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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
After hearing oral argument and fully examining the record, we conclude that the totality of circumstances as the record makes them manifest did not warrant bringing the case here. Accordingly, the writ is dismissed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a partnership income tax case brought here by the United States on a petition for writ of certiorari from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Respondents, physicians and partners in a medical partnership, filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of California seeking the refund of income taxes previously paid pursuant to a deficiency assessed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The case was heard on an agreed statement of facts and the District Court ruled in respondents’ favor. 295 F. Supp. 1289 (1968). The Government appealed to the Ninth Circuit and that court affirmed the lower court’s judgment. 450 F. 2d 109 (1971). We agreed to hear this case to consider whether, as the Government contends, the decision below is in conflict with precedents of this Court. 405 U. S. 1039 (1972). Because we find that the decision is incompatible with basic principles of income taxation as developed in our prior cases, we reverse.
I
Respondents, each of whom is a physician, are partners in a limited partnership known as Permanente Medical Group, which was organized in California in 1949. Associated with the partnership are over 200 partner physicians, as well as numerous nonpartner physicians and other employees. In 1959, Permanente entered into an agreement with Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., a nonprofit corporation providing prepaid medical care and hospital services to its dues-paying members.
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Permanente agreed to supply medical services for the 390,000 member-families, or about 900,000 individuals, in Kaiser’s Northern California Region which covers primarily the San Francisco Bay area. In exchange for those services, Kaiser agreed to pay the partnership a “base compensation” composed of two elements. First, Kaiser undertook to pay directly to the partnership a sum each month computed on the basis of the total number of members enrolled in the health program. That number was multiplied by a stated fee, which originally was set at a little over $2.60. The second item of compensation — and the one that has occasioned the present dispute — called for the creation of a program, funded entirely by Kaiser, to pay retirement benefits to Permanente’s partner and non-partner physicians.
The pertinent compensation provision of the agreement did not itself establish the details of the retirement program; it simply obligated Kaiser to make contributions to such a program in the event that the parties might thereafter agree to adopt one. As might be expected, a separate trust agreement establishing the contemplated plan soon was executed by Permanente, Kaiser, and the Bank of America Trust and Sayings Association, acting as trustee. Under this agreement Kaiser agreed to make payments to the trust at a predetermined rate, initially pegged at 12 cents per health plan member per month. Additionally, Kaiser made a flat payment of $200,000 to start the fund and agreed that its pro rata payment obligation would be retroactive to the date of the signing of the medical service agreement.
The beneficiaries of the trust were all partner and nonpartner physicians who had completed at least two years of continuous service with the partnership and who elected to participate. The trust maintained a separate tentative account for each beneficiary. As periodic payments were received from Kaiser, the funds were allocated among these accounts pursuant to a complicated formula designed to take into consideration on a relative basis each participant's compensation level, length of service, and age. No physician was eligible to receive the amounts in his tentative account prior to retirement, and retirement established entitlement only if the participant had rendered at least 15 years of continuous service or 10 years of continuous service and had attained age 65. Prior to such time, however, the trust agreement explicitly provided that no interest in any tentative account was to be regarded as having vested in any particular beneficiary. The agreement also provided for the forfeiture of any physician's interest and its redistribution among the remaining participants if he were to terminate his relationship with Permanente prior to retirement. A similar forfeiture and redistribution also would occur if, after retirement, a physician were to render professional services for any hospital or health plan other than one operated by Kaiser. The trust agreement further stipulated that a retired physician’s right to receive benefits would cease if he were to refuse any reasonable request to render consultative services to any Kaiser-operated health plan.
The agreement provided that the plan would continue irrespective either of changes in the partnership’s personnel or of alterations in its organizational structure. The plan would survive any reorganization of the partnership so long as at least 50% of the plan’s participants remained associated with the reorganized entity. In the event of dissolution or of a nonqualifying reorganization, all of the amounts in the trust were to be divided among the participants entitled thereto in amounts governed by each participant’s tentative account. Under no circumstances, however, could payments from Kaiser to the trust be recouped by Kaiser: once compensation was paid into the trust it was thereafter committed exclusively to the benefit of Permanente’s participating physicians.
Upon the retirement of any partner or eligible non-partner physician, if he had satisfied each of the requirements for participation, the amount that had accumulated in his tentative account over the years would be applied to the purchase of a retirement income contract. While the program thus provided obvious benefits to Permanente’s physicans, it also served Kaiser’s interests. By providing attractive deferred benefits for Permanente’s staff of professionals, the retirement plan was designed to “create an incentive” for physicians to remain with Permanente and thus “insure” that Kaiser would have a “stable and reliable group of physicians.”
During the years from the plan’s inception until its discontinuance in 1963, Kaiser paid a total of more than $2,000,000 into the trust. Permanente, however, did not report these payments as income in its partnership returns. Nor did the individual partners include these payments in the computations of their distributive shares of the partnership’s taxable income. The Commissioner assessed deficiencies against each partner-respondent for his distributive share of the amount paid by Kaiser. Respondents, after paying the assessments under protest, filed these consolidated suits for refund.
The Commissioner premised his assessment on the conclusion that Kaiser’s payments to the trust constituted a form of compensation to the partnership for the services it rendered and therefore was income to the partnership. And, notwithstanding the deflection of those payments to the retirement trust and their current unavailability to the partners, the partners were still taxable on their distributive shares of that compensation. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals disagreed. They held that the payments to the fund were not income to the partnership because it did not receive them and never had a “right to receive” them. 295 F. Supp., at 1292-1294; 450 F. 2d, at 114-115. They reasoned that the partnership, as an entity, should be disregarded and that each partner should be treated simply as a potential beneficiary of his tentative share of the retirement fund. Viewed in this light, no presently taxable income could be attributed to these cash basis taxpayers because of the contingent and forfeitable nature of the fund allocations. 295 F. Supp., at 1294-1296 ; 450 F. 2d, at 112.
We hold that the courts below erred and that respondents were properly taxable on the partnership’s retirement fund income. This conclusion rests on two familiar principles of income taxation, first, that income is taxed to the party who earns it and that liability may not be avoided through an anticipatory assignment of that income, and, second, that partners are taxable on their distributive or proportionate shares of current partnership income irrespective of whether that income is actually distributed to them. The ensuing discussion is simply an application of those principles to the facts of the present case.
II
Section 703 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, insofar as pertinent here, prescribes that “[t]he taxable income of a partnership shall be computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual.” 26 U. S. C. §703 (a). Thus, while the partnership itself pays no taxes, 26 U. S. C. § 701, it must report the income it generates and such income must be calculated in largely the same manner as an individual computes his personal income. For this purpose, then, the partnership is regarded as an independently recognizable entity apart from the aggregate of its partners. Once its income is ascertained and reported, its existence may be disregarded since each partner must pay a tax on a portion of the total income as if the partnership were merely an agent or conduit through which the income passed.
In determining any partner’s income, it is first necessary to compute the gross income of the partnership. One of the major sources of gross income, as defined in § 61 (a)(1) of the Code, is “ [compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar items.” 26 U. S. C. §61 (a)(1). There can be no question that Kaiser’s payments to the retirement trust were compensation for services rendered by the partnership under the medical service agreement. These payments constituted an integral part of the employment arrangement. The agreement itself called for two forms of “base compensation” to be paid in exchange for services rendered— direct per-member, per-month payments to the partnership and other, similarly computed, payments to the trust. Nor was the receipt of these payments contingent upon any condition other than continuation of the contractual relationship and the performance of the prescribed medical services. Payments to the trust, much like the direct payments to the partnership, were not forfeitable by the partnership or recoverable by Kaiser upon the happening of any contingency.
Yet the courts below, focusing on the fact that the retirement fund payments were never actually received by the partnership but were contributed directly to the trust, found that the payments were not includable as income in the partnership’s returns. The view of tax accountability upon which this conclusion rests is incompatible with a foundational rule, which this Court has described as “the-first principle of income taxation: that income must be taxed to him who earns it.” Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733, 739-740 (1949). The entity earning the income — whether a partnership or an individual taxpayer — cannot avoid taxation by entering into a contractual arrangement whereby that income is diverted to some other person or entity. Such arrangements, known to the tax law as “anticipatory assignments of income,” have frequently been held ineffective as means of avoiding tax liability. The seminal precedent, written over 40 years ago, is Mr. Justice Holmes’ opinion for a unanimous Court in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930). There the taxpayer entered into a contract with his wife whereby she became entitled to one-half of any income he might earn in the future. On the belief that a taxpayer was accountable only for income actually received by him, the husband thereafter reported only half of his income. The Court, unwilling to accept that a reasonable construction of the tax laws permitted such easy deflection of income tax liability, held that the taxpayer was responsible for the entire amount of his income.
The basis for the Court’s ruling is explicit and controls the case before us today:
“[T]his case is not to be decided by attenuated subtleties. It turns on the import and reasonable construction of the taxing act. There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it. That seems to us the import of the statute before us and we think that no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.” Id., at 114-115.
The principle of Lacas v. Earl, that he who earns income may not avoid taxation through anticipatory arrangements no matter how clever or subtle, has been repeatedly invoked by this Court and stands today as a cornerstone of our graduated income tax system. See, e. g., Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U. S. 44 (1944); United States v. Joliet & Chicago R. Co., 315 U. S. 44 (1942); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 (1940); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 136 (1932). And, of course, that principle applies with equal force in assessing partnership income.
Permanente’s agreement with Kaiser, whereby a portion of the partnership compensation was deflected to the retirement fund, is certainly within the ambit of Lucas v. Earl. The partnership earned the income and, as a result of arm’s-length bargaining with Kaiser, was responsible for its diversion into the trust fund. The Court of Appeals found the Lucas principle inapplicable because Permanente “never had the right itself to receive the payments made into the trust as current income.” 450 F. 2d, at 114. In support of this assertion, the court relied on language in the agreed statement of facts stipulating that “[t]he payments . . . were paid solely to fund the retirement plan, and were not otherwise available to [Permanente] . . . .” Ibid. Emphasizing that the fund was created to serve Kaiser’s interest in a stable source of qualified, experienced physicians, the court found that Permanente could not have received that income except in the form in which it was received.
The court’s reasoning seems to be that, before the partnership could be found to have received income, there must be proof that “Permanente agreed to accept less direct compensation from Kaiser in exchange for the retirement plan payments.” Id., at 114-115. Apart from the inherent difficulty of adducing such evidence, we know of no authority imposing this burden upon the Government. Nor do we believe that the guiding principle of Lucas v. Earl may be so easily circumvented. Kaiser’s motives for making payments are irrelevant to the determination whether those amounts may fairly be viewed as compensation for services rendered. Neither does Kaiser’s apparent insistence upon payment to the trust deprive the agreed contributions of their character as compensation. The Government need not prove that the taxpayer had complete and unrestricted power to designate the manner and form in which his income is received. We may assume, especially in view of the relatively unfavorable tax status of self-employed persons with respect to the tax treatment of retirement plans, that many partnerships would eagerly accept conditions similar to those prescribed by this trust in consideration for tax-deferral benefits of the sort suggested here. We think it clear, however, that the tax laws permit no such easy road to tax avoidance or deferment. Despite the novelty and ingenuity of this arrangement, Permanente's “base compensation” in the form of payments to a retirement fund was income to the partnership and should have been reported as such.
III
Since the retirement fund payments should have been reported as income to the partnership, along with other income received from Kaiser, the individual partners should have included their shares of that income in their individual returns. 26 U. S. C. §§ 61 (a)(13), 702, 704. For it is axiomatic that each partner must pay taxes on his distributive share of the partnership's income without regard to whether that amount is actually distributed to him. Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U. S. 271 (1938), decided under a predecessor to the current partnership provisions of the Code, articulates the salient proposition. After concluding that “distributive” share means the “proportionate” share as determined by the partnership agreement, id., at 280, the Court stated:
“The tax is thus imposed upon the partner’s proportionate share of the net income of the partnership, and the fact that it may not be currently distributable, whether by agreement of the parties or by operation of law, is not material.” Id., at 281.
New principles of partnership taxation are more firmly established than that no matter the reason for nondistri-bution each partner must pay taxes on his distributive share. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1, 26 CFR § 1.702-1 (1972). See, e. g., Hulbert v. Commissioner, 227 F. 2d 399 (CA7 1955); Bell v. Commissioner, 219 F. 2d 442 (CA5 1955); Stewart v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 451 (SDNY 1967); Freudmann v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. 775 (1948); S. Surrey & W. Warren, Federal Income Taxation 1115 (1960) ; 6 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation §§ 35.01, 35.22 (1968); A. Willis, On Partnership Taxation § 5.01 (1971).
The courts below reasoned to the contrary, holding that the partners here were not properly taxable on the amounts contributed to the retirement fund. This view, apparently, was based on the assumption that each partner’s distributive share prior to retirement was too contingent and unascertainable to constitute presently recognizable income. It is true that no partner knew with certainty exactly how much he would ultimately receive or whether he would in fact be entitled to receive anything. But the existence of conditions upon the actual receipt by a partner of income fully earned by the partnership is irrelevant in determining the amount of tax due from him. The fact that the courts below placed such emphasis on this factor suggests the basic misapprehension under which they labored in this case. Rather than being viewed as responsible contributors to the partnership’s total income, respondent-partners were seen only as contingent beneficiaries of the trust. In some measure, this misplaced focus on the considerations of uncertainty and forfeitability may be a consequence of the erroneous manner in which the Commissioner originally assessed the partners’ deficiencies. The Commissioner divided Kaiser’s trust fund payments into two categories: (1) payments earmarked for the tentative accounts of nonpartner physicians; and (2) those allotted to partner physicians. The payments to the trust for the former category of nonpartner physicians were correctly counted as income to the partners in accord with the distributive-share formula as established in the partnership agreement. The latter payments to the tentative accounts of the individual partners, however, were improperly allocated to each partner pursuant to the complex formula in the retirement plan itself, just as if that agreement operated as an amendment to the partnership agreement. 295 F. Supp., at 1292.
The Solicitor General, alluding to this miscomputation during oral argument, suggested that this error “may be what threw the court below off the track.” It should be clear that the contingent and unascertainable nature of each partner's share under the retirement trust is irrelevant to the computation of his distributive share. The partnership had received as income a definite sum which was not subject to diminution or forfeiture. Only its ultimate disposition among the employees and partners remained uncertain. For purposes of income tax computation it made no difference that some partners might have elected not to participate in the retirement program or that, for any number of reasons, they might not ultimately receive any of the trust's benefits. Indeed, as the Government suggests, the result would be quite the same if the “potential beneficiaries included no partners at all, but were children, relatives, or other objects of the partnership's largesse.” The sole operative consideration is that the income had been received by the partnership, not what disposition might have been effected once the funds were received.
IV
In summary, we find this case controlled by familiar and long-settled principles of income and partnership taxation. There being no doubt about the character of the payments as compensation, or about their actual receipt, the partnership was obligated to report them as income presently received. Likewise, each partner was responsible for his distributive share of that income. We, therefore, reverse the judgments and remand the case with directions that judgments be entered for the United States.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.
Technically, the married respondents’ spouses are also parties because they filed joint income tax returns for the years in question here. Any reference to respondents in this opinion, however, refers only to the partner physicians.
The pertinent portion of the Kaiser-Permanente medical service contract states:
“Article H
“Base Compensation to Medical Group
“As base compensation to [Permanente] for Medical Services to be provided by [Permanente] hereunder, [Kaiser] shall pay to [Permanente] the amounts specified in this Article H.
“Section Provision for Savings and Retirement Program for Physicians.
“In the event that [Permanente] establishes a savings and retirement plan or other deferred compensation plan approved by [Kaiser], [Kaiser] will pay, in addition to all other sums payable by [Kaiser] under this Agreement, the contributions required under such plan to the extent that such contributions exceed amounts, if any, contributed by Physicians
The trust agreement states:
“The tentative accounts and suspended tentative accounts provided for Participants hereunder are solely for the purpose of facilitating record keeping and necessary computations, and confer no rights in the trust fund upon the individuals for whom they are established. . . .”
If, however, termination were occasioned by death or permanent disability, the trust agreement provided for receipt of such amounts as had accumulated in that physician’s tentative account. Additionally, if, after his termination for reasons of disability prior to retirement, a physician should reassociate with some affiliated medical group his rights as a participant would not be forfeited.
The agreed statement of facts filed by the parties in the District Court states:
“The primary purpose of the retirement plan was to create an incentive for physicians to remain with [Permanente] . . . and thus to insure [Kaiser] that it would have a stable and reliable group of physicians providing medical services to its members with a minimum, of turn-over. . . .”
The Court of Appeals purported not to decide, as the District Court had, whether the partnership should be viewed as an “entity” or as a “conduit.” 450 F. 2d 109, 113 n. 5, and 115. Yet, its analysis indicates that it found it proper to disregard the partnership as a separate entity. After explaining its view that Permanente never had a right to receive the payments, the Court of Appeals stated: “When the transaction is viewed in this light, the partnership becomes a mere agent contracting on behalf of its members for payments to the trust for their ultimate benefit, rather than a principal which itself realizes taxable income.” Id., at 115 (emphasis supplied).
Each respondent reported his income for the years in question on the cash basis. The partnership reported its taxable receipts under the accrual method.
There has been a great deal of discussion in the briefs and in the lower court opinions with respect to whether a partnership is to be viewed as an “entity” or as a “conduit.” We find ourselves in agreement with the Solicitor General's remark during oral argument when he suggested that “[i]t seems odd that we should still be discussing such things in 1972.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. The legislative history indicates, and the commentators agree, that partnerships are entities for purposes of calculating and filing informational returns but that they are conduits through which the taxpaying obligation passes to the individual partners in accord with their distributive shares. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 65-66 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 89-90 (1954); 6 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 35.01 (1968); S. Surrey & W. Warren, Federal Income Taxation 1115-1116 (1960); Jackson, Johnson, Surrey, Tenen & Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Partnerships, 54 Col. L. Rev. 1183 (1954).
The agreed statement of facts states that the contracting parties were “separate organizations independently contracting with one another at arms’ length.”
See n. 5, supra.
Respondents do not contend that such payments were gifts or some other type of nontaxable contribution. See Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U. S. 243 (1956); Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U. S. 741 (1969).
Disparities have long existed between the tax treatment of pension plans for corporate employees and the treatment of similar plans for the self-employed and for members of partnerships. S. Surrey & W. Warren, supra, n. 8, at 598-599. In 1962, Congress endeavored to ameliorate these differences by enacting corrective legislation, Pub. L. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809. While that legislation, commonly known as H. R. 10 or the Jenkins-Keogh Bill, provided some relief, it fell far short of affording a parity of treatment for professionals and other self-employed individuals. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 404. For a detailed review of the intricate provisions of the applicable statute and for a close comparison of the present differences, see Grayck, Tax Qualified Retirement Plans for Professional Practitioners: A Comparison of the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Requirement Act of 1962 and the Professional Association, 63 Col. L. Rev. 415 (1963); Note, Federal Tax Policy and Retirement Benefits — A New Approach, 59 Geo. L. J. 1299 (1971); Note, Tax Parity for Self-Employed Retirement Plans, 58 Va. L. Rev. 338 (1972).
Respondents contend in this Court that this case is controlled by Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, 405 U. S. 394 (1972), decided last Term. We held there that the Commissioner could not properly allocate income to one of a controlled group of corporations under 26 U. S. C. § 482 where that corporation could not have received that income as a matter of law. The “assignment-of-ineome doctrine” could have no application in that peculiar circumstance because the taxpayer had no legal right to receive the income in question. Id., at 403-404. In essence, that case involved a deflection of income imposed by law, not an assignment arrived at by the consensual agreement of two parties acting at arm’s length as we have in the present case. See n. 5, supra.
Revenue Act of 1918, §218 (a), 40 Stat. 1070:
“There shall be included in computing the net income of each partner his distributive share, whether distributed or not, of the net income of the partnership for the taxable year . . . .”
Other predecessor statutes -contained similar explicit indications that a partner’s distributive share was to be computed without reference to actual distribution. See Income Tax Act of 1913, § II D, 38 Stat. 169 (“whether divided or otherwise”); Revenue Act of 1938, § 182, 52 Stat. 521 (“whether or not distribution is made to hira”). Nothing in the legislative history suggests that any substantive change was intended by the deletion of this phrase from the 1954 Code revisions. See H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 65 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 89 (1954).
The regulation states as follows :
“Each partner is required to take into account separately in his return his distributive share, whether or not distributed, of each class or item of partnership income . . . .”
These amounts would be divided equally among the partners pursuant to the partnership agreement’s stipulation that all income above each partner’s drawing account “shall be distributed equally.”
Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-14. As the Solicitor General has also pointed out, the parties have, by stipulation in their agreed statement of facts, foreseen that recomputations might be necessary in light of the ultimate resolution of this controversy and have taken precautions to assure that any necessary reallocations may be handled expeditiously. Agreed Statement of Facts ¶24, App. 87-88.
Brief for United States 21. For this reason, the cases relied on by the Court of Appeals, 450 F. 2d, at 113, which have held that payments made into deferred compensation programs having contingent and forfeitable features are not taxable until received, are inapposite. Schaefer v. Bowers, 50 F. 2d 689 (CA2 1931); Perkins v. Commissioner, 8 T. C. 1051 (1947); Robertson v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 1060 (1946). Indeed, the Government notes, possibly as a consequence of these cases, that the Commissioner has not sought to tax the nonpartner physicians on their contingent accounts under the retirement plan. Brief for United States 21.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
Regulations promulgated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons broadly permit federal prisoners to receive publications from the “outside,” but authorize prison officials to reject incoming-publications found to be detrimental to institutional security. For 15 years, respondents, a class of inmates and certain publishers, have claimed that these regulations violate their First Amendment rights under the standard of review enunciated in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974). They mount a facial challenge to the regulations as well as a challenge to the regulations as applied to 46 specific publications excluded by the Bureau.
After a 10-day bench trial, the District Court refrained from adopting the Martinez standard. Instead, it favored an approach more deferential to the judgment of prison authorities and upheld the regulations without addressing the propriety of the 46 specific exclusions. App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a, 43a-47a. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, utilized the Martinez standard, found the regulations wanting, and remanded the case to the District Court for an individualized determination of the constitutionality of the 46 exclusions. Abbott v. Meese, 263 U. S. App. D. C. 186, 824 F. 2d 1166 (1987).
Petitioners, officials of the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Prisons, sought certiorari. We granted the writ in order to determine the appropriate standard of review. Meese v. Abbott, 485 U. S. 1020 (1988).
We now hold that the District Court correctly anticipated that the proper inquiry in this case is whether the regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,” Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 89 (1987), and we conclude that under this standard the regulations are facially valid. We therefore disagree with the Court of Appeals on the issue of facial validity, but we agree with that court’s remand of the case to the District Court for a determination of the validity of the regulations as applied to each of the 46 publications.
II
We are concerned primarily with the regulations set forth at 28 CFR §§540.70 and 540.71 (1988), first promulgated in 1979. These generally permit an inmate to subscribe to, or to receive, a publication without prior approval, but authorize the warden to reject a publication in certain circumstances. The warden may reject it “only if it is determined detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity.” § 540.71(b). The warden, however, may not reject a publication “solely because its content is religious, philosophical, political, social or sexual, or because its content is unpopular or repugnant.” Ibid. The regulations contain a nonexhaustive list of criteria which may support rejection of a publication. The warden is prohibited from establishing an excluded list of publications: each issue of a subscription publication is to be reviewed separately. § 540.71(c). The regulatory criteria for rejecting publications have been supplemented by Program Statement No. 5266.5, which provides further guidance on the subject of sexually explicit material.
The regulations provide procedural safeguards for both the recipient and the sender. The warden may designate staff to screen and, where appropriate, to approve incoming publications, but only the warden may reject a publication. § 540.70(b). The warden must advise the inmate promptly in writing of the reasons for the rejection, §540.71(d), and must provide the publisher or sender with a copy of the rejection letter, § 540.71(e). The notice must refer to “the specific article(s) or material(s) considered objectionable.” § 540.71(d). The publisher or sender may obtain an independent review of the warden’s rejection decision by a timely writing to the Regional Director of the Bureau. § 540.71(e). An inmate may appeal through the Bureau’s Administrative Remedy Procedure. See §§542.10 to 542.16. The warden is instructed to permit the inmate to review the rejected material for the purpose of filing an appeal “unless such review may provide the inmate with information of a nature which is deemed to pose a threat or detriment to the security, good order or discipline of the institution or to encourage or instruct in criminal activity.” §540.71(d).
III
There is little doubt that the kind of censorship just described would raise grave First Amendment concerns outside the prison context. It is equally certain that “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution,” Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S., at 84, nor do they bar free citizens from exercising their own constitutional rights by reaching out to those on the “inside,” id., at 94-99; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U. S. 119 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817 (1974). We have recognized, however, that these rights must be exercised with due regard for the “inordinately difficult undertaking” that is modern prison administration. Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S., at 85.
In particular, we have been sensitive to the delicate balance that prison administrators must strike between the order and security of the internal prison environment and the legitimate demands of those on the “outside” who seek to enter that environment, in person or through the written word. Many categories of noninmates seek access to prisons. Access is essential to lawyers and legal assistants representing prisoner clients, see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974), to journalists seeking information about prison conditions, see Pell v. Procunier, supra, and to families and friends of prisoners who seek to sustain relationships with them, see Procunier v. Martinez, supra. All these claims to prison access undoubtedly are legitimate; yet prison officials may well conclude that certain proposed interactions, though seemingly innocuous to laymen, have potentially significant implications for the order and security of the prison. Acknowledging the expertise of these officials and that the judiciary is “ill equipped” to deal with the difficult and delicate problems of prison management, this Court has afforded considerable deference to the determinations of prison administrators who, in the interest of security, regulate the relations between prisoners and the outside world. Id., at 404-405.
In this case, there is no question that publishers who wish to communicate with those who, through subscription, willingly seek their point of view have a legitimate First Amendment interest in access to prisoners. The question here, as it has been in our previous First Amendment cases in this area, is what standard of review this Court should apply to prison regulations limiting that access.
Martinez was our first significant decision regarding First Amendment rights in the prison context. There, the Court struck down California regulations concerning personal correspondence between inmates and noninmates, regulations that provided for censorship of letters that “unduly complain,” “magnify grievances,” or “expres[s] inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs.” Id., at 399. We reviewed these regulations under the following standard:
“First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Prison officials... must show that a regulation authorizing mail censorship furthers one or more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation. Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved. Thus a restriction on inmate correspondence that furthers an important or substantial interest of penal administration will nevertheless be invalid if its sweep is unnecessarily broad.” Id., at 413-414.
It is clear from this language, however, that we did not deprive prison officials of the degree of discretion necessary to vindicate “the particular governmental interest involved.” Accordingly, we said:
“Some latitude in anticipating the probable consequences of allowing certain speech in a prison environment is essential to the proper discharge of an administrator’s duty. But any regulation or practice that restricts inmate correspondence must be generally necessary to protect one or more... legitimate governmental interests.” Id., at 414.
The Court’s subsequent decisions regarding First Amendment rights in the prison context, however, laid down a different standard of review from that articulated in Martinez. As recently explained in Turner, these later decisions, which we characterized as involving “prisoners’ rights,” adopted a standard of review that focuses on the reasonableness of prison regulations: the relevant inquiry is whether the actions of prison officials were “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 482 U. S., at 89. The Court ruled that “such a standard is necessary if ‘prison administrators..., and not the courts, [are] to make- the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.’” Ibid., quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U. S., at 128. The Court set forth in Turner the development of this reasonableness standard in the respective decisions in Pell and Jones and in Block v. Rutherford, 468 U. S. 576 (1984), and we need not repeat that discussion here.
The Court’s decision to apply a reasonableness standard in these cases rather than Martinez’ less deferential approach stemmed from its concern that language in Martinez might be too readily understood as establishing a standard of “strict” or “heightened” scrutiny, and that such a strict standard simply was not appropriate for consideration of regulations that are centrally concerned with the maintenance of order and security within prisons. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S., at 81, 87, 89. Specifically, the Court declined to apply the Martinez standard in “prisoners’ rights” cases because, as was noted in Turner, Martinez could be (and had been) read to require a strict “least restrictive alternative” analysis, without sufficient sensitivity to the need for discretion in meeting legitimate prison needs. 482 U. S., at 89-90. The Court expressed concern that “every administrative judgment would be subject to the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand,” id., at 89, and rejected the costs of a “least restrictive alternative” rule as too high. Id., at 90. See also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U. S. 342, 350 (1987) (refusing to apply a least restrictive alternative standard for regulation of prisoner work rules having an impact on religious observance).
We do not believe that Martinez should, or need, be read as subjecting the decisions of prison officials to a strict “least restrictive means” test. As noted, Martinez required no more than that a challenged regulation be “generally necessary” to a legitimate governmental interest. 416 U. S., at 414. Certainly, Martinez required a close fit between the challenged regulation and the interest it purported to serve. But a careful reading of Martinez suggests that our rejection of the regulation at issue resulted not from a least restrictive means requirement, but from our recognition that the regulated activity centrally at issue in that case — outgoing personal correspondence from prisoners — did not, by its very nature, pose a serious threat to prison order and security." We pointed out in Martinez that outgoing correspondence that magnifies grievances or contains inflammatory racial views cannot reasonably be expected to present a danger to the community inside the prison. Id., at 416. In addition, the implications for security are far more predictable. Dangerous outgoing correspondence is more likely to fall within readily identifiable categories: examples noted in Martinez include escape plans, plans relating to ongoing criminal activity, and threats of blackmail or extortion. Id., at 412-413. Although we were careful in Martinez not to limit unduly the discretion of prison officials to reject even outgoing letters, we concluded that the regulations at issue were broader than “generally necessary” to protect the interests at stake. Id., at 414.
In light of these considerations, it is understandable that the Court in Martinez concluded that the regulations there at issue swept too broadly. Where, as in Martinez, the nature of the asserted governmental interest is such as to require a lesser degree of case-by-case discretion, a closer fit between the regulation and the purpose it serves may safely be required. Categorically different considerations — considerations far more typical of the problems of prison administration — apply to the case presently before this Court.
We deal here with incoming publications, material requested by an individual inmate but targeted to a general audience. Once in the prison, material of this kind reasonably may be expected to circulate among prisoners, with the concomitant potential for coordinated disruptive conduct. Furthermore, prisoners may observe particular material in the possession of a fellow prisoner, draw inferences about their fellow’s beliefs, sexual orientation, or gang affiliations from that material, and cause disorder by acting accordingly. See App. 22-23, 52, 59, 88; see generally Prisoners and the Law 3-14 (I. Robbins ed. 1988) (noting that possession of homosexually explicit material may identify the possessor as homosexual and target him for assault). As the Deputy Solicitor General noted at oral argument: “The prob-' lem is not... in the individual reading the materials in most cases. The problem is in the material getting into the prison.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. See also id., at 26; App. 10. In the volatile prison environment, it is essential that prison officials be given broad discretion to prevent such disorder.
In Turner, we dealt with incoming personal correspondence from prisoners; the impact of the correspondence on the internal environment of the prison was of great concern. There, we recognized that Martinez was too readily understood as failing to afford prison officials sufficient discretion to protect prison security. In light of these same concerns, we now hold that regulations affecting the sending of a “publication” (see the regulations’ specific definition of this word, n. 4, supra) to a prisoner must be analyzed under the Turner reasonableness standard. Such regulations are “valid if [they are] reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482 U. S., at 89.
Furthermore, we acknowledge today that the logic of our analyses in Martinez and Turner requires that Martinez be limited to regulations concerning outgoing correspondence. As we have observed, outgoing correspondence was the central focus of our opinion in Martinez. The implications of outgoing correspondence for prison security are of a categorically lesser magnitude than the implications of incoming materials. Any attempt to justify a similar categorical distinction between incoming correspondence from prisoners (to which we applied a reasonableness standard in Turner) and incoming correspondence from nonprisoners would likely prove futile, and we do not invite it. To the extent that Martinez itself suggests such a distinction, we today overrule that case; the Court accomplished much of this step when it decided Turner.
In so doing, we recognize that it might have been possible to apply a reasonableness standard to all incoming materials without overruling Martinez: we instead could have made clear that Martinez does not uniformly require the application of a “least restrictive alternative” analysis. We choose not to go that route, however, for we prefer the express flexibility of the Turner reasonableness standard. We adopt the Turner standard in this case with confidence that, as petitioners here have asserted, “a reasonableness standard is not toothless.” Pet. for Cert. 17, n. 10.
IV
The Court in Turner identified several factors that are relevant to, and that serve to channel, the reasonableness inquiry.
The first Turner factor is multifold: we must determine whether the governmental objective underlying the regulations at issue is legitimate and neutral, and that the regulations are rationally related to that objective. We agree with the District Court that this requirement has been met.
The legitimacy of the Government’s purpose in promulgating these regulations is beyond question. The regulations are expressly aimed at protecting prison security, a purpose this Court has said is “central to all other corrections goals.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S., at 823.
As to neutrality, “[w]e have found it important to inquire whether prison regulations restricting inmates’ First Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression.” Turner, 482 U. S., at 90. The ban on all correspondence between certain classes of inmates at issue in Turner clearly met this “neutrality” criterion, as did the restrictions at issue in Pell and Wolfish. The issue, however, in this case is closer.
On their face, the regulations distinguish between rejection of a publication “solely because its content is religious, philosophical, political, social or sexual, or because its content is unpopular or repugnant” (prohibited) and rejection because the publication is detrimental to security (permitted). 28 CFR §540.71(b)(1988). Both determinations turn, to some extent, on content. But the Court’s reference to “neutrality” in Turner was intended to go no further than its requirement in Martinez that “the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression.” 416 U. S., at 413. Where, as here, prison administrators draw distinctions between publications solely on the basis of their potential implications for prison security, the regulations are “neutral” in the technical sense in which we meant and used that term in Turner.
We also conclude that the broad discretion accorded prison wardens by the regulations here at issue is rationally related to security interests. We reach this conclusion for two reasons. The first has to do with the kind of security risk presented by incoming publications. This has been explored above in Part III. The District Court properly found that publications can present a security threat, and that a more closely tailored standard “could result in admission of publications which, even if they did not lead directly to violence, would exacerbate tensions and lead indirectly to disorder.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a. Where the regulations at issue concern the entry of materials into the prison, we agree with the District Court that a regulation which gives prison authorities broad discretion is appropriate.
Second, we are comforted by the individualized nature of the determinations required by the regulation. Under the regulations, no publication may be excluded unless the warden himself makes the determination that it is “detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or... might facilitate criminal activity.” 28 CFR §§ 540.70(b), 540.71(b) (1988). This is the controlling standard. A publication which fits within one of the “criteria” for exclusion may be rejected, but only if it is determined to meet that standard under the conditions prevailing at the institution at the time. Indeed, the regulations expressly reject certain shortcuts that would lead to needless exclusions. See § 540.70(b) (nondelegability of power to reject publications); § 540.71(c) (prohibition against establishing an excluded list of publications). We agree that it is rational for the Bureau to exclude materials that, although not necessarily “likely” to lead to violence, are determined by the warden to create an intolerable risk of disorder under the conditions of a particular prison at a particular time.
A second factor the Court in Turner held to be “relevant in determining the reasonableness of a prison restriction... is whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.” 482 U. S., at 90. As has already been made clear in Turner and O’Lone, “the right” in question must be viewed sensibly and expansively. The Court in Turner did not require that prisoners be afforded other means of communicating with inmates at other institutions, 482 U. S., at 92, nor did it in O’Lone require that there be alternative means of attending the Jumu’ah religious ceremony, 482 U. S., at 351. Rather, it held in Turner that it was sufficient if other means of expression (not necessarily other means of communicating with inmates in other prisons) remained available, and in O’Lone if prisoners were permitted to participate in other Muslim religious ceremonies. As the regulations at issue in the present case permit a broad range of publications to be sent, received, and read, this factor is clearly satisfied.
The third factor to be addressed under the Turner analysis is the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on others (guards and inmates) in the prison. 482 U. S., at 90. Here, the class of publications to be excluded is limited to those found potentially detrimental to order and security; the likelihood that such material will circulate within the prison raises the prospect of precisely the kind of “ripple effect” with which the Court in Turner was concerned. Where, as here, the right in question “can be exercised only at the cost of significantly less liberty and safety for everyone else, guards and other prisoners alike,” id., at 92, the courts should defer to the “informed discretion of corrections officials,” id., at 90.
Finally, Turner held: “[T]he existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an ‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.... But if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.” 482 U. S., at 90-91. We agree with the District Court that these regulations, on their face, are not an “exaggerated response” to the problem at hand: no obvious, easy alternative has been established.
Regarding the all-or-nothing rule, we analyze respondents’ proposed alternatives to that rule as alternative means of accommodating respondents’ asserted rights. The District Court discussed the evidence and found, on the basis of testimony in the record, that petitioners’ fear that tearing out the rejected portions and admitting the rest of the publication would create more discontent than the current practice was “reasonably founded.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. The Court of Appeals did not contest the District Court’s factual finding as such, but ruled that upholding a practice merely because it is based upon “reasonably founded” fears is improper under Martinez: the Court of Appeals held that this finding “conflicts with the holding of Martinez that prison administrators have the burden of showing that a restrictive practice is ‘generally necessary.’” 263 U. S. App. D. C., at 194, 824 F. 2d, at 1174.
As we here do not apply the Martinez standard, we reject the Court of Appeals’ sole ground for questioning the District Court’s findings in this respect. In our view, when prison officials are able to demonstrate that they have rejected a less restrictive alternative because of reasonably founded fears that it will lead to greater harm, they succeed in demonstrating that the alternative they in fact selected was not an “exaggerated response” under Turner. Furthermore, the administrative inconvenience of this proposed alternative is also a factor to be considered and adds additional support to the District Court’s conclusion that petitioners were not obligated to adopt it. See Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 549.
V
In sum, we hold that Turner's reasonableness standard is to be applied to the regulations at issue in this case, and that those regulations are facially valid under that standard. We agree with the remand for an examination of the validity of the regulations as applied to any of the 46 publications introduced at trial as to which there remains a live controversy. See 263 U. S. App. D. C., at 196, 824 F. 2d, at 1176.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
As explained in the text, rejection of a publication is authorized “only if it is determined detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity.” 28 CFR 8 540.71(b) (1988). References in the text to “prison security” are intended, for the sake of convenience, to refer more broadly to this range of concerns.
This lawsuit was filed by prisoners in May 1973 and was certified the following year as a class action. In 1978, three publishers, The Prisoners’ Union, Weekly Guardian Associates, and The Revolutionary Socialist League, were added as party plaintiffs. The suit also challenged several prison practices, largely concerning inmate correspondence, that are not at issue here. Individual claims for damages were severed in 1979. A bench trial on the claims for injunctive relief took place in 1981, and a memorandum opinion and accompanying order were issued by the District Court in September 1984. The Court of Appeals predicated its jurisdiction on 28 U. S. C. 8 1292(a)(1) on the ground that the order of the District Court denied respondents injunctive relief. Abbott v. Mee.sr, 263 U. S. App. D. C. 186, 187-188, 824 F. 2d 1166, 1167-1168 (1987).
When the complaint was filed in 1973, the Bureau had not yet issued regulations dealing with management of federal inmates. See 43 Fed. Reg. 30574 (1978) (proposed rulemaking); 44 Fed. Reg. 38254 (1979) (final rules). References herein to regulations are to those presently in effect. They are identical to the version considered by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. The current version differs in some respects from the 1979 version, but those differences are not material to our present inquiry.
The term “publication” is defined as “a book (for example, novel, instructional manual), or a single issue of a magazine or newspaper, plus such other materials addressed to a specific inmate as advertising brochures, flyers, and catalogues.” 28 CFR § 540.70(a) (1988).
Section 540.71(b) reads:
.. Publications which may be rejected by a Warden include but are not limited to publications which meet one of the following criteria:
“(1) It depicts or describes procedures for the construction or use of weapons, ammunition, bombs or incendiary devices;
“(2) It depicts, encourages, or describes methods of escape from correctional facilities, or contains blueprints, drawings or similar descriptions of Bureau of Prisons institutions;
“(3) It depicts or describes procedures for the brewing of alcoholic beverages, or the manufacture of drugs;
“(4) It is written in code;
“(5) It depicts, describes or encourages activities which may lead to the use of physical violence or group disruption;
“(6) It encourages or instructs in the commission of criminal activity;
“(7) It is sexually explicit material which by its nature or content poses a threat to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution, or facilitates criminal activity.”
The Program Statement was promulgated on January 2, 1985, in response to a lawsuit brought by the National Gay Task Force. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a (opinion of District Court). By ¶ (a) of the statement, a warden may reject the following types of sexually explicit material pursuant to 28 CFR § 540.71(b)(7) (see n. 5, supra):
“(1) Homosexual (of the same sex as the institution population).
“(2) Sado-masochistic.
“(3) Bestiality.
“(4) Involving children.”
Material in categories (1), (2), and (3) may be admitted if the warden determines it “not to pose a threat at the local institution.” ¶ (b)(1). Explicit heterosexual material ordinarily will be admitted. "I (b)(2). Other explicit material may be admitted if it has scholarly, or general social or literary, value. 1 (b)(5). Homosexual material that is not sexually explicit is to be admitted; this includes a publication covering the activities of gay-rights groups or gay religious groups, *: (b)(3), and literary publications with homosexual themes or references, "(b)(4). See 263 U. S. App. D. C., at 197, 824 F. 2d, at 1177.
Under the Administrative Remedy Procedure, a prisoner who has been unable informally to resolve his difficulty may file a formal written complaint. 28 CFR § 542.13(b) (1988). If the inmate believes he would be adversely affected if the complaint became known at the prison, he may file the complaint with the Regional Director of the Bureau. § 542.13(c). The warden or Regional Director is to respond within 15 or 30 days, respectively. § 542.14. An adverse decision by the Regional Director may be appealed to the General Counsel of the Bureau; an adverse decision by the warden may be appealed to the Regional Director. § 542.15.
Although the regulations do not so provide, it is the practice of the Bureau to withhold in its entirety any publication containing excludable material. This practice, referred to by the parties as the “all-or-nothing rule," is also at issue in this case.
We do not think it sufficient to focus, as respondents urge, on the identity of the individuals whose rights allegedly have been infringed. Although the Court took special note in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974), of the fact that the rights of nonprisoners were at issue, and stated a rule in Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987), for circumstances in which “a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights,” id,., at 89 (emphasis added), any attempt to forge separate standards for cases implicating the rights of outsiders is out of step with the intervening decisions in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817 (1974); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’Labor Union, Inc., 433 U. S. 119 (1977); and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979). These three cases, on which the Court expressly relied in Turner when it announced the reasonableness standard for “inmates’ constitutional rights” cases, all involved regulations that affected rights of prisoners and outsiders.
Pell involved the right of representatives of the news media to conduct interviews in the prisons in order to inform the public about prison conditions. The asserted right at issue in Jones was the right of a prisoners’ union to send its literature into the prison. In Wolfish, publishers sought to send hardback books into the prison. In all these eases, regulations worked a “consequential restriction on the... rights of those who are not prisoners.” Martinez, 416 U. S., at 409. But the Court in Turner observed: “In none of these... cases did the Court apply a standard of heightened scrutiny, but instead inquired whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights is ‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological objectives, or whether it represents an ‘exaggerated response’ to those concerns.” 482 U. S., at 87.
Martinez has been characterized in subsequent decisions of this Court as a case concerning “written communication by inmates” to noninmate recipients. See Pell, 417 U. S., at 826. See also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 12 (1978) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing Martinez as dealing with outsiders' right to receive communications from inside the prison, as opposed to outsiders' right to prison access); id., at 31 (dissenting opinion) (noting Martinez as a case concerning “excessive censorship of outgoing inmate correspondence” (emphasis added)). Indeed, the parties in Martinez stressed that the regulation as enforced dealt “with thoughts expressed in prisoner mail to relatives or friends — mainly outgoing lettern, not matters circulated within the walls." (Emphasis added.) Brief for Appellees in Procunier v. Martinez, O. T. 1973, No. 72-1465, p. 29. Bee also id., at 31; Tr. of Oral Arg. in Martinez, pp. 17, 25 (“[T]he issues in this -case involve what the prisoners are writing outside of the prison”), 31.
To be sure, some of the regulations at issue in Martinez applied to incoming, as well as outgoing, correspondence. In striking down these regulations as facially overbroad, the Court did not limit its holding to restrictions on outgoing correspondence. But the Court noted that the regulation banning transmission of “inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views” was not “limited to incoming letters.” 416 U. S., at 416. This observation suggests that the Court’s approach to the regulation might have been different had the regulation been so limited.
The District Court in the present case stated its standard of review: “the Bureau [must] articulate a relationship between its regulations (and practices) and legitimate penological objectives such as internal security. Once the Bureau meets that requirement, the plaintiffs must show by ‘substantial evidence’ that the defendants have ‘exaggerated their response’ to the problems the regulations address.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a-47a (citing, among other cases, St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F. 2d 109, 114 (CA3 1980)). The District Court did not have the benefit of this Court’s decision in Turner, and the standard of review it applied is not precisely identical to the Turner standard. In particular, it is by no means certain what the District Court meant by “substantial evidence.” We do not pass on any question of evidentiary burdens or burden shifting here, but we conclude that the standard applied by the District Court is sufficiently close to the Turner standard for present purposes to permit reliance on the District Court’s findings.
Indeed, the Court upheld content distinctions in Jones, where internal distribution of a prisoners’ union’s materials was prohibited while distribution of materials from the Jay cees and Alcoholics Anonymous was permitted. 433 U. S., at 131, n. 8. It upheld these distinctions against an equal protection challenge because the distinctions had a rational basis in the legitimate penological interests of the prisons: in contrast with the prisoners’ union, the Jaycees and Alcoholics Anonymous “were seen as serving a rehabilitative purpose, working in harmony with the goals and desires of the prison administrators, and both had been determined not to pose any threat to the order or security of the institution.” Id., at 134.
In contrast, the censorship at issue in Martinez closely resembled the kind of censorship which is expressly prohibited by the regulations presently at issue. In Martinez, the regulations barred writings that “unduly complain” or “magnify grievances,” express “inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views,” or are “defamatory” or “otherwise inappropriate.” 416 U. S, at 415. We found in Martinez that “[t]hese regulations fairly invited prison officials and employees to apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as standards for prisoner mail censorship,” and that the purpose of the regulations had not been found “unrelated
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit concerns tax provisions enacted by Congress in 1971 to provide incentives for domestic manufacturers to increase their exports and in 1984 to limit and modify those incentives. The specific question presented involves the interpretation of a Treasury Regulation (26 CFR § 1.861—8(e)(3) (1979)) promulgated in 1977 that governs the accounting for research and development (R&D) expenses under both statutory schemes. We shall explain the general outlines of the two statutes before we focus on that regulation.
The 1971 statute provided special tax treatment for export sales made by an American manufacturer through a subsidiary that qualified as a “domestic international sales corporation” (DISC). The DISC itself is not a taxpayer; a portion of its income is deemed to have been distributed to its shareholders, and the shareholders must pay taxes on that portion, but no tax is payable on the DISC’S retained income until it is actually distributed. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 991-997. Typically, “a DISC is a wholly owned subsidiary of a U. S. corporation.” 1 Senate Finance Committee, Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98th Cong., p. 630, n. 1 (Comm. Print 1984) (hereinafter Committee Print). The statute thus provides an incentive to maximize the DISC’S share — and to minimize the parent’s share — of the parties’ aggregate income from export sales.
The DISC statute does not, however, allow the parent simply to assign all of the profits on its export sales to the DISC. Rather, “to avoid granting undue tax advantages,” the statute provides three alternative ways in which the parties may divert a limited portion of taxable income from the parent to the DISC. See 26 U. S. C. §§994(a)(1)-(3). Each of the alternatives assumes that the parent has sold the product to the DISC at a hypothetical “transfer price” that produced a profit for both seller and buyer when the product was resold to the foreign customer. The alternative used by Boeing in this suit limited the DISC’S taxable income to a little over half of the parties’ “combined taxable income” (CTI).
Soon after its enactment, the DISC statute became “the subject of an ongoing dispute between the United States and certain other signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)” regarding whether the DISC provisions were impermissible subsidies that violated our treaty obligations. Committee Print 634. “To remove the DISC as a contentious issue and to avoid further disputes over retaliation, the United States made a commitment to the GATT Council on October 1, 1982, to propose legislation that would address the concerns of other GATT members.” Id., at 634-635. This ultimately resulted in the replacement of the DISC provisions in 1984 with the “foreign sales corporation” (FSC) provisions of the Code. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, §§801-805, 98 Stat. 985.
Unlike a DISC, an FSC is a foreign corporation, and a portion of its income is taxable by the United States. See ibid.; see also B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders ¶ 17.14 (5th ed. 1987). Whereas a portion of a DISC’S income was tax deferred, a portion of an FSC’s income is exempted from taxation. Compare 26 U. S. C. §§991-997 with 26 U. S. C. §§921, 923 (1988 ed.). Hence, under the FSC regime, as under the DISC regime, it is in the parent’s interest to maximize the FSC’s share of the taxable income generated by export sales. Because the differences between the DISC and FSC regimes for the most part are immaterial to this suit, the analysis in this opinion will focus mainly on the DISC provisions.
The Internal Revenue Code gives the taxpayer an election either to capitalize and amortize the costs of R&D over a period of years or to deduct such expenses currently. See 26 U. S. C. § 174. The regulation at issue here, 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979), deals with R&D expenditures for which the taxpayer has taken a current deduction. It tells the taxpaying parent and its DISC “what” must be treated as a cost when calculating CTI, and “how” those costs should be (a) allocated among different products and (b) apportioned between the DISC and its parent.
With respect to the “what” question, the Treasury might have adopted a broad approach defining the relevant R&D as including all of the parent’s products, or a narrow approach defining the relevant R&D as all R&D directly related to a particular product being exported. Instead, the regulation includes a list of two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories (examples are “chemicals and allied products” and “transportation equipment”), and it requires that R&D for any product within the same category as the exported product be taken into account. See ibid. The regulation explains that R&D on any product “is an inherently speculative activity” that sometimes contributes unexpected benefits on other products, and “that the gross income derived from successful research and development must bear the cost of unsuccessful research and development.” Ibid.
With respect to the two “how” questions, the regulations use gross receipts from sales as the basis both for allocating the costs among the products within the broad R&D categories and also for apportioning those costs between the parent and the DISC. Thus, if the exported product constitutes 20 percent of the parties’ total sales of all products within an R&D category, 20 percent of the R&D cost is allocated to that product. And if export sales represent 70 percent of the total sales of that product, 70 percent of that amount, or 14 percent of the R&D, is apportioned to the DISC.
I
Petitioners (and cross-respondents) are The Boeing Company and subsidiaries that include a DISC and an FSC. For over 40 years Boeing has been a world leader in commercial aircraft development and a major exporter of commercial aircraft. During the period at issue in this litigation, the dollar volume of its sales amounted to about $64 billion, 67 percent of which were DISC-eligible export sales. The amount that Boeing spent on R&D during that period amounted to approximately $4.6 billion.
During the tax years at issue here, Boeing organized its internal operations along product lines (e. g., aircraft models 727, 737, 747, 767, 767) for management and accounting purposes, each of which constituted a separate “program” within the Boeing organization. For those purposes, it divided its R&D expenses into two broad categories: “Blue Sky” and “Company Sponsored Product Development.” The former includes the cost of broad-based research aimed at generally advancing the state of aviation technology and developing alternative designs of new commercial planes. The latter includes product-specific research pertaining to a specific program after the board of directors has given its approval for the production of a new model. With respect to its $1 billion of “Blue Sky” R&D, Boeing’s accounting was essentially consistent with 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979). Its method of accounting for $3.6 billion of “Company Sponsored” R&D gave rise to this litigation.
Boeing’s accountants treated all of the Company Sponsored research costs as directly related to a single program, and as totally unrelated to any other program. Thus, for DISC purposes, the cost of Company Sponsored R&D directly related to the 767 model, for example, had no effect on the calculation of the “combined taxable income” produced by export sales of any other models. Moreover, because immense Company Sponsored research costs were routinely incurred while a particular model was being completed and before any sales of that model occurred, those costs effectively “disappeared” in the calculation of the CTI even for the model to which the R&D was most directly related. Almost half of the $3.6 billion of Company Sponsored R&D at issue in this suit was allocated to programs that had no sales in the year in which the research was conducted. That amount (approximately $1.75 billion) was deducted by Boeing currently in the calculation of its taxable income for the years at issue, but never affected the calculation of the CTI derived by Boeing and its DISC from export sales.
Pursuant to an audit, the Internal Revenue Service reallocated Boeing’s Company Sponsored R&D costs for the years 1979 to 1987, thereby decreasing the untaxed profits of its export subsidiaries and increasing the parent’s taxable profits from export sales. Boeing paid the additional tax obligation of $419 million and filed this suit seeking a refund. Relying on the decision of the Eighth Circuit in St. Jude Medical, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 F. 3d 1394 (1994), the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Boeing. It held that 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979) is invalid as applied to DISC and FSC transactions because the regulation’s categorical treatment of R&D conflicted with congressional intent that there be a “direct” relationship between items of gross income and expenses “related thereto,” and with a specific DISC regulation giving the taxpayer the right to group and allocate income and costs by product or product line. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, 258 F. 3d 958 (2001), and we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Circuits, 535 U. S. 1094 (2002). We now affirm.
II
Section 861 of the Internal Revenue Code distinguishes between United States and foreign source income for several different purposes. See 26 U. S. C. § 861. The regulation at issue in this suit, 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979), was promulgated pursuant to that general statute. Separate regulations promulgated under the DISC statute, 26 U. S. C. §§ 991-997, incorporate 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979) by specific reference. See § 1.994-1(c)(6)(iii) (citing and incorporating the cost allocation rules of § 1.861-8). Boeing does not claim that its method of accounting for Company Sponsored R&D complied with § 1.861-8(e)(3). Rather, it argues that § 1.861-8(e)(3) is so plainly inconsistent with congressional intent and with other provisions of the DISC regulations that it cannot be validly applied to its computation of CTI for DISC purposes.
Boeing argues, in essence, that the statute and certain specific regulations promulgated pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 994 give it an unqualified right to allocate its Company Sponsored R&D expenses to the specific products to which they are “factually related” and to exclude any allocated R&D from being treated as a cost of any other product. The relevant statutory text does not support its argument.
As we have already mentioned, the DISC statute gives the taxpayer a choice of three methods of determining the transfer price for an exported good. Boeing elected to use only the second method described in the following text:
“Inter-company pricing rules
“(a) In general
“In the case of a sale of export property to a DISC by a person described in section 482, the taxable income of such DISC and such person shall be based upon a transfer price which would allow such DISC to derive taxable income attributable to such sale (regardless of the sales price actually charged) in an amount which does not exceed the greatest of—
“(1) 4 percent of the qualified export receipts on the sale of such property by the DISC plus 10 percent of the export promotion expenses of such DISC attributable to such receipts,
“(2) 50 percent of the combined taxable income of such DISC and such person which is attributable to the qualified export receipts on such property derived as the result of a sale by the DISC plus 10 percent of the export promotion expenses of such DISC attributable to such receipts, or
“(3) taxable income based upon the sale price actually charged (but subject to the rules provided in section 482).
“(b) Rules for commissions, rentals, and marginal costing
“The Secretary shall prescribe regulations setting forth
“(2) rules for the allocation of expenditures in computing combined taxable income under subsection (a)(2) in those cases where a DISC is seeking to establish or maintain a market for export property.” 26 U. S. C. §§994(a)(1)(3), (b)(2) (emphasis added).
The statute does not define the term “combined taxable income,” nor does it specifically mention expenditures for R&D. Congress did grant the Secretary express authority to prescribe regulations for determining the proper allocation of expenditures in computing CTI in certain specific contexts. See, e.g., §§ 994(b)(1)-(2). Yet in promulgating 26 CFR §1.861-8 (1979), the Secretary of the Treasury exercised his rulemaking authority under 26 U. S. C. § 7806(a), which gives the Secretary general authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the Internal Revenue Code. See 41 Fed. Reg. 49160 (1976) (“The proposed regulations are to be issued under the authority contained in section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code”). Even if we regard the challenged regulation as interpretive because it was promulgated under § 7805(a)’s general rulemaking grant rather than pursuant to a specific grant of authority, we must still treat the regulation with deference. See Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 499 U. S. 564, 560-561 (1991).
The words that we have emphasized in the statutory text do place some limits on the Secretary’s interpretive authority. First, the “does not exceed” phrase places an upper limit on the share of the export profits that can be assigned to a DISC and also gives the taxpayer an unfettered right to select any of the three methods of setting a “transfer price.” Second, the use of the term “combined taxable income” in subsection (a)(2) makes it clear that the taxable income of the domestic parent is a part of the equation that should produce the CTI. As Boeing recognizes, even a charitable contribution to the Seattle Symphony that reduces its domestic earnings from sales of 767’s must be treated as a cost that is not definitely related to any particular category of income and thus must be apportioned among all categories of income, including income from export sales. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 01-1209, p. 8, n. 7. Third, the word “attributable” places a limit on the portion of the domestic parent’s taxable income that can be treated as a part of the CTI. It is this word that provides the statutory basis for Boeing’s position.
Under Boeing’s reading of the statute, a calculation of the domestic income “attributable” to the export sale of a 767 may include both the direct and indirect costs of manufacturing and selling 767’s, but it may not include the direct costs of selling anything else. Moreover, if Boeing’s accountants classify a particular cost as directly related to the 767, that classification is conclusive. Thus, while the Secretary asserts that Boeing’s R&D expenses are definitely related to all income in the relevant SIC category, Boeing claims the right to divide its R&D in a way that effectively creates three segments: (1) Blue Sky; (2) Company Sponsored R&D on products that have no sales in the current year; and (3) Company Sponsored R&D on products that are being sold currently. Boeing, like the Secretary, essentially treats Blue Sky R&D as án indirect cost in computing both its domestic taxable income and its CTI. With respect to the second segment, Boeing uses the R&D to reduce its domestic taxable earnings on every product it sells, but eliminates it entirely from the calculation of CTI on any product by charging the R&D costs to programs without any sales. The third segment is used for both domestic and CTI purposes, but with respect to CTI only for the export sales to which it is “factually related.”
The Secretary’s classification of all R&D as an indirect cost of all export sales of products in a broadly defined SIC category — in other words, as “attributable” to such sales — is surely not arbitrary. It has the virtue of providing consistent treatment for cost items used in computing the taxpayer’s domestic taxable income and its CTI. Moreover, its allocation of R&D expenditures to all products in a category even when specifically intended to improve only one or a few of those products is no more tenuous than the allocation of a chief executive officer’s salary to every product that a company sells even when he devotes virtually all of his time to the development of an Edsel.
On the other hand, even if Boeing’s method of accounting for R&D is fully justified for management purposes, it certainly produces anomalies for tax purposes. Most obvious is the fact that it enabled Boeing to deduct some $1.75 billion of expenditures from its domestic taxable earnings under 26 U. S. C. § 174 and never deduct a penny of those expenditures from its “combined taxable earnings” under the DISC statute. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 01-1209, at 11. Less obvious, but nevertheless significant, is that Boeing’s method assumed that Blue Sky research produces benefits for airplane models that are producing current income and — at the same time — assumed that Company Sponsored research related to a specific product, such as the 727, is not likely to produce benefits for other airplane models, such as the 737 or 767.
In all events, the mere use of the word “attributable” in the text of § 994 surely does not qualify the Secretary’s authority to decide whether a particular tax deductible expenditure made by the parent of a DISC is sufficiently related to its export sales to qualify as an indirect cost in the computation of the parties’ CTI. Boeing argues, however, that the text of § 994 should be read in light of § 861, the more general provision dealing with the distinction between domestic and foreign source income.
Title 26 U. S. C. § 861(b) contains the following two sentences:
“Taxable income from sources within United States
“From the items of gross income specified in subsection (a) as being income from sources within the United States there shall be deducted the expenses, losses, and other deductions properly apportioned or allocated thereto and a ratable part of any expenses, losses, or other deductions which cannot definitely be allocated to some item or class of gross income. The remainder, if any, shall be included in full as taxable income from sources within the United States.” (Emphasis added.)
Focusing on the emphasized words, Boeing interprets this section as having created a background rule dividing all expenses into two categories: those that can be allocated to specific income and those that cannot. “Ratable” allocation is permissible for the second category, but not for the first, according to Boeing. Moreover, in Boeing’s view, any expense in the first category cannot be ratably apportioned across all classes of income.
There are at least two flaws in this argument. First, although the emphasized words authorize ratable apportionment of costs that cannot definitely be allocated to some item or class of income, the sentence as a whole does not prohibit ratable apportionment of expenses that could be, but perhaps in fairness should not be, treated as direct costs. Second, the Secretary has the authority to prescribe regulations determining whether an expense can be properly apportioned to an item of gross income in the calculation of CTI. See 26 U. S. C. § 7805(a). Thus, as in this suit, if the Secretary reasonably determines that Company Sponsored R&D can be properly apportioned on a categorical basis, the italicized portion of § 861 is simply inapplicable.
In sum, Boeing’s arguments based on statutory text are plainly insufficient to overcome the deference to which the Secretary’s interpretation is entitled.
III
Boeing also advances two arguments based on the text of specific DISC regulations. The first resembles its argument based on the text of §861, and the second relies on regulations providing that certain accounting decisions made by the taxpayer shall be controlling.
The regulations included in 26 CFR §1.994-1 (1979) set forth intercompany pricing rules for DISCs. They generally describe the three methods of determining a transfer price, noting that the taxpayer may choose the most favorable method, and may group transactions to use one method for some export sales and another method for others. See ibid. With respect to the CTI method used by Boeing, there is a rule, § 1.994 — 1(c)(6), that describes the computation of CTI. The rule broadly defines the CTI of a DISC and its related supplier from a sale of export property as the excess of gross receipts over their total costs “which relate to such gross receipts.” Subdivision (iii) of that rule, on which Boeing relies, provides:
“Costs (other than cost of goods sold) which shall be treated as relating to gross receipts from sales of export property are (a) the expenses, losses, and other deductions definitely related, and therefore allocated and apportioned, thereto, and (b) a ratable part of any other expenses, losses, or other deductions which are not definitely related to a class of gross income, determined in a manner consistent with the rules set forth in § 1.861-8.” § 1.994-1(c)(6)(iii) (emphasis added).
Boeing interprets the emphasized words as prohibiting a ratable allocation of R&D expenditures that can be “definitely related” to particular export sales. The obvious response to this argument is provided by the final words in the paragraph. Whether such an expense can be “definitely related” is determined by the rules set forth in the very regulation that Boeing challenges, §1.861-8. Moreover, it seems quite clear that the Secretary could reasonably determine that expenditures on 767 research conducted in years before any 767’s were sold were not “definitely related” to any sales, but should be treated as an indirect cost of producing the gross income derived from the sale of all planes in the transportation equipment category.
Boeing also argues that the regulations expressly allow it to allocate and apportion R&D expenses to groups of export sales that are based on industry usage rather than SIC categories. The regulations providing the strongest support for this argument are §§ 1.994—1(c)(7)(i) and (ii)(a), which control the grouping of transactions for the purpose of determining the transfer price of sales of export property, and §1.994-1(c)(6)(iv), which governs the grouping of receipts when the CTI method of transfer pricing is used. Treasury Regulation § 1.994-1(c)(7) reads, in part, as follows:
“Grouping transactions, (i) Generally, the determinations under this section are to be made on a transaction-by-transaction basis. However, at the annual choice of the taxpayer some or all of these determinations may be made on the basis of groups consisting of products or product lines.
“(ii) A determination by a taxpayer as to a product or a product line will be accepted by a district director if such determination conforms to any one of the following standards: (a) A recognized industry or trade usage, or (b) the 2-digit major groups... of the Standard Industrial Classification....”
As we understand the statutory and regulatory scheme, it gives controlling effect to three important choices by the taxpayer. First, the taxpayer may elect to deduct R&D expenses on an annual basis instead of capitalizing and amortizing those costs. See 26 U. S. C. § 174(a)(1). Second, when engaging in export transactions with a DISC, the taxpayer may choose any one of the three methods of determining the transfer price. See § 994(a). Third, the taxpayer may decide how best to group those transactions for purposes of applying the transfer pricing methods. See 26 CFR § 1.994-1(c)(7) (1979). Conceivably, the taxpayer could account for each sale separately, by product lines, or by grouping all of its export sales together. These regulations confirm the finality of the third type of choice (i. e., which groups of sales will be evaluated under one of the three alternative transfer pricing methods), but do not speak to the questions answered by the regulation at issue in this suit — namely, whether or how a particular research cost should be allocated and apportioned.
Nor does § 1.994-1(c)(6)(iv) support Boeing’s argument. It provides that a “taxpayer’s choice in accordance with subparagraph (7) of this paragraph as to the grouping of transactions shall be controlling, and costs deductible in a taxable year shall be allocated and apportioned to the items or classes of gross income of such taxable year resulting from such grouping.” The regulation makes clear that if the taxpayer selects the CTI method of transfer pricing (as Boeing did), then the taxpayer may choose to group export receipts according to product lines, two-digit SIC codes, or on a transaction-by-transaction basis. Ibid. The regulation also establishes that there shall be an allocation and apportionment of all relevant costs deducted in the taxable year. Ibid. Notably, however, the regulation simply does not speak to how costs should be allocated among different items or classes of gross income and apportioned between the DISC and its parent once the taxpayer (pursuant to § 1.994-1(c)(6)) groups its gross receipts. Treasury Regulation § 1.861-8(e)(3) fills this gap by providing that R&D expenditures that are related to all income reasonably connected with the taxpayer’s relevant two-digit SIC category or categories are “allocable to all items of gross income as a class... related to such product category (or categories).” 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979) (emphasis added).
IV
Boeing also relies heavily on legislative history, particularly on statements in Reports prepared by the tax-writing committees of the House and the Senate on the DISC statute. Those Reports are virtually identical in terms of their discussion of the DISC provisions. See H. R. Rep., at 58-95; S. Rep., at 90-129. Neither says anything about R&D costs. They both contain statements supporting the proposition that in determining how to calculate income that qualifies for a tax benefit, the expenses to be deducted from gross income are those expenses that are “directly related” to the income. See H. R. Rep., at 74; S. Rep., at 107. Those statements are not, however, inconsistent with the proposition that particular R&D expenses may be factually related to more than one item of income, or with the proposition that the Secretary has broad authority to promulgate regulations determining which expenses are directly or indirectly related to particular items of income.
If anything, what little relevant legislative history there is in this suit weighs in favor of the Government’s position in two important respects. First, whereas the DISC transfer price could be set at a level that attributed over half of the CTI to the DISC, when Congress enacted the FSC provisions in 1984, it lowered the maximum allowable share of CTI attributable to an FSC to 23 percent. Compare 26 U.S.C. §994(a)(2) with 26 U.S.C. §926(a)(2) (1988 ed.). This dramatizes the point that even though the purpose of the DISC and FSC statutes was to provide American firms with a tax incentive to increase their exports, Congress did not intend to grant “undue tax advantages” to firms. S. Rep., at 13. Rather, the statutory formulas were designed to place ceilings on the amount of those special tax benefits. See Committee Print 636 (“[T]he income of the foreign sales corporation must be determined according to transfer prices specified in the bill: either actual prices for sales between unrelated, independent parties or, if the sales are between related parties, formula prices which are intended to comply with GATT’s requirement of arm’s-length prices”).
Second, the 1977 R&D regulation at issue in this suit had been in effect for seven years when Congress enacted the FSC provisions. Yet Congress did not legislatively override 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979) in enacting the FSC provisions. In fact, although a moratorium was placed on the application of § 1.861-8(e)(3) for purposes of the sourcing of income in 1981, a 1984 conference agreement specified that the moratorium would “not apply for other purposes, such as the computation of combined taxable income of a DISC (or FSC) and its related supplier.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-861, p. 1263 (1984). The fact that Congress did not legislatively override 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979) in enacting the FSC provisions in 1984 serves as persuasive evidence that Congress regarded that regulation as a correct implementation of its intent. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580-581 (1978).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
In 1996, the provisions of 26 CFR § 1.861-8 were amended, renumbered, and republished as 26 CFR §1.861-17. See 26 CFR §1.861-17 (2002); see also 60 Fed. Reg. 66503 (1995).
To qualify as a DISC, at least 95 percent of a corporation’s gross receipts must arise from qualified export receipts. See 26 U. S. C. § 992(a)(1)(A). In addition, at least 95 percent of the corporation’s assets must be export related. See § 992(a)(1)(B).
S. Rep. No. 92-437, p. 13 (1971) (hereinafter S. Rep.).
To be more precise, it allowed the DISC “to derive taxable income attributable to [an export sale] in an amount which does not exceed... 50 percent of the combined taxable income of [the DISC and the parent] plus 10 percent of the export promotion expenses of such DISC attributable to such receipts....” 26 U. S. C. §994(a)(2).
A hypothetical example in both the House and Senate Committee Reports illustrated the computation of a transfer price of $816 based on a DISC’S selling price of $1,000 and the parent’s cost of goods sold of $650. The gross margin of $350 was reduced by $180 (including the DISC’S promotion expenses of $90, the parent’s directly related selling and administrative expenses of $60, and the parent’s prorated indirect expenses of $30), to produce a CTI of $170. Half of that amount ($85) plus 10 percent of the DISC’s promotion expenses ($9) gave the DISC its allowable taxable income of $94, leaving only $76 of income immediately taxable to the parent. The $184 aggregate of the two amounts attributed to the DISC (promotion expenses of $90 plus its $94 share of CTI) subtracted from the $1,000 gross receipt produced the “transfer price” of $816. See S. Rep., at 108, n. 7; H. R. Rep. No. 92-533, p. 74, n. 7 (1971) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.).
In 2000, Congress repealed and replaced the FSC provisions with the “extraterritorial income” exclusion of 26 U. S. C. § 114.
Two aspects of the 1984 statute that do have special significance to this suit are discussed in Part IV, infra.
Treasury Regulation § 1.861-8 (1979) also specifies how other specific items of expense should be treated. See, e. g., 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(2) (1979) (interest fees); § 1.861-8(e)(5) (legal and accounting fees); § 1.861-8(e)(6) (income taxes).
The original regulation used two-digit SIC categories. See §1.861-8(e)(3). The current regulation uses narrower three-digit SIC categories, see 26 CFR § 1.861-17(a)(2)(ii) (2002), but the change is not relevant to this suit.
Because all of Boeing’s commercial aircraft were “transportation equipment” within the meaning of the Treasury Regulation, it properly allocated all of its Blue Sky research among all of its programs, and then apportioned those costs between the parent and the DISC. However, according to the Government, it erroneously did so on the basis of hours of direct labor rather than sales. See Brief for United States 10.
When Boeing charged R&D costs to programs that had no sales in the year the research was conducted, the R&D costs effectively “disappeared” in the sense that they were not accounted for by Boeing in computing its CTI.
This assumption, of course, runs contrary to the Secretary’s determination that R&D “is an inherently speculative activity” that sometimes contributes unexpected benefits on other products. 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3)(i)(A) (1979).
Treasury Regulation § 1.994 — 1(c)(6), 26 CFR § 1.994-1(c)(6) (1979), provides in part:
“Combined taxable income. For purposes of this section, the combined taxable income of a DISC and its related supplier from a sale of export property is the excess of the gross receipts (as defined in section 993(f)) of the DISC from such sale over the total costs of the DISC and related supplier which relate to such gross receipts. Gross receipts from a sale do not include interest with respect to the sale. Combined taxable income under this paragraph shall be determined after taking into account under paragraph (e)(2) of this section all adjustments required by section 482 with respect to transactions to which such section is applicable. In determining the gross receipts of the DISC and the total costs of the DISC and related supplier which relate to such gross receipts, the following rules shall be applied:
“(i) Subject to subdivisions (ii) through (v) of this subparagraph, the taxpayer’s method of accounting used in computing taxable income will be accepted for purposes of determining amounts and the taxable year for which items of income and expense (including depreciation) are taken into account. See § 1.991-1(b)(2) with respect to the method of accounting which may be used by a DISC.”
In support of its argument that §§ 1.994-1(c) and 1.861-8(e)(3) conflict, Boeing also points to various proposed regulations, including
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The central question before us is whether a judicial hearing is required before the State may treat a mentally ill prisoner with antipsychotic drugs against his will. Resolution of the case requires us to discuss the protections afforded the prisoner under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I
Respondent Walter Harper was sentenced to prison in 1976 for robbery. From 1976 to 1980, he was incarcerated at the Washington State Penitentiary. Most of that time, respondent was housed in the prison’s mental health unit, where he consented to the administration of antipsychotic drugs. Antipsychotic drugs, sometimes called “neuroleptics” or “psychotropic drugs,” are medications commonly used in treating mental disorders such as schizophrenia. Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 2-3, n. 1. As found by the trial court, the effect of these and similar drugs is to alter the chemical balance in the brain, the desired result being that the medication will assist the patient in organizing his or her thought procésses and regaining a rational state of mind. See App. to Pet. for Cert. B-7.
Respondent was paroled in 1980 on the condition that he participate in psychiatric treatment. While on parole, he continued to receive treatment at the psychiatric ward at Harborview Medical Center in Seattle, Washington, and was later sent to Western State Hospital pursuant to a civil commitment order. In December 1981, the State revoked respondent’s parole after he assaulted two nurses at a hospital in Seattle.
Upon his return to prison, respondent was sent to the Special Offender Center (SOC or Center), a 144-bed correctional institute established by the Washington Department of Corrections to diagnose and treat convicted felons with serious mental disorders. At the Center, psychiatrists first diagnosed respondent as suffering from a manic-depressive disorder. At first, respondent gave voluntary consent to treatment, including the administration of antipsychotic medications. In November 1982, he refused to continue taking the prescribed medications. The treating physician then sought to medicate respondent over his objections, pursuant to SOC Policy 600.30.,
Policy 600.30 was developed in partial response to this Court’s decision in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980). The Policy has several substantive and procedural components. First, if a psychiatrist determines that an inmate should be treated with antipsychotic drugs but the inmate does not consent, the inmate may be subjected to involuntary treatment with the drugs only if he (1) suffers from a “mental disorder” and (2) is “gravely disabled” or poses a “likelihood of serious harm” to himself, others, or their property. Only a psychiatrist may order or approve the medication. Second, an inmate who refuses to take the medication voluntarily is entitled to a hearing before a special committee consisting of a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the Associate Superintendent of the Center, none of whom may be, at the time of the hearing, involved in the inmate’s treatment or diagnosis. If the committee determines by a majority vote that the inmate suffers from a mental disorder and is gravely disabled or dangerous, the inmate may be medicated against his will, provided the psychiatrist is in the majority.
Third, the inmate has certain procedural rights before, during, and after the hearing. He must be given at least 24 hours’ notice of the Center’s intent to convene an involuntary medication hearing, during which time he may not be medicated. In addition, he must receive notice of the tentative diagnosis, the factual basis for the diagnosis, and why the staff believes medication is necessary. At the hearing, the inmate has the right to attend; to present evidence, including witnesses; to cross-examine staff witnesses; and to the assistance of a lay adviser who has not been involved in his case and who understands the psychiatric issues involved. Minutes of the hearing must be kept, and a copy provided to the inmate. The inmate has the right to appeal the committee’s decision to the Superintendent of the Center within 24 hours, and the Superintendent must decide the appeal within 24 hours after its receipt. See App. to Pet. for Cert. B-3. The inmate may seek judicial review of a committee decision in state court by means of a personal restraint petition or extraordinary writ. See Wash. Rules App. Proc. 16.3 to 16.17; App. to Pet. for Cert. B-8.
Fourth, after the initial hearing, involuntary medication can continue only with periodic review. When respondent first refused medication, a committee, again composed of a nontreating psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the Center’s Associate Superintendent, was required to review an inmate’s case after the first seven days of treatment. If the committee reapproved the treatment, the treating psychiatrist was required to review the case and prepare a report for the Department of Corrections medical director every 14 days while treatment continued.
In this case, respondent was absent when members of the Center staff met with the committee before the hearing. The committee then conducted the hearing in accordance with the Policy, with respondent being present and assisted by a nurse practitioner from another institution. The committee found that respondent was a danger to others as a result of a mental disease or disorder, and approved the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs. On appeal, the Superintendent upheld the committee’s findings. Beginning on November 23, 1982, respondent was involuntarily medicated for about one year. Periodic review occurred in accordance with the Policy.
In November 1983, respondent was transferred from the Center to the Washington State Reformatory. While there, he took no medication, and as a result, his condition deteriorated. He was retransferred to the Center after only one month. Respondent was the subject of another committee hearing in accordance with Policy 600.30, and the committee again approved medication against his will. Respondent continued to receive antipsychotic drugs, subject to the required periodic reviews, until he was transferred to the Washington State Penitentiary in June 1986.
In February 1985, respondent filed suit in state court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1982 ed.) against various individual defendants and the State, claiming that the failure to provide a judicial hearing before the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free Speech Clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions, as well as state tort law. He sought both damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. After a bench trial in March 1987, the court held that, although respondent had a liberty interest in not being subjected to the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication, the procedures contained in the Policy met the requirements of due process as stated in Vitek.
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. 110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P. 2d 358 (1988). Agreeing with the trial court that respondent had a liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic medications, the court concluded that the “highly intrusive nature” of treatment with antipsychotic medications warranted greater procedural protections than those necessary to protect the liberty interests at stake in Vitek. 110 Wash. 2d, at 880-881, 759 P. 2d, at 363. It held that, under the Due Process Clause, the State could administer antipsychotic medication to a competent, nonconsenting inmate only if, in a judicial hearing at which the inmate had the full panoply of adversarial procedural protections, the State proved by “clear, cogent, and convincing” evidence that the administration of antipsychotic medication was both necessary and effective for furthering a compelling state interest. Id., at 883-884, 759 P. 2d, at 364-365.
We granted certiorari, 489 U. S. 1064 (1989), and we reverse.
II
Respondent contends that because the State has ceased administering antipsychotic drugs to him against his will, the case is moot. We disagree.
Even if we confine our attention to those facts found in the record, a live case or controversy between the parties remains. There is no evidence that respondent has recovered from his mental illness. Since being sentenced to prison in 1976, he has been diagnosed and treated for a serious mental disorder. Even while on parole, respondent continued to receive treatment, at one point under a civil commitment order, at state mental hospitals. At the time of trial, after his transfer from the Center for a second time, respondent was still diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia.
Respondent continues to serve his sentence in the Washington state prison system, and is subject to transfer to the Center at any time. Given his medical history, and the fact that he has been transferred not once but twice to the Center from other state penal institutions during the period 1982-1986, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a strong likelihood that respondent may again be transferred to the Center. Once there, given his medical history, it is likely that, absent the holding of the Washington Supreme Court, Center officials would seek to administer antipsychotic medications pursuant to Policy 600.30.
On the record before us, the case is not moot. The alleged injury likely would recur but for the decision of the Washington Supreme Court. This sufficiently overcomes the claim of mootness in the circumstances of the case and under our precedents. See Vitek, 445 U. S., at 486-487.
Ill
The Washington Supreme Court gave its primary attention to the procedural component of the Due Process Clause. It phrased the issue before it as whether “a prisoner [is] entitled to a judicial hearing before antipsychotic drugs can be administered against his will.” 110 Wash. 2d, at 874, 759 P. 2d, at 360. The court, however, did more than establish judicial procedures for making the factual determinations called for by Policy 600.30. It required that a different set of determinations than those set forth in the Policy be made as a precondition to medication without the inmate’s consent. Instead of having to prove, pursuant to the Policy, only that the mentally ill inmate is “gravely disabled” or that he presents a “serious likelihood of harm” to himself or others, the court required the State to prove that it has a compelling interest in administering the medication and that the administration of the drugs is necessary and effective to further that interest. The decisionmaker was required further to consider and make written findings regarding either the inmate’s desires or a “substituted judgment” for the inmate analogous to the medical treatment decision for an incompetent person. Id., at 883-884, 759 P. 2d, at 365.
The Washington Supreme Court’s decision, as a result, has both substantive and procedural aspects. It is axiomatic that procedural protections must be examined in terms of the substantive rights at stake. But identifying the contours of the substantive right remains a task distinct from deciding what procedural protections are necessary to protect that right. “[T]he substantive issue involves a definition of th[e] protected constitutional interest, as well as identification of the conditions under which competing state interests might outweigh it. The procedural issue concerns the minimum procedures required by the Constitution for determining that the individual’s liberty interest actually is outweighed in a particular instance.” Mills v. Rogers, 457 U. S. 291, 299 (1982) (citations omitted).
Restated in the terms of this case, the substantive issue is what factual circumstances must exist before the State may administer antipsychotic drugs to the prisoner against his will; the procedural issue is whether the State’s nonjudicial mechanisms used to determine the facts in a particular case are sufficient. The Washington Supreme Court in effect ruled upon the substance of the inmate’s right, as well as the procedural guarantees, and both are encompassed by our grant of certiorari. We address these questions beginning with the substantive one.
As a matter of state law, the Policy itself undoubtedly confers upon respondent a right to be free from the arbitrary administration of antipsychotic medication. In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460 (1983), we held that Pennsylvania had created a protected liberty interest on the part of prison inmates to avoid administrative segregation by enacting regulations that “used language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures ‘shall,’ ‘will,’ or ‘must’ be employed, and that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates — viz., ‘the need for control,’ or ‘the threat of a serious disturbance.’” Id., at 471-472 (citations omitted). Policy 600.30 is similarly mandatory in character. By permitting a psychiatrist to treat an inmate with antipsychotic drugs against his wishes only if he is found to be (1) mentally ill and (2) gravely disabled or dangerous, the Policy creates a justifiable expectation on the part of the inmate that the drugs will not be administered unless those conditions exist. See also Vitek, 445 U. S., at 488-491.
We have no doubt that, in addition to the liberty interest created by the State’s Policy, respondent possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id., at 491-494; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 316 (1982); Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 600-601 (1979). Upon full consideration of the state administrative scheme, however, we find that the Due Process Clause confers upon respondent no greater right than that recognized under state law.
Respondent contends that the State, under the mandate of the Due Process Clause, may not override his choice to refuse antipsychotic drugs unless he has been found to be incompetent, and then only if the factfinder makes a substituted judgment that he, if competent, would consent to drug treatment. We disagree. The extent of a prisoner’s right under the Clause to avoid the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in the context of the inmate’s confinement. The Policy under review requires the State to establish, by a medical finding, that a mental disorder exists which is likely to cause harm if not treated. Moreover, the fact that the medication must first be prescribed by a psychiatrist, and then approved by a reviewing psychiatrist, ensures that the treatment in question will be ordered only if it is in the prisoner’s medical interests, given the legitimate needs of his institutional confinement. These standards, which recognize both the prisoner’s medical interests and the State’s interests, meet the demands of the Due Process Clause.
The legitimacy, and the necessity, of considering the State’s interests in prison safety and security are well established by our cases. In Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987), and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U. S. 342 (1987), we held that the proper standard for determining the validity of a prison regulation claimed to infringe on an inmate’s constitutional rights is to ask whether the regulation is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, supra, at 89. This is true even when the constitutional right claimed to have been infringed is fundamental, and the State under other circumstances would have been required to satisfy a more rigorous standard of review. Estate of Shabazz, supra, at 349. The Washington Supreme Court declined to apply this standard of review to the Center’s Policy, reasoning that the liberty interest present here was distinguishable from the First Amendment rights at issue in both Turner and Estate of Shabazz. 110 Wash. 2d, at 883, n. 9, 759 P. 2d, at 364, n. 9. The court erred in refusing to apply the standard of reasonableness.
Our earlier determination to adopt this standard of review was based upon the need to reconcile our longstanding adherence to the principle that inmates retain at least some constitutional rights despite incarceration with the recognition that prison authorities are best equipped to make difficult decisions regarding prison administration. Turner, supra, at 84-85; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U. S. 119, 128 (1977). These two principles apply in all cases in which a prisoner asserts that a prison regulation violates the Constitution, not just those in which the prisoner invokes the First Amendment. We made quite clear that the standard of review we adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights. See Turner, 482 U. S., at 85 (“Our task... is to formulate a standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims that is responsive both to the ‘policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional rights’”) (citation omitted); id., at 89 (“If Pell, Jones, and Bell have not already resolved the question posed in [Procunier v.] Martinez, [416 U. S. 396 (1974),] we resolve it now: when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”); Estate of Shabazz, supra, at 349 (“To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, we have determined that prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights”). In Turner itself we applied the reasonableness standard to a prison regulation that imposed severe restrictions on the inmate’s right to marry, a right protected by the Due Process Clause. See Turner, supra, at 95-96 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374 (1978), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967)). Our precedents require application of the standard here.
In Turner, we considered various factors to determine the reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation. Three are relevant here. “First, there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.” 482 U. S., at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U. S. 576, 586 (1984)). Second, a court must consider “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.” 482 U. S., at 90. Third, “the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation,” but this does not mean that prison officials “have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Id., at 90-91; see also Estate of Shabazz, supra, at 350.
Applying these factors to the regulation before us, we conclude that the Policy comports with constitutional requirements. There can be little doubt as to both the legitimacy and the importance of the governmental interest presented here. There are few cases in which the State’s interest in combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater than in a prison environment, which, “by definition,” is made up of persons with “a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 526 (1984); Jones, supra, at 132; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 561-562 (1974). We confront here the State’s obligations, not just its interests. The State has undertaken the obligation to provide prisoners with medical treatment consistent not only with their own medical interests, but also with the needs of the institution. Prison administrators have not only an interest in ensuring the safety of prison staffs and administrative personnel, see Hewitt, 459 U. S., at 473, but also the duty to take reasonable measures for the prisoners’ own safety. See Hudson, supra, at 526-527. These concerns have added weight when a penal institution, like the SOC, is restricted to inmates with mental illnesses. Where an inmate’s mental disability is the root cause of the threat he poses to the inmate population, the State’s interest in decreasing the danger to others necessarily encompasses an interest in providing him with medical treatment for his illness.
SOC Policy 600.30 is a rational means of furthering the State’s legitimate objectives. Its exclusive application is to inmates who are mentally ill and who, as a result of their illness, are gravely disabled or represent a significant danger to themselves or others. The drugs may be administered for no purpose other than treatment, and only under the direction of a licensed psychiatrist. There is considerable debate over the potential side effects of antipsychotic medications, but there is little dispute in the psychiatric profession that proper use of the drugs is one of the most effective means of treating and controlling a mental illness likely to cause violent behavior.
The alternative means proffered by respondent for accommodating his interest in rejecting the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs do not demonstrate the invalidity of the State’s policy. Respondent’s main contention is that, as a precondition to antipsychotic drug treatment, the State must find him incompetent, and then obtain court approval of the treatment using a “substituted judgment” standard. The suggested rule takes no account of the legitimate governmental interest in treating him where medically appropriate for the purpose of reducing the danger he poses. A rule that is in no way responsive to the State’s legitimate interests is not a proper accommodation, and can be rejected out of hand. Nor are physical restraints or seclusion “alternative[s] that fully accommodat[e] the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.” Turner, supra, at 91. Physical restraints are effective only in the short term, and can have serious physical side effects when used on a resisting inmate, see Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 12, as well as leaving the staff at risk of injury while putting the restraints on or tending to the inmate who is in them. Furthermore, respondent has failed to demonstrate that physical restraints or seclusion are acceptable substitutes for antipsychotic drugs, in terms of either their medical effectiveness or their toll on limited prison resources.
We hold that, given the requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest. Policy 600.30 comports with these requirements; we therefore reject respondent’s contention that its substantive standards are deficient under the Constitution.
iv
Having determined that state law recognizes a liberty interest, also protected by the Due Process Clause, which permits refusal of antipsychotic drugs unless certain preconditions are met, we address next what procedural protections are necessary to ensure that the decision to medicate an inmate against his will is neither arbitrary nor erroneous under the standards we have discussed above. The Washington Supreme Court held that a full judicial hearing, with the inmate being represented by counsel, was required by the Due Process Clause before the State could administer antipsychotic drugs to him against his will. In addition, the court held that the State must justify the authorization of involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs by “clear, cogent, and convincing” evidence. We hold that the administrative hearing procedures set by the SOC Policy do comport with procedural due process, and conclude that the Washington Supreme Court erred in requiring a judicial hearing as a prerequisite for the involuntary treatment of prison inmates.
A
The primary point of disagreement between the parties is whether due process requires a judicial decisionmaker. As written, the Policy requires that the decision whether to medicate an inmate against his will be made by a hearing committee composed of a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the Center’s Associate Superintendent. None of the committee members may be involved, at the time of the hearing, in the inmate’s treatment or diagnosis; members are not disqualified from sitting on the committee, however, if they have treated or diagnosed the inmate in the past. The committee’s decision is subject to review by the Superintendent; if the inmate so desires, he may seek judicial review of the decision in a state court. See supra, at 216. Respondent contends that only a court should make the decision to medicate an inmate against his will.
The procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause must be determined with reference to the rights and interests at stake in the particular case. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972); Hewitt, 459 U. S., at 472; Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 12 (1979). The factors that guide us are well established. “Under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976), we consider the private interests at stake in a governmental decision, the governmental interests involved, and the value of procedural requirements in determining what process is due under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hewitt, supra, at 473.
