2) housekeeping supplies; (3) apparel and services; (4) personal care products and services; (5) out-of-pocket health care costs; and (6) miscellaneous expenses. Internal Revenue Manual § 5.15.1.8 (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.irs.gOv/irm/part5/irm_05-015-001.html#d0el012 (all Internet materials as visited Jan. 7, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). The Local Standards authorize deductions for two kinds of expenses: (1) housing and utilities; and (2) transportation. Id., § 5.15.1.9.
. Although both components of the transportation allowance are listed in the Local Standards, only the operating-cost expense amounts vary by geography; in contrast, the IRS provides a nationwide figure for ownership costs.
. Compare In re Ransom, 577 F.3d 1026, 1027 (CA9 2009) (case below), with In re Washburn, 579 F.3d 934, 935 (CA8 2009) (permitting the allowance); In re Tate, 571 F.3d 423, 424 (CA5 2009) (same); and In re Ross-Tousey, 549 F.3d 1148, 1162 (CA7 2008) (same). The question has also divided bankruptcy courts. See, e.g., In re Canales, 377 B.R. 658, 662 (Bkrtcy. Ct. CD Cal. 2007) (citing dozens of cases reaching opposing results).
. This interpretation also avoids the anomalous result of granting preferential treatment to individuals with above-median income. Because the means test does not apply to Chapter 13 debtors whose incomes are below the median, those debtors must prove on a case-by-case basis that each claimed expense is reasonably necessary. See §§ 1325(b)(2) and (3). If a below-median-income debtor cannot take a deduction for a nonexistent expense, we doubt Congress meant to provide such an allowance to an above-median-income debtor—the very kind of debtor whose perceived abuse of the bankruptcy system inspired Congress to enact the means test.
. In addition, the IRS has categorized taxes, including those associated with car ownership, as an “Other Necessary Expens[e],’’ for which a debtor may take a deduction. See App. to Brief for Respondent 26a; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16, n. 4.
. Because the dissent appears to misunderstand our use of the Collection Financial Standards, and because it may be important for future cases to be clear on this point, we emphasize again that the statute does not “incorporat[e]’’ or otherwise “impor[t]“ the IRS’s guidance. Post, at 81, 83, 178 L. Ed. 2d, at 618, 619 (opinion of Scalia, J.). The dissent questions what possible basis except incorporation could justify our consulting the IRS’s view, post, at 83, n., 178 L. Ed. 2d, at 619-620, but we think that basis obvious: The IRS creates the National and Local Standards referenced in the statute, revises them as it deems necessary, and uses them every day. The agency might, therefore, have something insightful and persuasive (albeit not controlling) to say about them.
. The parties and the Solicitor General as amicus curiae dispute the proper deduction for a debtor who has expenses that are lower than the amounts listed in the Local Standards. Ransom argues that a debtor may claim the specified expense amount in full regardless of his out-of-pocket costs. Brief for Petitioner 24-27. The Government concurs with this view, provided (as we require) that a debtor has some expense relating to the deduction. See
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns government officials — entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense in a “constitutional tort” action — who seek an immediate appeal of a district court order denying their motions for summary judgment. The order in question resolved a/aci-related dispute about the pretrial record, namely, whether or not the evidence in the pretrial record was sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial. We hold that the defendants cannot immediately appeal this kind of fact-related district court determination. And, we affirm the similar holding of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
I
The plaintiff in this case, Houston Jones, is a diabetic. Police officers found him on the street while he was having an insulin seizure. The officers thought he was drunk, they arrested him, and they took him to the police station. Jones later found himself in a hospital, with several broken ribs. Subsequently, Jones brought this “constitutional tort” action against five named policemen. Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Jones claimed that these policemen used excessive force when they arrested him and that they beat him at the station.
Three of the officers (the petitioners here) moved for summary judgment arguing that, whatever evidence Jones might have about the other two officers, he could point to no evir dence that these three had beaten him or had been present while others did so. Jones responded by pointing to his deposition, in which he swore that officers (though he did not name them) had used excessive force when arresting him and, later, in the booking room at the station house. He also pointed to the three officers’ own depositions, in which they admitted they were present at the arrest and in or near the booking room when Jones was there.
The District Court denied the officers’ summary judgment motion. The court wrote that Seventh Circuit precedent indicated potential liability if the three officers “stood by and allowed others to beat the plaintiff.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 7a. And, the court held that there was “sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting [Jones’] theory of the case.” Id., at 8a.
The three officers immediately appealed the District Court’s denial of their summary judgment motion. They argued, in relevant part, that the denial was wrong because the record contained “not a scintilla of evidence . .. that one or more” of them had “ever struck, punched or kicked the plaintiff, or ever observed anyone doing so.” Brief for Appellants in No. 93-3777 (CA7), p. 10. But, the Seventh Circuit refused to consider this argument — namely, that the District Court had improperly rejected their contention that the record lacked sufficient evidence even to raise a “genuine” (i. e., triable) issue of fact. The Seventh Circuit held that it “lack[ed] appellate jurisdiction over th[is] contention,” i e., of the “evidence insufficiency” contention that “we didn’t do it.” 26 P. 3d 727, 728 (1994). It consequently dismissed their appeal.
Courts of Appeals hold different views about the immediate appealability of such pretrial “evidence insufficiency” claims made by public official defendants who assert qualified immunity defenses. Compare, e. g., Kaminsky v. Rosenblum, 929 F. 2d 922, 926 (CA2 1991) (saying that no appellate jurisdiction exists); Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F. 3d 1241, 1247 (CA3 1994) (same); Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F. 2d 604, 609 (CA5 1987) (same); Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F. 2d 338, 341-342 (CA7 1991) (same), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 1074, 1121 (1992); Crawford-El v. Britton, 951 F. 2d 1314, 1317 (CADC 1991) (same), with Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F. 2d 124, 128 (CA1 1988) (saying that appellate jurisdiction does exist); Turner v. Dammon, 848 F. 2d 440, 444 (CA4 1988) (same); Kelly v. Bender, 23 F. 3d 1328, 1330 (CA8 1994) (same); Burgess v. Pierce County, 918 F. 2d 104, 106, and n. 3 (CA9 1990) (per curiam) (same); Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F. 2d 1155, 1157, 1162-1163 (CA10 1991) (same). We therefore granted cer-tiorari. 513 U. S. 1071 (1995).
II
A
Three backgroundprinciples guide our effort to decide this issue. First, the relevant statute grants appellate courts jurisdiction to hear appeals only from “final decisions” of district courts. 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Given this statute, interlocutory appeals — appeals before the end of district court proceedings — are the exception, not the rule. The statute recognizes that rules that permit too many interlocutory appeals can cause harm. An interlocutory appeal can make it more difficult for trial judges to do their basic job — supervising trial proceedings. It can threaten those proceedings with delay, adding costs and diminishing coherence. It also risks additional, and unnecessary, appellate court work either when it presents appellate courts with less developed records or when it brings them appeals that, had the trial simply proceeded, would have turned out to be unnecessary. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Roller, 472 U. S. 424, 430 (1985); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U. S. 259, 263-264 (1984); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 374 .(1981).
Of course, sometimes interlocutory appellate review has important countervailing benefits. In certain cases, it may avoid injustice by quickly correcting a trial court’s error. It can simplify, or more appropriately direct, the future course of litigation. And, it can thereby reduce the burdens of future proceedings, perhaps freeing a party from those burdens entirely. Congress consequently has authorized, through other statutory provisions, immediate appeals (or has empowered courts to authorize immediate appeals) in certain classes of cases — classes in which these countervailing benefits may well predominate. None of these special “immediate appeal” statutes, however, is applicable here. See 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (immediate appeal of, e. g., orders granting or denying injunctions; authority to “certify” certain important legal questions); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(b) (authorizing district courts to “direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties”); 28 U. S. C. §§ 1292(e), 2072(c) (1988 ed., Supp. V) (authorizing this Court to promulgate rules designating certain kinds of orders as immediately appealable); cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1651 (authorizing federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate,” including writs of mandamus).
Second, in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), this Court held that certain so-called collateral orders amount to “final decisions,” immediately appeal-able under the here-relevant statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1291, even though the district court may have entered those orders before (perhaps long before) the case has ended. These special “collateral orders” were those that fell within
“that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Cohen, supra, at 546.
More recently, this Court has restated Cohen as requiring that the order “‘[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’ ” Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 144 (1993) (brackets in original) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978)).
In determining which “collateral orders” amount to “final decisions,” these requirements help qualify for immediate appeal classes of orders in which the considerations that favor immediate appeals seem comparatively strong and those that disfavor such appeals seem comparatively weak. The requirement that the issue underlying the order be “ ‘effectively unreviewable’ ” later on, for example, means that failure to review immediately may well cause significant harm. See 15A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3911, pp. 334-335 (1992) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). The requirement that the district court’s order “conclusively determine” the question means that appellate review is likely needed to avoid that harm. Id., at 333. The requirement that the matter be separate from the merits of the action itself means that review now is less likely to force the appellate court to consider approximately the same (or a very similar) matter more than once, and also seems less likely to delay trial court proceedings (for, if the matter is truly collateral, those proceedings might continue while the appeal is pending). Id., at 333-334.
Third, in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985), this Court held that a district court’s order denying a defendant’s motion for summary judgment was an immediately appeal-able “collateral order” (i. e., a “final decision”) under Cohen, where (1) the defendant was a public official asserting a defense of “qualified immunity,” and (2) the issue appealed concerned, not which facts the parties might be able to prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts showed a violation of “clearly established” law. 472 U. S., at 528; see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that public officials are entitled to a “qualified immunity” from “liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established . . . rights of which a reasonable person would have known”). Applying Cohen’s criteria, the Mitchell Court held that this kind of summary judgment order was, in a sense, “effectively unreviewable,” for review after trial would come too late to vindicate one important purpose of “qualified immunity” — namely, protecting public officials, not simply from liability, but also from standing trial. Mitchell, supra, at 525-527. For related reasons, the Court found that the order was conclusive, i. e., it “conclusively” settled the question of the defendant’s immunity from suit. 472 U. S., at 527.
The Court in Mitchell found more difficult the “separability” question, i. e., whether or not the “qualified immunity” issue was “completely separate from the merits of the action,” supra, at 310. The Court concluded that:
“it follows from the recognition that qualified immunity is in part an entitlement not to be forced to litigate the consequences of official conduct that a claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that his rights have been violated.” Mitchell, supra, at 527-528 (emphasis added).
And, the Court said that this “conceptual distinctness” made the immediately appealable issue “separate” from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, in part because an
“appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant’s claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations actually state a claim. All it need determine is a question of law: whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions or, in cases where the district court has denied summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that even under the defendant’s version of the facts the defendant’s conduct violated clearly established law, whether the law clearly proscribed the actions the defendant claims he took.” Id., at 528 (footnote omitted).
B
We now consider the appealability of a portion of a district court’s summary judgment order that, though entered in a “qualified immunity” case, determines only a question of “evidence sufficiency,” i. e., which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at trial. This kind of order, we conclude, is not appealable. That is, the District Court’s determination that the summary judgment record in this case raised a genuine issue of fact concerning petitioners’ involvement in the alleged beating of respondent was not a “final decision” within the meaning of the relevant statute. We so decide essentially for three reasons.
First, consider Mitchell itself, purely as precedent. The dispute underlying the Mitchell appeal involved the application of “clearly established” law to a given (for appellate purposes undisputed) set of facts. And, the Court, in its opinion, explicitly limited its holding to appeals challenging, not a district court’s determination about what factual issues are “genuine,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c), but the purely legal issue what law was “clearly established.” The opinion, for example, referred specifically to a district court’s “denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” 472 U. S., at 530 (emphasis added). It “emphasize[d]... that the appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether the facts, alleged (by the plaintiff, or, in some cases, the defendant) support a claim of violation of clearly established law.” Id., at 528, n. 9. It distinguished precedent not permitting interlocutory appeals on the ground that “a qualified immunity ruling ... is ... a legal issue that can be decided with reference only to undisputed facts and in isolation from the remaining issues of the case.” Id., at 530, n. 10. And, it explained its separability holding by saying that “[a]n appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant’s claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts.” Id., at 528. Although there is some language in the opinion that sounds as if it might imply the contrary, it does not do so when read in context. See, e.g., id., at 526 (referring to defendant’s entitlement to summary judgment, not to appealability, by saying that “defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue”).
Second, consider, in the context of an “evidence sufficiency” claim, Cohen’s conceptual theory of appealability— the theory that brings immediate appealability within the scope of the jurisdictional statute’s “final decision” requirement. That theory finds a “final” district court decision in part because the immediately appealable decision involves issues significantly different from those that underlie the plaintiff’s basic case. As we have just pointed out, Mitchell rested upon the view that “a claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.” 472 U. S., at 527. It held that this was so because, although sometimes practically intertwined with the merits, a claim of immunity nonetheless raises a question that is significantly different from the questions underlying plaintiff’s claim on the merits (i. e., in the absence of qualified immunity). Id., at 528.
Where, however, a defendant simply wants to appeal a district court’s determination that the evidence is sufficient to permit a particular finding of fact after trial, it will often prove difficult to find any such “separate” question — one that is significantly different from the fact-related legal issues that likely underlie the plaintiff’s claim on the merits. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 248 (1986) (district court’s task, in deciding whether there is a “genuine” issue of fact, is to determine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”); see also Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F. 2d, at 341 (“[Wjhether the defendants did the deeds alleged ... is precisely the question for trial”) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 1074, 1121 (1992); Wright v. South Arkansas Regional Health Center, Inc., 800 F. 2d 199, 203 (CA8 1986) (saying that this question “is ... less clearly separable from the merits” than the question in Mitchell)', see also Brief for United States 18 (“In one sense, a ruling regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is closely intertwined with the merits”).
It has been suggested that Mitchell implicitly recognized that “the need to protect officials against the burdens of further pretrial proceedings and trial” justifies a relaxation of the separability requirement. 15A Wright & Miller §3914.10, at 656; see id., §3911, at 344-345; id., §3911.2, at 387; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 20 (“[W]here the right not to be tried is at stake, [closer] association with the merits is tolerated”) (argument of the United States). Assuming that to be so, and despite a similar interest in avoiding trial in the kind of case here at issue, we can find no separability. To take what petitioners call a small step beyond Mitchell, Brief for Petitioners 18, would more than relax the separability requirement — it would in many cases simply abandon it.
Finally, consider the competing considerations that underlie questions of finality. See supra, at 309-310. We of course decide appealability for categories of orders rather than individual orders. See Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868 (1994). Thus, we do not now in each individual case engage in ad hoc balancing to decide issues of appealability. See generally P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and The Federal System 1810 (3d ed. 1988). But, that does not mean that, in delineating appealable categories, we should not look to “the competing considerations underlying all questions of finality — ‘the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.’ ” Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 171 (1974) (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U. S. 507, 511 (1950)). And, those considerations, which we discussed above in Part II-A, argue against extending Mitchell to encompass orders of the kind before us.
For one thing, the issue here at stake — the existence, or nonexistence, of a triable issue of fact — is the kind of issue that trial judges, not appellate judges, confront almost daily. Institutionally speaking, appellate judges enjoy no comparative expertise in such matters. Cf. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 560-561 (1988); id., at 584 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the “special expertise and experience of appellate courts” lies in “assessing the relative force of . . . applications of legal norms”) (internal quotation marks omitted). And, to that extent, interlocutory appeals are less likely to bring important error-correcting benefits here than where purely legal matters are at issue, as in Mitchell. Cf. Richardson-Merrell, 472 U. S., at 434 (stating that the fact that “[m]ost pretrial orders [of the kind there at issue] are ultimately affirmed by appellate courts” militated against immediate appealability).
For another thing, questions about whether or not a record demonstrates a “genuine” issue of fact for trial, if appealable, can consume inordinate amounts of appellate time. Many constitutional tort cases, unlike the simple “we didn’t do it” case before us, involve factual controversies about, for example, intent — controversies that, before trial, may seern nebulous. To resolve those controversies — to determine whether there is or is not a triable issue of fact about such a matter— may require reading a vast pretrial record, with numerous conflicting affidavits, depositions, and other discovery materials. This fact means, compared with Mitchell, greater delay.
For a third thing, the close connection between this kind of issue and the factual matter that will likely surface at trial means that the appellate court, in the many instances in which it upholds a district court’s decision denying summary judgment, may well be faced with approximately the same factual issue again, after trial, with just enough change (brought about by the trial testimony) to require it, once again, to canvass the record. That is to say, an interlocutory appeal concerning this kind of issue in a sense makes unwise use of appellate courts’ time, by forcing them to decide in the context of a less developed record, an issue very similar to one they may well decide anyway later, on a record that will permit a better decision. See 15A Wright & Miller §3914.10, at 664 (“[I]f [immunity appeals] could be limited to ... issues of law ... there would be less risk that the court of appeals would need to waste time in duplicating investigations of the same facts on successive appeals”).
The upshot is that, compared with Mitchell, considerations of delay, comparative expertise of trial and appellate courts, and wise use of appellate resources argue in favor of limiting interlocutory appeals of “qualified immunity” matters to cases presenting more abstract issues of law. Considering these “competing considerations,” we are persuaded that “[i]mmunity appeals . . . interfere less with the final judgment rule if they [are] limited to cases presenting neat abstract issues of law.” 16A Wright & Miller § 3914.10, at 664; cf. Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U. S., at 147 (noting the argument for a distinction between fact-based and law-based appeals, but seeing no “basis for drawing” it with respect to the particular kind of order at hand); 15A Wright & Miller §3914.10, at 85 (1995 Supp.).
We recognize that, whether a district court’s denial of summary judgment amounts to (a) a determination about preexisting “clearly established” law, or (b) a determination about “genuine” issues of fact for trial, it still forces public officials to trial. See Brief for Petitioners 11-16. And, to that extent, it threatens to undercut the very policy (protecting public officials from lawsuits) that (the Mitchell Court held) militates in favor of immediate appeals. Nonetheless, the countervailing considerations that we have mentioned (precedent, fidelity to statute, and underlying policies) are too strong to permit the extension of Mitchell to encompass appeals from orders of the sort before us.
C
We mention one final point. Petitioners argue that our effort to separate reviewable from unreviewable summary-judgment determinations will prove unworkable. First, they say that the parties can easily manipulate our holding. A defendant seeking to create a reviewable summary judgment order might do so simply by adding a reviewable claim to a motion that otherwise would create an unreviewable order. “[H]ere, for example,” they say, “petitioners could have contended that the law was unclear on how much force may be exerted against suspects who resist arrest.” Brief for Petitioners 29, n. 11.
We do not think this is a serious problem. We concede that, if the District Court in this case had determined that beating respondent violated clearly established law, petitioners could have sought review of that determination. But, it does not automatically follow that the Court of Appeals would also have reviewed the here more important determination that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether petitioners participated in (or were present at) a beating. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that it may sometimes be appropriate to exercise “pendent appellate jurisdiction” over such a matter, but cf. Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 50-51 (1995), it seems unlikely that courts of appeals would do so in a case where the appealable issue appears simply a means to lead the court to review the underlying factual matter, see, e. g., Natale v. Ridgefield, 927 F. 2d 101, 104 (CA2 1991) (saying exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction is proper only in “exceptional circumstances”); United States ex rel. Valders Stone & Marble, Inc. v. C-Way Constr. Co., 909 F. 2d 259, 262 (CA7 1990) (saying exercise of such jurisdiction is proper only where there are “ ‘compelling reasons’ ”).
Second, petitioners add, if appellate courts try to separate an appealed order’s reviewable determination (that a given set of facts violates clearly established law) from its unre-viewable determination (that an issue of fact is “genuine”), they will have great difficulty doing so. District judges may simply deny summary judgment motions without indicating their reasons for doing so. How, in such a case, will the court of appeals know what set of facts to assume when it answers the purely legal question about “clearly established” law?
This problem is more serious, but not serious enough to lead us to a different conclusion. When faced with an argument that the district court mistakenly identified clearly established law, the court of appeals can simply take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied summary judgment for that (purely legal) reason. Knowing that this is “extremely helpful to a reviewing court,” Anderson, 477 U. S., at 250, n. 6, district courts presumably will often state those facts. But, if they do not, we concede that a court of appeals may have to undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed. Regardless, this circumstance does not make a critical difference to our result, for a rule that occasionally requires a detailed evidence-based review of the record is still, from a practical point of view, more manageable than the rule that petitioners urge us to adopt. Petitioners’ approach would make that task, not the exception, but the rule. We note, too, that our holding here has been the law in several Circuits for some time. See supra, at 308-309. Yet, petitioners have not pointed to concrete examples of the unmanageability they fear.
III
For these reasons, we hold that a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a “genuine” issue of fact for trial. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is therefore
Affirmed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, first stated the rule of pre-emption which is the critical issue in the present case. Speaking through Mr. Justice Curtis, it said:
“Now the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.
“. . . Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.” Id., at 319.
This suit brought by appellees asked for an injunction against the enforcement of an ordinance adopted by the City Council of Burbank, California, which made it unlawful for a so-called pure jet aircraft to take off from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport between 11 p. m. of one day and 7 a. m. the next day, and making'it unlawful for the operator of that airport to allow any such aircraft to take off from that airport during such periods. The only regularly scheduled flight affected by the ordinance was an intrastate flight of Pacific Southwest Airlines originating in Oakland, California, and departing from Hollywood-Burbank Airport for San Diego every Sunday night at 11:30.
The District Court found the ordinance to be unconstitutional on both Supremacy Clause and Commerce Clause grounds. 318 F. Supp. 914. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds of the Supremacy Clause both as respects pre-emption and as respects conflict. 457 F. 2d 667. The case is here on appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2). We noted probable jurisdiction. 409 U. S. .840. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq., as amended by the Noise Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1234, and the regulations under it, 14 CFR pts. 71, 73, 75, 77, 91, 93, 95, 97, are central to the question of pre-emption.
Section 1108 (a) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1508 (a), provides in part, “The United States of America is declared to possess and exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace of the United States . . . .” By §§ 307 (a), (c) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1348 (a), (c), the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been given broad authority to regulate the use of the navigable airspace, “in order to insure the safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization of such airspace . . and “for the protection of persons and property on the ground .
The Solicitor General, though arguing against preemption, concedes that as respects “airspace management” there is pre-emption. That, however, is a fatal concession, for as the District Court found: “The imposition of curfew ordinances on a nationwide basis would result in a bunching of flights in those hours immediately preceding the curfew. This bunching of flights during these hours would have the twofold effect of increasing an already serious congestion problem and actually increasing, rather than relieving, the noise problem by increasing flights in the period of greatest annoyance to surrounding communities. Such a result is totally inconsistent with the objectives of the federal statutory and regulatory scheme.” It also found “[t]he imposition of curfew ordinances on a nationwide basis would cause a serious loss of efficiency in the use of the navigable airspace.”
Curfews such as Burbank has imposed would, according to the testimony at the trial and the District Court’s findings, increase congestion, cause a loss of efficiency, and aggravate the noise problem. FAA has occasionally enforced curfews. See Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573. But the record shows that FAA has consistently opposed curfews, unless managed by it, in the interests of its management of the “navigable airspace.”
As stated by Judge Dooling in American Airlines v. Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226, 230, aff’d, 398 F. 2d 369:
“The aircraft and its noise are indivisible; the noise of the aircraft extends outward from it with the same inseparability as its wings and tail assembly; to exclude the aircraft noise from the Town is to exclude the aircraft; to set a ground level decibel limit for the aircraft is directly to exclude it from the lower air that it cannot use without exceeding the decibel limit.”
The Noise Control Act of 1972, which was approved October 27, 1972, provides that the Administrator “after consultation with appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies and interested persons” shall conduct a study of various facets of the aircraft noise problems and report to the Congress within nine months, i. e., by July 1973. The 1972 Act, by amending § 611 of the Federal Aviation Act, also involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the comprehensive scheme of federal control of the aircraft noise problem. Under the amended § 611 (b)(1), 86 Stat. 1239, 49 U. S. C. § 1431 (b) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. II), FAA, after consulting with EPA, shall provide “for the control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom, including the application of such standards and regulations in the issuance, amendment, modification, suspension, or revocation of any certificate authorized by this title.”' Section 611 (b)(2), as amended, 86 Stat. 1239, 49 U. S. C. § 1431 (b) (2) (1970 ed., Supp. II), provides that future certificates for aircraft operations shall not issue unless the new aircraft noise requirements are met. Section 611 (c)(1), as amended, provides that not later than July 1973 EPA shall submit to FAA proposed regulations to provide such “control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom” as EPA determines is “necessary to protect the public health and welfare.” FAA is directed within 30 days to publish the proposed regulations in a notice of proposed rulemaking. Within 60 days after that publication, FAA is directed to commence a public hearing on the proposed rules. Section 611 (c)(1). That subsection goes on to provide that within “a reasonable time after the conclusion of such hearing and after consultation with EPA,” FAA is directed either to prescribe the regulations substantially as submitted by EPA, or prescribe them in modified form, or publish in the Federal Register a notice that it is not prescribing any regulation in response to EPA's submission together with its reasons therefor.
Section 611 (c)(2), as amended, also provides that if EPA believes that FAA’s action with respect to a regulation proposed by EPA “does not protect the public health and welfare from aircraft noise or sonic boom,” EPA shall consult with FAA and may request FAA to review and report to EPA on the advisability of prescribing the regulation originally proposed by EPA. That request shall be published in the Federal Register; FAA shall complete the review requested and report to EPA in the time specified together with a detailed statement of FAA’s findings and the reasons for its conclusion and shall identify any impact statement filed under § 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (c), with respect to FAA’s action. FAA’s action, if adverse to EPA’s proposal, shall be published in the Federal Register.
Congress did not leave FA A to act at large but provided in § 611 (d), as amended, particularized standards:
“In prescribing and amending standards and regulations under this section, the FA A shall'—
“(1) consider relevant available data relating to aircraft noise and sonic boom, including the results of research, development, testing, and evaluation activities conducted pursuant to this Act and the Department of Transportation Act;
“(2) consult with such Federal, State, and interstate agencies as he deems appropriate;
“(3) consider whether any proposed standard or regulation is consistent with the highest degree of safety in air commerce or air transportation in the public interest;
“(4) consider whether any proposed standard or regulation is economically reasonable, technologically practicable, and appropriate for the particular type of aircraft, aircraft engine, appliance, or certificate to which it will apply; and
“(5) consider the extent to which such standard or regulation will contribute to carrying out the purposes of this section.”
The original complaint was filed on May 14, 1970; the District Court entered its judgment November 30, 1970; and the Court of Appeals announced its judgment and opinion March 22, 1972 — all before the Noise Control Act of 1972 was approved by the President on October 27, 1972. That Act reaffirms and reinforces the conclusion that FA A, now in conjunction with EPA, has full control over aircraft noise, pre-empting state and local control.
There is, to be sure, no express provision of pre-emption in the 1972 Act. That, however, is not decisive. As we stated in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230:
“Congress legislated here in a field which the States have traditionally occupied. . . .' So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. . . . Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. . . . Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. . . . Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. ... Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute.”
It is the pervasive nature of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to conclude that there is pre-emption. As Mr. Justice Jackson stated, concurring in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 303:
“Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal commands. The moment a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and detailed system of controls.”
Both the Senate and House Committees included in their Reports clear statements that the bills would not change the existing pre-emption rule. The House Report stated: “No provision of the bill is intended to alter in any way the relationship between the authority of the Federal Government and that of the State and local governments that existed with respect to matters covered by section 611 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 prior to the enactment of the bill.” The Senate Report stated: “States and local governments are preempted from establishing or enforcing noise emission standards for aircraft unless such standards are identical to standards prescribed under this bill. This does not address responsibilities or powers of airport operators, and no provision of the bill is intended to alter in any way the relationship between the authority of the Federal government and that of State and local governments that existed with respect to matters covered by section 611 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 prior to the enactment of the bill.”
These statements do not avail appellants. Prior to the 1972 Act, § 611 (a) provided that the Administrator “shall prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he may find necessary to provide for the control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom.” 82 Stat. 395. Under §611 (b)(3) the Administrator was required to “consider whether any proposed standard, rule, or regulation is consistent with the highest degree of safety in air commerce or air transportation in the public interest.” 82 Stat. 395. When the legislation which added this section to the Federal Aviation Act was considered at Senate hearings, Senator Monroney (the author of the 1958 Act) asked Secretary of Transportation Boyd whether the proposed legislation would “to any degree preempt State and local government regulation of aircraft noise and sonic boom.” The Secretary requested leave to submit a written opinion, and in a letter dated June 22, 1968, he stated:
“The courts have held that the Federal Government presently preempts the field of noise regulation insofar as it involves controlling the flight of aircraft. ... H. R. 3400 would merely expand the Federal Government's role in a field already preempted. It would not change this preemption. State and local governments will remain unable to use their police powers to control aircraft noise by regulating the flight of aircraft.”
According to the Senate Report, it was “not the intent of the committee in recommending this legislation to effect any change in the existing apportionment of powers between the Federal and State and local governments,” and the Report concurred in the views set forth by the Secretary in his letter.
The Senate version of the 1972 Act as it passed the Senate contained an express pre-emption section. But the Senate version never was presented to the House. Instead, the Senate passed, with amendments, the House version; the House, also with amendments, then concurred in the Senate amendments. The Act as passed combined provisions of both the House and Senate bills on the subject that each had earlier approved. When the blended provisions of the present Act were before the House, Congressman Staggers, Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in urging the House to accept the amended version, said:
“I cannot say what industry’s intention may be, but I can say to the gentleman what my intention is in trying to get this bill passed. We have evidence that across America some cities and States are trying to pass noise regulations. Certainly we do not want that to happen. It would harass industry and progress in America. That is the reason why I want to get this bill passed during this session.”
When the House approved the blended provisions of the bill, Senator Tunney moved that the Senate concur. He made clear that the regulations to be considered by EPA for recommendation to FAA would include:
“proposed means of reducing noise in airport environments through the application of emission controls on aircraft, the regulation of flight patterns and aircraft and airport operations, and modifications in the number, frequency, or scheduling of flights [as well as] . . . the imposition of curfews on noisy airports, the imposition of flight path alterations in areas where noise was a problem, the imposition of noise emission standards on new and existing aircraft — with the expectation of a retrofit schedule to abate noise emissions from existing aircraft — the imposition of controls to increase the load factor on commercial flights, or other reductions in the joint use of airports, and such other procedures as may be determined useful and necessary to protect public health and welfare.” (Emphasis added.)
The statements by Congressman Staggers and Senator Tunney are weighty ones. For Congressman Staggers was Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce which submitted the Noise Control Act and Report; and Senator Tunney was a member of the Senate Committee on Public Works, which submitted the Act and Report.
When the President signed the bill he stated that “many of the most significant sources of noise move in interstate commerce and can be effectively regulated only at the federal level.”
Our prior cases on pre-emption are not precise guidelines in the present controversy, for each case turns on the peculiarities and special features of the federal regulatory scheme in question. Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52; Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440. Control of noise is of course deep-seated in the police power of the States. Yet the pervasive control vested in EPA and in FAA under the 1972 Act seems to us to leave no room for local curfews or other local controls. What the ultimate remedy may be for aircraft noise which plagues many communities and tens of thousands of people is not known. The procedures under the 1972 Act are under way. In addition, the Administrator has imposed a variety of regulations relating to takeoff and landing procedures and runway preferences. The Federal Aviation Act requires a delicate balance between safety and efficiency, 49 U. S. C. § 1348 (a), and the protection of persons on the ground. 49 U. S. C. § 1348 (c). Any regulations adopted by the Administrator to control noise pollution must be consistent with the “highest degree of safety.” 49 U. S. C. § 1431 (d)(3). The interdependence of these factors requires a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation if the congressional objectives underlying the Federal Aviation Act are to be fulfilled.
If we were to uphold the Burbank ordinance and a significant number of municipalities followed suit, it is obvious that fractionalized control of the timing of takeoffs and landings would severely limit the flexibility of FAA in controlling air traffic flow. The difficulties of scheduling flights to avoid congestion and the concomitant decrease in safety would be compounded. In 1960 FAA rejected a proposed restriction on jet operations at the Los Angeles airport between 10 p. m. and 7 a. m. because such restrictions could “create critically serious problems to all air transportation patterns.” 25 Fed. Reg. 1764-1765. The complete FAA statement said:
“The proposed restriction on the use of the airport by jet aircraft between the hours of 10 p. m. and 7 a. m. under certain surface wind conditions has also been reevaluated and this provision has been omitted from the rule. The practice of prohibiting the use of various airports during certain specific hours could create critically serious problems to all air transportation patterns. The network of airports throughout the United States and the constant availability of these airports are essential to the maintenance of a sound air transportation system. The continuing growth of public acceptance of aviation as a major force in passenger transportation and the increasingly significant role of commercial aviation in the nation’s economy are accomplishments which cannot be inhibited if the best interest of the public is to be served. It was concluded therefore that the extent of relief from the noise problem which this provision might have achieved would not have compensated the degree of restriction it would have imposed on domestic and foreign Air Commerce.”
This decision, announced in 1960, remains peculiarly within the competence of FAA, supplemented now by the input of EPA. We are not at liberty to diffuse the powers given by Congress to FAA and EPA by letting the States or municipalities in on the planning. If that change is to be made, Congress alone must do it.
Affirmed.
Burbank Municipal Code § 20-32.1. The ordinance provides an exception for “emergency” flights approved by the City Police Department.
The Court of Appeals held that the Burbank ordinance conflicted with the runway preference order, BUR 7100.5B, issued by the EAA Chief of the Airport Traffic Control Tower at the Hollywood-Burbank Airport. The order stated that “[procedures established for the Hollywood-Burbank airport are designed to reduce community exposure to noise to the lowest practicable minimum. . . The Court of Appeals concluded that the ordinance “interferes with the balance set by the FAA among the interests with which it is empowered to deal, and frustrates the full accomplishment of the goals of Congress.” 457 F. 2d 667, 676. In view of our disposition of this appeal under the doctrine of pre-emption, we need not reach this question.
Section 307 provides in relevant part as follows:
“(a) The Administrator is authorized and directed to develop plans for and formulate policy with respect to the use of the navigable airspace; and assign by rule, regulation, or order the use of the navigable airspace under such terms, conditions, and limitations as he may deem necessary in order to insure the safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization of such airspace. . . .
“(c) The Administrator is further authorized and directed to prescribe air traffic rules and regulations governing the flight of aircraft, for the navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft, for the protection of persons and property on the ground, and for the efficient utilization of the navigable airspace, including rules as to safe altitudes of flight and rules for the prevention of collision between aircraft, between aircraft and land or water vehicles, and between aircraft and airborne objects.”
Section 7 (a) provides:
“The Administrator, after consultation with appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies and interested persons, shall conduct a study of the (1) adequacy of Federal Aviation Administration flight and operational noise controls; (2) adequacy of noise emission standards on new and existing aircraft, together with recommendations on the retrofitting and phaseout of existing aircraft; (3) implications of identifying and achieving levels of cumulative noise exposure around airports; and (4) additional measures available to airport operators and local governments to control aircraft noise. He shall report on such study to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Commerce and Public Works of the Senate within nine months after the date of the enactment of this Act.”
Section 611 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1431, was added in July 1968. Act of July 21, 1968, Pub. L. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395. Prior to amendment by the 1972 Act, it provided in part that the Administrator, “[i]n order to afford present and future relief and protection to the public from unnecessary aircraft noise and sonic boom, . . . shall prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he may find necessary to provide for the control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom.” 49 U. S. C. § 1431 (a).
Section 611 (b) (1), as amended, reads:
“In order to afford present and future relief and protection to the public health and welfare from aircraft noise and sonic boom, the FAA, after consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and with EPA, shall prescribe and amend standards for the measurement of aircraft noise and sonic boom and shall prescribe and amend such regulations as the FAA may find necessary to provide for the control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom, including the application of such standards and regulations in the issuance, amendment, modification, suspension, or revocation of any certificate authorized by this title. No exemption with respect to any standard or regulation under this section may be granted under any provision of this Act unless the FAA shall have consulted with EPA before such exemption is granted, except that if the FAA determines that safety in air commerce or air transportation requires that such an exemption be granted before EPA can be consulted, the FAA shall consult with EPA as soon as practicable after the exemption is granted.”
Subsection (b)(2) provides:
“The FAA shall not issue an original type certificate under section 603 (a) of this Act for any aircraft for which substantial noise abatement can be achieved by prescribing standards and regulations in accordance with this section, unless he shall have prescribed standards and regulations in accordance with this section which apply to such aircraft and which protect the public from aircraft noise and sonic boom, consistent with the considerations listed in subsection (d).”
Section 102 reads in part as follows:
“The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall— . . . (C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on— (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should 'the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes.”
Section 611 (c) (3) of the Federal Aviation Act, as amended, provides that if FAA files no statement under § 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act “then EPA may request the FAA to file a supplemental report, which shall be published in the Federal Register within such a period as EPA may specify (but such time specified shall not be less than ninety days from the date the request was made), and which shall contain a comparison of (A) the environmental effects (including those which cannot be avoided) of the action actually taken by the FAA in response to EPA’s proposed regulations, and (B) EPA’s proposed regulations.”
H. R. Rep. No. 92-842, p. 10.
S. Rep. No. 92-1160, pp. 10-11.
See n. 5, supra.
Hearing before the Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 707 and H. R. 3400, Aircraft Noise Abatement Regulation, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 29.
S. Rep. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 6.
The letter from the Secretary of Transportation also expressed the view that “the proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a State or local public agency, as the proprietor of an airport, from issuing regulations or establishing requirements as to the permissible level of noise which can be created by aircraft using the airport. Airport owners acting as proprietors can presently deny the use of their airports to aircraft on the basis of noise considerations so long as such exclusion is nondiscriniinatory.” (Emphasis added.) This portion as well was quoted with approval in the Senate Report. Ibid.
Appellants and the Solicitor General submit that this indicates that a municipality with jurisdiction over an airport has the power to impose a curfew on the airport, notwithstanding federal responsibility in the area. But, we are concerned here not with an ordinance imposed by the City of Burbank as “proprietor” of the airport, but with the exercise of police power. While the Hollywood-Burbank Airport may be the only major airport which is privately owned, many airports are owned by one municipality yet physically located in another. For example, the principal airport serving Cincinnati is located in Kentucky. Thus, authority that a municipality may have as a landlord is not necessarily congruent with its police power. We do not consider here what limits, if any, apply to a municipality as a proprietor.
118 Cong. Rec. 35868.
Id., at 35886.
Id., at 37075.
Id., at 37083.
Id., at 37317.
8 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 1582, 1583 (Oct. 28, 1972).
The Administrator has adopted regulations prescribing noise standards which must be met as a condition to type certification for all new subsonic turbojet-powered aircraft. 14 CFR pt. 36. On January 30, 1973, FAA gave advance notice of proposed rulemaking for the control of fleet noise levels (FNL) of airplanes operating in interstate commerce. 38 Fed. Reg. 2769. (The regulations would not pertain to carriers also operating in foreign commerce). The proposed rules are designed to limit FNL prior to July 1, 1978, when the covered aircraft become subject to the requirements of 14 CFR pt. 36.
The FNL would be determined as a function of the takeoff and approach noise levels of each airplane in the fleet and the number of takeoffs and landings of the fleet. Until July 1, 1976, the cumulative noise level of any fleet subject to regulation could not exceed the FNL during the previous 90-day base period. In 1976 each fleet would be required to reduce its FNL by 50% of the difference between the original base-period level and the level ultimately required by 14 CFR pt. 36.
In order to insure efficient and safe use of the navigable airspace, FAA uses centralized “flow control,” regulating the number of aircraft that will be accepted in a given area and restricting altitudes and routes that may be flown. Flow control has resulted in the Los Angeles Air Route Traffic Control Center holding aircraft on the ground at the Hollywood-Burbank Airport.
Prior to April 1970, 21 regional Air Route Traffic Control Centers exercised independent control over traffic flow in their areas. In April 1970 FAA established a Central Flow Facility to coordinate flow control throughout the Air Traffic Control system. This change was necessitated because no regional center “had enough information to make a judgment based on the overall condition of the ATC system. . . .” Fourth Annual Report of the Secretary of Transportation for Fiscal Year 1970.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun join.
Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The principal question presented is whether the execution of that sentence would violate the constitutional prohibition against the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments” because petitioner was only 15 years old at the time of his offense.
I
Because there is no claim that the punishment would be excessive if the crime had been committed by an adult, only a brief statement of facts is necessary. In concert with three older persons, petitioner actively participated in the brutal murder of his former brother-in-law in the early morning hours of January 23, 1983. The evidence disclosed that the victim had been shot twice, and that his throat, chest, and abdomen had been cut. He also had multiple bruises and a broken leg. His body had been chained to a concrete block and thrown into a river where it remained for almost four weeks. Each of the four participants was tried separately and each was sentenced to death.
Because petitioner was a “child” as a matter of Oklahoma law, thé District Attorney filed a statutory petition, see Okla. Stat., Tit. 10, § 1112(b) (1981), seeking an order finding “that said child is competent and had the mental capacity to know and appreciate the wrongfulness of his [conduct].” App. 4. After a hearing, the trial court concluded “that there are virtually no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation of William Wayne Thompson within the juvenile system and that William Wayne Thompson should be held accountable for his acts as if he were an adult and should be certified to stand trial as an adult.” Id., at 8 (emphasis in original).
At the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial, the prosecutor introduced three color photographs showing the condition of the victim’s body when it was removed from the river. Although the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the use of two of those photographs was error, it concluded that the error was harmless because the evidence of petitioner’s guilt was so convincing. However, the prosecutor had also used the photographs in his closing argument during the penalty phase. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not.consider whether this display was proper.
At the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor asked the jury to find two aggravating circumstances: that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and that there was a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. The jury found the first, but not the second, and fixed petitioner’s punishment at death.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, 724 P. 2d 780 (1986), citing its earlier opinion in Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (1980), rev’d on other grounds, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), for the proposition that “once a minor is certified to stand trial as an adult, he may also, without violating the Constitution, be punished as an adult.” 724 P. 2d, at 784. We granted certiorari to consider whether a sentence of death is cruel and unusual punishment for a crime committed by a 15-year-old child, as well as whether photographic evidence that a state court deems erroneously-admitted but harmless at the guilt phase nevertheless violates a capital defendant’s constitutional rights by virtue of its being considered at the penalty phase. 479 U. S. 1084 (1987).
II
The authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a categorical prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, but they made no attempt to define the contours of that category. They delegated that task to future generations of judges who have been guided by the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (Warren, C. J.). In performing that task the Court has reviewed the work product of state legislatures and sentencing juries, and has carefully considered the reasons why a civilized society may accept or reject the death penalty in certain types of cases. Thus, in confronting the question whether the youth of the defendant — more specifically, the fact that he was less than 16 years old at the time of his offense — is a sufficient reason for denying the State the power to sentence him to death, we first review relevant legislative enactments, then refer to jury determinations, and finally explain why these indicators of contemporary standards of decency confirm our judgment that such a young person is not capable of acting with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty.
III
Justice Powell has repeatedly reminded us of the importance of “the experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law, recognizing that there are differences which must be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of children as compared with those of adults. Examples of this distinction abound in our law: in contracts, in torts, in criminal law and procedure, in criminal sanctions and rehabilitation, and in the right to vote and to hold office.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 590-591 (1975) (dissenting opinion). Oklahoma recognizes this basic distinction in a number of its statutes. Thus, a minor is not eligible to vote, to sit on a jury, to marry without parental consent, or to purchase alcohol or cigarettes. Like all other States, Oklahoma has developed a juvenile justice system in which most offenders under the age of 18 are not held criminally responsible. Its statutes do provide, however, that a 16- or 17-year-old charged with murder and other serious felonies shall be considered an adult. Other than the special certification procedure that was used to authorize petitioner’s trial in this case “as an adult,” apparently there are no Oklahoma statutes, either civil or criminal, that treat a person under 16 years of age as anything but a “child.”
The line between childhood and adulthood is drawn in different ways by various States. There is, however, complete or near unanimity among all 50 States and the District of Columbia in treating a person under 16 as a minor for several important purposes. In no State may a 15-year-old vote or serve on a jury. Further, in all but one State a 15-year-old may not drive without parental consent, and in all but four States a 15-year-old may not marry without parental consent. Additionally, in those States that have legislated on the subject, no one under age 16 may purchase pornographic materials (50 States), and in most States that have some form of legalized gambling, minors are not permitted to participate without parental consent (42 States). Most relevant, however, is the fact that all States have enacted legislation designating the maximum age for juvenile' court jurisdiction at no less than 16. All of this legislation is consistent with the experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law, that the normal 15-year-old is not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult.
Most state legislatures have not expressly confronted the question of establishing a minimum age for imposition of the death penalty."' In States, capital punishment is not authorized at all,-'' and in others capital punishment is authorized but no minimum age is expressly stated in the death penalty statute. One might argue on the basis of this body of legislation that there is no chronological age at which the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional and that our current standards of decency would still tolerate the execution of 10-year-old children. We think it self-evident that such an argument is unacceptable; indeed, no such argument has been advanced in this case. If, therefore, we accept the premise that some offenders are simply too young to be put to death, it is reasonable to put this group of statutes to one side because they do not focus on the question of where the chronological age line should be drawn. When we confine our attention to the 18 States that have expressly established a minimum age in their death penalty statutes, we find that all of them require that the defendant have attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the capital offense.
The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed by respected professional organizations, by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European community. Thus, the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute have formally expressed their opposition to the death penalty for juveniles. Although the death penalty has not been entirely abolished in the United Kingdom or New Zealand (it has been abolished in Australia, except in the State of New South Wales, where it is available for treason and piracy), in neither of those countries may a juvenile be executed. The death penalty has been abolished in West Germany, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian countries, and is available only for exceptional crimes such as treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. Juvenile executions are also prohibited in the Soviet Union.
IV
The second societal factor the Court has examined in determining the acceptability of capital punishment to the American sensibility is the behavior of juries. In fact, the infrequent and haphazard handing out of death sentences by capital juries was a prime factor underlying our judgment in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), that the death penalty, as then administered in unguided fashion, was unconstitutional.
While it is not known precisely how many persons have been executed during the 20th century for crimes committed under the age of 16, a scholar has recently compiled a table revealing this number to be between 18 and 20. All of these occurred during the first half of the century, with the last such execution taking place apparently in 1948. In the following year this Court observed that this “whole country has traveled far from the period in which the death sentence was an automatic and commonplace result of convictions....” Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949). The road we have traveled during the past four decades — in which thousands of juries have tried murder cases — leads to the unambiguous conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community.
Department of Justice statistics indicate that during the years 1982 through 1986 an average of over 16,000 persons were arrested for willful criminal homicide (murder and non-negligent manslaughter) each year. Of that group of 82,094 persons, 1,393 were sentenced to death. Only 5 of them, including the petitioner in this case, were less than 16 years old at the time of the offense. Statistics of this kind can, of course, be interpreted in different ways, but they do suggest that these five young offenders have received sentences that are “cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
V
“Although the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty” on one such as petitioner who committed a. heinous murder when he was only 15 years old. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782, 797 (1982). In making that judgment, we first ask whether the juvenile’s culpability should be measured by the same standard as that of an adult, and then consider whether the application of the death penalty to this class of offenders “measurably contributes” to the social purposes that are served by the death penalty. Id., at 798.
It is generally agreed “that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.” California v. Brown, 479 U. S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring)..There is also broad agreement on the proposition that adolescents as a.class are less mature and responsible than adults. We stressed this difference in explaining the importance of treating the defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor in capital cases:
“But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly ‘during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment’ expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 635 (1979).” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 115-116 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
To add further emphasis to the special mitigating force of youth, Justice Powell quoted the following passage from the 1978 Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders:
“ ‘[Ajdolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover, youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender’s fault; offenses by the young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, which share responsibility for the development of America’s youth.’” 455 U. S., at 115, n. 11.
Thus, the Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended explanation. Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.
“The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). In Gregg we concluded that as “an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct,” retribution was not “inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men.” Ibid. Given the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager’s capacity for growth, and society’s fiduciary obligations to its children, this conclusion is simply inapplicable to the execution of a 15-year-old offender.
For such a young offender, the deterrence rationale is equally unacceptable. The Department of Justice statistics indicate that about 98% of the arrests for willful homicide involved persons who were over 16 at the time of the offense. Thus, excluding younger persons from the class that is eligible for the death penalty will not diminish the deterrent value of capital punishment for the vast majority of potential offenders. And even with respect to those under 16 years of age, it is obvious that the potential deterrent value of the death sentence is insignificant for two reasons. The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent. And, even if one posits such a cold-blooded calculation by a 15-year-old, it is fanciful to believe that he would be deterred by the knowledge that a small number of persons his age have been executed during the 20th century. In short, we are not persuaded that the imposition of the death penalty for offenses committed by persons under 16 years of age has made, or can be expected to make, any measurable contribution to the goals that capital punishment is intended to achieve. It is, therefore, “nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,” Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S., at 592, and thus an unconstitutional punishment.
VI
Petitioner’s counsel and various amici curiae have asked us to “draw a line” that would prohibit the execution of any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense. Our task today, however, is to decide the case before us; we do so by concluding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to enter an appropriate order vacating petitioner’s death sentence.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
APPENDICES
Appendix A
Right to Vote
The United States Constitution, Amendment 26, requires States to permit 18-year-olds to vote. No State has lowered its voting-age below 18. The following chart assembles the various provisions from state constitutions and statutes that' provide an 18-year-old voting age.
Ala. [No provisions beyond reference to U. S. Const., Amdt. 26]
Alaska Alaska Const., Art. V, SI
Ariz. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §16-121 (Supp. 1987)
Ark. Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-401 (1987)
Cal. Cal. Const., Art. 2, §2
Colo. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-2-101 (1980)
Conn. Conn. Const., Art. 9; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-12 (Supp. 1988)
Del. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 15, S 1701 (1981)
D. C. D. C. Code § l-1311(b)(l) (1987)
Fla. Fla. Stat. §97.041 (1987)
Ga. Ga. Code Ann. §21-2-219 (1987)
Hawn Haw. Rev. Stat. §11-12 (1985)
Idaho Idaho Code § 34-402 (Supp. 1988)
III. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, 3-l (1987)
Ind. Ind. Code § 3-7-1-1 (Supp. 1987)
Iowa Iowa Code § 47.4 (1987)
Kan. Kan. Const., Art. 5, §1
Ky. Kv. Const. § 145
La. La. Const.. Art. 1, §10; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18:101(A) (West 1979)
Me. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21A, § 111(2) (Supp. 1987-1988)
Md.'Md. Ann. Code, Art. 33. §3-4(b)(2) (1986)
Mass. Mass. Gen. Laws §51:1 (1986)
Mich. Mich. Comp. Laws §168.492 (1979)
Minn. Minn. Stat. §201.014 (1986)
Miss. Miss. Const., Art. 12, §241
Mo. Mo. Const., Art. VIII, §2
Mont. Mont. Const., Art. IV, §2; Mont. Code Ann. §13-1-111(1987)
Neb. Neb. Const., Art. VI, §1; Neb. Rev. Stat. §32-223 (1984)
Nev. Nev. Rev. Stat. §293.485 (1987)
N. H. N. H. Const., Pt. 1, Art. 11
N. J. N. J. Const., Art. 2, ¶3
N. M. [No provisions beyond reference to U. S. Const., Amdt. 26]
N. Y. N. Y. Elec. Law § 5-102 (McKinney 1978)
N. C. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 163-55 (1987)
N. D. N. D. Const., Art. II, §1
Ohio Ohio Const., Art. V, § 1; Ohio Rev.. Code Ann. §§3503.01, 3503.011 (1982)
Okla. Okla. Const., Art. 3, § 1
Ore. Ore. Const., Art. II, §2
Pa. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, §2811 (Purdon Supp. 1988-1889)
R. I. R. I. Gen. Laws § 17-1-3 (Supp. 1987)
S. C. S. C. Code § 7-5-610 (Supp. 1987)
S. D. S. D. Const., Art. VII, §2; S. D. Codified Laws.§ 12-3-1 (1982)
Tenn. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-2-102 (1985)
Tex. Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §11.002 (Supp. 1988)
Utah Utah Code Ann. §20-1-17 (1984)
Vt. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2121 (1982)
Va. Va. Const., Art. II, § 1
Wash. Wash. Const., Art. VI, §1, Amdt. 63
W. Va. W. Va. Code §3-1-3 (1987)
Wis. Wis. Const., Art. 3, §1; Wis. Stat. §§6.02,6.05 (1985-1986)
Wyo. Wyo. Stat. §22-l-102(k) (Supp. 1988)
Appendix B
Right to Serve on a Jury
In no State may anyone below the age of 18 serve on a jury. The following chart assembles the various state provisions relating to minimum age for jury service.
Ala. Ala. Code § 12-16-60(a)(l) (1986)
Alaska Alaska Stat. Ann. § 09.20.010(a)(3) (Supp. 1987)
Ariz. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-301(0) (Supp. 1987)
Ark. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-31-101 (1987)
Cal. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 198(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988)
Colo. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-71-109(2)(a) (1973)
Conn. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-217 (Supp. 1988)
Del. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, §4506(b)(1) (Supp. 1986)
D. C. D. C. Code § ll-1906(b)(l)(C) (Supp. 1988)
Fla. Fla. Stat. HO. 01 (1987)
Ga. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-12-40 (Supp. 1988)
Haw. Haw. Rev. Stat. §612-4 (1985)
Idaho Idaho Code § 2-209(2)(a) (Supp. 1988)
Ill. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 78, ¶2 (1987)
Ind. Ind. Code § 33-4-5-2 (Supp. 1987)
Iowa Iowa Code §607A.4(l)(a) (1987)
Kan. Kan. Stat. Ann. §43-156 (1986)
Ky. Ky. Rev. Stat. §29A.080(2)(a) (1985)
La. La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 401(A)(2) (West Supp. 1988)
Me. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 14, §1211 (Supp. 1987-1988)
Md. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §8-104 (1984)
Mass. Mass. Gen. Laws §234:1 (1986)
Mich. Mich. Comp.'Laws § 600.1307a(l)(a) (Supp. 1988-1989)
Minn. Minn. Stat. § 593.41, subd. 2(2) (1986)
Miss. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-1 (1972)
Mo. Mo. Rev. Stat. §494.010 (1986)
Mont. Mont. Code Ann. §3-15-301 (1987)
Neb. Neb. Rev. Stat. §25-1601 (1985)
Nev. Nev. Rev. Stat. §6.010 (1987)
N. H. N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 500-A:3 (1983)
N. J. N. J. Stat. Ann. §9:17B-1 (West Supp. 1988)
N. M. N. M. Stat. Ann. §38-5-1 (1987)
N. Y. N. Y. Jud. Law §510(2) (McKinney Supp. 1988)
N. C. N. C. Gen. Stat. §9-3 (1986)
N. D. N. D. Cent. Code § 27-09.l-08(2)(b) (Supp. 1987)
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2313.42 (1984)
Okla. Okla. Stat., Tit. 38, §28 (1981)
Ore. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 10.030(2)(c) (1987)
Pa. Pa. Cons. Stat. §4521 (1982)
R. I. R. I. Gen. Laws § 9-9-1 (1985)
S. C. S. C. Code § 14-7-130 (1987)
S. D. Codified Laws § 16-18-10 (1987) S. D.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-1-101 (1980) Tenn.
Tex. Govt. Code Ann. §62.102 (1988) Tex.
Utah Code Ann. §78-46-7(l)(b) (1987) Utah
Vt. Stat. Ann. — Administrative Orders and Rules: Qualification, List, Selection and Summoning of All Jurors — Rule 25 (1986) Vt.
Va. Code §8.01-337 (Supp. 1988) Va.
Wash. Rev. Code §2.36.070 (1987) Wash.
W. Va. Code § 52-l-8(b)(l) (Supp. 1988) W. Va.
Wis. Stat. §756.01 (1985-1986) Wis.
Wyo. Stat. § 1-11-101 (1988) Wyo.
Appendix C
Right to Drive Without Parental Consent
Most States have various provisions regulating driving age, from learner’s permits through driver’s licenses. In all States but one, 15-year-olds either may not drive, or may drive only with parental consent or accompaniment.
Ala. Ala. Code §32-6-7(1) (1983)
Alaska Alaska Stat. Ann. §28.15.071 (Supp. 1987)
Ariz. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-413(A)(l) (Supp. 1987)
Ark. Ark. Code Ann. §27-16-604(a)(l) (1987)
Cal. Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 12507 (West 1987)
Colo. Colo. Rev. Stat. §42-2-107(1) (1984).
Conn. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-36 (1985)
Del. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 21, §2707 (1985)
D. C. D. C. Code §40-301 (1981)
Fla. Fla. Stat. §322.09 (1987)
Ga. Ga. Code Ann. §40-5-26 (1985)
Haw. Haw. Rev. Stat. §286-112 (1985)
Idaho Idaho Code §49-313 (Supp. 1987)
Ill. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95V», 6-103 (1987)
Ind. Ind. Code § 9-1-4-32 (1982)
Iowa Iowa Code § 321.177 (1987)
Kan. Kan. Stat. Ann. §8-237 (1982)
Ky. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §186.470 (1980)
La. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §32:407 (West Supp. 1988)
Me. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 29, §585 (Supp. 1987-1988)
Md. Md. Transp. Code Ann. § 16-103 (1987)
Mass. Mass. Gen. Laws §90:8 (1986)
Mich. Mich. Comp. Laws §257.308 (1979)
Minn. Minn. Stat. § 171.04 (1986)
Miss. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-23 (Supp. 1987)
Mo. Mo. Rev. Stat. §302.060 (Supp. 1987)
Mont. Mont. Code Ann. §61-5-105 (1987) (15-year-olds may drive without parental consent if they pass a driver’s education course)
Neb. Neb. Rev. Stat. §60-407 (1984)
Nev. Nev. Rev. Stat. §483.250 (1987)
N. H. N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §263:17 (Supp. 1987)
N. J. N. J. Stat. Ann. §39:3-10 (West Supp. 1988)
N. M. N. M. Stat. Ann. §66-5-11 (1984)
N. Y. N. Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §502(2) (McKinney 1986)
N. C. N. C. Gen. Stat. §20-11 (1983)
N. D. N. D. Cent. Code § 39-06-08 (1987)
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4507.07 (Supp. 1987)
Okla. Okla. Stat., Tit. 47, §6-107 (Supp. 1987)
Ore. Ore. Rev. Stat. §807.060 (1987)
Pa. Pa. Cons. Stat., § 1503 (1987)
R. I. R. I. Gen. Laws § 31-10-3 (Supp. 1987)
S. C. S. C. Code §56-1-100 (1976)
S. D. S. D. Codified Laws §32-12-6 (1984)
Tenn. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-7-104 (Supp. 1987)
Tex. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 6687b(4) (Vernon Supp. 1988)
Utah Utah Code Ann. §41-2-109 (Supp. 1987)
Vt. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 23, §607 (1987)
Va. Va. Code §46.1-357 (Supp. 1988)
Wash. Wash. Rev. Code §46.20.031 (1987)
W. Va. W. Va. Code § 17B-2-3 (1986)
Wis. Wis. Stat. §343.15 (1985-1986)
Wyo. Wyo. Stat. §31-7-112 (Supp. 1988)
Appendix D
Right to Marry Without Parental Consent
In all States but four, 15-year-olds may not marry without parental consent.
Ala. Ala. Code § 30-1-5 (1983)
Alaska Alaska Stat. Ann. §25.05.171 (1983) (judge may permit minor to marry without parental consent, even in the face of parental opposition, in certain circumstances)
Anz. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25 — 102(A) (1976)
Ark. Ark. Code Ann. §9-11-102 (1987)
Cal. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §4101 (West 1983)
Colo. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-106(l)(a)(I) (1987)
Conn. Conn. Gen. Stat. §46b-30 (1986)
Del. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 13, §123 (1981)
D. C. D. C. Code §30-111(1981)
Fla. Fla. Stat. §741.04 (1987)
Ga. Ga. Code Ann. § 19-3-37 (1982)
Haw. Haw. Rev. Stat. §572-2 (1985)
Idaho Idaho Code §32-202 (1983)
Ill. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 40, 203(1) (1987)
Ind. Ind. Code §31-7-1-6 (Supp. 1987)
Iowa Iowa Code §595.2 (1987)
Kan. Kan. Stat. Ann. §23-106 (1981)
Ky. Ky. Rev. Stat. §402.210 (1984)
La. La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 87 (West Supp. 1988) (minors not legally prohibited from marrying, even without parental consent, but marriage ceremony required); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §9:211 (West Supp. 1988) (official may not perform marriage ceremony in which a minor is a party without parental consent; comments to Civ. Code Ann., Art. 87, suggest that such a marriage is valid but that official may face sanctions)
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19, §62 (Supp. 198
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to a well-publicized plan, a group of lawyers agreed not to represent indigent criminal defendants in the District of Columbia Superior Court until the District of Columbia government increased the lawyers’ compensation. The questions presented are whether the lawyers’ concerted conduct violated §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and, if so, whether it was nevertheless protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
I — I
The burden of providing competent counsel to indigent defendants in the District of Columbia is substantial. During 1982, court-appointed counsel represented the defendant in approximately 25,000 cases. In the most serious felony cases, representation was generally provided by full-time employees of the District’s Public Defender System (PDS). Less serious felony and misdemeanor cases constituted about 85 percent of the total caseload. In these cases, lawyers in private practice were appointed and compensated pursuant to the District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act (CJA).
Although over 1,200 lawyers have registered for CJA appointments, relatively few actually apply for such work on a regular basis. In 1982, most appointments went to approximately 100 lawyers who are described as “CJA regulars.” These lawyers derive almost all of their income from representing indigents. In 1982, the total fees paid to CJA lawyers amounted to $4,579,572.
In 1974, the District created a Joint Committee on Judicial Administration with authority to establish rates of compensation for CJA lawyers not exceeding the rates established by the federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964. After 1970, the federal Act provided for fees of $30 per hour for court time and $20 per hour for out-of-court time. See 84 Stat. 916, codified at 18 U. S. C. §3006A (1970 ed.). These rates accordingly capped the rates payable to the District’s CJA lawyers, and could not be exceeded absent amendment to either the federal statute or the District Code.
Bar organizations began as early as 1975 to express concern about the low fees paid to CJA lawyers. Beginning in 1982, respondents, the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (SCTLA) and its officers, and other bar groups sought to persuade the District to increase CJA rates to at least $35 per hour. Despite what appeared to be uniform support for the bill, it did not pass. It is also true, however, that nothing in the record indicates that the low fees caused any actual shortage of CJA lawyers or denied effective representation to defendants.
In early August 1983, in a meeting with officers of SCTLA, the Mayor expressed his sympathy but firmly indicated that no money was available to fund an increase. The events giving rise to this litigation then ensued.
At an SCTLA meeting, the CJA lawyers voted to form a “strike committee.” The eight members of that committee promptly met and informally agreed “that the only viable way of getting an increase in fees was to stop signing up to take new CJA appointments, and that the boycott should aim for a $45 out-of-court and $55 in-court rate schedule.” In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 107 F. T. C. 510, 538 (1986).
On August 11, 1983, about 100 CJA lawyers met and resolved not to accept any new cases after September 6 if legislation providing for an increase in their fees had not passed by that date. Immediately following the meeting, they prepared (and most of them signed) a petition stating:
“We, the undersigned private criminal lawyers practicing in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, agree that unless we are granted a substantial increase in our hourly rate we will cease accepting new appointments under the Criminal Justice Act.” 272 U. S. App. D. C. 272, 276, 856 F. 2d 226, 230 (1988).
On September 6, 1983, about 90 percent of the CJA regulars refused to accept any new assignments. Thereafter, SCTLA arranged a series of events to attract the attention of the news media and to obtain additional support. These events were well publicized and did engender favorable editorial comment, but the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that “there is no credible evidence that the District’s eventual capitulation to the demands of the CJA lawyers was made in response to public pressure, or, for that matter, that this publicity campaign actually engendered any significant measure of public pressure.” 107 F. T. C., at 543.
As the participating CJA lawyers had anticipated, their refusal to take new assignments had a severe impact on the District’s criminal justice system. The massive flow of new cases did not abate, and the need for prompt investigation and preparation did not ease. As the ALJ found, “there was no one to replace the CJA regulars, and makeshift measures were totally inadequate. A few days after the September 6 deadline, PDS was swamped with cases. The handful of CJA regulars who continued to take cases were soon overloaded. The overall response of the uptown lawyers to the PDS call for help was feeble, reflecting their universal distaste for criminal law, their special aversion for compelled in-digency representation, the near epidemic siege of self-doubt about their ability to handle cases in this field, and their underlying support for the demands of the CJA lawyers. Most of the law student volunteers initially observed the boycott, and later all law student volunteers were limited (as they usually are) to a relatively few minor misdemeanors.” Id., at 544 (footnotes omitted).
Within 10 days, the key figures in the District’s criminal justice system “became convinced that the system was on the brink of collapse because of the refusal of CJA lawyers to take on new cases.” Ibid. On September 15, they hand-delivered a letter to the Mayor describing why the situation was expected to “reach a crisis point” by early the next week and urging the immediate enactment of a bill increasing all CJA rates to $35 per hour. The Mayor promptly met with members of the strike committee and offered to support an immediate temporary increase to the $35 level as well as a subsequent permanent increase to $45 an hour for out-of-court time and $55 for in-court time.
At noon on September 19, 1983, over 100 CJA lawyers attended an SCTLA meeting and voted to accept the $35 offer and end the boycott. The city council’s Judiciary Committee convened at 2 o’clock that afternoon. The committee recommended legislation increasing CJA fees to $35, and the council unanimously passed the bill on September 20. On September 21, the CJA regulars began to accept new assignments and the crisis subsided.
II
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against SCTLA and four of its officers (respondents) alleging that they had “entered into an agreement among themselves and with other lawyers to restrain trade by refusing to compete for or accept new appointments under the CJA program beginning on September 6, 1983, unless and until the District of Columbia increased the fees offered under the CJA program.” Id., at 511. The complaint alleged that virtually all of the attorneys who regularly compete for or accept new appointments under the CJA program had joined the agreement. The FTC characterized respondents’ conduct as “a conspiracy to fix prices and to conduct a boycott” and concluded that they were engaged in “unfair methods of competition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”
After a 3-week hearing, the ALJ found that the facts alleged in the complaint had been proved, and rejected each of respondents’ three legal defenses — that the boycott was adequately justified by the public interest in obtaining better legal representation for indigent defendants; that as a method of petitioning for legislative change it was exempt from the antitrust laws under our decision in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127 (1961); and that it was a form of political action protected by the First Amendment under our decision in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886 (1982). The ALJ nevertheless concluded that the complaint should be dismissed because the District officials, who presumably represented the victim of the boycott, recognized that its net effect was beneficial. The increase in fees would attract more CJA lawyers, enabling them to reduce their caseloads and provide better representation for their clients. “I see no point,” he concluded, “in striving resolutely for an antitrust triumph in this sensitive area when the particular case can be disposed of on a more pragmatic basis — there was no harm done.” 107 F. T. C., at 561.
The ALJ’s pragmatic moderation found no favor with the FTC. Like the ALJ, the FTC rejected each of respondents’ defenses. It held that their “coercive, concerted refusal to deal” had the “purpose and effect of raising prices” and was illegal per se. Id., at 573. Unlike the ALJ, the FTC refused to conclude that the boycott was harmless, noting that the “boycott forced the city government to increase the CJA fees from a level that had been sufficient to obtain an adequate supply of CJA lawyers to a level satisfactory to the respondents. The city must, as a result of the boycott, spend an additional $4 million to $5 million a year to obtain legal services for indigents. We find that these are substantial anticompetitive effects resulting from the respondents’ conduct.” Id., at 577. Finally, the FTC determined that the record did not support the AL J’s conclusion that the District supported the boycott. The FTC also held that such support would not in any event excuse respondents’ antitrust violations. Accordingly,. it entered a cease-and-desist order “to prohibit the respondents from initiating another boycott... whenever they become dissatisfied with the results or pace of the city’s legislative process.” Id., at 602.
The Court of Appeals vacated the FTC order and remanded for a determination whether respondents possessed “significant market power.” The court began its analysis by recognizing that absent any special First Amendment protection, the boycott “constituted a classic restraint of trade within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 280, 856 F. 2d, at 234. The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by respondents’ reliance on Claiborne Hardware or Noerr, or by their argument that the boycott was justified because it was designed to improve the quality of representation for indigent defendants. It concluded, however, that “the SCTLA boycott did contain an element of expression warranting First Amendment protection.” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 294, 856 F. 2d, at 248. It noted that boycotts have historically been used as a dramatic means of expression and that respondents intended to convey a political message to the public at large. It therefore concluded that under United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), a restriction on this form of expression could not be justified unless it is no greater than is essential to an important governmental interest. - This test, the court reasoned, could not be satisfied by the application of an otherwise appropriate per se rule, but instead required the enforcement agency to “prove rather than presume that the evil against which the Sherman Act is directed looms in the conduct it condemns.” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 296, 856 F. 2d, at 250.
Because of our concern about the implications of the Court of Appeals’ unique holding, we granted the FTC’s petition for certiorari as well as respondents’ cross-petition. 490 U. S. 1019 (1989).
We consider first the cross-petition, which contends that respondents’ boycott is outside the scope of the Sherman Act or is immunized from antitrust regulation by the First Amendment. We then turn to the FTC’s petition.
Ill
Reasonable lawyers may differ about the wisdom of this enforcement proceeding. The dissent from the decision to file the complaint so demonstrates. So, too, do the creative conclusions of the AL J and the Court of Appeals. Respondents’ boycott may well have served a cause that was worthwhile and unpopular. We may assume that the preboycott rates were unreasonably low, and that the increase has produced better legal representation for indigent defendants. Moreover, given that neither indigent criminal defendants nor the lawyers who represent them command any special appeal with the electorate, we may also assume that without the boycott there would have been no increase in District CJA fees at least until the Congress amended the federal statute. These assumptions do not control the case, for it is not our task to pass upon the social utility or political wisdom of price-fixing agreements.
As the ALJ, the FTC, and the Court of Appeals all agreed, respondents’ boycott “constituted a classic restraint of trade within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 280, 856 F. 2d, at 234. As such, it also violated the prohibition against unfair methods of competition in § 5 of the FTC Act. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 694 (1948). Prior to the boycott CJA lawyers were in competition with one another, each deciding independently whether and how often to offer to provide services to the District at CJA rates. The agreement among the CJA lawyers was designed to obtain higher prices for their services and was implemented by a concerted refusal to serve an important customer in the market for legal services and, indeed, the only customer in the market for the particular services that CJA regulars offered. “This constriction of supply is the essence of ‘price-fixing/ whether it be accomplished by agreeing upon a price, which will decrease the quantity demanded, or by agreeing upon an output, which will increase the price offered.” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 280, 856 F. 2d, at 234. The horizontal arrangement among these competitors was unquestionably a “naked restraint” on price and output. See National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board, of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 110 (1984).
It is, of course, true that the city purchases respondents’ services because it has a constitutional duty to provide representation to indigent defendants. It is likewise true that the quality of representation may improve when rates are increased. Yet neither of these facts is an acceptable justification for an otherwise unlawful restraint of trade. As we have remarked before, the “Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.” National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 695 (1978). This judgment “recognizes that all elements of a bargain — quality, service, safety, and durability — and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers.” Ibid. That is equally so when the quality of legal advocacy, rather than engineering design, is at issue.
The social justifications proffered for respondents’ restraint of trade thus do not make it any less unlawful. The statutory policy underlying the Sherman Act “precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad.” Ibid. Respondents’ argument, like that made by the petitioners in Professional Engineers, ultimately asks us to find that their boycott is permissible because the price it seeks to set is reasonable. But it was settled shortly after the Sherman Act was passed that it “is no excuse that the prices fixed are themselves reasonable. See, e. g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 397-398 (1927); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290, 340-341 (1897).” Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S. 643, 647 (1980). Respondents’ agreement is not outside the coverage of the Sherman Act simply because its objective was the enactment of favorable legislation.
Our decision in Noerr in no way detracts from this conclusion. In Noerr, we “considered whether the Sherman Act prohibited a publicity campaign waged by railroads” and “designed to foster the adoption of laws destructive of the trucking business, to create an atmosphere of distaste for truckers among the general public, and to impair the relationships existing between truckers and their customers.” Claiborne Hardware, 458 U. S., at 913. Interpreting the Sherman Act in the light of the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, the Court noted that “at least insofar as the railroads’ campaign was directed toward obtaining governmental action, its legality was not at all affected by any. anticompetitive purpose it may have had.” 365 U. S., at 139-140.
It of course remains true that “no violation of the Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws,” id., at 135, even if the defendants’ sole purpose is to impose a restraint upon the trade of their competitors, id., at 138-140. But in the Noerr case the alleged restraint of trade was the intended consequence of public action; in this case the boycott was the means by which respondents sought to obtain favorable legislation. The restraint of trade that was implemented while the boycott lasted would have had precisely the same anticompetitive consequences during that period even if no legislation had been enacted. In Noerr, the desired legislation would have created the restraint on the truckers’ competition; in this case the emergency legislative response to the boycott put an end to the restraint.
Indeed, respondents’ theory of Noerr was largely disposed of by our opinion in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U. S. 492 (1988). We held that the Noerr doctrine does not extend to “every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to influence governmental action.” 486 U. S., at 503. We explained:
“If all such conduct were immunized then, for example, competitors would be free to enter into horizontal price agreements as long as they wished to propose that price as an appropriate level for governmental ratemaking or price supports. But see Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 324 U. S. 439, 456-463 (1945). Horizontal conspiracies or boycotts designed to exact higher prices or other economic advantages from the government would be immunized on the ground that they are genuinely intended to influence the government to agree to the conspirators’ terms. But see Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159 (1942). Firms could claim immunity for boycotts or horizontal output restrictions on the ground that they are intended to dramatize the plight of their industry and spur legislative action.” Ibid.
IV
SCTLA argues that if its conduct would otherwise be prohibited by the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, it is nonetheless protected by the First Amendment rights recognized in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886 (1982). That case arose after black citizens boycotted white merchants in Claiborne County, Mississippi. The white merchants sued under state law to recover losses from the boycott. We found that the “right of the States to regulate economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself.” Id., at 914. We accordingly held that “the nonviolent elements of petitioners’ activities are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.” Id., at 915.
SCTLA contends that because it, like the boycotters in Claiborne Hardware, sought to vindicate constitutional rights, it should enjoy a similar First Amendment protection. It is, of course, clear that the association’s efforts to publicize the boycott, to explain the merits of its cause, and to lobby District officials to enact favorable legislation — like similar activities in Claiborne Hardware — were activities that were fully protected by the First Amendment. But nothing in the FTC’s order would curtail such activities, and nothing in the FTC’s reasoning condemned any of those activities.
The activity that the FTC order prohibits is a concerted refusal by CJA lawyers to accept any further assignments until they receive an increase in their compensation; the undenied objective of their boycott was an economic advantage for those who agreed to participate. It is true that the Claiborne Hardware case also involved a boycott. That boycott, however, differs in a decisive respect. Those who joined the Claiborne Hardware boycott sought no special advantage for themselves. They were black citizens in Port Gibson, Mississippi, who had been the victims of political, social, and economic discrimination for many years. They sought only the equal respect and equal treatment to which they were constitutionally entitled. They struggled “to change a social order that had consistently treated them as second class citizens.” Id., at 912. As we observed, the campaign was not intended “to destroy legitimate competition.” Id., at 914. Equality and freedom are preconditions of the free market, and not commodities to be haggled over within it.
The same cannot be said of attorney’s fees. As we recently pointed out, our reasoning in Claiborne Hardware is not applicable to a boycott conducted by business competitors who “stand to profit financially from a lessening of competition in the boycotted market.” Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., supra, at 508. No matter how altruistic the motives of respondents may have been, it is -undisputed that their immediate objective was to increase the price that they would be paid for their services. Such an economic boycott is well within the category that was expressly distinguished in the Claiborne Hardware opinion itself. 458 U. S., at 914-915.
Only after recognizing the well-settled validity of prohibitions against various economic boycotts did we conclude in Claiborne Hardware that “peaceful, political activity such as that found in the [Mississippi] boycott” are entitled to constitutional protection. We reaffirmed the government’s “power to regulate [such] economic activity.” Id., at 912-913. This conclusion applies with special force when a clear objective of the boycott is to economically advantage the participants.
V
Respondents’ concerted action in refusing to accept further CJA assignments until their fees were increased was thus a plain violation of the antitrust laws. The exceptions derived from Noerr and Claiborne Hardware have no application to respondents’ boycott. For these reasons we reject the arguments made by respondents in the cross-petition.
The Court of Appeals, however, crafted a new exception to the per se rules, and it is this exception which provoked the FTC’s petition to this Court. The Court of Appeals derived its exception from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). In that case O’Brien had burned his Selective Service registration certificate on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse. He did so before a sizable crowd and with the purpose of advocating his antiwar beliefs. We affirmed his conviction. We held that the governmental interest in regulating the “nonspeech element” of his conduct adequately justified the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms. Specifically, we concluded that the statute’s incidental restriction on O’Brien’s freedom of expression was no greater than necessary to further the Government’s interest in requiring registrants to have valid certificates continually available.
However, the Court of Appeals held that, in light of O’Brien, the expressive component of respondents’ boycott compelled courts to apply the antitrust laws “prudently and with sensitivity,” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 279-280, 856 F. 2d, at 233-234, with a “special solicitude for the First Amendment rights” of respondents. The Court of Appeals concluded that the governmental interest in prohibiting boycotts is not sufficient to justify a restriction on the communicative element of the boycott unless the FTC can prove, and not merely presume, that the boycotters have market power. Because the Court of Appeals imposed this special requirement upon the government, it ruled that per se antitrust analysis was inapplicable to boycotts having an expressive component.
There are at least two critical flaws in the Court of Appeals’ antitrust analysis: it exaggerates the significance of the expressive component in respondents’ boycott and it denigrates the importance of the rule of law that respondents violated. Implicit in the conclusion of the Court of Appeals are unstated assumptions that most economic boycotts do not have an expressive component, and that the categorical prohibitions against price fixing and boycotts are merely rules of “administrative convenience” that do not serve any substantial governmental interest unless the price-fixing competitors actually possess market power.
It would not much matter to the outcome of this case if these flawed assumptions were sound. O’Brien would offer respondents no protection even if their boycott were uniquely expressive and even if the purpose of the per se rules were purely that of administrative efficiency. We have recognized that the government’s interest in adhering to a uniform rule may sometimes satisfy the O’Brien test even if making an exception to the rule in a particular case might cause no serious damage. United States v. Albertini, 472 U. S. 675, 688 (1985) (“The First Amendment does not bar application of a neutral regulation that incidentally burdens speech merely because a party contends that allowing an exception in the particular case will not threaten important government interests”). The administrative efficiency interests in antitrust regulation are unusually compelling. The per se rules avoid “the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable.” Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5 (1958). If small parties “were allowed to prove lack of market power, all parties would have that right, thus introducing the enormous complexities of market definition into every price-fixing case.” R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 269 (1978). For these reasons, it is at least possible that the Claiborne Hardware doctrine, which itself rests in part upon O’Brien, exhausts O’Brien’s application to the antitrust statutes.
In any event, however, we cannot accept the Court of Appeals’ characterization of this boycott or the antitrust laws. Every concerted refusal to do business with a potential customer or supplier has an expressive component. At one level, the competitors must exchange their views about their objectives and the means of obtaining them. The most blatant, naked price-fixing agreement is a product of communication, but that is surely not a reason for viewing it with special solicitude. At another level, after the terms of the boycotters’ demands have been agreed upon, they must be communicated to its target: “[W]e will not do business until you do what we ask.” That expressive component of the boycott conducted by these respondents is surely not unique. On the contrary, it is the hallmark of every effective boycott.
At a third level, the boycotters may communicate with third parties to enlist public support for their objectives; to the extent that the boycott is newsworthy, it will facilitate the expression of the boycotters’ ideas. But this level of expression is not an element of the boycott. Publicity may be generated by any other activity that is sufficiently newsworthy. Some activities, including the boycott here, may be newsworthy precisely for the reasons that they are prohibited: the harms they produce are matters of public concern. Certainly that is no reason for removing the prohibition.
In sum, there is thus nothing unique about the “expressive component” of respondents’ boycott. A rule that requires courts to apply the antitrust laws “prudently and with sensitivity” whenever an economic boycott has an “expressive component” would create a gaping hole in the fabric of those laws. Respondents’ boycott thus has no special characteristics meriting an exemption from the per se rules of antitrust law.
Equally important is the second error implicit in respondents’ claim to immunity from the per se rules. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals assumed that the antitrust laws permit, but do not require, the condemnation of price fixing and boycotts without proof of market power. The opinion further assumed that the per se rule prohibiting such activity “is only a rule of 'administrative convenience and efficiency,’ not a statutory command.” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 295, 856 F. 2d, at 249. This statement contains two errors. The per se rules are, of course, the product of judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act, but the rules nevertheless have the same force and effect as any other statutory commands. Moreover, while the per se rule against price fixing and boycotts is indeed justified in part by “administrative convenience,” the Court of Appeals erred in describing the prohibition as justified only by such concerns. The per se rules also reflect a longstanding judgment that the prohibited practices by their nature have “a substantial potential for impact on competition.” Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U. S. 2, 16 (1984).
As we explained in Professional Engineers, the rule of reason in antitrust law generates
“two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality — they are ‘illegal per se.’ In the second category are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.” 435 U. S., at 692.
“Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable.” Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U. S. 332, 344 (1982).
The per se rules in antitrust law serve purposes analogous to per se restrictions upon, for example, stunt flying in congested areas or speeding. Laws prohibiting stunt flying or setting speed limits are justified by the State’s interest in protecting human life and property. Perhaps most violations of such rules actually cause no harm. No doubt many experienced drivers and pilots can operate much more safely, even at prohibited speeds, than the average citizen.
If the especially skilled drivers and pilots were to paint messages on their cars, or attach streamers to their planes, their conduct would have an expressive component. High speeds and unusual maneuvers would help to draw attention to their messages. Yet the laws may nonetheless be enforced against these skilled persons without proof that their conduct was actually harmful or dangerous.
In part, the justification for these per se rules is rooted in administrative convenience. They are also supported, however, by the observation that every speeder and every stunt pilot poses some threat to the community. An unpredictable event may overwhelm the skills of the best driver or pilot, even if the proposed course of action was entirely prudent when initiated. A bad driver going slowly may be more dangerous that a good driver going quickly, but a good driver who obeys the law is safer still.
So it is with boycotts and price fixing. Every such horizontal arrangement among competitors poses some threat to the free market. A small participant in the market is, obviously, less likely to cause persistent damage than a large participant. Other participants in the market may act quickly and effectively to take the small participant’s place. For reasons including market inertia and information failures, however, a small conspirator may be able to impede competition over some period of time. Given an appropriate set of circumstances and some luck, the period can be long enough to inflict real injury upon particular consumers or competitors.
As Justice Douglas observed in an oft-quoted footnote to his United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940), opinion:
“Price-fixing agreements may or may not be aimed at complete elimination of price competition. The group making those agreements may or may not have power to control the market. But the fact that the group cannot control the market prices does not necessarily mean that the agreement as to prices has no utility to the members of the combination. The effectiveness of price-fixing agreements is dependent on many factors, such as competitive tactics, position in the industry, the formula underlying pricing policies. Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy.” Id., at 225-226, n. 59.
See also Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U. S., at 351, and n. 23.
Of course, some boycotts and some price-fixing agreements are more pernicious than others; some are only partly successful, and some may only succeed when they are buttressed by other causative factors, such as political influence. But an assumption that, absent proof of market power, the boycott disclosed by this record was totally harmless — when overwhelming testimony demonstrated that it almost produced a crisis in the administration of criminal justice in the District and when it achieved its economic goal — is flatly inconsistent with the clear course of our antitrust jurisprudence. Conspirators need not achieve the dimensions of a monopoly, or even a degree of market power any greater than that already disclosed by this record, to warrant condemnation under the antitrust laws.
<1 HH
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed insofar as that court held the per se rules inapplicable to the lawyers’ boycott. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45(a)(1), provides:
“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.”
The First Amendment to the Constitution provides:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
D. C. Code §§ 11-2601 — 11-2609 (1981). In a small number of cases, the indigent defendants were represented by third-year law students or private counsel serving without compensation.
As the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) noted:
“Because of the nature of CJA practice — its long hours away from the office (assuming the CJA lawyer has an office), the deadlines of Superior Court, and the problem of meeting deadlines in other courts — CJA regulars ordinarily do not take civil cases, nor do they usually appear on the criminal side of U. S. District court.” In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 107 F. T. C. 510, 522, n. 54 (1986).
The ALJ found that “at most” 13 of the CJA regulars continued to take assignments. 107 F. T. C., at 542, n. 173.
It is not clear how much of this finding by the ALJ was accepted by the Federal Trade Commission (FT
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The State of New Jersey imposes on each domestic corporation “an annual franchise tax ... for the privilege of having or exercising its corporate franchise” in the State. This tax, as applied to appellant, is measured by the corporation's “net worth,” which is defined as the sum of the corporation’s issued and outstanding capital stock, paid-in or capital surplus, earned surplus and undivided profits, other surplus accounts which will accrue to the shareholders (not including depreciation reserves), and debts owed to shareholders owning 10 percent or more of the corporation’s stock. Appellant is a corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey, and is therefore subject to the tax. In assessing appellant’s tax for 1952, the Tax Commissioner included in appellant’s net worth the value of certain federal bonds held by appellant, thereby increasing the amount due by $320.07. Appellant protested, claiming that under R. S. § 3701, 31 U. S. C. § 742, these bonds were immune from state taxation. The New Jersey courts upheld the Commissioner’s assessment, and this appeal contests the validity of the state statute as so applied.
Appellant contends that this tax is not in reality a franchise tax, but is rather in the nature of a direct property tax on the immune federal obligations. Corporate franchises granted by a State create a relationship which may legitimately be made the subject of taxation, Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 599-600; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 162; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 388; and the statute expressly declares this to be a franchise tax. Moreover, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has, on independent examination, found this to be “a bona fide franchise tax.” While this is, of course, not conclusive here, Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S. 143, we find no basis in this instance for not accepting the state court’s conclusion that this tax is not imposed directly on the property held by the corporation. Cf. Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U. S. 480, 495-496.
Appellant argues further that even if this is a franchise tax, it must fall because its effect is the same as if it had been imposed directly on the tax-exempt federal securities. Since the tax remains the same whatever the character of the corporate assets may be, no claim can be sustained that this taxing statute discriminates against the federal obligations. And since this is a tax on the corporate franchise, it is valid despite the inclusion of federal bonds in the determination of net worth. This Court has consistently upheld franchise taxes measured by a yardstick which includes tax-exempt income or property, even though a part of the economic impact of the tax may be said to bear indirectly upon such income or property. See, e. g., Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611; Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, supra; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, supra; Pacific Co. v. Johnson, supra. We have only recently adhered to this principle in another aspect of this field of taxation. See Society for Savings v. Bowers, supra, at 147-148. New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U. S. 665, on which appellant relies, is distinguishable, in that it did not involve a franchise tax, but rather a tax whose legal incidence this Court found to be upon the intangible assets of the corporation.
Since as applied here this is a permissible tax on the corporate franchise, the decision below must be
Affirmed.
N. J. Laws 1945, c. 162, N. J. S. A. §§ 54:10A-1 et seq.
Id., §§ 54:10A-4 (d)(5).
Werner Machine Co. v. Director of Division of Taxation, 17 N. J. 121, 125, 110 A. 2d 89, 91.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case first presents the question whether a plaintiff recovering under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. § 51, is entitled to have interest on the verdict for the interval between its return and the entry of judgment, where the Circuit Court of Appeals’ mandate which authorized the judgment contains no direction to add interest and is never amended to do so.
The jury returned a verdict of $42,500. The District Court then granted a motion, as to which decision had been reserved during the trial, to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and the judgment entered was therefore one of dismissal. However, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 153 F. 2d 841, and directed that judgment be entered on the verdict for plaintiff. When the District Court entered judgment, it added to the verdict interest from the date thereof to the date of judgment. The mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals had made no provision for interest. No motion to recall and amend the mandate had been made and the term at which it was handed down had expired. Motion to resettle so as to exclude the interest was denied by the District Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals has modified the judgment to exclude the interest in question and to conform to its mandate, 164 F. 2d 21, and the case is here on certiorari, 333 U. S. 836.
In its earliest days this Court consistently held that an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court. Himely v. Rose, 5 Cranch 313; The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431; Boyce’s Executors v. Grundy, 9 Pet. 275; Ex parte Sibbald v. United States, 12 Pet. 488. The rule of these cases has been uniformly followed in later days; see, for example, In re Washington & Georgetown R. Co., 140 U. S. 91; Ex parte Union Steamboat Company, 178 U. S. 317; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Guardian Trust Co., 281 U. S. 1. Chief Justice Marshall applied the rule to interdict allowance of interest not provided for in the mandate, Himely v. Rose, 5 Cranch 313; Mr. Justice Story explained and affirmed the doctrine, The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431; Boyce’s Executors v. Grundy, 9 Pet. 275. We do not see how it can be questioned at this time. It is clear that the interest was in excess of the terms of the mandate and hence was wrongly included in the District Court’s judgment and rightly stricken out by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The latter court’s mandate made no provision for such interest and the trial court had no power to enter judgment for an amount different than directed. If any enlargement of that amount were possible, it could be done only by amendment of the mandate. But no move to do this was made during the term at which it went down. While power to act on its mandate after the term expires survives to protect the integrity of the court’s own processes, Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Co., 322 U. S. 238, it has not been held to survive for the convenience of litigants. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U. S. 70.