Respondent’s interest in avoiding the unwarranted administration of antipsychotic drugs is not insubstantial. The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty. Cf. Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 772 (1966). The purpose of the drugs is to alter the chemical balance in a patient’s brain, leading to changes, intended to be beneficial, in his or her cognitive processes. See n. 1, supra. While the therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well documented, it is also true that the drugs can have serious, even fatal, side effects. One such side effect identified by the trial court is acute dystonia, a severe involuntary spasm of the upper body, tongue, throat, or eyes. The trial court found that it may be treated and reversed within a few minutes through use of the medication Cogentin. Other side effects include akathesia (motor restlessness, often characterized by an inability to sit still); neuroleptic malignant syndrome (a relatively rare condition which can lead to death from cardiac dysfunction); and tardive dyskinesia, perhaps the most discussed side effect of antipsychotic drugs. See Finding of Fact 9, App. to Pet. for Cert. B-7; Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae 6-9. Tardive dyskinesia is a neurological disorder, irreversible in some cases, that is characterized by involuntary, uncontrollable movements of various muscles, especially around the face. See Mills, 457 U. S., at 293, n. 1. The State, respondent, and amici sharply disagree about the frequency with which tar-dive dyskinesia occurs, its severity, and the medical profession’s ability to treat, arrest, or reverse the condition. A fair reading of the evidence, however, suggests that the proportion of patients treated with antipsychotic drugs who exhibit the symptoms of tardive dyskinesia ranges from 10% to 25%. According to the American Psychiatric Association, studies of the condition indicate that 60% of tardive dyskinesia is mild or minimal in effect, and about 10% may be characterized as severe. Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 14-16, and n. 12; see also Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae 8.
Notwithstanding the risks that are involved, we conclude that an inmate’s interests are adequately protected, and perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by medical professionals rather than a judge. The Due Process Clause “has never been thought to require that the neutral and detached trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer.” Parham, 442 U. S., at 607. Though it cannot be doubted that the decision to medicate has societal and legal implications, the Constitution does not prohibit the State from permitting medical personnel to make the decision under fair procedural mechanisms. See id., at 607-609; cf. Youngberg, 457 U. S., at 322-323. Particularly where the patient is mentally disturbed, his own intentions will be difficult to assess and will be changeable in any event. Schwartz, Vingiano, & Perez, Autonomy and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Patients’ Attitudes After Involuntary Medication, 39 Hospital & Community Psychiatry 1049 (1988). Respondent’s own history of accepting and then refusing drug treatment illustrates the point. We cannot make the facile assumption that the patient’s intentions, or a substituted judgment approximating those intentions, can be determined in a single judicial hearing apart from the realities of frequent and ongoing clinical observation by medical professionals. Our holding in Parham that a judicial hearing was not required prior to the voluntary commitment of a child to a mental hospital was based on similar observations:
“... [D]ue process is not violated by use of informal, traditional medical investigative techniques.... The mode and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the business of judges....
“Although we acknowledge the fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis, see O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 584 (1975) (concurring opinion), we do not accept the notion that the shortcomings of specialists can always be avoided by shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the traditional tools of medical science to an untrained judge or administrative hearing officer after a judicial-type hearing. Even after a hearing, the nonspecialist decisionmaker must make a medical-psychiatric decision. Common human experience and scholarly opinions suggest that the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than real.” Parham, 442 U. S., at 607-609.
Nor can we ignore the fact that requiring judicial hearings will divert scarce prison resources, both money and the staff’s time, from the care and treatment of mentally ill inmates. See id., at 605-606.
Under Policy 600.30, the decisionmaker is asked to review a medical treatment decision made by a medical professional. That review requires two medical inquiries: first, whether the inmate suffers from a “mental disorder”; and second, whether, as a result of that disorder, he is dangerous to himself, others, or their property. Under the Policy, the hearing committee reviews on a regular basis the staff’s choice of both the type and dosage of drug to be administered, and can order appropriate changes. 110 Wash. 2d, at 875, 759 P. 2d, at 360. The risks associated with antipsychotic drugs are for the most part medical ones, best assessed by medical professionals. A State may conclude with good reason that a judicial hearing will not be as effective, as continuous, or as probing as administrative review using medical decisionmakers. We hold that due process requires no more.
A State’s attempt to set a high standard for determining when involuntary medication with antipsychotic drugs is permitted cannot withstand challenge if there are no procedural safeguards to ensure the prisoner’s interests are taken into account. Adequate procedures exist here. In particular, independence of the decisionmaker is addressed to our satisfaction by these procedures. None of the hearing committee members may be involved in the inmate’s current treatment or diagnosis. The record before us, moreover, is limited to the hearings given to respondent. There is no indication that any institutional biases affected or altered the decision to medicate respondent against his will. The trial court made specific findings that respondent has a history of assaultive behavior which his doctors attribute to his mental disease, and that all of the Policy’s requirements were met. See App. to Pet. for Cert. B-4 to B-5, B-8. The court found also that the medical treatment provided to respondent, including the administration of antipsychotic drugs, was at' all times consistent “with the degree of care, skill, and learning expected of a reasonably prudent psychiatrist in the State of Washington, acting in the same or similar circumstances.” Id., at B-8. In the absence of record evidence to the contrary, we are not willing to presume that members of the staff lack the necessary independence to provide an inmate with a full and fair hearing in accordance with the Policy. In previous cases involving medical decisions implicating similar liberty interests, we have approved use of similar internal decisionmakers. See Vitek, 445 U. S., at 496; Parham, supra, at 613-616. Cf. Wolff, 418 U. S., at 570-571 (prison officials sufficiently impartial to conduct prison disciplinary hearings). As we reasoned in Vitek, it is only by permitting persons connected with the institution to make these decisions that courts are able to avoid “unnecessary intrusion into either medical or correctional judgments.” Vitek, supra, at 496; see Turner, 482 U. S., at 84-85, 89..
B
The procedures established by the Center are sufficient to meet the requirements of due process in all other respects, and we reject respondent’s arguments to the contrary. The Policy provides for notice, the right to be present at an adversary hearing, and the right to present and cross-examine witnesses. See Vitek, supra, at 494-496. The procedural protections are not vitiated by meetings between the committee members and staff before the hearing. Absent evidence of resulting bias, or evidence that the actual decision is made before the hearing, allowing respondent to contest the staff’s position at the hearing satisfies the requirement that the opportunity to be heard “must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). We reject also respondent’s contention that the hearing must be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence or that a “clear, cogent, and convincing” standard of proof is necessary. This standard is neither required nor helpful when medical personnel are making the judgment required by the regulations here. See Vitek, supra, at 494-495. Cf. Youngberg, 457 U. S., at 321-323. Finally, we note that under state law an inmate may obtain judicial review of the hearing committee’s decision by way of a personal restraint petition or petition for an extraordinary writ, and that the trial court found that the record compiled under the Policy was adequate to allow such review. See App. to Pet. for Cert. B-8.
Respondent contends that the Policy is nonetheless deficient because it does not allow him to be represented by counsel. We disagree. “[I]t is less than crystal clear why lawyers must be available to identify possible errors in medical judgment.” Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 473 U. S. 305, 330 (1985) (emphasis in original). Given the nature of the decision to be made, we conclude that the provision of an independent lay adviser who understands the psychiatric issues involved is sufficient protection. See Vitek, supra, at 499-500 (Powell, J., concurring).
V
In sum, we hold that the regulation before us is permissible under the Constitution
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent Rumely was Secretary of an organization known as the Committee for Constitutional Government, which, among other things, engaged in the sale of books of a particular political tendentiousness. He refused to disclose to the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities the names of those who made bulk purchases of these books for further distribution, and was convicted under R. S. § 102, as amended, 52 Stat. 942, 2 U. S. C. § 192, which provides penalties for refusal to give testimony or to produce relevant papers “upon any matter” under congressional inquiry. The Court of Appeals reversed, one judge dissenting. It held that the committee before which Rumely refused to furnish this information had no authority to compel its production. 90 U. S. App. D. C. 382, 197 F. 2d 166. Since the Court of Appeals thus took a view of the committee’s authority contrary to that adopted by the House in citing Rumely for contempt, we granted certiorari. 344 U. S. 812. This issue — whether the committee was authorized to exact the information which the witness withheld — must first be settled before we may consider whether Congress had the power to confer upon the committee the authority which it claimed.
Although we are here dealing with a resolution of the House of Representatives, the problem is much the same as that which confronts the Court when called upon to construe a statute that carries the seeds of constitutional controversy. The potential constitutional questions have far-reaching import. We are asked to recognize the penetrating and pervasive scope of the investigative power of Congress. The reach that may be claimed for that power is indicated by Woodrow Wilson’s characterization of it:
“It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served’ and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it should understand and direct. The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.” Wilson, Congressional Government, 303.
Although the indispensable “informing function of Congress” is not to be minimized, determination of the “rights” which this function implies illustrates the common juristic situation thus defined for the Court by Mr. Justice Holmes: “All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached.” Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 355. President Wilson did not write in light of the history of events since he wrote; more particularly he did not write of the investigative power of Congress in the context of the First Amendment. And so, we would have to be that “blind” Court, against which Mr. Chief Justice Taft admonished in a famous passage, Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 37, that does not see what “[a] 11 others can see and understand” not to know that there is wide concern, both in and out of Congress, over some aspects of the exercise of the congressional power of investigation.
Accommodation of these contending principles — the one underlying the power of Congress to investigate, the other at the basis of the limitation imposed by the First Amendment — is not called for until after we have construed the scope of the authority which the House of Representatives gave to the Select Committee on Lobbying Activities. The pertinent portion of the resolution of August 12, 1949, reads:
“The committee is authorized and directed to conduct a study and investigation of (1) all lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation; and (2) all activities of agencies of the Federal Government intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation.” H. Res. 298, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
This is the controlling charter of the committee’s powers. Its right to exact testimony and to call for the production of documents must be found in this language. The resolution must speak for itself, since Congress put no gloss upon it at the time of its passage. Nor is any help to be had from the fact that the purpose of the Buchanan Committee, as the Select Committee was known, was to try to “find out how well [the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 839] worked.” 96 Cong. Rec. 13882. That statute had a section of definitions, but Congress did not define the terms “lobbying” or “lobbying activities” in that Act, for it did not use them. Accordingly, the phrase “lobbying activities” in the resolution must be given the meaning that may fairly be attributed to it, having special regard for the principle of constitutional adjudication which makes it decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction may raise serious constitutional questions avoided by another. In a long series of decisions we have acted on this principle. In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, “[i]t is our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach a conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality.” Richmond Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 331, 346. Again, what Congress has written, we said through Mr. Chief Justice (then Mr. Justice) Stone, “must be construed with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to its validity.” Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573, 577. As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, “if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62, and cases cited.
Patently, the Court’s duty to avoid a constitutional issue, if possible, applies not merely to legislation technically speaking but also to congressional action by way of resolution. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298. Indeed, this duty of not needlessly projecting delicate issues for judicial pronouncement is even more applicable to resolutions than to formal legislation. It can hardly be gainsaid that resolutions secure passage more casually and less responsibly, in the main, than do enactments requiring presidential approval.
Surely it cannot be denied that giving the scope to the resolution for which the Government contends, that is, deriving from it the power to inquire into all efforts of private individuals to influence public opinion through books and periodicals, however remote the radiations of influence which they may exert upon the ultimate legislative process, raises doubts of constitutionality in view of the prohibition of the First Amendment. In light of the opinion of Prettyman, J., below and of some of the views expressed here, it would not be seemly to maintain that these doubts are fanciful or factitious. Indeed, adjudication here, if it were necessary, would affect not an evanescent policy of Congress, but its power to inform itself, which underlies its policy-making function. Whenever constitutional limits upon the investigative power of Congress have to be drawn by this Court, it ought only to be done after Congress has demonstrated its full awareness of what is at stake by unequivocally authorizing an inquiry of dubious limits. Experience admonishes us to tread warily in this domain. The loose language of Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, the weighty criticism to which it has been subjected, see, e. g., Fairman, Mr. Justice Miller and the Supreme Court, 332-334; Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153, the inroads that •have been made upon that case by later cases, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 170-171, and Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, strongly counsel abstention from adjudication unless no choice is left.
Choice is left. As a matter of English, the phrase “lobbying activities” readily lends itself to the construction placed upon it below, namely, “lobbying in its commonly accepted sense,” that is, “representations made directly to the Congress, its members, or its committees,” 90 U. S. App. D. C. 382, 391, 197 F. 2d 166, 175, and does not reach what was in Chairman Buchanan’s mind, attempts “to saturate the thinking of the community.” 96 Cong. Rec. 13883. If “lobbying” was to cover all activities of anyone intending to influence, encourage, promote or retard legislation, why did Congress differentiate between “lobbying activities” and other “activities . . . intended to influence” ? Had Congress wished to authorize so extensive an investigation of the influences that form public opinion, would it not have used language at least as explicit as it employed in the very resolution in question in authorizing investigation of government agencies? Certainly it does no violence to the phrase “lobbying activities" to give it a more restricted scope. To give such meaning is not barred by intellectual honesty. So to interpret is in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt. “Words have been strained more than they need to be strained here in order to avoid that doubt.” (Mr. Justice Holmes in Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148, with the concurrence of Mr. Justice Brandéis, Mr. Justice Sanford and Mr. Justice Stone.) With a view to observing this principle of wisdom and duty, the Court very recently strained words more than they need be strained here. United States v. C. I. O., 335 U. S. 106. The considerations which prevailed in that case should prevail in this.
Only a word need be said about the debate in Congress after the committee reported that Rumely had refused to produce the information which he had a right to refuse under the restricted meaning of the phrase “lobbying activities.” The view taken at that time by the committee and by the Congress that the committee was authorized to ask Rumely for the information he withheld is not legislative history defining the scope of a congressional measure. What was said in the debate on August 30, 1950, after the controversy had arisen regarding the scope of the resolution of August 12, 1949, had the usual infirmity of post litem motam, self-serving declarations. In any event, Rumely’s duty to answer must be judged as of the time of his refusal. The scope of the resolution defining that duty is therefore to be ascertained as of that time and cannot be enlarged by subsequent action of Congress.
Grave constitutional questions are matters properly to be decided by this Court but only when they inescapably come before us for adjudication. Until then it is our duty to abstain from marking the boundaries of congressional power or delimiting the protection guaranteed by the First Amendment. Only by such self-restraint will we avoid the mischief which has followed occasional departures from the principles which we profess.
The judgment below should be
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Minton took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The ambiguity of the terms of the resolution — that is, whether questions asked to which answers were refused were within those terms — is reflected by the close division by which the committee’s view of its own authority prevailed. The vote was 183 to 175.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent claims the right to withdraw his plea of guilty as a consequence of the District Court’s failure to give one of the warnings required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure-11. Because the claim of Rule 11 error was not preserved by timely objection, the plain-error standard of Rule 52(b) applies, with its requirement to prove effect on substantial rights. The question is what showing must thus be made to obtain relief for an unpreserved Rule 11 failing, and we hold that a defendant is obliged to show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.
I
In early May 1999, a confidential informant working with law enforcement arranged through respondent Carlos Dominguez Benitez (hereinafter Dominguez) to buy several pounds of methamphetamine. First, the informant got a sample from Dominguez, and a week later Dominguez went to a restaurant in Anaheim, California, to consummate the sale in the company of two confederates, one of whom brought a shopping bag with over a kilogram of the drugs. The meeting ended when the informant gave a signal and officers arrested the dealers. Dominguez confessed to selling the methamphetamine and gave information about his supplier and confederates.
A federal grand jury indicted Dominguez on two counts: conspiracy to possess more than 500 grams of methamphetamine, and possession of 1,391 grams of a methamphetamine mixture, both with intent to distribute. On the conspiracy count, Dominguez faced a statutory, mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years, with a maximum of life. 84 Stat. 1260, 21 U. S. C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846. The District Court appointed counsel, who began talking with the Government about a plea agreement.
In September 1999, the District Court received the first of several letters from Dominguez, in which he asked for a new lawyer and expressed discomfort with the plea agreement his counsel was encouraging him to sign. On counsel’s motion, the court held a status conference, at which Dominguez spoke to the judge. Again he said he was dissatisfied with his representation, and wanted a “better deal.” The court asked whether he was “talking about a disposition ... other than trial,” and Dominguez answered, “At no time have I decided to go to any trial.” App. 46-47. Counsel spoke to the same effect later in the proceeding, when he said that he had “told [the prosecutor] all along that there won’t be a trial on the [date set] based on my client’s representations that he doesn’t want a trial.” Id., at 51. The court explained to Dominguez that it could not help him in plea negotiations, and found no reason to change counsel.
Shortly after that, the parties agreed that Dominguez would plead guilty to the conspiracy, and the Government would dismiss the possession charge. The Government stipulated that Dominguez would receive what is known as a safety-valve reduction of two levels. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §§2Dl.l(b)(6), 5C1.2 (Nov. 1999) (hereinafter USSG). The safety valve was important because it would allow the court to invoke 18 U. S. C. § 3553(f), authorizing a sentence below the otherwise mandatory minimum in certain cases of diminished culpability, the only chance Dominguez had for a sentence under 10 years. That chance turned on satisfying five conditions, one going to Dominguez’s criminal history, which the agreement did not address. The agreement did, however, warn Dominguez that it did not bind the sentencing court, and that Dominguez could not withdraw his plea if the court did not accept the Government’s stipulations or recommendations. At a hearing the next day, Dominguez changed his plea to guilty. In the plea colloquy, the court gave almost all the required Rule 11 warnings, including the warning that the plea agreement did not bind the court, but the judge failed to mention that Dominguez could not withdraw his plea if the court did not accept the Government’s recommendations. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3)(B).
When the Probation Office subsequently issued its report, it found that Dominguez had three prior convictions, two of them under other names, which neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor had known at the time of the plea negotiations. The upshot was that Dominguez was ineligible for the safety valve, and so had no chance to escape the sentence of 10 years. After receiving two more letters from Dominguez complaining about the quality of counsel’s representation, the District Court sentenced Dominguez to the mandatory minimum. At the sentencing hearing, all counsel told the court that they had thought Dominguez might at least have been eligible for the safety-valve mitigation, but agreed that with three convictions, he was not. Dominguez told the court that he had “never had any knowledge about the points of responsibility, the safety valve, or anything like that.” App. 109. The court replied that in light of the “lengthy change of plea proceedings” it was “difficult ... to accept what” Dominguez said. Id., at 112.
On appeal, Dominguez argued that the District Court’s failure to warn him, as Rule 11(c)(3)(B) instructs, that he could not withdraw his guilty plea if the court did not accept the Government’s recommendations required reversal. After waiting for United States v. Vonn, 535 U. S. 55 (2002), a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, 310 F. 3d 1221 (2002), and cited United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725 (1993), in applying the plain-error standard. The court held that the District Court had indeed erred; and that the error was plain, affected Dominguez’s substantial rights, and required correction in the interests of justice.
To show that substantial rights were affected, the Court of Appeals required Dominguez to “prove that the court’s error was not minor or technical and that he did hot understand the rights at issue when he entered his guilty plea.” 310 F. 3d, at 1225. The court rejected the Government’s arguments that the written plea agreement or the District Court’s other statements in the plea colloquy sufficiently advised Dominguez of his rights, given Dominguez’s inability to speak English and the assurances of both counsel that he would likely qualify under the safety-valve provision. Judge Tallman dissented, with the warning that the majority’s analysis followed neither Vonn nor Circuit precedent. 310 F. 3d, at 1227-1228.
We granted certiorari, 540 U. S. 1072 (2003), on the question “[wjhether, in order to show that a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 constitutes reversible plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pleaded guilty if the violation had not occurred.” Pet. for Cert. (I). We now reverse.
II
A
Because the Government agreed to make a nonbinding sentencing recommendation, Rule 11(c)(3)(B) required the court to “advise the defendant that the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does not follow the recommendation or request.” Rule 11, however, instructs that not every violation of its terms calls for reversal of conviction by entitling the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. “A variance from the requirements of this rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(h).
In Vonn, we considered the standard that applies when a defendant is dilatory in raising Rule 11 error, and held that reversal is not in order unless the error is plain. 535 U. S., at 63; see Olano, supra, at 731-737. Although we explained that in assessing the effect of Rule 11 error, a reviewing court must look to the entire record, not to the plea proceedings alone, Vonn, supra, at 74-75, we did not formulate the standard for determining whether a defendant has shown, as the plain-error standard requires, Olano, supra, at 734-735, an effect on his substantial rights.
B
It is only for certain structural errors undermining the fairness of a criminal proceeding as a whole that even preserved error requires reversal without regard to the mistake’s effect on the proceeding. See Arizona v. Fulmi-nante, 499 U. S. 279, 309-310 (1991) (giving examples). Dominguez does not argue that either Rule 11 error generally or the Rule 11 error here is structural in this sense.
Otherwise, relief for error is tied in some way to prejudicial effect, and the standard phrased as “error that affects substantial rights,” used in Rule 52, has previously been taken to mean error with a prejudicial effect on the outcome of a judicial proceeding. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750 (1946). To affect “substantial rights,” see 28 U. S. C. §2111, an error must have “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the . . . verdict.” Kot-teakos, supra, at 776. In cases where the burden of demonstrating prejudice (or materiality) is on the defendant seeking relief, we have invoked a standard with similarities to the Kotteakos formulation in requiring the showing of “a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (adopting the prejudice standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (1984), for claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 473 U. S., at 685 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (same).
No reason has appeared for treating the phrase “affecting substantial rights” as untethered to a prejudice requirement when applying Olano to this nonstructural error, or for doubting that Bagley is a sensible model to follow. As Vonn makes clear, the burden of establishing entitlement to relief for plain error is on the defendant claiming it, and for several reasons, we think that burden should not be too easy for defendants in Dominguez’s position. First, the standard should enforce the policies that underpin Rule 52(b) generally, to encourage timely objections and reduce wasteful reversals by demanding strenuous exertion to get relief for unpreserved error. See Vonn, 535 U. S., at 73. Second, it should respect the particular importance of the finality of guilty pleas, which usually rest, after all, on a defendant’s profession of guilt in open court, and are indispensable in the operation of the modern criminal justice system. See United States v. Timmreck, 441 U. S. 780, 784 (1979). And, in this case, these reasons are complemented by the fact, worth repeating, that the violation claimed was of Rule 11, not of due process.
We hold, therefore, that a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea. A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the proceeding. Strickland, supra, at 694; Bagley, supra, at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J. (internal quotation marks omitted)).
c
What we have already said points to why the test applied by the Court of Appeals in this case fell short. Its first element was whether the error was “minor or technical,” 310 F. 3d, at 1225, a phrase it took from United States v. Graibe, 946 F. 2d 1428 (CA9 1991), which in turn found it in the 1983 commentary that accompanied the amendment to Rule 11(h). 946 F. 2d, at 1433. But this element requires no examination of the effect of the omitted warning on a defendant’s decision, a failing repeated to a significant extent by the second element of the Ninth Circuit’s test, taken from United States v. Minore, 292 F. 3d 1109 (CA9 2002), which asks whether the defendant understood “the rights at issue when he entered his.guilty plea.” 310 F. 3d, at 1225. True, this enquiry gets closer than the first to a consideration of the likely effect of Rule 11 error on the defendant’s decision to plead; assessing a claim that an error affected a defendant’s decision to plead guilty must take into account any indication that the omission of a Rule 11 warning misled him. But the standard of the Court of Appeals does not allow consideration of any record evidence tending to show that a misunderstanding was inconsequential to a defendant’s decision, or evidence indicating the relative significance of other facts that may have borne on his choice regardless of any Rule 11 error.
Relevant evidence that the Court of Appeals thus passed over in this case included Dominguez’s statement to the District Court that he did not intend to go to trial, and his eoun-sel’s confirmation of that representation, made at the same hearing. The neglected but relevant considerations also included the implications raised by Dominguez’s protests at the sentencing hearing. He claimed that when he pleaded guilty he had “never had any knowledge about the points of responsibility, the safety valve, or anything like that.” App. 109. These statements, if credited, would show that Dominguez was confused about the law that applied to his sentence, about which the court clearly informed him, but they do not suggest any causal link between his confusion and the particular Rule 11 violation on which he now seeks relief.
Other matters that may be relevant but escape notice under the Ninth Circuit’s test are the overall strength of the Government’s case and any possible defenses that appear from the record, subjects that courts are accustomed to considering in a Strickland or Brady analysis. When the record made for a guilty plea and sentencing reveals evidence, as this one does, showing both a controlled sale of drugs to an informant and a confession, one can fairly ask a defendant seeking to withdraw his plea what he might ever have thought he could gain by going to trial. The point of the question is not to second-guess a defendant’s actual decision; if it is reasonably probable he would have gone to trial absent the error, it is no matter that the choice may have been foolish. The point, rather, is to enquire whether the omitted warning would have made the difference required by the standard of reasonable probability; it is hard to see here how the warning could have had an effect on Dominguez’s assessment of his strategic position. And even if there were reason to think the warning from the bench could have mattered, there was the plea agreement, read to Dominguez in his native Spanish, which specifically warned that he could not withdraw his plea if the court refused to accept the Government’s recommendations. This fact, uncontested by Dominguez, tends to show that the Rule 11 error made no difference to the outcome here.
* * *
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Dominguez speaks and writes Spanish, not English. A certified translator was present for the hearings in court we describe, and for the plea agreement. Some of the letters are in English, and the record does not show who translated them or assisted Dominguez in writing them.
The agreement also contemplated that Dominguez’s total offense level under the Guidelines would be 27, after considering the safety valve and a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Assuming so, and assuming he had no (or minimal) criminal history, his sentence could have been as low as 70 months. See USSG eh. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).
At the time of the plea hearing, the requirement appeared at Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(2). It has not changed in substance. We refer to the current Rule in the text of this opinion, and do likewise for Rules 11(h) and 52(b), each of which has also received a stylistic amendment.
Other Courts of Appeals employed different tests. See n. 8, infra.
Congress gave the courts this instruction in 1983, in partial response to this Court’s decision in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459 (1969), which it felt had caused too many reversals for reasons that were too insubstantial. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U. S. 55, 66-71 (2002) (discussing the history of Rule 11(h)).
The argument, if made, would not prevail. The omission of a single Rule 11 warning without more is not colorably structural. Cf. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U. S. 780, 783-784 (1979) (holding that Rule 11 error without more is not cognizable on collateral review).
When the Government has the burden of addressing prejudice, as in excusing preserved error as harmless on direct review of the criminal conviction, it is not enough to negate an effect on the outcome of the case. See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967) (“[T]he court must be able to declare a belief that [constitutional error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). When the Government has the burden of showing that constitutional trial error is harmless because it comes up on collateral review, the heightened interest in finality generally calls for the Government to meet the more lenient Kotteakos standard. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 638 (1993). If the burden is on a defendant to show prejudice in the first instance, of course, it would be easier to show a reasonable doubt that constitutional error affected a trial than to show a likely effect on the outcome or verdict.
This standard is similar to one already applied by some Courts of Appeals, though those courts have not drawn a direct connection to Strickland and Bagley, and in some cases understood themselves to be reviewing for harmless, rather than plain, error. See United States v. Martinez, 289 F. 3d 1023, 1029 (CA7 2002) (on plain-error review, asking “whether any Rule 11 violations would have likely affected [the defendant’s] willingness to plead guilty”); see also United States v. Johnson, 1 F. 3d 296, 302 (CA5 1993) (en banc) (on harmless-error review, asking “whether the defendant’s knowledge and comprehension of the full and correct information would have been likely to affect his willingness to plead guilty”); cf. United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 734-735 (1993) (the main difference as to substantial rights in the harmless- and plain-error analyses is that the burden of persuasion shifts from Government to defendant).
One significant difference, however, between Rule 11 claims and claims under Strickland and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), is that the latter may be raised in postconviction proceedings such as a petition for habeas corpus, or a motion to vacate a sentence under 28 U. S. C. §2255. Those proceedings permit greater development of the record. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U. S. 500 (2003) (Strickland claims are not procedurally defaulted when brought for the first time on § 2255, because of the advantages of that form of proceeding for hearing, such cases). For Rule 11 claims, by contrast, that way is open only in the most egregious cases. Timmreck, supra; see also Vonn, 535 U. S., at 64 (noting that Rule 11(h) was not meant to disturb Timmreck). A defendant will rarely, if ever, be able to obtain relief for Rule 11 violations under §2255; and relief on direct appeal, given the plain-error standard that will apply in many cases, will be difficult to get, as it should be.' Cf. United States v. Raineri, 42 F. 3d 36, 45 (CA1 1994) (Boudin, J.) (“[JJust as there are many fair trials but few perfect ones, so flaws are also to be expected in Rule 11 proceedings”).
Our rule does not, however, foreclose relief altogether. The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 434 (1995).
This is another point of contrast with the constitutional question whether a defendant’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. We have held, for example, that when the record of a criminal conviction obtained by guilty plea contains no evidence that a defendant knew of the rights he was putatively waiving, the conviction must be reversed. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (1969). We do not suggest that such a conviction could be saved even by overwhelming evidence that the defendant would have pleaded guilty regardless.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether a district court order granting permissive intervention but denying intervention as of right is immediately appealable.
b-H
This case is part of the ongoing litigation concerning the Stringfellow Acid Pits, an abandoned hazardous waste disposal site near Glen Avon, California. Petitioners are 28 individuals, companies, or entities who formerly owned or operated the Acid Pits, or who allegedly produced or transported the wastes that were dumped at the disposal site. In 1983 the United States and the State of California filed suit against petitioners, claiming that the Acid Pits created a substantial danger to the surrounding area. The Government plaintiffs sought injunctive relief that would require petitioners to abate the release of harmful substances from the site, and to take remedial steps to correct the unsafe conditions. Both the United States and California also requested reimbursement for the costs incurred in bringing about the cleanup.
Shortly after the complaint was filed, respondent Concerned Neighbors in Action (CNA), a nonprofit organization whose members live near the dumpsite, moved to intervene in the litigation. CNA claimed that it was entitled to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), because it had a substantial interest in the suit that would not be represented adequately by the existing parties. CNA also asserted that the citizen suit provisions of various environmental statutes allowed intervention as of right in these circumstances. Alternatively, CNA claimed that it should be allowed to intervene by permission pursuant to Rule 24(b).
The District Court denied the request to intervene as of right, but granted CNA’s application to become a permissive intervenor. The court concluded, however, that CNA’s right to participate should be subject to three conditions. First, it held that CNA could not assert any claim for relief that had not already been requested by one of the original parties. The court found that “allowing applicants to assert their individualized damage and other claims would burden and expand an already complex litigation, and could jeopardize the possibility of settlement.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-19. Second, CNA could not intervene in the Government plaintiffs’ claim for recovery of the clean-up costs. Finally, in an effort to “minimize any delay and confusion involved in discovery,” the District Court ruled that CNA could not file any motions or conduct its own discovery unless it first conferred with all the original parties, and then obtained permission to go forward from at least one of these litigants. Id., at A-20. The court emphasized, though, that CNA had the right to attend all depositions, to participate to the extent not duplicative of the original parties, and to receive copies of all discovery material produced by the other litigants.
CNA filed an immediate appeal, protesting both the denial of the application to intervene as of right and the restrictions imposed on permissive intervention. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially dismissed the appeal, finding that the District Court order was not a “final decision” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1291. The court’s decision was largely based on the fact that CNA had been made a party to the litigation and could protect its interests fully during an appeal from the final judgment. The Ninth Circuit also noted that its decision was consistent with the results reached by other Courts of Appeals in similar cases. The court subsequently withdrew its opinion, however, concluding that the holding was inconsistent with Ninth Circuit precedent. Relying on California v. Block, 690 F. 2d 753, 776 (1982), the court ruled that “[d]enial of intervention as of right is a final appealable order, despite the grant of permissive intervention.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-26. The court ordered further briefing on the merits of the intervention application, and ultimately held that CNA must be allowed to intervene as of right. United States v. Stringfellow, 755 F. 2d 1383 (1985) (order). See also 783 F. 2d 821 (1986) (opinion).
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether this type of pretrial order is subject to immediate appeal. 476 U. S. 1157. We now vacate and remand.
II
CNA acknowledges that the District Court order in this case is not “final” in the traditional sense. The decision concerning CNA’s intervenor status clearly is not one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” See Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233 (1945). Instead, CNA argues that the order falls within one of the narrow categories of decisions that we have deemed final for purposes of review, even though the entire dispute has not yet been resolved.
A
CNA’s primary argument is that the District Court ruling is covered by the “collateral order” exception to § 1291. This doctrine recognizes that a limited class of prejudgment orders is sufficiently important and sufficiently separate from the underlying dispute that immediate appeal should be available. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949). To qualify as a collateral order, a decision must: (i) “conclusively determine the disputed question”; (ii) “resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action”; and (iii) “be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978) (footnote omitted). See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 375 (1981).
Although a party seeking appeal must show that all three requirements are satisfied, we find it unnecessary to address each part of the test. We assume, arguendo, that the District Court order conclusively determined CNA’s right to intervene, and that the intervention issue is completely separate from the merits of the underlying action. We nevertheless find that the order is not “collateral” within the meaning of Coopers & Lybrand. We conclude that because CNA is now a party to the suit by virtue of its permissive intervention, it can obtain effective review of its claims on appeal from the final judgment.
An intervenor, whether by right or by permission, normally has the right to appeal an adverse final judgment by a trial court. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275, 280-283 (1946); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 687 F. 2d 543 (CA1 1982). See also 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶24-15, pp. 24-169 — 24-170 (2d ed. 1985) (An intervenor may appeal from “all interlocutory and final orders that affect him . . . whether the right under which he intervened was originally absolute or discretionary”); 7C C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1923, p. 517 (2d ed. 1986). Thus if CNA still wishes to challenge the denial of intervention as of right, or if it believes that the restrictions imposed by the District Court prevented it from protecting its interests, it can raise these claims before the Court of Appeals after the trial. That court then can decide whether the order was erroneous, and if so, whether CNA’s inability to participate more fully in the proceedings may have affected the final judgment. We therefore cannot conclude that CNA’s interests will be “irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal.” See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424, 431 (1985).
CNA does not dispute that it has the right to pursue a post-trial appeal. But it argues that, given the realities of complex litigation, a dispute over the right to intervene must be resolved before trial if it is to have any practical significance. CNA argues that once the district court enters a remedial order in a case such as this, involving numerous parties and years of litigation, an appellate court will be reluctant to vacate the judgment because of an erroneous intervention order. CNA suggests that the incentives to affirm the trial court’s decision will be so strong at that point that the “right” to appeal will be academic at best, and thus CNA’s ability to press for the strongest possible clean-up order will indeed be “irretrievably lost.”
This contention may be true to some degree, but it is largely beside the point. Although it may be difficult for CNA to show that the harm from the intervention order is sufficiently great to overturn the final judgment, this has little bearing on whether CNA has the right to an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The difficulties of which CNA complains are the same as those faced by any party who is subject to an adverse pretrial order. A party who has had one of several claims dismissed before trial, for example, may similarly believe that the chances of overturning the judgment on this ground are small, even if the dismissal turns out to be erroneous. Yet unless the district court specifically holds otherwise, challenges to this type of order can be raised only after judgment. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(b). See also 10 Wright, Miller, & Kane, supra, §2653, at 25-26, 31. CNA presents no compelling reason why the intervention order in this case should be treated differently. As a permissive intervenor, CNA will have the same rights of appeal from a final judgment as all other parties; we decline to extend the collateral order doctrine to provide more.
B
CNA also argues that because the District Court placed such onerous limitations on its right to participate in the case, the order should be construed as a complete denial of the right to intervene. CNA correctly notes that when an order prevents a putative intervenor from becoming a party in any respect, the order is subject to immediate review. Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 524-525 (1947). Even though CNA is now a party to the action, it maintains that the restrictions on discovery and the right to request additional relief so severely undermine its ability to influence the litigation that the order is not different in effect from one denying all participation. Indeed, CNA argues that unless it can challenge these restrictions immediately, it will be in a worse position than if the District Court had rejected its intervention application in full: CNA will be unable to participate effectively, and yet still will be bound by the final judgment because of its permissive-party status. We therefore are urged to give the District Court decision a “practical” interpretation and rule that the permissive-intervention order was a constructive denial.
We cannot accept this argument. In Railroad Trainmen, we found that the order denying all intervention was by necessity subject to immediate review, because the applicant “[could] not appeal from any subsequent order or judgment in the proceeding . . . .” 331 U. S., at 524. In that case the party seeking to intervene had no recourse other than pretrial review, since the trial court’s order terminated that party’s participation in the litigation. In the present case, however, CNA is a participant in the proceeding and has alternative means for challenging the order. Consequently, the justification for immediate review found in Railroad Trainmen is absent from this case. And while the District Court restricted CNA’s ability to participate as fully as it might wish, it is significant that none of the limitations interfere with CNA’s ability to raise its claims on postjudgment appeal. As noted, CNA was given access to discovery information and was permitted to participate to the extent not duplicative of other parties. We therefore refuse to find that the grant of permissive intervention, even though subject to conditions, should be treated as a complete denial of the right to participate.
C
Finally, CNA argues that the District Court order comes within the statutory exception to finality set forth in 28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(1). That section provides that a party may take an interlocutory appeal from an order “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions.” CNA asserts that the order in this case constituted a “refusal” to grant an injunction in two respects. First, by ruling that CNA could not raise any claim not asserted by an original party, the District Court necessarily denied the injunctive relief CNA sought in its Complaint in Intervention. Second, by denying the right to file motions without the consent of another party, CNA claims that the order prevents it from even requesting, much less obtaining, a preliminary injunction.
This argument fails for the reasons discussed above. Even if we were convinced that the District Court order had the effect of denying an injunction, it still would not satisfy § 1292(a)(1). This Court has made it clear that not all denials of injunctive relief are immediately appealable; a party seeking review also must show that the order will have a “ ‘serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,’ and that the order can be ‘effectually challenged’ only by immediate appeal.” Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 79, 84 (1981) (quoting Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U. S. 176, 181 (1955)). Because we have concluded that CNA, during post-trial review, can challenge the limitations on its participation, we conclude that § 1292(a)(1) provides no basis for affirming the decision below.
I — I I — I t-H
As we have noted in the past, the finality rule of § 1291 protects a variety of interests that contribute to the efficiency of the legal system. Pretrial appeals may cause disruption, delay, and expense for the litigants; they also burden appellate courts by requiring immediate consideration of issues that may become moot or irrelevant by the end of trial. In addition, the finality doctrine protects the strong interest in allowing trial judges to supervise pretrial and trial procedures without undue interference. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S., at 374. Particularly in a complex case such as this, a district judge’s decision on how best to balance the rights of the parties against the need to keep the litigation from becoming unmanageable is entitled to great deference. Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(b)(2) (“In exercising its discretion [concerning permissive intervention] the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties”). The judge’s ability to conduct efficient and orderly trials would be frustrated, rather than furthered, by piecemeal review. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S., at 434.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
It is so ordered.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 provides in part:
“(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the . . . subject of the action and . . . the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
“(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action:... (2) when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. . . . In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.”
CNA alleged that it had the right to intervene under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 88 Stat. 1690, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 300j-8, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 90 Stat. 2825, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 6972 (1982 ed. and Supp. Ill), and the Clean Water Act, as added, 86 Stat. 888, 33 U. S. C. § 1365.
Section 1291 provides: “The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”
See Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 687 F. 2d 543, 549-550 (CA1 1982); Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 606 F. 2d 354, 357 (CA2 1979); see also Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp., 582 F. 2d 891, 896 (CA5 1977).
When CNA filed its application to intervene, it also lodged a proposed Complaint in Intervention that requested injunctive relief beyond that which was sought by the government plaintiffs. See United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F. 2d 821, 824 (CA9 1986).
CNA also argues that recent congressional action demonstrates that the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is plainly correct. In October 1986, the Superfund Amendments and Authorization Act of 1986 was signed into law. Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613. CNA claims that § 113(e) of these amendments shows that affected groups such as CNA are allowed to intervene as of right in proceedings designed to clean up hazardous waste sites. We express no opinion on the new legislation, because we find it irrelevant to the question before us. CNA’s argument addresses the merits of the District Court intervention order; we granted certiorari, however, only to decide whether this type of order is immediately appealable. The possibility that the District Court order is legally flawed has no bearing on our decision, given that “interlocutory orders are not appealable ‘on the mere ground that they may be erroneous.’ ” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 378 (1981) (citation omitted).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the death sentence imposed on Chandler Clemons even though the jury instruction regarding one of the aggravating factors pressed by the State, that the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” was constitutionally invalid in light of our decision in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356 (1988). Although we hold that the Federal Constitution does not prevent a state appellate court from upholding a death sentence that is based in part on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance either by reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating evidence or by harmless-error review, we vacate the judgment below and remand, because it is unclear whether the Mississippi Supreme Court correctly employed either of these methods.
I
On the evening of April 17, 1987, petitioner Clemons complained to friends that he needed money and suggested a robbery of a pizza delivery man. Clemons used a pay telephone to order a pizza to be delivered to an apartment complex. He and two others, Calvin and Hay, went to the complex in a car and waited. When the pizza delivery vehicle arrived, Clemons and Hay got out of the car; Clemons carried a shotgun belonging to Hay. Clemons stopped and entered the delivery vehicle and ordered the driver, Arthur Shorter, to get out of the car. Shorter was told to take any money he had out of his pockets, which he did. Clemons then told Shorter to lie down, took a bag of money and some pizza from the delivery vehicle, and was about to return to the car where Calvin was sitting when Hay asked if Shorter had seen Clemons’ face. When Clemons answered in the affirmative, Hay told him he had to kill Shorter. Shorter begged for his life but Clemons shot him and got into the car with Hay and Calvin. As they drove away, Calvin looked back and saw Shorter raise his head once. Shorter died shortly thereafter.
The three men eventually went home. Clemons disposed of the shotgun in a hole in his backyard. Calvin, however, later that night related the robbery and shooting incident to his sister’s friend, who happened to be a county jailer. The next day Clemons was arrested at his home and later made a videotaped statement in which he admitted being part of the group that robbed Shorter but denied foreknowledge of the robbery plan and denied that he had been the killer. Before trial Clemons also told the Sheriff where he had hidden the gun.
Clemons was indicted for capital murder and, after a change of venue, was tried before a jury. The principal witness against Clemons was Calvin, who had entered into a plea agreement with the State of Mississippi. Clemons was convicted of capital murder and a sentencing hearing was held. At the sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence arguably establishing that two statutory aggravating factors were present in this case: (1) that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery for pecuniary gain and (2) that it was an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” killing. Clemons presented testimony from his mother and a psychologist regarding mitigating evidence. The State argued the “especially heinous” factor extensively and with regard to that factor the trial court instructed the jury in the bare terms of the Mississippi statute. The jury was further instructed several times that it need not sentence Clemons to death even if it found that no mitigating circumstances were present. The jury sentenced Clemons to death, finding that both aggravating factors argued by the State were present and that they outweighed any mitigating circumstances.
Clemons appealed his conviction and sentence to the Mississippi Supreme Court, and that court affirmed. 535 So. 2d 1354 (1988). After rejecting Clemons’ arguments regarding guilt and several of his challenges to the sentencing proceeding, the court addressed the validity of the “especially heinous” aggravating factor even though Clemons had never raised the issue. The court began by noting that our decision in Maynard v. Cartwright, supra, had invalidated Oklahoma’s identical “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance because it was unconstitutionally vague and did not provide sufficient guidance to the jury in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. The court also recognized that we had refused to sustain the death penalty in Maynard, even though valid aggravating circumstances remained, because Oklahoma had no procedure for salvaging death sentences under such circumstances and that we had left the question of the effect of possible constitutional limiting constructions of the “especially heinous” factor to the Oklahoma courts in the first instance.
The Mississippi Supreme Court distinguished this case from Maynard and sustained Clemons’ death sentence on the following grounds: (1) in Mississippi there is an established procedure that “when one aggravating circumstance is found to be invalid or unsupported by the evidence, a remaining valid aggravating circumstance will nonetheless support the death penalty verdict,” 535 So. 2d, at 1362 (citing cases); (2) the Mississippi Supreme Court has previously given the “especially heinous” factor a constitutional limiting construction, narrowing that category to murders that are conscienceless or pitiless and unnecessarily torturous to the victim, id., at 1363 (citing Coleman v. State, 378 So. 2d 640, 648 (1979)); and (3) the trial court gave the jury no less than seven instructions that “singly and collectively told the jury that regardless of aggravating circumstances, they were not required to impose the death penalty,” even “if . . . there were no mitigating circumstances.” 535 So. 2d, at 1364 (citing instructions).
The court then stated that given all of these considerations plus “the brutal and torturous facts surrounding the murder of Arthur Shorter ... it is inescapable that Maynard v. Cartwright does not dictate the outcome of the case sub ju-' dice.” Ibid. The court added that “[w]e likewise are of the opinion beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s verdict would have been the same with or without the ‘especially heinous, atrocious or cruel’ aggravating circumstance.” Ibid. Finally, the court conducted its proportionality review. The court noted that it had reviewed the record and stated that “[i]n our opinion . . . the punishment of death is not too great when the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are weighed against each other . . . .” Id., at 1365. Three justices dissented, arguing that the sentence should be vacated and the case remanded to a jury for resentencing with properly defined aggravating factors. We granted certiorari, 491 U. S. 904 (1989).
II.
We deal first with petitioner’s submission that it is constitutionally impermissible for an appellate court to uphold a death sentence imposed by a jury that has relied in part on an invalid aggravating circumstance. In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983), we determined that in a State like Georgia, where aggravating circumstances serve only to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty and not to determine the punishment, the invalidation of one aggravating circumstance does not necessarily require an appellate court to vacate a death sentence and remand to a jury. We withheld opinion, however, “concerning the possible significance of a holding that a particular aggravating circumstance is ‘invalid’ under a statutory scheme in which the judge or jury is specifically instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in exercising its discretion whether to impose the death penalty.” Id., at 890. In Mississippi, unlike the Georgia scheme considered in Zant, the finding of aggravating factors is part of the jury’s sentencing determination, and the jury is required to weigh any mitigating factors against the aggravating circumstances. Although these differences complicate the questions raised, we do not believe that they dictate reversal in this case.
A
Nothing in the Sixth Amendment as construed by our prior decisions indicates that a defendant’s right to a jury trial would be infringed where an appellate court invalidates one of two or more aggravating circumstances found by the jury, but affirms the death sentence after itself finding that the one or more valid remaining aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating evidence. Any argument that the Constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U. S. 376 (1986), held that an appellate court can make the findings required by Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 (1982), in the first instance and stated that “[t]he decision whether a particular punishment — even the death penalty — is appropriate in any given case is not one that we have ever required to be made by a jury.” 474 U. S., at 385. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447 (1984), ruled that neither the Sixth Amendment, nor the Eighth Amendment, nor any other constitutional provision provides a defendant with the right to have a jury determine the appropriateness of a capital sentence; neither is there a double jeopardy prohibition on a judge’s override of a jury’s recommended sentence. Likewise, the Sixth Amendment does not require that a jury specify the aggravating factors that permit the imposition of capital punishment, Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U. S. 638 (1989), nor does it require jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 93 (1986).
B
To avoid the import of these cases, Clemons argues that under Mississippi law only a jury has the authority to impose a death sentence, see Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-101 (Supp. 1989), and that he therefore has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in having a jury make all determinations relevant to his sentence. He therefore argues that an appellate court cannot reweigh the balance of factors when the jury has found and relied on an invalid aggravating circumstance. Capital sentencing proceedings must of course satisfy the dictates of the Due Process Clause, Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion), and we have recognized that when state law creates for a defendant a liberty interest in having a jury make particular findings, speculative appellate, findings will not suffice to protect that entitlement for due .process purposes. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U. S. 343 (1980). However, these two general propositions do not lead to the result Clemons seeks.
In Hicks v. Oklahoma, sentence had been imposed under an invalid recidivist statute that provided for a mandatory 40-year sentence. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence because it was within the range of possible sentences the jury validly could have imposed. Hicks claimed, and the State conceded, that in Oklahoma only the jury could impose sentence. We held that under state law Hicks had a liberty interest in having the jury impose punishment, an interest that could not be overcome by the “frail conjecture” that the jury “might” have imposed the same sentence in the absence of the recidivist statute. Id., at 346. We specifically pointed out, however, that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not “purport to cure the deprivation by itself reconsidering the appropriateness” of the 40-year sentence, id., at 347 (footnote omitted), thus suggesting that appellate sentencing, if properly conducted, would not violate due process of law.
Contrary to the situation in Hicks, the state court in this case, as it had in others, asserted its authority under Mississippi law to decide for itself whether the death sentence was to be affirmed even though one of the two aggravating circumstances on which the jury had relied should not have been, or was improperly, presented to the jury. The court did not consider itself bound in such circumstances to vacate the death sentence and to remand for a new sentencing proceeding before a jury. We have no basis for disputing this interpretation of state law, which was considered by the court below to be distinct from its asserted authority to ¡affirm the sentence on the ground of harmless error, and which plainly means that we must reject Clemons’ assertion that he had an unqualified liberty interest under the Due Process Clause td have the jury assess the consequence of the invalidation of one of the aggravating circumstances on which it had been instructed. In this respect, the case is analogous to Cabana v. Bullock, supra, where we specifically rejected a due process challenge based on Hicks because state law created no entitlement to have a jury make findings that an appellate court also could make. 474 U. S., at 387, and n. 4.
c
Clemons also submits that appellate courts are unable to fully consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence presented by defendants at the sentencing phase in a capital case and that it therefore violates the Eighth Amendment for an appellate court to undertake to reweigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in an attempt to salvage the death sentence imposed by a jury. He insists, therefore, that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing before a jury and that the decision below must be reversed. We are unpersuaded, however, that our cases require this result. Indeed, they point in the opposite direction.
The primary concern in the Eighth Amendment context has been that the sentencing decision be based on the facts and circumstances of the defendant, his background, and his crime. See, e. g., Spaziano v. Florida, supra, at 460; Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S., at 879; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 110-112 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 601-605 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 197 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). In scrutinizing death penalty procedures under the Eighth Amendment, the Court has emphasized the “twin objectives” of “measured consistent application and fairness to the accused.” Eddings, supra, at 110-111. See also Lockett, supra, at 604 (emphasizing the importance of reliability). Nothing inherent in the process of appellate reweighing is inconsistent with the pursuit of the foregoing objectives.
We see no reason to believe that careful appellate weighing of aggravating against mitigating circumstances in cases such as this would not produce “measured consistent application” of the death penalty or in any way be unfair to the defendant. It is a routine task of appellate courts to decide whether the evidence supports a jury verdict and in capital cases in “weighing” States, to consider whether the evidence is such that the sentencer could have arrived at the death sentence that was imposed. And, as the opinion below indicates, a similar process of weighing aggravating and mitigating evidence is involved in an appellate court’s proportionality review. Furthermore, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that meaningful appellate review of death sentences promotes reliability and consistency. See, e. g., Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 204-206 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 253 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 295-296 (1977); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 276 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). It is also.important to note that state supreme courts in States authorizing the death penalty may well review many death sentences and that typical jurors, in contrast, will serve on only one such case during their lifetimes. See Proffitt, supra, at 252-253. Therefore, we conclude that state appellate courts can and do give each defendant an individualized and reliable sentencing determination based on the defendant’s circumstances, his background, and the crime.
This is surely the import of Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U. S. 376 (1986), which held that a state appellate court could make the finding that Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 (1982), required for the imposition of the death penalty, i. e. whether the defendant had killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U. S. 78 (1983) (per curiam), is likewise instructive. There, a Florida trial judge relied on an allegedly impermissible aggravating circumstance (“future dangerousness”) in imposing a death sentence on Goode. The Florida Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the record, reweighed the mitigating and aggravating factors, and concluded that the death penalty was warranted. In a federal habeas proceeding, Goode then successfully chailenged the trial court’s reliance on the allegedly impermissible factor. We reversed the grant of the writ and concluded that even if the trial judge relied on a factor not available for his consideration under Florida law, the sentence could stand. “Whatever may have been true of the sentencing judge, there is no claim that in conducting its independent reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances the Florida Supreme Court considered Goode’s future dangerousness. Consequently there is no sound basis for concluding that the procedures followed by the State produced an arbitrary or freakish sentence forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Id., at 86-87.
We accordingly see nothing in appellate weighing or reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that is at odds with contemporary standards of fairness or that is inherently unreliable and likely to result in arbitrary imposition of the death sentence. Nor are we impressed with the claim that without written jury findings concerning mitigating circumstances, appellate courts cannot perform their proper role. In Spaziano and Proffitt, we upheld the Florida death penalty scheme permitting a trial judge to override a jury’s recommendation of life even though there were no written jury findings. An appellate court also is able adequately to evaluate any evidence relating to mitigating factors without the assistance of written jury findings.
Ill
Clemons argues that even if appellate reweighing is permissible-, the Mississippi Supreme Court did not actually reweigh the evidence in this case and instead simply held that when an aggravating circumstance relied on by the jury has been invalidated, the sentence may be affirmed as long as there remains at least one valid and undisturbed aggravating circumstance, an approach that requires no weighing whatsoever. The State on the other hand insists that a proper reweighing of aggravating circumstances was undertaken.
We find the opinion below unclear with respect to whether the Mississippi Supreme Court did perform a weighing function, either by disregarding entirely the “especially heinous” factor and weighing only the remaining aggravating circumstance against the mitigating evidence, or by including in the balance the “especially heinous” factor as narrowed by its prior decisions and embraced in this case. At one point the court recites the proper limiting construction of the “especially heinous” aggravating factor, 535 So. 2d, at 1363, and at times the court’s opinion seems to indicate that the court was reweighing the mitigating circumstances and both aggravating factors by applying the proper definition to the “especially heinous” factor. For example, at one point the court refers to the “brutal and torturous facts” surrounding Shorter’s murder and elsewhere states that “the punishment of death is not too great when the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are weighed against each other.” Id., at 1364, 1365. At other times, however, the opinion indicates that the court may have been employing the other approach and disregarding the “especially heinous” factor entirely. “[T]his Court (Mississippi) has held and established unequivocally through the years that when one aggravating circumstance is found to be invalid or unsupported by the evidence, a remaining valid aggravating circumstance will nonetheless support the death penalty verdict.” Id., at 1362.
In addition, although the latter statement does not necessarily indicate that no reweighing was undertaken, the court’s statement can be read as a rule authorizing or requiring affirmance of a death sentence so long as there remains at least one valid aggravating circumstance. If that is what the Mississippi Supreme Court meant, then it was not conducting appellate reweighing as we understand the concept. An automatic rule of affirmance in a weighing State would be invalid under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), for it would not give defendants the individualized treatment that would result from actual reweighing of the mix of mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances. Cf. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 958 (1983) (plurality opinion). Additionally, because the Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion is virtually silent with respect to the particulars of the allegedly mitigating evidence presented by Clemons to the jury, we cannot be sure that the court fully heeded our cases emphasizing the importance of the sentencer’s consideration of a defendant’s mitigating evidence. We must, therefore, vacate the judgment below, and remand for further proceedings, insofar as the judgment purported to rely on the State Supreme Court’s reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Cf., Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U. S., at 390-392.
IV
Even if under Mississippi law, the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances were not an appellate, but a jury, function, it was open to the Mississippi Supreme Court to find that the error which occurred during the sentencing proceeding was harmless. See, e. g., Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U. S. 249 (1988). As the plurality in Barclay v. Florida, supra, opined, the Florida Supreme Court could apply harmless-error analysis when reviewing a death sentence imposed by a trial judge who relied on an aggravating circumstance not available for his consideration under Florida law:
“Cases such as [those cited by the petitioner] indicate that the Florida Supreme Court does not apply its harmless-error analysis in an automatic or mechanical fashion, but rather upholds death sentences on the basis of this analysis only when it actually finds that the error is harmless. There is no reason why the Florida Supreme Court cannot examine the balance struck by the trial judge and decide that the elimination of improperly considered aggravating circumstances could not possibly affect the balance. . . . What is important... is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.’ Zant, [462 U. S.], at 879 (emphasis in original).” Id., at 958.
Clemons argues, however, that the Mississippi Supreme Court incorrectly applied the harmless-error rule, that the court acted arbitrarily in applying it to his case when it refused to do so in a similar case, and that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless.
With regard to harmless error, the Mississippi Supreme Court made only the following statement: ‘We likewise are of the opinion beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s verdict would have been the same with or without the ‘especially heinous, atrocious or cruel’ aggravating circumstance.” 535 So. 2d, at 1364. Although the court applied the proper “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, see Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967), its cryptic holding suggests that it was beyond reasonable doubt that the sentence would have been the same even if there had been no “especially heinous” instruction at all and only the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery for pecuniary gain was to be balanced against the mitigating circumstances. We agree that it would be permissible to approach the harmless-error question in this fashion, but if this is the course the court took, its ultimate conclusion is very difficult to accept. As Clemons points out, the State repeatedly emphasized and argued the “especially heinous” factor during the sentencing hearing. The State placed little emphasis on the “robbery for pecuniary gain” factor. Under these circumstances, it would require a detailed explanation based on the record for us possibly to agree that the error in giving the invalid “especially heinous” instruction was harmless.
It is perhaps possible, however, that the Mississippi Supreme Court intended to ask whether beyond reasonable doubt the result would have been the same had the especially heinous aggravating circumstance been properly defined in the jury instructions; and perhaps on this basis it could have determined that the failure to instruct properly was harmless error. Because we cannot be sure which course was followed in Clemons’ case, however, we vacate the judgment insofar as it rested on harmless error and remand for further proceedings.
V
Nothing in this opinion is intended to convey the impression that state appellate courts are required to or necessarily should engage in reweighing or harmless-error analysis when errors have occurred in a capital sentencing proceeding.Our holding is only that such procedures are constitutionally permissible. In some situations, a state appellate court may conclude that peculiarities in a case make appellate reweighing or harmless-error analysis extremely speculative or impossible. We have previously noted that appellate courts may face certain difficulties in determining sentencing questions in the first instance. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 330-331 (1985). Nevertheless, that decision is for state appellate courts, including the Mississippi Supreme Court in this case, to make.
VI
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
The court instructed the jury as follows: “Consider only the following elements, if any, of aggravation in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed: ... (2) The Capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” App. 25. This language is identical to that in Miss. Code Ann. § 99 — 19—101(5)(h) (Supp. 1989), which provides that “[alggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: . . . (h) The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.”
Mississippi Code Ann. § 99-19-101(3)(c) (Supp. 1989) provides that “[f]or the jury to impose a sentence of death, it must unanimously find . . . (c) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances, as enumerated in subsection (6), to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.”
We note also that although Hicks and a due process rationale were argued by the respondent in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983), see Brief for Respondent, O. T. 1982, No. 81-89, pp. 37-38, and by the dissenters in Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 985-986 (1983), the Court implicitly rejected those arguments in both cases by refusing to address them.
Along similar lines, in Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277 (1983), the Court concluded that appellate courts are capable of comparing the propriety of different criminal sentences and noted that “[t]he easiest comparison, of course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punishments, for the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather than degree.” Id,., at 294 (footnote omitted).
We find unpersuasive Clemons’ argument that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision to remand to a sentencing jury in Johnson v. State, 511 So. 2d 1333 (1987), rev’d, 486 U. S. 578 (1988), on remand, 547 So. 2d 59 (1989), a case in which this Court reversed the death sentence because it depended in part on a jury finding that the “especially heinous” aggravating factor was present, indicates that the Mississippi Supreme Court acted arbitrarily in refusing to do the same in this case. Johnson is distinguishable because in that case the jury had found both that the defendant had been convicted of a prior violent felony and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. In fact, the prior conviction the jury relied upon had been vacated and thus the jury was permitted to consider inadmissible evidence in determining the defendant’s sentence. This Court noted in vacating the sentence that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s refusal to rely on harmless-error analysis in upholding the sentence was “plainly justified” because the error “extended beyond the mere invalidation of an aggravating circumstance supported by evidence that was otherwise admissible” and in fact permitted the jury “to consider evidence that [was] revealed to be materially inaccurate.” 486 U. S., at 590. The Court did not hold that the Mississippi Supreme Court could not have applied harmless-error analysis.
Given that two aggravating factors had been invalidated and inadmissible evidence had been presented to the jury, it was not unreasonable for the Mississippi Supreme Court to conclude that it could not conduct the harmless-error inquiry or adequately reweigh the mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances in Johnson. By contrast, in this case there is no serious suggestion that the State’s reliance on the “especially heinous” factor led to the introduction of any evidence that was not otherwise admissible in either the guilt or sentencing phases of the proceeding. All of the circumstances surrounding the murder already had been aired during the guilt phase of the trial and a jury clearly is entitled to consider such evidence in imposing sentence. A state appellate court’s decision to conduct harmless-error analysis or to reweigh aggravating and mitigating factors rather than remand to the sentencing jury violates the Constitution only if the decision is made arbitrarily. We cannot say that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s refusal to remand in this case was rendered arbitrary by its decision to remand in Johnson.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
While proceeding up the Columbia River, the oil tanker S. S. Santa Maria, bareboat chartered by petitioner, was struck by a barge owned by respondent Oliver J. Olson & Co. The barge was being towed by the tugboat San Ja-cinto, owned by respondent Star & Crescent Towboat Co. Both vessels were damaged. Petitioner commenced this admiralty action for damages to the Santa Maria, and respondent cross-libeled for damages to the barge. The District Court found the collision resulted solely from negligence on the part of the crew of the San Jacinto, and dismissed the cross-libel. 304 F. Supp. 519 (Ore. 1969). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding that the San Jacinto had been negligent, but determined that the Santa Maria was also negligent in violating the “half-distance” rule, 30 Stat. 99, 33 U. S. C. § 192. That court therefore reversed with directions that the District Court determine the amount of damage sustained by the barge and assess damages under the divided-damages rule. See The Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, 17 How. 170 (1855). We granted certiorari, 405 U. S. 954 (1972), principally to consider petitioner’s request that we abandon the divided-damages rule. The orderly disposition of the issues presented by the petition for certiorari, however, requires that we address ourselves to the issue of liability before reaching the question of damages. Since in so doing we conclude that the Court of Appeals was wrong in holding the Santa Maria liable at all, we do not reach the issue of damages.
I
On the evening of December 24, 1967, the Santa Maria, loaded with 17,000 tons of petroleum products, was proceeding up the Columbia River toward Portland. The ship was steaming on the Oregon side of the channel, with clear visibility. At the same time, the San Jacinto was proceeding downriver, towing a 275-foot barge, fully loaded with lumber, by a 250-foot towline. Proceeding on the Washington side of the channel, it had encountered foggy weather conditions upriver. As the San Jacinto approached Cooper Point, the Santa Maria, steaming upstream, sighted the tug both visually and by radar. The two vessels were more than a mile apart and on opposite sides of the 500-foot-wide shipping channel. There was heavy fog, described as “tule fog,” around Cooper Point, but the fog was localized on the Washington side of the channel. Although there was haze and drizzle, there was no fog on the Oregon side of the channel; the visibility from the bridge of the Santa Maria upstream was between one and one-half and two miles.
As the San Jacinto entered the fog on the Washington side off Cooper Point, the Santa Maria lost visual contact with the tug and barge. The Santa Maria’s pilot did not track the San Jacinto on radar, believing that the tug would remain on the Washington side of the channel and knowing that there was ample room for a port-to-port passage. At this time, the Santa Maria was proceeding at half-speed making approximately seven knots.
The watch on the San Jacinto had not sighted the Santa Maria when the tug entered the heavy fog off Cooper Point. The tug’s captain testified that, after entering the fog, he cut speed to three or three and one-half knots, and the visibility dead ahead was approximately 50 yards. The San Jacinto’s navigators were “navigating by visual sight of the Washington coast,” and the captain estimated that the tug passed between 50 and 75 yards off Cooper Point. At that point, the crew of the San Jacinto heard one blast of a ship’s horn (later discovered to have been that of the Santa Maria), and responded with the fog signal for a tug with a barge in tow. No visual sighting of a ship was made, however. Shortly thereafter, the captain sighted range lights, which, he testified, he thought were 20 degrees off his starboard bow. To avoid what he anticipated to be a momentary collision, the captain swung the San Jacinto to port — towards the Oregon side of the channel — and executed a U-turn, hoping to run upriver and thus avoid a collision.
The San Jacinto started the U-turn while still in the heavy fog, and the execution of the turn brought the tug on a course directly across that of the Santa Maria. The Santa Maria sighted the San Jacinto emerging from the fog, at right angles to the Santa Maria, at a distance of approximately 900 feet. Full astern was immediately ordered. The San Jacinto, quickly completing the turn, headed safely upriver. Before the Santa Maria could completely stop, however, the barge in tow sideslipped across the channel, crashing into the port bow of the Santa Maria; the force of that blow drove the tanker aground.
The District Court found that the San Jacinto and the barge, and those in charge of navigation, were negligent in eight respects, including navigating at excessive speed, failing to maintain a proper lookout, and “acting hastily and without sufficient cause in pulling the tow across the channel when there was adequate clearance for the tug and barge to pass port to port.” The court found that “the collision was proximately caused by the sole fault and negligence” of the San Jacinto and the barge, and that the acts of negligence allegedly committed by the Santa Maria did not “proximately [contribute] to the collision and resulting damage.” 304 F. Supp., at 521, 522.
The Ninth Circuit partially reversed, holding that the Santa Maria was proceeding at an immoderate speed in traveling at three to seven knots “while approaching the edge of the fog bank.” That court reasoned that the San Jacinto was only 900 feet from the Santa Maria when the tug emerged from the fog bank, and the Santa Maria’s, speed was such that she could not stop within half that distance. The court, relying on The Silver Palm, 94 F. 2d 754 (CA9), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Silver Line, Ltd., 304 U. S. 576 (1937), deemed it immaterial that the visibility up the Oregon side of the channel — the direction in which the Santa Maria was headed — was almost two miles, because in its view the “relevant distance” for calculating the proper speed under the half-distance rule was the distance between the tanker and the fog bank — to port of the Santa Maria. Finding statutory fault, and ruling that petitioner had failed to prove that that fault could not have possibly contributed to the collision, see The Pennsylvania, 19 Wall. 125 (1874), the Court of Appeals held the Santa Maria liable for half the total damages.
II
The question of the liability of the Santa Maria turns on the application of Art. 16 of the Inland Rules of Navigation, 33 U. S. C. § 192. That Rule provides in pertinent part:
“Every vessel shall, in a fog, mist, falling snow, or heavy rainstorms, go at a moderate speed, having careful regard to the existing circumstances and conditions.” (Emphasis added.)
Although the statutory test for determining the proper speed at which a vessel should proceed in a fog is phrased in general terms, our decisions have attached a well-recognized gloss to that phrase. This gloss on the statutory rule, variously referred to as the half-distance rule or the “rule of sight,” is that, in a fog, “a moderate speed” is that
“rate of speed as would enable [the vessel] to come to a standstill, by reversing her engines at full speed, before she should collide with a vessel which she should see through the fog.” The Nacoochee, 137 U. S. 330, 339 (1890).
See also The Colorado, 91 U. S. 692, 702 (1876); The Umbria, 166 U. S. 404, 417 (1897). As stated in The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540, 548 (1899), “[t]he principal reason for such reduction of speed is that it will give [both] vessels time to avoid a collision after coming in sight of each other.” If two vessels, upon sighting each other, are proceeding at rates of speed such that each can stop before it reaches the point at which the courses of the two intersect, collision is impossible.
There can be no quarrel with the salutary purpose of this “rule of thumb.” It is premised on the notion that when a ship is traveling under foggy weather conditions in waters in which other ships might be proceeding on intersecting courses, the speed of each ship must be such as to enable her to stop within half the distance separating the ships when they first sight each other. Implicit in the rule, however, is the assumption that vessels can reasonably be expected to be traveling on intersecting courses. If, on the facts of the case, it is totally unrealistic to anticipate the possibility that a vessel will travel on a particular heading that would intersect the course of another ship, the reason for the rule is rather clearly not present.
Those cases in which this Court has upheld a finding of statutory fault because of a violation of the half-distance rule involved ships proceeding in fog on established coastal shipping lanes, The City of New York, 147 U. S. 72 (1893); The Nacoochee, supra; cf. The Colorado, supra (Lake Huron), or ships traveling near or in a harbor, The Umbria, supra; cf. The Ludvig Holberg, 157 U. S. 60 (1895) (no fault). We do not imply that because a vessel is running near fog, as opposed to running in it, the vessel is not required to proceed at “a moderate speed” in relation to the distance to the fog cover. That was, indeed, the circumstance in The Silver Palm, supra, upon which the Ninth Circuit relied. But there a naval cruiser was traveling, with clear visibility ahead but with fog banks on each side, on the busy coastal shipping lane between San Francisco and Los Angeles. On such a course it is reasonable to expect that another ship might steam out of the fog at right angles to, and on a collision course with, the first vessel. The rule of sight was applicable there precisely because of the reasonable possibility that such an event might occur.
The facts of our case were significantly different. The Santa Maria and the San Jacinto were proceeding on opposite sides of a well-defined and relatively narrow channel. The Santa Mrnia had last sighted the tug only a mile ahead, proceeding along the Washington coast. Those in charge of the navigation of the tanker cannot be faulted for not anticipating the tug’s totally unorthodox maneuver in darting across such a channel. The Victory & The Plymothian, 168 U. S. 410 (1897). The visibility in the direction in which the Santa Maria was headed was almost two miles. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the speed of the tanker would have prevented her from coming to a complete halt within half the distance of sighting a vessel that was either proceeding on a remotely foreseeable intersecting course or else being overtaken by her. The tug emerged from a fog bank only 900 feet from the tanker on a course and for reasons that no seaman could, under the circumstances, have anticipated.
The District Court’s finding that any negligence on the part of the Santa Maria did not “proximately [contribute] to the collision” was but another way of saying that fault based on the half-distance rule must have some relationship to the dangers against which that rule was designed to protect. Here it did not. We believe that the District Court, and not the Court of Appeals, reached the correct result on the issue of liability.
Since in our view respondents alone were at fault, there is no occasion to consider how damages should be apportioned were both vessels at fault.
Reversed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, involving California’s second rejection of petitioner’s application for admission to the state bar, is a sequel to Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S. 252, in which this Court reversed the State’s initial refusal of his application.
Under California law the State Supreme Court may admit to the practice of law any applicant whose qualifications have been certified to it by the California Committee of Bar Examiners. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6064. To qualify for certification an applicant must, among other things, be of “good moral character,” id., § 6060 (c), and no person may be certified “who advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of this State by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means....”' Id., § 6064.1. The Committee is empowered and required to ascertain the qualifications of all candidates. Id., § 6046. Under rules prescribed by the Board of Governors of the State Bar, an applicant before the Committee has “the burden of proving that he is possessed of good moral character, of removing any and all reasonable suspicion of moral unfitness, and that he is entitled to the high regard and confidence of the public.” Id., Div. 3, c. 4, Rule X, § 101. Any applicant denied certification may have the Committee’s action reviewed by the State Supreme Court. Id., § 6066.
In 1953 petitioner, having successfully passed the California bar examinations, applied for certification for bar membership. The Committee, after interrogating Konigsberg and receiving considerable evidence as to his qualifications, declined to certify him on the ground that he had failed to meet the burden of proving his eligibility under the two statutory requirements relating to good moral character and nonadvocacy of violent overthrow. That determination centered largely around Konigsberg’s repeated refusals to answer Committee questions as to his present or past membership in the Communist Party. The California Supreme Court denied review without opinion. See 52 Cal. 2d 769, 770, 344 P. 2d 777, 778.
On certiorari this Court, after reviewing the record, held the state determination to have been without rational support in the evidence and therefore offensive to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra. At the same time the Court declined to decide whether Konigsberg’s refusals to answer could constitutionally afford “an independent ground for exclusion from the Bar,” considering that such an issue was not before it. Id., 259-262. The case was remanded to the State Supreme Court “for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.” Id., 274.
On remand petitioner moved the California Supreme Court for immediate admission to the bar. The court vacated its previous order denying review and referred the matter to the Bar Committee for further consideration. At the ensuing Committee hearings Konigsberg introduced further evidence as to his good moral character (none of which was rebutted), reiterated unequivocally his disbelief in violent overthrow, and stated that he had never knowingly been a member of any organization which advocated such action. He persisted, however, in his refusals to answer any questions relating to his membership in the Communist Party. The Committee again declined to certify him, this time on the ground that his refusals to answer had obstructed a full investigation into his qualifications. The California Supreme Court, by a divided vote, refused review, and also denied Konigsberg’s motion for direct admission to practice. 52 Cal. 2d 769, 344 P. 2d 777. We again brought the case here. 362 U. S. 910.
Petitioner’s contentions in this Court in support of reversal of the California Supreme Court’s order are reducible to three propositions: (1) the State’s action was inconsistent with this Court’s decision in the earlier Konigsberg case; (2) assuming the Committee’s inquiries into Konigsberg’s possible Communist Party membership were permissible, it was unconstitutionally arbitrary for the State to deny him admission because of his refusals to answer; and (3) in any event, Konigsberg was constitutionally justified in refusing to answer these questions.
I.
Consideration of petitioner’s contentions as to the effect of this Court’s decision in the former Konigsberg case requires that there be kept clearly in mind what is entailed in California’s rule, comparable to that in many States, that an applicant for admission to the bar bears the burden of proof of “good moral character” — a requirement whose validity is not, nor could well be, drawn in question here.
Under such a rule an applicant must initially furnish enough evidence of good character to make a prima facie case. The examining Committee then has the opportunity to rebut that showing with evidence of bad character. Such evidence may result from the Committee’s own independent investigation, from an applicant’s responses to questions on his application form, or from Committee interrogation of the applicant himself. This interrogation may well be of decisive importance for, as all familiar with bar admission proceedings know, exclusion of unworthy candidates frequently depends upon the thoroughness of the Committee’s questioning, revealing as it may infirmities in an otherwise satisfactory showing on his part. This is especially so where a bar committee, as is not infrequently the case, has no means of conducting an independent investigation of its own into an applicant’s qualifications. If at the conclusion of the proceedings the evidence of good character and that of bad character are found in even balance, the State may refuse admission to the applicant, just as in an ordinary suit a plaintiff may fail in his case because he has not met his burden of proof.
In the first Konigsberg case this Court was concerned solely with the question whether the balance between the favorable and unfavorable evidence as to Konigsberg’s qualifications had been struck in accordance with the requirements of due process. It was there held, first, that Konigsberg had made out a prima facie case of good character and of nonadvocacy of violent overthrow, and, second, that the other evidence in the record could not, even with the aid of all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, cast such doubts upon petitioner’s prima facie case as to justify any finding other than that these two California qualification requirements had been satisfied. In assessing the significance of Konigsberg’s refusal to answer questions as to Communist Party membership, the Court dealt only with the fact that this refusal could not provide any reasonable indication of a character not meeting these two standards for admission. The Court did not consider, but reserved for later decision, all questions as to the permissibility of the State treating Konigsberg’s refusal to answer as a ground for exclusion, not because it was evidence from which substantive conclusions might be drawn, but because the refusal had thwarted a full investigation into his qualifications. See 353 U. S., at 259-262. The State now asserts that ground for exclusion, an issue that is not foreclosed by anything in this Court’s earlier opinion which decided a quite different question.
It is equally clear that the State’s ordering of the rehearing which led to petitioner’s exclusion manifested no disrespect of the effect of the mandate in that case, which expressly left the matter open for further state proceedings “not inconsistent with” the Court’s opinion. There is no basis for any suggestion that the State in so proceeding has adopted unusual or discriminatory procedures to avoid the normal consequences of this Court’s earlier determination. In its earlier proceeding, the California Bar Committee may have found further investigation and questioning of petitioner unnecessary when, in its view, the applicant’s prima facie case of qualifications had been sufficiently rebutted by evidence already in the record. While in its former opinion this Court held that the State could not constitutionally so conclude, it did not undertake to preclude the state agency from asking any questions or from conducting any investigation that it might have thought necessary had it known that the basis of its then decision would be overturned. In recalling Konigsberg for further testimony, the Committee did only what this Court has consistently held that federal administrative tribunals may do on remand after a reviewing court has set aside agency orders as unsupported by requisite findings of fact. Federal Communications Comm’n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134; Fly v. Heitmeyer, 309 U. S. 146.
In the absence of the slightest indication of any purpose on the part of the State to evade the Court’s prior decision, principles of finality protecting the parties to this state litigation are, within broad limits of fundamental fairness, solely the concern of California law. Such limits are broad even in a criminal case, see Bryan v. United States, 338 U. S. 552; Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464; cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 328. In this instance they certainly have not been transgressed by the State’s merely taking further action in this essentially administrative type of proceeding.
II.
We think it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against arbitrary state action does not forbid a State from denying admission to a bar applicant so long as he refuses to provide unprivileged answers to questions having a substantial relevance to his qualifications. An investigation of this character, like a civil suit, requires procedural as well as substantive rules. It is surely not doubtful that a State could validly adopt an administrative rule analogous to Rule 37 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that that refusal, after due warning, to answer relevant questions may result in “the matters regarding which the questions were asked” being considered for the purposes of the proceeding to be answered in a way unfavorable to the refusing party, or even that such refusal may result in “dismissing the action or proceeding” of the party asking affirmative relief.
The state procedural rule involved here is a less broad one, for all that California has in effect said is that in cases where, on matters material to an applicant’s qualifications, there are gaps in the evidence presented by him which the agency charged with certification considers should be filled in the appropriate exercise of its responsibilities, an applicant will not be admitted to practice unless and until he cooperates with the agency’s efforts to fill those gaps. The fact that this rule finds its source in the supervisory powers of the California Supreme Court over admissions to the bar, rather than in legislation, is not constitutionally significant. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362. Nor in the absence of a showing of arbitrary or discriminatory application in a particular case, is it a matter of federal concern whether such a rule requires the rejection of all applicants refusing to answer material questions, or only in instances where the examining committee deems that a refusal has materially obstructed its investigation. Compare Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U. S. 399, with Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U. S. 1.
In the context of the entire record of these proceedings, the application of the California rule in this instance cannot be said to be arbitrary or discriminatory. In the first Konigsberg case this Court held that neither the somewhat weak but uncontradicted testimony, that petitioner had been a Communist Party member in 1941, nor his refusal to answer questions relating to Party membership, could rationally support any substantive adverse inferences as to petitioner’s character qualifications, 353 U. S., at 266-274. That was not to say, however, that these factors, singly or together, could not be regarded as leaving the investigatory record in sufficient uncertainty as constitutionally to permit application of the procedural rule which the State has now invoked, provided that Konigsberg had been first given due warning of the consequences of his continuing refusal to respond to the Committee’s questions. Cf. 353 U. S., at 261.
It is no answer to say that petitioner has made out a prima facie case of qualifications, for this is precisely the posture of a proceeding in which the Committee’s right to examine and cross-examine becomes significant. Assuming, as we do for the moment, that there is no privilege here to refuse to answer, petitioner could no more insist that his prima facie case makes improper further questioning of him than he could insist that such circumstance made improper the introduction of other forms of rebutting evidence.
We likewise regard as untenable petitioner’s contentions that the questions as to Communist Party membership were made irrelevant either by the fact that bare, innocent membership is not a ground of disqualification or by petitioner’s willingness to answer such ultimate questions as whether he himself believed in violent overthrow or knowingly belonged to an organization advocating violent overthrow. The Committee Chairman’s answer to the former contention was entirely correct:
“If you answered the question, for example, that you had been a member of the Communist Party during some period since 1951 or that you were presently a member of the Communist Party, the Committee would then be in a position to ask you what acts you engaged in to carry out the functions and purposes of that party, what the aims and purposes of the party were, to your knowledge, and questions of that type. You see by failing to answer the initial question there certainly is no basis and no opportunity for us to investigate with respect to the other matters to which the initial question might very well be considered preliminary.”
And the explanation given to petitioner’s counsel by another Committee member as to why Konigsberg’s testimony about ultimate facts was not dispositive was also sound:
“Mr. Mosk, you realize that if Mr. Konigsberg had answered the question that he refused to answer, an entirely new area of investigation might be opened up, and this Committee might be able to ascertain from Mr. Konigsberg that perhaps he is now and for many years past has been an active member of the Communist Party, and from finding out who his associates were in that enterprise we might discover that he does advocate the overthrow of this government by force and violence. I am not saying that he would do that, but it is a possibility, and we don’t have to take any witness’ testimony as precluding us from trying to discover if he is telling the truth. That is the point.”
Petitioner’s further miscellaneous contentions that the State’s exclusion of him was capricious are all also insubstantial.
There remains the question as to whether Konigsberg was adequately warned of the consequences of his refusal to answer. At the outset of the renewed hearings the Chairman of the Committee stated:
“As a result of our two-fold purpose [to investigate and reach determinations], particularly our function of investigation, we believe it will be necessary for you, Mr. Konigsberg, to answer our material questions or our investigation will be obstructed. We would not then as a result be able to certify you for admission.”
After petitioner had refused to answer questions on Communist Party membership, the Chairman asked:
“Mr. Konigsberg, I think you will recall that I initially advised you a failure to answer our material questions would obstruct our investigation and result in our failure to certify you. With this in mind do you wish to answer any of the questions which you heretofore up to now have refused to answer?”
At the conclusion of the proceeding another Committee member stated:
“I would like to make this statement so that there will be no misunderstanding on the part of any court that may review this record in the future, that I feel that as a member of the Committee that the failure of Mr. Konigsberg to answer the question as to whether or not he is now a member of the Communist Party is an obstruction of the function of this Committee, not a frustration if that word has been used. I think it would be an obstruction. There are phases of his moral character that we haven’t been able to investigate simply because we have been stopped at this point, and I for one could not certify to the Supreme Court that he was a proper person to be admitted to practice law in this State until he answers the question about his Communist affiliation.”
The record thus leaves no room for doubt on the score of “warning,” and petitioner does not indeed contend to the contrary.
III.
Finally, petitioner argues that, in any event, he was privileged not to respond to questions dealing with Communist Party membership because they unconstitutionally impinged upon rights of free speech and association protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association (N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460), as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are “absolutes,” not only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment. Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least two ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection. See, e. g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568; Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250; Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298; Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476. On the other hand, general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest involved. See, e. g., Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382; Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622. It is in the latter class of cases that this Court has always placed rules compelling disclosure of prior association as an incident of the informed exercise of a valid governmental function. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524. Whenever, in such a context, these constitutional protections are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be effected, and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved. Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 198; N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, supra; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 126-127; Bates v. Little Rock, supra; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399; Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431. With more particular reference to the present context of a state decision as to character qualifications, it is difficult, indeed, to imagine a view of the constitutional protections of speech and association which would automatically and without consideration of the extent of the deterrence of speech and association and of the importance of the state function, exclude all reference to prior speech or association on such issues as character, purpose, credibility, or intent. On the basis of these considerations we now judge petitioner’s contentions in the present case.
Petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of § 6064.1 of the California Business and Professions Code forbidding certification for admission to practice of those advocating the violent overthrow of government. It would indeed be difficult to argue that a belief, firm enough to be carried over into advocacy, in the use of illegal means to change the form of the State or Federal Government is an unimportant consideration in determining the fitness of applicants for membership in a profession in whose hands so largely lies the safekeeping of this country’s legal and political institutions. Cf. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716. Nor is the state interest in this respect insubstantially related to the right which California claims to inquire about Communist Party membership. This Court has long since recognized the legitimacy of a statutory finding that membership in the Communist Party is not unrelated to the danger of use for such illegal ends of powers given for limited purposes. See American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382; see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 128-129; cf. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399; Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431.
As regards the questioning of public employees relative to Communist Party membership it has already been held that the interest in not subjecting speech and ássociation to the deterrence of subsequent disclosure is outweighed by the State’s interest in ascertaining the fitness of the employee for the post he holds, and hence that such questioning does not infringe constitutional protections. Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U. S. 399; Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716. With respect to this same question of Communist Party membership, we regard the State’s interest in having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its broadest sense, including not only its substantive provisions, but also its procedures for orderly change, as clearly sufficient to outweigh the minimal effect upon free association occasioned by compulsory disclosure in the circumstances here presented.
There is here no likelihood that deterrence of association may result from foreseeable private action, see N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, supra, at 462, for bar committee interrogations such as this are conducted in private. See Rule 58, Section X, Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of Illinois; cf. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, Rule 8; Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U. S. 287, 291-292. Nor is there the possibility that the State may be afforded the opportunity for imposing undetectable arbitrary consequences upon protected association, see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 486, for a bar applicant’s exclusion by reason of Communist Party membership is subject to judicial review, including ultimate review by this Court, should it appear that such exclusion has rested on substantive or procedural factors that do not comport with the Federal Constitution. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S. 252; Schware v. Board of Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U. S. 232; cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183. In these circumstances it is difficult indeed to perceive any solid basis for a claim of unconstitutional intrusion into rights assured by the Fourteenth Amendment.
If this were all there was to petitioner’s claim of a privilege to refuse to answer, we would regard the Beilan case as controlling. There is, however, a further aspect of the matter. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, we held unconstitutional a state procedural rule that in order to obtain an exemption a taxpayer must bear the burden of proof, including both the burdens of establishing a prima facie case and of ultimate persuasion, that he did not advocate the violent overthrow of government. We said (p. 526):
“The vice of the present procedure is that, where particular speech falls close to the line separating the lawful and the unlawful, the possibility of mistaken factfinding — -inherent in all litigation — will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized. The man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens. This is especially to be feared when the complexity of the proofs and the generality of the standards applied, cf. Dennis v. United States, supra, provide but shifting sands on which the litigant must maintain his position. How can a claimant whose declaration is rejected possibly sustain the burden of proving the negative of these complex factual elements? In practical operation, therefore, this procedural device must necessarily ■ produce a result which the State could not command directly. It can only result in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free.”
It would be a sufficient answer to any suggestion of the applicability of that holding to the present proceeding to observe that Speiser was explicitly limited so as not to reach cases where, as here, there is no showing of an intent to penalize political beliefs. Distinguishing Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716; Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U. S. 56, and American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, the Court said (p. 527):
“In these cases... there was no attempt directly to control speech but rather to protect, from an evil shown to be grave, some interest clearly within the sphere of governmental concern.... Each case concerned a limited class of persons in or aspiring to public positions by virtue of which they could, if evilly motivated, create serious danger to the public safety. The principal aim of those statutes was not to penalize political beliefs but to deny positions to persons supposed to be dangerous because the position might be misused to the detriment of the public.”
But there are also additional factors making the rationale of Speiser inapplicable to the case before us. There is no unequivocal indication that California in this proceeding has placed upon petitioner the burden of proof of nonadvocacy of violent overthrow, as distinguished from its other requirement of “good moral character.” All it has presently required is an applicant’s cooperation with the Committee’s search for evidence of forbidden advocacy. Petitioner has been denied admission to the California bar for obstructing the Committee in the performance of its necessary functions of examination and cross-examination, a ruling which indeed presupposes that the burden of producing substantial evidence on the issue of advocacy was not upon petitioner but upon the Committee. Requiring a defendant in a civil proceeding to testify or to submit to discovery has never been thought to shift the burden of proof to him. Moreover, when this Court has allowed a State to comment upon a criminal defendant’s failure to testify it has been careful to note that this does not result in placing upon him the burden of proving his innocence. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 58.
In contrast to our knowledge with respect to the burden of establishing a prima facie case, we do not now know where, under California law, would rest the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of advocacy of violent overthrow. But it is for the Supreme Court of California first to decide this question. Only if and when that burden is placed by the State upon a bar applicant can there be drawn in question the distinction made in the Speiser case between penalizing statutes and those merely denying access to positions where unfitness may lead to the abuse of state-given powers or privileges. The issue is not now before us.
Thus as matters now stand, there is nothing involved here which is contrary to the reasoning of Speiser, for despite compelled testimony the prospective bar applicant need not “steer far wider of the unlawful zone” (357 U. S., at 526) for fear of mistaken judgment or fact finding declaring unlawful speech which is in fact protected by the Constitution. This is so as to the ultimate burden of persuasion for, notwithstanding his duty to testify, the loss resulting from a failure of proof may, for all we now know, still fall upon the State. It is likewise so as to the initial burden of production, for there is no indication in the proceeding on rehearing of petitioner’s application that the Bar Committee expected petitioner to “sustain the burden of proving the negative” (357 U. S., at 526) of those complex factual elements which amount to forbidden advocacy of violent overthrow. To the contrary it is clear that the Committee had assumed the burden of proving the affirmative of those elements, but was prevented from attempting to discharge that burden by petitioner’s refusal to answer relevant questions.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is
Affirmed.
Konigsberg rested his refusals, not on any claim of privilege against self-incrimination, but on the ground that such inquiries were beyond the purview of the Committee’s authority, and infringed rights of free thought, association, and expression assured him under the State and Federal Constitutions. He affirmatively asserted, however, his disbelief in violent overthrow of government.
The Committee made the following findings relevant to the issues now before us:
“(1) That the questions put to the applicant by the Committee concerning past or present membership in or affiliation with the Communist Party are material to a proper and complete investigation of his qualifications for admission to practice law in the State of California.
“(2) That the refusal of applicant to answer sai4 questions has obstructed a proper and complete investigation of applicant’s qualifications for admission to practice law in the State of California.”
The essence of the state court’s decision 'appears in the following extracts from its opinion:
"... The committee action now before us contains no findings or conclusion that petitioner had failed to establish either his good moral character or his abstention from advocacy of overthrow of the government.
“Here it is the refusal to answer material questions which is the basis for denial of certification....
“... [T]o admit applicants who refuse to answer the committee’s questions upon these subjects would nullify the concededly valid legislative direction to the committee. Such a rule would effectively stifle committee inquiry upon issues legislatively declared to be relevant to that issue.” Id., at 772, 774, 344 P. 2d, at 779, 780.
Justice Traynor dissented on the ground that the California Supreme Court, not being required by statute to exclude bar applicants on the sole ground of their refusal to answer questions concerning possible advocacy of the overthrow of government, should not adopt such an exclusionary rule, at least where the Committee of Bar Examiners has not come forward with some evidence of advocacy. He declined to reach constitutional issues. Justice Peters dissented on federal constitutional grounds and in the belief that this Court’s decision in the first Konigsberg case required immediate admission of the applicant. Chief Justice Gibson did not participate in the decision.
All of the 50 States, as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, prescribe qualifications of moral character as preconditions for admission to the practice of law. See West Publishing Co., Rules for Admission'to the Bar (35th ed. 1957); Survey of the Legal Profession, Bar Examinations and Requirements for Admission to the Bar (1952); Jackson, Character Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 20 Fordham L. Rev. 305 (1951); Annot., 64 A. L. R. 2d 301 (1959).
The burden of demonstrating good moral character is regularly placed upon the bar applicant. Ex parte Montgomery, 249 Ala. 378, 31 So. 2d 85; In re Stephenson, 243 Ala. 342, 10 So. 2d 1; Application of Courtney, 83 Ariz. 231, 319 P. 2d 991; Ark. Stat. Ann., 1947, §§ 25-101, 25-103; Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183, 294 P. 697; O’Brien’s Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 63 A. 777; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 147, 67 A. 497; Del. Sup. Ct. Rule 31 (1)(A)(a), (2)(A)(a); Coleman v. Watts, 81 So. 2d 650 (Fla.) (burden of proof on applicant; prima facie showing shifts burden of going forward to Examiners); Gordon v. Clinkscales, 215 Ga. 843, 114 S. E. 2d 15; In re Latimer, 11 Ill. 2d 327, 143 N. E. 2d 20 (semble); Rosencranz v. Tidrington, 193 Ind. 472, 141 N. E. 58; In re Meredith, 272 S. W. 2d 456 (Ky.); In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A. 2d 489 (semble); Matter of Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 47 N. E. 2d 12; Application of Smith, 220 Minn. 197, 19 N. W. 2d 324 (semble); On Application for Attorney’s License, 21 N. J. L. 345; Application of Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 202, aff’d, 296 N. Y. 926, 73 N. E. 2d 41; Application of Farmer, 191 N. C. 235, 131 S. E. 661; In re Weinstein, 150 Ore. 1, 42 P. 2d 744; State ex rel. Board v. Poyntz, 152 Ore. 592, 52 P. 2d 1141 (burden of proof on applicant; prima facie showing shifts burden of going forward to Examiners); In the Matter of Eary, 134 W. Va. 204, 58 S. E. 2d 647 (semble).
For reasons given later (pp. 55-56, infra), we need not decide whether California’s burden-of-proof rule could constitutionally be applied, as it was by the Committee after the first Konigsberg proceedings, to the requirement of nonadvocacy of violent overthrow.
The Court assumed, but did not discuss, the constitutionality of California’s burden-of-proof rule as applied to the nonadvocacyof-forcible-overthrow requirement of the California statute.
Moreover, even if there could be debate as to whether this Court’s prior decision prevented new hearings on matters that had already transpired at the time of the first state hearings, there can be no doubt that such decision did not prevent California from investigating petitioner’s actions during the period subsequent to the first hearing. Therefore we would in any case be presented with the question of the constitutionality of the State’s refusing to admit petitioner to the practice of law because of his declining to answer whether he has been a member of the Communist Party since the termination of the first set of hearings.
The transcript of the original hearings before the Committee has been made part of the record before us in the present case. ■
There is no basis for any intimation that the California Supreme Court fashioned a special procedural rule for the purposes of this particular case. The California Bar Committee has in the past declined to certify applicants who refused to answer pertinent questions. See Farley (Secretary, Committee of Bar Examiners), Character Investigation of Applicants for Admission, 29 Cal. State Bar Journal, 454, 457, 466 (1954). No more does the State’s action bear any of the hallmarks of a bill of attainder or of an ex post facto regulation, see Cummings v. Missouri
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case calls upon the Court to decide whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., pre-empts a Pennsylvania law precluding employee welfare benefit plans from exercising subrogation rights on a claimant’s tort recovery.
I
Petitioner, FMC Corporation (FMC), operates the FMC Salaried Health Care Plan (Plan), an employee welfare benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA, §3(1), 29 U. S. C. §1002(1), that provides health benefits to FMC employees and their dependents. The Plan is self-funded; it does not purchase an insurance policy from any insurance company in order to satisfy its obligations to its participants. Among its provisions is a subrogation clause under which a Plan member agrees to reimburse the Plan for benefits paid if the member recovers on a claim in a liability action against a third party.
Respondent, Cynthia Ann Holliday, is the daughter of FMC employee and Plan member Gerald Holliday. In 1987, she was seriously injured in an automobile accident. The Plan paid a portion of her medical expenses. Gerald Holli-day brought a negligence action on behalf of his daughter in Pennsylvania state court against the driver of the automobile in which she was injured. The parties settled the claim. While the action was pending, FMC notified the Hollidays that it would seek reimbursement for the amounts it had paid for respondent’s medical expenses. The Hollidays replied that they would not reimburse the Plan, asserting that § 1720 of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1720 (1987), precludes subrogation by FMC. Section 1720 states that “[i]n actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant’s tort recovery with respect to . . . benefits . . . payable under section 1719.” Section 1719 refers to benefit payments by “[a]ny program, group contract or other arrangement.”
Petitioner, proceeding in diversity, then sought a declaratory judgment in Federal District Court. The court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment, holding that § 1720 prohibits FMC’s exercise of subrogation rights on Hol-liday’s claim against the driver. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 885 F. 2d 79 (1989). The court held that §1720, unless pre-empted, bars FMC from enforcing its contractual subrogation provision. According to the court, ERISA pre-empts § 1720 if ERISA’s “deemer clause,” § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(B), exempts the Plan from state subrogation laws. The Court of Appeals, citing Northern Group Services, Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F. 2d 85, 91-94 (CA6 1987), cert. denied, 486 U. S. 1017 (1988), determined that “the deemer clause [was] meant mainly to reach back-door attempts by states to regulate core ERISA concerns in the guise of insurance regulation.” 885 F. 2d, at 86. Pointing out that the parties had not suggested that the Pennsylvania antisubrogation law addressed “a core type of ERISA matter which Congress sought to protect by the preemption provision,” id., at 90, the court concluded that the Pennsylvania law is not pre-empted. The Third Circuit’s holding conflicts with decisions of other Courts of Appeals that have construed ERISA’s deemer clause to protect self-funded plans from all state insurance regulation. See, e. g., Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F. 2d 182, 186 (CA8 1989); Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 846 F. 2d 416, 425-426 (CA7), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 856 (1988). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 493 U. S. 1068 (1990), and now vacate and remand.
II
In determining whether federal law pre-empts a state statute, we look to congressional intent. “ ‘Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and “is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.’”” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 95 (1983) (quoting Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 152-153 (1982), in turn quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977)); see also Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court . . . must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress” (footnote omitted)). We “begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 194 (1985). Three provisions of ERISA speak expressly to the question of pre-emption:
“Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” § 514(a), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a) (pre-emption clause).
“Except as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.” § 514(b)(2)(A), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (saving clause).
“Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be' deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.” § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (deemer clause).
We indicated in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724 (1985), that these provisions “are not a model of legislative drafting.” Id., at 739. Their operation is nevertheless discernible. The pre-emption clause is conspicuous-for its breadth. It establishes as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of every state law that “relate[s] to” an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. The saving clause returns to the States the power to enforce those state laws that “regulat[e] insurance,” except as provided in the deemer clause. Under the deemer clause, an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be “deemed” an insurance company, an insurer, or engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of state laws “purporting to regulate” insurance companies or insurance contracts.
Ill
Pennsylvania’s antisubrogation law “relate[s] to” an employee benefit plan. We made clear in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, supra, that a law relates to an employee welfare plan if it has “a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Id., at 96-97 (footnote omitted). We based our reading in part on the plain language of the statute. Congress used the words “‘relate to’ in §514(a) [the pre-emption clause] in their broad sense.” Id., at 98. It did not mean to pre-empt only state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans. That interpretation would have made it unnecessary for Congress to enact ERISA § 514(b)(4), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(4), which exempts from pre-emption “generally” applicable criminal laws of a State. We also emphasized that to interpret the pre-emption clause to apply only to state laws dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA, such as reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary duties, would be incompatible with the provision’s legislative history because the House and Senate versions of the bill that became ERISA contained limited pre-emption clauses, applicable only to state laws relating to specific subjects covered by ERISA. These were rejected in favor of the present language in the Act, “indicat[ing] that the section’s pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U. S., at 98.
Pennsylvania’s antisubrogation law has a “reference” to benefit plans governed by ERISA. The statute states that “[i]n actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant’s tort recovery with respect to . . . benefits . . . paid or payable under section 1719.” 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1720 (1987). Section 1719 refers to “[a]ny program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits.” These terms “includ[e], but [are] not limited to, benefits payable by a hospital plan corporation or a professional health service corporation.” § 1719 (emphasis added).
The Pennsylvania statute also has a “connection” to ERISA benefit plans. In the past, we have not hesitated to apply ERISA’s pre-emption clause to state laws that risk subjecting plan administrators to conflicting state regulations. See, e. g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, supra, at 95-100 (state laws making unlawful plan provisions that discriminate on the basis of pregnancy and requiring plans to provide specific benefits “relate to” benefit plans); Alessi v. Raybestos- Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 523-526 (1981) (state law prohibiting plans from reducing benefits by amount of workers’ compensation awards “relate[s] to” employee benefit plan). To require plan providers to design their programs in an environment of differing state regulations would complicate the administration of nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased benefits. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1, 10 (1987). Thus, where a “patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation,” we have applied the pre-emption clause to ensure that benefit plans will be governed by only a single set of regulations. Id., at 11.
Pennsylvania’s antisubrogation law prohibits plans from being structured in a manner requiring reimbursement in the event of recovery from a third party. It requires plan providers to calculate benefit levels in Pennsylvania based on expected liability conditions that differ from those in States that have not enacted similar antisubrogation legislation. Application of differing state subrogation laws to plans would therefore frustrate plan administrators’ continuing obligation to calculate uniform benefit levels nationwide. Accord, Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., supra (state statute prohibiting offsetting worker compensation payments against pension benefits pre-empted since statute would force employer either to structure all benefit payments in accordance with state statute or adopt different payment formulae for employers inside and outside State). As we stated in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, supra, at 9, “[t]he most efficient way to meet these [administrative] responsibilities is to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits.”
There is no dispute that the Pennsylvania law falls within ERISA’s insurance saving clause, which provides, “[ejxcept as provided in [the deemer clause], nothing in this sub-chapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance,” § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Section 1720 directly controls the terms of insurance contracts by invalidating any subrogation provisions that they contain. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S., at 740-741. It does not merely have an impact on the insurance industry; it is aimed at it. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 50 (1987). This returns the matter of subrogation to state law. Unless the statute is excluded from the reach of the saving clause by virtue of the deemer clause, therefore, it is not pre-empted.
We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that “regulat[e] insurance” within the meaning of the saving clause. By forbidding States to deem employee benefit plans “to be an insurance company or other insurer ... or to be engaged in the business of insurance,” the deemer clause relieves plans from state laws “purporting to regulate insurance.” As a result, self-funded ERISA plans are exempt from state regulation insofar as that regulation “relate[s] to” the plans. State laws directed toward the plans are pre-empted because they relate to an employee benefit plan but are not “saved” because they do not regulate insurance. State laws that directly regulate insurance are “saved” but do not reach self-funded employee benefit plans because the plans may not be deemed to be insurance companies, other insurers, or engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of such state laws. On the other hand, employee benefit plans that are insured are subject to indirect state insurance regulation. An insurance company that insures a plan remains an insurer for purposes of state laws “purporting to regulate insurance” after application of the deemer clause. The insurance company is therefore not relieved from state insurance regulation. The ERISA plan is consequently bound by state insurance regulations insofar as they apply to the plan’s insurer.
Our reading of the deemer clause is consistent with Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra. That case involved a Massachusetts statute requiring certain self-funded benefit plans and insurers issuing group health policies to plans to provide minimum mental health benefits. Id., at 734. In pointing out that Massachusetts had never tried to enforce the portion of the statute pertaining directly to benefit plans, we stated, “[i]n light of ERISA’s ‘deemer clause,’ which states that a benefit plan shall not ‘be deemed an insurance company’ for purposes of the insurance saving clause, Massachusetts has never tried to enforce [the statute] as applied to benefit plans directly, effectively conceding that such an application of [the statute] would be pre-empted by ERISA’s pre-emption clause.” Id., at 735, n. 14 (citations omitted). We concluded that the statute, as applied to insurers of plans, was not pre-empted because it regulated insurance and was therefore saved. Our decision, we acknowledged, “results in a distinction between insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation while the latter are not. ” Id., at 747. “By so doing, we merely give life to a distinction created by Congress in the ‘deemer clause,’ a distinction Congress is aware of and one it has chosen not to alter.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).
Our construction of the deemer clause is also respectful of the presumption that Congress does not intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state regulation. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S., at 525. In the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq., Congress provided that the “business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.” 15 U. S. C. § 1012(a). We have identified laws governing the “business of insurance” in the Act to include not only direct regulation of the insurer but also regulation of the substantive terms of insurance contracts. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra, at 742-744. By recognizing a distinction between insurers of plans and the contracts of those insurers, which are subject to direct state regulation, and self-insured employee benefit plans governed by ERISA, which are not, we observe Congress’ presumed desire to reserve to the States the regulation of the “business of insurance.”
Respondent resists our reading of the deemer clause and would attach to it narrower significance. According to the deemer clause, “[njeither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance contracts.” § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Like the Court of Appeals, respondent would interpret the deemer clause to except from the saving clause only state insurance regulations that are pretexts for impinging upon core ERISA concerns. The National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as amici curiae in support of respondent offer an alternative interpretation of the deemer clause. In their view, the deemer clause precludes States from deeming plans to be insurers only for purposes of state laws that apply to insurance as a business, such as laws relating to licensing and capitalization requirements.
These views are unsupported by ERISA’s language. Laws that purportedly regulate insurance companies or insurance contracts are laws having the “appearance of” regulating or “intending” to regulate insurance companies or contracts. Black’s Law Dictionary 1236 (6th ed. 1990). Congress’ use of the word does not indicate that it directed the deemer clause solely at deceit that it feared state legislatures would practice. Indeed, the Conference Report, in describing the deemer clause, omits the word “purporting,” stating, “an employee benefit plan is not to be considered as an insurance company, bank, trust company, or investment company (and is not to be considered as engaged in the business of insurance or banking) for purposes of any State law that regulates insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 383 (1974).
Nor, in our view, is the deemer clause directed solely at laws governing the business of insurance. It is plainly directed at “any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.” § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). Moreover, it is difficult to understand why Congress would have included insurance contracts in the pre-emption clause if it meant only to pre-empt state laws relating to the operation of insurance as a business. To be sure, the saving and deemer clauses employ differing language to achieve their ends — the former saving, except as provided in the deemer clause, “any law of any State which regulates insurance” and the latter referring to “any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance contracts.” We view the language of the deemer clause, however, to be either coextensive with or broader, not narrower, than that of the saving clause. Our rejection of a restricted reading of the deemer clause does not lead to the deemer clause’s engulfing the saving clause. As we have pointed out, supra, at 62-63, the saving clause retains the independent effect of protecting state insurance regulation of insurance contracts purchased by employee benefit plans.
Congress intended by ERISA to “establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.” Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S., at 523 (footnote omitted). Our interpretation of the deemer clause makes clear that if a plan is insured, a State may regulate it indirectly through regulation of its insurer and its insurer’s insurance contracts; if the plan is uninsured, the State may not regulate it. As a result, employers will not face “ ‘conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.’” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S., at 99 (quoting remarks of Sen. Williams). A construction of the deemer clause that exempts employee benefit plans from only those state regulations that encroach upon core ERISA concerns or that apply to insurance as a business would be fraught with administrative difficulties, necessitating definition of core ERISA concerns and of what constitutes business activity. It would therefore undermine Congress’ desire to avoid “endless litigation over the validity of State action,” see 120 Cong. Rec. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits), and instead lead to employee benefit plans’ expenditure of funds in such litigation.
In view of Congress’ clear intent to exempt from direct state insurance regulation ERISA employee benefit plans, we hold that ERISA pre-empts the application of § 1720 of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law to the FMC Salaried Health Care Plan. We therefore vacate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 1720 of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law is entitled “[sjubrogation” and provides:
“In actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant’s tort recovery with respect to workers’ compensation benefits, benefits available under section 1711 (relating to required benefits), 1712 (relating to availability of benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability of adequate limits) or benefits in lieu thereof paid or payable under section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits).”
Section 1719, entitled “[cjoordination of benefits,” reads:
“(a) General rule. — Except for workers’ compensation, a policy of insurance issued or delivered pursuant to this subchapter shall be primary. Any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits such as described in section 1711 (relating to required benefits), 1712(1) and (2) (relating to availability of benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability of adequate limits) shall be construed to contain a provision that all benefits provided therein shall be in excess of and not in duplication of any valid and collectible first party benefits provided in section 1711, 1712 or 1715 or workers’ compensation.
“(b) Definition. — As used in this section the term ‘program, group contract or other arrangement’ includes, but is not limited to, benefits payable by a hospital plan corporation or a professional health service corporation subject to 40 Pa. C. S. Ch. 61 (relating to hospital plan corporations) or 63 (relating to professional health services plan corporations).”
The bill introduced in the Senate and reported out of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare would have pre-empted “any and all laws of the States and of political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act.” S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 609(a) (1973). As introduced in the House, the bill that became ERISA would have superseded “any and all laws of the States and of the political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the fiduciary, reporting, and disclosure responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of employee benefit plans.” H. R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 114 (1973). The bill was approved by the Committee on Education and Labor in a slightly modified form. See H. R. 2,- 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 514(a) (1973).
H. R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 114 (1973); 1 Leg. Hist. 51.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320 (1997), we held that amendments made to chapter 153 of Title 28 of the United States Code by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, do not apply to cases pending in federal court on April 24, 1996 — AEDPA’s effective date. In this case we consider when a capital ha-beas case becomes “pending” for purposes of the rule announced in Lindh.
I
Respondent Robert Garceau brutally killed his girlfriend Maureen Bautista and her 14-year-old son, Telesforo Bau-tista. He was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The California Supreme Court affirmed respondent’s conviction and sentence, People v. Garceau, 6 Cal. 4th 140, 862 P. 2d 664 (1993), and denied on the merits his petition for state postconviction relief. We denied certio-rari. 513 U. S. 848 (1994).
On May 12,1995, respondent filed a motion for the appointment of federal habeas counsel and an application for a stay of execution in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The District Court promptly issued a 45-day stay of execution. On June 26, 1995, the District Court appointed counsel and extended the stay of execution for another 120 days. On August 1, 1995, the State filed a motion to vacate the stay, in part because respondent had failed to file a “specification of nonfrivolous issues,” as required by local court rules. Brief for Respondent 2. Respondent cured that defect, and, on October 13, 1995, the District Court denied the State’s motion and ordered that the habeas petition be filed within nine months. Respondent filed his application for habeas relief on July 2, 1996.
Although respondent’s habeas application was filed after AEDPA’s effective date, the District Court, following Circuit precedent, concluded that the application was not subject to AEDPA. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 31-32 (citing Lindh, supra; Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Central Dist. of Cal., 163 F. 3d 530, 540 (CA9 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 526 U. S. 1060 (1999)). On the merits, however, the District Court ruled that respondent was not entitled to ha-beas relief. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Like the District Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded AEDPA does not apply to respondent’s application. 275 F. 3d 769, 772, n. 1 (2001). Unlike the District Court, however, the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief for reasons that are not relevant to our discussion here. Id., at 777-778. We granted certiorari. 536 U. S. 990 (2001).
II
As already noted, we held in Lindh that the new provisions of chapter 153 of Title 28 do not apply to cases pending as of the date AEDPA became effective. Lindh, however, had no occasion to elaborate on the precise time when a case becomes “pending” for purposes of chapter 153 because in that case petitioner’s habeas application had been filed prior to AEDPA’s effective date. See Lindh, supra, at 323 (noting that petitioner filed his federal habeas application on July 9, 1992). Since Lindh, the Courts of Appeals have divided on the question whether AEDPA applies to a habeas application filed after AEDPA’s effective date if the applicant sought the appointment of counsel or a stay of execution (or both) prior to that date. Five Courts of Appeals have ruled that AEDPA applies, see, e. g., Isaacs v. Head, 300 F. 3d 1232, 1245-1246 (CA11 2002); Moore v. Gibson, 195 F. 3d 1152, 1160-1163 (CA10 1999); Gosier v. Welborn, 175 F. 3d 504, 506 (CA7 1999); Williams v. Coyle, 167 F. 3d 1036, 1037-1040 (CA6 1999); Williams v. Cain, 125 F. 3d 269, 273-274 (CA5 1997), while the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held it does not, Calderon, supra, at 539-540. For the reasons stated below, we agree with the majority of the Courts of Appeals.
Congress enacted AEDPA to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 386 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“Congress wished to curb delays, to prevent ‘retrials’ on federal habeas, and to give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law”); see also id., at 404 (majority opinion), and “to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 436 (2000). One of the methods Congress used to advance these objectives was the adoption of an amended 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). Williams, 529 U. S., at 404 (“It cannot be disputed that Congress viewed § 2254(d)(1) as an important means by which its goals for habeas reform would be achieved”). As we have explained before, § 2254(d) places “new constraint^] on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of ha-beas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court.” Id., at 412. Our cases make clear that AEDPA in general and § 2254(d) in particular focus in large measure on revising the standards used for evaluating the merits of a habeas application. See id., at 412-413; Lindh, supra, at 329 (noting that “amended § 2254(d) . . . governs standards affecting entitlement to relief”); see also Early v. Packer, 537 U. S. 3 (2002) (per curiam) (applying AEDPA’s standards); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19 (2002) (per curiam) (same).
Because of AEDPA’s heavy emphasis on the standards governing the review of the merits of a habeas application, we interpret the rule announced in Lindh in view of that emphasis, as have the majority of the Courts of Appeals. See, e. g., Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F. 3d 876, 880 (CA7 1997) (“[T]he motion for counsel is not itself a petition, because it does not call for (or even permit) a decision on the merits. And it is ‘the merits’ that the amended § 2254(d)(1) is all about”); Isaacs, supra, at 1245 (same); Coyle, supra, at 1040 (same). Thus, whether AEDPA applies to a state prisoner turns on what was before a federal court on the date AEDPA became effective. If, on that date, the state prisoner had before a federal court an application for habeas relief seeking an adjudication on the merits of the petitioner’s claims, then amended § 2254(d) does not apply. Otherwise, an application filed after AEDPA’s effective date should be reviewed under AEDPA, even if other filings by that same applicant — such as, for example, a request for the appointment of counsel or a motion for a stay of execution — were presented to a federal court prior to AEDPA’s effective date.
A review of the amended chapter 153 supports our conclusion. For instance, § 2254(e)(1) provides that, “[i]n a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” (Emphasis added.) Under the Ninth Circuit’s view, the presumption established in § 2254(e)(1) would rarely apply in a capital case. If, as the Ninth Circuit held, a capital habeas case can be commenced (and, therefore, may become pending for purposes of Lindh) with the filing of a request for the appointment of counsel or a motion for a stay, then § 2254(e)(1), which by its terms applies only to a proceeding “instituted” by “an application for a writ of habeas corpus,” would not apply to any capital prisoners whose first filing in federal court is a request for the appointment of counsel or a motion for a stay. This would make § 2254(e)(1) applicable only to those capital prisoners who did not need counsel and did not seek a stay. AEDPA’s text, however, contains no indication that § 2254(e)(1) was intended to have such a limited scope. Nor is it reasonable to believe that Congress meant for a capital prisoner to avoid the application of the stringent requirements of § 2254(e)(1) simply by filing a request for counsel or a motion for a stay before filing an actual application for habeas relief. Other provisions of chapter 153 likewise - support our view. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2241(d) (indicating that the power to grant a writ is not triggered except by “application for a writ of habeas corpus”); § 2244(a) (providing that federal judges are not required to “entertain” a second or successive “application for a writ of habeas corpus” except as provided for by statute).
Finally, our conclusion is reinforced by the procedural rules governing §2254 cases. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 explains that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint.” The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in the context of habeas suits to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the Habeas Corpus Rules. See 28 U. S. C. §2254 Rule 11; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(2); Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U. S. 482, 489 (1975) (per curiam). Nothing in the Habeas Corpus Rules contradicts Rule 3. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that a habeas suit begins with the filing of an application for habeas corpus relief — the equivalent of a complaint in an ordinary civil case.
H-I H-l 1 — 1
Respondent asks us to determine the scope of the rule announced in Lindh by looking at some of the provisions of chapter 154 of Title 28. But our task in this case is to apply Lindh to an action under chapter 153; thus, the precise phrasing of provisions in chapter 154 is inapposite to our inquiry here.
Moreover, respondent’s argument that our holding in McFarland v. Scott, 512 U. S. 849 (1994), should inform our decision here is unpersuasive. To begin with, McFarland involved the interpretation of §2251, not §2254, which is at issue here. And, as the Courts of Appeals have recognized, see Isaacs, 300 F. 3d, at 1242-1246 (collecting and discussing authorities), the Court’s ruling in McFarland must be understood in light of the Court’s concern to protect the right to counsel contained in 21 U. S. C. § 848(q)(4)(B). McFarland, 512 U. S., at 855 (“This interpretation is the only one that gives meaning to the statute as a practical matter”); id., at 856 (“Requiring an indigent capital petitioner to proceed without counsel in order to obtain counsel thus would expose him to the substantial risk that his habeas claims never would be heard on the merits. Congress legislated against this legal backdrop in adopting § 848(q)(4)(B), and we safely assume that it did not intend for the express requirement of counsel to be defeated in this manner”); id., at 857 (“Even if the District Court had granted McFarland’s motion for appointment of counsel and had found an attorney to represent him, this appointment would have been meaningless unless McFarland’s execution also was stayed”). Thus, McFarland cannot carry the day for respondent.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit’s and respondent’s reliance on Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236 (1998), is misplaced. In Hohn, we considered whether this Court has jurisdiction to review a court of appeals’ denial of a certificate of appealability (COA). To answer that question we focused on the text of 28 U. S. C. § 1254, which “confines our jurisdiction to ‘[c]ases in’ the courts of appeals.” Hohn, supra, at 241 (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 741-742 (1982)). Although we concluded that an application for a COA constituted a case within the meaning of § 1254, we did not provide an all-purpose definition of the term “case.” Thus, while Hohn might support an argument that respondent’s request for appointment of counsel and his motion for a stay of execution began a “case” that could be reviewed on appeal, see, e. g., Gosier, 175 F. 3d, at 506 (“[A] request for counsel is a ‘case’ in the sense that it is subject to appellate review (and, if need be, review by the Supreme Court)”), it says nothing about whether a request for counsel or motion for a stay suffices to create a “case” that is “pending” within the meaning of the Lindh rule.
•fc 'K
In sum, we hold that, for purposes of applying the rule announced in Lindh, a case does not become “pending” until an actual application for habeas corpus relief is filed in federal court. Because respondent’s federal habeas corpus application was not filed until after AEDPA’s effective date, that application is subject to AEDPA’s amendments. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice O’Connor contends that we may have misapplied our test because a filing labeled “Specification of Non-Frivolous Issues” placed the merits of respondent’s claims before the District Court before AEDPA’s effective date. Post, at 211 (opinion concurring in judgment). That is simply not so. Respondent’s “Specification of Non-Frivolous Issues” plainly stated that “[biased on a preliminary review of case materials, counsel believes the following federal constitutional issues exist in this case and are among the issues that may be raised on [Garceau’s] behalf in a petition for habeas corpus.” App. to Brief in Opposition 227 (emphasis added). The clear import of this language is that the filing itself did not seek any relief on the merits or place the merits of respondent’s claims before the District Court for decision. Rather, the document simply alerted the District Court as to some of the possible claims that might be raised by respondent in the future. Indeed, the habeas corpus application respondent eventually filed contained numerous issues that were not mentioned in the “Specification of Non-Frivolous Issues.”
In view of the question on which we granted certiorari, we decline petitioner’s request to rule on the merits of respondent's habeas application.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Under Florida law, after a defendant is found guilty of a capital felony, a separate sentencing proceeding is conducted to determine whether the sentence should be life imprisonment or death. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(1) (1991). At the close of a hearing at which the prosecution and the defense may present evidence and argument in favor of and against the death penalty, ibid., the trial judge charges the jurors to consider “[w]hether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist,” “[wjhether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances,” and “[b]ased on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.” §921.141(2). The verdict does not include specific findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but states only the jury’s sentencing recommendation. “Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury,” the trial court itself must then “weig[h] the aggravating and mitigating circumstances” to determine finally whether the sentence will be life or death. § 921.141(3). If the trial court fixes punishment at death, the court must issue a written statement of the circumstances found and weighed. Ibid.
A Florida jury found petitioner Henry Jose Espinosa guilty of first-degree murder. At the close of the evidence in the penalty hearing, the trial court instructed the jury on aggravating factors. One of the instructions informed the jury that it was entitled to find as an aggravating factor that the murder of which it had found Espinosa guilty was “especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel.” See § 921.141(h). The jury recommended that the trial court impose death, and the court, finding four aggravating and two mitigating factors, did so. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, petitioner argued that the “wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel” instruction was vague and therefore left the jury with insufficient guidance when to find the existence of the aggravating factor. The court rejected this argument and affirmed, saying: “We reject Espinosa’s complaint with respect to the text of the jury instruction on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating factor upon the rationale of Smalley v. State, 546 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1989).” 589 So. 2d 887, 894 (1991).
Our cases establish that, in a State where the sentencer weighs aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the weighing of an invalid aggravating circumstance violates the Eighth Amendment. See Sochor v. Florida, 504 U. S. 527, 532 (1992); Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. 222, 232 (1992); Parker v. Dugger, 498 U. S. 308, 319-321 (1991); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 752 (1990). Our cases further establish that an aggravating circumstance is invalid in this sense if its description is so vague as to leave the sentencer without sufficient guidance for determining the presence or absence of the factor. See Stringer, supra, at 235. We have held instructions more specific and elaborate than the one given in the instant case unconstitutionally vague. See Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U. S. 1 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980).
The State here does not argue that the “especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel” instruction given in this case was any less vague than the instructions we found lacking in Shell, Cartwright, or Godfrey. Instead, echoing the State Supreme Court’s reasoning in Smalley v. State, 546 So. 2d, at 722, the State argues that there was no need to instruct the jury with the specificity our cases have required where the jury was the final sentencing authority, because, in the Florida scheme, the jury is not “the sentencer” for Eighth Amendment purposes. This is true, the State argues, because the trial court is not bound by the jury’s sentencing recommendation; rather, the court must independently determine which aggravating and mitigating circumstances exist, and, after weighing the circumstances, enter a sentence “[njotwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury,” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3).
Our examination of Florida case law indicates, however, that a Florida trial court is required to pay deference to a jury’s sentencing recommendation, in that the trial court must give “great weight” to the jury’s recommendation, whether that recommendation be life, see Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), or death, see Smith v. State, 515 So. 2d 182, 185 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 971 (1988); Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 839, n. 1 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U. S. 1071 (1989). Thus, Florida has essentially split the weighing process in two. Initially, the jury weighs aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the result of that weighing process is then in turn weighed within the trial court’s process of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
It is true that, in this ease, the trial court did not directly weigh any invalid aggravating circumstances. But, we must presume that the jury did so, see Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367, 376-377 (1988), just as we must further presume that the trial court followed Florida law, cf. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 653 (1990), and'gave “great weight” to the resultant recommendation. By giving “great weight” to the jury recommendation, the trial court indirectly weighed the invalid aggravating factor that we must presume the jury found. This kind of indirect weighing of an invalid aggravating factor creates the same potential for arbitrariness as the direct weighing of an invalid aggravating factor, cf. Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U. S. 372, 382 (1985), and the result, therefore, was error.
We have often recognized that there are many constitutionally permissible ways in which States may choose to allocate capital sentencing authority. See id., at 389; Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 464 (1984). Today’s decision in no way signals a retreat from that position. We merely hold that, if a weighing State decides to place capital sentencing authority in two actors rather than one, neither actor must be permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed. We remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
The ChieF Justice and Justice White dissent and would grant certiorari and set the ease down for oral argument.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1983, creates a remedy for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law. State courts as well as federal courts have jurisdiction over § 1983 cases. The question in this case is whether a state-law defense of “sovereign immunity” is available to a school board otherwise subject to suit in a Florida court even though such a defense would not be available if the action had been brought in a federal forum.
Petitioner, a former high school student, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Pinellas County, Florida, naming the School Board of Pinellas County and three school officials as defendants. He alleged that an assistant principal made an illegal search of his car while it was parked on school premises and that he was wrongfully suspended from regular classes for five days. Contending that the search and subsequent suspension violated rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and under similar provisions of the State Constitution, he prayed for damages and an order expunging any reference to the suspension from the school records.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on various grounds, including failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. The school board also contended that the court was without jurisdiction to hear the federal claims—but not the state claims—because the Florida waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statute did not extend to claims based on § 1983. App. 13-14. The Circuit Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, citing a state case requiring state-law challenges to be first presented to the District Court of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court decision in Hill v. Department of Corrections, 513 So. 2d 129 (1987). App. 19.
The District Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s § 1983 claim against the school board. It held that the availability of sovereign immunity in a § 1983 action brought in state court is a matter of state law, and that Florida’s statutory waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply to § 1983 cases. The court rejected the argument that whether a State has maintained its sovereign immunity from a § 1983 suit in its state courts is a question of federal law. It wrote:
“[W]hen a section 1983 action is brought in state court, the sole question to be decided on the basis of state law is whether the state has waived its common law sovereign immunity to the extent necessary to allow a section 1983 action in state court. Hill holds that Florida has not so waived its sovereign immunity. We therefore do not reach appellant’s second issue in this case, i. e., whether under federal law a Florida school board is immune from a section 1983 law. There is no question under Florida law that agencies of the state, including school boards and municipalities, are the beneficiaries of sovereign immunity.” 537 So. 2d 706, 708 (1989) (emphasis in original).
The Court of Appeal acknowledged our holding in Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980), that a State cannot immunize an official from liability for injuries compensable under federal law. It held, however, that under Hill a State’s invocation of a “state common law immunity from the use of its courts for suits against the state in those state courts” raised “purely a question of state law.” 537 So. 2d, at 708. The Florida Supreme Court denied review. 545 So. 2d 1367 (1987). In view of the importance of the question decided by the Court of Appeal, we granted certiorari. 493 U. S. 963 (1989).
II
The question in this case stems from the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in the Hill case. In that case, the plaintiff sought damages for common-law negligence and false imprisonment and violations of his constitutional rights under § 1983 from the Florida Department of Corrections for the conduct of one of its probation supervisors. Hill argued that the department was a “person” under § 1983, that it was responsible for the actions of its supervisor, and that it was subject to suit in the Circuit Court pursuant to the Florida waiver of sovereign immunity. Fla. Stat. § 768.28 (1989). That statute provides that the State and its subdivisions, including municipalities and school boards, § 768.28(2), are subject to suit in circuit court for tort claims “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” § 768.28(5). Although the terms of the waiver could be read narrowly to restrict liability to claims against the State in its proprietary capacity, the Florida courts have rejected that interpretation. In 16 cases arising under Florida statutory and common law, the State Supreme Court has held that the State may be sued in respondeat superior for the violation of nondiscretionary duties in the exercise of governmental authority. The Florida courts thus have entertained suits against state agencies for the violation of nondiscretionary duties committed in the performance of various governmental activities, including the roadside stop and arrest of an individual driving with an expired inspection sticker, the negligent maintenance by city employees of a storm sewer system, the failure of a state caseworker to detect and prevent child abuse, the negligent maintenance of county swimming pools and failure to warn or correct known dangerous conditions, and the failure to protect a prison inmate from other inmates known to be dangerous. Hill argued that just as the State could be joined in an action for the violation of established state common-law or statutory duties, it was also subject to suit for violations of its nondiscretionary duty not to violate the Constitution. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 649-650 (1980).
The trial court dismissed Hill’s § 1983 claim but entered judgment on the jury’s verdict in his favor on the common-law claims. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the § 1983 claim and reversed the judgment on the common-law claim. It also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether Florida’s statutory waiver of sovereign immunity permitted suits against the State and its agencies under § 1983. Department of Corrections v. Hill, 490 So. 2d 118 (1986).
The State Supreme Court answered that question in the negative. Hill v. Department of Corrections, 513 So. 2d 129 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 1064 (1988). Without citing any of its own sovereign immunity cases and relying solely on analogy to the Eleventh Amendment and decisions of the courts of other States, the State Supreme Court held that the Florida statute conferred a blanket immunity on governmental entities from federal civil rights actions under § 1983. 513 So. 2d, at 133. It stated: “While Florida is at liberty to waive its immunity from section 1983 actions, it has not done so. The recovery ceilings in section 768.28 were intended to waive sovereign immunity for state tort actions, not federal civil rights actions commenced under section 1983.” Ibid. The court thus affirmed the dismissal of the §1983 claim but reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment on the common-law claim and allowed the judgment for Hill on that claim to stand.
On its facts, the disposition of the Hill case would appear to be unexceptional. The defendant in Hill was a state agency protected from suit in a federal court by the Eleventh Amendment. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 341 (1979) (§ 1983 does not “override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States”). As we held last Term in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989), an entity with Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. The anomaly identified by the State Supreme Court, and by the various state courts which it cited, that a State might be forced to entertain in its own courts suits from which it was immune in federal court, is thus fully met by our decision in Will. Will establishes that the State and arms of the State, which have traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court or state court.
The language and reasoning of the State Supreme Court, if not its precise holding, however, went further. That further step was completed by the District Court of Appeal in this case. As that court construed the law, Florida has extended absolute immunity from suit not only to the State and its arms but also to municipalities, counties, and school districts that might otherwise be subject to suit under § 1983 in federal court. That holding raises the concern that the state court may be evading federal law and discriminating against federal causes of action. The adequacy of the state-law ground to support a judgment precluding litigation of the federal claim is itself a federal question which we review de novo. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U. S. 578, 587 (1988); James v. Kentucky, 466 U. S. 341, 348-349 (1984); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U. S. 255, 263 (1982); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 146, 149 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 455 (1958); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226, 230-231 (1904); Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 943, 954-957 (1965). Whether the constitutional rights asserted by petitioner were “‘given due recognition by the [Court of Appeal] is a question as to which the [petitioner is] entitled to invoke our judgment, and this [he has] done in the appropriate way. It therefore is within our province to inquire not only whether the right was denied in express terms, but also whether it was denied in substance and effect, as by putting forward nonfederal grounds of decision that were without any fair or substantial support.'” Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 318-319 (1958) (quoting Ward v. Love County Board of Comm’rs, 253 U. S. 17, 22 (1920)).
III
Federal law is enforceable in state courts not because Congress has determined that federal courts would otherwise be burdened or that state courts might provide a more convenient forum—although both might well be true—but because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature. The Supremacy Clause makes those laws “the supreme Law of the Land,” and charges state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce that law according to their regular modes of procedure. “The laws of the United States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are.... The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the State; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but as courts of the same country, having jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent.” Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 136-137 (1876); see Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211, 222 (1916) (“[T]he governments and courts of both the Nation and the several States [are not] strange or foreign to each other in the broad sense of that word, but [are] all courts of a common country, all within the orbit of their lawful authority being charged with the duty to safeguard and enforce the right of every citizen without reference to the particular exercise of governmental power from which the right may have arisen, if only the authority to enforce such right comes generally within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by the government creating them”); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489 (1954) (“The law which governs daily living in the United States is a single system of law”); see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U. S. 455, 469 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). As Alexander Hamilton expressed the principle in a classic passage:
“[I]n every case in which they were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the national legislature, [state courts] will of course take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth. This I infer from the nature of judiciary power, and from the general genius of the system. The judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe. Those of Japan, not less than of New York, may furnish the objects of legal discussion to our courts. When in addition to this we consider the State governments and the national governments, as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as parts of ONE WHOLE, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the Union, where it was not expressly prohibited.” The Federalist No. 82, p. 182 (E. Bourne ed. 1947) (emphasis added).
Three corollaries follow from the proposition that “federal” law is part of the “Law of the Land” in the State:
1. A state court may not deny a federal right, when the parties and controversy are properly before it, in the absence of “valid excuse.” Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377, 387-388 (1929) (Holmes, J.). “The existence of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty to exercise it.” Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 58 (1912); see Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947); Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. R. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200, 208 (1924); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 637 (1884).
2. An excuse that is inconsistent with or violates federal law is not a valid excuse: The Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to dissociate themselves from federal law because of disagreement with its content or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of its source. “The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the State, and therefore that the courts of the State are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the States, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of [the State] as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the State.” Mondou, 223 U. S., at 57; see Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U. S. 698, 703-704 (1942) (“By virtue of the Constitution, the courts of the several states must remain open to such litigants on the same basis that they are open to litigants with causes of action springing from a different source”); McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co., 292 U. S. 230, 233-234 (1934); Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211 (1916); cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 776, n. 1 (1982) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (State may not discriminate against federal causes of action).
3. When a state court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts, we must act with utmost caution before deciding that it is obligated to entertain the claim. See Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1 (1950); Georgia Rail Road & Banking Co. v. Musgrove, 335 U. S. 900 (1949) (per curiam); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 (1945); Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377 (1929). The requirement that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not necessarily include within it a requirement that the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim is presented. The general rule, “bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.” Hart, 54 Colum. L. Rev., at 508; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 33 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S., at 774 (opinion of Powell, J.). The States thus have great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts. See Herb, supra; Bombolis, supra; Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 30-31 (1880). In addition, States may apply their own neutral procedural rules to federal claims, unless those rules are pre-empted by federal law. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131 (1988); James v. Kentucky, 466 U. S., at 348.
These principles are fundamental to a system of federalism in which the state courts share responsibility for the application and enforcement of federal law. In Mondou, for example, we held that rights under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) “may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the States when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion.” 223 U. S., at 59. The Connecticut courts had declined cognizance of FELA actions because the policy of the federal Act was “not in accord with the policy of the State,” and it was “inconvenient and confusing” to apply federal law. Id., at 55-56. We noted, as a matter of some significance, that Congress had not attempted “to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts or to control or affect their modes of procedure,” id., at 56, and found from the fact that the state court was a court of general jurisdiction with cognizance over wrongful-death actions that the court’s jurisdiction was “appropriate to the occasion,” id., at 57. “The existence of the jurisdiction creat[ed] an implication of duty to exercise it,” id., at 58, which could not be overcome by disagreement with the policy of the federal Act, id., at 57.
In McKnett, the state court refused to exercise jurisdiction over a FELA cause of action against a foreign corporation for an injury suffered in another State. We held “[w]hile Congress has not attempted to compel states to provide courts for the enforcement of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of general jurisdiction from refusing to do so solely because the suit is brought under a federal law.” 292 U. S., at 233-234 (citation omitted). Because the state court had “general jurisdiction of the class of actions to which that here brought belongs, in cases between litigants situated like those in the case at bar,” id., at 232, the refusal to hear the FELA action constituted discrimination against rights arising under federal laws, id., at 234, in violation of the Supremacy Clause.
We unanimously reaffirmed these principles in Testa v. Katt. We held that the Rhode Island courts could not decline jurisdiction over treble damages claims under the federal Emergency Price Control Act when their jurisdiction was otherwise “adequate and appropriate under established local law.” 330 U. S., at 394. The Rhode Island court had distinguished our decisions in McKnett and Mondou on the grounds that the federal Act was a “penal statute,” which would not have been enforceable under the Full Faith and Credit Clause if passed by another State. We rejected that argument. We observed that the Rhode Island court enforced the “same type of claim” arising under state law and claims for double damages under federal law. 330 U. S., at 394. We therefore concluded that the court had “jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate this action.” Ibid. The court could not decline to exercise this jurisdiction to enforce federal law by labeling it “penal.” The policy of the federal Act was to be considered “the prevailing policy in every state” which the state court could not refuse to enforce “‘because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of Congress in having called into play its lawful powers.’” Id., at 393 (quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S., at 222).
On only three occasions have we found a valid excuse for a state court’s refusal to entertain a federal cause of action. Each of them involved a neutral rule of judicial administration. In Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377 (1929), the state statute permitted discretionary dismissal of both federal and state claims where neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was a resident of the forum State. In Herb, the City Court denied jurisdiction over a FELA action on the grounds that the cause of action arose outside its territorial jurisdiction. Although the state court was not free to dismiss the federal claim “because it is a federal one,” we found no evidence that the state courts “construed the state jurisdiction and venue laws in a discriminatory fashion.” 324 U. S., at 123. Finally, in Mayfield, we held that a state court could apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens to bar adjudication of a FELA case if the State “enforces its policy impartially so as not to involve a discrimination against Employers’ Liability Act suits.” 340 U. S., at 4 (citation omitted).
IV
The parties disagree as to the proper characterization of the District Court of Appeal’s decision. Petitioner argues that the court adopted a substantive rule of decision that state agencies are not subject to liability under § 1983. Respondents, stressing the court’s language that it had not “opened its own courts for federal actions against the state,” 537 So. 2d, at 708, argue that the case simply involves the court’s refusal to take cognizance of § 1983 actions against state defendants. We conclude that whether the question is framed in pre-emption terms, as petitioner would have it, or in the obligation to assume jurisdiction over a “federal” cause of action, as respondents would have it, the Florida court’s refusal to entertain one discrete category of § 1983 claims, when the court entertains similar state-law actions against state defendants, violates the Supremacy Clause.
If the District Court of Appeal meant to hold that governmental entities subject to § 1983 liability enjoy an immunity over and above those already provided in § 1983, that holding directly violates federal law. The elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined by federal law. See, e. g., Monessen Southwestern R. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U. S. 330, 335 (1988); Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Kuhn, 284 U. S. 44, 46-47 (1931). A State may not, by statute or common law, create a cause of action under § 1983 against an entity whom Congress has not subjected to liability. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 698-710 (1973). Since this Court has construed the word “person” in § 1983 to exclude States, neither a federal court nor a state court may entertain a § 1983 action against such a defendant. Conversely, since the Court has held that municipal corporations and similar governmental entities are “persons,” see Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 663 (1978); cf. Will, 491 U. S., at 69, n. 9; Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280-281 (1977), a state court entertaining a § 1983 action must adhere to that interpretation. “Municipal defenses—including an assertion of sovereign immunity—to a federal right of action are, of course, controlled by federal law.” Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S., at 647, n. 30. “By including municipalities within the class of ‘persons’ subject to liability for violations of the Federal Constitution and laws, Congress—the supreme sovereign on matters of federal law—abolished whatever vestige of the State’s sovereign immunity the municipality possessed.” Id., at 647-648 (footnote omitted).
In Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980), we unanimously concluded that a California statute that purported to immunize public entities and public employees from any liability for parole release decisions was pre-empted by § 1983 “even though the federal cause of action [was] being asserted in the state courts.” Id., at 284. We explained:
“‘Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 or § 1985(3) cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced. See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F. 2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1968). The immunity claim raises a question of federal law.’ Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F. 2d 602, 607 (CA7 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 917.” Id., at 284, n. 8.
In Felder v. Casey, we followed Martinez and held that a Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute that effectively shortened the statute of limitations and imposed an exhaustion requirement on claims against public agencies and employees was pre-empted insofar as it was applied to § 1983 actions. After observing that the lower federal courts, with one exception, had determined that notice-of-claim statutes were inapplicable to § 1983 actions brought in federal courts, we stated that such a consensus also demonstrated that “enforcement of the notice-of-claim statute in § 1983 actions brought in state court... interfered] with and frustrated] the substantive right Congress created.” 487 U. S., at 151. We concluded: “The decision to subject state subdivisions to liability for violations of federal rights... was a choice that Congress, not the Wisconsin Legislature, made, and it is a decision that the State has no authority to override.” Id., at 143.
While the Florida Supreme Court’s actual decision in Hill is consistent with the foregoing reasoning, the Court of Appeal’s extension of Hill to persons subject by § 1983 to liability is flatly inconsistent with that reasoning and the holdings in both Martinez and Felder. Federal law makes governmental defendants that are not arms of the State, such as municipalities, liable for their constitutional violations. See St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112, 121-122 (1988); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). Florida law, as interpreted by the District Court of Appeal, would make all such defendants absolutely immune from liability under the federal statute. To the extent that the Florida law of sovereign immunity reflects a substantive disagreement with the extent to which governmental entities should be held liable for their constitutional violations, that disagreement cannot override the dictates of federal law. “Congress surely did not intend to assign to state courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 269 (1985).
If, on the other hand, the District Court of Appeal meant that § 1983 claims are excluded from the category of tort claims that the Circuit Court could hear against a school board, its holding was no less violative of federal law. Cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Burnette, 239 U. S. 199, 201 (1915). This case does not present the questions whether Congress can require the States to create a forum with the capacity to enforce federal statutory rights or to authorize service of process on parties who would not otherwise be subject to the court’s jurisdiction. The State of Florida has constituted the Circuit Court for Pinellas County as a court of general jurisdiction. It exercises jurisdiction over tort claims by private citizens against state entities (including school boards), of the size and type of petitioner’s claim here, and it can enter judgment against them. That court also exercises jurisdiction over § 1983 actions against individual officers and is fully competent to provide the remedies the federal statute requires. Cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 238 (1969). Petitioner has complied with all the state-law procedures for invoking the jurisdiction of that court.
The mere facts, as argued by respondents’ amici, that state common law and statutory law do not make unlawful the precise conduct that § 1983 addresses and that § 1983 actions “are more likely to be frivolous than are other suits,” Brief for Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 17, clearly cannot provide sufficient justification for the State’s refusal to entertain such actions. These reasons have never been asserted by the State and are not asserted by the school board. More importantly, they are not the kind of neutral policy that could be a “valid excuse” for the state court’s refusal to entertain federal actions. To the extent that the Florida rule is based upon the judgment that parties who are otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the court should not be held liable for activity that would not subject them to liability under state law, we understand that to be only another way of saying that the court disagrees with the content of federal law. Sovereign immunity in Florida turns on the nature of the claim—whether the duty allegedly breached is discretionary—not on the subject matter of the dispute. There is no question that the Circuit Court, which entertains state common-law and statutory claims against state entities in a variety of their capacities, ranging from law enforcement to schooling to the protection of individuals using parking lots, has jurisdiction over the subject of this suit. That court cannot reject petitioner’s § 1983 claim because it has chosen, for substantive policy reasons, not to adjudicate other claims which might also render the school board liable. The federal law is law in the State as much as laws passed by the state legislature. A “state court cannot ‘refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of Congress in having called into play its lawful powers.’” Testa, 330 U. S., at 393 (quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S., at 222).
The argument by amici that suits predicated on federal law are more likely to be frivolous and have less of an entitlement to the State’s limited judicial resources warrants little response. A State may adopt neutral procedural rules to discourage frivolous litigation of all kinds, as long as those rules are not pre-empted by a valid federal law. A State may not, however, relieve congestion in its courts by declaring a whole category of federal claims to be frivolous. Until it has been proved that the claim has no merit, that judgment is not up to the States to make.
Respondents have offered no neutral or valid excuse for the Circuit Court’s refusal to hear § 1983 actions against state entities. The Circuit Court would have had jurisdiction if the defendant were an individual officer and the action were based on § 1983. It would also have had jurisdiction over the defendant school board if the action were based on established state common law or statutory law. A state policy that permits actions against state agencies for the failure of their officials to adequately police a parking lot and for the negligence of such officers in arresting a person on a roadside, but yet declines jurisdiction over federal actions for constitutional violations by the same persons can be based only on the rationale that such persons should not be held liable for § 1983 violations in the courts of the State. That reason, whether presented in terms of direct disagreement with substantive federal law or simple refusal to take cognizance of the federal cause of action, flatly violates the Supremacy Clause.
V
Respondents offer two final arguments in support of the judgment of the District Court of Appeal. First, at oral argument—but not in their brief—they argued that a federal court has no power to compel a state court to entertain a claim over which the state court has no jurisdiction as a matter of state law. Second, respondents argue that sovereign immunity is not a creature of state law, but of long-established legal principles which have not been set aside by § 1983. We find no merit in these contentions.
The fact that a rule is denominated jurisdictional does not provide a court an excuse to avoid the obligation to enforce federal law if the rule does not reflect the concerns of power over the person and competence over the subject matter that jurisdictional rules are designed to protect. It is settled that a court of otherwise competent jurisdiction may not avoid its parallel obligation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to entertain another State’s cause of action by invocation of the term “jurisdiction.” See First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U. S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609, 611 (1951); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 642-643 (1935); Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U. S. 411 (1920). A State cannot “escape this constitutional obligation to enforce the rights and duties validly created under
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner James Olden and his friend Charlie Ray Harris, both of whom are black, were indicted for kidnaping, rape, and forcible sodomy. The victim of the alleged crimes, Starla Matthews, a young white woman, gave the following account at trial: She and a friend, Regina Patton, had driven to Princeton, Kentucky, to exchange Christmas gifts with Bill Russell, petitioner’s half brother. After meeting Russell at a local car wash and exchanging presents with him, Matthews and Patton stopped in J.R.’s, a “boot-legging joint” serving a predominantly black clientele, to use the restroom. Matthews consumed several glasses of beer. As the bar became more crowded, she became increasingly nervous because she and Patton were the only white people there. When Patton refused to leave, Matthews sat at a separate table, hoping to demonstrate to her friend that she was upset. As time passed, however, Matthews lost track of Patton and became somewhat intoxicated. When petitioner told her that Patton had departed and had been in a car accident, she left the bar with petitioner and Harris to find out what had happened. She was driven in Harris’ car to another location, where, threatening her with a knife, petitioner raped and sodomized her. Harris assisted by holding her arms. Later, she was driven to a dump, where two other men joined the group. There, petitioner raped her once again. At her request, the men then dropped her off in the vicinity of Bill Russell’s house.
On cross-examination, petitioner’s counsel focused on a number of inconsistencies in Matthews’ various accounts of the alleged crime. Matthews originally told the police that she had been raped by four men. Later, she claimed that she had been raped by only petitioner and Harris. At trial, she contended that petitioner was the sole rapist. Further, while Matthews testified at trial that petitioner had threatened her with a knife, she had not previously alleged that petitioner had been armed.
Russell, who also appeared as a State’s witness, testified that on the evening in question he heard a noise outside his home and, when he went out to investigate, saw Matthews get out of Harris’ car. Matthews immediately told Russell that she had just been raped by petitioner and Harris.
Petitioner and Harris asserted a defense of consent. According to their testimony, Matthews propositioned petitioner as he was about to leave the bar, and the two engaged in sexual acts behind the tavern. Afterwards, on Matthews’ suggestion, Matthews, petitioner, and Harris left in Harris’ car in search of cocaine. When they discovered that the seller was not at home, Matthews asked Harris to drive to a local dump so that she and petitioner could have sex once again. Harris complied. Later that evening, they picked up two other men, Richard Hickey and Chris Taylor, and drove to an establishment called The Alley. Harris, Taylor, and Hickey went in, leaving petitioner and Matthews in the ear. When Hickey and Harris returned, the men gave Hickey a ride to a store and then dropped Matthews off, at her request, in the vicinity of Bill Russell’s home.
Taylor and Hickey testified for the defense and corroborated the defendants’ account of the evening. While both acknowledged that they joined the group later than the time when the alleged rape occurred, both testified that Matthews did not appear upset. Hickey further testified that Matthews had approached him earlier in the evening at J.R.’s and told him that she was looking for a black man with whom to have sex. An independent witness also appeared for the defense and testified that he had seen Matthews, Harris, and petitioner at a store called Big O’s on the evening in question, that a policeman was in the store at the time, and that Matthews, who appeared alert, made no attempt to signal for assistance.
Although Matthews and Russell were both married to and living with other people at the time of the incident, they were apparently involved in an extramarital relationship. By the time of trial the two were living together, having separated from their respective spouses. Petitioner’s theory of the case was that Matthews concocted the rape story to protect her relationship with Russell, who would have grown suspicious upon seeing her disembark from Harris’ car. In order to demonstrate Matthews’ motive to lie, it was crucial, petitioner contended, that he be allowed to introduce evidence of Matthews’ and Russell’s current cohabitation. Over petitioner’s vehement objections, the trial court nonetheless granted the prosecutor’s motion in limine to keep all evidence of Matthews’ and Russell’s living arrangement from the jury. Moreover, when the defense attempted to cross-examine Matthews about her living arrangements, after she had claimed during direct examination that she was living with her mother, the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection.
Based on the evidence admitted at trial, the jury acquitted Harris of being either a principal or an accomplice to any of the charged offenses. Petitioner was likewise acquitted of kidnaping and rape. However, in a somewhat puzzling turn of events, the jury convicted petitioner alone of forcible sodomy. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.
Petitioner appealed, asserting, inter alia, that the trial court’s refusal to allow him to impeach Matthews’ testimony by introducing evidence supporting a motive to lie deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. No. 86-CR-006 (May 11, 1988). The court specifically held that evidence that Matthews and Russell were living together at the time of trial was not barred by the State’s rape shield law. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §510.145 (Michie 1985). Moreover, it acknowledged that the evidence in question was relevant to petitioner’s theory of the case. But it held, nonetheless, that the evidence was properly excluded as “its probative value [was] outweighed by its possibility for prejudice.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A6. By way of explanation, the court stated: “[T]here were the undisputed facts of race; Matthews was white and Russell was black. For the trial court to have admitted into evidence testimony that Matthews and Russell were living together at the time of the trial may have created extreme prejudice against Matthews.” Judge Clayton, who dissented but did not address the evidentiary issue, would have reversed petitioner’s conviction both because he believed the jury’s verdicts were “manifestly inconsistent,” and because he found Matthews’ testimony too incredible to provide evidence sufficient to uphold the verdict. Id., at A7.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals failed to accord proper weight to petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him. ” That right, incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore available in state proceedings, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965), includes the right to conduct reasonable cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 315-316 (1974).
In Davis v. Alaska, we observed that, subject to “the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation . . . , the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i. e., discredit, the witness.” Id., at 316. We emphasized that “the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Id., at 316-317, citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474, 496 (1959). Recently, in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673 (1986), we reaffirmed Davis, and held that “a criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” 475 U. S., at 680, quoting Davis, supra, at 318.
In the instant case, petitioner has consistently asserted that he and Matthews engaged in consensual sexual acts and that Matthews — out of fear of jeopardizing her relationship with Russell — lied when she told Russell she had been raped and has continued to lie since. It is plain to us that “[a] reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of [the witness’] credibility had [defense counsel] been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, at 680.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals did not dispute, and indeed acknowledged, the relevance of the impeachment evidence. Nonetheless, without acknowledging the significance of, or even adverting to, petitioner’s constitutional right to confrontation, the court held that petitioner’s right to effective cross-examination was outweighed by the danger that revealing Matthews’ interracial relationship would prejudice the jury against her. While a trial court may, of course, impose reasonable limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness, to take account of such factors as “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that [would be] repetitive or only marginally relevant,” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, at 679, the limitation here was beyond reason. Speculation as to the effect of jurors’ racial biases cannot justify exclusion of cross-examination with such strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of Matthews’ testimony.
In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, we held that “the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to Chapman [v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967)] harmless-error analysis.” Id., at 684. Thus we stated:
“The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. These factors include the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Ibid.
Here, Matthews’ testimony was central, indeed crucial, to the prosecution’s case. Her story, which was directly contradicted by that of petitioner and Harris, was corroborated only by the largely derivative testimony of Russell, whose impartiality would also have been somewhat impugned by revelation of his relationship with Matthews. Finally, as demonstrated graphically by the jury’s verdicts, which cannot be squared with the State’s theory of the alleged crime, and by Judge Clayton’s dissenting opinion below, the State’s case against petitioner was far from overwhelming. In sum, considering the relevant Van Arsdall factors within the context of this case, we find it impossible to conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the restriction on petitioner’s right to confrontation was harmless.
The motion for leave to proceed informa pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment of the Kentucky Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
As a sanction for failing to identify a defense witness in response to a pretrial discovery request, an Illinois trial judge refused to allow the undisclosed witness to testify. The question presented is whether that refusal violated the petitioner’s constitutional right to obtain the testimony of favorable witnesses. We hold that such a sanction is not absolutely prohibited by the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment and find no constitutional error on the specific facts of this case.
I
A jury convicted petitioner in 1984 of attempting to murder Jack Bridges in a street fight on the south side of Chicago on August 6,1981. The conviction was supported by the testimony of Bridges, his brother, and three other witnesses. They described a 20-minute argument between Bridges and a young man named Derrick Travis, and a violent encounter that occurred over an hour later between several friends of Travis, including petitioner, on the one hand, and Bridges, belatedly aided by his brother, on the other. The incident was witnessed by 20 or 30 bystanders. It is undisputed that at least three members of the group which included Travis and petitioner were carrying pipes and clubs that they used to beat Bridges. Prosecution witnesses also testified that petitioner had a gun, that he shot Bridges in the back as he attempted to flee, and that, after Bridges fell, petitioner pointed the gun at Bridges’ head but the weapon misfired.
Two sisters, who are friends of petitioner, testified on his behalf. In many respects their version of the incident was consistent with the prosecution’s case, but they testified that it was Bridges’ brother, rather than petitioner, who possessed a firearm and that he had fired into the group hitting his brother by mistake. No other witnesses testified for the defense.
Well in advance of trial, the prosecutor filed a discovery motion requesting a list of defense witnesses. In his original response, petitioner’s attorney identified the two sisters who later testified and two men who did not testify. On the first day of trial, defense counsel was allowed to amend his answer by adding the names of Derrick Travis and a Chicago police officer; neither of them actually testified.
On the second day of trial, after the prosecution’s two principal witnesses had completed their testimony, defense counsel made an oral motion to amend his “Answer to Discovery” to include two more witnesses, Alfred Wormley and Pam Berkhalter. In support of the motion, counsel represented that he had just been informed about them and that they had probably seen the “entire incident.”
In response to the court’s inquiry about defendant’s failure to tell him about the two witnesses earlier, counsel acknowledged that defendant had done so, but then represented that he had been unable to locate Wormley. After noting that the witnesses’ names could have been supplied even if their addresses were unknown, the trial judge directed counsel to bring them in the next day, at which time he would decide whether they could testify. The judge indicated that he was concerned about the possibility “that witnesses are being found that really weren’t there.”
The next morning Wormley appeared in court with defense counsel. After further colloquy about the consequences of a violation of discovery rules, counsel was permitted to make an offer of proof in the form of Wormley’s testimony outside the presence of the jury. It developed that Wormley had not been a witness to the incident itself. He testified that prior to the incident he saw Jack Bridges and his brother with two guns in a blanket, that he heard them say “they were after Ray [petitioner] and the other people,” and that on his way home he “happened to run into Ray and them” and warned them “to watch out because they got weapons.” On cross-examination, Wormley acknowledged that he had first met defendant “about four months ago” (i e., over two years after the incident). He also acknowledged that defense counsel had visited him at his home on the Wednesday of the week before the trial began. Thus, his testimony rather dramatically contradicted defense counsel’s representations to the trial court.
After hearing Wormley testify, the trial judge concluded that the appropriate sanction for the discovery violation was to exclude his testimony. The judge explained:
“THE COURT: All right, I am going to deny Wormley an opportunity to testify here. He is not going to testify. I find this is a blatent [sic] violation of the discovery rules, willful violation of the rules. I also feel that defense attorneys have been violating discovery in this courtroom in the last three or four cases blatantly and I am going to put a stop to it and this is one way to do so.
“Further, for whatever value it is, because this is a jury trial, I have a great deal of doubt in my mind as to the veracity of this young man that testified as to whether he was an eyewitness on the scene, sees guns that are wrapped up. He doesn’t know Ray but he stops Ray.
“At any rate, Mr. Wormley is not going to testify, be a witness in this courtroom.” App. 28.
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction. 141 Ill. App. 3d 839, 491 N. E. 2d 3 (1986). It held that when “discovery rules are violated, the trial judge may exclude the evidence which the violating party wishes to introduce” and that “[t]he decision of the severity of the sanction to impose on a party who violates discovery rules rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” The court concluded that in this case “the trial court was within its discretion in refusing to allow the additional witnesses to testify.” Id., at 844-845, 491 N. E. 2d, at 7. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal and we granted the petition for certiorari, 479 U. S. 1063 (1987).
In this Court petitioner makes two arguments. He first contends that the Sixth Amendment bars a court from ever ordering the preclusion of defense evidence as a sanction for violating a discovery rule. Alternatively, he contends that even if the right to present witnesses is not absolute, on the facts of this case the preclusion of Wormley’s testimony was constitutional error. Before addressing these contentions, we consider the State’s argument that the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment is merely a guarantee that the accused shall have the power to subpoena witnesses and simply does not apply to rulings on the admissibility of evidence.
II
In the State’s view, no Compulsory Process Clause concerns are even raised by authorizing preclusion as a discovery sanction, or by the application of the Illinois rule in this case. The State’s argument is supported by the plain language of the Clause, see n. 1, supra, by the historical evidence that it was intended to provide defendants with subpoena power that they lacked at common law, by some scholarly comment, and by a brief excerpt from the legislative history of the Clause. We have, however, consistently given the Clause the broader reading reflected in contemporaneous state constitutional provisions.
As we noted just last Term, “[o]ur cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants have the right to the government’s assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury-evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U. S. 39, 56 (1987). Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense, see, e. g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302 (1973). Indeed, this right is an essential attribute of the adversary system itself.
“We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 709 (1974).
The right to compel a witness’ presence in the courtroom could not protect the integrity of the adversary process if it did not embrace the right to have the witness’ testimony heard by the trier of fact. The right to offer testimony is thus grounded in the Sixth Amendment even though it is not expressly described in so many words:
“The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (1967).
The right of the defendant to present evidence “stands on no lesser footing than the other Sixth Amendment rights that we have previously held applicable to the States.” Id., at 18. We cannot accept the State’s argument that this constitutional right may never be offended by the imposition of a discovery sanction that entirely excludes the testimony of a material defense witness.
Ill
Petitioner’s claim that the Sixth Amendment creates an absolute bar to the preclusion of the testimony of a surprise witness is just as extreme and just as unacceptable as the State’s position that the Amendment is simply irrelevant. The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence. The Compulsory Process Clause provides him with an effective weapon, but it is a weapon that cannot be used irresponsibly.
There is a significant difference between the Compulsory Process Clause weapon and other rights that are protected by the Sixth Amendment — its availability is dependent entirely on the defendant’s initiative. Most other Sixth Amendment rights arise automatically on the initiation of the adversary process and no action by the defendant is necessary to make them active in his or her case. While those rights shield the defendant from potential prosecutorial abuses, the right to compel the presence and present the testimony of witnesses provides the defendant with a sword that may be employed to rebut the prosecution’s case. The decision whether to employ it in a particular case rests solely with the defendant. The very nature of the right requires that its effective use be preceded by deliberate planning and affirmative conduct.
The principle that undergirds the defendant’s right to present exculpatory evidence is also the source of essential limitations on the right. The adversary process could not function effectively without adherence to rules of procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and arguments to provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the opponent’s case. The trial process would be a shambles if either party had an absolute right to control the time and content of his witnesses’ testimony. Neither may insist on the right to interrupt the opposing party’s case, and obviously there is no absolute right to interrupt the deliberations of the jury to present newly discovered evidence. The State’s interest in the orderly conduct of a criminal trial is sufficient to justify the imposition and enforcement of firm, though not always inflexible, rules relating to the identification and presentation of evidence.
The defendant’s right to compulsory process is itself designed to vindicate the principle that the “ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 709. Rules that provide for pretrial discovery of an opponent’s witnesses serve the same high purpose. Discovery, like cross-examination, minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predicated on incompíete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated testimony. The “State’s interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense” is merely one component of the broader public interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical facts.
To vindicate that interest we have held that even the defendant may not testify without being subjected to cross-examination. Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 156 (1958). Moreover, in United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225 (1975), we upheld an order excluding the testimony of an expert witness tendered by the defendant because he had refused to permit discovery of a “highly relevant” report. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell explained:
“The court’s preclusion sanction was an entirely proper method of assuring compliance with its order. Respondent’s argument that this ruling deprived him of the Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory process and cross-examination misconceives the issue. The District Court did not bar the investigator’s testimony. Cf. Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (1967). It merely prevented respondent from presenting to the jury a partial view of the credibility issue by adducing the investigator’s testimony and thereafter refusing to disclose the contemporaneous report that might offer further critical insights. The Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system; one cannot invoke the Sixth Amendment as a justification for presenting what might have been a half-truth. Deciding, as we do, that it was within the court’s discretion to assure that the jury would hear the full testimony of the investigator rather than a truncated portion favorable to respondent, we think it would be artificial indeed to deprive the court of the power to effectuate that judgment. Nor do we find constitutional significance in the fact that the court in this instance was able to exclude the testimony in advance rather than receive it in evidence and thereafter charge the jury to disregard it when respondent’s counsel refused, as he said he would, to produce the report.” Id., at 241 (emphasis added).
Petitioner does not question the legitimacy of a rule requiring pretrial disclosure of defense witnesses, but he argues that the sanction of preclusion of the testimony of a previously undisclosed witness is so drastic that it should never be imposed. He argues, correctly, that a less drastic sanction is always available. Prejudice to the prosecution could be minimized by granting a continuance or a mistrial to provide time for further investigation; moreover, further violations can be deterred by disciplinary sanctions against the defendant or defense counsel.
It may well be true that alternative sanctions are adequate and appropriate in most cases, but it is equally clear that they would be less effective than the preclusion sanction and that there are instances in which they would perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice to the State and the harm to the adversary process. One of the purposes of the discovery rule itself is to minimize the risk that fabricated testimony will be believed. Defendants who are willing to fabricate a defense may also be willing to fabricate excuses for failing to comply with a discovery requirement. The risk of a contempt violation may seem trivial to a defendant facing the threat of imprisonment for a term of years. A dishonest client can mislead an honest attorney, and there are occasions when an attorney assumes that the duty of loyalty to the client outweighs elementary obligations to the court.
We presume that evidence that is not discovered until after the trial is over would not have affected the outcome. It is equally reasonable to presume that there is something suspect about a defense witness who is not identified until after the 11th hour has passed. If a pattern of discovery violations is explicable only on the assumption that the violations were designed to conceal a plan to present fabricated testimony, it would be entirely appropriate to exclude the tainted evidence regardless of whether other sanctions would also be merited.
In order to reject petitioner’s argument that preclusion is never a permissible sanction for a discovery violation it is neither necessary nor appropriate for us to attempt to draft a comprehensive set of standards to guide the exercise of discretion in every possible case. It is elementary, of course, that a trial court may not ignore the fundamental character of the defendant’s right to offer the testimony of witnesses in his favor. But the mere invocation of that right cannot automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing public interests. The integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process must also weigh in the balance.
A trial judge may certainly insist on an explanation for a party’s failure to comply with a request to identify his or her witnesses in advance of trial. If that explanation reveals that the omission was willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence, it would be entirely consistent with the purposes of the Compulsory Process Clause simply to exclude the witness’ testimony. Cf. United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225 (1975).
The simplicity of compliance with the discovery rule is also relevant. As we have noted, the Compulsory Process Clause cannot be invoked without the prior planning and affirmative conduct of the defendant. Lawyers are accustomed to meeting deadlines. Routine preparation involves location and interrogation of potential witnesses and the serving of subpoenas on those whose testimony will be offered at trial. The burden of identifying them in advance of trial adds little to these routine demands of trial preparation.
It would demean the high purpose of the Compulsory Process Clause to construe it as encompassing an absolute right to an automatic continuance or mistrial to allow presumptively perjured testimony to be presented to a jury. We reject petitioner’s argument that a preclusion sanction is never appropriate no matter how serious the defendant’s discovery violation may be.
IV
Petitioner argues that the preclusion sanction was unnecessarily harsh in this case because the voir dire examination of Wormley adequately protected the prosecution from any possible prejudice resulting from surprise. Petitioner also contends that it is unfair to visit the sins of the lawyer upon his client. Neither argument has merit.
More is at stake than possible prejudice to the prosecution. We are also concerned with the impact of this kind of conduct on the integrity of the judicial process itself. The trial judge found that the discovery violation in this case was both willful and blatant. In view of the fact that petitioner’s counsel had actually interviewed Wormley during the week before the trial began and the further fact that he amended his Answer to Discovery on the first day of trial without identifying Wormley while he did identify two actual eyewitnesses whom he did not place on the stand, the inference that he was deliberately seeking a tactical advantage is inescapable. Regardless of whether prejudice to the prosecution could have been avoided in this particular case, it is plain that the case fits into the category of willful misconduct in which the severest sanction is appropriate. After all, the court, as well as the prosecutor, has a vital interest in protecting the trial process from the pollution of perjured testimony. Evidentiary rules which apply to categories of inadmissible evidence — ranging from hearsay to the fruits of illegal searches — may properly be enforced even though the particular testimony being offered is not prejudicial. The pretrial conduct revealed by the record in this case gives rise to a sufficiently strong inference that “witnesses are being found that really weren’t there,” to justify the sanction of preclusion.
The argument that the client should not be held responsible for his lawyer’s misconduct strikes at the heart of the attorney-client relationship. Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer has — and must have — full authority to manage the conduct of the trial. The adversary process could not function effectively if every tactical decision required client approval. Moreover, given the protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege and the fact that extreme cases may involve unscrupulous conduct by both the client and the lawyer, it would be highly impracticable to require an investigation into their relative responsibilities before applying the sanction of preclusion. In responding to discovery, the client has a duty to be candid and forthcoming with the lawyer, and when the lawyer responds, he or she speaks for the client. Putting to one side the exceptional cases in which counsel is ineffective, the client must accept the consequences of the lawyer’s decision to forgo cross-examination, to decide not to put certain witnesses on the stand, or to decide not to disclose the identity of certain witnesses in advance of trial. In this case, petitioner has no greater right to disavow his lawyer’s decision to conceal Wormley’s identity until after the trial had commenced than he has to disavow the decision to refrain from adducing testimony from the eyewitnesses who were identified in the Answer to Discovery. Whenever a lawyer makes use of the sword provided by the Compulsory Process Clause, there is some risk that he may wound his own client.
The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court is
Affirmed.
The Sixth Amendment provides, in part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor....” This right is applicable in state as well as federal prosecutions. Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967).
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 413(d) provides in pertinent part:
“Subject to constitutional limitations and within a reasonable time after the filing of a written motion by the State, defense counsel shall inform the State of any defenses which he intends to make at a hearing or trial and shall furnish the State with the following material and information within his possession or control:
“(i) the names and last known addresses of persons he intends to call as witnesses together with their relevant written or recorded statements, including memoranda reporting or summarizing their oral statements, any record of prior criminal convictions known to him.. (emphasis added).
These two men, Earl Travis, the brother of Derrick Travis, and Luther Taylor, petitioner’s brother, were identified by prosecution witnesses as participants in the street fight.
“During the direct testimony of the witnesses, your Honor, called by the State, I was informed of some additional witnesses which could have and probably did, in fact, see this entire incident. We at this time would ask to amend our Answer to include two additional witnesses.
“THE COURT: Who are they?
“MR. VAN: One is a guy named Alfred Wrdely of which—
“THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me, W-r-d-e-l-y.
“MR. VAN: Whose address I do not have. I’m going to have to see if I can locate him tonight. And Pam Berkhalter.” App. 12.
“THE COURT: Yeah, but the defendant was there, and the defendant is now telling you Pam Berkhalter, and he’s now telling you Alfred Wrdely. Why didn’t he tell you that sometime ago? He’s got an obligation to tell you.
“MR. VAN: That is correct, Judge. He, in fact, told me about Alfred sometime ago. The problem was that he could not locate Alfred.” Id., at 12-13.
“There’s all sorts of people on the scene, and all of these people should have been disclosed before.
“When you bring up these witnesses at the very last moment, there’s always the allegation and the thought process that witnesses are being found that really weren’t there. And it’s a problem in these types of cases, and it should be — should have been put on that sheet a long time ago.
“At any rate, I’ll worry about it tomorrow.” Id., at 13-14.
The record does not explain why Pam Berkhalter did not appear.
“Q. What, if anything did you learn by standing there in the crowd?
“A. Well, Jack had a blanket. It was two pistols in there and he gave it to—
“Q. And then what, if anything, did they say at that time, if you can recall?
“A. Well, they were saying what they were going to do to the people. Say they were after Ray and the other people.
“Q. What, if anything, did you do at that time?
“A. At that time I left. I was on my way home and I happened to run into Ray and them and so I told them what was happening and to watch out because they got weapons.” Id., at 19.
The State also argues that we should decline to exercise jurisdiction over petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim because it was inadequately presented in the state court. As respondent points out, petitioner did not specifically articulate his claim as based on the Compulsory Process Clause until he filed a petition for rehearing in the Illinois Appellate Court. Moreover, at trial petitioner merely argued that the trial court erred by not letting his witness testify. On appeal, however, petitioner asserted that the error was constitutional: “The trial judge abused his discretion and denied [petitioner] due process by excluding a material defense witness from testifying as a sanction for a discovery violation.” Brief and Argument For Appellant in No. 84-1073 (App. Ct. Ill.), p. 28. Although petitioner expressly asserted only a due process violation, his reliance on the Sixth Amendment was clear. He cited and relied upon, through a quotation from an Illinois Appellate Court decision, two of our Compulsory Process Clause eases, Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967), and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973). The state-court decision from which petitioner quoted, People v. Rayford, 43 Ill. App. 3d 283, 356 N. E. 2d 1274 (1976), was also a Compulsory Process Clause case. The court in Rayford asserted that use of the preclusion sanction in criminal cases should be limited to extreme situations because in criminal cases “due process requires that a defendant be permitted to offer testimony of witnesses in his defense,” id., at 286-287, 356 N. E. 2d, at 1277 (emphasis added), citing Washington, supra.
A generic reference to the Fourteenth Amendment is not sufficient to preserve a constitutional claim based on an unidentified provision of the Bill of Rights, but in this case the authority cited by petitioner and the manner in which the fundamental right at issue has been described and understood by the Illinois courts make it appropriate to conclude that the constitutional question was sufficiently well presented to the state courts to support our jurisdiction.
See Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee In Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711, 767 (1976).
8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2191, pp. 68-70 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
“Mr. Burke moved to amend this proposition in such a manner as to leave it in the power of the accused to put off the trial to the next session, provided he made it appear to the court that the evidence of the witnesses, for whom process was granted but not served, was material to his defence.
“Mr. Hartley said, that in securing him the right of compulsory process, the Government did all it could; the remainder must lie in the discretion of the court.
“Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, thought the regulation would come properly in, as part of the Judicial system.
“The question on MR. BURKE’s motion was taken and lost; ayes 9, noes 41.” 1 Annals of Cong. 756 (1789).
“Particulars varied from state to state, but the provisions reflected a common principle. Three states emphasized the right to present evidence, guaranteeing the accused the right ‘to call for evidence in his favour.’ Two emphasized the subpoena power, giving the defendant the right to produce ‘all proofs that may be favorable’ to him. North Carolina combined the right to put on a defense with the right of confrontation, guaranteeing the right ‘to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony.’ Delaware emphasized the defendant’s interest in sworn testimony, giving him the right ‘to examine evidence on oath in his favour.’ New Jersey opted for a principle of equality between the parties: ‘[A]ll criminals shall be admitted to the same privileges of witnesses and counsel, as their prosecutors are or shall be entitled to.’ Maryland consolidated several interests, guaranteeing the defendant the right ‘to examine [his] witnesses... on oath,’ and ‘to have process for his witnesses.’
“Some of the state provisions originated in English statutes, some in colonial enactments, and some were original. Regardless, they all reflected the principle that the defendant must have a meaningful opportunity, at least as advantageous as that possessed by the prosecution, to establish the essential elements of his ease. The states pressed the principle so vigorously that the framers of the federal Bill of Rights included it in the sixth amendment in a distinctive formulation of their own.” Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 94-95 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
As one commentator has noted:
“The defendant’s rights to be informed of the charges against him, to receive a speedy and public trial, to be tried by a jury, to be assisted by counsel, and to be confronted with adverse witnesses are designed to restrain the prosecution by regulating the procedures by which it presents its case against the accused. They apply in every case, whether or not the defendant seeks to rebut the case against him or to present a case of his own. Compulsory process, on the other hand, comes into play at the close of the prosecution’s case. It operates exclusively at the defendant’s initiative and provides him with affirmative aid in presenting his defense.” Id., at 74.
“In the exercise of [the right to present witnesses], the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S., at 302.
“Notice-of-alibi rules, now in use in a large and growing number of States, are based on the proposition that the ends of justice will best be served by a system of liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximum possible amount of information with which to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at trial. See, e. g., Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 Wash. U. L. Q. 279; American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Discovery and Procedure Before Trial 23-43 (Approved Draft 1970); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L. J. 1149 (1960). The growth of such discovery devices is a salutary development which, by increasing the evidence available to both parties, enhances the fairness of the adversary system.” Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470, 473-474 (1973).
“Given the ease with which an alibi can be fabricated, the State’s interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense is both obvious and legitimate. Reflecting this interest, notice-of-alibi provisions, dating at least from 1927, are now in existence in a substantial number of States. The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played. We find ample room in that system, at least as far as ‘due process’ is concerned, for the instant Florida rule, which is designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence.” Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 81-82 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
Lloyd v. Gill, 406 F. 2d 585, 587 (CA5 1969) (motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence “may not be granted unless... the facts discovered are of such nature that they will probably change the result if a new trial is granted,... they have been discovered since the trial and could not by the exercise of due diligence have been discovered earlier, and... they are not merely cumulative or impeaching”); Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Kassab, 325 F. 2d 591, 594 (CA3 1963) (“[C]ourts will indulge all presumptions in favor of the validity of a verdict”); Rowlik v. Greenfield, 87 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (ED Pa. 1949) (“[N]ew trials should not be allowed simply because after the verdict the losing party has come upon some witness or information theretofore unknown to him or his attorney”).
See, e. g., Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F. 2d 1181, 1188-1190 (CA9 1983) (giving consideration to the effectiveness of less severe sanctions, the impact of preclusion on the evidence at trial and the outcome of the case, the extent of prosecutorial surprise or prejudice, and whether the violation was willful).
There may be eases in which a defendant has legitimate objections to disclosing the identity of a potential witness. See Note, The Preclusion Sanction — A Violation of the Constitutional Right to Present a Defense, 81 Yale L. J. 1342, 1350 (1972). Such objections, however, should be raised in advance of trial in response to the discovery request and, if the parties are unable to agree on a resolution, presented to the court. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and under the rules adopted by most States, a party may request a protective order if he or she has just cause for objecting to a discovery request. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16(d)(1); Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 412(i). In this case, there is no issue concerning the validity of the discovery requirement or petitioner’s duty to comply with it. There is also no indication that petitioner ever objected to the prosecution’s discovery request.
“In the ease before us, the notice-of-alibi rule by itself in no way affected petitioner’s crucial decision to call alibi witnesses or added to the legitimate pressures leading to that course of action. At most, the rule only compelled petitioner to accelerate the timing of his disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an earlier date information that the petitioner from the beginning planned to divulge at trial. Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State’s case before announcing the nature of his defense, any more than it entitles him to await the jury’s verdict on the State’s case-in-chief before deciding whether or not to take the stand himself.” Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S., at 85.
The trial judge also expressed concern about discovery violations in other trials. If those violations involved the same attorney, or otherwise contributed to a concern about the trustworthiness of Wormley’s llth-hour testimony, they were relevant. Unrelated discovery violations in other litigation would not, however, normally provide a proper basis for curtailing the defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense.
It should be noted that in Illinois, the sanction of preclusion is reserved for only the most extreme cases. In People v. Rayford, the Illinois Appellate Court explained:
“The exclusion of evidence is a drastic measure; and the rule in civil cases limits its application to flagrant
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or Act) generally requires employers to pay their employees for overtime work at a rate of IV2 times the employees’ regular wages. In 1985, Congress amended the FLSA to provide a limited exception to this rule for state and local governmental agencies. Under the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985 (1985 Amendments), public employers may compensate employees who work overtime with extra time off instead of overtime pay in certain circumstances. The question in this case is whether a public employer in a State that prohibits public sector collective bargaining may take advantage of that exception when its employees have designated a union representative.
Because the text of the 1985 Amendments provides the framework for our entire analysis, we quote the most relevant portion at the outset. Subsection 7(o)(2)(A) states:
“(2) A public agency may provide compensatory time [in lieu of overtime pay] only—
“(A) pursuant to—
“(i) applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, memorandum of understanding, or any other agreement between the public agency and representatives of such employees; or
“(ii) in the case of employees not covered by sub-clause (i), an agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and employee before the performance of the work----”
Petitioners are a group of employees who sought, unsuccessfully, to negotiate a collective FLSA compensatory time agreement by way of a designated representative. The narrow question dispositive here is whether petitioners are “employees not covered by subclause (i)” within the meaning of subclause (ii), so that their employer may provide compensatory time pursuant to individual agreements under the second subclause.
X
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 to establish nationwide minimum wage and maximum hours standards. Section 7 of the Act encourages compliance with maximum hours standards by providing that employees generally must be paid on a time-and-one-half basis for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week.
Amendments to the Act in 1966 and 1974 extended its coverage to most public employers, and gave rise to a series of eases questioning the power of Congress to regulate the compensation of state and local employees. Following our decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528 (1985), upholding that power, the Department of Labor (DOL) announced that it would hold public employers to the standards of the Act effective April 15, 1985.
In response to the Garcia decision and the DOL announcement, both Houses of Congress held hearings and considered legislation designed to ameliorate the burdens associated with necessary changes in public employment practices. The projected “financial costs of coming into compliance with the FLSA — particularly the overtime provisions” — were specifically identified as a matter of grave concern to many States and localities. S. Rep. No. 99-159, p. 8 (1985). The statutory provision at issue in this ease is the product of those deliberations.
In its Report recommending enactment of the 1985 Amendments, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources explained that the new subsection 7(o) would allow public employers to compensate for overtime hours with compensatory time off, or “comp time,” in lieu of overtime pay, so long as certain conditions were met: The provision of comp time must be at the premium rate of not less than IV2 hours per hour of overtime work, and must be pursuant to an agreement reached prior to performance of the work. Id., at 10-11. With respect to the nature of the necessary agreement, the issue raised in this case, the Committee stated: “Where employees have a recognized representative, the agreement or understanding must be between that representative and the employer, either through collective bargaining or through a memorandum of understanding or other type of agreement.” Id., at 10.
The House Committee on Education and Labor was in substantial agreement with the Senate Committee as to the conditions under which comp time could be made available. See H. R. Rep. No. 99-331, p. 20 (1985). On the question of subsection 7(o)’s agreement requirement, the House Committee expressed an understanding similar to the Senate Committee’s: “Where employees have selected a representative, which need not be a formal or recognized collective bargaining agent as long as it is a representative designated by the employees, the agreement or understanding must be between the representative and the employer ....” Ibid.
Where the Senate and House Committee Reports differ is in their description of the “representative” who, once designated, would require that compensatory time be provided only pursuant to an agreement between that representative and the employer. While the Senate Report refers to a “recognized” representative, the House Report states that the representative “need not be a formal or recognized collective bargaining agent.” Swpm this page. The Conference Report does not comment on this difference, see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-357 (1985), and the 1985 Amendments as finally enacted do not adopt the precise language of either Committee Report.
The issue is addressed, however, by the Secretary of Labor, in implementing regulations promulgated pursuant to express legislative direction under the 1985 Amendments. The relevant DOL regulation seems to be patterned after the House Report, providing that “the representative need not be a formal or recognized bargaining agent.” At the same time, in response to concerns expressed by the State of Missouri about the impact of the regulation in States where employee representatives have no authority to enter into enforceable agreements, the Secretary explained:
“The Department believes that the proposed rule accurately reflects the statutory requirement that a CBA [collective bargaining agreement], memorandum of understanding or other agreement be reached between the public agency and the representative of the employees where the employees have designated a representative. Where the employees do not have a representative, the agreement must be between the employer and the individual employees. The Department recognizes that there is a wide variety of State law that may be pertinent in this area. It is the Department’s intention that the question of whether employees have a representative for purposes of FLSA section 7(o) shall be determined in accordance with State or local law and practices.” 52 Fed. Reg. 2014-2015 (1987) (emphasis added).
II
Petitioner Moreau is the president of the Harris County Deputy Sheriffs Union, representing approximately 400 deputy sheriffs in this action against the county and its sheriff, respondent Klevenhagen. For several years, the union has represented Harris County deputy sheriffs in various matters, such as processing grievances and handling workers' compensation claims, but it is prohibited by Texas law from entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with the county. Accordingly, the terms and conditions of petitioners’ employment are included in individual form agreements signed by each employee. These agreements incorporate by reference the county^ regulations providing that deputies shall receive IV2 hours of compensatory time for each hour of overtime work.
Petitioners filed this action in 1986, alleging, inter alia, that the county violated the Act by paying for overtime work with comp time, rather than overtime pay, absent an agreement with their representative authorizing the substitution. Petitioners contended that they were “covered” by subclause (i) of subsection 7(o)(2)(A) by virtue of their union representation, and that the county therefore was precluded from providing comp time pursuant to individual agreements (or pre-existing practice) under subclause (ii).