The plaintiff has at no time moved to amend the mandate which is the basis of the judgment. That it made no provision for interest was apparent on its face. Plaintiff accepted its advantages and brings her case to this Court, not on the proposition that amendment of the mandate has been improperly refused, but on the ground that the mandate should be disregarded. Such a position cannot be sustained. Hence the question whether interest might, on proper application, have been allowed, is not reached. In re Washington & Georgetown R. Co., 140 U.S.91. ,
Affirmed.
Compare Louisiana & Arkansas R. Co. v. Pratt, 142 F. 2d 847, with Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 164 F. 2d 21.
"We do not consider the question as to whether interest was allowable by law, or rule, or statute, on the original judgment of the special term, or whether it would have been proper for the special term, in rendering the judgment, or otherwise, to have allowed interest upon it, or whether it would have been proper for the general term to do so; but we render our decision solely upon the point that, as neither the special term nor the general term allowed interest on the judgment, and as this court awarded no interest in its judgment of affirmance, all that the general term could do, after the mandate of this court went down, was to enter a judgment carrying out the mandate according to its terms, and simply affirming the prior judgment of the general term, and directing execution of the judgment of the special term . . . with costs, and without interest . . . .” 140 U. S. 91 at 97.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Opinion PER CURIAM.
Federal courts may grant habeas corpus relief if the underlying state-court decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by" this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Here, the Sixth Circuit held that respondent Cory Donald's attorney provided per seineffective assistance of counsel under United States v. Cronic,466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), when he was briefly absent during testimony concerning other defendants. Because no decision from this Court clearly establishes that Donald is entitled to relief under Cronic,we reverse.
I
After a day of drinking and smoking marijuana, Cory Donald and four others-Seante Liggins, Rashad Moore, Dewayne Saine, and Fawzi Zaya-decided to rob a drug dealer named Mohammed Makki. Donald, Moore, and Liggins drove to Makki's home in Dearborn, Michigan, wearing black skull caps and coats. Moore and Donald entered the house, while Liggins waited in the car.
Michael McGinnis, one of Makki's drug runners, was in the house at the time. When Donald and Moore came through the door, McGinnis raised his hands and dropped face-down to the floor. He heard a scuffle in the kitchen and two gunshots as someone said, " '[L]et it go.' " Donald v. Rapelje,580 Fed.Appx. 277, 279 (C.A.6 2014). After that, McGinnis felt a gun on the back of his head while someone rifled through his pockets saying, " '[W]hat you got, what you got?' " Donald v. Rapelje,2012 WL 6047130, *3 (E.D.Mich., Dec. 5, 2012). He also heard one of the two men whisper to the other, " 'I got shot, I got shot.' " 580 Fed.Appx., at 279. After Moore and Donald left, McGinnis found Makki slumped against the refrigerator dying.
About seven minutes after they entered the house, Moore and Donald returned, guns in hand, to Liggins' car. Donald told the others that he had stolen $320 and that Moore had accidentally shot him during the crime. That night, Donald checked into a hospital for a gunshot woundto his foot. Police arrested him about three weeks later.
The State charged Donald with one count of first-degree felony murder and two counts of armed robbery. Liggins and Zaya pleaded guilty, and Donald was tried with Moore and Saine. His defense theory was that he was present at the scene of the crime but he did not participate. At trial, the government sought to admit a chart chronicling phone calls from the day of the crime among Moore, Saine, and Zaya. Moore and Saine's attorneys objected, but Donald's attorney declined, saying: " 'I don't have a dog in this race. It does not affect me at all.' " Id., at 280. The court admitted the exhibit and took a short recess.
When the trial resumed, Donald's counsel was not in the courtroom. At first, the judge indicated that he would wait for the attorney. But he then decided to proceed because Donald's counsel had already indicated that the exhibit and testimony did not apply to his client. About 10 minutes later, the lawyer returned. The judge informed him that " 'up until that point we only were discussing the telephone chart,' " to which the attorney replied, " '[Y]es, your Honor, and as I had indicated on the record, I had no dog in the race and no interest in that.' " Ibid.
The jury found Donald guilty on all three counts. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony-murder count and to concurrent prison terms of 10 ½ to 20 years for each of the armed robbery counts. On appeal, Donald argued that he was entitled to a new trial because his attorney's absence during the phone call testimony denied him his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his claim, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied review.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted federal habeas relief, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was both contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of this Court's decision in Cronic. In the normal course, defendants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the familiar framework of Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), which requires a showing that "counsel's performance was deficient" and "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." And when reviewing an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id.,at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
In Cronic,however, we held that courts may presume that a defendant has suffered unconstitutional prejudice if he "is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial." 466 U.S., at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039. And in Bell v. Cone,535 U.S. 685, 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002), we characterized a "critical stage" as one that "held significant consequences for the accused." According to the Sixth Circuit, these statements should have compelled the Michigan court to hold that the phone call testimony was a "critical stage" and that counsel's absence constituted per seineffective assistance. Without identifying any decision from this Court directly in point, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the relevant testimony in this case was "similar to" our cases applying Cronic. 580 Fed.Appx., at 284.
II
A
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, a federal court may grant habeas relief only when a state court's decision on the merits was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by" decisions from this Court, or was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Donald does not argue that the state-court decision in his case was factually erroneous. Instead, he argues that the decision was both contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of this Court's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases.
AEDPA's standard is intentionally " ' "difficult to meet." ' " White v. Woodall,572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014)(quoting Metrish v. Lancaster,569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1781, 1786, 185 L.Ed.2d 988 (2013)). We have explained that " 'clearly established Federal law' for purposes of § 2254(d)(1)includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions." White,572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1702(some internal quotation marks omitted). "And an 'unreasonable application of' those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice." Id.,at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1702(same). To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to "show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter,562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).
Adherence to these principles serves important interests of federalism and comity. AEDPA's requirements reflect a "presumption that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford v. Visciotti,537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002)(per curiam). When reviewing state criminal convictions on collateral review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong. Federal habeas review thus exists as "a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington, supra,at 102-103, 131 S.Ct. 770(internal quotation marks omitted). This is especially true for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, where AEDPA review must be " ' "doubly deferential" ' " in order to afford "both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt." Burt v. Titlow,571 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 10, 13, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013)(quoting Cullen v. Pinholster,563 U.S. 170, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011)).
B
The Sixth Circuit should not have affirmed the Cronic-based grant of habeas relief in this case. The Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was not contrary to any clearly established holding of this Court. We have never addressed whether the rule announced in Cronicapplies to testimony regarding codefendants' actions. In Cronicitself, we rejected the defendant's claim that his counsel's lack of experience and short time for preparation warranted a presumption of prejudice, not a claim based on counsel's absence. See 466 U.S., at 663-666, 104 S.Ct. 2039. When announcing the rule in Cronic,we cited earlier cases finding prejudice where "counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding." Id.,at 659, n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039. But none of those cases dealt with circumstances like those present here. And Belldid not involve the absence of counsel; instead, we declined to presume prejudice where a capital defendant's counsel "failed to 'mount some case for life' after the prosecution introduced evidence in the sentencing hearing and gave a closing statement." 535 U.S., at 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843.
Because none of our cases confront "the specific question presented by this case," the state court's decision could not be "contrary to" any holding from this Court. Lopez v. Smith,574 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1, 4, 190 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014)(per curiam). The most that the Sixth Circuit could muster was that "[t]he testimony of a government witness is similar to the trial events that th[is] Court has deemed to be critical stages." 580 Fed.Appx., at 284. But that conclusion is doubly wrong. First, if the circumstances of a case are only "similar to" our precedents, then the state court's decision is not "contrary to" the holdings in those cases. See, e.g., Carey v. Musladin,549 U.S. 70, 76-77, and n. 2, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006). Second, the Sixth Circuit framed the issue at too high a level of generality. See, e.g.,Lopez, supra,at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 3-4. The relevant testimony was not merely "testimony of a government witness"; it was prosecution testimony about other defendants. To be sure, the Sixth Circuit considered the testimony relevant to Donald because he was being prosecuted on an aiding-and-abetting theory for felony murder. But Donald's position was that he had nothing to do with the planning among his codefendants. And none of our holdings address counsel's absence during testimony that is irrelevant within the defendant's own theory of the case.
Nor was the state court's decision an unreasonable application of our cases. The Sixth Circuit stated "that a critical stage of trial is a 'step of a criminal proceeding ... that h[olds] significant consequences for the accused.' " 580 Fed.Appx., at 284(quoting Bell, supra,at 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843). And it held that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was "objectively unreasonable" because the phone call evidence might have indirectly inculpated Donald in the eyes of the jury. But that holding is not correct. Just last Term we warned the Sixth Circuit that "where the ' "precise contours" ' of [a] right remain ' "unclear," ' state courts enjoy 'broad discretion' in their adjudication of a prisoner's claims." White,572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1705, (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade,538 U.S. 63, 76, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003), in turn quoting Harmelin v. Michigan,501 U.S. 957, 998, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991)(KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and in judgment)). Within the contours of Cronic,a fairminded jurist could conclude that a presumption of prejudice is not warranted by counsel's short absence during testimony about other defendants where that testimony was irrelevant to the defendant's theory of the case.
Cronicapplies in "circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." 466 U.S., at 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039. The Michigan Court of Appeals' refusal to apply it to these circumstances was not the "extreme malfunction" required for federal habeas relief. Harrington,562 U.S., at 102, 131 S.Ct. 770.
III
Because we consider this case only in the narrow context of federal habeas review, we "expres[s] no view on the merits of the underlying Sixth Amendment principle." Marshall v. Rodgers,569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 1451, 185 L.Ed.2d 540 (2013)(per curiam). All that matters here, and all that should have mattered to the Sixth Circuit, is that we have not held that Cronicapplies to the circumstances presented in this case. For that reason, federal habeas relief based upon Cronicis unavailable.
The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent's motion to proceed in forma pauperisare granted. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant, a Louisiana corporation, challenges the State’s imposition of a use tax on catalogs printed at appellant’s direction outside Louisiana and shipped to prospective customers within the State. The Louisiana Court of Appeal found that this application of the use tax did not violate the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. We affirm.
HH
Appellant D. H. Holmes Company, Ltd., is a Louisiana corporation with its principal place of business and registered office in New Orleans. Holmes owns and operates 13 department stores in various locations throughout Louisiana that employ about 5,000 workers. It has approximately 500,000 credit card customers and an estimated 1,000,000 other customers within the State.
In 1979-1981, Holmes contracted with several New York companies for the design and printing of merchandise catalogs. The catalogs were designed in New York, but were actually printed in Atlanta, Boston, and Oklahoma City. From these locations, 82% of the catalogs were directly mailed to residents of Louisiana; the remainder of the catalogs were mailed to customers in Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida, or were sent to Holmes for distribution at its flagship store on Canal Street in New Orleans. The catalogs were shipped free of charge to the addressee, and their entire cost (about $2 million for the 3-year period), including mailing, was borne by Holmes. Holmes did not, however, pay any sales tax where the catalogs were designed or printed.
Although the merchandise catalogs were mailed to selected customers, they contained instructions to the postal carrier to leave them with the current resident if the addressee had moved, and to return undeliverable catalogs to Holmes’ Canal Street store. Holmes freely concedes that the purpose of the catalogs was to promote sales at its stores and to instill name recognition in future buyers. The catalogs included inserts which could be used to order Holmes’ products by mail.
The Louisiana Department of Revenue and Taxation, of which appellee is the current Secretary, conducted an audit of Holmes’ tax returns for 1979-1981 and determined that it was liable for delinquent use taxes on the value of the catalogs. The Department of Revenue and Taxation assessed the use tax pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§47:302 and 47:321 (West 1970 and Supp. 1988), which are set forth in the margin. Together, §§47:302(A)(2) and 47:321(A)(2) impose a use tax of 3% on all tangible personal property used in Louisiana. “Use,” as defined elsewhere in the statute, is the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to ownership, and includes consumption, distribution, and storage. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 47:301(18) and (19) (West 1970 and Supp. 1988). The use tax is designed to compensate the State for sales tax that is lost when goods are purchased out-of-state and brought for use into Louisiana, and is calculated on the retail price the property would have brought when imported.
When Holmes refused to pay the use tax assessed against it, the State filed suit in Louisiana Civil District Court to collect the tax. In response to the State’s complaint, Holmes answered that it owed no tax under §§47:302 and 47:321 as properly applied, a position Holmes claimed was reinforced by La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §47:305(5) (West 1970). Holmes also contended that the use tax violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution.
After a 2-day bench trial, the District Court determined that the distribution of the catalogs in Louisiana was “intended for the use of D. H. Holmes in increasing its sales to potential customers who are residents of Louisiana.” No. 83-15523 (La. Civ. Dist. Ct., July 19, 1985), App. to Juris. Statement 12A, 21A. The court also found that “[o]nce the catalogs reach the residences of the prospective customers to whom they are addressed, Louisiana taxing authority reaches the resting place of the catalogs,” id., at 22A, and concluded that the application of the use tax statutes did not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce. The court then ordered Holmes to pay the State $49,937.03, plus interest and attorney’s fees, which was the amount the parties stipulated as due on the use tax.
The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 505 So. 2d 102 (1987). After reviewing the Louisiana use tax statute, the Court of Appeal found that the catalog distribution was properly subjected to the tax, since once the catalogs landed in Louisiana mailboxes they left the stream of interstate commerce and became part of the property mass of the State. Furthermore, “[distribution of the catalogs certainly constitutes ‘use’ by Holmes under the statute and is subject to the tax.” Id., at 105. Turning to the federal question in the case, the Court of Appeal analyzed the use tax under the test we articulated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977), and found that it did not Violate the Commerce Clause.
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied discretionary review. 506 So. 2d 1224 (1987). We noted probable jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). 484 U. S. 923 (1987).
HH b-H
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Even where Congress has not acted affirmatively to protect interstate commerce, the Clause prevents States from discriminating against that commerce. The “distinction between the power of the State to shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety and from fraud, even when those dangers emanate from interstate commerce, and its lack of power to retard, burden or constrict the flow of such commerce for their economic advantage, is one deeply rooted in both our history and our law.” H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 533 (1949).
One frequent source of conflict of this kind occurs when a State seeks to tax the sale or use of goods within its borders. See, e. g., Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U. S. 100 (1975); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80 (1948). This recurring dilemma is exemplified in what has come to be the leading case in the area, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra. In Complete Auto, Mississippi imposed a tax on appellant’s business of in-state transportation of motor vehicles manufactured outside the State. We found that the State’s tax did not violate the Commerce Clause, because appellant’s activity had a substantial nexus with Mississippi, and the tax was fairly apportioned, did not discriminate against interstate commerce, and .was fairly related to benefits provided by the State. Id., at 287.
This four-part formulation has since been used to evaluate the validity of state taxes vis-a-vis the Commerce Clause in a number of contexts. Two Terms ago, for instance, we upheld a Florida tax on aviation fuel purchased within the State, finding that all four of the Complete Auto criteria were satisfied. Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U. S. 1 (1986). The Complete Auto test has also been employed to test the constitutionality of business and occupation taxes, Department of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734 (1978); mineral severance taxes, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609 (1981); and the taxation of income received by an out-of-state corporation from its in-state subsidiaries, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U. S. 425 (1980).
Complete Auto abandoned the abstract notion that interstate commerce “itself” cannot be taxed by the States. We recognized that, with certain restrictions, interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes. Accordingly, in the present case, it really makes little difference for Commerce Clause purposes whether Holmes’ catalogs “came to rest” in the mailboxes of its Louisiana customers or whether they were still considered in the stream of interstate commerce. This distinction may be of some importance for other purposes (in determining, for instance, whether a “taxable moment” has occurred, see 505 So. 2d, at 105), but for Commerce Clause analysis it is largely irrelevant.
Holmes argues that Louisiana’s assessment against its merchandise catalogs is, in essence, a tax on the mere presence of goods within the State. This contention was expressly rejected by the Louisiana Court of Appeal’s finding that the distribution of the catalogs constituted use under §§47:802 and 47:321. We accept this construction of state law, and thus see no merit in the argument that Louisiana has attempted to tax only the existence of goods within the State.
In the case before us, then, the application of Louisiana’s use tax to Holmes’ catalogs does not violate the Commerce Clause if the tax complies with the four prongs of Complete Auto. We have no doubt that the second and third elements of the test are satisfied. The Louisiana taxing scheme is fairly apportioned, for it provides a credit against its use tax for sales taxes that have been paid in other States. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §47:303(A) (West 1970) (“A credit against the use tax imposed by this Chapter shall be granted to taxpayers who have paid a similar tax upon the sale or use of the same tangible personal property in another state”); §47:302(A)(2) (instructing that “there shall be no duplication of the tax”); §47:321(A)(2) (West Supp. 1988) (same). Holmes paid no sales tax for the catalogs where they were designed or printed; if it had, it would have been eligible for a credit against the use tax exacted. Similarly, Louisiana imposed its use tax only on the 82% of the catalogs distributed in-state; it did not attempt to tax that portion of the catalogs that went to out-of-state customers.
The Louisiana tax structure likewise does not discriminate against interstate commerce. The use tax is designed to compensate the State for revenue lost when residents purchase out-of-state goods for use within the State. It is equal to the sales tax applicable to the same tangible personal property purchased in-state; in fact, both taxes are set forth in the same sections of the Louisiana statutes. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§47:302 and 47:321 (West 1970 and Supp. 1988).
Complete Auto requires that the tax be fairly related to benefits provided by the State, but that condition is also met here. Louisiana provides a number of services that facilitate Holmes’ sale of merchandise within the State: It provides fire and police protection for Holmes’ stores, runs mass transit and maintains public roads which benefit Holmes’ customers, and supplies a number of other civic services from which Holmes profits. To be sure, many others in the State benefit from the same services; but that does not alter the fact that the use tax paid by Holmes, on catalogs designed to increase sales, is related to the advantages provided by the State which aid Holmes’ business.
Finally, we believe that Holmes’ distribution of its catalogs reflects a substantial nexus with Louisiana. To begin with, Holmes’ contention that it lacked sufficient control over the catalogs’ distribution in Louisiana to be subject to the use tax verges on the nonsensical. Holmes ordered and paid for the catalogs and supplied the list of customers to whom the catalogs were sent; any catalogs that could not be delivered were returned to it. Holmes admits that it initiated the distribution to improve its sales and name recognition among Louisiana residents. Holmes also has a significant presence in Louisiana, with 13 stores and over $100 million in annual sales in the State. See App. 68-69, 98. The distribution of catalogs to approximately 400,000 Louisiana customers was directly aimed at expanding and enhancing its Louisiana business. There is “nexus” aplenty here.
Holmes and several amici argue that Holmes’ posture here closely resembles the predicament of the mail-order business we confronted in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U. S. 753 (1967). In National Bellas Hess, we held that the State of Illinois could not, consistently with the Commerce Clause, compel an out-of-state mail-order company to collect a use tax on purchases of goods by Illinois residents when the seller’s only connection with its Illinois customers was by mail or common carrier. Holmes apparently views its catalog distribution as analogous to the mail-order solicitation in National Bellas Hess. This argument ignores, however, Holmes’ significant economic presence in Louisiana, its many connections with the State, and the direct benefits it receives from Louisiana in conducting its business. We thus see little similarity between the mail-order shipments in National Bellas Hess and Holmes’ activities in this case.
We find Holmes’ activities much closer to those considered in National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U. S. 551 (1977). National Geographic involved the operation of two California offices by a national magazine devoted solely to soliciting advertising for the magazine. California nonetheless applied its use tax, which required every retailer engaged in business in the State to collect a tax from its purchasers, on the magazine’s mail-order activities. We determined that the imposition of the tax did not violate the Commerce Clause, since the magazine’s “maintenance of the two offices in California and activities there adequately established] a relationship or ‘nexus’ between the [magazine] and the State” sufficient to support the tax. Id., at 556. This conclusion applies a fortiori here, since Holmes’ connection with Louisiana far exceeds that of the magazine with California in National Geographic.
Because Louisiana’s imposition of its use tax on Holmes does not violate the Commerce Clause, the judgment of the Louisiana Court of Appeal is
Affirmed.
Ҥ47:302. Imposition of tax
“A. There is hereby levied a tax upon the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution, and the storage for use or consumption in this state, of each item or article of tangible personal property, as defined herein, the levy of said tax to be as follows:
“(2) At the rate of two per centum (2%) of the cost price of each item or article of tangible personal property when the same is not sold but is used, consumed, distributed, or stored for use or consumption in this state; provided there shall be no duplication of the tax.”
Ҥ 47:321. Imposition of tax
“A. In addition to the tax levied by R. S. 47:302(A) and collected under the provisions of Chapter 2 of Subtitle II of Title 47 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, there is hereby levied an additional tax upon the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution, and the storage for use or consumption in this state, of each item or article of tangible personal property . . . the levy of said tax to be as follows:
“(2) At the rate of one percent of the cost price of each item or article of tangible personal property when the same is not sold but is used, consumed, distributed, or stored for use or consumption in this state, provided that there shall be no duplication of the tax.”
As originally filed in Louisiana Civil District Court, the State’s complaint included a claim for delinquent sales taxes on candy sold by Holmes. The State apparently reached an acceptable compromise with Holmes, and the Civil District Court granted a joint motion by the parties to dismiss without prejudice the candy sales tax issue. That issue is thus no longer a part of this case.
As then codified this section provided:
Ҥ 47:305. Exclusions and exemptions from the tax
“(5) It is not the intention of this Chapter to levy a tax upon articles of tangible personal property imported into this state, or produced or manufactured in this state, for export; nor is it the intention of this Chapter to levy a tax on bona fide interstate commerce. It is, however, the intention of this Chapter to levy a tax on the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution, and the storage to be used or consumed in this state, of tangible personal property after it has come to rest in this state and has become a part of the mass of property in this state.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Stewart
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Mr. Justice Blackmun, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Stevens joined.
Under Georgia law, a person convicted of murder may be sentenced to death if it is found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense “was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." Ga. Code § 27-2534.1 (b) (7) (1978). In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, the Court held that this statutory aggravating circumstance (§ (b)(7)) is not unconstitutional on its face. Responding to the argument that the language of the provision is “so broad that capital punishment could be imposed in any murder case/' the joint opinion said:
“It is, of course, arguable that any murder involves depravity of mind or an aggravated battery. But this language need not be construed in this way, and there is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construction.” 428 U. S., at 201 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
Nearly four years have passed since the Gregg decision, and during that time many death sentences based in whole or in part on § (b)(7) have been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The issue now before us is whether, in affirming the imposition of the sentences of death in the present case, the Georgia Supreme Court has adopted such a broad and vague construction of the § (b)(7) aggravating circumstance as to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
I
On a day in early September in 1977, the petitioner and his wife of 28 years had a heated argument in their home. During the course of this altercation, the petitioner, who had consumed several cans of beer, threatened his wife with a knife and damaged some of her clothing. At this point, the petitioner’s wife declared that she was going to leave him, and departed to stay with relatives. That afternoon she went to a Justice of the Peace and secured a warrant charging the petitioner with aggravated assault. A few days later, while still living away from home, she filed suit for divorce. Summons was served on the petitioner, and a court hearing was set on a date some two weeks later. Before the date of the hearing, the petitioner on several occasions asked his wife to return to their home. Each time his efforts were rebuffed. At some point during this period, his wife moved in with her mother. The petitioner believed that his mother-in-law was actively instigating his wife’s determination not to consider a possible reconciliation.
In the early evening of September 20, according to the petitioner, his wife telephoned him at home. Once again they argued. She asserted that reconciliation was impossible and allegedly demanded all the proceeds from the planned sale of their house. The conversation was terminated after she said that she would call back later. This she did in an hour or so. The ensuing conversation was, according to the petitioner’s account, even more heated than the first. His wife reiterated her stand that reconciliation was out of the question, said that she still wanted all the proceeds from the sale of their house, and mentioned that her mother was supporting her position. Stating that she saw no further use in talking or arguing, she hung up.
At this juncture, the petitioner got out his shotgun and walked with it down the hill from his home to the trailer where his mother-in-law lived. Peering through a window, he observed his wife, his mother-in-law, and his 11-year-old-daughter playing a card game. He pointed the shotgun at his wife through the window and pulled the trigger. The charge from the gun struck his wife in the forehead and killed her instantly. He proceeded into the trailer, striking and injuring his fleeing daughter with the barrel of the gun. He then fired the gun at his mother-in-law, striking her in the head and killing her instantly.
The petitioner then called the local sheriff’s office, identified himself, said where he was, explained that he had just killed his wife and mother-in-law, and asked that the sheriff come and pick him up. Upon arriving at the trailer, the law enforcement officers found the petitioner seated on a chair in open view near the driveway. He told one of the officers that “they’re dead, I killed them” and directed the officer to the place where he had put the murder weapon. Later the petitioner told a police officer: “I’ve done a hideous crime, . . . but I have been thinking about it for eight years ... I'd do it again.”
The petitioner was subsequently indicted on two counts of murder and one count of aggravated assault. He pleaded not guilty and relied primarily on a defense of temporary insanity at his trial. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all three counts.
The sentencing phase of the trial was held before the same jury. No further evidence was’tendered, but counsel for each side made arguments to the jury. Three times during the course of his argument, the prosecutor stated that the case involved no allegation of “torture” or of an “aggravated battery.” When counsel had completed their arguments, the trial judge instructed the jury orally and in writing on the standards that must guide them in imposing sentence. Both orally and in writing, the judge quoted to the jury the statutory language of the § (b) (7) aggravating circumstance in its entirety.
The jury imposed sentences of death on both of the murder convictions. As to each, the jury specified that the aggravating circumstance they had found beyond a reasonable doubt was “that the offense of murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.”
In accord with Georgia law in capital cases, the trial judge prepared a report in the form of answers to a questionnaire for use on appellate review. One question on the form asked whether or not the victim had been “physically harmed or tortured.” The trial judge's response was “No, as to both victims, excluding the actual murdering of the two victims.”
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court in all respects. 243 Ga. 302, 253 S. E. 2d 710 (1979). With regard to the imposition of the death sentence for each of the two murder convictions, the court rejected the petitioner’s contention that § (b)(7) is unconstitutionally vague. The court noted that Georgia’s death penalty legislation had been upheld in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, and cited its prior decisions upholding § (b) (7) in the face of similar vagueness challenges. 243 Ga., at 308-309, 253 S. E. 2d, at 717. As to the petitioner’s argument that the jury’s phraseology was, as a matter of law, an inadequate statement of § (b) (7), the court responded by simply observing that the language “was not objectionable.” 243 Ga., at 310, 253 S. E. 2d, at 718. The court found no evidence that the sentence had been “imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor,” held that the sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, and stated that the evidence suported the jury’s finding of the § (b) (7) statutory aggravating circumstance. 243 Ga., at 309-311, 253 S. E. 2d, at 717-718. Two justices dissented.
II
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, the Court held that the penalty of death may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, reaffirmed this holding:
“[Wjhere discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to, minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” 428 U. S., at 189 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a “ 'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.’ ” Id., at 188, quoting Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 313 (White, J., concurring).
This means that if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. Part of a State’s responsibility in this regard is to define the crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates “standard-less [sentencing] discretion.” Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 196, n. 47. See also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262. It must channel the sentencer’s discretion by “clear and objective standards” that provide “specific and detailed guidance,” and that “make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.” As was made clear in Gregg, a death penalty “system could have standards so vague that they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur.” 428 U. S., at 195, n. 46.
In the case before us, the Georgia Supreme Court has affirmed a sentence of death based upon no more than a finding that the offense was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.” There is nothing in these few words, standing alone, that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence. A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.” Such a view may, in fact, have been one to which the members of the jury in this case subscribed. If so, their preconceptions were not dispelled by the trial judge’s sentencing instructions. These gave the jury no guidance concerning the meaning of any of § (b)(7)’s terms. In fact, the jury’s interpretation of § (b) (7) can only be the subject of sheer speculation.
The standardless and unchanneled imposition of death sentences in the uncontrolled discretion of a basically uninstructed jury in this case was in no way cured by the affirmance of those sentences by the Georgia Supreme Court. Under state law that court may not affirm a judgment of death until it has independently assessed the evidence of record and determined that such evidence supports the trial judge’s or jury’s finding of an aggravating circumstance. Ga. Code § 27-2537 (c) (2) (1978).
In past cases the State Supreme Court has apparently understood this obligation as carrying with it the responsibility to keep § (b)(7) within constitutional bounds. Recognizing that “there is a.possibility of abuse of [the § (b) (7)] statutory aggravating circumstance,” the court has emphasized that it will not permit the language of that subsection simply to become a “catchall” for cases which do not fit within any other statutory aggravating circumstance. Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718, 732, 230 S. E. 2d 1, 10 (1976). Thus, in exercising its function of death sentence review, the court has said that it will restrict its “approval of the death penalty under this statutory aggravating circumstance to those cases that lie at the core.” Id., at 733, 230 S. E. 2d, at 11.
When Gregg was decided by this Court in 1976, the Georgia Supreme Court had affirmed two death sentences based wholly on § (b)(7). See McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S. E. 2d 577 (1974); House v. State, 232 Ga. 140, 205 S. E. 2d 217 (1974). The homicide in McCorquodale was “a horrifying torture-murder.” There, the victim had been beaten, burned, raped, and otherwise severely abused before her death by strangulation. The homicide in House was of a similar ilk. In that case, the convicted murderer had choked two 7-year-old boys to death after having forced each of them to submit to anal sodomy.
Following our decision in Gregg, the Georgia Supreme Court for the first time articulated some of the conclusions it had reached with respect to § (b) (7):
"This aggravating circumstance involves both the effect on the victim, viz., torture, or an aggravated battery; and the offender, viz., depravity of mind. As to both parties the test is that the acts (the offense) were outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.
“We believe that each of [the cases decided to date that has relied exclusively on § (b) (7) ] establishes beyond any reasonable doubt a depravity of mind and either involved torture or an aggravated battery to the victim as illustrating the crimes were outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman. Each of the cases is at the core and not the periphery.. . .” Harris v. State, supra, at 732-733, 230 S. E. 2d, at 10-11.
Subsequently, in Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 236 S. E. 2d 637 (1977), the court elaborated on its understanding of § (b)(7). There, the contention was that a jury’s finding of the aggravating circumstance could never be deemed unanimous without a polling of each member of the panel. The court said:
“We find no significant dissimilarity between outrageously vile, wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman. Considering torture and.aggravated battery on the one hand as substantially similar treatment of the victim and depravity of mind on the other hand as relating to the defendant, we find no room for nonunanimous verdicts for the reason that there is no prohibition upon measuring cause on the one hand by effect on the other hand. That is to say, the depravity of mind contemplated by the statute is that which results in torture or aggravated battery to the victim. . . 239 Ga., at 299, 236 S. E. 2d, at 643.
The Harris and Blake opinions suggest that the Georgia Supreme Court had by 1977 reached three separate but consistent conclusions respecting the § (b)(7) aggravating circumstance. The first was that the evidence that the offense was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman” had to demonstrate “torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.” The second was that the phrase, “depravity of mind,” comprehended only the kind of mental state that led the murderer to torture or to commit an aggravated battery before killing his victim. The third, derived from Blake alone, was that the word, “torture,” must be construed in pari materia with “aggravated battery” so as to require evidence -of serious physical abuse of the victim before death. Indeed, the circumstances proved in a number of the § (b)(7) death sentence cases affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court have met all three of these criteria.
The Georgia courts did not, however, so limit § (b) (7) in the present case. No claim was made, and nothing in the record before us suggests, that the petitioner committed an aggravated battery upon his wife or mother-in-law or, in fact, caused either of them to suffer any physical injury preceding their deaths. Moreover, in the trial court, the prosecutor repeatedly told the jury- — and the trial judge wrote in his sentencing report — that the murders did not involve “torture.” Nothing said on appeal by the Georgia Supreme Court indicates that it took a different view of the evidence. The circumstances of this case, therefore, do not satisfy the criteria laid out by the Georgia Supreme Court itself in the Harris and Blake cases. In holding that the evidence supported the jury’s § (b)(7) finding, the State Supreme Court simply asserted that the verdict was “factually substantiated.”
Thus, the validity of the petitioner’s death sentences turns on whether, in light of the facts and circumstances of the murders that he was convicted of committing, the Georgia Supreme Court can be said to have applied a constitutional construction of the phrase “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that [they] involved . . . depravity of mind. . . .” We conclude that the answer must be no. The petitioner’s crimes cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness materially more “depraved” than that of any person guilty of murder. His victims were killed instantaneously. They were members of his family who were causing him extreme emotional trauma. Shortly after the killings, he acknowledged his responsibility and the heinous nature of his crimes. These factors certainly did not remove the criminality from the petitioner’s acts. .But, as was said in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 358, it “is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.”
That cannot be said here. There is no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many eases in which it was not. Accordingly, the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court insofar as it leaves standing the petitioner’s death sentences is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Georgia Code §26-1101 (1978) defines “murder” as follows:
“(a) A person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being. Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears, and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.
“(b) A person also commits the crime of murder when in the commission of a felony he causes the death of another human being, irrespective of malice.”
The other statutory aggravating circumstances upon which a death sentence may be based after conviction of murder in Georgia are considerably more specific or objectively measurable than § (b) (7):
“(1) The offense of murder . . . was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions.
“ (2) The offense of murder . . . was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
“(3) The offender by his act of murder . . . knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.
“(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
“(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of his official duty.
“(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person.
“(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
“(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
“(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or another.” Ga. Code §27-2534.1 (b) (1978).
In Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 540, 224 S. E. 2d 386, 391 (1976), the Supreme Court of Georgia held unconstitutional the portion of the first statutory aggravating circumstances encompassing persons who have a “substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions” because it did not set “sufficiently ‘clear and objective standards.’ ”
According to the petitioner, this was not the first time that he and his wife had been separated as a result of his violent behavior. On two or more previous occasions the petitioner had been hospitalized because of his drinking problem.
Another question on the form asked the trial judge to list the mitigating circumstances that were in evidence. The judge noted that the petitioner had no significant history of prior criminal activity.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 198, quoting Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S. E. 2d 612, 615 (1974).
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S., at 253 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.).
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 303 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
See also Ruffin v. State, 243 Ga. 95, 106-107, 252 S. E. 2d 472, 480 (1979); Hill v. State, 237 Ga. 794, 802, 229 S. E. 2d 737, 742-743 (1976). Cf. Holton v. State, 243 Ga. 312, 318, 253 S. E. 2d 736, 740 (1979).
Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 201.
Banks v. State, 237 Ga. 325, 227 S. E. 2d 380 (1976); McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S. E. 2d 577 (1974); House v. State, 232 Ga. 140, 205 S. E. 2d 217 (1974).
Since Harris and Blake, the court has summarily rejected all constitutional challenges to its construction of § (b)(7). See, e. g., Baker v. State, 243 Ga. 710, 711-712, 257 S. E. 2d 192, 193-194 (1979); Collins v. State, 243 Ga. 291, 294, 253 S. E. 2d 729, 732 (1979); Johnson v. State, 242 Ga. 649, 651, 250 S. E. 2d 394, 397-398 (1978); Lamb v. State, 241 Ga. 10, 15, 243 S. E. 2d 59, 63 (1978).
This construction of § (b) (7) finds strong support in the language and structure of the statutory provision.
“Aggravated battery” is a term that is defined in Georgia's criminal statutes. Georgia Code §26-1305 (1978) states: “A person commits aggravated battery when he maliciously causes bodily harm to another by depriving him of a member of his body, or by rendering a member of his body useless, or by seriously disfiguring his body or a member thereof.” It appears that this definition has on at least one occasion been treated by the state trial courts as controlling the meaning of the same words in § (b) (7). See, e. g., Holton v. State, 243 Ga., at 317, n. 1, 253 S. E. 2d, at 740, n. 1.
We note, however, that the Hams case apparently did not involve “torture” in this sense.
See, e. g., Thomas v. State, 240 Ga. 393, 242 S. E. 2d 1 (1977) ; Stanley v. State, 240 Ga. 341; 241 S. E. 2d 173 (1977); Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209, 232 S. E. 2d 47 (1977); Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815, 225 S. E. 2d 248 (1976); McCorquodale v. State, supra.
The sentences of death in this case rested exclusively on § (b)(7). Accordingly, we intimate no view as to whether or not the petitioner might constitutionally have received the same sentences on some other basis. Georgia does not, as do some States, make multiple murders an aggravating circumstance, as such.
In light of this fact, it is constitutionally irrelevant that the petitioner used a shotgun instead of a rifle as the murder weapon, resulting in a gruesome spectacle in his mother-in-law’s trailer. An interpretation of § (b) (7) so as to include all murders resulting in gruesome scenes would be totally irrational.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This ease concerns the timeliness of a complaint filed in a private securities fraud action. The complaint was timely if filed no more than two years after the plaintiffs “discover[ed] the facts constituting the violation.” 28 U. S. C. § 1658(b)(1). Construing this limitations statute for the first time, we hold that a cause of action accrues (1) when the plaintiff did in fact discover, or (2) when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered, “the facts constituting the violation” — whichever comes first. We also hold that the “facts constituting the violation” include the fact of scienter, “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 194, n. 12 (1976). Applying this standard, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ determination that the complaint filed here was timely.
I
The action before us involves a claim by a group of investors (the plaintiffs, respondents here) that Merck & Co. and others (petitioners here, hereinafter Merck) knowingly misrepresented the risks of heart attacks accompanying the use of Merck’s painkilling drug, Vioxx (leading to economic losses when the risks later became apparent). The plaintiffs brought an action for securities fraud under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U. S.C. §78j(b); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5(b) (2009); Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U. S. 336, 341-342 (2005).
The applicable statute of limitations provides that a “private right of action” that, like the present action, “involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws... may be brought not later than the earlier of—
“(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or
“(2) 5 years after such violation.” 28 U. S. C. § 1658(b).
The complaint in this case was filed on November 6, 2003, and no one doubts that it was filed within five years of the alleged violation. Therefore, the critical date for timeliness purposes is November 6, 2001 — two years before this complaint was filed. Merck claims that before this date the plaintiffs had (or should have) discovered the “facts constituting the violation.” If so, by the time the plaintiffs filed their complaint, the 2-year statutory period in § 1658(b)(1) had run. The plaintiffs reply that they had not, and could not have, discovered by the critical date those “facts," particularly not the facts related to scienter, and that their complaint was therefore timely.
A
We first set out the relevant pre-November 2001 facts, as we have gleaned them from the briefs, the record, and the opinions below.
1.1990’s. In the mid~1990’s, Merck developed Vioxx. In 1999, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved it for prescription use. Vioxx suppresses pain by inhibiting the body’s production of an enzyme called COX-2 (cyclooxygenase-2). COX-2 is associated with pain and inflammation. Unlike some other anti-inflammatory drugs in its class like aspirin, ibuprofen, and naproxen, Vioxx does not inhibit production of a second enzyme called COX-1 (cyclooxygenase-1). COX-1 plays a part in the functioning of the gastrointestinal tract and also in platelet aggregation (associated with blood clots). App. 50-51.
2. March 2000. Merck announced the results of a study, called the “VIGOR” study. Id., at 291-294. The study compared Vioxx with another painkiller, naproxen. The study showed that persons taking Vioxx suffered fewer gastrointestinal side effects (as Merck had hoped). But the study also revealed that approximately 4 out of every 1,000 participants who took Vioxx suffered heart attacks, compared to only 1 per 1,000 participants who took naproxen. Id., at 296, 306; see Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients With Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 New England J. Medicine 1520, 1523, 1526-1527 (2000).
Merck’s press release acknowledged VIGOR’S adverse cardiovascular data. But Merck said that these data were “consistent with naproxen’s ability to block platelet aggregation.” App. 291. Merck noted that, since “Vioxx, like all COX-2 selective medicines, does not block platelet aggregation^ it] would not be expected to have similar effects.” Ibid. And Merck added that “safety data from all other completed and ongoing clinical trials... showed no indication of a difference in the incidence of thromboembolic events between Vioxx” and either a placebo or comparable drugs. Id., at 293 (emphasis deleted).
This theory — that VIGOR’S troubling cardiovascular findings might be due to the absence of a benefit conferred by naproxen rather than due to a harm caused by Vioxx — later became known as the “naproxen hypothesis.” In advancing that hypothesis, Merck acknowledged that the naproxen benefit “had not been observed previously.” Id., at 291. Journalists and stock market analysts reported all of the above — the positive gastrointestinal results, the troubling cardiovascular finding, the naproxen hypothesis, and the fact that the naproxen hypothesis was unproved. See id., at 355-391, 508-557.
3. February 2001 to August 2001. Public debate about the naproxen hypothesis continued. In February 2001, the FDA’s Arthritis Advisory Committee convened to consider Merck’s request that the Vioxx label be changed to reflect VIGOR’S positive gastrointestinal findings. The VIGOR cardiovascular findings were also discussed. Id., at 392-395, 558-577. In May 2001, a group of plaintiffs filed a products-liability lawsuit against Merck, claiming that “Merck’s own research” had demonstrated that “users of Vioxx were four times as likely to suffer heart attacks as compared to other less expensive medications.” Id., at 869. In August 2001, the Journal of the American Medical Association wrote that the available data raised a “cautionary flag” and strongly urged that “a trial specifically assessing cardiovascular risk” be done. Id., at 331-332; Mukherjee, Nissen, & Topol, Risk of Cardiovascular Events Associated with Selective COX-2 Inhibitors, 286 JAMA 954 (2001). At about the same time, Bloomberg News quoted a Merck scientist who claimed that Merck had “additional data” that were “very, very reassuring,” and Merck issued a press release stating that it stood “behind the overall and cardiovascular safety profile... of Vioxx.” App. 434, 120 (emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted).
U. September and October 2001. The FDA sent Merck a warning letter released to the public on September 21, 2001. It said that, in respect to cardiovascular risks, Merck’s Vioxx marketing was “false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading.” Id., at 339. At the same time, the FDA acknowledged that the naproxen hypothesis was a “possible explanation” of the VIGOR results. Id., at 340. But it found that Merck’s “promotional campaign selectively present[ed]” that hypothesis without adequately acknowledging “another reasonable explanation,” namely, “that Vioxx may have pro-thrombotic [i. e., adverse cardiovascular] properties.” Ibid. The FDA ordered Merck to send healthcare providers a corrective letter. Id., at 353.
After the FDA letter was released, more products-liability lawsuits were filed. See id., at 885-956. Merck’s share price fell by 6.6% over several days. See id., at 832. By October 1, the price rebounded. See ibid. On October 9, 2001, the New York Times said that Merck had reexamined its own data and “found no evidence that Vioxx increased the risk of heart attacks.” Id., at 504. It quoted the president of Merck Research Laboratories as positing “ ‘two possible interpretations’ “ ‘Naproxen lowers the heart attack rate, or Vioxx raises it.’” Ibid. Stock analysts, while reporting the warning letter, also noted that the FDA had not denied that the naproxen hypothesis remained an unproven but possible explanation. See id., at 614, 626, 628.
B
We next set forth three important events that occurred after the critical date.
1. October 2003. The Wall Street Journal published the results of a Merck-funded Vioxx study conducted at Boston’s Brigham and Women’s Hospital. After examining the medical records of more than 50,000 Medicare patients, researchers found that those given Vioxx for 30 to 90 days were 37% more likely to have suffered a heart attack than those given either a different painkiller or no painkiller at all. Id., at 164-165. (That is to say, if patients given a different painkiller or given no painkiller at all suffered 10 heart attacks, then the same number of patients given Vioxx would suffer 13 or 14 heart attacks.) Merck defended Vioxx and pointed to the study’s limitations. Id., at 165-167.
2. September SO, 2004. Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market. It said that a new study had found “an increased risk of confirmed cardiovascular events beginning after 18 months of continuous therapy.” Id., at 182 (internal quotation marks omitted). A Merck representative publicly described the results as “totally unexpected.” Id., at 186 (emphasis deleted). Merck’s shares fell by 27% the same day. Id., at 185,856.
S. November 1, 2004. The Wall Street Journal published an article stating that “internal Merck e-mails and marketing materials as well as interviews with outside scientists show that the company fought forcefully for years to keep safety concerns from destroying the drug’s commercial prospects.” Id., at 189-190. The article said that an early e-mail from Merck’s head of research had said that the VIGOR “results showed that the cardiovascular events 'are clearly there,’” that it was “ 'a shame but... a low incidence,’ ” and that it '"is mechanism based as we worried it was.’” Id., at 192. It also said that Merck had given its salespeople instructions to ‘"DODGE”’ questions about Vioxx's cardiovascular effects. Id., at 193.
C
The plaintiffs filed their complaint on November 6, 2003. As subsequently amended, the complaint alleged that Merck had defrauded investors by promoting the naproxen hypothesis, knowing the hypothesis was false. It said, for example, that Merck “knew, at least as early as 1996, of the serious safety issues with Vioxx,” and that a “1998 internal Merck clinical trial... revealed that... serious cardiovascular events... occurred six times more frequently in patients given Vioxx than in patients given a different arthritis drug or placebo.” Id., at 56, 58-59 (emphasis and capitalization deleted).
Merck, believing that the plaintiffs knew or should have known the “facts constituting the violation” at least two years earlier, moved to dismiss the complaint, saying it was filed too late. The District Court granted the motion. The court held that the (March 2001) VIGOR study, the (September 2001) FDA warning letter, and Merck's (October 2001) response should have alerted the plaintiffs to a “possibility that Merck had knowingly misrepresented material facts” no later than October 9, 2001, thus placing the plaintiffs on “inquiry notice” to look further. In re Merck & Co. Securities, Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation, 483 F. Supp. 2d 407, 423 (NJ 2007) (emphasis added). Finding that the plaintiffs had failed to “show that they exercised reasonable due diligence but nevertheless were unable to discover their injuries,” the court took October 9, 2001, as the date that the limitations period began to run and therefore found the complaint untimely. Id., at 424.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. A majority held that the pre-November 2001 events, while constituting “storm warningts],” did not suggest much by way of scienter, and consequently did not put the plaintiffs on “inquiry notice,” requiring them to investigate further. In re Merck & Co. Securities, Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation, 543 F. 3d 150, 172 (2008). A dissenting judge considered the pre-November 2001 events sufficient to start the 2-year clock running. Id., at 173 (opinion of Roth, J.).
Merck sought review in this Court, pointing to disagreements among the Courts of Appeals. Compare Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F. 3d 1219, 1228 (CA11 2001) (limitations period begins to run when information puts plaintiffs on “inquiry notice” of the need for investigation), With Shah v. Meeker, 435 F. 3d 244, 249 (CA2 2006) (same; but if plaintiff does investigate, period runs “from the date such inquiry should have revealed the fraud” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 336 F. 3d 495, 501 (CA6 2003) (limitations period always begins to run only when a reasonably diligent plaintiff, after being put on “inquiry notice,” should have discovered facts constituting violation (internal quotation marks omitted)). We granted Merck’s petition.
II
Before turning to Merck’s arguments, we consider a more basic matter. The parties and the Solicitor General agree that § 165S(b)(l)’s word “discovery” refers not only to a plaintiff’s actual discovery of certain facts, but also to the facts that a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered. We agree. But because the statute’s language does not make this interpretation obvious, and because we cannot answer the question presented without considering whether the parties are right about this matter, we set forth the reasons for our agreement in some detail.
We recognize that one might read the statutory words “after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation” as referring to the time a plaintiff actually discovered the relevant facts. But in the statute of limitations context, the word “discovery” is often used as a term of art in connection with the “discovery rule,” a doctrine that delays accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff has “discovered” it. The rule arose in fraud cases as an exception to the general limitations rule that a cause of action accrues once a plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action,” Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal, 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997) (citing Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583, 589 (1875); internal quotation marks omitted). This Court long ago recognized that something different was needed in the case of fraud, where a defendant’s deceptive conduct may prevent a plaintiff from even knowing that he or she has been defrauded. Otherwise, “the law which was designed to prevent fraud” could become “the means by which it is made successful and secure.” Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 349 (1875). Accordingly, “where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). And for more than a century, courts have understood that “[fjraud is deemed to be discovered... when, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, it could have been discovered.” 2 H. Wood, Limitation of Actions §276b(ll), p. 1402 (4th ed. 1916); see id., at 1401-1403, and nn. 74-84 (collecting cases and statutes); see, e.g., Holmberg, supra, at 397; Kirby v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co., 120 U. S. 130, 138 (1887) (The rule “regard[s] the cause of action as having accrued at the time the fraud was or should have been discovered”).
More recently, both state and federal courts have applied forms of the “discovery rule” to claims other than fraud. See 2 C. Corman, Limitation of Actions §§ 11.1.2.1, 11.1.2.3, pp. 136-142, and nn. 6-13,18-23 (1991 and 1993 Supp.) (hereinafter Corman) (collecting cases); see, e. g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111 (1979). Legislatures have codified the discovery rule in various contexts. 2 Corman § 11.2, at 170-171, and nn. 1-9 (collecting statutes); see, e. g., 28 U. S. C. §2409a(g) (actions to quiet title against the United States). In doing so, legislators have written the word “discovery” directly into the statute. And when they have done so, state and federal courts have typically interpreted the word to refer not only to actual discovery, but also to the hypothetical discovery of facts a reasonably diligent plaintiff would know. See, e. g., Peacock v. Barnes, 142 N. C. 215, 217-220, 55 S. E. 99, 100 (1906); Davis v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc., 21 Cal. App. 444, 448, 132 P. 462, 464 (1913); Roether v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 51 N. D. 634, 640-642, 200 N. W. 818, 821 (1924); Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F. 2d 675, 681 (CA5 1959); Mobley v. Hall, 202 Mont. 227, 232, 657 P. 2d 604, 606 (1983); Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F. 3d 717, 721-722 (CA7 1993); J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F. 3d 1245, 1254 (CA1 1996).
Thus, treatise writers now describe “the discovery rule” as allowing a claim “to accrue when the litigant first knows' or with due diligence should know facts that will form the basis for an action.” 2 Corman § 11.1.1, at 134 (emphasis added); see also ibid., n. 1 (collecting cases); 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit §347, p. 354 (2001 and Supp. 2009) (noting that the various formulations of “discovery” all provide that “in addition to actual knowledge of the fraud, once a reasonably diligent party is in a position that they should have sufficient knowledge or information to have actually discovered the fraud, they are charged with discovery”); id., at 354-355, and nn. 2-11 (collecting cases).
Like the parties, we believe that Congress intended courts to interpret the word “discovery” in § 1658(b)(1) similarly. Before Congress enacted that statute, this Court, having found in the federal securities laws the existence of an implied private § 10(b) action, determined its governing limitations period by looking to other limitations periods in the federal securities laws. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U. S. 350 (1991). Noting the existence of various formulations “differ[ing] slightly in terminology,” the Court chose the language in 15 U. S. C. § 78i(e), the statutory provision that governs securities price manipulation claims. 501 U. S., at 364, n. 9. And in doing so, the Court said that private § 10(b) actions “must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation.” Id., at 364 (emphasis added). (The Court listed among the various formulations the one in 15 U. S. C. § 77m, on which the concurrence relies. See post, at 656-658 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Lampf, supra, at 360, and n. 7 (quoting § 77m).)
Subsequently, every Court of Appeals to decide the matter held that “discovery of the facts constituting the violation” occurs not only once a plaintiff actually discovers the facts, but also when a hypothetical reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered them. See, e. g., Law v. Medco Research, Inc., 113 F. 3d 781, 785-786 (CA7 1997); Dodds v. Cigna Securities, Inc., 12 F. 3d 346, 350, 353 (CA2 1993); see In re NAHC, Inc. Securities Litigation, 306 F. 3d 1314, 1325, n. 4 (CA3 2002) (collecting cases). Some of those courts noted that other limitations provisions in the federal securities laws explicitly provide that the period begins to run “ 'after the discovery of the untrue statement... or after such discovery should have been made by [the] exercise of reasonable diligence,”’ whereas the formulation adopted by the Court in Lampf from 15 U. S. C. § 78i(e) does not. Tregenza, supra, at 721 (quoting § 77m; emphasis added in Tregenza); see Lampf, supra, at 364, n. 9. But, courts reasoned, because the term “discovery” in respect to statutes of limitations for fraud has long been understood to include discoveries a reasonably diligent plaintiff would make, the omission of an explicit provision to that effect did not matter. Tregenza, supra, at 721; accord, New England Health Care, 336 F. 3d, at 499-500.
In 2002, when Congress enacted the present limitations statute, it repeated Lampf s critical language. The statute says that an action based on fraud “may be brought not later than the earlier of... 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation” (or “5 years after such violation”). § 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. 801, codified at 28 U. S. C. § 1658(b) (emphasis added). (This statutory provision does not make the linguistic distinction that the concurrence finds in a different statute, § 77m, and upon which its argument rests. Cf. 29 U. S. C. § 1113(2) (statute in which Congress provided that an action be brought “three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation” (emphasis added)).) Not surprisingly, the Courts of Appeals unanimously have continued to interpret the word “discovery” in this statute as including not only facts a particular plaintiff knows, but also the facts any reasonably diligent plaintiff would know. See, e. g., Staehr v. Hartford Financial Servs. Group, Inc., 547 F. 3d 406, 411 (CA2 2008); Sudo Properties, Inc. v. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Govt., 503 F. 3d 371, 376 (CA5 2007).
We normally assume that, when Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of relevant judicial precedent. See, e. g., Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U. S. 106, 116-117, and n. 13 (2002); Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Industries, Inc., 508 U. S. 152, 159 (1993). Given the history and precedent surrounding the use of the word “discovery” in the limitations context generally as well as in this provision in particular, the reasons for making this assumption are particularly strong here. We consequently hold that “discovery” as used in this statute encompasses not only those facts the plaintiff actually knew, but also those facts a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have known. And we evaluate Merck’s claims accordingly.
III
We turn now to Merck’s arguments in favor of holding that petitioners’ claims accrued before November 6,2001. First, Merck argues that the statute does not require “discovery” of scienter-related “facts.” See Brief for Petitioners 19-28. We cannot agree, however, that facts about scienter are unnecessary.
The statute says that the limitations period does not begin to run until “discovery of the facts constituting the violation.” 28 U. S. C. § 1658(b)(1) (emphasis added). Scienter is assuredly a “fact.” In a § 10(b) action, scienter refers to “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & Ernst, 425 U. S., at 194, n. 12. And the “ ‘state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion.’ ” Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 716 (1983) (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, [1885] 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483).
And this “fact” of scienter “constitutes]” an important and necessary element of a § 10(b) “violation.” A plaintiff cannot recover without proving that a defendant made a material misstatement with an intent to deceive — not merely innocently or negligently. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U. S. 308, 319 (2007); Ernst & Ernst, supra. Indeed, Congress has enacted special heightened pleading requirements for the scienter element of § 10(b) fraud cases. See 15 U. S. C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (requiring plaintiffs to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind” (emphasis added)). As a result, unless a § 10(b) plaintiff can set forth facts in the complaint showing that it is “at least as likely as” not that the defendant acted with the relevant knowledge or intent, the claim will fail. Tellabs, supra, at 328 (emphasis deleted). It would therefore frustrate the very purpose of the discovery rule in this provision — which, after all, specifically applies only in cases “involv[ing] a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance,” § 1658(b) — if the limitations period began to run regardless of whether a plaintiff had discovered any facts suggesting scienter. So long as a defendant concealed for two years that he made a misstatement with an intent to deceive, the limitations period would expire before the plaintiff had actually “discover [ed]” the fraud.
We consequently hold that facts showing scienter are among those that “constitute] the violation.” In so holding, we say nothing about other facts necessary to support a private § 10(b) action. Cf. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 1 (suggesting that facts concerning a plaintiff’s reliance, loss, and loss causation are not among those that constitute “the violation” and therefore need not be “discovered]” for a claim to accrue).
Second, Merck argues that, even if “discovery” requires facts related to scienter, facts that tend to show a materially false or misleading statement (or material omission) are ordinarily sufficient to show scienter as well. See Brief for Petitioners 22, 28-29. But we do not see how that is so. We recognize that certain statements are such that, to show them false is normally to show scienter as well. It is unlikely, for example, that someone would falsely say “I am not married” without being aware of the fact that his statement is false. Where § 10(b) is at issue, however, the relation of factual falsity and state of mind is more context specific. An incorrect prediction about a firm’s future earnings, by itself, does not automatically tell us whether the speaker deliberately lied or just made an innocent (and therefore nonactionable) error. Hence, the statute may require “discovery” of scienter-related facts beyond the facts that show a statement (or omission) to be materially false or misleading. Merck fears that this requirement will give life to stale claims or subject defendants to liability for acts taken long ago. But Congress’ inclusion in the statute of an unqualified bar on actions instituted “5 years after such violation,” § 1658(b)(2), giving defendants total repose after five years, should diminish that fear. Cf. Lampf, 501 U. S., at 363 (holding comparable bar not subject to equitable tolling).
Third, Merck says that the limitations period began to run prior to November 2001 because by that point the plaintiffs were on “inquiry notice.” Merck uses the term “inquiry notice” to refer to the point “at which a plaintiff possesses a quantum of information sufficiently suggestive of wrongdoing that he should conduct a further inquiry.” Brief for Petitioners 20. And some, but not all, Courts of Appeals have used the term in roughly similar ways. See, e. g., Franze v. Equitable Assurance, 296 F. 3d 1250, 1254 (CA11 2002) (“[I]nquiry notice [is] The term used for knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonable person to begin investigating the possibility that his legal rights had been infringed’ ”). Cf. Dodds, 12 F. 3d, at 350 (“duty of inquiry” arises once “circumstances would suggest to an investor of ordinary intelligence the probability that she had been defrauded”); Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co. v. Kapoor, 115 F. 3d 1332, 1335-1336 (CA7 1997) (“The facts constituting [inquiry] notice must be sufficient]... to incite the victim to investigate” and “to enable him to tie up any loose ends and complete the investigation in time to file a timely suit”); Great Rivers Cooperative of Southeastern Iowa v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 120 F. 3d 893, 896 (CA8 1997) (“Inquiry notice exists when the victim is aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to investigate and consequently acquire actual knowledge of the defendant's misrepresentations” (emphasis added)).
If the term “inquiry notice” refers to the point where the facts would lead a reasonably diligent plaintiff to investigate further, that point is not necessarily the point at which the plaintiff would already have discovered facts showing scienter or other “facts constituting the violation.” But the statute says that the plaintiff's claim accrues only after the “discovery” of those latter facts. Nothing in the text suggests that the limitations period can sometimes begin before “discovery” can take place. Merck points out that, as we have discussed, see supra, at 644-645, the court-created “discovery rule” exception to ordinary statutes of limitations is not generally available to plaintiffs who fail to pursue then-claims with reasonable diligence. But we are dealing here with a statute, not a court-created exception to a statute. Because the statute contains no indication that the limitations period should occur at some earlier moment before “discovery,” when a plaintiff would have begun investigating, we cannot accept Merck’s argument.
As a fallback, Merck argues that even if the limitations period does generally begin at “discovery,” it should nonetheless run from the point of “inquiry notice” in one particular situation, namely, where the actual plaintiff fails to undertake an investigation once placed on “inquiry notice.” In such circumstances, Merck contends, the actual plaintiff is not diligent, and the law should not “effectively excuse a plaintiff’s failure to conduct a further investigation” by placing that nondiligent plaintiff and a reasonably diligent plaintiff “in the same position.” Brief for Petitioners 48.
We cannot accept this argument for essentially the same reason we reject “inquiry notice” as the standard generally: We cannot reconcile it with the statute, which simply provides that “discovery” is the event that triggers the 2-year limitations period — for all plaintiffs. Cf. United States v. Mack, 295 U. S. 480, 489 (1935) (“Laches within the term of the statute of limitations is no defense at law”). Furthermore, the statute does not place all plaintiffs “in the same position” no matter whether they investigate when investigation is warranted. The limitations period puts plaintiffs who fail to investigate once on “inquiry notice” at a disadvantage because it lapses two years after a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered the necessary facts. A plaintiff who fails entirely to investigate or delays investigating may well not have discovered those facts by that time or, at least, may not have found sufficient facts by that time to be able to file a § 10(b) complaint that satisfies the applicable heightened pleading standards. Cf. Young v. Lepone, 305 F. 3d 1, 9 (CA1 2002) (“[A] reasonably diligent investigation... may consume as little as a few days or as much as a few years to get to the bottom of the matter”).
Mer
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
At the close of the prosecution’s case in chief, the trial court dismissed certain charges against petitioners on the ground that the evidence presented was legally insufficient to support a conviction. The question presented is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecution from appealing this ruling.
I
Petitioners, husband and wife, owned a building housing a restaurant and some apartments that burned under suspicious circumstances, killing two of the tenants. Petitioners were charged with various crimes in connection with this fire, including criminal homicide, reckless endangerment, and causing a catastrophe. They opted for a bench trial, and at the close of the prosecution’s case in chief challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by filing a demurrer pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1124(a)(1). The trial court sustained petitioners’ demurrer to charges of murder, voluntary manslaughter, and causing a catastrophe, stating:
“As the trier of fact and law, the court was not satisfied, after considering all of the facts together with all reasonable inferences which the Commonwealth’s evidence tended to prove, that there was sufficient evidence from which it could be concluded that either of the defendants was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of setting or causing to be set the fire in question.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 101a-102a.
The Commonwealth sought review of this ruling in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, but a panel of that court quashed the appeal, holding it barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Superior Court granted review en banc and affirmed. 331 Pa. Super. 307, 480 A. 2d 1046 (1984). Citing a number of our decisions as controlling authority, the court set out two relevant principles of law. First, a judgment that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See, e. g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564 (1977); Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 (1978); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U. S. 54 (1978); United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 91 (1978) (dicta); Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U. S. 40 (1981). Second, when a trial court enters such a judgment, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars an appeal by the prosecution not only when it might result in a second trial, but also if reversal would translate into further proceedings devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged. The Superior Court concluded that because reversal of the trial court’s granting of petitioners’ demurrer would necessitate further trial proceedings, the Commonwealth’s appeal was improper under Martin Linen.
The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which reversed. Commonwealth v. Zoller, 507 Pa. 344, 490 A. 2d 394 (1985). The court relied heavily on the statement in United States v. Scott, supra, that a trial judge’s ruling in a defendant’s favor constitutes an acquittal “only when ‘the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant’s favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.’” Id., at 97 (quoting Martin Linen, supra, at 571). The court gave the following explanation of why the trial court’s ruling on petitioners’ demurrer is not within this definition of an acquittal:
“In deciding whether to grant a demurrer, the court does not determine whether or not the defendant is guilty on such evidence, but determines whether the evidence, if credited by the jury, is legally sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
“Hence, by definition, a demurrer is not a factual determination. . . . [T]he question before the trial judge in ruling on a demurrer remains purely one of law.
“We conclude, therefore, that a demurrer is not the functional equivalent of an acquittal, and that the Commonwealth has the right to appeal from an order sustaining defendant’s demurrer to its case-in-chief. In such a situation, the defendant himself elects to seek dismissal on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or innocence.” Commonwealth v. Zoller, supra, at 357-358, 490 A. 2d, at 401.
Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the case to the Superior Court for a determination on the merits of the appeal. We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 944 (1985), and now reverse.
II
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in holding that, for purposes of considering a plea of double jeopardy, a defendant who demurs at the close of the prosecution’s case in chief “elects to seek dismissal on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or innocence.” Commonwealth v. Zoller, supra, at 358, 490 A. 2d, at 401. What the demurring defendant seeks is a ruling that as a matter of law the State’s evidence is insufficient to establish his factual guilt. Our past decisions, which we are not inclined to reconsider at this time, hold that such a ruling is an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See, e. g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra; Sanabria v. United States, supra. United States v. Scott does not overturn these precedents; indeed, it plainly indicates that the category of acquittals includes “judgments] ... by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict.” 437 U.S., at 91.
The Commonwealth argues that its appeal is nonetheless permissible under Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U. S. 294 (1984), because resumption of petitioners’ bench trial following a reversal on appeal would simply constitute “continuing jeopardy.” Brief for Respondent 87-88. But Lydon teaches that “[ajcquittals, unlike convictions, terminate the initial jeopardy.” 466 U. S., at 308. Thus, whether the trial is to a jury or to the bench, subjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 211-212 (1984).
When a successful postacquittal appeal by the prosecution would lead to proceedings that violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the appeal itself has no proper purpose. Allowing such an appeal would frustrate the interest of the accused in having an end to the proceedings against him. The Superior Court was correct, therefore, in holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a postacquittal appeal by the prosecution not only when it might result in a second trial, but also if reversal would translate into “ ‘further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged.’ ” Martin Linen, 430 U. S., at 570.
We hold, therefore, that the trial judge’s granting of petitioners’ demurrer was an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that the Commonwealth’s appeal was barred because reversal would have led to further trial proceedings.
The judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is
Reversed.
Various misdemeanor charges were also filed against petitioners, as well as charges relating to a previous fire in another building that they owned. These other charges are not relevant to this petition.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1124, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. (1985 Pamphlet), provides in relevant part:
“Challenges to Sufficiency of Evidence
“(a) A defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction of one or more of the offenses charged by a:
“(1) demurrer to the evidence presented by the Commonwealth at the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-ehief;
“(b) A demurrer to the evidence shall not constitute an admission of any facts or inferences except for the purpose of deciding the demurrer. If the demurrer is not sustained, the defendant may present evidence and the ease shall proceed.”
Before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, petitioners’ ease was consolidated with another ease presenting the same double jeopardy issue, Commonwealth v. Zoller, 318 Pa. Super. 402, 465 A. 2d 16 (1983).
For purposes of our jurisdiction, the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was final and subject to review at this time under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3). Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55 (1971). As explained in Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977):
“[T]he guarantee against double jeopardy assures an individual that, among other things, he will not be forced, with certain exceptions, to endure the personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial more than once for the same offense. . . . Obviously, these aspects of the guarantee’s protections would be lost if the accused were forced to ‘run the gauntlet’ a second time before an appeal could be taken; even if the accused is acquitted, or, if convicted, has his conviction ultimately reversed on double jeopardy grounds, he has still been forced to endure a trial that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to prohibit.” Id., at 661-662 (footnote omitted).
We of course accept the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s definition of what the trial judge must consider in ruling on a defendant’s demurrer. But just as “the trial judge’s characterization of his own action cannot control the classification of the action [under the Double Jeopardy Clause],” United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 96 (1978) (citation omitted), so too the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s characterization, as a matter of double jeopardy law, of an order granting a demurrer is not binding on us.
See also Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 (1978), where a Court of Appeals’ reversal of the defendant’s conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury verdict “unquestionably. . . ‘represente[d] a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.’” Id. at 10 (quoting Martin Linen, 430 U. S., at 571).
The status of the trial court’s judgment as an acquittal is not affected by the Commonwealth’s allegation that the court “erred in deciding what degree of recklessness was . . . required to be shown under Pennsylvania’s definition of [third-degree] murder.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. “[T]he fact that ‘the acquittal may result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles’. . . affects the accuracy of that determination but it does not alter its essential character.” United States v. Scott, 437 U. S., at 98 (quoting id., at 106 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Accord, Sanabria v. United States, 437 U. S. 54 (1978); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203 (1984).
In Rumsey, a trial judge sitting as a sentencer in a death-penalty proceeding entered an “acquittal,” i. e., a life sentence, based on an erroneous construction of the law governing a particular aggravating circumstance. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a second sentencing hearing. It distinguished United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332 (1975), which holds that the prosecution may appeal when the trial court enters judgment n.o.v. following a jury verdict of guilty. Rumsey explains that “[n]o double jeopardy problem was presented in Wilson because the appellate court, upon reviewing asserted legal errors of the trial judge, could simply order the jury’s guilty verdict reinstated; no new factfinding would be necessary, and the defendant therefore would not be twice placed in jeopardy.” 467 U. S., at 211-212.
The fact that the “further proceedings” standard which the Superior Court quoted from Martin Linen was first articulated in United States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358, 370 (1975), does not detract from its authority. United States v. Scott, supra, overrules Jenkins only insofar as Jenkins bars an appeal by the government when a defendant successfully moves for dismissal on a ground “unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. ...” Scott, supra, at 99. The issue before us in Scott was what constitutes an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause; the question of the circumstances under which an acquittal is appealable was not presented.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Me. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant was incorporated in 1833 by a Special Act of the Georgia General Assembly that included a provision for exemption from taxation. In 1945, the Georgia Constitution was amended to provide that “All exemptions from taxation heretofore granted in corporate charters are declared to be henceforth null and void.” According to appellant’s complaint, appellee, who is State Revenue Commissioner, is threatening to act pursuant to this amendment by proceeding against appellánt for the collection of ad valorem taxes for the year 1939, and all subsequent years, on behalf of the State and every county, school district and municipality through which appellant’s lines run. Appellant claims that this threatened taxation would be contrary to its legislative charter and would impair the obligation of contract between appellant and the State of Georgia, contrary to Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution.
This latest phase of appellant’s frequent litigation over the tax exemption provision of its 1833 charter began when appellant filed suit against appellee’s predecessor in a Georgia state court .seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Relief was denied without reaching the merits of appellant’s claim when the Georgia Supreme Court held that the action was, in effect, an unconsented suit against the State which could not be maintained in the state courts. Musgrove v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 204 Ga. 139, 49 S. E. 2d 26 (1948). We dismissed an appeal from that judgment because it was based upon a nonfederal ground adequate to support it. 335 U. S. 900 (1949).
Thereafter, appellant filed this action in the District Court to enjoin appellee from assessing or collecting ad valorem taxes contrary to its legislative charter. Appellant also asked that appellee’s threatened acts be adjudged in violation of a prior decree also entered by the court below and affirmed by this Court. Wright v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 216 U. S. 420 (1910). A court of three judges dismissed appellant’s complaint for want of jurisdiction, holding that the State of Georgia had not submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court so as to be barred by the Wright decree and that this action against appellee is in effect an unconsented suit against the State prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. 85 F. Supp. 749 (1949).
The Attorney General of Georgia stated at the bar of this Court that “plain, speedy and efficient” state remedies were available to appellant, particularly by appeal from an assessment by appellee. We ordered the cause continued to enable appellant to assert such remedies. 339 U. S. 901 (1950). After the District Court modified the restraining order which it had entered pending appeal to permit , assessment, appellee held appellant liable for the full ad valorem tax and appellant appealed to the state courts. The Georgia Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that such remedy was not available to appellant. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 208 Ga. 261, 66 S. E. 2d 234 (1951). Following this decision, appellant moved for termination of the continuance of its appeal in this Court and we ordered reargument.
First. On reargument, the Attorney General of Georgia again maintained that “plain, speedy and efficient” remedies were available to appellant in the state courts. If so, the District Court is without jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1341. The remedies now suggested are: (1) suit for injunction in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia; (2) arresting tax execution by affidavits of illegality; and (3) suing the State for refund after payment of taxes. The first route was tried by appellant without success in the Musgrove litigation, supra. The second remedy, the present availability of which was doubted by the three Justices of the Georgia Supreme Court that considered the matter in the appeal case, would require the filing of over three hundred separate Claims in^ourteen different counties to protect the single federal claim asserted by appellant. The third remedy, suit for refund after payment, is applicable only to taxes payable directly to the State and amounting to less than 15% of the total taxes in controversy. We cannot say that the remedies suggested by the Attorney General afford appellant the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” necessary to deprive the District Court of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1341.
Second: Passing to the jurisdictional ground upon which the District Court rested its decision, we note that the State of Georgia was not named as a party in the District Court. But, since appellee is a state officer, the court below properly considered whether the relief sought against the officer is not, in substance, sought against the sovereign. If this action is, in effect, an unconsented suit against the State, the action is barred.
The District Court characterized appellant’s action as one to enforce an alleged contract with the State of Georgia, and, as such, a suit against the State. But appellant’s complaint is not framed as a suit for specific performance. It seeks to enjoin appellee from collecting taxes in violation of appellant’s rights under the Federal Constitution. This Court has long held that a suit to restrain unconstitutional action threatened by an individual who is a state officer is not a suit against the State. These decisions were reexamined and reaffirmed in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), and have been consistently followed to the present day. This general.rule has been applied in suits against individuals threatening to enforce allegedly unconstitutional taxation, including cases where, as here, it is alleged that taxation would impair the obligation of contract. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273 (1906); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1 (1891); Allen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 114 U. S. 311 (1885).
In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887), relied upon below, is not a contrary holding. In that case, complainant had not alleged that officers threatened to tax its property iri violation of its constitutional rights. As a result, the Court held the action barred as one in substance directed at the State merely to obtain specific performance of a contract with the State. Since appellant seeks to enjoin appellee from a threatened and allegedly unconstitutional invasion of its property, we hold that this action against appellee as an individual is not barred as an unconsented suit against the State. The State is free to carry out its functions without judicial interference directed at the sovereign or its agents, but this immunity from federal jurisdiction does not extend to individuals who act as officers without constitutional authority.
Accordingly, we find that the District Court was not deprived of jurisdiction in this case on either the ground that it is a suit against the State or that “plain, speedy and efficient” remedies are available to appellant in the state courts. Since the District Court did not determine whether appellee was bound by the Wright decree and did not address itself to the merits of appellant’s claim, we do not pass upon these questions but remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Ga. Laws 1833, pp. 256, 264.
Ga. Const., Art. I, § III, par. III. See Ga. Laws 1945, No. 34, pp. 8, 14.
Ga. Code Ann., 1937, cc. 92-26, 92-27, 92-28, as amended, contains the taxation provisions which appellee is allegedly threatening to invoke against appellant.
“No State, shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, ...” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
The cases concerning this exemption that have reached this Court are collected in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Phillips, 332 U. S. 168, 173 (1947).
Required under 28 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) §§ 2281, 2284. Query v. United States, 316 U. S. 486 (1942).
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend .to any- suit in- law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U. S. Const., Amend. XI.
“The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”
208 Ga. at 272, 66 S. E. 2d at 241.
Compare Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, 520 (1917), with Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 529-530 (1932). See also Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393, 403 (1936).
An adequate remedy as to only a portion of the taxes in controversy does not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction over the entire controversy. Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., note 10, supra. See Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629 (1946).
It was also suggested that appellant’s federal claim could be raised in defense to a suit brought by appellee to recover taxes, but. this is hardly a remedy that could have been .invoked by appellant,
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687-688 (1949); In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887).
Appellant is incorporated in Georgia and a suit by it against the State of Georgia is not expressly barred by the language of the Eleventh Amendment. Nevertheless, a federal court may not entertain the action if it is a suit against the State. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890).
Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273 (1906); Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537 (1903); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 518-519 (1898); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897); Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1 (1891), and numerous cases cited therein.
Alabama, Comm’n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U. S. 341, 344 (1951); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 393 (1932), and cases cited therein; Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., note 10, supra, at 507, and cases cited therein. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., note 12, supra, at 690-691, 704.
Appellant in this case merely seeks the cessation of appellee’s allegedly unconstitutional conduct and does not request affirmative action, by the State. Compare Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 462-463 (1945); Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 50-51 (1944); North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22 (1890); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52 (1886).
That there is no inconsistency between the decision in Ayers and the cases above cited is shown by the careful differentiation of Allen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., supra, an opinion also written by Mr. Justice Matthews. See also Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, note 14, supra.
The fact that the Georgia Supreme Court has considered that appellee acts with official immunity does not, of course, impart immunity from responsibility to the supreme federal authority.. Ex parte Young, supra, at 167. See also Graves v. Texas Co., note 10, supra, at 403-404.
We dp not find it necessary to consider whether the State of Georgia had submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the District Court in the Wright litigation. Unlike Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, where additional parties were brought into the second action, appellant has limited its' complaint to a request for relief against appellee, alone.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We address in this decision the appropriate standard for determining whether an office in the taxpayer’s home qualifies as his “principal place of business” under 26 U. S. C. § 280A(c)(l)(A). Because the standard followed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit failed to undertake a comparative analysis of the various business locations of the taxpayer in deciding whether the home office was the principal place of business, we reverse.
► — I
Respondent Nader E. Solimán, an anesthesiologist, practiced his profession in Maryland and Virginia during 1983, the tax year in question. Solimán spent 30 to 35 hours per week with patients, dividing that time among three hospitals. About 80 percent of the hospital time was spent at Suburban Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland. At the hospitals, Solimán administered the anesthesia, cared for patients after surgery, and treated patients for pain. None of the three hospitals provided him with an office.
Solimán lived in a condominium in McLean, Virginia. His residence had a spare bedroom which he used exclusively as an office. Although he did not meet patients in the home office, Solimán spent two to three , hours per day there on a variety of tasks such as contacting patients, surgeons, and hospitals by telephone; maintaining billing records and patient logs; preparing for treatments and presentations; satisfying continuing medical education requirements; and reading medical journals and books.
On his 1983 federal income tax return, Solimán claimed deductions for the portion of condominium fees, utilities, and depreciation attributable to the home office. Upon audit, the Commissioner disallowed those deductions based upon his determination that the home office was not Soliman’s principal place of business. Solimán filed a petition in the Tax Court seeking review of the resulting tax deficiency.
The Tax Court, with six of its judges dissenting, ruled that Soliman’s home office was his principal place of business. 94 T. C. 20 (1990). After noting that in its earlier decisions it identified the place where services are performed and income is generated in order to determine the principal place of business, the so-called “focal point test,” the Tax Court abandoned that test, citing criticism by two Courts of Appeals. Id., at 24-25 (noting Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F. 2d 75 (CA7 1986); Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F. 2d 512 (CA2 1984); and Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F. 2d 67 (CA2 1983)). Under a new test, later summarized and adopted by the Court of Appeals, the Tax Court allowed the deduction. The dissenting opinions criticized the majority for failing to undertake a comparative analysis of Soliman’s places of business to establish which one was the principal place. 94 T. C., at 33, 35.
The Commissioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. A divided panel of that court affirmed. 935 F. 2d 52 (1991). It adopted the test used in the Tax Court and explained it as follows:
“[The] test. . . provides that where management or administrative activities are essential to the taxpayer’s trade or business and the only available office space is in the taxpayer’s home, the ‘home office’ can be his ‘principal place of business,’ with the existence of the following factors weighing heavily in favor of a finding that the taxpayer’s ‘home office’ is his ‘principal place of business:’ (1) the office in the home is essential to the taxpayer’s business; (2) he spends a substantial amount of time there; and (3) there is no other location available for performance of the office functions of the business.” Id., at 54.
For further support, the Court of Appeals relied upon a proposed IRS regulation related to home office deductions for salespersons. Under the proposed regulation, salespersons would be entitled to home office deductions “even though they spend most of their time on the road as long as they spend ‘a substantial amount of time on paperwork at home.’” Ibid, (quoting proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(b)(3), 45 Fed. Reg. 52399 (1980), as amended, 48 Fed. Reg. 33320 (1983)). While recognizing that the proposed regulation was not binding on it, the court suggested that it “evince[d] a policy to allow ‘home office’ deductions for taxpayers who maintain ‘legitimate’ home offices, even if the taxpayer does not spend a majority of his time in the office.” 935 F. 2d, at 55. The court concluded that the Tax Court’s test would lead to identification of the “true headquarters of the business.” Ibid. Like the dissenters in the Tax Court, Judge Phillips in his dissent argued that the plain language of § 280A(c)(l)(A) requires a comparative analysis of the places of business to assess which one is principal, an analysis that was not undertaken by the majority. Ibid.
Although other Courts of Appeals have criticized the focal point test, their approaches for determining the principal place of business differ in significant ways from the approach employed by the Court of Appeals in this case, see Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F. 2d 495, 497 (CA9 1988); Meiers v. Commissioner, supra, at 79; Weissman v. Commissioner, supra, at 514-516; Drucker v. Commissioner, supra, at 69. Those other courts undertake a comparative analysis of the functions performed at each location. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 503 U. S. 935 (1992).
a
<$
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to deduct “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred ... in carrying on any trade or business.” 26 U. S. C. § 162(a). That provision is qualified, however, by various limitations, including one that prohibits otherwise allowable deductions “with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer ... as a residence.” §280A(a). Taxpayers may nonetheless deduct expenses attributable to the business use of their homes if they qualify for one or more of the statute’s exceptions to this disallowance. The exception at issue in this case is contained in § 280A(c)(l):
“Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a regular basis—
“(A) [as] the principal place of business for any trade, or business of the taxpayer[,]
“(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business, or “(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer’s trade or business.
“In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall apply only if the exclusive use referred to in the preceding sentence is for the convenience of his employer.” (Emphasis added.)
Congress adopted §280A as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Pub. L. 94-455, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. Before its adoption, expenses attributable to the business use of a residence were deductible whenever they were “appropriate and helpful” to the taxpayer’s business. See, e. g., Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F. 2d 998 (CA2 1970). This generous standard allowed many taxpayers to treat what otherwise would have been nondeductible living and family expenses as business expenses, even though the limited business tasks performed in the dwelling resulted in few, if any, additional or incremental costs to the taxpayer. H. R. Rep. No. 94-658, p. 160 (1975); S. Rep. No. 94-938, p. 147 (1976). Comparing the newly enacted section with the previous one, the apparent purpose of § 280A is to provide a narrower scope for the deduction, but Congress has provided no definition of “principal place of business.”
In interpreting the meaning of the words in a revenue Act, we look to the “ ‘ordinary, everyday senses’ ” of the words. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U. S. 569, 571 (1966) (per curiam) (quoting Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1, 6 (1947)). In deciding whether a location is “the principal place of business,” the commonsense meaning of “principal” suggests that a comparison of locations must be undertaken. This view is confirmed by the definition of “principal,” which means “most important, consequential, or influential.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1802 (1971). Courts cannot assess whether any one business location is the “most important, consequential, or influential” one without comparing it to all the other places where business is transacted.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ suggestion, the statute does not allow for a deduction whenever a home office may be characterized as legitimate. See 935 F. 2d, at 55. That approach is not far removed from the “appropriate and helpful” test that led to the adoption of § 280A. Under the Court of Appeals’ test, a home office may qualify as the principal place of business whenever the office is essential to the taxpayer’s business, no alternative office space is available, and the taxpayer spends a substantial amount of time there. See id., at 54. This approach ignores the question whether the home office is more significant in the taxpayer’s business than every other place of business. The statute does not refer to the “principal office” of the business. If it had used that phrase, the taxpayer’s deduction claim would turn on other considerations. The statute refers instead to the “principal place” of business. It follows that the most important or significant place for the business must be determined.
B
In determining the proper test for deciding whether a home office is the principal place of business, we cannot develop an objective formula that yields a clear answer in every case. The inquiry is more subtle, with the ultimate determination of the principal place of business being dependent upon the particular facts of each case. There are, however, two primary considerations in deciding whether a home office is a taxpayer’s principal place of business: the relative importance of the activities performed at each business location and the time spent at each place.
Analysis of the relative importance of the functions performed at each business location depends upon an objective description of the business in question. This preliminary step is undertaken so that the decisionmaker can evaluate the activities conducted at the various business locations in light of the particular characteristics of the specific business or trade at issue. Although variations are inevitable in case-by-case determinations, any particular business is likely to have a pattern in which certain activities are of most significance. If the nature of the trade or profession requires the taxpayer to meet or confer with a client or patient or to deliver goods or services to a customer, the place where that contact occurs is often an important indicator of the principal place of business. A business location where these contacts occur has sometimes been called the “focal point” of the business and has been previously regarded by the Tax Court as conclusive in ascertaining the principal place of business. See 94 T. C., at 24-25. We think that phrase has a metaphorical quality that can be misleading, and, as we have said, no one test is determinative in every case. We decide, however, that the point where goods and services are delivered must be given great weight in determining the place where the most important functions are performed.
Section 280A itself recognizes that the home office gives rise to a deduction whenever the office is regularly and exclusively used “by patients, clients, of customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business.” § 280A(c)(l)(B). In that circumstance, the deduction is allowed whether or not the home office is also the principal place of business. The taxpayer argues that because the point of delivery of goods and services is addressed in this provision, it follows that the availability of the principal place of business exception does not depend in any way upon whether the home office is the point of delivery. We agree with the ultimate conclusion that visits by patients, clients, and customers are not a required characteristic of a principal place of business, but we disagree with the implication that whether those visits occur is irrelevant. That Congress allowed the deduction where those visits occur in the normal course even when some other location is the principal place of business indicates their importance in determining the nature and functions of any enterprise. Though not conclusive, the point where services are rendered or goods delivered is a principal consideration in most cases. If the nature of the business requires that its services are rendered or its goods are delivered at a facility with unique or special characteristics, this is a further and weighty consideration in finding that it is the delivery point or facility, not the taxpayer’s residence, where the most important functions of the business are undertaken.
Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not regard the necessity of the functions performed at home as having much weight in determining entitlement to the deduction. In many instances, planning and initial preparation for performing a service or delivering goods are essential to the ultimate performance of the service or delivery of the goods, just as accounting and billing are often essential at the final stages of the process. But that is simply because, in integrated transactions, all steps are essential. Whether the functions performed in the home office are necessary to the business is relevant to the determination of whether a home office is the principal place of business in a particular case, but it is not controlling. Essentiality, then, is but part of the assessment of the relative importance of the functions performed at each of the competing locations.
We reject the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the availability of alternative office space as an additional consideration in determining a taxpayer’s principal place of business. While that factor may be relevant in deciding whether an employee taxpayer’s use of a home office is “for the convenience of his employer,” § 280(c)(1), it has no bearing on the inquiry whether a home office is the principal place of business. The requirements of particular trades or professions may preclude some taxpayers from using a home office as the principal place of business. But any taxpayer’s home office that meets the criteria here set forth is the principal place of business regardless of whether a different office exists or might have been established elsewhere.
In addition to measuring the relative importance of the activities undertaken at each business location, the decision-maker should also compare the amount of time spent at home with the time spent at other places where business activities occur. This factor assumes particular significance when comparison of the importance of the functions performed at various places yields no definitive answer to the principal place of business inquiry. This may be the case when a taxpayer performs income-generating tasks at both his home office and some other location.
The comparative analysis of business locations required by the statute may not result in every case in the specification of which location is the principal place of business; the only question that must be answered is whether the home office so qualifies. There may be cases when there is no principal place of business, and the courts and the Commissioner should not strain to conclude that a home office qualifies for the deduction simply because rip other location seems to be the principal place. The taxpayer’s house does not become a principal place of business by default.
Justice Cardozo’s observation that in difficult questions of deductibility “[l]ife in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle,” Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 115 (1933), must not deter us from deciding upon some rules for the fair and consistent interpretation of a statute that speaks in the most general of terms. Yet we accept his implicit assertion that there are limits to the guidance from appellate courts in these cases. The consequent necessity to give considerable deference to the trier of fact is but the law’s recognition that the statute is designed to accommodate myriad and ever-changing forms of business enterprise.
I — t H — l
Under the principles we have discussed, the taxpayer was not entitled to a deduction for home office expenses. The practice of anesthesiology requires the medical doctor to treat patients under conditions demanding immediate, personal observation. So exacting were these requirements that all of respondent’s patients were treated at hospitals, facilities with special characteristics designed to accommodate the demands of the profession. The actual treatment was the essence of the professional service. We can assume that careful planning and study were required in advance of performing the treatment, and all acknowledge that this was done in the home office. But the actual treatment was the most significant event in the professional transaction. The home office activities, from an objective standpoint, must be regarded as less important to the business of the taxpayer than the tasks he performed at the hospital.
A comparison of the time spent by the taxpayer further supports a determination that the home office was not the principal place of business. The 10 to 15 hours per week spent in the home office measured against the 30 to 35 hours per week at the three hospitals are insufficient to render the home office the principal place of business in light of all of the circumstances of this case. That the office may have been essential is not controlling.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
By administrative subpoena, the Office of Special Investigations of the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice (OSI) sought testimony from the respondent, Aloyzas Balsys, about his wartime activities between 1940 and 1944 and his immigration to the United States in 1961. Balsys declined to answer such questions, claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, based on his fear of prosecution by a foreign nation. We hold that concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause.
I
Respondent Aloyzas Balsys is a resident alien living in Woodhaven, New York, having obtained admission to this country in 1961 under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1201, on an immigrant visa and alien registration issued at the American Consulate in Liverpool. In his application, he said that he had served in the Lithuanian army between 1934 and 1940, and had lived in hiding in Plateliai, Lithuania, between 1940 and 1944. Balsys swore that the information was true, and signed a statement of understanding that if his application contained any false information or materially misleading statements, or concealed any material fact, he would be subject to criminal prosecution and deportation.
OSI, which was created to institute denaturalization and deportation proceedings against suspected Nazi war criminals, is now investigating whether, contrary to his representations, Balsys participated in Nazi persecution during World War II. Such activity would subject him to deportation for persecuting persons because of their race, religion, national origin, or political opinion under §§ 1182(a)(3)(E) and 1251(a)(4)(D), as well as for lying on his visa application under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and 1251(a)(1)(A).
When OSI issued a subpoena requiring Balsys to testify at a deposition, he appeared and gave his name and address, but he refused to answer any other questions, such as those directed to his wartime activities in Europe between 1940-1945 and his immigration to the United States in 1961. In response to all such questions, Balsys invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, claiming that his answers could subject him to criminal prosecution. He did not contend that he would incriminate himself under domestic law, but claimed the privilege because his responses could subject him to criminal prosecution by Lithuania, Israel, and Germany.