The District Court disagreed and entered summary judgment for the county. The court assumed that designation of a union representative normally would establish that employees are “covered” by subelause (i), and hence render sub-clause (ii) inapplicable, but went on to hold that subelause (i) cannot apply in States, like Texas, that prohibit collective bargaining in the public sector. Merritt v. Klevenkagen, Civ. Action No. 88-1298 (SD Tex., Sept. 5, 1990), p. 5, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a-20a. Reaching the same result by an alternative route, the court also reasoned that petitioners were not “covered” by subclause (i) because their union was not “ ‘recognized’ ” by the county, a requirement it grounded in the legislative history of the 1985 Amendments. Id., at 6, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, but relied on slightly different reasoning. It seemed to agree with an Eleventh Circuit case, Dillard v. Harris, 885 F. 2d 1549 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 878 (1990), that the words “not covered” in subclause (ii) refer to the absence of an agreement rather than the absence of a representative. 956 F. 2d 516, 519-520 (CA5 1992). Under that theory, the fact that Texas law prohibits agreements between petitioners’ union and the employer means that petitioners can never be “covered” by sub-clause (i), making subelause (ii) available as an alternative vehicle for provision of comp time.
Because there is conflict among the Circuits over the scope of subelause (i)’s coverage, we granted certiorari. 506 U. S. 813 (1992).
Ill
Respondents find the language of the statute perfectly clear. In their view, subelause (ii) plainly authorizes individual agreements whenever public employees have not successfully negotiated a collective-bargaining agreement under subclause (i). Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that ambiguity in the statute itself justifies resort to its legislative history and the DOL regulations, and that these secondary sources unequivocally preclude individual comp time agreements with employees who have designated a representative. We begin our analysis with the relevant statutory text.
At least one proposition is not in dispute. Subclause (ii) authorizes individual comp time agreements only “in the case of employees not covered by subclause (i).” Our task, therefore, is to identify the class of “employees” covered by sub-clause (i). This task is complicated by the fact that sub-clause (i) does not purport to define a category of employees, as the reference in subelause (ii) suggests it would. Instead, it describes only a category of agreements — those that (a) are bargained with an employee representative, and (b) authorize the use of comp time.
Respondents read this shift in subject from “employees” in subelause (ii) to “agreement” in subclause (i) as susceptible of just one meaning: Employees are covered by subelause (i) only if they are bound by applicable provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement. Under this narrow construction, subclause (i) would not cover employees who designate a representative if that representative is unable to reach agreement with the employer, for whatever reason; such employees would remain “uncovered” and available for individual comp time agreements under subclause (ii).
We find this reading unsatisfactory. First, while the language of subclauses (i) and (ii) will bear the interpretation advanced by respondents, we cannot say that it will bear no other. Purely as a matter of grammar, subclause (ii)’s reference to “employees” remains unmodified by subclause (i)’s focus on “agreement,” and “employees . . . covered” might as easily comprehend employees with representatives as employees with agreements. See International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 2203 v. West Adams County Fire Dist., 877 F. 2d 814, 816-817, and n. 1 (CA10 1989).
Second, respondents’ reading is difficult to reconcile with the general structure of subsection 7(o). Assuming designation of an employee representative, respondents’ theory leaves it to the employer to choose whether it will proceed under subclause (i), and negotiate the terms of a collective comp time agreement with the representative, or instead proceed under subclause (ii), and deal directly with its employees on an individual basis. If the employer is free to choose the latter course (as most employers likely would), then it need only decline to negotiate with the employee representative to render subclause (i) inapplicable and authorize individual comp time agreements under subelause (ii). This permissive interpretation of subsection 7(o), however, is at odds with the limiting phrase of subelause (ii) at issue here. See supra, at 31. Had Congress intended such an open-ended authorization of the use of comp time, it surely would have said so more simply, forgoing the elaborate sub-clause structure that purports to restrict use of individual agreements to a limited class of employees. Respondents’ broad interpretation of the subsection 7(o) exception is also in some tension with the well-established rule that “exemptions from the [FLSA] are to be narrowly construed.” See, e. g., Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U. S. 290, 295-296 (1959).
At the same time, however, we find equally implausible a reading of the statutory text that would deem employees “covered” by subclause (i) whenever they select a representative, whether or not the representative has the ability to enter into the kind of agreement described in that sub-clause. If there is no possibility of reaching an agreement under subclause (i), then that subclause cannot logically be read as applicable. In other words, “employees ... covered by subclause (i)” must, at a minimum, be employees who conceivably could receive comp time pursuant to the agreement contemplated by that subclause.
The most plausible reading of the phrase “employees ... covered by subclause (i)” is, in our view, neither of the extreme alternatives described above. Rather, the phrase is most sensibly read as referring to employees who have designated a representative with the authority to negotiate and agree with their employer on “applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement” authorizing the use of comp time. This reading accords significance to both the focus on the word “agreement” in subclause (i) and the focus on “employees” in subclause (ii). It is also true to the hierarchy embodied in subsection 7(o), which favors subclause (i) agreements over individual agreements by limiting use of the latter to cases in which the former are unavailable.
This intermediate reading of the statutory text is consistent also with the DOL regulations, interpreted most reasonably. It is true that 29 CFR § 553.23(b), read in isolation, would support petitioners’ view that selection of a representative by employees — even a representative without lawful authority to bargain with the employer — is sufficient to bring the employees within the scope of subelause (i) and preclude use of subclause (ii) individual agreements. See supra, at 27, and n. 9. So interpreted, however, the regulation would prohibit entirely the use of comp time in a substantial portion of the public sector. It would also be inconsistent with the Secretary’s statement that “the question ... whether employees have a representative for purposes of FLSA section 7(o) shall be determined in accordance with State or local law and practices.” See supra, at 28. This clarification by the Secretary convinces us that when the regulations' identify selection of a representative as the condition necessary for coverage under subelause (i), they refer only to those representatives with lawful authority to negotiate agreements.
Thus, under both the statute and the DOL regulations, employees are “covered” by subclause (i) when they designate a representative who lawfully may bargain collectively on their behalf — under the statute, because such authority is necessary to reach the kind of “agreement” described in subelause (i), and under the regulation, because such authority is a condition of “representative” status for subclause (i) purposes. Because we construe the statute and regulation in harmony, we need not comment further on petitioners’ argument that the Secretary’s interpretation of the 1985 Amendments is entitled to special deference.
Petitioners in this case did not have a representative authorized by law to enter into an agreement with their employer providing for use of comp time under subclause (i). Accordingly, they were “not covered by subclause (i),” and subclause (ii) authorized the individual agreements challenged in this litigation.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
So ordered.
52 Stat. 1063, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 207(a).
The relevant portion of the 1985 Amendments, 99 Stat. 790, is codified at 29 U. S. C. §207(o). It provides:
Ҥ207. Maximum hours.
“(1) Employees of a public agency which is a State, a political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency may receive, in accordance with this subsection and in lieu of overtime compensation, compensatory time off at a rate not less than one and one-half hours for each hour of employment for which overtime compensation is required by this section.
“(2) A public agency may provide compensatory time under paragraph (1) only—
“(A) pursuant to—
“(i) applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, memorandum of understanding, or any other agreement between the public agency and representatives of such employees; or
“(ii) in the case of employees not covered by subclause (i), an agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and employee before the performance of the work; and
“(B) if the employee has not accrued compensatory time in excess of the limit applicable to the employee prescribed by paragraph (3).
“In the case of employees described in clause (A)(ii) hired prior to April 15, 1986, the regular practice in effect on April 15, 1986, with respect to compensatory time off for such employees in lieu of the receipt of overtime compensation, shall constitute an agreement or understanding under such clause (A)(ii). Except as provided in the previous sentence, the provision of compensatory time off to such employees for hours worked after April 14,1986, shall be in accordance with this subsection.”
29 U. S. C. § 207(a).
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, §§ 102(a) and (b), 80 Stat. 830, 29 U. S. C. §§ 203(d) and (r).
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, §§ 6(a)(1) and (6), 88 Stat. 58, 60, 29 U. S. C. §§ 203(d) and (x).
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968); Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528 (1985).
See S. Rep. No. 99-159, p. 7 (1985). The Department of Labor also announced that it would delay enforcement activities until October 15, 1985; that date was later extended to November 1, 1985. Ibid.
99 Stat. 790, §6, 29 U. S. C. §203.
“(b) Agreement or understanding between the public agency and a representative of the employees. (1) Where employees have a representative, the agreement or understanding concerning the use of compensatory time must be between the representative and the public agency either through a collective bargaining agreement or through a memorandum of understanding or other type of oral or written agreement. In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement applicable to the employees, the representative need not be a formal or recognized bargaining agent as long as the representative is designated by the employees. Any agreement must be consistent with the provisions of section 7(o) of the Act.” 29 CFR § 553.23(b) (1992).
As the Court of Appeals stated: “Tex. Rev. Crv. Stat. Ann. art. 5154c prohibits any political subdivision from entering into a collective bargaining agreement with a labor organization unless the political subdivision has adopted the Fire and Police Employee Relations Act. Harris County has not adopted that Act; thus, under article 5154c the County has no authority to bargain with the Union.” 956 F. 2d 516, 519 (CA5 1992). The court went on to clarify that “Texas law prohibits any bilateral agreement between a city and a bargaining agent, whether the agreement is labeled a collective bargaining agreement or something else. Under Texas law, the County could not enter into any agreement with the Union.” Id., at 520 (emphasis in original).
The District Court interpreted Texas law the same way. Merritt v. Klevenkagen, Civ. Action No. 88-1298 (SD Tex., Sept. 5, 1990), pp. 3-4, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a. Our decision is premised on the normal assumption that the Court of Appeals and the District Court have correctly construed the relevant rules of Texas law. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 346, and n. 10 (1976) (citing cases).
Merritt, Civ. Action No. 88-1298, p. 2, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a.
The District Court granted summary judgment for the county on two additional claims: that the county failed to include longevity pay in its overtime pay calculations, and that the county excluded nonmandated firearms qualification time from the calculation of number of hours worked. The Court of Appeals affirmed with respect to the former and remanded for further proceedings with respect to the latter claim. 956 F. 2d, at 520-523. Neither claim is before us today.
Respondents in this ease sought to provide comp time pursuant to both a “regular practice in effect on April 15, 1986,” for deputies hired before that date, and individual agreements, for deputies hired later. Merritt, Civ. Action No. 88-1298, p. 2, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a. Like subelause (ii) individual agreements, “regular practice” is available as an option only for employees “not covered by subelause (i).” 29 U. S. C. § 207(o)(2); n. 2, supra. Accordingly, our analysis is the same with respect to both forms of agreement, and we refer to them here collectively as individual agreements.
See, e. g., International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 2203 v. West Adams County Fire Dist., 877 F. 2d 814 (CA10 1989) (employees covered by subclause (i) upon designation of representative); Abbott v. Virginia Beach, 879 F. 2d 132 (CA4 1989) (employees covered by subclause (i) upon designation of recognized representative), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 1051 (1990); Dillard v. Harris, 885 F. 2d 1549 (CA11 1989) (employees covered by subelause (i) upon entry of agreement regarding compensatory time), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 878 (1990); Nevada Highway Patrol Assn. v. Nevada, 899 F. 2d 1549 (CA9 1990) (employees covered by subclause (i) upon designation of representative unless state law prohibits public sector collective bargaining).
For discussion of the division in the Courts of Appeals, see generally Note, The Public Sector Compensatory Time Exception to the Fair Labor Standards Act: Trying to Compensate for Congress's Lack of Clarity, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1807 (1991).
Indeed, even an employer who is party to a collective-bargaining agreement with its employees may be permitted to take advantage of subelause (ii) under respondents’ construction. Because subclause (i) describes only those agreements that authorize the use of comp time, see supra, at 31-32, a collective-bargaining agreement silent on the subject, or even one prohibiting use of comp time altogether, would not constitute a subclause (i) agreement. Accordingly, employees bound by such an agreement would not be “covered by subelause (i)” under respondents’ theory, and their employer would be free to provide comp time instead of overtime pay pursuant to individual employee agreements.
So read, we do not understand subsection 7(o) to impose any new burden upon a public employer to bargain collectively with its employees. Subsection 7(o) is, after ail, an exception to the general FLSA rule mandating overtime pay for overtime work, and employers may take advantage of the benefits it offers “only” pursuant to certain conditions set forth by Congress. 29 U. S. C. § 207(b)(2); see n. 2, supra. Once its employees designate a representative authorized to engage in collective bargaining, an employer is entitled to take advantage of those benefits if it reaches a comp time agreement with the representative. It is also free, of course, to forgo collective bargaining altogether; if it so chooses, it remains in precisely the same position as any other employer subject to the overtime pay provisions of the FLSA.
Accordingly, public employers need not fear that they will find themselves dealing with a different representative for each employee, should each of their employees choose to seleet his or her own representative. See Brief for the National Association of Counties et al. as Amici Curiae 17. Unless such individual designations were “in accordance with State or local law and practices,” the designees would not be “representatives” for purposes of subclause (i).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether a municipal ordinance requiring advance notice to be given to the local police department by “[a]ny person desiring to canvass, solicit or call from house to house ... for a recognized charitable cause . . . or . . . political campaign or cause ... in writing, for identification only” violates the guarantees of freedom of speech and due process of law embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.
(1)
The Borough of Oradell, N. J., has enacted two ordinances that together regulate most forms of door-to-door canvassing and solicitation. A broad ordinance, No. 573, requires all solicitors to obtain a permit from the borough clerk, by making a formal application, accompanied by a description and photograph of the applicant, the description and license number of any automobile to be used in soliciting, a driver’s license, and other data. The ordinance apparently requires that the chief of police approve issuance of the permit.
The ordinance at issue here, Ordinance No. 598A, is an amendment to this broader scheme, and imposes no permit requirement; it covers persons soliciting for “a recognized charitable cause, or any person desiring to canvass, solicit or call from house, to house for a Federal, State, County or Municipal political campaign or cause.” Ordinance No. 598A also applies to “representatives of Borough Civic Groups and Organizations and any veterans honorably discharged or released under honorable circumstances” from the Armed Forces. Those covered by this ordinance are required only to “notify the Police Department, in writing, for identification only.” Once given, the notice is “good for the duration of the campaign or cause.”
Appellants are Edward Hynes, a New Jersey state assemblyman whose district was redrawn in 1973 to include the Borough of Oradell, and three Oradell registered voters. They brought suit in the Superior Court of Bergen County, N. J., seeking a declaration that Ordinance No. 598A was unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. Appellant Hynes alleged that he wished to campaign for re-election in Oradell. The other appellants alleged either that they wished to canvass door to door in the borough for political causes or that they wished to speak with candidates who campaigned in Oradell. Each appellant claimed that the ordinance would unconstitutionally restrict such activity.
The Superior Court held the ordinance invalid for three reasons. First, the court noted that it contained no penalty clause, and hence was unenforceable under New Jersey law; second, the court held that the ordinance was not related to its announced purpose — the prevention of crime — since it required only candidates and canvassers to register. Finally, the court concluded that the ordinance was vague and overbroad — unclear “as to what is, and what isn’t required” of those who wished to canvass for political causes. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court affirmed, reaching and accepting only the first ground for the trial court’s decision.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed. 66 N. J. 376, 331 A. 2d 277 (1975). It noted that a penalty clause, enacted during the pendency of the appeal, cured the defect that had concerned the Appellate Division. Relying largely on a decision in a case dealing with a similar ordinance, Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N. J. 350, 331 A. 2d 262 (1975), appeal docketed, No. 74-1335, the court held that Ordinance No. 598A was a legitimate exercise of the borough’s police power, enacted to prevent crime and to reduce residents’ fears about strangers wandering door to door. The ordinance regulated conduct— door-to-door canvassing — as well as speech, and in doing so “it could hardly be more clear.” 66 N. J., at 380, 331 A. 2d, at 279. The ordinance, the court thought, imposed minimal requirements which did not offend free speech interests:
“It may be satisfied in writing, suggesting that resort may be had to the mails. It need be fulfilled only once for each campaign. There is no fee. The applicant does not have to obtain or carry a card or license. And perhaps most importantly, no discretion reposes in any municipal official to deny the privilege of calling door to door. The ordinance is plainly an identification device in its most basic form.” Ibid.
Two of the court’s seven members dissented. One justice thought the ordinance “plain silly” as a crime-prevention measure, for the reasons given by the trial court. Id., at 382, 331 A. 2d, at 280; another justice thought that the “ordinance has the potential to have a significant chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment rights and thus infringes on these rights.” Id., at 389, 331 A. 2d, at 284.
(2)
We are not without guideposts in considering appellants’ First Amendment challenge to Ordinance No. 598A. “Adjustment of the inevitable conflict between free speech and other interests is a problem as persistent as it is perplexing,” Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 275 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result), and this Court has in several cases reviewed attempts by municipalities to regulate activities like canvassing and soliciting. Regulation in this area “must be done, and the restriction applied, in such a manner as not to intrude upon the rights of free speech and free assembly,” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 540-541 (1945). But in these very cases the Court has consistently recognized a municipality’s power to protect its citizens from crime and undue annoyance by regulating soliciting and canvassing. A narrowly drawn ordinance, that does not vest in municipal officials the undefined power to determine what messages residents will hear, may serve these important interests without running afoul of the First Amendment.
In Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938), the Court held invalid an ordinance that prohibited the distribution of “literature of any kind . . . without first obtaining written permission from the City Manager,” id., at 447. The ordinance contained “no restriction in its application with respect to time or place,” and was “not limited to ways which might be regarded as inconsistent with the maintenance of public order or as involving disorderly conduct, the molestation of the inhabitants, or the misuse or littering of the streets.” Id., at 451.
A year later, in Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939), the Court held unconstitutional an Irvington, N. J., ordinance that dealt specifically with house-to-house canvassers and solicitors. The ordinance required them to obtain a permit, which would not issue if the chief of police decided that “the canvasser is not of good character or is canvassing for a project not free from fraud.” Id., at 158. Because the Court concluded that the canvasser’s “liberty to communicate with the residents of the town at their homes depends upon the exercise of the officer’s discretion,” id., at 164, the Court held the ordinance invalid. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), the Court held that a similar permit ordinance, as applied to prevent Jehovah’s Witnesses from soliciting door to door, infringed upon the right to free exercise of religion, guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. And in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943), the Court struck down a municipal ordinance that made it a crime for a solicitor or canvasser to knock on the front door of a resident’s home or ring the doorbell. See also Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313 (1958).
In reaching these results, the Court acknowledged the valid and important interests these ordinances sought to serve. In Martin, supra, at 144, Mr. Justice Black writing for the Court stated:
“Ordinances of the sort now before us may be aimed at the protection of the householders from annoyance, including intrusion upon the hours of rest, and at the prevention of crime. Constant callers, whether selling pots or distributing leaflets, may lessen the peaceful enjoyment of a home as much as a neighborhood glue factory or railroad yard which zoning ordinances may prohibit. . . . In addition, burglars frequently pose as canvassers, either in order that they may have a pretense to discover whether a house is empty and hence ripe for burglary, or for the purpose of spying out the premises in order that they may return later. Crime prevention may thus be the purpose of regulatory ordinances.”
As Mr. Justice Black suggested, the lone housewife has no way of knowing whether the purposes of the putative solicitor are benign or malignant, and even an innocuous caller “may lessen the peaceful enjoyment of a home.” Ibid. In his view a municipality “can by identification devices” regulate canvassers in order to deter criminal conduct by persons “posing as canvassers,” id., at 148, relying on. the Court’s statement in Cantwell, supra, at 306:
“Without doubt a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent.”
These opinions of the Court and the dissenting opinions found common ground as to the important municipal interests at stake. See Martin v. Struthers, supra, at 152 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id., at 154 (Reed, J., dissenting); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 166 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting in Martin v. Struthers). Professor Zechariah Chafee articulated something of the householder's right to be let alone, saying:
“Of all the methods of spreading unpopular ideas, [house-to-house canvassing] seems the least entitled to extensive protection. The possibilities of persuasion are slight compared with the certainties of annoyance. Great as is the value of exposing citizens to novel views, home is one place where a man ought to be able to shut himself up in his own ideas if he desires.” Free Speech in the United States 406 (1954).
Professor Chafee went on to note: “[These cases] do not invalidate all ordinances that include within their scope . . . doorway dissemination of thought. Several sentences in the opinions state that ordinances suitably designed to take care of legitimate social interests are not void.” Id., at 407.
There is, of course, no absolute right under the Federal Constitution to enter on the private premises of another and knock on a door for any purpose, and the police power permits reasonable regulation for public safety. We cannot say, and indeed appellants do not argue, that door-to-door canvassing and solicitation are immune from regulation under the State’s police power, whether the purpose of the regulation is to protect from danger or to protect the peaceful enjoyment of the home. See Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 735-738 (1970).
(3)
There remains the question whether the challenged ordinance meets the test that in the First Amendment area “government may regulate . . . only with narrow specificity.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963). As a matter of due process, “[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.” Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939). The general test of vagueness applies with particular force in review of laws dealing with speech. “[S] tricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.” Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 151 (1959). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 76-82 (1976); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 611-612 (1973).
Notwithstanding the undoubted power of a municipality to enforce reasonable regulations to meet the needs recognized by the Court in the cases discussed, we conclude that Ordinance No. 598A must fall because in certain respects “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.” Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926). Since we conclude that the ordinance is invalid because of vagueness, we need not reach the other arguments appellants advance.
First, the coverage of the ordinance is unclear; it does not explain, for example, whether a “recognized charitable cause” means one recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as tax exempt, one recognized by some community agency, or one approved by some municipal official. While it is fairly clear what the phrase “political campaign” comprehends, it is not clear what is meant by a “Federal, State, County or Municipal... cause.” Finally, it is not clear what groups fall into the class of “Borough Civic Groups and Organizations” that the ordinance also covers.
Second, the ordinance does not sufficiently specify what those within its reach must do in order to comply. The citizen is informed that before soliciting he must “notify the Police Department, in writing, for identification only.” But he is not told what must be set forth in the notice, or what the police will consider sufficient as “identification.” This is in marked contrast to Ordinance No. 573 which sets out specifically what is required of commercial solicitors; it is not clear that the provisions of Ordinance 573 extend to Ordinance 598A. See n. 1, supra. Ordinance No. 598A does not have comparable precision. The New Jersey Supreme Court construed the ordinance to permit one to send the required identification by mail; a canvasser who used the mail might well find — too late — that the identification he provided by mail was inadequate. In this respect, as well as with respect to the coverage of the ordinance, this law “may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108 (1972). Nor does the ordinance “provide explicit standards for those who apply” it. Ibid. To the extent that these ambiguities and the failure to explain what “identification” is required give police the effective power to grant or deny permission to canvass for political causes, the ordinance suffers in its practical effect from the vice condemned in Lovell, Schneider, Cantwell, and Staub. See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 614 (1971); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 75-85 (1960).
The New Jersey Supreme Court undertook to give the ordinance a limiting construction by suggesting that since the identification requirement “may be satisfied in writing, . . . resort may be had to the mails,” 66 N. J., at 380, 331 A. 2d, at 279, but this construction of the ordinance does not explain either what the law covers or what it requires; for example, it provides no clue as to what is a “recognized charity”; nor is political “cause” defined. Cf. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, 110-111 (1972); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941). Even assuming that a more explicit limiting interpretation of the ordinance could remedy the flaws we have pointed out— a matter on which we intimate no view — we are without power to remedy the defects by giving the ordinance constitutionally precise content. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 575 (1974).
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of New Jersey for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Ordinance No. 573 provides in relevant part:
“Section 1. Permit Required
“No person shall canvass or solicit or call from house to house in the Borough to sell or attempt to sell goods by sample or to take or attempt to take orders for the future delivery of goods, merchandise, wares, or any personal property of any nature whatsoever, or take or attempt to take orders for services to be furnished or performed in the future, without first having received a written permit therefor.
“Sections. Application for Permit: Contents Thereof
“a) Any person desiring a permit to canvass or solicit in the Borough shall file, on a form to be supplied by the Borough Clerk, an application with the Borough Clerk stating:
"(1) Name of applicant;
“(2) Permanent home address;
"(3) Name and address of employer or firm represented;
"(4) Place or places of residence of the applicant for the preceding three years;
“(5) Date on which he desires to commence canvassing or soliciting;
“(6) Nature of merchandise to be sold or offered for sale or the nature of the services to be furnished;
“(7) Whether or not the applicant has ever been convicted of a crime, misdemeanor, or violation of any ordinance concerning canvassing or soliciting, and if so, when, where and the nature of the offense;
“(8) Names of other communities in New Jersey in which applicant has worked as a solicitor or canvasser in the past 2 years.
“b) Said application shall also be accompanied by a letter or other written statement from the individual, firm or corporation employing the applicant, certifying that the applicant is authorized to act as the employer’s representative.
“c) No such application shall be filed more than 3 months prior to the time such canvassing or soliciting shall commence.
“Section 4- Investigation: Issuance of Permit
“The Borough Clerk shall give a copy of the application to the Chief of Police who shall cause such investigation to be made of the applicant’s business and moral character as he deems necessary for the protection of the public good. He shall use any information available in other New Jersey cities, towns or boroughs, where the applicant has canvassed or solicited within 2 years last past.
“Section 6. Penalty
“Any person, firm or corporation violating any provision of this ordinance shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in an amount not exceeding $500.00 or be imprisoned in the County Jail for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days, or be both fined and imprisoned. Each day said violation is permitted or is permitted to continue, shall constitute a separate offense and shall be subject to a penalty hereunder.”
In Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N. J. 350, 331 A. 2d 262 (1975), appeal docketed, No. 74-1335, decided the same day as the ease reviewed here, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an ordinance quite similar to Ordinance No. 573 was invalid insofar as it vested in the chief of police too much discretion in deciding whether or not to grant a canvassing permit. The court in Collingswood accordingly struck that provision of the ordinance, but let the remainder stand.
Ordinance No. 598A provides in relevant part:
“Whereas, The Borough of Oradell is primarily a one family residential town whose citizens are employed elsewhere, resulting in the wives of the wage earner being left alone during the day; and
“Whereas, because of the geographical location of most of the homes it is impossible to police all areas at the same time, resulting in a number of break and entries and larceny in the home; and
“Whereas, it is in the public interest and the public safety that persons not be permitted to call from house to house on the pretext of soliciting votes for a designated candidate or signatures for a nominating petition, or to solicit for a recognized charitable cause or borough activity, without such persons being first identified by the Police Department; and
“Whereas, the Mayor and Borough Council of The Borough of Oradell feel that it is in the public interest and for the protection of The Borough of Oradell that such persons be required to notify the Police Department for the purpose of identification.
“Now, therefore, be it ordained by the Borough Council of The Borough of Oradell, in the County of Bergen and State of New Jersey, that an ordinance entitled ‘An ordinance to regulate and prohibit canvassing and soliciting in The Borough of Oradell and establish fees and provide penalties for the violation thereof be amended and supplemented as follows:
“(1) That Section 1 be amended and supplemented by the addition of Section 1 (a) to be entitled ‘Exceptions to Permit' as hereinafter set forth:
“Section 1 (a): Exceptions to Permit
“Any person desiring to canvass, solicit or call from house to house in the Borough for a recognized charitable cause, or any person desiring to canvass, solicit or call from house to house for a Federal, State, County or Municipal political campaign or cause, shall be required to notify the Police Department, in writing, for identification only. Said notification shall be good for the duration of the campaign or cause. The provisions of this section shall also apply to representatives of Borough Civic Groups and Organizations and any veterans honorably discharged or released under honorable circumstances from active service in any branch of the Armed Forces of the United States. All other Sections of Ordinance No. 573, with the exception of the penalty clause designated as Section 7 [sic], shall not be applicable to such persons or groups as designated herein.
“(2) All ordinances or parts of ordinances inconsistent with this ordinance are hereby repealed."
The trial court’s opinion in this regard appears to ignore the provisions of Ordinance No. 573, which covers other forms of door-to-door solicitation, and to which Ordinance No. 598A is an amendment.
Appellants also argue that the ordinance bears no rational relationship to its announced purpose of crime prevention, that it is overbroad because it covers Oradell residents casually soliciting the votes of neighbors, and that it violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by infringing on the right to meet and discuss national candidates. We intimate no view as to these contentions.
The flaw we find in this ordinance is vagueness, not the over-breadth at issue in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973), on which the dissent relies. Several appellants alleged that their right to receive information would be infringed because persons canvassing for political causes would be uncertain whether the ordinance covered them. In the circumstances of this case these allegations are enough to put in issue the precision or lack of precision with which the ordinance defines the categories of “causes” it covers.
The agency charged with enforcement, the police department, has not adopted any regulations that would give more precise meaning to the ordinance — if indeed it has the legal power to do so. Cf. Broadrick, 413 U. S., at 616-617; CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 575 (1973); Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 162-163 (1971). The chief of police suggested in an affidavit that neither a photograph nor fingerprints are required, and that the canvasser must simply “let us know who he is.” To the extent that this explanation adds any specificity to the ordinance, it does not purport to be binding on the enforcement authorities. Cf. ibid. Nor has the ordinance a history of “less formalized custom and usage” that might remedy the vagueness problems. Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 754 (1974).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Petition for rehearing denied.
Former decision, 559 U.S. 43, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1003, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 1037.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Employers’ Liability Act provides that every common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce shall be liable in damages for the injury or death of its employees resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of the railroad or its agents or resulting from defects in its equipment due to its negligence. The question in this case is whether the respondent Pacific Fruit Express Company is a “common carrier by railroad.”
The respondent is the largest company of its kind in the United States. It owns, maintains, and leases refrigerator cars to railroads to transport perishable products in commerce. Because it repairs its own cars, it also owns buildings, plants, switching tracks, and equipment to make these repairs. While the railroads to which its cars are leased transport them as directed, the respondent Express Company reserves the right to have the cars diverted to carry out its own business plans. The petitioner Edwards works as an iceman at one of respondent’s repair and concentration plants. His duties are to transport ice and help store it in cars for carriage by the railroads. While driving a company motor vehicle in the performance of his duty as an employee for respondent, he was thrown violently to the ground, covered with burning gasoline and severely burned. He later brought this action against respondent, charging it was a “common carrier by railroad” and liable for damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Contending that it was not a railroad within the meaning of the Act, respondent company moved for a summary judgment which the District Court granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 378 F. 2d 54, and we granted cer-tiorari. 389 U. S. 912. We agree with both courts and affirm.
In conducting its business of providing and servicing insulated railroad cars for the carriage of perishable commodities, it is undoubtedly true that respondent performs some railroad functions. For example, it maintains and takes care of railroad cars which are leased to railroads for transportation in interstate commerce. It services these cars while in transit and controls their eventual destination. And respondent has yards and facilities for the repair and storage of its refrigerator cars. The question is whether such functions as these are sufficient to constitute respondent a “common carrier by railroad.” For the answer to this question we must look to past judicial decisions interpreting the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and also the legislative history surrounding the Act.
This Court has held that the words “common carrier by railroad” mean “one who operates a railroad as a means of carrying for the public, — that is to say, a railroad company acting as a common carrier. This view not only is in accord with the ordinary acceptation of the words, but is enforced by the mention of cars, engines, track, roadbed and other property pertaining to a going railroad . . . .” Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 187-188. (Emphasis added.) This interpretation of the Act with its references to “operat[ing] a railroad” and a “going railroad” would indicate that the business of renting refrigerator cars to railroads or shippers and providing protective service in the transportation of perishable commodities is not of itself that of a “common carrier by railroad.” And indeed the Wells Fargo decision held that express companies were not within the coverage of the Act. In an even earlier case, Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 237 U. S. 84, this Court held that a Pullman car porter was not an employee of a railroad, hence, not within the coverage of the Act. These decisions are based on the rationale that there exist a number of activities and facilities which, while used in conjunction with railroads and closely related to railroading, are yet not railroading itself. In fact, this Court pointed out in the Robinson case, in discussing the coverage of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, that, “It was well known that there were on interstate trains persons engaged in various services for other masters. Congress, familiar with this situation, did not use any appropriate expression which could be taken to indicate a purpose to include such persons among those to whom the railroad company was to be liable under the Act.” 237 U. S., at 94.
In 1939 Congress substantially amended the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Because of such decisions as Wells Fargo, supra, and Robinson, supra, one of the proposed amendments would have changed the coverage language of § 1 of the Act to read as follows: “Every common carrier by railroad, including every express company, freight forwarding company, and sleeping-car company, engaged in commerce . . . .” Obviously the proposal was designed to nullify this Court’s construction of the Act which had excluded employees of sleeping-car companies and express companies. In committee the proposal received little support and was even opposed by certain segments of organized labor, and it failed to pass. By refusing to broaden the meaning of railroads, Congress declined to extend the coverage of the Act to activities and facilities intimately associated with the business of common carrier by railroad.
Equally significant is the fact that in the years immediately preceding the 1939 amendment to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, Congress had enacted other major labor and social transportation legislation in which refrigerator car companies were expressly included. For example, in the decade of the 1930’s Congress passed the following Acts which specifically extend coverage to “any company . . . which operates any equipment or facilities or performs any service ... in connection with . . . refrigeration or icing ... of property transported by railroad . . (1) An amendment to the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U. S. C. § 151. The Act as originally passed, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), did not specifically include refrigerator car companies. Congress amended it to do so. (2) The Railroad Retirement Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1283, held unconstitutional in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935). (3) The Railroad Retirement Act (1935), 49 Stat. 967, and (4) The Carriers’ Taxing Act, 49 Stat. 974 (1935), both of which were passed to overcome the constitutional objection to the Act of 1934. (5) The Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 307, 45 U. S. C. § 228a et seq. (1937). (6) The Carriers’ Taxing Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 435. (7) The Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 52 Stat. 1094, 45 U. S. C. § 351 et seq. (1938). Yet in 1939, when it came to the amendment of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, Congress made no mention of refrigerator car companies.
In light of this history it is not surprising that there are only four reported cases where suits have been filed alleging that refrigerator car companies like respondent are covered by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act— all refusing to hold liability under the Act. The first was Gaulden v. Southern Pacific Co., 174 F. 2d 1022 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1949), where suit was brought by an iceman employed by the very refrigerator car company involved here. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s opinion (78 F. Supp. 651) holding that such a refrigerator car company was not a “common carrier by railroad.” In a subsequent case the Third Circuit, citing the Gaulden opinion, held that another refrigerator car company “which conducted a business similar in all critical aspects to that of” Pacific Fruit Express Company, was not a “common carrier by railroad.” Hetman v. Fruit Growers Express Co., 346 F. 2d 947 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1965). There have also been two state cases involving this very respondent which denied liability. In both Aguirre v. Southern Pacific Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 636, 43 Cal. Rptr. 73, and Moleton v. Union Pac. R. Co., 118 Utah 107, 219 P. 2d 1080, cert. denied, 340 U. S. 932, the courts concluded that respondent was not a “common' carrier by railroad.”
Thus, for 60 years the Federal Employers’ Liability Act has been administered with the understanding that refrigerator car companies are not included within the terms of the Act. During that time injured employees have been taken care of under state compensation laws. In fact the petitioner here has already drawn more than $6,000 under the California compensation law. The question of whether employees shall rely on state compensation or on the Federal Employers’ Liability Act is a pure question of legislative policy, concerning which apparently even the labor organizations most interested have been divided. Under these circumstances we do not think this Court should depart from 60 years of history to do what is a job for Congress.
Affirmed.
35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 51.
Express companies were again excluded in the subsequent case of Jones v. New York Cent. R. Co., 182 F. 2d 326 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1950), relying on the Wells Fargo decision.
S. 1708, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
Hearings before Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Amending the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 57, 58 (1939).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent, a federal officer, was charged in Arizona with the commission of a state crime. On the officer’s motion, the case was removed from state court and tried in federal court. The issue presented is whether a federal appellate court has jurisdiction to entertain Arizona’s appeal from the District Court’s judgment of acquittal entered after a jury verdict of guilty.
I
A
Respondent William Dale Manypenny had been employed for six years as a Border Patrol Agent in the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). On the moonlit evening of March 15, 1976, he and fellow Agent Gerald Wayne Hjelle were assigned to patrol the Sweetwater Pass, located on federal land in Pima County, Ariz., approximately 10 miles from the Mexican border. INS officials knew that the Pass was frequently traveled by aliens illegally entering the United States. While patrolling the Pass, respondent and his colleague were expected to stop and question any person suspected of being an alien and to arrest that person if he could not produce a lawful entry permit. Both agents wore plain clothes, as was customary for patrol work in that rugged desert area. Tr. 248-249, 293.
Three Mexican males were traveling north along the trail when respondent’s electronic sensor system signaled their approach. Following standard procedure, Agent Hjelle stationed himself near where the path emerged from the canyon onto higher ground. Respondent took a position some 100 yards to the south, on a bluff overlooking but out of sight of the path. The plan called for Hjelle to stop any suspected illegal alien, identify himself, and conduct a brief inquiry to determine the suspect’s status, while respondent approached from behind.
The three men emerged from the canyon and saw Hjelle, who ordered them to stop. Id., at 16-17, 283-284. Before Hjelle could begin his questioning, one of the men turned and ran back south toward the border. Respondent shouted after him to halt. Id., at 174. When the fleeing man failed to stop, respondent fired three shotgun blasts in his direction. One hit the fugitive in the buttocks, causing multiple wounds. Id., at 105-106. Another struck him in the upper spine, severing the cord and leaving him a quadriplegic. Id., at 87-88, 93.
B
Respondent was indicted in the Superior Court of Pima County, Ariz., for assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-249 A and B (Supp. 1973). Because the charge arose from an act committed while on duty for the INS, respondent, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1442 (a)(1), removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The case was tried before a jury, and a verdict of guilty was returned. Respondent then timely moved for arrest of judgment or, alternatively, for a new trial. See Fed. Rules Grim. Proc. 33 and 34. The District Court granted respondent’s motion to arrest judgment and dismissed the indictment; it did so on the ground that the State could not assert its criminal jurisdiction over federal lands. 7 Record 7-8. The State immediately moved for reconsideration; the District Court also granted the State’s motion and took the matter under advisement. App. 36-38.
Nine months later, the District Court vacated its previous order arresting judgment. 445 F. Supp. 1123 (1977). The court on reconsideration held that Arizona retained criminal jurisdiction over all land within its exterior boundaries. Having determined that it properly could exercise jurisdiction over Arizona’s claim, the District Court then proceeded sua sponte to construe respondent’s motion under Rule 34 as a motion for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (c). Although an immunity defense had not been raised at trial, and the State had not introduced any evidence designed to overcome that defense, the court concluded that it had erred in failing to instruct the jury on such a defense. Relying on principles enunciated in In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 75 (1890), and Clifton v. Cox, 549 F. 2d 722 (CA9 1977), the District Court reasoned that respondent would be immune from prosecution on a state criminal charge if he acted under color of federal law and in the honest belief that his actions were necessary and proper for the execution of his federal duties. 445 P. Supp., at 1126-1127. The court applied this standard to the evidence adduced at trial, and concluded that a reasonable jury could not have found respondent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 1128. The presumed motion for acquittal was granted and the jury verdict was set aside.
Claiming that the trial court had exceeded its authority, the State filed a timely notice of appeal from the acquittal. It invoked the appellate court’s jurisdiction under 18 II. S. C. § 3731. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by a brief per curiam opinion citing Sanabria v. United States, 437 U. S. 54 (1978), initially dismissed the appeal on double jeopardy grounds. Upon timely petition for rehearing, however, the Court of Appeals withdrew the opinion, App. to Pet. for Cert, 1a, and substituted another in its place. This time, by a divided vote, the court dismissed Arizona’s appeal on the ground that jurisdiction was lacking. 608 F. 2d 1197 (1979). It noted that under settled precedent of this Court, the Government may take an appeal from an adverse decision in a criminal case only if expressly authorized by statute to do so. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 568 (1977); United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 336 (1975); United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 312, 318-323 (1892). Emphasizing the language of 18 U. S. C. § 3731, the court held that the statute authorizes an appeal only when the United States is the prosecutor, not when a state prosecution has been removed to federal court.
The Court of Appeals declined to consider whether state law provided Arizona with a right to appeal in this case. Instead, the court reasoned that a criminal proceeding removed to federal court under 28 U. S. C. § 1442 (a)(1) arises under federal law, and accordingly is to be controlled by that law rather than state law. The court concluded that “only Congress can authorize an appeal by a state in a § 1442 (a)(1) criminal prosecution,” and Congress had not done so. 608 F. 2d, at 1200.- The Court of Appeals also rejected the suggestion that the general appeals statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1291, provided authorization for Arizona's appeal. 608 F. 2d, at 1199, n. 3.
The dissenting judge discerned separate bases for appellate jurisdiction in 18 U. S. C. § 3731 and 28 U. S. C. § 1291. 608 F. 2d, at 1200-1202.
We granted certiorari in order to resolve a problem of appellate jurisdiction created by the federal removal statute. 445 U. S. 960 (1980). Because it is an issue that carries significance for federal-state relations, we pay close attention to both state and federal law bearing on its resolution.
II
We begin by noting that had respondent’s trial occurred in state rather than federal court, Arizona’s statutes, as construed and applied by the courts of that State, would enable the State to obtain the appellate review it seeks. Under Arizona law, the prosecution is authorized to seek review, by certiorari, when its claim is that the lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has abused its discretion. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2001 (1956). The State’s petition for review has been routinely granted in numerous instances exactly like this case, where the prosecution seeks review of a judgment of acquittal following a guilty verdict. See, e. g., State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court (Clifton, Real Party in Interest), 128 Ariz. 216, 624 P. 2d 1264 (1981); State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court (Moya, Real Party in Interest), 124 Ariz. 560, 606 P. 2d 411 (1980); State ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 123, 538 P. 2d 397 (1975). See also State v. Allen, 27 Ariz. App. 577, 557 P. 2d 176 (1976); State v. Lopez, 26 Ariz. App. 559, 550 P. 2d 113 (1976); State v. Gradillas, 25 Ariz. App. 510, 512, 544 P. 2d 1111, 1113 (1976).
Thus, the sole question posed here is whether respondent’s removal of the state prosecution to federal court for trial alters, the nature of the State’s otherwise well-established right, under state law, to seek review of the instant judgment of acquittal. We consider this question first by reviewing the legal effect of and the policies served by removal for trial under § 1442 (a)(1). We then examine respondent’s argument that the federal law governing federal appellate jurisdiction not only does not permit but also, in fact, bars the State’s criminal appeal in federal court.
A
The Court of Appeals concluded that the fact of removal substantially alters the State’s right to seek review. Reasoning that a case brought pursuant to § 1442 (a)(1) arises under federal law, the court held that state enabling statutes retain no significance. But a state criminal proceeding against a federal officer that is removed to federal court does not “arise under federal law” in this pre-empting sense. Rather, the federal court conducts the trial under federal rules of procedure while applying the criminal law of the State. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 271-272 (1880). See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 54(b)(1), Advisory Committee Notes, 18 U. S. C. App., pp. 1480-1481.
This principle is entirely consistent with the purpose underlying the removal of proceedings commenced in state court against a federal officer. Historically, removal under § 1442 (a)(1) and its predecessor statutes was meant to ensure a federal forum in any case where a federal official is entitled to raise a defense arising out of his official duties. The act of removal permits a trial upon the merits of the state-law question free from local interests or prejudice. See Colorado v. Symes, 286 U. S. 610, 617-518 (1932); Maryland v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9, 32 (1926). It also enables the defendant to have the validity of his immunity defense adjudicated in a federal forum. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U. S. 402, 407 (1969). For these reasons, this Court has held that the right of removal is absolute for conduct performed under color of federal office, and has insisted that the policy favoring removal “should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging interpretation of § 1442 (a)(1).” Ibid.
“[The Federal Government] can act only through its officers and agents, and they must act within the States. If, when thus acting, and within the scope of their authority, those officers can be arrested and brought to trial in a State court, for an alleged offense against the law of the State, yet warranted by the Federal authority they possess, and if the general government is powerless to interfere at once for their protection, — if their protection must be left to the action of the State court, — the operations of the general government may at any time be arrested at the will of one of its members.” Id., at 263.
At the same time, the invocation of removal jurisdiction by a federal officer does not revise or alter the underlying law to be applied. In this respect, it is a purely derivative form of jurisdiction, neither enlarging nor contracting the rights of the parties. Federal involvement is necessary in order to insure a federal forum, but it is limited to assuring that an impartial setting is provided in which the federal defense of immunity can be considered during prosecution under state law. Thus, while giving full effect to the purpose of removal, this Court retains the highest regard for a State's right to make and enforce its own criminal laws. Colorado v. Symes, 286 II S., at 517-618.
Under our federal system, “[i]t goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government.” Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 201 (1977). Because the regulation of crime is pre-eminently a matter for the States, we have identified “a strong judicial policy against federal interference with state criminal proceedings.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592, 600 (1975). A State's interest in enforcing its criminal laws merits comparable judicial respect when pursued in the federal courts. Cf. Colorado v. Symes, 286 U. S., at 518.
Respondent here, by obtaining a federal forum, has fully vindicated the federal policies supporting removal. The plainest evidence of this vindication is the District Court's application of the immunity defense. No further purpose of the removal statute would be served by denying the State a right to seek review when that very right is available under applicable state law. On the contrary, it would be anomalous to conclude that the State’s appellate rights were diminished solely because of the removal. The statutory goal of ensuring fair and impartial adjudication is not advanced when the State in effect can be penalized by the defendant's decision to remove a criminal prosecution. Absent any indication that the removal statute was intended to derogate from the State’s interest in evenhanded enforcement of its laws, we see no justification for providing an unintended benefit to a defendant who happens to be a federal officer.
B
Although the purposes of the removal statute do not support denial of a State’s customary right to seek appellate review, we do not suggest that this alone establishes the State’s right to appeal in federal court. Authorization to seek review under Arizona law is not a grant of federal appellate jurisdiction. Nor, when added to the conclusion that removal itself fails to diminish Arizona’s appellate rights, does this authorization amount to a grant of equivalent federal jurisdiction at the appellate level. Because the criminal removal statute does not confer federal appellate jurisdiction, some independent federal basis is required if a State is to perfect its appeal. Petitioner contends in part that such authorization derives from 28 U. S. C. § 1291, the general statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction. Brief for Petitioner 49-58. Respondent argues, however, that § 1291 cannot support Arizona’s appeal because it has been found inadequate, standing alone, to support a criminal appeal by the Federal Government. Brief for Respondent 32-40. This argument deserves close attention, for it draws on the important tradition disfavoring criminal appeals by the sovereign.
Under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, any litigant armed with a final judgment from a lower federal court is entitled to take an appeal. By its terms, the statute addresses neither the identity of particular parties nor the nature of the prior legal proceedings. But while it is settled that a civil appeal, or an appeal by the defendant in a criminal case, may be taken from any final decision of a District Court, this Court has observed on. prior occasions that, “ 'in the federal jurisprudence, at least, appeals by the Government in criminal cases are something unusual, exceptional, not favored.’ ” Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 96 (1967), quoting from Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, 400 (1957). This federal policy has deep roots in the common law, for it was generally understood, at least in this country, that the sovereign had no right to appeal an adverse criminal judgment unless expressly authorized by statute to do so. Accordingly, from the early days of the Republic, most state courts refused to consider appeals by prosecutors who lacked the requisite statutory authority,
Both prudential and constitutional interests contributed to this tradition. The need to restrict appeals by the prosecutor reflected a prudential concern that individuals should be free from the harassment and vexation of unbounded litigation by the sovereign. See, e. g., State v. Jones, 7 Ga. 422, 425-426 (1849); People v. Corning, 2 N. Y. 9, 16 (1848). This concern also underlies the constitutional ban against double jeopardy, which bars an appeal by the prosecutor following a jury verdict of acquittal. See, e. g., People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467, 476-480 (1869); State v. Burris, 3 Tex. 118 (1848) ; State v. Hand, 6 Ark. 169, 171 (1845). See also Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 16 (1978); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141, 143 (1962). See generally United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, 129-130 (1980). In general, both concerns translate into the presumption that the prosecution lacks appellate authority absent express legislative authorization to the contrary.
This presumption was first announced as a rule of federal law in United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (1892). There, the Court held that no appellate right by the Federal Government exists in the absence of express enabling legislation from Congress. The Court also concluded that the general grant of appellate jurisdiction contained in the Judiciary Act of 1891 did not satisfy this requirement. In subsequent decisions, the Court has reaffirmed that the Federal Government enjoys no inherent right to appeal a criminal judgment, and that the grant of general appellate jurisdiction, now contained in 28 U. S. C. § 1291, does not authorize such a federal appeal. DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S. 121, 130 (1962); Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, 400-403 (1957). See Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 96-97 (1967); United States v. Burroughs, 289 U. S. 159, 161 (1933).
Respondent contends that Sanges and its progeny must be read to foreclose a criminal appeal in federal court by any governmental entity unless the appellate right derives from an express federal statute. We do not believe that Sanges is to be so broadly construed. Sanges holds simply that the federal sovereign may not subject one of its citizens to continued federal prosecution in its own courts where it has not been expressly permitted to do so under federal law. 144 U. S., at 323. Our continuing refusal to assume that the United States possesses any inherent right to appeal reflects an abiding concern to check the Federal Government’s possible misuse of its enormous prosecutorial powers. By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice when extending to the Executive a right to expand criminal prosecutions, Sanges and its subsequent applications have placed the responsibility for such assertions of authority over citizens in the democratically elected Legislature where it belongs. Congress has properly assumed this responsibility by first defining, and then broadening and clarifying, the Federal Government’s right to appeal an adverse criminal judgment.
The concern to restrict prosecuting authority to express congressional grants, however, does not justify a requirement of express authorization by Congress when the sovereign seeking to appeal is a State rather than the Federal Government. Nothing in the language or logic of the Sanges opinion contains any suggestion of that kind. Nor should such an intimation be read into the Court’s subsequent decisions adhering to Sanges’ principle. For the purposes of congressional restriction of prosecution by the sovereign, the Federal Executive, not the State, is the relevant sovereign. The decision to limit or extend a State’s appellate authority is a matter of state law within constitutional constraints. If a State wishes to empower its prosecutors to pursue a criminal appeal under certain conditions, it is free so to provide, limited only by the guarantees afforded the criminal defendant under the Constitution. Requiring Congress also to address explicitly the State’s authority contributes nothing to the policy concerns that prompt the requirement of express sovereign action. There is, in short, no basis for concluding that Congress’ neglect specifically to authorize a state appeal in a removed criminal proceeding impairs the appellate rights of the state prosecutor acting to enforce his separate body of criminal law.
In sum, the Court’s prior decisions restricting the availability of § 1291 in a criminal context flow from a tradition of requiring that a prosecutorial appeal be affirmatively sanctioned by the same sovereign that sponsors the prosecution. The intention to restrict sovereign power in this area is adequately addressed when the legislature responsible for that power has spoken in express terms, or when a legislative enactment has been authoritatively construed by the sovereign’s highest court. We conclude that § 1291 neither compels nor forecloses appellate jurisdiction in an appeal taken by a State as prosecutor. Instead, the provision permits a State to appeal if it is authorized to do so by state law. Petitioner Arizona can rely on § 1291 combined with appellate authorization from the Arizona Legislature. In the circumstances of this case, no more is required.
Ill
We hold that in a criminal proceeding removed to federal court, a State may appeal under § 1291 from an adverse judgment if statutory authority to seek such review is conferred by state law. Because Arizona law conferred such authority here, and because removal does not alter the nature of the authority conferred, the State must be allowed to appeal from the post-guilty-verdict judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Sweetwater Pass is located about 29 miles southeast of Ajo, Ariz. The Pass is bounded on the west by the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, and on the east by the Papago Indian Reservation. It is undisputed that the events in question occurred on land owned by the Federal Government.
Under 8 U. S. C. § 1325, an alien not previously convicted of illegal entry who enters the United States at an improper time or place is guilty of a misdemeanor.
According to testimony at trial, the Mexicans were unarmed and were seeking employment in this country. Tr. 15, 23.
The statute then read in pertinent part:
“A. A person who commits assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument... shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than one nor more than ten years, by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or both.
“B. A crime as prescribed by the terms of subsection A, committed by a person armed with a gun or other deadly weapon, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, for the first offense, for not less than five years... and in no case... shall the person convicted be eligible for suspension or commutation of sentence, probation, pardon or parole until such person has served the minimum sentence imposed.”
Section 13-249 was repealed by 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 142, §4, effective Oct. 1, 1978, and replaced by other legislation. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1204 (1978).
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1442 (a) (1) provides:
“(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any one of the following persons may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
“(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person acting under him, for any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.”
In his motion in arrest of judgment under Rule 34, respondent maintained that the State of Arizona, and therefore the United States District Court on removal, had no criminal jurisdiction over the federal land where the shooting occurred. Respondent further contended that any attempt to prosecute him under a state statute unlawfully interfered with the exclusively federal interest in regulating immigration.
The court further concluded that the federal interest in enforcement of the immigration laws did not pre-empt the applicability of state criminal law in this instance. 445 F. Supp., at 1125-1127.
Arizona argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to act on a Rule 29 (e) motion 11 months after a guilty verdict, in violation of the Rule’s 7-day requirement. Brief for Appellant in No. 77-3453 (CA9), pp. 8-11. The State also contended that the District Court had misapplied relevant immunity law and that the evidence was more than sufficient to sustain the jury verdict. Id., at 17-24.
Section 3731 provides in pertinent part:
“In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie tó a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.”
The court reasoned that even if, in a removed criminal prosecution, the State of Arizona had the same right of appeal under 18 U. S. C. § 3731 as is accorded the United States in a federal prosecution, the judgment of acquittal nonetheless was unreviewable on double jeopardy grounds. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a-40a.
Title 28 U. S. C. §1291 provides:
“The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”
Having found jurisdiction, the dissent concluded on the merits that the judgment of acquittal should be reversed. 608 F. 2d, at 1205. The Court of Appeals’ majority, however, did not reach the merits. In view of the posture of the case, we also intimate no view on the merits. Neither do we have any occasion now to decide whether the instant appeal would be barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 793-796 (1969). That question was not decided by the Court of Appeals, and the parties have not raised it before this Court. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Section 12-2001 reads:
“The writ of certiorari may be granted by the supreme and superior courts or by any judge thereof, in all cases when an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.”
A writ of certiorari may be obtained by filing a petition for special action, pursuant to Rule 4, Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973). The certiorari provision itself speaks of review to determine whether the lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction, but as consistently construed by the Arizona Supreme Court, the statute also authorizes review for abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Ryder v. Superior Court (Clifton, Real Party in Interest), 128 Ariz. 216, 222, 624 P. 2d 1264, 1270 (1981); State ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 123, 538 P. 2d 397 (1975); State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court, 95 Ariz. 319, 322, 390 P. 2d 109, 111 (1964); State ex rel. Mahoney v. Stevens, 79 Ariz. 298, 300, 288 P. 2d 1077, 1078 (1955). See Rule 3, Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973).
The dissent maintains that this longstanding application of the statute, never questioned by the Arizona Legislature, is an insufficiently clear expression of state law. But it is obvious that in the precise circumstances of this case, the Arizona Legislature and the Arizona Supreme Court have authorized the appellate review requested by the State. The absence of a statutory formula providing for automatic appeal by the State in every criminal prosecution does not alter this fact.
A separate Arizona statute permits the State to appeal from an “order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the state.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4032.5 (1978), formerly § 13-1712.5. Although there is little case law interpreting this provision, it may furnish an additional basis for appellate review here. See generally State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court (Clifton, Real Party in Interest), 128 Ariz., at 220, 624 P. 2d, at 1268; State v. Wynn, 114 Ariz. 561, 563, 562 P. 2d 734, 736 (App. 1977).
In concluding that federal law controls all aspects of a case before the federal court under § 1442 (a) (1), the Court of Appeals relied on several decisions, none of which involved proceedings removed from state to federal court. See D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U. S. 447 (1942); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190 (1940); Board of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U. S. 343 (1939); United States v. Crain, 589 E. 2d 996 (CA9 1979). Moreover, in each of these eases federal law was deemed controlling because the rights that the complainant sought to protect or enforce were created by federal statutes. In contrast, petitioner here seeks to enforce a state statute.
This Court elsewhere has reviewed the “long history” of the federal-officer removal statute. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U. S. 402, 405-406 (1969). It has been 100 years since the Court in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 (1880), first emphasized the need to safeguard the exercise of legitimate federal authority:
In the area of general civil removals, it is well settled that if the state court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, the federal court acquires none upon removal, even though the federal court would have had jurisdiction if the suit had originated there. Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U. S. 448, 449 (1943); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 389 (1939); Lambert Bun Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258 U. S. 377, 382 (1922). This principle of derivative jurisdiction is instructive where, as here, relevant state-court jurisdiction is found to exist and the question is whether the federal court in effect loses such jurisdiction as a result of removal. Of course, because appellate rather than original jurisdiction is at issue, the analogy is not perfect. See Sub-part B, injra.
By enacting the current version of 18 U. S. C. § 3731, see 84 Stat. 1890, Congress manifested an intent to remove all statutory barriers to a criminal appeal taken by the Federal Government. United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 337 (1975). Petitioner argues that this intent should inform our deliberations concerning a state prosecution’s appellate rights upon removal to federal court. A proper respect for the State’s interest in enforcing its own criminal laws, however, counsels against that conclusion. While the policy announced in § 3731 might perhaps be viewed as indicative of congressional support for any prosecutor’s appeal in federal court, the statute does not speak in such terms. Moreover, if § 3731 is construed to extend broad appellate rights to a State that does not authorize comparable rights under state law, one result might be to inhibit the exercise of the removal right, contrary to established federal policy. In light of these uncertainties, and our resolution of the case on other grounds, we do not reach the question whether § 3731 applies to the States.
Congress from the very beginning provided that final civil judgments were reviewable as a matter of statutory right. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 22, 1 Stat. 84. Later, when the growing volume of appellate business threatened to overwhelm this Court’s docket, Congress acted to establish circuit courts of appeals. Judiciary Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1295, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1890) ; 21 Cong. Ree. 10220-10222 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Evarts). While preserving, under § 5 of the 1891 Act, 26 Stat. 827, several designated categories of eases under this Court’s direct appellate jurisdiction; the Act, in § 6, conferred on the new intermediate appellate court the power to review and revise final judgments in all other eases, civil and criminal, “unless otherwise provided by law.” 26 Stat. 828. Through a succession of recodifications and technical amendments,- § 6 of the 1891 Act has been carried forward as 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
There is disagreement among scholars as to whether, at common law in England, the prosecution could appeal. See R. Moreland,- Modem Criminal Procedure 273 (1959); L. Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 57 (1939); Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 Yale L. J. 486, 491 (1927); Note, Criminal Procedure — Right of State to Appeal, 45 Ky. L. J. 628, 629 (1957
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question we have for decision here is whether petitioner, a clerical employee of respondent railroad, is within the coverage of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. § 1, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 51. Petitioner is employed entirely in respondent’s office building in Philadelphia. Her duties consist of filing original tracings of all of respondent’s engines, cars, parts, tracks, bridges, and other structures, from which blueprints of those items are made. There are some 325,000 tracings on file in the office in which petitioner works. Whenever an order for blueprints comes in from anywhere in respondent’s system, it is petitioner’s responsibility to fill the order by securing the correct tracings from the files. These she takes to the blueprint maker in the same office building. After the blueprints are made, it is petitioner’s further duty to return the original tracings to the appropriate file. About 67% of the blueprints so made are sent to points outside Pennsylvania. The files which petitioner attends are the sole depository of the original tracings of the structural details of all of respondent’s rolling stock, trackage, and other equipment and installations, and as such represent a fund of documents without which maintenance of the operating system would be impossible.
Petitioner was injured when a cracked window pane in her office blew in upon her. She brought suit for personal injury under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. On respondent’s motion to dismiss, the District Court held that petitioner was not within the coverage of § 1 of the Act and, there being no diversity of citizenship between the parties, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 227 F. 2d 810. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question presented in the administration of the Act. 350 U. S.965.
As originally enacted, § 1 provided that every railroad, “while engaging” in interstate commerce,
“shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce ... for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.” 35 Stat. 65.
A further paragraph was added to the section in 1939, and it is clear that two specific problems which the amendment sought at least to remedy were the results of this Court’s holdings that, at the moment of his injury, the employee as well as the railroad had to be engaged in interstate commerce in order to come within the coverage of § 1, and that employees engaged in construction of new facilities were not covered. S. Rep. No. 661, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3; Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo, decided today, ante, p. 493. The amendment took the form of an expanded definition of “person . . . employed” in interstate commerce. The amendment reads:
“Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of this Act, be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this Act . . . .” 53 Stat. 1404.
No argument is made that Congress could not constitutionally include petitioner within the coverage of the Act. The argument is that the amendment was narrowly drawn to remedy specific evils and that to construe it to include petitioner would amount to inclusion in the Act of virtually all railroad employees — a result which respondent assumes is unintended and undesirable. The argument takes several forms. First, it is said that “commerce” in the Act means only transportation and that petitioner is not employed in transportation. See Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 239 U. S. 556, 559-560. But the interstate commerce in which respondent is engaged is interstate transportation. If “any part” of petitioner’s duties is in “furtherance” of or substantially affects interstate commerce, it also is in “furtherance” of or substantially affects interstate transportation. The. test for coverage under the amendment is not whether the employee is engaged in transportation, but rather whether what he does in any way furthers or substantially affects transportation. Nor can we resolve the issue presented here in terms of whether or not clerical employees as a class are excluded from the benefits of the statute. The 1939 amendment was designed to obliterate fine distinctions as to coverage between employees who, for the purpose of this remedial legislation, should be treated alike. There is no meaningful distinction, in terms of whether the employee’s duties are clerical or not, between petitioner and, for illustration, an assistant chief timekeeper, Straub v. Reading Co., 220 F. 2d 177, or a messenger boy carrying waybills and grain orders between separate local offices and freight stations, Bowers v. Wabash R. Co., 246 S. W. 2d 535, or a lumber inspector hurt while inspecting ties at a lumber company, Ericksen v. Southern Pacific Co., 39 Cal. 2d 374, 246 P. 2d 642 — all of whom have been held covered by the 1939 amendment. See also Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U. S. 459. Nor are the benefits of the Act limited to those exposed to the special hazards of the railroad industry. The Act has not been so interpreted, and the 1939 amendment specifically affords protection to “any employee” whose duties bring him within that amendment. There is no basis in the language of § 1 for confining liability of the railroad so as to exclude any class of railroad employees as a class. The benefits of the Act are not limited to those who have cinders in their hair, soot on their faces, or callouses on their hands. Section 1 cannot be interpreted to exclude petitioner from its benefits without further consideration of the function she performs and its impact on interstate commerce.
We think that the present petitioner is employed by the respondent in interstate commerce within the meaning of the 1939 amendment to § 1. Although the amendment may have been prompted by a specific desire to obviate certain court-made rules limiting coverage, the language used goes far beyond that narrow objective. It evinces a purpose to expand coverage substantially as well as to avoid narrow distinctions in deciding questions of coverage. Under the amendment, it is the “duties” of the employee that must further or affect commerce, and it is enough if “any part” of those duties has the requisite effect. The statute commands us to examine the purpose and effect of the employee’s function in the railroad’s interstate operation, without limitation to nonclerical employees or determination on the basis of the employee’s importance as an individual in the railroad’s organization.
Here respondent railroad has chosen to arrange its operations so that repairs and construction anywhere within its system which require blueprints must go through its Philadelphia office. No such work can be done without recourse to the files of 325,000 original tracings in petitioner’s custody. Loss or misplacing of those tracings could promptly cause delay, confusion, or worse in the day-to-day operation of respondent’s lines. If all employees who perform petitioner’s duties were removed from service, respondent could not conduct its operations without a change in its organizational system. To recognize this is to attribute to petitioner neither an exaggerated nor an attenuated relationship to respondent’s transportation system. The filing of tracings and the dispatch of blueprints taken from them comprise a direct link in the maintenance of respondent’s lines and rolling stock. Together with the makers of blueprints, petitioner constitutes the means by which men throughout respondent’s system obtain the information they must have to maintain the railroad’s trains, equipment, track, and structures.
The very purpose of petitioner’s job is to further physical maintenance of an interstate railroad system. Proper performance of her duties makes an obvious contribution to the maintenance of that system. We hold that the petitioner, by the performance of her duties, is furthering the interstate transportation in which the respondent is engaged. “The word ‘furtherance’ is a comprehensive term. Its periphery may be vague, but admittedly it is both large and elastic.” Shelton v. Thomson, 148 F. 2d 1, 3. Petitioner’s duties here come within the confines of that concept.
Similarly, those duties which “in any way directly or closely and substantially affect” interstate commerce in the railroad industry must necessarily be marked out through the process of case-by-case adjudication. This definition and the “furtherance” definition of employment in interstate commerce in the 1939 amendment are set forth in the disjunctive. In some situations they may overlap. Here we hold that, for the reasons already given, performance of petitioner’s duties has a' close and substantial effect upon the operation of respondent’s interstate activities. Cf. Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125.
Petitioner’s duties brought her within the coverage of § 1 as amended, and the District Court therefore had jurisdiction over this suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. The judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Burton dissents for the reasons stated below in the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III-B.
Sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 require cable television systems to devote a portion of their channels to the transmission of local broadcast television stations. This case presents the question whether these provisions abridge the freedom of speech or of the press, in violation of the First Amendment.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the United States, holding that the challenged provisions are consistent with the First Amendment. Because issues of material fact remain unresolved in the record as developed thus far, we vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
I
A
The role of cable television in the Nation’s communications system has undergone dramatic change over the past 45 years. Given the pace of technological advancement and the increasing convergence between cable and other electronic media, the cable industry today stands at the center of an ongoing telecommunications revolution with still undefined potential to affect the way we communicate and develop our intellectual resources.
The earliest cable' systems were built in the late 1940’s to bring clear broadcast television signals to remote or mountainous communities. The purpose was not to replace broadcast television but to enhance it. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157, 161-164 (1968); D. Brenner, M. Price, & M. Meyerson, Cable Television and Other Nonbroadcast Video §1.02 (1992); M. Hamburg, All About Cable, ch. 1 (1979). Modern cable systems do much more than enhance the reception of nearby broadcast television stations. With the capacity to carry dozens of channels and import distant programming signals via satellite or microwave relay, today’s cable systems are in direct competition with over-the-air broadcasters as an independent source of television programming.
Broadcast and cable television are distinguished by the different technologies through which they reach viewers. Broadcast stations radiate electromagnetic signals from a central transmitting antenna. These signals can be captured, in turn, by any television set within the antenna’s range. Cable systems, by contrast, rely upon a physical, point-to-point connection between a transmission facility and the television sets of individual subscribers. Cable systems make this connection much like telephone companies, using cable or optical fibers strung aboveground or buried in ducts to reach the homes or businesses of subscribers. The construction of this physical infrastructure entails the use of public rights-of-way and easements and often results in the disruption of traffic on streets and other public property. As a result, the cable medium may depend for its very existence upon express permission from local governing authorities. See generally Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 660 F. 2d 1370, 1377-1378 (CA10 1981).
Cable technology affords two principal benefits over broadcast. First, it eliminates the signal interference sometimes encountered in over-the-air broadcasting and thus gives viewers undistorted reception of broadcast stations. Second, it is capable of transmitting many more channels than are available through broadcasting, giving subscribers access to far greater programming variety. More than half of the cable systems in operation today have a capacity to carry between 30 and 53 channels. Television and Cable Factbook, Services Vol. No. 62, p. 1-69 (1994). And about 40 percent of cable subscribers are served by systems with a capacity of more than 53 channels. Ibid. Newer systems can carry hundreds of channels, and many older systems are being upgraded with fiber optic rebuilds and digital compression technology to increase channel capacity. See, e.g., Cablevision Systems Adds to Rapid Fiber Growth in Cable Systems, Communications Daily 6-7 (Feb. 26,1993).
The cable television industry includes both cable operators (those who own the physical cable network and transmit the cable signal to the viewer) and cable programmers (those who produce television programs and sell or license them to cable operators). In some cases, cable operators have acquired ownership of cable programmers, and vice versa. Although cable operators may create some of their own programming, most of their programming is drawn from outside sources. These outside sources include not only local or distant broadcast stations, but also the many national and regional cable programming networks that have emerged in recent years, such as CNN, MTV, ESPN, TNT, C-SPAN,' The Family Channel, Nickelodeon, Arts and Entertainment, Black Entertainment Television, CourtTV, The Discovery Channel, American Movie Classics, Comedy Central, The Learning Channel, and The Weather Channel. Once the cable operator has selected the programming sources, the cable system functions, in essence, as a conduit for the speech of others, transmitting it on a continuous and unedited basis to subscribers. See Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of Expression, 1988 Duke L. J. 329, 339 (“For the most part, cable personnel do not review any of the material provided by cable networks.... [C]able systems have no conscious control over program services provided by others”).
In contrast to commercial broadcast stations, which transmit signals at no charge to viewers and generate revenues by selling time to advertisers, cable systems charge subscribers a monthly fee for the right to receive cable programming and rely to a lesser extent on advertising. In most instances, cable subscribers choose the stations they will receive by selecting among various plans, or “tiers,” of cable service. In a typical offering, the basic tier consists of local broadcast stations plus a number of cable programming networks selected by the cable operator. For an additional cost, subscribers can obtain channels devoted to particular subjects or interests, such as recent-release feature movies, sports, children’s programming, sexually explicit programming, and the like. Many cable systems also offer pay-per-view service, which allows an individual subscriber to order and pay a one-time fee to see a single movie or program at a set time of the day. See J. Goodale, All About Cable: Legal and Business Aspects of Cable and Pay Television § 5.05[2] (1989); Brenner, supra, at 334, n. 22.
B
On October 5,1992, Congress overrode a Presidential veto to enact the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992 Cable Act or Act). Among other things, the Act subjects the cable industry to rate regulation by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and by municipal franchising authorities; prohibits municipalities from awarding exclusive franchises to cable operators; imposes various restrictions on cable programmers that are affiliated with cable operators; and directs the FCC to develop and promulgate regulations imposing minimum technical standards for cable operators. At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the so-called must-carry provisions, contained in §§4 and 5 of the Act, which require cable operators to carry the signals of a specified number of local broadcast television stations.
Section 4 requires carriage of “local commercial television stations,” defined to include all full power television broadcasters, other than those qualifying as “noncommercial educational” stations under §5, that operate within the same television market as the cable system. § 4, 47 U. S. C. §§ 534(b)(1)(B), (h)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. IV). Cable systems with more than 12 active channels, and more than 300 subscribers, are required to set aside up to one-third of their channels for commercial broadcast stations that request carriage. § 534(b)(1)(B). Cable systems with more than 300 subscribers, but only 12 or fewer active channels, must carry the signals of three commercial broadcast stations. § 534(b)(1)(A).
If there are fewer broadcasters requesting carriage than slots made available under the Act, the cable operator is obligated to carry only those broadcasters who make the request. If, however, there are more requesting broadcast stations than slots available, the cable operator is permitted to choose which of these stations it will carry. § 534(b)(2). The broadcast signals carried under this provision must be transmitted on a continuous, uninterrupted basis, § 534(b)(3), and must be placed in the same numerical channel position as when broadcast over the air, § 534(b)(6). Further, subject to a few exceptions, a cable operator may not charge a fee for carrying broadcast signals in fulfillment of its must-carry obligations. § 534(b)(10).
Section 5 of the Act imposes similar requirements regarding the carriage of local public broadcast television stations, referred to in the Act as local “noncommercial educational television stations.” 47 U. S. C. § 535(a) (1988 ed., Supp. IV). A cable system with 12 or fewer channels must carry one of these stations; a system of between 13 and 36 channels must carry between one and three; and a system with more than 36 channels must carry each local public broadcast station requesting carriage. §§ 535(b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(A), (b)(3)(D). The Act requires a cable operator to import distant signals in certain circumstances but provides protection against substantial duplication of local noncommercial educational stations. See §§ 535(b)(3)(B), (e). As with commercial broadcast stations, §5 requires cable system operators to carry the program schedule of the public broadcast station in its entirety and at its same over-the-air channel position. §§ 535(g)(1), (g)(5).
Taken together, therefore, §§4 and 5 subject all but the smallest cable systems nationwide to must-carry obligations, and confer must-carry privileges on all full power broadcasters operating within the same television market as a qualified cable system.
C
Congress enacted the 1992 Cable Act after conducting three years of hearings on the structure and operation of the cable television industry. See S. Rep. No. 102-92, pp. 3-4 (1991) (describing hearings); H. R. Rep. No. 102-628, p. 74 (1992) (same). The conclusions Congress drew from its fact-finding process are recited in the text of the Act itself. See §§ 2(a)(l)-(21). In brief, Congress found that the physical characteristics of cable transmission, compounded by the increasing concentration of economic power in the cable industry, are endangering the ability of over-the-air broadcast television stations to compete for a viewing audience and thus for necessary operating revenues, v Congress determined that regulation of the market for video programming was necessary to correct this competitive imbalance.
In particular, Congress found that over 60 percent of the households with television sets subscribe to cable, § 2(a)(3), and for these households cable has replaced over-the-air broadcast television as the primary provider of video programming, §2(a)(17). This is so, Congress found, because “[m]ost subscribers to cable television systems do not or cannot maintain antennas to receive broadcast television services, do not have input selector switches to convert from a cable to antenna reception system, or cannot otherwise receive broadcast television services.” Ibid. In addition, Congress concluded that due to “local franchising requirements and the extraordinary expense of constructing more than one cable television system to serve a particular geographic area,” the overwhelming majority of cable operators exercise a monopoly over cable service. § 2(a)(2). “The result,” Congress determined, “is undue market power for the cable operator as compared to that of consumers and video programmers.” Ibid.
According to Congress, this market position gives cable operators the power and the incentive to harm broadcast competitors. The power derives from the cable operator’s ability, as owner of the transmission facility, to “terminate the retransmission of the broadcast signal, refuse to carry new signals, or reposition a broadcast signal to a disadvantageous channel position.” §2(a)(15). The incentive derives from the economic reality that “[c]able television systems and broadcast television stations increasingly compete for television advertising revenues.” §2(a)(14). By refusing carriage of broadcasters’ signals, cable operators, as a practical matter, can reduce the number of households that have access to the broadcasters’ programming, and thereby capture advertising dollars that would otherwise go to broadcast stations. § 2(a)(15).
Congress found, in addition, that increased vertical integration in the cable industry is making it even harder for broadcasters to secure carriage on cable systems, because cable operators have a financial incentive to favor their affiliated programmers. § 2(a)(5). Congress also determined that the cable industry is characterized by horizontal concentration, with many cable operators sharing common ownership. This has resulted in greater “barriers to entry for new programmers and a reduction in the number of media voices available to consumers.” § 2(a)(4).
In light of these technological and economic conditions, Congress concluded that unless cable operators are required to carry local broadcast stations, “[t]here is a substantial likelihood that... additional local broadcast signals will be deleted, repositioned, or not carried,” §2(a)(15); the “marked shift in market share” from broadcast to cable will continue to erode the advertising revenue base which sustains free local broadcast television, §§ 2(a)(13)-(14); and that, as a consequence, “the economic viability of free local broadcast television and its ability to originate quality local programming will be seriously jeopardized,” §2(a)(16).
D
Soon after the Act became law, appellants filed these five consolidated actions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States and the Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter referred to collectively as the Government), challenging the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions. Appellants, plaintiffs below, are numerous cable programmers and cable operators. After additional parties intervened, a three-judge District Court convened under 28 U. S. C. § 2284 to hear the actions. 1992 Cable Act §23, 47 U.S.C. § 555(c)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. IV). Each of the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment; several intervenor-defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment; and the Government filed a cross-motion to dismiss. Although the Government had not asked for summary judgment, the District Court, in a divided opinion, granted summary judgment in favor of the Government and the other intervenor-defendants, ruling that the must-carry provisions are consistent with the First Amendment. 819 F. Supp. 32 (1993).
The court found that in enacting the must-carry provisions, Congress employed “its regulatory powers over the economy to impose order upon a market in dysfunction.” Id., at 40. The court characterized the 1992 Cable Act as “simply industry-specific antitrust and fair trade practice regulatory legislation,” ibid., and said that the must-carry requirements “are essentially economic regulation designed to create competitive balance in the video industry as a whole, and to redress the effects of cable operators’ anti-competitive practices,” ibid. The court rejected appellants’ contention that the must-carry requirements warrant strict scrutiny as a content-based regulation, concluding that both the commercial and public broadcast provisions “are, in intent as well as form, unrelated (in all but the most recondite sense) to the content of any messages that [the] cable operators, broadcasters, and programmers have in contemplation to deliver.” Ibid. The court proceeded to sustain the must-carry provisions under the intermediate standard of scrutiny set forth in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), concluding that the preservation of local broadcasting is an important governmental interest, and that the must-carry provisions are sufficiently tailored to serve that interest. 819 F. Supp., at 45-47.
Judge Williams dissented. He acknowledged the “very real problem” that “cable systems control access ‘bottlenecks’ to an important communications medium,” id., at 57, but concluded that Congress may not address that problem by extending access rights only to broadcast television stations. In his view, the must-carry rules are content based, and thus subject to strict scrutiny, because they require cable operators to carry speech they might otherwise choose to exclude, and because Congress’ decision to grant favorable access to broadcast programmers rested “in part, but quite explicitly, on a finding about their content.” Id., at 58. Applying strict scrutiny, Judge Williams determined that the interests advanced in support of the law are inadequate to justify it. While assuming “as an abstract matter” that the interest in preserving access to free television is compelling, he found “no evidence that this access is in jeopardy.” Id., at 62. Likewise, he concluded that the rules are insufficiently tailored to the asserted interest in programming diversity because cable operators “now carry the vast majority of local stations,” and thus to the extent the rules have any effect at all, “it will be only to replace the mix chosen by cablecasters — whose livelihoods depend largely on satisfying audience demand — with a mix derived from congressional dictate.” Id., at 61.
This direct appeal followed, see § 23, 47 U. S. C. § 555(c)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. IV), and we noted probable jurisdiction. 509 U. S. 952 (1993).
II
There can be no disagreement on an initial premise: Cable programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U. S. 439, 444 (1991). Through “original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire,” cable programmers and operators “see[k] to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety of formats.” Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U. S. 488, 494 (1986). By requiring cable systems to set aside a portion of their channels for local broadcasters, the must-carry rules regulate cable speech in two respects: The rules reduce the number of channels over which cable operators exercise unfettered control, and they render it more difficult for cable programmers to compete for carriage on the limited channels remaining. Nevertheless, because not every interference with speech triggers the same degree of scrutiny under the First Amendment, we must decide at the outset the level of scrutiny applicable to the must-carry provisions.
A
We address first the Government’s contention that regulation of cable television should be analyzed under the same First Amendment standard that applies to regulation of broadcast television. It is true that our cases have permitted more intrusive regulation of broadcast speakers than of speakers in other media. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969) (television), and National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943) (radio), with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974) (print), and Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781 (1988) (personal solicitation). But the rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation, whatever its validity in the cases elaborating it, does not apply in the context of cable regulation.
The justification for our distinct approach to broadcast regulation rests upon the unique physical limitations of the broadcast medium. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 377 (1984); Red Lion, supra, at 388-389, 396-399; National Broadcasting Co., 319 U. S., at 226. As a general matter, there are more would-be broadcasters than frequencies available in the electromagnetic spectrum. And if two broadcasters were to attempt to transmit over the same frequency in the same locale, they would interfere with one another’s signals, so that neither could be heard at all. Id., at 212. The scarcity of broadcast frequencies thus required the establishment of some regulatory mechanism to divide the electromagnetic spectrum and assign specific frequencies to particular broadcasters. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, supra, at 377 (“The fundamental distinguishing characteristic of the new medium of broadcasting... is that [broadcast frequencies are a scarce resource [that] must be portioned out among applicants”) (internal quotation marks omitted); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U. S. 775, 799 (1978). In addition, the inherent physical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the broadcast medium has been thought to require some adjustment in traditional First Amendment analysis to permit the Government to place limited content restraints, and impose certain affirmative obligations, on broadcast licensees. Red Lion, 395 U. S., at 390. As we said in Red Lion, “[w]here there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.” Id., at 388; see also Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 101 (1973).
Although courts and commentators have criticized the scarcity rationale since its inception, we have declined to question its continuing validity as support for our broadcast jurisprudence, see FCC v. League of Women Voters, supra, at 376, n. 11, and see no reason to do so here. The broadcast cases are inapposite in the present context because cable television does not suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize the broadcast medium. Indeed, given the rapid advances in fiber optics and digital compression technology, soon there may be no practical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the cable medium. Nor is there any danger of physical interference between two cable speakers attempting to share the same channel. In light of these fundamental technological differences between broadcast and cable transmission, application of the more relaxed standard of scrutiny adopted in Red Lion and the other broadcast cases is inapt when determining the First Amendment validity of cable regulation. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 74 (1983) (“Our decisions have recognized that the special interest of the Federal Government in regulation of the broadcast media does not readily translate into a justification for regulation of other means of communication”) (footnote omitted).
This is not to say that the unique physical characteristics of cable transmission should be ignored when determining the constitutionality of regulations affecting cable speech. They should not. See infra, at 656. But whatever relevance these physical characteristics may have in the evaluation of particular cable regulations, they do not require the alteration of settled principles of our First Amendment jurisprudence.
Although the Government acknowledges the substantial technological differences between broadcast and cable, see Brief for Federal Appellees 22, it advances a second argument for application of the Red Lion framework to cable regulation. It asserts that the foundation of our broadcast jurisprudence is not the physical limitations of the electromagnetic spectrum, but rather the “market dysfunction” that characterizes the broadcast market. Because the cable market is beset by a similar dysfunction, the Government maintains, the Red Lion standard of review should also apply to cable. While we agree that the cable market suffers certain structural impediments, the Government’s argument is flawed in two respects. First, as discussed above, the special physical characteristics of broadcast transmission, not the economic characteristics of the broadcast market, are what underlies our broadcast jurisprudence. See League of Women Voters, 468 U. S., at 377; National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, supra, at 799; Red Lion, supra, at 390. Second, the mere assertion of dysfunction or failure in a speech market, without more, is not sufficient to shield a speech regulation from the First Amendment standards applicable to nonbroadcast media. See, e. g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 657-658 (1990); Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 256-259 (1986); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S., at 248-258.
By a related course of reasoning, the Government and some appellees maintain that the must-carry provisions are nothing more than industry-specific antitrust legislation, and thus warrant rational-basis scrutiny under this Court’s “precedents governing legislative efforts to correct market failure in a market whose commodity is speech,” such as Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945), and Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U. S. 143 (1951). See Brief for Federal Appellees 17. This contention is unavailing. Associated Press and Lorain Journal both involved actions against members of the press brought under the Sherman Antitrust Act, a law of general application. But while the enforcement of a generally applicable law may or may not be subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment, compare Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U. S. 663, 670 (1991), with Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560, 566-567 (1991), laws that single out the press, or certain elements thereof, for special treatment “pose a particular danger of abuse by the State,” Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 228 (1987), and so are always subject to at least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny. See Preferred Communications, 476 U. S., at 496 (“Where a law is subjected to a colorable First Amendment challenge, the rule of rationality which will sustain legislation against other constitutional challenges typically does not have the same controlling force”). Because the must-carry provisions impose special obligations upon cable operators and special burdens upon cable programmers, some measure of heightened First Amendment scrutiny is demanded. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575, 583 (1983).
B
At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U. S., at 449 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 24 (1971)); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638, 640-642 (1943). Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this essential right. Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate'the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion. These restrictions “rais[e] the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 116 (1991).
For these reasons, the First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals. R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 382-383 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414 (1989). Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U. S., at 115; id., at 125-126 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983). Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a particular message are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny. See Riley v. National Federation for Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S., at 798; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, supra. In contrast, regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984), because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.
Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task. We have said that the “principal inquiry in determining content neutrality... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989). See R. A. V, supra, at 386 (“The government may not regulate [speech] based on hostility — or favoritism — towards the underlying message expressed”). The purpose, or justification, of a regulation will often be evident on its face. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 481 (1988). But while a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content based, it is not necessary to such a showing in all cases. Cf. Simon & Schuster, supra, at 117 (“‘[I]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment’”) (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune, supra, at 592). Nor will the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose be enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content. Arkansas Writers’ Project, 481 U. S., at 231-232; Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 464-469 (1980).
As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based. See, e. g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191, 197 (1992) (“Whether individuals may exercise their free-speech rights near polling places depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a political campaign”); Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 318-319 (1988) (plurality opinion) (whether municipal ordinance permits individuals to “picket in front of a foreign embassy depends entirely upon whether their picket signs are critical of the foreign government or not”). By contrast, laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content neutral. See, e. g., Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 804 (1984) (ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property “is neutral — indeed it is silent — concerning any speaker’s point of view”); Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 649 (1981) (State Fair regulation requiring that sales and solicitations take place at designated locations “applies evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds”).
C
Insofar as they pertain to the carriage of full-power broadcasters, the must-carry rules, on their, face, impose burdens and confer benefits without reference to the content of speech. Although the provisions interfere with cable operators’ editorial discretion by compelling them to offer carriage to a certain minimum number of broadcast stations, the extent of the interference does not depend upon the content of the cable operators’ programming. The rules impose obligations upon all operators, save those with fewer than 300 subscribers, regardless of the programs or stations they now offer or have offered in the past. Nothing in the Act imposes a restriction, penalty, or burden by reason of the views, programs, or stations the cable operator has selected or will select. The number of channels a cable operator must set aside depends only on the operator’s channel capacity, see 47 U. S. C. §§ 534(b)(1), 535(b)(2)-(3) (1988 ed„ Supp. IV); hence, an operator cannot avoid or mitigate its obligations under the Act by altering the programming it offers to subscribers. Cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S., at 256-257 (newspaper may avoid access obligations by refraining from speech critical of political candidates).
The must-carry provisions also burden cable programmers by reducing the number of channels for which they can compete. But, again, this burden is unrelated to content, for it extends to all cable programmers irrespective of the programming they choose to offer viewers. Cf. Boos, supra, at 319 (individuals may picket in front of a foreign embassy so long as their picket signs are not critical of the foreign government). And finally, the privileges conferred by the must-carry provisions are also unrelated to content. The rules benefit all full power broadcasters who request carriage — be they commercial or noncommercial, independent or network affiliated, English or Spanish language, religious or secular. The aggregate effect of the rules is thus to make every full power commercial and noncommercial broadcaster eligible for must-carry, provided only that the broadcaster operates within the same television market as a cable system.
It is true that the must-carry provisions distinguish between speakers in the television programming market. But they do so based only upon the manner in which speakers transmit their messages to viewers, and not upon the messages they carry: Broadcasters, which transmit over the airwaves, are favored, while cable programmers, which do not, are disfavored. Cable operators, too, are burdened by the carriage obligations, but only because they control access to the cable conduit. So long as they are not a subtle means of exercising a content preference, speaker distinctions of this nature are not presumed invalid under the First Amendment.
That the must-carry provisions, on their face, do not burden or benefit speech of a particular content does not end the inquiry. Our cases have recognized that even a regulation neutral on its face may be content based if its manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the message it conveys. United States v. Eichman, 496 U. S. 310, 315 (1990) (“Although the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the Government’s asserted interest is related to the suppression of free expression”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ward, 491 U. S., at 791-792; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S., at 293; cf. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 534-535 (1993).
Appellants contend, in this regard, that the must-carry regulations are content based because Congress’ purpose in enacting them was to promote speech of a favored content. We do not agree. Our review of the Act and its various findings persuades us that Congress’ overriding objective in enacting must-carry was not to favor programming of a particular subject matter, viewpoint, or format, but rather to preserve access to free television programming for the 40 percent of Americans without cable.
In unusually detailed statutory findings, supra, at
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. Petitioner charged that he was being held in prison without lawful authority and in violation of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused the writ without either a hearing or a response from the State.
We hold that the facts alleged are such as to entitle petitioner to a hearing under Herman v. Claudy, 350 U. S. 116. The judgment is vacated and the case remanded to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, as is the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Petitioner was convicted of bank robbery in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Under 28 U. S. C. § 1915 he applied to the District Court for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Petitioner, who was assisted by court-appointed counsel in preparing his application, contended that the evidence was insufficient to justify his conviction and that the trial court had committed reversible error by permitting the United States Attorney to ask him irrelevant and prejudicial questions about another criminal offense. Petitioner requested that the District Court make available a transcript of the trial record so he could substantiate his claimed errors. In reply the United States Attorney filed an affidavit asserting that the evidence was sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction. However the affidavit did not directly controvert petitioner’s claim that the prosecuting attorney had been allowed to inject irrelevant and prejudicial matter into the trial. Counsel for petitioner then filed an affidavit in answer supporting petitioner’s allegation of errors.
The District Court refused the request for a transcript of the trial record and denied the application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis on the ground that the appeal was “not taken in good faith” because it was “frivolous and without merit” and “[t]he evidence amply supported the verdict.” Petitioner then asked the Court of Appeals for permission to appeal in forma pauperis but that court denied his request indicating that his claimed errors were without substance. 242 F. 2d 338. And see 238 F. 2d 575.
As things now stand conflicting affidavits have been introduced concerning petitioner’s contention of errors at the trial. If the allegations made by petitioner and his counsel are correct then it seems quite clear to us that his appeal cannot be characterized as frivolous. Before his allegation of errors can be accurately evaluated, however, to ascertain if they do have any merit he should be furnished with a transcript of the trial record — unless counsel can agree on a statement of the relevant facts or some other means are devised to make the minutes of the trial available to petitioner — so that he has an opportunity to substantiate his allegations and point out their significance and so that they can be appraised on a dependable record. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 352 U. S. 565. In our judgment petitioner has not yet been afforded an adequate opportunity to show the Court of Appeals that his claimed errors are not frivolous so as to enable that court to review properly the District Court’s certification that the appeal was in bad faith. Accordingly the judgment below must be vacated and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan dissent.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
By reason of a divorce in an Illinois state court, with a judgment for monthly installments of alimony until remarriage, petitioner asserts that her divorced husband, the respondent Leib, is liable for unpaid installments of alimony. Asserting diversity jurisdiction, petitioner, a divorcee, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Claim for recovery is made, notwithstanding a later marriage by petitioner to another in Nevada, subsequently annulled in New York, for the period from the Nevada remarriage to her third presumably valid marriage in New York to a third man. .Jo respondent’s plea that the Illinois alimony obligation was finally ended by the Nevada remarriage of petitioner, Mrs. Sutton relied upon the' New . York annulment decree as determining that her Nevada marriage was void. ■ She contends that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution requires that Illinois hold her Nevada marriage void ab initio by virtue of the New York annulment; that as the annulment decree obliterates the existence of her Nevada marriage respondent is liable for unpaid alimony until her New York marriage to Sutton.
The trial court rendered summary judgment for respondent and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 188 F. 2d 766. The affirmance was bottomed on the conclusion that, as the Nevada’marriáge of petitioner was valid in Nevada, it terminated the liability for alimony under the Illinois judgment of divorce. The court thus gave full faith and credit to the Nevada marriage rather than the New York annulment. Because disposition of this case required treatment of an important question of federal law, review was granted on a writ of certiorari. 342 U. S. 846.
Facts. Petitioner, Verna Sutton, divorced respondent, Leib, in Illinois in 1939, and under the terms of the decree of divorce was awarded $125 “on or before the first day of each calendar month . '. . for so long as the plaintiff shall remain unmarried, or for so long as this decree remains in full force and effect.” On July 3, 1944, in Reno, Nevada, petitioner married Walter Henzel who had that day obtained a Nevada divorce from Dorothy Henzel, a resident of New York who had not been served in Nevada and who made no appearance there. One month later, August 3,1944, Dorothy Henzel brought a separate maintenance proceeding in the courts of New York. Walter Henzel defended this suit. The proceeding resulted in a decree in Dorothy Henzel’s favor, declaring Walter Henzel’s Nevada divorce from her “null and void.” With the service of Dorothy’s process on Walter, petitioner ceased living with him, and in January 1945 filed suit in New York for annulment of her marriage to him. In this proceeding Walter Henzel also appeared. On June 6, 1947, the New. York court entered an interlocutory decrée after trial which became final three months thereafter. This judgment declared that petitioner’s marriage to Henzel Was. “null and void” for the reason that he “had another wife living at the time-of said marriage.”
There was no appeal in Nevada from the Nevada divorce of the Henzels. No further action was taken in Nevada concerning the marriage of Henzel and petitioner, and no. appeal taken in New York from the judgnient holding the Henzels’ Nevada divorce null and void or from the judgment annulling the Nevada marriage of Henzel and petitioner. The jurisdiction of the New York courts to enter the judgments is unquestioned.
Analysis of Issues. Collection of alimony is sought against respondent who was not a party to any of the judicial proceedings in Nevada or New York and appears in none of the records from either state. Illinois law as to respondent’s liability governs the federal court’s decision of this case. But the responsibility for the decision of federal constitutional issues involved rests finally on this Court. This controversy presents, fundamentally, a problem of Illinois law, to wit, the Illinois rule as to thé effect of a subsequently annulled second marriage on the alimony provisions of an Illinois divorce awarding support until remarriage.
As the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires Illinois to recognize the validity of records and judicial proceedings of sister states, the conclusion will not vary because the post-divorce recorded events underlying this litigation took place in other states than Illinois. This is not an alleged conflict of decisions between states such as existed in certain tax and estate cases. Rather the situation -more nearly approaches Barber v. Barber, 323 U. S. 77. There Tennessee refused full faith and credit to a North Carolina judgment for arrears of alimony on the ground of its lack of finality in North Carolina. We reversed Tennessee’s decision, not on the ground of error in Tennessee rules of law but on our determination that the North Carolina judgment was final and therefore enforceable as a matter of federal law in Tennessee under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. So in this case, Illinois’ conclusion as to this claim for alimony must be reached under Illinois law on the basis of giving the various proceedings the effect to which the Constitution entitles them. In this way the Full Faith and Credit Clause performs its intended function of avoiding relitigation in other states of adjudicated issues, while leaving to the law of the forum state the application of the predetermined facts to the new problem. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U. S. 343, 348-349.
Legal Effect of Nevada and New York Events. Petitioner and Henzel were married in Nevada. Thereafter petitioner, brought her putative husband before the New York court. Petitioner and Henzel subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the New York court and its decree annulling their Nevada marriage was entered with jurisdiction, so far as this record shows, of the parties and the subject matter. The burden is upon one attacking the validity of a judgment to demonstrate its invalidity. That judgment is res judicata between the parties and is unassailable collaterally. As both parties were before the New York court, its decree of annulment of their Nevada marriage ceremony is effective to determine that the. marriage relationship of petitioner and Henzel did not exist at the time of filing the present complaint in Illinois for unpaid alimony. The effect in Illinois of the New York declaration of nullity on the obligation for alimony is a matter of Illinois law hereinafter treated. The New York annulment determines the marriage relationship that is the marital status of petitioner and Henzel, just as any divorce judgment determines such relationship. If the Nevada court had had jurisdiction by personal service in the state or appearance in the case of Henzel and the first Mrs. Henzel, its decree of divorce would have been unassailable in other states. So as to the New York decree annulling the marriage, New York had such jurisdiction of the parties and its decree is entitled to full faith throughout the Nation, in Nevada as well as ip Illinois.
The New York invalidation of the Nevada divorce of the Henzels stands in the same position. As Mrs. Henzel was neither personally served in Nevada nor entered her appearance, the Nevada divorce decree was subject to attack and nullification in New York for lack of jurisdiction over the parties in a. contested action.
This leads us to hold that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals quoted in note 2, supra, is incorrect under the facts of this case. The marriage ceremony performed for petitioner and Henzel in Nevada must be held invalid because then Henzel had a living wife. The NeV York annulment held the Nevada marriage void. Nevada declares bigamous marriages void.
.Conclusion. The determination that the New York’adjudications must be given full faith and credit in Illinois, however, does not decide this controversy. Although the federal courts must give the same force and effect to the New York decrees as Illinois does, a question of state law remains. Does Illinois give the marriage ceremony of an annulled marriage sufficient vitality to release Leib, the respondent, from his obligation to pay alimony subse-quently due?
Full faith to the New York annulment, which is conclusive everywhere as to the marriage status of petitioner and Henzel, compels Illinois to treat their Neváda marriage ceremony as void. The force of that rule, however, does not require that the effect of the New York annulment on rights incident to this declaration of the invalidity of the Nevada marriage ceremony shall be the same in all states; Annulment is, in respect to its effect, analogous to divorce. A valid divorce, one. spouse appearing only by constructive service, that frees the parties from the bonds of matrimony throughout the United States does not require a second state to accord its terms the same result in litigation over separable legal rights as the decree would have in the courts of the state entering the decree. Without reference to the effect of a divorce on incidents of the márriage relation where both spouses are actually before the court, we think it equally clear, as a matter of constitutional law, that Illinois is free to decide for itself the effect of New York’s declaration of annulment on the obligations of respondent, a stranger to that decree.
Although the present proceeding necessarily presents questions of state law, resting as it does upon diversity jurisdiction, the case does not present any non-federal issue suitable for separation and determination in the state courts. The remaining matters of state law are for the decision of the federal courts.
It is frequently said, as a legal fiction, that annulment makes the annulled marriage ceremony as though it had never occurred. That fiction is variously treated in different jurisdictions. For example in New York, the petitioner apparently would recover alimony, after annulment but not for the period between the remarriage ceremony and the annulment.
The Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit has declared on an issue'as to whether the petitioner’s claim for alimony bad been adjusted that there has been in this controversy no compromise of a disputed claim. See note 15, supra. We accept that ruling. That court has not had occasion to consider the effect of the annulment under the law of Illinois on the respondent’s alimony obligation.
Where there had been a valid foreign marriage, followed by an annulment, based partly on issues not here involved, Illinois has held that the obligation of a former husband to pay alimony until the wife “remarry” is terminated by the remarriage. What the Illinois rule is when the foreign (Nevada) marriage is judicially declared invalid, under present circumstances, or whether respondent, if liable at all, is liable for the period during which Henzel may have owed support under a rule such as that of Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N. Y. 366, 167 N. E. 501, has not, so far as we know, been determined.
■ The judgment of the Court of Appeals' should be reversed and the cause remanded to the Court of. Appeals for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Black agrees with the Court of Appeals and would affirm its judgment.
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be iproved, and the Effect thereof.” U. S. Constitution, Art. IV, § 1.
Pursuant to the section,. Congress early prescribed the effect substantially in- the words now used:
“Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which.they are taken.” 28 U. S. C. § 1738.
“We have' searched the numerous cases decid' ' by the Supreme Court of the United States on the subject of migratory divorce for a definitive holding as to thé judicial status of such divorce in the state that decreed it.- It appears to be assumed that the decree is valid and binding in the state where it is rendered. Thus Mr. Justice Frankfurter remarks in his concurring opinion, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 307, . . . ‘It is indisputable that the Nevada decrees here, like the Connecticut decree in the Haddock . . . case, . . . were valid and binding in the state where they were.rendered.’ And Mr. Justice Murphy, concurring in Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 239, . . . states that ‘The State of Nevada has unquestioned authority, consistent with procedural due process, to grant divorces on whatever basis it sees fit to all who meet its statutory requirements. It is entitled, moreover, to give to its divorce decrees absolute and binding finality within the confines of its borders.’ And Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in the same case, 325 U. S. at page 244, . . . comments on the fact that the Nevada judgment was not voided by the decision. ‘It could not be, if the same test applies to sustain it as upholds the North Carolina convictions. It stands, with the marriages founded upon it, unimpeached.’ He and Mr. Justice Black, also dissenting, both call attention to the fact that the Court, in its decision, does not hold that the Nevada judgment is invalid in Nevada. Hence, in spite of the absence of a clear-cut statement in any of the main opinions of the Court as to the status of the Nevada decree in Nevada after a successful extraterritorial challenge of it, we think we may spell out authority for our assumption that it survives, such challenge and remains in full force and effect within the confines of the state of Nevada until and unless it is set aside upon review in that state.
“Assuming the validity of the divorce in Nevada, then the party or parties thereto resumed full marital capacity in that state. It follows that, so far as the state of .Nevada is concerned, there was no inhibition against the remarriage of Walter Henzel in that state, and no reason appears for challenging his marriage there to plaintiff immediately after the decree of divorce was rendered. Under the terms .of the Illinois decree of divorce of plaintiff and defendant, such marriage immediately terminated the obligation of the latter to continue the alimony payménts required thereby. We think that obligation was not reinstated and revived by the subsequent annulment of the Nevada marriage in New York.” 188 F. 2d at 768.
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64; Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183.
Barber v. Barber, 323 U. S. 77, 81.
Worcester County Co. v. Riley. 302 U. S. 292, and cases cited. In this case this Court held, p. 299, as a basis that the action was against a state without its consent, that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require uniformity of decision as to domicile between the courts of different states. Cf. Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 410.
Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U. S. 343. In this case Georgia had .determined that decedent’s domicile was Georgia. New York had determined the domicile was New York. In an interpleader suit in Delaware, involving the transfer of stock of a Delaware corporation to one of the two personal representatives of decedent appointed by the respective states, this Court held, where neither personal representative had been a party to the determination of domicile in the state of the other, Delaware was free to determine the question of domicile and require delivery of the stock to that representative.
Barber v. Barber, supra, 86; Cook v. Cook, 342 U. S. 126, 128.
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66, 76-78.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343.
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., supra; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 462.
Cook v. Cook, supra, citing Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226; Rice v. Rice, 336 U. S. 674. Cf. Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra.
Nev. Comp. Laws, 1929, § 4066; Poupart v. District Court, 34 Nev. 336, 123 P. 769.
See note 1, and Union & Planters’ Bank v. Memphis, 189 U. S. 71, 75.
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 291-304.
Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541. See MacKay v. Mackay, 279 App. Div. 350, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 82.
Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 489, et seq., and cases cited.
Furthermore the Court of Appeals has already determined that certain payments of alimony made to petitioner by respondent in settlement of installments accruing prior to the Nevada marriage do not amount to a compromise of the disputed claim. 188 F. 2d at 767-768. Cf. Moore v. Shook, 276 Ill. 47, 55, 114 N. E. 592; Darst v. Lang, 367 Ill. 119, 10 N. E. 2d 659.
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228; Propper v. Clark, supra, 486.
In re Wombwell’s Settlement, [1922] 2 Ch. 298. Here a.marriage settlement was in trust for the settlor “until the said intended marriage” and thereafter on declared trusts for the spouses. The marriage was annulled.. The settlor was held entitled to the funds as a /valid marriage was intended and this .one was void ab initio. Likewise Chapman v. Bradley, 33 L. J. Ch. 139. Cf. In re Garnett. 74 L. J. Ch. 570; Bishop v. Smith, 1 Vict. L. R. 313; P. v. P., [1916] 2 I.R. 400.
See Vernier, American Family Laws, § 53, Suits to Annul — Effect of Judgment, and § 48, Issue of Prohibited Marriages (this includes annulment).
New York declares some marriages void from the time their nullity is declared. McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law, § 7.
For effect on different incidents, see Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 N. E. 462 (seduction, tort); Burney v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. R. 599, 13 S. W. 2d 375 (seduction, criminal); Miller v. Wall, 216 Ala. 448, 113 So. 501 (marriage, later annulled, held annulment did not postpone distribution of estate, distributable marriage); Deeds v. Strode, 6 Idaho 317, 55 P. 656 (civil action); Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal. 354, 295 P. 2d 339 (distribution of community property).
This avoids double support to the wife. Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N. Y. 366, 167 N. E. 501. See Frank v. Carter, 219 N. Y. 35, 113 N. E. 549 (husband liable for necessaries pridr to annulment); In the Matter of Moncrief, 235 N. Y. 390, 139 N. E. 550 (child of annulled marriage, illegitimate).
The Sleicher case called forth many comments when it was handed down. See 43 Harv. L. Rev. 109; 30 Col. L. Rev. 877; 25 Ill. L. Rev. 99; 14 Minn. L. Rev. 93; 39 Yale L. J. 133.
Lehmann v. Lehmann, 225 Ill. App. 513, saying:
"We think that said-words as so used were intended by the parties to refer to the ceremony or act of marriage as distinguished from the status or relation thereafter.” P. 522.
“Even though it be considered that such marriage was not a valid one in Illinois, it was valid in New Jersey, where performed, and also valid in their subsequent successive domiciles, and we think that under all the facts disclosed it should be held, contrary to the finding of the chancellor in the decree appealed from, that she remarried within the meaning of. the words contained in said divorce decree of April 1, 1915, and in the written agreement entered into between the parties about that time, and that she thereby elected to forfeit, and did forfeit, her right to receive alimony for her own support thereafter from respondent.” P. 526.
The Illinois court was influenced by the practical construction given to the alimony decree by the parties. Pp. 516, 527. See Wilson v. Cook 256 Ill. 460, 100 N. E. 222.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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C
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises a variety of questions concerning the proper standards to be applied by a United States district court in passing on a motion for summary judgment in a civil antitrust action. Petitioner, Fortner Enterprises, Inc., filed this suit seeking treble damages and an injunction against alleged violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 16 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2. The complaint charged that respondents, United States Steel Corp. and its wholly owned subsidiary, the United States Steel Homes Credit Corp., had engaged in a contract, combination, and conspiracy to restrain trade and to monopolize trade in the sale of prefabricated houses. It alleged that there was a continuing agreement between respondents “to force corporations and individuals, including the plaintiff, as a condition to availing themselves of the services of United States Steel Homes Credit Corporation, to purchase at artificially high prices only United States Steel Homes . . . .” Specifically, petitioner claimed that in order to obtain loans totaling over $2,000,000 from the Credit Corp. for the purchase and development of certain land in the Louisville, Kentucky, area, it had been required to agree, as a condition of the loans, to erect a prefabricated house manufactured by U. S. Steel on each of the lots purchased with the loan proceeds. Petitioner claimed that the prefabricated materials were then supplied by U. S. Steel at unreasonably high prices and proved to be defective and unusable, thus requiring the expenditure of additional sums and delaying the completion date for the development. Petitioner sought treble damages for the profits thus lost, along with a decree enjoining respondents from enforcing the requirement of the loan agreement that petitioner use only houses manufactured by U. S. Steel.
After pretrial proceedings in which a number of affidavits and answers to interrogatories were filed, the District Court entered summary judgment for respondents, holding that petitioner’s allegations had failed to raise any question of fact as to a possible violation of the antitrust laws. Noting that the agreement involved here was essentially a tying arrangement, under which the purchaser was required to take a tied product — here prefabricated homes — as a condition of being allowed to purchase the tying product — here credit, the District Judge held that petitioner had failed to establish the prerequisites of illegality under our tying cases, namely sufficient market power over the tying product and foreclosure of a substantial volume of commerce in the tied product. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, and we granted certiorari, 393 U. S. 820 (1968). Since we find no basis for sustaining this summary judgment, we reverse and order that the case proceed to trial.
We agree with the District Court that the conduct challenged here primarily involves a tying arrangement of the traditional kind. The Credit Corp. sold its credit only on the condition that petitioner purchase a certain number of prefabricated houses from the Homes Division of U. S. Steel. Our cases have made clear that, at least when certain prerequisites are met, arrangements of this kind are illegal in and of themselves, and no specific showing of unreasonable competitive effect is required. The discussion in Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5-6 (1958), is dispositive of this question:
“[TJhere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. . . .
“. . . Where [tying] conditions are successfully exacted competition on the merits with respect to the tied product is inevitably curbed. Indeed 'tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.’ Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293, 305-306. They deny competitors free access to the market for the tied product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a better product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another market. At the same time buyers are forced to forego their free choice between competing products. For these reasons ‘tying agreements fare harshly under the laws forbidding restraints of trade.' Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, 606. They are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product and a ‘not insubstantial’ amount of interstate commerce is affected. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392.” (Footnote omitted.)
Despite its recognition of this strict standard, the District Court held that petitioner had not even made out a case for the jury. The court held that respondents did not have “sufficient economic power” over credit, the tying product here, because although the Credit Corp.’s terms evidently made the loans uniquely attractive to petitioner, petitioner had not proved that the Credit Corp. enjoyed the same unique attractiveness or economic control with respect to buyers generally. The court also held that the amount of interstate commerce affected was “insubstantial” because only a very small percentage of the land available for development in the area was foreclosed to competing sellers of prefabricated houses by the contract with petitioner. We think it plain that the District Court misunderstood the two controlling standards and misconceived the extent of its authority to evaluate the evidence in ruling on this motion for summary judgment.
A preliminary error that should not pass unnoticed is the District Court’s assumption that the two prerequisites mentioned in Northern Pacific are standards that petitioner must meet in order to prevail on the merits. On the contrary, these standards are necessary only to bring into play the doctrine of per se illegality. Where the standards were found satisfied in Northern Pacific, and in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947), this Court approved summary judgment against the defendants but by no means implied that inability to satisfy these standards would be fatal to a plaintiff's case. A plaintiff can still prevail on the merits whenever he can prove, on the basis of a more thorough examination of the purposes and effects of the practices involved, that the general standards of the Sherman Act have been violated. Accordingly, even if we could agree with the District Court that the Northern Pacific standards were not satisfied here, the summary judgment against petitioner still could not be entered without further examination of petitioner’s general allegations that respondents conspired together for the purpose of restraining competition and acquiring a monopoly in the market for prefabricated houses. And such an examination could rarely justify summary judgment with respect to a claim of this kind, for as we said in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting, 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962):
“We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of ‘even handed justice.’ ” (Footnote omitted.)
We need not consider, however, whether petitioner is entitled to a trial on this more general theory, for it is clear that petitioner raised questions of fact which, if proved at trial, would bring this tying arrangement within the scope of the per se doctrine. The requirement that a “not insubstantial” amount of commerce be involved makes no reference to the scope of any particular market or to the share of that market foreclosed by the tie, and hence we could not approve of the trial judge’s conclusions on this issue even if we agreed that his definition of the relevant market was the proper one. An analysis of market shares might become relevant if it were alleged that an apparently small dollar-volume of business actually represented a substantial part of the sales for which competitors were bidding. But normally the controlling consideration is simply whether a total amount of business, substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de min-imis, is foreclosed to competitors by the tie, for as we said in International Salt, it is “unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market” by a tying arrangement, 332 U. S., at 396.
The complaint and affidavits filed here leave no room for doubt that the volume of commerce allegedly foreclosed was substantial. It may be true, as respondents claim, that petitioner’s annual purchases of houses from U. S. Steel under the tying arrangement never exceeded $190,000, while more than $500,000 in annual sales was involved in the tying arrangement held illegal in International Salt, but we cannot agree with respondents that a sum of almost $200,000 is paltry or “insubstantial.” In any event, a narrow focus on the volume of commerce foreclosed by the particular contract or contracts in suit would not be appropriate in this context. As the special provision awarding treble damages to successful plaintiffs illustrates, Congress has encouraged private antitrust litigation not merely to compensate those who have been directly injured but also to vindicate the important public interest in free competition. See Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 138-139 (1968). For purposes of determining whether the amount of commerce foreclosed is too insubstantial to warrant prohibition of the practice, therefore, the relevant figure is the total volume of sales tied by the sales policy under challenge, not the portion of this total accounted for by the particular plaintiff who brings suit. In International Salt the $500,000 total represented the volume of tied sales to all purchasers, and although this amount was directly involved because the case was brought by the Government against the practice generally, the case would have been no less worthy of judicial scrutiny if it had been brought by one individual purchaser who accounted for only a fraction of the $500,000 in tied sales. In the present case, the annual sales allegedly foreclosed by respondents’ tying arrangements throughout the country totaled almost $4,000,000 in 1960, more than $2,800,000 in 1961, and almost $2,300,000 in 1962. These amounts could scarcely be regarded as insubstantial.
The standard of “sufficient economic power” does not, as the District Court held, require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout the market for the tying product. Our tie-in cases have made unmistakably clear that the economic power over the tying product can be sufficient even though the power falls far short of dominance and even though the power exists only with respect to some of the buyers in the market. See, e. g., International Salt; Northern Pacific; United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U. S. 38 (1962). As we said in the Loew’s case, 371 U. S., at 45: “Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic power may be inferred from the tying product’s desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes.”
These decisions rejecting the need for proof of truly dominant power over the tying product have all been based on a recognition that because tying arrangements generally serve no legitimate business purpose that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive way, the presence of any appreciable restraint on competition provides a sufficient reason for invalidating the tie. Such appreciable restraint results whenever the seller can exert some power over some of the buyers in the market, even if his power is not complete over them and over all other buyers in the market. In fact, complete dominance throughout the market, the concept that the District Court apparently had in mind, would never exist even under a pure monopoly. Market power is usually stated to be the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output, for reduced output is the almost inevitable result of higher prices. Even a complete monopolist can seldom raise his price without losing some sales; many buyers will cease to buy the product, or buy less, as the price rises. Market power is therefore a source of serious concern for essentially the same reason, regardless of whether the seller has the greatest economic power possible or merely some lesser degree of appreciable economic power. In both instances, despite the freedom of some or many buyers from the seller’s power, other buyers — whether few or many, whether scattered throughout the market or part of some group within the market— can be forced to accept the higher price because of their stronger preferences for the product, and the seller could therefore choose instead to force them to accept a tying arrangement that would prevent free competition for their patronage in the market for the tied product. Accordingly, the proper focus of concern is whether the seller has the power to raise prices, or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable number of buyers within the market.
The affidavits put forward by petitioner clearly entitle it to its day in court under this standard. A construction company president stated that competitors of U. S. Steel sold prefabricated houses and built conventional homes for at least $400 less than U. S. Steel’s price for comparable models. Since in a freely competitive situation buyers would not accept a tying arrangement obligating them to buy a tied product at a price higher than the going market rate, this substantial price differential with respect to the tied product (prefabricated houses) in itself may suggest that respondents had some special economic power in the credit market. In addition, petitioner’s president, A. B. Fortner, stated that he accepted the tying condition on respondents’ loan solely because the offer to provide 100% financing, lending an amount equal to the full purchase price of the land to be acquired, was unusually and uniquely advantageous to him. He found that no such financing was available to his corporation on any such cheap terms from any other source during the 1959-1962 period. His views on this were supported by the president of a finance company in the Louisville area, who stated in an affidavit that the type of advantageous financing plan offered by U. S. Steel “was not available to Fortner Enterprises or any other potential borrower from or through Louisville Mortgage Service Company or from or through any other lending institution or mortgage company to this affiant’s knowledge during this period.”
We do not mean to accept petitioner’s apparent argument that market power can be inferred simply because the kind of financing terms offered by a lending company are “unique and unusual.” We do mean, however, that uniquely and unusually advantageous terms can reflect a creditor’s unique economic advantages over his competitors. Since summary judgment in antitrust cases is disfavored, Poller, supra, the claims of uniqueness in this case should be read in the light most favorable to petitioner. They could well mean that U. S. Steel’s subsidiary Credit Corp. had a unique economic ability to provide 100% financing at cheap rates. The affidavits show that for a three-to-four-year period no other financial institution in the Louisville area was willing to match the special credit terms and rates of interest available from U. S. Steel. Since the possibility of a decline in property values, along with the difficulty of recovering full market value in a foreclosure sale, makes it desirable for a creditor to obtain collateral greater in value than the loan it secures, the unwillingness of competing financial institutions in the area to offer 100% financing probably reflects their feeling that they could not profitably lend money on the risks involved. U. S. Steel’s subsidiary Credit Corp., on the other hand, may well have had a substantial competitive advantage in providing this type of financing because of economies resulting from the nationwide character of its operations. In addition, potential competitors such as banks and savings and loan associations may have been prohibited from offering 100% financing by state or federal law. Under these circumstances the pleadings and affidavits sufficiently disclose the possibility of market power over borrowers in the credit market to entitle petitioner to go to trial on this issue.
It may also be, of course, that these allegations will not be sustained when the case goes to trial. It may turn out that the arrangement involved here serves legitimate business purposes and that U. S. Steel’s subsidiary does not have a competitive advantage in the credit market. But on the record before us it would be impossible to reach such conclusions as a matter of law, and it is not our function to speculate as to the ultimate findings of fact. We therefore conclude that the showing made by petitioner was sufficient on the market power issue.
Brief consideration should also be given to respondents’ additional argument that even if their unique kind of financing reflected economic power in the credit market, and even if a substantial volume of commerce was affected, the arrangement involving credit should not be held illegal under normal tie-in principles. In support of this, respondents suggest that every sale on credit in effect involves a tie. They argue that the offering of favorable credit terms is simply a form of price competition equivalent to the offering of a comparable reduction in the cash price of the tied product. Consumers should not, they say, be deprived of such advantageous services, and they suffer no harm because they can buy the tangible product with credit obtained elsewhere if the combined price of the seller’s credit-product package is less favorable than the cost of purchasing the components separately.
All of respondents’ arguments amount essentially to the same claim — namely, that this opinion will somehow prevent those who manufacture goods from ever selling them on credit. But our holding in this case will have no such effect. There is, at the outset of every tie-in case, including the familiar cases involving physical goods, the problem of determining whether two separate products are in fact involved. In the usual sale on credit the seller, a single individual or corporation, simply makes an agreement determining when and how much he will be paid for his product. In such a sale the credit may constitute such an inseparable part of the purchase price for the item that the entire transaction could be considered to involve only a single product. It will be time enough to pass on the issue of credit sales when a case involving it actually arises. Sales such as that are a far cry from the arrangement involved here, where the credit is provided by one corporation on condition that a product be purchased from a separate corporation, and where the borrower contracts to obtain a large sum of money over and above that needed to pay the seller for the physical products purchased. Whatever the standards for determining exactly when a transaction involves only a “single product,” we cannot see how an arrangement such as that present in this case could ever be said to involve only a single product.
Nor does anything in respondents’ arguments serve to distinguish credit from other kinds of goods and services, all of which may, when used as tying products, extend the seller’s economic power to new markets and foreclose competition in the tied product. The asserted business justifications for a tie of credit are not essentially different from the justifications that can be advanced when the tying product is some other service or commodity. Although advantageous credit terms may be viewed as a form of price competition in the tied product, so is the offer of any other tying product on advantageous terms. In both instances, the seller can achieve his alleged purpose, without extending his economic power, by simply reducing the price of the tied product itself.
The potential harm is also essentially the same when the tying product is credit. The buyer may have the choice of buying the tangible commodity separately, but as in other cases the seller can use his power over the tying product to win customers that would otherwise have constituted a market available to competing producers of the tied product. “ [C] ompetition on the merits with respect to the tied product is inevitably curbed.” Northern Pacific, 356 U. S., at 6. Nor can it be assumed that because the product involved is money needed to finance a purchase, the buyer would not have been able to purchase from anyone else without the seller’s attractive credit. A buyer might have a strong preference for a seller’s credit because it would eliminate the need for him to lay out personal funds, borrow from relatives, put up additional collateral, or obtain guarantors, but any of these expedients might have been chosen to finance a purchase from a competing producer if the seller had not captured the sale by means of his tying arrangement.
In addition, barriers to entry in the market for the tied product are raised since, in order to sell to certain buyers, a new company not only must be able to manufacture the tied product but also must have sufficient financial strength to offer credit comparable to that provided by larger competitors under tying arrangements. If the larger companies have achieved economies of scale in their credit operations, they can of course exploit these economies legitimately by lowering their credit charges to consumers who purchase credit only, but economies in financing should not, any more than economies in other lines of business, be used to exert economic power over other products that the company produces no more efficiently than its competitors.
For all these reasons we can find no basis for treating credit differently in principle from other goods and services. Although money is a fungible commodity — like wheat or, for that matter, unfinished steel — credit markets, like other markets, are often imperfect, and it is easy to see how a big company with vast sums of money in its treasury could wield very substantial power in a credit market. Where this is true, tie-ins involving credit can cause all the evils that the antitrust laws have always been intended to prevent, crippling other companies that are equally, if not more, efficient in producing their own products. Therefore, the same inquiries must be made as to economic power over the tying product and substantial effect in the tied market, but where these factors are present no special treatment can be justified solely because credit, rather than some other product, is the source of the tying leverage used to restrain competition.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to let this suit proceed to trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Since the loan agreements obligated petitioner to erect houses manufactured by TJ. S. Steel on the land acquired, the trial judge thought the relevant foreclosure was the percentage of the undeveloped land in the county that was no longer open for sites on which homes made by competing producers could be built. This apparently was an insignificant .00032%. But of course the availability of numerous vacant lots on which houses might legally be erected would be small consolation to competing producers once the economic demand for houses had been pre-empted by respondents. It seems plain that the most significant percentage figure with reference to the tied product is the percentage of annual sales of houses, or prefabricated houses, in the area that was foreclosed to other competitors by the tying arrangement.
Uniqueness confers economic power only when other competitors are in some way prevented from offering the distinctive product themselves. Such barriers may be legal, as in the case of patented and copyrighted products, e. g., International Salt; Loew’s, or physical, as when the product is land, e. g., Northern Pacific. It is true that the barriers may also be economic, as when competitors are simply unable to produce the distinctive product profitably, but the uniqueness test in such situations is somewhat confusing since the real source of economic power is not the product itself but rather the seller’s cost advantage in producing it.
See, e. g., Federal Reserve Act § 24, 38 Stat. 273, as amended, 12 U. S. C. §371; 12 CFR §545.6-14 (c).
Cf. Perma Life Mufflers, 392 U. S., at 141-142; Timken Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 593, 598 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U. S. 211, 215 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218, 227 (1947).
Where price reductions on the tied product are made difficult in practice by the structure of that market, the seller can still achieve his alleged objective by offering other kinds of fringe benefits over which he has no economic power.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner brought this suit under the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C.- § 688, and recovered judgment after a jury trial. He was employed as mate on respondent’s barge. On the day prior to the injury the barge came to respondent’s repair yard to have a cargo pump fixed. At this repair yard respondent maintained' a covered lighter, known as the Winisook, which was used as a work barge. Its inshore side was connected with the dock by a plank runway. Between the Winisook and the dock was a raft used for chipping, painting, and welding on such barges as might need that service. The barge on which petitioner worked was not at this time being serviced by the raft. But the raft had been used in repair work on thé barge at other times and now needed new decking.
The barge was moored to adjoin the open water side of the Winisook, the crew of the barge using a catwalk around the sides of the Winisook whenever they left or boarded the barge. The morning after the barge was moored, petitioner’s supervisor ordered him to lay some decking on the raft, as petitioner had experience as a carpenter. Petitioner accordingly prepared to go to work on this new job assignment. As he was standing on the catwalk, preparatory to starting his work, releasing a line on the raft to permit him to maneuver it into place so he could board it, the catwalk gave way, causing the injury. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for - petitioner. 263 F. 2d 147. We granted the petition for certiorari because that decision seemed to be out of line with the authorities. 359 U. S. 952.
In O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Co., 318 U. S. 36, a seaman was allowed to recover under the Jones Act even though he was injured on shore. The seaman was a deckhand. The ship was discharging her cargo through a conduit that was connected at its outer end to a land pipe by means of a gasket. • The seaman in question' was ordered by the master to go ashore to assist in repairing the gasket. While so engaged, he was injured by reason of the negligence of a fellow employee. We held that the words “in the course of his employment”, as used in the Jones Act were not restricted to injuries occurring on navigable waters, that they were broadly used by Congress in support of “all .the constitutional power it possessed,” id., at 39, and that it was constitutionally permissible for Congress to supplement the remedy of maintenance and cure by extending a right of recovery in trial by jury to a seaman injured “while in the service of his vessel by negligence.” Id., at 43.
The test, as the O’Donnell case holds, is not whether the injury occurred on navigable waters, for that had been applied by the lower court, id., at 38, which we reversed. Rather it is whether the seaman was injured by negligence while “in the course of his employment.”
The injured party must of course have “status as a member of the vessel” for it is seamen, not others who may work on the vessel (Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U. S. 1, 4), to whom Congress extended the protection of the Jones Act. Niee questions often arise concerning the status of particular workmen and whether their duties give them the status óf “seamen” as that word is used in the Act. Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U. S. 187. And see Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U. S. 879, reversing 222 F. 2d 382; Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U. S. 370; Butler v. Whiteman, 356 U. S. 271. The court below apparently thought that at the moment petitioner was injured he was not a “seaman”; and that conclusion apparently turned on its view that to be such he had to be engaged at the time of the injury in work which was in furtherance of the navigation of the vessel. The court, indeed, held it error not to have given instructions to that effect.
At times the work done by an employee will be crucial in determining what his status is for purposes of recovery. South Chicago Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251, 260; Swanson v. Marra Bros., supra; Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., supra; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. O’Rourke, 344 U. S. 334; Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 356 U. S. 252; Butler v. Whiteman, supra. Those cases, however, are not relevant to our present''problem since the question whether petitioner’s duties on the.raft assignment were of the . type to bring one not otherwise a member of a ship’s crew within the scope of the Act is not presented in this case. Here we start with an employee who had the status of mate. The issue is whether petitioner, a mate and therefore a “seaman,” was injured “in the course of his employment.” We conclude that he was.
The fact that the injury did not occur on the vessel is not controlling, as Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., supra, 373, holds. A “seaman” may often be sent off ship to perform duties of his employment. O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Co., supra. In Marceau v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 146 F. 2d 416, a ship’s cook was allowed to recover under the Jones Act when, pursuant to duty, he was returning to the ship and was injured on the dock while approaching a ladder used as ingress to the vessel.
We held that a seaman who was injured on the dock while departing from the ship on shore leave was in the service óf the vessel and was entitled to recover for maintenance and curé in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U. S. 724. It was there recognized that a seaman is as much in the service of his ship when boarding it on first reporting for duty, quitting it on being discharged, or going to and from the ship while on shore leave, as he is while on board at high sea. Id., at 736-737. We also held that a seaman injured in a dance hall while on shore leave was in the service of his ship in Warren v. United States, 340 U. S. 523, 529. These two cases were not brought under the Jones Act but involved maintenance and cure. Yet they make clear that the scope of a seaman’s employment or the activities which are related to the furtherance of the vessel are not measured by the standard's applied to land-based employment relationships. They also supply relevant guides to the meaning of the term “course of employment” .'under the Act since it is the equivalent of the “service of the ship” formula used in maintenance and cure cases. See Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, p. 284, And see O’Donnell v. Great Lakes, Co., supra, at 43; Marceau v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., supra.
Petitioner in the present case was ordered by a superior to perform some carpentry work on a raft which lay between the lighter and the dock. Petitioner was injured, as we have said, while on- the catwalk attempting to move the’raft into position for boarding. ■ The raft was used to facilitate chipping, painting and welding on respondent’s vessels. Cf. Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469. New decking was to be installed on the raft. The fact that the raft was not presently being used, to repair respondent’s barge is in our view immaterial. Petitioner- was acting “in the course of his employment” at the time of the injury, for at that moment he was doing the work of his employer pursuant to his employer’s orders. No more is required by the Jones Act, as the O’Donnell case indicates, petitioner being a seaman who was injured as' a consequence of the negligence of his employer.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the District Court is reinstated.
So ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mb. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are present and former members of the United States Maritime Commission. Respondents are stockholders of Dollar Steamship Lines, Inc., Ltd. (Dollar of Delaware), whose corporate name was changed to American President Lines, Ltd., subsequent to the execution in 1938 of a contract out of which the present litigation arises. By 1937 Dollar of Delaware was in difficult financial straits. The problems confronting it and the various steps taken to remedy the situation need not be recapitulated here. It is sufficient for purposes of the various questions presented by this case to say that the Commission and respondents entered into a contract in 1938 by which respondents delivered their common stock in Dollar of Delaware, endorsed in blank, to the Commission; and the Commission released some of respondents from certain obligations and agreed to grant Dollar of Delaware an operating subsidy and to make a loan to it and to obtain for it another loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
The subsidy was granted and the loans were made. By 1943 American President Lines, Ltd., had fully paid all indebtedness due the United States. Respondents thereupon demanded return of their shares of stock from the then members of the Commission, claiming that the shares had only been pledged as collateral for a debt which had been paid. The members of the Commission refused to surrender the shares, claiming that they had not been pledged under the 1938 contract but transferred outright. Acting on that theory the Commission had indeed offered the shares for sale and had under consideration substantial offers to purchase them.
Thereupon respondents instituted the present suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia, see 11 D. C. Code, §§ 301, 305, 306, claiming that petitioners were unlawfully in possession of respondents’ stock and illegally withholding it. The prayer was that petitioners be restrained from selling the shares and be directed to return them to respondents. Respondents moved for a preliminary injunction. Petitioners submitted affidavits opposing the motion. After a hearing, the District Court on its own motion dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that .the suit was against the United States. The Court of Appeals reversed. 81 U. S. App. D. C. 28, 154 F. 2d 307. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the question presented.
First. The facts asserted in the affidavits support the view that the 1938 contract called for the outright transfer of the shares, not for their pledge. But we put the affidavits to one side for two reasons. In the first place, the function of the affidavits was to oppose the motion for a preliminary injunction. The case had not been submitted for decision on the merits. Issue, indeed, had not yet been joined. And the ruling of the District Court, as we read it, was based on the premise that since the Commission had the right to make the contract, the suit was against the United States. Hence we do not think the District Court in fact relied on the affidavits in dismissing the complaint. In the second place, although as a general rule the District Court would have authority to consider questions of jurisdiction on the basis of affidavits as well as the pleadings, this is the type of case where the question of jurisdiction is dependent on decision of the merits.
The allegations of the complaint, if proved, would establish that petitioners are unlawfully withholding respondents’ property under the claim that it belongs to the United States. That conclusion would follow if either of respondents’ contentions were established: (1) that the Commission had no authority to purchase the shares or acquire them outright; or (2) that, even though such authority existed, the 1938 contract resulted not in an outright transfer but in a pledge of the shares.
If respondents are right in these contentions, their claim rests on their right under general law to recover possession of specific property wrongfully withheld. At common law their suit as pledgors to recover the pledged property on payment of the debt would sound in tort.
If viewed in that posture, the case is very close to United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196. That was an action in ejectment to recover possession of a tract of land. The defendants were military officers who, acting under orders of the President, took possession of the land and converted one part into a fort and another into a cemetery. For the lawfulness of their possession they relied on a tax sale of the property to the United States. On the trial it was held that the claim of the plaintiffs to the land was valid and that the defendants were wrongfully in possession. The Court affirmed the judgment over the objection that the suit was one against the United States. It held that the assertion by officers of the Government of their authority to act did not foreclose judicial inquiry into the lawfulness of their action; that a determination of whether their “authority is rightfully assumed is the exercise of jurisdiction, and must lead to the decision of the merits of the question.” P. 219. It further held that while such an adjudication is not res judicata against the United States because it cannot be made a party to the suit, the courts have jurisdiction to resolve the controversy between those who claim possession. And it concluded that an agent or officer of the United States who acts beyond his authority is answerable for his actions. And see Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 619-620; Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 567.
Where the right to possession or enjoyment of property under general law is in issue, and the defendants claim as officers or agents' of the sovereign, the rule of United States v. Lee, supra, has been repeatedly approved. Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446, 452; Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 439; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 152-153; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, supra, pp. 619-620; Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U. S. 536, 545; Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82, 96; Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 50-51. That rule is applicable here although we assume that record title to the shares is in the Commission. In United States v. Lee, supra, record title of the land was in the United States and its officers were in possession. The force of the decree in that case was to grant possession to the private claimant. Though the judgment was not res judicata against the United States, p. 222, it settled as between the parties the controversy over possession. Precisely the same will be true here, if we assume the allegations of the complaint are proved. For if we view the case in its posture before the District Court, petitioners, being members of the Commission, were in position to restore possession of the shares which they unlawfully held.
We do not trace the principle of United States v. Lee, supra, in its various ramifications. Cases on which petitioners rely are distinguishable. This is not an indirect attempt to collect a debt from the United States by preventing action of government officials which would alter or terminate the contractual obligation of the United States to pay money. See Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335; Mine Safety Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371. It is not an attempt to get specific performance of a contract to deliver property of the United States. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U. S. 218. It is not a case where the sovereign admittedly has title to property and is sued by those who seek to compel a conveyance or to enjoin disposition of the property, the adverse claims being based on an allegedly superior equity or on rights arising under Acts of Congress. Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., supra; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373; Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60; Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 473; Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U. S. 70; Morrison v. Work, 266 U. S. 481. And see Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255, 271-272.
We say the foregoing cases are distinguishable from the present one, though as a matter of logic it is not easy to reconcile all of them. But the rule is based on practical considerations reflected in the policy which forbids suits against the sovereign without its consent. The “essential nature and effect of the proceeding” may be such as to make plain that the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration. Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 500, 502. If so, the suit is one against the sovereign. Mine Safety Co. v. Forrestal, supra, p. 374. But public officials may become tort-feasors by exceeding the limits of their authority. And where they unlawfully seize or hold a citizen’s realty or chattels, recoverable by appropriate action at law or in equity, he is not relegated to the Court of Claims to recover a money judgment. The dominant interest of the sovereign is then on the side of the victim who may bring his possessory action to reclaim that which is wrongfully withheld.
It is in the latter category that the pleadings have cast this case. That is to say, if the allegations of the petition are true, the shares of stock never were property of the United States and are being wrongfully withheld by petitioners who acted in excess of their authority as public officers. If ownership of the shares is in the United States, suit to recover them would of course be a suit against the United States. But if it is decided on the merits either that the contract was illegal or that respondents are pledgors, they are entitled to possession of the shares as against petitioners, though, as we have said, the judgment would not be res judicata as against the United States. See United States v. Lee, supra, p. 222.
We intimate no opinion on the merits of the controversy. We only hold that the District Court has jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction by proceeding to a decision on the merits.
Second. Motions were made by the Solicitor General to substitute as defendants the new members of the Commission for those who are no longer members. We added the new members as petitioners-defendants, and dismissed as to a deceased member, but reserved decision as to the other former members. A majority of those joining in this opinion are of the view that it is more appropriate that both motions be considered by the District Court. The questions have not been briefed or argued here. Moreover, the present record may not present all the facts necessary for disposition of the motions. Accordingly, we vacate the order of substitution which we entered, so that the District Court may, on remand of the cause, pass on the motions unembarrassed by any action here.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The details of the difficulties, and the steps taken to remedy them are contained in two reports to Congress by the Commission: (1) Financial Readjustments in Dollar Steamship Lines, Inc., Ltd., dated February 17, 1938; (2) Reorganization of American President Lines, Ltd., dated April 10, 1939.
Although the judgment below was not a final one, we considered it appropriate for review because it involved an issue “fundamental to the further conduct of the case.” United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 377.
The District Court said: "... I think . . . that the Commission had the legal right; and therefore I think it is inescapable that this is a suit against the United States and therefore that the complaint must be dismissed . . .
In passing on a motion to dismiss because the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the facts set forth in the complaint are assumed to be true and affidavits and other evidence produced on application for a preliminary injunction may not be considered. Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U. S. 5, 9; Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66, 76. But when a question of the District Court’s jurisdiction is raised, either by a party or by the court on its own motion, Judicial Code § 37, 28 U. S. C. § 80, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b), the court may inquire, by affidavits or otherwise, into the facts as they exist. Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U. S. 115, 120-121; McNutt v. General Motors Corp., 298 U. S. 178, 184 et seq.; KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U. S. 269, 278. As stated in Gibbs v. Buck, supra, pp. 71-72, “As there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court.”
Restatement of the Law of Torts, §§ 223, 237; 3 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (1906), p. 160.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 (d); Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 444-445.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The petitions for certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is set aside with direction to that court to enter a new judgment consistent with this opinion.
The Regional Director of the Second Region of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing upon a charge filed by the International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (IUE). The charge alleged that General Electric Company violated §§ 8 (a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(1) and (5), in refusing to bargain upon the renewal of an expiring collective bargaining agreement because of “the inclusion among the persons designated by the Union to represent it ... of persons who also represented other labor organizations which engaged in collective bargaining with” the company. Pursuant to § 10 (j) of the Act the Regional Director also obtained a temporary injunction in the District Court for the Southern District of New York restraining the company from “[fjailing or refusing to meet, confer and bargain collectively in good faith with . . . [IUE], by declining to meet with the selected representatives of . . . [IUE] because of the presence of any representatives of other unions whom IUE and its constituent locals have invited to attend for the purpose of participating in the discussion and advising ór consulting with IUE and its constituent locals.” The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 366 F. 2d 847. Mr. Justice Harlan stayed the Court of Appeals’ judgment pending action on the petition for writ of certiorari filed in No. 645.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals differed regarding the proper standard which should be determinative of the right to injunctive relief under § 10 (j). The District Court applied a dual test: (1) whether “the impact upon the public interest is grave enough to justify swifter corrective action than the normal process of Board adjudication and court enforcement,” 257 F. Supp. 690, 708, and (2) “whether the Board has ‘reasonable cause to believe’ that the accused party has been guilty of unfair labor practices.” 257 F. Supp., at 709. The Court of Appeals on the other hand considered the proper standard to be whether the Board had “demonstrated that an injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo or to prevent any irreparable harm.” 366 F. 2d, at 850.
We do not think it appropriate however to decide at this time the proper construction of § 10 (j). For on October 14, 1966, after the decision of the Court of Appeals, the company and IUE agreed upon a three-year collective bargaining agreement to replace the expired contract. We think th$t the District Court should determine in the first instance the effect of this supervening event upon the appropriateness of injunctive relief. The controversy over the proper standard for injunctive relief is immaterial if such relief is now improper whichever standard is applied. We therefore dissolve the stay granted by Mr. Justice Harlan and set.aside the judgment of the Court of Appeals with direction to enter a new judgment setting aside the order of the District Court and remanding to that court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate in light of the supervening event. See Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U. S. 263; Scranton v. Drew, 379 U. S. 40.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
An amendment to a Texas statute that went into effect on September 1, 1993, authorized conviction of certain sexual offenses on the victim’s testimony alone. The previous statute required the victim’s testimony plus other corroborating evidence to convict the offender. The question presented is whether that amendment may be applied in a trial for offenses committed before the amendment’s effective date without violating the constitutional prohibition against state ex post facto” laws.
I
In 1996, a Texas grand jury returned a 15-count indictment charging petitioner with various sexual offenses against his stepdaughter. The alleged conduct took place over more than four years, from February 1991 to March 1995, when the victim was 12 to 16 years old. The conduct ceased after the victim told her mother what had happened. Petitioner was convicted on all 15 counts. The two most serious counts charged him with aggravated sexual assault, and petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment on those two counts. For each of the other 13 offenses (5 counts of sexual assault and 8 counts of indecency with a child), petitioner received concurrent sentences of 20 years.
Until September 1, 1993, the following statute was in effect in Texas:
“A conviction under Chapter 21, Section 22.011, or Section 22.021, Penal Code, is supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual offense if the victim informed any person, other than the defendant, of the alleged offense within six months after the date on which the offense is alleged to have occurred. The requirement that the victim inform another person of an alleged offense does not apply if the victim was younger than 14 years of age at the time of the alleged offense.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann,, Art. 38.07 (Vernon 1983).
We emphasize three features of this law that are critical to petitioner’s case.
The first is the so-called “outcry or corroboration” requirement. Under that provision, a victim’s testimony can support a conviction for the specified offenses only if (1) that testimony is corroborated by other evidence, or (2) the victim informed another person of the offense within six months of its occurrence (an “outcry”). The second feature is the “child victim” provision, which is an exception to the outcry or corroboration requirement. According to this provision, if the victim was under 14 years old at the time of the alleged offense, the outcry or corroboration requirement does not apply and the victim’s testimony alone can support a conviction — even without any corroborating evidence or outcry. The third feature is that Article 38.07 establishes a suffi-eiency of the evidence rule respecting the minimum quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a conviction. If the statute’s requirements are not met (for example, by introducing only the uncorroborated testimony of a 15-year-old victim who did not make a timely outcry), a defendant cannot be convicted, and the court must enter a judgment of acquittal. See Leday v. State, 983 S. W. 2d 713, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Scoggan v. State, 799 S. W. 2d 679, 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Conversely, if the requirements are satisfied, a conviction, in the words of the statute, “is supportable,” and the case may be submitted to the jury and a conviction sustained. See Vickery v. State, 566 S. W. 2d 624, 626-627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); see also Burnham v. State, 821 S. W. 2d 1, 3 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
Texas amended Article 38.07, effective September 1,1993. The amendment extended the child victim exception to victims under 18 years old. For four of petitioner’s counts, that amendment was critical. The “outcry or corroboration” requirement was not satisfied for those convictions; they rested solely on the victim’s testimony. Accordingly, the verdicts on those four counts stand or fall depending on whether the child victim exception applies. Under the old law, the exception would not apply, because the victim was more than 14 years old at the time of the alleged offenses. Under the new law, the exception would apply, because the victim was under 18 years old at that time. In short, the validity of four of petitioner’s convictions depends on whether the old or new law applies to his case, which, in turn, depends on whether the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the application of the new version of Article 38.07 to his case.
As mentioned, only 4 of petitioner’s 15 total convictions are implicated by the amendment to Article 38.07; the other 11 counts — including the 2 convictions for which petitioner received life sentences — are uncontested. Six counts are uncontested because they were committed when the victim was under 14 years old, so his convictions stand even under the old law; the other five uncontested counts were committed after the new Texas law went into effect, so there could be no ex post facto claim as to those convictions. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 31 (1981) (“The critical question [for an ex post facto violation] is whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date”)- What are at stake, then, are the four convictions on counts 7 through 10 for offenses committed between June 1992 and July 1993 when the victim was 14 or 15 years old and the new Texas law was not in effect.
Petitioner appealed his four convictions to the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas in Fort Worth. See 963 S. W. 2d 833 (1998). Petitioner argued that under the pre-1993 version of Article 38.07, which was the law in effect at the time of his alleged conduct, those convictions could not stand, because they were based solely on the victim’s testimony, and the victim was not under 14 years old at the time of the offenses, nor had she made a timely outcry.
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s argument. Under the 1993 amendment to Article 38.07, the court observed, petitioner could be convicted on the victim’s testimony alone because she was under 18 years old at the time of the offenses. The court held that applying this amendment retrospectively to petitioner’s case did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause:
“The statute as amended does not increase the punishment nor change the elements of the offense that the State must prove. It merely ‘removes existing restrictions upon the competency of certain classes of persons as witnesses’ and is, thus, a rule of procedure. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 590... (1884).” Id., at 836.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied discretionary review. Because the question whether the retrospective application of a statute repealing a corroboration requirement has given rise to conflicting decisions, we granted petitioner’s pro se petition for certiorari, 527 U. S. 1002 (1999), and appointed counsel, id., at 1051.
II
To prohibit legislative Acts contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to every principle of sound legislation,” the Framers included provisions they considered to be “perhaps greater securities to liberty and republicanism than any [the Constitution] contains.” The provisions declare:
“No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts... U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10.
The proscription against ex post facto laws “necessarily requires some explanation; for, naked and without explanation, it is unintelligible, and means nothing.” Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798) (Chase, J.). In Calder v. Bull, Justice Chase stated that the necessary explanation is derived from English common law well known to the Framers: “The expressions ‘ex post facto laws,’ are technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by Legislators, Lawyers, and Authors.” Id., at 391; see also id., at 389 (“The prohibition... very probably arose from the knowledge, that the Parliament of Great Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass such laws...”); id., at 396 (Paterson, J.). Specifically, the phrase “ex post facto” referred only to certain types of criminal laws. Justice Chase cataloged those types as follows:
“I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.” Id., at 390 (emphasis in original).
It is the fourth category that is at issue in petitioner’s case.
The common-law understanding explained by Justice Chase drew heavily upon the authoritative exposition of one of the great scholars of the common law, Richard Wooddeson. See id., at 391 (noting reliance on Wooddeson’s treatise). Woóddeson’s classification divided ex post facto laws into three general categories: those respecting the crimes themselves; those respecting the legal rules of evidence; and those affecting punishment (which he further subdivided into laws creating a punishment and those making an existing punishment more severe). See 2 R. Wooddeson, A Systematical View of the Laws of England 625-640 (1792) (Lecture 41) (hereinafter Wooddeson). Those three categories (the last of which was further subdivided) correlate precisely to Calder’s four categories. Justice Chase also used language in describing the categories that corresponds directly to Wooddeson’s phrasing. Finally, in four footnotes in Justice Chase’s opinion, he listed examples of various Acts of Parliament illustrating each of the four categories. See 3 Dali., at 389, nn. *, †, ‡, ||. Each of these examples is exactly the same as the ones Wooddeson himself used in his treatise. See 2 Wooddeson 629 (case of the Earl of Strafford); id., at 634 (ease of Sir John Fenwick); id., at 638 (banishments of Lord Clarendon and of Bishop Atter-bury); id., at 639 (Coventry Act).
Calder’s four categories, which embraced Wooddeson’s formulation, were, in turn, soon embraced by contemporary scholars. Joseph Story, for example, in writing on the Ex Post Facto Clause, stated:
“The general interpretation has been, and is,... that the prohibition reaches every law, whereby an act is declared a crime, and made punishable as such, when it was not a crime, when done; or whereby the act, if a crime, is aggravated in enormity, or punishment; or whereby different, or less evidence, is required to convict an offender, than was required, when the act was committed.” 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1339, p. 212 (1833).
James Kent concurred in this understanding of the Clause:
“[T]he words ex post facto laws were technical expressions, and meant every law that made an act done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; or which aggravated a crime, and made it greater than it was when committed; or which changed the punishment, and inflicted a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; or which altered the legal rules of evidence, and received less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.” 1 Commentaries on American Law 408 (3d ed. 1836) (Lecture 19).
This Court, moreover, has repeatedly endorsed this understanding, including, in particular, the fourth category (sometimes quoting Chase’s words verbatim, sometimes simply paraphrasing). See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U. S. 433, 441, n. 13 (1997); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 293 (1977); Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U. S. 180, 183-184 (1915); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589, 593-594 (1901); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 382, 387 (1898); Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189, 201 (1898) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 589-590 (1896); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 382 (1894); Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 589 (1884); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 228 (1883), overruled on other grounds, Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37 (1990); Gut v. State, 9 Wall. 35, 38 (1870); Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 390-391 (1867) (Miller, J., dissenting); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325-326, 328 (1867). State courts, too, in the years following Colder, adopted Justice Chase’s four-category formulation. See Boston & Gunby v. Cummins, 16 Ga. 102, 106 (1854); Martindale v. Moore, 3 Blackf. 275, 277 (Ind. 1833); Davis v. Ballard, 24 Ky. 563, 578 (1829); Strong v. State, 1 Blackf. 193, 196 (Ind. 1822); Dickinson v. Dickinson, 7 N. C. 327, 330 (1819); see also Woart v. Winnick, 3 N. H. 473, 475 (Super. Ct. 1826).
III
As mentioned earlier, Justice Chase and Wooddeson both cited several examples of ex post facto laws, and, in particular, cited the case of Sir John Fenwick as an example of the fourth category. To better understand the type of law that falls within that category, then, we turn to Fenwick’s case for preliminary guidance.
Those who remained loyal to James II after he was deposed by King William III in the Revolution of 1688 thought their opportunity for restoration had arrived in 1695, following the death of Queen Mary. 9 T. Macaulay, History of England 31 (1899) (hereinafter Maeaulay). Sir John Fen-wick, along with other Jacobite plotters including George Porter and Cardell Goodman, began concocting their scheme in the spring of that year, and over the next several months the original circle of conspirators expanded in number. Id., at 32, 47-48, 109-110. Before the conspirators could carry out their machinations, however, three members of the group disclosed the plot to William. Id., at 122-125. One by one, the participants were arrested, tried, and convicted of treason. Id., at 127-142. Fenwick, though, remained in hiding while the rest of the cabal was brought to justice. During that time, the trials of his accomplices revealed that there were only two witnesses among them who could prove Fenwick’s guilt, Porter and Goodman. Id., at 170-171. As luck would have it, an act of Parliament proclaimed that two witnesses were necessary to convict a person of high treason. See An Act for Regulateing of Tryals in Cases of Treason and Misprision of Treason, 7 & 8 Will. Ill, ch. 3, § 2 (1695-1696), in 7 Statutes of the Realm 6 (reprint 1963). Thus, Fenwick knew that if he could induce either Porter or Goodman to abscond, the case against him would vanish. 9 Macaulay 171.
Fenwick first tried his hand with Porter. Fenwick sent his agent to attempt a bribe, which Porter initially accepted in exchange for leaving for France. But then Porter simply pocketed the bribe, turned in Fenwick's agent (who was promptly tried, convicted, and pilloried), and proceeded to testify against Fenwick (along with Goodman) before a grand jury. Id., at 171-173. When the grand jury returned an indictment for high treason, Fenwick attempted to flee the country himself, but was apprehended and brought before the Lord Justices in London. Sensing an impending conviction, Fenwick threw himself on the mercy of the court and offered to disclose all he knew of the Jacobite plotting, aware all the while that the judges would soon leave the city for their circuits, and a delay would thus buy him a few weeks time. Id., at 173-174.
Fenwick was granted time to write up his confession, but rather than betray true Jacobites, he concocted a confession calculated to accuse those loyal to William, hoping to introduce embarrassment and perhaps a measure of instability to the current regime. Id., at 175-178. William, however, at once perceived Fenwick’s design and rejected the confession, along with any expectation of mercy. Id., at 178-180, 194. Though his contrived ploy for leniency was unsuccessful in that respect, it proved successful in another: during the delay, Fenwick’s wife had succeeded in bribing Goodman, the other witness against him, to leave the country. Id., at 194-195.
Without a second witness, Fenwick could not be convicted of high treason under the statute mentioned earlier. For all his plotting, however, Fenwick was not to escape. After Goodman’s absence was discovered, the House of Commons met and introduced a bill of attainder against Fenwick to correct the situation produced by the combination of bribery and the two-witness law. Id., at 198-199. A lengthy debate ensued, during which the Members repeatedly discussed whether the two-witness rule should apply. Ultimately, the bill passed by a close vote of 189 to 156, id., at 210, notwithstanding the objections of Members who (foreshadowing Colder’s fourth category) complained that Fenwick was being attainted “upon less Evidence” than would be required under the two-witness law, and despite the repeated importuning against the passing of an ex post facto law. The bill then was taken up and passed by the House of Lords, and the King gave his assent. Id., at 214-225; see also An Act to Attaint Sir John Fenwick Baronet of High Treason, 8 Will. Ill, ch. 4 (1696). On January 28,1697, Sir John Fenwick was beheaded. 9 Macaulay 226-227.
> b-H
Article 38.07 is unquestionably a law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.” Under the law in effect at the time the acts were committed, the prosecution’s case was legally insufficient and petitioner was entitled to a judgment of acquittal, unless the State could produce both the victim’s testimony and corroborative evidence. The amended law, however, changed the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a conviction; under the new law, petitioner could be (and was) convicted on the victim’s testimony alone, without any corroborating evidence. Under any commonsense understanding of Calder’s fourth category, Article 38.07 plainly fits. Requiring only the victim’s testimony to convict, rather than the victim’s testimony plus other corroborating evidence is surely “less testimony required to convict” in any straightforward sense of those words.
Indeed, the circumstances of petitioner’s case parallel those of Fenwick’s case 300 years earlier. Just as the relevant law in Fenwick’s case required more than one witness’ testimony to support a conviction (namely, the testimony of a second witness), Texas’ old version of Article 38.07 required more than the victim’s testimony alone to sustain a conviction (namely, other corroborating evidence). And just like Fen-wick’s kill of attainder, which permitted the House of Commons to convict him with less evidence than was otherwise required, Texas’ retrospective application of the amendment to Article 38.07 permitted petitioner to be convicted with less than the previously required quantum of evidence. It is true, of course, as the Texas Court of Appeals observed, that “[t]he statute as amended does not increase the punishment nor change the elements of the offense that the State must prove.” 963 S. W. 2d, at 836. But that observation simply demonstrates that the amendment does not fit within Calder’s first and third categories. Likewise, the dissent’s remark that “Article 38.07 does not establish an element of the offense,” post, at 559, only reveals that the law does not come within Calder’s first category. The fact that the amendment authorizes a conviction on less evidence than previously required, however, brings it squarely within the fourth category.
V
The fourth category, so understood, resonates harmoniously with one of the principal interests that the Ex Post Facto Clause was designed to serve, fundamental justice.
Justice Chase viewed all ex post facto laws as “manifestly unjust and oppressive Calder, 3 Dall., at 391. Likewise, Blackstone condemned them as “cruel and unjust,” 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 46 (1765), as did every state constitution with a similar clause, see n. 25, infra. As Justice Washington explained in characterizing “[t]he injustice and tyranny” of ex post facto laws:
“Why did the authors of the constitution turn their attention to this subject, which, at the first blush, would appear to be peculiarly fit to be left to the discretion of those who have the police and good government of the State under their management and control? The only answer to be given is, because laws of this character are oppressive, unjust, and tyrannical; and, as such, are condemned by the universal sentence of civilized man.” Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 266 (1827).
In short, the Ex Post Facto Clause was designed as “an additional bulwark in favour of the personal security of the subject,” Calder, 3 Dall, at 390 (Chase, J.), to protect against “the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny,” The Federalist No. 84, p. 512 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton), that were “often used to effect the most detestable purposes,” Calder, 3 Dall., at 396 (Paterson, J.).
Calder’s fourth category addresses this concern precisely. A law reducing the quantum of evidence required to convict an offender is as grossly unfair as, say, retrospectively eliminating an element of the offense, increasing the punishment for an existing offense, or lowering the burden of proof (see infra, at 540-544). In each of these instances, the government subverts the presumption of innocence by reducing the number of elements it must prove to overcome that presumption; by threatening such severe punishment so as to induce a plea to a lesser offense or a lower sentence; or by making it easier to meet the threshold for overcoming the presumption. Reducing the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof is simply another way of achieving the same end. All of these legislative changes, in a sense, are mirror images of one another. In each instance, the government refuses, after the fact, to play by its own rules, altering them in a way that is advantageous only to the State, to facilitate an easier conviction. There is plainly a fundamental fairness interest, even apart from any claim of reliance or notice, in having the government abide by the rules of law it establishes to govern the circumstances under which it can deprive a person of his or her liberty or life.
Indeed, Fenwick's ease is itself an illustration of this principle. Fenwick could claim no credible reliance interest in the two-witness statute, as he could not possibly have known that only two of his fellow conspirators would be able to testify as to his guilt, nor that he would be successful in bribing one of them to leave the country. Nevertheless, Parliament had enacted the two-witness law, and there was a profound unfairness in Parliament’s retrospectively altering the very rulés it had established, simply because those rules prevented the conviction of the traitor — notwithstanding the fact that Fenwick could not truly claim to be “innocent.” (At least one historian has concluded that his guilt was clearly established, see 9 Macaulay 203-204, and the debate in the House of Commons bears out that conclusion, see, e. g., Proceedings 219,230,246,265,289.) Moreover, the pertinent rule altered in Fenwick’s case went directly to the general issue of guilt, lowering the minimum quantum of evidence required to obtain a conviction. The Framers, quite clearly, viewed such maneuvers as grossly unfair, and adopted the Ex Post Facto Clause accordingly.
<1 W-l
The United States as amicus asks us to revisit the accuracy of the fourth category as an original matter. None of its reasons for abandoning the category is persuasive.
First, pointing to Blackstone’s Commentaries and a handful of state constitutions cited by Justice Chase in Colder, see 3 Dali., at 891-392, the United States asserts that Justice Chase simply got it wrong with his four categories. Blackstone wrote: “There is still a more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws ex post facto; when after an action is committed, the legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it....” 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England, at 46 (emphasis in original). The ex post facto clauses in Ratification-era state constitutions to which Justice Chase cited are of a piece. The United States directs our attention to the fact that none of these definitions mentions Justice Chase’s fourth category.
All of these sources, though, are perfectly consistent with Justice Chase’s first category of ex post facto laws. None of them is incompatible with his four-category formulation, unless we accept the premise that Blackstone and the state constitutions purported to express the exclusive definition of an ex post facto law. Yet none appears to do so on its face. And if those definitions were read as exclusive, the United States’ argument would rim up against a more troubling obstacle, namely, that neither Blackstone nor the state constitutions mention Calder’s third category either (increases in punishment). The United States, in effect, asks us to abandon two of Calder’s categories based on the unsupported supposition that the Blaekstonian and state constitutional definitions were exclusive, and upon the implicit premise that neither Wooddeson, Chase, Story, Kent, nor subsequent courts (state and federal) realized that was so. We think that simply stating the nature of the request demonstrates why it must be rejected.
Next, the United States contends Justice Chase was mistaken to cite the case of Sir John Fenwick as an example of an ex post facto law, because it was actually a bill of attainder. Fenwick was indeed convicted by a bill of attainder, but it does not follow that his ease cannot also be an example of an ex post facto law. Clearly, Wooddeson thought it was, see 2 Wooddeson 641, as did the House of Commons, see n. 19, supra, and we are aware of no rule stating that a single historical event can explain one, but not two, constitutional Clauses (actually, three Clauses, see Art. Ill, § 3 (Treason Clause)). We think the United States’ observation simply underscores the kinship between bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, see Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 468, n. 30 (1977); United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 323 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Z. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, pp. 92-93 (1956) (hereinafter Chafee), which may explain why the Framers twice placed their respective prohibitions adjacent to one another. And if the United States means to argue that category four should be abandoned because its illustrative example was a bill of attainder, this would prove entirely too much, because all of the specific examples listed by Justice Chase were passed as bills of attainder.
Finally, both Texas and the United States argue that we have already effectively cast out the fourth category in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37 (1990). Collins held no such thing. That case began its discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause by quoting verbatim Justice Chase’s “now familiar opinion in Calder” and his four-category definition. Id., at 41-42. After noting that “[e]arly opinions of the Court portrayed this as an exclusive definition of ex post facto laws,” id., at 42, the Court then quoted from our opinion in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167 (1925):
“ ‘It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their citation may be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.’” Collins, 497 U. S., at 42 (quoting Beazell, 269 U. S., at 169-170).
Collins then observed in a footnote: “The Beazell definition omits the reference by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, to alterations in the ‘legal rules of evidence.’ As cases subsequent to Colder make clear, this language was not intended to prohibit the application of new evidentiary rules in trials for crimes committed before the changes.” 497 U. S., at 43, n. 3 (citations omitted). Collins then commented that “[t]he Beazell formulation is faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id., at 43.
It seems most accurate to say that Collins is rather cryptic. While calling Colder’s four categories the “exclusive definition” of ex post facto laws, it also calls Beazell’s definition a “faithful” rendition of the “original understanding” of the Clause, even though that quotation omitted category four. And while Collins quotes a portion of Beazell omitting the fourth category, the immediately preceding paragraph in Beazell explains that the law at issue in that case did not change “[t]he quantum and kind of proof required to establish guilt,” 269 U. S., at 170, a statement distinguishing, rather than overruling, Colder’s fourth category.
If Collins had intended to resurrect a long forgotten original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause shorn of the fourth category, we think it strange that it would have done so in a footnote. Stranger still would be its reliance on a single case from 1925, which did not even implicate, let alone purport to overrule, the fourth category, and which did not even mention Fenwick’s case. But this Court does not discard longstanding precedent in this manner. Further still, Collins itself expressly overruled two of our prior cases; if the Court that day were intent on overruling part of Colder as well, it surely would have said so directly, rather than act in such an ambiguous manner.
The better understanding of Collins’ discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause is that it eliminated a doctrinal hitch that had developed in our cases, which purported to define the scope of the Clause along an axis distinguishing between laws involving “substantial protections" and those that are merely “procedural.” Both Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) — the two cases Collins overruled — relied on just that distinction. In overruling them, the Court correctly pointed out, “the prohibition which may not be evaded is, the one defined by the Colder categories.” 497 U. S., at 46. Accordingly, Collins held that it was a mistake to stray beyond Colder’s four categories, not that the fourth category was itself mistaken.
VII
Texas next argues that even if the fourth category exists, it is limited to laws that retrospectively alter the burden of proof (which Article 38.07 does not do). See also post, at 572 (dissenting opinion). It comes to this conclusion on the basis of two pieces of evidence. The first is our decision in Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867). The second concerns Texas’ historical understanding of Fenwick’s case.
Cummings v. Missouri addressed an ex post facto challenge to certain amendments to the Missouri State Constitution made in 1865. When read together, those amendments listed a series of acts deemed criminal (all dealing with the giving of aid or comfort to anyone engaged in armed hostility against the United States), and then declared that unless a person engaged in certain professions (e. g., lawyers and clergymen) swore an oath of loyalty, he “shall, on conviction [for failing to swear the oath], be punished” by a fine, imprisonment, or both. Id'., at 279-281. We held that these provisions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Writing for the Court, Justice Field first observed that “[b]y an ex post facto law is meant one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed; or changes the rules of evidence by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required.” Id., at 325-326. The Court then held the amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause in all these respects: some of the offenses deemed criminal by the amendments were not criminal acts before then, id., at 327-328; other acts were previously criminal, but now they carried a greater criminal sanction, id
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Linde Air Products Co., owner of the Jones patent for an electric welding process and for fluxes to be used therewith, brought an action for infringement against Lincoln and the two Graver companies. The trial court held four flux claims valid and infringed and certain other flux claims and all process claims invalid. 75 U. S. P. Q. 231. The Court of Appeals affirmed findings of validity and infringement as to the four flux claims but reversed the trial court and held valid the process claims and the remaining contested flux claims. 167 F. 2d 531. We granted certiorari, 335 U. S. 810, and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it reversed that of the trial court, and reinstated the District Court decree. 336 U. S. 271. Rehearing was granted, limited to the question of infringement of the four valid flux claims and to the applicability of the doctrine of equivalents to findings of fact in this case. 337 U. S. 910.
At the outset it should be noted that the single issue before us is whether the trial court’s holding that the four flux claims have been infringed will be sustained. Any issue as to the validity of these claims was unanimously determined by the previous decision in this Court and attack on their validity cannot be renewed now by reason of limitation on grant of rehearing. The disclosure, the claims, and the prior art have been adequately described in our former opinion and in the opinions of the courts below.
In determining whether an accused device or composition infringes a valid patent, resort must be had in the first instance to the words of the claim. If accused matter falls clearly within the claim, infringement is made out and that is the end of it.
But courts have also recognized that to permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such a limitation would leave room for — indeed encourage — the unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim, and hence outside the reach of law. One who seeks to pirate an invention, like one who seeks to pirate a copyrighted book or play, may be expected to introduce minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy. Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement. To prohibit no other would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating substance to form. It would deprive him of the benefit of his invention and would foster concealment rather than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the primary purposes of the patent system.
The doctrine of equivalents evolved in response to this experience. The essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a fraud on a patent. Originating almost a century ago in the case of Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330, it has been consistently applied by this Court and the lower federal courts, and continues today ready and available for utilization when the proper circumstances for its application arise. “To temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of an invention” a patentee may invoke this doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device “if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.” Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U. S. 30, 42. The theory on which it is founded is that “if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form, or shape.” Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U. S. 120, 125. The doctrine operates not only in favor of the patentee of a pioneer or primary invention, but also for the patentee of a secondary invention consisting of a combination of old ingredients which produce new and useful results, Imhaeuser v. Buerk, 101 U. S. 647, 655, although the area of equivalence may vary under the circumstances. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 414-415, and cases cited; Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 556; Gould v. Rees, 15 Wall. 187, 192. The wholesome realism of this doctrine is not always applied in favor of a patentee but is sometimes used against him. Thus, where a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee’s action for infringement. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U. S. 537, 568. In its early development, the doctrine was usually applied in cases involving devices where there was equivalence in mechanical components. Subsequently, however, the same principles were also applied to compositions, where there was equivalence between chemical ingredients. Today the doctrine is applied to mechanical or chemical equivalents in compositions or devices. See discussions and cases collected in 3 Walker on Patents (Deller’s ed. 1937) §§ 489-492; Ellis, Patent Claims (1949) §§ 59-60.
What constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the ease. Equivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered in a vacuum. It does not require complete identity for every purpose and in every respect. In determining equivalents, things equal to the same thing may not be equal to each other and, by the same token, things for most purposes different may sometimes be equivalents. Consideration must be given to the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined with the other ingredients, and the function which it is intended to perform. An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was.
A finding of equivalence is a determination of fact. Proof can be made in any form: through testimony of experts or others versed in the technology; by documents, including texts and treatises; and, of course, by the disclosures of the prior art. Like any other issue of fact, final determination requires a balancing of credibility, persuasiveness and weight of evidence. It is to be decided by the trial court and that court’s decision, under general principles of appellate review, should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Particularly is this so in a field where so much depends upon familiarity with specific scientific problems and principles not usually contained in the general storehouse of knowledge and experience.
In the case before us, we have two electric welding compositions or fluxes: the patented composition, Union-melt Grade 20, and the accused composition, Lincolnweld 660. The patent under which Unionmelt is made claims essentially a combination of alkaline earth metal silicate and calcium fluoride; Unionmelt actually contains, however, silicates of calcium and magnesium, two alkaline earth metal silicates. Lincolnweld’s composition is similar to Unionmelt’s, except that it substitutes silicates of calcium and manganese — the latter not an alkaline earth metal — for silicates of calcium and magnesium. In all other respects, the two compositions are alike. The mechanical methods in which these compositions are employed are similar. They are identical in operation and produce the same kind and quality of weld.
The question which thus emerges is whether the substitution of the manganese which is not an alkaline earth metal for the magnesium which is, under the circumstances of this case, and in view of the technology and the prior art, is a change of such substance as to make the doctrine of equivalents inapplicable; or conversely, whether under the circumstances the change was so insubstantial that the trial court’s invocation of the doctrine of equivalents was justified.
Without attempting to be all-inclusive, we note the following evidence in the record: Chemists familiar with the two fluxes testified that manganese and magnesium were similar in many of their reactions (R. 287, 669). There is testimony by a metallurgist that alkaline earth metals are often found in manganese ores in their natural state and that they serve the same purpose in the fluxes (R. 831-832); and a chemist testified that “in the sense of the patent” manganese could be included as an alkaline earth metal (R. 297). Much of this testimony was corroborated by reference to recognized texts on inorganic chemistry (R. 332). Particularly important, in addition, were the disclosures of the prior art, also contained in the record. The Miller patent, No. 1,754,566, which preceded the patent in suit, taught the use of manganese silicate in welding fluxes (R. 969, 971). Manganese was similarly disclosed in the Armor patent, No. 1,467,825, which also described a welding composition (R. 1346). And the record contains no evidence of any kind to show that Lincolnweld was developed as the result of independent research or experiments.
It is not for this Court to even essay an independent evaluation of this evidence. This is the function of the trial court. And, as we have heretofore observed, “To no type of case is this . . . more appropriately applicable than to the one before us, where the evidence is largely the testimony of experts as to which a trial court may be enlightened by scientific demonstrations. This trial occupied some three weeks, during which, as the record shows, the trial judge visited laboratories with counsel and experts to observe actual demonstrations of welding as taught by the patent and of the welding accused of infringing it, and of various stages of the prior art. He viewed motion pictures of various welding operations and tests and heard many experts and other witnesses.” 336 U. S. 271, 274-275.
The trial judge found on the evidence before him that the Lincolnweld flux and the composition of the patent in suit are substantially identical in operation and in result. He found also that Lincolnweld is in all respects equivalent to Unionmelt for welding purposes. And he concluded that “for all practical purposes, manganese silicate can be efficiently and effectually substituted for calcium and magnesium silicates as the major constituent of the welding composition.” These conclusions are adequately supported by the record; certainly they are not clearly erroneous.
It is difficult to conceive of a case more appropriate for application of the doctrine of equivalents. The disclosures of the prior art made clear that manganese silicate was a useful ingredient in welding compositions. Specialists familiar with the problems of welding compositions understood that manganese was equivalent to and could be substituted for magnesium in the composition of the patented flux and their observations were confirmed by the literature of chemistry. Without some explanation or indication that Lincolnweld was developed by independent research, the trial court could properly infer that the accused flux is the result of imitation rather than experimentation or invention. Though infringement was not literal, the changes which avoid literal infringement are colorable only. We conclude that the trial court’s judgment of infringement respecting the four flux claims was proper, and we adhere to our prior decision' on this aspect of the case.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Minton took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice Black,
with whom
Mr. Justice Douglas
concurs, dissenting.
1 heartily agree with the Court that “fraud” is bad, “piracy” is evil, and “stealing” is reprehensible. But in this case, where petitioners are not charged with any such malevolence, these lofty principles do not justify the Court’s sterilization of Acts of Congress and prior decisions, none of which are even mentioned in today’s opinion.
The only patent claims involved here describe respondent’s product as a flux “containing a major proportion of alkaline earth metal silicate.” The trial court found that petitioners used a flux “composed principally of manganese silicate.” Finding also that “manganese is not an alkaline earth metal,” the trial court admitted that petitioners’ flux did not “literally infringe” respondent’s patent. Nevertheless it invoked the judicial “doctrine of equivalents” to broaden the claim for “alkaline earth metals” so as to embrace “manganese.” On the ground that “the fact that manganese is a proper substitute . . . is fully disclosed in the specification” of respondent’s patent, it concluded that “no determination need be made whether it is a known chemical fact outside the teachings of the patent that manganese is an equivalent . . . .” Since today’s affirmance unquestioningly follows the findings of the trial court, this Court necessarily relies on what the specifications revealed. In so doing, it violates a direct mandate of Congress without even discussing that mandate.
R. S. § 4888, as amended, 35 U. S. C. § 33, provides that an applicant “shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery.” We have held in this very case that this statute precludes invoking the specifications to alter a claim free from ambiguous language, since “it is the claim which measures the grant to the patentee.” Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U. S. 271, 277. What is not specifically claimed is dedicated to the public. See, e. g., Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, 352. For the function of claims under R. S. § 4888, as we have frequently reiterated, is to exclude from the patent monopoly field all that is not specifically claimed, whatever may appear in the specifications. See, e. g., Marconi Wireless Co. v. United States, 320 U. S. 1, 23, and cases there cited. Today the Court tacitly rejects those cases. It departs from the underlying principle which, as the Court pointed out in White v. Dunbar, 119 U. S. 47, 51, forbids treating a patent claim “like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the specification, so as to make it include something more than, or something different from, what its words express. . . . The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms.” Giving this patentee the benefit of a grant that it did not precisely claim is no less “unjust to the public” and no less an evasion of R. S. § 4888 merely because done in the name of the “doctrine of equivalents.”
In seeking to justify its emasculation of R. S. § 4888 by parading potential hardships which literal enforcement might conceivably impose on patentees who had for some reason failed to claim complete protection for their discoveries, the Court fails even to mention the program for alleviation of such hardships which Congress itself has provided. 35 U. S. C. § 64 authorizes reissue of patents where a patent is “wholly or partly inoperative” due to certain errors arising from “inadvertence, accident, or mistake” of the patentee. And while the section does not expressly permit a patentee to expand his claim, this Court has reluctantly interpreted it to justify doing so. Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, 353-354. That interpretation, however, was accompanied by a warning that “Reissues for the enlargement of claims should be the exception and not the rule.” Id. at 355. And Congress was careful to hedge the privilege of reissue by exacting conditions. It also entrusted the Patent Office, not the courts, with initial authority to determine whether expansion of a claim was justified, ****8 and barred suits for retroactive infringement based on such expansion. Like the Court’s opinion, this congressional plan adequately protects patentees from “fraud,” “piracy,” and “stealing.” Unlike the Court's opinion, it also protects businessmen from retroactive infringement suits and judicial expansion of a monopoly sphere beyond that which a patent expressly authorizes. The plan is just, fair, and reasonable. In effect it is nullified by this decision undercutting what the Court has heretofore recognized as wise safeguards. See Milcor Steel Co. v. Fuller Co., 316 U. S. 143, 148. One need not be a prophet to suggest that today’s rhapsody on the virtue of the “doctrine of equivalents” will, in direct contravention of the Miller case, supra, make enlargement of patent claims the “rule” rather than the “exception.”
Whatever the merits of the “doctrine of equivalents” where differences between the claims of a patent and the allegedly infringing product are de minimis, colorable only, and without substance, that doctrine should have no application to the facts of this case. For the differences between respondent’s welding substance and petitioners’ claimed flux were not nearly so slight. The claims relied upon here did not involve any mechanical structure or process where invention lay in the construction or method rather than in the materials used. Rather they were based wholly on using particular materials for a particular purpose. Respondent’s assignors experimented with several metallic silicates, including that of manganese. According to the specifications (if these are to be considered) they concluded that while several were “more or less efficacious in our process, we prefer to use silicates of the alkaline earth metals.” Several of their claims which this Court found too broad to be valid encompassed manganese silicate; the only claims found valid did not. Yet today the Court disregards that crucial deficiency, holding those claims infringed by a composition of which 88.49% by weight is manganese silicate.
In view of the intense study and experimentation of respondent’s assignors with manganese silicate, it would be frivolous to contend that failure specifically to include that substance in a precise claim was unintentional. Nor does respondent attempt to give that or any other explanation for its omission. But the similar use of manganese in prior expired patents, referred to in the Court’s opinion, raises far more than a suspicion that its elimination from the valid claims stemmed from fear that its inclusion by name might result in denial or subsequent invalidation’ of respondent’s patent.
Under these circumstances I think petitioners had a right to act on the belief that this Court would follow the plain mandates of Congress that a patent’s precise claims mark its monopoly boundaries, and that expansion of those claims to include manganese could be obtained only in a statutory reissue proceeding. The Court’s ruling today sets the stage for more patent “fraud” and “piracy” against business than could be expected from faithful observance of the congressionally enacted plan to protect business against judicial expansion of precise patent claims. Hereafter a manufacturer cannot rely on what the language of a patent claims. He must be able, at the peril of heavy infringement damages, to forecast how far a court relatively unversed in a particular technological field will expand the claim’s language after considering the testimony of technical experts in that field. To burden business enterprise on the assumption that men possess such a prescience bodes ill for the kind of competitive economy that is our professed goal.
The way specific problems are approached naturally has much to do with the decisions reached. A host of prior cases, to some of which I have referred, have treated the 17-year monopoly authorized by valid patents as a narrow exception to our competitive enterprise system. For that reason, they have emphasized the importance of leaving business men free to utilize all knowledge not preempted by the precise language of a patent claim. E. g., Sontag Stores Co. v. Nut Co., 310 U. S. 281, and cases there cited. In the Sontag case Mr. Justice McReynolds, speaking for a unanimous Court, said in part: “In the case under consideration the patentee might have included in the application for the original patent, claims broad enough to embrace petitioner’s accused machine, but did not. This 'gave the public to understand’ that whatever was not claimed 'did not come within his patent and might rightfully be made by anyone.’ ” Id. at 293.
The Court’s contrary approach today causes it to retreat from this sound principle. The damages retroactively assessed against petitioners for what was authorized until today are but the initial installment on the cost of that retreat.
L. Hand in Boyal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, 168 F. 2d 691, 692.
Rule 52 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part: “Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.”
For this reason the tidbits of evidence painstakingly selected from the record by this Court have no significance, since the trial court avowedly did not look beyond the specifications themselves.
This Court’s approval of the trial judge’s resort to specifications is ironic as well as unfortunate. In its original opinion this Court rejected respondent’s contention that the very language invoked here to support infringement should be applied to validate a claim otherwise too broad to be upheld. 336 U. S. 271, 277.
“This provision was inserted in the law for the purpose of relieving the courts from the duty of ascertaining the exact invention of the patentee by inference and conjecture, derived from a laborious examination of previous inventions, and a comparison thereof with that claimed by him. This duty is now cast upon the Patent Office. There his claim is, or is supposed to be, examined, scrutinized, limited, and made to conform to what he is entitled to. If the office refuses to allow him all that he asks, he has an appeal. But the courts have no right to enlarge a patent beyond the scope of its claim as allowed by the Patent Office, or the appellate tribunal to which contested applications are referred. When the terms of a claim in a patent are clear and distinct (as they always should be), the patentee, in a suit brought upon the patent, is bound by it. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U. S. 568.” Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U. S. 274, 278.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents questions as to the validity of an order issued by petitioner, the Postmaster General, which directed that mail addressed to some of respondents be returned to the senders marked “Fraudulent,” and that postal money order sums payable to their order be returned to the remitters.
The respondent Publishers Service Company has conducted many contests to promote the circulation of newspapers in which it has advertised that prizes would be given for the solution of puzzles. Through its corporate subsidiaries, respondents Literary Classics, Inc., and Read Magazine, Inc., it publishes books and two monthly magazines called Read and Facts. The place of business is in New York City.
In 1945 respondents to promote sales of their books put on a nationally advertised project, known as the Facts Magazine Hall of Fame Puzzle Contest. The Postmaster General after a hearing found “upon evidence satisfactory to him” that the “puzzle contest” was “a scheme or device for obtaining money through the mails by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, in violation of sections 259 and 732 of title 39, United States Code . . . .” Specifically, the Postmaster General found that the representations were false and fraudulent for two principal reasons. First, that prospective contestants were falsely led to believe that they might be eligible to win prizes upon payment of $3 as a maximum sum when in reality the minimum requirement was $9, and as it later developed they were finally called on to pay as much as $42 to be eligible for increased prize offers. Second, the Postmaster General found that though the contest was emphasized in advertisements as a “puzzle contest” it was not a puzzle contest; that respondents knew from experience that the puzzles were so easy that many people would solve all the “puzzles” and that prizes would be awarded only as a result of a tie-breaking letter-essay contest; and that contestants were deliberately misled concerning all these facts by artfully composed advertisements.
The contest was under the immediate supervision of respondents Henry Walsh Lee and Judith S. Johnson, editor-in-chief and “contest editor” respectively of Facts. The Postmaster General’s original fraud order related to mail and money orders directed to
“Puzzle Contest, Facts Magazine; Contest Editor, Facts Magazine; Judith S. Johnson, Contest Editor; Miss J. S. Johnson, Contest Editor; Contest Editor; Facts Magazine; and Henry Walsh Lee, Editor in Chief, Facts Magazine, and their officers and agents as such, at New York, New York.”
Respondents filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin enforcement of the order. They alleged its invalidity on the grounds that there was no substantial evidence to support the Postmaster General’s findings of fraud, and that the statutory provisions under which the order was issued authorize the Postmaster General to act as a censor and hence violate the First Amendment. The District Court issued a temporary restraining order but directed that pending further orders respondents should deposit in court all moneys and the proceeds of all checks and money orders received through the mails as qualifying fees for the Hall of Fame Puzzle Contest. After a hearing the respondents’ motion for summary judgment was granted on the ground that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence. 63 F. Supp. 318. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed on the same ground, one judge dissenting. 158 F. 2d 542. We granted certiorari.