OSI responded with a petition in Federal District Court to enforce the subpoena under § 1225(a). Although the District Court found that if Balsys were to provide the information requested, he would face a real and substantial danger of prosecution by Lithuania and Israel (but not by Germany), it granted OSI’s enforcement petition and ordered Balsys to testify, treating the Fifth Amendment as inapplicable to a claim of incrimination solely under foreign law. 918 F. Supp. 588 (EDNY 1996). Balsys appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the Distinct Court’s order, holding that a witness with a real and substantial fear of prosecution by a foreign country may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid giving testimony in a domes-tie proceeding, even if the witness has no valid fear of a criminal prosecution in this country. 119 F. 3d 122 (1997). We granted certiorari, 522 U. S. 1072 (1998), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on this issue and now reverse.
I — [ HH
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. Resident aliens such as Balsys are considered “persons” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and are entitled to the same protections under the Clause as citizens. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 596 (1953). The parties do not dispute that the Government seeks to “compel” testimony from Balsys that would make him “a witness against himself” The question is whether there is a risk that Balsys’s testimony will be used in a proceeding that is a “criminal ease.”
Balsys agrees that the risk that his testimony might subject him to deportation is not a sufficient ground for asserting the privilege, given the civil character of a deportation proceeding. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S. 1032, 1038-1039 (1984). If, however, Balsys could demonstrate that any testimony he might give in the deportation investigation could be used in a criminal proceeding against him brought by the Government of either the United States or one of the States, he would be entitled to invoke the privilege. It “can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory,” in which the witness reasonably believes that the information sought, or discoverable as a result of his testimony, could be used in a subsequent state or federal criminal proceeding. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 444-445 (1972); see also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 40 (1924) (the privilege “applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it”). But Balsys makes no such claim, contending rather that his entitlement to invoke the privilege arises because of a real and substantial fear that his testimony could be used against him by Lithuania or Israel in a criminal prosecution. The reasonableness of his fear is not challenged by the Government, and we thus squarely face the question whether a criminal prosecution by a foreign government not subject to our constitutional guarantees presents a “criminal case” for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Ill
Balsys relies in the first instance on the textual contrast between the Sixth Amendment, which clearly applies only to domestic criminal proceedings, and the Compelled Self-Incrimination Clause, with its facially broader reference to “any criminal case.” The same point is developed by Balsys’s amici, who argue that “any criminal case” means exactly that, regardless of the prosecuting authority. According to the argument, the Framers' use of the adjective “any” precludes recognition of the distinction raised by the Government, between prosecution by a jurisdiction that is itself bound to recognize the privilege and prosecution by a foreign jurisdiction that is not. But the argument overlooks the cardinal rule to construe provisions in context. See King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991). In the Fifth Amendment context, the Clause in question occurs in the company of guarantees of grand jury proceedings, defense against double jeopardy, due process, and compensation for property taking. Because none of these provisions is implicated except by action of the government that it binds, it would have been strange to choose such associates for a Clause meant to take a broader view, and it would be strange to find such a sweep in the Clause now. See Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155, 169-170 (1894) (noscitur a sociis); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995) (same). The oddity of such a reading would be especially stark if the expansive language in question is open to another reasonable interpretation, as we think it is. Because the Fifth Amendment opens by requiring a grand jury indictment or presentment “for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,” the phrase beginning with “any” in the subsequent Self-Incrimination Clause may sensibly be read as making it clear that the privilege it provides is not so categorically limited. It is plausible to suppose the adjective was inserted only for that purpose, not as taking the further step of defining the relevant prosecutorial jurisdiction internationally. We therefore take this to be the fair reading of the adjective “any,” and we read the Clause contextually as apparently providing a witness with the right against compelled self-incrimination when reasonably fearing prosecution by the government whose power the Clause limits, but not otherwise. Since there is no helpful legislative history, and because there was no different common law practice at the time of the framing, see Part III-C, infra; cf. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 563-564 (1892) (listing a sample of cases, including preframing eases, in which the privilege was asserted, none of which involve fear of foreign prosecution), there is no reason to disregard the contextual reading. This Court’s precedent has indeed adopted that so-called same-sovereign interpretation.
A
The currently received understanding of the Bill of Rights as instituted “to curtail and restrict the general powers granted to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches” of the National Government defined in the original constitutional articles, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 716 (1971) (per curiam) (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis deleted), was expressed early on in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in the leading ease of Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 247 (1833): the Constitution’s “limitations on power... are naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government created by the instrument,” and not to “distinct [state] governments, framed by different persons and for dif-fei’ent purposes.”
To be sure, it would have been logically possible to decide (as in Barron) that the “distinct [state] governments... framed... for different purposes” were beyond the ambit of the Fifth Amendment, and at the same time to hold that the self-incrimination privilege, good against the National Government, was implicated by fear of prosecution in another jurisdiction. But after Barron and before the era of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, that would have been an unlikely doctrinal combination, and no such improbable development occurred.
The precursors of today’s case were those raising the question of the significance for the federal privilege of possible use of testimony in state prosecution. Only a handful of early eases even touched on the problem. In Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896), a witness raised the issue, claiming the privilege in a federal proceeding based on his fear of prosecution by a State, but we found that a statute under which immunity from federal prosecution had been conferred provided for immunity from state prosecution as well, obviating any need to reach the issue raised. Id., at, 606-608. In Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372 (1905), a Fourteenth Amendment case, we affirmed a sentence for contempt imposed on a witness in a state proceeding who had received immunity from state prosecution but refused to answer questions based on a fear that they would subject him to federal prosecution. Although there was no reasonable fear of a prosecution by the National Government in that ease, we addressed the question whether a self-incrimination privilege could be invoked in the one jurisdiction based on fear of prosecution by the other, saying that “[w]e think the legal immunity is in regard to a prosecution in the same jurisdiction, and when that is fully given it is enough.” Id., at 382. A year later, in the course of considering whether a federal witness, immunized from federal prosecution, could invoke the privilege based on fear of state prosecution, we adopted the general proposition that “the possibility that information given by the witness might be used” by the other government is, as a matter of law, “a danger so unsubstantial and remote” that it fails to trigger the right to invoke the privilege. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 69 (1906).
“[I]f the argument were a sound one it might be carried still further and held to apply not only to state prosecutions within the same jurisdiction, but to prosecutions under the criminal laws of other States to which the witness might have subjected himself. The question has been folly considered in England, and the conclusion reached by the courts of that country [is] that the only danger to be considered is one arising within the same jurisdiction and under the same sovereignty. Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311[, 121 Eng. Rep. 730]; King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 7 State Trials (N. S.), 1049, 1068; State v. March, 1 Jones (N. Car.), 526; State v. Thomas, 98 N. Car. 599.” Ibid.
A holding to this effect came when United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931), “definitely settled” the question whether in a federal proceeding the privilege applied on account of fear of state prosecution, concluding “that one under examination in a federal tribunal could not refose to answer on account of probable incrimination under state law.” United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 396 (1933).
“The English rule of evidence against compulsory self-inerimination, on which historically that contained in the Fifth Amendment rests, does not protect witnesses against disclosing offenses in violation of the laws of another country. King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 7 State Trials (N. S.) 1049, 1068. Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S., at 330[, 121 Eng. Rep., at 738]. This court has held that immunity against state prosecution is not essential to the validity of federal statutes declaring that a witness shall not be excused from giving evidence on the ground that it will incriminate him, and also that the lack of state power to give witnesses protection against federal prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute. The principle established is that full and complete immunity against prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule against compulsory self-incrimination. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 606. Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372, 381. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 68. As appellee at the hearing did not invoke protection against federal prosecution, his.plea is without merit and the government’s demurrer should have been sustained.” Murdock, 284 U. S., at 149.
Murdock’s resolution of the question received a subsequent complement when we affirmed again that a State could compel a witness to give testimony that might incriminate him under federal law, see Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U. S. 371 (1958), overruled by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N. Y. Harbor, 378 U. S. 52 (1964), testimony that we had previously held to be admissible into evidence in the federal courts, see Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487 (1944), overruled by Murphy, supra, at 80.
B
It has been suggested here that our precedent addressing fear of prosecution by a government other than the compelling authority fails to reflect the Murdock rule uniformly. In 1927 (prior to our decision in Murdock), in a case involving a request for habeas relief from a deportation order, we declined to resolve whether “the Fifth Amendment guarantees immunity from self-incrimination under state statutes.” United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 113 (1927). Although we found that the witness had waived his claim to the privilege, our decision might be read to suggest that there was some tension between the reasoning of two of the eases discussed above, Hale v. Henkel and Brown v. Walker, and the analyses contained in two others, United States v. Saline Bank of Va., 1 Pet. 100 (1828), and Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U. S. 186 (1906). 273 U. S., at 113. These last two eases have in fact been cited here for the claim that prior to due process incorporation, the privilege could be asserted in a federal proceeding based on fear of prosecution by a State. Saline Bank and Ballmann are not, however, inconsistent with Murdock.
In Saline Bank, we permitted the defendants to refuse discovery sought by the United States in federal court, where the defendants claimed that their responses would result in incrimination under the laws of 'Virginia. “The rule clearly is, that a party is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him to penalties, and this case falls within it.” 1 Pet., at 104. But, for all the sweep of this statement, the opinion makes no mention of the Fifth Amendment, and in Hale v. Henkel, we explained that “the prosecution [in Saline Bank] was under a state law which imposed the penalty, and... the Federal court was simply administering the state law.” 201 U. S., at 69. The state law, which addresses prosecutions brought by the State, suggested the rule that the Saline Bank Court applied to the case before it; the law provided that “no disclosure made by any party defendant to such suit in equity, and no books or papers exhibited by him in answer to the bill, or under the order of the Court, shall be used as evidence against him in any... prosecution under this law,” quoted in 1 Pet., at 104. Saline Bank, then, may have turned on a reading of state statutory law. Cf. MeNaughton, Self-Incrimination Under Foreign Law, 45 Va. L. Rev. 1299,1305-1306 (1959) (suggesting that Saline Bank represents “an application not of the privilege against self-incrimination... but of the principle that equity will not aid a forfeiture”). But see Ballmann, supra, at 195 (Holmes, J.) (suggesting that Saline Bank is a Fifth Amendment case, though this view was soon repudiated by the Court in Hale, as just noted).
Where Saline Bank is laconic, Ballmann is equivocal. While Ballmann specifically argued only the danger of incriminating himself under state law as his basis for invoking the privilege in a federal proceeding, and we upheld his claim of privilege, our opinion indicates that we concluded that Ballmann might have had a fear of incrimination under federal law as well as under state law. “While we did suggest, contrary to the Murdock rule, that Ballmann might have been able to invoke the privilege based on a fear of state prosecution, the opinion says only that “[o]ne way or the other [due to the risk of incrimination under federal or state law] we are of opinion that Ballmann could not be required to produce his cash book if he set up that it would tend to criminate him.” 200 U. S., at 195-196. At its equivocal worst, Ballmann reigned for only two months. Hale v. Henkel explained that “the only danger to be considered is one arising within the same jurisdiction and under the same sovereignty,” 201 U. S., at 69, and Ballmann and Saline Bank were later, of course, superseded by Murdock with its unequivocal holding that prosecution in a state jurisdiction not bound by the Clause is beyond the purview of the privilege.
C
In 1964, our precedent took a turn away from the unqualified proposition that fear of prosecution outside the jurisdiction seeking to compel testimony did not implicate a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment privilege, as the case might be. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N. Y. Harbor, 378 U. S. 52 (1964), we reconsidered the converse of the situation in Murdock, whether a witness in a state proceeding who had been granted immunity from state prosecution could invoke the privilege based on fear of prosecution on federal charges. In the course of enquiring into a work stoppage at several New Jersey piers, the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor subpoenaed the defendants, who were given immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey and New York. When the witnesses persisted in refusing to testify based on their fear of federal prosecution, they were held in civil contempt, and the order was affirmed by New Jersey’s highest court. In re Application of the Waterfront Comm’n of N. Y. Harbor, 39 N. J. 436, 449, 189 A. 2d 36, 44 (1963). This Court held the defendants could be forced to testify not because fear of federal prosecution was irrelevant but because the Self-Incrimination Clause barred the National Government from using their state testimony or its fruits to obtain a federal conviction. We explained that “the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal law.” 378 U. S., at 77-78.
Murphy is a case invested with two alternative rationales. Under the first, the result reached in Murphy was undoubtedly correct, given the decision rendered that very same day in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964), which applied the doctrine of Fourteenth Amendment due process incorporation to the Self-Incrimination Clause, so as to bind the States as well as the National Government to recognize the privilege. Id., at 3. Prior to Malloy, the Court had refused to impose the privilege against self-incrimination against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), thus leaving state-court witnesses seeking exemption from compulsion to testify to their rights under state law, as supplemented by the Fourteenth Amendment’s limitations on coerced confessions. Malloy, however, established that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement — the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty... for such silence.” 378 U. S., at 8.
As the Court immediately thereafter said in Murphy, Malloy “necessitate^] a reconsideration” of the unqualified Murdock rule that a witness subject to testimonial compulsion in one jurisdiction, state or federal, could not plead fear of prosecution in the other. 378 U. S., at 57. After Malloy, the Fifth Amendment limitation could no longer be seen as framed for one jurisdiction alone, each jurisdiction having instead become subject to the same claim of privilege flowing from the one limitation. Since fear of prosecution in the one jurisdiction bound by the Clause now implicated the very privilege binding upon the other, the Murphy opinion sensibly recognized that if a witness could not assert the privilege in such circumstances, the witness could be “whipsawed into incriminating himself under both state and federal law even though the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to each.” 378 U. S., at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted). The whipsawing was possible owing to a feature unique to the guarantee against self-incrimination among the several Fifth Amendment privileges. In the absence of waiver, the other such guarantees are purely and simply binding on the government. But under the Self-Incrimination Clause, the government has an option to exchange the stated privilege for an immunity to prosecutorial use of any compelled inculpatory testimony. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S., at 448-449. The only condition on the government when it decides to offer immunity in place of the privilege to stay silent is the requirement to provide an immunity as broad as the privilege itself. Id., at 449. After Malloy had held the privilege binding on the state jurisdictions as well as the National Government, it would therefore have been intolerable to allow a prosecutor in one or the other jurisdiction to eliminate the privilege by offering immunity less complete than the privilege’s dual jurisdictional reach. Murphy accordingly held that a federal court could not receive testimony compelled by a State in the absence of a statute effectively providing for federal immunity, and it did this by imposing an exclusionary rule prohibiting the National Government "from making any such use of compelled testimony and its fruits,” 378 U. S., at 79 (footnote omitted).
This view of Murphy as necessitated by Malloy was adopted in the subsequent case of Kastigar v. United States, supra, at 456, n. 42 (“Reconsideration of the rule that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not protect a witness in one jurisdiction against being compelled to give testimony that could be used to convict him in another jurisdiction was made necessary by the decision in Malloy v. Hogan”). Read this way, Murphy rests upon the same understanding of the Self-Incrimination Clause that Murdock recognized and to which the earlier eases had pointed. Although the Clause serves a variety of interests in one degree or another, see Part IV, infra, at its heart lies the principle that the courts of a government from which a witness may reasonably fear prosecution may not in fairness compel the witness to furnish testimonial evidence that may be used to prove his guilt. After Murphy, the immunity option open to the Executive Branch could be exercised only on the understanding that the state and federal jurisdictions were as one, with a federally mandated exclusionary rule filling the space between the limits of state immunity statutes and the scope of the privilege. As so understood, Murphy stands at odds with Balsys’s claim.
There is, however, a competing rationale in Murphy, investing the Clause with a more expansive promise. The Murphy majority opened the door to this view by rejecting this Court’s previous understanding of the English common-law evidentiary privilege against compelled self-incrimination, which could have informed the Framers’ understanding of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e. g., Murphy, 378 U. S., at 67 (rejecting Murdock’s analysis of the scope of the privilege under English common law). Having removed what it saw as an unjustified, historically derived limitation on the privilege, the Murphy Court expressed a comparatively ambitious conceptualization of personal privacy underlying the Clause, one capable of supporting, if not demanding, the scope of protection that Balsys claims. As the Court of Appeals recognized, if we take the Murphy opinion at face value, the expansive rationale can be claimed quite as legitimately as the Murdock-Malloy-Kastigar understanding of Murphy’s result, and Balsys’s claim accordingly requires us to decide whether Murphy’s innovative side is as sound as its traditional one. We conclude that it is not.
As support for the view that the Court had previously misunderstood the English rule, Murphy relied, first, on two preconstitutional English cases, East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. sen. 246, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749), and Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. sen. 243, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750), for the proposition that a witness in an English court was permitted to invoke the privilege based on fear of prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction. See 378 U. S., at 58-59. Neither of these cases is on point as holding that proposition, however. In East India Co., a defendant before the Court of Exchequer, seeking to avoid giving an explanation for his possession of certain goods, claimed the privilege on the ground that his testimony might subject him to a fine or corporal punishment. The Court of Exchequer found that the defendant would be punishable in Calcutta, then an English Colony, and said it would “not oblige one to discover that, which, if he answers in the affirmative, will subject him to the punishment of a crime.” 1 Ves. sen., at 247, 27 Eng. Rep., at 1011. In Brownsword, a defendant before the Court of Chancery claimed the privilege on the ground that her testimony could render her liable to prosecution in an English ecclesiastical court. “The general rule,” the court said, “is that no one is bound to answer so as to subject himself to punishment, whether that punishment arises by the ecclesiastical law of the land.” 2 Ves. sen., at 245, 28 Eng. Rep., at 158. Although this statement, like its counterpart in East India Co., is unqualified, neither case is authority.for the proposition that fear of prosecution in foreign courts implicates the privilege. For in each of these cases, the judicial system to which the witness’s fears related was subject to the same legislative sovereignty that had created the courts in which the privilege was claimed. In fact, when these cases were decided, and for years after adoption of the Fifth Amendment, English authority was silent on whether fear of prosecution by a foreign nation implicated the privilege, and the 'Vice-Chancellor so stated in 1851. See King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 301, 331, 61 Eng. Rep, 116, 128 (Ch. 1851) (observing, in the course of an opinion that clearly involved a claim of privilege based on the fear of prosecution by another sovereign, that there is an “absence of all authority on the point”).
Murphy, in fact, went on to discuss the case last cited, as well as a subsequent one. The Murphy majority began by acknowledging that King of the Two Sicilies was not authority for attacking this Court’s prior view of English law. 378 U. S., at 60. In an opinion by Lord Cranworth, the Court of Chancery declined to allow defendants to assert the privilege based on their fear of prosecution in Sicily, for two reasons. 1 Sim. (N. S.), at 329, 61 Eng. Rep., at 128. The first was the court’s belief that the privilege speaks only to matters that might be criminal under the laws of England: “The rule relied on by the Defendants, is one which exists merely by virtue of our own municipal law, and must, I think, have reference, exclusively, to matters penal by that law: to matters as to which, if disclosed, the Judge would be able to say, as matter of law, whether it could or could not entail penal consequences.” For the second, the court relied on the unlikelihood that the defendants would ever leave England and be subject to Sicilian prosecution.
The Murphy majority nonetheless understood this rule to have been undermined by the subsequent case of United States of America v. McRae, 3 L. R. Ch. 79 (1867). See 378 U. S., at 61. In that suit brought by the United States against McRae in England to recover funds that he had collected there as a Confederate agent during the Civil War, the court recognized the privilege based on McRae’s claim that his testimony would incriminate him in the United States. The court distinguished the litigation then before it from King of the Two Sicilies, indicating that though it agreed with the general principles stated by Lord Cran-worth, see 3 L. R. Ch., at 84, he had not needed to lay down the broad proposition that invocation of the privilege was appropriate only with regard to matters penal under England’s own law, see id., at 85. The corut did not say that the privilege could be invoked in any ease involving fear of prosecution under foreign law, however. Instead it noted two distinctions from King of the Two Sicilies, the first being that the “presumed ignorance of the Judge as to foreign law” on which King of the Two Sicilies rested has been “completely removed by the admitted statements upon the pleadings,” 3 L. R. Ch., at 85; the second being that McRae presented the unusual circumstance that the party seeking to compel the testimony, the United States, was also the party that would prosecute any crime under its laws that might thereby be revealed, id., at 87. The court’s holding that the privilege could be invoked in such circumstances does not, however, support a general application of the privilege in any case in which a witness fears prosecution under foreign law by a party not before the court. Thus, Murphy went too far in saying that McRae overruled King of the Two Sicilies. See Murphy, 378 U. S., at 71. What is of more fundamental importance, however, is that even if McRae had announced a new development in English law going to the heart of King of the Two Sicilies, it would have been irrelevant to Fifth Amendment interpretation. The presumed influence of English law on the intentions of the Framers hardly invests the Framers with clairvoyance, and subsequent English developments are not attributable to the Framers by some rule of renvoi. Cf. Brown, 161 U. S., at 600 (citing Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 264, 280 (1831)). Since McRae neither stated nor implied any disagreement with Lord Cranworth’s 1857 statement in King of the Two Sicilies that there was no clear prior authority on the question, the Murphy Court had no authority showing that Murdock rested on unsound historical assumptions contradicted by opinions of the English courts.
In sum, to the extent that the Murphy majority went beyond its response to Malloy and undercut Murdock’s rationale on historical grounds, its reasoning cannot be accepted now. Long before today, indeed, Murphy’s history was shown to be fatally flawed.
D
Although the Court and Justice Breyer’s dissent differ on details, including some considerations of policy addressed in Part IV, infra, our basic disagreement with that dissent turns on three points. First, we start with what we think is the most probable reading of the Clause in its Fifth Amendment context, as limiting its principle to concern with prosecution by a sovereign that is itself bound by the Clause; the dissent instead emphasizes the Clause’s facial breadth as consistent with a broader principle. Second, we rely on the force of our precedent, notably Murdock, as confirming this same-sovereign principle, as adapted to reflect the post-Malloy requirement of immunity effective against both sovereigns subject to the one privilege under the National Constitution; the dissent attributes less force to Murdock, giving weight to its tension with the Saline Bank language, among other things. Third, we reject Murphy’s restatement of the common-law background and read none of the common-law cases as authority inconsistent with our contextual reading of the Clause, later confirmed by precedent such as Murdock; the dissent finds support in the common-law eases for Murphy’s historical reexamination and the broader reading of the Clause. In the end, our contextual reading of the Clause, combined with the Murdock holding, places a burden on anyone who contests the basic same-sovereign principle, a burden that only clear, contrary, preframing common law might carry; since the dissent starts with a broader reading of the Clause and a less potent view of Murdock, it does not require Murphy and the common-law eases to satisfy such a burden before definitively finding that a more expansive principle underlies the Clause.
IV
There remains, at
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, brought under § 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 891, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a), concerns ERISA’s preemption and saving clauses. The preemption clause, § 514(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a), broadly states that ERISA provisions “shall supersede... State laws” to the extent that those laws “relate to any employee benefit plan.” The saving clause, § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), phrased with similar breadth, exempts from preemption “any law of any State which regulates insurance.” The key words “regulates insurance” in § 514(b)(2)(A), and “relate to” in § 514(a), once again require interpretation, for their meaning is not “plain”; sensible construction of ERISA, our decisions indicate, requires that we measure these words in context. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 47 (1987) (noting that repeated calls for interpretation are not surprising in view of “the wide variety of state statutory and decisional law arguably affected” by ERISA’s preemption and saving clauses).
The context here is a suit to recover disability benefits under an ERISA-governed insurance policy issued by defendant-petitioner UNUM Life Insurance Company of America (UNUM). Plaintiff-respondent John E. Ward submitted his proof of claim to UNUM outside the time limit set in the policy, and UNUM therefore denied Ward’s claim.
and reversing the District Court’s summary judgment for UNUM, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on decisional law in California, the State in which Ward worked and in which his employer operated. The Ninth Circuit’s judgment rested on two grounds. That court relied first on California’s “notice-prejudice” rule, under which an insurer cannot avoid liability although the proof of claim is untimely, unless the insurer shows it was prejudiced by the delay. The notice-prejudice rule is saved from preemption, the Court of Appeals held, because it is “law... which regulates insurance.” See Ward v. Management Analysis Co. Employee Disability Benefit Plan, 135 F. 3d 1276, 1280 (1998).
The Court of Appeals announced a further reversing the District Court’s judgment for UNUM, one that would come into play if the insurer proved prejudice due to the delayed notice. Under California’s decisions, the Ninth Circuit said, the employer could be deemed an agent of the insurer in administering group insurance policies. Ward’s employer knew of his disability within the time the policy allowed for proof of claim. The Ninth Circuit held that the generally applicable agency law reflected in the California eases does not “relate to” employee benefit plans, and therefore is not preempted. See id., at 1281-1283, 1287-1288.
We granted the Court of Appeals’ first disposition, and reverse the second. California’s notice-prejudice rule, we agree, is a “law... which regulates insurance,” and is therefore saved from preemption by ERISA. California’s agency law, we further hold, does “relate to” employee benefit plans, and therefore does not occupy ground outside ERISA’s preemption clause.
I
UNUM issued a long-term group disability policy to Management Analysis Company (MAC) as an insured welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA, effective November 1, 1983. The policy provides that proofs of claim must be furnished to UNUM, at the latest, one year and 180 days after the onset of disability.
Ward was employed by MAC from 1983 Throughout this period, premiums for the disability policy were deducted from Ward’s paycheck. Under the admitted facts of the case, Ward became permanently disabled with severe leg pain on the date of his resignation, May 5, 1992. See 135 F. 3d, at 1280.
Ward’s condition was diagnosed as diabetic neuropathy in December 1992. In late February or early March 1993, he qualified for state disability benefits and thereupon informed MAC of his disability and inquired about continuing health insurance benefits. In July 1993, Ward received a determination of eligibility for Social Security disability benefits and forwarded a copy of this determination to MAC’S human resources division. See id., at 1279. In April 1994, Ward discovered among his papers a booklet describing the long-term disability plan and asked MAG whether the plan covered his condition. When MAC told him he was covered, Ward completed an application for benefits and forwarded it to MAC. In turn, and after filling in the employer information section, MAC forwarded the application to UNUM. UNUM received proof of Ward’s claim on April 11, 1994. See ibid. This notice was late under the terms of the policy, which required submission of proof of claim by November 5, 1993. See id., at 1280. By letter dated April 13, 1994, UNUM advised Ward that his claim was denied as untimely. See id., at 1279.
In September 1994, Ward filed suit against the MAC plan under §502 of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1132, to recover the disability benefits provided by the plan. UNUM appeared as a defendant and answered on behalf of itself and the plan. See 135 P. 3d, at 1279. To the District Court, Ward argued that under Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 2d 503, 512, 432 P. 2d 731, 737 (1967) (en banc), a California employer that administers an insured group health plan should be deemed to act as the agent of the insurance company. Therefore, Ward asserted, his notice of permanent disability to MAC, in February or March 1993, sufficed to supply timely notice to UNUM. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a. The District Court rejected this argument, concluding that the agency rule announced in Elfstrom “relate[s] to” ERISA plans; hence it is preempted under § 514(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). See App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a. The District Court further held that the Elfstrom rule is not saved from preemption as a law that “regulates insurance” within the compass of ERISA’s insurance saving clause, § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a. Accordingly, the court rendered summary judgment in UNUM’s favor. See id., at 33a.
The Court of tifying two grounds on which Ward might prevail. First, following the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Cisneros v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 134 F. 3d 939 (1998), the appeals court held that California’s notice-prejudice rule is saved from ERISA preemption as a law that “regulates insurance”; under the notice-prejudice rule, Ward’s late notice would not preclude his ERISA claim absent proof that the insurer suffered actual prejudice because of the delay. See 135 F. 3d, at 1280. Second, and contingently, the Ninth Circuit held that the Elfstrom rule, under which the employer could be deemed an agent of the insurer, does not “relate to” employee benefit plans, and therefore is not preempted by reason of ERISA. See 135 F. 3d, at 1287 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court accordingly remanded the case to the District Court for a determination whether UNUM suffered actual prejudice on account of the late submission of Ward’s notice of claim; and if so, whether, under the reasoning of Elfstrom, Ward could nevertheless prevail because he had timely filed his claim. See 135 F. 3d, at 1289.
HH
California’s notice-prejudice rule prescribes:
“[A] defense based on an insured’s failure to give timely notice [of a claim] requires the insurer to prove that it suffered substantial prejudice. Prejudice is not presumed from delayed notice alone. The insurer must show actual prejudice, not the mere possibility of prejudice.” Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12 Cal. App. 4th 715, 760-761, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 845 (1st Dist. 1993) (citations omitted).
The parties agree that the notice-prejudice rule falls under ERISA’s preemption clause, § 514(a), as a state law that “relate[s] to” an employee benefit plan. Their dispute hinges on this question: Does the rule “regulat[e] insurance” and thus escape preemption under the saving clause, § 514(b)(2)(A).
Our precedent provides a framework for resolving whether a state law “regulates insurance” within the meaning of the saving clause. First, we ask whether, from a “common-sense view of the matter,” the contested prescription regulates insurance. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 740 (1985); see Pilot Life, 481 U. S., at 48. Second, we consider three factors employed to determine whether the regulation fits within the “business of insurance” as that phrase is used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq.: “first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 743 (emphasis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pilot Life, 481 U. S., at 48-49.
A
The Ninth Circuit concluded that California’s notice-prejudice rule “regulates insurance” as a matter of common sense. See Cisneros, 134 E 3d, at 945. We do not normally disturb an appeals court’s judgment on an issue so heavily dependent on analysis of state law, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 181-182 (1976), and we lack cause to do so here. The California notice-prejudice rule controls the terms of the insurance relationship by “requiring the insurer to prove prejudice before enforcing proof-of-claim requirements.” Cisneros, 134 F.3d, at 945. As the Ninth Circuit observed, the rule, by its very terms, “is directed specifically at the insurance industry and is applicable only to insurance contracts.” Ibid.; see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12 (“[0]ur survey of California law reveals no cases where the state courts apply the notice-prejudice rule as such outside the insurance area. Nor is this surprising, given that the rule is stated in terms of prejudice to an ‘insurer’ resulting from untimeliness of notice.”). The rule thus appears to satisfy the common-sense view as a regulation that homes in on the insurance industry and does “not just have an impact on [that] industry.” Pilot Life, 481 U. S., at 50.
UNUM and its urge cuit’s common-sense conclusion that the notice-prejudice rule is merely an industry-specific application of the general principle that “disproportionate forfeiture should be avoided in the enforcement of contracts.” See Brief for American Council of Life Insurance et al. as Amici Curiae 13; Brief for Association of California Life and Health Insurance Companies as Amicus Curiae 5 (“[Njotice-prejudice is merely a branch of the broad doctrine of harmless error.”). Given the tenet from which the notice-prejudice rule springs, UNUM maintains, the rule resembles the Mississippi law at issue in Pilot Life; under that law, punitive damages could be sought for “bad faith” in denying claims without any reasonably arguable basis for the refusal to pay. See 481 U. S., at 50. We determined in Pilot Life that although Mississippi had “identified its law of bad faith with the insurance industry, the roots of this law are firmly planted in the general principles of Mississippi tort and contract law.” Ibid. “Any breach of contract,” we observed, “and not merely breach of an insurance contract, may lead to liability for punitive damages under [the Mississippi common law of bad faith].” Ibid. Accordingly, we concluded, the Mississippi law did not “regulate] insurance” within the meaning of ERISA’s saving clause. Ibid.
We do not find it fair to bracket California’s notice-prejudice rule for insurance contracts with Mississippi’s broad gauged “bad faith” claim for relief. Insurance policies like UNUM’s frame timely notice provisions as conditions precedent to be satisfied by the insured before an insurer’s contractual obligation arises. See 1 B. Witkin, Summary of California Law, Contracts § 726, p. 657 (9th ed. 1987); Zurn Engineers v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 61 Cal. App. 3d 493, 499, 132 Cal. Rptr. 206, 210 (2d Dist. 1976). Ordinarily, “failure to comply with conditions precedent... prevents an action by the defaulting party to enforce the contract.” 14 Cal. Jur. 3d, Contracts §245, p. 542 (3d ed. 1974). A recent California decision, Platt Pacific Inc. v. Andelson, 6 Cal. 4th 307, 862 P. 2d 158 (1993) (en bane), is illustrative. In that case, the California Supreme Court adhered to the normal course: It refused to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a contractual requirement to timely demand arbitration, although there was no allegation that the defendant had been prejudiced by the plaintiff’s lapse. The plaintiff had forfeited the right to pursue arbitration, the court concluded, for “the condition precedent [of a timely demand] was neither legally excused nor changed by modification of the parties’ written agreement.” Id., at 321, 862 P. 2d, at 167. “A contrary conclusion,” the court stated, “would undermine the law of contracts by vesting in one contracting party the power to unilaterally convert the other contracting party’s conditional obligation into an independent, unconditional obligation notwithstanding the terms of the agreement.” Id., at 314, 862 P. 2d, at 162.
It is no doubt true that out the maxim that “law abhors a forfeiture” and that the notice-prejudice rule is an application of that maxim. But it is an application of a special order, a rule mandatory for insurance contracts, not a principle a court may pliably employ when the circumstances so warrant. Tellingly, UNUM has identified no California authority outside the insurance-specific notice-prejudice context indicating that as a matter of law, failure to abide by a contractual time condition does not work a forfeiture absent prejudice. Outside the notice-prejudice context, the burden of justifying a departure from a contract’s written terms generally rests with the party seeking the departure. See, e. g., American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F. 3d 1401, 1413 (CA9 1996); CQL Original Products, Inc. v. National Hockey League Players’ Assn., 39 Cal. App. 4th 1347, 1357-1358, n. 6, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412, 418, n. 6 (4th Dist. 1995). In short, the notice-prejudice rule is distinctive most notably because it is a rule firmly applied to insurance contracts, not a general principle guiding a court’s discretion in a range of matters.
California’s insistence that insurers show prejudice before they may deny coverage because of late notice is grounded in policy concerns specific to the insurance industry See Brief for Council of State Governments et al. as Amici Curiae 10-14. That grounding is key to our decision. Announcing the notice-prejudice rule in Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 303, 384 P. 2d 155 (1963) (en banc), the California Supreme Court emphasized the “public policy of this state” in favor of compensating insureds. Id., at 307, 384 P. 2d, at 157; see ibid, (weighing the relative burdens of notice-prejudice on insurers and insureds). Subsequent notice-prejudice rulings have likewise focused on insurance industry policy and governance. See, e. g., Hanover Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 241 Cal. App. 2d 558, 570, 50 Cal. Rptr. 704, 712 (1st Dist. 1966) (public policy respecting compensation of insured injured parties); Northwestern Title Security Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134, 143-144, 85 Cal. Rptr. 693, 698 (1st Dist. 1970) (extending notice-prejudice rule to “elaims-type” policies, rejecting contention that sound public policy required limitation of rule to “occurrence-type” policies); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1348,1359-1360, 270 Cal. Rptr. 779, 784-785 (2d Dist. 1990) (evaluating insurance industry public policy considerations in reaching the opposite conclusion). Decisions of courts in other States similarly indicate that the notice-prejudice rule addresses policy concerns specific to insurance. See, e.g., Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N. J. 86, 94, 237 A. 2d 870, 874 (1968) (failure to adopt notice-prejudice would “disserve the public interest, for insurance is an instrument of a social policy that the victims of negligence be compensated”); Great American Ins. Co. v. C. G. Tate Construction Co., 303 N. C. 387, 395, 279 S. E. 2d 769, 774 (1981) (“The [notice-prejudice] rule we adopt today has the advantages of promoting social policy and fulfilling the reasonable expectations of the purchaser while fully protecting the ability of the insurer to protect its own interests.”); Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S. W. 2d 845, 851-853 (Tenn. 1998) (surveying the “compelling public policy justifications” that support departing from traditional contract interpretation in favor of notice-prejudice).
In sum, the Ninth Circuit properly concluded that notice-prejudice is a rule of law governing the insurance relationship distinctively. We reject UNUM’s contention that the rule merely restates a general principle disfavoring forfeitures and conclude instead that notice-prejudice, as a matter of common sense, regulates insurance.
B
We next consider the criteria used to determine whether a state law regulates the “business of insurance” within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Preliminarily, we reject UNUM’s assertion that a state regulation must satisfy all three McCarran-Ferguson factors in order to “regulate insurance” under ERISA’s saving clause. Our precedent is more supple than UNUM conceives it to be. We have indicated that the McCarran-Ferguson factors are “considerations [to be] weighed” in determining whether a state law regulates insurance, Pilot Life, 481 U. S., at 49, and that “[n]one of these criteria is necessarily determinative in itself,” Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U. S. 119, 129 (1982). In Metropolitan Life, the case in which we first used the McCarran-Ferguson formulation to assess whether a state law “regulates insurance” for purposes of ERISA’s saving clause, we called the McCarran-Ferguson factors “relevant”; we did not describe them as “required.” See 471 U. S., at 743; O’Connor v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 146 F. 3d 959, 963 (CADC 1998) (“That the factors are merely ‘relevant’ suggests that they need not all point in the same direction, else they would be ‘required.’”). As the Ninth Circuit correctly recognized, Metropolitan Life asked first whether the law there in question “fit a common-sense understanding of insurance regulation,” Cisneros, 134 F. 3d, at 945, and then looked to the McCarran-Ferguson factors as cheeking points or “guideposts, not separate essential elements... that must each be satisfied” to save the State’s law, id., at 946.
The first McCarran-Ferguson factor asks whether the at issue “has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit determined that the notice-prejudice rule does not satisfy that criterion because it “does not alter the allocation of risk for which the parties initially contracted, namely the risk of lost income from long-term disability.” Cisneros, 134 F. 3d, at 946. The United States as amicus curiae, however, suggests that the notice-prejudice rule might be found to satisfy the McCarran-Ferguson “risk-spreading” factor: “Insofar as the notice-prejudice rule shifts the risk of late notice and stale evidence from the insured to the insurance company in some instances, it has the effect of raising premiums and spreading risk among policyholders.” Brief for United States as Ami-cus Curiae 14. We need not pursue this point, because the remaining McCarran-Ferguson factors, verifying the common-sense view, are securely satisfied.
Meeting as “an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 743. California’s rule changes the bargain between insurer and insured; it “effectively creates a mandatory contract term” that requires the insurer to prove prejudice before enforcing a timeliness-of-elaim provision. Cisneros, 134 F. 3d, at 946. As the Ninth Circuit stated: “The [notice-prejudice] rule dictates the terms of the relationship between the insurer and the insured, and consequently, is integral to that relationship.” Ibid.
The third McCarran-Ferguson factor — which asks whether the rule is limited to entities within the insurance industry— is also well met. As earlier explained, see supra, at 368-373, California’s notice-prejudice rule focuses on the insurance industry. The rule “does not merely have an impact on the insurance industry; it is aimed at it.” FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U. S. 52, 61 (1990).
HH
UNUM and its amici assert that even if the notice-prejudice rule is saved under 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), it is nonetheless preempted because it conflicts with substantive provisions of ERISA in three ways. UNUM first contends that the notice-prejudice rule, by altering the notice provisions of the insurance contract, conflicts with ERISA’s requirement that plan fiduciaries act “in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan.” § 1104(a)(1)(D). According to UNUM, § 1104(a)(1)(D) preempts any state law contrary to a written plan term. See Brief for Petitioner 32-33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 8.
UNUM’s “contra plan term” argument overlooks controlling precedent and makes scant sense. We have repeatedly held that state laws mandating insurance contract terms are saved from preemption under § 1144(b)(2)(A). See Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 758 (“Massachusetts’ mandated-benefit law is a ‘law which regulates insurance’ and so is not pre-empted by ERISA as it applies to insurance contracts purchased for plans subject to ERISA.”); FMC Corp., 498 U. S., at 64 (“[I]f a plan is insured, a State may regulate it indirectly through regulation of its insurer and its insurer’s insurance contracts.”). Under UNUM’s interpretation of § 1104(a)(1)(D), however, States would be powerless to alter the terms of the insurance relationship in ERISA plans; insurers could displace any state regulation simply by inserting a contrary term in plan documents. This interpretation would virtually “rea[d] the saving clause out of ERISA.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 741.
UNUM next vision, § 502(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a), preempts any action for plan benefits brought under state rules such as notice-prejudice. Whatever the merits of UNUM’s view of § 502(a)’s preemptive force, the issue is not implicated here. Ward sued under § 502(a)(1)(B) “to recover benefits due... under the terms of his plan.” The notice-prejudice rule supplied the relevant rule of decision for this § 502(a) suit. The case therefore does not raise the question whether § 502(a) provides the sole launching ground for an ERISA enforcement action.
Finally, we reject UNUM’s suggestion that the notice-prejudice rule conflicts with §503 of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1133, which requires plans to provide notice and the opportunity for review of denied claims, or with Department of Labor regulations providing that “[a] claim is filed when the requirements of a reasonable claim filing procedure... have been met,” 29 CFR §2560.503-1(d) (1998). By allowing a longer period to file than the minimum filing terms mandated by federal law, the notice-prejudice rule complements rather than contradicts ERISA and the regulations. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 9.
IV
Ward successfully maintained in the Ninth Circuit that MAG had timely notice of his disability and that his notice to MAG could be found to have served as notice to UNUM on the theory that MAC, as administrator of the group policy, acted as UNUM’s agent. The policy itself provides otherwise:
“For all purposes of this policy, the policyholder [MAC] acts on its own behalf or as agent of the employee. Under no circumstances will the policyholder be deemed the agent of the Company [UNUM] without a written authorization.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a.
California law rendered that policy provision ineffective, the Ninth Circuit appeared to conclude, because under the rule stated in Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 2d, at 512, 432 P. 2d, at 737, “the employer is the agent of the insurer in performing the duties of administering group insurance policies.” Thus, the Ninth Circuit instructed that, on remand, if UNUM was found to have suffered actual prejudice on account of Ward’s late notice of claim, the District Court should then determine whether the claim was timely under Elfstrom. 135 F. 3d, at 1289.
Ward does not argue in this Court as comprehended by the Ninth Circuit, is a law that “regulates insurance.” See Brief for Respondent 35 (the Ninth Circuit applied “general principles of agency law,” not a rule determining when “employers who administer insured plans are agents of the insurer as a matter of law”). Indeed, it is difficult to tell from the Court of Appeals opinion precisely what rule or principle that court derived from Elfstrom. See Brief for Respondent 35 (“[T]he court below did not actually apply the Elfstrom rule in this case.”); 135 F. 3d, at 1283, and n. 6 (endorsing the reasoning of Paulson v. Western Life Ins. Co, 292 Ore. 38, 636 P. 2d 935 (1981), an Oregon Supreme Court decision that purported to reconcile Elf-strom with an apparently conflicting body of case law). Whatever the contours of Elfstrom may be, the Ninth Circuit held that the state law emerging from that case does not “relatfe] to” an ERISA plan within the meaning of § 1144(a), and therefore escapes preemption. See 135 F. 3d, at 1287.
In this determination, the Ninth Circuit was The Court of Appeals stated, without elaboration, that Elf-strom does not dictate “the manner in which the plan will be administered,” and therefore is consistent with this Court’s ERISA preemption precedent. Ibid.; see New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 657-658 (1995) (identifying among laws that “relat[e] to” employee benefit plans those that “mandat[e] employee benefit structures or their administration”). The Ninth Circuit’s statement is not firmly grounded.
As persuasively urged by the United States in its amicus curiae brief, deeming the policyholder-employer the agent of the insurer would have a marked effect on plan administration. It would “fore[e] the employer, as plan administrator, to assume a role, with attendant legal duties and consequences, that it has not undertaken voluntarily”; it would affect “not merely the plan’s bookkeeping obligations regarding to whom benefits checks must be sent, but [would] also regulat[e] the basic services that a plan may or must provide to its participants and beneficiaries.” Brief 27. Satisfied that the Elfstrom rule “relate[s] to” ERISA plans, we reject the Ninth Circuit’s contrary determination.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Common-law rules developed by decisions of state courts are “State law” under ERISA. See 29 U. S. C. § 1144(c)(1) (“The term ‘State law' includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law.”).
State laws that purport to regulate insurance by “deemfingF a plan to be an insurance company are outside the saving clause and remain subject to preemption. See § 1144(b)(2)(B). Self-insured ERISA plans, therefore, are generally sheltered from state insurance regulation. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 747 (1985). Because this case does not involve a self-insured plan, this limitation on state regulatory authority is not at issue here.
UNUM cites a handful of California cases of this genre. They do not cast doubt on our disposition. In Conservatorship of Rand, 49 Cal. App. 4th 835, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 119 (4th Dist. 1996), the court found that a county court rule governing notice to a conservatee of potential liability for fees and coste did not comply with statutory notice requirements, but excused the defective notice because the conservatee had suffered no prejudice. See id., at 838-841, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 121-123. Rand was not a contract case at all; it concerned the consequences of a court’s violation of a state-created notice provision in the context of a judicial proceeding. Industrial Asphalt Inc. v. Garrett Corp., 180 Cal. App. 3d 1001, 226 Cal. Rptr. 17 (2d Dist. 1986), concerned the notice requirements imposed by California’s mechanics lien law and turned on principles of statutory rather than contract interpretation. See id., at 1005-1006, 226 Cal. Rptr., at 18-19. In Industrial Asphalt, moreover, the complaining party had received actual notice of the claim underlying the lien. Ibid. Neither ease suggests that California courts are generally unwilling or reluctant to enforce time conditions in private contracts as written.
The older decisions on which UNUM relies are no more instructive. The contract at issue in Ballard v. MacCallum, 15 Cal. 2d 439, 101 P. 2d 692 (1940) (en banc), contained contradictory clauses, some appearing to provide for forfeiture in the event of default, others appearing to contemplate an opportunity to cure. See id., at 442, 101 P. 2d, at 694. The court invoked a general presumption against forfeitures only to resolve the conflict. See id., at 444, 101 P. 2d, at 695. Finally, in Henck v. Lake Hemet Water Co., 9 Cal. 2d 136, 69 P. 2d 849 (1937) (en banc), a water supplier attempted to escape the terms of a long-term delivery contract on the ground that the water recipient had not timely made annual payment. The California Supreme Court rejected the supplier’s plea, observing that “in a proper case,” equity permits a court to excuse a lapse like the recipient’s in order to avoid forfeiture. See id., at 141, 142, 69 P. 2d, at 852. The Henck court carefully weighed the competing interests of the parties and relied in part on the water supplier’s fault in inducing the late payment. See id., at 144-145, 69 P. 2d, at 853; c£ Restatement (Second) of Contracts §229, Comment c, Reporter’s Note (1979) (courts are likely to excuse obligor’s failure strictly to adhere to a performance timetable where obligee has induced the failure).
These decisions support the uncontested propositions that the law disfavors forfeitures and that in case-specific circumstances California courts will excuse the breach of a time or notice provision in order to avoid an inequitable forfeiture. None of the decisions even remotely suggests that failures to comply with contractual notice periods are excused as a matter of law absent prejudice; none, therefore, suggests that the notice-prejudice rule is merely a routine application of a general antiforfeiture principle.
§229 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1979), and urges that the notice-prejudice rule fits within its compass. Section 229 provides that “[t]o the extent that the non-occurrence of a condition would cause disproportionate forfeiture,
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Again we are “asked to decide whether state taxes as applied to an interstate motor carrier run afoul of the commerce clause, Art. I, §8, of the Federal Constitution.” Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm’rs, 332 U. S. 495, 496 (1947). That statement of the question presented might equally well have introduced the Court’s opinion in either Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951), or Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977), which overruled Spector. In this case we review the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s judgment upholding the constitutionality of two Pennsylvania statutes which impose lump-sum annual taxes on the operation of trucks and truck tractors. Our task is by no means easy; the uneven course of decisions in this field reflects the difficulties of reconciling unrestricted access to the national market with each State’s authority to collect its fair share of revenues from interstate commercial activity.
Appellants claim that these Pennsylvania statutes violate the principle that no State may discriminate against interstate commerce by enacting a tax which provides a competitive advantage to local business. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the taxes, interpreting them as facially neutral and in accord with a line of our decisions in the pre-Spector era approving flat taxes imposed on interstate truckers for the privilege of using a State’s highway system. Before turning to the judgment of the State Supreme Court, we first describe the challenged taxes in some detail in the context of the State’s revenue-gathering system and explain why we find persuasive appellants’ claims of discrimination. Despite appellees’ defense of the revenue provisions as valid compensatory, user-fee, or flat taxes, the judgment of the State Supreme Court must be reversed.
I
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania spends large sums of money to improve and maintain its highways and bridges. Passenger and cargo vehicles travel billions of miles on these highways every year. Operators of large trucks and tractor trailers engaged in interstate commerce make particularly heavy use of the State’s highways. Their vehicles, which may be classified by the number of their axles or by their gross weight — ranging from less than 5,000 pounds for the smallest class to 79,001-80,000 pounds for the 25th class —not only transport cargo between Pennsylvania and out-of-state locations, but also use Pennsylvania’s highways extensively as corridors connecting the States of the Northeast, the Southeast, and the Midwest. Because of their weight and size, trucks using the State’s roads require the State to make higher road-related expenditures than would use of the roads by smaller vehicles alone. App. 30. The State’s hilly terrain and frequently severe weather conditions enhance the costs of highway maintenance. 510 Pa. 430, 433, 509 A. 2d 838, 840 (1986).
These expenditures are financed, in substantial part, by three types of levies on users of Pennsylvania’s highways: vehicle registration fees, fuel consumption taxes, and lump-sum annual fees which we will describe as “flat taxes.” Although the two taxes at issue in this litigation are both flat taxes — a $25 “marker fee” assessed from August 18, 1980, through March 31, 1983, and an “axle tax” imposed thereafter — registration fees and fuel taxes are principal sources of revenue for road-related purposes and therefore the mechanics of their collection provide necessary background for our analysis of the economic significance and constitutional validity of the challenged flat taxes.
Registration Fees
Owners of motor vehicles that are based in Pennsylvania must register them with the Department of Transportation and pay an annual registration fee. The weight of a truck or truck tractor determines the amount of the annual fee. Prior to 1980, there were 20 weight classifications, and the corresponding fees ranged from $39 to $606 per vehicle. App. 260. In 1980, the registration fees were increased and five new weight classes for heavier vehicles were added to the statutory schedule; from 1980 to 1982 the maximum registration fee was $1,125, for a vehicle weighing 79,001 to 80,000 pounds. Ibid. In 1982, the registration fees for vehicles weighing more than 26,000 pounds (classes 9-25) were reduced by multiples of $36 ranging up to a $180 reduction; thereafter, the máximum fee was $945. Ibid.
Pennsylvania, many other States, and Provinces of Canada participate in an apportioned registration scheme called the “International Registration Plan” (IRP). Participants in this plan share the registration fees for vehicles based in their States with other IRP States in which the vehicles travel. The percentage of each vehicle’s total registration fee that is allocated to each IRP State other than the State in which the vehicle is based is determined by dividing the total number of miles the vehicle traveled within the IRP State during the preceding year by its total mileage. The total fee payable to each State is the product of each State’s total fee for full registration of each vehicle and that State’s percentage share of the vehicle’s mileage. Thus, if 30% of the mileage of a Pennsylvania-based vehicle was accrued in other States, Pennsylvania’s share of the registration fee would be 70% of the full amount specified in its statutory schedule. On the other hand, if a vehicle based in another IRP State logged 40% of its mileage in Pennsylvania, its owner would be required to pay that portion of the Pennsylvania fee schedule to Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania collects no registration fees from motor carriers based in non-IRP States and, conversely, Pennsylvania-based vehicles pay no registration fees to non-IRP States.
In sum, the amount of each truck’s registration fee is determined by the weight of the vehicle and, if the truck travels in other IRP States, in part by its in-state mileage. No vehicle is required to pay more than one full registration fee.
Fuel Consumption Taxes
Pennsylvania collects a fuel consumption tax in two ways. It imposes a per-gallon fuel tax on fuel purchased within the State. The State also requires trucks that travel less than 90% of their miles in Pennsylvania to pay a tax based on their miles traveled in Pennsylvania, reduced by the amount of the tax actually paid through fuel purchased at Pennsylvania pumps. See Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 72, §§ 2611d, 2614.4, and 2617.1-2617.26 (Purdon 1964 and Supp. 1987). The amount of these taxes does not depend on the vehicle’s State of registration.
The Flat Taxes
Pennsylvania requires an identification marker issued by the Department of Revenue to be affixed to every motor carrier vehicle. A motor carrier vehicle is a “truck, truck tractor or combination having a gross weight or registered gross weight in excess of 17,000 pounds.” 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 102 (1984). Until 1980, the fee for the issuance of this marker was $2. In that year the fee was increased to $25, but vehicles registered in Pennsylvania were exempted from the fee. The statute effected this exemption by providing that for each vehicle registered in Pennsylvania the “marker fee shall be deemed a part of and included in the vehicle registration fee.” § 2102(b).
The parties have stipulated that the administrative costs associated with the issuance of the identification markers total approximately $5 per vehicle. App. 22. In 1982, when it enacted the axle tax, Pennsylvania reduced the annual marker fee from $25 to $5 per vehicle. § 2102(b). Since 1982, then, the marker fee is sufficient only to meet the specific cost of issuing the marker, but the effect of the $25 marker fee from 1980 to 1982 was to impose a flat tax on vehicles registered in other States. This tax was, at least nominally, not imposed on Pennsylvania-registered vehicles. It should be noted, however, that the same statute that increased the marker fee in 1980 to $25 for out-of-state vehicles weighing more than 17,000 pounds also increased Pennsylvania’s registration fees for such vehicles by amounts substantially larger than $25.
In 1982, Pennsylvania enacted its axle tax and, as noted, reduced the marker fee to $5 per vehicle. The axle tax applies to all trucks, truck tractors, and combinations weighing more than 26,000 pounds, whether registered in Pennsylvania or elsewhere; it requires an annual payment of $36 per vehicle axle. 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9902 (1984). For example, the tax is $72 for a two-axle vehicle and $180 for a five-axle vehicle. If a truck travels less than 2,000 miles in Pennsylvania, however, it is entitled to a rebate: the axle tax paid multiplied by the ratio of the amount by which the vehicle’s in-state mileage was short of 2,000 miles to 2,000 determines the rebate amount. § 9905. Moreover, the axle tax is excused when a trucker pays $25 for a trip permit for a period not exceeding five days. § 2102(d).
The same statute that enacted the axle tax in 1982 also reduced the registration fees for all weight classes of vehicles of more than 26,000 pounds. In classes 9-12, which generally include two-axle vehicles required to pay a $72 axle tax, the reduction amounted to $72; in classes 13-17, which usually include three-axle vehicles subject to a $108 axle tax, it amounted to $108; in classes 18, 19, and 20, usually four-axle vehicles subject to a $144 axle tax, it amounted to $144, and in the five heaviest classes — vehicle weights exceeding the permissible weight for four-axle vehicles — it amounted to $180. In brief, the amounts of the reductions in all classes were a multiple of the $36 per axle which is used as the measure for the axle tax. App. 260.
II
Appellants represent a class of interstate motor carriers whose vehicles are registered outside of Pennsylvania and who paid the $25 marker fee while it was in effect and who have thereafter been subject to the axle tax. They brought separate actions in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania challenging the constitutionality of the $25 marker fee and of the axle tax. In each case, appellants made two separate arguments based on the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution.
First, they argued that the entire economic burden of each tax fell on out-of-state vehicles because the 1980 statute “deemed” the marker fee for Pennsylvania vehicles to be a part of the registration fee, and the 1982 legislation granted Pennsylvania vehicles a reduction in registration fees that neatly offset the newly imposed axle tax. Second, they argued that even if owners of vehicles registered in Pennsylvania, through payment of registration fees, shared the burden of the two flat taxes with owners of vehicles based elsewhere, the taxes were nevertheless discriminatory because both taxes imposed a much heavier charge per mile of highway usage by out-of-state vehicles. On the average, the Pennsylvania-based vehicles subject to the flat taxes travel about five times as many miles on Pennsylvania roads as do the out-of-state vehicles; correspondingly, the cost per mile of each of the flat taxes is approximately five times as high for out-of-state vehicles as for local vehicles. Although out-of-state and instate vehicles subject to the axle tax traveled approximately the same number of miles on Pennsylvania’s highways, less than one-sixth of the State’s total axle tax revenues were generated by Pennsylvania-based vehicles in fiscal years 1982-1983 and 1983-1984.
In both the marker fee case and the axle tax case the Commonwealth Court accepted appellants’ first argument and did not consider the second. In the first case, the court reasoned:
“A state tax on interstate commerce does not offend the Commerce Clause... if that tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the state. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, m U. S. 274[, 279] (1977).... Section 2102(b) facially fails the third prong of the Complete Auto standard which prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce. Notwithstanding legislative legerdemain in the insertion of the obfuscating term ‘deemed,’ Pennsylvania-registered vehicles were exempted from, and foreign-registered vehicles were subject to, the marker decal fee. ‘The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.’ Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454, 455 (1940) (footnote omitted).” American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Bloom, 77 Pa. Commw. 575, 581, 466 A. 2d 755, 757 (1983).
The Commonwealth Court ordered a refund of marker fee payments made after April 1, 1982. Id., at 581-582, 466 A. 2d, at 758. Sitting en banc, the Commonwealth Court overruled defendants’ exceptions to the trial judge’s order. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Bloom, 87 Pa. Commw. 345, 487 A. 2d 468 (1985). The en banc court inferred from the legislature’s nonenactment of increased registration fees to keep pace with the marker levy imposed on vehicles based outside of Pennsylvania “a legislative intent to exempt Pennsylvania-registered motor carriers from payment of the $25.00 marker fee.” Id., at 350, 487 A. 2d, at 471.
Appellants in the case challenging the axle tax represent a class of all interstate motor carriers who own vehicles registered outside of Pennsylvania who are or will be subject to the tax, and a subclass consisting of such interstate motor carriers who are registered in any of the States or the Provinces of Canada that are not members of the IRP. Appellants contended that the axle tax, together with the simultaneous reduction in registration fees substantially offsetting the axle tax for Pennsylvania-registered vehicles, is facially discriminatory and in practice imposes the axle tax only on interstate motor carriers registered outside of Pennsylvania. Appellants also argued that the axle tax is an invalid flat tax wholly unrelated to the benefits received by interstate motor carriers. Sitting en banc, the Commonwealth Court declared that the axle tax violated the Commerce Clause and ordered a refund of axle tax payments made by affected class members after April 1, 1983. 87 Pa. Commw. 379, 487 A. 2d 465 (1985). The court found that operators of foreign-registered vehicles bore the “full brunt of the tax” and concluded that the axle tax therefore “constitutes economic protectionism and is facially invalid.” Id., at 383, 487 A. 2d, at 467.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered the two cases together and reversed. 510 Pa. 430, 509 A. 2d 838 (1986). The Court began its analysis by noting that the prohibition against discrimination was included in the four-part test stated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977), and that it was essential to focus on the “effect or economic consequences of the state tax upon interstate commerce.” 510 Pa., at 449, 509 A. 2d, at 848.
Pursuing this inquiry, the State Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that the full burden of both taxes was imposed on foreign-registered vehicles. With respect to the marker fee, the Court considered irrelevant the legislative history supporting a contrary inference, because the plain language of the statute “deemed” a portion of the registration fee to constitute payment of the marker fee for Pennsylvania vehicles. The Court thus found no discrimination in the operation of the marker fee because the statute “imposed a $25.00 marker fee on all motor carriers in the class represented by appellees and deemed a like amount of the simultaneous increase in Pennsylvania registration fees as the marker fee for Pennsylvania registered vehicles.” Id., at 453, 509 A. 2d, at 850. Moreover, even if the statute had not explicitly provided that Pennsylvania-registered vehicles are regarded as having paid a marker fee, the simultaneous increase in the registration fee when the $25 marker fee was enacted made it “apparent that the marker fee does not work any discrimination against interstate commerce in practical operation.” Ibid.
The court thus viewed the marker fee as a flat tax applied equally on all vehicles using the State’s highways. The court offered two reasons why this flat tax was not discriminatory despite its imposition of a greater cost per mile on non-Pennsylvania registered vehicles. First, relying on our opinions in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707 (1972), and Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609 (1981), the Court reasoned that a State may impose a tax for the privilege of using its highways “so long as the flat fee charged is not manifestly disproportionate to the services rendered.” 510 Pa., at 457, 509 A. 2d, at 852. Second, the Court found that interstate motor carriers could not protest that the burden of the flat fee fell too heavily upon them, for they “are free to use the Commonwealth’s highways as often and for whatever distances they wish.” Ibid.
In the axle tax case, the Court found that the tax was collected from Pennsylvania and non-Pennsylvania-registered vehicles alike and thus presented no question of discrimination “[o]n its face and in actual operation.” Id., at 459, 509 A. 2d, at 853. The Court acknowledged that a difficulty arose when it considered the tax together with the statutory reduction in 1982 of registration fees paid by Pennsylvania-based vehicles subject to the axle tax, but concluded that even though the reduction in registration fees offset the axle taxes for Pennsylvania-based vehicles, this reduction had to be viewed against the earlier increase in 1980 of registration fees. According to the State Supreme Court, the net effect of the restructuring of the tax system over the 2-year period was “to enact a compensatory tax to neutralize or partially offset an economic advantage previously enjoyed by interstate commerce to the disadvantage of local commerce that was caused by operation of that state’s taxing scheme.” Id., at 462, 509 A. 2d, at 855. Taking all provisions of the State’s highway user-fee system into account, the court reasoned that members of appellants’ class bore less of the tax burden than Pennsylvania-registered motor vehicles. Id., at 460-463, 509 A. 2d, at 854-855. The Court concluded that “in easing the burden on Pennsylvania registered vehicles, the Commonwealth has neither disadvantaged interstate commerce nor favored local commerce, and the axle tax does not, therefore, discriminate against interstate commerce.” Id., at 462, 509 A. 2d, at 855.
Ill
Although we have described our own decisions in this area as a “quagmire” of judicial responses to specific state tax measures, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450, 457-458 (1959), we have steadfastly adhered to the central tenet that the Commerce Clause “by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by the States.” Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318, 328 (1977). See also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 642 (1984). One primary consequence of this constitutional restriction on state taxing powers, frequently asserted in litigation, is that “a State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.” Ibid.; see also Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U. S. 388, 403 (1984). In its guarantee of a free trade area among States, however, the Commerce Clause has a deeper meaning that may be implicated even though state provisions, such as the ones reviewed here, do not allocate tax burdens between insiders and outsiders in a manner that is facially discriminatory.
The parties broadly state the constitutional question in this appeal as whether Pennsylvania’s flat taxes result in a blanket discrimination against interstate commerce. The operator of a Pennsylvania-based vehicle that engages in interstate commerce, however, has no apparent quarrel with the challenged flat taxes; he is “deemed” to pay the $25 marker fee through his registration fee, and the axle taxes he paid beginning in 1982 were generally offset by the statutory reduction in vehicle registration fees. But some operators of vehicles based in other States or Provinces have neither consolation, for they have paid registration fees to their own jurisdictions and still face Pennsylvania’s axle taxes. The precise issue is therefore more subtle: do the methods by which the flat taxes are assessed discriminate against some participants in interstate commerce in a way that contradicts the central purpose of the Commerce Clause? We find dispositive those of our precedents which make it clear that the Commerce Clause prohibits a State from imposing a heavier tax burden on out-of-state businesses that compete in an interstate market than it imposes on its own residents who also engage in commerce among States.
The way in which a tax levied on participants in interstate commerce is measured and assessed bears directly on whether it implicates central Commerce Clause values. The method of assessing the marker and axle taxes in this case on Pennsylvania-based vehicles and on other vehicles establishes that the State is not treating the two types of vehicles with an even hand. There are important and obvious differences of a constitutional magnitude between the State’s registration fees and fuel taxes, on the one hand, and its flat taxes, on the other.
The State’s vehicle registration fee has its counterpart in every other State and the District of Columbia. See 2 CCH State Tax Guide ¶¶ 50-200—50-940 (2d ed. 1986). It is a tax that readily satisfies the test of “internal consistency” that we have applied in other contexts. Under this test, even though the registration fee is assessed, as indeed it has been, by every jurisdiction, it causes no impermissible interference with free trade because every State respects the registration of every other State. Payment of one registration fee enables a carrier to operate a vehicle either locally or in the interstate market. Having paid one registration fee, a vehicle may pass among the States as freely as it may roam the State in which it is based; the Commerce Clause is not offended when state boundaries are economically irrelevant.
Yet even if more than one jurisdiction applies a charge to participants in interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause may be satisfied if the revenue measures maintain state boundaries as a neutral factor in economic decisionmaking. Pennsylvania’s fuel consumption taxes, for example, do not hinder the maintenance of a free trade area among States. The fuel consumption taxes are directly apportioned to the mileage traveled in Pennsylvania; they are therefore simply payments for traveling a certain distance that happens to be within Pennsylvania. When a vehicle uses other States’ roads, it may be subject to their fuel taxes, but the free trade area is unimpaired; if one sovereign controlled the entire free trade area, it would have the equivalent authority to impose a charge for the use of all of its roads.
The unapportioned flat taxes, however, penalize some travel within the free trade area. Whether the full brunt, or only a major portion, of their burden is imposed on the out-of-state carriers, their inevitable effect is to threaten the free movement of commerce by placing a financial barrier around the State of Pennsylvania. To pass the “internal consistency” test, a state tax must be of a kind that, “if applied by every jurisdiction, there would be no impermissible interference with free trade.” Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S., at 644. If each State imposed flat taxes for the privilege of making commercial entrances into its territory, there is no conceivable doubt that commerce among the States would be deterred.
Although the actual imposition of flat taxes by-other jurisdictions is not necessary to sustain the Commerce Clause challenge to Pennsylvania’s flat taxes under the “internal consistency” test, the adoption of these flat taxes by other jurisdictions even before the Pennsylvania suits were resolved surely suggests that acquiescence in these flat taxes would occasion manifold threats to the national free trade area. Since 1980 when Pennsylvania authorized the $25 marker fee, six other States have also adopted flat taxes and seven States have adopted retaliatory levies that are assessed on motor carrier vehicles that are based in Pennsylvania or another flat-tax State. Such taxes can obviously divide and disrupt the market for interstate transportation services. In practical effect, since they impose a cost per mile on appellants’ trucks that is approximately five times as heavy as the cost per mile borne by local trucks, the taxes are plainly discriminatory. Under our consistent course of decisions in recent years a state tax that favors in-state business over out-of-state business for no other reason than the location of its business is prohibited by the Commerce Clause. Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, ante, p. 232; Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263 (1984); Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638 (1984); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U. S. 388 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725 (1981); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318 (1977). Nor is the axle tax saved because some out-of-state carriers which accrue high mileage in Pennsylvania pay the axle tax at a lower per-mile rate than some Pennsylvania-based carriers; it makes no difference that the axle tax, on its face, does not exact a lower per-mile charge from Pennsylvania-based carriers than from out-of-state carriers. Like the exemption from wholesaling tax for goods manufactured in Washington that we struck down in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc., the axle tax has a forbidden impact on interstate commerce because it exerts an inexorable hydraulic pressure on interstate businesses to ply their trade within the State that enacted the measure rather than “among the several States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
IV
Notwithstanding our recent precedents invalidating various state taxation measures that failed the “internal consistency” test, Pennsylvania advances three arguments in defense of its flat taxes. They are said to reflect a reasonable charge for the privilege of using its roads when considered alongside the high price that Pennsylvania-based trucks pay in registration fees. Appellees also argue that the flat taxes are no different from the flat user fees this Court has recently upheld. Finally, talismanically invoking decisions in which we upheld flat taxes for the privilege of doing business within a State, appellees contend that a mere disparity in per-mile costs between interstate and intrastate truckers provides no basis upon which to strike down a tax. We are persuaded, however, that none of the cases relied upon by appellees controls our disposition.
The “Rational Restructuring” Defense
Appellees expressly acknowledge that the axle tax cannot be defended as a compensatory tax that equalizes previously unequal tax burdens by offsetting “a specific tax imposed only on intrastate commerce for a substantially equivalent event.” Brief for Appellees 18. See Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, ante, at 242-244; Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S., at 642-643; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 584 (1937). Instead, they argue that the axle tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce because “it is but a small part of Pennsylvania’s multi-tiered scheme of taxes and fees designed to finance an extensive highway system.” Brief for Appellees 17. Appellees contend that domestic trucks pay a higher price to use Pennsylvania’s highways than those registered in other States, and specifically, that the totality of the tax and fee changes since 1980 has resulted in higher relative taxes on trucks registered in Pennsylvania. The registration fee reductions in 1982 only partially offset these increases. We find this argument unavailing.
Appellees’ reasoning is based on the erroneous premise that relief for Pennsylvania-based trucks is constitutionally permissible because they are subject to a higher financial burden for their use of Pennsylvania’s roads than trucks based in other States must pay for use of the same roads. This premise is flawed for three reasons. Pennsylvania-based trucks are allowed to travel throughout the United States without paying more than one registration fee; the registration fees they pay are not solely for the use of Pennsylvania’s highways. In addition, while it is true that registration fees are lower in some States, they are also higher in some other States. See, e. g., App. 178. Most importantly, even if the relative amounts of the States’ registration fees confer a competitive advantage on trucks based in other States, the Commerce Clause does not permit compensatory measures for the disparities that result from each State’s choice of tax levels. To the extent that a competitive disadvantage is conferred on Pennsylvania carriers by the relative amounts of the States’ registration fees, the remedy lies in a change in their level, the enlargement of participation in the IRP, or the collection of revenues through valid taxes. The axle tax cannot be vindicated as a “rational restructuring of burdens” simply because it arguably benefits a class of truckers that pays more to use the State’s highways than does another class of highway users. As one commentator has observed, “[implementation of a rule of law that a tax is nondiscriminatory because other taxes of at least the same magnitude are imposed by the taxing State on other taxpayers engaging in different transactions would plunge the Court into the morass of weighing comparative tax burdens.” J. Hellerstein, 1 State Taxation: Corporate Income and Franchise Taxes ¶ 4.12[5], p. 150 (1983). The flat taxes must stand or fall on their own.
The User-Fee Defense
Taken on their own, the marker fee and axle tax are wholly unlike the user fees we upheld in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707 (1972), a case relied upon by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Evansville-Vanderburgh involved the question whether a municipal airport authority could collect a flat service fee of $1 for each passenger boarding a commercial aircraft operating from the airport. After reviewing our decisions concerning highway tolls, as well as the cases holding that a State may impose a flat fee for the privilege of using its roads without regard to the actual use by particular vehicles, so long as the fee is not excessive, we stated:
“At least so long as the toll is based on some fair approximation of use or privilege for use, as was that before us in Capitol Greyhound [Lines v. Brice, 339 U. S. 542 (1950)], and is neither discriminatory against interstate commerce nor excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit conferred, it will pass constitutional muster, even though some other formula might reflect more exactly the relative use of the state facilities by individual users.” Id., at 716-717.
We then explained why the $1 fee satisfied the two essential conditions that it be neither discriminatory nor excessive:
“The Indiana and New Hampshire charges meet those standards. First, neither fee discriminates against interstate commerce and travel. While the vast majority of passengers who board flights at the airports involved are traveling interstate, both interstate and intrastate flights are subject to the same charges. Furthermore, there is no showing of any inherent difference between these two classes of flights, such that the application of the same fee to both would amount to discrimination against one or the other. See Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946).
“Second, these charges reflect a fair, if imperfect, approximation of the use of facilities for whose benefit they are imposed.” Id., at 717.
Pennsylvania’s flat taxes satisfy neither of these conditions: They discriminate against out-of-state vehicles by subjecting them to a much higher charge per mile traveled in the State, and they do not even purport to approximate fairly the cost or value of the use of Pennsylvania’s roads.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also relied on Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609 (1981). The State of Montana imposed a severance tax on coal at the same rate whether the final destination of the coal was local or interstate. We rejected the taxpayer’s discrimination claim, which was premised on the fact that 90% of Montana coal was shipped to other States under contracts that shifted the tax burden principally to utility companies outside of Montana and that therefore imposed the bulk of the tax burden on out-of-state consumers of Montana coal. We held that “there is no real discrimination in this case; the tax burden is borne according to the amount of coal consumed and not according to any distinction between in-state and out-of-state consumers.” Id., at 619. Because the tax was a percentage of the value of the contract, and because only Montana could impose the tax, every holder of an equivalently valued contract paid the same tax; whether the shipment crossed a state border was irrelevant to the magnitude of the tax burden imposed by Montana. The flat taxes in this case are distinguishable in two ways. First, the amount of Pennsylvania’s marker and axle taxes owed by a trucker does not vary directly with miles traveled or with some other proxy for value obtained from the State. “[W]hen the measure of a tax bears no relationship to the taxpayers’ presence or activities in a State, a court may properly conclude under the fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test that the State is imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce.” Id., at 629. As Justice Frankfurter argued in his dissent in Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U. S. 542, 557 (1950):
“So long as a State bases its tax on a relevant measure of actual road use, obviously both interstate and intrastate carriers pay according to the facilities in fact provided by the State. But a tax levied for the privilege of using roads, and not their actual use, may, in the normal course of operations and not as a fanciful hypothesis, involve an undue burden on interstate carriers. While the privilege extended by a State is unlimited in form, and thus theoretically the same for all vehicles, whether interstate or intrastate, the intrastate vehicle can and will exercise the privilege whenever it is in operation, while the interstate vehicle must necessarily forego the privilege some of the time simply because of its interstate character, i. e., because it operates in other States as well. In the general average of instances, the privilege is not as valuable to the interstate as to the intrastate carrier.”
Second, unlike the Montana coal tax, highway use taxes can be imposed by other States.
“And because it operates in other States there is danger — and not a fanciful danger — that the interstate carrier will be subject to the privilege taxes of several States, even though his entire use of the highways is not significantly greater than that of intrastate operators who are subject to only one privilege tax.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).
Justice Frankfurter thus illuminated the reason that a State’s imposition of an unapportioned flat tax, unlike the neutral user fee in Evansville-Vanderburgh and the neutral severance
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thomas M. Thompson was convicted in California state court of the rape and murder of Ginger Fleisehli. More than 15 years after the crime, 13 years after Thompson’s conviction, and 7 years after Thompson filed his first petition for federal habeas relief, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate denying the writ of habeas corpus. Two days before Thompson’s scheduled execution, however, the Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, recalled the mandate and granted habeas relief to Thompson. The case presents two issues: First, whether the Court of Appeals’ order recalling its mandate violated 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b) (1994 ed., Supp. II), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. 104-132, §104, 110 Stat. 1218; and second, whether the order was an abuse of the court’s discretion. The recall of the mandate was not controlled by thé precise terms of AEDPA, but this does not save the order, which, we hold, was a grave abuse of discretion.
I
A
Thompson met his 20-year-old victim, Ginger Fleischli, in the summer of 1981. Fleischli shared a Laguna Beach studio apartment with David Leiteh, with whom she had an intermittent sexual relationship. In August of that year, Fleischli moved out and Thompson moved in. Fleischli took up residence with Tracy Leiteh, the former wife of David Leiteh.
On September 11, 1981, at about 7:80 p.m., Fleischli and Tracy Leiteh encountered Thompson and David Leiteh at a pizza parlor. Fleischli told Tracy Leiteh she was afraid Thompson might kill her if she were left alone with him. The group later went to a bar together, but David and Tracy Leiteh soon departed. At 9:30 p.m., Afshin Kashani joined Thompson and Fleischli, drinking with both of them and smoking hashish with Thompson. The trio went to a second bar before walking to Thompson’s apartment around 1 a.m. At about 2 a.m., after Fleischli had gone to a nearby liquor store to buy soda, Thompson told Kashani he wanted to have sexual intercourse with Fleischli that night. He assured Kashani, however, that Kashani could “have” Fleischli after Thompson and David Leiteh left for Thailand to smuggle refugees and drugs back to the United States. App. 7.
Before Fleischli returned to the apartment, Kashani began walking to his truck, which seems to have been left at a local bar. On the way, Kashani realized he had forgotten his cigarettes. He returned to the apartment, where Thompson met him at the door. Thompson appeared nervous and made Kashani wait outside while Thompson retrieved the cigarettes. After returning to his truck, Kashani looked for Fleischli at a nearby liquor store and, not finding her, went home.
Tracy Leiteh visited Thompson’s apartment the morning of September 12, asking where Fleischli was. Lying, Thompson said she had left the Sandpiper Inn with Kashani the night before. At a party that evening,- Tracy Leiteh again asked Thompson where Fleischli was. In response, Thompson described Fleischli in the past tense, saying he had liked her. The next day, Tracy Leiteh filed a missing person’s report with the local police department.
On September 14, police found Fleischli’s body buried in a field 10 miles from the apartment shared by Thompson and David Leiteh. The body was wrapped in rope as well as a sleeping bag and blanket, both taken from the apartment. Fleischli’s head was wrapped with duet tape, two towels, a sheet, and her jacket. She had been stabbed five times in the head near the right ear. The body was bruised on the ankles, palms, and left wrist; the right wrist was crushed. Fleischli’s shirt and bra had been cut down the middle and pulled to her elbows, restraining her arms and exposing her breasts. She had on unbuttoned jeans, but no underwear, shoes, or socks. A vaginal swab revealed semen consistent with Thompson’s blood type.
Police found two footprints near the body, one smooth and one with a wavy pattern matching a shoe worn by David Leiteh. Fibers from the blanket around the body were identical to fibers found in the trunk of David Leiteh’s car. The rope around the body was smeared with paint from the ear’s trunk. Other fibers matched the carpet in the apartment, which was stained with Fleischli’s blood.
On or around the day police found the body, Thompson and David Leiteh went to Mexico. Leiteh returned to the United States, but Mexican authorities arrested Thompson on September 26,1981. He had handcuffs with him. When questioned by police after his return to the United States, Thompson claimed Fleischli had left his apartment with Ka-shani the night of the murder. He also said Fleischli had been stabbed in the head, though this information had not yet been made public. He further claimed not to have had sex with Fleischli, but later asserted they had engaged in consensual sex.
We next recount the lengthy procedural history of the case.
B
On November 4, 1983, an Orange County Superior Court jury convicted Thompson of the first-degree murder and forcible rape of Fleischli. The jury made a special finding that “the homicide of Ginger Lorraine Fleischli was an intentional killing personally committed by the defendant Thomas Martin Thompson.” 45 Cal. 3d 86, 117, n. 23, 753 P. 2d 37, 56, n. 23 (1988). The jury further found the special circumstance of murder during the commission of rape, making Thompson eligible for the death penalty. After penalty phase proceedings the jury was unanimous in recommending a capital sentence, which the trial judge imposed. In a later trial, a different jury found David Leitch guilty of second-degree murder for his role in Fleischli’s slaying.
On April 28, 1988, the California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Thompson’s rape and murder convictions and the jury’s finding of the rape special circumstance. The court also affirmed Thompson’s death sentence, with two of seven justices dissenting. The dissenters concurred in the affirmance of the murder and rape convictions and the rape special circumstance, but asserted the jury’s sentencing recommendation had been influenced in an improper manner by evidence that Thompson had solicited the murder of David Leitch. Id., at 144-145, 753 P. 2d, at 74-75. Thompson petitioned for rehearing, which the court denied in June 1988. Thompson also filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, which we denied. 488 U. S. 960 (1988).
Thompson filed his first state habeas petition, which the California Supreme Court denied in March 1989. Thompson filed a federal habeas petition in January 1990. The District Court held Thompson’s petition in abeyance while Thompson pursued unexhausted claims in state court. In January 1991, the California Supreme Court denied Thompson’s second state habeas petition. In February 1993, the California Supreme Court denied Thompson’s third state habeas petition.
In November 1993, the United States District Court for the Central District of California held an evidentiary hearing on the claims raised in Thompson’s federal habeas petition. In an order dated March 28,1995, the District Court granted habeas relief as to the rape conviction and rape special circumstance and denied relief as to the murder conviction. In the District Court’s view, Thompson’s trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel as to the rape charge. The District Court cited two failings by the attorney. First, the court held, counsel failed to contest certain of the conclusions offered by the State’s forensic expert at trial. Second, the court determined, counsel should have impeached the credibility of two jailhouse informants to a greater extent than he did. In the District Court’s view, these failings prejudiced Thompson under the rule of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). Having granted relief as to the rape special circumstance, the District Court ruled Thompson’s death sentence was invalid. As to the murder conviction, the District Court rejected Thompson’s claim he had been prejudiced by what Thompson alleged were inconsistencies between the prosecution’s theories at his trial and the later trial of David Leitch. Having read the transcripts of both trials, the court found “the trials differed mainly in emphasis.” App. 71.
The timing of later federal proceedings is critical to the issues we now resolve. On June 19, 1996, a unanimous three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s grant of habeas relief as to the rape conviction and rape special circumstance, affirmed the denial of habeas relief as to the murder conviction, and reinstated Thompson’s death sentence. Noting that “[t]he State presented strong evidence of rape” at Thompson’s trial, 109 F. 3d 1358, 1365 (CA9 1997), the court held that, irrespective of whether the performance of Thompson’s counsel was deficient in the manner Thompson alleged, Thompson could not demonstrate prejudice under Strickland.
On August 5,1996, Thompson filed a petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en bane, which circulated to “each active judge” of the court. See U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit General Orders 5.4(a)(1), p. 30 (Aug. 1997). In an order dated March 6, 1997, the original panel denied the petition and rejected the suggestion, observing that “[t]he full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc and no judge in active service has requested a vote to rehear the matter en banc.” App. 137. In the same order, the panel reissued its opinion in the case with minor changes. Thompson filed a petition for certio-rari with this Court, which we denied on June 2,1997. 520 U. S. 1259. The Court of Appeals issued its mandate denying all habeas relief in Thompson’s ease on June 11, 1997. In response, the State of California scheduled Thompson’s execution for August 5,1997.
Thompson filed a fourth state habeas petition on July 3, 1997. In it, he alleged David Leiteh had stated in a parole hearing that he had witnessed Thompson and Fleischli engaged in what appeared to be consensual intercourse on the night of Fleisehli’s murder. The California Supreme Court denied the petition on July 16,1997.
On July 22,1997, Thompson filed a motion with the Court of Appeals to recall its mandate denying habeas relief. The following day, Thompson filed a motion in United States District Court for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). In support of both motions, Thompson cited Leiteh’s alleged statement that he had seen Thompson and Fleischli engaged in consensual sex.
The District Court denied Thompson’s Rule 60(b) motion on July 25, 1997. The court construed the motion to be a successive petition under 28 U. S. C. §2244 as amended by AEDPA, ruling that Thompson “must not be permitted to utilize a Rule 60(b) motion to make an end-run around the requirements” of AEDPA. App. 170. The court observed that the alleged new statement by Leitch conflicted with Thompson’s own account of the specifics of his encounter with Fleisehli, the physical evidence in the ease, and the previous stories told by Leitch himself. Thus, the court held, Thompson “certainly cannot make the requisite showing that he is actually innocent such that his execution would be a miscarriage of justice.” Id., at 188.
The Court of Appeals denied Thompson’s motion to recall the mandate on July 28,1997. Two days later, however, the full court voted to consider en banc whether to recall its earlier mandate “to consider whether the panel decision of our court would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” 120 F. 3d 1042, 1043. The court scheduled oral argument on this question for August 1, 1997, four days before Thompson’s scheduled execution.
Meanwhile, on July 29, 1997, the Governor of California held a hearing on whether to grant clemency to Thompson. In addition to the arguments presented by Thompson’s attorneys during the hearing, the Governor reviewed “the materials submitted on [Thompson’s] behalf, the petition and letters signed by supporters of clemency, the submissions of the Orange County District Attorney, the letters of the trial judge concerning clemency,” all the court opinions in Thompson’s ease, and “the materials and recommendation provided to [him] by the Board of Prison Terms.” App. to Brief for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae A-2 to A-3 (Decision of Governor Pete Wilson). In a comprehensive decision dated July 31, 1997, the Governor found Thompson “ha[d] not remotely approached making any” showing of innocence of rape or murder. Id., at A-16. The Governor agreed with the view of the judge who presided over Thompson’s trial, that “it would be an absolute tragedy and a travesty of justice to even seriously consider clemency in this case.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). Clemency was denied.
Two days before Thompson was to be executed, a divided en banc panel of the Court of Appeals recalled the court’s mandate of June 11, 1997. This action came 53 days after the mandate had issued and almost a full year after Thompson had filed his suggestion for rehearing en banc. The Court of Appeals asserted it did not recall the mandate on the basis of Thompson’s later motion for recall, but did so sua sponte, on the basis of the claims and evidence presented in Thompson’s first federal habeas petition. Thus, the court said, its “recall of the mandate is not predicated on any new evidence or claims Thompson raises in his motion to recall the mandate.” 120 F. 3d 1045, 1049, n. 3. The court stated it had considered whether to recall the mandate sooner, but had chosen to wait until the conclusion of Thompson’s state-court proceedings before taking action.
The court presented two bases for recalling its earlier mandate. First, the court asserted that, absent certain “procedural misunderstandings within [the] court,” it would have called for en banc review of the underlying decision before issuing the mandate denying relief. Id., at 1047. These procedural misunderstandings included a mishandled law clerk transition in one judge’s chambers and the failure of another judge to notice that the original panel had issued its opinion in the case. Id., at 1067 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Second, the en banc court asserted the decision of the original panel “would lead to a miscarriage of justice.” Id., at 1048.
Having recalled the mandate in Thompson’s case, the en banc court went on to address the merits of his first federal habeas petition. The court held that Thompson’s trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance as to the rape charge and rape special circumstance, to the defendant’s prejudice. A plurality of the court would have granted habeas relief on the additional ground of inconsistent theories by the prosecution at his trial and the later trial of David Leitch. The majority made no effort to determine whether Thompson was actually innocent of the rape and murder of Fleisehli. The court nonetheless affirmed the District Court’s grant of the writ as to the rape conviction and rape special circumstance, vacated Thompson’s death sentence, and further “remanded] the question of the murder conviction for [the District Court’s] initial consideration in light of our vacatur of the rape conviction.” Id., at 1060. Thus, almost 16 years after Fleischli’s murder, the Ninth Circuit directed the District Court to “enter the partial writ unless the State elects to retry Thompson within a reasonable time.” Ibid.
Four judges dissented. Judge Hall argued the majority’s decision allowed Thompson to evade AEDPA’s restrictions on successive petitions. Id., at 1064-1066. Judge Kozinski detailed the circumstances which led'the majority to find its en banc process had malfunctioned. He asserted that, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the court’s en banc process “operated just as it’s supposed to.” Id., at 1067. In a third dissenting opinion, Judge Kleinfeld recited in detail the evidence of Thompson’s guilt of rape. Id., at 1073.
Within hours of the Court of Appeals’ order recalling its mandate, the State of California filed with this Court a second petition for a writ of mandamus, which we construed as a petition for certiorari. We granted the petition, 521 U. S. 1136 (1997), and now reverse.
II
Although some Justices have expressed doubt on the point, see, e. g., United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U. S. 98, 102-103 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting), the courts of appeals are recognized to have an inherent power to recall their mandates, subject to review for an abuse of discretion. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 463 U. S. 1323, 1324 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); see also Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U. S. 238, 249-250 (1944). In light of “the profound interests in repose” attaching to the mandate of a court of appeals, however, the power can be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances. 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3938, p. 712 (2d ed. 1996). The sparing use of the power demonstrates it is one of last resort, to be held in reserve against grave, unforeseen contingencies.
The en banc majority asserted extraordinary circumstances justified its order recalling the mandate in Thompson’s ease because, “[b]ut for procedural misunderstandings by some judges of this court, an en bane call would have been made and voted upon at the ordinary time.” 120 F. 3d, at 1048. As noted earlier, the original panel issued its decision denying habeas relief on June 19, 1996, and Thompson filed a petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en bane on August 5,1996. On January 17,1997, the panel notified the full court of its intention to reject the suggestion. Id., at 1067 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The panel reissued its earlier opinion with minor revisions on March 6, 1997. In the March 6 order, the panel also denied Thompson’s petition for rehearing and rejected his suggestion for rehearing en banc. The panel observed that, although the full court had been advised of Thompson’s suggestion, no judge in active service had requested a vote to rehear the case en banc within the time specified in the General Orders of the Ninth Circuit. App. 137.
It appears from Judge Kozinski’s opinion that the following events also transpired. On March 12, 1997, an off-panel judge wrote to the panel, requesting an opportunity to make a belated call for a vote to rehear the ease en bane. The judge stated that the panel’s decision had been “circulated shortly before a law clerk transition” in the judge’s chambers, and that “the old and new law clerks assigned to the case failed to communicate.” 120 F. 3d, at 1067 (dissenting opinion). Another judge seconded the request and asked: "Was [the panel’s January 17, 1997, notice of intention to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc] circulated? Did I miss it?” Ibid. The author of the panel opinion denied the request for a belated en banc call, explaining that the requesting judges had been notified two months earlier of the panel’s intention to reject Thompson’s suggestion, id., at 1067-1068, which itself had circulated to every active judge of the court on August 5,1996.
The panel stayed the issuance of its mandate pending Thompson’s petition to this Court for certiorari review. We denied Thompson’s petition on June 2, 1997. 520 U. S. 1259. The Court of Appeals issued its mandate on June 11, 1997. According to the en banc majority, “[a] sua sponte request to consider en banc whether to recall the mandate was made shortly thereafter, even before the mandate was spread in the district court.” 120 F. 3d, at 1049. “[I]n the interests of comity,” however, the court delayed further action until the California Supreme Court had denied Thompson’s fourth state petition for habeas relief. Ibid. It was not until August 3, 1997 — two days before Thompson was scheduled to be executed — that the Ninth Circuit voted to recall its mandate.
Measured even by standards of general application, the Court of Appeals’ decision to recall the mandate rests on the most doubtful of grounds. A mishandled law clerk transition in one judge’s chambers, and the failure of another judge to notice the action proposed by the original panel, constitute the slightest of bases for setting aside the “deep rooted policy in favor of the repose of judgments.” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., supra, at 244. This is especially true where the only consequence of the oversights was the failure of two judges to contribute their views to a determination that had been given full consideration on the merits by a panel of the court.
Even if the Ninth Circuit’s en banc process did somehow malfunction — which is itself open to question, see 120 F. 3d, at 1067 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“[T]he process operated just as it’s supposed to”) — the court only compounded its error when it delayed further action for more than four months after the alleged misunderstandings took place. The promptness with which a court acts to correct its mistakes is evidence of the adequacy of its grounds for reopening the ease. In this case, the two judges first revealed their oversights to the full court in March 1997. At that point the two judges remained free to “request that the [full] court vote to suspend” its time limits for voting to rehear the ease en banc. See Ninth Circuit General Orders 11.11, at 83. They chose not to do so, instead waiting another four months to make what was, in effect, an identical request. The Court of Appeals for all practical purposes lay in wait while this Court acted on the petition for certiorari, the State scheduled a firm execution date for Thompson, and the Governor conducted an exhaustive clemency review. Then, only two days before Thompson was scheduled to be executed, the court came forward to recall the judgment on which the State, not to mention this Court, had placed heavy reliance.
It is no answer for the Court of Appeals to assert it delayed action in the interests of comity. Comity is not limited to the judicial branch of a state government. In this case, the executive branch of California’s government took extensive action in reliance on the mandate denying relief to Thompson. Rather than focus only on the California Supreme Court’s interest in considering Thompson’s fourth (and, as could be predicted, meritless) state habeas petition, the Court of Appeals should have considered as well the more vital interests of California’s executive branch.
It would be the rarest of cases where the negligence of two judges in expressing their views is sufficient grounds to frustrate the interests of a State of some 32 million persons in enforcing a final judgment in its favor. Even if this were a ease implicating no more than ordinary concerns of finality, we would have grave doubts about the actions taken by the Court of Appeals.
Ill
Thompson’s is not an ordinary ease, however, because he seeks relief from a criminal judgment entered in state court. To decide whether the Court of Appeals’ order recalling the mandate was proper in these circumstances, we measure it not only against standards of general application, but also against the statutory and jurisprudential limits applicable in habeas corpus eases.
A
California argues the Court of Appeals’ recall of its mandate was barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b) (1994 ed., Supp. II) as amended by AEDPA. Section 2244(b)(1) provides: “A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.” Subsection 2244(b)(2) provides: “A claim presented in a second or successive application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed” unless a narrow exception applies. The immediate question is whether the Court of Appeals recalled its mandate on the basis of a “second or successive application” for habeas relief.
In a §2254 case, a prisoner’s motion to recall the mandate on the basis of the merits of the underlying decision can be regarded as a second or successive application for purposes of § 2244(b). Otherwise, petitioners could evade the bar against relitigation of claims presented in a prior application, § 2244(b)(1), or the bar against litigation of claims not presented in a prior application, § 2244(b)(2). If the court grants such a motion, its action is subject to AEDPA irrespective of whether the motion is based on old claims (in which ease § 2244(b)(1) would apply) or new ones (in which case § 2244(b)(2) would apply).
As a textual matter, § 2244(b) applies only where the court acts pursuant to a prisoner’s “application.” This carries implications for cases where a motion to recall the mandate is pending, but the court instead recalls the mandate on its own initiative. Whether these cases are subject to § 2244(b) depends on the underlying basis of the court’s action. If, in recalling the mandate, the court considers new claims or evidence presented in a successive application for habeas relief, it is proper to regard the court’s action as based on that application. In these eases, § 2244(b)(2) applies irrespective of whether the court characterizes the action as sua sponte.
In Thompson’s ease, however, the Court of Appeals was specific in reciting that it acted on the exclusive basis of Thompson’s first federal habeas petition. The court’s characterization of its action as sua sponte does not, of course, prove this point; had the court considered claims or evidence presented in Thompson’s later filings, its action would have been based on a successive application, and so would be subject to § 2244(b). But in Thompson’s case the court’s recitation that it acted on the exclusive basis of his first federal petition is not disproved by consideration of matters presented in a later filing. Thus we deem the court to have acted on his first application rather than a successive one. As a result, the court’s order recalling its mandate did not contravene the letter of AEDPA.
Although the terms of AEDPA do not govern this case, a court of appeals must exercise its discretion in a manner consistent with the objects of the statute. In a habeas case, moreover, the court must be guided by the general principles underlying our habeas corpus jurisprudence. We now consider those principles as applied to this ease.
B
In light of “the profound societal costs that attend the exercise of habeas jurisdiction,” Smith v. Murray, 477 U. S. 527, 539 (1986), we have found it necessary to impose significant limits on the discretion of federal courts to grant habeas relief. See, e. g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 487 (1991) (limiting “a district court’s discretion to entertain abusive petitions”); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (limiting courts’ discretion to entertain proeedurally defaulted claims); Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 308-310 (1989) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.) (limiting courts’ discretion to give retroactive application to “new rules” in habeas cases); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 637-638 (1993) (limiting courts’ discretion to grant habeas relief on the basis of “trial error”).
These limits reflect our enduring respect for “the State’s interest in the finality of convictions that have survived direct review within the state court system.” Id., at 635; accord, Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U. S. 1, 8 (1995) (per cu-riam); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333, 338 (1992); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1, 7 (1992); McCleskey, supra, at 491-492; Teague, supra, at 309; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 487 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 127 (1982). Finality is essential to both the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal law. “Neither innocence nor just punishment can be vindicated until the final judgment is known.” McCleskey, supra, at 491. “Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.” Teague, supra, at 309.
Finality also enhances the quality of judging. There is perhaps “nothing more subversive of a judge’s sense of responsibility, of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the difficult and subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of the notion that all the shots will always be called by someone else.” Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 451 (1963).
Finality serves as well to preserve the federal balance. Federal habeas review of state convictions frustrates “ ‘both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.’ ” Murray v. Carrier, supra, at 487 (quoting Engle, supra, at 128). “Our federal system recognizes the independent power of a State to articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the power of a State to pass laws means little if the State cannot enforce them.” McCleskey, 499 U. S., at 491.
A State’s interests in finality are compelling when a federal court of appeals issues a mandate denying federal ha-beas relief. At that point, having in all likelihood borne for years “the significant costs of federal habeas review,” id., at 490-491, the State is entitled to the assurance of finality. When lengthy federal proceedings have rim their course and a mandate denying relief has issued, finality acquires an added moral dimension. Only with an assurance of real finality can the State execute its moral judgment in a ease. Only with real finality can the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral judgment will be carried out. See generally Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991). To unsettle these expectations is to inflict a profound injury to the “powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the guilty,” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 421 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring), an interest shared by the State and the victims of crime alike.
This case well illustrates the extraordinary costs associated with a federal court of appeals’ recall of its mandate denying federal habeas relief. By July 31,1997, to vindicate the laws enacted by the legislature of the State of California, a jury had convicted Thompson of rape and murder and recommended that he be executed; the trial judge had imposed a sentence of death; the California Supreme Court had affirmed Thompson’s sentence and on four occasions refused to disturb it on collateral attack; and, in a comprehensive and public decision, the Governor had determined the sentence was just. Relying upon the mandate denying habeas relief to Thompson, the State of California had invoked its entire legal and moral authority in support of executing its judgment. Yet, after almost 13 years of state and federal review of Thompson’s conviction and sentence, almost one year after Thompson filed his petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en bane, a full 53 days after issuance of the mandate denying relief, and a mere two days before Thompson was scheduled to be executed, the Ninth Circuit recalled its mandate and granted the writ of habeas corpus. The costs imposed by these actions are as severe as any that can be imposed in federal habeas review.
We should be clear about the circumstances we address in this case. We deal not with the recall of a mandate to correct mere clerical- errors in the judgment itself, similar to those described in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a). The State can have little interest, based on reliance or other grounds, in preserving a mandate not in accordance with the actual decision rendered by the court. This also is not a case of fraud upon the court, calling into question the very legitimacy of the judgment. See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U. S. 238 (1944). Nor is this a ease where the mandate is stayed under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41 pending the court’s disposition of a suggestion for rehearing en banc.
Rather, we are concerned with cases where, as here, a court of appeals recalls its mandate to revisit the merits of its earlier decision denying habeas relief. In these cases, the State’s interests in finality are all but paramount, without regal’d to whether the court of appeals predicates the recall on a procedural misunderstanding or some other irregularity occurring prior to its decision. The prisoner has already had extensive review of his claims in federal and state courts. In the absence of a strong showing of “actua[l] innoeen[ee],” Murray v. Carrier, supra, at 496, the State’s interests in actual finality outweigh the prisoner’s interest in obtaining yet another opportunity for review.
Based on these considerations, we hold the general rule to be that, where a federal court of appeals sua sponte recalls its mandate to revisit the merits of an earlier decision denying habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner, the court abuses its discretion unless it acts to avoid a miscarriage of justice as defined by our habeas corpus jurisprudence. The rule accommodates the need to allow courts to remedy actual injustice while recognizing that, at some point, the State must be allowed to exercise its “'sovereign power to punish
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether School Board members, vested by state law with the power to employ and dismiss teachers, could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, dismiss teachers engaged in a strike prohibited by state law.
I
The petitioners are a Wisconsin school district, the seven members of its School Board, and three administrative employees of the district. Respondents are teachers suing on behalf of all teachers in the district and the Hortonville Education Association (HEA), the collective-bargaining agent for the district's teachers.
During the 1972-1973 school year Hortonville teachers worked under a master collective-bargaining agreement; negotiations were conducted for renewal of the contract, but no agreement was reached for the 1973-1974 school year. The teachers continued to work while negotiations proceeded during the year without reaching agreement. On March 18, 1974, the members of the teachers’ union went on strike, in direct violation of Wisconsin law. On March 20, the district superintendent sent all teachers a letter inviting them to return to work; a few did so. On March 23, he sent another letter, asking the 86 teachers still on strike to return, and reminding them that strikes by public employees were illegal; none of these teachers returned to work. After conducting classes with substitute teachers on March 26 and 27, the Board decided to conduct disciplinary hearings for each of the teachers on strike. Individual notices were sent to each teacher setting hearings for April 1, 2, and 3.
On April 1, most of the striking teachers appeared before the Board with counsel. Their attorney indicated that the teachers did not want individual hearings, but preferred to be treated as a group. Although counsel agreed that the teachers were on strike, he raised several procedural objections to the hearings. He also argued that the Board was not sufficiently impartial to exercise discipline over the striking teachers and that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required an independent, unbiased decisionmaker. An offer of proof was tendered to demonstrate that the strike had been provoked by the Board’s failure to meet teachers’ demands, and respondents’ counsel asked to cross-examine Board members individually. The Board rejected the request, but permitted counsel to make the offer of proof, aimed at showing that the Board’s contract offers were unsatisfactory, that the Board used coercive and illegal bargaining tactics, and that teachers in the district had been locked out by the Board.
On April 2, the Board voted to terminate the employment of striking teachers, and advised them by letter to that effect. However, the same letter invited all teachers on strike to reapply for teaching positions. One teacher accepted the invitation and returned to work; the Board hired replacements to fill the remaining positions.
Respondents then filed suit against petitioners in state court, alleging, among other things, that the notice and hearing provided them by the Board were inadequate to comply with due process requirements. The trial court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment on the due process claim. The court found that the teachers, although on strike, were still employees of the Board under Wisconsin law and that they retained a property interest in their positions under this Court’s decisions in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972). The court concluded that the only question before the Board on April 1 and 2 was whether the teachers were on strike in violation of state law, and that no evidence in mitigation was relevant. It rejected their claim that they were denied due process, since the teachers admitted they were on strike after receiving adequate notice and a hearing, including the warning that they were in violation of Wisconsin law.
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, 66 Wis. 2d 469, 225 N. W. 2d 658 (1975). On the single issue now presented it held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution required that the teachers’ conduct and the Board’s response be evaluated by an impartial de-cisionmaker other than the Board. The rationale of the Wisconsin Supreme Court appears to be that although the teachers had admitted being on strike, and although the strike violated Wisconsin law, the Board had available other remedies than dismissal, including an injunction prohibiting the strike, a call for mediation, or continued bargaining. Relying on our holding in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), the Wisconsin court thén held “it would seem essential, even in cases of undisputed or stipulated facts, that an impartial decision maker be charged with the responsibility of determining what action shall be taken on the basis of those facts.” 66 Wis. 2d, at 493, 225 N. W. 2d, at 671. The court held that the Board was not sufficiently impartial to make this choice: “The background giving rise to the ultimate facts in this case reveals a situation not at all conducive to detachment and impartiality on the part of the school board.” Ibid. In reaching its conclusion, the court acknowledged that the Board’s decision could be reviewed in other forums; but no reviewing body would give the teachers an opportunity to demonstrate that “another course of action such as mediation, injunction, continued collective bargaining or arbitration would have been a more reasonable response on the part of the decision maker.” Id., at 496, 225 N. W. 2d, at 672.
Since it concluded that state law provided no adequate remedy, the Wisconsin Supreme Court fashioned one it thought necessary to comply with federal due process principles. To leave with the Board “[a]s much control as possible ... to set policy and manage the school,” the court held that the Board should after notice and hearing make the decision to fire in the first instance. A teacher dissatisfied with the Board’s decision could petition any court of record in the county for a de novo hearing on all issues; the trial court would “resolve any factual disputes and provide for a reasonable disposition.” Id., at 498, 225 N. W. 2d, at 673. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that this remedy was “not ideal because a court may be required to make public policy decisions that are better left to a legislative or administrative body.” Ibid. But it would suffice “until such time and only until such time as the legislature provides a means to establish a forum that will meet the requirements of due process.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari because of the state court’s reliance on federal due process. 423 U. S. 821 (1975). We reverse.
II
The Hortonville School District is a common school district under Wisconsin law, financed by local property taxes and state school aid and governed by an elected seven-member School Board. Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 120.01, 120.03, 120.06 (1973). The Board has broad power over “the possession, care, control and management of the property and affairs of the school district.” § 120.12 (1) ; see also §§ 120.08, 120.10, 120.15-120.17. The Board negotiates terms of employment with teachers under the Wisconsin Municipal Employment Relations Act, § 111.70 et seg. (1974), and contracts with individual teachers on behalf of the district. The Board is the only body vested by statute with the power to employ and dismiss teachers. § 118.22 (2).
The sole issue in this case is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits this School Board from making the decision to dismiss teachers admittedly engaged in a strike and persistently refusing to return to their duties. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that state law prohibited the strike and that termination of the striking teachers’ employment was within the Board’s statutory authority. 66 Wis. 2d, at 479-481, 225 N. W. 2d, at 663-665. We are, of course, bound to accept the interpretation of Wisconsin law by the highest court of the State. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U. S. 505, 507 (1971); Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 688 (1959). The only decision remaining for the Board therefore involved the exercise of its discretion as to what should be done to carry out the duties the law placed on the Board.
A
Respondents argue, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court held, that the choice presented for the Board’s decision is analogous to that involved in revocation of parole in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, that the decision could be made only by an impartial decisionmaker, and that the Board was not impartial. In Morrissey the Court considered a challenge to state procedures employed in revoking the parole of state prisoners. There we noted that the parole revocation decision involved two steps: First, an inquiry whether the parolee had in fact violated the conditions of his parole; second, determining whether the violations found were serious enough to justify revocation of parole and the consequent deprivation of the parolee’s conditional liberty. With respect to the second step, the Court observed:
“The second question involves the application of expertise by the parole authority in making a prediction as to the ability of the individual to live in society without committing antisocial acts. This part of the decision, too, depends on facts, and therefore it is important for the board to know not only that some violation was committed but also to know accurately how many and how serious the violations were. Yet this second step, deciding what to do about the violation once it is identified, is not purely factual but also predictive and discretionary.” 408 U. S., at 480.
Nothing in this case is analogous to the first step in Morrissey, since the teachers admitted to being on strike. But respondents argue that the School Board’s decision in this case is, for constitutional purposes, the same as the second aspect of the decision to revoke parole. The Board cannot make a “reasonable” decision on this issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held and respondents argue, because its members are biased in some fashion that the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit.
Morrissey arose in a materially different context. We recognized there that a parole violation could occur at a place distant from where the parole revocation decision would finally be made; we also recognized the risk of factual error, such as misidentification. To minimize this risk, we held: “[D]ue process requires that after the arrest [for parole violation], the determination that reasonable ground exists for revocation of parole should be made by someone not directly involved in the case.” Id., at 485. But this holding must be read against our earlier discussion in Morrissey of the parole officer's role as counselor for and confidant of the parolee; it is this same officer who, on the basis of preliminary information, decides to arrest the parolee. A school board is not to be equated with the parole officer as an arresting officer; the school board is more like the parole board, for it has ultimate plenary authority to make its decisions derived from the state legislature. General language about due process in a holding concerning revocation of parole is not a reliable basis for dealing with the School Board's power as an employer to dismiss teachers for cause. We must focus more clearly on, first, the nature of the bias respondents attribute to the Board, and, second, the nature of the interests at stake in this case.
B
Respondents’ argument rests in part on doctrines that have no application to this case. They seem to argue that the Board members had some personal or official stake in the decision whether the teachers should be dismissed, comparable to the stake the Court saw in Turney v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927), or Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972); see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564 (1973), and that the Board has manifested some personal bitterness toward the teachers, aroused by teacher criticism of the Board during the strike, see, e. g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S. 455 (1971). Even assuming that those cases state the governing standards when the decisionmaker is a public employer dealing with employees, the teachers did not show, and the Wisconsin courts did not find, that the Board members had the kind of personal or financial stake in the decision that might create a conflict of interest, and there is nothing in the record to support charges of personal animosity. The Wisconsin Supreme Court was careful “not to suggest . . . that the board members were anything but dedicated public servants, trying to provide the district with quality education . . . within its limited budget.” 66 Wis. 2d, at 494, 225 N. W. 2d, at 671. That court’s analysis would seem to be confirmed by the Board’s repeated invitations for striking teachers to return to work, the final invitation being contained in the letter that notified them of their discharge.
The only other factor suggested to support the claim of bias is that the School Board was involved in the negotiations that preceded and precipitated the striking teachers’ discharge. Participation in those negotiations was a statutory duty of the Board. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that this involvement, without more, disqualified the Board from deciding whether the teachers should be dismissed:
“The board was the collective bargaining agent for the school district and thus was engaged in the collective bargaining process with the teachers' representative, the HEA. It is not difficult to imagine the frustration on the part of the board members when negotiations broke down, agreement could not be reached and the employees resorted to concerted activity. . . . They were . . . not uninvolved in the events which precipitated decisions they were required to make.” Id., at 493-494, 225 N. W. 2d, at 671.
Mere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an agency in the performance of its statutory role does not, however, disqualify a decisionmaker. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 700-703 (1948). Nor is a decisionmaker disqualified simply because he has taken a position, even in public, on a policy issue related to the dispute, in the absence of a showing that he is not “capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.” United States v. Morgan, 313 U. S. 409, 421 (1941); see also FTC v. Cement Institute, supra, at 701.
Respondents’ claim and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s holding reduce to the argument that the Board was biased because it negotiated with the teachers on behalf of the school district without reaching agreement and learned about the reasons for the strike in the course of negotiating. From those premises the Wisconsin court concluded that the Board lost its statutory power to determine that the strike and persistent refusal to terminate it amounted to conduct serious enough to warrant discharge of the strikers. Wisconsin statutes vest in the Board the power to discharge its employees, a power of every employer, whether it has negotiated with the employees before discharge or not. The Fourteenth Amendment permits a court to strip the Board of the otherwise unremarkable power the Wisconsin Legislature has given it only if the Board’s prior involvement in negotiating with the teachers means that it cannot act consistently with due process.
C
Due process, as this Court has repeatedly held, is a term that “negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). Determining what process is due in a given setting requires the Court to take into account the individual’s stake in the decision at issue as well as the State’s interest in a particular procedure for making it. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ; id., at 188 (White, J., concurring and dissenting); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263-266 (1970). Our assessment of the interests of the parties in this case leads to the conclusion that this is a very different case from Morrissey v. Brewer, and that the Board’s prior role as negotiator does not disqualify it to decide that the public interest in maintaining uninterrupted classroom work required that teachers striking in violation of state law be discharged.
The teachers’ interest in these proceedings is, of course, self-evident. They wished to avoid termination of their employment, obviously an important interest, but one that must be examined in light of several factors. Since the teachers admitted that they were engaged in a work stoppage, there was no possibility of an erroneous factual determination on this critical threshold issue. Moreover, what the teachers claim as a property right was the expectation that the jobs they had left to go and remain on strike in violation of law would remain open to them. The Wisconsin court accepted at least the essence of that claim in defining the property right under state law, and we do not quarrel with its conclusion. But even if the property interest claimed here is to be compared with the liberty interest at stake in Morrissey, we note that both “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” and “the degree of potential deprivation” differ in a qualitative sense and in degree from those in Morrissey. Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, at 341.
The governmental interests at stake in this case also differ significantly from the interests at stake in Mor-rissey. The Board’s decision whether to dismiss striking teachers involves broad considerations, and does not in the main turn on the Board’s view of the “seriousness” of the teachers’ conduct or the factors they urge mitigated their violation of state law. It was not an adjudicative decision, for the Board had an obligation to make a decision based on its own answer to an important question of policy: What choice among the alternative responses to the teachers’ strike will best serve the interests of the school system, the interests of the parents and children who depend on the system, and the interests of the citizens whose taxes support it? The Board’s decision was only incidentally a disciplinary decision; it had significant governmental and public policy dimensions as well. See Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 Yale L. J. 1156 (1974).
State law vests the governmental, or policymaking, function exclusively in the School Board and the State has two interests in keeping it there. First, the Board is the body with overall responsibility for the governance of the school district; it must cope with the myriad day-to-day problems of a modern public school system including the severe consequences of a teachers’ strike; by virtue of electing them the constituents have declared the Board members qualified to deal with these problems, and they are accountable to the voters for the manner in which they perform. Second, the state legislature has given to the Board the power to employ and dismiss teachers, as a part of the balance it has struck in the area of municipal labor relations; altering those statutory powers as a matter of federal due process clearly changes that balance. Permitting the Board to make the decision at issue here preserves its control over school district affairs, leaves the balance of power in labor relations where the state legislature struck it, and assures that the decision whether to dismiss the teachers will be made by the body responsible for that decision under state law.
Ill
Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the decision to terminate their employment was infected by the sort of bias that we have held to disqualify other decisionmakers as a matter of federal due process. A showing that the Board was “involved” in the events preceding this decision, in light of the important interest in leaving with the Board the power given by the state legislature, is not enough to overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity in policymakers with decisionmak-ing power. Cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S., at 47. Accordingly, we hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not guarantee respondents^ that the decision to terminate their employment would be made or reviewed by a body other than the School Board.
The judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
The National School Boards Association informs us that 45 States lodge the power to dismiss teachers in local school boards. Brief as Amicus Curiae 9 n. 4.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the discharge of the teachers during their 1973-1974 individual contracts, and the revocation of the Board’s individual offers of employment for the 1974W975 school year, deprived them of property. 66 Wis. 2d 469, 489, 225 N. W. 2d 658, 669 (1975). “Property interests . . . are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. . . .” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972). We do not challenge the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s conclusion that state law gave these teachers a “legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 602 (1972).
We are not required to determine whether the notice and hearing afforded by the Board, as matters separate from the Board’s ability fairly to decide the issue before it, were adequate to afford respondents due process. Respondents do not suggest here that the notice they received was constitutionally inadequate, and they refused to treat the dismissals on a case-by-case basis.
Respondents argue that the requirement that the Board’s decision be “reasonable” is in fact a requirement of state law. From that premise and from the premise that the “reasonableness” determination requires an evaluation of the Board’s negotiating stance, they argue that nothing but decision and review de novo by an “uninvolved” party will secure their right to a “reasonable” decision. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 58-59, n. 25 (1975). It is clear, however, that the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Board’s decision must be “reasonable,” not by virtue of state law, but because of its reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the Wisconsin court relied largely upon cases interpreting the Federal Constitution in this aspect of its holding. See 66 Wis. 2d, at 493, 225 N. W. 2d, at 671. Second, the only state case the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited for more than a general statement of federal requirements was Durkin v. Board of Police & Fire Comm’rs, 48 Wis. 2d 112, 180 N. W. 2d 1 (1970). There the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted a state statute that gave firemen and policemen the right to appeal a decision of the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners to a state court; the statute expressly provided that the court was to determine whether “upon the evidence the order of the Board was reasonable.” Id., at 117, 180 N. W. 2d, at 3. See Wis. Stat. Ann. §62.13 (5) (h) (1957). There is no comparable statutory provision giving teachers the right to review this standard. Finally, to impose a “reasonableness” requirement, or any other test that looks to evaluation by another entity, makes semantic sense only where review is contemplated by the statute. Review, and the standard for review, are concepts that go hand in hand. The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded both that review of the Board’s decision was necessary and that a “reasonableness” standard was appropriate as a result of its reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Respondents alleged before the Board, and argue here, that the Board’s decision to dismiss them was motivated by antiunion animus in addition to personal vindictiveness, and that their illegal strike should be excused because the Board provoked it. The Wisconsin Supreme Court suggested that the Board’s “decision to discharge was possibly a convenient alternative which would eliminate their labor problems in one fell swoop.” 66 Wis. 2d, at 494, 225 N. W. 2d, at 671. Given that Wisconsin statutes permitted the Board to dismiss striking teachers, and assuming, as did the Wisconsin court, that the Board’s decision was in other respects proper under state labor law, we do not agree that federal due process prevented the Board from pursuing a course of action that was within its explicit statutory authority and which, in its judgment, would serve the best interests of the school system. That the' result may also have been desirable for other reasons is irrelevant to the due process issue on which the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision turned, and if the other reasons are invalid under state law, respondents can resort to whatever forum the State provides.
Respondents argue that the School Board is free to defend its action in the de novo hearing authorized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court by attempting to demonstrate that policy considerations dictated its decision to dismiss the striking teachers. Policymaking is a process of prudential judgment, and we are not prepared to say that a judge can generally make a better policy judgment or, in this case, as good a judgment as the School Board, which is intimately familiar with all the needs of the school district, or that a school board must, at the risk of suspending school operations, wend its way through judicial processes not mandated by the legislature. More important, no matter what arguments the Board may make to the de novo trial judge, as we noted earlier it will be the School Board that will have to cope with the consequences of the decision and be responsible to the electorate for it. The privilege of oral argument to a judge is no substitute for the power to employ and dismiss vested by statute exclusively in the Board.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We noted probable jurisdiction in this case to consider whether a State may constitutionally limit the appointment of members of its police force to citizens of the United States. 430 U. S. 944 (1977).
The appellant, Edmund Foley, is an alien eligible in due course to become a naturalized citizen, who is lawfully in this country as a permanent resident. He applied for appointment as a New York State trooper, a position which is filled on the basis of competitive examinations. Pursuant to a New York statute, N. Y. Exec. Law § 215 (3) (McKinney 1972), state authorities refused to allow Foley to take the examination. The statute provides:
“No person shall be appointed to the New York state police force unless he shall be a citizen of the United States.”
Appellant then brought this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking a declaratory judgment that the State’s exclusion of aliens from its police force violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After Foley was certified as representative of a class of those similarly situated, a three-judge District Court was convened to consider the merits of the claim. The District Court held the statute to be constitutional. 419 F. Supp. 889 (1976). We affirm.
I
The essential facts in this case are uncontroverted. New York Exec. Law § 215 ,(3) (McKinney 1972) prohibits appellant and his class from becoming state troopers. It is not disputed that the State has uniformly complied with this restriction since the statute was enacted in 1927. Under it, an alien who desires to compete for a position as a New York State trooper must relinquish his foreign citizenship and become an American citizen. Some members of the class, including appellant, are not currently eligible for American citizenship due to waiting periods imposed by congressional enactment.
A trooper in New York is a member of the state police force, a law enforcement body which exercises broad police authority throughout the State. The powers of troopers are generally described in the relevant statutes as including those functions traditionally associated with a peace officer. Like most peace officers, they are charged with the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of suspected criminals, investigation of suspect conduct, execution of warrants and have powers of search, seizure and arrest without a formal warrant under limited circumstances. In the course of carrying out these responsibilities an officer is empowered by New York law to resort to lawful force, which may include the use of any weapon that he is required to carry while on duty. All troopers are on call 24 hours a day and are required to take appropriate action whenever criminal activity is observed.
Perhaps the best shorthand description of the role of the New York State trooper was that advanced by the District Court: “State police are charged with the enforcement of the law, not in a private profession and for the benefit of themselves and their clients, but for the benefit of the people at large of the State of New York.” 419 F. Supp., at 896.
II
Appellant claims that the relevant New York statute violates his rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
The decisions of this Court with regard to the rights of aliens living in our society have reflected fine, and often difficult, questions of values. As a Nation we exhibit extraordinary hospitality to those who come to our country, which is not surprising for we have often been described as “a nation of immigrants.” Indeed, aliens lawfully residing in this society have many rights which are accorded to noncitizens by few other countries. Our cases generally reflect a close scrutiny of restraints imposed by States on aliens. But we have never suggested that such legislation is inherently invalid, nor have we held that all limitations on aliens are suspect. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 648 (1973). Rather, beginning with a case which involved the denial of welfare assistance essential to life itself, the Court has treated certain restrictions on aliens with “heightened judicial solicitude,” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971), a treatment deemed necessary since aliens — pending their eligibility for citizenship — have no direct voice in the political processes. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938).
Following Graham, a series of decisions has resulted requiring state action to meet close scrutiny to exclude aliens as a class from educational benefits, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S. 1 (1977); eligibility for a broad range of public employment, Sugarman v. Dougall, supra; or the practice of licensed professions, Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973). These exclusions struck at the noncitizens’ ability to exist in the community, a position seemingly inconsistent with the congressional determination to admit the alien to permanent residence. See Graham, supra, at 377-378; Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications — A More Modest Role For Equal Protection?, 1976 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 89, 101.
It would be inappropriate, however, to require every statutory exclusion of aliens to clear the high hurdle of "strict scrutiny,” because to do so would “obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship.” Mauclet, supra, at 14 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). The act of becoming a citizen is more than a ritual with no content beyond the fanfare of ceremony. A new citizen has become a member of a Nation, part of a people distinct from others. Cf. Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559 (1832). The individual, at that point, belongs to the polity and is entitled to participate in the processes of democratic decisionmaking. Accordingly, we have recognized “a State’s historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions,” Dougall, supra, at 648, as part of the sovereign’s obligation “ 'to preserve the basic conception of a political community.’ ” 413 U. S., at 647.
The practical consequence of this theory is that ''our scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters firmly within a State’s constitutional prerogatives.” Dougall, supra, at 648. The State need only justify its classification by a showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification. This is not intended to denigrate the valuable contribution of aliens who benefit from our traditional hospitality. It is no more than recognition of the fact that a democratic society is ruled by its people. Thus, it is clear that a State may deny aliens the right to vote, or to run for elective office, for these lie at the heart of our political institutions. See 413 U. S., at 647-649. Similar considerations support a legislative determination to exclude aliens from jury service. See Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), aff’d, 426 U. S. 913 (1976). Likewise, we have recognized that citizenship may be a relevant qualification for fulfilling those ''important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions,” held by “officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy.” Dougall, supra, at 647. This is not because our society seeks to reserve the better jobs to its members. Rather, it is because this country entrusts many of its most important policy responsibilities to these officers, the discretionary exercise of which can often more immediately affect the lives of citizens than even the ballot of a voter or the choice of a legislator. In sum, then, it represents the choice, and right, of the people to be governed by their citizen peers. To effectuate this result, we must necessarily examine each position in question to determine whether it involves discretionary decisionmaking, or execution of policy, which substantially affects members of the political community.
The essence of our holdings to date is that although we extend to aliens the right to education and public welfare, along with the ability to earn a livelihood and engage in licensed professions, the right to govern is reserved to citizens.
Ill
A discussion of the police function is essentially a description of one of the basic functions of government, especially in a complex modern society where police presence is pervasive. The police function fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government to its constituency. Police officers in the ranks do not formulate policy, per se, but they are clothed with authority to exercise an almost infinite variety of discretionary powers. The execution of the broad powers vested in them affects members of the public significantly and often in the most sensitive areas of daily life. Our Constitution, of course, provides safeguards to persons, homes and possessions, as well as guidance to police officers. And few countries, if any, provide more protection to individuals by limitations on the power and discretion of the police. Nonetheless, police may, in the exercise of their discretion, invade the privacy of an individual in public places, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). They may under some conditions break down a door to enter a dwelling or other building in the execution of a warrant, e. g., Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301 (1958), or without a formal warrant in very limited circumstances; they may stop vehicles traveling on public highways, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977).
An arrest, the function most commonly associated with the police, is a serious matter for any person even when no prosecution follows or when an acquittal is obtained. Most arrests are without prior judicial authority, as when an officer observes a criminal act in progress or suspects that felonious activity is afoot. Even the routine traffic arrests made by the state trooper — for speeding, weaving, reckless driving, improper license plates, absence of inspection stickers, or dangerous physical condition of a vehicle, to describe only a few of the more obvious common violations — can intrude on the privacy of the individual. In stopping cars, they may, within limits, require a driver or passengers to disembark and even search them for weapons, depending on time, place and circumstances. That this prophylactic authority is essential is attested by the number of police officers wounded or killed in the process of making inquiry in borderline, seemingly minor violation situations — for example, where the initial stop is made for a traffic offense but, unknown to the officer at the time, the vehicle occupants are armed and engaged in or embarked on serious criminal conduct.
Clearly the exercise of police authority calls for a very high degree of judgment and discretion, the abuse or misuse of which can have serious impact on individuals. The office of a policeman is in no sense one of “the common occupations of the community” that the then Mr. Justice Hughes referred to in Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915). A policeman vested with the plenary discretionary powers we have described is not to be equated with a private person engaged in routine public employment or other “common occupations of the community” who exercises no broad power over people generally. Indeed, the rationale for the qualified immunity historically granted to the police rests on the difficult and delicate judgments these officers must often make. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 555-557 (1967); cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 245-246 (1974).
In short, it would be as anomalous to conclude that citizens may be subjected to the broad discretionary powers of non-citizen police officers as it would be to say that judicial officers and jurors with power to judge citizens can be aliens. It is not surprising, therefore, that most States expressly confine the employment of police officers to citizens, whom the State may reasonably presume to be more familiar with and sympathetic to American traditions. Police officers very clearly fall within the category of “important nonelective . . . officers who participate directly in the . . . execution ... of broad public policy.” Dougall, 413 U. S., at 647 (emphasis added). In the enforcement and execution of the laws the police function is one where citizenship bears a rational relationship to the special demands of the particular position. A State may, therefore, consonant with the Constitution, confine the performance of this important public responsibility to citizens of the United States.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
We recognize that New York’s statute may effectively prevent some class members from .ever becoming troopers since state law limits eligibility for these positions to those between the age of 21 and 29 years. N. Y. Exec. Law §215 (3) (McKinney 1972).
One indication of this attitude is Congress’ determination to malee it relatively easy for immigrants to become naturalized citizens. See 8 U. S. C. § 1427 (1976 ed.).
The alien’s status is, at least for a time, beyond his control since Congress has imposed durational residency requirements for the attainment of citizenship. Federal law generally requires an alien to lawfully reside in this country for five years as a prerequisite to applying for naturalization. 8 U. S. C. § 1427 (a) (1976 ed.).
In Mauclet, for example, New York State policy reflected a legislative judgment that higher education was “ ‘no longer ... a luxury; it is a necessity for strength, fulfillment and survival.’ ” 432 U. S., at 8 n. 9.
This is not to say, of course, that a State may accomplish this end with a citizenship restriction that "sweeps indiscriminately,” Dougall, 413 U. S., at 643, without regard to the differences in the positions involved.
See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The Urban Police Function 119 (App. Draft 1973); National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police 22-23 (1973); President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 10 (1967).
After the event, some abuses of power may be subject to remedies by one showing injury. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). And conclusive evidence of criminal conduct may be kept from the knowledge of a jury because of police error or misconduct.
Twenty-four States besides New York specifically require United States citizenship as a prerequisite for becoming a member of a statewide law enforcement agency: see Ark. Stat. Ann. § 42-406 (1964); Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 1031 (West Supp. 1978); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.13 (2) (West Supp. 1976); Ga. Code § 92A-214 (Supp. 1977); 111. Rev. Stat., ch. 121, §307.9 (1975); Ind. Rules & Regs., Tit. 10, Art. 1, ch. 1, §4-7 (1976); Iowa Code § 80.15 (1977); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 74r-2113 (c) (Supp. 1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 16.040 (2)(c) (1971); Mich. Comp. Laws §28.4 (1967); Miss. Code Ann. § 45-3-9 (Supp. 1977); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 43.060 (1969); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 31-105 (3) (a) (v) (Supp. 1977); Nev. Rev. Stat. §281.060 (1) (1975); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 106-R:20 (Supp. 1975); N. J. Stat. Ann. §53:1-9 (West Supp. 1977); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-6 (1972); N. D. Cent. Code § 39-03-04 (4) (Supp. 1977); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 181.260 (1) (a) (1977); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 71, § 1193 (Purdon 1962); R. I. Gen. Laws § 42-28-10 (1970); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §3-7-9 and §3-1-4 (1974); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Am., Art. 4413 (9) (2) (Vernon 1976); Utah Code Ann. §27-11-11 (1976). Oklahoma requires its officers to be citizens of the State. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 47, § 2-105 (a) (Supp. 1976). Nine other States require American citizenship as part of a general requirement applicable to all types of state officers or employees: see Ala. Code, Tit. 36, § 2-1 (a) (1) (1977); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-201 (1974); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 78-1 (1976); Idaho Code § 59-101 (1976) and Idaho Const., Art. 6, § 2; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 5, § 556 (Supp. 1977); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 31, § 12 (West Supp. 1977); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.22 (1978); Tenn. Code Ann. §8-1801 (Supp. 1977); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 3, § 262 (1972); W. Va. Const., Art. 4, § 4.
Police powers in many countries are exercised in ways that we would find intolerable and indeed violative of constitutional rights. To taire only one example, a large number of nations do not share our belief in the freedom of movement and travel, requiring persons to carry identification cards at all times. This, inter alia, affords a rational basis for States to require that those entrusted with the execution of the laws be individuals who, even if not native Americans, have indicated acceptance and allegiance, to our Constitution by becoming citizens.
Cf. McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm’n, 424 U. S. 645 (1976); Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N. W. 2d 97 (1971), dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 405 U. S. 950 (1972).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Court has here under review the decision of a state court rejecting a claim of infirmity in a conviction for murder based on a constitutional ground raised for the first time in an extraordinary proceeding after the conviction had been affirmed on appeal. Respect for the State’s administration of criminal justice requires a detailed narrative of the procedural course of this litigation and an adequate consideration of the legal factors relevant to our disposition.
Petitioner, a Negro, was convicted in Fulton County, Georgia, of the murder of a white man and sentenced to death. According to the allegations before us, the petit jury which convicted him was selected in the following manner:
On February 18, 1953, a judge of the Fulton County Superior Court selected from a box the names of prospective jurors. The names of white persons were on white tickets and the names of Negroes were on yellow tickets. The tickets were handed to a deputy sheriff, who in turn gave them to a deputy clerk for listing. The named jurors were subsequently summoned, some were excused, and the remaining 120 were available for the ten panels of twelve jurors each to serve in the trial of civil and criminal cases in the Fulton County Superior Court for the week of March 9, 1953. Of the 120 jurors, four were Negroes, and all four were assigned to the criminal docket.
On March 10, 1953, a panel of 48 of the 120 jurors was “put upon” Williams at his trial. Thirteen jurors, including three of the four Negroes, were excused for cause. The State peremptorily challenged the fourth Negro, so that no Negroes served on the jury of twelve which was finally selected to try Williams.
The trial, which immediately followed the selection of the jury, lasted one day. Twenty-three witnesses appeared against Williams. His only defense was a short unsworn statement to the effect that he had not committed the crime and that he had been “afraid” when he signed the written confession introduced against him.
Williams’ court-appointed attorney filed a formal motion for new trial on March 27, 1953, and a more detailed amendment to the motion on June 29, 1953. The motion was overruled, and an appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court followed. On October 14,1953, that court affirmed the judgment. 210 Ga. 207, 78 S. E. 2d 521.
On December 1,1953, Williams’ counsel filed in the trial court an extraordinary motion for new trial under Ga. Code Ann., § 70-303. In this motion he alleged for the first time that Williams had been denied equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by the manner in which the petit jury had been selected, organized, impaneled and challenged. An affidavit by Williams accompanied the motion, stating that at the time of trial he had no knowledge of the methods used to select the jury. A similar affidavit by his counsel stated further that “the same could not have been discovered by him [the counsel] in the exercise of ordinary diligence.” The law partner of Williams’ counsel submitted a third affidavit to the effect that he had taken no part in the trial or in its preparation.
On January 18, 1954, the trial court dismissed the extraordinary motion for new trial. An appeal was taken to the Georgia Supreme Court. In the appeal, reliance was placed almost exclusively upon the case of Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559, for the claim that Williams had been denied equal protection of the laws. The pertinence of that case to this turns on the time sequence in the two cases as well as on the relevant substantive facts.
Avery was convicted of rape on September 20, 1951, in Fulton County, Georgia — the same county in which Williams was tried a year and a half later. Avery’s petit jury was drawn with yellow and white tickets, precisely in the manner used later in the case of Williams. In Avery’s case, no Negroes appeared on the list of 60 jurors put upon him at the trial, whereas here, four Negroes appeared on the list of 120 jurors from which Williams’ jury was selected. Avery, however, challenged the array when the jury was put upon him; Williams did not. Avery’s challenge was overruled, and after trial he appealed on the ground of discrimination in the selection of the jury. The Georgia Supreme Court disapproved of the use of yellow and white tickets but affirmed the judgment on the ground that no discrimination was actually shown.
Certiorari in the Avery case was filed in this Court on July 28, 1952, nine weeks before the alleged murder in the Williams case. The ground, as here, was that the use of different-colored tickets for whites and Negroes deprived the defendant of equal protection of the laws. Avery’s petition for certiorari was granted March 9,1953, the day before the petit jury was put upon Williams. This Court reversed the Avery case on May 25, 1953, holding that Avery had made out a prima facie case of an unconstitutional discrimination by showing the use of different-colored tickets which the State had not rebutted.
While this Court’s decision in the Avery case was thus rendered over two months after Williams’ trial, it came a month before the amendment to his formal motion for new trial. Yet Williams’ counsel did not rely upon the ground raised by the Avery decision until some six months later in his extraordinary motion for new trial.
As already stated, the extraordinary motion was dismissed by the trial court, and Williams again appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. That court affirmed the dismissal of the extraordinary motion. The court concluded that Williams, having failed to challenge the array when put upon him, had waived any objections to the jury’s selection. The affidavits of Williams, his counsel, and his counsel’s partner were deemed insufficient to excuse Williams’ failure to challenge the array at the outset of the trial.
The court did not rest on this consideration. It urged that the facts inherent in the case contradicted the affidavits. The court said that its own decision in the Avery case, prior to the Williams trial, had fully set out the practice of using different-colored tickets in the selection of juries. “Due diligence would certainly have required the defendant and his attorney to make themselves familiar with the opinions of this court on the question now raised. It follows that, for this reason, the motion for new trial was not sufficient as an extraordinary motion for new trial.” 210 Ga. 665, 668, 82 S. E. 2d 217, 219.
In view of the entanglement of this case with our decision in Avery, we granted certiorari. 348 U. S. 854. Since the attorney appointed by the Georgia court advised the Clerk of this Court that he would not be in a position to present oral argument before this Court, we appointed amicus curiae to present argument on Williams’ behalf. 348 U. S. 957.
In his brief on behalf of the State before the State Supreme Court, the Solicitor General of Fulton County-had urged, inter alia, that there was no showing of a denial of equal protection in this case. On oral argument here, however, the State, with commendable regard for its responsibility, agreed that the use of yellow and white tickets in this case was, in light of this Court’s decision in Avery, a denial of equal protection, so that a new trial would be required but for the failure to challenge the array. We need only add that it was the system of selection and the resulting danger of abuse which was struck down in Avery and not an actual showing of discrimination on the basis of comparative numbers of Negroes and whites on the jury lists. The question now before us, in view of the State’s concession, is whether the ruling of the Georgia Supreme Court rests upon an adequate nonfederal ground, so that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the Georgia court.
A state procedural rule which forbids the raising of federal questions at late stages in the case, or by any other than a prescribed method, has been recognized as a valid exercise of state power. The principle is clear enough. But the unique aspects of the never-ending new cases that arise require its individual application to particular circumstances. Thus, we would have a different question from that before us if the trial court had no power to consider Williams’ constitutional objection at the belated time he raised it. But, where a State allows questions of this sort to be raised at a late stage and be determined by its courts as a matter of discretion, we are not concluded from assuming jurisdiction and deciding whether the state court action in the particular circumstances is, in effect, an avoidance of the federal right. A state court may not, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to entertain a constitutional claim while passing upon kindred issues raised in the same manner.
The Georgia courts have indicated many times that motions for new trial after verdict are not favored, and that extraordinary motions for new trial after final judgment are favored even less. But the Georgia statute provides for such motion, and it has been granted in “exceptional” or “extraordinary” cases. The general rule is that the granting or denying of an extraordinary motion for new trial rests primarily in the discretion of the trial court, and the appellate court will not reverse except for a clear abuse of discretion. In practice, however, the Georgia appellate courts have not hesitated to reverse and grant a new trial in exceptional cases. For example:
In Wright v. Davis, 184 Ga. 846, 193 S. E. 757 (1937), the defendant was sentenced to death, his motion for new trial was overruled, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal by the Georgia Supreme Court. Three months after the affirmance the defendant made an extraordinary motion for new trial on the ground that an ex-convict had obtained a seat on the jury by impersonating his father, whose name was properly on the jury list. The trial court denied the extraordinary motion. The Georgia Supreme Court granted mandamus and made it absolute. It said:
“In the instant case we are of the opinion that the extraordinary motion for a new trial and the proffered amendment presented a state of facts which, standing without dispute, required as a matter of law that a new trial should be granted....
.. The verdict itself shows that the defendant was not benefited, as he received the extreme penalty, and it is clear that he was deprived of his right to have a jury composed entirely of upright men. Code, §§ 2-4502, 59-106. It will not do to speculate on whether the accused suffered actual injury, when so vital a right has been violated. There are some conditions from which injury will be presumed....” (184 Ga., at 851, 853, 193 S. E., at 760.)
The court rejected the State’s contention that the defendant had not shown due diligence in discovering the juror’s disqualification.
Smith v. Georgia, 2 Ga. App. 574, 59 S. E. 311 (1907), involved a conviction for arson. A motion for new trial was denied, the judgment was affirmed on appeal, and five months later the defendant filed an extraordinary motion for new trial on the ground that one of the jurors was related to the deceased wife of the prosecutor within the ninth degree, and several of the prosecutor’s'children continued the kinship by affinity. The trial court denied the motion, but the appellate court granted a new trial. It said:
“... There is no higher purpose to be subserved in the administration of the criminal law than that every defendant shall be accorded a trial by jury, and jury trial is a mockery unless the jury be not only impartial but also beyond just suspicion of partiality....” (2 Ga. App., at 578, 59 S. E., at 313.)
In answer to the State’s contention that the defendant and his attorney had not shown due diligence in discovering the prohibited relationship, the court said that the trial judge had inquired into the question of relationship when the jury was impaneled, and then the court added this quotation from a Georgia Supreme Court opinion:
.. ‘Parties are not required to make searching investigation out of court to determine whether the jurors who are summoned are disqualified in their cases. Not only is such a duty not placed by the law upon parties and their counsel, but the contrary practice is to be encouraged, for obvious reasons.’ ” (2 Ga. App., at 582, 59 S. E., at 315.)
In Crawley v. Georgia, 151 Ga. 818, 108 S. E. 238 (1921), four defendants were convicted of murder. Two were sentenced to death and two to life imprisonment. A motion for new trial was overruled, the judgment was affirmed on appeal, a motion for rehearing was denied, and a week later the defendants filed an extraordinary motion for new trial, which the trial court overruled. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed. The extraordinary motion showed that the wife of one juror was within the ninth degree of relationship to the wife of the murdered man. A new trial was granted even though the State submitted an affidavit by the juror that he did not know of the relationship at the time of the trial and therefore could not have been prejudiced.
In Doyal v. Georgia, 73 Ga. 72 (1884), the defendant was convicted of murder. His motion for new trial was denied, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. He filed an extraordinary motion for new trial on the ground that five witnesses were ready to testify that one of the jurors had said in effect before the trial that the defendant ought to be hung and that the juror would see to it if he got on the jury. The defendant and his attorney filed affidavits to the effect that they had been ignorant of the facts at the time of trial. Despite affidavits submitted by the State showing the availability of three of the five witnesses at the time of trial, the Georgia Supreme Court granted a new trial.
There are other cases of like tenor.
All these cases (barring Harris v. Georgia, n. 14) involved objections to individual jurors, as contrasted with the objection to the whole panel in this case. But the two situations cannot be distinguished on this ground. Georgia has a rule, as the State Supreme Court noted in this case, that an objection to the whole panel must be made by way of a challenge to the array at the time the panel is put upon the defendant. Cornelious v. Georgia, 193 Ga. 25, 17 S. E. 2d 156 (1941); Wilcoxon v. Aldredge, 192 Ga. 634, 15 S. E. 2d 873 (1941); Cumming v. Georgia, 155 Ga. 346, 117 S. E. 378 (1923); Lumpkin v. Georgia, 152 Ga. 229, 109 S. E. 664 (1921). But none of these cases declare that an extraordinary motion is not available in a proper case for granting a new trial when the objection is to the panel. On the contrary, several factors indicate that the trial judge and the appellate court have the same degree of discretion in the “array” cases as in cases involving individual j urors. First: There is also a rule in Georgia that an objection to an individual juror must be made at the trial by a challenge to the poll. But as the cases above demonstrate, this rule gives way in an exceptional case to the need for a new trial shown by extraordinary motion. It does not appear rational to deny that the rule as to challenges to the array is likewise not inflexible. Second: The opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court in this case supports this conclusion. If the trial court had no power to entertain the motion, it was immaterial whether the affidavits were faulty. Yet the Supreme Court felt called upon to question the reliability of the affidavits, concluding that Williams’ counsel must have failed to use due diligence and “for this reason” the motion was “not sufficient.”
We conclude that the trial court and the State Supreme Court declined to grant Williams’ motion though possessed of power to do so under state law. Since his motion was based upon a constitutional objection, and one the validity of which has in principle been sustained here, the discretionary decision to deny the motion does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to find that the substantive issue is properly before us.
But the fact that we have jurisdiction does not compel us to exercise it. In Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600, we remanded a case to the highest court of the State, even though that court had affirmed on state procedural grounds, because after that affirmance we had reversed on constitutional grounds a case having identical substantive facts. We said there:
“While we must have proper regard to this ruling of the state court in relation to its appellate procedure, we cannot ignore the exceptional features of the present case. An important question under the Federal Constitution was involved, and, from that standpoint, the case did not stand alone....
.. We are not satisfied that the court would have dealt with the case in the same way if it had determined the constitutional question as we have determined it....
“We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered. We may recognize such a change, which may affect the result, by setting aside the judgment and remanding the case so that the state court may be free to act. We have said that to do this is not to review, in any proper sense of the term, the decision of the state court upon a non-federal question, but only to deal appropriately with a matter arising since its judgment and having a bearing upon the right disposition of the case....” (294 U. S., at 605, 606, 607.)
In the instant case, there is an important factor which has intervened since the affirmance by the Georgia Supreme Court which impels us to remand for that court’s further consideration. This is the acknowledgment by the State before this Court that, as a matter of substantive law, Williams has been deprived of his constitutional rights. The Solicitor General of Fulton County, it should be recalled, had urged before the Georgia Supreme Court that no denial of equal protection was involved, and that court may well have been influenced by the contention. Moreover, if there is another remedy open to Williams, as the Attorney General of the State intimated in his brief to the Georgia Supreme Court, that court should have an opportunity to designate the appropriate remedy.
The facts of this case are extraordinary, particularly in view of the use of yellow and white tickets by a judge of the Fulton County Superior Court almost a year after the State’s own Supreme Court had condemned the practice in the Avery case. That life is at stake is of course another important factor in creating the extraordinary situation. The difference between capital and non-capital offenses is the basis of differentiation in law in diverse ways in which the distinction becomes relevant. We think that orderly procedure requires a remand to the State Supreme Court for reconsideration of the case. Fair regard for the principles which the Georgia courts have enforced in numerous cases and for the constitutional commands binding on all courts compels us to reject the assumption that the courts of Georgia would allow this man to go to his death as the result of a conviction secured from a jury which the State admits was unconstitutionally impaneled. Cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103.
Remanded.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark, see post, p. 393.]
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Minton, see post, p. 403.]
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
WILLIAMS CASE
Oct. 4, 1952 — alleged murder occurs.
Oct. 17, 1952 — Williams arrested, placed in a line-up, confesses. Oct. 21, 1952 — Williams indicted. Feb. 18, 1953 — jury panels chosen for trials during week of March 9th.
March 10, 1953 — jury put upon Williams, trial held, and verdict of guilty. March 11, 1953 — sentenced. March 27, 1953 — formal motion for new trial filed.
June 29, 1953 — amendment to motion for new trial filed; motion overruled.
July 16, 1953 — bill of exceptions filed.
Oct. 14, 1953 — Georgia Supreme Court affirms.
Nov. 23, 1953 — Williams again sentenced to death.
Dec. 1, 1953 — extraordinary motion for new trial filed.
Jan. 18, 1954 — trial court dismisses extraordinary motion.
May 19, 1954 — Georgia Supreme Court affirms.
Oct. 18, 1954 — this Court grants certiorari.
AVERY CASE
Sept. 20, 1951 — Avery convicted. April 14,1952 — Georgia Supreme Court affirms.
July 28, 1952 — certiorari filed in this Court.
March 9,1953-certiorari. -this Court grants
April 30, 1953 — case argued in this Court.
May 25, 1953 — this Court reverses, holding jury selection unconstitutional.
“In case of a motion for a new trial made after the adjournment of the court, some good reason must be shown why the motion was not made during the term, which shall be judged of by the court. In all such cases, 20 days’ notice shall be given to the opposite party. Whenever a motion for a new trial shall have been made at the term of trial in any criminal case and overruled, or when a motion for a new trial has not been made at such term, no motion for a new trial from the same verdict shall be made or received, unless the same is an extraordinary motion or case, and but one such extraordinary motion shall be made or allowed.”
See Appendix, post, p. 392, for table comparing the dates in the two cases.
The court said: “And while the statute does not say so, its manifest intention is that the tickets shall be of uniform size and color, so as to make discrimination impossible in the drawing of jurors; and, where not so done, this is prima facie evidence of discrimination, and, if nothing else appeared, would require a reversal. In this case, however, it is not charged or contended that any discrimination was practiced in drawing the challenged jurors; and the judge who drew them, as a witness for the accused, testified there was in fact none. Therefore, the practice of placing the names of white and colored jurors in the jury box on tickets of different colors did no harm in this instance, and consequently furnished no sufficient objection to the jurors challenged by the accused.” 209 Ga. 116, 124, 70 S. E. 2d 716, 722.
Counsel were informed that this case would be argued in this Court on March 3, 1955. On February 14, 1955, the Assistant Attorney General of Georgia wrote the Clerk of this Court that his office had been informed by Williams’ counsel that “in all probability he would not participate in the oral argument of this case.” The Clerk requested the attorney on February 18 to inform the Court of his plans. Under date of February 22, the attorney wrote to the Clerk as follows:
“Dear Sir:
“At the present time, it does not appear that I will be able to come to Washington to present oral argument in the above case. I have little or nothing to add to the brief.
“It is entirely agreeable, insofar as my agreement has any bearing, that the Attorney General’s request in letter of February 14, 1955, [for permission to have two counsel present the State’s case] be granted.
“I am assuming that if events take such a turn that I am able to come to Washington, I will be permitted to make a short oral argument. “Yours truly,”
“Yours very truly,”
Under date of February 26, 1955, the Clerk sent the attorney the following letter:
“Dear Sir:
“I have spoken to the Chief Justice about the oral argument in this case and of the probability that you would not be present. “He asked me to inform you that the Court would appreciate your presenting oral argument if at all possible, particularly in view of the fact that this a capital case. “Yours truly ”
The attorney replied under date of February 28:
“Dear Sir:
“I am in this position about this case: I originally entered the case by appointment, before our General Assembly enacted legislation authorizing the payment of appointed counsel from the Treasury of Fulton County. This petitioner has no money. His family have made contributions which have in part paid actual expenses. At the present time, they have only paid one-half the cost of printing the brief, and in this situation, it appears that any expense connected with a trip to Washington will be out-of-pocket to me.
“In addition, I am sole counsel in a suit in the Superior Court of Polk County, Georgia, on the calendar of that court for trial during the present week where my absence for any cause will have the result that payment of temporary alimony to my client will not be continued, which in turn, will have the result that I will lose the client.
“I have appeared in the Supreme Court of Georgia twice in this case and have pursued it thus far in the Supreme Court of the United States at a considerable sacrifice. It has been my intention to present oral argument if at all possible. In view of the foregoing, however, it simply does not seem that I will be able to. If I can try the case in Polk Superior Court tomorrow (March 1st), there remains a possibility that I will be able to appear before the Supreme Court. I do not, however, believe such will be the case and for that reason, I cannot plan on going to Washington. “Very truly yourS;”
Oral argument was subsequently reset for April 18, 1955.
The Solicitor General said at the end of his brief: “...In the Avery Case no negro jurors were drawn and impanelled. In this case 4 negro jurors were actually impanelled and sworn for the trial of this case. The mere fact that 3 were disqualified for cause and one was stricken peremptorily by the State would not suffice to show a course of systematic exclusion of negroes from the jury such as would amount to discrimination against the defendant in the trial of his case.
“We respectfully submit that the facts alleged in the extraordinary motion for a new trial do not make out a case showing denial of equal protection of the law or due process of law under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that under the authorities cited above the judgment of the trial judge in dismissing the extraordinary motion should be affirmed.”
The Attorney General of the State, who also filed a brief on behalf of the State, did not discuss the constitutional question except in his concluding paragraph:
“If, under the decision in the Avery case, there was in fact a discrimination against the movant in his trial, we do not say that he does not have some remedy at law but we do contend that the question is not ground for extraordinary motion for new trial and that the Court did not err in dismissing the same.”
No other remedy was mentioned by the Georgia Supreme Court, and none has been called to our attention by the parties.
See, e. g., Parker v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 571; Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 128; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Illinois Brick Co., 297 U. S. 447, 462-463; Central Union Telephone Co. v. City of Edwardsville, 269 U. S. 190.
Cf. Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226; Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 772-773; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 358; Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 172-173; Vandalia R. Co. v. Indiana ex rel. South Bend, 207 U. S. 359, 367.
E. g., Parks v. Georgia, 204 Ga. 41, 48 S. E. 2d 837 (1948); Brown v. Georgia, 141 Ga. 783, 82 S. E. 238 (1914); Tyre v. Georgia, 38 Ga. App. 206, 143 S. E. 778 (1928).
Ga. Code Ann., § 70-303. See note 1, supra.
E. g., Patterson v. Georgia, 208 Ga. 689, 69 S. E. 2d 84 (1952) ; Pulliam v. Georgia, 199 Ga. 709, 35 S. E. 2d 250 (1945); Rogers v. Georgia, 129 Ga. 589, 59 S. E. 288 (1907); Echols v. Georgia, 87 Ga. App. 565, 74 S. E. 2d 474 (1953); Bivins v. McDonald, 50 Ga. App. 299, 177 S. E. 829 (1934).
Cf. Williams v. Georgia, 12 Ga. App. 337, 77 S. E. 189 (1913), in which the presence on the jury of a juror previously convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude was deemed to warrant a new trial on a motion after verdict, as compared with an extraordinary motion after final judgment.
Cf. the following cases in which new trials were granted on motion after verdict, as compared with an extraordinary motion after final judgment, because of a juror’s disqualification. Harris v. Georgia, 188 Ga. 745, 4 S. E. 2d 651 (1939); Ethridge v. Georgia, 164 Ga. 53, 137 S. E. 784 (1927); Currie v. Georgia, 156 Ga. 85, 118 S. E. 724 (1923); O’Berry v. Georgia, 153 Ga. 644, 113 S. E. 2 (1922); Merritt v. Georgia, 152 Ga. 405, 110 S. E. 160 (1921); Hubbard v. Georgia, 5 Ga. App. 599, 63 S. E. 588 (1909); Perrett v. Georgia, 16 Ga. App. 587, 85 S. E. 820 (1915); Cray v. Georgia, 37 Ga. App. 371, 140 S. E. 402 (1927).
Under Georgia practice, the headnotes to cases are written by the court. The headnote in this case said: “Held, that conviction for murder and sentence of death on the verdict of a juror so utterly destitute of truth and uprightness of character, would shock the conscience of civilization, and soil the purity of jury trial; and no matter how heinous the crime committed, the preservation of that purity is of more consequence than the speedy punishment of any one man for any one offense, and public policy, as well as individual right, demand a new trial.”
In Wallace v. Georgia, 205 Ga. 751, 55 S. E. 2d 145 (1949), affidavits similar to those in the Boyal case were presented by the defendant, but the State introduced positive affidavits to the effect that no such statements by the juror had been made. The headnote written by the Georgia Supreme Court stated: “There was no manifest abuse of discretion by the trial judge in overruling [this] ground of the extraordinary motion for a new trial, based upon conflicting evidence as to the alleged disqualification of the juror therein referred to.” (205 Ga., at 752, 55 S. E. 2d, at 146.)
In Bloodworth v. Georgia, 161 Ga. 332, 334, 131 S. E. 80, 81 (1925), it was stated that in a prior trial defendant was granted a new trial on an extraordinary motion after final judgment because a juror was disqualified.
In Harris v. Georgia, 150 Ga. 680, 104 S. E. 902 (1920), the defendant was sentenced to death for murder, a motion for a new trial was denied, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. An extraordinary motion for new trial was overruled by the trial court, but the State Supreme Court reversed. The ground of the reversal was that after the jury had informed the judge that they could not agree, a deputy sheriff gave them the judge’s message that he could not help them further, and then the deputy added, “the judge would keep them locked up until they did make a verdict,” after which a verdict was brought in.
Some of these cases are not entirely clear. For example, Lump-kin stated that all objections to the impaneling of the grand jury should be made by challenge to the array before the indictment is found, where the illegality is known, or, if not known, by plea in abatement to the indictment; objections to “certain jurors” on the trial jury should be raised by a challenge to the juror when put upon the defendant. This rule is cited in Cornelious for the proposition that an objection to both grand and petit juries must be made by a challenge to the array before indictment or by plea in abatement before trial. In Kato v. Georgia, 33 Ga. App. 342, 126 S. E. 266 (1925), the grand jury rule was applied to individual grand jurors rather than to the panel, and the challenge was said to be one to the array. And in Moon v. Georgia, 68 Ga. 687 (1882), it was said that an objection to a single juror should be made by a challenge to the array. Cf. note 16, infra.
E. g., Fudge v. Georgia, 190 Ga. 340, 9 S. E. 2d 259 (1940); Bryan v. Georgia, 124 Ga. 79, 52 S. E. 298 (1905); Taylor v. Georgia, 121 Ga. 348, 49 S. E. 303 (1904). In Georgia, challenges to the array go to the form and manner of making up the entire panel, whereas challenges to the poll are directed solely to the individual juror. See Humphries v. Georgia, 100 Ga. 260, 262, 28 S. E. 25, 26 (1897); Mitchell v. Georgia, 69 Ga. App. 771, 776, 26 S. E. 2d 663, 667 (1943).
210 Ga. 665, 668, 82 S. E. 2d 217, 219.
Even if extraordinary motion is the appropriate remedy, local practice may require Williams to be
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question here is whether Congress intended 18 U. S. C. § 3501 to discard, or merely to narrow, the rule in McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957), under which an arrested person’s confession is inadmissible if given after an unreasonable delay in bringing him before a judge. We hold that Congress meant to limit, not eliminate, McNabb-Mallory.
I
A
The common law obliged an arresting officer to bring his prisoner before a magistrate as soon as he reasonably could. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 61-62 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This “presentment” requirement tended to prevent secret detention and served to inform a suspect of the charges against him, and it was the law in nearly every American State and the National Government. See id., at 60-61; McNabb, supra, at 342, and n. 7.
McNabb v. United States raised the question of how to enforce a number of federal statutes codifying the presentment rule. 318 U. S., at 342 (citing, among others, 18 U. S. C. § 595 (1940 ed.), which provided that “ ‘[i]t shall be the duty of the marshal... who may arrest a person... to take the defendant before the nearest... judicial officer... for a hearing’”). There, federal agents flouted the requirement by interrogating several murder suspects for days before bringing them before a magistrate, and then only after they had given the confessions that convicted them. 318 U. S., at 334-338, 344-345.
On the defendants’ motions to exclude the confessions from evidence, we saw no need to reach any constitutional issue. Instead we invoked the supervisory power to establish and maintain “civilized standards of procedure and evidence” in federal courts, id., at 340, which we exercised for the sake of making good on the traditional obligation embodied in the federal presentment legislation. We saw both the statutes and the traditional rule as aimed not only at cheeking the likelihood of resort to the third degree but meant generally to “avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime.” Id., at 344. We acknowledged that “Congress ha[d] not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence... procured” in derogation of the presentment obligation, id., at 345, but we realized that “permitting] such evidence to be made the basis of a conviction in the federal courts would stultify the policy which Congress ha[d] enacted into law,” ibid., and in the exercise of supervisory authority we held confessions inadmissible when obtained during unreasonable presentment delay.
Shortly after McNabb, the combined action of the Judicial Conference of the United States and Congress produced Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which pulled the several statutory presentment provisions together in one place. See Mallory, supra, at 452 (describing Rule 5(a) as “a compendious restatement, without substantive change, of several prior specific federal statutory provisions”). As first enacted, the rule told “[a]n officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant [to] take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States.” Fed. Rule Grim. Proc. 5(a) (1946). The rule remains much the same today: “A person making an arrest within the United States must take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge....” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5(a)(1)(A) (2007).
A case for applying McNabb and Rule 5(a) together soon arose in Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410 (1948). Despite the Government’s confession of error, the D. C. Circuit had thought McNabb’s exclusionary rule applied only to involuntary confessions obtained by coercion during the period of delay, 335 U. S., at 411-412, and so held the defendant’s voluntary confession admissible into evidence. This was error, and we reiterated the reasoning of a few years earlier. “In the McNabb case we held that the plain purpose of the requirement that prisoners should promptly be taken before committing magistrates was to check resort by officers to ‘secret interrogation of persons accused of crime.’ ” Id., at 412 (quoting McNabb, supra, at 344). Upshaw consequently emphasized that even voluntary confessions are inadmissible if given after an unreasonable delay in presentment. 335 U. S., at 413.
We applied Rule 5(a) again in Mallory v. United States, holding a confession given seven hours after arrest inadmissible for “unnecessary delay” in presenting the suspect to a magistrate, where the police questioned the suspect for hours “within the vicinity of numerous committing magistrates.” 354 U. S., at 455. Again, we repeated the reasons for the rule and explained, as we had before and have since, that delay for the purpose of interrogation is the epitome of “unnecessary delay.” Id., at 455-456; see also McLaughlin, supra, at 61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It was clear” at common law “that the only element bearing upon the reasonableness of delay was not such circumstances as the pressing need to conduct further investigation, but the arresting officer’s ability, once the prisoner had been secured, to reach a magistrate”); Upshaw, supra, at 414. Thus, the rule known simply as McNabb-Mallory “generally render[s] inadmissible confessions made during periods of detention that violat[e] the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a).” United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 354 (1994).
There the law remained until 1968, when Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. § 3501 in response to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and to the application of McNabb-Mallory in some federal courts. Subsections (a) and (b) of §3501 were meant to eliminate Miranda. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 435-437 (2000); infra, at 318. Subsection (a) provides that “[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by the United States..., a confession... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given,” while subsection (b) lists several considerations for courts to address in assessing voluntariness. Subsection (c), which focused on McNabb-Mallory, see infra, at 318, provides that in any federal prosecution, “a confession made... by... a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest..., shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate judge... if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily... and if such confession was made... within six hours [of arrest]”; the 6-hour time limit is extended when further delay is “reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available [magistrate judge].”
The issue in this case is whether Congress intended § 3501(a) to sweep McNabb-Mallory’s exclusionary rule aside entirely, or merely meant § 3501(c) to provide immunization to voluntary confessions given within six hours of a suspect's arrest.
B
Petitioner Johnnie Corley was suspected of robbing a bank in Norristown, Pennsylvania. After federal agents learned that Corley was subject to arrest on an unrelated local matter, some federal and state officers went together to execute the state warrant on September 17,2003, and found him just as he was pulling out of a driveway in his ear. Corley nearly ran over one officer, then jumped out of the car, pushed the officer down, and ran. The agents gave chase and caught and arrested him for assaulting a federal officer. The arrest occurred about 8 a.m. 500 F. 3d 210, 212 (CA3 2007).
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents first kept Corley at a local police station while they questioned residents near the place he was captured. Around 11:45 a.m. they took him to a Philadelphia hospital to treat a minor cut on his hand that he got during the chase. At 3:30 p.m. the agents took him from the hospital to the Philadelphia FBI office and told him that he was a suspect in the Norristown bank robbery. Though the office was in the same building as the chambers of the nearest magistrate judges, the agents did not bring Corley before a magistrate judge, but questioned him instead, in hopes of getting a confession. App. 68-69, 83, 138-139.
The agents' repeated arguments sold Corley on the benefits of cooperating with the Government, and he signed a form waiving his Miranda rights. At 5:27 p.m., some 9.5 hours after his arrest, Corley began an oral confession that he robbed the bank, App. 62, and spoke on in this vein until about 6:30, when agents asked him to put it all in writing. Corley said he was tired and wanted a break, so the agents decided to hold him overnight and take the written statement the next morning. At 10:30 a.m. on September 18 they began the interrogation again, which ended when Corley signed a written confession. He was finally presented to a Magistrate Judge at 1:30 p.m. that day, 29.5 hours after his arrest. 500 F. 3d, at 212.
Corley was charged with armed bank robbery, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2113(a), (d), conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, §371, and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, § 924(c). When he moved to suppress his oral and written confessions under Rule 5(a) and McNabb-Mallory, the District Court denied the motion, with the explanation that the time Corley was receiving medical treatment should be excluded from the delay, and that the oral confession was thus given within the 6-hour window of § 3501(e). Crim. No. 03-775 (ED Pa., May 10, 2004), App. 97. The District Court also held Corley’s written confession admissible, reasoning that “a break from interrogation requested by an arrestee who has already begun his confession does not constitute unreasonable delay under Rule 5(a).” Id., at 97-98. Corley was convicted of conspiracy and armed robbery but acquitted of using a firearm during a crime of violence. 500 F. 3d, at 212-213.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, though its rationale for rejecting Corley’s Rule 5(a) argument was different from the District Court’s. The panel majority considered itself bound by Circuit precedent to the effect that § 3501 entirely abrogated the McNabb-Mallory rule and replaced it with a pure voluntariness test. See 500 F. 3d, at 212 (citing Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F. 2d 914 (CA3 1974)). As the majority saw it, if a district court found a confession voluntary after considering the points listed in § 3501(b), it would be admissible, regardless of whether delay in presentment was unnecessary or unreasonable. 500 F. 3d, at 217. Judge Sloviter read Gereau differently and dissented with an opinion that “§3501 does not displace Rule 5(a)” or abrogate McNabb-Mallory for presentment delays beyond six hours. 500 F. 3d, at 236.
We granted certiorari to resolve a division in the Courts of Appeals on the reach of §3501. 554 U. S. 945 (2008). Compare United States v. Glover, 104 F. 3d 1570, 1583 (CA10 1997) (§ 3501 entirely supplanted McNabb-Mallory); United States v. Christopher, 956 F. 2d 536, 538-539 (CA6 1991) (per curiam) (same), with United States v. Mansoori, 304 F. 3d 635, 660 (CA7 2002) (§ 3501 limited the McNabb-Mallory rule to periods more than six hours after arrest); United States v. Perez, 733 F. 2d 1026, 1031-1032 (CA2 1984) (same). We now vacate and remand.
II
The Government’s argument focuses on § 3501(a), which provides that any confession “shall be admissible in evidence” in federal court “if it is voluntarily given.” To the Government, subsection (a) means that once a district court looks to the considerations in § 3501(b) and finds a confession voluntary, in it comes; (a) entirely eliminates McNabbMallory with its bar to admitting even a voluntary confession if given during an unreasonable delay in presentment.
Corley argues that § 3501(a) was meant to overrule Miranda and nothing more, with no effect on McNabb-Mallory, which §3501 touches only in subsection (c). By providing that a confession “shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay” in presentment if “made voluntarily and... within six hours [of arrest],” subsection (c) leaves McNabb-Mallory inapplicable to confessions given within the six hours, but when a confession comes even later, the exclusionary rule applies and courts have to see whether the delay was unnecessary or unreasonable.
Corley has the better argument.
A
The fundamental problem with the Government’s reading of § 3501 is that it renders § 3501(c) nonsensical and superfluous. Subsection (c) provides that a confession “shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay” in presentment if the confession is “made voluntarily and... within six hours [of arrest].” If (a) really meant that any voluntary confession was admissible, as the Government contends, then (c) would add nothing; if a confession was “made voluntarily” it would be admissible, period, and never “inadmissible solely because of delay,” no matter whether the delay went beyond six hours. There is no way out of this, and the Government concedes it. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33 (“Congress never needed (c); (c) in the [Government's view was always superfluous”).
The Government’s reading is thus at odds with one of the most basic interpretive canons, that “‘[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant....’” Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction §46.06, pp. 181-186 (rev. 6th ed. 2000); footnote omitted). The Government attempts to mitigate its problem by rewriting (c) into a clarifying, if not strictly necessary, provision: although Congress wrote that a confession “shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay” if the confession is “made voluntarily and... within six hours [of arrest],” the Government tells us that Congress actually meant that a confession “shall not be [involuntary] solely because of delay” if the confession is “[otherwise voluntary] and... [made] within six hours [of arrest].” Thus rewritten, (c) would coexist peacefully (albeit inelegantly) with (a), with (c) simply specifying a bright-line rule applying (a) to cases of delay: it would tell courts that delay alone does not make a confession involuntary unless the delay exceeds six hours.
To this proposal, “ ‘[t]he short answer is that Congress did not write the statute that way.’ ” Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 773 (1979)). The Government may say that we can sensibly read “inadmissible” as “involuntary” because the words are “virtually synonymous... in this statutory context,” Brief for United States 23, but this is simply not so. To begin with, Congress used both terms in (c) itself, and “[w]e would not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.” Russello, supra, at 23. And there is, in fact, every reason to believe that Congress used the distinct terms very deliberately. Subsection (c) specifies two criteria that must be satisfied to prevent a confession from being “inadmissible solely because of delay”: the confession must be “[1] made voluntarily and... [2] within six hours [of arrest].” Because voluntariness is thus only one of several criteria for admissibility under (c), “involuntary” and “inadmissible” plainly cannot be synonymous. What is more, the Government’s argument ignores the fact that under the McNabb-Mallory rule, which we presume Congress was aware of, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 699 (1979), “inadmissible” and “involuntary” mean different things. As we explained before and as the Government concedes, McNabb-Mallory makes even voluntary confessions inadmissible if given after an unreasonable delay in presentment, Upshaw, 335 U. S., at 413; Tr. of Oral Arg. 33 (“[I]t was well understood that McNabb-Mallory... excluded totally voluntary confessions”). So we cannot accept the Government’s attempt to confuse the critically distinct terms “involuntary” and “inadmissible” by rewriting (c) into a bright-line rule doing nothing more than applying (a).
Corley’s position, in contrast, gives effect to both (c) and (a), by reading (a) as overruling Miranda and (c) as qualifying McNabb-Mallory. The Government answers, however, that accepting Corley’s argument would result in a different problem: it would create a conflict between (c) and (a), since (a) provides that all voluntary confessions are admissible while Corley’s reading of (c) leaves some voluntary confessions inadmissible. But the Government’s counterargument falls short for two reasons. First, even if (a) is read to be at odds with (c), the conflict is resolved by recognizing that (a) is a broad directive while (c) aims only at McNabbMallory, and “a more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one....” Busic v. United States, 446 U. S. 398, 406 (1980). Second, and more fundamentally, (a) cannot prudently be read to create a conflict with (c), not only because it would make (c) superfluous, as explained, but simply because reading (a) that way would create conflicts with so many other rules that the subsection cannot possibly be given its literal scope. Subsection (a) provides that “[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by the United States..., a confession... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given,” and § 3501(e) defines “confession” as “any confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in writing.” Thus, if the Government seriously urged a literal reading, (a) would mean that “[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by the United States..., [‘any self-incriminating statement’ with respect to ‘any criminal offense’]... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.” Thus would many a Rule of Evidence be overridden in case after case: a defendant’s self-incriminating statement to his lawyer would be admissible despite his insistence on attorney-client privilege; a fourth-hand hearsay statement the defendant allegedly made would come in; and a defendant’s confession to an entirely unrelated crime committed years earlier would be admissible without more. These are some of the absurdities of literalism that show that Congress could not have been writing in a literalistic frame of mind.
B
As it turns out, there is more than reductio ad absurdum and the antisuperfluousness canon to confirm that subsection (a) leaves McNabb-Mallory alone, for that is what legislative history says. In fact, the Government concedes that subsections (a) and (b) were aimed at Miranda, while subsection (c) was meant to modify the presentment exclusionary rule. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38 (“I will concede to you... that section (a) was considered to overrule Miranda[,] and subsection (c) was addressed to McNabb-Mallory”). The concession is unavoidable. The Senate, where § 3501 originated, split the provision into two parts: division 1 contained subsections (a) and (b), and division 2 contained subsection (c). 114 Cong. Rec. 14171 (1968). In the debate on the Senate floor immediately before voting on these proposals, several Senators, including the section’s prime sponsor, Senator McClellan, explained that division 1 “has to do with the Miranda decision,” while division 2 related to Mallory. 114 Cong. Rec. 14171-14172. This distinct intent was confirmed by the separate Senate votes adopting the two measures, division 1 by 55 to 29 and division 2 by 58 to 26, id., at 14171-14172, 14174-14175; if (a) did abrogate McNabb-Mallory, as the Government claims, then voting for division 2 would have been entirely superfluous, for the division 1 vote would already have done the job. That aside, a sponsor's statement to the full Senate carries considerable weight, and Senator McClellan’s explanation that division 1 was specifically addressed to Miranda confirms that (a) and (b) were never meant to reach far enough to abrogate other background evidentiary rules including McNabb-Mallory.
Further legislative history not only drives that point home, but conclusively shows an intent that subsection (c) limit McNabb-Mallory, not replace it. In its original draft, subsection (e) would indeed have done away with McNabb-Mallory completely, for the bill as first written would have provided that “[i]n any criminal prosecution by the United States..., a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein... shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a [magistrate judge] if such confession is... made voluntarily.” S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 44-45 (1968) (as reported by Senate Committee on the Judiciary); 114 Cong. Rec. 14172. The provision so conceived was resisted, however, by a number of Senators worried about allowing indefinite presentment delays. See, e. g., id., at 11740, 13990 (Sen. Tydings) (the provision would “permit Federal criminal suspects to be questioned indefinitely before they are presented to a committing magistrate”); id., at 12290 (Sen. Fong) (the provision “would open the doors to such practices as holding suspects incommunicado for an indefinite period”). After Senator Tydings proposed striking (c) from the bill altogether, id., at 13651 (Amendment No. 788), Senator Scott introduced the compromise of qualifying (c) with the words: “‘and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours following his arrest or other detention,’” id., at 14184-14185 (Amendment No. 805). The amendment was intended to eonfine McNabb-Mallory to excluding only confessions given after more than six hours of delay, see 114 Cong. Rec. 14184 (remarks of Sen. Scott) (“My amendment provides that the period during which confessions may be received... shall in no case exceed 6 hours”), and it was explicitly modeled on the provision Congress had passed just months earlier to govern presentment practice in the District of Columbia, Title III of An Act Relating to Crime and Criminal Procedure in the District of Columbia (D. C. Crime Act), § 301(b), 81 Stat. 735-736, see, e.g., 114 Cong. Rec. 14184 (remarks of Sen. Scott) (“My amendment is an attempt to conform, as nearly as practicable, to title III of [the D. C. Crime Act]”). By the terms of that Act, “[a]ny statement, admission, or confession made by an arrested person within three hours immediately following his arrest shall not be excluded from evidence in the courts of the District of Columbia solely because of delay in presentment.” § 301(b), 81 Stat. 735-736. Given the clear intent that Title III modify but not eliminate McNabb-Mallory in the District of Columbia, see, e. g., S. Rep. No. 912, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 17-18 (1967), using it as a model plainly shows how Congress meant as much but no more in § 3501(c).
In sum, the legislative history strongly favors Corley’s reading. The Government points to nothing in this history supporting its view that (c) created a bright-line rule for applying (a) in cases with a presentment issue.
C
It also counts heavily against the position of the United States that it would leave the Rule 5 presentment requirement without any teeth, for as the Government again is forced to admit, if there is no McNabb-Mallory there is no apparent remedy for delay in presentment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. One might not care if the prompt presentment requirement were just some administrative nicety, but in fact the rule has always mattered in very practical ways and still does. As we said, it stretches back to the common law, when it was “one of the most important” protections “against unlawful arrest.” McLaughlin, 500 U. S., at 60-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Today presentment is the point at which the judge is required to take several key steps to foreclose Government overreaching: informing the defendant of the charges against him, his right to remain silent, his right to counsel, the availability of bail, and any right to a preliminary hearing; giving the defendant a chance to consult with counsel; and deciding between detention or release. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5(d); see also Rule 58(b)(2).
In a world without McNabb-Mallory, federal agents would be free to question suspects for extended periods before bringing them out in the open, and we have always known what custodial secrecy leads to. See McNabb, 318 U. S. 332. No one with any smattering of the history of 20th-century dictatorships needs a lecture on the subject, and we understand the need even within our own system to take care against going too far. “[Cjustodial police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the individual,” Dick erson, 530 U. S., at 435, and there is mounting empirical evidence that these pressures can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed, see, e. g., Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N. C. L. Rev. 891, 906-907 (2004).
Justice Frankfurter’s point in McNabb is as fresh as ever: “The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards.” 318 U. S., at 347. McNabb-Mallory is one of them, and neither the text nor the history of § 3501 makes out a case that Congress meant to do away with it.
Ill
The Government’s fallback claim is that even if § 3501 preserved a limited version of McNabb-Mallory, Congress cut out the rule altogether by enacting Federal Rule of Evidence 402 in 1975. Act of Jan. 2, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. So far as it might matter here, that rule provides that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.” Id., at 1931. The Government says that McNabb-Mallory excludes relevant evidence in a way not “otherwise provided by” any of these four authorities, and so has fallen to the scythe.
The Government never raised this argument in the Third Circuit or the District Court, which would justify refusing to consider it here, but in any event it has no merit. The Advisory Committee’s Notes on Rule 402, which were before Congress when it enacted the Rules of Evidence and which we have relied on in the past to interpret the rules, Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150, 160 (1995) (plurality opinion), expressly identified McNabb-Mallory as a statutorily authorized rule that would survive Rule 402: “The Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure in some instances require the exclusion of relevant evidence. For example,... the effective enforcement of... Rule 5(a)... is held to require the exclusion of statements elicited during detention in violation thereof.” 28 U. S. C. App., pp. 325-326 (citing Mallory, 354 U. S. 449, and 18 U. S. C. § 3501(c)); see also Mallory, supra, at 451 (“Th[is] case calls for the proper application of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure... ”). Indeed, the Government has previously conceded before this Court that Rule 402 preserved McNabb-Mallory. Brief for United States in United States v. Payner, O. T. 1979, No. 78-1729, p. 32, and n. 13 (saying that Rule 402 “left to the courts... questions concerning the propriety of excluding relevant evidence as a method of implementing the Constitution, a federal statute, or a statutorily authorized rule,” and citing McNabb-Mallory as an example). The Government was right the first time, and it would be bizarre to hold that Congress adopted Rule 402 with a purpose exactly opposite to what the Advisory Committee Notes said the rule would do.
IV
We hold that §3501 modified McNabb-Mallory without supplanting it. Under the rule as revised by § 3501(c), a district court with a suppression claim must find whether the defendant confessed within six hours of arrest (unless a longer delay was “reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available [magistrate judge]”). If the confession came within that period, it is admissible, subject to the other Rules of Evidence, so long as it was “made voluntarily and... the weight to be given [it] is left to the jury.” Ibid. If the confession occurred before presentment and beyond six hours, however, the court must decide whether delaying that long was unreasonable or unnecessary under the McNabb-Mallory cases, and if it was, the confession is to be suppressed.
In this case, the Third Circuit did not apply this rule and in consequence never conclusively determined whether Corley’s oral confession “should be treated as having been made within six hours of arrest,” as the District Court held. 500 F. 3d, at 220, n. 7. Nor did the Circuit consider the justifiability of any delay beyond six hours if the oral confession should be treated as given outside the 6-hour window; and it did not make this enquiry with respect to Corley’s written confession. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for consideration of those issues in the first instance, consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice & alia, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
Section 3501(a) of Title 18, United States Code, directly and unequivocally answers the question presented in this case. After petitioner was arrested by federal agents, he twice waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily confessed, first orally and later in writing, that he had participated in an armed bank robbery. He was then taken before a Magistrate Judge for an initial appearance. The question that we must decide is whether this voluntary confession may be suppressed on the ground that there was unnecessary delay in bringing petitioner before the Magistrate Judge. Unless the unambiguous language of § 3501(a) is ignored, petitioner’s confession may not be suppressed.
I
Section 3501(a) states: “In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States..., a confession... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.”
Applying “settled principles of statutory construction,” “we must first determine whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous,” and “[i]f it is, we must apply the statute according to its terms.” Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U. S. 379, 387 (2009). Here, there is nothing ambiguous about the language of § 3501(a), and the Court does not claim otherwise. Although we normally presume that Congress “means in a statute what it says there,” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-254 (1992), the Court today concludes that § 3501(a) does not mean what it says and that a voluntary confession may be suppressed under the McNdbbMallory rule. This supervisory rule, which requires the suppression of a confession where there was unnecessary delay in bringing a federal criminal defendant before a judicial officer after arrest, was announced long before 18 U. S. C. § 3501(a) was adopted. According to the Court, this rule survived the enactment of § 3501(a) because Congress adopted that provision for the sole purpose of abrogating Miranda and apparently never realized that the provision’s broad language would also do away with the McNabbMallory rule. I disagree with the Court’s analysis and therefore respectfully dissent.
II
A
The Court’s first and most substantial argument invokes “
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The National Labor Relations Act (Act) affords employees the rights to organize and to engage in collective bargaining free from employer interference. The Act does not grant those rights to supervisory employees, however, so the statutory definition of supervisor becomes essential in determining which employees are covered by the Act. In this case, we decide the narrow question whether the National Labor Relations Board’s (Board’s) test for determining if a nurse is a supervisor is consistent with the statutory definition.
I
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. Act of July 5,1935, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449. In the early years of its operation, the Act did not exempt supervisory employees from its coverage; as a result, supervisory employees could organize as part of bargaining units and negotiate with the employer. Employers complained that this produced an imbalance between labor and management, but in 1947 this Court refused to carve out a supervisory employee exception from the Act’s broad coverage. The Court stated that “it is for Congress, not for us, to create exceptions or qualifications at odds with [the Act’s] plain terms.” Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 490 (1947). Later that year, Congress did just that, amending the statute so that the term “ ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor.” 61 Stat. 137-138, codified at 29 U. S. C. § 152(3). Congress defined a supervisor as:
“[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.” 61 Stat. 138, codified at 29 U. S. C. § 152(11).
As the Board has stated, the statute requires the resolution of three questions; and each must be answered in the affirmative if an employee is to be deemed a supervisor. First, does the employee have authority to engage in 1 of the 12 listed activities? Second, does the exercise of that authority require “the use of independent judgment”? Third, does the employee hold the authority “in the interest of the employer”? Nortkcrest Nursing Home, 313 N. L. R. B. 491, 493 (1993). This case concerns only the third question, and our decision turns upon the proper interpretation of the statutory phrase “in the interest of the employer.”'