The case has been twice argued in this Court. Briefs of both parties on the first argument dealt only with the question of whether the Postmaster General’s findings of fraud were supported by substantial evidence. But assuming validity of the findings, questions arose during the first oral argument concerning the scope of the fraud order. That order had included a direction to the New York postmaster to refuse to deliver any mail or to pay any money orders to Facts, its officers and agents, including its editor-in-chief, who was also editor of Read. The two monthly magazines, both published in New York, had an aggregate circulation of nearly five hundred thousand copies. We were told the total deprivation of the right of Facts and of the editor of the two magazines to receive mail and to cash money orders would practically put both magazines out of business. See Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407. Furthermore, the order was of indefinite duration and Facts and its affiliates have made a business of conducting contests to promote the circulation of books and magazines. The order, if indefinitely enforced, might have resulted in barring delivery of mail and payment of money orders in relation to other non-fraudulent contests as well as legitimate magazine business. All of the foregoing raised questions about the validity and scope of the original order, if unmodified, which we deemed of sufficient importance to justify further argument. For that reason we set the case down for reargument, requesting parties to discuss the validity and scope of the order, and whether, if invalid by reason of its scope, it could be so modified as to free it from statutory or constitutional objections.
Thereafter, and before reargument, the Postmaster General revoked the order insofar as it applied to Facts magazine, its editor-in-chief, and its officers and agents. As modified, the order bars delivery of mail and payment of money orders only to addressees designated in the contest advertisements:
“Puzzle Contest, Facts Magazine; Contest Editor,
Facts Magazine; Judith S. Johnson, Contest Editor;
Miss J. S. Johnson, Contest Editor; Contest Editor.”
The Postmaster General, so we are informed, does not construe the modified order as forbidding delivery of mail or payment of money orders to Facts magazine or even to Miss Judith (J. S.) Johnson, individually. So construed, the order is narrowly restricted to mail and money orders sent in relation to the Hall of Fame Puzzle Contest found fraudulent, and would not bar deliveries to the magazines, to their editor, or to the three corporate respondents. It would bar deliveries to Judith (J. S.) Johnson, only if sent to her at the designated address and in her capacity as “Contest Editor.” Likewise the District Court’s order impounding funds is limited to qualifying fees received in the Hall of Fame Puzzle Contest. If the Postmaster General’s action in modifying the order is valid, the questions we asked to have argued have largely been eliminated from the original order.
Respondents’ contentions now are: (1) The Postmaster General lacked power to modify his original fraud order, and hence that order remains subject to any and all of its original infirmities. (2) The findings on which the order is based are not supported by substantial evidence. (3) The statutes under which the order was issued violate various constitutional provisions.
First. Respondents’ contention that the Postmaster General was without power to modify the order by elimination of Facts magazine, its editor, and its officers and agents is based almost entirely on their two other grounds for asserting invalidity of the order. Of course, if the order were wholly invalid as to all of the respondents for these reasons, it could not have been validated merely by eliminating some of them from its terms. But laying aside respondents’ other contentions for the moment, we have no doubt as to the Postmaster General’s authority to modify the fraud order.
Having concluded that the original order was broader than necessary to reach the fraud proved, the Postmaster General not only possessed the power but he had the duty to reduce its scope to what was essential for that purpose. The purpose of mail fraud orders is not punishment, but prevention of future injury to the public by denying the use of the mails to aid a fraudulent scheme. See Comm’r v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 467, 474. Such orders if too broad could work great hardships and inflict unnecessary injuries upon innocent persons and businesses. No persuasive reason has been suggested why the Postmaster General should be without power to modify an order of this kind. Such an order is similar to an equitable injunction to restrain future conduct, and like such an injunction should be subject to modification whenever it appears that one or more of the restraints imposed are no longer needed to protect the public. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114; see Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U. S. 557, 570.
Furthermore, the modification here involved was for respondents’ benefit; it gave them a part of the very relief for which they prayed. It removed the ban against delivery of mail and payment of money orders to their magazine, its editor and its agents — a ban which we were told would have done them irreparable injury if left in effect. The possibility that another order might be entered against the eliminated respondents is too remote to require us to consider the original order as though the modification had never been made. See United States v. Hamburg-American Co., 239 U. S. 466, 475-476.
Nor does the modification subject respondents to any disadvantage in this case in reference to the impounded funds. Those funds are sums sent in as qualifying fees for the scheme found fraudulent. They are in court custody because of the court’s- restraining order; but for it they would have been returned to the senders as ordered by the Postmaster General. Now, as before the fraud order was modified, their disposition is dependent entirely upon the validity of the finding of fraud. Respondents could thus claim the funds only by asserting a right growing out of the scheme found fraudulent. The court having lawful command of such funds must allocate them to the remitters if the order is valid. See Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U. S. 153, 156-158; United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 194-195.
Second. Respondents contend that there was no substantial evidence to support the Postmaster General’s findings that they had represented that prizes could be won (1) on payment of only three dollars as contest fees or (2) by the mere solution of puzzles. They say that the very advertisements and circular letters to contestants from which these inferences were drawn by the Postmaster General contained language which showed that the first $3 series of puzzles might result in ties, making necessary a second and maybe a third $3 puzzle series, and that if these three efforts failed to determine the prize winners, they would then be selected on the basis of competitive letters, written by the tied contestants on the subject “The Puzzle I Found Most Interesting and Educational in This Contest.”
There were sentences in the respondents’ advertisements and communications which, standing alone, would have conveyed to a careful reader information as to the nine-dollar fees and the letter-essay feature of the contest. Had these sentences stood alone, doubtless the fraud findings of the Postmaster General would not have been justified. But they did not stand alone. They were but small and inconspicuous portions of lengthy descriptions used by respondents to present their contest to the public in their advertisements and letters. In reviewing-fraud findings of the Postmaster General, neither this Court nor any other is authorized to pick out parts of the advertisements on which respondents particularly rely, decide that these excerpts would have supported different findings, and set aside his order for that reason. We consider all the contents of the advertisements and letters, and all of the evidence, not to resolve contradictory inferences, but only to determine if there was evidence to support the Postmaster General’s findings of fraud. Leach v. Carlile, 258 U. S. 138, 140.
Respondents’ advertisements were long; their form letters to contestants discussing the contest, its terms, and its promises were even longer than the advertisements. Paradoxically, the advertisements constituted at the same time models of clarity and of obscurity — clarity in referring to prizes and to a “puzzle contest,” obscurity in referring to a remote possibility of a letter-essay contest. In bold type, almost an inch high, their advertisements referred to “$10,000 FIRST PRIZE PUZZLE CONTEST.” Time after time they used the words “puzzle” and “puzzle contest.” Conspicuous pictures of sample “puzzles” covered a large part of a page. Rebus “puzzles” Nos. 1 to 4 of the contest were there. An explanation of what each represented appeared above it. The first, it was explained, represented “the inventor of the phonograph and electric light,” the second “a Republican President who became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.” The last two contained equally helpful clues to the “puzzles.” The advertisements left no doubt that the contest presented an opportunity to win large prizes in connection with solution of puzzles, which puzzles, to say the least, would not be too taxing on the imagination.
Readers who might have felt some reluctance about paying their money to enter an essay contest were not so impressively and conspicuously informed about that prospect; here the advertisement became a model of obscurity. In the lower left corner of one of the advertising pages appeared the “Official Rules of the Contest,” to which rules references were carefully placed in various parts of the advertisement, and which were printed, as the District Court’s opinion observed, “in small type.” There were ten rules. About the middle of Rule 9 appeared the only reference to the possible need for letters as a means of breaking ties. And it is impossible to say that the Postmaster General drew an unreasonable inference in concluding that competitive letter-writing thus obscurely referred to was mentioned only as a remote and unexpected contingency. The same kind of obscurity and doubt occurs in reference to the cost of the contest. The District Court in an opinion holding that the Postmaster General’s findings were not supported by the evidence had this to say about one advertisement which was widely used:
“Indeed, the advertisement is by no means a model of clarity and lucidity. It is diffuse and prolix, and at times somewhat obscure. Many of its salient provisions are printed in rather small type. An intensive and concentrated reading of the entire text is indispensable in order to arrive at an understanding of the entire scheme. Nevertheless, a close analysis of this material discloses the complete plan. Nothing is omitted, concealed or misrepresented. There is no deception. The well-founded criticisms of the plaintiffs’ literature are a far cry from justifying a conclusion that the announcement was a fraud on the public. . . . The conclusion is inevitable that there is no evidence to support the finding of fact on which the fraud order is based and that, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the order.”
We agree with the District Court that many people are intellectually capable of discovering the cost and nature of this contest by “intensive and concentrated reading” and by close analysis of these advertisements. Nevertheless, we believe that the Postmaster General could reasonably have concluded, as he did, that the advertisements and other writings had been artfully contrived and composed in such manner that they would confuse readers, distract their attention from the fact that the scheme was in reality an essay contest, and mislead them into thinking that they were entering a “rebus puzzle” contest, in which prizes could be won by an expenditure of not more than $3. That respondents’ past experience in similar contests enabled them to know at the beginning that essay writing, not puzzle solutions, would determine prize winners is hardly controvertible on this record. That experience was borne out in this contest by the fact that of the 90,000 contestants who submitted answers to the first series of 80 puzzles, 35,000 solved all of them, and of that number 27,000 had completed the first set of “tie-breaking puzzles” when the fraud order was issued. Under the circumstances, to advertise this as a puzzle contest instead of what it actually was cannot be attributed to a mere difference in “nomenclature”; such conduct falls far short of that fair dealing of which fraud is the antithesis.
Advertisements as a whole may be completely misleading although every sentence separately considered is literally true. This may be because things are omitted that should be said, or because advertisements are composed or purposefully printed in such way as to mislead. Wiser v. Lawler, 189 U. S. 260, 264; Farley v. Simmons, 99 F. 2d 343, 346; see also cases collected in 6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 129-131. That exceptionally acute and sophisticated readers might have been able by penetrating analysis to have deciphered the true nature of the contest’s terms is not sufficient to bar findings of fraud by a fact-finding tribunal. Questions of fraud may be determined in the light of the effect advertisements would most probably produce on ordinary minds. Durland v. United States, 161 U. S. 306-313, 314; Wiser v. Lawler, supra at 264; Oesting v. United States, 234 F. 304, 307. People have a right to assume that fraudulent advertising traps will not be laid to ensnare them. “Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Standard Education Society, 302 U. S. 112, 116.
The Postmaster General found that respondents’ advertisements had been deliberately contrived to divert readers’ attention from material but adroitly obscured facts. That finding has substantial support in the evidence. The District Court and the Court of Appeals were wrong in holding the evidence insufficient.
Third. It is contended that §§ 259 and 732 of 39 U. S. C., the sections under which this order was issued, are in conflict with various constitutional provisions and that the statutes should be held unenforceable for this reason. Specifically, it is argued that the sections authorize a prior censorship and thus violate the First Amendment; authorize unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment; violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment; deny the kind of trial guaranteed in criminal proceedings by the Sixth Amendment and by Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3; and inflict unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
In 1872 Congress first authorized the Postmaster General to forbid delivery of registered letters and payment of money orders to persons or companies found by the Postmaster General to be conducting an enterprise to obtain money by false pretenses through the use of the mails. 17 Stat. 322-323, 39 U. S. C. § 732. In the same statute Congress made it a crime to place letters, circulars, advertisements, etc., in the mails for the purpose of carrying out such fraudulent artifices or schemes. 17 Stat. 323, 18 U. S. C. § 338. In 1889 Congress declared “non-mailable” letters and other matter sent to help perpetrate frauds. 25 Stat. 874, 39 U. S. C. § 256. In 1895 the Postmaster General’s fraud order powers were extended to cover all letters or other matter sent by mail. 28 Stat. 964, 39 U. S. C. § 259. And Congress has passed many more statutes, such, for illustration, as the Securities and Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 77, 906, 15 U. S. C. § 77 (e), and the Federal Trade Commission Act as amended, 52 Stat. 114, 15 U. S. C. § 52, to protect people against fraudulent use of the mails.
All of the foregoing statutes, and others which need not be referred to specifically, manifest a purpose of Congress to utilize its powers, particularly over the mails and in interstate commerce, to protect people against fraud. This governmental power has always been recognized in this country and is firmly established. The particular statutes here attacked have been regularly enforced by the executive officers and the courts for more than half a century. They are now part and parcel of our governmental fabric. This Court in 1904, in the case of Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, sustained the constitutional power of Congress to enact the laws. The decision there rejected all the contentions now urged against the validity of the statutes in their entirety, insofar as the present contentions have any possible merit. No decision of this Court either before or after the Coyne case has questioned the power of Congress to pass these laws. The Coyne case has been cited with approval many times.
Recognizing that past decisions of this Court if adhered to preclude acceptance of their contentions, respondents urge that certain of our decisions since the Coyne case have partially undermined the philosophy on which it rested. Respondents refer particularly to comparatively recent decisions under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. None of the recent cases to which respondents refer, however, provide the slightest support for a contention that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press include complete freedom, uncontrollable by Congress, to use the mails for perpetration of swindling schemes.
We reject the contention that we should overrule the Coyne case and declare these fraud order statutes to be wholly void and unenforceable.
An additional argument urged by respondents is that the fraud order statutes as interpreted and applied by the Postmaster General in this case violate some of the constitutional provisions above mentioned. We consider this suggestion only in connection with the modified order. Its future effect is merely to enjoin the continuation of conduct found fraudulent. Carried no further than this, the order has not even a slight resemblance to punishment — it only keeps respondents from getting the money of others by false pretenses and deprives them of a right to speak or print only to the extent necessary to protect others from their fraudulent artifices. And so far as the impounding order is concerned, of course respondents can have no just or legal claim to money mailed to them as a result of their fraudulent practices. Nor does the modified order jeopardize respondents’ magazine except to the extent, if any, that its circulation might be dependent on monies received from this contest scheme found fraudulent. A contention cannot be seriously considered which assümes that freedom of the press includes a right to raise money to promote circulation by deception of the public.
The order as modified is valid and its enforcement should not have been enjoined. The judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and of the District Court are reversed. The cause is remanded to the District Court to dismiss the petition for injunction and to provide for proper return to the remitters of the impounded funds sent in response to the fraudulent advertisements and communications.
It is so ordered.
“This case is ordered restored to the docket for reargument. On reargument counsel need not further discuss the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Postmaster General’s findings. They are requested to discuss the following:
"1. Does the fraud order prohibit delivery of mail and postal money orders to Facts Magazine and all its employees, including its editor-in-chief ? If so,
“(a) Is the order within the Postmaster General’s authority under 39 U. S. C. Secs. 259, 732?
“(b) If so, do these code provisions, in violation of the First Amendment or any other constitutional provisions, abridge the freedom of speech or press of either the senders or the sendees of the mail or the money orders?
“2. Does the fraud order prohibit indefinitely the delivery of mail or money orders which relate to subject matters or contests other than the contest on which the order is based? If so,
“(a) Is the order within the Postmaster General’s statutory authority ?
“(b) If so, are these code provisions in conflict with the Constitution of the United States ?
“3. Assuming that the order is in conflict with the code provisions or the Constitution, can it be modified in such way as to free it from statutory or constitutional objections? If so, by whom can the order be modified and by what procedure?”
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 245-249; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 713, et seq.; Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 260-263; Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367; Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are seven cases in which petitioner sued to recover stock assessments from shareholders of the Banco Kentucky Co. They were started in 1936 in the Eastern District of Kentucky and were stayed by agreement while the principal case upon which these depended, Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U. S. 349, wended its way through the courts. In the latter case we sustained the liability of the shareholders of Banco for the stock assessment. That was in 1944. During the time Anderson v. Abbott was being litigated, the shareholders involved in the present litigation died and respondents became executors of their estates. Through no lack of diligence, petitioner failed to learn of these facts until more than two years later. Upon learning of them he promptly moved to revive the actions against the representatives of the decedents. The District Court, following Anderson v. Brady, 1 F. R. D. 589, denied the motions for revivor and granted motions of the executors to dismiss. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote. 153 F. 2d 685. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because the case presented an important problem in the construction of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The case involves a reconciliation of Rule 25 (a) and Rule 6 (b). So far as material here, Rule 25 (a) provides:
“If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court within 2 years after the death may order substitution of the proper parties. If substitution is not so made, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.”
And the relevant part of Rule 6(b) reads:
“When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may, at any time in its discretion . . . (2) upon motion permit the act to be done after the expiration of the specified period where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not enlarge the period for taking any action under Rule 59, except as stated in subdivision (c) thereof, or the period for taking an appeal as provided by law.”
It is said that since by Rule 25 (a) substitution may be made within two years after the death of a party, substitution is, within the meaning of Rule 6 (b), an act “allowed” to be done “within a specified time” which the court may on a showing of “excusable neglect” permit to be done after the two-year period. That argument is reinforced by reliance on the provision in Rule 6 (b) which grants but two exceptions to the power of enlargement of time. Since Rule 25 (a) is not included in the exceptions, it is argued that the time allowed by that rule may be enlarged under Rule 6(b). And it is pointed out that the facts of the present cases establish that the failure of the receiver to act within the two-year period was the result of “excusable neglect,” thus giving the District Court discretion to allow the substitution under Rule 6 (b).
We agree, however, with the Circuit Court of Appeals. Rule 25 (a) is based in part on 28 U. S. C. § 778, 42 Stat. 352, which limited the power of substitution to two years from the death of a party. And even within that two-year period substitution could not be made unless the executor or administrator was served “before final settlement and distribution of the estate.” That statute, like other statutes of limitations, was a statute of repose. It was designed to keep short the time within which actions might be revived so that the closing and distribution of estates might not be interminably delayed. That policy is reflected in Rule 25 (a). Even within the two-year period substitution is not a matter of right; the court “may” order substitution but it is under no duty to do so. Under the Rule, as under the statute, the settlement and distribution of the estate might be so far advanced as to warrant a denial of the motion for substitution within the two-year period. In contrast to the discretion of the court to order substitution within the two-year period is the provision of Rule 25 (a) that if substitution is not made within that time the action “shall be dismissed” as to the deceased. The word “shall” is ordinarily “the language of command.” Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 493. And when the same Rule uses both “may” and “shall,” the normal inference is that each is used in its usual sense — the one act being permissive, the other mandatory. See United States v. Thoman, 156 U.S. 353, 360.
Thus, as stated by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Rule 25 (a) operates both as a statute of limitations upon re-vivor and as a mandate to the court to dismiss an action not revived within the two-year period. Rule 6 (b) relates to acts required or allowed to be done by parties to an action and permits the court to afford relief to a party for his failure to act within the prescribed time limits. There would be more force in petitioner’s argument if Rule 25 (a) had, without more, set a two-year period within which substitution might be made. But Rule 25 (a) does not stop there. It directs the court to dismiss the action if substitution has not been made within that time. That is action required of the court, not of a party. And Rule 6 (b) should not be construed to override an express direction of action to be taken by the court. See Wallace v. United States, 142 F. 2d 240, 244.
Reasons of policy support this construction. It is, to be sure, stipulated that in five of the present cases the estate is “still open and undistributed”; in one it is “still open”; in another it has been distributed. At least where an estate is ready to be closed or where there has already been a distribution, revivor may work unfairness and be disruptive of orderly and expeditious administration of estates. But it is not enough to say that if Rule 6 (b) and Rule 25 (a) are construed to permit substitution after the two-year period, the court need not allow it where unfairness or prejudice would result. For the normal policy of a statute of limitations is to close the door — finally, not qualifiedly or conditionally. The federal law embodied in Rule 25 (a) has a direct impact on the probate of estates in the state courts. It should not be construed to be more disruptive of prompt and orderly probate administration in those courts than its language makes necessary.
Affirmed.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Reed took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Petitioner brought actions against approximately 5,000 shareholders scattered throughout the United States and some in foreign countries. During the progress of the litigation some changed their residences. And it was stipulated that petitioner, with a limited staff, could not during this time keep up with the changes of residence or deaths of defendants.
Cf. Ainsworth v. Gill Glass & Fixture Co., 104 F. 2d 83, with Burke v. Canfield, 72 App. D. C. 127, 111 F. 2d 526, and Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assn. v. Snyder, 109 F. 2d 469.
See note 1, supra.
But see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Joy, 173 U. S. 226; Winslow v. Domestic Engineering Co., 20 F. Supp. 578.
And see H. Rep. No. 429, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, sentenced to death by the Louisiana state courts, makes two federal constitutional attacks on his sentence. He first contends that the trial court impermissibly coerced the jury to return a sentence of death by inquiries it made to the jury and a supplemental charge which it gave to the jury following the receipt of a communication from that body. Petitioner’s second contention is that the death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the single “aggravating circumstance” found by the jury and upheld by the Supreme Court of Louisiana merely duplicates an element of the underlying offense of first-degree murder of which he was convicted at the guilt stage. We reject both of these contentions.
I
Petitioner was charged with killing a woman with whom he had lived, three members of her family, and one of her male friends. The jury found petitioner guilty of two counts of manslaughter and three counts of first-degree murder; an essential element of the latter verdicts was a finding that petitioner intended “to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:30A(3) (West 1986).
The jury commenced its sentencing deliberations on the same day that it returned the verdict of guilt, and the judge’s charge to them in this second phase of the trial included the familiar admonition that the jurors should consider the views of others with the objective of reaching a verdict, but that they should not surrender their own honest beliefs in doing so. The court also charged the jury that if it were unable to reach a unanimous recommendation, the court would impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
The jury was allowed to retire late in the evening, and reconvene the next day. During the afternoon of that day a note came from the foreman of the jury stating that the jury was unable to reach a decision at that time, and requesting that the court again advise the jury as to its responsibilities. The jury was called back. The court provided a piece of paper to each juror and asked each to write on the paper his or her name and the answer to the question whether “further deliberations would be helpful in obtaining a verdict.” The jurors complied, and were asked to retire to the jury room. The papers revealed eight answers in the affirmative — that more deliberation would be helpful — and four in the negative. Defense counsel renewed a previously made motion for a mistrial, arguing that the jury was obviously hung. The trial court denied the motion, noting that this was the first sign that the jury was having trouble reaching a verdict in the penalty phase. The court directed that as previously agreed upon the jury would return to the courtroom and be instructed again as to its obligations in reaching a verdict.
When the jurors returned to the courtroom a new note from them was given to the judge. This note stated that some of the jurors had misunderstood the question previously asked. The judge polled the jury again using the same method but changing the question slightly; the judge asked, “Do you feel that any further deliberations will enable you to arrive at a verdict?” App. 55. This time 11 jurors answered in the affirmative and 1 in the negative. The court then reinstructed the jury:
“Ladies and Gentlemen, as I instructed you earlier if the jury is unable to unanimously agree on a recommendation the Court shall impose the sentence of Life Imprisonment without benefit of Probation, Parole, or Suspension of Sentence.
“When you enter the jury room it is your duty to consult with one another to consider each other’s views and to discuss the evidence with the objective of reaching a just verdict if you can do so without violence to that individual judgment.
“Each of you must decide the case for yourself but only after discussion and impartial consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You are not advocates for one side or the other. Do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and to change your opinion if you are convinced you are wrong but do not surrender your honest belief as to the weight and effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.” Id., at 56.
Defense counsel did not object to either poll, to the manner in which the polls were conducted, or to the supplemental instruction. The jury resumed its deliberations and in 30 minutes returned with a verdict sentencing petitioner to death on all three counts of first-degree murder. In support of all three sentences, the jury found the statutory aggravating circumstance of “knowingly creating] a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person.” La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.4(d) (West 1984). One death sentence was additionally supported by the aggravating circumstance that “the victim was a witness in a prosecution against the defendant. ...” Art. 905.4(h).
On direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the convictions and sentences. State v. Lowenfield, 495 So. 2d 1245 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U. S. 1153 (1986). The court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to support the aggravating circumstance that the victim was a witness in a prosecution against the defendant, but concluded that the remaining aggravating circumstance was established by the evidence and was sufficient to support the sentences. 495 So. 2d, at 1256-1258. The court went on to hold that the trial court had not abused its discretion in declining to declare a mistrial during sentencing when the jury indicated that it was having difficulty reaching a verdict. “This court has rejected the construction that the court is required to declare a deadlock at the first sign of trouble.” Id., at 1259. Finally, the court rejected petitioner’s argument that the judge had coerced the sentence recommendations from the jury. “It is a well settled proposition that when the court is informed by a jury that they are having difficulty in agreeing, it is not error for the court to impress upon them the importance of the case, urge them to come to agreement, and send them back for further deliberation.” Ibid.
Subsequently petitioner sought habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Petitioner raised, inter alia, the two issues now before this Court: whether a sentence of death may validly rest upon a single aggravating circumstance that is a necessary element of the underlying offense of first-degree murder, and whether the judge had coerced the sentence verdicts from the jury. The District Court denied relief and a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 817 F. 2d 285 (1987). The panel unanimously rejected the aggravating circumstance claim. Id., at 289. The majority went on to conclude: “there is no showing of coercion; the record certainly does not demonstrate coercion sufficient to render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Id., at 293. The dissenting judge argued that the combination of the supplemental instruction to the jury and the polling of the jury as to the usefulness of further deliberations constituted improper coercion. Id., at 299-303.
II
Our review of petitioner’s contention that the jury was improperly coerced requires that we consider the supplemental charge given by the trial court “in its context and under all the circumstances.” Jenkins v. United States, 380 U. S. 445, 446 (1965) (per curiam). The use of a supplemental charge has long been sanctioned. Nearly a century ago in Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492 (1896), this Court reviewed a charge similar but by no means identical to that given to the Louisiana jury here, and concluded that it was not reversible error even within the federal system. The defendant in that case had been sentenced to death by Judge Parker in the Western District of Arkansas, exercising a jurisdiction unique among federal courts. The judge’s charge is not set out verbatim in the opinion of this Court, but it differed from the charge given in the present case in that the Allen charge urged the minority to consider the views of the majority, and ask themselves whether their own views were reasonable under the circumstances. This Court upheld the conviction and sentence against the defendant’s claim of coercion, saying:
“The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves. It certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with deference to the arguments and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view of the case from what he does himself. It cannot be that each juror should go to the jury room with a blind determination that the verdict shall represent his opinion of the case at that moment; or, that he should close his ears to the arguments of men who are equally honest and intelligent as himself.” Id., at 501-502.
The continuing validity of this Court’s observations in Allen are beyond dispute, and they apply with even greater force in a case such as this, where the charge given, in contrast to the so-called “traditional Allen charge,” does not speak specifically to the minority jurors. But in this case one of the purposes served by such a charge — the avoidance of the societal costs of a retrial — is not present because Louisiana law provides that if the jury hangs, the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment. La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.8 (West 1984). Petitioner naturally urges that this difference makes the charge here impermissible under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. The difference between the division of function between the jury and judge in this case and the division in Allen obviously weighs in the constitutional calculus, but we do not find it dis-positive. The State has in a capital sentencing proceeding a strong interest in having the jury “express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 519 (1968). Surely if the jury had returned from its deliberations after only one hour and informed the court that it had failed to achieve unanimity on the first ballot, the court would incontestably have had the authority to insist that they deliberate further. This is true even in capital cases such as this one and Allen, even though we are naturally mindful in such cases that the “qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978).
Petitioner relies on this Court’s decision in Jenkins v. United States, supra, but we think that case affords him no help. There the jury had sent a note to the judge to the effect that it was unable to agree upon a verdict; the judge then gave additional instructions to the jury, in the course of which he said: “‘You have got to reach a decision in this case.’” Id., at 446. This Court concluded that “in its context and under all the circumstances the judge’s statement had the coercive effect attributed to it.” Ibid. The difference between the language used there and the language used in the present case is sufficiently obvious to show the fallacy of petitioner’s reliance. The same is true of the colloquy between the judge and the foreman of the jury in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, 459 (1978), upon which petitioner also relies.
Petitioner argues, however, that the coercive effect of the supplemental charge was exacerbated by inquiries made to the jury by the trial court. In Brasfield v. United States, 272 U. S. 448 (1926), the trial court had, after deliberations stalled, inquired as to how the jury was divided, and was informed simply that the jury stood nine to three. The jury resumed deliberations and subsequently found the defendants guilty. This Court concluded that the inquiry into the jury’s numerical division necessitated reversal because it was generally coercive and almost always brought to bear “in some degree, serious although not measurable, an improper influence upon the jury.” Id., at 450. Although the decision in Brasfield was an exercise of this Court’s supervisory powers, it is nonetheless instructive as to the potential dangers of jury polling.
Petitioner’s attempt to fit the instant facts within the holding of Brasfield is, however, unavailing. Here the inquiry as to the numerical division of the jury was not as to how they stood on the merits of the verdict, but how they stood on the question of whether further deliberations might assist them in returning a verdict. There is no reason why those who may have been in the minority on the merits would necessarily conclude that further deliberation would not be helpful, or that those in the majority would necessarily conclude otherwise. The two questions are clearly independent of one another. We believe the type of question asked by the trial court in this case is exactly what the Court in Brasfield implicitly approved when it stated: “[An inquiry as to numerical division] serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division.” Ibid.
We are mindful that the jury returned with its verdict soon after receiving the supplemental instruction, and that this suggests the possibility of coercion. United States Gypsum Co., supra, at 462. We note, however, that defense counsel did not object to either the polls or the supplemental instruction. We do not suggest that petitioner thereby waived this issue, Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412, 431, n. 11 (1985), but we think such an omission indicates that the potential for coercion argued now was not apparent to one on the spot. Id., at 430-431, and n. 11.
We hold that on these facts the combination of the polling of the jury and the supplemental instruction was not “coercive” in such a way as to deny petitioner any constitutional right. By so holding we do not mean to be understood as saying other combinations of supplemental charges and polling might not require a different conclusion. Any criminal defendant, and especially any capital defendant, being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body. For the reasons stated we hold there was no coercion here.
Ill
Petitioner advances as a second ground for vacating his sentence of death that the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury at the sentencing phase was identical to an element of the capital crime of which he was convicted. Petitioner urges that this overlap left the jury at the sentencing phase free merely to repeat one of its findings in the guilt phase, and thus not to narrow further in the sentencing phase the class of death-eligible murderers. Upon consideration of the Louisiana capital punishment scheme in the light of the decisions of this Court we reject this argument.
Louisiana has established five grades of homicide: first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, and vehicular homicide. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:29 (West 1986). Second-degree murder includes intentional murder and felony murder, and provides for punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. §14:30.1. Louisiana defines first-degree murder to include a narrower class of homicides:
“First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
“(1) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, or simple robbery;
“(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a fireman or peace officer engaged in the performance of his lawful duties;
“(3) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person; or
“(4) When the offender has specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and has offered, has been offered, has given, or has received anything of value for the killing.
“(5) When the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim under the age of twelve years.” § 14:30A.
An individual found guilty of first-degree murder is sentenced by the same jury in a separate proceeding to either death or life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. § 14:30C. “A sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists and, after consideration of any mitigating circumstances, recommends that the sentence of death be imposed.” La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.3 (West 1984). Louisiana has established 10 statutory aggravating circumstances. Art. 905.4. If the jury returns a sentence of death, the sentence is automatically reviewable for excessiveness by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. Art. 905.9.
Petitioner was found guilty of three counts of first-degree murder under § 14.30. A.(3): “[T]he offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person.” The sole aggravating circumstance both found by the jury and upheld by the Louisiana Supreme Court was that “the offender knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person.” Art. 905.4(d). In these circumstances, these two provisions are interpreted in a “parallel fashion” under Louisiana law. See State v. Williams, 480 So. 2d 721, 726-727 (La. 1985). Petitioner’s argument that the parallel nature of these provisions requires that his sentences be set aside rests on a mistaken premise as to the necessary role of aggravating circumstances.
To pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must “genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 877 (1983); cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976). Under the capital sentencing laws of most States, the jury is required during the sentencing phase to find at least one aggravating circumstance before it may impose death. Id., at 162-164 (reviewing Georgia sentencing scheme); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 247-250 (1976) (reviewing Florida sentencing scheme). By doing so, the jury narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty according to an objective legislative definition. Zant, supra, at 878 (“[Statutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty”).
In Zant v. Stephens, supra, we upheld a sentence of death imposed pursuant to the Georgia capital sentencing statute, under which “the finding of an aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty.” Id., at 874. We found no constitutional deficiency in that scheme because the aggravating circumstances did all that the Constitution requires.
The use of “aggravating circumstances” is not an end in itself, but a means of genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible persons and thereby channeling the jury’s discretion. We see no reason why this narrowing function may not be performed by jury findings at either the sentencing phase of the trial or the guilt phase. Our opinion in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976), establishes this point. The Jurek Court upheld the Texas death penalty statute, which, like the Louisiana statute, narrowly defined the categories of murders for which a death sentence could be imposed. If the jury found the defendant guilty of such a murder, it was required to impose death so long as it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s acts were deliberate, the defendant would probably constitute a continuing threat to society, and, if raised by the evidence, the defendant’s acts were an unreasonable response to the victim’s provocation. Id., at 269. We concluded that the latter three elements allowed the jury to consider the mitigating aspects of the crime and the unique characteristics of the perpetrator, and therefore sufficiently provided for jury discretion. Id., at 271-274. But the opinion announcing the judgment noted the difference between the Texas scheme, on the one hand, and the Georgia and Florida schemes discussed in the cases of Gregg, supra, and Proffitt, supra:
‘While Texas has not adopted a list of statutory aggravating circumstances the existence of which can justify the imposition of the death penalty as have Georgia and Florida, its action in narrowing the categories of murders for which a death sentence may ever be imposed serves much the same purpose. ... In fact, each of the five classes of murders made capital by the Texas statute is encompassed in Georgia and Florida by one or more of their statutory aggravating circumstances. . . . Thus, in essence, the Texas statute requires that the jury find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance before the death penalty may be imposed. So far as consideration of aggravating circumstances is concerned, therefore, the principal difference between Texas and the other two States is that the death penalty is an available sentencing option — even potentially — for a smaller class of murders in Texas.” 428 U. S., at 270-271 (citations omitted).
It seems clear to us from this discussion that the narrowing function required for a regime of capital punishment may be provided in either of these two ways: The legislature may itself narrow the definition of capital offenses, as Texas and Louisiana have done, so that the jury finding of guilt responds to this concern, or the legislature may more broadly define capital offenses and provide for narrowing by jury findings of aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase. See also Zant, supra, at 876, n. 13, discussing Jurek and concluding: “[I]n Texas, aggravating and mitigating circumstances were not considered at the same stage of the criminal prosecution.”
Here, the “narrowing function” was performed by the jury at the guilt phase when it found defendant guilty of three counts of murder under the provision that “the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person.” The fact that the sentencing jury is also required to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance in addition is no part of the constitutionally required narrowing process, and so the fact that the aggravating circumstance duplicated one of the elements of the crime does not make this sentence constitutionally infirm. There is no question but that the Louisiana scheme narrows the class of death-eligible murderers and then at the sentencing phase allows for the consideration of mitigating circumstances and the exercise of discretion. The Constitution requires no more.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is accordingly
Affirmed.
Justice Stevens joins Part III of this opinion, except for the last sentence.
All of the Federal Courts of Appeals have upheld some form of a supplemental jury charge. See United States v. Angiulo, 485 F. 2d 37 (CA1 1973); United States v. Burke, 700 F. 2d 70, 80 (CA2), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 816 (1983); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F. 2d 407, 414-420 (CA3), cert. denied sub nom. Panaccione v. United States, 396 U. S. 837 (1969); United States v. Sawyers, 423 F. 2d 1335 (CA4 1970); United States v. Kelly, 783 F. 2d 575, 576-577 (CA5), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 889 (1986); United States v. Scott, 547 F. 2d 334 (CA6 1977); United States v. Silvern, 484 F. 2d 879 (CA7 1973) (en banc); Potter v. United States, 691 F. 2d 1275 (CA8 1982); United States v. Bonam, 772 F. 2d 1449, 1450 (CA9 1985); United States v. McKinney, 822 F. 2d 946 (CA10 1987); United States v. Rey, 811 F. 2d 1453 (CA11), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 830 (1987); United States v. Thomas, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 101, 449 F. 2d 1177 (1971) (en banc).
We note that our ruling in Jenkins v. United States was based on our supervisory power over the federal courts, cf. United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171, 180, n. 7 (1975), and not on constitutional grounds. The Jenkins Court cited no provision of the Constitution, but rather relied upon other cases involving the exercise of supervisory powers. 380 U. S., at 446.
Our decision in Brasfield makes no mention of the Due Process Clause or any other constitutional provision. The Federal Courts of Appeals have uniformly rejected the notion that Brasfield’s per se reversal approach must be followed when reviewing state proceedings on habeas corpus. E. g., Williams v. Parke, 741 F. 2d 847, 851 (CA6 1984), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 1029 (1985); Locks v. Sumner, 703 F. 2d 403, 405-407 (CA9), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 933 (1983).
The mistrial motions referred to by the dissent, post, at 254, n. 3, were unrelated to the actions of the trial court — the polls and the supplemental instruction — that now form the core of petitioner’s argument and the dissent’s attack, and there is no reason defense counsel would have been dissuaded from objecting to these latter actions because of the unsuccessful mistrial motions.
“Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:
“(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or
“(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:30.1 (West 1986).
“The following shall be considered aggravating circumstances:
“(a) the offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery;
“(b) the victim was a fireman or peace officer engaged in his lawful duties;
“(c) the offender was previously convicted of an unrelated murder, aggravated rape, or aggravated kidnapping or has a significant prior history of criminal activity;
“(d) the offender knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person;
“(e) the offender offered or has been offered or has given or received anything of value for the commission of the offense;
“(f) the offender at the time of the commission of the offense was imprisoned after sentence for the commission of an unrelated forcible felony;
“(g) the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner; or
“(h) the victim was a witness in a prosecution against the defendant, gave material assistance to the state in any investigation or prosecution of the defendant, or was an eyewitness to a crime alleged to have been committed by the defendant or possessed other material evidence against the defendant.
“(i) the victim was a correctional officer or any other employee of the Louisiana Department of Corrections who, in the normal course of his employment was required to come in close contact with persons incarcerated in a state prison facility, and the victim was engaged in his lawful duties at the time of the offense.” La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.4 (West 1984).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In November, and again in December 1981, the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare mailed a written notice to over 16,000 recipients advising them that a recent change in federal law might result in either a reduction or a termination of their food-stamp benefits. The notice did not purport to explain the precise impact of the change on each individual recipient. The question this case presents is whether that notice violated any federal statute or regulation, or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we conclude that there was no violation.
In an attempt to “permit low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of trade,” Congress created a federally subsidized food-stamp program. The Secretary of Agriculture prescribes the standards for eligibility for food stamps, but state agencies are authorized to make individual eligibility determinations and to distribute the food stamps to eligible households, which may use them to purchase food from approved, retail food stores. The eligibility of an individual household, and the amount of its food-stamp allotment, are based on several factors, including the size of the household and its income. Certifications of eligibility expire periodically and are renewed on the basis of applications submitted by the households.
Prior to 1981, federal law provided that 20 percent of the household’s earned income should be deducted, or disregarded, in computing eligibility. The purpose of the earned-income disregard was to maintain the recipients’ incentive to earn and to report income. In 1981 Congress amended the Food Stamp Act to reduce this deduction from 20 percent to 18 percent. That amendment had no effect on households with no income or with extremely low income, but caused a reduction of benefits in varying amounts, or a complete termination of benefits, for families whose income placed them close to the border between eligibility and ineligibility.
On September 4, 1981, the Department of Agriculture issued regulations providing for the implementation of the change in the earned-income disregard and directing the States to provide notice to food-stamp recipients. That directive indicated that the form of the notice might comply with the regulations dealing with so-called “mass changes,” rather than with the regulations dealing with individual “adverse actions.”
In November, the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare (Department) mailed a brief, ambiguously dated notice to all food-stamp recipients with earned income advising them that the earned-income deduction had been lowered from 20 percent to 18 percent and that the change would result in either a reduction or a termination of their benefits. The notice was printed on a card, in English on one side and Spanish on the other. The notice stated that the recipient had a right to request a hearing “if you disagree with this action,” and that benefits would be reinstated if a hearing was requested within 10 days of the notice.
On December 10, 1981, petitioners in No. 83-6381 commenced this action on behalf of all Massachusetts households that had received the notice. They alleged that the notice was inadequate as a matter of law and moved for a temporary restraining order. On December 16, 1981, after certifying the action as a class action, and after commenting that the “notice was deficient in that it failed to provide recipients with a date to determine the time in which they could appeal,” the District Court enjoined the Department from reducing or terminating any benefits on the basis of that notice.
The Department, in compliance with the District Court’s order, mailed supplemental benefits for the month of December to each of the 16,640 class members. It then sent out a second notice, in English and Spanish versions, dated December 26, which stated in part:
“ * * * IMPORTANT NOTICE — READ CAREFULLY * * *
“RECENT CHANGES IN THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM HAVE BEEN MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 1981 FEDERAL LAW. UNDER THIS LAW, THE EARNED INCOME DEDUCTION FOR FOOD STAMP BENEFITS HAS BEEN LOWERED FROM 20 TO 18 PERCENT. THIS REDUCTION MEANS THAT A HIGHER PORTION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD’S EARNED INCOME WILL BE COUNTED IN DETERMINING YOUR ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT AMOUNT FOR FOOD STAMPS. AS A RESULT OF THIS FEDERAL CHANGE, YOUR BENEFITS WILL EITHER BE REDUCED IF YOU REMAIN ELIGIBLE OR YOUR BENEFITS WILL BE TERMINATED. (FOOD STAMP MANUAL CITATION: 106 CMR:364.400).
“YOUR RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING:
“YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REQUEST A FAIR HEARING IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THIS ACTION. IF YOU ARE REQUESTING A HEARING, YOUR FOOD STAMP BENEFITS WILL BE REINSTATED. ... IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE CORRECTNESS OF YOUR BENEFITS COMPUTATION OR THE FAIR HEARING PROCESS, CONTACT YOUR LOCAL WELFARE OFFICE. YOU MAY FILE AN APPEAL AT ANY TIME IF YOU FEEL THAT YOU ARE NOT RECEIVING THE CORRECT AMOUNT OF FOOD STAMPS.”
Petitioners filed a supplemental complaint attacking the adequacy of this notice, and again moved for a preliminary injunction. In October 1982, the District Court consolidated the hearing on that motion with the trial on the merits and again ruled in petitioners’ favor. The District Court found that there was a significant risk of error in the administration of the food-stamp program, particularly with the implementation of the change in the earned-income disregard, and that the failure to provide each recipient with an adequate notice increased the risk of error. In essence, the District Court concluded that the December notice was defective because it did not advise each household of the precise change in its benefits, or with the information necessary to enable the recipient to calculate the correct change; because it did not tell recipients whether their benefits were being reduced or terminated; and because the reading level and format of the notice made it difficult to comprehend. Based on the premise that the statutorily mandated reduction or termination of benefits was a deprivation of property subject to the full protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court held that the Due Process Clause had been violated.
As a remedy, the District Court ordered the Department “to return forthwith to each and every household in the plaintiff class all food stamp benefits lost as a result of the action taken pursuant to the December notice” between January 1, 1981, and the date the household received adequate notice, had its benefits terminated for a reason unrelated to the change in the earned-income disregard, or had its file re-certified. The District Court also ordered that all future food-stamp notices issued by the Department contain various data, including the old and new benefit amounts, and that the Department issue regulations, subject to court approval, governing the form of future food-stamp notices.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with the District Court’s constitutional holding, indicated its belief that Congress could not have “intended a constitutionally deficient notice to satisfy the statutory notice requirement,” and thus affirmed the District Court’s holding that “the December notice failed to satisfy the notice requirements of 7 U. S. C. § 2020(e)(10) and 7 CFR §273.12(e)(2) (ii).” Foggs v. Block, 722 F. 2d 933, 939-940 (1983). The Court of Appeals held, however, that the District Court had erred in ordering a reinstatement of benefits and in specifying the form of future notices.
Petitioners in No. 83-6381 sought review of the Court of Appeals’ modification of the District Court’s remedy, and the Department, in No. 83-1660, cross-petitioned for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the holding on liability. We granted both the petition and the cross-petition, and invited the Solicitor General to participate in the argument. 467 U. S. 1250 (1984). We conclude that the notice was lawful, and therefore have no occasion to discuss the remedy issue that the petition in No. 83-6381 presents. Because there would be no need to decide the constitutional question if we found a violation of either the statute or the regulations, we first consider the statutory issue.
I
The only reference in the Food Stamp Act to a notice is contained in § 2020(e), which outlines the requirements of a state plan of operation. Subsection (10) of that section provides that a state plan must grant a fair hearing, and a prompt determination, to any household that is aggrieved by the action of a state agency. A proviso to that subsection states that any household “which timely requests such a fair hearing after receiving individual notice of agency action reducing or terminating its benefits” shall continue to receive the same level of benefits until the hearing is completed.
The language of the proviso does not itself command that any notice be given, but it does indicate that Congress assumed that individual notice would be an element of the fair-hearing requirement. Thus, whenever a household is entitled to a fair hearing, it is appropriate to read the statute as imposing a requirement of individual notice that would enable the household to request such a hearing. The hearing requirement, and the incidental reference to “individual notice,” however, are by their terms applicable only to “agency action reducing or terminating” a household's benefits. Therefore, it seems unlikely that Congress contemplated individual hearings for every household affected by a general change in the law.
The legislative history of §2020(e)(10) sheds light on its meaning. As originally enacted in 1964, the Food Stamp Act contained no fair-hearing requirement. See 78 Stat. 703-709. In 1971, however, in response to this Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), Congress amended the Act to include a fair-hearing provision, and in the Food Stamp Act of 1977, § 2020(e)(10) was enacted in its present form. The legislative history of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 contains a description of the then-existing regulations, which were promulgated after the 1971 amendment, and which drew a distinction between the requirement of notice in advance of an “adverse action” based on the particular facts of an individual case, on the one hand, and the absence of any requirement of individual notice of a “mass change,” on the other. That history contains no suggestion that Congress intended to eliminate that distinction; to the contrary, Congress expressly recognized during the period leading to the enactment of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 the distinction between the regulatory requirement regarding notice in the case of an adverse action and the lack of such a requirement in the case of a mass change. Read against this background, the relevant statutory language — which does not itself mandate any notice at all but merely assumes that a request for a hearing will be preceded by “individual notice of agency action” — cannot fairly be construed as a command to give notice of a general change in the law.
Nor can we find any basis for concluding that the December notice failed to comply with the applicable regulations. Title 7 CFR § 273.12(e)(2)(h) (1984) provides:
“(ii) A notice of adverse action is not required when a household’s food stamp benefits are reduced or terminated as a result of a mass change in the public assistance grant. However, State agencies shall send individual notices to households to inform them of the change. If a household requests a fair hearing, benefits shall be continued at the former level only if the issue being appealed is that food stamp eligibility or benefits were improperly computed.”
This regulation reflects the familiar distinction between an individual adverse action and a mass change. The statement that a notice of adverse action is not required when a change of benefits results from a mass change surely implies that individual computations are not required in such cases. The two requirements that are imposed when a mass change occurs are: (1) that “individual” notice be sent and (2) that it “inform them of the change.” In this case, a separate individual notice was sent to each individual household and it did “inform them of the change” in the program that Congress had mandated. Since the word “change” in the regulation plainly refers to the “mass change,” the notice complied with the regulation.
II
Since the notice of the change in the earned-income disregard was sufficient under the statute and under the regulations, we must consider petitioners’ claim that they had a constitutional right to advance notice of the amendment’s specific impact on their entitlement to food stamps before the statutory change could be implemented by reducing or terminating their benefits. They argue that an individualized calculation of the new benefit was necessary in order to avoid the risk of an erroneous reduction or termination.
The record in this case indicates that members of petitioners’ class had their benefits reduced or terminated for either or both of two reasons: (1) because Congress reduced the earned-income disregard from 20 percent to 18 percent; or (2) because inadvertent errors were made in calculating benefits. These inadvertent errors, however, did not necessarily result from the statutory change, but rather may have been attributable to a variety of factors that can occur in the administration of any large welfare program. For example, each of the named petitioners, presumably representative of the class, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(a), appealed a reduction in benefits. None identified an error resulting from the legislative decision to change the earned-income disregard. But even if it is assumed that the mass change increased the risk of erroneous reductions in benefits, that assumption does not support the claim that the actual notice used in this case was inadequate. For that notice plainly informed each household of the opportunity to request a fair hearing and the right to have its benefit level frozen if a hearing was requested. As the testimony of the class representatives indicates, every class member who contacted the Department had his or her benefit level frozen, and received a fair hearing, before any loss of benefit occurred. Thus, the Department’s procedures provided adequate protection against any deprivation based on an unintended mistake. To determine whether the Constitution required a more detailed notice of the mass change, we therefore put the miscellaneous errors to one side and confine our attention to the reductions attributable to the statutory change.
Food-stamp benefits, like the welfare benefits at issue in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), “are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.” Id., at 262 (footnote omitted). Such entitlements are appropriately treated as a form of “property” protected by the Due Process Clause; accordingly, the procedures that are employed in determining whether an individual may continue to participate in the statutory program must comply with the commands of the Constitution. Id., at 262-263.
This case, however, does not concern the procedural fairness of individual eligibility determinations. Rather, it involves a legislatively mandated substantive change in the scope of the entire program. Such a change must, of course, comply with the substantive limitations on the power of Congress, but there is no suggestion in this case that the amendment at issue violated any such constraint. Thus, it must be assumed that Congress had plenary power to define the scope and the duration of the entitlement to food-stamp benefits, and to increase, to decrease, or to terminate those benefits based on its appraisal of the relative importance of the recipients’ needs and the resources available to fund the program. The procedural component of the Due Process Clause does not “impose a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to make substantive changes in the law of entitlement to public benefits.” Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971).
The congressional decision to lower the earned-income deduction from 20 percent to 18 percent gave many food-stamp households a less valuable entitlement in 1982 than they had received in 1981. But the 1981 entitlement did not include any right to have the program continue indefinitely at the same level, or to phrase it another way, did not include any right to the maintenance of the same level of property entitlement. Before the statutory change became effective, the existing property entitlement did not qualify the legislature’s power to substitute a different, less valuable entitlement at a later date. As we have frequently noted: “[A] welfare recipient is not deprived of due process when the legislature adjusts benefit levels. . . . [T]he legislative determination provides all the process that is due.”
The participants in the food-stamp program had no greater right to advance notice of the legislative change — in this case, the decision to change the earned-income disregard level— than did any other voters. They do not claim that there was any defect in the legislative process. Because the substantive reduction in the level of petitioners’ benefits was the direct consequence of the statutory amendment, they have no basis for challenging the procedure that caused them to receive a different, less valuable property interest after the amendment became effective.
The claim that petitioners had a constitutional right to better notice of the consequences of the statutory amendment is without merit. All citizens are presumptively charged with knowledge of the law, see, e. g., North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 283 (1925). Arguably that presumption may be overcome in cases in which the statute does not allow a sufficient “grace period” to provide the persons affected by a change in the law with an adequate opportunity to become familiar with their obligations under it. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516, 532 (1982). In this case, however, not only was there a grace period of over 90 days before the amendment became effective, but in addition, every person affected by the change was given individual notice of the substance of the amendment.
As a matter of constitutional law there can be no doubt concerning the sufficiency of the notice describing the effect of the amendment in general terms. Surely Congress can presume that such a notice relative to a matter as important as a change in a household’s food-stamp allotment would prompt an appropriate inquiry if it is not fully understood. The entire structure of our democratic government rests on the premise that the individual citizen is capable of informing himself about the particular policies that affect his destiny. To contend that this notice was constitutionally insufficient is to reject that premise.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
7 U. S. C. §2011.
§2014.
§§ 2013(a), 2020(a).
§ 2014.
§§ 2012(c), 2014(f), 2015(c).
§ 2014(e) (1976 ed., Supp. II).
See 95 Stat. 360, 7 U. S. C. § 2014(e).
The Government states that it is “advised that the reductions involved did not exceed $6 per month for a four-member household if the household remained eligible for benefits.” Brief for Federal Respondent 7. It does not indicate where in the record this information is located; nor does it indicate the source of the “advice.”
46 Fed. Reg. 44722 (1981). The regulation provided that the change should begin no later than 90 days from the date of implementation, with October 1,1981, as the last date for state agencies to begin implementation (absent a waiver).
Ibid. The portion of 7 CFR § 273.12(e) (1985), which discusses the notice required for mass changes, provides in relevant part:
“(e) Mass changes. Certain changes are initiated by the State or Federal government which may affect the entire caseload or significant portions of the caseload. These changes include adjustments to the income eligibility standards, the shelter and dependent care deductions, the Thrifty Food Plan, and the standard deduction; annual and seasonal adjustments to Social Security, SSI, and other Federal benefits, periodic adjustments to AFDC or GA payments; and other changes in the eligibility criteria based on legislative or regulatory actions.
“(2) . . . (ii) A notice of adverse action is not required when a household’s food stamp benefits are reduced or terminated as a result of a mass change in the public assistance grant. However, State agencies shall send individual notices to households to inform them of the change. If a household requests a fair hearing, benefits shall be continued at the former level only if the issue being appealed is that food stamp eligibility or benefits were improperly computed.”
The section on adverse actions, 7 CFR §273.13 (1985), provides in relevant part:
“(a) Use of notice. Prior to any action to reduce or terminate a household’s benefits within the certification period, the State agency shall, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, provide the household timely and adequate advance notice before the adverse action is taken.”
“(b) Exemptions from notice. Individual notices of adverse action are not required when:
“(1) The State initiates a mass change as described in § 273.12(e).”
App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1660, pp. A. 44-A. 45; App. 3.
App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1660, pp. A. 45-A. 46.
App. 5. Each recipient was provided with a card that he could mail to obtain a hearing; a recipient could also obtain a hearing by placing a telephone call or by asking for a hearing in person. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1660, p. A. 48.
Id,., at A. 100. The District Court wrote:
“The risk of erroneous deprivation of benefits is increased in this case by the lack of adequate notice. The December notice did not inform the affected food stamp households of the exact action being taken, that is, whether their food stamp allotment was being reduced or terminated. There was no mention of the amount by which the benefits were being reduced. And finally, the December notice lacked the information necessary to enable the household to determine if an error had been made. Therefore, without the relevant information to determine whether an error had been made, the risk of an erroneous deprivation is increased.” Id., at A. 90-A. 91.
The District Court concluded:
“It is clear that the entitlement to food stamps benefits is a property interest subject to the full protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970). Therefore, given the existence of a constitutionally protected property interest, the question is what process is due.” Id., at A. 86.
The District Court also held that the December notice violated the timely notice requirements of 7 U. S. C. §2020(e)(10) and 7 CFR §273.12(e)(2)(ii) (1985), App. Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1660, p. A. 98; that the notice required to implement the earned-income disregard had to comport with 7 CFR §273.13(a) (1985), App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1660, p. A. 98, and that the notice violated multilingual notice requirements, id., at A. 104-A. 105.
Id., at A. 101.
Id., at A. 102-104.
However, the Court of Appeals disagreed that the December notice failed to satisfy the notice requirements of 7 CFR §273.13(a) (1985). Foggs v. Block, 722 F. 2d, at 940.
Id., at 941.
Escambia County, Florida v. McMillan, 466 U. S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam) (“normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case”); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring).
Title 7 U. S. C. § 2020(e)(10) provides, in relevant part:
“The State plan of operation . . . shall provide . . .
“(10) for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of the State agency under any provision of its plan of operation as it affects the participation of such household in the food stamp program or by a claim against the household for an overissuance: Provided, That any household which timely requests such a fair hearing after receiving individual notice of agency action reducing or terminating its benefits within the household’s certification period shall continue to participate and receive benefits on the basis authorized immediately prior to the notice of adverse action until such time as the fair hearing is completed and an adverse decision rendered or until such time as the household’s certification period terminates, whichever occurs earlier . . .
84 Stat. 2051; see H. R. Rep. No. 95-464, pp. 285-286 (1977); 7 U. S. C. § 2019(e)(8) (1976 ed.) (state agency must provide “for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of a State agency”).
91 Stat. 972.
See H. R. Rep. No. 95-464, at 285-289 (summarizing the existing rules governing fair hearings).
Id., at 289 (“The Committee bill would retain the fair hearings provision of the law intact and would encourage the Department to enforce its excellent regulations and instructions on the subject. . . . The Department should also be certain that, although its regulations do not require individual notice of adverse action when mass changes in program benefits are proposed, they should require the states to send precisely such notices well in advance when the massive changes mandated by this bill are about to be implemented so that the individuals affected are fully aware of precisely why their benefits are being adversely affected. Hearings would, of course, be unnecessary in the absence of claims of factual error in individual benefit computation and calculation. All states should be overseen to be certain that their individual notices in non-mass change adverse action contexts recite the household’s fair hearing request rights”).
Prior to the enactment of the Food Stamp Act of 1977, although individual notices of adverse action were not required by the regulations when mass changes in benefits were instituted because of changes in the law affecting, among other items, income standards or other eligibility criteria, see 7 CFR § 271.1 (n)(2)(i) (1975), the States were required to “publicize the possibility of a change in benefits through the various news media or through a general notice mailed out with [food stamp allotment] cards and with notices placed in food stamp and welfare offices.” §271.1(n)(3); see also 39 Fed. Reg. 25996 (1974).
It may well be true, as petitioners argue, that the computerized data in the Department’s possession made it feasible for the agency to send an individualized computation to each recipient, and that such a particularized notice would have served the Commonwealth’s interest in minimizing or correcting predictable error. What judges may consider common sense, sound policy, or good administration, however, is not the standard by which we must evaluate the claim that the notice violated the applicable regulations.
Moreover, present regulations protect the food-stamp household by providing, upon request, the ongoing right to access to information and materials in its case file. 7 CFR § 272.1(c)(2) (1985). Further, upon request, specific materials are made available for determining whether a hearing should be requested, §273.15(i)(l). If a hearing is requested, access to information and materials concerning the case must be made available prior to the hearing and during the hearing, §273.15(p)(l).
See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 83-1660, pp. A. 50-A. 52 (Cecelia Johnson), A. 53 (Gill Parker), A. 55 (Stephanie Zades), A. 55-A. 56 (Madeline Jones). By hypothesis, an inadvertent error is one that the Department did not anticipate; for that reason, the Department could not give notice of a reduction that was simply the consequence of an unintended mistake.
Thus, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 332 (1976), this Court wrote:
“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. The Secretary does not contend that procedural due process is inapplicable to terminations of Social Security disability benefits. He recognizes, as has been implicit in our prior decisions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 889, 401-402 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 611 (1960), that the interest of an individual in continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created ‘property’ interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.”
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 432-433 (1982); see also United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174 (1980); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U. S. 572, 575 (1979); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 608-611 (1960).
Cf. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U. S. 441, 445 (1915) (“Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule”).
Thus, even under the position espoused in dissent in Texaco, there would be no merit to the claim in this case. As Justice Brennan wrote: “As a practical matter, a State cannot afford notice to every person who is or may be affected by a change in the law. But an unfair and irrational exercise of state power cannot be transformed into a rational exercise merely by invoking a legal maxim or presumption. If it is to survive the scrutiny that the Constitution requires us to afford laws that deprive persons of substantial interests in property, an enactment that relies on that presumption of knowledge must evidence some rational accommodation between the interests of the State and fairness to those against whom the law is applied.” 454 U. S., at 544.
In the case before us, the constitutional claim is particularly weak because the relevant regulations provided that any recipient who claimed that his benefit had been improperly computed as a result of the change in the income deduction was entitled to a reinstatement of the earlier benefit level pending a full individual hearing. 7 CFR §273.12(e)(2)(h) (1985). Petitioners do not contend that there was a failure to comply with this regulation. This, of course, would be a different case if the reductions were based on changes in individual circumstances, or if the reductions were based on individual factual determinations, and notice and an opportunity to be heard had been denied.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Douglas,
announced by Mr. Chief Justice Burger.
This is a civil suit under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 15, for injunctive relief and damages instituted by respondents, who are highway carriers operating in California, against petitioners, who are also highway carriers operating within, into, and from California. Respondents and petitioners are, in other words, competitors. The charge is that the petitioners conspired to monopolize trade and commerce in the transportation of goods in violation of the antitrust laws. The conspiracy alleged is a concerted action by petitioners to institute state and federal proceedings to resist and defeat applications by respondents to acquire operating rights or to transfer or register those rights. These activities, it is alleged, extend to rehearings and to reviews or appeals from agency or court decisions on these matters.
The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, 1967 Trade Cas. ¶ 72,298. The Court of Appeals reversed, 432 F. 2d 755. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. 402 U. S. 1008.
The present case is akin to Eastern Railroad Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U. S. 127, where a group of trucking companies sued a group of railroads to restrain them from an alleged conspiracy to monopolize the long-distance freight business in violation of the antitrust laws and to obtain damages. We held that no cause of action was alleged insofar as it was predicated upon mere attempts to influence the Legislative Branch for the passage of laws or the Executive Branch for their enforcement. We rested our decision on two grounds:
(1) “In a representative democracy such as this, these branches of government act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their representatives. To hold that the government retains the power to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a purpose which "would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of that Act.” Id., at 137.
(2) “The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.” Id., at 138.
We followed that view in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 669-671.
The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483, 485; Ex parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546, 549.
We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business and economic interests vis-á-vis their competitors.
We said, however, in Noerr that there may be instances where the alleged conspiracy “is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.” 365 U. S., at 144.
In that connection the complaint in the present case alleged that the aim and purpose of the conspiracy was “putting their competitors, including plaintiff, out of business, of weakening such competitors, of destroying, eliminating and weakening existing and potential competition, and of monopolizing the highway common carriage business in California and elsewhere.”
More critical are other allegations, which are too lengthy to quote, and which elaborate on the “sham” theory by stating that the power, strategy, and resources of the petitioners were used to harass and deter respondents in their use of administrative and judicial proceedings so as to deny them “free and unlimited access” to those tribunals. The result, it is alleged, was that the machinery of the agencies and the courts was effectively closed to respondents, and petitioners indeed became “the regulators of the grants of rights, transfers and registrations” to respondents — thereby depleting and diminishing the value of the businesses of respondents and aggrandizing petitioners’ economic and monopoly power. See Note, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 518 (1969).
Petitioners rely on our statement in Pennington that “Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose.” 381 U. S., at 670. In the present case, however, the allegations are not that the conspirators sought “to influence public officials,” but that they sought to bar their competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp that decisionmaking process. It is alleged that petitioners “instituted the proceedings and actions . . . with or without probable cause, and regardless of the merits of the cases.” The nature of the views pressed does not, of course, determine whether First Amendment rights may be invoked; but they may bear upon a purpose to deprive the competitors of meaningful access to the agencies and courts. As stated in the opinion concurring in the judgment, such a purpose or intent, if shown, would be “to discourage and ultimately to prevent the respondents from invoking” the processes of the administrative agencies and courts and thus fall within the exception to Noerr.
The political campaign operated by the railroads in Noerr to obtain legislation crippling truckers employed deception and misrepresentation and unethical tactics. We said:
“Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution in legislating with respect to problems relating to the conduct of political activities, a caution which has been reflected in the decisions of this Court interpreting such legislation. All of this caution would go for naught if we permitted an extension of the Sherman Act to regulate activities of that nature simply because those activities have a commercial impact and involve conduct that can be termed unethical.” 365 U. S., at 141.
Yet unethical conduct in the setting of the adjudicatory process often results in sanctions. Perjury of witnesses is one example. Use of a patent obtained by fraud to exclude a competitor from the market may involve a violation of the antitrust laws, as we held in Walker Process Equipment v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U. S. 172, 175-177. Conspiracy with a licensing authority to eliminate a competitor may also result in an antitrust transgression. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 707; Harman v. Valley National Bank, 339 F. 2d 564 (CA9 1964). Similarly, bribery of a public purchasing agent may constitute a violation of § 2 (c) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F. 2d 851 (CA9 1965).
There are many other forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and which may result in antitrust violations. Misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process. Opponents before agencies or courts often think poorly of the other’s tactics, motions, or defenses and may readily call them baseless. One claim, which a court or agency may think baseless, may go unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have been abused. That may be a difficult line to discern and draw. But once it is drawn, the case is established that abuse of those processes produced an illegal result, viz., effectively barring respondents from access to the agencies and courts. Insofar as the administrative or judicial processes are involved, actions of that kind cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of “political expression.”
Petitioners, of course, have the right of access to the agencies and courts to be heard on applications sought by competitive highway carriers. That right, as indicated, is part of the right of petition protected by the First Amendment. Yet that does not necessarily give them immunity from the antitrust laws.
It is well settled that First Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation when they are used as an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute. Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U. S. 490. In that case Missouri enacted a statute banning secondary boycotts and we sustained an injunction against picketing to enforce the boycott, saying:
“It is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. . . . Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.” 336 U. S., at 502.
In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, we held that the Associated Press was not immune from the antitrust laws by reason of the fact that the press is under the shelter of the First Amendment. We said:
“Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.” Id., at 20.
Accord, Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U. S. 131, 139-140. Cf. Eastern States Lumber Assn. v. United States, 234 U. S. 600.
The rationale of those cases, when applied to the instant controversy, makes the following conclusions clear: (1) that any carrier has the right of access to agencies and courts, within the limits, of course, of their prescribed procedures, in order to defeat applications of its competitors for certificates as highway carriers; and (2) that its purpose to eliminate an applicant as a competitor by denying him free and meaningful access to the agencies and courts may be implicit in that opposition.
First Amendment rights may not be used as the means or the pretext for achieving “substantive evils” (see NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 444) which the legislature has the power to control. Certainly the constitutionality of the antitrust laws is not open to debate. A combination of entrepreneurs to harass and deter their competitors from having “free and unlimited access” to the agencies and courts, to defeat that right by massive, concerted, and purposeful activities of the group are ways of building up one empire and destroying another. As stated in the opinion concurring in the judgment, that is the essence of those parts of the complaint to which we refer. If these facts are proved, a violation of the antitrust laws has been established. If the end result is unlawful, it matters not that the means used in violation may be lawful.
What the proof will show is not known, for the District Court granted the motion to dismiss the complaint. We must, of course, take the allegations of the complaint at face value for the purposes of that motion. Walker Process Equipment v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U. S., at 174-175. On their face the above-quoted allegations come within the “sham” exception in the Noerr case, as adapted to the adjudicatory process.
Accordingly we affirm the Court of Appeals and remand the case for trial.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
JUSTICE WHITE
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether a state prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from liability for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for giving legal advice to the police and for participating in a probable-cause hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that he is. 894 F. 2d 949 (1990). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On the evening of September 2, 1982, petitioner Cathy Burns called the Mun-cie, Indiana, police and reported that an unknown assailant had entered her house, knocked her unconscious, and shot and wounded her two sons while they slept. Two police officers, Paul Cox and Donald Scroggins, were assigned to investigate the incident. The officers came to view petitioner as their primary suspect, even though she passed a polygraph examination and a voice stress test, submitted exculpatory handwriting samples, and repeatedly denied shooting her sons.
Speculating that petitioner had multiple personalities, one of which was responsible for the shootings, the officers decided to interview petitioner under hypnosis. They became concerned, however, that hypnosis might be an unacceptable investigative technique, and therefore sought the advice of the Chief Deputy Prosecutor, respondent Richard Reed. Respondent told the officers that they could proceed with the hypnosis.
While under hypnosis, petitioner referred to the assailant as “Katie” and also referred to herself by that name. The officers interpreted that reference as supporting their multiple-personality theory. As a result, they detained petitioner at the police station and sought respondent’s advice about whether there was probable cause to arrest petitioner. After hearing about the statements that petitioner had made while under hypnosis, respondent told the officers that they “probably had probable cause” to arrest petitioner. See Tr. 108; see also id.., at 221. Based on that assurance, the officers placed petitioner under arrest.
The next day, respondent and Officer Scroggins appeared before a county court judge in a probable-cause hearing, seeking to obtain a warrant to search petitioner’s house and car. During that hearing, Scroggins testified, in response to respondent’s questioning, that petitioner had confessed to shooting her children. Neither the officer nor respondent informed the judge that the “confession” was obtained under hypnosis or that petitioner had otherwise consistently denied shooting her sons. On the basis of the misleading presentation, the judge issued a search warrant.
Petitioner was charged under Indiana law with attempted murder of her sons. Before trial, however, the trial judge granted petitioner’s motion to suppress the statements given under hypnosis. As a result, the prosecutor’s office dropped all charges against petitioner.
On January 31, 1985, petitioner filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against respondent, Officers Cox and Scroggins, and others. She alleged that the defendants were liable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for violating her rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and she sought compensatory and punitive damages. Petitioner reached a settlement with several of the defendants, and the case proceeded to trial against respondent. After petitioner presented her case, the District Court granted respondent a directed verdict, finding that respondent was absolutely immune from liability for his conduct.
Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. That court affirmed. 894 F. 2d 949 (1990). It held that “a prosecutor should be afforded absolute immunity for giving legal advice to police officers about the legality of their prospective investigative conduct.” Id., at 956. In a brief footnote, the court also held that respondent was absolutely immune from liability for his role in the probable-cause hearing. Id., at 955, n. 6. Because the Courts of Appeals are divided regarding the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity, we granted certiorari. 497 U. S. 1023 (1990).
I — I HH
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983. is written in broad terms. It purports to subject “[e]very person” acting under color of state law to liability for depriving any other person in the United States of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” The Court has consistently recognized, however, that § 1983 was not meant “to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 (1967). The section is to be read “in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 418 (1976); see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951). In addition, we have acknowledged that for some “special functions,” Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 508 (1978), it is “‘better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.’” Imbler, supra, at 428 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950)).
Imbler, supra, was the first case in which the Court addressed the immunity of state prosecutors from suits under § 1983. Noting that prior immunity decisions were “predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and interests behind it,” the Court stated that the “liability of a state prosecutor under § 1983 must be determined in the same manner.” Id., at 421. The Court observed that at common law prosecutors were immune from suits for malicious prosecution and for defamation, and that this immunity extended to the knowing use of false testimony before the grand jury and at trial. Id., at 421-424, 426, and n. 23.
The interests supporting the common-law immunity were held to be equally applicable to suits under § 1983. That common-law immunity, like the common-law immunity for judges and grand jurors, was viewed as necessary to protect the judicial process. Id., at 422-423. Specifically, there was “concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust.” Id., at 423.
The Court in Imbler declined to accord prosecutors only qualified immunity because, among other things, suits against prosecutors for initiating and conducting prosecutions “could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the State’s advocate,” id., at 425; lawsuits would divert prosecutors’ attention and energy away from their important duty of enforcing the criminal law, ibid.; prosecutors would have more difficulty than other officials in meeting the standards for qualified immunity, ibid.; and potential liability “would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system,” id., at 427-428. The Court also noted that there are other checks on prosecutorial misconduct, including the criminal law and professional discipline, id., at 429.
The Court therefore held that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct in “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case,” id., at 431, insofar as that conduct is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” id., at 430. Each of the charges against the prosecutor in Imbler involved conduct having that association, including the alleged knowing use of false testimony at trial and the alleged deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence. The Court expressly declined to decide whether absolute immunity extends to “those aspects of the prosecutor’s responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of an advocate.” Id., at 430-431. It was recognized, though, that “the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.” Id., at 431, n. 33.
Decisions in later cases are consistent with the functional approach to immunity employed in Imbler. See, e. g., Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U. S. 292, 296, n. 3 (1988); Forester v. White, 484 U. S. 219, 224 (1988); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 342-343 (1986); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 520-523 (1985); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325 (1983); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978). These decisions have also emphasized that the official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question. Forrester, supra, at 224; Malley, supra, at 340; Harlow. supra, at 812; Blitz, supra, at 506. The presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties. We have been "quite sparing" in our recognition of absolute immunity, Forrester, supra, at 224, and have refused to extend it any "further than its justification would warrant." Harlow, supra, at 811.
III
We now consider whether the absolute prosecutorial immunity recognized in Imbler is applicable to (a) respondent's participation in a probable-cause hearing, which led to the issuance of a search warrant, and (b) i~espondent's legal advice to the police regarding the use of hypnosis and the existence of probable cause to arrest petitioner.
A
We address first respondent's appearance as a lawyer for the State in the probable-cause hearing, where he examined a witness and successfully supported the application for a search warrant. The decision in Imbler leads to the conclusion that respondent is absolutely immune from liability in a § 1983 suit for that conduct.
Initially, it is important to determine the precise claim that petitioner has made against respondent concerning respond~ ent's role in the search warrant hearing. An examination of petitioner's complaint, the decisions by both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit, and the questions presented in the petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court reveals that petitioner has challenged only respondent's participation in the hearing, and not his motivation in seeking the search warrant or his conduct outside of the courtroom relating to the warrant.
Petitioner's complaint alleged only the following with regard to respondent's role in the search warrant hearing:
"Acting in his official capacity , [respondent] facilitated the issuance of a search warrant when on September 22, 1982 he presented evidence to the Court with the full knowledge of the false testimony of the Defendant, DONALD SCROGGINS. On direct examination, Deputy Prosecutor Reed asked of police officer Donald Scrog-gins various questions and in doing so and in concert with other Defendants deliberately misled the Court into believing that the Plaintiff had confessed to the shooting of her children.” Complaint ¶9; see also id., ¶31.
Obviously, that claim concerns only respondent’s participation in the probable-cause hearing.
When directing a verdict for respondent after petitioner’s presentation of her case, the District Court continued to view petitioner’s search warrant claim as concerning only respondent’s participation in the hearing. The District Court stated:
“Finally, as to getting the search warrant, you can characterize the proceeding before the judge as testimony by [respondent]. And if he asked leading questions — and I think he did — why, of course, you can say that. But the fact is that it was a proceeding in court before a judge. No matter what the form of the question was, the person seeking the search warrant and doing the testifying was the police officer. And what [respondent] was doing was . . . his job as a deputy prosecuting attorney and presenting that evidence. Even though it was fragmentary and didn’t go far enough, he did it as a part of his official duties.” Tr. 221.
This interpretation is further confirmed by the Seventh Circuit’s summary of petitioner’s claims on appeal:
“The question before the court is whether a state prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 for his acts of giving legal advice to two police officers about their proposed investigative conduct, and for eliciting misleading testimony from one of the officers in a subsequent probable cause hearing.” 894 F. 2d, at 950 (emphasis added). See also id., at 955, n. 6.
Finally, the only “question presented” in the petition for a writ of certiorari that related to the search warrant hearing was limited to respondent’s conduct in the hearing:
“II. Is a deputy prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity when he seeks a search warrant in a probable cause hearing and intentionally fails to fully inform the court by failing to state that the arrested person made an alleged confession while under hypnosis and yet had persistently denied committing any crime before and after the hypnosis?” Pet. for Cert, i (emphasis added).
Therefore, like the courts below, we address only respondent’s participation in the search warrant hearing.
Petitioner’s challenge to respondent’s participation in the search warrant hearing is similar to the claim in Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325 (1983). There, the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim was based on the allegation that a police officer had given perjured testimony at the plaintiff’s criminal trial. In holding that the officer was entitled to absolute immunity, we noted that witnesses were absolutely immune at common law from subsequent damages liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings “even if the witness knew the statements were false and made them with malice.” Id., at 332.
Like witnesses, prosecutors and other lawyers were absolutely immune from damages liability at common law for making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings (at least so long as the statements were related to the proceeding), and also for eliciting false and defamatory testimony from witnesses. See, e. g., Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F. 2d 396, 401-402 (CA2 1926), summarily aff’d, 275 U. S. 503 (1927); Youmans v. Smith, 153 N. Y. 214, 219-220, 47 N. E. 265, 266-267 (1897); Griffith v. Stinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 122, 44 N. E. 1001, 1002 (1896); Marsh v. Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309, 312-313 (1872); Jennings v. Paine, 4 Wis. 358 (1855); Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass. 193, 197-198 (1841). See also King v. Skinner, Lofft 55, 56, 98 Eng. Rep. 529, 530 (K. B. 1772), where Lord Mansfield observed that “neither party, witness, counsel, jury, or Judge can be put to answer, civilly or criminally, for words spoken in office.”
This immunity extended to “any hearing before a tribunal which perform[ed] a judicial function.” W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 94, pp. 826-827 (1941); see also Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation, 9 Colum. L. Rev. 463, 487-488 (1909). In Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U. S. 503 (1927), for example, this Court affirmed a decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in which that court had held that the common-law immunity extended to a prosecutor’s conduct before a grand jury. See also, e. g., Griffith, supra, at 122, 44 N. E., at 1002; Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wis. 325, 106 N. W. 1066 (1906).
In addition to finding support in the common law, we believe that absolute immunity for a prosecutor’s actions in a probable-cause hearing is justified by the policy concerns articulated in Imbler. There, the Court held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for initiating a prosecution and for presenting the State’s case. 424 U. S., at 431. The Court also observed that “the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution.” Id., at 431, n. 33.
The prosecutor’s actions at issue here — appearing before a judge and presenting evidence in support of a motion for a search warrant — clearly involve the prosecutor’s “role as advocate for the State,” rather than his role as “administrator or investigative officer,” the protection for which we reserved judgment in Imbler, see id., at 430-431, and n. 33. Moreover, since the issuance of a search warrant is unquestionably a judicial act, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349, 363, n. 12 (1978), appearing at a probable-cause hearing is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler, supra, at 430. It is also connected with the initiation and conduct of a prosecution, particularly where the hearing occurs after arrest, as was the case here.
As this and other cases indicate, pretrial court appearances by the prosecutor in support of taking criminal action against a suspect present a substantial likelihood of vexatious litigation that might have an untoward effect on the independence of the prosecutor. Therefore, absolute immunity for this function serves the policy of protecting the judicial process, which underlies much of the Court’s decision in Imbler. See, e. g., Forrester, 484 U. S., at 226; Briscoe, 460 U. S., at 334-335. Furthermore, the judicial process is available as a check on prosecutorial actions at a probable-cause hearing. “[T]he safeguards built into the judicial system tend to reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct.” Butz, 438 U. S., at 512. See also Mitchell, 472 U. S., at 522-523.
Accordingly, we hold that respondent’s appearance in court in support of an application for a search warrant and the presentation of evidence at that hearing are protected by absolute immunity.
B
Turning to respondent’s acts of providing legal advice to the police, we note first that neither respondent nor the court below has identified any historical or common-law support for extending absolute immunity to such actions by prosecutors. Indeed, the Court of Appeals stated that its “review of the historical or commonlaw basis for the immunity in question does not yield any direct support for the conclusion that a prosecutor’s immunity from suit extends to the act of giving legal advice to police officers.” 894 F. 2d, at 955.
The Court of Appeals did observe that Indiana common law purported to provide immunity “ ‘[w]henever duties of a judicial nature are imposed upon a public officer.’” Ibid. (quoting Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind., at 121, 44 N. E., at 1002). The court then reasoned that giving legal advice is “of a judicial nature” because the prosecutor is, like a judge, called upon to render opinions concerning the legality of conduct. We do not believe, however, that advising the police in the investigative phase of a criminal case is so “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” Imbler, 424 U. S., at 430, that it qualifies for absolute immunity. Absent a tradition of immunity comparable to the common-law immunity from malicious prosecution, which formed the basis for the decision in Imbler, we have not been inclined to extend absolute immunity from liability under § 1983. See, e. g., Malley, 475 U. S., at 342.
The United States, as amicus curiae, argues that the absence of common-law support here should not be determinative because the office of public prosecutor was largely unknown at English common law, and prosecutors in the 18th and 19th centuries did not have an investigatory role, as they do today. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20-21. We are not persuaded. First, it is American common law that is determinative, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 644 (1987), and the office of public prosecutor ivas known to American common law. See Imbler, supra, at 421-424. Second, although “the precise contours of official immunity” need not mirror the immunity at common law, Anderson, supra, at 645, we look to the common law and other history for guidance because our role is “not to make a freewheeling policy choice,” but rather to discern Congress’ likely intent in enacting § 1983. Malley, supra, at 342. “We do not have a license to establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the interests of what we judge to be sound public policy.” Tower v. Glover, 467 U. S. 914, 922-923 (1984). Thus, for example, in Malley, supra, it was observed that “[s]ince the statute [§ 1983] on its face does not provide for any immunities, we would be going far to read into it an absolute immunity for conduct which was only accorded qualified immunity in 1871.” Id., at 342.
The next factor to be considered — risk of vexatious litigation — also does not support absolute immunity for giving legal advice. The Court of Appeals asserted that absolute immunity was justified because “a prosecutor’s risk of becoming entangled in litigation based on his or her role as a legal advisor to police officer is as likely as the risks associated with initiating and prosecuting a case.” 894 F. 2d, at 955-956. We disagree. In the first place, a suspect or defendant is not likely to be as aware of a prosecutor’s role in giving advice as a prosecutor’s role in initiating and conducting a prosecution. But even if a prosecutor’s role in giving advice to the police does carry with it some risk of burdensome litigation, the concern with litigation in our immunity cases is not merely a generalized concern with interference with an official’s duties, but rather is a concern with interference with the conduct closely related to the judicial process. Forrester, supra, at 226; Imbler, supra, at 430. Absolute immunity is designed to free the judicial process from the harassment and intimidation associated with litigation. For-rester, supra, at 226. That concern therefore justifies absolute prosecutorial immunity only for actions that are connected with the prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct.
The Court of Appeals speculated that anything short of absolute immunity would discourage prosecutors from performing their “vital obligation” of giving legal advice to the police. 894 F. 2d, at 956. But the qualified immunity standard is today more protective of officials than it was at the time that Imbler was decided. “As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley, supra, at 341; see also Mitchell, 472 U. S., at 524. Although the absence of absolute immunity for the act of giving legal advice may cause prosecutors to consider their advice more carefully, “ ‘[w]here an official could be expected to know that his conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate.’” Ibid, (quoting Harlow, 457 U. S., at 819). Indeed, it is incongruous to allow prosecutors to be absolutely immune from liability for giving advice to the police, but to allow police officers only qualified immunity for following the advice. Cf. Butz, 438 U. S., at 505-506. Ironically, it would mean that the police, who do not ordinarily hold law degrees, would be required to know the clearly established law, but prosecutors would not.
The United States argues that giving legal advice is related to a prosecutor’s roles in screening cases for prosecution and in safeguarding the fairness of the criminal judicial process. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15-18. That argument, however, proves too much. Almost any action by a prosecutor, including his or her direct participation in purely investigative activity, could be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether to prosecute, but we have never indicated that absolute immunity is that expansive. Rather, as in Imbler, we inquire whether the prosecutor’s actions are closely associated with the judicial process. Indeed, we implicitly rejected the United States’ argument in Mitchell, supra, where we held that the Attorney General was not absolutely immune from liability for authorizing a warrantless wiretap. Even though the wiretap was arguably related to a potential prosecution, we found that the Attorney General “was not acting in a prosecutorial capacity” and thus was not entitled to the immunity recognized in Imbler. Id., at 521.
As a final basis for allowing absolute immunity for legal advice, the Court of Appeals observed that there are several checks other than civil litigation to prevent abuses of authority by prosecutors. 894 F. 2d, at 956. Although we agree, we note that one of the most important checks, the judicial process, will not necessarily restrain out-of-court activities by a prosecutor that occur prior to the initiation of a prosecution, such as providing legal advice to the police. This is particularly true if a suspect is not eventually prosecuted. In those circumstances, the prosecutor’s action is not subjected to the “crucible of the judicial process.” Imbler, 424 U. S., at 440 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
In sum, we conclude that respondent has not met his burden of showing that the relevant factors justify an extension of absolute immunity to the prosecutorial function of giving legal advice to the police.
> > — f
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse m part the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Following her arrest, petitioner was placed in the psychiatric ward of a state hospital for four months. During that time, she was discharged from her employment, and the State obtained temporary custody of her sons. The medical experts at the hospital eventually concluded that petitioner did not have multiple personalities, and she was released.
Since the decision in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976), most Courts of Appeals have held that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity for “investigative” or “administrative” acts. The courts, however, have differed in where they draw the line between protected and unprotected activities. For example, the courts are split on the issue of whether absolute immunity extends to the act of giving legal advice to the police. Compare Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F. 2d 930, 937 (CA10 1987), with 894 F. 2d 949 (CA7 1990) (case below); Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F. 2d 783, 790 (CA11 1988); Myers v. Morris, 810 F. 2d 1437, 1449-1451 (CA8), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 828 (1987).
Section 1983, which originated as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, provides in full:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.” Rev. Stat. S 1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
The Court previously had affirmed a decision holding that federal prosecutors were absolutely immune from suits for malicious prosecution. See Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U. S. 503 (1927), summarily aff’g 12 F. 2d 396 (CA2 1926).
We are not persuaded by Justice Scalia’s attempt to read more into petitioner’s claims. See post, at 501-504. Although one snippet of respondent’s testimony at trial related to his decision to go to court to seek the warrant, see Tr. 145, we are not aware of anything in the record showing either that respondent expressly or impliedly consented to an amendment of petitioner’s claims or that petitioner sought to amend her complaint based on the evidence presented at trial. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(b). As a result, Justice Scalia’s argument that there was no common-law immunity for malicious procurement of a search warrant, post, at 504, is irrelevant. Cf. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325, 330-331, n. 9 (1983) (“The availability of a common-law action for false accusations of crime . . . is inapposite because petitioners present only the question of § 1983 liability for false testimony during a state-court criminal trial”).
There is widespread agreement among the Courts of Appeals that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct before grand juries. See, e. g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F. 2d 1230, 1243 (CA7 1990); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F. 2d 1135, 1139 (CA6 1989); Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F. 2d 73, 74-75 (CA2 1988); Morrison v. Baton Rouge, 761 F. 2d 242 (CA5 1985); Gray v. Bell, 229 U. S. App. D. C. 176, 188, and n. 37, 712 F. 2d 490, 502, and n. 37 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1100 (1984).
The judge before whom the probable-cause hearing was held testified in the present case and described the procedure in her court for the issuance of search warrants. Her description is revealing as to the role of the prosecutor in connection with that judicial function:
“A. The general procedure is that the judge is presented with what we call an affidavit of probable cause. And in that affidavit are certain statements which are meant to apprise the Court of alleged facts in existence which would convince the Court that a search warrant should be issued.
“The other procedure is that a prosecutor or deputy prosecutor can ask the court for a closed-door hearing. And the courtroom is then locked in our county. -Witnesses are presented for the purpose of convincing the court that there exists what we call probable cause for the issuance of search warrants. There can be one or many witnesses.
“Q. Thank you, Judge. In each of those instances, is the information presented to the Court either in affidavit form or in the form of personal testimony, sworn testimony?
“A. It is.
“Q. And would you tell the jury who, under the procedures you have just described, has the sole and exclusive power to seek a search warrant or approve the seeking of a search warrant?
“THE WITNESS: Who has this power?
“MR. SUTHERLIN: Yes.
“A. It would be the prosecutor of the county or one of the deputies.
“Q. Is it possible for a police officer to go directly to your court or any court and obtain a search warrant?
“A. No.” Tr. 4-5.
In this case, of course, respondent appeared in court and presented testimony, and it is his conduct at that appearance that is the focus of the first issue in this case.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982), we “completely reformulated qualified immunity,” Anderson, 483 U. S., at 645, replacing the common-law subjective standard with an objective standard that allows liability only where the official violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow, supra, at 818. This change was “specifically designed to ‘avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment,’ and we believe it sufficiently serves this goal.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341 (1986); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 524 (1985). Accordingly, it satisfies one of the principal concerns underlying our recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler, 424 U. S., at 419, n. 13.
Of course, in holding that respondent is not entitled to absolute immunity for rendering the legal advice in this case, we express no views about the underlying merits of petitioner’s claims against respondent.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are confronted in this case with an issue concerning § 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 506(d). May a debtor “strip down” a creditor’s lien on real property to the value of the collateral, as judicially determined, when that value is less than the amount of the claim secured by the lien?
I
On June 1, 1978, respondents loaned $119,000 to petitioner Aletha Dewsnup and her husband, T. LaMar Dewsnup, since deceased. The loan was accompanied by a Deed of Trust granting a lien on two parcels of Utah farmland owned by the Dewsnups.
Petitioner defaulted the following year. Under the terms of the Deed of Trust, respondents at that point could have proceeded against the real property collateral by accelerating the maturity of the loan, issuing a notice of default, and selling the land at a public foreclosure sale to satisfy the debt. See also Utah Code Ann. §§57-1-20 to 57-1-37 (1990 and Supp. 1991).
Respondents did issue a notice of default in 1981. Before the foreclosure sale took place, however, petitioner sought reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. That bankruptcy petition was dismissed, as was a subsequent Chapter 11 petition. In June 1984, petitioner filed a petition seeking liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Code, 11 U. S. C. §701 et seq. Because of the pendency of these bankruptcy proceedings, respondents were not able to proceed to the foreclosure sale. See 11 U. S. C. §362 (1988 ed. and Supp. II).
In 1987, petitioner filed the present adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah seeking, pursuant to § 506, to “avoid” a portion of respondents’ lien. App. 3. Petitioner represented that the debt of approximately $120,000 then owed to respondents exceeded the fair market value of the land and that, therefore, the Bankruptcy Court should reduce the lien to that value. According to petitioner, this was compelled by the interrelationship of the security-reducing provision of § 506(a) and the lien-voiding provision of § 506(d). Under § 506(a) (“An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property”), respondents would have an “allowed secured claim” only to the extent of the judicially determined value of their collateral. And under § 506(d) (“To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void”), the court would be required to void the lien as to the remaining portion of respondents’ claim, because the remaining portion was not an “allowed secured claim” within the meaning of § 506(a).
The Bankruptcy Court refused to grant this relief. In re Dewsnup, 87 B. R. 676 (1988). After a trial, it determined that the then value of the land subject to the Deed of Trust was $39,000. It indulged in the assumption that the property had been abandoned by the trustee pursuant to §554, and reasoned that once property was abandoned it no longer fell within the reach of § 506(a), which applies only to “property in which the estate has an interest,” and therefore was not covered by § 506(d).