In cases involving nurses, the Board admits that it has interpreted the statutory phrase in a unique manner. Tr. of Oral Arg. 52 (Board: “[t]he Board has not applied a theory that’s phrased in the same terms to other categories of professionals”). The Board has held that “a nurse’s direction of less-skilled employees, in the exercise of professional judgment incidental to the treatment of patients, is not authority exercised ‘in the interest of the employer.’” Pet. for <pert. 15. As stated in reviewing its position on this issue in its recent decision in Northcrest Nursing Home, supra, at 491-492, the Board believes that its special interpretation of “in the interest of the employer” in cases involving nurses is necessary because professional employees (including registered nurses) are not excluded from coverage under the Act. See 29 U. S. C. § 152(12). Respondent counters that “[tjhere is simply no basis in the language of the statute to conclude that direction given to aides in the interest of nursing home residents, pursuant to professional norms, is not ‘in the interest of the employer.’ ” Brief for Respondent 30.
In this case, the Board’s General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that respondent, the owner and operator of the Heartland Nursing Home in Urbana, Ohio, had committed unfair labor practices in disciplining four licensed practical nurses. At Heartland, the Director of Nursing has overall responsibility for the nursing department. There is also an Assistant Director of Nursing, 9 to 11 staff nurses (including both registered nurses and the four licensed practical nurses involved in this case), and 50 to 55 nurses’ aides. The staff nurses are the senior ranking employees on duty after 5 p.m. during the week and at all times on weekends— approximately 75% of the time. The staff nurses have responsibility to ensure adequate staffing; to make daily work assignments; to monitor the aides’ work to ensure proper performance; to counsel and discipline aides; to resolve aides’ problems and grievances; to evaluate aides’ performances; and to report to management. In light of these varied activities, respondent contended, among other things, that the four nurses involved in this case were supervisors, and so not protected under the Act. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, concluding that the nurses were not supervisors. The ALJ stated that the nurses’ supervisory work did not “equate to responsibly ... directing] the aides in the interest of the employer,” noting that “the nurses’ focus is on the well-being of the residents rather than of the employer.” 306 N. L. R. B. 68, 70 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). The Board stated only that “[t]he judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent’s staff nurses are employees within the meaning of the Act.” 306 N. L. R. B. 63, 63, n. 1 (1992).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 987 F. 2d 1256 (1993). The Court of Appeals had decided in earlier cases that the Board’s test for determining the supervisory status of nurses was inconsistent with the statute. See Beverly California Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F. 2d 1548 (1992); NLRB v. Beacon Light Christian Nursing Home, 825 F. 2d 1076 (1987). In Beverly, for example, the court had stated that “the notion that direction given to subordinate personnel to ensure that the employer’s nursing home customers receive ‘quality care’ somehow fails to qualify as direction given ‘in the interest of the employer’ makes very little sense to us.” 970 F. 2d, at 1552. Addressing the instant case, the court followed Beverly and again held the Board’s interpretation inconsistent with the statute. 987 F. 2d, at 1260. The court further stated that “it is up to Congress to carve out an exception for the health care field, including nurses, should Congress not wish for such nurses to be considered supervisors.” Id., at 1261. The court “reminded] the Board that it is the courts, and not the Board, who bear the final responsibility for interpreting the law.” Id., at 1260. After concluding that the Board’s test was inconsistent with the statute, the court found that the four licensed practical nurses involved in this case were supervisors. Id., at 1260-1261.
We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 810 (1993), to resolve the conflict in the Courts of Appeals over the validity of the Board’s rule. See, e. g., Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 933 F. 2d 626 (CA8 1991); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F. 2d 1461 (CA7 1983); Misericordia Hospital Medical Center v. NLRB, 623 F. 2d 808 (CA2 1980).
II
We must decide whether the Board’s test for determining if nurses are supervisors is rational and consistent with the Act. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U. S. 27, 42 (1987). We agree with the Court of Appeals that it is not.
A
The Board’s interpretation, that a nurse’s supervisory activity is not exercised in the interest of the employer if it is incidental to the treatment of patients, is similar to an approach the Board took, and we rejected, in NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U. S. 672 (1980). There, we had to determine whether faculty members at Yeshiva were “managerial employees.” Managerial employees are those who “formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer.” NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 288 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted). Like supervisory employees, managerial employees are excluded from the Act’s coverage. Id., at 283 (“so clearly outside the Act that no specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary”). The Board in Yeshiva argued that the faculty members were not managerial, contending that faculty authority was “exercised in the faculty’s own interest rather than in the interest of the university.” 444 U. S., at 685. To support its position, the Board placed much reliance on the faculty members’ independent professional role in designing the curriculum and in discharging their professional obligations to the students. We found the Board’s reasoning unpersuasive:
“In arguing that a faculty member exercising independent judgment acts primarily in his own interest and therefore does not represent the interest of his employer, the Board assumes that the professional interests of the faculty and the interests of the institution are distinct, separable entities with which a faculty member could not simultaneously be aligned. The Court of Appeals found no justification for this distinction, and we perceive none. In fact, the faculty’s professional interests — as applied to governance at a university like Yeshiva — cannot be separated from those of the institution.
“... The ‘business’ of a university is education.” Id., at 688.
The Board’s reasoning fares no better here than it did in Yeshiva. As in Yeshiva, the Board has created a false dichotomy — in this case, a dichotomy between acts taken in connection with patient care and acts taken in the interest of the employer. That dichotomy makes no sense. Patient care is the business of a nursing home, and it follows that attending to the needs of the nursing home patients, who are the employer’s customers, is in the interest of the employer. See Beverly California, supra, at 1553. We thus see no basis for the Board’s blanket assertion that supervisory authority exercised in connection with patient care is somehow not in the interest of the employer.
Our conclusion is supported by the case that gave impetus to the statutory provision now before us. In Packard Motor, we considered the phrase “in the interest of an employer” contained in the definition of “employer” in the original 1935 Act. We stated that “[e]very employee, from the very fact of employment in the master’s business, is required to act in his interest.” 330 U. S., at 488. We rejected the argument of the dissenters who, like the Board in this case, advanced the proposition that the phrase covered only “those who acted for management... in formulating [and] executing its labor policies.” Id., at 496 (Douglas, J., dissenting); cf. Reply Brief for Petitioner 4 (filed July 23, 1993) (nurses are supervisors when, “in addition to performing their professional duties and responsibilities, they also possess the authority to affect the job status or pay of employees working under them”). Consistent with the ordinary meaning of the phrase, the Court in Packard Motor determined that acts within the scope of employment or on the authorized business of the employer are “in the interest of the employer.” 330 U. S., at 488-489. There is no indication that Congress intended any different meaning when it included the phrase in the statutory definition of supervisor later in 1947. To be sure, Congress altered the result of Packard Motor, but it did not change the meaning of the phrase “in the interest of the employer” when doing so. And we of course have rejected the argument that a statute altering the result reached by a judicial decision necessarily changes the meaning of the language interpreted in that decision. See Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U. S. 158, 168 (1989).
Not only is the Board’s test inconsistent with Yeshiva, Packard Motor, and the ordinary meaning of the phrase “in the interest of the employer,” it also renders portions of the statutory definition in §2(11) meaningless. Under §2(11), an employee who in the course of employment uses independent judgment to engage in 1 of the 12 listed activities, including responsible direction of other employees, is a supervisor. Under the Board’s test, however, a nurse who in the course of employment uses independent judgment to engage in responsible direction of other employees is not a supervisor. Only a nurse who in the course of employment uses independent judgment to engage in one of the activities related to another employee’s job status or pay can qualify as a supervisor under the Board’s test. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 4 (filed July 23, 1993) (nurses are supervisors when they affect “job status or pay of employees working under them”). The Board provides no plausible justification, however, for reading the responsible direction portion of §2(11) out of the statute in nurse cases, and we can perceive none.
The Board defends its test by arguing that phrases in § 2(11) such as “independent judgment” and “responsibly to direct” are ambiguous, so the Board needs to be given ample room to apply them to different categories of employees. That is no doubt true, but it is irrelevant in this particular case because interpretation of those phrases is not the underpinning of the Board’s test. The Board instead has placed exclusive reliance on the “in the interest of the employer” language in §2(11). With respect to that particular phrase, we find no ambiguity supporting the Board’s position. It should go without saying, moreover, that ambiguity in one portion of a statute does not give the Board license to distort other provisions of the statute. Yet that is what the Board seeks us to sanction in this case.
The interpretation of the “in the interest of the employer” language mandated by our precedents and by the ordinary meaning of the phrase does not render the phrase meaningless in the statutory definition. The language ensures, for example, that union stewards who adjust grievances are not considered supervisory employees and deprived of the Act’s protections. But the language cannot support the Board’s argument that supervision of the care of patients is not in the interest of the employer. The welfare of the patient, after all, is no less the object and concern of the employer than it is of the nurses. And the statutory dichotomy the Board has created is no more justified in the health care field than it would be in any other business where supervisory duties are a necessary incident to the production of goods or the provision of services.
B
Because the Board’s test is inconsistent with both the statutory language and this Court’s precedents, the Board seeks to shift ground, putting forth a series of nonstatutory arguments. None of them persuades us that we can ignore the statutory language and our case law.
The Board first contends that we should defer to its test because, according to the Board, granting organizational rights to nurses whose supervisory authority concerns patient care does not threaten the conflicting loyalties that the supervisor exception was designed to avoid. Brief for Petitioner 25. We rejected the same argument in Yeshiva where the Board contended that there was “no danger of divided loyalty and no need for the managerial exclusion” for the Yeshiva faculty members. 444 U. S., at 684. And we must reject that reasoning again here. The Act is to be enforced according to its own terms, not by creating legal categories inconsistent with its meaning, as the Board has done in nurse cases. Whether the Board proceeds through adjudication or rulemaking, the statute must control the Board’s decision, not the other way around. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U. S. 790, 811 (1974); cf. Packard Motor, supra, at 493 (rejecting resort to policy and legislative history in interpreting meaning of the phrase “in the interest of the employer”). Even on the assumption, moreover, that the statute permits consideration of the potential for divided loyalties so that a unique interpretation is permitted in the health care field, we do not share the Board’s confidence that there is no danger of divided loyalty here. Nursing home owners may want to implement policies to ensure that patients receive the best possible care despite potential adverse reaction from employees working under the nurses’ direction. If so, the statute gives nursing home owners the ability to insist on the undivided loyalty of its nurses notwithstanding the Board’s impression that there is no danger of divided loyalty.
The Board also argues that “[t]he statutory criterion of having authority ‘in the interest of the employer’ . . . must not be read so broadly that it overrides Congress’s intention to accord the protections of the Act to professional employees.” Brief for Petitioner 26; see 29 U. S. C. § 152(12). The Act does not distinguish professional employees from other employees for purposes of the definition of supervisor in § 2(11). The supervisor exclusion applies to “any individual” meeting the statutory requirements, not to “any nonprofessional employee.” In addition, the Board relied on the same argument in Yeshiva, but to no avail. The Board argued that “the managerial exclusion cannot be applied in a straightforward fashion to professional employees because those employees often appear to be exercising managerial authority when they are merely performing routine job duties.” 444 U. S., at 683-684. Holding to the contrary, we said that the Board could not support a statutory distinction between the university’s interest and the managerial interest being exercised on its behalf. There is no reason for a different result here. To be sure, as recognized in Yeshiva, there may be “some tension between the Act’s exclusion of [supervisory and] managerial employees and its inclusion of professionals,” but we find no authority for “suggesting that that tension can be resolved” by distorting the statutory language in the manner proposed by the Board. Id., at 686.
Finally, as a reason for us to defer to its conclusion, the Board cites legislative history of the 1974 amendments to other sections of the Act. Those amendments did not alter the test for supervisory status in the health care field, yet the Board points to a statement in a Committee Report expressing apparent approval of the Board’s then-current application of its supervisory employee test to nurses. S. Rep. No. 93-766, p. 6 (1974); see Yeshiva, supra, at 690, n. 30. As an initial matter, it is far from clear that the Board in fact had a consistent test for nurses before 1974. Compare Avon Convalescent Center, Inc., 200 N. L. R. B. 702 (1972), with Doctors' Hospital of Modesto, Inc., 183 N. L. R. B. 950 (1970). In any event, the isolated statement in the 1974 Committee Report does not represent an authoritative interpretation of the phrase “in the interest of the employer,” which was enacted by Congress in 1947. “[I]t is the function of the courts and not the Legislature, much less a Committee of one House of the Legislature, to say what an enacted statute means.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 566 (1988). Indeed, in American Hospital Assn. v. NLRB, 499 U. S. 606 (1991), the petitioner pointed to isolated statements from the same 1974 Senate Report cited here and argued that they revealed Congress’ intent with respect to a provision of the original 1935 Act. We dismissed the argument, stating that such statements do not have “the force of law, for the Constitution is quite explicit about the procedure that Congress must follow in legislating.” Id., at 616; see also Betts, 492 U. S., at 168. In this case as well, we must reject the Board’s reliance on the 1974 Committee Report. If Congress wishes to enact the policies of the Board, it can do so without indirection. See generally Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., ante, at 185-188.
Ill
An examination of the professional’s duties (or in this case the duties of the four nonprofessional nurses) to determine whether 1 or more of the 12 listed activities is performed in a manner that makes the employee a supervisor is, of course, part of the Board’s routine and proper adjudicative function. In cases involving nurses, that inquiry no doubt could lead the Board in some cases to conclude that supervisory status has not been demonstrated. The Board has not sought to sustain its decision on that basis here, however. It has chosen instead to rely on an industrywide interpretation of the phrase “in the interest of the employer” that contravenes precedents of this Court and has no relation to the ordinary meaning of that language.
To be sure, in applying §2(11) in other industries, the Board on occasion reaches results reflecting a distinction between authority arising from professional knowledge and authority encompassing front-line management prerogatives. It is important to emphasize, however, that in almost all of those cases (unlike in cases involving nurses) the Board’s decisions did not result from manipulation of the statutory phrase “in the interest of the employer,” but instead from a finding that the employee in question had not met the other requirements for supervisory status under the Act, such as the requirement that the employee exercise one of the listed activities in a nonroutine manner. See supra, at 573 (listing other requirements for supervisory status). That may explain why the Board did not cite in its submissions to this Court a single case outside the health care field approving the interpretation of “in the interest of the employer” the Board uses in nurse cases. That the Board sometimes finds a professional employee not to be a supervisor when applying other elements of the statutory definition of §2(11) cannot be shoehorned into the conclusion that the Board can rely on its strained interpretation of the phrase “in the interest of the employer” in all nurse cases. If we accepted the Board’s position in this case, moreover, nothing would prevent the Board from applying this interpretation of “in the interest of the employer” to all professional employees.
We note further that our decision casts no doubt on Board or court decisions interpreting parts of §2(11) other than the specific phrase “in the interest of the employer.” Because the Board’s interpretation of “in the interest of the employer” is for the most part confined to nurse cases, our decision will have almost no effect outside that context. Any' parade of horribles about the meaning of this decision for employees in other industries is thus quite misplaced; indeed, the Board does not make that argument.
In sum, the Board’s test for determining the supervisory status of nurses is inconsistent with the statute and our precedents. The Board did not petition this Court to uphold its order in this case under any other theory. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 25. If the case presented the question whether these nurses were supervisors under the proper test, we would have given a lengthy exposition and analysis of the facts in the record. But as we have indicated, the Board made and defended its decision by relying on the particular test it has applied to nurses. Our conclusion that the Court of Appeals was correct to find the Board’s test inconsistent with the statute therefore suffices to resolve the case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
On March 24, 1986, after a jury trial in the Municipal Court of Beverly Hills Judicial District, California, appellant Eugene Carella was convicted of grand theft for failure to return a rented car. At his trial, the court adopted the prosecution’s requested instructions applying the statutory presumptions in Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 10855 (West 1987) and Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 484(b) (West 1988). Specifically, over Carella’s objection, the court charged the jury as follows:
(1) “Presumption Respecting Theft by Fraud:
“Intent to commit theft by fraud is presumed if one who has leased or rented the personal property of another pursuant to a written contract fails to return the personal property to its owner within 20 days after the owner has made written demand by certified or registered mail following the expiration of the lease or rental agreement for return of the property so leased or rented.”
(2) “Presumption Respecting Embezzlement of a Leased or Rented Vehicle:
“Whenever any person who has leased or rented a vehicle wilfully and intentionally fails to return the vehicle to its owner within five days after the lease or rental agreement has expired, that person shall be presumed to have embezzled the vehicle.” App. 15.
On appeal to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court, the prosecution confessed error, acknowledging that these two instructions unconstitutionally imposed conclusive presumptions as to core elements of Carella’s crime. The Appellate Department disagreed, however, and validated the presumptions on the ground that Carella “never offered testimony concerning the nonexistence of the presumed facts. ...” Id., at 61. This disposition was so plainly at odds with prior decisions of this Court that we noted probable jurisdiction, 488 U. S. 964 (1988), and now reverse.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies States the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970). Jury instructions relieving States of this burden violate a defendant’s due process rights. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979). Such directions subvert the presumption of innocence accorded to accused persons and also invade the truth-finding task assigned solely to juries in criminal cases.
We explained in Francis and Sandstrom that courts should ask whether the presumption in question is mandatory, that is, whether the specific instruction, both alone and in the context of the overall charge, could have been understood by reasonable jurors to require them to find the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts. See Sandstrom, supra, at 514. The prosecution understandably does not now dispute that the instructions in this case were phrased as commands, for those instructions were explicit and unqualified to that effect and were not explained elsewhere in the jury charge to be merely permissive. Carella’s jury was told first that a person “shall be presumed to have embezzled” a vehicle if it is not returned within 5 days of the expiration of the rental agreement; and second, that “intent to commit theft by fraud is presumed” from failure to return rented property within 20 days of demand.
These mandatory directions directly foreclosed independent jury consideration of whether the facts proved established certain elements of the offenses with which Carella was charged. The instructions also relieved the State of its burden of proof articulated in Winship, namely, proving by evidence every essential element of Carella’s crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The two instructions violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
The State insists that the error was in any event harmless. As we have in similar cases, we do not decide that issue here. In Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, at 515, the jury in a murder case was instructed that the “law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.” We held that, because the jury might have understood the presumption to be conclusive or as shifting the burden of persuasion, the instruction was constitutional error. There was a claim of harmless error, however, and even though the jury might have considered the presumption to be conclusive, we remanded for the state court to consider the issue if it so chose.
In Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570 (1986), we again said that a Sandstrom error is subject to the harmless-error rule. “Nor is Sandstrom error equivalent to a directed verdict for the State. When a jury is instructed to presume malice from predicate facts, it still must find the existence of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U. S. 73, 96-97 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting). In many cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury. ... In that event the erroneous instruction is simply superfluous: the jury has found, in Winship’s words, ‘every fact necessary’ to establish every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rose, supra, at 580-581 (footnote and citations omitted). We also observed that although we have the authority to make the harmless-error determination ourselves, we do not ordinarily do so. Hence, we remanded the case for the lower court to make that determination in the first instance.
We follow the same course here and reverse the judgment of the California court without deciding here whether no rational jury could find the predicate acts but fail to find the fact presumed. 478 U. S., at 580-581. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Department is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Carella was acquitted of the charged violation of Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 10851(a) (West 1987), which provides that the nonconsensual taking or driving of a vehicle is a “public offense” if accomplished with the specific “intent either to permanently or temporarily” deprive the owner of title or possession.
California Veh. Code Ann. § 10855 reads: “Whenever any person who has leased or rented a vehicle wilfully and intentionally fails to return the vehicle to its owner within five days after the lease or rental agreement has expired, that person shall be presumed to have embezzled the vehicle.”
California Penal Code Ann. § 484(b) reads: “Except as provided in Section 10855 of the Vehicle Code, intent to commit theft by fraud is presumed if one who has leased or rented the personal property of another pursuant to a written contract fails to return the personal property to its owner within 20 days after the owner has made written demand by certified or registered mail following the expiration of the lease or rental agreement for return of the property so leased or rented.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether the Sherman Act extends to an agreement among real estate brokers in a market area to conform to a fixed rate of brokerage commissions on sales of residential property.
I
The complaint in this private antitrust action, filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana in 1975, alleges that real estate brokers in the Greater New Orleans area have engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1. No trial has as yet been had on the merits of the claims since the complaint was dismissed for failure to establish the interstate commerce component of Sherman Act jurisdiction.
The complaint asserts a claim individually and on behalf of that class of persons who employed the services of a respondent real estate broker in the purchase or sale of residential property in the Louisiana parishes of Jefferson or Orleans (the Greater New Orleans area) during the four years preceding the filing of the complaint. The respondents are two real estate trade associations, six named real estate firms, and that class of real estate brokers who at some time during the period covered by the complaint transacted realty brokerage business in the Greater New Orleans area and charged a brokerage fee for their services. The unlawful conduct alleged is a continuing combination and conspiracy among the respondents to fix, control, raise, and stabilize prices for the purchase and sale of residential real estate by the systematic use of fixed commission rates, widespread fee splitting, suppression of market information useful to buyers and sellers, and other allegedly anticompetitive practices. The complaint asserts that respondents’ conduct has injured petitioners in their business or property because the fees and commissions charged for brokerage services have been maintained at an artificially high and noncompetitive level, with the effect that the prices of residential properties have been artificially raised. The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief as authorized by §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 15, 26.
The allegations of the complaint pertinent to establishing federal jurisdiction are:
(1) that the activities of the respondents are “within the flow of interstate commerce and have an effect upon that commerce”;
(2) that the services of respondents were employed in connection with the purchase and sale of real estate by “persons moving into and out of the Greater New Orleans area”;
(3) that respondents “assist their clients in securing financing and insurance involved with the purchase of real estate in the Greater New Orleans area,” which “financing and insurance are obtained from sources outside the State of Louisiana and move in interstate commerce into the State of Louisiana through the activities of the [respondents]”; and
(4) that respondents have engaged in an unlawful restraint of “interstate trade and commerce in the offering for sale and sale of real estate brokering services.”
Respondents moved in the District Court to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim within the ambit of the Sherman Act. This motion was supported by a memorandum and by the affidavits of two officers of respondent Real Estate Board of New Orleans. The affiants testified that real estate brokers in Louisiana were licensed to perform their function in that State only, that there was no legal or other requirement that real estate brokers be employed in connection with the purchase or sale of real estate within Louisiana, and that the affiants had personal knowledge of such transactions occurring without the assistance of brokers. The function of real estate brokers was described as essentially completed when buyer and seller had been brought together on agreeable terms. The affiants also stated that real estate brokers did not obtain and were not instrumental in obtaining financing of credit sales, save in a few special cases, nor were they involved with examination of titles in connection with the sale of real estate or the financing of such sales.
The memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss sought to distinguish this case from Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), in which we held that § 1 of the Sherman Act had been violated by conformance with a bar association’s minimum-fee schedule that established fees for title examination services performed by attorneys in connection with the financing of real estate purchases. The respondents construed the applicability of Goldfarb as limited by certain language in the opinion that described the activities of lawyers in the examination of titles as an inseparable and integral part of the interstate commerce in real estate financing. 421 U. S., at 784-785. In contrast, with respect to this case, respondents asserted on the basis of the affidavits that “the role of . . . real estate brokers in financing such purchases is neither integral nor inseparable.” Respondents contended (1) that the activities of respondent real estate brokers were purely local in nature; (2) that the allegation that respondents assisted in securing financing or insurance in connection with the purchase of real estate had been controverted by the affidavits; and (3) that the conclusory assertion in the complaint that respondents’ activities “are within the flow of interstate commerce and have an effect upon that commerce” was insufficient by itself to establish federal jurisdiction.
Petitioners’ response to the motion to dismiss asserted that since adequate pretrial discovery up to that time had been precluded pursuant to a pretrial order, petitioners had not had a full opportunity to substantiate the jurisdictional allegations of their complaint. Petitioners advanced two independent theories to support federal jurisdiction: (1) that respondents’ activities occurred within the stream of interstate commerce; and (2) that even if respondents’ activities were wholly local in character they depended upon and affected the interstate flow of both services and people.
Accompanying the response was an affidavit stating that one of the named petitioners had employed the services of a respondent real estate broker to assist in an interstate relocation. There was also an affidavit from a loan guarantee officer of the Veterans’ Administration disclosing that VA-insured loans for residential purchases in the Greater New Orleans area for the years 1973-1975 amounted to $46.3 million, $45.9 million, and $53.5 million, respectively.
After briefing on the jurisdictional issue, the District Court heard oral argument and received postargument briefs. The court then held a conference with counsel, the substance of which was carefully recorded in the minute entries by the District Judge:
“The Court advised counsel that it appears plaintiffs may satisfy said jurisdictional requirement only by bringing the facts of this case within the parameters of the Supreme Court’s holding in Ooldfarb v. Virginia State Bar. ... It is recognized, however, that further discovery is needed on the issue of Ooldfarb’s applicability sub judice. More specifically, such discovery should determine whether, in the first place, there is the requisite interdependence between the brokerage activity of defendants and the financing and/or insuring of real estate transactions in the New Orleans area and, secondly, whether there is a substantial involvement of interstate commerce in such real estate transactions via the financing and/or insurance aspects thereof.”
Following this conference, petitioners deposed nine witnesses, who produced various documents. The deponents included government officials, real estate brokers, mortgage lenders, and real estate title insurers. This evidence was directed to establishing that an appreciable amount of interstate commerce was involved in various aspects of the purchase and sale of residential property in the Greater New Orleans area.
The deposition testimony of the president of Security Homestead Association, one of nearly 40 savings and loan institutions in the Greater New Orleans area, revealed that during the period covered by the complaint the Association lent in excess of $100 million for local purchases of residential property. The Association obtained loan capital from deposits by investors, some of whom lived out of state, and from borrowings from the Federal Home Loan Bank of Little Rock, Ark. Toward the close of the relevant period, the Association entered the interstate secondary mortgage market, in which existing mortgages were sold to raise new capital for future loans.
Another deponent was the president of Carruth Mortgage Corp., an Arkansas corporation doing business in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Its business was to originate home loans, then to sell the financial paper in the secondary mortgage market. The testimony showed that during the relevant period Carruth made in excess of $100 million in loans on residential real estate in the Greater New Orleans area. The overwhelming proportion of these home loans was guaranteed by either the Federal Housing Administration or the Veterans’ Administration. With respect to the FHA-guaranteed loans, Carruth collected and remitted premiums for the guarantee to the FHA in Washington, D. C., on a periodic basis for each account.
Both deponents testified that real estate brokers often play a role in securing financing information on behalf of a borrower and in bringing borrower and lender together, but that after the introductory phases the substance of the mortgage transaction progressed without the involvement of a real estate broker. The president of Carruth testified that his company required title insurance on all the home loans it made. This testimony was accompanied by the deposition of the president of Lawyers Title Insurance Co. of Louisiana, which revealed that each of the nearly 30 title insurance companies then writing coverage in the Greater New Orleans area was a subsidiary or branch of a corporation in another state.
Following the close of the discovery period and the filing of additional briefs, the District Court took the matter under submission and, having considered the memoranda of counsel and the relevant documents of record, issued a memorandum opinion and order granting the motion to dismiss the complaint. 432 F. Supp. 982 (1977). The court stated that the ground upon which respondents had challenged jurisdiction was that “brokerage activities are wholly intrastate in nature and, since they neither occur in nor substantially affect interstate commerce, are beyond the ambit of federal anti-trust prohibition.” Id., at 983. In line with the view expressed at the earlier conference, see swpra, at 237-238, the District Court viewed the jurisdictional inquiry as narrowly confined: the question was whether the facts of this case could be brought within the Ooldfarb holding. In the District Court’s view, “any inquiry based upon [Goldfarb] must be twofold: 1) whether a 'substantial’ volume of interstate commerce is involved in the overall real estate transaction, and 2) whether the challenged activity is an essential, integral part of the transaction and inseparable from its interstate aspects.” 432 F. Supp., at 984. The District Court assumed, arguendo, that the title insurance and financing aspects of the New Orleans residential real estate market were interstate in character, but ruled that federal jurisdiction was not established because in its view “the inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is that the participation of the broker in these (presumably interstate) phases of the real estate transaction is an incidental rather than indispensable occurrence in the transactional chain of events.” Id., at 985.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. 583 F. 2d 1315 (1978). Examining first the specific acts complained of in this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that they failed to satisfy the “in commerce” test. Realty was viewed as a quintessentially local product, and the brokerage activity described in the pleadings was found to occur wholly intrastate. Id., at 1319. Second, that court rejected petitioners’ “effect on commerce” argument. The interpretation of Goldfarb that had guided the District Court’s analysis was adopted by the Court of Appeals, which ruled that “unlike the attorneys in Goldfarb whose participation in title insurance was statutorily mandated, real estate brokers are neither necessary nor integral participants in the 'interstate aspects’ of realty financing and insurance.” 583 F. 2d, at 1321-1323.
The Court of Appeals noted that the District Court had styled its judgment as a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, to be treated as a summary judgment insofar as matters outside of the pleadings were considered. The Court of Appeals concluded that the appropriate designation of the dismissal was for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12 (b)(1), and affirmed the dismissal on that basis.
We granted certiorari. 441 U. S. 942.
II
A
The broad authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause has, of course, long been interpreted to extend beyond activities actually in interstate commerce to reach other activities that, while wholly local in nature, nevertheless substantially affect interstate commerce. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941). This Court has often noted the correspondingly broad reach of the Sherman Act. Hospital Building Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U. S. 738, 743 (1976); United States v. Employing Plasterers Assn., 347 U. S. 186, 189 (1954); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533, 558 (1944); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932). During the near century of Sherman Act experience, forms and modes of business and commerce have changed along with changes in communication and travel, and innovations in methods of conducting particular businesses have altered relationships in commerce. Application of the Act reflects an adaptation to these changing circumstances. Compare United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 12-15 (1895), and Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578, 587-592 (1898), with Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 231-235 (1948), and United States v. Employing Plasterers Assn., supra, at 189.
The conceptual distinction between activities “in” interstate commerce and those which “affect” interstate commerce has been preserved in the cases, for Congress has seen fit to preserve that distinction in the antitrust and related laws by limiting the applicability of certain provisions to activities demonstrably “in commerce.” United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U. S. 271 (1975); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186 (1974); FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U. S. 349 (1941). It can no longer be doubted, however, that the jurisdictional requirement of the Sherman Act may be satisfied under either the “in commerce” or the “effect on commerce” theory. Hospital Building Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, supra, at 743; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., supra, at 194—195; United States v. Women’s Sportswear Manufacturers Assn., 336 U. S. 460, 464 (1949); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., supra, at 235-237.
Although the cases demonstrate the breadth of Sherman Act prohibitions, jurisdiction may not be invoked under that statute unless the relevant aspect of interstate commerce is identified; it is not sufficient merely to rely on identification of a relevant local activity and to presume an interrelationship with some unspecified aspect of interstate commerce. To establish jurisdiction a plaintiff must allege the critical relationship in the pleadings and if these allegations are controverted must proceed to demonstrate by submission of evidence beyond the pleadings either that the defendants’ activity is itself in interstate commerce or, if it is local in nature, that it has an effect on some other appreciable activity demonstrably in interstate commerce. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., supra, at 202.
To establish the jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act violation it would be sufficient for petitioners to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate commerce generated by respondents’ brokerage activity. Petitioners need not make the more particularized showing of an effect on interstate commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy to fix commission rates, or by those other aspects of respondents’ activity that are alleged to be unlawful. The validity of this approach is confirmed by an examination of the case law. If establishing jurisdiction required a showing that the unlawful conduct itself had an effect on interstate commerce, jurisdiction would be defeated by a demonstration that the alleged restraint failed to have its intended anticompetitive effect. This is not the rule of our cases. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 811 (1946); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 225, n. 59 (1940). A violation may still be found in such circumstances because in a civil action under the Sherman Act, liability may be established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or an anti-competitive effect. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, 436, n. 13 (1978); see United States v. Container Corp., 393 U. S. 333, 337 (1969); United States v. National Assn, of Real Estate Boards, 339 U. S. 485, 489 (1950); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra, at 224-225, n. 59.
Nor is jurisdiction defeated in a case relying on anticom-petitive effects by plaintiff’s failure to quantify the adverse impact of defendant’s conduct. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U. S. 100, 123-125 (1969); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U. S. 251, 265-266 (1946). Even where there is an inability to prove that concerted activity has resulted in legally cognizable damages, jurisdiction need not be impaired, though such a failure may confine the available remedies to injunctive relief. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 452-463 (1945); Keogh v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 260 U. S. 156 (1922).
B
The interpretation and application of our holding in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), has figured prominently in this case. The District Court held that petitioners could establish federal jurisdiction only if the facts of this case could be brought within Goldfarb. As previously noted, as interpreted by that court, "any inquiry based upon [Goldfarb] must be twofold: 1) whether a ‘substantial’ volume of interstate commerce is involved in the overall real estate transaction, and 2) whether the challenged activity is an essential, intergral part of the transaction and inseparable from its interstate aspects.” 432 F. Supp., at 984. The Court of Appeals took a similar view of Goldfarb, holding that Sherman Act jurisdiction did not exist because petitioners had failed to demonstrate that real estate brokers are either necessary or integral participants in the interstate aspects of residential real estate financing and title insurance. 583 F. 2d, at 1322.
It is with the second phase of the analysis of the District Court and of the Court of Appeals that we disagree. The facts of Goldfarb revealed an application of the state bar association’s minimum-fee schedule to fix fees for attorneys’ title examination services. Since the financing depended on a valid and insured title we concluded that title examination, was “an integral part” of the interstate transaction of obtaining financing for the purchase of residential property and, because of the “inseparability” of the attorneys’ services from the title examination process, we held that the legal services were in turn an “integral part of an interstate transaction.” 421 U. S., at 784-785. By placing the Goldfarb holding on the available ground that the activities of the attorneys were within the stream of interstate commerce, Sherman Act jurisdiction was established. The Goldfarb holding was not addressed to the “effect on commerce” test of jurisdiction and in no way restricted it to those challenged activities that have an integral relationship to an activity in interstate commerce. To adopt the restrictive interpretation urged upon us by respondents would return to a jurisdictional analysis under the Sherman Act of an era long past. It has been more than 30 years since this Court stated: “At this late day we are not willing to take that long backward step.” Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S., at 235.
C
On the record thus far made, it cannot be said that there is an insufficient basis for petitioners to proceed at trial to establish Sherman Act jurisdiction. It is clear that an appreciable amount of commerce is involved in the financing of residential property in the Greater New Orleans area and in the insuring of titles to such property. The presidents of two of the many lending institutions in the area stated in their deposition testimony that those institutions committed hundreds of millions of dollars to residential financing during the period covered by the complaint. The testimony further demonstrates that this appreciable commercial activity has occurred in interstate commerce. Funds were raised from out-of-state investors and from interbank loans obtained from interstate financial institutions. Multistate lending institutions took mortgages insured under federal programs which entailed interstate transfers of premiums and settlements. Mortgage obligations physically and constructively were traded as financial instruments in the interstate secondary mortgage market. Before making a mortgage loan in the Greater New Orleans area, lending institutions usually, if not always, required title insurance, which was furnished by interstate corporations. Reading the pleadings, as supplemented, most favorably to petitioners, for present purposes we take these facts as established.
At trial, respondents will have the opportunity, if they so choose, to make their own case contradicting this factual showing. On the other hand, it may be possible for petitioners to establish that, apart from the commerce in title insurance and real estate financing, an appreciable amount of interstate commerce is involved with the local residential real estate market arising out of the interstate movement of people, or otherwise.
To establish federal jurisdiction in this case, there remains only the requirement that respondents’ activities which allegedly have been infected by a price-fixing conspiracy be shown “as a matter of practical economics” to have a not insubstantial effect on the interstate commerce involved. Hospital Building Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U. S., at 745; see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, supra, at 784, n. 11; Burke v. Ford, 389 U. S. 320, 321-322 (1967). It is clear, as the record shows, that the function of respondent real estate brokers is to bring the buyer and seller together on agreeable terms. For this service the broker charges a fee generally calculated as a percentage of the sale price. Brokerage activities necessarily affect both the frequency and the terms of residential sales transactions. Ultimately, whatever stimulates or retards the volume of residential sales, or has an impact on the purchase price, affects the demand for financing and title insurance, those two commercial activities that on this record are shown to have occurred in interstate commerce. Where, as here, the services of respondent real estate brokers are often employed in transactions in the relevant market, petitioners at trial may be able to show that respondents’ activities have a not insubstantial effect on interstate commerce.
It is axiomatic that a complaint should not be dismissed unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ; see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1202, 1205-1207, 1215-1224, 1228 (1969). This rule applies with no less force to a Sherman Act claim, where one of the requisites of a cause of action is the existence of a demonstrable nexus between the defendants’ activity and interstate commerce. Here, what was submitted to the District Court shows a sufficient basis for satisfying the Act’s jurisdictional requirements under the effect-on-commerce theory so as to entitle the petitioners to go forward. We therefore conclude that it was error to dismiss the complaint at this stage of the proceedings. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.
Me. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves financial instruments commonly known as “Ginnie Maes.” These instruments are issued by private financial institutions, which are obliged to make timely payment of the principal and interest as set forth in the certificates. The Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) guarantees that the payments will be made as scheduled. The question presented today is whether these instruments are exempt from state taxation under the constitutional principle of intergovernmental tax immunity, or under the relevant immunity statute.
Prior to 1979 changes in Illinois’ tax law, Rockford Life Insurance Company (Rockford) paid an annual property tax on the assessed value of its capital stock. In 1978, the Illinois taxing authorities included the value of Rockford’s portfolio of Ginnie Maes in their calculation of the corporation’s net assets. Rockford challenged the assessment in the Illinois courts and the County Treasurer filed an action to collect the full amount of the assessment ($723,053.70). The Illinois courts uniformly rejected Rockford’s contention that the securities were exempt from state property taxes, reasoning that “the securities in question here were not ‘other obligations of the United States’ within the meaning of § 3701,” and that the constitutional and statutory inquiries were identical in this case. 112 Ill. 2d 174, 176-184, 492 N. E. 2d 1278, 1279-1283 (1986). We noted probable jurisdiction, 479 U. S. 947 (1986), and now affirm.
I
The instruments involved here are standard securities bearing the title “Mortgage Backed Certificate Guaranteed by Government National Mortgage Association.” App. 56. True to that title, the instruments contain a provision in which GNMA pledges the “full faith and credit of the United States” to secure the timely payment of the interest and principal set forth in the instrument. The purpose of the guarantee, and the function of GNMA, which is a wholly owned government corporation within the Department of Housing and Urban Development, is to attract investors into the mortgage market by minimizing the risk of loss. See 12 U. S. C. § 1716(a). There is uncontradicted evidence in the record supporting the conclusion that GNMA’s guarantee is responsible for the ready marketability of these securities. That guarantee is not the primary obligation described in the instrument, however. The duty to make monthly payments of principal and interest to the investors falls squarely on the issuer of the certificate.
The issuer of the certificate is a private party, generally a financial institution, that posesses a pool of federally guaranteed mortgages. Those individual mortgages are the product of transactions between individual borrowers and private lending institutions. It is this pool of private obligations that provides the source of funds, as well as the primary security, for the principal and interest that the issuer promises to pay to the order of the holder of the instrument. After a pool of qualified mortgages is assembled by a qualified issuer, the issuer enters into an agreement with GNMA authorizing the issuer to sell one or more certificates, each of which is proportionately based on and backed by all the mortgages in the designated pool, and each of which is also guaranteed by GNMA. The issuer thereafter may sell the “mortgage-backed certificates” to holders such as Rockford. The issuer administers the pool by collecting principal and interest from the individual mortgagors and remitting the amounts specified in the certificates to the holders. GNMA’s costs for the regulatory duties is covered by a fee charged to the issuer. Unless the issuer defaults in its payments to the holder of a certificate, no federal funds are used in connection with the issuance and sale of these securities, the administration of the pool of mortgages, or the payments of principal and interest set forth in the certificates.
Under the type of Ginnie Maes involved in this case, see n. 5, supra, the issuer is required to continue to make payments to the holders even if an individual mortgage in the pool becomes delinquent. In such event, the issuer may pursue its remedies against the individual mortgagor, or the guarantor of the mortgage, but the issuer does not have any rights against GNMA. GNMA’s guarantee is implicated only if the issuer fails to meet its obligations to the holders under the certificates. In that event the holder proceeds directly against GNMA, and not against the issuer. But the risk of actual loss to GNMA is minimal because its guarantee is secured not only by the individual mortgages in the pool but also by the separate guarantee of each of those mortgages, and by a fidelity bond which the issuer is required to post. See 24 CFR § 390.1 (1986).
rH
The GNMA guarantee of payment that is contained m the mortgage-backed certificates held by Rockford is a pledge of the “full faith and credit of the United States.” But that does not mean that it is the type of “obligation” of the United States which is subject to exemption under the Constitution or the immunity statute. Because the statutory immunity provision now codified at 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a) is “principally a restatement of the constitutional rule,” see Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U. S. 392, 397 (1983), we shall first decide whether the statute requires that Ginnie Maes be exempted from state property taxes, and then consider whether the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity requires any broader exemption.
At the time relevant to this case, Rev. Stat. §3701, as amended, 31 U. S. C. §742 (1976 ed.), provided that “all stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority” (emphasis added). The full text of the sentence in which these words appear, rules of statutory construction, and the earlier legislation that was codified by the enactment of this statute, are all consistent with the conclusion that the phrase “other obligations” refers “only to obligations or securities of the same type as those specifically enumerated.” Smith v. Davis, 323 U. S. 111, 117 (1944). This longstanding interpretation resolves the statutory question before us. GNMA certificates are fundamentally different from the securities specifically named in the statute. Most significantly, they are neither direct nor certain obligations of the United States. As the certificate provides, it is the issuer that bears the primary obligation to make timely payments — the United States’ obligation is secondary and contingent. In short, the United States is the guarantor — not the obligor. This distinction is more than adequate to support our conclusion that Ginnie Maes do not qualify as “other obligations of the United States” for the purposes of this statute.
Nor does the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity exempt these instruments from state property taxes. In Smith v. Davis, supra, the United States owed money to a construction company for work that the company had performed on open account. In computing its assets for state tax purposes, the company sought to exclude the amount owed to it by the Federal Government, but a unanimous Court held that the debt was not exempt. The Court concluded that “a unilateral, unliquidated creditor’s claim, which by itself does not bind the United States and which in no way increases or affects the public debt, cannot be said to be a credit instrumentality of the United States for the purposes of tax immunity,” 323 U. S., at 114, and went on to explain that the claim differed
“vitally from the type of credit instrumentalities which this Court in the past has recognized as constitutionally exempt from state and local taxation. Such instrumen-talities in each instance have been characterized by (1) written documents, (2) the bearing of interest, (3) a binding promise by the United States to pay specified sums at specified dates and (4) specific Congressional authorization, which also pledged the full faith and credit of the United States in support of the promise to pay.” Id., at 114-115.
With respect to Ginnie Maes, the third element described in Smith v. Davis is clearly lacking, and its absence is critical in view of the purposes behind the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. That doctrine is based on the proposition that the borrowing power is an essential aspect of the Federal Government’s authority and, just as the Supremacy Clause bars the States from directly taxing federal property, it also bars the States from taxing federal obligations in a manner which has an adverse effect on the United States’ borrowing ability. See Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (1829); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). The lack of a fixed and certain obligation by the United States in the Ginnie Mae context makes this concern far too attenuated to support constitutional immunity. Cf. Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 225 (1931); Hibernia Sav ings Society v. San Francisco, 200 U. S. 310, 315 (1906); Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 136 (1900). Moreover, none of the proceeds of the issuance and sale of the GNMA certificates are received by the Federal Government or used to finance any governmental function. Indeed, given the fixed fees that GNMA charges issuers, and the lack of any GNMA profit sharing, it has not been suggested here that the federal fisc would at all benefit from a holding that Ginnie Maes are exempt from state taxation.
Appellant asserts that Congress authorized the GNMA’s guarantee for the salutary purpose of facilitating the financing of private mortgages, and that an exemption from state taxation will further this purpose. But our job is neither to assess the underlying merits of the program, nor to opine on whether Congress would be wise to exempt Ginnie Maes from state taxation. Our task is simply to decide whether the indirect, contingent, and unliquidated promise that GNMA is authorized to make is the type of federal obligation for which the Constitution, in Congress’ silence, imposes an exemption from state taxation. We hold that it is not.
H — < 1 — i
A court must proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly established. We do well to remember the concluding words in Smith, which although spoken in reference to the statute, are relevant to our role in applying the constitutional doctrine as well:
“All of these related statutes are a clear indication of an intent to immunize from state taxation only the interest-bearing obligations of the United States which are needed to secure credit to carry on the necessary functions of government. That intent, which is largely codified in § 3701, should not be expanded or modified in any degree by the judiciary.” 323 U. S., at 119.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
At the time relevant to this case, that statute was Rev. Stat. § 3701, as amended, and provided:
“Except as otherwise provided by law, all stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority. This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the obligations or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax, except nondiscriminatory franchise or other non-property taxes in lieu thereof imposed on corporations and except estate taxes or inheritance taxes.” 31 U. S. C. §742 (1976 ed.).
The 1982 reformulation of the statute was “without substantive change” see Pub. L. 97-258, § 4(a), 96 Stat. 1067, and now appears at 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a) with some minor variations in its language, which are not relevant to this case. As in First National Bank of Atlanta v. Bartow County Tax Assessors, 470 U. S. 583 (1985), the tax at issue here was levied prior to the recodification, and “the pre-1982 form of the statute technically controls this case.” Id., at 585, n. 1.
Appellant’s state-court action also involved a variety of state-law claims, and claims that some other federally guaranteed securities were exempt from state taxation. See 112 Ill. 2d 174, 177, 185-187, 492 N. E. 2d 1278, 1279, 1283-1284 (1986). These claims are not at issue here.
The issue presented is not the type that would usually merit our attention if presented in a petition for certiorari. The issue has divided neither the federal courts of appeals nor the state courts. Indeed, aside from the Illinois courts, no court has ever considered whether Ginnie Maes are exempt from state taxes. Nor does it appear that this case presents an overly important question of federal law “which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court. ” This Court’s Rule 17.1(c). The fact is that the Illinois property tax imposed here was repealed in 1979. Nonetheless, this case arises under our mandatory jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2), and Congress has not allowed us to consider these factors in deciding whether to rule on this case on its merits.
“The Mortgage-Backed Securities Program provides a means for channeling funds from the Nation’s securities markets into the housing market. The U. S. Government full faith and credit guaranty of securities makes them widely accepted in those sectors of the capital markets that otherwise would not be likely to supply funds to the mortgage market. The funds raised through the securities issued are used to make residential and other mortgage loans. Through this process, the program serves to increase the overall supply of credit available for housing and helps to assure that this credit is available at reasonable interest rates.” Dept, of Housing and Urban Development, Handbook GNMA 5500.1 Rev. 6, GNMA I Mortgage Backed Securities Guide 1-1 (1984) (hereinafter GNMA Guide).
The promises set forth in the representative GNMA certificate in the record read as follow:
“THE ISSUER, NAMED BELOW, PROMISES TO PAY TO THE ORDER OF:
“ROCKFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
“36 1695690 F
“(HEREINAFTER CALLED THE HOLDER) The sum of $1,018,717 DOLS 20 CTS in principal amount, together with interest thereon and on portions thereof outstanding from time to time at the fixed rate set forth hereon, such payment to be in monthly installments, adjustable as set forth below. All monthly installments shall be for application first to interest at such fixed rate and then in reduction of principal balance then outstanding, and shall continue until payment in full of the principal amount, and of all interest accruing thereon.
“[T]he issuer shall pay to the holder, whether or not collected by the issuer, and shall remit as set forth below, monthly payments of not less than the amounts of principal being due monthly on the mortgages and apportioned to the holder by reason of the aforesaid base and backing, together with any apportioned prepayments or other early recoveries of principal and interest at the fixed rate.” App. 56-57.
Sample certificates are published in the GNMA Guide, at App. 39-43.
The Ginnie Maes held by Rockford, are “modified pass-through securities” that provide for the payment of specific amounts whether or not timely collections are made from the individual mortgagors in the pool. See 128 Ill. App. 3d 302, 313, 470 N. E. 2d 596, 603 (2d Dist. 1984). GNMA also guarantees “straight pass-through securities” which provide that the issuer shall pay the holders of the securities the amounts collected from the pool, “as collected,” less specified administrative costs. See 24 CFR § 390.5(a) (1986); GNMA Guide, at 1-1.
The issuer must satisfy various financial requirements imposed by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and GNMA. See 24 CFR § 390.3 (1986). In addition each of the individual mortgages in the pool must be guaranteed by the FHA, the Veterans Administration, or another Government agency. Ibid.
GNMA is authorized to make this guarantee under 12 U. S. C. § 1721(g). The fact that the guarantee is executed by a federal agency, rather than by the United States itself, does not avoid the application of the immunity doctrine and statute. See Memphis Bank & Trust v. Garner, 459 U. S. 392, 396 (1983).
See n. 1, supra.
Appellant contends that the issuer is not an obligor at all because the certificate provides that the holder’s sole recourse is against the GNMA. We disagree. That GNMA is willing to pay the investor in case of default and then pursue its own remedies against the issuer does not detract from the reality that the primary obligor is in fact the issuer, and not the GNMA. While the holder of the certificate may not enforce the obligation through a direct action against the issuer, GNMA may, upon default, institute a claim against the issuer’s fidelity bond or extinguish the issuer’s interest in the underlying mortgages thereby making the mortgages the absolute property of GNMA “subject only to unsatisfied rights therein of the holders of the securities.” 24 CFR § 390.15(b) (1986); see also 12 U. S. C. § 1721(g); New York Guardian Mortgagee Corp. v. Cleland, 473 F. Supp. 409, 411 (SDNY 1979). As the GNMA Guide provides: An “issuer of GNMA-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities is responsible for . . . making the full and timely payment of all amounts due to securities holders.” GNMA Guide, at 2-1. This statement is supported by the regulations which prohibit GNMA from guaranteeing securities “if the pool arrangement proposed by the issuer does not satisfactorily provide for . . . [t]imely payment of principal and interest, in accordance with the terms of the guaranteed securities.” 24 CFR § 390.9(c) (1986). See also GNMA Guide, at App. 19, §4.01 (issuer’s contractual agreement with GNMA binds issuer to “remit to the holders all payments ... in a timely manner”).
“But when effort is made, as is the case here, to establish the un-constititional character of a particular tax by claiming that its remote effect will be to impair the borrowing power of the government, courts in overturning statutes, long established and within the ordinary sphere of state legislation, ought to have something more substantial to act upon than mere conjecture. The injury ought to be obvious and appreciable.” Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 137-138 (1900).
The proposition that a federal guarantee of a loan does not preclude state taxation is a “long established” one. See Board of Comm’rs of Montgomery County v. Elston, 32 Ind. 27, 32 (1869); S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 5 N. Y. 2d 635, 641, 159 N. E. 2d 195, 197-198, cert. denied, 361 U. S. 912 (1959); see also 47 Op. N. C. Atty. Gen. 19 (1977) (concluding that Ginnie Maes are not “obligation of the United States” for these purposes, and indicating that the Assistant Director of GNMA agreed with this position). In fact, during the debate on one of the predecessors to the current immunity statute, Senator Sherman assured the Senate that bonds of the Pacific Railroad, which had been guaranteed by the United States, were not subject to immunity. See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 1591 (1870), discussing Act of July 14, 1870, 16 Stat. 272.
Even if there were a somewhat more certain effect, state taxation of these privately issued instruments would not necessarily be invalid. See Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941); Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937). Immunity from taxation “may not be conferred simply because the tax has an effect on the United States.” United States v. New Mexico, 455 U. S. 720, 734 (1982).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
An offender had been serving time in federal prison for multiple felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid. As a result, he had served too much prison time and was at once set free, but a term of supervised release was yet to be served on the remaining convictions. The question becomes whether the excess prison time should be credited to the supervised release term, reducing its length. Bound by the text of the controlling statute, 18 U. S. C. § 3624(e), we hold that the supervised release term remains unaltered.
Respondent Roy Lee Johnson was convicted in 1990 on two counts of possession with an intent to distribute controlled substances, 84 Stat. 1260, 21 U. S. C. § 841(a), on two counts of use of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime, 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) (1994 ed. and Supp. IV), and on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, § 922(g). He received a sentence of 171 months’ imprisonment, consisting of three concurrent 51-month terms on the § 841(a) and § 922(g) counts, to be followed by two consecutive 60-month terms on the § 924(c) counts. In addition, the District Court imposed a mandatory 3-year term of supervised release for the drug possession offenses. See 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (1994 ed., Supp. III). The Court of Appeals, though otherwise affirming respondent’s convictions and sentence, concluded the District Court erred in sentencing him to consecutive terms of imprisonment for the two § 924(c) firearm offenses. United States v. Johnson, 25 F. 3d 1335, 1337-1338 (CA6 1994) (en banc). On remand the District Court modified the prisoner’s sentence to a term of 111 months.
After our decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995), respondent filed a motion under 28 U. S. C. §2255 to vacate his § 924(e) convictions, and the Government did not oppose. On May 2, 1996, the District Court vacated those convictions, modifying respondent’s sentence to 51 months. He had already served more than that amount of time, so the District Court ordered his immediate release. His term of supervised release then went into effect. This dispute concerns its length.
In June 1996, respondent filed a motion requesting the District Court to reduce his supervised release term by 2.5 years, the extra time served on the vacated § 924(e) convictions. The District Court denied relief, explaining that pursuant to 18 U. S. C¡ § 3624(e) the supervised release commenced upon respondent’s actual release from incarceration, not before. Granting respondent credit, the court observed, would undermine Congress’ aim of using supervised release to assist convicted felons in their transitions to community life.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. 154 F. 3d 569 (CA6 1998). The court accepted respondent’s argument that his term of supervised release commenced not on the day he left prison confines but earlier, when his' lawful term of imprisonment expired. Id., at 571. Awarding respondent credit for the extra time served, the court further concluded, would provide meaningful relief because supervised release, while serving rehabilitative purposes, is also “punitive in nature.” Ibid. Judge Gilman dissented, agreeing with the position of the District Court. Id., at 572-573.
The Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions on the question presented. Compare United States v. Blake, 88 F. 3d 824, 825 (CA9 1996) (supervised release commences on the date defendants “should have been released, rather than on the dates of their actual release”), with United States v. Jeanes, 150 F. 3d 483, 485 (CA5 1998) (supervised release cannot run during any period of imprisonment); United States v. Joseph, 109 F. 3d 34 (CA1 1997) (same); United States v. Douglas, 88 F. 3d 533, 534 (CA8 1996) (same). We granted certiorari to resolve the question, 527 U. S. 1062 (1999), and we now reverse.
Section 3583(a) of Title 18 authorizes, and in some instances mandates, sentencing courts to order supervised release terms following imprisonment. On the issue presented for review — whether a term of supervised release begins on the date of actual release from incarceration or on an earlier date due to a mistaken interpretation of federal law — the language of § 3624(e) controls. The statute provides in relevant part:
“A prisoner whose sentence includes a term of supervised release after imprisonment shall be released by the Bureau of Prisons to the supervision of a probation officer who shall, during the term imposed, supervise the person released to the degree warranted by the conditions specified by the sentencing court. The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment and runs concurrently with any Federal, State, or local term of probation or supervised release or parole for another offense to which the person is subject or becomes subject during the term of supervised release. A term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.”
The quoted language directs that a supervised release term does not commence until an individual “is released from imprisonment.” There can be little question about the meaning of the word “release” in the context of imprisonment. It means “[t]o loosen or destroy the force of; to remove the obligation or effect of; hence to alleviate or remove; . . . [t]o let loose again; to set free from restraint, confinement, or servitude; to set at liberty; to let go.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2103 (2d ed. 1949). As these definitions illustrate, the ordinary, commonsense meaning of release is to be freed from confinement. To say respondent was released while still imprisoned diminishes the concept the word intends to convey.
of § 3624(e) supports our construction. A term of supervised release comes “after imprisonment,” once the prisoner is “released by the Bureau of Prisons to the supervision of a probation officer.” Supervised release does not run while an individual remains in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. The phrase “on the day the person is released,” in the second sentence of § 3624(e), suggests a strict temporal interpretation, not some fictitious or constructive earlier time. The statute does not say “on the day the person is released or on the earlier day when he should have been released.” Indeed, the third sentence admonishes that “supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned.”
statute does provide for concurrent running of supervised release in specific cases. After the operative phrase “released from imprisonment,” § 3624(e) requires the concurrent running of a term of supervised release with terms of probation, parole, or with other, separate terms of supervised release. The statute instructs that concurrency is permitted not for prison sentences but only for those other types of sentences given specific mention. The next sentence in the statute does address a prison term and does allow concurrent counting, but only for prison terms less than 30 days in length. When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts have authority to create others. The proper inference, and the one we adopt here, is that Congress considered the issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set forth. The 30-day exception finds no application in this case; each of respondent’s sentences, to which the term of supervised release attached, exceeded that amount of time. Finally, § 3583(e)(3) does not have a substantial bearing on the interpretive issue, for this directive addresses instances where conditions of supervised release have been violated, and the court orders a revocation.
Our conclusion finds further support in 18 U. S. C. § 3583(a), which authorizes the imposition of “a term of supervised release after imprisonment.” This provision, too, is inconsistent with respondent’s contention that confinement and supervised release can run at the same time. The statute’s direction is clear and precise. Release takes place on the day the prisoner in fact is freed from confinement.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that reduction of respondent’s supervised release term was a necessary implementa1 tion of § 3624(a), which provides that “[a] prisoner shall be released by the Bureau of Prisons on the date of the expiration of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment. . ..” All concede respondent’s term of imprisonment should have ended earlier than it did. It does not follow, however, that the term of supervised release commenced, as a matter of law, once he completed serving his lawful sentences. It is true the prison term and the release term are related, for the latter cannot begin until the former expires. Though interrelated, the terms are not interchangeable. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in holding otherwise, and the text of § 3624(e) cannot accommodate the rule the Court of Appeals derived. Supervised release has no statutory function until confinement. ends. Cf. United States v. Granderson, 511 U. S. 39, 50 (1994) (observing that 'Terms of supervised release . . . follow up prison terms”)- The rule of lenity does not alter the analysis. Absent ambiguity, the rule of lenity is not applicable to guide statutory interpretation. Cf. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 410 (1991).
While the text of § 3624(e) resolves the case, we observe that our conclusion accords with the statute’s purpose and design. The objectives of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release. Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration. See § 3553(a)(2)(D); United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §§5D1.3(c), (d), (e) (Nov. 1998); see also S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 124 (1983) (declaring that “the primary goal [of supervised release] is to ease the defendant’s transition into the community after the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly short period in prison for punishment or other purposes but still needs supervision and training programs after release”). Sentencing courts, in determining the conditions of a defendant’s supervised release, are required to consider, among other factors, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” “the need ... to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; ... to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and ... to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.” 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a). In the instant case, the transition assistance ordered by the trial court required respondent, among other conditions, to avoid possessing or transporting firearms and to participate in a drug dependency treatment program. These conditions illustrate that supervised release, unlike incarceration, provides individuals with postconfinement assistance. Cf. Gozlon-Peretz, supra, at 407 (describing “[supervised release [a]s a unique method of postconfinement supervision invented by the Congress for a series of sentencing reforms”). The Court of Appeals erred in treating respondent’s time in prison as interchangeable with his term of supervised release.
There can be no doubt that equitable considerations of great weight exist when an individual is incarcerated beyond the proper expiration of his prison term. The statutory structure provides a means to address these concerns in large part. The trial court, as it sees fit, may modify an individual’s conditions of supervised release. § 3583(e)(2). Furthermore, the court may terminate an individual’s supervised release obligations “at any time after the expiration of one year ... if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” § 3583(e)(1). Respondent may invoke § 3583(e)(2) in pursuit of relief; and, having completed one year of supervised release, he may also seek relief under § 3583(e)(1).
The statute, by its own necessary operation, does not reduce the length of a supervised release term by reason of excess time served in prison. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Harlan
announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion,
in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Clark, and Mr. Justice Whittaker join.
We are called upon in this case to weigh in a particular context two considerations of high importance which now and again come into sharp conflict — on the one hand, the protection of the individual citizen against pecuniary damage caused by oppressive or malicious action on the part of officials of the Federal Government; and on the other, 'the protection of the public interest by shielding responsible governmental officers against the harassment and inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits brought on account of action taken in the exercise of their official responsibilities.
This is a libel suit, brought in the District Court of the District of Columbia by respondents, former employees of the Office of Rent Stabilization. The alleged libel was contained in a press release issued by the office on February 5, 1953, at the direction of petitioner, then its Acting Director. The circumstances which gave rise to the issuance of the release follow.
In 1950 the statutory existence of the Office of Housing Expediter, the predecessor agency of the Office of Rent Stabilization, was about to expire. Respondent Madigan, then Deputy. Director in charge of personnel and fiscal matters, and respondent Matteo, chief of the personnel branch, suggested to the Housing Expediter a plan designed to utilize some $2,600,000 of agency funds earmarked in the agency’s appropriation for the fiscal year 1950 exclusively for terminal-leave payments. The effect of the plan would have been to obviate the possibility that the agency might have to make large terminal-leave payments during the next fiscal year out of general agency funds, should the life of the agency be extended by Congress. In essence, the mechanics of the plan were that agency employees would be discharged, paid accrued annual leave out of the $2,600,000 earmarked for terminal-leave payments, rehired immediately as temporary employees, and restored to permanent status should the agency’s life in fact be extended.
Petitioner, at the time General Manager of the agency, opposed.respondents! plan-on the ground that it violated the spirit of the Thomas Amendment, 64 Stat. 768, and expressed his opposition to the Housing Expediter. The Expediter decided against general adoption of the plan, but at respondent Matteo’s request gave permission for its use in connection with approximately fifty employees, including both respondents, on a voluntary basis. Thereafter the life of the agency was in fact extended.
Some two and a half years later, on January 28, 1953, the Office of Rent Stabilization received a letter from Senator John J. Williams of Delaware, inquiring about the terminal-leave payments made under the plan in 1950. Respondent Madigan drafted a reply to the letter, which he did not attempt to bring to the attention of petitioner, and then prepared a reply which he sent to petitioner’s office for his signature as Acting Director of the agency. Petitioner was out.of the office, and a secretary signed the submitted letter, which was then delivered by Madigan to Senator Williams on the morning of February 3, 1953.
On February 4, 1953, Senator Williams delivered a' speech on the floor of the Senate strongly criticizing the plan, stating that “to say the least it is an unjustifiable raid on the Federal Treasury, and heads of every agency in the Government who have condoned this practice should be called to task.”. The letter above referred to was ordered printed in the Congressional Record. Other Senators joined in the attack on the plan. Their comments were widely, reported in the press on February 5, 1953, and petitioner, in his capacity as Acting Director of the agency, received a' large number of inquiries from newspapers and other, news. media as to the agency’s position on the matter. ^
On that day petitioner served upon respondents letters expressing his intention to suspend them from duty, and at the same time ordered issuance by the office of the press release which is the subject of .this litigation, and the text of which appears in the margin.
Respondents sued, charging that the press release, in itself and as coupled with the contemporaneous news reports of senatorial reaction to the plan, defamed them to their injury, and alleging that its publication and terms had been actuated by malice on the part of petitioner. Petitioner defended, inter alia, on the ground that the issuance of the press release was protected by either a qualified or an absolute privilege. The trial court overruled these contentions, and instructed the jury to return a verdict for respondents if fit found the release defamatory. The jury found for respondents.
Petitioner appealed, raising only the issue of absolute privilege. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which held that “in explaining his decision [to suspend respondents] to the general public [petitioner] . . . went entirely outside his line of duty” and that thus the absolute privilege, assumed otherwise to be available, did not attach. 100 U. S. App. D. C. 319, 244 F. 2d 767. We granted certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment, and remanded the case “with directions . to pass upon petitioner’s claim of a qualified privilege.” 355 U. S. 171, 173. .On remand the Court of Appeals held that the press release was protected by a qualified privilege, but that there was evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that petitioner had acted maliciously, or had spoken with lack of reasonable grounds for believing that his statement was true, and that either conclusion would defeat the qualified privilege. Accordingly it remanded the case to the District Court for retrial. 103 U. S. App. D. C. 176, 256 F. 2d 890. At this point petitioner again sought, and we again granted certiorari, 358 U. S. 917, to determine whether in the circumstances of this case petitioner’s claim of absolute privilege should have stood as a bar to maintenance of the suit despite the allegations of malice made in the complaint.
The law of privilege as a defense by officers of government to civil damage suits for defamation and kindred torts has in large part been of judicial making, although the Constitution itself gives an absolute privilege to members of both Hoiises of Congress in respect to any speech, debate, vote, report, or action doné in session. This Court early held that judges of courts of superior or general authority are absolutely privileged as respects civil suits to recover for actions taken by them in the exercise of their judicial functions, irrespective of the motives with which those acts are alléged to have been performed, Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, and that a. like immunity extends to other officers of government whose duties are related to the judicial process. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F. 2d 396, aff’d per curiam, 275 U. S. 503, involving a Special Assistant to the Attorney General. Nor has the privilege been confined to officers of the legislative and judicial branches of the Government and executive officers of the kind involved in Yaselli. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, petitioner brought suit against the Postmaster General, alleging that the latter had maliciously circulated widely among postmasters, past and present, information which he knew to be false and which was intended to deceive the postmasters to the detriment of the plaintiff. This Court sustained a plea by the Postmaster General of absolute privilege, stating that (498-499):
“In exercising the functions of his office; the head of an Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government, if he 'were subjected to any such restraint. He may have legal authority to act, but he may have such large discretion in the premises that it will not always be his absolute duty to exercise the authority with which he is invested. But if he acts, having authority, his conduct cannot be made the foundation of a suit against him personally for damages, even if the circumstances show that he is not disagreeably impressed by the fact that his action injuriously affects the claims of particular individuals.”
The reasons for the recognition of the privilege have been often stated. It has been thought important that officials of government should, be free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the feap of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of those duties — suits which would consume time and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the threat of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government. The matter has been admirably expressed by Judge Learned Hand:
“It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit, all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the. most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later .find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties; but thai/is quite another matter from exposing such ás have^been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.....
“The decisions have, indeed, always imposed as a limitation upon, the immunity that the official’s act must have been within the scope of his powers; and' it can be argued that official powers^ since they exist only for the public good, never cover occasions where the public good, is not their aim, and hence that to exercise a power dishonestly is necessarily to overstep its bounds. A moment’s reflection shows, however, that that cannot be the meaning of the limitation without defeating the whole doctrine. What is meant by saying that the officer must be acting .within his power <|annot be more than that the occasion must be such ¿s would have justified the act, if he had been using his power for any of the purposes on whose account it was vested in him. . . .” Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581.
We do not think that the principle announced-iii Vilas can properly be restricted to executive officers of cabinet rank, and in fact it never has been so restricted by thte lower federal courts. The privilege is not a badge or. emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government. The complexities and magnitude of governmental activity have become so great that there must of necessity be a delegation • and redelegation of authority as to many functions, and we cannot say that these functions become less important simply because they are exercised by officers of lower rank in the executive hierarchy.
To be sure, the occasions upon which the acts of the head of an executive department will be protected by the privilege are jloübtless far broader than in the case of an officer with less sweeping functions. But that is because the higher the post, the broader the range of responsibilities and duties, and the wider the scope, of discretion, it entails. It is not the title of his office but the duties with which the particular officer sought to be made to respond in damages is entrusted — the relation of the. act complained of to “matters committed by law to his control or supervision,” Spalding v. Vilas, supra, at 498 — which must provide the guide in delineating the scope of the rule which clothes the official acts of- the executive officer with immunity from civil defamation suits.
Judged by these standards, we hold that petitioner’s plea of absolute privilege in defense of the alleged libel published at his direction must be sustained. The question is a close one, but we cannot say that it was not an appropriate exercise of the discretion with which an executive officer of petitioner’s rank is necessarily clothed to publish the press release here at issue in the circumstances disclosed by this record. Petitioner was the Acting Director of an important agency of government, and was clothed by redelegation with “all powers, duties, and functions conferred on the President by Title II of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 . . . .’•’ The integrity of the internal operations of the agency which he headed, and thus his own integrity in his public capacity, had been directly and severely challenged in charges made on the floor of the Senate and given wide publicity; and without his knowledge correspondence which couíd reasonably be read as impliedly defending a position very different from that which he had from the beginning taken in the matter had been sent to a Senator over his signature and incorporated in the Congressional Record. The. issuance of press releases was standard agency practice, as it has become with many governmental agencies in these times. We think that under these circumstances a publicly expressed statement of the position of the agency head, announcing personnel action which he planned to take in reference to the charges so widely disseminated to the public, was an appropriate exercise of the discretion which an officer of that rank must possess if the public service is to function effectively. It would be an unduly restrictive view of the scope of the’duties of a policy-making executive official to hold that a public statement of agency policy in respect to matters of wide public interest , and concern is not action in the line of duty. That petitioner was not required by law or by direction of his superiors to speak out cannot- be controlling in the case of an official, of policy-making rank, for the same considerations which underlie the recognition .of the priv-. ilege as to acts done in connection with a mandatory duty apply with equal force to discretionary acts at those levels of government where the concept of duty encompasses the sound exercise of discretionary authority.
The fact that the action here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner’s line of duty is enough to render the privilege applicable, despite the allegations of malice in the complaint, for as this Court has said of legislative privilege:
“The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good. One must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury’s speculation as to motives.” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377.
We are told that we should' forbear from sanctioning any such rule of absolute privilege lest it open the door to wholesale oppression and abuses on the part of unscrupulous government officials. It is perhaps enough to say that fears of this sort have not been realized within the wide area of government where a judicially formulated absolute privilege of broad scope has long existed. It seems to us wholly chimerical to suggest that what hangs in the balance here is the maintenance of high standards of conduct among those in the public service. To be sure, as with any rule of law which attempts to reconcile fundamentally antagonistic social policies, there may be occasional instances of actual injustice which will go unredressed, but we think that price a necessary one to pay for the greater good. And there are of course other sanctions than civil tort suits available to deter the executive official who may be prone to exercise his functions in an unworthy and irresponsible manner. We think that we should not be deterred from establishing the rule which we announce today by any'such remote forebodings.
Reversed.
Petitioner was appointed Acting Director of the agency effective February 9, 1953. On February 5 he occupied that position by designation of the retiring Director, who was absent from the city.
This statute, part of.the General Appropriation Act of 1951, provided' that:
“No part of the funds of, or available for expenditure by any corporation or agency included in this Act, including the government of the District of Columbia,.shall be .available to pay for annual leave accumulated by any civilian officer or employee during the calendar year 1950 and unused at the close of business on June 30, 1951
The General Accounting Office subsequently ruled that the payments were illégal, and respondents were required to return them. Respondent Madigan challenged this determination- in the Court of Claims, which held that the plan was not in violation of law. Madigan v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 641.
The-plan was referred to1 by various. Senators as "a highly questionable procedure,” a “raid on the Federal Treasury,” “a conspiracy to defraud the Government of funds,” “a new racket,” and. as “definitely involving] criminal action.” It was suggested that i't might constitute “a conspiracy by the head of an agency to defraud the Government 'of money,” and that “it is highly irregular, if not actually immoral, for the heads of agencies to use any such device . . . .” 99 Cong. Rec. 868-871.
“William G. Barr, Acting Director of Rent Stabilization today served notice of suspension on the two officials of the agency who in June 1950 were responsible for the plan which allowed 53 of the agency’s 2,681 .employees to take their accumulated annual leave in cash.
“Mr. Barr’s appointment as Acting Director becomes effective Monday, February 9, 1953, and the suspension of these employees will be his first act of duty. The employees are John J. Madigan, Deputy Director for Administration, and Linda Matteo, Director of Personnel.
“ ‘In June 1950,’ Mr. Barr stated, ‘my position in the agency was not one of authority which would have permitted me to stop •the action. Furthermore, I did hot know.about it until it was almost completed.
“ ‘When I did learn that certain employees were receiving ■ cash annual leave settlements and being returned to agency employment on a temporary basis, I specifically notified the employees under my supervision that if they applied for such cash settlements I would demand their resignations and the record will show that my immediate employees complied with my request.
“ 'While I was advised that the action was legal, I took the position that it violated the spirit of the Thomas Amendment and I violently opposed it. Monday, February -9th, when my appointment as Acting Director becomes effective, will be the first time my position in the agency has permitted me to take any action on this matter, and-the suspension of these employees will be the first official act I shall take.’
“Mr. Barr also revealed that he has written to Senator Joseph McCarthy, Chairman of the Committee on Government Operations, and to Representative John Phillips, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Independent Offices Appropriations, requesting an opportunity to be heard on the entire matter.”
U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168.
See also Cooper v. O’Connor, 69 App. D. C. 100, 99 F. 2d 135;compare Brown v. Shimabukuro, 73 App. D. C. 194, 118 F. 2d 17.
The communication in Spalding v. Vilas was not distributed to the general public, but only to a particular segment thereof which had a special interest in the subject matter. • Statements issued at the direction of Cabinet officers and disseminated to the press in the form of press releases have- also been accorded' an absolute privilege, so long as their contents and the occasion for their issuance relate to the- duties and functions of the particular department. Mellon v. Brewer, 57 App. D. C. 126, 18 F. 2d 168; Glass v. Ickes, 73 App. D. C. 3, 117 F. 2d 273.
As to suits for defamation see, e. g., Taylor v. Glotfelty, 201 F. 2d 51; Smith v. O’Brien, 66 App. D. C. 387, 88 F. 2d 769; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App. D. C. 167; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D. C. 413; United States to use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 63 App. D. C. 65, 69 F. 2d 383; Carson v. Behlen, 136 F. Supp. 222; Tinkoff v. Campbell, 86 F. Supp. 331; Miles v. McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603. See also, as to other torts, Jones v. Kennedy, 73 App. D. C. 292, 121 F. 2d 40; Adams v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 107 F. 2d 139; Gregoire v. Biddle, supra; De Busk v. Harvin, 212 F. 2d 143; Lang v. Wood, 67 App. D. C. 287, 92 F. 2d 211.
See the striking description in Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice (1937), pp. 80-81, quoted in Cooper v. O’Connor, supra, 69 App. D. C. 100, 107, 99 F. 2d 135, 142, n. 28, of the-office of Attorney General of the United States in the' early days of the Republic:
“Not only were there no records but the government provided - neither an office nor clerical assistance. As far back as December 1791, Attorney General Randolph, through President Washington, without success had urged Congress to provide á clerk. President Madison, when it became evident that residence at Washington had greatly increased the Attorney General’s labor, in 1816 urged that he be supplied with ‘the usual appurtenances to a public office.’ A bill to provide offices and a clerk came to the Senate floor on January 10, 1817. . . . Thirty years had passed since the federal government was first organized. Now, Congress-provided offices in the Treasury and a clerk at $1,000 a year, with an additional small contingent fund of $500 for such essentials as stationery, fuel, and ‘a boy to attend the menial duties.’ ”
The record indicates that in 1950 the Office of Housing Expediter had some 2,500 employees.
61 Stat. 193.' See 16 Fed.-Reg. 7630.
Compare United States v. Macdaniel, 7 Pet. 1, 14; United States v. Birdsall, 233 U. S. 223, 230-231.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice O'Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves an action for damages against a railroad due to its alleged failure to maintain adequate warning devices at a grade crossing in western Tennessee. After her husband was killed in a crossing accident, respondent brought suit against petitioner, the operator of the train involved in the collision. Respondent claimed that the warning signs posted at the crossing, which had been installed using federal funds, were insufficient to warn motorists of the danger posed by passing trains. The specific issue we must decide is whether the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 971, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 20101 et seq., in conjunction with the Federal Highway Administration’s regulation addressing the adequacy of warning devices installed with federal funds, pre-empts state tort actions such as respondent’s. We hold that it does.
I
A
In 1970, Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents.” 49 U. S. C. § 20101. The FRSA grants the Secretary of Transportation the authority to “prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety,” § 20103(a), and directs the Secretary to “maintain a coordinated effort to develop and carry out solutions to the railroad grade crossing problem,” § 20134(a). The FRSA also contains an express pre-emption provision, which states:
“Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement.” §20106.
Although the pre-emption provision contains an exception, see ibid., it is inapplicable here.
Three years after passing the FRSA, Congress enacted the Highway Safety Act of 1973, §203, 87 Stat. 283, which, among other things, created the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program (Crossings Program), see 23 U. S. C. § 130. That program makes funds available to States for the “cost of construction of projects for the elimination of hazards of railway-highway crossings.” § 130(a). To participate in the Crossings Program, all States must “conduct and systematically maintain a survey of all highways to identify those railroad crossings which may require separation, relocation, or protective devices, and establish and implement a schedule of projects for this purpose.” § 130(d). That schedule must, “[a]t a minimum, . . . provide signs for all railway-highway crossings.” Ibid.
The Secretary, through the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), has promulgated several regulations implementing the Crossings Program. One of those regulations, 23 CFR § 646.214(b) (1999), addresses the design of grade crossing improvements. More specifically, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) address the adequacy of warning devices installed under the program. According to § 646.214(b)(3), “[a]de-quate warning devices ,. on any project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices are to include automatic gates with flashing light signals” if any of several conditions are present. Those conditions include (A) “[mjultiple main line railroad tracks,” (B) multiple tracks in the vicinity such that one train might “obscure the movement of another train approaching the crossing,” (C) high speed trains combined with limited sight distances, (D) a “combination of high speeds and moderately high volumes of highway and railroad traffic,” (E) the use of the crossing by “substantial numbers of sehoolbuses or trucks carrying hazardous materials,” or (F) when a “diagnostic team recommends them.” § 646.214(b)(3)(i). Subsection (b)(4) states that “[f]or crossings where the requirements of § 646.214(b)(3) are not applicable, the type of warning device to be installed, whether the determination is made by a State regulatory agency, State highway agency, and/or the railroad, is subject to the approval of FHWA.” Thus, at crossings where any of the conditions listed in (b)(3) exist, adequate warning devices, if installed using federal funds, are automatic gates and flashing lights. And where the (b)(3) conditions are not present, the decision of what devices to install is subject to FHWA approval.
B
Shortly after 5 a.m. on October 3, 1993, Eddie Shanklin drove his truck eastward on Oakwood Church Road in Gibson County, Tennessee. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. As Shanklin crossed the railroad tracks that intersect the road, he was struck and killed by a train operated by petitioner. Ibid. At the time of the accident, the Oakwood Church Road crossing was equipped with advance warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks, id., at 34a, the familiar black-and-white, X-shaped signs that read “RAILROAD CROSSING,” see U. S. Dept, of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices §8B-2 (1988) (MUTCD). The Tennessee Department of Transportation (TDOT) had installed the signs in 1987 with federal funds received under the Crossings Program. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. The TDOT had requested the funds as part of a project to install such signs at 196 grade crossings in 11 Tennessee counties. See App. 128-131. That request contained information about each crossing covered by the project, including the presence or absence of several of the factors listed in § 646.214(b)(3). See id., at 134. The FHWA approved the project, App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a, and federal funds accounted for 99% of the cost of installing the signs at the crossings, see App. 133. It is undisputed that the signs at the Oakwood Church Road crossing were installed and fully compliant with the federal standards for such devices at the time of the accident.
Following the accident, Mr. Shanklin’s widow, respondent Dedra Shanklin, brought this diversity wrongful death action against petitioner in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. Id., at 29-34. Respondent’s claims were based on Tennessee statutory and common law. Id., at 31-33. She alleged that petitioner had been negligent in several respects, including by failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing. Ibid. Petitioner moved for summary judgment on the ground that the FRSA pre-empted respondent’s suit. App. to'Pet. for Cert. 28a. The District Court held that respondent’s allegation that the signs installed at the crossing were inadequate was not preempted. Id., at 29a-37a. Respondent thus presented her inadequate warning device claim and three other allegations of negligence to a jury, which found that petitioner and Mr. Shanklin had both been negligent. App. 47. The jury assigned 70% responsibility to petitioner and 30% to Mr. Shanklin, and it assessed damages of $615,379. Ibid. The District Court accordingly entered judgment of $430,765.30 for respondent. Id., at 48.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FRSA did not pre-empt respondent’s claim that the devices at the crossing were inadequate. 173 F. 3d 386 (1999). It reasoned that federal funding alone is insufficient to trigger pre-emption of state tort actions under the FRSA and §§646.214(b)(3) and (4). Id., at 394. Instead, the railroad must establish that § 646.214(b)(3) or (4) was “applied” to the crossing at issue, meaning that the FHWA affirmatively approved the particular devices installed at the crossing as adequate for safety. Id., at 397. The court concluded that, because the TDOT had installed the signs for the purpose of providing “minimum protection” at the Oakwood Church Road crossing, there had been no such individualized determination of adequacy.
We granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 949 (1999), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether the FRSA, by virtue of 23 CFR §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) (1999), pre-empts state tort claims concerning a railroad’s failure to maintain adequate warning devices at crossings where federal funds have participated in the installation of the devices. Compare Ingram v. CSX Transp., Inc., 146 F. 3d 858 (CA11 1998) (holding that federal funding of crossing improvement triggers pre-emption under FRSA); Armijo v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 87 F. 3d 1188 (CA10 1996) (same); Elrod v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 68 F. 3d 241 (CA81995) (same); Hester v. CSX Transp., Inc., 61 F. 3d 382 (CA5 1995) (same), cert. denied, 516 U. S. 1093 (1996), with 173 F. 3d 386 (CA6 1999) (ease below); Shots v. CSX Transp., Inc., 38 F. 3d 304 (CA7 1994) (no pre-emption until representative of Federal Government has determined that devices installed are adequate for safety).
II
We previously addressed the pre-emptive effect of the FHWA’s regulations implementing the Crossings Program in CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U. S. 658 (1993). In that case, we explained that the language of the FRSA’s pre-emption provision dictates that, to pre-empt state law, the federal regulation must “cover” the same subject matter, and not merely “ ‘touch upon’ or ‘relate to’ that subject matter.” Id., at 664; see also 49 U. S. C. §20106. Thus, “preemption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law.” Easterwood, supra, at 664. Applying this standard, we concluded that the regulations contained in 23 CFR pt. 924 (1999), which “establish the general terms of the bargain between the Federal and State Governments” for the Crossings Program, are not pre-emptive. 507 U. S., at 667. We also held that § 646.214(b)(1), which requires that all traffic control devices installed under the program comply with the MUTCD, does not pre-empt state tort actions. Id., at 668-670. The MUTCD “provides a description of, rather than a prescription for, the allocation of responsibility for grade crossing safety between Federal and State Governments and between States and railroads,” and hence “disavows any claim to cover the subject matter of that body of law.” Id., at 669-670.
With respect to §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), however, we reached a different conclusion. Because those regulations “establish requirements as to the installation of particular warning devices,” we held that “when they are applicable, state tort law is pre-empted.” Id., at 670. Unlike the other regulations, “§§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) displace state and private decisionmaking authority by establishing a federal-law requirement that certain protective devices be installed or federal approval obtained.” Ibid. As a result, those regulations “effectively set the terms under which railroads are to participate in the improvement of crossings.” Ibid.
In Easterwood itself, we ultimately concluded that the plaintiff’s state tort claim was not pre-empted. Ibid. As here, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action alleging that the railroad had not maintained adequate warning devices at a particular grade crossing. Id., at 661. We held that §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) were not applicable because the warning devices for which federal funds had been obtained were never actually installed at the crossing where the accident occurred. Id., at 671-673. Nonetheless, we made clear that, when they do apply, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) “cover the subject matter of state law which, like the tort law on which respondent relies, seeks to impose an independent duty on a railroad to identify and/or repair dangerous crossings.” Id., at 671. The sole question in this case, then, is whether §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) “are applicable” to all warning devices actually installed with federal funds.
We believe that Easterwood answers this question as well. As an original matter, one could plausibly read §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) as being purely definitional, establishing a standard for the adequacy of federally funded warning devices but not requiring that all such devices meet that standard. Easterwood rejected this approach, however, and held that the requirements spelled out in (b)(3) and (4) are mandatory for all warning devices installed with federal funds. “[F]or projects that involve grade crossings ... in which ‘Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the [warning] devices,’ regulations specify warning devices that must be installed.” Id., at 666 (emphasis added). Once it is accepted that the regulations are not merely definitional, their scope is plain: They apply to “any project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices.” 23 CFR § 646.214(b)(3)(i) (1999).
Sections 646.214(b)(3) and (4) therefore establish a standard of adequacy that “determiners] the devices to be installed” when federal funds participate in the crossing improvement project. Easterwood, 507 U. S., at 671. If a crossing presents those conditions listed in (b)(3), the State must install automatic gates and flashing lights; if the (b)(3) factors are absent, (b)(4) dictates that the decision as to what devices to install is subject to FHWA approval. See id., at 670-671. In either case, § 646.214(b)(3) or (4) “is applicable” and determines the type of warning device that is “adequate” under federal law. As a result, once the FHWA has funded the crossing, improvement and the warning devices are actually installed and operating, the regulation “dis-placéis] state and private decisionmaking authority by establishing a federal-law requirement that certain protective devices be installed or federal approval obtained.” Id., at 670.
Importantly, this is precisely the interpretation of §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) that the FHWA endorsed in Easter-wood. Appearing as amicus curiae, the Government explained that § 646.214(b) “establishes substantive standards for what constitutes adequate safety devices on grade crossing improvement projects financed with federal funds.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, O. T. 1992, Nos. 91-790 and 91-1206, p. 23. As a result, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) “cover the subject matter of adequate safety devices at crossings that have been improved with the use of federal funds.” Ibid. More specifically, the Government stated that § 646.214(b)
“requires gate arms in certain circumstances, and requires FHWA approval of the safety devices in all other circumstances. Thus, the warning devices in place at a crossing improved with the use of federal funds have, by definition, been specifically found to be adequate under a regulation issued by the Secretary. Any state rule that more or different crossing devices were necessary at a federally funded crossing is therefore preempted.” Id., at 24.
Thus, Easterwood adopted the FHWA’s own understanding of the application of §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), a regulation that the agency had been administering for 17 years.
Respondent and the Government now argue that §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) are more limited in seopé and only apply where the warning devices have been selected based on diagnostic studies and particularized analyses of the conditions at the crossing. See Brief for Respondent 16, 24; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22 (hereinafter Brief for United States). They contend that the Crossings Program actually comprises two distinct programs — the “minimum protection” program and the “priority” or “hazard” program. See Brief for Respondent 1-7; Brief for United States 15-21. Under the “minimum protection” program, they argue, States obtain federal funds merely to equip crossings with advance warning signs and refleetorized erossbucks, the bare minimum required by the MUTCD, without any judgment as to whether the signs are adequate. See Brief for Respondent 5-7, 30-36; Brief for United States 15-21. Under the “priority” or “hazard” program, in contrast, diagnostic teams conduct individualized assessments of particular crossings, and state or FHWA officials make specific judgments about the adequacy of the warning devices using the criteria set out in § 646.214(b)(3). See Brief for Respondent 5-7, 34-35; Brief for United States 18-21. They therefore contend that (b)(3) and (4) only apply to devices installed under the “priority” or “hazard” program, when a diagnostic team has actually applied the decisional process mandated by (b)(3). See Brief for Respondent 16; Brief for United States 18-25. Only then has the regulation prescribed a federal standard for the adequacy of the warning devices that displaces state law covering the same subject.
This construction, however, contradicts the regulation’s plain text. Sections 646.214(b)(3) and (4) make no distinction between devices installed for “minimum protection” and those installed under a so-called “priority” or “hazard” program. Nor does their applicability depend on any individualized determination of adequacy by a diagnostic team or an FHWA official. Rather, as the FHWA itself explained in its Easterwood brief, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) have a “comprehensive scope.” Brief for United States in CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, O. T. 1992, Nos. 91-790 and 91-1206, at 12. Section 646.214(b)(3) states that its requirements apply to ‘‘any project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices.” 23 CFR § 646.214(b)(3)(i) (1999) (emphasis added). And § 646.214(b)(4) applies to all federally funded crossings that do not meet the criteria specified in (b)(3). Either way, the federal standard for adequacy applies to the crossing improvement and “substantially subsume[s] the subject matter of the relevant state law.” Easterwood, 507 U. S., at 664.
Thus, contrary to the Government’s position here, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) “specify warning devices that must be installed” as a part of all federally funded crossing improvements. Id., at 666. Although generally “an agency’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference,” Lyng v. Payne, 476 U. S. 926, 939 (1986), no such deference is appropriate here. Not only is the FHWA’s interpretation inconsistent with the text of §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), see Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 359 (1989), but it also contradicts the agency’s own previous construction that this Court adopted as authoritative in Easterwood, cf. Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116, 131 (1990) (“Once we have determined a statute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute’s meaning”).
The dissent contends that, under our holding, state law is pre-empted even though “[n]o authority, federal or state, has found that the signs in place” are “adequate to protect safety.” Post, at 360 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). This presupposes that States have not fulfilled their obligation to comply with §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4). Those subsections establish a standard for adequacy that States are required to follow in determining what devices to install when federal funds are used. The dissent also argues that Easterwood did not hold that federal funding of the devices is “sufficient” to effect pre-emption, and that “any statement as to the automatic preemptive effect of federal funding should have remained open for reconsideration in a later case.” Post, at 361. But Easterwood did not, in fact, leave this question open. Instead, at the behest of the FHWA, the Court clearly stated that §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) pre-empt state tort claims concerning the adequacy of all warning devices installed with the participation of federal funds.
Respondent also argues that pre-emption does not lie in this particular case because the Oakwood Church Road crossing presented several of the factors listed in § 646.214(b)(3), and because the TDOT did not install pavement markings as required by the MUTCD. See Brief for Respondent 20-22, 36; Brief in Opposition 6-8. This misconceives how pre-emption operates under these circumstances. When the FHWA approves a crossing improvement project and the State installs the warning devices using federal funds, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) establish a federal standard for the adequacy of those devices that displaces state tort law addressing the same subject. At that point, the regulation dictates “the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection.” Easterwood, supra, at 671. It is this displacement of state law concerning the devices’ adequacy, and not the State’s or the FHWA’s adherence to the standard set out in §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) or to the requirements of the MUTCD, that pre-empts state tort actions. Whether the State should have originally installed different or additional devices, or whether conditions at the crossing have since changed such that automatic gates and flashing lights would be appropriate, is immaterial to the pre-emption question.
It should be noted that nothing prevents a State from revisiting the adequacy of devices installed using federal funds. States are free to install more protective devices at such crossings with their own funds or with additional funding from the FHWA. What States cannot do — once they have installed federally funded devices at a particular crossing— is hold the railroad responsible for the adequacy of those devices. The dissent objects that this bestows on railroads a “double windfall”: The Federal Government pays for the installation of the devices, and the railroad is simultaneously absolved of state tort liability. Post, at 860-361. But the same is true of the result urged by respondent and the Government. Respondent and the Government acknowledge that §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) can pre-empt state tort law, but they argue that pre-emption only occurs when the State has installed the devices pursuant to a diagnostic team’s analysis of the crossing in question. Under this reading, railroads would receive the same “double windfall” — federal funding of the devices and pre-emption of state tort law — so long as a diagnostic team has evaluated the crossing. The supposed conferral of a “windfall” on the railroads therefore casts no doubt on our construction of the regulation.
Sections 646.214(b)(3) and (4) “cover the subject matter” of the adequacy of warning devices installed with the participation of federal funds. As a result, the FRSA pre-empts respondent’s state tort claim that the advance warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks installed at the Oakwood Church Road crossing were inadequate. Because the TDOT used federal funds for the signs’ installation, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) governed the selection and installation of the devices. And because the TDOT determined that warning devices other than automatic gates and flashing lights were appropriate, its decision was subject to the approval of the FHWA. See § 646.214(b)(4). Once the FHWA approved the project and the signs were installed using federal funds, the federal standard for adequacy displaced Tennessee statutory and common law addressing the same subject, thereby preempting respondent’s claim.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Sections 646.214(b)(3) and (4) provide in full:
“(3)(i) Adequate warning devices, under § 646.214(b)(2) or on any project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices are to include automatic gates with flashing light signals when one or more of the following conditions exist:
“(A) Multiple main line railroad tracks.
"(B) Multiple tracks at or in the vicinity of the crossing which may be occupied by a train or locomotive so as to obscure the movement of another train approaching the crossing.
“(C) High Speed train operation combined with limited sight distance at either single or multiple track crossings.
“(D) A combination of high speeds and moderately high volumes of highway and railroad traffic.
“(E) Either a high volume of vehicular traffic, high number of train movements, substantial numbers of sehoolbuses or trucks carrying hazardous materials, unusually restricted sight distance, continuing accident occurrences, or any combination of these conditions.
“(F) A diagnostic team recommends them.
“(ii) In individual cases where a diagnostic team justifies that gates are not appropriate, FHWA may find that the above requirements are not applicable.
“(4) For crossings where the requirements of § 646.214(b)(3) are not applicable, the type of warning device to be installed, whether the determination is made by a State regulatory agency, State highway agency, and/or the railroad, is subject to the approval of FHWA.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Me. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc., a nonprofit Maryland corporation, was organized in 1958 for the purpose of operating a swimming pool. After a membership drive to raise funds, the Association obtained zoning as a “community pool” and constructed its facility near Silver Spring, Maryland. The Association is essentially a single-function recreational club, furnishing only swimming and related amenities.
Membership is by family units, rather than individuals, and is limited to 325 families. This limit has been reached on at least one occasion. Membership is largely keyed to the geographical area within a three-quarter-mile radius of the pool. A resident (whether or not a homeowner) of that area requires no recommendation before he may apply for membership; the resident receives a preferential place on the waiting list if he applies when the membership is full; and the resident-member who is a homeowner and who sells his home and turns in his membership, confers on the purchaser of his property a first option on the vacancy created by his removal and resignation. A person residing outside the three-quarter-mile area may apply for membership only upon the recommendation of a member; he receives no preferential place on the waiting list if the membership is full; and if he becomes a member, he has no way of conferring an option upon the purchaser of his property. Beyond-the-area members may not exceed 30%■ of the total. Majority approval of those present at a meeting of the board of directors or of the general membership is required before an applicant is admitted as a member.
Only members and their guests are admitted to the pool. No one else may gain admission merely by payment of an entrance fee.
In the spring of 1968 petitioner, Harry C. Press, a Negro who had purchased from a nonmember a home within the geographical preference area, inquired about membership in Wheaton-Haven. At that time the Association had no Negro member. In November 1968 the general membership rejected a resolution that would have opened the way for Negro members. Dr. Press was never given an application form, and respondents concede that he was discouraged from applying because of his race.
In July 1968 petitioners Murray and Rosalind N. Tillman, who were husband and wife and members in good standing, brought petitioner Grace Rosner, a Negro, to the pool as their guest. Although Mrs. Rosner was admitted on that occasion, the guest policy was changed by the board of directors, at a special meeting the following day, to limit guests to relatives of members. Respondents concede that one reason for the adoption of this policy was to prevent members from having Negroes as guests at the pool. Under this new policy Mrs. Rosner thereafter was refused admission when the Tillmans sought to have her as their guest. In the fall of 1968 the membership, by resolution, reaffirmed the policy.
In October 1969 petitioners (Mr. and Mrs. Tillman, Dr. and Mrs. Press, and Mrs. Rosner) instituted this civil action against the Association and individuals who were its officers or directors, seeking damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, particularly under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, now 42 U. S. C. § 1982, the Civil Rights Act of 1870, now 42 U. S. C. § 1981, and Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a, et seq. The District Court, in an unreported opinion, held that Wheaton-Haven was a private club and exempt from the nondiscrimination provisions of the statutes. It granted summary judgment for defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. 451 F.2d 1211 (CA4 1971). It later denied rehearing en banc over two dissents, id., at 1225. We granted certiorari, 406 U. S. 916 (1972), to review the case in the light of Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U. S. 229 (1969).
I
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968), this Court, after a detailed review of the legislative history of 42 U. S. C. § 1982, id., at 422-437, held that the statute reaches beyond state action and is not confined to officially sanctioned segregation. The Court subsequently applied § 1982 in Sullivan to private racial discrimination practiced by a nonstock corporation organized to operate a community park and playground facilities, including a swimming pool, for residents of a designated area. The Presses contend that their § 1982 claim is controlled by Sullivan. We agree.
A. The Court of Appeals held that § 1982 would not apply to the Presses because membership rights in Wheaton-Haven could neither be leased nor transferred incident to the acquisition of property. 451 F. 2d, at 1216-1217. In Sullivan, the Court concluded that the right to enjoy a membership share in the corporation, assigned by a property owner as part of a leasehold he was granting, constituted a right “to . . . lease . . . property” protected by § 1982. 396 U. S., at 236-237. The Court of Appeals distinguished property-linked membership shares in Sullivan from property-linked membership preferences in Wheaton-Haven by emphasizing the speculative nature of the benefits available to residents of the area around Wheaton-Haven. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erroneously characterized the property-linked preferences conferred by Wheaton-Haven’s bylaws.
Under the bylaws, a resident of the area within three-quarters of a mile from the pool receives the three preferences noted above: he is allowed to apply for membership without seeking a recommendation from a current member; he receives preference over others, except those with first options, when applying for a membership vacancy; and, if he is an owner-member, he is able to pass to his successor-in-title a first option to acquire the membership Wheaton-Haven purchases from him. If the membership is full, the preference-area resident is placed on the waiting list; other applicants, however, are required to reapply after those on the waiting list obtain memberships.
The Court of Appeals concluded, incorrectly it later appeared, that the membership had never been full, and that the option possibility, therefore, was “far too tenuous a thread to support a conclusion that there is a transfer of membership incident to the purchase of property.” 451 F. 2d, at 1217. Since the Presses had not purchased their area home from a member, the court found no transaction by which the Presses could have acquired a membership preference. 451 F. 2d, at 1217-1218, n. 14.
We differ from the Court of Appeals in our evaluation of the three rights obtained. The record indicates that the membership was full in the spring of 1968 but dropped, perhaps not unexpectedly in view of the season, in the fall of that year. We cannot be certain, either, that the membership would not have remained full in the absence of racial discrimination, or that the membership will never be full in the future. As was observed in dissent in the Court of Appeals:
“Several years from now it may well be that a white neighbor can sell his home at a considerably higher price than Dr. and Mrs. Press because the white owner will be able to assure his purchaser of an option for membership in Wheaton-Haven. Dr. and Mrs. Press, however, are denied this advantage.” 451 F. 2d, at 1223.
Similarly, the automatic waiting-list preference given to residents of the favored area may have affected the price paid by the Presses when they bought their home. Thus, the purchase price to them, like the rental paid by Freeman in Sullivan, may well reflect benefits dependent on residency in the preference area. For them, however, the right to acquire a home in the area is abridged and diluted.
When an organization links membership benefits to residency in a narrow geographical area, that decision infuses those benefits into the bundle of rights for which an individual pays when buying or leasing within the area. The mandate of 42 U. S. C. § 1982 then operates to guarantee a nonwhite resident, who purchases, leases, or holds this property, the same rights as are enjoyed by a white resident.
B. Respondents contend that even if 42 U. S. C. § 1982 applies, Wheaton-Haven nevertheless is exempt as a private club under § 201 (e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a (e), with a consequent implied narrowing effect upon the range and application of the older § 1982. In Sullivan we found it unnecessary to consider limits on § 1982 as applied to a truly private association because we found “no plan or purpose of exclusiveness” in Little Hunting Park. 396 U. S., at 236. But here, as there, membership “is open to every white person within the geographic area, there being no selective element other than race.” Ibid. The only restrictions are the stated maximum number of memberships and, as in Sullivan, id.., at 234, the requirement of formal board or membership approval. The structure and practices of Wheaton-Haven thus are indistinguishable from those of Little Hunting Park. We hold, as a consequence, that Wheaton-Haven is not a private club and that it is not necessary in this case to consider the issue of any implied limitation on the sweep of § 1982 when its application to a truly private club, within the meaning of § 2000a (e), is under consideration. Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163 (1972); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298 (1969).
II
Mrs. Rosner and the Tillmans, relying on 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 2000a et seq., contend that Wheaton-Haven could not adopt a racially discriminatory policy toward guests. The District Court granted summary judgment for the respondents on these claims also, holding that Wheaton-Haven was a private club and exempt from all three statutes.
The operative language of both § 1981 and § 1982 is traceable to the Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 30-31 n. 7 (1948). In light of the historical interrelationship between § 1981 and § 1982, we see no reason to construe these sections differently when applied, on these facts, to the claim of Wheaton-Haven that it is a private club. Consequently, our discussion and rejection of Wheaton-Haven’s claim that it is exempt from § 1982 disposes of the argument that Wheaton-Haven is exempt from § 1981. On remand the District Court will develop any necessary facts concerning the adoption of the guest policy and will evaluate the claims of the parties free of the misconception that Wheaton-Haven is exempt from §§ 1981, 1982, and 2000a.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Candy, ice cream, and soft drinks have been sold on the premises, but these were merely incidentals for the convenience of swimmers during the season. Aside from meetings of the board of directors and of the general membership, the premises apparently have been utilized only for pool-related activities.
Wheaton-Haven presently charges an initiation fee of $375 and annual dues ranging from $50 to $60, depending on the number of persons in the family unit.
The Association’s bylaws provide that “[m]embership shall be open to bona fide residents (whether or not home owners) of the area within a three-quarter mile radius of the pool,” and “may be extended” to others “who shall have been recommended ... by a member.”
“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U. S. C. § 1982.
Under the Wheaton-Haven system, a within-the-area member selling his home may either retain his membership or seek to sell it back to the Association. If Wheaton-Haven is willing to purchase, it pays 80% of the initial cost if the membership is not full, and 90% if the membership is full. The purchaser of the member’s home then has a first option on the membership so released by the seller. The practical effect of this system is to prefer applicants who purchase from members over other applicants, particularly at a time when the membership is full.
In the court’s per curiam statement responsive to the petition for rehearing, it described its earlier observation that the membership list had never been full as an “inadvertent misstatement . . . now corrected to reflect a full membership list in the spring of 1968.” 451 F. 2d 1211, 1225.
The record reveals that a number of members withdrew when the present suit was filed. Tr. of Oral Arg. in District Court 15.
“The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000a (e).
Apparently one applicant was formally rejected during the preceding 12 years of Little Hunting Park’s operation. App. 127 and Brief for Petitioner 7, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U. S. 229 (1969). At Wheaton-Haven one applicant was formally rejected in the preceding 11 years.
The Court of Appeals found it “inferable from Little Hunting Park’s organization and membership provisions that it was built by the same real estate developers who built the four subdivisions from which members were drawn, as an aid to the sale of homes.” 451 F. 2d, at 1215 n. 8. This inference may be erroneous. App. 24-36 and Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, 31-34, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, supra. In any event, Sullivan did not rest on any relationship between the club and real estate developers.
“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be ptirties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”
The Act of Apr. 9, 1866, § 1, read in part:
“That all persons born in the United States ... of every race and color . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.” 14 Stat. 27.
The present codification of § 1981 is derived from Revised Statutes § 1977 (1874), which codified the Act of May 31, 1870, § 16, 16 Stat. 144. Although the 1866 Act rested only on the Thirteenth Amendment, United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 640 (1883); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 22 (1883); United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322, 323 (ED Ark. 1903), and, indeed, was enacted before the Fourteenth Amendment was formally proposed, United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 804 (1966); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 32 n. 11 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 640 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, supra, 109 U. S., at 22, the 1870 Act was passed pursuant to the Fourteenth, and changes in wording may have reflected the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 695-696 (1898). The 1866 Act was re-enacted in 1870, and the predecessor of the present § 1981 was to be “enforced according to the provisions” of the 1866 Act. Act of May 31, 1870, § 18, 16 Stat. 144.
Respondent McIntyre urges that the judgment in his favor should be affirmed as to him because he was merely a director of Wheaton-Haven and was later defeated in his bid for re-election to its board, and because, in his deposition, he stated that he opposed the Association’s exclusionary practices. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals discussed Mr. McIntyre’s individual liability, and we find it inappropriate to attempt resolution of this issue on the present record.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent company employs at its refinery in East Chicago, Indiana, approximately 1,700 men, for whom the petitioning international union and its local are bargaining agents, and 24 of whom are also petitioners here. In early February 1959, the respondent company docked three of its employees at the East Chicago refinery a total of $2.19. On February 13 and 14, 999 of the 1,700 employees participated in a strike or work stoppage, or so the complaint alleges. On March 12, the company filed this suit for damages and an injunction, naming the international and its local as defendants, together with 24 individual union member-employees.
Count I of the complaint, which was in three counts, stated a cause of action under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act (29 U. S. C. § 185) against the international and its local. It alleged an existing collective bargaining agreement between the international and the company containing, among other matters, a promise by the union not to strike over any cause which could be the subject of a grievance under other provisions of the contract. It was alleged that the international and the local caused the strike or work stoppage occurring on February 13 and 14 and that the strike was over the pay claims of three employees in the amount of $2.19, which claims were properly subject to the grievance procedure provided by the contract. The complaint asked for damages in the amount of $12,500 from the international and the local.
Count II of the complaint purported to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the District Court. It asked judgment in the same amount against 24 individual employees, each of whom was alleged to be a committeeman of the local union and an agent of the international, and responsible for representing the international, the local, and their members. The complaint asserted that on February 13 and 14, the individuals, “contrary to their duty to plaintiff to abide by said contract, and maliciously confederating and conspiring together to cause the plaintiff expense and damage, and to induce breaches of the said contract, and to interfere with performance thereof by the said labor organizations and the affected employees, and to cause breaches thereof, individually and as officers, committeemen and agents of the said labor organizations, fomented, assisted and participated in a strike or work stoppage . . . .”
Count.Ill of the complaint asked for an injunction but that matter need not concern us here since it is disposed of in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, ante, p. 195, decided this day.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on various grounds and a motion to stay the action for the reasons (1) that all of the issues in the suit were referable to arbitration under the collective bargaining contract and (2) that important issues in the suit were also involved in certain grievances filed by employees and said to be in arbitration under the contract. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss Count I, dismissed Count II, and denied the motion to stay (187 F. Supp. 225). The Court of Appeals upheld the refusal to dismiss or stay Count I, but reversed the dismissal of Count II (290 F. 2d 312), and this Court granted certiorari (368 U.S. 937).
I.
We have concluded that Count I should not be dismissed or stayed. Count I properly states a cause of action under § 301 and is to be governed by federal law. Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95, 102-104; Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448. Under our decisions, whether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court on the basis of the contract entered into by the parties. “The Congress . . . has by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, assigned the courts the duty of determining whether the reluctant party has breached his promise to arbitrate. For arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 582. See also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564, 570-571 (concurring opinion). We think it unquestionably clear that'the contract here involved is not susceptible to a construction that the company was bound to arbitrate its claim for damages against the union for breach of the undertaking not to strike.
While it is quite obvious from other provisions of the contract that the parties did not intend to commit all of their possible disputes and the whole scope of their relationship to the grievance and arbitration procedures established in Article XXVI, that article itself is determinative of the issue in this case since it precludes arbitration boards from considering any matters other than employee grievances. After defining a grievance as “any difference regarding wages, hours or working conditions between the parties hereto or between the Employer and an employee covered by this working agreement,” Article XXVI provides that the parties desire to settle employee grievances fairly and quickly and that therefore a stated procedure “must be followed.” The individual employee is required to present his grievance to his foreman, and if not satisfied there, he may take his grievance to the plant superintendent who is to render a written decision. There is also provision for so-called Workmen's Committees to present grievances to the local management. If the local superintendent’s decision is not acceptable, the matter is to be referred for discussion between the President of the International and the Director of Industrial Relations for the company (or their representatives), and for decision by the Director alone. If the Director's decision is disputed, then “upon request of the President or any District Director” of the international, a local arbitration board may be convened and the matter finally decided by this board.
Article XXVI then imposes the critical limitation. It is provided that local arbitration boards “shall consider only individual or local employee or local committee grievances arising under the application of the currently existing agreement.” There is not a word in the grievance and arbitration article providing for the submission of grievances by the company. Instead, there is the express, flat limitation that arbitration boards should consider only employee grievances. Furthermore, the article expressly provides that arbitration may be invoked only at the option of the union. At no place in the contract does the union agree to arbitrate at the behest of the company. The company is to take its claims elsewhere, which it has now done.
The union makes a further argument for a stay. Following the strike, and both before and after the company filed its suit, 14 of the 24 individual defendants filed grievances claiming reimbursement for pay withheld by the employer. The union argues that even though the company need not arbitrate its claim for damages, it is bound to arbitrate these grievances; and the arbitrator, in the process of determining the grievants’ right to reimbursement, will consider and determine issues which also underlie the company’s claim for damages. Therefore, it is said that a stay of the court action is appropriate.
We are not satisfied from the record now before us, however, that any significant issue in the damage suit will be presented to and decided by an arbitrator. The grievances filed simply claimed reimbursement for pay due employees for time spent at regular work or processing grievances. Although the record is a good deal less than clear and although no answer has been filed in this case, it would appear from the affidavits of the parties presented in connection with the motion to stay that the grievants claimed to have been disciplined as a result of the work stoppage and that they were challenging this disciplinary action. The company sharply denies in its brief in this Court that any employee was disciplined. In any event, precisely what discipline was imposed, upon what grounds it is being attacked by the grievants, and the circumstances surrounding the withholding of pay from the employees are unexplained in the record. The union’s brief here states that the important issue underlying the arbitration and the suit for damages is whether the grievants instigated or participated in a work stoppage contrary to the collective bargaining contract. This the company denies and it asserts that no issue in the damage suit will be settled by arbitrating the grievances.
The District Court must decide whether the company is entitled to damages from the union for breach of contract. The arbitrator, if arbitration occurs, must award or deny reimbursement in whole or in part to all or some of the 14 employees. His award, standing alone, obviously would determine no issue in the damage suit. If he awarded reimbursement to the employees and if it could be ascertained with any assurance that one of his subsidiary findings was that the 14 men had not participated in a forbidden work stoppage — the critical issue according to the union’s brief — the company would nevertheless not be foreclosed in court since, even if it were bound by such a subsidiary finding made by the arbitrator, it would be free to prove its case in court through the conduct of other agents of the union. In this state of the record, the union has not made out its case for a stay.
For the foregoing reasons, the lower courts properly denied the union’s motion to dismiss Count I or stay it pending arbitration of the employer’s damage claim.
II.
We turn now to Count II of the complaint, which charged 24 individual officers and agents of the union with breach of the collective bargaining contract and tortious interference with contractual relations. The District Court held that under § 301 union officers or members cannot be held personally liable for union actions, and that therefore “suits of the nature alleged in Count II are no longer cognizable in state or federal courts.” The Court of Appeals reversed, however, ruling that “Count II stated a cause of action cognizable in the courts of Indiana and, by diversity, maintainable in the District Court.”
We are unable to agree with the Court of Appeals, for we are convinced that Count II is controlled by federal law and that it must be dismissed on the merits for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Under § 301 a suit for violation of the collective bargaining contract in either a federal or state court is governed by federal law (Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95, 102-104; Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448), and Count II on its face charges the individual defendants with a violation of the no-strike clause. After quoting verbatim the no-strike clause, Count II alleges that the 24 individual defendants “contrary to their duty to plaintiff to abide by” the contract fomented and participated in a work stoppage in violation of the no-strike clause. The union itself does not quarrel with the proposition that the relationship of the members of the bargaining unit to the employer is “governed by” the bargaining agreement entered into on their behalf by the union. It is universally accepted that the no-strike clause in a collective agreement at, the very least establishes a rule of conduct or condition of employment the violation of which by employees justifies discipline or discharge (Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270, 280 & n. 10; Labor Board v. Rockaway News Co., 345 U. S. 71, 80; Labor Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332; Labor Board v. Draper Corp., 145 F. 2d 199 (C. A. 4th Cir.); United Biscuit Co. v. Labor Board, 128 F. 2d 771 (C. A. 7th Cir.); see R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 5 Lab. Arb. 16; Ford Motor Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 439). The conduct charged in Count II is therefore within the scope of a “violation” of the collective agreement.
As well as charging a violation of the no-strike clause by the individual defendants, Count II necessarily charges a violation of the clause by the union itself. The work stoppage alleged is the identical work stoppage for which the union is sued under Count I and the same damage is alleged as is alleged in Count I. Count II states that the individual defendants acted “as officers, committeemen and agents of the said labor organizations” in breaching and inducing others to breach the collective bargaining contract. Count I charges the principal, and Count II charges the agents for acting on behalf of the principal. Whatever individual liability Count II alleges for the 24 individual defendants, it necessarily restates the liability of the union which is charged under Count I, since under § 301 (b) the union is liable for the acts of its agents, under familiar principles of the law of agency (see also §301 (e)). Proof of the allegations of Count II in its present form would inevitably prove a violation of the no-strike clause by the union itself. Count II, like Count I, is thus a suit based on the union’s breach of its collective bargaining contract with the employer, and therefore comes within § 301 (a). When a union breach of contract is alleged, that the plaintiff seeks to hold the agents liable instead of the principal does not bring the action outside the scope of § 301.
Under any theory, therefore, the company’s action is governed by the national labor relations law which Congress commanded this Court to fashion under § 301 (a). We hold that this law requires the dismissal of Count II for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted — whether the contract violation charged is that of the union or that of the union plus the union officers and agents.
When Congress passed § 301, it declared its view that only the union was to be made to respond for union wrongs, and that the union members were not to be subject to levy. Section 301 (b) has three clauses. One makes unions suable in the courts of the United States. Another makes unions bound by the acts of their agents according to Conventional principles of agency law (cf. §301 (e)). At the same time, however, the remaining clause exempts agents and members from personal liability for judgments against the union (apparently even when the union is without assets to pay the judgment). The legislative history of § 301 (b) makes it clear that this third clause was a deeply felt congressional reaction against the Danbury Hatters case (Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274; Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522), and an expression of legislative determination that the aftermath (Loewe v. Savings Bank of Danbury, 236 F. 444 (C. A. 2d Cir.)) of that decision was not to be permitted to recur. In that case, an antitrust treble damage action was brought against a large number of union members, including union officers and agents, to recover from them the employer’s losses in a nationwide, union-directed boycott of his hats. The union was not named as a party, nor was judgment entered against it. A large money judgment was entered, instead, against the individual defendants for participating in the plan “emanating from headquarters” (235 U. S., at 534), by knowingly authorizing and delegating authority to the union officers to do the acts involved. In the debates, Senator Ball, one of the Act’s sponsors, declared that § 301, “by providing that the union may sue and be sued as a legal entity, for a violation of contract, and that liability for damages will lie against union assets only, will prevent a repetition of the Danbury Hatters case, in which many members lost their homes” (93 Cong. Rec. 5014). See also 93 Cong. Rec. 3839, 6283; S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16.
Consequently, in discharging the duty Congress imposed on us to formulate the federal law to govern § 301 (a) suits, we are strongly guided by and do not give a niggardly reading to § 301 (b). “We would undercut the Act and defeat its policy if we read § 301 narrowly” (Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S., at 456). We have already said in another context that § 301 (b) at least evidences “a congressional intention that the union as an entity, like a corporation, should in the absence of agreement be the sole source of recovery for injury inflicted by it” (Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U. S. 459, 470). This policy cannot be evaded or truncated by the simple device of suing union agents or members, whether in contract or tort, or both, in a separate count or in a separate action for damages for violation of a collective bargaining contract for which damages the union itself is liable. The national labor policy requires and we hold that when a union is liable for damages for violation of the no-strike clause, its officers and members are not liable for these damages. Here, Count II, as we have said, necessarily alleges union liability but prays for damages from th'e union agents. Where the union has inflicted the injury it alone must pay. Count II must be dismissed.
The case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
Article XXVI provides:
“GRIEVANCE AND ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
“Definition
"1. A grievance is defined to be any difference regarding wages, hours or working conditions between the parties hereto or between the Employer and an employee covered by this working agreement which might arise within any plant or within any region of operations.
“Grievance Procedure
“It is the sincere desire of both parties that employee grievances be settled as fairly and as quickly as possible. Therefore, when a grievance arises, the following procedure must be followed:
“2. For the purpose of adjusting employee grievances and disputes as defined above, it is agreed that an}'- employee, individually or accompanied by his committeeman, if desired shall:
“(a) Seek direct adjustment of any grievance or dispute with the foreman under whom he is employed. Such meeting will be without loss of time to the employee and/or his committeeman during regular working hours for time spent in conference with the foreman. The foreman shall reply to said employee within three (3) working days (Saturday, Sunday and Holidays excluded) from the date on which the grievance was first presented to him;
“(b) If the question is not then settled, the employee may submit his grievance in writing, on forms supplied by Union, to a committee selected as hereinafter provided for the particular plant or region in which such employee is employed. Such committee shall investigate said complaint and if in its’ opinion the grievance has merit it shall have the right to meet with'■ the local company superintendent or his representative, who shall receive the committee for this purpose. Written decisions shall be made by the local superintendent or his representative within ten (10) days after meeting with the committee, provided that prior to the time of or at the meeting with the committee such complaint or grievance has been submitted in writing to the local superintendent or his representative.
“(c) In exceptional cases, Workmen’s Committees shall have the right to institute grievances concerning any alleged violation of this Agreement, by filing written complaint with the official locally in charge.
“(d) Any grievance filed with or by the local Workmen’s Committee can only be withdrawn with the Workmen’s Committee’s consent.
“3. No complaint or grievance shall be considered hereunder unless it is presented to the superintendent or official locally in charge within sixty (60) days from the date on which the complaint or grievance arose, or from the date on which the employee or employees concerned first learned of the cause of complaint.
“4. The committee above mentioned shall be selected from among and by employees of the Employer who are members of the Union. No official, foreman, or employee having authority to hire or discharge men shall serve on the committee.
“5. In case of discharge or lay-off, employees who may desire to file complaints must present such complaints within one (1) week after the effective date of discharge or lay-off to the committee mentioned in this Article. Before any such employee is to be discharged for cause, other than flagrant violation of rules, or is to be laid off, he shall be given a written notice, dated and signed by his foreman or other representative of the Employer, setting forth the reason for such discharge or lay-off. In the event an employee has been discharged for a flagrant violation of a company rule, he shall subsequently, upon request, be given a written notice, dated and signed by his foreman or other representative of the Employer setting forth the reason for such discharge. The Workmen’s Committee will be furnished with a copy of the statement furnished to the employee, both where the discharge or lay-off is for cause or for flagrant violation of a Company rule. Any grievance to be filed under this section must be filed within forty (40) days from the effective date of the discharge or lay-off.
"6. In the event the decision of the superintendent or his representative shall not be satisfactory to the committee, it is agreed that the President of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, or someone designated by him, shall, not later than forty-five (45) days after such decision, have the right to confer with the Director of Industrial Relations for the Sinclair Companies, or someone designated by him, for the purpose of discussing grievances or disputes and of obtaining decisions thereon. It is agreed that the Director of Industrial Relations for the Sinclair Companies, or someone designated by him, shall render a decision to the President of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CJO, within twenty (20) days after grievances or disputes have been so submitted to him in writing.
“7. If such decision is not satisfactory, then, upon request of the President or any District Director of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO and within sixty (60) days from the posting date of the final appeal answer, there shall be set up a local Arbitration Board, and such grievances and disputes submitted to it within ten (10) days after formation of such Board. Such local boards may be set up at each refinery to deal with cases arising therefrom; cases arising from Sinclair Oil & Gas Company shall be heard and determined at Tulsa, Oklahoma; Fort Worth, Texas; Midland, Texas; or Casper, Wyoming; cases arising from Sinclair Pipe Line Company shall be heard and determined at the cities previously named or at Kansas City, Missouri; Toledo, Ohio; Houston, Texas; Chicago, Illinois; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; or Independence, Kansas. These local Arbitration Boards shall consider only individual or local employee or local committee grievances arising under the application of the currently existing agreement, or supplements thereto, and local wage and classification disputes submitted on the initiative of the President or any District Director of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO. In this connection, Employer agrees to give consideration to local classification rate inequity complaints existing by reason of a comparison with the average of competitive rates of pay for like jobs having comparable duties and responsibilities being paid by agreed-upon major competitive companies in the local area. Such requests for adjustments of classification rate inequities, if any, shall be made not more frequently than twice annually, to be effective on February 1st and August 1st. Such requests to be submitted at least thirty (30) days prior to such semi-annual dates.
''8. The above mentioned local Arbitration Board shall be composed of one person designated by Employer and one designated by the President or District Director of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO. The board shall be requested by both parties to render a decision within seven (7) days from date of submission. Should the two members of the board selected as above provided, be unable to agree within seven (7) days, or to mutually agree upon an impartial third arbitrator, an impartial third member shall be selected within seven (7) days thereafter by the employer or employee member of the Arbitration Board, or such two parties jointly, requesting the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to submit a panel of arbitrators from which the third member of the board will be selected in accordance with the procedure of such Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
“9. The decision of the Board aforesaid, as provided in Section 8 hereof, shall be final. However, if the rules and conditions existing at the time a given case originated are subsequently changed, it is understood that the arbitration award rendered under former rules and conditions shall not act to prohibit consideration of a complaint originating under the changed rules and conditions.
“10. Cases arising from the Gasoline Plants shall be considered as coming within the Producing Division in which they are located.
“11. The fee and expense of the impartial arbitrator selected as above provided shall be divided equally between the parties to such arbitration. The Parties agree to attempt to hold the arbitrator’s fees to a reasonable basis.”
The no-strike clause (Article III) provides that “[T]here shall be no strikes . . . (1) For any cause which is or may be the subject of a grievance ... or (2) For any other cause, except upon written notice by Union to Employer . . . .” Article XXVII, covering “general disputes,” provides that disputes which are general in character or which affect a large number of employees are to be negotiated between the parties; there is no provision for arbitration. Moreover, the management-prerogative clause (Article XXXI) recognizes that “operation of the Employer’s facilities and the direction of the working forces, including the right to hire, suspend or discharge for good and sufficient cause and pursuant to the seniority Article of this agreement, the right to relieve employees from duties because of lack of work, are among the sole prerogatives of the Employer; provided, however, that . . . such suspensions and discharges shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration clause . . . .”
Article XXVI is set out in full injra, at p. 250, as an Appendix.
We do not need to reach, therefore, the question of whether, under the contract involved here, breaches of the no-strike clause are "grievances,” i. e., “difference[s] regarding wages, hours or working conditions,” or are “grievances” in the more general sense of the term. See Hoover Express Co. v. Teamsters Local, No. 327, 217 F. 2d 49 (C. A. 6th Cir.). The present decision does not approve or disapprove the doctrine of the Hoover case or the Sixth Circuit cases following it (e. g., Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc., v. United Steelworkers, 289 F. 2d 103; United Auto Workers v. Benton Harbor Indus., 242 F. 2d 536). See also cases collected in Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Local Lodge No. 1717, 299 F. 2d 882, 883-884 n. 5, 6 (C. A. 3d Cir.). In Drake Bakeries, Inc., v. Local 50, post, p. 254, decided this day, the question of arbitrability of a damages claim for breach of a no-strike clause is considered and resolved in favor of arbitration in the presence of an agreement to arbitrate “all complaints, disputes or grievances arising between them [i. e., the parties] involving . . . any act or conduct or relation between the parties.”
Arbitrators generally have no obligation to give their reasons for an award. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U. S. 593, 598; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198, 203. The record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial. Ibid.
The union also argues that the preemptive doctrine of cases such as San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, is applicable and prevents the courts from asserting jurisdiction. Since this is a § 301 suit, that doctrine is inapplicable. Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95, 101 n. 9.
We put aside, since it is unnecessary to reach them, the questions of whether the employer was excused from arbitrating the damage claim because it was over breach of the no-strike clause (see Drake Bakeries, Inc., v. Local 50, post, p. 254, decided this day) and whether the underlying factual or legal determination, made by an arbitrator in the process of awarding or denying reimbursement to 14 employees, would bind either the union or the company in the latter’s action for damages against the union in the District Court.
Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo.). Contra, Square D Co. v. United E., R. & M. Wkrs., 123 F. Supp. 776, 779-781 (E. D. Mich.). See also Morgan Drive Away, Inc., v. Teamsters Union, 166 F. Supp. 885 (S. D. Ind.), concluding, as we do, that the complaint should be dismissed because of §§ 301 (b) and 301 (e), but for want of jurisdiction rather than on the merits. Our holding, however, is that the suit is a § 301 suit; whether there is a claim upon which relief can be granted is a separate question. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678. '
In reaching this conclusion, we have not ignored the argument that Count II was drafted in order to anticipate the possible union defense under Count I that the work stoppage was unauthorized by the union, and was a wildcat strike led by the 24 individual defendants acting not in behalf of the union but in their personal and nonunion capacity. The language of Count II contradicts the argument, however, and we therefore do not reach the question of whether the count would state a proper § 301 (a) claim if it charged unauthorized, individual action.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents but a single question, upon which petitioner and the Government are substantially agreed that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. Does a United States citizen by birth who by foreign law derives from his parents citizenship of a foreign nation lose his United States citizenship by foreign residence long continued after attaining his majority?
Petitioner Mandoli was born in this country, of un-naturalized Italian parents. These circumstances made him a citizen of the United States by virtue of our Constitution and a national of Italy by virtue of Italian law. While he was a suckling, his parents returned to Italy taking him with them. At about the age of fifteen, he sought to come to the United States; but permission was refused by the American Consul at Palermo upon the ground that he was too young to take the journey unaccompanied.
In 1931, Mandoli saw brief service in the Italian army. In 1937, being 29 or 30 years of age, he attempted to come to the United States, but was rejected because of such army service. He renewed the effort in 1944, with the same result. In 1948, he was granted a certificate of identity which permitted him to enter the United States for prosecution of an action to establish his citizenship.
Judgment in the District Court went against him on the ground that expatriation had resulted from two causes: first, contrary to his contentions, it found that his service in the Italian army was voluntary and that he then took an oath of allegiance to the King of Italy; second, that he continued to reside in Italy after attaining his majority, thereby electing between his dual citizenships in favor of that of Italy.
The Government abandoned the first ground because the Attorney General ruled that such service in the Italian army by one similarly situated could “only be regarded as having been taken under legal compulsion amounting to duress.” He said, “The choice of taking the oath or violating the law was, for a soldier in the army of Fascist Italy, no choice at all.” The Court of Appeals, however, relying largely on Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325, affirmed upon the ground that failure to return to the United States upon the attainment of his majority operated to extinguish petitioner’s American citizenship. We conclude that Mandoli has not lost his citizenship.
It would be as easy as it would be unrewarding to point out conflict in precept and confusion in practice on this side of the Atlantic, where ideas of nationality and expatriation were in ferment during the whole Nineteenth Century. Reception of the common law confronted American courts with a doctrine that a national allegiance into which one was born could be renounced only with consent of his sovereign. European rulers, losing subjects (particularly seamen) to the New World, adhered fiercely to the old doctrine. On the other hand, the United States, prospering from the migrant’s freedom of choice, became champion of the individual’s right to expatriate himself, for which it contended in diplomacy and fought by land and by sea. However, this personal freedom of expatriation was not always recognized by our own courts, because of their deference to common-law precedent. Finally, Congress, by the Act of July 27, 1868, declared that “the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” and that “any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of this government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government.”
But this statute left unanswered many questions as to the overt acts that would effect a voluntary expatriation by our own citizens or would cause an involuntary forfeiture of citizenship. Prior to 1907, courts and administrators were left to devise their own answers.
Preparatory to legislative action on the subject, Congress sought and received a report of a special citizenship board. Reviewing judicial decisions, this report concluded that the courts recognized well-established doctrines of election in cases dealing with rights of persons with dual citizenship. This board recommended that Congress follow what it assumed to be established de-cisional law and enact, among other things, that expatriation be assumed as to any citizen who became domiciled in a foreign state, with a rebuttable presumption of foreign domicile from five years of residence in a foreign state. This was proposed as to all citizens and not merely those possessing dual citizenship. Congress, however, instead of accepting this broad doctrine of expatriation, by the Expatriation Act of 1907 limited the presumption of expatriation from foreign residence to the case of naturalized but not of native-born citizens.
If petitioner, when he became of full age in 1928, were under a statutory duty to make an election and to return to this country for permanent residence if he elected United States citizenship, that duty must result from the 1907 Act then applicable. In the light of the foregoing history, we can find no such obligation imposed by that Act; indeed, it would appear that the proposal to impose that duty was deliberately rejected.
The Nationality Act of 1940, though not controlling here, shows the consistency of congressional policy not to subject a citizen by birth to the burden and hazard of election at majority. This comprehensive revision and codification of the laws relating to citizenship and nationality was prepared at the request of Congress by the Departments of State, Justice and Labor. The State Department proposed a new provision requiring an American-born national taken during minority to the country of his other nationality to make an election and to return to the United States, if he elected American nationality, on reaching majority. The Departments of Justice and Labor were opposed and, as a consequence, it was omitted from the proposed bill. This disagreement between the Departments was called to the attention of the Congress. While in some other respects Congress enlarged the grounds for loss of nationality, it refused to require a citizen by nativity to elect between dual citizenships upon reaching a majority.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied such a rule because it understood that this Court, in Perkins v. Elg, supra, had declared it to be the law. Miss Elg was American-born, of naturalized parents Swedish in origin. They took her to Sweden when she was but four years old, where she remained during her nonage. By virtue of a Swedish-American Treaty of 1869, this resumption of residence in Sweden repatriated the parents, which carried with it Swedish citizenship for their minor child. Under the Act of 1907, any American citizen is deemed expatriated if naturalized in a foreign state in conformity with its laws. Undoubtedly, Miss Elg had become naturalized under the laws of Sweden. But it was not by any act of her own or within her control, and about eight months after she became twenty-one, she sought and obtained an American passport and returned to this country where she resided for something over five years. American immigration officials then decided that her derivative naturalization had deprived her of American citizenship and put their harsh and technical doctrine to test by instituting proceedings to deport her. That case did not present and the Court could not properly have decided any question as to consequences of a failure to elect American citizenship, for Miss Elg promptly did so elect and decisively evidenced it by resuming residence here. What it held was that citizenship conferred by our Constitution upon a child born under its protection cannot be forfeited because the citizen during nonage is a passive beneficiary of foreign naturalization proceedings. It held that Miss Elg had acquired a derivative dual-citizenship but had not suffered a derivative expatriation. In affirming her right to return to and remain in this country, it did not hold that it was mandatory for her to do so.
We find no warrant in the statutes for concluding that petitioner has suffered expatriation. And, since Congress has prescribed a law for this situation, we think the dignity of citizenship which the Constitution confers as a birthright upon every person born within its protection is not to be withdrawn or extinguished by the courts except pursuant to a clear statutory mandate. The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed, with directions to remand the case to the District Court for the entry of an order declaring that the petitioner is a citizen of the United States.
Reversed and so ordered.
Certiorari was granted without opposition, 343 U. S. 976.
D. C. opinion not reported.
41 Op. Atty. Gen., Op. No. 16.
90 U. S. App. D. C. 1121, 193 F. 2d 920.
15 Stat. 223, 8 U. S. C. § 800.
H. R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 23; see also 74, 79, 160 et seq.
34 Stat. 1228.
Administrative practice, when involving protections abroad, involves very different policy considerations and is not controlling here. However, while not always consistent, it seems to have settled to the rule we apply in this case. 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 371; see also Nielsen, Some Vexatious Questions Relating to Nationality, 20 Col. L. Rev. 840, 854.
8 U. S. C., c. 11.
See Hearings before House of Representatives Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H. R. 9980, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 32.
See also § 350 of Pub. L. No. 414, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 66 Stat. 163, 269.
The question of whether the statutory grounds under the 1940 Act exclude other acts that will amount to voluntary expatriation was reserved in Kawakita v. United States, 343 U. S. 717, 730-732. It is not present in this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed. Accardi v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 383 U. S. 225.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kagan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal law authorizes a court to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party in certain civil rights cases. See 42 U. S. C. § 1988. We have held that a defendant may receive such an award if the plaintiff’s suit is frivolous. In this case, the plaintiff asserted both frivolous and non-frivolous claims. We hold today that a court may grant reasonable fees to the defendant in this circumstance, but only for costs that the defendant would not have incurred but for the frivolous claims. A trial court has wide discretion in applying this standard. But here we must vacate the judgment below because the court used a different and incorrect standard in awarding fees.
I
This case arises out of an election for chief of police in the town of Vinton, Louisiana. The candidates were petitioner Ricky Fox (the challenger) and respondent Billy Ray Vice (the incumbent). By Fox’s account, Vice resorted to an assortment of dirty tricks to try to force Fox out of the race. In particular, Vice sent an anonymous letter to Fox threatening to publish damaging charges against him if he remained a candidate. Vice also arranged for a third party to publicly accuse Fox of using racial slurs and then to file a criminal complaint against Fox repeating those allegations. And when prosecutors ignored that faux complaint, Vice leaked it to the press. Yet all of these machinations failed; Fox won the election. And Vice got an even greater comeuppance: He was subsequently convicted of criminal extortion for his election-related conduct.
Fox, however, chose not to let the matter rest; he filed this suit in Louisiana state court against Vice and the town of Vinton, also a respondent here. Fox’s complaint asserted both state-law claims, including defamation, and federal civil rights claims under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, including interference with his right to seek public office. Vice and the town (Vice, for short) removed the case to federal court on the basis of the § 1983 claims.
At the end of discovery in the suit, Vice moved for summary judgment on Fox’s federal claims. Fox conceded that the claims were "no[t] valid,” App. 169, and the District Court accordingly dismissed them with prejudice. In the same ruling, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Docket No. 2:06-cv-135 (WD La., Oct. 16, 2007), App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a~40a. The court instead remanded the now slimmed-down case to state court for adjudication. In doing so, the District Court observed that “[a]ny trial preparation, legal research, and discovery may be used by the parties in the state court proceedings.” Id., at 40a.
Vice then asked the federal court for an award of attorney’s fees under §1988, arguing that Fox’s federal claims were “baseless and without merit.” App. 198. Vice stated that his lawyers had had to participate in five lengthy depositions and review numerous records to defend against Fox’s charges. Id., at 199. In support of his fee request, Vice submitted attorney billing records estimating the time spent on the whole suit, without differentiating between the federal and state-law claims. See Supp. App. 8-67.
The District Court granted the motion for attorney’s fees on the ground that Fox’s federal claims were frivolous. Although the state-law allegations had not been found frivolous (and indeed remained live), the court did not require Vice to separate out the work his attorneys had done on the two sets of claims. Docket No. 2:06-cv-135 (WD La., Sept. 22, 2008), App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. According to the court, such “segregation” was unnecessary because the “various claims arose out of the same transaction and were so interrelated that their prosecution or defense entailed proof or denial of essentially the same facts.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the court declined to reduce the fee award to reflect the surviving state-law claims. “[Throughout the litigation,” the court stated, both sides “foeus[ed]” on Fox’s frivolous § 1983 claims. Id., at 32a-33a. The court therefore concluded that Vice should receive all of the fees he reasonably incurred in defending the suit — a total of $48,681. Id., at 34a.
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. 594 F. 3d 423 (CA5 2010). The majority first rejected Fox’s contention that all claims in a suit must be frivolous for the defendant to recover any fees. That rule, the court explained, would “'allow plaintiffs to prosecute frivolous claims without consequence]’ ” so long as they added a single non-frivolous claim. Id., at 428 (quoting Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Hailey, 452 F. 3d 1055, 1064 (CA9 2006)). The Court of Appeals then turned to the District Court’s decision that Vice was entitled to fees for all time thus far spent on the case, even though state-law claims remained unadjudicated. Repeating the trial court’s view that the whole litigation had focused on the frivolous federal claims, the Fifth Circuit upheld the fee award. See 594 F. 3d, at 428.
Judge Southwick dissented. He agreed that Vice was entitled to some reimbursement for fees. Id., at 430. But he thought the District Court had erred in declining to “allocate the fees separately between the successful claims and the unsuccessful” ones just because all of them were “interrelated.” Ibid. “[W]hen some claims are dismissed as frivolous and others are not,” he stated, the defendants should receive fees only for “the legal work allocable solely or dominantly to the dismissed” claims. Id., at 431. Because in this case “almost all of the defendant^’] discovery and factual analysis would have been necessary even if no federal claims had been brought,” he concluded, the fee award should have been much smaller. Ibid.
The Fifth Circuit's decision deepened a Circuit split about whether and to what extent a court may award fees to a defendant under § 1988 when a plaintiff asserts both frivolous and non-frivolous claims. One Court of Appeals has forbidden any compensation unless all of the plaintiff's claims are frivolous. See Balmer v. HCA, Inc., 423 F. 3d 606, 617 (CA6 2005). Others have rejected this approach, but struggled with how to allocate fees in a suit that involves a mix of frivolous and non-frivolous claims. Compare, e. g., 594 F. 3d 423 (CA5 2010) (opinion below), with Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F. 2d 122, 132 (CA2 1985) (declining to award fees when the frivolous claim “added no additional testimony or expense to the trial”). We granted certiorari to resolve these questions. 562 U. S. 1002 (2010).
H-4 h-H
Our legal system generally requires each party to bear his own litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, regardless whether he wins or loses. Indeed, this principle is so firmly entrenched that it is known as the “American Rule.” See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247 (1975). But Congress has authorized courts to deviate from this background rule in certain types of cases by shifting fees from one party to another. See Burlington v. Dague, 505 U. S. 557, 562 (1992) (listing federal fee-shifting provisions).
The statute involved here, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, allows the award of “a reasonable attorney's fee” to “the prevailing party” in various kinds of civil rights cases, including suits brought under § 1983. Most of our decisions addressing this provision have concerned the grant of fees to prevailing plaintiffs. When a plaintiff succeeds in remedying a civil rights violation, we have stated, he serves “as a 'private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam). He therefore “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee” from the defendant — the party whose misconduct created the need for legal action. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 416 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). Fee-shifting in such a ease at once reimburses a plaintiff for “what it eos[t] [him] to vindicate [civil] rights,” Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U. S. 561, 577-578 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted), and holds to account “a violator of federal law,” Christiansburg, 434 U. S., at 418.
In Christiansburg, we held that § 1988 also authorizes a fee award to a prevailing defendant, but under a different standard reflecting the “quite different equitable considerations” at stake. Id., at 419. In enacting § 1988, we stated, Congress sought “to protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis.” Id., at 420. Accordingly, § 1988 authorizes a district court to award attorney’s fees to a defendant “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Id., at 421; see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 165, n. 9 (1985).
These standards would be easy to apply if life were like the movies, but that is usually not the case. In Hollywood, litigation most often concludes with a dramatic verdict that leaves one party fully triumphant and the other utterly prostrate. The court in such a case would know exactly how to award fees (even if that anti-climactic scene is generally left on the cutting-room floor). But in the real world, litigation is more complex, involving multiple claims for relief that implicate a mix of legal theories and have different merits. Some claims succeed; others fail. Some charges are frivolous; others (even if not ultimately successful) have a reasonable basis. In short, litigation is messy, and courts must deal with this untidiness in awarding fees.
Given this reality, we have made clear that plaintiffs may receive fees under § 1988 even if they are not victorious on every claim. A civil rights plaintiff who obtains meaningful relief has corrected a violation of federal law and, in so doing, has vindicated Congress's statutory purposes. That “result is what matters,” we explained in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 435 (1983): A court should compensate the plaintiff for the time his attorney reasonably spent in achieving the favorable outcome, even if “the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention.” Ibid. The fee award, of course, should not reimburse the plaintiff for work performed on claims that bore no relation to the grant of relief: Such work “cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). But the presence of these unsuccessful claims does not immunize a defendant against paying for the attorney’s fees that the plaintiff reasonably incurred in remedying a breach of his civil rights.
Analogous principles indicate that a defendant may deserve fees even if not all the plaintiff’s claims were frivolous. In this context, § 1988 serves to relieve a defendant of expenses attributable to frivolous charges. The plaintiff acted wrongly in leveling such allegations, and the court may shift to him the reasonable costs that those claims imposed on his adversary. See Christiansburg, 434 U. S., at 420-421. That remains true when the plaintiff’s suit also includes non-frivolous claims. The defendant, of course, is not entitled to any fees arising from these non-frivolous charges. See ibid. But the presence of reasonable allegations in a suit does not immunize the plaintiff against paying for the fees that his frivolous claims imposed.
Indeed, we have previously said exactly this much. In Hensley, we noted the possibility that a plaintiff might prevail on one contention in a suit while also asserting an unrelated frivolous claim. In this situation, we explained, a court could properly award fees to both parties — to the plaintiff, to reflect the fees he incurred in bringing the meritorious claim; and to the defendant, to compensate for the fees he paid in defending against the frivolous one. See 461 U. S., at 435, n. 10. We thus made clear that a court may reimburse a defendant for costs under § 1988 even if a plaintiff’s suit is not wholly frivolous. Fee-shifting to recompense a defendant (as to recompense a plaintiff) is not all-or-nothing: A defendant need not show that every claim in a complaint is frivolous to qualify for fees.
The question then becomes one of allocation: In a lawsuit involving a mix of frivolous and non-frivolous claims, what work may the defendant receive fees for? Vice concedes, as he must, that a defendant may not obtain compensation for work unrelated to a frivolous claim. Brief for Respondents 42, n. 13. Similarly, we think Fox would have to concede (once he has lost the argument that the presence of any non-frivolous claim precludes a fee award) that the defendant may receive reasonable fees for work related exclusively to a frivolous claim. The question in dispute concerns work that helps defend against non-frivolous and frivolous claims alike — for example, a deposition eliciting facts relevant to both allegations.
Vice proposes authorizing the trial court to award fees for work that is “fairly attributable” to the frivolous portion of the lawsuit. See, e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 45. But that standard is in truth no standard at all. The very question under consideration is: What fees may be fairly attributed to frivolous claims under § 1988? To answer “Those that are fairly attributable to frivolous claims” is just to restate this question. And that non-response response would leave to each and every trial court not only the implementation, but also the invention, of the applicable legal standard. We do not think trial courts would appreciate that lack of guidance. And yet more important, we do not think such an empty and amorphous test would ensure that all fee awards to defendants comport with Congress's purpose in enacting § 1988.
That congressional policy points to a different and more meaningful standard: Section 1988 allows a defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees incurred because of, but only because of, a frivolous claim. Or what is the same thing stated as a but-for test: Section 1988 permits the defendant to receive only the portion of his fees that he would not have paid but for the frivolous claim. Recall that the relevant purpose of § 1988 is to relieve defendants of the burdens associated with fending off frivolous litigation. See supra, at 833. So if a frivolous claim occasioned the attorney’s fees at issue, a court may decide that the defendant should not have to pay them. But if the defendant would have incurred those fees anyway, to defend against non-frivolous claims, then a court has no basis for transferring the expense to the plaintiff. Suppose, for example, that a defendant’s attorney conducts a deposition on matters relevant to both a frivolous and a non-frivolous claim — and more, that the lawyer would have taken and committed the same time to this deposition even if the case had involved only the non-frivolous allegation. In that circumstance, the work does not implicate Congress’s reason for allowing defendants to collect fees. The defendant would have incurred the expense in any event; he has suffered no incremental harm from the frivolous claim. In short, the defendant has never shouldered the burden that Congress, in enacting § 1988, wanted to relieve. The basic American Rule thus continues to operate.
A standard allowing more expansive fee-shifting would furnish windfalls to some defendants, making them better off because they were subject to a suit including frivolous claims. For under any more permissive test, the simple presence of a frivolous claim would allow the court to shift to the plaintiff some of the costs of defending against regular, non-frivolous charges. So two defendants (call them Vice and Rice) could face identical non-frivolous allegations, but because Vice also confronted a frivolous claim, he might end by paying less than Rice to his attorneys. The chance assertion — for Vice, the downright lucky assertion — of the frivolous claim could relieve him not only of the incremental costs of that claim but also of costs that he, like Rice, would have had to pay in its absence. Section 1988 provides no warrant for that peculiar result; that statute was “never intended to produce windfalls” for parties. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103, 115 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
At the same time, the “but-for” standard we require may in some cases allow compensation to a defendant for attorney work relating to both frivolous and non-frivolous claims. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff asserts one frivolous and one non-frivolous claim, but that only the frivolous allegation can legally result in a damages award. If an attorney performs work useful to defending against both, but did so only because of the defendant’s monetary exposure on the frivolous charge, a court may decide to shift fees. Or similarly, imagine that the frivolous claim enables removal of the case :to federal court, which in turn drives up litigation expenses. Here too, our standard would permit awarding fees for work relevant to both claims in order to reflect the increased costs (if any) of the federal forum. And frivolous claims may increase the cost of defending a suit in ways that are not reflected in the number of hours billed. If a defendant could prove, for example, that a frivolous claim involved a specialized area that reasonably caused him to hire more expensive counsel for the entire case, then the court may reimburse the defendant for the increased marginal cost. As all these examples show, the dispositive question is not whether attorney costs at all relate to a non-ffivolous claim, but whether the costs would have been incurred in the absence of the frivolous allegation. The answers to those inquiries will usually track each other, but when they diverge, it is the second that matters.
We emphasize, as we have before, that the determination of fees “should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley, 461 U. S., at 437. The fee applicant (whether a plaintiff or a defendant) must, of course, submit appropriate documentation to meet “the burden of establishing entitlement to an award.” Ibid. But trial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney’s time. And appellate courts must give substantial deference to these determinations, in light of “the district court’s superior understanding of the litigation.” Ibid.; see Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Ed., 471 U. S. 234, 244 (1985). We can hardly think of a sphere of judicial decisionmaking in which appellate micromanagement has less to recommend it.
But the trial court must apply the correct standard, and the appeals court must make sure that has occurred. See Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U. S. 542, 548 (2010) (“Determining a 'reasonable attorney’s fee’ is a matter that is committed to the sound discretion of a trial judge, . . . but the judge’s discretion is not unlimited”); cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81, 100 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law”). That means the trial court must determine whether the fees requested would not have accrued but for the frivolous claim. And the appeals court must determine whether the trial court asked and answered that question, rather than some other. A trial court has wide discretion when, but only when, it calls the game by the right rules.
Ill
The task remains of applying these principles to the fee award Vice received. The District Court’s analysis suggests that Vice’s attorneys would have done much the same work even if Fox had not brought his frivolous claims. As noted earlier, see supra, at 830-831, the court acknowledged that Fox’s federal and state-law claims were “interrelated,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a (internal quotation marks omitted). The charges “arose out of the same transaction” — Vice’s conduct in the campaign — and their “defense entailed proof or denial of essentially the same facts.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). It therefore seems likely that Vice’s attorneys would at least have conducted similar fact-gathering activities — taken many of the same depositions, produced and reviewed many of the same documents, and so forth. Indeed, the District Court highlighted the usefulness of the attorneys’ work to defending against the state-law claims: In its order remanding those claims, the court noted that the “trial preparation, legal research, and discovery” done in the federal court could “be used by the parties in the state court proceedings.” Id., at 40a.
The District Court’s decision to award full attorney’s fees to Vice failed to take proper account of this overlap between - the frivolous and non-frivolous claims. Rather than apply the but-for standard we have set out, the court indicated that the paramount factor was the parties’ “focus” in the litigation. Id., at 33a. The court did not address whether the “infcerrelated[ness] ” of the claims meant that Vice would have incurred part or most of his fees even if Fox had asserted only the non-frivolous state-law claims. To the contrary, the court suggested that the close relationship between the federal and state-law claims supported Vice’s request to recover all of his attorney’s fees. See id., at 28a; supra, at 830-831. That reasoning stands the appropriate analysis on its head. It cannot be squared with the congressional policy of sparing defendants from the costs of frivolous litigation.
Nor did the Court of Appeals uphold the award of fees on the ground that we would require. The majority articulated a standard that, taken alone, might be read as consistent with our opinion; according to the court, a defendant should receive fees for “work which can be distinctly traced to a plaintiff’s frivolous claims.” 594 F. 3d, at 429. But the court seemed to think that its test permitted awarding Vice fees for any work useful to defending against a frivolous claim, even if lawyers would have done that work regardless. Indeed, this very point divided the majority and the dissent. Judge Southwick objected to the fee award on the ground that “almost all [of] the defendant^’] discovery and factual analysis would have been necessary even if no federal claims had been brought.” id, at 431. But the majority never responded to that argument or otherwise engaged this crucial question. The majority instead merely reiterated the District Court’s reasoning that the parties had principally “focus[ed]" on the § 1983 allegations. That finding, as we have explained, is irrelevant if Vice’s attorneys would have performed the same work to defend against the state-law claims.
On this record, we must return the case to the lower courts. See, e. g., Perdue, 559 U. S., at 557-560; Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U. S. 546, 566-568 (1986); Hensley, 461 U. S., at 438-440. In a suit of this kind, involving both frivolous and non-frivolous claims, a defendant may recover the reasonable attorney’s fees he expended solely because of the frivolous allegations. And that is all. Consistent with the policy underlying § 1988, the defendant may not receive compensation for any fees that he would have paid in the absence of the frivolous claims. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Vice died during the course of this litigation. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 35.1, we substituted the executor of his estate as respondent. 562 U. S. 1282 (2011). But for the sake of clarity, we refer to the respondent as Vice.
The parties do not dispute for purposes of argument here that this case involves both kinds of claims. The District Court deemed the federal claims frivolous, and Fox has not asked us to disturb that ruling. See Brief for Petitioner 26, and n. 2. The court remanded the state-law claims to state court, and Vice has assumed in this Court that they are not frivolous. See Brief for Respondents 8, n. 5.
The test set out here differs from the one we adopted in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 435 (1983), to govern fee awards to plaintiffs in cases involving both successful and unsuccessful claims. See supra, at 834. That difference reflects the disparate legislative purposes we have recognized in the two settings. See Ckristiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 419-420 (1978); supra, at 833. Congress authorized fees to plaintiffs to compensate them for the costs of redressing civil rights violations; accordingly, a plaintiff may receive fees for all work relating to the accomplishment of that result, even if “the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised.” Hensley, 461 U. S., at 435. By contrast, Congress authorized fees to defendants to remove the burden associated with fending off frivolous claims; accordingly, a defendant may recover for fees that those claims caused him to incur. In each context, the standard for allocating fees in “mixed” eases matches the relevant congressional purpose.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a constitutionally deficient reasonable-doubt instruction may be harmless error.
I
Petitioner was charged with first-degree murder in the course of committing an armed robbery at a New Orleans bar. His alleged accomplice in the crime, a convicted felon named Michael Hillhouse, testifying at the trial pursuant to a grant of immunity, identified petitioner as the murderer. Although several other people were in the bar at the time of the robbery, only one testified at trial. This witness, who had been unable to identify either Hillhouse or petitioner at a physical lineup, testified that they committed the robbery, and that she saw petitioner hold a gun to the victim’s head. There was other circumstantial evidence supporting the conclusion that petitioner was the triggerman. 596 So. 2d 177, 180-181 (La. 1992). In closing argument, defense counsel argued that there was reasonable doubt as to both the identity of the murderer and his intent.
In his instructions to the jury, the trial judge gave a definition of “reasonable doubt” that was, as the State conceded below, essentially identical to the one held unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39 (1990) (per curiam). See 596 So. 2d, at 185, and n. 3. The jury found petitioner guilty of first-degree murder and subsequently recommended that he be sentenced to death. The trial court agreed. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held, consistent with its opinion on remand from our decision in Cage, State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d 1125, cert. denied, 502 U. S. 874 (1991), that the erroneous instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 596 So. 2d, at 186. It therefore upheld the conviction, though remanding for a new sentencing hearing because of ineffectiveness of counsel in the sentencing phase. We granted certiorari, 506 U. S. 939 (1992).
II
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . ..” In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 149 (1968), we found this right to trial by jury in serious criminal cases to be “fundamental to the American scheme of justice,” and therefore applicable in state proceedings. The right includes, of course, as its most important element, the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of “guilty.” See Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 105-106 (1895). Thus, although a judge may direct a verdict for the defendant if the evidence is legally insufficient to establish guilt, he may not direct a verdict for the State, no matter how overwhelming the evidence. Ibid. See also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 572-573 (1977); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 410 (1947).
What the factfinder must determine to return a verdict of guilty is prescribed by the Due Process Clause. The prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, see, e. g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 210 (1977); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 795 (1952), and must persuade the factfinder “beyond a reasonable doubt” of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements, see, e. g., In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970); Cool v. United States, 409 U. S. 100, 104 (1972) (per curiam). This beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement, which was adhered to by virtually all common-law jurisdictions, applies in state as well as federal proceedings. Winship, supra.
It is self-evident, we think, that the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated. It would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have a jury determine that the defendant is probably guilty, and then leave it up to the judge to determine (as Winship requires) whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Our per curiam opinion in Cage, which we accept as controlling, held that an instruction of the sort given here does not produce such a verdict. Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was therefore denied.
Ill
In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), we rejected the view that all federal constitutional errors in the course of a criminal trial require reversal. We held that the Fifth Amendment violation of prosecutorial comment upon the defendant’s failure to testify would not require reversal of the conviction if the State could show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id., at 24. The Chapman standard recognizes that “certain constitutional errors, no less than other errors, may have been ‘harmless’ in terms of their effect on the factfinding process at trial.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 681 (1986). Although most constitutional errors have been held amenable to harmless-error analysis, see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279, 306-307 (1991) (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J., for the Court) (collecting examples), some will always invalidate the conviction. Id., at 309-310 (citing, inter alia, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963) (total deprivation of the right to counsel); Turney v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927) (trial by a biased judge); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U. S. 168 (1984) (right to self-representation)). The question in the present case is to which category the present error belongs.
Chapman itself suggests the answer. Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee, the question it instructs the reviewing court to consider is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand. See Chapman, supra, at 24 (analyzing effect of error on “verdict obtained”). Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which “the jury actually rested its verdict.” Yates v. Evatt, 500 U. S. 391, 404 (1991) (emphasis added). The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered — no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be — would violate the jury-trial guarantee. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570, 578 (1986); id., at 593 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U. S. 497, 509-510 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Once the proper role of an appellate court engaged in the Chapman inquiry is understood, the illogic of harmless-error review in the present case becomes evident. Since, for the reasons described above, there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, the entire premise of Chapman review is simply absent. There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless. There is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can conclude is that a jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt — not that the jury’s actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been different absent the constitutional error. That is not enough. See Yates, supra, at 413-414 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury’s action, or else directed verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of guilty. See Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U. S. 607, 614 (1946).
Insofar as the possibility of harmless-error review is concerned, the jury-instruction error in this case is quite different from the jury-instruction error of erecting a presumption regarding an element of the offense. A mandatory presumption — for example, the presumption that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts — violates the Fourteenth Amendment, because it may relieve the State of its burden of proving all elements of the offense. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307 (1985). But “[w]hen a jury is instructed to presume malice from predicate facts, it still must find the existence of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rose v. Clark, supra, at 580. And when the latter facts “are so closely related to the ultimate fact to be presumed that no rational jury could find those facts without also finding that ultimate fact, making those findings is functionally equivalent to finding the element required to be presumed.” Carella v. California, 491 U. S. 263, 271 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). See also Pope, supra, at 504 (Scalia, J., concurring). A reviewing court may thus be able to conclude that the presumption played no significant role in the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Yates, supra, at 402-406. But the essential connection to a “beyond a reasonable doubt” factual finding cannot be made where the instructional error consists of a misdescription of the burden of proof, which vitiates all the jury’s findings. A reviewing court can only engage in pure speculation — its view of what a reasonable jury would have done. And when it does that, “the wrong entity judge[s] the defendant guilty.” Rose, supra, at 578.
Another mode of analysis leads to the same conclusion that harmless-error analysis does not apply: In Fulminante, we distinguished between, on the one hand, “structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards,” 499 U. S., at 309, and, on the other hand, trial errors which occur “during the presentation of the ease to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented,” id., at 307-308. Denial of the right to a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is certainly an error of the former sort, the jury guarantee being a “basic proteetio[n]” whose precise effects are unmeasurable, but without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function, Rose, supra, at 577. The right to trial by jury reflects, we have said, “a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S., at 155. The deprivation of that right, with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as “structural error.”
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The State has argued in this Court that the Cage standard for review of jury instructions, which looked to whether a jury “could have” applied the instructions in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution, was contradicted in Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 380 (1990), and disapproved in Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, 72-73, n. 4 (1991). In view of the question presented and the State's failure to raise this issue below, we do not consider whether the instruction given here would survive review under the Boyde standard. See Granfinanciera, S. A v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 38-39 (1989); Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 476, n. 20 (1979).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A criminal information filed in a Florida state court charged that these eighteen appellants had violated § 509.141 of the Florida Statutes by remaining in a restaurant after the manager had requested them to leave. The material facts are not in dispute and show: Shell’s City Restaurant', which is one of nineteen departments in Shell’s Department Store in Miami, had, at the time of appellants’ arrest, a policy of refusing to serve Negroes. Appellants, Negroes and whites, went as a group into the restaurant and seated themselves at tables. In accordance with the restaurant’s policy, the manager told appellants they would not be served. The manager called the police and, accompanied by one policeman, went to each table, again told appellants they would not be served, and requested them to leave. They refused. The police officers then advised them to leave, and when appellants persisted in their refusal the police placed them all under arrest.
At the trial, the Shell’s City management explained that, while Negroes were welcomed as customers in the store’s other departments, serving Negroes in the restaurant would be “very detrimental to our business” because of the objections of white customers. After these facts had been brought out during the examination of the State’s witnesses, appellants moved for a directed verdict on the ground that their arrest, prosecution, and conviction by the State on this evidence would amount to state discrimination against them on account of color, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws. This motion was denied. The appellants calling no witnesses, the trial court stayed the adjudication of guilt and the imposition of sentence and placed appellants on probation, as authorized by § 948.01 (3) of the Florida Statutes. On appeal, after various jurisdictional rulings in the Florida appellate courts, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed, holding the statute under which appellants were convicted to be nondiscriminatory. 144 So. 2d 811. The case is properly here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), and we noted probable jurisdiction. 374 U. S. 803.
In this case we do not reach the broad question whether the Fourteenth Amendment of its own force forbids a State to arrest and prosecute those who, having been asked to leave a restaurant because of their color, refuse to do so. For here there are additional circumstances which, we think, call for reversal because of our holding in Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U. S. 244. The petitioners in Peterson were convicted of trespass in violation of a city ordinance after they had seated themselves at a lunch counter and remained there over the manager’s protest. At that time, however, there existed another Greenville ordinance which made it unlawful for restaurants to serve meals to white persons and colored persons in the same room or at the same table or counter. In Peterson the city argued that the manager’s refusal to serve Negroes was based on his own personal preference, which did not amount to “state action” forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. But we held that the case must be decided on the basis of what the ordinance required people to do, not on the basis of what the manager wanted to do. We said:
“When a state agency passes a law compelling persons to discriminate against other persons because of race, and the State’s criminal processes are employed in a way which enforces the discrimination mandated by that law, such a palpable violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be saved by attempting to separate the mental urges of the discriminators.” 373 U. S., at 248.
See also Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 267.
In the present case, when appellants were arrested and tried the Florida Board of Health had in effect a regulation, adopted under “authority of the Florida Legislature” and applicable to restaurants, which provided that “where colored persons are employed or accommodated” separate toilet and lavatory rooms must be provided. A month before petitioners were arrested, the State of Florida had issued a “Food and Drink Services” manual, based on state regulations. The manual said that as a “basic requirement,”
“Separate facilities shall be provided for each sex and for each race whether employed or served in the establishment.”
While these Florida regulations do not directly and expressly forbid restaurants to serve both white and colored people together, they certainly embody a state policy putting burdens upon any restaurant which serves both races, burdens bound to discourage the serving of the two races together. Of course, state action, of the kind that falls within the proscription of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, may be brought about through the State’s administrative and regulatory agencies just as through its legislature. Cf. Lombard v. Louisiana, supra, 373 U. S., at 273. Here as in Peterson v. City of Greenville, supra, we conclude that the State through its regulations has become involved to such a significant extent in bringing about restaurant segregation that appellants’ trespass convictions must be held to reflect that state policy and therefore to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas would reverse the judgment below for the reasons stated in his opinion in No. 12, Bell v. Maryland, post, p. 242.
Mr. Justice Harlan, considering himself bound by Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U. S. 244, acquiesces in the judgment of the Court.
The statute says that a manager or other person in authority at a restaurant (among other places named in the statute) shall have the right to remove or cause to be removed any person “who, in the opinion of the management, is a person whom it would be detrimental” to the restaurant to serve. The management must first give notice, orally or in writing, that the guest depart. The statute then provides, “[A]ny guest who shall remain or attempt to remain in such . . . restaurant . . . after being requested, as aforesaid, to depart therefrom, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”
See 132 So. 2d 3 (Supreme Court of Florida); 132 So. 2d 771 (District Court of Appeal of Florida).
Florida State Sanitary Code, c. VII, § 6. The substance of this regulation was reissued on June 26, 1962, and is now part of Florida Administrative Code, c. 170C, § 8.06.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which The Chief Justice, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Kennedy join.
The issue presented by this case is whether § 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 106(c), authorizes a bankruptcy court to issue a money judgment against a State that has not filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Petitioner Martin W. Hoffman is the bankruptcy trustee for Willington Convalescent Home, Inc. (Willington), and Edward Zera in two unrelated Chapter 7 proceedings. On behalf of Willington, he filed an adversarial proceeding in United States Bankruptcy Court — a “turnover” proceeding under 11 U. S. C. § 542(b) — against respondent Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance. Petitioner sought to recover $64,010.24 in payments owed to Willington for services it had rendered during March 1983 under its Medicaid contract with Connecticut. Willington closed in April 1983. At that time, it owed respondent $121,408 for past Medicaid overpayments that Willington had received, but respondent filed no proof of claim in the Chapter 7 proceeding.
Petitioner likewise filed an adversarial proceeding in United States Bankruptcy Court on behalf of Edward Zera against respondent Connecticut Department of Revenue Services. Zera owed the State of Connecticut unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest, and in the month prior to Zera’s filing for bankruptcy the Revenue Department had issued a tax warrant resulting in a payment of $2,100.62. Petitioner sought to avoid the payment as a preference and recover the amount paid. See 11 U. S. C. § 547(b).
Respondents moved to dismiss both actions as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In each case the Bankruptcy Court denied the motions to dismiss, reasoning that Congress in § 106(c) had abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from actions under §§ 542(b) and 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and that Congress had authority to do so under the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Respondents appealed to the United States District Court, and the United States intervened because of the challenge to the constitutionality of § 106. The District Court reversed without reaching the issue of congressional authority. 72 B. R. 1002 (Conn. 1987). The court held that § 106(c), when read with the other provisions of § 106, did not unequivocally abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court. 850 F. 2d 50 (1988). The Court of Appeals concluded that the plain language of § 106(c) abrogates sovereign immunity “only to the extent necessary for the bankruptcy court to determine a state’s rights in the debtor’s estate.” Id., at 55. The section does not, according to the Court of Appeals, abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from recovery of an avoided preferential transfer of money or from a turnover proceeding. The Court of Appeals specifically rejected petitioner’s reliance on the legislative history of § 106(c) because that expression of congressional intent was not contained in the language of the statute as required by Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985). Because the actions brought by petitioner were not within the scope of § 106(c), the court held that they were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Second Circuit’s decision conflicts with the decisions of the Third Circuit in Vazquez v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare, 788 F. 2d 130, 133, cert. denied, 479 U. S. 936 (1986), and the Seventh Circuit in McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Secretary of State of Illinois, 812 F. 2d 311, 326-327, cert. denied, 484 U. S. 895 (1987). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 488 U. S. 1003 (1989), and we now affirm.
Section 106 provides as follows:
“(a) A governmental unit is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity with respect to any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrence out of which such governmental unit’s claim arose. -
“(b) There shall be offset against an allowed claim or interest of a governmental unit any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate.
“(c) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section and notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity—
“(1) a provision of this title that contains ‘creditor,’ ‘entity,’ or ‘governmental unit’ applies to governmental units; and
“(2) a determination by the court of an issue arising under such a provision binds governmental units.” 11 U. S. C. § 106.
Neither § 106(a) nor § 106(b) provides a basis for petitioner’s actions here, since respondents did not file a claim in either Chapter 7 proceeding. Instead, petitioner relies on § 106(c), which he asserts subjects “governmental units,” which includes States, 11 U. S. C. § 101(26), to all provisions of the Bankruptcy Code containing any of the “trigger” words in § 106(c)(1). Both the turnover provision, § 542(b), and the preference provision, § 547(b), contain trigger words — “an entity” is required to pay to the trustee a debt that is the property of the estate, and a trustee can under appropriate circumstances avoid the transfer of property to “a creditor.” Therefore, petitioner reasons, those provisions apply to respondents “notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity,” including Eleventh Amendment immunity.
We disagree. As we have repeatedly stated, to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court, which the parties do not dispute would otherwise bar these actions, Congress must make its intention “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, supra, at 242; see also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S. 223, 227-228 (1989); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U. S. 468, 474 (1987) (plurality opinion). In our view, § 106(c) does not satisfy this standard.
Initially, the narrow scope of the waivers of sovereign immunity in §§ 106(a) and (b) makes it unlikely that Congress adopted in § 106(c) the broad abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity for which petitioner argues. The language of § 106(a) carefully limits the waiver of sovereign immunity under that provision, requiring that the claim against the governmental unit arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the governmental unit’s claim. Subsection (b) likewise provides for a narrow waiver of sovereign immunity, with the amount of the offset limited to the value of the governmental unit’s allowed claim. Under petitioner’s interpretation of § 106(c), however, the only limit is the number of provisions of the Bankruptcy Code containing one of the trigger words. With this “limit,” § 106(c) would apply in a scattershot fashion to over 100 Code provisions.
We believe that § 106(c)(2) operates as a further limitation on the applicability of § 106(c), narrowing the type of relief to which the section applies. Section 106(c)(2) is joined with subsection (c)(1) by the conjunction “and.” It provides that a “determination” by the bankruptcy court of an “issue” “binds governmental units.” This language differs significantly from the wording of §§ 106(a) and (b), both of which use the word “claim,” defined in the Bankruptcy Code as including a “right to payment.” See 11 U. S. C. §101(4)(A). Nothing in § 106(c) provides a similar express authorization for monetary recovery from the States.
The language of § 106(c)(2) is more indicative of declaratory and injunctive relief than of monetary recovery. The clause echoes the wording of sections of the Code such as §505, which provides that “the court may determine the amount or legality of any tax,” 11 U. S. C. § 505(a)(1), a determination of an issue that obviously should bind the governmental unit but that does not require a monetary recovery from a State. We therefore construe § 106(c) as not authorizing monetary recovery from the States. Under this construction of § 106 (c), a State that files no proof of claim would be bound, like other creditors, by discharge of debts in bankruptcy, including unpaid taxes, see Neavear v. Schweiker, 674 F. 2d 1201, 1204 (CA7 1982); cf. Gwilliam v. United States, 519 F. 2d 407, 410 (CA9 1975), but would not be subjected to monetary recovery.
We are not persuaded by the. suggestion of petitioner’s amicus that the use of the word “determine” in the jurisdictional provision of the Code, 28 U. S. C. § 157(b)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. V), is to the contrary. Brief for INSLAW, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 10-11. That provision authorizes bankruptcy judges to determine “cases” and “proceedings,” not issues, and provides that the judge may “enter appropriate orders and judgments,” not merely bind the governmental unit by its determinations. Moreover, the construction we give to § 106(c) does not render irrelevant the language of the section that it applies “notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity.” The section applies to the Federal Government as well, see 11 U. S. C. § 101(26) (defining “governmental unit” as including the “United States”), and the language in § 106(c) waives the sovereign immunity of the Federal Government so that the Federal Government is bound by determinations of issues by the bankruptcy courts even when it did not appear and subject itself to the jurisdiction of such courts. See, e. g., Neavear, supra, at 1204.
Petitioner contends that the language of the sections containing the trigger words supplies the necessary authorization for monetary recovery from the States. This interpretation, however, ignores entirely the limiting language of § 106(c)(2). Indeed, § 106(c), as interpreted by petitioner, would have exactly the same effect if subsection (c)(2) had been totally omitted. “It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,’” United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883)), and neither petitioner nor his amicus suggests any effect that their interpretation gives to subsection (c)(2).
Finally, petitioner’s reliance on the legislative history of § 106(c) is.also misplaced. He points in particular to floor statements to the effect that “section 106(c) permits a trustee or debtor in possession to assert avoiding powers under title 11 against a governmental unit.” See 124 Cong. Rec. 32394 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id., at 33993 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). The Government suggests that these statements should be construed as referring only to cases in which the debtor retains a possessory or ownership interest in the property that the trustee seeks to recover, Brief for United States 20, and cites as an example this Court’s decision in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U. S. 198 (1983) (holding that the Internal Revenue Service could be required to turn over to bankrupt estate tangible property to which debtor retained ownership).
The weakness in petitioner’s argument is more fundamental, however, as the Second Circuit properly recognized. As we observed in Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S., at 230, “[legislative history generally will be irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.” If congressional intent is unmistakably clear in the language of the statute, reliance on committee reports and floor statements will be unnecessary, and if it is not, Atascadero will not be satisfied. 491 U. S., at 228-229. Similarly, the attempts of petitioner and his amicus to construe § 106(c) in light of the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code are unavailing. These arguments are not based in the text of the statute and so, too, are not helpful in determining whether the command of Atascadero is satisfied. See 491 U. S., at 230.
We hold that in enacting § 106(c) Congress did not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States. Therefore, petitioner’s actions in United States Bankruptcy Court under §§ 542(b) and 547(b) of the Code are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Since we hold that Congress did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting § 106 (c), we need not address whether it had the authority to do so under its bankruptcy power. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989). The judgment of the Second Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits a State or political subdivision subject to § 4 of the Act from enforcing “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964,” unless it has obtained a declaratory-judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia that such change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color” or has submitted the proposed change to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not objected to it. The constitutionality of this procedure was upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, and it is now well established that § 5 is applicable when a State or political subdivision adopts a legislative reapportionment plan. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544; Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526.
The city of New Orleans brought this suit under § 5 seeking a judgment declaring that a reapportionment of New Orleans’ councilmanic districts did not have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. The District Court entered a judgment of dismissal, holding that the new reapportionment plan would have the effect of abridging the voting rights of New Orleans’ Negro citizens. 374 F. Supp. 363. The city appealed the judgment to this Court, claiming that the District Court used an incorrect standard in assessing the effect of the reapportionment in this § 5 suit. We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal. 419 U. S. 822.
I
New Orleans is a city of almost 600,000 people. Some 55% of that population is white and the remaining 45% is Negro. Some 65% of the registered voters are white, and the remaining 35% are Negro. In 1954, New Orleans adopted a mayor-council form of government. Since that time the municipal charter has provided that the city council is to consist of seven members, one to be elected from each of five councilmanic districts, and two to be elected by the voters of the city at large. The 1954 charter also requires an adjustment of the boundaries of the five single-member councilmanic districts following each decennial census to reflect population shifts among the districts.
In 1961, the city council redistricted the city based on the 1960 census figures. That reapportionment plan established four districts that stretched from the edge of Lake Pontchartrain on the north side of the city to the Mississippi River on the city’s south side. The fifth district was wedge shaped and encompassed the city’s downtown area. In one of these councilmanic districts, Negroes constituted a majority’ of the population, but only about half of the registered voters. In the other four districts white voters clearly outnumbered Negro voters. No Negro was elected to the New Orleans City Council during the decade from 1960 to 1970.
After receipt of the 1970 census figures the city council adopted a reapportionment plan (Plan I) that continued the basic north-to-south pattern of councilmanic districts combined with a wedge-shaped, downtown district. Under Plan I Negroes constituted a majority of the population in two districts, but they did not make up a majority of registered voters in any district. The largest percentage of Negro voters in a single district under Plan I was 45.2%. When the city submitted Plan I to the Attorney General pursuant to § 5, he objected to it, stating that it appeared to “dilute black voting strength by combining a number of black voters with a larger number of white voters in each of the five districts.” He also expressed the view that “the district lines [were not] drawn as they [were] because of any compelling governmental need” and that the district lines did “not reflect numeric population configurations or considerations of district compactness or regularity of shape.”
Even before the Attorney General objected to Plan I, the city authorities had commenced work on a second plan — Plan II. That plan followed the general north-to-south districting pattern common to the 1961 apportionment and Plan I. It produced Negro population majorities in two districts and a Negro voter majority (52.6%) in one district. When Plan II was submitted to the Attorney General, he posed the same objections to it that he had raised to Plan I. In addition, he noted that “the predominantly black neighborhoods in the city are located generally in an east to west progression,” and pointed out that the use of north-to-south districts in such a situation almost inevitably would have the effect of diluting the maximum potential impact of the Negro vote. Following the rejection by the Attorney General of Plan II, the city brought this declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The District Court concluded that Plan II would have the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. It calculated that if Negroes could elect city councilmen in proportion to their share of the city’s registered voters, they would be able to choose 2.42 of the city’s seven councilmen, and, if in proportion to their share of the city’s population, to choose 3.15 councilmen. But under Plan II the District Court concluded that, since New Orleans’ elections had been marked by bloc voting along racial lines, Negroes would probably be able to elect only one councilman — the candidate from the one councilmanic district in which a majority of the voters were Negroes. This difference between mathematical potential and predicted, reality was such that “the burden in the case at bar was at least to demonstrate that nothing but the redistricting proposed by Plan II was feasible.” 374 F. Supp., at 393. The court concluded that “[t]he City has not made that sort of demonstration; indeed, it was conceded at trial that neither that plan nor any of its variations was the City’s sole available alternative.” Ibid.
As a separate and independent ground for rejecting Plan II, the District Court held that the failure of the plan to alter the city charter provision establishing two at-large seats had the effect in itself of “abridging the right to vote ... on account of race or color.” As the court put it: “[T]he City has not supported the choice of at-large elections by any consideration which would satisfy the standard of compelling governmental interest, or the need to demonstrate the improbability of its realization through the use of single-member districts. These evaluations compel the conclusion that the feature of the city’s electoral scheme by which two councilmen are selected at large has the effect of impermissibly minimizing the vote of its black citizens; and the further conclusion that for this additional reason the city’s redistricting plan does not pass muster.” Id., at 402. (Footnotes omitted.)
The District Court therefore refused to allow Plan II to go into effect. As a result there have been no coun-cilmanic elections in New Orleans since 1970, and the councilmen elected at that time (or their appointed successors) have remained in office ever since.
II
A
The appellants urge, and the United States on reargument of this case has conceded, that the District Court was mistaken in holding that Plan II could be rejected under § 5 solely because it did not eliminate the two at-large councilmanic seats that had existed since 1954. The appellants and the United States are correct in their interpretation of the statute in this regard.
The language of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed changes in voting procedures. “[Discriminatory practices . . . instituted prior to November 1964 . . . are not subject to the requirement of pre-clearance [under § 5].” U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After, p. 347. The ordinance that adopted Plan II made no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, since those seats had been established in 1954 by the city charter, an ordinance could not have altered them; any change in the charter would have required approval by the city’s voters. The at-large seats, having existed without change since 1954, were not subject to review in this proceeding under § 5.
B
The principal argument made by the appellants in this Court is that the District Court erred in concluding that the makeup of the five geographic council-manic districts under Plan II would have the effect of abridging voting rights on account of race or color. In evaluating this claim it is important to note at the outset that the question is not one of constitutional law, but of statutory construction. A determination of when a legislative reapportionment has “the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” must depend, therefore, upon the intent of Congress in enacting the Voting Rights Act and specifically § 5.
The legislative history reveals that the basic purpose of Congress in enacting the Voting Rights Act was “to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 315. Section 5 was intended to play an important role in achieving that goal:
“Section 5 was a response to a common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had'been struck down. That practice had been possible because each new law remained in effect until the Justice Department or private plaintiffs were able to sustain the burden of proving that the new law, too, was discriminatory. . . . Congress therefore decided, as the Supreme Court held it could, ‘to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim/ by ‘freezing election procedures in the covered areas unless the changes can be shown to be nondiscriminatory.’ ” H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, pp. 57-58. (Footnotes omitted.)
See also H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 9-11, 26; S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 6-9, 24; H. R. Rep. No. 91-397, pp. 6-8; H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, pp. 8-11, 57-60; S. Rep. No. 94-295, pp. 15-19; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 335.
By prohibiting the enforcement of a voting-procedure change until it has been demonstrated to the United States Department of Justice or to a three-judge federal court that the change does not have a discriminatory effect, Congress desired to prevent States from “undo-ting] or defeat [ing] the rights recently won” by Negroes. H. R. Rep. No. 91-397, p. 8. Section 5 was intended “to insure that [the gains thus far achieved in minority political participation] shall not be destroyed through new [discriminatory] procedures and techniques.” S. Rep. No. 94-295, p. 19.
When it adopted a 7-year extension of the Voting Rights Act in 1975, Congress explicitly stated that “the standard [under § 5] can only be fully satisfied by determining on the basis of the facts found by the Attorney General [or the District Court] to be true whether the ability of minority groups to participate in the political process and to elect their choices to office is augmented, diminished, or not affected by the change affecting voting . . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 94-196, p. 60 (emphasis added) , In other words the purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.
It is thus apparent that a legislative reapportionment that enhances the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise can hardly have the “effect” of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of § 5. We conclude, therefore, that such an ameliorative new legislative apportionment cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution.
The application of this standard to the facts of the present case is straightforward. Under the apportionment of 1961 none of the five councilmanic districts had a clear Negro majority of registered voters, and no Negro has been elected to the New Orleans City Council while that apportionment system has been in effect. Under Plan II, by contrast, Negroes will constitute a majority of the population in two of the five districts and a clear majority of the registered voters in one of them. Thus, there is every reason to predict, upon the District Court’s hypothesis of bloc voting, that at least one and perhaps two Negroes may well be elected to the council under Plan II. It was therefore error for the District Court to conclude that Plan II “will. . . have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color” within the meaning of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 5 provides:
"Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 1973b (b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of this title based upon determinations made under the second sentence of section 1973b (b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1968, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of this title based upon determinations made under the third sentence of section 1973b (b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b (f) (2) of this title, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made. Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney General’s failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. In the event the Attorney General affirmatively indicates that no objection will be made within the sixty-day period following receipt of a submission, the Attorney General may reserve the right to reexamine the submission if additional information comes to his attention during the remainder of the sixty-day period which would otherwise require objection in accordance with this section. Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.” 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 89 Stat. 402, 404, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V).
42 U. S. C. § 1973b (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Louisiana and its political subdivisions are subject to the provisions of §4. 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 (1965).
The action was actually brought on behalf of the city of New Orleans by six of the seven members of its city council. For convenience the appellants sometimes are referred to in this opinion as New Orleans or the city.
The defendants in the suit were the United States and the Attorney General of the United States. A group of Negro voters of New Orleans intervened on the side of the defendants in the District Court.