The United States District Court, without a supporting opinion, summarily affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment of dismissal with prejudice. App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in its turn, also affirmed. In re Dewsnup, 908 F. 2d 588 (1990). Starting from the “fundamental premise” of § 506(a) that a claim is subject to reduction in security only when the estate has an interest in the property, the court reasoned that because the estate had no interest in abandoned property, § 506(a) did not apply (nor, by implication, did § 506(d)). Id., at 590-591. The court then noted that a contrary result would be inconsistent with § 722 under which a debtor has a limited right to redeem certain personal property. Id., at 592.
Because the result reached by the Court of Appeals was at odds with that reached by the Third Circuit in Gaglia v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 889 F. 2d 1304, 1306-1311 (1989), and was expressly recognized by the Tenth Circuit as being in conflict, see 908 F. 2d, at 591, we granted certiorari. 498 U. S. 1081 (1991).
II
As we read their several submissions, the parties and their amici are not in agreement in their respective approaches to the problem of statutory interpretation that confronts us. Petitioner-debtor takes the position that §§ 506(a) and 506(d) are complementary and to be read together. Because, under § 506(a), a claim is secured only to the extent of the judicially determined value of the real property on which the lien is fixed, a debtor can void a lien on the property pursuant to § 506(d) to the extent the claim is no longer secured and thus is not “an allowed secured claim.” In other words, § 506(a) bifurcates classes of claims allowed under § 502 into secured claims and unsecured claims; any portion of an allowed claim deemed to be unsecured under § 506(a) is not an “allowed secured claim” within the lien-voiding scope of § 506(d). Petitioner argues that there is no exception for unsecured property abandoned by the trustee.
Petitioner’s amicus argues that the plain language of § 506(d) dictates that the proper portion of an undersecured lien on property in a Chapter 7 case is void whether or not the property is abandoned by the trustee. It further argues that the rationale of the Court of Appeals would lead to evisceration of the debtor’s right of redemption and the elimination of an undersecured creditor’s ability to participate in the distribution of the estate’s assets.
Respondents primarily assert that § 506(d) is not, as petitioner would have it, “rigidly tied” to § 506(a), Brief for Respondents 7. They argue that § 506(a) performs the function of classifying claims by true secured, status at the time of distribution of the estate to ensure fairness to unsecured claimants. In contrast, the lien-voiding § 506(d) is directed to the time at which foreclosure is to take place, and, where the trustee has abandoned the property, no bankruptcy distributional purpose is served by voiding the lien.
In the alternative, respondents, joined by the United States as amicus curiae, argue more broadly that the words “allowed secured claim” in § 506(d) need not be read as an indivisible term of art defined by reference to § 506(a), which by its terms is not a definitional provision. Rather, the words should be read term-by-term to refer to any claim that is, first, allowed, and, second, secured. Because there is no question that the claim at issue here has been “allowed” pursuant to § 502 of the Code and is secured by a lien with recourse to the underlying collateral, it .does not come within the scope of § 506(d), which voids only liens corresponding to claims that have not been allowed and secured. This reading of § 506(d), according to respondents and the United States, gives the provision the simple and sensible function of voiding a lien whenever a claim secured by the lien itself has not been allowed. It ensures that the Code’s determination not to allow the underlying claim against the debtor personally is given full effect by preventing its assertion against the debtor’s property.
Respondents point out that pre-Code bankruptcy law preserved liens like respondents’ and that there is nothing in the Code’s legislative history that reflects any intent to alter that law. Moreover, according to respondents, the “fresh start” policy cannot justify an impairment of respondents’ property rights, for the fresh start does not extend to an in rent claim against property but is limited to a discharge of personal liability.
III
The foregoing recital of the contrasting positions of the respective parties and their amici demonstrates that §506 of the Bankruptcy Code and its relationship to other provisions of that Code do embrace some ambiguities. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ch. 506 and, in particular, ¶ 506.07 (15th ed. 1991). Hypothetical applications that come to mind and those advanced at oral argument illustrate the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would apply to all possible fact situations. We therefore focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to await their legal resolution on another day.
We conclude that respondents’ alternative position, espoused also by the United States, although not without its difficulty, generally is the better of the several approaches. Therefore, we hold that § 506(d) does not allow petitioner to “strip down” respondents’ lien, because respondents’ claim is secured by a lien and has been fully allowed pursuant to §502. Were we writing on a clean slate, we might be inclined to agree with petitioner that the words “allowed secured claim” must take the same meaning in § 506(d) as in § 506(a). But, given the ambiguity in the text, we are not convinced that Congress intended to depart from the pre-Code rule that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected.
1. The practical effect of petitioner’s argument is to freeze the creditor’s secured interest at the judicially determined valuation. By this approach, the creditor would lose the benefit of any increase in the value of the property by the time of the foreclosure sale. The increase would accrue to the benefit of the debtor, a result some of the parties describe as a “windfall.”
We think, however, that the creditor’s lien stays with the real property until the foreclosure. That is what was bargained for by the mortgagor and the mortgagee. The voidness language sensibly applies only to the security aspect of the lien and then only to the real deficiency in the security. Any increase over the judicially determined valuation during bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit of the creditor, not to the benefit of the debtor and not to the benefit of other unsecured creditors whose claims have been allowed and who had nothing to do with the mortgagor-mortgagee bargain.
Such surely would be the result had the lienholder stayed aloof from the bankruptcy proceeding (subject, of course, to the power of other persons or entities to pull him into the proceeding pursuant to § 501), and we see no reason why his acquiescence in that proceeding should cause him to experience a forfeiture of the kind the debtor proposes. It is true that his participation in the bankruptcy results in his having the benefit of an allowed unsecured claim as well as his allowed secured claim, but that does not strike us as proper recompense for what petitioner proposes by way of the elimination of the remainder of the lien.
2. This result appears to have been clearly established before the passage of the 1978 Act. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a lien on real property passed through bankruptcy unaffected. This Court recently acknowledged that this was so. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U. S. 291, 297 (1991) (“Ordinarily, liens and other secured interests survive bankruptcy”); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U. S. 78, 84 (1991) (“Rather, a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim — namely, an action against the debtor in personam — while leaving intact another — namely, an action against the debtor in rem”).
3. Apart from reorganization proceedings, see 11 U. S. C. §§616(1) and (10) (1976 ed.), no provision of the pre-Code statute permitted involuntary reduction of the amount of a creditor’s lien for any reason other than payment on the debt. Our cases reveal the Court’s concern about this. In Long v. Bullard, 117 U. S. 617, 620-621 (1886), the Court held that a discharge in bankruptcy does not release real estate of the debtor from the lien of a mortgage created by him before the bankruptcy. And in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935), the Court considered additions to the Bankruptcy Act effected by the Frazier-Lemke Act, 48 Stat. 1289. There the Court noted that the latter Act’s “avowed object is to take from the mortgagee rights in the specific property held as security; and to that end ‘to scale down the indebtedness’ to the present value of the property.” 295 U. S., at 594. The Court invalidated that statute under the Takings Clause. It further observed: “No instance has been found, except under the Frazier-Lemke Act, of either a statute or decision compelling the mortgagee to relinquish the property to the mortgagor free of the lien unless the debt was paid in full.” Id., at 579.
Congress must have enacted the Code with a full understanding of this practice. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 357 (1977) (“Subsection (d) permits liens to pass through the bankruptcy case unaffected”).
4. When Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write “on a clean slate.” See Emil v. Hanley, 318 U. S. 515, 521 (1943). Furthermore, this Court has been reluctant to accept arguments that would interpret the Code, however vague the particular language under consideration might be, to effect a major change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some discussion in the legislative history. See United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 380 (1988). See also Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 563 (1990); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 244-245 (1989). Of course, where the language is unambiguous, silence in the legislative history cannot be controlling. But, given the ambiguity here, to attribute to Congress the intention to grant a debtor the broad new remedy against allowed claims to the extent that they become “unsecured” for purposes of § 506(a) without the new remedy’s being mentioned somewhere in the Code itself or in the annals of Congress is not plausible, in our view, and is contrary to basic bankruptcy principles.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 506 provides in full:
“(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.
“(b) To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.
“(c) The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim.
“(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless—
“(1) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or
“(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.”
Respondents expressly stated in their brief and twice again at oral argument that they adopted as an alternative position the United States’ interpretation of § 506(d). Brief for Respondents 40, n. 33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 14, 20. In dissent, however, Justice Scalia contends that respondents have not taken the same position as the United States on this issue. According to the dissent, the United States has taken the position that “a lien only ‘secures’ the claim in question up to the value of the security that is the object of the lien — and only up to that value is the lien subject to avoidance under § 506(d).” Post, at 424. In fact, the United States says: “Under [petitioner’s] reading, Section 506(d) would operate to reduce the creditor’s lien to the value of the allowed secured claim described in Section 506(a). In our view, this reading makes no sense.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 5.
Accordingly, we express no opinion as to whether the words “allowed secured claim” have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 67d of the 1898 Act, 30 Stat. 564, made this explicit:
“Liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud upon this Act, and for a present consideration, which have been recorded according to law, if record thereof was necessary in order to impart notice, shall not be affected by this Act.”
The Court, with respect to this statute, has said: “Section 67d ... declares that liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud upon this act, shall not be affected by it.” City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U. S. 174, 177 (1919).
This precise statutory language did not appear in a reorganization of the section in the Chandler Act of 1938,52 Stat. 840. A respected bankruptcy authority convincingly explained that this was done not to remove the rule of validity but because “the draftsmen of the 1938 Act desired generally to specify only what should be invalid." 4B Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 70.70, p. 771 (14th ed. 1978) (emphasis in original). The alteration had no substantive effect. Oppenheimer v. Oldham, 178 F. 2d 386, 389 (CA5 1949).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice GINSBURGdelivered the opinion of the Court.
In Illinois v. Caballes,543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), this Court held that a dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable seizures. This case presents the question whether the Fourth Amendment tolerates a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop. We hold that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, "become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission" of issuing a ticket for the violation. Id., at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834. The Court so recognized in Caballes,and we adhere to the line drawn in that decision.
I
Just after midnight on March 27, 2012, police officer Morgan Struble observed a Mercury Mountaineer veer slowly onto the shoulder of Nebraska State Highway 275 for one or two seconds and then jerk back onto the road. Nebraska law prohibits driving on highway shoulders, see Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,142 (2010), and on that basis, Struble pulled the Mountaineer over at 12:06 a.m. Struble is a K-9 officer with the Valley Police Department in Nebraska, and his dog Floyd was in his patrol car that night. Two men were in the Mountaineer: the driver, Dennys Rodriguez, and a front-seat passenger, Scott Pollman.
Struble approached the Mountaineer on the passenger's side. After Rodriguez identified himself, Struble asked him why he had driven onto the shoulder. Rodriguez replied that he had swerved to avoid a pothole. Struble then gathered Rodriguez's license, registration, and proof of insurance, and asked Rodriguez to accompany him to the patrol car. Rodriguez asked if he was required to do so, and Struble answered that he was not. Rodriguez decided to wait in his own vehicle.
After running a records check on Rodriguez, Struble returned to the Mountaineer. Struble asked passenger Pollman for his driver's license and began to question him about where the two men were coming from and where they were going. Pollman replied that they had traveled to Omaha, Nebraska, to look at a Ford Mustang that was for sale and that they were returning to Norfolk, Nebraska. Struble returned again to his patrol car, where he completed a records check on Pollman, and called for a second officer. Struble then began writing a warning ticket for Rodriguez for driving on the shoulder of the road.
Struble returned to Rodriguez's vehicle a third time to issue the written warning. By 12:27 or 12:28 a.m., Struble had finished explaining the warning to Rodriguez, and had given back to Rodriguez and Pollman the documents obtained from them. As Struble later testified, at that point, Rodriguez and Pollman "had all their documents back and a copy of the written warning. I got all the reason[s] for the stop out of the way[,] ... took care of all the business." App. 70.
Nevertheless, Struble did not consider Rodriguez "free to leave." Id.,at 69-70. Although justification for the traffic stop was "out of the way," id.,at 70, Struble asked for permission to walk his dog around Rodriguez's vehicle. Rodriguez said no. Struble then instructed Rodriguez to turn off the ignition, exit the vehicle, and stand in front of the patrol car to wait for the second officer. Rodriguez complied. At 12:33 a.m., a deputy sheriff arrived. Struble retrieved his dog and led him twice around the Mountaineer. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs halfway through Struble's second pass. All told, seven or eight minutes had elapsed from the time Struble issued the written warning until the dog indicated the presence of drugs. A search of the vehicle revealed a large bag of methamphetamine.
Rodriguez was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska on one count of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)and (b)(1). He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground, among others, that Struble had prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff.
After receiving evidence, a Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion be denied. The Magistrate Judge found no probable cause to search the vehicle independent of the dog alert. App. 100 (apart from "information given by the dog," "Officer Struble had [no]thing other than a rather large hunch"). He further found that no reasonable suspicion supported the detention once Struble issued the written warning. He concluded, however, that under Eighth Circuit precedent, extension of the stop by "seven to eight minutes" for the dog sniff was only a de minimisintrusion on Rodriguez's Fourth Amendment rights and was therefore permissible.
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's factual findings and legal conclusions and denied Rodriguez's motion to suppress. The court noted that, in the Eighth Circuit, "dog sniffs that occur within a short time following the completion of a traffic stop are not constitutionally prohibited if they constitute only de minimis intrusions." App. 114 (quoting United States v. Alexander,448 F.3d 1014, 1016 (C.A.8 2006)). The court thus agreed with the Magistrate Judge that the "7 to 10 minutes" added to the stop by the dog sniff "was not of constitutional significance." App. 114. Impelled by that decision, Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to five years in prison.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The "seven- or eight-minute delay" in this case, the opinion noted, resembled delays that the court had previously ranked as permissible. 741 F.3d 905, 907 (2014). The Court of Appeals thus ruled that the delay here constituted an acceptable "de minimisintrusion on Rodriguez's personal liberty." Id.,at 908. Given that ruling, the court declined to reach the question whether Struble had reasonable suspicion to continue Rodriguez's detention after issuing the written warning.
We granted certiorari to resolve a division among lower courts on the question whether police routinely may extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff.573 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 43, 189 L.Ed.2d 896 (2014). Compare, e.g., United States v. Morgan,270 F.3d 625, 632 (C.A.8 2001)(postcompletion delay of "well under ten minutes" permissible), with, e.g., State v. Baker,2010 UT 18, ¶ 13, 229 P.3d 650, 658 (2010)("[W]ithout additional reasonable suspicion, the officer must allow the seized person to depart once the purpose of the stop has concluded.").
II
A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. "[A] relatively brief encounter," a routine traffic stop is "more analogous to a so-called 'Terrystop' ... than to a formal arrest." Knowles v. Iowa,525 U.S. 113, 117, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998)(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty,468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio,392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). See also Arizona v. Johnson,555 U.S. 323, 330, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). Like a Terrystop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's "mission"-to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, Caballes,543 U.S., at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834and attend to related safety concerns, infra,at 1619 - 1620. See also United States v. Sharpe,470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Florida v. Royer,460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)(plurality opinion) ("The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification."). Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may "last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose." Ibid.See also Caballes,543 U.S., at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed. See Sharpe,470 U.S., at 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568(in determining the reasonable duration of a stop, "it [is] appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued [the] investigation").
Our decisions in Caballesand Johnsonheed these constraints. In both cases, we concluded that the Fourth Amendment tolerated certain unrelated investigations that did not lengthen the roadside detention. Johnson,555 U.S., at 327-328, 129 S.Ct. 781(questioning);Caballes,543 U.S., at 406, 408, 125 S.Ct. 834(dog sniff). In Caballes,however, we cautioned that a traffic stop "can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission" of issuing a warning ticket. 543 U.S., at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834. And we repeated that admonition in Johnson: The seizure remains lawful only "so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop." 555 U.S., at 333, 129 S.Ct. 781. See also Muehler v. Mena,544 U.S. 93, 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005)(because unrelated inquiries did not "exten[d] the time [petitioner] was detained[,] ... no additional Fourth Amendment justification ... was required"). An officer, in other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But contrary to Justice ALITO's suggestion, post, at 1625, n. 2, he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual. But see post,at 1623 - 1624 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (premising opinion on the dissent's own finding of "reasonable suspicion," although the District Court reached the opposite conclusion, and the Court of Appeals declined to consider the issue).
Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer's mission includes "ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop." Caballes,543 U.S., at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834. Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance. See Delaware v. Prouse,440 U.S. 648, 658-660, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). See also 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(c), pp. 507-517 (5th ed. 2012). These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. See Prouse,440 U.S., at 658-659, 99 S.Ct. 1391; LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(c), at 516(A "warrant check makes it possible to determine whether the apparent traffic violator is wanted for one or more previous traffic offenses.").
A dog sniff, by contrast, is a measure aimed at "detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." Indianapolis v. Edmond,531 U.S. 32, 40-41, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000). See also Florida v. Jardines,569 U.S. 1, ---- - ----, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1416-1417, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013). Candidly, the Government acknowledged at oral argument that a dog sniff, unlike the routine measures just mentioned, is not an ordinary incident of a traffic stop. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer's traffic mission.
In advancing its de minimisrule, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on our decision in Pennsylvania v. Mimms,434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977)(per curiam). See United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency,182 F.3d 643, 649 (C.A.8 1999). In Mimms,we reasoned that the government's "legitimate and weighty" interest in officer safety outweighs the "de minimis" additional intrusion of requiring a driver, already lawfully stopped, to exit the vehicle. 434 U.S., at 110-111, 98 S.Ct. 330. See also Maryland v. Wilson,519 U.S. 408, 413-415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997)(passengers may be required to exit vehicle stopped for traffic violation). The Eighth Circuit, echoed in Justice THOMAS's dissent, believed that the imposition here similarly could be offset by the Government's "strong interest in interdicting the flow of illegal drugs along the nation's highways." $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency,182 F.3d, at 649; see post, at 1621.
Unlike a general interest in criminal enforcement, however, the government's officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop itself. Traffic stops are "especially fraught with danger to police officers," Johnson,555 U.S., at 330, 129 S.Ct. 781(internal quotation marks omitted), so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely. Cf. United States v. Holt,264 F.3d 1215, 1221-1222 (C.A.10 2001)(en banc) (recognizing officer safety justification for criminal record and outstanding warrant checks), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Stewart,473 F.3d 1265, 1269 (C.A.10 2007). On-scene investigation into other crimes, however, detours from that mission. See supra,at 1615. So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours. But cf. post, at 1624 - 1625 (ALITO, J., dissenting). Thus, even assuming that the imposition here was no more intrusive than the exit order in Mimms,the dog sniff could not be justified on the same basis. Highway and officer safety are interests different in kind from the Government's endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular.
The Government argues that an officer may "incremental[ly]" prolong a stop to conduct a dog sniff so long as the officer is reasonably diligent in pursuing the traffic-related purpose of the stop, and the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other traffic stops involving similar circumstances. Brief for United States 36-39. The Government's argument, in effect, is that by completing all traffic-related tasks expeditiously, an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation. See also post, at 1617 - 1619 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (embracing the Government's argument). The reasonableness of a seizure, however, depends on what the police in fact do. See Knowles,525 U.S., at 115-117, 119 S.Ct. 484. In this regard, the Government acknowledges that "an officer always has to be reasonably diligent." Tr. of Oral Arg. 49. How could diligence be gauged other than by noting what the officer actually did and how he did it? If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of "time reasonably required to complete [the stop's] mission." Caballes,543 U.S., at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834. As we said in Caballesand reiterate today, a traffic stop "prolonged beyond" that point is "unlawful." Ibid.The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, as Justice ALITO supposes, post, at 1624 - 1625, but whether conducting the sniff "prolongs"-i.e., adds time to-"the stop," supra,at 1615.
III
The Magistrate Judge found that detention for the dog sniff in this case was not independently supported by individualized suspicion, see App. 100, and the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's findings, see id., at 112-113. The Court of Appeals, however, did not review that determination. But see post, at 1617, 1622 - 1623 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (resolving the issue, nevermind that the Court of Appeals left it unaddressed); post, at 1623 - 1624 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (upbraiding the Court for addressing the sole issue decided by the Court of Appeals and characterizing the Court's answer as "unnecessary" because the Court, instead, should have decided an issue the Court of Appeals did not decide). The question whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified detaining Rodriguez beyond completion of the traffic infraction investigation, therefore, remains open for Eighth Circuit consideration on remand.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when a justice of the Alabama Supreme Court declined to recuse himself from participation in that court’s consideration of this case.
I — I
This appeal arises out of litigation concerning an insurance policy issued by appellant covering appellees Margaret and Roger Lavoie. In January 1977, Mrs. Lavoie was examined by her physician, Dr. Douglas, because of various ailments. Shortly thereafter, on Dr. Douglas’ recommendation, she was admitted to the Mobile Infirmary Hospital, where she remained for 23 days for a battery of tests.
After her discharge, the hospital forwarded the appropriate forms and medical records along with a bill for $3,028.25 to appellant’s local office in Mobile, Alabama. The local office refused to pay the entire amount, tendering payment for only $1,650.22. The local office also sent a letter to the national office, concluding that the 23-day hospitalization was unnecessary and that “[hjospital records do not indicate anything to the contrary,” even though all the hospital records had not yet been received. At one point, the national office told the local office to continue denying the request for full payment, but added that “if they act like they are going to file suit,” the file should be reviewed.
Appellees filed suit against appellant, seeking both payment of the remainder of their original claim and punitive damages for the tort of bad-faith refusal to pay a valid claim. The trial court dismissed for failure to state a cause of action with respect to the bad-faith counts. Appellees appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which remanded on the ground that it had “not foreclosed the possibility of recovery in tort for the bad faith refusal of an insurer to pay legitimate benefits due under an insurance policy.” Lavoie v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 374 So. 2d 310, 312 (1979). On remand, the trial court entered judgment for appellees on the unpaid portion of their claim and granted summary judgment for appellant on the bad-faith claim. The Alabama Supreme Court again reversed, explaining that on that same day it had “recognized the intentional tort of bad faith in first party insurance actions.” Lavoie v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 405 So. 2d 17, 18 (1981) (citing Chavers v. National Security Fire & Casualty Co., 405 So. 2d 1 (1981)). On remand, appellees’ bad-faith claim was submitted to a jury. The jury awarded $3.5 million in punitive damages. The trial judge denied appellant’s motion for judgment n.o.v. or, alternatively, for remittitur.
The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the award in a 5-to-4 decision. 470 So. 2d 1060 (1984). An unsigned per curiam opinion expressed the view of five justices that the evidence demonstrated that appellant had acted in bad faith. The court interpreted its prior opinions as not requiring dismissal of a bad-faith-refusal-to-pay claim even where a directed verdict against the insurer on the underlying claim was impossible. The opinion also clarified the issue of whether a bad-faith suit could be maintained where the insurer had made a partial payment of the underlying claim. Although earlier opinions of the court had refused to allow bad-faith suits in such circumstances, partial payment was not dispositive of the bad-faith issue. The court also rejected.appellant’s argument that the punitive damages award was so excessive that it must be set aside.
Chief Justice Torbert, joined by Justice Beatty, dissented; Justice Maddox, joined by Justice Shores, also dissented, concluding that the case was controlled by the court’s earlier decision in National Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So. 2d 1357 (1982), because there was an arguable reason for appellant’s refusal to pay the claim.
The court’s opinion was released on December 7, 1984; on December 21,1984, appellant filed a timely application for rehearing. On February 14, 1985, before its application had been acted on, appellant learned that while the instant action was pending before the Alabama Supreme Court, Justice Embry, one of the five justices joining the per curiam opinion, had filed two actions in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County, Alabama, against insurance companies. Both of these actions alleged bad-faith failure to pay a claim. One suit arose out of Maryland Casualty Company’s alleged failure to pay for the loss of a valuable mink coat; the other suit, which Justice Embry brought on behalf of himself and as a representative of a class of all other Alabama state employees insured under a group plan by Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama (including, apparently, all justices of the Alabama Supreme Court), alleged a willful and intentional plan to withhold payment on valid claims. Both suits sought punitive damages.
On February 21, 1985, appellant filed two motions in the Alabama Supreme Court, challenging Justice Embry’s participation in the court’s December 7, 1984, decision and his continued participation in considering appellant’s application for rehearing. The motion also alleged that all justices on the court should recuse themselves because of their interests as potential class members in Justice Embry’s suit against Blue Cross. On March 8, 1985, the court unanimously denied the recusal motions. The brief order stated that each justice had voted individually on the matter of whether he should recuse himself and that each justice had voted not to do so. At the same time, by a 5-to~4 division, the court denied appellant’s motion for rehearing.
Chief Justice Torbert wrote separately, explaining that although his views had not been influenced by his possible membership in the putative class alleged in Justice Embry’s suit against Blue Cross, he was nonetheless notifying the Clerk of the court where that suit was pending not to permit him to be included in the alleged class. Justice Maddox also wrote separately, taking similar action.
On March 20, 1985, appellant obtained a copy of the transcript of Justice Embry’s deposition, taken on January 10, 1985, in connection with his Blue Cross suit. The deposition revealed that Justice Embry had authored the per curiam opinion in this case over an 8- or 9-month period during which his civil action against Blue Cross was being prosecuted. Justice Embry also stated that, during that period, he had received “leads” from people with regard to his bad-faith action against Blue Cross and that he put them in touch with his attorney. Finally, Justice Embry revealed frustration with insurance companies. For example, when asked if he had ever had any difficulty with processing claims, Justice Embry retorted: “[T]hat is a silly question. For years and years.”
Appellant moved for leave to file a second application for rehearing based on the deposition, but that motion was denied. Appellant filed an appeal with this Court, and Justice Powell, as Circuit Justice, granted appellant’s application for a stay of the judgment below pending this Court’s disposition of the appeal. Shortly thereafter, Justice Embry’s suit against Blue Cross was settled by stipulation of the parties. In the stipulation, Blue Cross recognized that “some problems have occurred in the past and is determined to minimize them in the future.” Justice Embry received $30,000 under the settlement agreement on a basic compensatory claim of unspecified amount; a check for that sum was deposited by his attorney directly into Justice Embry’s personal account.
We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction pending argument on the merits. 471 U. S. 1134 (1985). We now vacate and remand.
r — i ⅜ — I
We are satisfied as to the Court’s jurisdiction over the question of whether Justice Embry’s participation violated appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Ap-pellees argue that the Alabama Supreme Court did not reach this issue because it was raised only after the court’s decision on the merits. We reject that contention as at odds with the record. On March 8, 1985, the court entered the following order:
“Upon consideration, the Court is of the opinion that under the allegation of said motion in this case each justice should vote individually on the matter of whether or not he or she is disqualified and should recuse. Each justice having voted not to recuse,
“IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the ‘Motion for Disqualification and Motion for Withdrawal of Opinion of December 7, 1984, and for Hearing De Novo’ be . . . denied.” App. to Juris. Statement 64a.
This order clearly demonstrates that the Alabama court reached the merits of appellant’s constitutional challenge, albeit on a justice-by-justice basis. Moreover, appellant raised this issue as soon as it discovered the facts relating to Justice Embry’s personal lawsuits. On this record, we conclude jurisdiction is proper. See Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 147-154 (1979); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57, 61 (1972).
HH hH
, <¡
Appellant contends Justice Embry s general hostility towards insurance companies that were dilatory in paying claims, as expressed in his deposition, requires a conclusion that the Due Procéss Clause was violated by his participation in the disposition of this case. The Court has recognized that not “[a]ll questions of judicial qualification . . . involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.” Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 523 (1927); see also FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 702 (1948) (“[M]ost matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level”). Moreover, the traditional common-law rule was that disqualification for bias or prejudice was not permitted. See, e. g., Clyma v. Kennedy, 64 Conn. 310, 29 A. 539 (1894). See generally Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L. J. 605 (1947). As Blackstone put it, “the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.” 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *361. The more recent trend has been towards the adoption of statutes that permit disqualification for bias or prejudice. See Berger v. United States, 255 U. S. 22, 31 (1921) (enforcing statute disqualifying federal judges in certain circumstances for personal bias or prejudice). See also ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(l)(a) (1980) (“A judge should disqualify himself. . . where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party”). But that alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the Due Process Clause. We held in Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 201-202 (1977) (citations omitted), that
“it is normally within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out. . . and its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”
We need not decide whether allegations of bias or prejudice by a judge of the type we have here would ever be sufficient under the Due Process Clause to force recusal. Certainly only in the most extreme of cases would disqualification on this basis be constitutionally required, and appellant’s arguments here fall well below that level. Appellant suggests that Justice Embry’s general frustration with insurance companies reveals a disqualifying bias, but it is likely that many claimants have developed hostile feelings from the frustration in awaiting settlement of insurance claims. Insurers, on their side, have no easy task, especially when trying to evaluate whether certain medical diagnostic tests or prolonged hospitalization were indicated. In turn, the physicians and surgeons, whether impelled by valid medical judgment or by apprehension as to future malpractice claims — or some combination of the two — similarly face difficult problems. Appellant’s allegations of bias and prejudice on this general basis, however, are insufficient to establish any constitutional violation.
B
The record in this case presents more than mere allegations of bias and prejudice, however. Appellant also presses a claim that Justice Embry had a more direct stake in the outcome of this case. In Tumey, while recognizing that the Constitution does not reach every issue of judicial qualification, the Court concluded that “it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment ... to subject [a person’s] liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.” 273 U. S., at 523.
More than .30 years ago Justice Black, speaking for the Court, reached a similar conclusion and recognized that under the Due Process Clause no judge “can be a judge in his own case [or be] permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.” In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955). He went on to acknowledge that what degree or kind of interest is sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting “cannot be defined with precision.” Ibid. Nonetheless, a reasonable formulation of the issue is whether the
“situation is one ‘which would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.’” Ward v. Village of Monroeville, supra, at 60.
Under these prior holdings, we examine just what factors might constitute such an interest in the outcome of this case that would bear on recusal. At the time Justice Embry cast the deciding vote and authored the court’s opinion, he had pending at least one very similar bad-faith-refusal-to-pay lawsuit against Blue Cross in another Alabama court. The decisions of the court on which Justice Embry sat, the Alabama Supreme Court, are binding on all Alabama courts. We need not blind ourselves to the fact that the law in the area of bad-faith-refusal-to-pay claims in Alabama, as in many other jurisdictions, was unsettled at that time, as the court’s close division in deciding this case indicates. When Justice Embry cast the deciding vote, he did not merely apply well-established law and in fact quite possibly made new law; the court’s opinion does not suggest that its conclusion was compelled by earlier decisions. Instead, to decide the case the court stated that “it is first necessary to review the policy considerations, elements, and instructive guide posts set out by this court in earlier case law.” 470 So. 2d, at 1070. And in another case the court acknowledged that “the tort of bad faith refusal to pay a valid insurance claim is in the embryonic stage, and the Court has not had occasion to address every issue that might arise in these cases.” National Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So. 2d, at 1362.
The decision under review firmly established that punitive damages could be obtained in Alabama in a situation where the insured’s claim is not fully approved and only partial payment of the underlying claim had been made. Prior to the decision under review, the Alabama Supreme Court had not clearly recognized any claim for tortious injury in such circumstances; moreover, it had affirmatively recognized that partial payment was evidence of good faith on the part of the insurer. Sexton v. Liberty National Life Ins. Co., 405 So. 2d 18, 22 (1981). The Alabama court also held that a bad-faith-refusal-to-pay cause of action will lie in Alabama even where the insured is not entitled to a directed verdict on the underlying claim, a conclusion that at the least clarified the thrust of an earlier holding. Cf. National Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, supra, at 1362. Finally, the court refused to set aside as excessive a punitive damages award of $3.5 million. The largest punitive award previously affirmed by that court was $100,000, a figure remitted from $1.1 million as “obviously the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury.” -Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916, 926 (1981).
All of these issues were present in Justice Embry’s lawsuit against Blue Cross. His complaint sought recovery for partial payment of claims. Also the very nature of Justice Embry’s suit placed in issue whether he would have to establish that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the underlying claims that he alleged Blue Cross refused to pay before gaining punitive damages. Finally, the affirmance of the largest punitive damages award ever (by a substantial margin) on precisely the type of claim raised in the Blue Cross suit undoubtedly “raised the stakes” for Blue Cross in that suit, to the benefit of Justice Embry. Thus, Justice Embry’s opinion for the Alabama Supreme Court had the clear and immediate effect of enhancing both the legal status and the settlement value of his own case.
We need not decide whether to characterize the decision under review as a change in Alabama law or a clarification of the contours of that law, a judgment we are obviously not called on to make. We hold simply that when Justice Embry made that judgment, he acted as “a judge in his own case.” Murchison, supra, at 136.
We also hold that his interest was “ ‘direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary.’” Ward, supra, at 60 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S., at 523). Justice Embry’s complaint against Blue Cross sought “compensatory damage for breach of contract, inconvenience, emotional and mental distress, disappointment, pain and suffering” in addition to punitive damages for himself and for the class. Soon after the opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court in this case was announced, Blue Cross paid Justice Embry what he characterized in an interview as “a tidy sum,” Reply Brief for Appellant 10, n. 8, to settle the suit. Records lodged with this Court show that Justice Embry received $30,000, which was deposited by his attorney directly into Justice Embry’s personal account. To be sure, a portion of this money may have gone to Justice Embry’s attorney in connection with the case, even though some materials before us suggest that his attorney agreed to waive his fee. Deposition of A. Grey Till in Clay v. Nationwide Insurance Co., CV-78-1148 (Cir. Ct. of Mobile Cty., Ala.), pp. 27-29. We are also aware that Justice Embry obtained a statement in the settlement agreement to the effect that “[t]he primary object of the institution of this suit . . . was to emphasize to defendant Blue Cross . . . that, claims under the Plan be processed and determined by Blue Cross in a timely and efficient manner,” even though that type of relief was not sought specifically in the complaint while monetary relief was. We nonetheless hold that the “tidy sum” that Justice Embry received directly is sufficient to establish the substantiality of his interest here.
We conclude that Justice, Embry’s participation in this case violated appellant’s due process rights as explicated in Tumey, Murchison, and Ward. We make clear that we are not required to decide whether in fact Justice Embry was influenced, but only whether sitting on the case then before the Supreme Court of Alabama “ ‘would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.’” Ward, 409 U. S., at 60 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, supra, at 532). The Due Process Clause “may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its high fimction in the best way, ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’” Murchison, 349 U. S., at 136 (citation omitted).
C
Appellant has challenged not only the participation of Justice Embry in this case but also the participation of all the other justices of the Alabama Supreme Court, or at least the six justices who did not withdraw from Justice Embry’s class action against Blue Cross, claiming that they also have an interest in this case. Such allegations do not constitute a sufficient basis for requiring recusal under the Constitution. In the first place, accepting appellant’s expansive contentions might require the disqualification of every judge in the State. If so, it is possible that under a “rule of necessity” none of the judges or justices would be disqualified. See United States v. Will, 449 U. S. 200, 214 (1980).
More important, while these justices might conceivably have had a slight pecuniary interest, we find it impossible to characterize that interest as “ ‘direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary.’” Ward, supra, at 60 (quoting Tumey, supra, at 523). Appellant concedes that nothing in the record even suggests that these justices had any knowledge of the class action before the court issued a decision on the merits. Thus, at most only the decision to deny rehearing was even plausibly affected. Any interest that they might have had when they passed on the rehearing motion was clearly highly speculative and contingent. At the time, the trial court had not even certified a class, let alone awarded any class relief of a pecuniary nature. With the proliferation of class actions involving broadly defined classes, the application of the constitutional requirement of disqualification must be carefully limited. Otherwise constitutional disqualification arguments could quickly become a standard feature of class-action litigation. Cf. In re City of Houston, 745 F. 2d 925 (CA5 1984). At some point, “[t]he biasing influence . . . [will be] too remote and insubstantial to violate the constitutional constraints.” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U. S. 238, 243 (1980). Charges of disqualification should not be made lightly. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923). We hold that there is no basis for concluding these justices were disqualified under the Due Process Clause.
D
Having concluded that only Justice Embry was disqualified from participation in this case, we turn to the issue of the proper remedy for this constitutional violation. Our prior decisions have not considered the question whether a decision of a multimember tribunal must be vacated because of the participation of one member who had an interest in the outcome of the case. Rather, our prior cases have involved interpretations of statutes with provisions concerning this question, e. g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U. S. 145 (1968), disqualifications of the sole member of a tribunal, e. g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, supra, and disqualifications of an entire panel, e. g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564 (1973). Some courts have concluded that a decision need not be vacated where a disqualified judge’s vote is mere surplusage. See, e. g., State ex rel. Langer v. Kositzky, 38 N. D. 616, 166 N. W. 534 (1918); but see, e. g., Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547 (1850). But we are aware of no case, and none has been called to our attention, permitting a court’s decision to stand when a disqualified judge casts the deciding vote. Here Justice Embry’s vote was decisive in the 5-to-4 decision and he was the author of the court’s opinion. Because of Justice Embry’s leading role in the decision under review, we conclude that the “appearance of justice” will best be served by vacating the decision and remanding for further proceedings. Appellees have not contended that, upon a finding of disqualification, this disposition is. improper.
I — I I — I > — i
We underscore that our decision today undertakes to answer only the question of under what circumstances the Constitution requires disqualification. The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications. Congress and the states, of course, remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than those we find mandated here today.
Appellant also argues that the retrospective imposition of punitive damages under a new cause of action violates its rights under the Contracts Clause of Article I, § 10; that a $3.5 million punitive damages award is impermissible under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment; and that lack of sufficient standards governing punitive damages awards in Alabama violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, appellant contends that Ala. Code § 12-22-72 (1975), under which any person who unsuccessfully appeals a money judgment is assessed a 10% penalty, is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These arguments raise important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved; however, our disposition of the recusal-for-bias issue makes it unnecessary to reach them.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.
Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Justice Embry’s suit against Maryland Casualty Company had been settled sometime earlier by the payment of Justice Embry’s claim.
Justice Embry has since retired from the court for health reasons.
The Court in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U. S. 145 (1968), stated in dicta that “in Tumey[, 273 U. S., at 524,] the Court held that a decision should be set aside where there is ‘the slightest pecuniary interest’ on the part of the judge . . . .” Id., at 148. We think this was a misreading of Tumey. The reference to “the slightest pecuniary interest” in that opinion came in a portion of the opinion describing “cases at common law in England prior to the separation of colonies from the mother country . . . 273 U. S., at 524. At a later point in the opinion, Chief Justice Taft quoted approvingly from the work of Justice Cooley, that disqualification is not worked in cases where the “‘interest is so remote, trifling and insignificant that it may fairly be supposed to be incapable of affecting the judgment of or of influencing the conduct of an individual.’” Id., at 531 (quoting T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 594 (7th ed. 1903)). Chief Justice Taft also reiterated that the case was not one “in which the penalties and the costs are negligible. . . . The court is a state agency, imposing substantial punishment.... It is not to be treated as a mere village tribunal for village peccadilloes.” 273 U. S., at 532. We therefore follow Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57, 60 (1972), and decline to read Tumey as constitutionalizing any rule that a decision rendered by a judge with “the slightest pecuniary interest” constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause.
We have confined the opinion to the issues presented by the parties and express no view on the question discussed by the justices who write separately. The issues here are far more complex than acknowledged by the concurrences, which, reasoning from hypothetical situations on matters not presented by the facts of this case, postulate a broad general rule. Traditionally the Court does not undertake to “ ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’” Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, N. Y. & P. S. S. Co. v. Emigration Comm’rs, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885)). Because the issue of disqualification of a single member of a multimember panel arises in a variety of factual contexts, see generally 48A C. J. S., Judges § 159, p. 868 (1981) (collecting eases), sound judicial practice wisely counsels judges to avoid unnecessary declarations on issues not presented, briefed, or argued.
If Justice Embry had disqualified himself, the decision of the trial court would not have been affirmed by a vote of an equally divided court. Rather, Ala. Code § 12-2-14 (1975), which authorizes the appointment of special justices in the event disqualifications result in an even-numbered court which is evenly divided on a matter, would presumably have come into play.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Moved to action by a widely felt need to sponsor independ-' ent sources of broadcast programming as an alternative to commercial broadcasting, Congress set out in 1967 to support and promote the development of noncommercial, educational broadcasting stations. A keystone of Congress’ program was the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 47 U. S. C. §390 et seq., which established the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, a nonprofit corporation authorized to disburse federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations in support of station operations and educational programming. Section 399 of that Act, as amended by the Public Broadcasting Amendments Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 730, forbids any “noncommercial educational broadcasting station which receives a grant from the Corporation” to “engage in editorializing.” 47 U. S. C. §399. In this case, we are called upon to decide whether Congress, by imposing that restriction, has passed a “law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” in violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution.
I
A
The history of noncommercial, educational broadcasting in the United States is as old as broadcasting itself. In its first efforts to regulate broadcasting, Congress made no special provision for noncommercial, educational broadcasting stations. Under the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934, such stations were subject to the same licensing requirements as their commercial counterparts. As commercial broadcasting rapidly expanded during the 1930’s, however, the percentage of broadcast licenses held by noncommercial stations began to shrink. In 1939, recognizing the potential effect of these commercial pressures on educational stations, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) decided to reserve certain frequencies for educational radio, 47 CFR §§4.131-4.133 (1939), and in 1945, the Commission allocated 20 frequencies on the new FM spectrum exclusively for educational use, FCC, Report of Proposed Allocations 77 (1945). Similarly, in 1952, with the advent of television, the FCC reserved certain television channels solely for educational stations. Television Assignments, 41 F. C. C. 148 (1952). Helped in part by these allocations, a wide variety of noncommercial stations, some funded by state and local governments and others by private donations and foundation grants, developed during this period.
It was not until 1962, however, that Congress provided any direct financial assistance to noncommercial, educational broadcasting. This first step was taken with the passage of the Educational Television Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64, which authorized the former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to distribute $32 million in matching grants over a 5-year period for the construction of noncommercial television facilities.
Impetus for expanded federal involvement came in 1967 when the Carnegie Corporation sponsored a special commission to review the state of educational broadcasting. Finding that the prospects for an expanded public broadcasting system rested on “the vigor of its local stations,” but that these stations were hobbled by chronic underfinancing, the Carnegie Commission called upon the Federal Government to supplement existing state, local, and private financing so that educational broadcasting could realize its full potential as a true alternative to commercial broadcasting. Carnegie I, at 33-34, 36-37. In fashioning a legislative proposal to carry out this vision, the Commission recommended the creation of a nonprofit, nongovernmental “Corporation for Public Television” to provide support for noncommercial broadcasting, including funding for new program production, local station operations, and the establishment of satellite interconnection facilities to permit nationwide distribution of educational programs to all local stations that wished to receive and use them. Id., at 37-38.
The Commission’s report met with widespread approval, and its proposals became the blueprint for the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, which established the basic framework of the public broadcasting system of today. Titles I and III of the Act authorized over $38 million for continued HEW construction grants and for the study of instructional television. Title II created the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB or Corporation), a nonprofit, private corporation governed by a 15-person, bipartisan Board of Directors appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Corporation was given power to fund “the production of... educational television or radio programs for national or regional distribution,” 47 U. S. C. § 396(g)(2)(B) (1976 ed.), to make grants to local broadcasting stations that would “aid in financing local educational... programming costs of such stations,” § 396(g)(2)(C), and to assist in the establishment and development of national interconnection facilities. § 396(g)(2)(E). Aside from conferring these powers on the Corporation, Congress also adopted other measures designed both to ensure the autonomy of the Corporation and to protect the local stations from governmental interference and control. For example, all federal agencies, officers, and employees were prohibited from “exercising] any direction, supervision or control” over the Corporation or local stations, §398, and the Corporation itself was forbidden to “own or operate any television or radio broadcast station,” § 396(g)(3), and was further required to “carry out its purposes and functions... in ways that will most effectively assure the maximum freedom... from interference with or control of program content” of the local stations. § 396(g)(1)(D).
B
Appellee Pacifica Foundation is a nonprofit corporation that owns and operates several noncommercial educational broadcasting stations in five major metropolitan areas. Its licensees have received and are presently receiving grants from the Corporation and are therefore prohibited from editorializing by the terms of § 399, as originally enacted and as recently amended. In April 1979, appellees brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California challenging the constitutionality of former § 399. In October 1979, the Department of Justice informed both Houses of Congress and the District Court that it had decided not to defend the constitutionality of the statute. The Senate then adopted a resolution directing its counsel to intervene as amicus curiae in support of § 399. Counsel appeared and subsequently obtained dismissal of the lawsuit for want of a justiciable controversy because the Government had decided not to enforce the statute. While appellees’ appeal from this disposition was pending before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, the Department of Justice under a new administration announced that it would defend the statute. The Court of Appeals then remanded the case to the District Court; the District Court permitted the Senate counsel to withdraw from the litigation, and, finding that a concrete controversy was now presented, vacated its earlier order of dismissal. While the suit was pending before the District Court, Congress, as already mentioned, see n. 7, supra, amended § 399 by confining the ban on editorializing to noncommercial stations that receive Corporation grants and by separately prohibiting all noncommercial stations from making political endorsements, irrespective of whether they receive federal funds. Subsequently, appellees amended their complaint to reflect this change, challenging only the ban on editorializing.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, holding that § 399’s ban on editorializing violated the First Amendment. 547 F. Supp. 379 (1982). The court rejected the Federal Communication Commission’s contention that “§ 399 serves a compelling government interest in ensuring that funded noncommercial broadcasters do not become propaganda organs for the government.” Id., at 384-385. Noting the diverse sources of funding for noncommercial stations, the protections built into the Public Broadcasting Act to ensure that noncommercial broadcasters remain free of governmental influence, and the requirements of the FCC’s fairness doctrine which are designed to guard against one-sided presentation of controversial issues, the District Court concluded that the asserted fear of Government control was not sufficiently compelling to warrant § 399’s restriction on speech. Id., at 386. The court also rejected the contention that the restriction on editorializing as necessary to ensure that Government funding of noncommercial broadcast stations does not interfere with the balanced presentation of opinion on those stations. Id., at 387. The FCC appealed from the District Court judgment directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. We postponed consideration of the question of our jurisdiction to the merits, 460 U. S. 1010 (1983), and we now affirm.
II
We begin by considering the appropriate standard of review. The District Court acknowledged that our decisions have generally applied a different First Amendment standard for broadcast regulation than in other areas, but after finding that no special characteristic of the broadcast media justified application of a less stringent standard in this case, it held that §399 could survive constitutional scrutiny only if it served a “compelling” governmental interest. 547 F. Supp., at 384. Claiming that the court drew the wrong lessons from our prior decisions concerning broadcast regulation, the Government contends that a less demanding standard is required. It argues that Congress may, consistently with the First Amendment, exercise broad power to regulate broadcast speech because the medium of broadcasting is subject to the “special characteristic” of spectrum scarcity — a characteristic not shared by other media — which calls for more exacting regulation. This power, in the Government’s view, includes authority to restrict the ability of all broadcasters, both commercial and noncommercial, to editorialize. Brief for Appellant 31. Moreover, given the unique role of noncommercial broadcasting as a source of “programming excellence and diversity that the commercial sector could not or would not produce,” id., at 33, Congress was entitled to impose special restrictions such as § 399 upon these stations. The Government concludes by urging that §399 is an appropriate and essential means of furthering “important” governmental interests, id., at 34, 35, 39, which leaves open the possibility that a wide variety of views on matters of public importance can be expressed through the medium of noncommercial educational broadcasting.
At first glance, of course, it would appear that the District Court applied the correct standard. Section 399 plainly operates to restrict the expression of editorial opinion on matters of public importance, and, as we have repeatedly explained, communication of this kind is entitled to the most exacting degree of First Amendment protection. E. g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575, 585 (1983); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 776-777 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14 (1976); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101-102 (1940). Were a similar ban on editorializing applied to newspapers and magazines, we would not hesitate to strike it down as violative of the First Amendment. E. g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214 (1966). But, as the Government correctly notes, because broadcast regulation involves unique considerations, our cases have not followed precisely the same approach that we have applied to other media and have never gone so far as to demand that such regulations serve “compelling” governmental interests. At the same time, we think the Government’s argument loses sight of concerns that are important in this area and thus misapprehends the essential meaning of our prior decisions concerning the reach of Congress’ authority to regulate broadcast communication.
The fundamental principles that guide our evaluation of broadcast regulation are by now well established. First, we have long recognized that Congress, acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause, has power to regulate the use of this scarce and valuable national resource. The distinctive feature of Congress’ efforts in this area has been to ensure through the regulatory oversight of the FCC that only those who satisfy the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” are granted a license to use radio and television broadcast frequencies. 47 U. S. C. § 309(a).
Second, Congress may, in the exercise of this power, seek to assure that the public receives through this medium a balanced presentation of information on issues of public importance that otherwise might not be addressed if control of the medium were left entirely in the hands of those who own and operate broadcasting stations. Although such governmental regulation has never been allowed with respect to the print media, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), we have recognized that “differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 386 (1969). The fundamental distinguishing characteristic of the new medium of broadcasting that, in our view, has required some adjustment in First Amendment analysis is that “[broadcast frequencies are a scarce resource [that] must be portioned out among applicants.” Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 101 (1973). Thus, our cases have taught that, given spectrum scarcity, those who are granted a license to broadcast must serve in a sense as fiduciaries for the public by presenting “those views and voices which are representative of [their] community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.” Red Lion, supra, at 389. As we observed in that case, because “[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail,... the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences [through the medium of broadcasting] is crucial here [and it] may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.” 395 U. S., at 390.
Finally, although the Government’s interest in ensuring balanced coverage of public issues is plainly both important and substantial, we have, at the same time, made clear that broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of communicative activity. As a result, the First Amendment must inform and give shape to the manner in which Congress exercises its regulatory power in this area. Unlike common carriers, broadcasters are “entitled under the First Amendment to exercise ‘the widest journalistic freedom consistent with their public [duties].”’ CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U. S. 367, 395 (1981) (quoting Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra, at 110). See also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689, 703 (1979). Indeed, if the public’s interest in receiving a balanced presentation of views is to be fully served, we must necessarily rely in large part upon the editorial initiative and judgment of the broadcasters who bear the public trust. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra, at 124-127.
Our prior cases illustrate these principles. In Red Lion, for example, we upheld the FCC’s “fairness doctrine” — which requires broadcasters to provide adequate coverage of public issues and to ensure that this coverage fairly and accurately reflects the opposing views — because the doctrine advanced the substantial governmental interest in ensuring balanced presentations of views in this limited medium and yet posed no threat that a “broadcaster [would be denied permission] to carry a particular program or to publish his own views.” 395 U. S., at 396. Similarly, in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, supra, the Court upheld the right of access for federal candidates imposed by § 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act both because that provision “makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process,” id., at 396, and because it defined a sufficiently “limited right of ‘reasonable’ access” so that “the discretion of broadcasters to present their views on any issue or to carry any particular type of programming” was not impaired. Id., at 396-397 (emphasis in original). Finally, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra, the Court affirmed the FCC’s refusal to require broadcast licensees to accept all paid political advertisements. Although it was argued that such a requirement would serve the public’s First Amendment interest in receiving additional views on public issues, the Court rejected this approach, finding that such a requirement would tend to transform broadcasters into common carriers and would intrude unnecessarily upon the editorial discretion of broadcasters. Id., at 123-125. The FCC’s ruling, therefore, helped to advance the important purposes of the Communications Act, grounded in the First Amendment, of preserving the right of broadcasters to exercise “the widest journalistic freedom consistent with [their] public obligations,” and of guarding against “the risk of an enlargement of Government control over the content of broadcast discussion of public issues.” Id., at 110, 126.
Thus, although the broadcasting industry plainly operates under restraints not imposed upon other media, the thrust of these restrictions has generally been to secure the public’s First Amendment interest in receiving a balanced presentation of views on diverse matters of public concern. As a result of these restrictions, of course, the absolute freedom to advocate one’s own positions without also presenting opposing viewpoints — a freedom enjoyed, for example, by newspaper publishers and soapbox orators — is denied to broadcasters. But, as our cases attest, these restrictions have been upheld only when we were satisfied that the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest, such as ensuring adequate and balanced coverage of public issues, e. g., Red Lion, 395 U. S., at 377. See also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, supra, at 396-397; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S., at 110-111; Red Lion, supra, at 396. Making that judgment requires a critical examination of the interests of the public and broadcasters in light of the particular circumstances of each case. E. g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978).
Ill
We turn now to consider whether the restraint imposed by §399 satisfies the requirements established by our prior cases for permissible broadcast regulation. Before assessing the Government’s proffered justifications for the statute, however, two central features of the ban against editorializing must be examined, since they help to illuminate the importance of the First Amendment interests at stake in this case.
A
First, the restriction imposed by §399 is specifically directed at a form of speech — namely, the expression of editorial opinion — that lies at the heart of First Amendment protection. In construing the reach of the statute, the FCC has explained that “although the use of noncommercial educational broadcast facilities by licensees, their management or those speaking on their behalf for the propagation of the licensee’s own views on public issues is therefore not to be permitted, such prohibition should not be construed to inhibit any other presentations on controversial issues of public importance.” Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F. C. C. 2d 297, 302 (1973) (emphasis added). The Commission’s interpretation of § 399 simply highlights the fact that what the statute forecloses is the expression of editorial opinion on “controversial issues of public importance.” As we recently reiterated in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886 (1982), “expression on public issues ‘has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’ ” Id., at 913 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 467 (1980)). And we have emphasized:
“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.... Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S., at 101-102.
The editorial has traditionally played precisely this role by informing and arousing the public, and by criticizing and cajoling those who hold government office in order to help launch new solutions to the problems of the time. Preserving the free expression of editorial opinion, therefore, is part and parcel of “a profound national commitment... that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964). As we recognized in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214 (1966), the special place of the editorial in our First Amendment jurisprudence simply reflects the fact that the press, of which the broadcasting industry is indisputably a part, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 166 (1948), carries out a historic, dual responsibility in our society of reporting information and of bringing critical judgment to bear on public affairs. Indeed, the pivotal importance of editorializing as a means of satisfying the public’s interest in receiving a wide variety of ideas and views through the medium of broadcasting has long been recognized by the FCC; the Commission has for the past 35 years actively encouraged commercial broadcast licensees to include editorials on public affairs in their programming. Because §399 appears to restrict precisely that form of speech which the Framers of the Bill of Rights were most anxious to protect — speech that is “indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth” — we must be especially careful in weighing the interests that are asserted in support of this restriction and in assessing the precision with which the ban is crafted. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Second, the scope of § 399’s ban is defined solely on the basis of the content of the suppressed speech. A wide variety of noneditorial speech “by licensees, their management or those speaking on their behalf,” Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F. C. C. 2d, at 302, is plainly not prohibited by § 399. Examples of such permissible forms of speech include daily announcements of the station’s program schedule or over-the-air appeals for contributions from listeners. Consequently, in order to determine whether a particular statement by station management constitutes an “editorial” proscribed by § 399, enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the content of the message that is conveyed to determine whether the views expressed concern “controversial issues of public importance.” Ibid.
As Justice Stevens observed in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530 (1980), however: “A regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail expression of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest example of a law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’ A regulation that denies one group of persons the right to address a selected audience on ‘controversial issues of public policy’ is plainly such a regulation.” Id., at 546 (opinion concurring in judgment); accord, id., at 537-540 (majority opinion). Section 399 is just such a regulation, for it singles out noncommercial broadcasters and denies them the right to address their chosen audience on matters of public importance. Thus, in enacting §399 Congress appears to have sought, in much the same way that the New York Public Service Commission had attempted through the regulation of utility company bill inserts struck down in Consolidated Edison, to limit discussion of controversial topics and thus to shape the agenda for public debate. Since, as we observed in Consolidated Edison, “[t]he First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic,” id., at 537, we must be particularly wary in assessing § 399 to determine whether it reflects an impermissible attempt “to allow a government [to] control... the search for political truth.” Id., at 538.
B
In seeking to defend the prohibition on editorializing imposed by § 399, the Government urges that the statute was aimed at preventing two principal threats to the overall success of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. According to this argument, the ban was necessary, first, to protect noncommercial educational broadcasting stations from being coerced, as a result of federal financing, into becoming vehicles for Government propagandizing or the objects of governmental influence; and, second, to keep these stations from becoming convenient targets for capture by private interest groups wishing to express their own partisan viewpoints. By seeking to safeguard the public’s right to a balanced presentation of public issues through the prevention of either governmental or private bias, these objectives are, of course, broadly consistent with the goals identified in our earlier broadcast regulation cases. But, in sharp contrast to the restrictions upheld in Red Lion or in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, which left room for editorial discretion and simply required broadcast editors to grant others access to the microphone, § 399 directly prohibits the broadcaster from speaking out on public issues even in a balanced and fair manner. The Government insists, however, that the hazards posed in the “special” circumstances of noncommercial educational broadcasting are so great that § 399 is an indispensable means of preserving the public’s First Amendment interests. We disagree.
(1)
When Congress first decided to provide financial support for the expansion and development of noncommercial educational stations, all concerned agreed that this step posed some risk that these traditionally independent stations might be pressured into becoming forums devoted solely to programming and views that were acceptable to the Federal Government. That Congress was alert to these dangers cannot be doubted. It sought through the Public Broadcasting Act to fashion a system that would provide local stations with sufficient funds to foster their growth and development while preserving their tradition of autonomy and community-orientation. A cardinal objective of the Act was the establishment of a private corporation that would “facilitate the development of educational radio and television broadcasting and... afford maximum protection to such broadcasting from extraneous interference and control.” 47 U. S. C. § 396(a)(6) (1976 ed.).
The intended role of §399 in achieving these purposes, however, is not as clear. The provision finds no antecedent in the Carnegie report, which generally provided the model for most other aspects of the Act. It was not part of the administration’s original legislative proposal. And it was not included in the original version of the Act passed by the Senate. The provision found its way into the Act only as a result of an amendment in the House. Indeed, it appears that, as the House Committee Report frankly admits, § 399 was added not because Congress thought it was essential to preserving the autonomy and vitality of local stations, but rather “[o]ut of an abundance of caution.” H. R. Rep. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 (1967).
More importantly, an examination of both the overall legislative scheme established by the 1967 Act and the character of public broadcasting demonstrates that the interest asserted by the Government is not substantially advanced by § 399. First, to the extent that federal financial support creates a risk that stations will lose their independence through the bewitching power of governmental largesse, the elaborate structure established by the Public Broadcasting Act already operates to insulate local stations from governmental interference. Congress not only mandated that the new Corporation for Public Broadcasting would have a private, bipartisan structure, see §§ 396(c) — (f), but also imposed a variety of important limitations on its powers. The Corporation was prohibited from owning or operating any station, § 396(g)(3), it was required to adhere strictly to a standard of “objectivity and balance” in disbursing federal funds to local stations, § 396(g)(1)(A), and it was prohibited from contributing to or otherwise supporting any candidate for office, § 396(f)(3).
The Act also established a second layer of protections which serve to protect the stations from governmental coercion and interference. Thus, in addition to requiring the Corporation to operate so as to “assure the maximum freedom [of local stations] from interference with or control of program content or other activities,” § 396(g)(1)(D), the Act expressly forbids “any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over educational television or radio broadcasting, or over the Corporation or any of its grantees or contractors...,” § 398(a) (1976 ed.). Subsequent amendments to the Act have confirmed Congress’ commitment to the principle that because local stations are the “bedrock of the system,” their independence from governmental interference and control must be fully guaranteed. These amendments have provided long-term appropriations authority for public broadcasting, rather than allowing funding to depend upon yearly appropriations, see § 396(k)(l)(C), as amended, Pub. L. 97-35, Title XII, § 1227, 95 Stat. 727; have strictly defined the percentage of appropriated funds that must be disbursed by the Corporation to local stations, § 396(k)(3) (A)-(B); and have defined objective criteria under which local television and radio stations receive basic grants from the Corporation to be used at the discretion of the station. §§396(k)(6)(A)-(B), 396(k)(7). The principal thrust of the amendments, therefore, has been to assure long-term appropriations for the Corporation and, more importantly, to insist that it pass specified portions of these funds directly through to local stations to give them greater autonomy in defining the uses to which those funds should be put. Thus, in sharp contrast to § 399, the unifying theme of these various statutory provisions is that they substantially reduce the risk of governmental interference with the editorial judgments of local stations without restricting those stations’ ability to speak on matters of public concern.
Even if these statutory protections were thought insufficient to the task, however, suppressing the particular category of speech restricted by § 399 is simply not likely, given the character of the public broadcasting system, to reduce substantially the risk that the Federal Government will seek to influence or put pressure on local stations. An underlying supposition of the Government’s argument in this regard is that individual noncommercial stations are likely to speak so forcefully on particular issues that Congress, the ultimate source of the stations’ federal funding, will be tempted to retaliate against these individual stations by restricting appropriations for all of public broadcasting. But, as the District Court recognized, the character of public broadcasting suggests that such a risk is speculative at best. There are literally hundreds of public radio and television stations in communities scattered throughout the United States and its territories, see CPB, 1983-84 Public Broadcasting Directory 20-50, 66-86 (Sept. 1983). Given that central fact, it seems reasonable to infer that the editorial voices of these stations will prove to be as distinctive, varied, and idiosyncratic as the various communities they represent. More importantly, the editorial focus of any particular station can' fairly be expected to focus largely on issues affecting only its community. Accordingly, absent some showing by the Government to the contrary, the risk that local editorializing will place all of public broadcasting in jeopardy is not sufficiently pressing to warrant § 399’s broad suppression of speech.
Indeed, what is far more likely than local station editorials to pose the kinds of dangers hypothesized by the Government are the wide variety of programs addressing controversial issues produced, often with substantial CPB funding, for national distribution to local stations. Such programs truly have the potential to reach a large audience and, because of the critical commentary they contain, to have the kind of genuine national impact that might trigger a congressional response or kindle governmental resentment. The ban imposed by § 399, however, is plainly not directed at the potentially controversial content of such programs; it is, instead, leveled solely at the expression of editorial opinion by local station management, a form of expression that is far more likely to be aimed at a smaller local audience, to have less national impact, and to be confined to local issues. In contrast, the Act imposes no substantive restrictions, other than normal requirements of balance and fairness, on those who produce nationally distributed programs. Indeed, the Act is designed in part to encourage and sponsor the production of such programs and to allow each station to decide for itself whether to accept such programs for local broadcast.
Furthermore, the manifest imprecision of the ban imposed by §399 reveals that its proscription is not sufficiently tailored to the harms it seeks to prevent to justify its substantial interference with broadcasters’ speech. Section 399 includes within its grip a potentially infinite variety of speech, most of which would not be related in any way to governmental affairs, political candidacies, or elections. Indeed, the breadth of editorial commentary is as wide as human imagination permits. But the Government never explains how, say, an editorial by local station management urging improvements in a town’s parks or museums will so infuriate Congress or other federal officials that the future of public broadcasting will be imperiled unless such editorials are suppressed. Nor is it explained how the suppression of editorials alone serves to reduce the risk of governmental retaliation and interference when it is clear that station management is fully able to broadcast controversial views so long as such views are not labeled as its own. See infra, at 396, and n. 25.
The Government appears to recognize these flaws in § 399, because it focuses instead on the suggestion that the source of governmental influence may well be state and local governments, many of which have established public broadcasting commissions that own and operate local noncommercial educational stations. The ban on editorializing is all the more necessary with respect to these stations, the argument runs, because the management of such stations will be especially likely to broadcast only editorials that are favorable to the state or local authorities that hold the purse strings. The Government’s argument, however, proves too much. First, §399’s ban applies to the many private noncommercial community organizations that own and operate stations that are not controlled in any way by state or local government. Second, the legislative history of the Public Broadcasting Act clearly indicates that Congress was concerned with “assuring] complete freedom from any Federal Government influence.” The Public Television Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1160 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Pastore) (emphasis added). Consistently with this concern, Congress refused to create any federally owned stations and it expressly forbade the CPB to own or operate any television or radio stations, § 396(g)(3). By contrast, although Congress was clearly aware in 1967 that many noncommercial educational stations were owned by state and local governments, it did not hesitate to extend federal assistance to such stations, it imposed no special requirements to restrict state or local control over these stations, and, indeed, it ensured through the structure of the Act that these stations would be as insulated from federal interference as the wholly private stations.
Finally, although the Government certainly has a substantial interest in ensuring that the audiences of noncommercial stations will not be led to think that the broadcaster’s editorials reflect the official view of the Government, this interest can be fully satisfied by less restrictive means that are readily available. To address this important concern, Congress could simply require public broadcasting stations to broadcast a disclaimer every time they editorialize which would state that the editorial represents only the view of the station’s management and does not in any way represent the views
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1983 and thereafter the Florida Legislature enacted a series of statutes authorizing the department of corrections to award early release credits to prison inmates when the population of the state prison system exceeded predetermined levels. The question presented by this case is whether a 1992 statute canceling such credits for certain classes of offenders after they had been awarded — indeed, after they had resulted in the prisoners’ release from custody — violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution.
I
In 1986 petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of attempted murder and received a sentence of 22'years (8,030 days) in prison. In 1992 the Florida Department of Corrections released him from prison based on its determination that he had accumulated five different types of early release credits totaling 5,668 days. Of that total, 1,860 days were “provisional credits” awarded as a result of prison overcrowding. Shortly after petitioner’s release, the state attorney general issued an opinion interpreting a 1992 statute as having retroactively canceled all provisional credits awarded to inmates convicted of murder or attempted murder. Petitioner was therefore rearrested and returned to custody. His new release date was set for May 19, 1998.
In 1994 petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Relying on Eleventh Circuit and Florida precedent holding that the revocation of provisional credits did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because their sole purpose was to alleviate prison overcrowding, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the petition. The District Court adopted that recommendation, dismissed the petition, and denied a certificate of probable cause. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also denied a certificate of probable cause in an unpublished order. Because the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached a different conclusion on similar facts, Arnold v. Cody, 951 F. 2d 280 (1991), we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 517 U. S. 1186 (1996).
Motivated largely by the overcrowded condition of the entire Florida prison system, in 1983 the state legislature enacted the Correctional Reform Act of 1983, a comprehensive revision of the State’s sentencing laws. The Act authorized generous awards of early release credits including “basic gain-time” at the rate of 10 days for each .month, “up to 20 days of incentive gain time, which shall be credited and applied monthly,” and additional deductions of “meritorious gain-time of from 1 to 60 days.” See 1983 Fla. Laws, ch. 83-131, §8. The Act also created an emergency procedure to be followed “whenever the population of the state correctional system exceeds 98 percent of the lawful capacity of the system for males or females, or both.” §5(1). When such an emergency was declared, “the sentences of all inmates in the system who are eligible to earn gain-time shall be reduced by the credit of up to 30 days gain-time in 5-day increments as may be necessary to reduce the inmate population to 97 percent of lawful capacity.” § 5(2).
In the ensuing years, the Florida Legislature modified the overcrowding gain-time system. In 1987 the legislature raised the threshold for awarding emergency release credits from 98% to 99% of capacity. At the same time, the legislature authorized a new form of overcrowding credit, administrative gain-time, with a 98% threshold, which authorized up to a maximum of 60 days additional gain-time to inmates already earning incentive gain-time. Inmates serving sentences for certain offenses were ineligible for the awards. In 1988 the legislature repealed the administrative gain-time provision, and replaced it with a provisional credits system. The language of the provisional credits statute was virtually identical to that of the administrative gain-time statute — it also authorized up to 60 days of gain-time but was triggered when the inmate population reached 97.5% of capacity. In addition, the legislature expanded the list of offenders who were ineligible for the awards.
Having received overcrowding gain-time under the administrative gain-time and provisional credits statutes, as well as basic and incentive gain-time, petitioner was released from prison in 1992. That same year, the legislature canceled provisional overcrowding credits for certain classes of inmates, including those convicted of attempted murder. As a result of that action, credits for 2,789 inmates who were still in custody were canceled, and rearrest warrants were issued for 164 offenders who had been released. Petitioner was in the latter class.
Respondents contend that the cancellation of petitioner’s provisional credits did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause for two reasons: (1) Because the credits had been issued as part of administrative procedures designed to alleviate overcrowding, they were not an integral part of petitioner’s punishment; and (2) in petitioner’s case, the specific overcrowding credits had been awarded pursuant to statutes enacted after the date of his offense rather than pursuant to the 1983 statute. We consider the arguments separately.
I — I h-< h-H
The presumption against the retroactive application of new laws is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law affords the individual citizen. That presumption “is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 265 (1994). This doctrine finds expression in several provisions of our Constitution. The specific prohibition on ex post facto laws is only one aspect of the broader constitutional protection against arbitrary changes in the law. In both the civil and the criminal context, the Constitution places limits on the sovereign’s ability to use its lawmaking power to modify bargains it has made with its subjects. The basic principle is one that protects not only the rich and the powerful, United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U. S. 839 (1996), but also the indigent defendant engaged in negotiations that may lead to an acknowledgment of guilt and a suitable punishment.
Article I, § 10, of the Federal Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall... pass any ... ex post facto Law.” In his opinion for the Court in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167 (1925), Justice Stone explained:
“The constitutional prohibition and the judicial interpretation of it rest upon the notion that laws, whatever their form, which purport to make innocent acts criminal after the event, or to aggravate an offense, are harsh and oppressive, and that the criminal quality attributable to an act, either by the legal definition of the offense or by the nature or amount of the punishment imposed for its commission, should not be altered by legislative enactment, after the fact, to the disadvantage of the accused.” Id., at 170.
The bulk of our ex post facto jurisprudence has involved claims that a law has inflicted “a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798) (emphasis deleted). We have explained that such laws implicate the central concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause: “the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 30 (1981).
To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective — that is, “it must apply to events occurring before its enactment” — and it “must disadvantage the offender affected by it,” id., at 29, by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime, see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 50 (1990). In this case the operation of the 1992 statute to effect the cancellation of overcrowding credits and the consequent reincar-eeration of petitioner was clearly retrospective. The narrow issue that we must decide is thus whether those consequences disadvantaged petitioner by increasing his punishment.
In arguing that the cancellation of overcrowding credits inflicts greater punishment, petitioner relies primarily on our decision in Weaver v. Graham, in which we considered whether retroactively decreasing the amount of gain-time awarded for an inmate’s good behavior violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. In that case the petitioner had pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and had been sentenced to prison for 15 years. At the time of Weaver’s plea, Florida law provided credits contingent on the good conduct of the prisoner of 5 days per month for the first two years of his sentence, 10 days per month for the third and fourth years, and 15 days per month thereafter. The law therefore provided him with an opportunity to be released after serving less than nine years of his sentence. In 1978 the Florida Legislature enacted a new formula for computing gain-time; instead of 5, 10, and 15 days per month, it authorized only 3, 6, and 9 days. The new statute did not withdraw any credits already awarded to Weaver, but by curtailing the availability of future credits it effectively postponed the date when he would become eligible for early release. Because the statute made the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment “more onerous,” we unanimously concluded that it ran “afoul of the prohibition against ex post facto laws.” 450 U. S., at 36.
According to petitioner, although this case involves overcrowding credits, it is essentially like Weaver because the issuance of these credits was dependent on an inmate’s good conduct. Respondents, on the other hand, submit that Weaver is not controlling because it was the overcrowded condition of the prison system, rather than the character of the prisoner’s conduct, that gave rise to the award. In our view, both of these submissions place undue emphasis on the legislature’s subjective intent in granting the credits rather than on the consequences of their revocation.
In arriving at our holding in Weaver, we relied not on the subjective motivation of the legislature in enacting the gain-time credits, but rather on whether objectively the new statute “lengthened] the period that someone in petitioner’s position must spend in prison.” Id., at 33. Similarly, in this case, the fact that the generous gain-time provisions in Florida’s 1983 statute were motivated more by the interest in avoiding overcrowding than by a desire to reward good behavior is not relevant to the essential inquiry demanded by the Ex Post Facto Clause: whether the cancellation of 1,860 days of accumulated provisional credits had the effect of lengthening petitioner’s period of incarceration.
In our post-Weaver cases, we have also considered whether the legislature’s action lengthened the sentence without examining the purposes behind the original sentencing scheme. In Miller v. Florida, 482 U. S. 423 (1987), we unanimously concluded that a revision in Florida’s sentencing guidelines that went into effect between the date of petitioner’s offense and the date of his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Our determination that the new guideline was “ ‘more onerous than the prior law,’ ” id., at 431 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 294 (1977)), rested entirely on an objective appraisal of the impact of the ehange on the length of the offender’s presumptive sentence. 482 U. S., at 431 (“Looking only at the change in primary offense points, the revised guidelines law clearly disadvantages petitioner and similarly situated defendants”).
In California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499 (1995), we also relied entirely on objective considerations to support our conclusion that an amendment to California’s parole procedures that decreased the frequency of parole hearings for certain offenders had not made any “change in the ‘quantum of punishment,’ ” id., at 508. The amendment at issue in Morales allowed the parole board, after holding an initial parole hearing, to defer for up to three years subsequent parole suitability hearings for prisoners convicted of multiple murders if the board found that it was unreasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing during the subsequent years. We stated that the relevant inquiry is whether the “change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” Id., at 507, n. 3. After making that inquiry, we found that “there is no reason to conclude that the amendment will have any effect on any prisoner’s actual term of confinement.” Id., at 512. Our holding rested squarely on the conclusion that “a prisoner’s ultimate date of release would be entirely unaffected by the change in the timing of suitability hearings.” Id., at 513. Although we held that “speculative and attenuated possibilities]” of increasing the measure of punishment do not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause, id., at 509, the bulk of our analysis focused on the effect of the law on the inmate’s sentence.
We did not imply in Morales, as respondents contend, that the constitutionality of retroactive changes in the quantum of punishment depended on the purpose behind the parole sentencing system. The only mention of legislative purpose in Morales was in the following passage:
“In contrast to the laws at issue in Lindsey [v. Washington, 301 U. S. 397 (1937)], Weaver, and Miller (which had the purpose and effect of enhancing the range of available prison terms, see Miller, supra, at 433-434), the evident focus of the California amendment was merely ‘“‘to relieve the [Board] from the costly and time-consuming responsibility of scheduling parole hearings”” for prisoners who have no reasonable chance of being released. In re Jackson, 39 Cal. 3d 464, 473, 703 P. 2d 100, 106 (1985) (quoting legislative history).” Id., at 507.
Thus, we concluded, the change at issue had neither the purpose nor the effect of increasing the quantum of punishment. Whether such a purpose alone would be a sufficient basis for concluding that a law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause when it actually had no such effect is a question .the Court has never addressed. Moreover, in Morales our statements regarding purpose did not refer to the purpose behind the creation of the original sentencing scheme; they referred instead to the question whether, in changing that sentencing scheme, the legislature intended to lengthen the inmate’s sentence. To the extent that any purpose might be relevant in this case, it would only be the purpose behind the legislature’s 1992 enactment of the offense-based exclusion. Here, unlike in Morales, there is no evidence that the legislature’s change in the sentencing scheme was merely to save time or money. Rather, it is quite obvious that the retrospective change was intended to prevent the early release of prisoners convicted of murder-related offenses who had accumulated overcrowding credits.
Respondents also argue that the retroactive cancellation of overcrowding credits is permissible because overcrowding gain-time — unlike the incentive gain-time at issue in Weaver which is used to encourage good prison behavior and prisoner rehabilitation — “b[ears] no relationship to the original penalty assigned the crime or the actual penalty calculated under the sentencing guidelines.” Brief for Respondent Mathis 20. To the extent that respondents’ argument rests on the notion that overcrowding gain-time is not “in some technical sense part of the sentence,” Weaver, 450 U. S., at 32, this argument is foreclosed by our precedents. As we recognized in Weaver, retroactive alteration of parole or early release provisions, like the retroactive application of provisions that govern initial sentencing, implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause because such credits are “one determinant of petitioner’s prison term ... and ... [the petitioner’s] effective sentence is altered once this determinant is changed.” Ibid. We explained in Weaver that the removal of such provisions can constitute an increase in punishment, because a “prisoner’s eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor entering into both the defendant’s decision to plea bargain and the judge’s calculation of the sentence to be imposed.” Ibid.
Respondents argue that this reasoning does not apply to overcrowding credits because, when petitioner pleaded nolo contendere, he could not reasonably have expected to receive any such credits.. The State, after all, could have alleviated the overcrowding problem in various ways: It could have built more prisons; it could have paroled a large category of nonviolent offenders; or it might have discontinued prosecution of some classes of victimless crimes. Respondents thus argue that the 1992 statute does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because, like the California amendment at issue in Morales, it “create[d] only the most speculative and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect of increasing the measure of punishment for covered crimes.” 514 U. S., at 509. Given the fact that this petitioner was actually awarded 1,860 days of provisional credits and the fact that those credits were retroactively canceled as a result of the 1992 amendment, we find this argument singularly unpersuasive. In this case, unlike in Morales, the actual course of events makes it unnecessary to speculate about what might have happened. The 1992 statute has unquestionably disadvantaged petitioner because it resulted in his rearrest and prolonged his imprisonment. Unlike the California amendment at issue in Morales, the 1992 Florida statute did more than simply remove a mechanism that created an opportunity for early release for a class of prisoners whose release was unlikely; rather, it made ineligible for early release a class of prisoners who were previously eligible — including some, like petitioner, who had actually been released.
> HH
Although it does not appear that respondents advanced this argument in the papers filed in the District Court, the Court of Appeals, or in their brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari in this Court, they now argue that petitioner is not entitled to relief because his overcrowding credits were awarded pursuant to statutes enacted after the date of his offense rather than pursuant to the 1983 statute. We disagree.
The overcrowding statute in effect at the time of petitioner’s crime was modified in subsequent years, but its basic elements remained the same: The statute provided for reductions in a prisoner’s sentence when the population of the prison system exceeded a certain percentage of lawful capacity. At the time of petitioner’s sentence in 1986, the emergency gain-time statute was in effect. Under that statute, when the prison population reached 98% of lawful capacity, the secretary of the department of corrections was required to advise the Governor and, after receiving the Governor’s verification of the capacity certification, to declare a state of emergency whereupon the sentences of all eligible inmates “shall be reduced by the credit of up to 30 days gain-time, in 5-day increments, as may be necessary to reduce the inmate population to 97 percent of lawful capacity.” Fla. Stat. §944.598(2) (1983).
The later statutes slightly modified the procedures outlined in the 1983 statute. The administrative gain-time statute enacted in 1987 (after petitioner’s plea of nolo con-tendere) provided that the secretary, after certification to the Governor, “may grant up to a maximum of 60 days administrative gain-time.” Fla. Stat § 944.276(1). Unlike the emergency gain-time statute, the administrative gain-time statute made the issuance of gain-time discretionary, and it contained certain offense-based exclusions. The provisional credits provision was enacted to replace administrative gain-time and is essentially the same, except that it provides for the issuance of gain-time when the prison reaches 97.5% of lawful capacity, rather than 98%. Fla. Stat. §944.277 (1988). See Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1994).
The changes in the series of statutes authorizing the award of overcrowding gain-time do not affect petitioner’s core ex post facto claim. Petitioner could have accumulated gain-time under the emergency gain-time provision in much the same manner as he did under the provisional credits statute. We recognize, however, that although the differences in the statutes did not affect petitioner’s central entitlement to gain-time, they may have affected the precise amount of gain-time he received. Between 1988 and 1992, the provisional credits were authorized when the prison reached 97.5% capacity rather than 98% capacity as under the emergency gain-time statute. If the prison population did not exceed 98% of capacity between 1988 and 1992, and if petitioner received provisional credits during those years, there is force to the argument that the cancellation of that portion of the 1,860-day total did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Because this point was not adequately developed earlier in the proceeding, and because it may not in any event affect petitioner’s entitlement to release, we leave it open for further consideration on remand.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The total included: <1) a 170-day credit for time spent in jail prior to his conviction; (2) “basic gain-time” of 2,640 days; (3) “additional [incentive] gain-time” of 958 days; (4) “administrative gain-time” of 335 days; and (5) “provisional credits” of 1,860 days. Disciplinary action resulted in a forfeiture of 295 days.
Hock v. Singletary, 41 F. 3d 1470 (1995).
Dugger v. Rodrick, 584 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied sum nom. Rodrick v. Singletary, 502 U. S. 1037 (1992).
Petitioner did not advance his ex post facto claim in the District Court respondents challenged his failure to exhaust his state remedies, but do not appear to have raised the exhaustion issue in the Court of Appeals; nor have they raised it in this Court. Presumably they are satisfied, as we are, that exhaustion would have been futile. The Florida Supreme Court, in Dugger v. Rodrick, 584 So. 2d 2 (1991), held that retrospective application of the provisional credits statute’s offense-based exclusion did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court reasoned that overcrowding credits, unlike basic gain-time or incentive gain-time, were merely “procedural” and did not create any substantive rights. Relying on Dugger, the Florida Supreme Court held in Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (1994), that cancellation of provisional credits actually awarded to a prisoner did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Respondents have not suggested any reason why the Florida courts would have decided petitioner’s case differently.
In 1980 the Florida Department of Corrections consented to the entry of a decree establishing a limit on the prison population that could not be exceeded without court approval. See Costello v. Wainwright, 489 F. Supp. 1100 (MD Fla. 1980). In 1982 a special session of the legislature created a Corrections Overcrowding Task Force, which drafted the 1983 legislation.
1983 Fla. Laws, ch. 83-131.
Section 8 amended §944.275 of the Florida Statutes.
Section 5, in pertinent part, provides:
“(1) The Department of Corrections shall advise the Governor of the existence of a state of emergency in the state correctional system whenever the population of the state correctional system exceeds 98 percent of the lawful capacity of the system for males or females, or both. In conveying this information, the secretary of the department shall certify the rated design capacity, maximum capacity, lawful capacity, system maximum capacity, and current population of the state correctional system. When the Governor verifies such certification by letter, the secretary shall declare a state of emergency.
“(2) Following the declaration of a state of emergency, the sentences of all inmates in the system who are eligible to earn gain-time shall be reduced by the credit of up to 30 days gain-time in 5-day increments as may be necessary to reduce the inmate population to 97 percent of lawful capacity.” 1983 Fla. Laws, ch. 83-131, §5.
1988 Fla. Laws, eh. 88-122, § 5. The provisional credits statute was repealed in 1993. 1993 Fla. Laws, ch. 93-406, §§32, 35. The only overcrowding credit system in place today in Florida is the “control release” provision, first enacted in 1989, which authorizes release from incarceration rather than gain-time to control prison population. See Fla. Stat. §947.146 (Supp. 1992).
See Fla. Op. Atty. Gen. 92-96 (1992), reprinted in Lodging, p. 53; Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d, at 501. In 1989 the Florida Legislature amended the provisional credits statute to render those convicted of certain murder offenses, including attempted murder, ineligible for provisional credits. Fla. Stat. § 944.277 (1989). The Florida Department of Corrections interpreted the 1989 amendments, and subsequent amendments enacted in 1990 and 1991 which contained the same exclusion, to apply prospectively. The 1992 amendment at issue in this case was originally interpreted by the department of corrections to apply only prospectively, but the subsequent 1992 opinion by the attorney general concluded that the statute applied retroactively.
Department of Corrections Letter of July 9, 1996, App. to Brief for Florida Public Defender Association, Inc., as Amicus Curiae. The petitioner’s administrative gain-time credits were also canceled, but he does not challenge that action.
«The ex posi ]?acto Clause flatly prohibits retroactive application of penal legislation. Article I, §10, el. 1, prohibits States from passing another type of retroactive legislation, laws ‘impairing the Obligation of Contracts.’ The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause prevents the Legislature (and other government actors) from depriving private persons of vested property rights except for a ‘public use’ and upon payment of ‘just compensation.’ The prohibitions on ‘Bills of Attainder’ in Art. I, §§ 9-10, prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for past conduct. See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 456-462 (1965). The Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation ....” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S., at 266 (footnote omitted).
This case falls in the third of the four categories of ex post facto laws described by Justice Chase: “1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.” Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall., at 390 (emphasis deleted).
Later in the opinion we restated the test in similar language: “In evaluating the constitutionality of the 1981 amendment, we must determine whether it produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.” California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S., at 509.
Indeed, the attorney general issued the 1992 opinion interpreting the statute to apply retroactively in response to concerns about the release of a notorious sex offender and murderer. See Fla. Op. Atty. Gen. 92-96, at 283, reprinted in Lodging, at 53.
The support for our conclusion in Morales that the Act was merely speculative has no counterpart in this case. In Morales, we first relied on the fact that the amendment affected a class of prisoners — multiple murderers — who had little chance of being released on parole. Second, we found that the amendment did not alter the date of the prisoner’s initial parole suitability hearing, and therefore only affected those initially deemed unsuitable for parole. Lastly, we recognized that the parole board “retain[ed] the authority to tailor the frequency of subsequent suitability hearings to the particular circumstances of the individual prisoner.” 514 U. S., at 511. Simply put, we rejected the inmate’s claim in Morales, because it could not be said with any certainty that the amended statutory scheme was more “onerous” than at the time of the crime. See id., at 509-510 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 294 (1977), for “refusing to accept ‘speculation’ that the effective punishment under a new statutory scheme would be ‘more onerous’ than under the old one”).
We note that respondents do not argue, as the Magistrate Judge found, that the revocation of overcrowding credits is constitutional because such an act is merely “procedural.” Thére is no merit to this argument in any case. We explained in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282 (1977), that a procedural statute is one that “simply alter[s] the methods employed in determining” whether the punishment is “to be imposed” rather than “ehang[ing]. . . the quantum of punishment attached to the crime.” Id.,. at 293-294. Because the 1992 law did not change the method of determining the sentence, but rather lengthened the sentences of certain prisoners by making them ineligible for early release, it was not merely procedural.
Respondent Attorney General Butterworth suggests that under the emergency gain-time statute, the maximum award petitioner could have realized was 30 days of emergency gain-time. Therefore, according to the attorney general, it is unlikely that the gain-time statute would have had any effect on petitioner’s sentence. We do not agree that the statute lends itself to such a reading. The statute required the department of corrections to advise the Governor “whenever the population of the state correctional system exceeds 98 percent of lawful capacity.” Fla. Stat. §944.598(1) (1983) (emphasis added). The duty to grant up to 30 days gain-time in 5-day increments was continuing until the inmate population reached 97% of lawful capacity. If the inmate population were to rise again to 98%, the Secretary was required to issue additional gain-time.
Moreover, the attorney general’s reading of the emergency gain-time statute would also limit the award of gain-time under the administrative gain-time and provisional credits statute. These statutes contain wording similar to the emergency gain-time statute, see Fla. Stat. § 944.276(1) (1987); Fla. Stat. §944.277(1) (1989), yet the State has not interpreted the statutes to limit the award of gain-time to a total of 60 days.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 205 (e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, authorized the Price Administrator under certain circumstances to institute damage actions against sellers of commodities who charged more than prescribed ceiling prices. Pursuant to this section, the consolidated cases now before us were brought in the District Coui’t by the Administrator in his own name “for and on behalf of the United States,” and were properly pending there on April 23,1947. On that day the President, in connection with the termination of price controls, promulgated Executive Orders Nos. 9841 and 9842: No. 9841, among other things, transferred various price administration functions to the Secretary of Commerce; No. 9842, so far as here material, authorized the Attorney General to conduct certain § 205 (e) litigation “in the name of the United States or otherwise as permitted by law . . . .” In view of these orders the Attorney General promptly moved to substitute the United States as party plaintiff in the present proceedings. Although the district judge granted the motion, he dismissed the complaints in 1950 on the ground that there had been an improper substitution because the suits could not be maintained in the name of the United States. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 183 F. 2d 453. It held that the President in his Executive Orders did not intend to authorize conduct of § 205 (e) actions in the name of the United States. A belief that the President had no power to do so led the court to this conclusion. To resolve the conflict between the decision and those from other circuits, we granted certiorari. 340 U. S. 895.
We hold that it was error to construe the Executive Orders as not allowing maintenance of these suits in the name of the United States. It is true that Order No. 9841 which transferred various OPA functions to the Secretary of Commerce empowered the Secretary to “institute, maintain, or defend in his own name civil proceedings in any court . . ., relating to the matters transferred to him, including any such proceedings pending on the effective date of the transfer . . . .” (Emphasis added.) But this provision demonstrates no purpose to vest exclusive power in the Secretary to maintain all § 205 (e) enforcement actions. By its express terms it is made subject to Executive Order 9842 which directs the Attorney General to “coordinate, conduct, initiate, maintain or defend” litigation against violators of price control “in the name of the United States or otherwise as permitted by law . ...” All interested government agencies have construed the two orders together as authorizing the Attorney General to carry on § 205 (e) enforcement cases and to do so in the name of the United States. The Emergency Court of Appeals and other courts of appeal have taken the same view. We believe that such a reading of the orders is the most reasonable construction of the language employed.