The difference in the two figures is due in part to the fact that proportionately more whites of voting age are registered to vote than are Negroes and in part to the fact that the age structures of the white and Negro populations of New Orleans differ significantly — 72.3% of the white population is of voting age, but only 57.1% of the Negro population is of voting age. See U. S. Civil Rights Commission, The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After, pp. 368, 383.
The decision to draft a new plan was in large part attributable to the opposition to Plan I expressed by the residents of Algiers— that part of New Orleans located south of the Mississippi River. The residents of Algiers have a common interest in promoting the construction of an additional bridge across the river. They had always been represented by one councilman, and they opposed Plan I primarily because it divided Algiers among three council-manic districts.
The opposition to Plan I in Algiers, see n. 5, supra, was quieted in Plan II by placing all of that section of the city in one council-manic district.
The District Court did not address the question whether Plan II was adopted with such a ‘'purpose.” See n. 1, supra.
This Court has, of course, rejected the proposition that members of a minority group have a federal right to be represented in legislative bodies in proportion to their number in the general population. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 149. It is worth noting, however, that had the District Court applied its mathematical calculations to the five seats that were properly subject to its scrutiny, see Part II-A of text, infra, it would have concluded on the basis of registered voter figures that Negroes in New Orleans had a theoretical potential of electing 1.7 of the five eouncilmen. A realistic prediction would seem to be that under the actual operation of Plan II at least one and perhaps two Negro eouncilmen would in fact be elected. See infra, at 142.
At various points in its 40-page opinion the District Court described its understanding of the statutory criteria in terms somewhat different from those quoted in the text above. Since, as will hereafter appear, our understanding of the meaning of § 5 does not in any event coincide with that of the District Court, no purpose would be served by isolating and separately examining the various verbalizations of the statutory criteria contained in its opinion.
In reaching this conclusion, we do not decide the question reserved in Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 535 n. 7, whether a district in a proposed legislative reapportionment plan that is identical to a district in the previously existing apportionment may be subject to review under § 5. The at-large seats in the present case were not even part of the 1961 plan, let alone of Plan II.
This Court has not before dealt with the question of what criteria a legislative reapportionment plan must satisfy under § 5. Last Term in City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, the Court had to decide under what circumstances § 5 would permit a city to annex additional territory when that annexation would have the effect of changing the city’s Negro population from a majority into a minority. The Court held that the annexation should be approved under the “effect” aspect of § 5 if the system for electing councilmen would likely produce results that “fairly reflect [ed] the strength of the Negro community as it exists after the annexation.” 422 U. S., at 371. The City of Richmond case thus decided when a change with an adverse impact on previous Negro voting power met the “effect” standard of § 5. The present case, by contrast, involves a change with no such adverse impact upon the former voting power of Negroes.
Cf. MR. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in City of Richmond v. United States, supra, at 388: “I take to be the fundamental objective of § 5 . . . the protection of present levels of voting effectiveness for the black population.” (Emphasis in original.)
The intervenors have advised us of statistics indicating that as of 1974, the percentage of Negro registered voters in the city as a whole increased to 38.2%. Assuming the accuracy of these estimates, and that the increase has been proportionate in each council-manic district, it is quite possible that by this time not only a majority of the population but also a majority of the registered voters in two of the Plan II districts are Negroes. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 499 F. 2d 893, 896 (CA5).
It is possible that a legislative reapportionment could be a substantial improvement over its predecessor in terms of lessening racial discrimination, and yet nonetheless continue so to discriminate on the basis of race or color as to be unconstitutional. The United States has made no claim that Plan II suffers from any such disability, nor could it rationally do bo.
There is no decision in this Court holding a legislative apportionment or reapportionment violative of the Fifteenth Amendment. Cf. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52. The case closest to so holding is Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, in which the Court found that allegations of racially motivated gerrymandering of a municipality’s political boundaries stated a claim under that Amendment. The many cases in this Court involving the Fourteenth Amendment’s “one man, one vote” standard are not relevant here. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533. But in at least four cases the Court has considered claims that legislative apportion-ments violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of identifiable racial or ethnic minorities. See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 439; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 86-89; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 149; White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755. Plan II does not remotely approach a violation of the constitutional standards enunciated in those cases.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits as to whether a misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is subject to the harmless-error rule, and to determine whether there is sufficient evidence in this case to support convictions for mail fraud under 18 U. S. C. § 1341.
I
A
James Lane and three partners opened the El Toro Restaurant in Amarillo, Texas, in the summer of 1978. The business never operated at a profit, however, and sales began to decline that fall. In November, Lane purchased fire insurance covering the building’s contents and improvements and any related business losses. Simultaneously, he hired Sidney Heard, a professional arsonist, to burn the building in order to escape the lease and partnership. On February 27, 1979, Heard set a fire that caused smoke damage to the building’s contents. Lane first settled with the insurer on the contents and improvements. He then submitted an income statement that falsely indicated the restaurant had operated at a profit. After the insurance adjuster mailed the statement to the insurer’s headquarters, Lane settled his business interruption claim.
In early 1980, Lane again hired Heard to set fire to a duplex that Lane was moving to a vacant lot in Amarillo. Lane obtained a fire insurance policy on the building, listing the owner as L & L Properties, a partnership between his son Dennis Lane and Andrew Lawson. An accomplice of Heard’s burned the duplex on May 1, 1980.
Thereafter, on three occasions Dennis Lane signed proof-of-loss claims for repairs and submitted them to an insurance adjuster, who issued drafts in return totaling $12,000. Each time, the adjuster later mailed the proof-of-loss to the insurer’s headquarters. The adjuster issued a final settlement draft for $12,250 on September 16, 1980. Two days later, he mailed a memorandum to headquarters explaining why repairs had exceeded previous estimates by some $10,000. He enclosed invoices supplied by Dennis Lane listing various materials and furniture purportedly purchased to repair and refurbish the duplex. In fact, these invoices had been fabricated by James Lane, Heard, and Heard’s secretary.
The Lanes and Lawson met with Heard several weeks after the duplex fire to discuss a proposal to establish and burn a flower shop in Lubbock, Texas. Heard and Dennis Lane picked out a suitable building in July 1980, and an accomplice of Heard’s, William Lankford, prepared ficticious invoices for merchandise and delivered some artificial flowers to the building later in August. In November, James Lane insured the contents for $50,000. Heard, however, was later arrested for an unrelated crime, and the planned arson never took place.
In March 1981, an Amarillo newspaper article connected Dennis Lane with a scheme to burn the flower shop with Heard; that same day, James Lane canceled the insurance policy. On May 12, 1981, Dennis Lane appeared before a federal grand jury investigating Heard. He testified that Heard had nothing to do with the flower shop or with his own dealings with Lankford.
B
James Lane and Dennis Lane were indicted in multiple counts for mail fraud in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1341, conspiracy in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 371, and perjury in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1623. Count 1 charged James Lane with mail fraud with regard to the El Toro Restaurant fire. Counts 2 through 4 charged both Lanes with mail fraud related to the duplex fire, and Count 5 charged them with conspiracy to commit mail fraud in connection with the flower shop arson plan. In Count 6, Dennis Lane was charged with perjury before the grand jury.
Prior to trial in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas, the Lanes filed motions for severance contending that the charged offenses were misjoined in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b), but the motions were denied and the trial proceeded jointly before a jury. When evidence relating to the El Toro Restaurant fire was admitted, the trial court instructed the jury not to consider that evidence against Dennis Lane. App. 21. The trial judge repeated this instruction in the final charge, together with an instruction regarding the separate consideration to be given each defendant and each count. Ibid. The Lanes renewed their severance motions at the end of the Government’s evidence and at the close of all evidence, but the motions were again denied. The jury returned convictions on all counts.
On appeal, the Lanes argued that misjoinder under Rule 8(b) had occurred. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that Counts 2 through 6 were properly joined, but agreed “that Count 1 should not have been joined with the others because it was not part of the same series of acts or transactions as Counts 2 through 6.” 735 F. 2d 799, 803-804 (1984). The court refused to consider the Government’s argument that the error, if any, was harmless, stating only that “Rule 8(b) misjoinder is prejudicial per se in this circuit.” Id., at 806 (citing United States v. Levine, 546 F. 2d 658 (CA5 1977)). The court reversed the Lanes’ convictions and remanded for new trials.
At the same time, the Court of Appeals rejected the Lanes’ contention that there was insufficient evidence to support convictions for mail fraud under Counts 2 through 4 because each charged mailing occurred after each related payment had been received, and thus after each scheme had reached fruition. The Court of Appeals distinguished our holding in United States v. Maze, 414 U. S. 395 (1974), and instead relied on United States v. Sampson, 371 U. S. 75 (1962), to hold that mailings occurring after receipt of an insurance payment may nevertheless be “in execution of fraud” as required by 18 U. S. C. § 1341 where they are “designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security and postpone investigation.” 735 F. 2d, at 807-808.
The court found sufficient evidence for the properly instructed jury to “infer that the mailings were intended to and did have a lulling effect” because they helped persuade the insurer that “the claims were legitimate.” Id., at 808. It emphasized that had the proof-of-loss forms not been mailed shortly after issuance of the insurance drafts, the insurer might have been alerted to the possibility of a fraud. Ibid. Similarly, the false invoices submitted by Dennis Lane “gave the impression of a perfectly innocent claim.” Ibid.
The Government’s petition for rehearing was denied. 741 F. 2d 1381 (1984). We granted certiorari, 469 U. S. 1206 (1985). We reverse in part and affirm in part.
I — I HH
The Court of Appeals held that misjoinder is inherently prejudicial.” 735 F. 2d, at 804. The Circuits are divided on the question whether misjoinder requires automatic reversal, or whether the harmless-error rule governs. Most Circuits that have adopted the per se approach have relied on McElroy v. United States, 164 U. S. 76 (1896), where this Court applied the joinder statute then in force and reversed convictions of jointly tried defendants after rejecting the Government’s argument that there was no showing of prejudice. Id., at 81.
McElroy, however, was decided long before the adoption of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 8 and 52, and prior to the enactment of the harmless-error statute, 28 U. S. C. §2111, which provides that on appeal we are to ignore “errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Under Rule 52(a), we are similarly instructed that any error “which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”
The Court’s holding in Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), made a significant change in the law of harmless error. There, Justice Black, speaking for the Court, emphasized that even “some constitutional errors [may] be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.” Id., at 22. In rejecting the automatic reversal rule, the Court stated:
“We are urged by petitioners to hold that all federal constitutional errors, regardless of the facts and circumstances, must always be deemed harmful. ... We decline to adopt any such rule.” Id., at 21-22 (emphasis added).
Justice Black went on to note that all 50 States follow the harmless-error approach, and
“the United States long ago through its Congress established . . . the rule that judgments shall not be reversed for ‘errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.’ 28 U. S. C. §2111. None of these rules on its face distinguishes between federal constitutional errors and errors of state law or federal statutes and rules.” Id., at 22 (footnote omitted).
Since Chapman, we have “consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional violations.” United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 509 (1983). In Hasting, we again emphasized that
“given the myriad safeguards provided to assure a fair trial, and taking into account the reality of the human fallibility of the participants, there can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and . . . the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial.” Id., at 508-509.
In this case, the argument for applying harmless-error analysis is even stronger because the specific joinder standards of Rule 8 are not themselves of constitutional magnitude. Clearly, Chapman and Hasting dictate that the harmless-error rule governs here.
The applicability of harmless error to misjoinder also follows from Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750 (1946), a case similar to the one at hand. There, some 32 defendants were charged with one conspiracy, when in fact there had been at least eight separate conspiracies. Nineteen defendants were jointly tried, and seven were convicted. The Court applied the harmless-error statute to an error resulting from a variance from the indictment, and held the error was not harmless in that case. Emphasizing the numerous conspiracies involving unrelated defendants, as well as seriously flawed jury instructions, the Kotteakos Court reversed the convictions in light of each of the 32 defendants’ “right not to be tried en masse for the conglomeration of distinct and separate offenses” involved. Id., at 775.
Although the Court’s review in that case was from the perspective of a variance from the indictment, rather than mis-joinder, the Court recognized that misjoinder was implicated, and suggested that the harmless-error rule could similarly apply in that context. Id., at 774-775.
A holding directly involving misjoinder again indicated the harmless-error rule should apply. In Schaffer v. United States, 362 U. S. 511 (1960), three different groups of defendants were charged with participating in separate criminal acts with one other group of three defendants. The indictment also charged all the defendants with one overall count of conspiracy, making joinder under Rule 8 proper. At the close of the Government’s case, however, the District Court concluded there was insufficient evidence of conspiracy and dismissed that count. The court then denied a motion for severance after concluding that defendants failed to show prejudice from the joint trial; the Court of Appeals affirmed. This Court recognized that “the charge which originally justified joinder turn[ed] out to lack the support of sufficient evidence.” Id., at 516. Essentially, at that point in the trial, there was a clear error of misjoinder under Rule 8 standards. Nevertheless, the Schaffer Court held that once the Rule 8 requirements were met by the allegations in the indictment, severance thereafter is controlled entirely by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, which requires a showing of prejudice. Id., at 515-516. The Court then affirmed the finding of no prejudice. Although the Court did not reach the harmless-error rule because Rule 8(b) had initially been satisfied, the Court’s language surely assumed the rule was applicable.
A plain reading of these cases shows they dictate our holding. Applying the 1919 statute treated in Kotteakos, which governed only “technical errors,” 28 U. S. C. §391 (1946 ed.), the Court emphasized the clear intent of Congress “was simple: To substitute judgment for automatic application of rules.” 328 U. S., at 759-760. “In the final analysis judgment in each case must be influenced by conviction resulting from examination of the proceedings in their entirety, tempered but not governed in any rigid sense of stare decisis by what has been done in similar situations.” Id., at 762. The Court flatly rejected per se rules regarding particular errors because “any attempt to create a generalized presumption to apply in all cases would be contrary not only to the spirit of [the statute] but also to the expressed intent of its legislative sponsors.” Id., at 765.
Schaffer discussed the current harmless-error statute, which was enacted in 1949 after Kotteakos and deleted the qualifying word “technical” regarding errors governed by the rule. See 28 U. S. C. §2111. The Court again rejected any per se rule for joinder errors requiring reversal, refusing to “fashion a hard-and-fast formula that. . . [the] joinder [wa]s error as a matter of law.” 362 U. S., at 516. Citing Kotteakos, the Court pointed out that there “[t]he dissent agreed that the test of injury resulting from joinder ‘depends on the special circumstances of each case.’” 362 U. S., at 517 (quoting 328 U. S., at 777 (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
In common with other courts, the Court has long recognized that joint trials “conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial.” Bruton v. United States, 891 U. S. 123, 134 (1968). Rule 8 accommodates these interests while protecting against prejudicial joinder. But we do not read Rule 8 to mean that prejudice results whenever its requirements have not been satisfied.
Under Rule 52(a), the harmless-error rule focuses on whether the error “affect[ed] substantial rights.” In Kotteakos the Court construed a harmless-error statute with similar language, and observed:
“The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” 328 U. S., at 765.
Invoking the Kotteakos test, we hold that an error involving misjoinder “affects substantial rights” and requires reversal only if the misjoinder results in actual prejudice because it “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id., at 776. Only by so holding can we bring Rules 8 and 52(a) “into substantial harmony, not into square conflict.” Id., at 775.
Of course, “we are not required to review records to evaluate a harmless-error claim, and do so sparingly, [but] we plainly have the authority to do so.” United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S., at 510 (footnote omitted).
In the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt shown here, we are satisfied that the claimed error was harmless. When evidence oh misjoined Count 1 was introduced, the District Court provided a proper limiting instruction, and in the final charge repeated that instruction and admonished the jury to consider each count and defendant separately. Moreover, the same evidence on Count 1 would likely have been admissible on joint retrial of Counts 2 through 6 to show James Lane’s intent under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Any error therefore failed to have any “substantial influence” on the verdict. Kotteakos, supra, at 765.
I — I I — I I — I
Respondents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain their convictions. To find a violation of the mail fraud statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1341, the charged “mailings” must be “for the purpose of executing the scheme.” Kann v. United States, 323 U. S. 88, 94 (1944). Mailings occurring after receipt of the goods obtained by fraud are within the statute if they “were designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place.” United States v. Maze, 414 U. S., at 403. See United States v. Sampson, 371 U. S. 75 (1962).
Only Counts 2 through 4, involving the duplex fire, are at issue. The Lanes argue that each mailing occurred after irrevocable receipt of the related payment, and thus after each scheme to defraud came to fruition. This argument misconstrues the nature of the indictment, which charged an overall scheme to defraud based on the events surrounding the duplex fire. Counts 2 through 4 merely relate to separate mailings concerning partial payments that were a part of the whole scheme. The jury could properly find the scheme, at the earliest, was not completed until receipt of the last payment on September 16, 1980, which finally settled their claim. Hence, the mailings charged in Counts 2 and 3 clearly took place while the scheme was still continuing.
Moreover, the jury could reasonably have found that the scheme was not completed until the final mailing on September 18, 1980, charged in Count 4, because that mailing was intended (as were the two earlier ones) to “lull” the insurer into a false sense of security. The jury was properly instructed that each charged mailing must have been made both “for the purpose of executing the scheme to defraud,” App. 22, and prior to the scheme’s completion, id., at 23, and further that mailings “which facilitate concealment of the scheme” are covered by the statute. Id., at 24.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, ordering a new trial based on misjoinder of Count 1 with Counts 2 through 6, is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the action is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Six Circuits have adopted a per se approach holding that misjoinder is always reversible error. See United States v. Turkette, 632 F. 2d 896, 906, and n. 35 (CA1 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 452 U. S. 576 (1981); United States v. Graci, 504 F. 2d 411, 414 (CA3 1974); United States v. Bova, 493 F. 2d 33 (CA5 1974); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F. 2d 647, 654, 657-658 (CA8), cert. denied sub nom. Phillips v. United States, 459 U. S. 1040 (1982); United States v. Eagleston, 417 F. 2d 11, 14 (CA10 1969); United States v. Ellis, 709 F. 2d 688, 690 (CA11 1983).
Six have subjected misjoinder claims to harmless-error analysis. See United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F. 2d 830, 843 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1111 (1981); United States v. Seidel, 620 F. 2d 1006 (CA4 1980); United States v. Hatcher, 680 F. 2d 438, 442 (CA6 1982); United States v. Varelli, 407 F. 2d 735, 747-748 (CA7 1969); United States v. Martin, 567 F. 2d 849, 854 (CA9 1977); Baker v. United States, 131 U. S. App. D. C. 7, 21-23, 401 F. 2d 958, 972-974 (1968). Most of these courts had previously taken the view that misjoinder is prejudicial per se.
Each proof-of-loss form stated that the “loss did not originate by any act, design or procurement on the part of your insured or this affiant” and that “no attempt to deceive [the] company as to the extent of the loss has been made.”
Rule 8(b) provides:
“(b) Joinder of Defendants. Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.”
The Court of Appeals also rejected James Lane’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to Count 1. That holding was not challenged in the Lanes’ cross-petition.
Although the Government continues to believe that Count 1 was properly joined with Counts 2 through 6, it does not challenge that holding here.
See n. 1, swpra.
Justice Stevens’ partial dissent argues that McElroy conclusively determined misjoinder is prejudicial per se, and that Rule 8 was intended to represent a restatement of existing law, including the “rule of the McElroy case.” Post, at 467. Rule 8, however, is simply a procedural rule with certain technical requirements, and Justice Stevens’ opinion refers to the Advisory Committee on Rules’ citation of McElroy, see post, at 468, n. 3, making clear they were referring only to those technical requirements of prior law. Nowhere is there any indication Rule 8 was intended to enshrine any substantive “principle” of McElroy that misjoinder requires reversal, nor is there any citation of McElroy’s specific holding.
Improper joinder does not, in itself, violate the Constitution. Rather, misjoinder would rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if it results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.
Justice Stevens’ partial dissent suggests Chapman is irrelevant to our analysis because that case involved a constitutional violation, whereas the error here is of a noneonstitutional nature. Post, at 472. It is difficult to see any logic in the argument that although the harmless-error rule may be applicable to constitutional violations, it should not be applied to violations of mere procedural rules. Justice Stevens recognizes that the standard for harmless-error analysis adopted in Chapman concerning constitutional errors is considerably more onerous than the standard for non-constitutional errors adopted in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750 (1946). See post, at 472-473, n. 11. The heightened regard we have for constitutional protections surely warrants a conclusion that nonconstitu-tional provisions must be treated at least comparably, and in Hasting we emphasized even “most constitutional violations” must be ignored if they are harmless. 461 U. S., at 509.
The Court pointed out that “the problem is not merely one of variance . . . but is also essentially one of proper joinder.” 328 U. S., at 774. Even so, the Court indicated the harmless-error rule must apply, although perhaps with “restraint.” Id., at 775.
Contrary to these clear holdings, Justice Stevens’ partial dissent advocates a rule-by-rule review establishing bright-line per se rules whether to conduct harmless-error analysis. Post, at 472-474. But on its face, Rule 52(a) admits of no broad exceptions to its applicability. Any assumption that once a “substantial right” is implicated it is inherently “affected” by any error begs the question raised by Rule 52(a). Assuming there is a “substantial right,” the inquiry remains whether the error “affects substantial rights” requiring reversal of a conviction. That kind of inquiry requires a review of the entire record. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S., at 509. It is simply too late in the day to argue that Congress intended to incorporate any per se rule of McElroy for misjoinder following Kotteakos, the subsequent enactment of an arguably broader statute, and this Court’s prejudice inquiry in Schaffer.
Respondents argue that application of the harmless-error rule to Rule 8(b) misjoinder will eviscerate Rule 14, which provides the trial court with discretion to grant a severance even if the joinder is proper under Rule 8 when it believes the defendants or the Government may be prejudiced by a joinder. We see no conflict with our holding and the applicability of Rule 14. Rule 14’s concern is to provide the trial court with some flexibility when a joint trial may appear to risk prejudice to a party; review of that decision is for an abuse of discretion. Rule 8(b), however, requires the granting of a motion for severance unless its standards are met, even in the absence of prejudice; review on appeal is for an error of law. Applying the harmless-error rule to Rule 8(b) misjoinder simply goes to the additional question whether the error requires setting aside the convictions. We need not decide whether the degree of prejudice necessary to support a Rule 14 motion for severance is identical to that necessary to require reversal for a Rule 8(b) error.
Justice Stevens’ partial dissent fails to recognize that the Rule 14 prejudice component involves a different inquiry from the Rule 8 technical requirements. Indeed, the express language of Rule 14, as well as the Advisory Committee Note, shows that Congress tolerates some Rule 8 joinders even when there is prejudice. The first hurdle in obtaining a severance under Rule 14 is a showing of prejudice, and if shown, it remains in the district court’s discretion whether to grant the motion.
We can agree with Justice Stevens’ partial dissent “that the harmless-error inquiry is entirely distinct from a sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry.” Post, at 476; our reliance on the Kotteakos test makes that clear. See supra, at 449. But that does not in any sense mean that overwhelming evidence of guilt is irrelevant; the threshold of overwhelming evidence is far higher than mere sufficiency to uphold conviction.
Nor may proper limiting instructions or jury charges never be “an adequate response” to a prejudice inquiry. Post, at 477. Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S. 539 (1947), provides direct support for the Court’s approach in this case. There the Court recognized that, in the context of mass trials (as in Kotteakos), limiting instructions on evidence admissible only as to one defendant might in some circumstances be inadequate to prevent prejudice. 332 U. S., at 559-560. But here, as in Blumenthal, we are not faced with any trial en masse of numerous defendants and unrelated crimes.
When there are few defendants and the trial court is aware of the potential for prejudice, “the risk of transference of guilt over the border of admissibility [may be] reduced to the minimum” by carefully crafted limiting instructions with a strict charge to consider the guilt or innocence of each defendant independently. Id., at 560. We cannot necessarily “assume that the jury misunderstood or disobeyed” such instructions. Id., at 553. Indeed, this Court’s conclusion in Schaffer that defendants failed to show prejudice was based directly on the fact that “the judge was acutely aware of the possibility of prejudice and was strict in his charge — not only as to the testimony the jury was not to consider, but also as to that evidence which was available in the consideration of the guilt of each [defendant] separately under the respective substantive counts.” 362 U. S., at 516.
The same caution was exercised by the trial judge here, and no different result should be required. The Government initially observes that because of the similarity of each arson scheme, “only the court of appeals’ narrow reading of Rule 8” led to its finding of misjoinder. At trial, Heard and Lankford — two principal actors — testified against both Lanes, who relied essentially on denials or character defenses. Moreover, the evidence as to Count 1 was distinct and easily segregated from evidence relating to Counts 2 through 6. The misjoinder error, if any, in these circumstances was harmless.
The statute provides in relevant part:
“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, ... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice . . . , places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, ... or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail . . . any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
The Government contends that undisputed testimony shows the insurance drafts issued to the Lanes, unlike normal business checks, were not payable on demand but only upon authorization from the insurer’s home office when they arrived at the insurer’s bank for collection. If the drafts deposited by the Lanes had been dishonored by the insurer’s banks, the amounts would have been charged against their account. The Lanes, therefore, may not have irrevocably received the proceeds of the fraud prior to the final mailing. See Brief for United States 30-31. The Court of Appeals, however, did not rely on this argument, and we decline to resolve this factual issue here.
Our conclusion that the delayed mailings at issue in this action were part of an ongoing scheme to defraud is in accord with our holding in United States v. Sampson, 371 U. S. 75 (1962). In that case, defendants purported to help businessmen obtain loans or sell their businesses in exchange for an “advance fee.” Id., at 77. Following the deposit of checks for these fees, the defendants’ plan called for the mailing of a form letter assuring the victims of the fraud that they were receiving the services they paid for. Id., at 78. The Court upheld defendants’ convictions for mail fraud because of the “lulling effect” of the delayed mailings.
We see no conflict with our holding in United States v. Maze, 414 U. S. 395 (1974). There, use of a stolen credit card led to the mailing of charge statements to a bank. We held that the fraud was completed upon the defrauder’s receipt of the goods, distinguishing Sampson because the mailing of the charge slips, rather than acting to “lull” the bank into acquiescence, instead “increased the probability that [the defrauder] would be detected and apprehended.” 414 U. S., at 403. Had the Lanes failed to submit timely proof-of-loss forms here, the insurer might very well have discovered the fraud.
The Lanes contend that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in this action also conflicts with United States v. Ledesma, 632 F. 2d 670 (CA7), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 998 (1980), which reversed a conviction involving the mailing of a fraudulent proof-of-loss form after receipt of insurance proceeds. In that case, however, the Seventh Circuit never discussed Sampson or the possibility that the delayed mailing had any “lulling” effect.
The Lanes argue that the Government must show that the charged mailings were specifically intended to lull, rather than showing simply a general intention on their part to defraud, in order to come within Sampson’s holding. We need not determine whether any such specific intent must be shown, as we agree with the Court of Appeals that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer specific intent to lull here under these instructions, which the Lanes did not challenge on appeal or in their cross-petition.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
PeR Curiam.
Appellees commenced this action in the federal District Court for the Southern District of New York challenging on equal protection and statutory grounds § 131-a of the New York Social Services Law which provides for payments to welfare recipients in Nassau, Suffolk, and certain other New York State counties in lesser amounts than provided for residents of New York City should the Welfare Administrator determine that adequate cause exists for the differential. A three-judge court was convened and it found that appellees’ likelihood of success on their constitutional claim warranted the issuance of a preliminary injunction against what it found to be the payment of welfare in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found it unnecessary to consider appellees’ statutory claims. We noted probable jurisdiction. 397 U. S. 903.
Subsequent to the decision of the District Court this Court rendered its decision in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, wherein we held that a federal court called upon to pass upon the constitutional validity of a State’s welfare program should, before reaching the constitutional issues, consider first any pendent statutory claims that are presented, notwithstanding the pendency of negotiations between the State and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded to that court for an opportunity to pass on the propriety of granting interim relief in accordance with conventional equitable principles on the basis of appellees’ statutory claims, or, if the question is reached, continuing the present injunction in light of this Court’s decision in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the decision of this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A state Administrative Law Judge determined that petitioner University of Tennessee (hereafter petitioner or University) was not motivated by racial prejudice in seeking to discharge respondent. The question presented is whether this finding is entitled to preclusive effect in federal court, where respondent has raised discrimination claims under various civil rights laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
h-i
In 1981, petitioner informed respondent, a black employee of the University’s Agricultural Extension Service, that he would be discharged for inadequate work performance and misconduct on the job. Respondent requested a hearing under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-101 et seq. (1985), to contest his proposed termination. Prior to the start of the hearing, respondent also filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, alleging that his proposed discharge was racially motivated and seeking relief under Title VII and other civil rights statutes, including 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The relief sought included damages, an injunction prohibiting respondent’s discharge, and classwide relief from alleged patterns of discrimination by petitioner.
The District Court initially entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the University from taking any job action against respondent, but later lifted this order and permitted the state administrative proceeding to go forward. App. to Pet. for Cert. A27. There followed a hearing at which an administrative assistant to the University’s Vice President for Agriculture presided as an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The focus of the hearing was on 10 particular charges that the University gave as grounds for respondent’s discharge. Respondent denied these charges, which he contended were motivated by racial prejudice, and also argued that the University’s subjecting him to the charges violated his rights under the Constitution, Title VII, and other federal statutes. The ALJ held that he lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate respondent’s federal civil rights claims, but did allow respondent to present, as an affirmative defense, evidence that the charges against him were actually motivated by racial prejudice and hence not a proper basis for his proposed discharge. Id., at A44-45.
After hearing extensive evidence, the ALJ found that the University had proved some but not all of the charges against respondent, and that the charges were not racially motivated. Id., at A177-179. Concluding that the proposed discharge of respondent was too severe a penalty, the ALJ ordered him transferred to a new assignment with supervisors other than those with whom he had experienced conflicts. Id., at A179-181. Respondent appealed to the University’s Vice President for Agriculture, who affirmed the ALJ’s ruling. Id., at A33-35. The Vice President stated that his review of the record persuaded him that the proposed discharge of respondent had not been racially motivated. Id., at A34.
Respondent did not seek review of these administrative proceedings in the Tennessee courts; instead, he returned to federal court to pursue his civil rights claims. There, petitioner moved for summary judgment on the ground that respondent’s suit was an improper collateral attack on the ALJ’s ruling, which petitioner contended was entitled to pre-clusive effect. The District Court agreed, holding that the civil rights statutes on which respondent relied “were not intended to afford the plaintiff a means of relitigating what plaintiff has heretofore litigated over a five-month period.” Id., at A32.
Respondent appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the District Court’s judgment. 766 F. 2d 982 (1985). As regards respondent’s Title VII claim, the Court of Appeals looked for guidance to our decision in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U. S. 461 (1982). While Kremer teaches that final state-court judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in Title VII actions, it indicates that unreviewed determinations by state agencies stand on a different footing. The Sixth Circuit found the following passage from Kremer directly on point:
“EEOC review [pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(b)] of discrimination charges previously rejected by state agencies would be pointless if the federal courts were bound by such agency decisions. Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F. 2d 447, 450, n. 1 (CA7 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 928 (1975). Nor is it plausible to suggest that Congress intended federal courts to be bound further by state administrative decisions than by decisions of the EEOC. Since it is settled that decisions by the EEOC do not preclude a trial de novo in federal court, it is clear that unreviewed administrative determinations by state agencies also should not preclude such review even if such a decision were to be afforded pre-clusive effect in a State’s own courts. Garner v. Giarrusso, 571 F. 2d 1330 (CA5 1978), Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., supra; Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F. 2d 9 (CA6 1972); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F. 2d 889 (CA2 1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 918 (1972).” Id., at 470, n. 7.
The court accordingly held that res judicata did not foreclose a trial de novo on respondent’s Title VII claim.
The Sixth Circuit found the question of applying preclusion principles to respondent’s claims under § 1983 and other civil rights statutes a more difficult question. It held that 28 U. S. C. § 1738, which concerns the preclusive effect of “judicial proceedings of any [state] court,” does not require that federal courts be bound by the unreviewed findings of state administrative agencies. The court also declined to fashion a federal common law of preclusion, declaring that “[a]t least implicit in the legislative history of section 1983 is the recognition that state determination of issues relevant to constitutional adjudication is not an adequate substitute for full access to federal court.” 766 F. 2d, at 992. The court recognized that a similar argument for denying res judicata effect to state-court judgments in subsequent § 1983 actions was rejected in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980), and Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U. S. 75 (1984), but distinguished those cases as based on the explicit command of § 1738.
We granted certiorari to consider petitioner’s contention that the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that state administrative factfinding is never entitled to preclusive effect in actions under Title VII or the Reconstruction civil rights statutes. 474 U. S. 1004 (1985).
I — I I — I
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1738 governs the preclusive effect to be given the judgments and records of state courts, and is not applicable to the unreviewed state administrative factfind-ing at issue in this case. However, we have frequently fashioned federal common-law rules of preclusion in the absence of a governing statute. See, e. g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313 (1971); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 289-291 (1906). Although § 1738 is a governing statute with regard to the judgments and records of state courts, because § 1738 antedates the development of administrative agencies it clearly does not represent a congressional determination that the decisions of state administrative agencies should not be given preclusive effect. Accordingly, we will consider whether a rule of preclusion is appropriate, first with respect to respondent’s Title VII claim, and next with respect to his claims under the Constitution and the Reconstruction civil rights statutes.
Ill
Under 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(b), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), in investigating discrimination charges, must give “substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local [employment discrimination] law.” As we noted in Kremer, 456 U. S., at 470, n. 7, it would make little sense for Congress to write such a provision if state agency findings were entitled to preclusive effect in Title VII actions in federal court.
Moreover, our decision in Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U. S. 840 (1976), strongly supports respondent’s contention that Congress intended one in his position to have a trial de novo on his Title VII claim. In Chandler, we held that a federal employee whose discrimination claim was rejected by her employing agency after an administrative hearing was entitled to a trial de novo in federal court on her Title VII claim. After reviewing in considerable detail the language of Title VII and the history of the 1972 amendments to the statute, we concluded:
“The legislative history of the 1972 amendments reinforces the plain meaning of the statute and confirms that Congress intended to accord federal employees the same right to a trial de novo [following administrative proceedings] as is enjoyed by private-sector employees and employees of state governments and political subdivisions under the amended Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id., at 848.
Like the plaintiff in Chandler, the respondent in this case pursued his Title VII action following an administrative proceeding at which the employing agency rejected a discrimination claim. It would be contrary to the rationale of Chandler to apply res judicata to deny respondent a trial de novo on his Title VII claim.
Invoking the presumption against implied repeal, petitioner distinguishes Chandler as involving a federal agency determination not entitled to full faith and credit under § 1738. Reply Brief for Petitioners 16. This argument is based on the erroneous premise that § 1738 applies to state administrative proceedings. See Part II, supra. The question actually before us is whether a common-law rule of preclusion would be consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting Title VII. On the basis of our analysis in Kremer and Chandler of the language and legislative history of Title VII, we conclude that the Sixth Circuit correctly held that Congress did not intend unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII claims.
> 1 — (
This Court has held that § 1738 requires that state-court judgments be given both issue and claim preclusive effect in subsequent actions under 42 U. S. C. §1983. Allen v. McCurry, supra (issue preclusion); Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, supra (claim preclusion). Those decisions are not controlling in this case, where § 1738 does not apply; nonetheless, they support the view that Congress, in enacting the Reconstruction civil rights statutes, did not intend to create an exception to general rules of preclusion. As we stated in Allen:
“[Njothing in the language of §1983 remotely expresses any congressional intent to contravene the common-law rules of preclusion or to repeal the express statutory requirements of the predecessor of 28 U. S. C. § 1738. . . .
“Moreover, the legislative history of § 1983 does not in any clear way suggest that Congress intended to repeal or restrict the traditional doctrines of preclusion.” 449 U. S., at 97-98.
The Court’s discussion in Allen suggests that it would have reached the same result even in the absence of § 1738. We also see no reason to suppose that Congress, in enacting the Reconstruction civil rights statutes, wished to foreclose the adaptation of traditional principles of preclusion to such subsequent developments as the burgeoning use of administrative adjudication in the 20th century.
We have previously recognized that it is sound policy to apply principles of issue preclusion to the factfinding of administrative bodies acting in a judicial capacity. In a unanimous decision in United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U. S. 394 (1966), we held that the fact-finding of the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals was binding in a subsequent action in the Court of Claims involving a contract dispute between the same parties. We explained:
“Although the decision here rests upon the agreement of the parties as modified by the Wunderlich Act, we note that the result we reach is harmonious with general principles of collateral estoppel. Occasionally courts have used language to the effect that res judicata principles do not apply to administrative proceedings, but such language is certainly too broad. . When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.” Id., at 421-422 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
Thus, Utah Construction, which we subsequently approved in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Co., 456 U. S., at 484-485, n. 26, teaches that giving preclusive effect to administrative factfinding serves the value underlying general principles of collateral estoppel: enforcing repose. This value, which encompasses both the parties’ interest in avoiding the cost and vexation of repetitive litigation and the public’s interest in conserving judicial resources, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S., at 94, is equally implicated whether factfinding is done by a federal or state agency.
Having federal courts give preclusive effect to the fact-finding of state administrative tribunals also serves the value of federalism. Significantly, all of the opinions in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U. S. 261 (1980), express the view that the Full Faith and Credit Clause compels the States to give preclusive effect to the factfindings of an administrative tribunal in a sister State. Id., at 281 (opinion of Stevens, J.); 287-289 (White, J., concurring in judgment); 291-292 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Full Faith and Credit Clause is of course not binding on federal courts, but we can certainly look to the policies underlying the Clause in fashioning federal common-law rules of preclusion. “Perhaps the major purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to act as a nationally unifying force,” id., at 289 (White, J., concurring in judgment), and this purpose is served by giving preclusive effect to state administrative factfinding rather than leaving the courts of a second forum, state or federal, free to reach conflicting results. Accordingly, we hold that when a state agency “acting in a judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,” Utah Construction & Mining Co., supra, at 422, federal courts must give the agency’s factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State’s courts.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Respondent’s complaint also included claims under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986, and 1988, as well as the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. App. 17.
The hearing continued intermittently for more than five months, involved more than 100 witnesses and 150 exhibits, and generated over 5,000 pages of transcript. App. to Pet. for Cert. A27.
In Kremer, an employee filed a Title VII discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 referred the case to the New York State Division of Human Rights, the agency charged with administering the State’s employment discrimination laws. The state agency rejected the employee’s discrimination claim, a judgment that was affirmed both at the agency appellate level and by a reviewing state court. The employee then brought a Title VII action, in which the employer raised a res judicata defense. This Court held that under 28 U. S. C. § 1738 the state court’s judgment affirming the state agency’s finding of no discrimination was entitled to preclu-sive effect in the employee’s Title VII action.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1738 provides in pertinent part:
“The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any . . . State, Territory or Possession [of the United States], or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
“Such . . . records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.”
The fact that respondent requested the administrative hearing rather than being compelled to participate in it does not weigh in favor of preclusion. “[T]he legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 48 (1974) (footnote omitted).
As one respected authority on administrative law has observed:
“The law of res judicata, much more than most other segments of law, has rhyme, reason, and rhythm — something in common with good poetry. Its inner logic is rather satisfying. It consists entirely of an elaboration of the obvious principle that a controversy should be resolved once, not more than once. The principle is as much needed for administrative decisions as for judicial decisions. To the extent that administrative adjudications resemble courts’ decisions — a very great extent — the law worked out for courts does and should apply to agencies.” 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §21.9, p. 78 (2d ed. 1983).
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83, p. 269 (1982), reaches a similar conclusion:
“Where an administrative forum has the essential procedural characteristics of a court, ... its determinations should be accorded the same finality that is accorded the judgment of a court. The importance of bringing a legal controversy to conclusion is generally no less when the tribunal is an administrative tribunal than when it is a court.”
Congress of course may decide, as it did in enacting Title VII, that other values outweigh the policy of according finality to state administrative factfinding. See Part III, supra.
Respondent argues against preclusion on the grounds that the administrative hearing in this case did not satisfy the standard set out in Utah Construction & Mining Co., Brief for Respondent 39-76, and that the ALJ’s factfinding would not be given preclusive effect in the Tennessee courts, id., at 99-105. These contentions were not passed upon below, and we leave them for resolution on remand.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
CHIEF Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), we held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect’s statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted in evidence. In the wake of that decision, Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. § 8501, which in essence laid down a rule that the admissibility of such statements should turn only on whether or not they were voluntarily made. We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.
Petitioner Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence, all in violation of the applicable provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office, on the grounds that he had not received “Miranda warnings” before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion to suppress, and the Government took an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That court, by a divided vote, reversed the District Court’s suppression order. It agreed with the District Court’s conclusion that petitioner had not received Miranda warnings before making his statement. But it went on to hold that § 8501, which in effect makes the admissibility of statements such as Dickerson’s turn solely on whether they were made voluntarily, was satisfied in this ease. It then concluded that our decision in Miranda was not a constitutional holding, and that, therefore, Congress could by statute have the final say on the question of admissibility. 166 F. 3d 667 (1999).
Because of the importance of the questions raised by the Court of Appeals’ decision, we granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 1045 (1999), and now reverse.
We begin with a brief historical account of the law governing the admission of confessions. Prior to Miranda, we evaluated the admissibility of a suspect’s confession under a voluntariness test. The roots of this test developed in the common law, as the courts of England and then the United States recognized that coerced confessions are inherently untrustworthy. See, e. g., King v. Rudd, 1 Leach 115, 117-118, 122-123, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161, 164 (K. B. 1783) (Lord Mansfield, C. J.) (stating that the English courts excluded confessions obtained by threats and promises); King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 262, 263-264, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K. B. 1783) (“A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt... but a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape ... that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected”); King v. Parratt, 4 Car. & R 570, 172 Eng. Rep. 829 (N. P. 1831); Queen v. Garner, 1 Den. 329, 169 Eng. Rep. 267 (Ct. Crim. App. 1848); Queen v. Baldry, 2 Den. 430, 169 Eng. Rep. 568 (Ct. Crim. App. 1852); Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884); Pierce v. United States, 160 U. S. 355, 357 (1896). Over time, our eases recognized two constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into evidence: the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 542 (1897) (stating that the voluntariness test “is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment . . . commanding that no person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal ease to be a witness against himself’ ”); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936) (reversing a criminal conviction under the Due Process Clause because it was based on a confession obtained by physical coercion).
While Bram was decided before Brown and its progeny, for the middle third of the 20th century our eases based the rule against admitting coerced confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process. We applied the due process voluntariness test in “some 80 different cases decided during the era that intervened between Brown and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 [(1964)].” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 223 (1973). See, e. g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 (1963); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940). Those eases refined the test into an inquiry that examines “whether a defendant’s will was overborne” by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession. Schneckloth, 412 U. S., at 226. The due process test takes into consideration “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Ibid. See also Haynes, supra, at 513; Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U. S. 49, 55 (1962); Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433, 440 (1961) (“[A]ll the circumstances attendant upon the confession must be taken into account”); Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 404 (1945) (“If all the attendant circumstances indicate that the confession was coerced or compelled, it may not be used to convict a defendant”). The determination “depend[s] upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing.” Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 185 (1953).
We have never abandoned this due process jurisprudence, and thus continue to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily. But our decisions in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964), and Miranda changed the focus of much of the inquiry in determining the admissibility of suspects’ incriminating statements. In Malloy, we held that the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause is incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applies to the States. 378 U. S., at 6-11. We decided Miranda on the heels of Malloy.
In Miranda, we noted that the advent of modern custodial police interrogation brought with it an increased concern about confessions obtained by coercion. 384 U. S., at 445-458. Because custodial police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the individual, we stated that “[e]ven without employing brutality, the ‘third degree’ or [other] specific stratagems, . . . custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.” Id., at 455. We concluded that the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements, and thus heightens the risk that an individual will not be “accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment... not to be compelled to incriminate himself.” Id., at 439. Accordingly, we laid down “concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.” Id., at 442. Those guidelines established that the admissibility in evidence of any statement given during custodial interrogation of a suspect would depend on whether the police provided the suspect with four warnings. These warnings (which have come to be known colloquially as “Miranda rights”) are: a suspect “has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” Id., at 479.
Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted § 3501. That section provides, in relevant part:
“(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession .. . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of volun-tariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
“(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of vol-untariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsingbetween arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
“The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.”
Given § 3501’s express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and the instruction for trial courts to consider a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the circumstances of a confession, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress intended by its enactment to overrule Miranda. See also Davis v. United States, 512 U. S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that, prior to Miranda, “voluntariness vel non was the touchstone of admissibility of confessions”). Because of the obvious conflict between our decision in Miranda and §3501, we must address whether Congress has constitutional authority to thus supersede Miranda. If Congress has such authority, § 3501’s totality-of-the-eireumstances approach must prevail over Miranda!s requirement of warnings; if not, that section must yield to Miranda’s more specific requirements.
The law in this area is clear. This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding in those tribunals. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 426 (1996). However, the power to judicially create and enforce nonconstitutional “rules of procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress.” Palermo v. United States, 360 U. S. 343, 353, n. 11 (1959) (citing Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 382 (1933), and Gordon v. United States, 344 U. S. 414, 418 (1953)). Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution. Palermo, supra, at 345-348; Carlisle, supra, at 426; Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 265 (1980).
But Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution. See, e. g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 517-521 (1997). This ease therefore turns on whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congressional direction. Recognizing this point, the Court of Appeals surveyed Miranda and its progeny to determine the constitutional status of the Miranda decision. 166 F. 3d, at 687-692. Relying on the fact that we have created several exceptions to Miranda’s warnings requirement and that we have repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as “prophylactic,” New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 653 (1984), and “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,” Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 438, 444 (1974), the Court of Appeals concluded that the protections announced in Miranda are not constitutionally required. 166 F. 3d, at 687-690.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, although we concede that there is language in some of our opinions that supports the view taken by that court. But first and foremost of the factors on the other side — that Miranda is a constitutional decision — is that both Miranda and two of its companion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state courts — to wit, Arizona, California, and New York. See 384 U. S., at 491-494, 497-499. Since that time, we have consistently applied Miranda’s rule to prosecutions arising in state courts. See, e. g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U. S. 318 (1994) (per curiam); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U. S. 146 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 481-482 (1981). It is beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several States. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 221 (1982) (“Federal courts hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension”); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, 508-509 (1958). With respect to proceedings in state courts, our “authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution.” Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U. S. 415, 422 (1991). See also Harris v. Rivera, 454 U. S. 339, 344-345 (1981) (per curiam) (stating that “[fjederal judges . . . may not require the observance of any special procedures” in state courts “except when necessary to assure compliance with the dictates of the Federal Constitution”).
The Miranda opinion itself begins by stating that the Court granted certiorari “to explore some facets of the problems ... of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow” 384 U. S., at 441-442 (emphasis added). In fact, the majority opinion is replete with statements indicating that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule. Indeed, the Court’s ultimate conclusion was that the unwarned confessions obtained in the four cases before the Court in Miranda “were obtained from the defendant under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege.” Id., at 491.
Additional support for our conclusion that Miranda is constitutionally based is found in the Miranda Court’s invitation for legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination. After discussing the “compelling pressures” inherent in custodial police interrogation, the Miranda Court concluded that, “[i]n order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.” Id., at 467. However, the Court emphasized that it could not foresee “the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States,” and it accordingly opined that the Constitution would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were “at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals also relied on the fact that we have, after our Miranda decision, made exceptions from its rule in cases such as New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649 (1984), and Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971). See 166 F. 3d, at 672, 689-691. But we have also broadened the application of the Miranda doctrine in cases such as Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (1976), and Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675 (1988). These decisions illustrate the principle — not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule — but that no constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision.
The Court of Appeals also noted that in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985), we stated that “ ‘[t]he Miranda exclusionary rule ... serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.’ ” 166 F. 3d, at 690 (quoting Elstad, supra, at 306). Our decision in that case — refusing to apply the traditional “fruits” doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment eases — does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment.
As an alternative argument for sustaining the Court of Appeals’ decision, the court-invited amicus curiae contends that the section complies with the requirement that a legislative alternative to Miranda be equally as effective in preventing coerced confessions. See Brief for Paul G. Cassell as Amicus Curiae 28-39. We agree with the amicus' contention that there are more remedies available for abusive police conduct than there were at the time Miranda was decided, see, e. g., Wilkins v. May, 872 F. 2d 190, 194 (CA71989) (applying Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), to hold that a suspect may bring a federal cause of action under the Due Process Clause for police misconduct during custodial interrogation). But we do not agree that these additional measures supplement § 3501’s protections sufficiently to meet the constitutional minimum. Miranda requires procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and which will assure the suspect that the exercise of that right will be honored. See, e. g., 384 U. S., at 467. As discussed above, §3501 explicitly eschews a requirement of preinterrogation warnings in favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such warnings as only one factor in determining the volun-tariness of a suspect’s confession. The additional remedies cited by amicus do not, in our view, render them, together with §3501, an adequate substitute for the warnings required by Miranda.
The dissent argues that it is judicial overreaching for this Court to hold §3501 unconstitutional unless we hold that the Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution, in the sense that nothing else will suffice to satisfy constitutional requirements. Post, at 453-454, 465 (opinion of Scalia, J.). But we need not go further than Miranda to decide this ease. In Miranda, the Court noted that reliance on the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession, 384 U. S, at 457, a risk that the Court found, unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the case in chief to prove guilt. The Court therefore concluded that something more than the totality test was necessary. See ibid.; see also id., at 467, 490-491. As discussed above, §3501 reinstates the totality test as sufficient. Section 3501 therefore cannot he sustained if Miranda is to remain the law.
Whether or not we would agree with Miranda’s reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now. See, e. g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C. J., concurring in judgment) (“The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date”). While ‘“stare decisis is not an inexorable command,’” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991)), particularly when we are interpreting the Constitution, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 235 (1997), “even in constitutional eases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some ‘special justification.’ ” United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856 (1996) (quoting Payne, supra, at 842 (Souter, J., concurring), in turn quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984)).
We do not think there is such justification for overruling Miranda. Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U. S. 314, 331-332 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the fact that a rule has found “ ‘wide acceptance in the legal culture’ ” is “adequate reason not to overrule” it). While we have overruled our precedents when subsequent eases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings, see, e. g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 173 (1989), we do not believe that this has happened to the Miranda decision. If anything, our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief.
The disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that statements which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his “rights,” may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result. But experience suggests that the totality-of-the-eircumstances test which § 3501 seeks to revive is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner. See, e. g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S., at 515 (“The line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw”). The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry. But as we said in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420 (1984), “[c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.” Id., at 433, n. 20.
In sum, we conclude that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. Following the rule of stare decisis, we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
While our eases have long interpreted the Due Process and Self-Incrimination Clauses to require that a suspect be accorded a fair trial free from coerced testimony, our application of those Clauses to the context of custodial police interrogation is relatively recent because the routine practice of such interrogation is itself a relatively new development. See, e. g., Miranda, 384 U. S., at 445-458.
See also Davis v. United States, 512 U. S. 452, 457-458 (1994); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 690-691 (1993) (“Miranda’s, safeguards are not constitutional in character”); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195, 203 (1989); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U. S. 523, 528 (1987) (“|T]he Miranda Court adopted prophylactic rules designed to insulate the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights”); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 306 (1985); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 492 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in result).
Our conclusion regarding Miranda’s constitutional basis is further buttressed by the fact that we have allowed prisoners to bring alleged Miranda violations before the federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U. S. 99 (1995); Withrow, supra, at 690-695. Habeas corpus proceedings are available only for claims that a person “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a). Since the Miranda rule is clearly not based on federal laws or treaties, our decision allowing habeas review for Miranda claims obviously assumes that Miranda is of constitutional origin.
See 384 U. S., at 445 (“The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody”), 457 (stating that the Miranda Court was concerned with “adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights”), 458 (examining the “history and precedent underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause to determine its applicability in this situation”), 476 (“The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is... fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation”), 479 (“The whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the power of government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself”), 481, n. 52 (stating that the Court dealt with “constitutional standards in relation to statements made”), 490 (“[T]he issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by the courts”), 489 (stating that the Miranda Court was dealing “with rights grounded in a specific requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution”).
Many of our subsequent cases have also referred to Miranda’s constitutional underpinnings. See, e.g., Withrow, supra, at 691 (“‘Prophylactic’ though it may be, in protecting a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda safeguards a ‘fundamental trial right’”); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U. S. 292, 296 (1990) (describing Miranda’s warning requirement as resting on “the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-inerimination”); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 411 (1990) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated interrogation following a suspect’s request for counsel in the context of a separate investigation”); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625, 629 (1986) (“The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination provides the right to counsel at custodial interrogations”); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 427 (1986) (referring to Miranda as “our interpretation of the Federal Constitution”); Edwards, supra, at 481-482.
The Court of Appeals relied in part on our statement that the Miranda decision in no way “creates a ‘constitutional straightjacket.’” See 166 F. 3d 667, 672 (CA4 1999) (quoting Miranda, 384 U. S., at 467). However, a review of our opinion in Miranda clarifies that this disclaimer was intended to indicate that the Constitution does not require police to administer the particular Miranda warnings, not that the Constitution does not require a procedure that is effective in seeming Fifth Amendment rights.
Because no party to the underlying litigation argued in favor of § 3501’s constitutionality in this Court, we invited Professor Paul Cassell to assist our deliberations by arguing in support of the judgment below.
Various other contentions and suggestions have been pressed by the numerous amici, but because of the procedural posture of this case we do not think it appropriate to consider them. See United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 60, n. 2 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 531-532, n. 13 (1979); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U. S. 361, 370 (1960).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted.
In this capital case the Supreme Court of Arkansas sustained. petitioner’s conviction against the claim, among others, that in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States his involuntary confession of the crime was introduced in evidence at the trial. Walton v. State, 233 Ark. 999, 350 S. W. 2d 302. Petitioner contends that independently of this claim his conviction was unconstitutional because he was not represented by counsel at the time of his arraignment in the course of which he acknowledged the voluntariness of his confession, such acknowledgment being later used in evidence against him at the trial.
When the Arkansas Supreme Court decided this case it did not have the benefit of this Court’s decision in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52, which was rendered subsequent to the state court’s decision and on the same day that it denied rehearing upon a petition filed prior to the announcement of the Hamilton case. Further, we are unable to conclude from the record filed in this Court either that petitioner had counsel at the time of the arraignment proceedings or, if not, that he was advised of his right to have counsel at such proceedings and that he understandingly and intelligently waived that right.
In these circumstances we conclude that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas should be vacated and the case remanded to that court for further consideration in light of Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, or for such other appropriate proceedings as may be available under state law for resolution of this constitutional claim.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the question whether § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13a, making it a crime to sell goods at “unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor,” is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite as applied to sales made below cost with such purpose. National Dairy and Raymond J. Wise, a vice-president and director, upon being charged, inter alia, with violating § 3 by making sales below cost for the purpose of destroying competition, moved for dismissal of the Robinson-Pat-man Act counts of the indictment on the ground that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. The District Court granted the motion and ordered dismissal. On direct appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3731, we noted probable jurisdiction, 368 U. S. 808, because of the importance of the issue in the administration of the Robinson-Patman Act. We have concluded that the order of dismissal was error and therefore remand the case for trial.
I.
National Dairy is engaged in the business of purchasing, processing, distributing and selling milk and other dairy products throughout the United States. Through its processing plant in Kansas City, Missouri, National Dairy has for the past several years been in competition with national concerns and various local dairies in the Greater Kansas City area and the surrounding areas of Kansas and Missouri. In the Greater Kansas City-market National Dairy distributes its products directly, but cities and towns in the surrounding Kansas and Missouri areas outside this market are served by independent distributors who purchase milk from National Dairy and resell on their own account.
The indictment charged violations of both the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, and the Robinson-Patman Act in Kansas City and in six local markets in the adjacent area. The Robinson-Patman counts charged National Dairy and Wise with selling milk in those markets "at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition.” Further specifying the acts complained of, the indictment charged National Dairy with having “utilized the advantages it possesses by reason of the fact that it operates in a great many different geographical localities in order to finance and subsidize a price war against the small dairies selling milk in competition with it ... by intentionally selling milk [directly or to a distributor] at prices below National’s cost.” In five of the markets National Dairy’s pricing practice was alleged to have resulted in “severe financial losses to small dairies,” and in two others the effect was claimed to have been to “eliminate competition” and “drive small dairies from” the market.
National Dairy and Wise moved to dismiss all of the Robinson-Patman counts on the grounds that the statutory provision, “unreasonably low prices,” is so vague and indefinite as to violate the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment and an indictment based on this provision is violative of the Sixth Amendment in that it does not adequately apprise them of the charges. The District Court, after rendering an oral opinion holding that § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite, granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the § 3 counts. The case came here on direct appeal from the order of dismissal.
II.
National Dairy and Wise urge that § 3 is to be tested solely “on its face” rather than as applied to the conduct charged in the indictment, i. e., sales below cost for the purpose of destroying competition. The Government, on the other hand, places greater emphasis on the latter, contending that whether or not there is doubt as to the validity of the statute in all of its possible applications, § 3 is plainly constitutional in its application to the conduct alleged in the indictment.
It is true that a statute attacked as vague must initially be examined “on its face,” but it does not follow that a readily discernible .dividing line can always be drawn, with statutes falling neatly into one of the two categories of “valid” or “invalid” solely on the basis of such an examination.
We do not evaluate § 3 in the abstract.
“The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to hypothetical cases .... [A] limiting construction could be given to the statute by the court responsible for its construction if an application of doubtful constitutionality were . . . presented. We might add that application of this rule frees the Court not only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their constitutional application might be cloudy.” United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 22 (1960).
The strong presumptive validity that attaches to an Act of Congress has led this Court to hold many times that statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language. E. g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, 231 (1951), and United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7 (1947). Indeed, we have consistently sought an interpretation which supports the constitutionality of legislation. E. g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 47 (1953); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932); see Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945).
Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954). In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged. Robinson v. United States, 324 U. S. 282 (1945). In view of these principles we must conclude that if § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act gave National Dairy and Wise sufficient warning that selling below cost for the purpose of destroying competition is unlawful, the statute is constitutional as applied to them. This is not to say that a bead-sight indictment can correct a blunderbuss statute, for the latter itself must be sufficiently focused to forewarn of both its reach and coverage. We therefore consider the vagueness attack solely in relation to whether the statute sufficiently warned National Dairy and Wise that selling “below cost” with predatory intent was within its prohibition of “unreasonably low prices.”
III.
The history of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act indicates that selling below cost, unless mitigated by some acceptable business exigency, was intended to be prohibited by the words “unreasonably low prices.” That sales below cost without a justifying business reason may come within the proscriptions of the Sherman Act has long been established. See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911). Further, when the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 to strengthen the Sherman Act, Congress passed § 2 to cover price discrimination by large companies which compete by lowering prices, “oftentimes below the cost of production . . . with the intent to destroy and make unprofitable the business of their competitors.” H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8. The 1936 enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act was for the purpose of “strengthening the Clayton Act provisions,” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 544 (1960), and the Act was aimed at a specific weapon of the monopolist — predatory pricing. Moreover, § 3 was described by Representative Utterback, a House manager of the joint conference committee, as attaching “criminal penalties in addition to the civil liabilities and remedies already provided by the Clayton Act.” 80 Cong. Rec. 9419.
This Court, in 'Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115 (1954), a case based in part on § 3, recognized the applicability of the Robinson-Patman Act to conduct quite similar to that with which National Dairy and Wise are charged here. The Court said, “Congress by the Clayton Act and Robinson-Patman Act barred the use of interstate business to destroy local business” through programs in which “profits made in interstate activities would underwrite the losses of local price-cutting campaigns.” Id., at 120, 119.
In proscribing sales at “unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor” we believe that Congress condemned sales made below cost for such purpose. And we believe that National Dairy and Wise could reasonably understand from the statutory language that the conduct described in the indictment was proscribed by the Act. They say, however, that this is but the same horse with a different bridle because the phrase “below cost” is itself a vague and indefinite expression in business.
Whether “below cost” refers to “direct” or “fully distributed” cost or some other level of cost computation cannot be decided in the abstract. There is nothing in the record on this point, and it may well be that the issue will be rendered academic by a showing that National Dairy sold below any of these cost levels. Therefore, we do not reach this issue here. As we said in Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Common, 346 U. S. 61, 65 (1953): “Since precision of expression is not an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-Patman Act, exact formulation of the issue before us is necessary to avoid inadvertent pronouncement on statutory language in one context when the same language may require separate consideration in other settings.”
Finally, we think the additional element of predatory intent alleged in the indictment and required by the Act provides further definition of the prohibited conduct. We believe the notice here is more specific than that which was held adequate in Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945), in which a requirement of intent served to “relieve the statute of the objection that it punishes without warning an offense of which the accused was unaware.” Id., at 102; see id., at 101-107. Proscribed by the statute in Screws was the intentional achievement of a result, i. e., the willful deprivation of certain rights. The Act here, however, in prohibiting sales at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition, listed as elements of the illegal conduct not only the intent to achieve a result — destruction of competition — but also the act — selling at unreasonably low prices — done in furtherance of that design or purpose. It seems clear that the necessary specificity of warning is afforded when, as here, separate, though related, statutory elements of prohibited activity come to focus on one course of conduct.
United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921), on which much reliance is placed, is inapposite here. In Cohen the Act proscribed “any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge.” The charge in the indictment was in the exact language of the statute, and, in specifying the conduct covered by the charge, the indictment did nothing more than state the price the defendant was alleged to have collected. Hence, the Court held that a “specific or definite” act was neither proscribed by the Act nor alleged in the indictment. Id., at 89. Moreover, the standard held too vague in Cohen was without a meaningful referent in business practice or usage. “[T]here was no accepted and fairly stable commercial standard which could be regarded as impliedly taken up and adopted by the statute . . . .” Small Co. v. American Sugar Rfg. Co., 267 U. S. 233, 240-241 (1925). In view of the business practices against which § 3 was unmistakably directed and the specificity of the violations charged in the indictment here, both absent in Cohen, the proffered analogy to that case must be rejected.
In this connection we also note that the approach to “vagueness” governing a case like this is different from that followed in cases arising under the First Amendment. There we are concerned with the vagueness of the statute “on its face” because such vagueness may in itself deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88,98 (1940); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415. No such factor is present here where the statute is directed only at conduct designed to destroy competition, activity which is neither constitutionally protected nor socially desirable. We are thus permitted to consider the warning provided by § 3 not only in terms of the statute “on its face” but also in the light of the conduct to which it is applied. The reliance of National Dairy and Wise on First Amendment cases is therefore misplaced.
IV.
This opinion is not to be construed, however, as holding that every sale below cost constitutes a violation of § 3. Such sales are not condemned when made in furtherance of a legitimate commercial objective, such as the liquidation of excess, obsolete or perishable merchandise, or the need to meet a lawful, equally low price of a competitor. 80 Cong. Rec. 6332, 6334; see Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F. 2d 481 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1957). Sales below cost in these instances would neither be “unreasonably low” nor made with predatory intent. But sales made below cost without legitimate commercial objective and with specific intent to destroy competition would clearly fall within the prohibitions of § 3.
Since the indictment charges the latter conduct and, as noted, supra, n. 2, we are bound by the well-pleaded allegations of the indictment, we must conclude that National Dairy and Wise were adequately forewarned of the illegal conduct charged against them and remand the case for trial. Our holding, of course, does not foreclose proof on the merits as to the reasonableness of the alleged pricing conduct or, for that matter, the absence of the predatory intent necessary to conviction.
Reversed and remanded.
Seven counts of the 15-count indictment charged violations of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act counts relate to the same course of conduct.
One Robinson-Patman count, number 13, charges Raymond J. Wise, a vice-president and director of National, with authorizing National’s pricing practice and ordering its effectuation in the Kansas City market. United States v. Wise, 370 U. S. 405 (1962), involves two Sherman Act counts of the indictment which named Wise as a defendant.
It should be noted that, in reviewing a case in which a motion to dismiss was granted, we are required to accept well-pleaded allegations of the indictment as the hypothesis for decision. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 343 (1952).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Me. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents an important issue of the scope of the National Labor Relations Board’s authority under § 8 (b) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, which provides that “it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents... to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees....” The precise question is whether the Board may find that a union, which confers with an employer with the desire of reaching agreement on contract terms, has nevertheless refused to bargain collectively, thus violating that provision, solely and simply because during the negotiations it seeks to put economic pressure on the employer to yield to its bargaining demands by sponsoring on-the-job conduct designed to interfere with the carrying on of the employer’s business.
Since 1949 the respondent Insurance Agents’ International Union and the Prudential Insurance Company of America have negotiated collective bargaining agreements cdvering district agents employed by Prudential in 35 States and the District of Columbia. The principal duties of a Prudential district agent are to, collect premiums and to solicit -new business in an assigned locality known in the trade as his “debit.” He has no fixed or regular working hours except that he must report at his district office two mornings a week and remain for two or three hours to deposit his collections, prepare and submit reports, and attend meetings to receive sales and other instructions. He is paid commissions on-collections made and on new policies written;.his only fixed compensation is a weekly payment of $4.50 intended primarily to cover his expenses.
In January 1956 Prudential and the union began the negotiation of a new contract to replace an agreement expiring in the following March. Bargaining was carried on continuously for six months before the terms of the new contract wére agreed upon on July 17, 1956. It is not questioned that, if it stood alone, the record of negotiations would establish that the union conferred in good faith for the purpose and with the desire of reaching agreement with Prudential on a contract.
However, in April 1956, Prudential filed a § 8 (b) (3) charge of refusal to bargain collectively against the union. The charge was based upon actions of the union and its members outside the conference room, occurring after the old contract expired in March. The union had announced in February that if agreement on the terms of the new contract was not reached when the old contract expired, the union members would then participate in a “Work Without a Contract” program — which meant that they would engage in certain planned, concerted on-the-job activities designed to harass the company.
A complaint of violation of §8 (b)(3) issued on the charge and hearings began before the bargaining was concluded. It was developed in the evidence that the union’s harassing tactics involved activities by the member agents such as these: refusal for a time tó solicit new business, and refusal (after the writing of new business was resumed) to comply with the company’s reporting procedures; refusal to participate in the company’s “May Policyholders’ Month Campaign”; reporting late at district offices the days the agents were scheduled to attend them, and refusing to perform customary duties at the offices, instead engaging there in “sit-in-mornings,” “doing what comes naturally” and leaving at noon as a group; absenting themselves from special business conferences arranged by the company; picketing and distributing leaflets outside the various offices of the company on specified days and hours as directed by the union; distributing leaflets each day to policyholders and others and soliciting policyholders’ signatures on petitions directed to the company; and presenting the signed policyholders’ petitions to the company at its home office while simultaneously engaging in mass demonstrations there.
The hearing examiner filed a report recommending that the complaint be dismissed. The examiner noted that the Board in the so-called Personal Products case, Textile Workers Union, 108 N. L. R. B. 743, had declared similar union activities to constitute a prohibited refusal to bargain; but since the Board’s order in that case was set aside by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 97 U. S. App. D. C. 35, 227 F. 2d 409, he did not consider that he was bound to follow it.
However, the Board on review adhered to its ruling in the Personal Products case, rejected the trial examiner’s recommendation, and entered a cease-and-desist order, 119 N. L. R. B. 768. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also adhered to its decision in the Personal Products case, and, as in that case, set aside the Board’s order. 104 U. S. App. D. C. 218, 260 F. 2d 736. We granted the Board’s petition for certiorari to review the important question presented. 358 U. S. 944.
The hearing examiner found that there was nothing in the record, apart from the mentioned activities of the union during the negotiations, that could be relied upon to support an inference that the union'had not fulfilled its statutory duty; in fact nothing else was relied upon by the Board’s General Counsel in prosecuting the complaint. The.hearing examiner’s analysis of the congressional design in enacting the statutory duty to bargain led him to. conclude that the Board was not authorized to find that such economically* harassing activities constituted a § 8 (b) (3) violation. The Board’s opinion answers flatly “We do not agree” and proceeds to say “... the Respondent’s reliance upon harassing tactics during the course of negotiations for the avowed purpose of compelling the Company to capitulate to its terms is the antithesis of reasoned discussion it was duty-bound to follow. Indeed, it clearly revealed an unwillingness to submit its demands to the consideration of the bargaining table where argument, persuasion, and the free interchange of views could take place. In such circumstances, the fact that the Respondent continued to confer with the Company and was desirous of concluding an agreement does not alone establish that it fulfilled its obligation to bargain in good faith....” 119 N. L. R. B., at 769, 770-771. Thus the Board’s view is that irrespective of the union’s good faith in conferring with the employer at the bargaining table for the purpose and with the desire of reaching agreement on contract terms, its tactics during the course of the negotiations constituted per se a violation of § 8 (b) (3). Accordingly, as is said in the Board’s brief, “The issue here... comes down to whether the Board is authorized under the Act to hold that such tactics, which the Act does not specifically forbid but Section 7 does not protect, support a finding of a failure to bargain' in good faith as required by Section 8 (b) (3).”
First. The bill which became the Wagner Act included no provision specifically imposing a duty on either party to bargain collectively. Senator Wagner thought that the bill required bargaining in good faith without such a provision. However, the Senate Committee in charge of the bill concluded that it was desirable to include a provision.making it an unfair labor practice for an employer -to refuse to bargain collectively in order to assure that the Act would achieve its primary objective of requiring" an employer to recognize a union selected by his employees as.their representative. It was believed that other rights guaranteed by the Act would not- be meaningful if the employer was not under obligation to confer with the union in an effort to arrive at the terms of an agreement. It was said in the Senate Report:
“But, after deliberation, the committee has concluded that this fifth unfair labor practice should be inserted in the bill. It seems clear that a guarantee of the right of employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing is a mere delusion if it is not accompanied by the correlative duty on the part of the other party to recognize such representatives..and to negotiate with them in a bona fide effort to arrive at a collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the procedure of holding governmentally supervised elections to determine the choice of representatives of employees becomes of little worth if after the election its results are for all practical purposes ignored. Experience has proved that neither obedience to law nor respect ior law is encouraged by holding forth a right unaccompanied by fulfillment. Such a course provokes constant strife, not peace.” S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 12.
However, the nature of the duty to bargain in good faith thus imposed upon employers by § 8 (5) of the original Act was not sweepingly conceived. The Chairman of the Senate Committee declared: “When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to the door of their employer and say, ‘Here they are, the legal representatives of your employees.’ What happens behind those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.”
The limitation implied by the last sentence has not been in practice maintained — practically, it could hardly have been — but the underlying purpose of the remark has remained the most basic purpose of the statutory provision. That purpose is the making effective of the duty of management to extend recognition to the union; the ‘ duty of management to bargain in good faith is essentially a corollary of its duty to recognize the union. Decisions under this provision reflect this. For example, an employer’s unilateral wage increase during the bargaining processes tends to subvert the union’s position as the representative of the employees in matters of this nature, and hence has been condemned as a practice violative of this statutory provision. See Labor Board v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U. S. 217. And as suggested, the requirement of collective bargaining, although so premised, necessarily led beyond the door of, and into, the conference room. The first annual report of the Board declared: “Collective bargaining is something more than the mere meeting of an employer with the representatives of his employees; the essential thing is rather the serious intent to adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common ground.... The Board has repeatedly asserted that good faith on the part of the employer, is an essential ingredient of collective bargaining.” This standard had early judicial approval, e. g., Labor Board v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F. 2d 713. Collective bargaining, then, is not simply an occasion for purely formal meetings between management and labor, while each maintains an attitude of “take it or leave it”; it presupposes a desire to reach ultimate agreement, to enter into a collective bargaining contract. See Heinz Co. v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 514. This was the sort of recognition that Congress, in the Wagner Act, wanted extended to labor unions; recognition as the bargaining agent of the employees in a process that looked to the ordering of the parties’ industrial relationship through the formation of a contract. See Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283, 295.
But at the same time, Congress was generally not concerned with the substantive terms on which the parties contracted. Cf. Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U. S. 1, 6. Obviously there is tension between the principle that the parties need not contract on any specific terms and a practical enforcement of the principle that they are bound to deal with each other in a serious attempt to resolve differences and reach a common ground. And in fact criticism of the Board’s application of the “good-faith” test arose from the belief that it was forcing employers to yield to union demands if they were to avoid a successful charge of unfair labor practice. Thus, in 1947 in Congress the fear was expressed that the Board had “gone very far, in the guise of determining whether or not employers had bargained in good faith, in setting itself up as the judge of what concessions an employer must make and of the proposals and counterproposals that he may or may not make.” H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 19. Since the Board was not viewed by Congress as an agency which should exercise its powers to arbitrate the parties’ substantive solutions of the issues in their bargaining, a check on this apprehended trend was provided by writing the good-faith test of bargaining into § 8 (d) of the Act. That section defines collective, bargaining as follows:
“For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect.to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of. a concession...
The same problems as to whether positions taken at the bargaining table- violate the good-faith test continue to arise under the Act as amended. See Labor Board v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U. S. 149; Labor Board v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U. S. 342, 349. But it remains clear. that § 8 (d) was an attempt by Congress to prevent the Board from controlling the settling of the terms of collective bargaining agreements. Labor Board v. American National Ins. Co., 343 U. S. 395, 404.
Second. At the same time as it was statutorily defining the duty to bargain collectively, Congress, by adding § 8 (b) (3) of the Act through the Taft-Hartley amendments, imposed that duty on labor organizations. Unions obviously are formed for the very purpose of bargaining collectively; but the legislative history makes it plain that Congress was wary of. the position of some unions, and wanted to ensure that they would approach the bargaining table with the same attitude of willingness to reach an agreement as had been enjoined on management earlier. It intended to prevent employee representatives from putting forth the same “take it or leave it” attitude. that had been condemned in management. 93 Cong. Rec. 4135, 4363, 5005.
Third. It is apparent from the legislative history of the whole Act that the policy of Congress is to impose a mutual duty upon the parties to confer in good faith with a desire, to reach agreement, in the belief that such an approach from both sides of the table promotes the overall design of achieving industrial peace. See Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 45. Discussion conducted under that standard of good faith may narrow the issues, making the real demands of the parties clearer to each other, and perhaps to themselves, and may encourage an attitude of settlement through give and take. The mainstream of cases before the Board -and. in the courts reviewing its orders, under the provisions fixing the duty to bargain collectively, is concerned with insuring that the parties approach the bargaining table with this attitude. But apart from this essential standard of conduct, Congress intended that the parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted by any govern-méntal power to regulate the substantive solution of their differences. See Teamsters Union v. Oliver, supra, at 295.
We believe that the Board’s approach in this case— unless it'can be defended, in terms of § 8 (b) (3), as resting on some unique character of the union tactics involved here — must be taken as proceeding from an erroneous view of collective bargaining. It must be realized that collective bargaining, under a system where the Government dóes not attempt to control the results of negotiations, cannot be equated with an academic collective search for truth — or even with what might be thought to be the ideal of one. The parties — even granting the modification of views that may come from a realization of economic interdependence — still proceed, from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The system has not reached the ideal of the philosophic notion that perfect understanding among people would lead to perfect agreement among them on values. The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized. Abstract logical analysis might find inconsistency between the command of the statute to negotiate toward an agreement in good faith and the legitimacy of the use of economic weapons, frequently having the most serious effect upon individual workers and productive enterprises, to induce one party to come to the terms desired by the other. But the truth of the matter is that at the present statutory stage of our national labor relations policy, the two factors— necessity for good-faith bargaining between parties, and the availability of economic pressure- devices to each to make the other partv incline to agree on one’s terms— exist side by side. One writer recognizes this by describing economic force as “a prime motive power for agreements in free collective bargaining.” Doubtless one factor influences the other; there may be less need to apply economic pressure if the areas of controversy have been defined through discussion; and at' the same time, negotiation positions are apt to be weak or strong in accordance with the degree of economic power the parties possess. A close student of our national labor relations laws writes: “Collective bargaining is curiously ambivalent even today. In one aspect collective bargaining is a brute contest of economic power somewhat masked by polite manners and voluminous statistics. As the relation matures, Lilliputian bonds control the opposing concentrations of economic power; they lack legal sanctions but are nonetheless effective to contain the use of power. Initially it may be only fear of the economic consequences of disagreement that turns the parties to facts, reason, a sense of responsibility, a responsiveness to government and public opinion, and moral principle; but in time these forces generate their own compulsions, and negotiating a contract approaches the ideal of informed persuasion.” Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1409.
For similar reasons, we think the Board’s approach involves an intrusion into the substantive aspects of the bargaining process — again, unless there is some specific warrant for its condemnation of the precise tactics involved here. The scope of § 8 (b) (3) and the limitations on Board power which were- the design of § 8 (d) are exceeded, we hold, by inferring a lack of good faith not from any deficiencies of the union’s performance at the bargaining table by reason of its attempted use of economic pressure, but solely and simply because tactics designed to exert economic pressure were employed during the course of the good-faith negotiations. Thus the Board in the guise of determining good or bad faith in negotiations could regulate what economic weapons a party might summon to its aid. And if the Board could regulate the choice of economic weapons that may be used as part of collective bargaining, it would be in a position to exercise considerable influence upon the substantive terms on which the parties contract.'As the parties’ own devices became more limited, the Government might have to enter even more directly into the negotiation of collective agreements. Our labor policy is not presently erected on a foundation of government control of the results of negotiations. See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. Nor does it contain a charter for the National Labor Relations Board to act at large in equalizing disparities of bargaining power between employer and union.
Fourth. The use of economic pressure, as we have indicated, is of itself not at all inconsistent with the duty of bargaining in good faith. But in three cases in recent years, the Board has assumed the power to label particular union economic weapons inconsistent with that duty. See the Personal Products case, supra, 108 N. L. R. B. 743, set aside, 97 U. S. App. D. C. 35, 227 F. 2d 409; the Boone County case, United Mine Workers, 117 N. L. R. B. 1095, set aside, 103 U. S. App. D. C. 207, 257 F. 2d 211; and the present case. The Board freely (and we think correctly) conceded here that a “total” strike called by the union would not have subjected it to sanctions under § 8 (b)(3), at least if it were called after the old contract, with its no-strike clause, had expired. Cf. United Mine Workers, supra. The Board’s opinion in the instant case is not so unequivocal as this concession (and therefore perhaps more logical). But in the light of it and the principles we have enunciated, we must evaluate the claim of the Board to power, under § 8 (b)(3), to distinguish among various economic pressure tactics and brand the ones at bar inconsistent with good-faith collective bargaining. We conclude its claim is without foundation.
(a) The Board contends that the distinction between a total strike and the conduct at bar is that a total strike is a concerted activity protected against employer interference by §§ 7 and 8 (a)(1) of the Act, while the activity at bar is not a protected concerted activity. We may agree arguendo with the Board that this Court’s decision in the Briggs-Stratton case, Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 245, establishes that the employee conduct here was not a protected concerted activity. On this assumption the employer could have discharged or taken other appropriate disciplinary action against the employees participating in these “slow-down,” “sit-in,” and arguably unprotected disloyal tactics. See Labor Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240; Labor Board v. Electrical Workers, 346 U. S. 464. But sur.ely that a union activity is not protected against disciplinary action does not mean that it constitutes a refusal to bargain.in good faith. The reason why the ordinary economic strike is not evidence of a failure to bargain in good faith is not that it constitutes a protected activity but that, as we have developed, there is simply no inconsistency between the application of economic pressure and good-faith collective bargaining.' The, Board suggests that since (on the assumption we make) the union members’ activities here were unprotected, and they could have been discharged, the activities should also be deemed unfair labor practices, since thus the remedy of a cease-and-desist order, milder than mass discharges of personnel and less disruptive of commerce, would be available. The argument is not persuasive. There iá little logic in assuming that because Congress was willing to allow employers to use self-help against union tactics, if théy were willing to face the economic consequences of its use, it also impliedly declared these tactics unlawful as a matter of federal law. Our problem remains that of construing §8 (b)(3)’s terms, and we do not see how the availability of self-help to the' employer has anything to do with the matter.
(b) The Board contends that because an orthodox “total” strike is “traditional” its use must be taken as being consistent with § 8 (b) (3); but since the tactics here are not “traditional” or “normal,” they neéd not be so viewed. Further, the Board cites what it conceives to be the public’s moral condemnation of the sort of employee tactics involved here. But again we cannot see how these distinctions can be made under a statute which simply enjoins a duty to bargain in good faith. Again, these are relevant arguments when the question is the scope of the concerted activities given affirmative protection by the Act. But as-we have developed, the use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute is not a grudging exception to some policy of completely academic discussion enjoined by the Act; it is part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining. On this basis, we fail to see the relevance of whether the practice in question is time-honored or whether its exercise is generally-supported by public opinion. It may be that the tactics used here deserve condemnation, but this would not justify attempting to pour that condemnation into a vessel not designed to hold it. The same may be said for the Board’s contention that these activities, as opposed to a “normal” strike, are inconsistent with § 8 (b) (3) because they offer maximum pressure on the employer at minimum economic cost to the union. One may doubt whether this was so here, but the matter does not turn on that; Surely it cannot be said that the only economic weapons consistent with good-faith bargaining are those which minimize the pressure on the other party or maximize the disadvantage to the party using them. The catalog of union and employer weapons that might thus fall under ban would be most extensive.
Fifth. These distinctions essayed by the Board here, and the lack of relationship to the statutory standard inherent in them, confirm us in our conclusion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals, setting aside the order of the Board, must be affirmed. For they make clear to us that when the Board moves in this area, with only § 8 (b) (3) for support, it is functioning as an arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands. It has sought to introduce some standard of properly “balanced” bargaining power, or some new distinction of justifiable and unjustifiable, proper and “abusive” economic weapons into the collective bargaining duty imposed by the Act. The Board’s assertion of power under § 8 (b) (3) allows it to sit in judgment upon every economic weapon the parties to a labor contract negotiation employ, judging it on the yery general standard of that section, not drafted with reference to specific forms of economic pressure. We have expressed'our belief that this amounts to the Board’s entrance into the substantive aspects of the bargaining process to an extent Congress has not countenanced.
It is one thing to say that the Board has been afforded flexibility to determine, for example, whether an employer’s disciplinary action taken against specific workers is permissible or not, or whether a party’s conduct at the bargaining table evidences a real desire to come into agreement. The statute in such areas clearly poses the problem to the Board for its solution. Cf. Labor Board v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U. S. 87. And specifically we do not mean to question in any way the Board’s powers to determine the latter question, drawing inferences from the conduct of the parties as a whole. It is quite another matter, however, to say that the Board has been afforded flexibility in picking and choosing which economic devices of labor and management, shall be branded, as unlawful. Congress has been rather specific when it has come to outlaw particular economic weapons on the part of unions. See § 8 (b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as added by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 141, and as supplemented by the.Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 542; (29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(4)); § 8 (b)(7), as added by the latter Act, 73 Stat. 544. But the' activities here involved have never been specifically outlawed by Congress. To be sure, the express prohibitions of the Act are not exclusive — if there were any questions of a stratagem or device to evade thé policies of the Act, the Board hardly wouid be powerless. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 194. But it is clear to us that the Board needs a more specific charter than § 8 (b)(3) before it can add to the Act’s prohibitions here.
We recognize without hesitation the primary function and responsibility of the Board to resolve the conflicting interests that Congress has recognized in its labor legislation. Clearly, where the “ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests” it must be remembered that “The function of striking.that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.” Labor Board v. Truck Drivers Union, supra, at 96. Certainly a “statute expressive of such large public policy as that on which the National Labor Relations Board is based must be broadly phrased and necessarily carries with it the task of administrative application.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, at 194. • But recognition of the appropriate sphere of the administrative power here obviously cannot exclude all judicial review of the Board’s actions. On the facts of this case we need not attempt a detailed delineation of the respective functions of court and agency-in this area. We think the Board’s resolution of the issues here amounted not to a resolution of interests which the Act had left to it for case-by-cáse adjudication, but to a movement into a new area of regulation which Congress had not committed to it. Where Congress has in the statute given the Board a question to answer, the courts will give respect to that answer; but they must be sure the question has been asked. We see no indication here that Congress has put it to the Board to define through its processes what economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating parties in a" “ideal” or “balanced” state of collective bargaining.
It is suggested here that the time has come for a reevaluation of the basic content of collective bargaining as contemplated by the federal legislation. But that is for Congress. Congress has demonstrated its capacity to adjust the Nation’s labor legislation to what, in its legislative judgment, constitutes the statutory pattern appropriate to the developing state of labor relations in the country. Major revisions of the basic statute were enacted in 1947 and 1959. To be sure, then, Congress might be of opinion that greater stress should be put on the role of “pure” negotiation in settling labor disputes, to the extent of eliminating more and more economic weapons from the parties’ grasp, and perhaps it might start with the ones involved here; or in consideration of the alternatives, it might shrink from such an undertaking. But Congress’ policy has not yet moved to this point, and with only § 8 (b) (3) to lean on, we do not see how the Board can do so on its own.
Affirmed.
Separate opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
which Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Whittaker join.
The sweep of the Court’s opinion, with its far-reaching implications in a domain of lawmaking of such nationwide importance as that of legal control of collective bargaining, compels a separate statement of my views.
The conduct which underlies this action was the respondent union’s' “Work Without a Contract” program which it' admittedly initiated after the expiration of its contract with the Prudential Insurance Company on March 19, 1956. In brief, the union directed its members at various times to arrive late to work; to. decline, by “sitting-in” the company offices, to work according to their regular schedule; to refhse to write.new business or, whén writing it, not to report it in the ordinary fashion; to decline to attend special business meetings; to demonstrate before company offices; and to solicit petitions in the union’s behalf from policyholders with whom they dealt. Prudential was given notice in advance of the details of this program and of the demands which the union sought to achieve by carrying it out.
This action was commenced by a complaint issued on June 5, 1956, alleging respondent’s failure to bargain in good faith. After a hearing, the Trial Examiner recommended that the complaint be dismissed, finding that “[f]rom the ‘circumstantial evidence’ [of the union’s state of mind] of the bargaining itself... but one inference is possible... the Union’s motive was one of good faith...”; and that “whatever inference may be as reasonably drawn from the Union’s concurrent ‘unprotected’ activities” -is not sufficient to outweigh this evidence of good faith.
The Board sustained exceptions to the Trial Examiner’s report, concluding that respondent failed to bargain in good faith. The only facts relied on by the Board were based on the “Work Without a Contract” program. The Board found that such tactics on respondents part “clearly revealed an unwillingness to submit its demands to' the consideration of the bargaining table” and that respondent therefore failed tó bargain in good faith. In support of its conclusion of want of bargaining in good faith, the Board stated that “[hjarassing activities, are plainly ‘irreconcilable with the Act’s requirement of reasoned discussion in a background of balanced bargaining relations upon which good-faith bargaining must rest’....” The Board made no finding that the outward course of the negotiations gave rise to an inference that respondent’s state of mind was one of unwillingness to reach agreement. It found from the character of respondent’s activities in carrying out the “Work Without a Contract” program that what appeared to be good faith bargaining at the bargaining table was in fact a sham:
-^“[Tjhe fact that the Respondent continued to confer with the Company and.was desirous of concluding an -agreement does not alone establish that it fulfilled its obligation to bargain in good faith, as the Respondent argues and the Trial Examiner believes. At most, it demonstrates that the Respondent was prepared to go throfigh the motions of bargaining while relying upon a campaign of harassing tactics to disrupt the Company’s business tó achieve acceptance of its contractual demands.”
The Board issued a cease-and-desist order and sought its enforcement in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Respondent cross-petitioned to set it aside. The Court of Appeals, relying exclusively on its prior decision in Textile Workers Union v. Labor Board, 97 U. S. App. D. C. 35, 227 F. 2d 409 (1955), denied enforcement and set aside the order. In the Textile Workers case the court had held (one judge dissenting) that the Board could not consider the “harassing” activities of the union there involved as evidence of lack of good faith during the negotiations. “There is. not the slightest inconsistency between genuine desire to come to an agreement and use of economic pressure to get the kind of agreement one wants.” 97 U. S. App. D. C. 35, 36, 227 F. 2d 409, 410.
The record presents two different grounds for the Board’s action in this case. The Board’s own opinion proceeds in terms oh an examination of respondent’s conduct as it bears upon the genuineness of its bargaining in the negotiation proceedings. From the respondent’s conduct the Board drew the inference that respondent’s state of mind was inimical to reaching an agreement, and that inference alone supported its conclusion of a refusal to bargain. The Board’s position in this Court proceeded in terms of the relation of conduct such as respondent’s to the kind of bargaining required by the statute, without regard to the bearing of such conduct on the proof of good faith revealed by the actual bargaining. The Board maintained that it
“could appropriately determine that the basic statutory purpose of promoting industrial peace through. the collective bargaining process would be defeated by sanctioning resort to this form of industrial warfare as a collective bargaining technique.”
The opinion of this Court, like that of the Court of Appeals, disposes of both questions by a single broad stroke. It concludes that conduct designed to exert pressure on the.bargaining situation with the aim of achieving favorable results is to be deemed entirely consistent with the duty to bargain in good
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner was convicted of shooting with intent to kill or wound and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Over petitioner’s objection that it was obtained in violation of § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1103, 47 U. S. C. § 605, the prosecution introduced in evidence a telegram allegedly sent by petitioner to an accomplice. The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed, holding that it did not need to decide whether § 605 had actually been violated since the evidence was in any event admissible in state trials under Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199.
In Lee v. Florida, 392 U. S. 378, we overruled Schwartz v. Texas and held that evidence violative of § 605 is not admissible in state criminal trials. The decision of the Alaska Supreme Court cannot stand, therefore, if Lee is to be applied retroactively. We hold, however, that the exclusionary rule of Lee is to be given prospective application, and, accordingly, we affirm.
Prospective application of Lee is supported by all of the considerations outlined in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 297. The purpose of Lee was in no sense to “enhance the reliability of the fact-finding process at trial.” Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 729. Like Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, Lee was designed to enforce the federal law. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 639. And evidence seized in violation of the federal statute is no less relevant and reliable than that seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Moreover, the States have justifiably relied upon the explicit holding of Schwartz that such evidence was admissible.
Retroactive application of Lee would overturn every state conviction obtained in good-faith reliance on Schwartz. Since this result is not required by the principle upon which Lee was decided, or necessary to accomplish its purpose, we hold that the exclusionary rule is to be applied only to trials in which the evidence is sought to be introduced after the date of our decision in Lee.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alaska is affirmed.
These considerations were more recently applied in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 633, in which we concluded that the right to a jury trial in state criminal prosecutions under Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, was prospective only.
Lee v. Florida, 392 U. S., at 386-387:
“We conclude, as we concluded in Elkins and in Mapp, that nothing short of mandatory exclusion of the illegal evidence will compel respect for the federal law ‘in the only effectively available way— by removing the incentive to disregard it.’ Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S., at 217.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
At common law, the revenue rule generally barred courts from enforcing the tax laws of foreign sovereigns. The question presented in this case is whether a plot to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violates the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1343 (2000 ed., Supp. II). Because the plain terms of § 1343 criminalize such a scheme, and because this construction of the wire fraud statute does not derogate from the common-law revenue rule, we hold that it does.
I
Petitioners Carl J. Pasquantino, David B. Pasquantino, and Arthur Hilts were indicted for and convicted of federal wire fraud for carrying out a scheme to smuggle large quantities of liquor into Canada from the United States. According to the evidence presented at trial, the Pasquantinos, while in New York, ordered liquor over the telephone from discount package stores in Maryland. See 336 F. 3d 321, 325 (CA4 2003) (en banc). They employed Hilts and others to drive the liquor over the Canadian border, without paying the required excise taxes. Ibid. The drivers avoided paying taxes by hiding the liquor in their vehicles and failing to declare the goods to Canadian customs officials. Id., at 333. During the time of petitioners’ smuggling operation, between 1996 and 2000, Canada heavily taxed the importation of alcoholic beverages. See 1997 S. C., ch. 36, §§ 21.1(1), 21.2(1); Excise Act Schedule 1.(1), R. S. C., ch. E-14 (1985); Excise Act 2001, Schedule 4, ch. 22, 2002 S. C. 239. Uncontested evidence at trial showed that Canadian taxes then due on alcohol purchased in the United States and transported to Canada were approximately double the liquor’s purchase. price. App. 65-66.
Before trial, petitioners moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it stated no wire fraud offense. The wire fraud statute prohibits the use of interstate wires to effect “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” 18 U. S. C. § 1343 (2000 ed., Supp. II). Petitioners contended that the Government lacked a sufficient interest in enforcing the revenue laws of Canada, and therefore that they had not committed wire fraud. App: 48-57. The District Court denied the motion, and the case went to trial. The jury convicted petitioners of wire fraud.
Petitioners appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, again urging that the indictment failed to state a wire fraud offense. They argued that their prosecution contravened the common-law revenue rule, because it required the court to take cognizance of the revenue laws of Canada. Over Judge Hamilton’s dissent, the panel agreed and reversed the convictions. 305 F. 3d 291, 295 (2002). Petitioners also argued that Canada’s right to collect taxes from them was not “money or property” within the meaning of the wire fraud statute, but the panel unanimously rejected that argument. Id., at 294-295; id., at 299 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
The Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc, vacated the panel’s decision, and affirmed petitioners’ convictions. 336 F. 3d 321 (CA4 2003). It concluded that the common-law revenue rule, rather than barring any recognition of foreign revenue law, simply allowed courts to refuse to enforce the tax judgments of foreign nations, and therefore did not preclude the Government from prosecuting petitioners. Id., at 327-329. The Court of Appeals held as well that Canada’s right to receive tax revenue was “money or property” within the meaning of the wire fraud statute. Id., at 331-332.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over whether a scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violates the wire fraud statute. 541 U. S. 972 (2004). Compare United States v. Boots, 80 F. 3d 580, 587 (CA1 1996) (holding that a scheme to defraud a foreign nation of tax revenue does not violate the wire fraud statute), with United States v. Trapilo, 130 F. 3d 547, 552-553 (CA2 1997) (holding that a scheme to defraud a foreign nation of tax revenue violates the wire fraud statute). We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does and therefore affirm the judgment below.
I — I 1 — 1
We first consider whether petitioners’ conduct falls within the literal terms of the wire fraud statute. The statute prohibits using interstate wires to effect “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” 18 U. S. C. § 1343 (2000 ed., Supp. II). Two elements of this crime, and the only two that petitioners dispute here, are that the defendant engage in a “scheme or artifice to defraud,” ibid., and that the “object of the fraud... be ‘[money or] property’ in the victim’s hands,” Cleveland v. United States, 531 U. S. 12, 26 (2000). Petitioners’ smuggling operation satisfies both elements.
Taking the latter element first, Canada’s right to uncollected excise taxes on the liquor petitioners imported into Canada is “property” in its hands. This right is an entitlement to collect money from petitioners, the possession of which is “something of value” to the Government of Canada. McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350, 358 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Valuable entitlements like these are “property” as that term ordinarily is employed. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 9 (2004) (“When interpreting a statute, we must give words their ordinary or natural meaning” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Black’s Law Dictionary 1382 (4th ed. 1951) (defining “property” as “extending] to every species of valuable right and interest”). Had petitioners complied with this legal obligation, they would have paid money to Canada. Petitioners’ tax evasion deprived Canada of that money, inflicting an economic injury no less than had they embezzled funds from the Canadian treasury. The object of petitioners’ scheme was to deprive Canada of money legally due, and their scheme thereby had as its object the deprivation of Canada’s “property.”
The common law of fraud confirms this characterization of Canada’s right to excise taxes. The right to be paid money has long been thought to be a species of property. See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 153-155 (1768) (classifying a right to sue on a debt as personal property); 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *351 (same). Consistent with that understanding, fraud at common law included a scheme to deprive a victim of his entitlement to money. For instance, a debtor who concealed his assets when settling debts with his creditors thereby committed common-law fraud. 1 J. Story, Equity Jurisprudence § 378 (I. Redfield 10th rev. ed. 1870); Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 2 Ves. Sen. 125 (ch. 1750); 1 S. Rapalje & R. Lawrence, A Dictionary of American and English Law 546 (1883). That made sense given the economic equivalence between money in hand and money legally due. The fact that the victim of the fraud happens to be the government, rather than a private party, does not lessen the injury.
Our conclusion that the right to tax revenue is property in Canada’s hands, contrary to petitioners’ contentions, is consistent with Cleveland, supra. In that case, the defendant, Cleveland, had obtained a video poker license by making false statements on his license application. Id., at 16-17. We held that a State’s interest in an unissued video poker license was not “property,” because the interest in choosing particular licensees was “‘purely regulatory’” and “[could not] be economic.” Id., at 22-23. We also noted that “the Government nowhere allege[d] that Cleveland defrauded the State of any money to which the State was entitled by law.” Ibid.
Cleveland is different from this case. Unlike a State’s interest in allocating a video poker license to particular applicants, Canada’s entitlement to tax revenue is a straightforward “economic” interest. There was no suggestion in Cleveland that the defendant aimed at depriving the State of any money due under the license; quite the opposite, there was “no dispute that [the defendant’s partnership] paid the State of Louisiana its proper share of revenue” due. Id., at 22. Here, by contrast, the Government alleged and proved that petitioners’ scheme aimed at depriving Canada of money to which it was entitled by law. Canada could hardly have a more “economic” interest than in the receipt of tax revenue. Cleveland is therefore consistent with our conclusion that Canada’s entitlement is “property” as that word is used in the wire fraud statute.
Turning to the second element at issue here, petitioners’ plot was a “scheme or artifice to defraud” Canada of its valuable entitlement to tax revenue. The evidence showed that petitioners routinely concealed imported liquor from Canadian officials and failed to declare those goods on customs forms. See 336 F. 3d, at 333. By this conduct, they represented to Canadian customs officials that their drivers had no goods to declare. This, then, was a scheme “designed to defraud by representations,” Durland v. United States, 161 U. S. 306, 313 (1896), and therefore a “scheme or artifice to defraud” Canada of taxes due on the smuggled goods.
Neither the antismuggling statute, 18 U. S. C. § 546, nor U. S. tax treaties, see Attorney General of Canada v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F. 3d 103, 115-119 (CA2 2001), convince us that petitioners’ scheme falls outside the terms of the wire fraud statute. Unlike the treaties and the antismuggling statute, the wire fraud statute punishes fraudulent use of domestic wires, whether or not such conduct constitutes smuggling, occurs aboard a vessel, or evades foreign taxes. See post, at 380, n. 9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the antismuggling statute does not apply to this prosecution). Petitioners would be equally liable if they had used interstate wires to defraud Canada not of taxes due, but of money from the Canadian treasury. The wire fraud statute “applies without differentiation” to these two categories of fraud. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 378 (2005). “To give these same words a different meaning for each category would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one.” Ibid. We therefore decline to “interpret [this] criminal statute more narrowly than it is written.” Brogan v. United States, 522 U. S. 398, 406 (1998).
III
We next consider petitioners’ revenue rule argument. Petitioners argue that, to avoid reading § 1343 to derogate from the common-law revenue rule, we should construe the otherwise-applicable language of the wire fraud statute to except frauds directed at evading foreign taxes. Their argument relies on the canon of construction that “[statutes which invade the common law... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” United States v. Texas, 507 U. S. 529, 534 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). This presumption is, however, no bar to a construction that conflicts with a common-law rule if the statute “ ‘speak[s] directly’ to the question addressed by the common law.” Ibid.
Whether the wire fraud statute derogates from the common-law revenue rule depends, in turn, on whether reading §1343 to reach this prosecution conflicts with a well-established revenue rule principle. We clarified this constraint on the application of the nonderogation canon in United States v. Craft, 535 U. S. 274 (2002). The issue in Craft was whether the property interest of a tenant by the entirety was exempt from a federal tax lien. Id., at 276. We construed the federal tax lien statute to reach such a property interest, despite the tension between that construction and the common-law rule that entireties property enjoys immunity from liens, because this “common-law rule was not so well established with respect to the application of a federal tax lien that we must assume that Congress considered the impact of its enactment on the question now before us.” Id., at 288. So too here, before we may conclude that Congress intended to exempt the present prosecution from the broad reach of the wire fraud statute, we must find that the common-law revenue rule clearly barred such a prosecution. We examine the state of the common law as of 1952, the year Congress enacted the wire fraud statute. See Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 22-23 (1999).
The wire fraud statute derogates from no well-established revenue rule principle. We are aware of no common-law revenue rule case decided as of 1952 that held or clearly implied that the revenue rule barred the United States from prosecuting a fraudulent scheme to evade foreign taxes. The traditional rationales for the revenue rule, moreover, do not plainly suggest that it swept so broadly. We consider these two points in turn.
A
We first consider common-law revenue rule jurisprudence as it existed in 1952, the year Congress enacted §1343. Since the late 19th and early 20th century, courts have treated the common-law revenue rule as a corollary of the rule that, as Chief Justice Marshall put it, “[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.” The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123 (1825). The rule against the enforcement of foreign penal statutes, in turn, tracked the common-law principle that crimes could only be prosecuted in the country in which they were committed. See, e. g., J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws § 620, p. 840 (M. Bigelow ed. 8th ed. 1883). The basis for inferring the revenue rule from the rule against foreign penal enforcement was an analogy between foreign revenue laws and penal laws. See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 290 (1888); Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 219 (1932) (hereinafter Leflar).
Courts first drew that inference in a line of cases prohibiting the enforcement of tax liabilities of one sovereign in the courts of another sovereign, such as a suit to enforce a tax judgment. The revenue rule’s grounding in these cases shows that, at its core, it prohibited the collection of tax obligations of foreign nations. Unsurprisingly, then, the revenue rule is often stated as prohibiting the collection of foreign tax claims. See Brief for Petitioners 16 (noting that “[t]he most straightforward application of the revenue rule arises when a foreign sovereign attempts to sue directly in its own right to enforce a tax judgment in the courts of another nation”).
The present prosecution is unlike these classic examples of actions traditionally barred by the revenue rule. It is not a suit that recovers a foreign tax liability, like a suit to enforce a judgment. This is a criminal prosecution brought by the United States in its sovereign capacity to punish domestic criminal conduct. Petitioners nevertheless argue that common-law. revenue rule jurisprudence as of 1952 prohibited such prosecutions. Revenue rule cases, however, do not establish that proposition, much less clearly so.
1
Petitioners first analogize the present action to several cases that have applied the revenue rule to bar indirect enforcement of foreign revenue laws, in contrast to the direct collection of a tax obligation. They cite, for example, a decision of an Irish trial court holding that a private liquidator could not recover assets unlawfully distributed and moved to Ireland by a corporate director, because the recovery would go to satisfy the company’s Scottish tax obligations. Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. McVey, 1955 A. C. 516, 529-530 (Ir. H. Ct. 1950), app. dism’d, 1955 A. C. 530 (Ir. Sup. Ct. 1951). The court found that “the sole object of the liquidation proceedings in Scotland was to collect a revenue debt,” because if the liquidator won, “every penny recovered after paying certain costs... could be claimed by the Scottish Revenue.” Id., at 530. According to the Buchanan court, “[i]n every case the substance of the claim must be scrutinized, and if it then appears that it is really a suit brought for the purpose of collecting the debts of a foreign revenue it must be rejected.” Id., at 529.
Buchanan and the other cases on which petitioners rely cannot bear the weight petitioners place on them. Many of them were decided after 1952, too late for the Congress that passed the wire fraud statute to have relied on them. Others come from foreign courts. Drawing sure inferences regarding Congress’ intent from such foreign citations is perilous, as several of petitioners’ cases illustrate.
More important, none of these cases clearly establishes that the revenue rule barred this prosecution. None involved a domestic sovereign acting pursuant to authority conferred by a criminal statute. The difference is significant. An action by a domestic sovereign enforces the sovereign’s own penal law. A prohibition on the enforcement of foreign penal law does not plainly prevent the Government from enforcing a domestic criminal law. Such an extension, to our knowledge, is unprecedented in the long history of either the revenue rule or the rule against enforcement of penal laws.
Moreover, none of petitioners’ cases (with the arguable exception of Banco Do Brasil, S. A. v. A. C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N. Y. 2d 371, 190 N. E. 2d 235 (App. 1963)) barred an action that had as its primary object the deterrence and punishment of fraudulent conduct — a substantial domestic regulatory interest entirely independent of foreign tax enforcement. The main object of the action in each of those cases was the collection of money that would pay foreign tax claims. The absence of such an object in this action means that the link between this prosecution and foreign tax collection is incidental and attenuated at best, making it not plainly one in which “the whole object of the suit is to collect tax for a foreign revenue.” Buchanan, supra, at 529. Even those courts that as of 1952 had extended the revenue rule beyond its core prohibition had not faced a case closely analogous to this one — and thus we cannot say with any reasonable certainty whether Congress in 1952 would have considered this prosecution within the revenue rule.
Petitioners answer that the recovery of taxes is indeed the object of this suit, because restitution of the lost tax revenue to Canada is required under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§3663A-3664 (2000 ed. and Supp. II). We do not think it matters whether the provision of restitution is mandatory in this prosecution. Regardless, the wire fraud statute advances the Federal Government’s independent interest in punishing fraudulent domestic criminal conduct, a significant feature absent from all of petitioners’ revenue rule cases. The purpose of awarding restitution in this action is not to collect a foreign tax, but to mete out appropriate criminal punishment for that conduct.
In any event, any conflict between mandatory restitution and the revenue rule would not change our holding today. If awarding restitution to foreign sovereigns were contrary to the revenue rule, the proper resolution would be to construe the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act not to allow such awards, rather than to assume that the later enacted restitution statute impliedly repealed §1343 as applied to frauds against foreign sovereigns.
2
We are no more persuaded by a second line of cases on which petitioners rely. Petitioners analogize the present case to early English common-law cases from which the revenue rule originally derived. Those early cases involved contract law, and they held that contracts executed with the purpose of evading the revenue laws of other nations were enforceable, notwithstanding the rule against enforcing contracts with illegal purposes. See Boucher v. Lawson, Cas. T. Hard. 85, 89-90, 95 Eng. Rep. 53, 55-56 (K. B. 1734); Planche v. Fletcher, 1 Dougl. 251, 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (K. B. 1779). Petitioners argue that these cases demonstrate that “indirect” enforcement of revenue laws is at the very core of the common-law revenue rule, rather than at its margins.
The argument is unavailing. By the mid-20th century, the revenue rule had developed into a doctrine very different from its original form. Early revenue rule cases were driven by the interest in lessening the commercial disruption caused by the high tariffs of the day. As Lord Hardwicke explained, if contracts that aimed at circumventing foreign revenue laws were unenforceable, “it would cut off all benefit of such trade from this kingdom, which would be of very bad consequence to the principal and most beneficial branches of our trade.” Boucher, supra, at 89, 95 Eng. Rep., at 56. By the 20th century, however, that rationale for the revenue rule had been supplanted. By then, as we have explained, courts had begun to apply the revenue rule to tax obligations on the strength of the analogy between a country’s revenue laws and its penal ones, see supra, at 360-361, superseding the original promotion-of-commerce rationale for the rule. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 Harv. Int’l L. J. 161, 178 (2002); Buchanan, 1955 A. C., at 522-524, 528-529. The early English cases rest on a far different foundation from that on which the revenue rule came to rest. They thus say little about whether the wire fraud statute derogated from the revenue rule in its mid-20th-century form.
3
Granted, this criminal prosecution “enforces” Canadian revenue law in an attenuated sense, but not in a sense that clearly would contravene the revenue rule. From its earliest days, the revenue rule never proscribed all enforcement of foreign revenue law. For example, at the same time they were enforcing domestic contracts that had the purpose of violating foreign revenue law, English courts also considered void foreign contracts that lacked tax stamps required under foreign revenue law. See Alves v. Hodgson, 7 T. R. 241, 243, 101 Eng. Rep. 953, 955 (K. B. 1797); Clegg v. Levy, 3 Camp. 166, 167, 170 Eng. Rep. 1343 (N. P. 1812). Like the present prosecution, cases voiding foreign contracts under foreign law no doubt “enforced” foreign revenue law in the sense that they encouraged the payment of foreign taxes; yet they fell outside the revenue rule’s scope. The line the revenue rule draws between impermissible and permissible “enforcement” of foreign revenue law has therefore always been unclear.
The uncertainty persisted in American courts that recognized the revenue rule. In one of the earliest appearances of the revenue rule in America, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire entertained an action that required extensive recognition of a sister State’s revenue laws. Henry v. Sargeant, 13 N. H. 321 (1843). There, the plaintiff sought damages, alleging that a Vermont selectman had imposed an illegal tax on him. Id., at 331. The court found that the revenue rule did not bar the action, id., at 331-332, though the suit required the court to enforce the revenue laws of Vermont, see id., at 335-338.
Likewise, in In re Hollins, 79 Misc. 200, 139 N. Y. S. 713 (Sur. Ct.), aff’d, 160 App. Div. 886, 144 N. Y. S. 1121 (1913), aff’d, 212 N. Y. 567, 106 N. E. 1034 (App. 1914) (per curiam), the court held that an estate executor could satisfy foreign taxes due on a decedent’s estate out of property of the estate, notwithstanding a legatee’s argument that the revenue rule barred authorizing such payments. 79 Misc., at 207-208, 139 N. Y. S., at 716-717. The court explained:
“While it is doubtless true that this court will not aid a foreign country in the enforcement of its revenue laws, it will not refuse to direct a just and equitable administration of that part of an estate within its jurisdiction merely because such direction would result in the enforcement of such revenue laws.” Id., at 208, 139 N. Y. S., at 717.
These cases demonstrate that the extent to which the revenue rule barred indirect recognition of foreign revenue laws was unsettled as of 1952. Following the reasoning of In re Hollins, for instance, Congress might well have thought that courts would enforce the wire fraud statute, even if doing so might incidentally recognize Canadian revenue law. The uncertainty highlights that “[indirect enforcement is... easier to describe than to define,” and “it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between an issue involving merely recognition of a foreign law and indirect enforcement of it.” 1 A. Dicey & J. Morris, Conflict of Laws 90 (L. Collins gen. ed. 13th ed. 2000). Even if the present prosecution is analogous to the indirect enforcement cases on which petitioners rely, those cases do not yield a rule sufficiently well established to narrow the wire fraud statute in the context of this criminal prosecution.
B
Having concluded that revenue rule jurisprudence is no clear bar to this prosecution, we next turn to whether the purposes of the revenue rule, as articulated in the relevant authorities, suggest differently. They do not.
First, this prosecution poses little risk of causing the principal evil against which the revenue rule was traditionally thought to guard: judicial evaluation of the policy-laden enactments of other sovereigns. See, e. g., Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. 2d 600, 604 (CA2 1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring). As Judge Hand put it, allowing courts to enforce another country’s revenue laws was thought to be a delicate inquiry
“when it concerns the relations between the foreign state and its own citizens.... To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state is, or at any rate should be, beyond the powers of a court; it involves the relations between the states themselves, with which courts are incompetent to deal, and which are intrusted to other authorities.” Ibid.
The present prosecution creates little risk of causing international friction through judicial evaluation of the policies of foreign sovereigns. This action was brought by the Executive to enforce a statute passed by Congress. In our system of government, the Executive is “the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations,” United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 320 (1936), and has ample authority and competence to manage “the relations between the foreign state and its own citizens” and to avoid “embarass[ing] its.neighbors],” Moore, supra, at 604 (L. Hand, J., concurring); see also Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 111 (1948). True, a prosecution like this one requires a court to recognize foreign law to determine whether the defendant violated U. S. law. But we may assume that by electing to bring this prosecution, the Executive has assessed this prosecution’s impact on this Nation’s relationship with Canada, and concluded that it poses little danger of causing international friction. We know of no common-law court that has applied the revenue rule to bar an action accompanied by such a safeguard, and neither petitioners nor the dissent directs us to any. The greater danger, in fact, would lie in our judging this prosecution barred based on the foreign policy concerns animating the revenue rule, concerns that we have “neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility” to evaluate. Ibid.
More broadly, petitioners argue that the revenue rule avoids giving domestic effect to politically sensitive and controversial policy decisions embodied in foreign revenue laws, regardless of whether courts need pass judgment on such laws. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 448 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (“[Cjourts customarily refuse to enforce the revenue and penal laws of a foreign state, since no country has an obligation to further the governmental interests of a foreign sovereign”). This worries us little here. The present prosecution, if authorized by the wire fraud statute, embodies the policy choice of the two political branches of our Government — Congress and the Executive — to free the interstate wires from fraudulent use, irrespective of the object of the fraud. Such a reading of the wire fraud statute gives effect to that considered policy choice. It therefore poses no risk of advancing the policies of Canada illegitimately.
Still a final revenue rule rationale petitioners urge is the concern that courts lack the competence to examine the validity of unfamiliar foreign tax schemes. See, e. g., Leflar 218. Foreign law, of course, posed no unmanageable complexity in this case. The District Court had before it uncon-troverted testimony of a Government witness that petitioners’ scheme aimed at violating Canadian tax law. See App. 65-66.
Nevertheless, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 addresses petitioners’ concern by setting forth a procedure for interpreting foreign law that improves on those available at common law. Specifically, it permits a court, in deciding issues of foreign law, to consider “any relevant material or source — including testimony — without regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence.” By contrast, common-law procedures for dealing with foreign law — those available to the courts that formulated the revenue rule — were more cumbersome. See Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 26.1, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 1606 (noting that the rule improves on common-law procedures for proving foreign law). Rule 26.1 gives federal courts sufficient means to resolve the incidental foreign law issues, they may encounter in wire fraud prosecutions.
IV
Finally, our interpretation of the wire fraud statute does not give it “extraterritorial effect.” Post, at 378 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Petitioners used U. S. interstate wires to execute a scheme to defraud a foreign sovereign of tax revenue. Their offense was complete the moment they executed the scheme inside the United States; “[t]he wire fraud statute punishes the scheme, not its success.” United States v. Pierce, 224 F. 3d 158, 166 (CA2 2000) (internal quotation marks and brackets in original omitted); see Durland, 161 U. S., at 313 (“The significant fact is the intent and purpose”). This domestic element of petitioners’ conduct is what the Government is punishing in this prosecution, no less than, when it prosecutes a scheme to defraud a foreign individual or corporation, or a foreign government acting as a market participant. See post, at 379, n. 8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that such prosecutions of foreign individuals, corporations, and governments are domestic applications of the wire fraud statute). In any event, the wire fraud statute punishes frauds executed “in interstate or foreign commerce,” 18 U. S. C. § 1843 (2000 ed., Supp. II), so this is surely not a statute in which Congress had only “domestic concerns in mind.” Small v. United States, post, at 388.
* *
It may seem an odd use of the Federal Government’s resources to prosecute a U. S. citizen for smuggling cheap liquor into Canada. But the broad language of the wire fraud statute authorizes it to do so, and no canon of statutory construction permits ■ us to read the statute more narrowly. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
We express no view on the related question whether a foreign government, based on wire or mail fraud predicate offenses, may bring a civil action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for a scheme to defraud it of taxes. See Attorney General of Canada v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F. 3d 103, 106 (CA2 2001) (holding that the Government of Canada cannot bring a civil RICO. suit to recover for a scheme to defraud it of taxes); Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., 341 F. 3d 1253, 1255 (CA11 2003) (same with respect to other foreign governments).
Although Cleveland interpreted the term “property” in the mail statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1341 (2000 ed., Supp. II), we have construed identical language in the wire and mail fraud statutes in pari materia. See Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 20 (1999) (“ ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ ”); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U. S. 19, 25, and n. 6 (1987) (“scheme or artifice to defraud”; “money or property”).
Section 546 provides:
“Any person owning in whole or in part any vessel of the United States who employs, or participates in, or allows the employment of, such vessel for the purpose of smuggling, or attempting to smuggle, or assisting in smuggling, any merchandise into the territoiy of any foreign government in violation of the laws there in force, if under the laws of such foreign government any penalty or forfeiture is provided for violation of the laws of the United States respecting the customs revenue, and any citizen of, or person domiciled in, or any corporation incorporated in, the United States, controlling or substantially participating in the control of any such vessel, directly or indirectly, whether through ownership of corporate shares or otherwise, and allowing the employment of said vessel for any such purpose, and any person found, or discovered to
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Finally, the State and its amici point to the compelling governmental interest in combating drunk driving and contend that prompt BAC testing, including through blood testing, is vital to pursuit of that interest. They argue that is particularly so because, in addition to laws that make it illegal to operate a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, all 50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that make it per se unlawful to operate a motor vehicle with a BAC of over 0.08 percent. See National Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (NHTSA), Alcohol and Highway Safety: A Review of the State of Knowledge 167 (No. 811374, Mar. 2011) (NHTSA Review). To enforce these provisions, they reasonably assert, accurate BAC evidence is critical. See also post, at 1570 - 1571 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.); post, at 1576 - 1577 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).
"No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it." Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). Certainly we do not. While some progress has been made, drunk driving continues to exact a terrible toll on our society. See NHTSA, Traffic Safety Facts, 2011 Data 1 (No. 811700, Dec. 2012) (reporting that 9,878 people were killed in alcohol-impaired driving crashes in 2011, an average of one fatality every 53 minutes).
But the general importance of the government's interest in this area does not justify departing from the warrant requirement without showing exigent circumstances that make securing a warrant impractical in a particular case. To the extent that the State and its amici contend that applying the traditional Fourth Amendment totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to determine whether an exigency justified a warrantless search will undermine the governmental interest in preventing and prosecuting drunk-driving offenses, we are not convinced.
As an initial matter, States have a broad range of legal tools to enforce their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC
evidence without undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws. For example, all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense. See NHTSA Review 173; supra, at 1556 (describing Missouri's implied consent law). Such laws impose significant consequences when a motorist withdraws consent; typically the motorist's driver's license is immediately suspended or revoked, and most States allow the motorist's refusal to take a BAC test to be used as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. See NHTSA Review 173-175; see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554, 563-564, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (holding that the use of such an adverse inference does not violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
It is also notable that a majority of States either place significant restrictions on when police officers may obtain a blood sample despite a suspect's refusal (often limiting testing to cases involving an accident resulting in death or serious bodily injury) or prohibit nonconsensual blood tests altogether. Among these States, several lift restrictions on nonconsensual blood testing if law enforcement officers first obtain a search warrant or similar court order. Cf. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 2710-2711, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011) (noting that the blood test was obtained pursuant to a warrant after the petitioner refused a breath test). We are aware of no evidence indicating that restrictions on nonconsensual blood testing have compromised drunk-driving enforcement efforts in the States that have them. And in fact, field studies in States that permit nonconsensual blood testing pursuant to a warrant have suggested that, although warrants do impose administrative burdens, their use can reduce breath-test-refusal rates and improve law enforcement's ability to recover BAC evidence. See NHTSA, Use of Warrants for Breath Test Refusal: Case Studies 36-38 (No. 810852, Oct. 2007).
To be sure, "States [may] choos[e] to protect privacy beyond the level that the Fourth Amendment requires." Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008). But wide-spread state restrictions on nonconsensual blood testing provide further support for our recognition that compelled blood draws implicate a significant privacy interest. They also strongly suggest that our ruling today will not "severely hamper effective law enforcement." Garner, 471 U.S., at 19, 105 S.Ct. 1694.
IV
The State argued before this Court that the fact that alcohol is naturally metabolized by the human body creates an exigent circumstance in every case. The State did not argue that there were exigent circumstances in this particular case because a warrant could not have been obtained within a reasonable amount of time. In his testimony before the trial court, the arresting officer did not identify any other factors that would suggest he faced an emergency or unusual delay in securing a warrant. App. 40. He testified that he made no effort to obtain a search warrant before conducting the blood draw even though he was "sure" a prosecuting attorney was on call and even though he had no reason to believe that a magistrate judge would have been unavailable. Id., at 39, 41-42. The officer also acknowledged that he had obtained search warrants before taking blood samples in the past without difficulty. Id., at 42. He explained that he elected to forgo a warrant application in this case only because he believed it was not legally necessary to obtain a warrant. Id., at 39-40. Based on this testimony, the trial court concluded that there was no exigency and specifically found that, although the arrest took place in the middle of the night, "a prosecutor was readily available to apply for a search warrant and a judge was readily available to issue a warrant." App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a.
The Missouri Supreme Court in turn affirmed that judgment, holding first that the dissipation of alcohol did not establish a per se exigency, and second that the State could not otherwise satisfy its burden of establishing exigent circumstances.
358 S.W.3d, at 70, 74-75. In petitioning for certiorari to this Court, the State challenged only the first holding; it did not separately contend that the warrantless blood test was reasonable regardless of whether the natural dissipation of alcohol in a suspect's blood categorically justifies dispensing with the warrant requirement. See Pet. for Cert. i.
Here and in its own courts the State based its case on an insistence that a driver who declines to submit to testing after being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol is always subject to a nonconsensual blood test without any precondition for a warrant. That is incorrect.
Although the Missouri Supreme Court referred to this case as "unquestionably a routine DWI case," 358 S.W.3d, at 74, the fact that a particular drunk-driving stop is "routine" in the sense that it does not involve "'special facts,' " ibid., such as the need for the police to attend to a car accident, does not mean a warrant is required. Other factors present in an ordinary traffic stop, such as the procedures in place for obtaining a warrant or the availability of a magistrate judge, may affect whether the police can obtain a warrant in an expeditious way and therefore may establish an exigency that permits a warrantless search. The relevant factors in determining whether a warrantless search is reasonable, including the practical problems of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that still preserves the opportunity to obtain reliable evidence, will no doubt vary depending upon the circumstances in the case.
Because this case was argued on the broad proposition that drunk-driving cases present a per se exigency, the arguments and the record do not provide the Court with an adequate analytic framework for a detailed discussion of all the relevant factors that can be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of acting without a warrant. It suffices to say that the metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream and the ensuing loss of evidence are among the factors that must be considered in deciding whether a warrant is required. No doubt, given the large number of arrests for this offense in different jurisdictions nationwide, cases will arise when anticipated delays in obtaining a warrant will justify a blood test without judicial authorization, for in every case the law must be concerned that evidence is being destroyed. But that inquiry ought not to be pursued here where the question is not properly before this Court. Having rejected the sole argument presented to us challenging the Missouri Supreme Court's decision, we affirm its judgment.
* * *
We hold that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.
The judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice KENNEDY, concurring in part.
I join Parts I, II-A, II-B, and IV of the opinion for the Court.
For the reasons stated below this case does not call for the Court to consider in detail the issue discussed in Part II-C and the separate opinion by THE CHIEF JUSTICE.
As to Part III, much that is noted with respect to the statistical and survey data will be of relevance when this issue is explored in later cases. The repeated insistence in Part III that every case be determined by its own circumstances is correct, of course, as a general proposition; yet it ought not to be interpreted to indicate this question is not susceptible of rules and guidelines that can give important, practical instruction to arresting officers, instruction that in any number of instances would allow a warrantless blood test in order to preserve the critical evidence.
States and other governmental entities which enforce the driving laws can adopt rules, procedures, and protocols that meet the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment and give helpful guidance to law enforcement officials. And this Court, in due course, may find it appropriate and necessary to consider a case permitting it to provide more guidance than it undertakes to give today.
As the opinion of the Court is correct to note, the instant case, by reason of the way in which it was presented and decided in the state courts, does not provide a framework where it is prudent to hold any more than that always dispensing with a warrant for a blood test when a driver is arrested for being under the influence of alcohol is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment.
Chief Justice ROBERTS, with whom Justice BREYER and Justice ALITO join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
A police officer reading this Court's opinion would have no idea-no idea-what the Fourth Amendment requires of him, once he decides to obtain a blood sample from a drunk driving suspect who has refused a breathalyzer test. I have no quarrel with the Court's "totality of the circumstances" approach as a general matter; that is what our cases require. But the circumstances in drunk driving cases are often typical, and the Court should be able to offer guidance on how police should handle cases like the one before us.
In my view, the proper rule is straightforward. Our cases establish that there is an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. That exception applies when there is a compelling need to prevent the imminent destruction of important evidence, and there is no time to obtain a warrant. The natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes not only the imminent but ongoing destruction of critical evidence. That would qualify as an exigent circumstance, except that there may be time to secure a warrant before blood can be drawn. If there is, an officer must seek a warrant. If an officer could reasonably conclude that there is not, the exigent circumstances exception applies by its terms, and the blood may be drawn without a warrant.
I
The Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
That language does not state that warrants are required prior to searches, but this Court has long held that warrants must generally be obtained. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). We have also held that bodily intrusions like blood draws constitute searches and are subject to the warrant requirement. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).
However, "the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is'reasonableness,'
" Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006), and thus "the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions," King, 563 U.S., at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 1856. One of those exceptions is known as the "exigent circumstances exception," which "applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Within the exigent circumstances exception, we have identified several sets of exigent circumstances excusing the need for a warrant. For example, there is an emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. In Brigham City, supra, at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, we held that "law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury." There is also a fire exception to the warrant requirement. In Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978), we held that "[a] burning building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry'reasonable.' " And there is a hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement as well. In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976), and Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967), we recognized "the right of police, who had probable cause to believe that an armed robber had entered a house a few minutes before, to make a warrantless entry to arrest the robber and to search for weapons." Santana,supra, at 42, 96 S.Ct. 2406. In each of these cases, the requirement that we base our decision on the "totality of the circumstances" has not prevented us from spelling out a general rule for the police to follow.
The exigency exception most on point here is the one for imminent destruction of evidence. We have affirmed on several occasions that "law enforcement officers may make a warrantless entry onto private property... to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence." Brigham City, supra, at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) (plurality opinion)); see also, e.g., King, supra, at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 1856-1857. For example, in Ker, the police had reason to believe that the defendant was in possession of marijuana and was expecting police pursuit. We upheld the officers' warrantless entry into the defendant's home, with the plurality explaining that the drugs "could be quickly and easily destroyed" or distributed d or hidden before a warrant could be obtained at that time of night." 374 U.S., at 40, 42, 83 S.Ct. 1623.
As an overarching principle, we have held that if there is a "compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant," the warrant requirement may be excused. Tyler, supra, at 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942. The question here is whether and how this principle applies in the typical case of a police officer stopping a driver on suspicion of drunk driving.
II
A
The reasonable belief that critical evidence is being destroyed gives rise to a compelling need for blood draws in cases like this one. Here, in fact, there is not simply a belief that any alcohol in the bloodstream will be destroyed; it is a biological certainty. Alcohol dissipates from the bloodstream at a rate of 0.01 percent to 0.025 percent per hour. Stripp, Forensic and Clinical Issues in Alcohol Analysis, in Forensic Chemistry Handbook 440 (L. Kobilinsky ed.2012). Evidence is literally disappearing by the minute. That certainty makes this case an even stronger one than usual for application of the exigent circumstances exception.
And that evidence is important. A serious and deadly crime is at issue. According to the Department of Transportation, in 2011, one person died every 53 minutes due to drinking and driving. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (NHTSA), Traffic Safety Facts, 2011 Data 1 (No. 811700, Dec. 2012). No surprise then that drinking and driving is punished severely, including with jail time. See generally Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, L. Maruschak, Special Report, DWI Offenders under Correctional Supervision (1999). McNeely, for instance, faces up to four years in prison. See App. 22-23 (citing Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 558.011, 577.010, 577.023 (West 2011) ).
Evidence of a driver's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is crucial to obtain convictions for such crimes. All 50 States and the District of Columbia have laws providing that it is per se illegal to drive with a BAC of 0.08 percent or higher. Most States also have laws establishing additional penalties for drivers who drive with a "high BAC," often defined as 0.15 percent or above. NHTSA, Digest of Impaired Driving and Selected Beverage Control Laws, pp. vii, x-xviii (No. 811673, Oct. 2012). BAC evidence clearly matters. And when drivers refuse breathalyzers, as McNeely did here, a blood draw becomes necessary to obtain that evidence.
The need to prevent the imminent destruction of BAC evidence is no less compelling because the incriminating alcohol dissipates over a limited period of time, rather than all at once. As noted, the concentration of alcohol can make a difference not only between guilt and innocence, but between different crimes and different degrees of punishment. The officer is unlikely to know precisely when the suspect consumed alcohol or how much; all he knows is that critical evidence is being steadily lost. Fire can spread gradually, but that does not lessen the need and right of the officers to respond immediately. See Tyler, supra.
McNeely contends that there is no compelling need for a warrantless blood draw, because if there is some alcohol left in the blood by the time a warrant is obtained, the State can use math and science to work backwards and identify a defendant's BAC at the time he was driving. See Brief for Respondent 44-46. But that's not good enough. We have indicated that exigent circumstances justify warrantless entry when drugs are about to be flushed down the toilet. See, e.g., King, 563 U.S., at ---- - ----, 131 S.Ct., at 1857-1858. We have not said that, because there could well be drug paraphernalia elsewhere in the home, or because a defendant's co-conspirator might testify to the amount of drugs involved, the drugs themselves are not crucial and there is no compelling need for warrantless entry.
The same approach should govern here. There is a compelling need to search because alcohol-the nearly conclusive evidence of a serious crime-is dissipating from the bloodstream. The need is no less compelling because the police might be able to acquire second-best evidence some other way.
B
For exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search, however, there must also be "no time to secure a warrant." Tyler, 436 U.S., at 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942; see Schmerber, 384 U.S., at 771, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (warrantless search legal when "there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant"). In this respect, obtaining a blood sample from a suspected drunk driver differs from other exigent circumstances cases.
Importantly, there is typically delay between the moment a drunk driver is stopped and the time his blood can be drawn. Drunk drivers often end up in an emergency room, but they are not usually pulled over in front of one. In most exigent circumstances situations, police are just outside the door to a home. Inside, evidence is about to be destroyed, a person is about to be injured, or a fire has broken out. Police can enter promptly and must do so to respond effectively to the emergency. But when police pull a person over on suspicion of drinking and driving, they cannot test his blood right away. There is a time-consuming obstacle to their search, in the form of a trip to the hospital and perhaps a wait to see a medical professional. In this case, for example, approximately 25 minutes elapsed between the time the police stopped McNeely and the time his blood was drawn. App. 36, 38.
As noted, the fact that alcohol dissipates gradually from the bloodstream does not diminish the compelling need for a search-critical evidence is still disappearing. But the fact that the dissipation persists for some time means that the police-although they may not be able to do anything about it right away-may still be able to respond to the ongoing destruction of evidence later on.
There might, therefore, be time to obtain a warrant in many cases. As the Court explains, police can often request warrants rather quickly these days. At least 30 States provide for electronic warrant applications. See ante, at 1561 - 1563, and n. 4. In many States, a police officer can call a judge, convey the necessary information, and be authorized to affix the judge's signature to a warrant. See, e.g., Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.8(b) (2012-2013) ; Alaska Stat. § 12.35.015 (2012) ; Idaho Code §§ 19-4404, 19-4406 (Lexis 2004) ; Minn. Rules Crim. Proc. 36.01 - 36.08 (2010 and Supp.2013) ; Mont.Code Ann. § 46-5-222 (2012); see generally NHTSA, Use of Warrants for Breath Test Refusal: Case Studies 6-32 ( No. 810852, Oct. 2007) (overview of procedures in Arizona, Michigan, Oregon, and Utah). Utah has an e-warrant procedure where a police officer enters information into a system, the system notifies a prosecutor, and upon approval the officer forwards the information to a magistrate, who can electronically return a warrant to the officer. Utah, e-Warrants: Cross Boundary Collaboration 1 (2008). Judges have been known to issue warrants in as little as five minutes. Bergreen, Faster Warrant System Hailed, Salt Lake Tribune, Dec. 26, 2008, p. B1, col. 1. And in one county in Kansas, police officers can e-mail warrant requests to judges' iPads; judges have signed such warrants and e-mailed them back to officers in less than 15 minutes. Benefiel, DUI Search Warrants: Prosecuting DUI Refusals, 9 Kansas Prosecutor 17, 18 (Spring 2012). The police are presumably familiar with the mechanics and time involved in the warrant process in their particular jurisdiction.
III
A
In a case such as this, applying the exigent circumstances exception to the general warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment seems straightforward: If there is time to secure a warrant before blood can be drawn, the police must seek one. If an officer could reasonably conclude that there is not sufficient time to seek and receive a warrant, or he applies for one but does not receive a response before blood can be drawn, a warrantless blood draw may ensue. See Tyler, supra, at 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942; see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-186, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) ("in order to satisfy the'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by... police officer[s] conducting a search or seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement... is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ("police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure").
Requiring police to apply for a warrant if practicable increases the likelihood that a neutral, detached judicial officer will review the case, helping to ensure that there is probable cause for any search and that any search is reasonable. We have already held that forced blood draws can be constitutional-that such searches can be reasonable-but that does not change the fact that they are significant bodily intrusions. See Schmerber, 384 U.S., at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (upholding a warrantless forced blood draw but noting the "importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt" as "indisputable and great"). Requiring a warrant whenever practicable helps ensure that when blood draws occur, they are indeed justified.
At the same time, permitting the police to act without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence is well established in Fourth Amendment law. There is no reason to preclude application of that exception in drunk driving cases simply because it may take the police some time to be able to respond to the undoubted destruction of evidence, or because the destruction occurs continuously over an uncertain period.
And that is so even in situations where police have requested a warrant but do not receive a timely response. An officer who reasonably concluded there was no time to secure a warrant may have blood drawn from a suspect upon arrival at a medical facility. There is no reason an officer should be in a worse position, simply because he sought a warrant prior to his arrival at the hospital.
B
The Court resists the foregoing, contending that the question presented somehow inhibits such a focused analysis in this case. See ante, at 1567 - 1568. It does not. The question presented is whether a warrantless blood draw is permissible under the Fourth Amendment "based upon the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream." Pet. for Cert. i. The majority answers "It depends," and so do I. The difference is that the majority offers no additional guidance, merely instructing courts and police officers to consider the totality of the circumstances. I believe more meaningful guidance can be provided about how to handle the typical cases, and nothing about the question presented prohibits affording that guidance.
A plurality of the Court also expresses concern that my approach will discourage state and local efforts to expedite the warrant application process. See ante, at 1563. That is not plausible: Police and prosecutors need warrants in a wide variety of situations, and often need them quickly. They certainly would not prefer a slower process, just because that might obviate the need to ask for a warrant in the occasional drunk driving case in which a blood draw is necessary. The plurality's suggestion also overlooks the interest of law enforcement in the protection a warrant provides.
The Court is correct when it says that every case must be considered on its particular facts. But the pertinent facts in drunk driving cases are often the same, and the police should know how to act in recurring factual situations. Simply put, when a drunk driving suspect fails field sobriety tests and refuses a breathalyzer, whether a warrant is required for a blood draw should come down to whether there is time to secure one.
Schmerber itself provides support for such an analysis. The Court there made much of the fact that "there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant." 384 U.S., at 771, 86 S.Ct. 1826. It did so in an era when cell phones and e-mail were unknown. It follows quite naturally that if cell phones and e-mail mean that there is time to contact a magistrate and secure a warrant, that must be done. At the same time, there is no need to jettison the well-established exception for the imminent destruction of evidence, when the officers are in a position to do something about it.
* * *
Because the Missouri courts did not apply the rule I describe above, and because this Court should not do so in the first instance, I would vacate and remand for further proceedings in the Missouri courts.
Pursuant to congressional directive, the NHTSA conditions federal highway grants on States' adoption of laws making it a per se offense to operate a motor vehicle with a BAC of 0.08 percent or greater. See 23 U.S.C. § 163(a) ; 23 C.F.R. § 1225.1 (2012). Several federal prohibitions on drunk driving also rely on the 0.08 percent standard. E.g., 32 C.F.R. §§ 234.17(c)(1)(ii), 1903.4(b)(1)(i)-(ii) ; 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(2). In addition, 32 States and the District of Columbia have adopted laws that impose heightened penalties for operating a motor vehicle at or above a BAC of 0.15 percent. See NHTSA Review 175.
See Ala.Code § 32-5-192(c) (2010) ; Alaska Stat. §§ 28.35.032(a), 28.35.035(a) (2012) ; Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 28-1321(D)(1) (West 2012); Ark.Code Ann. §§ 5-65-205(a)(1), 5-65-208(a)(1) (Supp.2011); Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 14-227b(b), 14-227c(b) (2011); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.1933(1)(a) (West 2006); Ga.Code Ann. § 40-5-67.1(d), (d.1) (2011); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 291E-15 (2009 Cum.Supp.), §§ 291E-21(a), 291E-33 (2007), § 291E-65 (2009 Cum.Supp.); Iowa Code §§ 321J.9(1), 321J.10(1), 321J.10A(1) (2009); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1001(b), (d) (2001); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 189A.105(2) (Lexis Supp.2012); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 32:666.A(1)(a)(i), (2) (Supp.2013); Md. Transp. Code Ann. § 16-205.1(b)(i)(1), (c)(1) (Lexis 2012); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 90, § 24(1)(e), (f)(1) (West 2012); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.625d(1) (West 2006); Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-21 (1973-2004); Mont.Code Ann. § 61-8-402(4), (5) (2011); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-498.01(2) (2012 Cum.Supp.), § 60-6,210 (2010) ; N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 265-A:14(I), 265-A:16 (West 2012 Cum.Supp.); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-111(A) (LexisNexis 2009); N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law Ann. §§ 1194(2)(b)(1), 1194(3) (West 2011); N.D. Cent.Code Ann. § 39-20-01.1(1) (Lexis Supp.2011), § 39-20-04(1) (Lexis 2008); Okla. Stat., Tit. 47, § 753 (West Supp.2013) ; Ore.Rev.Stat. § 813.100(2) (2011); 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 1547(b)(1) (2004); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 31-27-2.1(b), 31-27-2.9(a) (Lexis 2010); S.C.Code Ann. § 56-5-2950(B) (Supp.2011); Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-10-406(a)(4), (f) (2012); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 724.012(b), 724.013 (West 2011) ; Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 23, § 1202(b), (f) (2007); Wash. Rev.Code § 46.20.308(2) -(3), (5) (2012); W. Va.Code Ann. § 17C-5-7 (Lexis Supp.2012); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(d) (Lexis 2011).
See Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 28-1321(D)(1) (West 2012); Ga.Code Ann. § 40-5-67.1(d), (d.1) (2011); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 189A.105(2)(b) (Lexis Supp.2012); Mich. Comp. Laws
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a direct appeal by the United States from dismissal by the District Court of its complaint seeking an injunction to prevent and restrain violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2.
Appellees are the Oregon State Medical Society, eight county medical societies, Oregon Physicians’ Service (an Oregon corporation engaged in the sale of prepaid medical care), and eight doctors who are or have been at some time responsible officers in those organizations.
This controversy centers about two forms of “contract practice” of medicine. In one, private corporations organized for profit sell what amounts to a policy of insurance by which small periodic payments purchase the right to certain hospital facilities and medical attention. In the other¡ railroad and large industrial employers of labor contract with one or more doctors to treat their ailing or injured employees. Both forms of “contract practice,” for rendering the promised medical and surgical service, depend upon doctors or panels of doctors who cooperate on a fee basis or who associate themselves with the plan on a full- or part-time employment basis.
' Objections of the organized medical profession to contract practice are both monetary and ethical. Such practice diverts patients from independent practitioners to contract doctors. It tends to standardize fees. The ethical objection has been that intervention by employer or insurance company makes a tripartite matter of the doctor-patient relation. Since the contract doctor owes his employment and looks for his pay to the employer or the insurance company rather than to the patient, he serves two masters with conflicting interests. In many cases companies assumed liability for medical or surgical service only if they approved the treatment in advance. There was evidence of instances where promptly needed treatment was delayed while obtaining company approval, and where a lay insurance official disapproved treatment advised by a doctor.
In 1936, five private associations were selling prepaid medical certificates in Oregon, and doctors of that State, alarmed at the extent to which private practice was being invaded and superseded by contract practice, commenced a crusade to stamp it out. A tooth-and-claw struggle ensued between the organized medical profession, on the one hand, and the organizations employing contract doctors on the other. The campaign was bitter on both sides. State and county medical societies adopted resolutions and policy statements condemning contract practice and physicians who engaged in it. They brought pressure on individual doctors to decline or abandon it. They threatened expulsion from medical societies, and one society did expel several doctors for refusal to terminate contract practices.
However, in 1941, seven years before this action was commenced, there was an abrupt about-face on the part of the organized medical profession in Oregon. It was apparently convinced that the public demanded and was entitled to purchase protection against unexpected costs of disease and accident, which are catastrophic to persons without reserves. The organized doctors completely reversed their strategy, and, instead of trying to discourage prepaid medical service, decided to render it on a nonprofit basis themselves.
In that year, Oregon Physicians’ Service, one of the defendants in this action, was formed. It is a nonprofit Oregon corporation, furnishing prepaid medical, surgical, and hospital care on a contract basis. As charged in the complaint, “It is sponsored and approved by the Oregon State Medical Society and is controlled and operated by members of that society. It sponsors, approves, and cooperates with component county societies and organizations controlled by the latter which offer prepaid medical plans.” 95 F. Supp., at 121. After seven years of successful operation, the Government brought this suit against the doctors, their professional organizations and their prepaid medical care company, asserting two basic charges: first, that they conspired to restrain and monopolize the business of providing prepaid medical care in the State of Oregon, and, second, that they conspired to restrain competition between doctor-sponsored prepaid medical plans within the State of Oregon in that Oregon Physicians’ Service would not furnish prepaid medical care in an area serviced by a local society plan.
The District Judge, after a long trial, dismissed the complaint on the ground that the Government had proved none of its charges by a preponderance of evidence. The direct appeal procedure does not give us the benefit of review by a Court of Appeals of findings of fact.
The appeal brings to us no important questions of law or unsettled problems of statutory construction. It is much like United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U. S. 338. Its issues are solely ones of fact. The record is long, replete with conflicts in testimony, and includes quantities of documentary material taken from the appellees’ files and letters written by doctors, employers, and employees. The Government and the appellees each put more than two score of witnesses on the stand. At the close of the trial the judge stated that his work “does not permit the preparation of a formal opinion in so complex a case. I will state my conclusions on the main issues and then will append some notes made at various stages throughout the trial. These may be of aid to counsel in the preparation of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be submitted as a basis for final judgment.” 95 F. Supp., at 104. These notes indicated his disposition of the issues, but the Government predicates a suggestion of bias on irrelevant soliloquies on socialized medicine, socialized law, and the like, which they contained. Admitting that these do not add strength ór persuasiveness to his opinion, they do not becloud his clear disposition of the main issues of the case, in all of which he ruled against the Government. Counsel for the doctors submitted detailed findings in accordance therewith. The Government did not submit requests to find, but by letter raised objections to various proposals of the appellees.
The trial judge found that appellees did not conspire to restrain or attempt to monopolize prepaid medical care in Oregon in the period 1936-1941, and that, even if such conspiracy during that time was proved, it was abandoned in 1941 with the formation of Oregon Physicians’ Service marking the entry of appellees into the prepaid medical care business. He ruled that what restraints were proved could be justified as reasonable to maintain proper standards of medical ethics. He found that supplying prepaid medical care within the State of Oregon by doctor-sponsored organizations does not constitute trade or commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act, but he declined to rule on the question whether supplying prepaid medical care by the private associations is interstate commerce.
The Government asks us to overrule each of these findings as contrary to the evidence, and to find that the business of providing prepaid medical care is interstate commerce. We are asked to review the facts and reverse and remand the case “for entry of a decree granting appropriate relief.” We are asked in substance to try the case de novo on the record, make findings and determine the nature and form of relief. We have heretofore declined to give such scope to our review. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., supra.
While Congress has provided direct appeal to this Court, it also has provided that where an action is tried by a court without a jury “Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.” Rule 52 (a), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. There is no case more appropriate for adherence to this rule than one in which the complaining party creates a vast record of cumulative evidence as to long-past transactions, motives, and purposes, the effect of which depends largely on credibility of witnesses.
The trial court rejected a grouping by the Government of its evidentiary facts into four periods, 1930-1936, the year 1936, 1936-1941, and 1941 to trial. That proposal projected the inquiry over an eighteen-year period before the action was instituted. The court accepted only the period since the organization of Oregon Physicians’ Service as significant and rejected the earlier years as “ancient history” of a time “when the Doctors were trying to find themselves. ... It was a period of groping for the correct position to take to accord with changing times.” 95 F. Supp., at 105. Of course, present events have roots in the past, and it is quite proper to trace currently questioned conduct backwards to illuminate its connections and meanings. But we think the trial judge was quite right in rejecting pre-1941 events as establishing the cause of action the Government was trying to maintain, and adopt his division of the time involved into two periods, 1936-1941, and 1941 to trial.
It will simplify consideration of such cases as this to keep in sight the target at which relief is aimed. The sole function of an action for injunction is to forestall future violations. It is so unrelated to punishment or reparations for those past that its pendency or decision does not prevent concurrent or later remedy for past violations by indictment or action for damages by those injured. All it takes to make the cause of action for relief by injunction is a real threat of future violation or a contemporary violation of a nature likely to continue or recur. This established, it adds nothing that the calendar of years gone by might have been filled with transgressions. Even where relief is mandatory in form, it is to undo existing conditions, because otherwise they are likely to continue. In a forward-looking action such as this, an examination of “a great amount of archeology” is justified only when it illuminates or explains the present and predicts the shape of things to come.
When defendants are shown to have settled into a continuing practice or entered into a conspiracy violative of antitrust laws, courts will not assume that it has been abandoned without clear proof. Local 167 v. United States, 291 U. S. 293, 298. It is the duty of the courts to beware of efforts to defeat injunctive relief by protestations of repentance and reform, especially when abandonment seems timed to anticipate suit, and there is probability of resumption. Cf. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 445.
But we find not the slightest reason to doubt the genuineness, good faith or permanence of the changed attitude and strategy of these defendant-appellees which took place in 1941. It occurred seven years before this suit was commenced and, so far as we are informed, before it was predictable. It did not consist merely of pretensions or promises but was an overt and visible reversal of policy, carried out by extensive operations which have every appearance of being permanent because wise and advantageous for the doctors. The record discloses no threat or probability of resumption of the abandoned warfare against prepaid medical service and the contract practice it entails. We agree with the trial court that conduct discontinued in 1941 does not warrant the issuance of an injunction in 1949. Industrial Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 64, 84.
Appellees, in providing prepaid medical care, may engage in activities which violate the antitrust laws. They are now competitors in the field and restraints, if any are to be expected, will be in their methods of promotion and operation of their own prepaid plan. Our duty is to inquire whether any restraints have been proved of a character likely to continue if not enjoined.
Striking the events prior to 1941 out of the Government’s case, except for purposes of illustration or background information, little of substance is left. The case derived its coloration and support almost entirely from the abandoned practices. It would prolong this opinion beyond useful length, to review evidentiary details peculiar to this case. We mention what appear to be some highlights.
Only the Multnomah County Medical Society resorted to expulsions of doctors because of contract-practice activities, and there have been no expulsions for such cause since 1941. There were hints in the testimony that Multnomah was reviving the expulsion threat a short time before this action was commenced, but nothing came of it, and what that Society might do within the limits of its own membership does not necessarily indicate a joint venture or conspiracy with other appellees.
Some emphasis is placed on a report of a meeting of the House of Delegates of the State Society at which it was voted that the “private patient status” policy theretofore applied to private commercial hospital association contracts be extended to the industrial and railroad type of contracts. Any significance of this provision seems neutralized -by another paragraph in the same report, which reads: “A receipt should be furnished each patient at the time of each visit, as it is understood the [industrial and railroad plan] companies concerned will probably establish a program of reimbursement to the affected employees.” That does not strike us as a threat to restrict the practice of industrial and railroad companies of reimbursing employees for medical expenses and we cannot say that any ambiguity was not properly resolved in appellees’ favor by the trial court.
The record contains a number of letters from doctors to private associations refusing to accept checks directly from them. Some base refusal on a policy of their local medical society, others are silent as to reasons. Some may be attributed to the writers’ personal resistance to dealing directly with the private health associations, for it is clear that many doctors objected to filling out the company forms and supplying details required by the associations, and preferred to confine themselves to direct dealing with the patient and leaving the patient to deal with the associations. Some writers may have mistaken or misunderstood the policy of local associations. Others may have avoided disclosure of personal opposition by the handy and impersonal excuse of association “policy.” The letters have some evidentiary value, but it is not compelling and, weighed against the other post-1941 evidence, does not satisfy us that the trial court's findings are “clearly erroneous.”
Since no concerted refusal to deal with private health associations has been proved, we need not decide whether it would violate the antitrust laws. We might observe in passing, however, that there are ethical considerations where the historic direct relationship between patient and physician is involved which are quite different than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial matters. This Court has recognized that forms of competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession. Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608.
Appellees’ evidence to disprove conspiracy is not conclusive, is necessarily largely negative, but is too persuasive for us to say it was clear error to accept it. In 1948, 1,210 of the 1,660 licensed physicians in Oregon were members of the Oregon State Medical Society, and between January 1, 1947, and June 30, 1948, 1,085 Oregon doctors billed and received payment directly from the Industrial Hospital Association, only one of the several private plans operating in the State. Surely there was no effective boycott, and ineffectiveness, in view of the power over its members which the Government attributes to the Society, strongly suggests the lack of an attempt to boycott these private associations. A parade of local medical society members from all parts of the State, apparently reputable, credible, and informed professional men, testified that their societies now have no policy of discrimination against private health associations, and that no attempts are made to prevent individual doctors from cooperating with them. Members of the governing councils of the State and Multnomah County Societies testified that since 1940 there have been no suggestions in their meetings of attempts to prevent individual doctors from serving private associations. The manager of Oregon Physicians' Service testified that at none of the many meetings and conferences of local societies attended by him did he hear any proposal to prevent doctors from cooperation with private plans.
If the testimony of these many responsible witnesses is given credit, no finding of conspiracy to restrain or monopolize this business could be sustained. Certainly we cannot say that the trial court's refusal to find such a conspiracy was clearly erroneous.
The other charge is that appellees conspired to restrain competition between the several doctor-sponsored organizations within the State of Oregon. The charge here, as we understand it from paragraph 33 (i) of the complaint, 95 F. Supp., at 124, is that Oregon Physicians' Service, the state-wide organization, and the county-medical-society-sponsored plans agreed not to compete with one another. Apparently if a county was provided with prepaid medical care by a local society, the state society would stay out, or if the county society wanted to inaugurate a local plan, the state society would withdraw from the area.
This is not a situation where suppliers of commercial commodities divide territories and make reciprocal agreements to exploit only the allotted market, thereby depriving allocated communities of competition. This prepaid plan does not supply to, and its allocation does not withhold from, any community medical service or facilities of any description. No matter what organization issues the certificate, it will be performed, in the main, by the local doctors. The certificate serves only to prepay their fees. The result, if the state association should enter into local competition with the county association, would be that the inhabitants could prepay medical services through either one of two medical society channels. There is not the least proof that duplicating sources of the prepaid certificates would make them cheaper, more available or would result in an improved service or have any beneficial effect on anybody. Through these nonprofit organizations the doctors of each locality, in practical effect, offer their services and hospitalization on a prepaid basis instead of on the usual cash fee or credit basis. To hold it illegal because they do not offer their services simultaneously and in the same locality through both a state and a county organization would be to require them to compete with themselves in sale of certificates. Under the circumstances proved here, we cannot regard the agreement by these nonprofit organizations not to compete as an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
With regard to this charge, the court found, “The sale of medical services, by Doctor Sponsored Organizations, as conducted within the State of Oregon, is not trade or commerce within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, nor is it commerce within the meaning of the constitutional grant of power to Congress 'To regulate Commerce ... among the several States.’ ” 95 F. Supp., at 118. If that finding in both aspects is not to be overturned as clearly erroneous, it, of course, disposes of this charge, for if there was no restraint of interstate commerce, the conduct charged does not fall within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.
Almost everything pointed to in the record by the Government as evidence that interstate commerce is involved in this case relates to across-state-line activities of the private associations. It is not proven, however, to be adversely affected by any allocation of territories by doctor-sponsored plans. So far as any evidence brought to our attention discloses, the activities of the latter are wholly intrastate. The Government did show that Oregon Physicians’ Service made a number of payments to out-of-state doctors and hospitals, presumably for treatment of policyholders who happened to remove or temporarily to be away from Oregon when need for service arose. These were, however, few, sporadic and incidental. Cf. Industrial Assn. v. United States, supra, at 84.
American Medical Assn. v. United States, 317 U. S. 519, does not stand for the proposition that furnishing of prepaid medical care on a local plane is interstate commerce. That was a prosecution under § 3 of the Sherman Act of a conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce in the District of Columbia. Interstate commerce was not necessary to the operation of the statute there.
We conclude that the Government has not clearly proved its charges. Certainly the court’s findings are not clearly erroneous. “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395. The Government’s contentions have been plausibly and earnestly argued but the record does not leave us with any “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
As was aptly stated by the New York Court of Appeals, although in a case of a rather different substantive nature: “Face to face with living witnesses the original trier of the facts holds a position of advantage from which appellate judges are excluded. In doubtful cases the exercise of his power of observation often proves the most accurate method of ascertaining the truth. . . . How can we say the judge is wrong? We never saw the witnesses. . . . To the sophistication and sagacity of the trial judge the law confides the duty of appraisal.” Boyd v. Boyd, 252 N. Y. 422, 429, 169 N. E. 632, 634.
Affirmance is, of course, without prejudice to future suit if practices in conduct of the Oregon Physicians’ Service or the county services, whether or not involved in the present action, shall threaten or constitute violation of the antitrust laws. Cf. United States v. Reading Co., 226 U. S. 324, 373.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black is of opinion that the judgment below is clearly erroneous and should be reversed.
Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this ease.
Pursuant to § 2 of the Expediting Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 29.
95 F. Supp. 103.
26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ... is declared to be illegal . . . .”
15 U. S. C. § 2: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . .
Judge Augustus Hand, “Trial Efficiency,” dealing with antitrust cases, Business Practices Under Federal Antitrust Laws, Symposium, New York State Bar Assn. (C. C. H. 1951) 31-32. See also Sec. VIII, Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, a Report adopted September 26, 1951, by the Judicial Conference of the United States.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case brought here on writ of certiorari tests the validity under the Anti-Assignment Act, R. S. § 3477, of an assignment of a claim against the United States for property damage. In an effort to escape the prohibition of that Act, respondents joined their assignors, Mrs. Kathleen Boshamer et al., as well as the United States as parties defendant. The District Court, holding the assignment to be “of full force and effect,” entered judgment for respondents against the United States alone. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 186 F. 2d 430.
The Boshamers owned, in addition to adjoining land which they leased to the United States, two one-acre tracts of land not under lease on which were located two houses and a barn. During January and February, 1945, these buildings were damaged by soldiers of the United States. On April 30, 1946, the Boshamers agreed to sell the entire tract — including both the léased and unleased portions — to respondents Samuel and W. L. Shannon, and in that instrument agreed that “after completion of the sale and after delivery of the deed, the sellers hereby release to the purchasers any claim, reparation, or other cause of action against the United States Government for any damage caused the property . . . .”
Respondents brought the present action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1346 (b). In their complaint respondents alleged that the Boshamers “have a cause of action against the United States of America and since they have assigned this cause of action to [respondents] for a valuable consideration and since they must prosecute this action in their own names they are equitably liable to [respondents] for the amount of any judgment that they may recover against the United States of America,” and further alleged that the Boshamers had “refus[ed] to aid [respondents] in recovering the damages to which [respondents] are entitled.” The Boshamers filed an answer stating that they had made the assignment but -“are without knowledge or information as to any damages done . . . and . . . have been unwilling to institute or prosecute a damage suit against their Government for something they have no knowledge of.” At the trial respondents admitted that all of the damage had occurred before the claim had been assigned to them, and that they had known of the damage at the time of the assignment. The District Court, however, held the Anti-Assignment Act inapplicable on the ground . that the joinder of the assignors prevented any possible prejudice to the Government, since “[tjhe rights of all of the possible claimants and of the United States will be finally adjudicated in this one suit.”
The Court of Appeals affirmed, believing that the assignment had resulted from a “mutual mistake as to the law,” and holding that: '
“Relief is granted, not merely because [respondents] are assignees, nor even because the vendors have been made parties to the suit, but because of the mistake that led to the making of the assignment, which was a part of the consideration for the purchase price paid by [respondents] for the land conveyed to them. The relief is given to the assignees, not as a matter of law, but as a matter of equity because of the mistake involved and the hardship which would otherwise result.” 186 F. 2d 430, 434.
We cannot agree.' In our view the judgment is based entirely on the assignment, v/hich falls clearly within the ban. of the Anti-Assignment Act. -We have recently had occasion to review the Act’s purposes. In United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 373 (1949), we stated that “[i]ts primary purpose was undoubtedly to prevent persons of influence from buying up claims against the /United States, which might then be improperly urged upon officers of the Government,” and that a second purpose was “to prevent possible multiple payment of claims, to make unnecessary the investigation of alleged assignments, and to enable the Government to deal only with the original claimant.” Other courts have found yet another purpose of the statute, namely, to save to the United States “defenses which it has to claims by an assignor by way of set-off, counter claim, etc.,-which might not be. applicable to an assignee.”
In the Aetna case’, supra, this Court reaffirmed the principle that the statute does not' apply to assignments by operation of law, as distinguished from voluntary assignments. There can be no doubt that in the present case the assignment was voluntary. The Boshamers were free to sell their land as well as their damage claim to whomever they pleased, or, had they chosen, they could have sold the land and the plaim separately. The voluntary nature of the assignment is reflected, in the fact that one of the respondents testified on cross-examination that he understood that he was “buying a claim against the Government.”
That an assignment is voluntary is not an end to' the matter, however. In the ninety-nine-year history of the Anti-Assignment Act, this Court has recognized as exceptions to the broad sweep of the statute two types of voluntary assignments (aside from voluntary assignments made after a claim has been allowed): transfers by will, Erwin v. United States, 97 U. S. 392, 397 (1878), and general assignments for the benefit of creditors, Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556, 560-561 (1881). The first of these exceptions is justified by analogy to transfers by intestacy, which are exempt from the statute as being transfers by operation of law* It would be unwise to make a distinction for purposes of the Act. between transfers which serve so much the same purposes as transfers by will and by intestacy. In similar fashion, the -exception for voluntary .assignments for the benefit t>f creditors has been justified by analogy to assignments in bankruptcy, See Goodman v. Niblack, supra. We find no such compelling analogies In the case at bar. On the contrary, this casé presents a situation productive of the very evils which Congress intended to prevent. For example, the assignors knew of no damage and refused to bring suit, yet by their assignment the Government is forced to defend this suit through the courts and deal with persons who were strangers to the damage and, are seeking to enforce a claim which their assignors have forsworn. One of Congress’ basic purposes in passing the Act was “that the government might not be harassed by multiplying the number of persons with whom it had to deal.” Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567, 576 (1886). See also United States v. Aetna Surety Co., supra.
.Nor are we persuaded by the special considerations' which the Court of Appeals thought were controlling here. To hold the Anti-Assignment Act inapplicable be-' cause an assignment has been executed under a “mutual mistake of law” would require an inquiry into the state of mind of all parties to a challenged assignment, .and would reward those who are ignorant of a statute which has been on the books for nearly a century. The all-inclusive language of the Act permits no such easy escape from its prohibition. In like manner, to hold the Act inapplicable because all possible claimants are before the court would be to draw a distinction on the basis of a purely fortuitous factor — whether an assignee, in his suit against the Government, can get personal service on his assignor. Even more important, this theory that an assignee can avoid the Act by joining his assignor as a party defendant or an unwilling party plaintiff, would not only subvert the purposes of the Act but flood the courts with litigation by permitting them to recognize assigned claims which the accounting officers of the . Government would be obligated to reject. Since only a court cán give the binding adjudication of the rights of all parties to’the transaction — United States, assignor, and assignee— which .it is claimed prevents any possible prejudice to the Government, the courts would be applying a laxer rule under the statute than would the accounting officers. Such was not the intention of Congress. See United States v. Gillis, 95 U. S. 407 (1877). We do not believe the Act can be by-passed by the use of any such procedural contrivance.
The Court of Appeals also felt' that respondents’ claim should be upheld because “hardship” would otherwise result. If it were necessary only to balance equities in order to decide whether the Anti-Assignment Act applies — a view which this. Court has many times repudiated — respondents would have little weight on their side of the scales. They paid the Boshamers $30 per acre for the land and buildings plus the claim; yet they admitted at the trial that land adjoining the Boshamer farm was worth $100 an acre or more, and that the Boshamer farm was one of the best in the county. Furthermore, we find here no “unconscionable” conduct on the part of the government agents. They had no part in the making of the assignment upon which respondents rely, and in fact the first dealing between respondents and the government agents occurred at least six weeks after that assignment had been executed.
The judgment is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Jackson dissent.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
I would dismiss these writs of certiorari.
After the argument of these cases it became manifest that they were legal sports. Each presents a unique set of circumstances. Neither is likely to recur; both are individualized instances outside the scope.of those considerations of importance which alone, as a matter of sound judicial discretion, justify disposition of a writ of certiorari on the merits.
The controlling purpose of the radical reforms introduced by the Judiciary Act of 1925, reinforced by an exercise of the Court’s rule-making power in regard to the residual jurisdiction on appeal (see Rule 12 and 275 U. S. 603-604, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 33, 42 et seq.), was to put the right to come here, for all practical purposes, in the Court’s judicial discretion. Needless to §ay, the reason for this is to enable the Court to adjudicate wisely, and therefore after adequate deliberation, the controversies that make the Court’s existence indispensable under our Federal system.
From time to tiine some cases which ought never to have been here in the first instance are bound to reach the stage of argument, despite the process by which the wheat of worthy petitions for certiorari is sifted from the vast chaff of cases for which review is sought here, too often because of the blind litigiousness of parties or of the irresponsibility and excessive zeal of their counsel. Since the Judiciary Act of 1925, successive Chief Justices have repeatedly brought this abuse of the certiorari privilege to the attention' of the Bar, but thus far without avail. When it is considered that at the last Term the Court passed on 987 such petitions, it is surprising, not that petitions are granted that escaped appropriate weeding-out— and, parenthetically, that a few are inappropriately denied — but that the process of rejection works as well as it does. And of course disposition of this volume of petitions for certiorari is the smaller part of the Court’s work.
The fact that a case inappropriate ~for review escaped denial through a weeding-out process that is bound to be circumscribed, is no reason for compounding the oversight by disposing of such a case on the merits, after argument has made more luminously clear than did the preliminary examination of the papers that the litigation ought to be allowed to rest where it is by dismissing the writ. The reason for this was set forth on behalf of the Court by Mr. Chief Justice Taft:
“If it be suggested that as much effort and time as we have given to the consideration of the alleged conflict would have enabled us to dispose of the case before us on the merits, the answer is that it is very important that‘we be consistent in not granting the writ of certiorari except in cases involving .principles the settlement of which is of importance to the public as distinguished from that of the parties, and in cases where there is a real and embarrassing conflict of opinion and authority between the circuit courts of appeal. The present case certainly comes under neither head.” Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 U. S. 387, 393.
In fairness to the effective adjudication of those cases for which the Court sits, the Court has again and again acted on these considerations and dismissed the writ as “improvidently granted” after the preliminary and necessarily tentative consideration of the petition. These reasons are especially compelling when the Court’s mistake in assuming that an important issue of general law was involved does not survive argument as to cases like the present, which were part of the vast summer accumulation of petitions to come before the Court at the .opening of the Term.
342 U. S. 808.
10 Stat. 170, as amended, 31 U. S. C. § 203:
“All transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the United States, or of any part or share thereof, or interest therein, whether absolute or conditional, and whatever may be the consideration therefor, and all powers of attorney, orders, or other authorities for receiving payment of any such claim, or of aúy part or. share thereof, shall be absolutely null and void, unless they are freely made and executed in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses, after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertainment' of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for the payment thereof. . . .”
Hereafter referred to as “the Boshamers.”
R. 33.
Originally there were two cases, one under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1346 (a)(2), for damages to property under lease to the United States, and the second under the Tort Claims Act for damages to buildings on property not under lease. The District Court awarded respondents judgment for $2,050 in the first action and $975 in the second, and both judgments were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Tort Claims action alone is involved here.
R. 20.
R. 23.
R. 18.
Grace v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 174, 175 (1948).
R. 13.
[This opinion applies also to No. 46, United States v. Jordan, post, p. 911.]
Compare the 154 petitions for certiorari presented to the Court during the October Term, 1915. Even one-sixth of our current volume of petitions impelled the Court to emphasize the administrative importance of freeing this Court from the imposition of improperly-granted petitions for certiorari. Furness, Withy & Co. v. Yang-Tsze Ins. Assn., Ltd., 242 U. S. 430, 434.
In addition to passing upon the 987 petitions for certiorari, the Court during the last Term considered and disposed of 77 cases by the “per curiam decisions,” 121 “other applications” on the Miscellaneous Docket, and 5 cases on the Original Docket, and after argument decided with full opinion 114 cases. Journal Sup. Court U. S., October Term, 1950, i.
United States v. Rimer, 220 U. S. 547; Furness, Withy & Co. v. Yang-Tsze Ins. Assn., Ltd., supra; Tyrrell v. District of Columbia, 243 U. S. 1; Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., supra; Southern Power Co. v. North Carolina Public Service Co., 263 U. S. 508; Keller v. Adams-Campbell Co., 264 U. S. 314; Wisconsin Elec. Co. v. Dumore Co., 282 U. S. 813; Sanchez v. Borras, 283 U. S. 798; Franklin-American Trust Co. v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 286 U. S. 533; Moor v. Texas & New Orleans R. Co., 297 U. S. 101; Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Neill, 302 U. S. 645; Goodman v. United States, 305 U. S. 578; Goins v. United States, 306 U. S. 622; McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 323 U. S. 327; McCarthy v. Bruner, 323 U. S. 673. See also Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co. v. Burton, 287 U. S. 97, 100; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 64.
Both of the petitions in these cases were filed on May 3, 1951, and granted on October 8, 1951. 342 U. S. 808, 809. At this Term’s opening the Court passed on 224 petitions for certiorari accumulated during the summer. In addition, at the beginning of this Term 4 cases were dismissed on motion; 6 other cases were disposed of by “per curiam decisions,” and 14 Miscellaneous Docket “applications”, were disposed of.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 824, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (b), provides that “[n]o natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the [Federal Power] Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission . . . that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment.” The question presented in this case is whether the FPC may, upon a proper finding of public convenience or necessity, simultaneously authorize both the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce by a producer and the abandonment of the sale at a future date certain. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit construed § 7 (b) to empower the FPC to authorize abandonment only when and if proposed at the end of the contract term, thus precluding power to authorize abandonment simultaneously with certificating new producer sales. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals set aside the FPC order involved in this case insofar as it permits the Commission, at the time it issues a certificate of public convenience and necessity, to authorize the producer to terminate the sale at the end of the contract term. 164 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 502 F. 2d 461 (1974). We granted certiorari. 422 U. S. 1006 (1975). We reverse.
I
FPC Order No. 455, 48 F. P. C. 218, issued August 3, 1972, is the order involved. The order was promulgated under FPC rulemaking authority pursuant to a notice of April 6, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 7345, as an addition to the FPC’s general rules of practice and procedure, 18 CFR §2.75 (1975). Order No. 455 established an “optional procedure for certificating new producer sales of natural gas.” 48 F. P. C., at 218. The new procedure did not displace area pricing, but instead provided an alternative to “stimulate and accelerate domestic exploration and development of natural gas reserves.” Id., at 225. The procedure was necessary, the Commission found, because natural gas producers were frequently unable, due to hazards of area price revisions in lengthy appellate review proceedings, to rely upon rates established by the FPC in its area rate orders, and thus were discouraged from exploring for new gas and committing it to the interstate market. For “there is no assurance at the present time that a producer may not ultimately have to refund some of an initial rate ... upon which the producer relied when it dedicated a new gas supply to the interstate market.” Id., at 222-223. “[T]he producer does not know ... how much it will get if it develops and sells new gas to the interstate market. The producer knows for sure only that once it sells in interstate commerce it cannot stop deliveries.” Id., at 223. “This uncertainty,” the Commission found, “has impeded domestic exploration and development.” Ibid.
The optional procedure introduced by Order No. 455 was designed to “lessen rate uncertainty which has prevailed since the early 1960’s.” Id., at 219. The procedure has several features. First, it permits producers to tender for FPC approval contracts for the sale of new natural gas at rates that may exceed the maximum authorized by the applicable rate order. Second, the FPC will determine in a single proceeding whether the “public convenience and necessity” under § 7 (c) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (c), warrants the issuance of a certificate authorizing the sale and whether the rates called for by the contract are “just and reasonable” under §4 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 717c (a). Third, a permanent certificate issued by the Commission and accepted by the producer is not subject to change in later proceedings under § 4 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717c, and the rates may be collected without risk of refund obligations. 48 F. P. C., at 226. See 18 CFR § 2.75(d) (1975). Fourth, Order No. 455 authorizes inclusion in the permanent certificate of the abandonment assurance — or “pregranted abandonment” — called in question in this case. 18 CFR § 2.75 (e) (1975). The authority to include assurance that the producer may abandon the sale at the end of the contract term is, however, to be exercised only upon appropriate findings by the FPC of public convenience or necessity, as required by § 7 (b). Order No. 455-A, 48 F. P. C. 477, 481 (1972).
The importance to the producer of the pregranted abandonment provision is obvious. Pregranted abandonment gives the producer assurance that his present sale will not indefinitely commit the gas to what may be a lower priced interstate market: he will be free on the. contract expiration date to discontinue deliveries to the purchaser without having to demonstrate again that abandonment is consistent with the public convenience or necessity.
II
The entire optional procedure of Order No. 455 was attacked in petitions for review before the Court of Appeals, which upheld the order in all respects save the pregranted abandonment authority. In holding that § 7 (b) requires a public-convenience-or-necessity finding by the FPC at the time of the proposed abandonment, thus precluding such finding at the time of certification, the Court of Appeals stated, 164 U. S. App. D. C., at 12, 502 F. 2d, at 472:
“Pregranted abandonment would leave a producer free to discontinue service to the interstate market, perhaps years after the original certification, with no contemporaneous obligation on the producer to justify withdrawal of service as consistent with the public convenience and necessity. We think Section 7 (b) does not contemplate or authorize such procedure.
“... It appears to us . .. that pregranted abandonment requires more clairvoyance than even the Commission's expertise reasonably encompasses.”
We find nothing on the face of § 7 (b) to support the holding that the section “does not contemplate or authorize such procedure.” There is no express provision prescribing the timing of the finding of public convenience or necessity that is prerequisite to FPC authority to allow the producer to abandon a sale. In the absence of an explicit direction, the inference may reasonably be made that Congress left the timing of the finding within the general discretionary power granted the FPC “to regulate the abandonment of service,” S. Rep. No. 1162, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937); H. R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). “[T]he Commission's broad responsibilities . . . demand a generous construction of its statutory authority,” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 776 (1968) (footnote omitted), and that inference is plainly consistent with Congress’ regulatory goals.
The reasoning of the Court of Appeals that pregranted abandonment requires “clairvoyance” overlooks the express power granted to the FPC in § 7 (b) to allow abandonment upon a proper finding that the “present or future” public convenience or necessity warrants permission to abandon. The power to authorize an abandonment upon finding that it is justified by future public convenience or necessity clearly encompasses advance authorization warranted by consideration of future circumstances and the necessary estimation of tomorrow’s needs. That has been our conclusion when FPC authority to make forecasts of future events has been challenged in other contexts. For example, in rejecting the contention that the FPC could not consider forecasts of the future under the nearly identical standard of § 7 (e), FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Corp., 365 U. S. 1, 29 (1961), stated that “a forecast of the direction in which future pub-lie interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency.” Similarly, as to another agency, we have stated our unwillingness to let “uncertainties as to the future ... paralyze the [Interstate Commerce] Commission into inaction.” United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Nav. Co., 326 U. S. 236, 241 (1945). Thus, to the extent that exercising the pregranted abandonment authority entails forecasting future developments affecting supply and demand, we cannot say that requiring this degree of “clairvoyance” renders the provision beyond FPC authority.
Furthermore, the FPC may determine that present supply and demand conditions require that pregranted abandonment be authorized in appropriate cases to encourage exploration for new gas and its dedication to the interstate market, since the unwillingness of producers to make indefinite commitments has made potentially available supplies inaccessible to the interstate market. We conclude therefore that an optional procedure encompassing pregranted authority intended to draw new gas supplies to the interstate market is clearly within FPC authority to permit abandonments justified by either present or future public convenience or necessity.
Order No. 455 does not authorize specific abandon-ments. It merely establishes an optional procedure under which pregranted abandonment may be authorized in appropriate cases. Any pregranted abandonments approved under this procedure are subject to judicial review under the Act. See § 19 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 717r (b). We should not presume, as the Court of Appeals did, that the Commission is not competent to make proper findings supported by substantial evidence and consistent with § 7 (b) in approving pregranted abandonment. Rather, the question whether particular pre-granted abandonment authorization's are beyond the Commission’s expertise should await resolution in concrete cases. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U. S. 380, 392 (1974). It suffices for the purposes of this case that we read § 7 (b) as leaving the timing of approval of abandonments to FPC discretion.
Ill
The Court of Appeals stated that its construction of § 7 (b) as denying FPC authority to authorize abandonment on a future date certain at the time of certification was “fortified” by Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U. S. 137 (1960) (Sunray II). Sunray II held that the FPC had authority to tender a certificate of public convenience and necessity without time limitation to a producer who applied for a certificate authorizing sales for 20 years only. The Court reasoned, id., at 142:
“If petitioners’ contentions, as to the want of authority in the Commission to grant a permanent certificate where one of limited duration has been sought for, were to be sustained, the way would be clear for every independent producer of natural gas to seek certification only for the limited period of its initial contract with the transmission company, and thus automatically be free at a future date, untrammeled by Commission regulation, to reassess whether it desired to continue serving the interstate market.”
We understand the Court of Appeals to read this passage as implying that a limited-term certificate would be barred by the Act, and that a permanent certificate with pregranted abandonment would also be barred since such a certificate, as the FPC concedes, Brief for FPC 22, is legally and functionally indistinguishable from a limited-term certificate. But the Court of Appeals’ reading of Sunray II was patently erroneous. Sunray II in fact indicated that the FPC is authorized to issue limited-term certificates. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had addressed that question at an earlier stage of the litigation and had held that the FPC was authorized to issue such certificates. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 239 F. 2d 97 (1956), rev’d on other grounds, 353 U. S. 944 (1957) (Sunray I). Sunray II implicitly approved this holding in stating, 364 U. S., at 157: “There is no contention that the Commission was again indulging in the erroneous notion that it had no power to issue a limited certificate.”
Thus, rather than imply that the Act forbids the issuance of a limited-term certificate, Sunray II approved the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that the Act permits the issuance of such a certificate. Sunray II therefore supports the conclusion we have reached and does not fortify the Court of Appeals’ construction of § 7 (b). In both the case of the limited-term certificate and the case of the permanent certificate with pregranted abandonment, the FPC determines at the time of certification that the present or future public convenience or necessity justifies the issuance of a certificate that allows discontinuance of service at a future date certain without need for further proceedings.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as it set aside the pregranted abandonment provision of Order No. 455, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 7 (b) of the Act provides in full text:
“No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment.”
The optional procedure is available for sales of gas produced from wells commenced after April 6, 1972, and gas that has not previously been sold in the interstate market. 18 CFR § 2.75 (b)(5) (1975).
After adoption of the optional procedure, the FPC established a national ceiling rate for some sales of natural gas. Opinion No. 699, 51 F. P. C. 2212 (1974). The optional procedure was then amended to permit producers to tender contracts for certification including rates exceeding the national ceiling, as well as area rates. Order No. 455-B, 52 F. P. C. 1416 (1974).
The procedure does not, however, limit the applicability of § 5, 15 U. S. C. § 717d. See 18 CFR § 2.75 (d) (1975). The Commission noted in Order No. 455 that it was unable to “bind a future Commission not to invoke the prospective operation of Section 5”; the Commissioners further stated that “[t]o the extent that this Commission can grant certainty of rates, we do so.” 48 F. P. C. 218, 223 (1972).
This provision reads as follows:
“Applications presented hereunder will be considered for permanent certification, either with or without pregranted abandonment, notwithstanding that the contract rate may be in excess of an area ceiling rate established in a prior opinion or order of this Commission.”
Respondents’ cross-petition seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ decision to the extent that it adversely resolved their contentions was denied. 422 U. S. 1020 (1975).
The FPC has disclaimed any reliance on the ground, permitted under § 7 (b), that "the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted.” We therefore have no occasion to address the question whether pregranted abandonment on that ground would exceed FPC authority.
Paradoxically, similar considerations led the Court of Appeals to reject respondents’ challenge to a provision of the optional procedure requiring the Commission to determine the reasonableness of future rate escalations included in contracts submitted purr suant to the procedure. Yet no attempt was made to distinguish the case of future rate escalations from that of pregranted abandonment in this respect. The Court said:
“We cannot say as an abstract proposition of law that it is impossible for the Commission to make an advance determination of ‘reasonableness’ in proceedings under Section 4. Although as a practical matter one may be skeptical about the ability of the Commission to succeed in this endeavor, we think it may make the attempt. Whether it succeeds will depend upon the evidentiary basis for the escalations proposed in a given contract and the reasonableness of Commission findings and projections supporting and approving such escalations. The question is one of proof which can be answered only on a record setting out a particular proposal and the evidence supporting it.” 164 U. S. App. D. C., at 8, 502 F. 2d, at 468.
Respondents claim that the pregranted abandonment provision amounts to deregulation akin to that condemned in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U. S. 380, 400 (1974). But, unlike the small-producer exemption involved there, the FPC in the optional procedure retains full control over its regulatory jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals found that pregranted abandonment has “the same potentiality of prejudice to consumers” that this Court was concerned about in Sunray II. 164 U. S. App. D. C., at 12, 502 F. 2d, at 472. In that case, however, Sunray’s position would .have removed FPC discretion not to issue limited-term certificates whenever a producer sought a limited certificate. Both Sunray II and today’s decision maintain FPC discretion in this regard, while the Court of Appeals’ conclusion reduces the FPC’s ability to exercise its regulatory responsibility.
The first decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was reversed in Sunray I on the ground that the Court had itself decided whether the FPC should have issued a limited-term certificate, rather than remanding to the Commission to resolve this question in the first instance, 353 U. S. 944. Sunray II sustained the Court of Appeals’ later affirmance of the FPC’s issuance of an unlimited certificate, 267 F. 2d 471 (1959).
Moreover, if issuance of limited-term certificates were barred by the Act, there would have been no need to decide Sunray II. In that circumstance the producer could hardly have complained that the FPC failed to recognize its request for only a limited certificate, since such a reading of the Act requires the FPC in all cases to issue unlimited-term certificates.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
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