The substitution of the United States in these cases therefore was proper unless, as the Court of Appeals thought, the President lacked power to authorize it. The view below was that § 205 (e) of the Price Control Act permitted enforcement suits to be brought only in the name of the Price Administrator, or, when the bulk of his duties were transferred to the Secretary of Commerce, in the name of the latter. Such a conclusion, however, is certainly not compelled by the section which provides merely for the bringing of actions by “the Administrator ... on behalf of the United States . . . .” There can be no question but that the President as a step in the winding-up process had power to transfer any or all of the price administration functions to the Attorney General. Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U. S. 111, 113-119. Accordingly, Executive Order 9842 could lawfully delegate the control and direction of the present actions to that official. Moreover, nothing in § 205 (e) prevents the Attorney General, who is customarily charged with representing the Government’s interests in court, from following his normal procedure of maintaining enforcement suits in the name of the United States itself. No unfairness to the defendants will result. Regardless of captions, the issues in these cases could not change and the real party-in-interest plaintiff has always been the same. Cf. United States v. Remund, 330 U. S. 539, 542-543. The handling of this litigation in the name of the United States is a fair and orderly method for carrying out the congressional mandate to wind up the OPA affairs. These cases should not have been dismissed.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
56 Stat. 33, as amended, 58 Stat. 640, 50 U. S. C. App. § 925 (e): “If . . . the buyer either fails to institute an action . . . within thirty days from the date of the occurrence of the violation or is not entitled for any reason to bring the action, the Administrator may institute such action on behalf of the United States . . .
Actually, one of these six consolidated actions was instituted “for and on behalf of the United States” in the name of Philip B. Fleming, Administrator of the Office of Temporary Controls after he had become the successor to the Price Administrator. On April 23, 1947, all six suits were properly pending in Fleming’s name. See Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U. S. 111, 113-119. The manner in which he became the successor of the Price Administrator is detailed by the Court of Appeals in its opinion below. United States v. Allied Oil Corp., 183 F. 2d 453.
12 Fed. Reg. 2645, 2646.
The ruling was that the Secretary of Commerce was the real party-in-interest plaintiff and that the actions had abated for failure to substitute the Secretary within six months as required by Rule 25 (d), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
Fleming v. Goodwin, 165 F. 2d 334; United States v. Koike, 164 F. 2d 155; Northwestern Lbr. & Shingle Co. v. United States, 170 F. 2d 692.
Executive Order No. 9841, §402 provides: “Functions under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, transferred under the provisions of this order shall be deemed to include authority on the part of each officer to whom such functions are transferred hereunder to institute, maintain, or defend in his own name civil proceedings in any court (including the Emergency Court of Appeals), relating to the matters transferred to him, including any such proceedings pending on the effective date of the transfer of any such function under this order. The provisions of this paragraph shall be subject to the provisions of the Executive order entitled ‘Conduct of Certain Litigation Arising under Wartime Legislation/ [Order No. 9842] issued on the date of this order . . . .”
See Executive Order No. 9841, § 402, note 6, supra.
Executive Order No. 9842 provides: “1. The Attorney General is authorized and directed, in the name of the United States or otherwise as permitted by law, to coordinate, conduct, initiate, maintain or defend:
“(b) Litigation against violators of regulations, schedules or orders relating to maximum prices pertaining to any commodity which has been removed from price control . . . .”
Price controls had been lifted on the commodities involved in the present actions prior to the promulgation of Executive Orders Nos. 9841 and 9842.
Hal-Mar Dress Co. v. Clark, 165 F. 2d 222, and cases cited note 5, supra.
Cf. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 27-28; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273, 279.
Respondents have contended in their brief that by virtue of 28 U. S. C. § 2105 the orders of the District Court dismissing these actions as abated were not subject to review. This contention is untenable in view of the recent decision in Snyder v. Buck, 340 U. S. 15, 21-22.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether a debtor can include a mortgage lien in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy reorganization plan once the personal obligation secured by the mortgaged property has been discharged in a Chapter 7 proceeding. We hold that the mortgage lien in such a circumstance remains a “claim” against the debtor that can be rescheduled under 13.
I
This case arises from the efforts of respondent Home State Bank (Bank) to foreclose a mortgage on the farm property of petitioner. Petitioner gave the mortgage to secure promissory notes to the Bank totaling approximately $470,000. When petitioner defaulted on these notes, the Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings in state court. During the pendency of these proceedings, petitioner filed for a liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to 11 U. S. C. § 727, the Bankruptcy Court discharged petitioner from personal liability on his promissory notes to the Bank. Notwithstanding the discharge, the Bank’s right to proceed against petitioner in rem survived the Chapter 7 liquidation. After the Bankruptcy Court lifted the automatic stay protecting petitioner’s estate, see 11 U. S. C. §362, the Bank reinitiated the foreclosure proceedings. Ultimately, the state court entered an in rem judgment of approximately $200,000 for the Bank.
Before the foreclosure sale was scheduled to take place, petitioner filed the Chapter 13 petition at issue here. In his Chapter 13 plan, petitioner listed the Bank’s mortgage in the farm property as a claim against his estate and proposed to pay the Bank four annual installments and a final “balloon payment” equal in total value to the Bank’s in rem judgment. Over the Bank’s objection, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Chapter 13 plan. The Bank appealed to the District Court, arguing that the Code does not allow a debtor to include in a Chapter 13 plan a mortgage used to secure an obligation for which personal liability has been discharged in Chapter 7 proceedings; the Bank argued in the alternative that the Bankruptcy Court had erred in finding that petitioner had proposed the plan in good faith and that the plan was feasible. The District Court accepted the first of these arguments and disposed of the case on that ground. See In re Johnson, 96 B. R. 326, 328-330 (Kan. 1989).
The Court of Appeals affirmed. See 904 F. 2d 563 (CA10 1990). Emphasizing that petitioner’s personal liability on the promissory notes secured by the mortgage had been discharged in the Chapter 7 proceedings, the court reasoned that the Bank no longer had a “claim” against petitioner subject to rescheduling under Chapter 13. See id., at 565, 566. Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case without considering the Bank’s contentions that Johnson’s plan was not in good faith and was not feasible. See id., at 566.
In contrast to the decision of the Tenth Circuit in this case, two other Circuit Courts of Appeals have concluded that a debtor can include a mortgage lien in a Chapter 13 plan even after the debtor’s personal liability on the debt secured by the property has been discharged in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See In re Saylors, 869 F. 2d 1434, 1436 (CA11 1989); In re Metz, 820 F. 2d 1495, 1498 (CA9 1987). Having granted cer-tiorari to resolve this conflict, see 498 U. S. 1066 (1991), we now reverse.
M HH
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a reorganization remedy for consumer debtors and proprietors with relatively small debts. See generally H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, pp. 116-119 (1977). So long as a debtor meets the eligibility requirements for relief under Chapter 13, see 11 U. S. C. § 109(e), he may submit for the bankruptcy court’s confirmation a plan that “modif [ies] the rights of holders of secured claims . . . or . . . unsecured claims,” § 1322(b)(2), and that “provide[s] for the payment of all or any part of any [allowed] claim,” § 1322(b)(6). The issue in this case is whether a mortgage lien that secures an obligation for which a debtor’s personal liability has been discharged in a Chapter 7 liquidation is a “claim” subject to inclusion in an approved Chapter 13 reorganization plan.
To put this question in context, we must say more about the nature of the mortgage interest that survives a Chapter 7 liquidation. A mortgage is an interest in real property that secures a creditor’s right to repayment. But unless the debtor and creditor have provided otherwise, the creditor ordinarily is not limited to foreclosure on the mortgaged property should the debtor default on his obligation; rather, the creditor may in addition sue to establish the debt- or’s in personam liability for any deficiency on the debt and may enforce any judgment against the debtor’s assets generally. See 3 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property ¶ 467 (1990). A defaulting debtor can protect himself from personal liability by obtaining a discharge in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See 11 U. S. C. § 727. However, such a discharge extinguishes only “the personal liability of the debtor.” 11 U. S. C. § 524(a)(1). Codifying the rule of Long v. Bullard, 117 U. S. 617 (1886), the Code provides that a creditor’s right to foreclose on the mortgage survives or passes through the bankruptcy. See 11 U. S. C. § 522(c)(2); Owen v. Owen, 500 U. S. 305, 308-309 (1991); Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U. S. 291, 297 (1991); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra, at 361.
Whether this surviving mortgage interest is a “claim” subject to inclusion in a Chapter 13 reorganization plan is a straightforward issue of statutory construction to be resolved by reference to “the text, history, and purpose” of the Bankruptcy Code. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, supra, at 298. Under the Code,
“‘[CJlaim’ means—
“(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
“(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U. S. C. § 101(5) (1988 ed., Supp. III).
We have previously explained that Congress intended by this language to adopt the broadest available definition of “claim.” See Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 558, 563-564 (1990); see also Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U. S. 274, 279 (1985). In Davenport, we concluded that “ ‘right to payment’ [means] nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation . . . .” 495 U. S., at 559.
Applying the teachings of Davenport, we have no trouble concluding that a mortgage interest that survives the discharge of a debtor’s personal liability is a "claim” within the terms of § 101(5). Even after the debtor’s personal obligations have been extinguished, the mortgage holder still retains a “right to payment” in the form of its right to the proceeds from the sale of the debtor’s property. Alternatively, the creditor’s surviving right to foreclose on the mortgage can be viewed as a “right to an equitable remedy” for the debtor’s default on the underlying obligation. Either way, there can be no doubt that the surviving mortgage interest corresponds to an “enforceable obligation” of the debtor.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in concluding charge of petitioner’s personal liability on his promissory notes constituted the complete termination of the Bank’s claim against petitioner. Rather, a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim — namely, an action against the debtor in personam — while leaving intact another — namely, an action against the debtor in rem. Indeed, but for the codification of the rule of Long v. Bullard, supra, there can be little question that a “discharge” under Chapter 7 would have the effect of extinguishing the in rem component as well as the in personam component of any claim against the debtor. And because only “claims” are discharged under the Code, the very need to codify Long v. Bullard presupposes that a mortgage interest is otherwise a “claim.”
The conclusion that a surviving mortgage interest is a “claim” under § 101(5) is consistent with other parts of the Code. Section 502(b)(1), for example, states that the bankruptcy court “shall determine the amount of [a disputed] claim . . . and shall allow such claim in such amount, except to the extent that. . . such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor” (emphasis added). In other words, the court must allow the claim if it is enforceable against either the debtor or his property. Thus, § 502(b)(1) contemplates circumstances in which a “claim,” like the mortgage lien that passes through a Chapter 7 proceeding, may consist of nothing more than an obligation enforceable against the debtor’s property. Similarly, § 102(2) establishes, as a “[r]ul[e] of construction,” that the phrase “ ‘claim against the debtor’ includes claim against property of the debtor.” A fair reading of § 102(2) is that a creditor who, like the Bank in this case, has a claim enforceable only against the debtor’s property nonetheless has a “claim against the debtor” for purposes of the Code.
The legislative background and history of the Code confirm this construction of “claim.” Although the pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act contained no single definition of “claim,” the Act did define “claim” as “including] all claims of whatever character against a debtor or its property” for purposes of Chapter X corporate reorganizations. See 11 U. S. C. § 506(1) (1976 ed.) (emphasis added). It is clear that Congress so defined “claim” in order to confirm that creditors with interests enforceable only against the property of the debtor had “claims” for purposes of Chapter X, see S. Rep. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 25 (1938); H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1937), and such was the established understanding of the lower courts. See generally 6 J. Moore & L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 2.05, pp. 307-308 (14th ed. 1978) ("[I]t is to be noted that a claim against the debtor’s property alone is sufficient” for Chapter X). In fashioning a single definition of “claim” for the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, Congress intended to “adop[t] an even broader definition of claim than [was] found in the [pre-1978 Act’s] debtor rehabilitation chapters.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309 (emphasis added); accord, S. Rep. No. 95-989, pp. 21-22 (1978); see also Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, supra, at 558, 563-564 (recognizing that Congress intended broadest available definition of claim). Presuming, as we must, that Congress was familiar with the prevailing understanding of “claim” under Chapter X of the Act, see Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 499 U. S. 554, 562 (1991); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 698-699 (1979), we must infer that Congress fully expected that an obligation enforceable only against a debtor’s property would be a “claim” under § 101(5) of the Code.
The legislative history surrounding § 102(2) directly corroborates this inference. The Committee Reports accompanying § 102(2) explain that this rule of construction contemplates, inter alia, “nonrecourse loan agreements where the creditor’s only rights are against property of the debtor, and not against the debtor personally.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra, at 315; accord, S. Rep. No. 95-989, supra, at 28. Insofar as the mortgage interest that passes through a Chapter 7 liquidation is enforceable only against the debtor’s property, this interest has the same properties as a nonrecourse loan. It is true, as the Court of Appeals noted, that the debtor and creditor in such a case did not conceive of their credit agreement as a nonrecourse loan when they entered it. See 904 F. 2d, at 566. However, insofar as Congress did not expressly limit § 102(2) to nonrecourse loans but rather chose general language broad enough to encompass such obligations, we understand Congress’ intent to be that § 102(2) extend to all interests having the relevant attributes of non-recourse obligations regardless of how these interests come into existence.
The Bank resists this analysis. It contends that even if an obligation enforceable only against the debtor’s property might normally be treated as a “claim” subject to inclusion in a Chapter 13 plan, such an obligation should not be deemed a claim against the debtor when it is merely the remainder of an obligation for which the debtor’s personal liability has been discharged in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Serial filings under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, respondent maintains, evade the limits that Congress intended to place on these remedies.
We disagree. Congress has expressly prohibited various forms of serial filings. See, e. g., 11 U. S. C. § 109(g) (no filings within 180 days of dismissal); § 727(a)(8) (no Chapter 7 filing within six years of a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 filing); § 727(a)(9) (limitation on Chapter 7 filing within six years of Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 filing). The absence of a like prohibition on serial filings of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 petitions, combined with the evident care with which Congress fashioned these express prohibitions, convinces us that Congress did not intend categorically to foreclose the benefit of Chapter 13 reorganization to a debtor who previously has filed for Chapter 7 relief. Cf. United States v. Smith, 499 U. S. 160, 167 (1991) (expressly enumerated exceptions presumed to be exclusive).
The Bank’s contention also fails to apprehend the significance of the full range of Code provisions designed to protect Chapter 13 creditors. A bankruptcy court is authorized to confirm a plan only if the court finds, inter alia, that “the plan has been proposed in good faith,” § 1325(a)(3); that the plan assures unsecured creditors a recovery as adequate as “if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7,” § 1325(a)(4); that secured creditors either have “accepted the plan,” obtained the property securing their claims, or “re-tainted] the[ir] lien[s]” where “the value ... of property to be distributed under the plan ... is not less than the allowed amount of such claim[s],” § 1325(a)(5); and that “the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan,” § 1325(a)(6). In addition, the bankruptcy court retains its broad equitable power to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Code.]” § 105(a). Any or all of these provisions may be implicated when a debtor files serially under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. But given the availability of these provisions, and given Congress’ intent that “claim” be construed broadly, we do not believe that Congress intended the bankruptcy courts to use the Code’s definition of “claim” to police the Chapter 13 process for abuse.
f — I I — I
The Bank renews here its claim that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding petitioner’s plan to be in good faith for purposes of § 1325(a)(3) and feasible for purposes of § 1325(a)(6) of the Code. Because the District Court and Court of Appeals disposed of this case on the ground that the Bank’s mortgage interest was not a “claim” subject to inclusion in a Chapter 13 plan, neither court addressed the issues of good faith or feasibility. We also decline to address these issues and instead leave them for consideration on remand.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
At the time at which the mortgage was executed, petitioner co-owned the property in question. However, by the time petitioner filed the Chapter 13 petition at issue in this case, he had acquired his wife’s interest in the property. In addition, although petitioner’s wife was a party in various of the proceedings surrounding disposition of the property, for simplicity we refer only to petitioner’s role in these proceedings.
During the course of the proceedings, the Bank acquired from another creditor a superior mortgage interest in petitioner’s property.
Section 109(e) states:
“Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000, or an individual with regular income and such individual’s spouse, except a stockbroker or a commodity broker, that owe, on the date of the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts that aggregate less than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000 may be a debtor under chapter 13 of this title.”
Using this definition, we held in Davenport that restitution orders imposed as a condition of probation in state criminal proceedings were “claims” dischargeable in a Chapter 13 reorganization. See 495 U. S., at 558-560. Congress subsequently overruled the result in Davenport. See Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-581, § 3, 104 Stat. 2865. It did so, however, by expressly withdrawing the Bankruptcy Court’s power to discharge restitution orders under 11 U. S. C. § 1328(a), not by restricting the scope of, or otherwise amending, the definition of “claim” under § 101(5). Consequently, we do not view the Criminal Victims Protection Act as disturbing our general conclusions on the breadth of the definition of “claim” under the Code.
A bankruptcy discharge extinguishes “the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt.” 11 U. S. C. § 524(a)(1) (emphasis added). As we explained in Davenport, “debt,” which is defined under the Code as “liability on a claim,” 11 U. S. C. § 101(12) (1988 ed., Supp. III), has a meaning coextensive with that of “claim” as defined in § 101(5). Pennsyl vania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, supra, at 558. Hence, a discharge under the Code extinguishes the debtor’s personal liability on his creditor’s claims.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases involve the interaction of three federal statutes with respect to the proposed sale of the rail line of the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Co. (P&LE). The statutes are the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.; the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), 49 U. S. C. §10101 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V); and the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA), 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. § 101 et seq.
I
Petitioner, P&LE, is a small rail carrier owning and operating 182 miles of rail line serving points in Ohio and western Pennsylvania and possessing trackage rights over other lines extending into New York. P&LE has experienced financial problems of increasing severity, having lost $60 million during the five years preceding the onset of these cases. After other efforts to improve its condition failed, notably work force reductions, concessions from its employees, and market expansion, P&LE decided that in order to recoup for its owners any part of their investments it must sell its assets. On July 8, 1987, P&LE agreed to sell its assets for approximately $70 million to a newly formed subsidiary, P&LE Rail Co., Inc. (Railco), of Chicago West Pullman Transportation Corporation (CWP). Railco intended to operate the railroad as P&LE had except that Railco would not assume P&LE’s collective-bargaining contracts with its various unions and would need only about 250 employees rather than the 750 then working for P&LE. When the unions representing P&LE’s employees were notified of the proposed sale, they asserted that the sale would have an effect on the working conditions of the carrier’s employees and therefore was subject to the requirements of the RLA, 45 U. S. C. §§ 152 Seventh and 156, which provide:
Ҥ 152... Seventh. Change in pay, rules, or working conditions contrary to agreement or to section 156 forbidden
“No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 156 of this title.”
Ҥ 156. Procedure in changing rates of pay, rules, and working conditions
“Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days’ written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, and the time and place for the beginning of conference between the representatives of the parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon within ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within the thirty days provided in the notice. In every case where such notice of intended change has been given, or conferences are being held with reference thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by either party, or said Board has proffered its services, rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon, as required by section 155 of this title, by the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten days has elapsed after termination of conferences without request for or proffer of the services of the Mediation Board.”
The unions advised that they stood ready to negotiate all aspects of the matter, including the decision to sell the railroad assets. P&LE responded that it was willing to discuss the matter but that § 156 notice and bargaining were not required since the transaction was subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) under the ICA and since the requirements of §§ 155 and 156 would intrude on that regime as well as upon management’s prerogatives to conduct the affairs of the company with respect to the sales transaction.
Most of the unions then responded by themselves filing § 156 notices proposing changes in existing agreements to ameliorate the adverse impacts of the proposed sale upon P&LE’s employees. The unions sought guarantees that the sale would not cause any employee to be deprived of employment or to be placed in any worse position with respect to pay or working conditions and that P&LE would require that the purchaser of its rail line assume P&LE’s collective-bargaining agreements. P&LE again declined to bargain, asserting that the transaction was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC. On August 19, respondent, Railway Labor Executives’ Association (RLEA), on behalf of P&LE’s unions, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to P&LE’s obligations under the RLA and an injunction against the sale pending completion of RLA bargaining obligations. On September 15, 1987, the unions went on strike. P&LE’s request for a restraining order against the strike was denied by the District Court on the ground that the NLGA forbade such an order.
The proposed sale of assets could not be carried out without compliance with the terms of the ICA, 49 U. S. C. § 10901, which requires that noncarriers seeking to acquire a rail line first obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the ICC. Section 10901(e) specifies the procedures for this purpose and provides that the ICC “may” require the acquiring company “to provide a fair and equitable arrangement for the protection of railroad employees who may be affected thereby no less protective of and beneficial to the interests of such employees than those established pursuant to section 11347 of this title.” Section 10505, however, authorizes the Commission to grant exemptions from the requirements of the Act when not necessary to carry out the national transportation policy. Based on its experience with acquisitions under § 10901, the ICC had issued what is known as the Ex Parte No. 392 Class Exemption, see Ex Parte No. 392 (Sub. No. 1), Class Exemption for the Acquisition and Operation of Rail Lines Under 4-9 U. S. C. 10901, 1 I. C. C. 2d 810 (1985) (Ex Parte 392), review denied sub nom. Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. ICC, 260 U. S. App. D. C. 38, 817 F. 2d 145 (1987)/' which provides abbreviated procedures for seeking approval for acquisitions by non-carriers such as Railco of an operating railroad or its assets. The regulatory procedure, see 49 CFR § 1150.32(b) (1987), involved the filing of an application for exemption which would become effective seven days after filing absent contrary notice from the Commission. An interested party could oppose the exemption by filing a petition to revoke at any time, after consideration of which the ICC could revoke the exemption in whole or in part or impose labor protective provisions. The ICC had indicated, however, that only in exceptional situations would such protective provisions be imposed.
Accordingly, Railco on September 19, 1987, filed a notice of exemption pursuant to Ex Parte 392. After denying various requests by the unions to reject the notice of exemption and stay the sale, the Commission allowed the exemption to become effective on September 26. A petition to revoke filed by RLEA on October 2 is still pending before the Commission. At no time did RLEA request imposition of labor protective provisions pursuant to the Commission’s authority under § 10901.
On October 5, 1987, P&LE reapplied to the District Court for an order restraining the strike. The District Court granted the request on October 8, ruling that the authorization of the sale by the ICC negated any duty that P&LE had to bargain over the effects of the sale on its employees, and that the NLGA did not forbid issuance of an injunction under such circumstances. On October 26, however, the Court of Appeals summarily reversed, holding that the ICA did not require accommodation of the NLGA’s restrictions on the District Court’s powers. 831 F. 2d 1231 (CA3 1987). A remand was ordered to determine whether the sale or strike violated the RLA. The unions did not resume their strike when the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s injunction, but threatened to do so if P&LE attempted to consummate the sale to Railco.
The case in the District Court then went forward. Addressing the unions’ request for an injunction, the District Court held that although P&LE did not have a duty to bargain over its decision to sell, P&LE was required by the RLA to bargain over the effects of the sale on employees, and that the status quo provision of § 156 required that its bargaining obligations under the RLA must be satisfied before the sale could be consummated despite approval of the transaction by the ICC acting pursuant to the ICA. 677 F. Supp. 830 (WD Pa. 1987). A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 845 F. 2d 420 (CA3 1988).
We granted P&LE’s petition in No. 87-1888, challenging the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the injunction against the sale issued by the District Court, as well as P&LE’s petition in No. 87-1589, asking for reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals setting aside the strike injunction issued by the District Court. 488 U. S. 965 (1988).
II
In No. 87-1888, the issue is whether the RLA, properly construed, required or authorized an injunction against closing the sale of P&LE’s assets to Railco because of an unsatisfied duty to bargain about the effects of the sale on P&LE’s employees. We first address whether the RLA required P&LE to give notice of its decision to sell and to bargain about the effects of the sale. We then consider whether the unions’ own notices and the status quo provision of § 156 justified the injunction.
A
P&LE submits that neither its decision to sell nor the impact that sale of the company might have had on its employees was a “change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions” (emphasis added) within the meaning of the RLA, 45 U. S. C. § 156, and that P&LE therefore had no duty to give notice or to bargain with respect to these matters. The Court of Appeals rejected this submission, focusing on the effects the sale would have on employees and concluding that the “loss of jobs by possibly two-thirds of the employees clearly would require a ‘change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.’” 845 F. 2d, at 428. The court did not point out how the proposed sale would require changing any specific provision of any of P&LE’s collective-bargaining agreements. It did not suggest that any of those agreements dealt with the possibility of the sale of the company, sought to confer any rights on P&LE’s employees in the event of the sale, or guaranteed that jobs would continue to be available indefinitely. What P&LE proposed to do would remove it from the railroad business and terminate its position as a railroad employer; and like the Court of Appeals, RLEA does not explain how such action would violate or require changing any of the provisions of the unions’ written contracts with P&LE.
Of course, not all working conditions to which parties may have agreed are to be found in written contracts. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 396 U. S. 142, 154-155 (1969) (Shore Line). It may be that “in the context of the relationship between the principals, taken as a whole, there is a basis for implying an understanding on the particular practice involved.” Id., at 160 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But the Court of Appeals did not purport to find an implied agreement that P&LE would not go out of business, would not sell its assets, or if it did, would protect its employees from the adverse consequences of such action. Neither does RLEA. We therefore see no basis for holding that P&LE should have given a § 156 notice of a proposed “change” in its express or implied agreements with the unions when it contracted to sell its assets to Railco. Nor was it, based on its own decision to sell, obligated to bargain about the impending sale or to delay its implementation. We find RLEA’s arguments to the contrary quite unconvincing.
B
There is more substance to the Court of Appeals’ holding, and to RLEA’s submission, that the unions’ § 156 notices proposed far-reaching changes in the existing agreements over which P&LE was required to bargain and that the status quo provision of § 156 prohibited P&LE from going forward with the sale pending completion of the “purposely long and drawn out” procedures which the Act requires to be followed in order to settle a “major” dispute. Railway Clerks v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 384 U. S. 238, 246 (1966). Section 156 provides that when a notice of change in agreements has been given, “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon, as required by section 155.” Relying on Shore Line, RLEA argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that when a rail labor union files a § 156 notice to change the terms of an agreement, the “working conditions” that the carrier may not change pending conclusion of the bargaining process are not limited to those contained in express or implied agreements but include, as Shore Line held, “those actual, objective working conditions and practices, broadly conceived, which were in effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and which are involved in or related to that dispute.” 396 U. S., at 153. RLE A submits that the relationship of employer-employee and the state of being employed are among those working conditions that may not be changed until the RLA procedures are satisfied. We are unconvinced, for several reasons, that this is the case.
The facts of Shore Line, briefly stated, were these: Shore Line operated 50 miles of rail line between Lang Yard in Toledo, Ohio, and Dearoad Yard near Detroit, Michigan. For many years, all train and engine crews reported for duty and finished the day at Lang Yard. When it was necessary to perform switching and other operations at other points, crews were transported at railroad expense to those outlying points. The company proposed to establish outlying work assignments at Trenton, Michigan, some 35 miles north of Lang Yard. Crews assigned there would have to report there. The proposed change was not forbidden by, and would not have violated, the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. The union filed a § 156 notice seeking to amend the agreement to forbid the railroad to make outlying assignments. The issue was not settled by the parties and the union called for mediation. While the Mediation Board proceedings were pending, the railroad posted a bulletin creating the disputed assignment at Trenton. The union threatened a strike, the company sued to restrain the strike, and the union counterclaimed for an injunction relying on the status quo provision of § 156. The District Court and the Court of Appeals held for the union, and we affirmed over a dissent by Justice Harlan, joined by Chief Justice Burger. We held that even though Shore Line did not propose to change any of its agreements, the status quo provision of §156 — “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered” pending exhaustion of the required procedure — forbade any change by Shore Line in the “objective working conditions” then existing. 396 U. S., at 153. We noted that had it been the practice to make outlying work assignments, the company would have been within its rights to make the Trenton assignment; but the prior practice, the objective working condition, was to have crews report for work and come back to Lang Yard. That working condition could not be changed pending resolution of the dispute without violating the status quo provision of § 156 even though there was nothing in the agreement between the parties to prevent outlying assignments. Id., at 153-154.
Shore Line, in our view, does not control these cases. In the first place, our conclusion in that case that the status quo provision required adherence not only to working conditions contained in express or implied agreements between the railroad and its union but also to conditions “objectively” in existence when the union’s notice was served, and that otherwise could be changed without violating any agreement, extended the relevant language of § 156 to its outer limits, and we should proceed with care before applying that decision to the facts of these cases. Second, reporting at Lang Yard, we thought, had been the unquestioned practice for many years, and we considered it reasonable for employees to deem it sufficiently established that it would not be changed without bargaining and compliance with the status quo provisions of the RLA. Third, and more fundamentally, the decision did not involve a proposal by the railroad to terminate its business. Here, it may be said that the working condition existing prior to the § 156 notice was that P&LE was operating a railroad through the agency of its employees, but there was no reason to expect, simply from the railroad’s long existence, that it would stay in business, especially in view of its losses, or that rail labor would have a substantial role in the decision to sell or in negotiating the terms of the sale. Whatever else Shore Line might reach, it did not involve the decision of a carrier to quit the railroad business, sell its assets, and cease to be a railroad employer at all, a decision that we think should have been accorded more legal significance than it received in the courts below. Our cases indicate as much.
In Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U. S. 263 (1965), an employer closed its textile mill when a union won a representation election. The National Labor Relations Board concluded that this action was an unfair labor practice under §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the complete or partial liquidation of an employer’s business even though motivated by antiunion animus was not an unfair practice. We affirmed in part, ruling that insofar as the NLRA is concerned, an employer “has an absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases....” 380 U. S., at 268. Whatever may be the limits of § 8(a)(1), we said, an employer’s decision to terminate its business is one of those decisions “so peculiarly matters of management prerogative that they would never constitute violations” of that section. Id., at 269. Neither would ceasing business and refusing to bargain about it violate § 8(a)(3) or § 8(a)(5) even if done with antiunion animus. Id., at 267, n. 5, 269-274. “A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor Relations Act.” Id., at 270. We found neither.
Although Darlington arose under the NLRA, we are convinced that we should be guided by the admonition in that case that the decision to close down a business entirely is so much a management prerogative that only an unmistakable expression of congressional intent will suffice to require the employer to postpone a sale of its assets pending the fulfillment of any duty it may have to bargain over the subject matter of union notices such as were served in this litigation. Absent statutory direction to the contrary, the decision of a railroad employer to go out of business and consequently to reduce to zero the number of available jobs is not a change in the conditions of employment forbidden by the status quo provision of § 156. In these cases, P&LE concluded that it must sell its assets, and its agreement to sell to Railco, if implemented, would have removed it from the railroad business; no longer would it be a railroad employer. No longer would it need the services of members of the rail unions. The RLEA concedes that had the collective-bargaining agreements expressly waived bargaining concerning sale of P&LE’s assets, the unions’ § 156 notices to change the agreements could not trump the terms of the agreements and could not delay the sale. Brief for Respondent RLEA 44. We think the same result follows where the agreement is silent on the matter and the railroad employer has proceeded in accordance with the ICA. In these circumstances, there is little or no basis for the unions to expect that a § 156 notice would be effective to delay the company’s departure from the railroad business. Congress clearly requires that sales transactions like P&LE’s proposal must satisfy the requirements of the ICA, but we find nothing in the RLA to prevent the immediate consummation of P&LE’s contract to sell. When the ICC approved the sale by permitting the Ex Parte 392 exemption to become effective, P&LE was free to close the transaction and should not have been enjoined from doing so.
This construction of the RLA also responds to our obligation to avoid conflicts between two statutory regimes, namely, the RLA and ICA, that in some respects overlap. As the Court has said, we “are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974). We should read federal statutes “to give effect to each if we can do so while preserving their sense and purpose.” Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 267 (1981); see also United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 453 (1988). We act accordingly in this litigation.
Congress has exercised its Commerce Clause authority to regulate rail transportation for over a century. See Act to regulate commerce of 1887 (the ICA), ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. In doing so, Congress has assigned to the ICC plenary authority over rail transactions, ranging from line extensions, consolidations, and abandonments, to acquisitions. In particular, the ICA in 49 U. S. C. § 10901(a) permits non-carriers to acquire a rail line only if the ICC determines that “the present or future public convenience and necessity require or permit” the rail acquisition and operation. The ICC may approve certification on satisfaction of various conditions. Specifically, it has authority to impose labor protection provisions though it is not obligated to do so. § 10901(e). Acting pursuant to § 10505, the ICC, in its Ex Parte 392 exemption proceedings, declared all noncarrier acquisitions presumptively exempt from § 10901 regulation. Such transactions would be deemed approved seven days after a notice filed by the acquiring entities. 49 CFR § 1150.32(b) (1987). And absent a showing of exceptional circumstances, which rail labor was entitled to demonstrate, labor protection provisions would not be imposed. The Ex Parte 392 procedures, and the ICA, § 10505 exemption authority generally, like amendments to ICA in the last two decades, see, e. g., the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31; the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895, aimed at reversing the rail industry’s decline through de-regulatory efforts, above all by streamlining procedures to effectuate economically efficient transactions.
Here P&LE agreed to sell its assets to Railco. The transaction was presented to the ICC and an Ex Parte 392 exemption was requested. The ICC rejected the unions’ applications to stay or reject the exemption, which became effective seven days after it was requested. The unions then successfully sought an injunction delaying the closing of the transaction based on their § 156 notices. The Court of Appeals several times noted the tension between the two regimes, but concluded that the provisions of the RLA left no room for a construction easing those tensions. This was the case even though the injunction that was affirmed would likely result in cancellation of P&LE’s sale and the frustration of Congress’ intent through ICA amendments to deregulate the rail and air industries generally and more specifically to assist small rail lines with financial problems. We disagree with that conclusion, for as we have said, we are confident that the RLA is reasonably subject to a construction that would, at least to a degree, harmonize the two statutes. The injunction, which effectively prevented the sale from going forward, should not have been granted.
c
Our holding in these cases, which rests on our construction of the RLA and not on the pre-emptive force of the ICA, is that petitioner was not obligated to serve its own § 156 notice on the unions in connection with the proposed sale. We also conclude that the unions’ notices did not obligate P&LE to maintain the status quo and postpone the sale beyond the time the sale was approved by the Commission and was scheduled to be consummated. We do not hold, however, that P&LE had no duty at all to bargain in response to the unions’ § 156 motions. The courts below held, and RLEA agrees, that P&LE’s decision to sell, as such, was not a bargainable subject. The disputed issue is whether P&LE was required to bargain about the effects that the sale would or might have upon its employees. P&LE, in our view, was not entirely free to disregard the unions’ demand that it bargain about such effects. When the unions’ notices were served, however, the terms of P&LE’s agreement with Railco were more or less settled, and P&LE’s decision to sell on those terms had been made. To the extent that the unions’ demands could be satisfied only by the assent of the buyers, they sought to change or dictate the terms of the sale, and in effect challenged the decision to sell itself. At that time, P&LE was under no obligation to bargain about the terms it had already negotiated. To the extent that the unions’ proposals could be satisfied by P&LE itself, those matters were bargainable but only until the date for closing the sale arrived, which, of course, could not occur until the Ex Parte 392 exemption became effective. We are therefore constrained to reverse the Court of Appeals in No. 87-1888.
III
In No. 87-1589, the issue is whether the Court of Appeals was correct in setting aside the injunction against the strike issued on October 8, 1987. At that time, the Ex Parte 392 exemption had become effective, and the District Court held that because the ICC had in effect authorized the sale and had ruled that delay would be prejudicial to the parties and the public interests, the NLGA prohibition against issuing injunctions in labor dispute cases must be accommodated to the ICC’s decision that the sale of assets should go forward. It was this decision, based on the legal significance of the ICA and its impact on the NLGA, that the Court of Appeals summarily reversed. We agree with that decision.
We have held that the NLGA § 4 general limitation on district courts’ power to issue injunctions in labor disputes must be accommodated to the more specific provisions of the RLA: “[T]he District Court has jurisdiction and power to issue necessary injunctive orders” to enforce compliance with the requirements of the RLA “notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.” Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768, 774 (1952). Thus, a union may be enjoined from striking when the dispute concerns the interpretation or application of its contract and is therefore subject to compulsory arbitration. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U. S. 30 (1957). “[T]he specific provisions of the Railway Labor Act take precedence over the more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.” Id., at 41-42. The same accommodation of the NLGA to the specific provisions of the NLRA must be made. A union that has agreed to arbitrate contractual disputes and is subject to a no-strike clause may be enjoined from striking despite the NLGA. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 (1970).
Petitioner contends that the NLGA must likewise be accommodated to the procedures mandated by Congress in 49 U. S. C. § 10901 specifically the authority of the ICC to impose labor protective provisions, the right of rail labor to seek such provisions from the ICC, and its right to judicial review if dissatisfied. It is urged that the ICA provides a comprehensive scheme for the resolution of labor protection issues arising out of ICC-regulated transactions and that rail labor must take advantage of those procedures rather than strike. We are unpersuaded that this is the case.
The prohibition of the NLGA must give way when necessary to enforce a duty specifically imposed by another statute. But no applicable provision has been called to our attention that imposes any duty on rail unions to participate in ICC proceedings and to seek ICC protections with which they must be satisfied. Furthermore, labor protection provisions run against the acquiring railroad rather than the seller. Yet here it is with the seller, P&LE, that the unions wanted to bargain, seeking to ease the adverse consequences of the sale. To that end, the unions served § 156 notices, which at least to some extent obligated P&LE to bargain until its transaction was closed. We find nothing in the ICA that relieved P&LE of that duty, nor anything in that Act that empowers the ICC to intrude into the relationship between the selling carrier and its railroad unions. We are thus quite sure that the NLGA forbade an injunction against that strike unless the strike was contrary to the unions’ duties under the RLA.
As to that issue, the Court of Appeals stated: “We intimate no view as to whether the provisions of the Railway Labor Act are applicable to this dispute so that the district court would be entitled to enjoin the strike while that Act’s dispute resolution mechanisms are underway. RLEA’s complaint seeking a declaration that the Railway Labor Act is applicable to this dispute is the merits issue before the district court.” 831 F. 2d, at 1237. On remand, the District Court held that the RLA was indeed applicable to the dispute and on that basis issued an injunction against P&LE. It did not, however, ever address the question whether the unions’ strike, which occurred after their suit was filed, was enjoin-able under the RLA. Neither did the Court of Appeals deal with that issue in affirming the District Court. P&LE perfunctorily asserts in its briefs in this Court that the strike injunction was proper because the unions were obligated to bargain rather than strike after their § 156 notices were served. RLEA did not respond to this assertion. With the case in this position, we shall not pursue the issue. Instead, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and leave the matter, if it is a live issue, to be dealt with on remand.
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 87-1888 is reversed and the judgment in No. 87-1589 is vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Attempts to interest major rail lines in the property were unavailing because of the high cost of labor protection that would have been mandatory under the section of the ICA applicable to purchases by an existing carrier. 49 U. S. C. § 11347 (1982 ed., Supp. V), which is set forth in n. 7, infra.
P&LE would keep certain real estate and some 6,000 railcars.
CWP anticipated inviting all P&LE employees to submit applications and intended to give preference to them in hiring. CWP also expected to bargain for new contracts with the existing unions.
Disputes about proposals to change rates of pay, rules, or working conditions are known as major disputes. Minor disputes are those involving the interpretation or application of existing contracts. The latter are subject to compulsory arbitration. The former are subject to the procedures set out in §§ 156 and 155, which specify the functions of the Mediation Board. In Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U. S. 369, 378 (1969), we described the procedures applicable to major disputes:
“The Act provides a detailed framework to facilitate the voluntary settlement of major disputes. A party desiring to effect a change of rates, pay, rules, or working conditions must give advance written notice. § 6. The parties must confer, § 2 Second, and if conference fails to resolve the dispute, either or both may invoke the services of the National Mediation Board, which may also proffer its services sua sponte if it finds a labor emergency to exist. § 5 First. If mediation fails, the Board must endeavor to induce the parties to submit the controversy to binding arbitration, which can take place, however, only if both consent. §§ 5 First, 7. If arbitration is rejected and the dispute threatens ‘substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify the President,’ who may create an emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. § 10. While the dispute is working its way through these stages, neither party may unilaterally alter the status quo. §§2 Seventh, 5 First, 6, 10.”
The unions’ proposals were essentially these:
“1. No employee of the P&LE Railroad Company who [was actively employed or on authorized leave of absencel between August 1, 1986 and August 1,1987... shall be deprived of employment or placed in a worse position with respect to compensation or working conditions for any reason except resignation, retirement, death or dismissal for justifiable cause.... The formulae for the protective allowances, with a separation option, shall be comparable to those established in the Neiv York Dock conditions.
“2. If an employee is placed in a worse position with respect to compensation or working conditions, that employee shall receive, in addition to a make-whole-remedy, penalty pay equal to three times the lost pay, fringe benefits and consequential damages suffered by such employee.
“3. P&LE agrees to obtain binding commitments from any purchaser of its rail line operating properties and assets to assume all [of P&LE’s] collective bargaining agreements... to hire P&LE employees in seniority order without physicals, and to negotiate with the P&LE and this Organization an agreement to apply this Agreement to the sale transaction and to select the forces to perform the work over the lines being acquired.” App. 38, 42, 46, 50, 54, 58, 62, 66, 122, 126.
Section 4 of the NLGA
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are asked in this case to decide whether an association-in-fact enterprise under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. § 1961 et seq., must have “an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.” Pet. for Cert. i. We hold that such an enterprise must have a “structure” but that an instruction framed in this precise language is not necessary. The District Court properly instructed the jury in this case. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
A
The evidence at petitioner’s trial was sufficient to prove the following: Petitioner and others participated in a series of bank thefts in New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin during the 1990’s. The participants in these crimes included a core group, along with others who were recruited from time to time. Although the participants sometimes attempted bank-vault burglaries and bank robberies, the group usually targeted cash-laden night-deposit boxes, which are often found in banks in retail areas.
Each theft was typically carried out by a group of participants who met beforehand to plan the crime, gather tools (such as crowbars, fishing gaffs, and walkie-talkies), and assign the roles that each participant would play (such as lookout and driver). The participants generally split the proceeds from the thefts. The group was loosely and informally organized. It does not appear to have had a leader or hierarchy; nor does it appear that the participants ever formulated any long-term master plan or agreement.
From 1991 to 1994, the core group was responsible for more than 30 night-deposit-box thefts. By 1994, petitioner had joined the group, and over the next five years, he participated in numerous attempted night-deposit-box thefts and at least two attempted bank-vault burglaries.
In 2003, petitioner was indicted for participation in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c); conspiracy to commit that offense, in violation of § 1962(d); conspiracy to commit bank burglary, in violation of § 371; and nine counts of bank burglary and attempted bank burglary, in violation of §2113(a).
B
In instructing the jury on the meaning of a RICO “enterprise,” the District Court relied largely on language in United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576 (1981). The court told the jurors that, in order to establish the existence of such an enterprise, the Government had to prove that: “(1) There [was] an ongoing organization with some sort of framework, formal or informal, for carrying out its objectives; and (2) the various members and associates of the association function[ed] as a continuing unit to achieve a common purpose.” App. 112. Over petitioner’s objection, the court also told the jury that it could “find an enterprise where an association of individuals, without structural hierarchy, form[ed] solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of racketeering acts” and that “[e]ommon sense suggests that the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by what is [sic] does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.” Id., at 111-112.
Petitioner requested an instruction that the Government was required to prove that the enterprise “had an ongoing organization, a core membership that functioned as a continuing unit, and an ascertainable structural hierarchy distinct from the charged predicate acts.” Id., at 95. The District Court refused to give that instruction.
Petitioner was convicted on 11 of the 12 counts against him, including the RICO counts, and was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. In a summary order, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction but vacated the sentence on a ground not relevant to the issues before us. 283 Fed. Appx. 825 (2007). The Court of Appeals did not specifically address the RICO jury instructions, stating only that the arguments not discussed in the order were “without merit.” Id., at 826. Petitioner was then re-sentenced, and we granted certiorari, 554 U. S. 944 (2008), to resolve conflicts among the Courts of Appeals concerning the meaning of a RICO enterprise.
II
A
RICO makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c) (emphasis added).
The statute does not specifically define the outer boundaries of the “enterprise” concept but states that the term “includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” § 1961(4). This enumeration of included enterprises is obviously broad, encompassing “any... group of individuals associated in fact.” Ibid, (emphasis added). The term “any” ensures that the definition has a wide reach, see, e. g., Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 218-219 (2008), and the very concept of an association in fact is expansive. In addition, the RICO statute provides that its terms are to be “liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.” § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947, note following 18 U. S. C. § 1961; see also, e. g., National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 257 (1994) (“RICO broadly defines ‘enterprise' ”); Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 497 (1985) (“RICO is to be read broadly”); Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 21 (1983) (noting “the pattern of the RICO statute in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth”).
In light of these statutory features, we explained in Turkette that “an enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact” and that RICO reaches “a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” 452 U. S., at 580, 583. Such an enterprise, we said, “is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” Id., at 583.
Notwithstanding these precedents, the dissent asserts that the definition of a RICO enterprise is limited to “businesslike entities.” See post, at 952 (opinion of Stevens, J.). We see no basis to impose such an extratextual requirement.
B
As noted, the specific question on which we granted certiorari is whether an association-in-fact enterprise must have “an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.” Pet. for Cert. i. We will break this question into three parts. First, must an association-in-fact enterprise have a “structure”? Second, must the structure be “ascertainable”? Third, must the “structure” go “beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity” in which its members engage?
“Structure.” We agree with petitioner that an association-in-fact enterprise must have a structure. In the sense relevant here, the term “structure” means “[t]he way in which parts are arranged or put together to form a whole” and “[t]he interrelation or arrangement of parts in a complex entity.” American Heritage Dictionary 1718 (4th ed. 2000); see also Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1410 (1967) (defining structure to mean, among other things, “the pattern of relationships, as of status or friendship, existing among the members of a group or society”).
From the terms of RICO, it is apparent that an association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose. As we succinctly put it in Turkette, an association-in-fact enterprise is “a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” 452 U. S., at 583.
That an “enterprise” must have a purpose is apparent from the meaning of the term in ordinary usage, i. e., a “venture,” “undertaking,” or “project.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 757 (1976). The concept of “association]” requires both interpersonal relationships and a common interest. See id., at 132 (defining “association” as “an organization of persons having a common interest”); Black’s Law Dictionary 156 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining “association” as a “collection of persons who have joined together for a certain object”). Section 1962(c) reinforces this conclusion and also shows that an “enterprise” must have some longevity, since the offense proscribed by that provision demands proof that the enterprise had “affairs” of sufficient duration to permit an associate to “participate” in those affairs through “a pattern of racketeering activity.”
Although an association-in-fact enterprise must have these structural features, it does not follow that a district court must use the term “structure” in its jury instructions. A trial judge has considerable discretion in choosing the language of an instruction so long as the substance of the relevant point is adequately expressed.
“Ascertainable. ” Whenever a jury is told that it must find the existence of an element beyond a reasonable doubt, that element must be “ascertainable” or else the jury could not find that it was proved. Therefore, telling the members of the jury that they had to ascertain the existence of an “ascertainable structure” would have been redundant and potentially misleading.
“Beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity.” This phrase may be interpreted in at least two different ways, and its correctness depends on the particular sense in which the phrase is used. If the phrase is interpreted to mean that the existence of an enterprise is a separate element that must be proved, it is of course correct. As we explained in Turkette, the existence of an enterprise is an element distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity and “proof of one does not necessarily establish the other.” 452 U. S., at 583.
On the other hand, if the phrase is used to mean that the existence of an enterprise may never be inferred from the evidence showing that persons associated with the enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, it is incorrect. We recognized in Turkette that the evidence used to prove the pattern of racketeering activity and the evidence establishing an enterprise “may in particular cases coalesce.” Ibid.
C
The crux of petitioner’s argument is that a RICO enterprise must have structural features in addition to those that we think can be fairly inferred from the language of the statute. Although petitioner concedes that an association-in-fact enterprise may be an “ ‘informal’ ” group and that “not ‘much’” structure is needed, Reply Brief for Petitioner 24, he contends that such an enterprise must have at least some additional structural attributes, such as a structural “hierarchy,” “role differentiation,” a “unique modus operandi," a “chain of command,” “professionalism and sophistication of organization,” “diversity and complexity of crimes,” “membership dues, rules and regulations,” “uncharged or additional crimes aside from predicate acts,” an “internal discipline mechanism,” “regular meetings regarding enterprise affairs,” an “enterprise ‘name,’ ” and “induction or initiation ceremonies and rituals,” id., at 31-35; see also Brief for Petitioner 26-28, 33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 8, 17.
We see no basis in the language of RICO for the structural requirements that petitioner asks us to recognize. As we said in Turkette, an association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit that functions with a common purpose. Such a group need not have a hierarchical structure or a “chain of command”; decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis and by any number of methods — by majority vote, consensus, a show of strength, etc. Members of the group need not have fixed roles; different members may perform different roles at different times. The group need not have a name, regular meetings, dues, established rules and regulations, disciplinary procedures, or induction or initiation ceremonies. While the group must function as a continuing unit and remain in existence long enough to pursue a course of conduct, nothing in RICO exempts an enterprise whose associates engage in spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence. Nor is the statute limited to groups whose crimes are sophisticated, diverse, complex, or unique; for example, a group that does nothing but engage in extortion through old-fashioned, unsophisticated, and brutal means may fall squarely within the statute’s reach.
The breadth of the “enterprise” concept in RICO is highlighted by comparing the statute with other federal statutes that target organized criminal groups. For example, 18 U. S. C. § 1955(b), which was enacted together with RICO as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452,84 Stat. 922, defines an “illegal gambling business” as one that “involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business.” A “continuing criminal enterprise,” as defined in 21 U. S. C. § 848(c), must involve more than five persons who act in concert and must have an “organizer,” supervisor, or other manager. Congress included no such requirements in RICO.
Ill
A
Contrary to petitioner’s claims, rejection of his argument regarding these structural characteristics does not lead to a merger of the crime proscribed by 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c) (participating in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity) and any of the following offenses: operating a gambling business, §1955; conspiring to commit one or more crimes that are listed as RICO predicate offenses, §371; or conspiring to violate the RICO statute, § 1962(d).
Proof that a defendant violated § 1955 does not necessarily establish that the defendant conspired to participate in the affairs of a gambling enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. In order to prove the latter offense, the prosecution must prove either that the defendant committed a pattern of § 1955 violations or a pattern of state-law gambling crimes. See § 1961(1). No such proof is needed to establish a simple violation of § 1955.
Likewise, proof that a defendant conspired to commit a RICO predicate offense — for example, arson — does not necessarily establish that the defendant participated in the affairs of an arson enterprise through a pattern of arson crimes. Under § 371, a conspiracy is an inchoate crime that may be completed in the brief period needed for the formation of the agreement and the commission of a single overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Feola, 420 U. S. 671, 694 (1975). Section 1962(c) demands much more: the creation of an “enterprise” — a group with a common purpose and course of conduct — and the actual commission of a pattern of predicate offenses.
Finally, while in practice the elements of a violation of §§ 1962(c) and (d) are similar, this overlap would persist even if petitioner’s conception of an association-in-fact enterprise were accepted.
B
Because the statutory language is clear, there is no need to reach petitioner’s remaining arguments based on statutory purpose, legislative history, or the rule of lenity. In prior cases, we have rejected similar arguments in favor of the clear but expansive text of the statute. See National Organization for Women, 510 U. S., at 262 (“The fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth” (quoting Sedima, 473 U. S., at 499; brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Turkette, 452 U. S., at 589-591. “We have repeatedly refused to adopt narrowing constructions of RICO in order to make it conform to a preconceived notion of what Congress intended to proscribe.” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U. S. 639, 660 (2008); see also, e. g., National Organization for Women, supra, at 252 (rejecting the argument that “RICO requires proof that either the racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic purpose”); H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 244 (1989) (declining to read “an organized crime limitation into RICO’s pattern concept”); Sedima, supra, at 481 (rejecting the view that RICO provides a private right of action “only against defendants who had been convicted on criminal charges, and only where there had occurred a ‘racketeering injury’ ”).
IV
The instructions the District Court Judge gave to the jury in this case were correct and adequate. These instructions explicitly told the jurors that they could not convict on the RICO charges unless they found that the Government had proved the existence of an enterprise. See App. 111. The instructions made clear that this was a separate element from the pattern of racketeering activity. Ibid.
The instructions also adequately told the jury that the enterprise needed to have the structural attributes that may be inferred from the statutory language. As noted, the trial judge told the jury that the Government was required to prove that there was “an ongoing organization with some sort of framework, formal or informal, for carrying out its objectives” and that “the various members and associates of the association function[ed] as a continuing unit to achieve a common purpose.” Id., at 112.
Finally, the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that “the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by what is [sic] does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.” Id., at 111-112. This instruction properly conveyed the point we made in Turkette that proof of a pattern of racketeering activity may be sufficient in a particular case to permit a jury to infer the existence of an assoeiation-in-fact enterprise.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting.
In my view, Congress intended the term “enterprise” as it is used in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. § 1961 et seq., to refer only to businesslike entities that have an existence apart from the predicate acts committed by their employees or associates. The trial judge in this case committed two significant errors relating to the meaning of that term. First, he instructed the jury that “an association of individuals, without structural hierarchy, form[ed] solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of racketeering acts” can constitute an enterprise. App. 112. And he allowed the jury to find that element satisfied by evidence showing a group of criminals with no existence beyond its intermittent commission of racketeering acts and related offenses. Because the Court’s decision affirming petitioner’s conviction is inconsistent with the statutory meaning of the term enterprise and serves to expand RICO liability far beyond the bounds Congress intended, I respectfully dissent.
I
RICO makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” § 1962(c). The statute defines “enterprise” to include “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” § 1961(4).
It is clear from the statute and our earlier decisions construing the term that Congress used “enterprise” in these provisions in the sense of “a business organization,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 757 (1976), rather than “a ‘venture,’ ‘undertaking,’ or ‘project,’” ante, at 946 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, at 757). First, the terms “individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity” describe entities with formal legal structures most commonly established for business purposes. § 1961(4). In context, the subsequent reference to any “union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity” reflects an intended commonality between the legal and nonlegal entities included in the provision. Ibid, (emphasis added). “The juxtaposition of the two phrases suggests that ‘associated in fact’ just means structured without the aid of legally defined structural forms such as the business corporation.” Limestone Development Corp. v. Lemont, 520 F. 3d 797, 804-805 (CA7 2008).
That an enterprise must have businesslike characteristics is confirmed by the text of § 1962(c) and our decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170 (1993). Section 1962(c) creates liability for “conducting] or participating]... in the conduct of [an] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” In Reves, we examined that provision’s meaning and held that, “[i]n order to ‘participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs,’ one must have some part in directing those affairs.” Id., at 179 (quoting § 1962(c)). It is not enough for a defendant to “carry on” or “participate in” an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity; instead, evidence that he operated, managed, or directed those affairs is required. See id., at 177-179. This requirement confirms that the enterprise element demands evidence of a certain quantum of businesslike organization — i. e., a system of processes, dealings, or other affairs that can be “directed.”
Our cases also make clear that an enterprise “is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 583 (1981). As with the requirement that an enterprise have businesslike characteristics, that an enterprise must have a separate existence is confirmed by § 1962(e) and Reves. If an entity's existence consisted solely of its members’ performance of a pattern of racketeering acts, the “enterprise’s affairs” would be synonymous with the “pattern of racketeering activity.” Section 1962(c) would then prohibit an individual from conducting or participating in “the conduct of [a pattern of racketeering activity] through a pattern of racketeering activity” — a reading that is unbearably redundant, particularly in a case like this one in which a single pattern of activity is alleged. The only way to avoid that result is to require that an “enterprise’s affairs” be something other than the pattern of racketeering activity undertaken by its members.
Recognizing an enterprise’s businesslike nature and its distinctness from the pattern of predicate acts, however, does not answer the question of what proof each element requires. In cases involving a legal entity, the matter of proving the enterprise element is straightforward, as the entity’s legal existence will always be something apart from the pattern of activity performed by the defendant or his associates. Cf. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U. S. 158, 163 (2001). But in the case of an assoeiationin-fact enterprise, the Government must adduce other evidence of the entity’s “separate” existence and “ongoing organization.” Turkette, 452 U. S., at 583. There may be cases in which a jury can infer that existence and continuity from the evidence used to establish the pattern of racketeering activity. Ibid. But that will be true only when the pattern of activity is so complex that it could not be performed in the absence of structures or processes for planning or concealing the illegal conduct beyond those inherent in performing the predicate acts. More often, proof of an enterprise’s separate existence will require different evidence from that used to establish the pattern of predicate acts.
Precisely what proof is required in each case is a more difficult question, largely due to the abundant variety of RICO predicates and enterprises. Because covered enterprises are necessarily businesslike in nature, however, proof of an association-in-fact enterprise’s separate existence will generally require evidence of rules, routines, or processes through which the entity maintains its continuing operations and seeks to conceal its illegal acts. As petitioner suggests, this requirement will usually be satisfied by evidence that the association has an “ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.” Pet. for Cert. i. Examples of such structure include an organizational hierarchy, a “framework for making decisions,” an “internal discipline mechanism,” “regular meetings,” or a practice of “reinvestfing]... proceeds to promote and expand the enterprise.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 31-34. In other cases, the enterprise’s existence might be established through evidence that it provides goods or services to third parties, as such an undertaking will require organizational elements more comprehensive than those necessary to perform a pattern of predicate acts. Thus, the evidence needed to establish an enterprise will vary from case to case, but in every case the Government must carry its burden of proving that an alleged enterprise has an existence separate from the pattern of racketeering activity undertaken by its constituents.
II
In some respects, my reading of the statute is not very different from that adopted by the Court. We agree that “an association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Ante, at 946. But the Court stops short of giving content to that requirement. It states only that RICO “demands proof that the enterprise had ‘affairs’ of sufficient duration to permit an associate to ‘participate’ in those affairs through ‘a pattern of racketeering activity,’ ” before concluding that “[a] trial judge has considerable discretion in choosing the language of an instruction” and need not use the term “structure.” Ibid. While I agree the word “structure” is not talismanic, I would hold that the instructions must convey the requirement that the alleged enterprise have an existence apart from the alleged pattern of predicate acts. The Court’s decision, by contrast, will allow juries to infer the existence of an enterprise in every case involving a pattern of racketeering activity undertaken by two or more associates.
By permitting the Government to prove both elements with the same evidence, the Court renders the enterprise requirement essentially meaningless in association-in-fact cases. It also threatens to make that category of § 1962(c) offenses indistinguishable from conspiracies to commit predicate acts, see §371, as the only remaining difference is § 1962(c)’s pattern requirement. The Court resists this criticism, arguing that § 1962(c) “demands much more” than the inchoate offense defined in §371. Ante, at 950. It states that the latter “may be completed in the brief period needed for the formation of the agreement and the commission of a single overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,” whereas the former requires the creation of “a group with a common purpose and course of conduct — and the actual commission of a pattern of predicate offenses.” Ibid. Given that it is also unlawful to conspire to violate § 1962(c), see § 1962(d), this comment provides no assurance that RICO and §371 offenses remain distinct. Only if proof of the enterprise element — the “group with a common purpose and course of conduct” — requires evidence of activity or organization beyond that inherent in the pattern of predicate acts will RICO offenses retain an identity distinct from § 371 offenses.
This case illustrates these concerns. The trial judge instructed the jury that an enterprise need have only the degree of organization necessary “for carrying out its objectives” and that it could “find an enterprise where an association of individuals, without structural hierarchy, forms solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of racketeering acts.” App. 112. These instructions were plainly deficient, as they did not require the Government to prove that the alleged enterprise had an existence apart from the pattern of predicate acts. Instead, they permitted the Government’s proof of the enterprise’s structure and continuing nature — requirements on which all agree — to consist only of evidence that petitioner and his associates performed a pattern of racketeering activity.
Petitioner’s requested instruction would have required the jury to find that the alleged enterprise “had an ongoing organization, a core membership that functioned as a continuing unit, and an ascertainable structural hierarchy distinct from the charged predicate acts.” Id., at 95. That instruction does not precisely track my understanding of the statute; although evidence of “structural hierarchy” can evidence an enterprise, it is not necessary to establish that element. Nevertheless, the proposed instruction would have better directed the jury to consider whether the alleged enterprise possessed the separate existence necessary to expose petitioner to liability under § 1962(c), and the trial judge should have considered an instruction along those lines.
The trial judge also erred in finding the Government’s evidence in this case sufficient to support petitioner’s RICO convictions. Petitioner was alleged to have participated and conspired to participate in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of one act of bank robbery and three acts of interstate transportation of stolen funds. Id., at 15-19. The “primary goals” of the alleged enterprise “included generating money for its members and associates through the commission of criminal activity, including bank robberies, bank burglaries and interstate transportation of stolen money.” Id., at 14. And its modus operandi was to congregate periodically when an associate had a lead on a night-deposit box that the group could break into. Whoever among the associates was available would bring screwdrivers, crowbars, and walkie-talkies to the location. Some acted as lookouts, while others retrieved the money. When the endeavor was successful, the participants would split the proceeds. Thus, the group’s purpose and activities, and petitioner’s participation therein, were limited to sporadic acts of taking money from bank deposit boxes. There is no evidence in RICO’s text or history that Congress intended it to reach such ad hoc associations of thieves.
Ill
Because the instructions and evidence in this case did not satisfy the requirement that an alleged enterprise have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages, I respectfully dissent.
The relevant portion of the instructions was as follows:
“The term ‘enterprise’ as used in these instructions may also include a group of people associated in fact, even though this association is not recognized as a legal entity. Indeed, an enterprise need not have a name. Thus, an enterprise need not be a form[al] business entity such as a corporation, but may be merely an informal association of individuals. A group or association of people can be an ‘enterprise’ if, among other requirements, these individuals ‘associate’ together for a purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. Common sense suggests that the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by what is [sic] does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.
“Moreover, you may find an enterprise where an association of individuals, without structural hierarchy, forms solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of racketeering acts. Such an association of persons may be established by evidence showing an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and... by evidence that the people making up the association functioned as a continuing unit. Therefore, in order to establish the existence of such an enterprise, the government must prove that: (1) There is an ongoing organization with some sort of framework, formal or informal, for carrying out its objectives; and (2) the various members and associates of the association function as a continuing unit to achieve a common purpose.
“Regarding ‘organization,’ it is not necessary that the enterprise have any particular or formal structure, but it must have sufficient organization that its members functioned and operated in a coordinated manner in order to carry out the alleged common purpose or purposes of the enterprise.” App. 111-113 (emphasis added).
This provision does not purport to set out an exhaustive definition of the term “enterprise.” Compare §§ 1961(1) — (2) (defining what the terms “racketeering activity” and “State” mean) with §§ 1961(3M4) (defining what the terms “person” and “enterprise” include). Accordingly, this provision does not foreclose the possibility that the term might include, in addition to the specifically enumerated entities, others that fall within the ordinary meaning of the term “enterprise.” See H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 238 (1989) (explaining that the term “pattern” also retains its ordinary meaning notwithstanding the statutory definition in § 1961(5)).
The dissent claims that the “businesslike” limitation “is confirmed by the text of § 1962(c) and our decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170 (1993).” Post, at 953. Section 1962(c), however, states only that one may not “conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [an] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Whatever businesslike characteristics the dissent has in mind, we do not see them in § 1962(c). Furthermore, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170 (1993), is inapposite because that case turned on our interpretation of the participation requirement of § 1962, not the definition of “enterprise.” See id., at 184-185. In any case, it would be an interpretive stretch to deduce from the requirement that an enterprise must be “directed” to impose the much broader, amorphous requirement that it be “businesslike.”
It is easy to envision situations in which proof that individuals engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity would not establish the existence of an enterprise. For example, suppose that several individuals, independently and without coordination, engaged in a pattern of crimes listed as RICO predicates — for example, bribery or extortion. Proof of these patterns would not be enough to show that the individuals were members of an enterprise.
The dissent states that “[o]nly if proof of the enterprise element... requires evidence of activity or organization beyond that inherent in the pattern of predicate acts will
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A 1981 amendment to the Food Stamp Act states that no household shall become eligible to participate in the food stamp program during the time that any member of the household is on strike or shall increase the allotment of food stamps that it was receiving already because the income of the striking member has decreased. We must decide whether this provision is valid under the First and the Fifth Amendments.
I
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, Congress enacted a package of budget cuts throughout the Federal Government. Among the measures contained in OBRA were more than a dozen specific changes in the food stamp program, id., §§ 101-117. One of them was the amendment at issue in this case, § 109 of OBRA, which is set out in the margin. The Committee Reports estimated that this measure alone would save a total of about $165 million in fiscal years 1982, 1983, and 1984. H. R. Rep., at 12; S. Rep., at 63.
In 1984, two labor unions and several individual union members brought suit against the Secretary of Agriculture in District Court, contending that §109 is unconstitutional and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, and the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Congress’ action was well within its constitutional prerogatives. After a hearing, the District Court denied both motions. 648 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (DC 1986) (Appendix).
Both sides conducted discovery and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On November 14, 1986, the District Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and issued a declaratory judgment, holding the statute unconstitutional. 648 F. Supp. 1234. Specifically, the District Court found that the amendment to the Food Stamp Act was unconstitutional on three different grounds. First, it interferes or threatens to interfere with the First Amendment rights of the individual plaintiffs to associate with their families, with their unions, and with fellow union members, as well as the reciprocal rights under the First Amendment of the union plaintiffs to their members’ association with them. Second, it interferes with strikers’ First Amendment right to express themselves about union matters free of coercion by the Government. Third, it violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As the basis for its conclusion on the equal protection claim, the District Court mentioned several somewhat related deficiencies in the amendment: it betrays an animus against an unpopular political minority, it irrationally treats strikers worse than individuals who quit a job, and it impermissibly directs the onus of the striker’s actions against the rest of his family. Id., at 1239-1241. The Secretary appealed the decision directly to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 481 U. S. 1036 (1987). We now reverse.
II
We deal first with the District Court’s holding that § 109 violates the associational and expressive rights of appellees under the First Amendment. These claimed constitutional infringements are also pressed as a basis for finding that appellees’ rights of “fundamental importance” have been burdened, thus requiring this Court to examine appellees’ equal protection claims under a heightened standard of review. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383 (1978). Since we conclude that the statute does not infringe either the associational or expressive rights of appellees, we must reject both parts of this analysis.
A
The challenge to the statute based on the associational rights asserted by appellees is foreclosed by the reasoning this Court adopted in Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U. S. 635 (1986). There we considered a constitutional challenge to the definition of “household” in the Food Stamp Act, 7 U. S. C. § 2012(i), which treats parents, siblings, and children who live together, but not more distant relatives or unrelated persons who do so, as a single household for purposes of defining eligibility for food stamps. Although the challenge in that case was brought solely on equal protection grounds, and not under the First Amendment, the Court was obliged to decide whether the statutory classification should be reviewed under a stricter standard than mere rational-basis review because it “ ‘directly and substantially’ interfere^] with family living arrangements and thereby burden[s] a fundamental right.” 477 U. S., at 638. The Court held that it did not, explaining that the definition of “household” does not “order or prevent any group of persons from dining together. Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of cases it probably has no effect at all. It is exceedingly unlikely that close relatives would choose to live apart simply to increase their allotment of food stamps, for the costs of separate housing would almost certainly exceed the incremental value of the additional stamps.” Ibid.; see also id., at 643 (Brennan, J-., dissenting) (stating that rational-basis review is applicable); ibid. (White, J., dissenting) (same).
The same rationale applies in this case. As was true of the provision at issue in Castillo, it is “exceedingly unlikely” that § 109 will “prevent any group of persons from dining together.” Id., at 638. Even if isolated instances can be found in which a striking individual may have left the other members of the household in order to increase their allotment of food stamps, “in the overwhelming majority of cases [the statute] probably has no effect at all.” Ibid. The statute certainly does not “order” any individuals not to dine together; nor does it in any other way “ ‘directly and substantially’ interfere with family living arrangements.” Ibid.
The statute also does not infringe the associational rights of appellee individuals and their unions. We have recognized that “one of the foundations of our society is the right of individuals to combine with other persons in pursuit of a common goal by lawful means,” NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 933 (1982), and our recognition of this right encompasses the combination of individual workers together in order better to assert their lawful rights. See, e. g., Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U. S. 1, 5-6 (1964). But in this case, the statute at issue does not “‘directly and substantially’ interfere” with appellees’ ability to associate for this purpose. Lyng, supra, at 638. It does not “order” appellees not to associate together for the purpose of conducting a strike, or for any other purpose, and it does not “prevent” them from associating together or burden their ability to do so in any significant manner. As we have just stated with respect to the effect of this statute on an individual’s decision to remain in or to leave his or her household, it seems “exceedingly unlikely” that this statute will prevent individuals from continuing to associate together in unions to promote their lawful objectives. 477 U. S., at 638.
Prior cases indicate that § 109 has no unconstitutional impact on the right of individuals to associate for various purposes. Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U. S. 525, 530-531 (1949), for example, held that where a State forbids employers to restrict employment to members of a union, enforcement of that state policy does not abridge the associational rights of unions or their members, despite their claim that a closed shop “is ‘indispensable to the right of self-organization and the association of workers into unions.’ ” Similarly, in Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U. S. 537, 548 (1987), we held that requiring Rotary Clubs to admit women “does not require the clubs to abandon or alter” any of their activities or their basic goals and therefore did not abridge the members’ associational rights. Both of those cases upheld state laws that exerted a much more direct and substantial threat to associational freedoms than the statute at issue here.
Any impact on associational rights in this case results from the Government’s refusal to extend food stamp benefits to those on strike, who are now without their wage income. Denying such benefits makes it harder for strikers to maintain themselves and their families during the strike and exerts pressure on them to abandon their union. Strikers and their union would be much better off if food stamps were available, but the strikers’ right of association does not require the Government to furnish funds to maximize the exercise „of that right. “We have held in several contexts [including the First Amendment] that a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.” Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U. S. 540, 549 (1983). Exercising the right to strike inevitably risks economic hardship, but we are not inclined to hold that the right of association requires the Government to minimize that result by qualifying the striker for food stamps.
In Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U. S. 471 (1977), we upheld a statute that denied unemployment compensation benefits to workers who are thrown out of work as a result of a labor dispute other than a lockout, saying that the case “does not involve any discernible fundamental interest.” Id., at 489. Although the complaining worker there was a nonstriking employee of a parent company that found it necessary to close because its subsidiary was on strike, it is clear enough that the same result would have obtained had the striking employees themselves applied for compensation.
B
For the same reasons, we cannot agree that § 109 abridges appellees’ right to express themselves about union matters free of coercion by the Government. Appellees rely on Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209 (1977). But we do not read either Abood or the First Amendment as providing support for this claim. In Abood, the challenged state law required certain employees to pay a fee to their representative union. We ruled that this law violated the First Amendment insofar as it allowed those funds to be used to promote political and ideological purposes with which the employees disagreed and to which they objected, because by its terms the employees were “compelled to make . . . contributions for political purposes.” Id., at 234. We based this conclusion on our observation that “at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.” Id., at 234-235. By contrast, the statute challenged in this case requires no exaction from any individual; it does not “coerce” belief; and it does not require appellees to participate in political activities or support political views with which they disagree. It merely declines to extend additional food stamp assistance to striking individuals simply because the decision to strike inevitably leads to a decline in their income. And this Court has explicitly stated that even where the Constitution prohibits coercive governmental interference with specific individual rights, it “‘does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.’” Regan, supra, at 550, quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 318 (1980).
Ill
Because the statute challenged here has no substantial impact on any fundamental interest and does not “affect with particularity any protected class,” Hodory, supra, at 489, we confine our consideration to whether the statutory classification “is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.” Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 533 (1973). We have stressed that this standard of review is typically quite deferential; legislative classifications are “presumed to be valid,” Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 314 (1976), largely for the reason that “the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one.” Ibid.; see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970).
Appellant submits that this statute serves three objectives. Most obvious, given its source in OBRA, is to cut federal expenditures. Second, the limited funds available were to be used when the need was likely to be greatest, an approach which Congress thought did not justify food stamps for strikers. Third was the concern that the food stamp program was being used to provide one-sided support for labor strikes; the Senate Report indicated that the amendment was intended to remove the basis for that perception and criticism. S. Rep., at 62.
We have little trouble in concluding that § 109 is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of avoiding undue favoritism to one side or the other in private labor disputes. The Senate Report declared: “Public policy demands an end to the food stamp subsidization of all strikers who become eligible for the program solely through the temporary loss of income during a strike. Union strike funds should be responsible for providing support and benefits to strikers during labor-management disputes.” Ibid. It was no part of the purposes of the Food Stamp Act to establish a program that would serve as a weapon in labor disputes; the Act was passed to alleviate hunger and malnutrition and to strengthen the agricultural economy. 7 U. S. C. § 2011. The Senate Report stated that “allowing strikers to be eligible for food stamps has damaged the program’s public integrity” and thus endangers these other goals served by the program. S. Rep., at 62. Congress acted in response to these problems.
It would be difficult to deny that this statute works at least some discrimination against strikers and their households. For the duration of the strike, those households cannot increase their allotment of food stamps even though the loss of income occasioned by the strike may well be enough to qualify them for food stamps or to increase their allotment if the fact of the strike itself were ignored. Yet Congress was in a difficult position when it sought to address the problems it had identified. Because a striking individual faces an immediate and often total drop in income during a strike, a single controversy pitting an employer against its employees can lead to a large number of claims for food stamps for as long as the controversy endures. It is the disbursement of food stamps in response to such a controversy that constitutes the source of the concern, and of the dangers to the program, that Congress believed it was important to remedy. We are not free in this instance to reject Congress’ views about “what constitutes wise economic or social policy.” Dandridge, supra, at 486.
It is true that in terms of the scope and extent of their ineligibility for food stamps, § 109 is harder on strikers than on “voluntary quitters.” See 648 F. Supp., at 1253-1254 (Appendix A); compare 7 CFR § 273.1(g) (1987) with id., § 273.7(n). But the concern about neutrality in labor disputes does not arise with respect to those who, for one reason or another, simply quit their jobs. As we have stated in a related context, even if the statute “provides only ‘rough justice,’ its treatment... is far from irrational.” Hodory, 431 U. S., at 491. Congress need not draw a statutory classification to the satisfaction of the most sharp-eyed observers in order to meet the limitations that the Constitution imposes in this setting. And we are not authorized to ignore Congress’ considered efforts to avoid favoritism in labor disputes, which are evidenced also by the two significant provisos contained in the statute. The first proviso preserves eligibility for the program of any household that was eligible to receive stamps “immediately prior to such strike.” 7 U. S. C. § 2015(d)(3). The second proviso makes clear that the statutory ineligibility for food stamps does not apply “to any household that does not contain a member on strike, if any of its members refuses to accept employment at a plant or site because of a strike or lockout.” Ibid. In light of all this, the statute is rationally related to the stated objective of maintaining neutrality in private labor disputes.
In view of the foregoing, we need not determine whether either of the other two proffered justifications for § 109 would alone suffice. But it is relevant to note that protecting the fiscal integrity of Government programs, and of the Government as a whole, “is a legitimate concern of the State.” Hodory, supra, at 493. This does not mean that Congress can pursue the objective of saving money by discriminating against individuals or groups. But our review of distinctions that Congress draws in order to make allocations from a finite pool of resources must be deferential, for the discretion about how best to spend money to improve the general welfare is lodged in Congress rather than the courts. Bowen v. Owens, 476 U. S. 340, 345 (1986). “Fiscal considerations may compel certain difficult choices in order to improve the protection afforded to the entire benefited class.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S., at 355 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In OBRA Congress had already found it necessary to restrict eligibility in the food stamp program and to reduce the amount of deductions that were allowed to recipients. Rather than undertaking further budget cuts in these or other areas, and in order to avoid favoritism in labor disputes, Congress judged that it would do better to pass this statute along with its provisos. The Constitution does not permit us to disturb that judgment in this case.
Appellees contend and the District Court held that the legislative classification is irrational because of the “critical” fact that it “impermissibly strikes at the striker through his family.” 648 F. Supp., at 1240. This, however, is nothing more than a description of how the food stamp program operates as a general matter, a fact that was acknowledged by the District Court. Ibid. Whenever an individual takes any action that hampers his or her ability to meet the program’s eligibility requirements, such as quitting a job or failing to comply with the work-registration requirements, the entire household suffers accordingly. We have never questioned the constitutionality of the entire Act on this basis, and we just recently upheld the validity of the Act’s definition of “household” even though that definition embodies the basic fact that the Act determines benefits “on a ‘household’ rather than an individual basis.” Lyng, 477 U. S., at 636. That aspect of the program does not violate the Constitution any more so today.
The decision of the District Court is therefore
Reversed.
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Included were such fundamental changes as redefining the requirements to constitute a family unit, reducing the gross income eligibility standard (except for the elderly and the disabled), and adjusting the levels of deductions that are allowed to recipients. §§ 101, 104(a), 105, 106, 115. The Committee Reports estimated that these changes in the food stamp program would save several billion dollars in fiscal years 1982, 1983, and 1984. H. R. Rep. No. 97-158, pp. 11-13 (1981) (hereafter H. R. Rep.); S. Rep. No. 97-139, pp. 52-70 (1981) (hereafter S. Rep.).
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a household shall not participate in the food stamp program at any time that any member of the household, not exempt from the work registration requirements ... is on strike as defined in section 142(2) of title 29, because of a labor dispute (other than a lockout) as defined in section 152(9) of title 29: Provided, That a household shall not lose its eligibility to participate in the food stamp program as a result of one of its members going on strike if the household was eligible for food stamps immediately prior to such strike, however, such household shall not receive an increased allotment as the result of a decrease in the income of the striking member or members of the household: Provided further, That such ineligibility shall not apply to any household that does not contain a member on strike, if any of its members refuses to accept employment at a plant or site because of a strike or lockout.” OBRA, § 109, 95 Stat. 361, 7 U. S. C. § 2015(d)(3).
The District Court did not find that any individuals had left their households in order to increase their allotment of food stamps. It found instead only that some individuals “have been told by state agencies or have learned that they can avoid household disqualification by having the striker leave the household.” 648 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (DC 1986). Appellees note that one striker’s spouse and children left the household after he was denied food stamps, and that the couple was subsequently divorced. Affidavit of Mark Dyer, ¶¶ 4-8, App. 25-26; Deposition of Mark Dyer,.id, at 82-83.
The District Court found that one individual quit his job and abandoned his union membership in order to receive food stamps, and another individual left a picket line to seek other work and lost his union membership. 648 F. Supp., at 1237. Some other strikers have voted to ratify or accept collective-bargaining agreements that were less favorable than they wished, motivated by lack of wages as a result of being out of work and, to a lesser degree, lack of food stamps. Ibid.
It is clear from previous decisions that associational rights “are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference,” Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 (1960), and that these rights can be abridged even by government actions that do not directly restrict individuals’ ability to associate freely. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 183 (1972). But none of these cases indicates that the statute challenged here “will affect in any significant way the existing members’ ability to carry out their various purposes.” Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U. S., at 548. The Court has found, for example, that compulsory disclosure of the membership lists of an organization, which led to harassment, physical threats, and economic reprisals against those individuals, worked “a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner’s members of their right to freedom of association.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 462 (1958). We also have held that the First Amendment “restricts the ability of the State to impose liability on an individual solely because of his association with another” when the individual lacks the specific intent to further any illegal aims that may be promoted by other members of a group. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 919-920 (1982). The facts of this case, however, do not demonstrate any “significant” interference with appellees’ associational rights of the magnitude found in decisions like Patterson and Claiborne Hardware. Exposing the members of an association to physical and economic reprisals or to civil liability merely because of their membership in that group poses a much greater danger to the exercise of associational freedoms than does the withdrawal of a government benefit based not on membership in an organization but merely for the duration of one activity that may be undertaken by that organization.
The decision in Hodory was based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not on the First Amendment, but our application of rational-basis review to the constitutional claim raised in that case indicated that fundamental rights guaranteed by the First Amendment were not implicated there.
Appellees rely heavily on Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), in which we held that a State violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when it denied unemployment benefits to a woman whose religious beliefs did not allow her to work on Saturday. That decision, however, “was decided in the significantly different context of a constitutionally imposed ‘governmental obligation of neutrality’ originating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.” Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 475, n. 8 (1977). The reasoning of Sherbert has not been applied in other contexts, and is inapposite here as shown by our decision in Hodory, which found no fundamental rights to be infringed by a State’s denial of unemployment benefits to a man who was unable to work as a result of a labor dispute.
We reject the proposition that strikers as a class are entitled to special treatment under the Equal Protection Clause. City of Charlotte v. Firefighters, 426 U. S. 283, 286 (1976); Hodory, 431 U. S., at 489. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (1973), does not counsel otherwise. There we upheld an equal protection, challenge to a provision of the Food Stamp Act and concluded that “a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” Id., at 534 (emphasis in original). This statement is merely an application of the usual rational-basis test: if a statute is not rationally related to any legitimate governmental objective, it cannot be saved from constitutional challenge by a defense that relates it to an illegitimate governmental interest. Accordingly, in Moreno itself we examined the challenged provision under the rational-basis standard of review. Id., at 533.
For example, one who voluntarily quits a job is disqualified for food stamps for 90 days. Thereafter, he is eligible as long as he registers for work and cannot find a job. 7 CFR § 273.7(n)(1)(v) (1987). The striker, unless he quits his job, is disqualified for as long as he is on strike. § 273.1(g).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In both No. 28 and No. 29, the issue is whether, under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, one year of reemployment of a veteran by his preservice employer terminated that veteran’s right to the seniority to which he was entitled by virtue of that Act’s treatment of him as though he had remained continuously in his civilian employment. For the reasons hereinafter stated, and pursuant to our previous decisions, our answer is “No.” In No. 29, there is the further question whether, after the expiration of such year, a United States District Court could entertain a complaint filed by the veteran to enforce his right to such seniority. Our answer is “Yes.”
In each case, a veteran sought, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, a declaratory judgment and an order restoring him to the seniority which he claimed he would have had if he had remained continuously in his civilian employment. In No. 28, Oakley, the petitioner, alleged that when he was inducted into the Armed Forces on May 7, 1944, he was employed as a locomotive machinist at Loyall, Kentucky, by the respondent, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company; that, on May 22,1946, he was honorably discharged from the Armed Forces; that, on July 17, 1946, he was reemployed by the respondent as a locomotive machinist with seniority from that date; that, on July 1, 1945, while he was with the Armed Forces, the respondent’s Loyall Shop was transferred to Corbin, Kentucky; “that had he not been in the Armed Forces he would have been transferred to the Corbin Shop with seniority from July 1, 1945, . . .”; and that, because of the respondent’s failure to credit him with seniority from the earlier date, he has been subjected to certain disadvantages in working hours and to an increased possibility of being laid off from his employment. He filed his complaint, April 14, 1947, under § 8 (e) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 891, as reenacted, 60 Stat. 341, 50 U. S. C. App. § 308 (e). The court, on its own motion, assigned the case for argument “upon the question whether, under the opinion of the Supreme Court in The Trailmobile Company, et al., v. Whirls (No. 85, April 14, 1947), the cause has been rendered moot by the expiration of the statutory year to which Section 8 (c) of the Selective Training and Service Act limited plaintiff’s right to any special or preferential standing in respect to restored seniority.” Thereupon, the collective bargaining agent of the machinist employees of the respondent, which had intervened as a defendant, moved to dismiss the cause on the ground that more than one year had elapsed since the date of the petitioner’s restoration to his employment. This motion is here considered upon the basis of the facts pleaded in the complaint.
In No. 29, Haynes, the petitioner, alleged that, when he enlisted in the Armed Forces on February 1, 1942, he was employed as a machinist helper at Somerset, Kentucky, by the respondent, Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Company (originally sued as the Southern Railway System); that, on October 31, 1945, he was honorably discharged from the Armed Forces; that, on November 16, 1945, he was reemployed by the respondent as a machinist helper, with seniority from that date; “that during his service in the Armed Forces the defendant company promoted six helper machinists to helper apprentices, and that these six men were junior in seniority to himself, and that had he not entered the Armed Forces as above mentioned he would have been promoted to helper apprentice and would have been given the pay as such, . . .”; and that such rate of pay exceeded that of the petitioner during his reemployment. He filed his complaint, February 14, 1947, asking for restoration to his claimed status and for the additional compensation to which that status would have entitled him. The respondent answered, but certain intervening defendants, following a procedure similar to that in No. 28, filed a motion to dismiss the cause for the reasons there stated.
The District Court heard the motions together and dismissed both actions. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 170 F. 2d 1008; 171 F. 2d 128. We granted certiorari, 336 U. S. 943, because of the close relation of these dismissals to our decisions in Fishgold v. Sullivan Corp., 328 U. S. 275, and Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U. S. 40.
The court below recognized that § 8 (c) granted to the respective veterans special statutory protection against discharge without cause and against loss of certain benefits during the first year of their reemployment. That court, however, concluded also that the expiration of that year not only terminated the veteran’s right to such special statutory protection, but likewise automatically terminated his right to the seniority in the restored position which he would have had if he had remained continuously in his civilian employment. That additional conclusion is not justified by the opinions of this Court or by the terms of the Act. We reserved the point in the Trailmobile case, supra:
“We find it unnecessary therefore to pass upon petitioners’ position in this case, namely, that all protection afforded by virtue of § 8 (c) terminates with the ending of the specified year. We hold only that so much of it ends then as would give the reemployed veteran a preferred standing over employees not veterans having identical seniority rights as of the time of his restoration. We expressly reserve decision upon whether the statutory security extends beyond the one-year period to secure the reemployed veteran against impairment in any respect of equality with such a fellow worker.” (At p. 60.)
In the Fishgold case, we did not deal with the effect, if any, upon a veteran’s seniority, of the expiration of his first year of reemployment. We there dealt with the initial terms of his restored position. We stated, in effect, that an honorably discharged veteran, covered by the statute, was entitled by the Act to be restored not to a position which would be the precise equivalent of that which he had left when he joined the Armed Forces, but rather to a position which, on the moving escalator of terms and conditions affecting that particular employment, would be comparable to the position which he would have held if he had remained continuously in his civilian employment. Fishgold v. Sullivan Corp., 328 U. S. 275, 284—285; see also, Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521, 526. In the Trailmobile case, supra, at pages 56 and 60, we dealt with the one year of special statutory protection given to the veteran in his restored position. We said, in effect, that this provision protected him not only from the total loss of that position by “discharge” from it “without cause,” but that it also protected him, for one year, against the loss of certain other benefits incidental to his restored position.
The instant cases take us one step further. In them we hold that the expiration of the year did not terminate the veteran’s right to the seniority to which he was entitled by virtue of the Act’s treatment of him as though he had remained continuously in his civilian employment; nor did it open the door to discrimination against him, as a veteran. Section 8 (c) of the Act requires that the veteran shall be restored to his position “without loss of seniority, . . . .” He therefore assumes, upon his reemployment, the seniority he would have had if he had remained in his civilian employment. His seniority status secured by this statutory wording continues beyond the first year of his reemployment, subject to the advantages and limitations applicable to the other employees.
In the instant cases, the respective complaints stated, in effect, that the complainants therein had not been restored to the places to which they were entitled on the escalators of their respective civilian employments. In No. 28, the allegation was that the petitioner was entitled, by virtue of the status he would have enjoyed had he remained continuously in his civilian employment, to the seniority of a locomotive machinist at Corbin from July 1, 1945, rather than from July 17, 1946. If he were entitled to the higher rating upon his reemployment, the Act did not deprive him of that rating merely by virtue of the expiration of his first year of reemployment. The motion to dismiss this action because of the expiration of that year, accordingly, should have been denied.
In No. 29, we reach the same result. That result is not affected by the failure of the veteran, in this case, to file his complaint until nearly three months after the expiration of his first year of reemployment. The Act did not establish a one-year statute of limitations upon the assertion of the veteran’s initial rights of reemployment. It added special statutory protection, for one year, against certain types of discharges or demotions that might rob the veteran’s reemployment of its substance, but the expiration of that year did not terminate the right of the veteran to the seniority to which he was, in the first instance, entitled by virtue of the Act’s treatment of him as though he had remained continuously in his civilian employment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in each case is therefore reversed and the respective causes are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Jackson concurs in the result.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
See especially, § 8 (a), (b), (c) and (e), 54 Stat. 890, as amended, 56 Stat. 724, 58 Stat. 798, 60 Stat. 341, 50 U. S. C. App. § 308 (a), (b), (c) and (e). See also, Fishgold v. Sullivan Corp., 328 U. S. 275, 278, 280, 281, for reprints of the material portions of the Act.
The respondent previously had answered, filed a request for admissions under Rule 36, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, received petitioner’s admissions, and moved for summary judgment on the pleadings, the admissions, and an affidavit filed in support of the motion. In the meantime, System Federation No. 91 of the Railway Employes’ Department of the American Federation of Labor, acting on its own behalf and as the collective bargaining agent of respondent’s machinist employees, was permitted to intervene and to answer. It then filed the motion to dismiss the cause which was acted upon by the court. Accordingly, neither the answers nor the motion for summary judgment are before us, and we have considered the case on the petitioner’s allegations in his complaint.
In No. 28, the court said:
“This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of the intervening defendants to dismiss the cause on the ground that the question presented has become moot, because more than one year has elapsed since the date of the plaintiffs restoration to employment with the defendant, L. & N. Railroad Company, and the Court being advised, it is ordered and adjudged that said motion be, and the same is hereby, sustained, and this action is now dismissed as moot, without cost to either the plaintiff, or the defendant, or the intervening defendants.”
In No. 29, the entry was the same except for the name of the defendant railway.
“Sec. 8. . . .
“(c) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) shall be considered as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of training and service in the land or naval forces, shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time such person was inducted into such forces, and shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration.” 54 Stat. 890, as reenacted, 60 Stat. 341, 50 U. S. C. App. § 308 (c).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The respondent consented to the entry by the National Labor Relations Board of an order directing it to cease and desist from certain practices as regards membership of its employees in a named labor organization “or any other labor organization of its employees.” The respondent further waived all defenses to the entry by the Court of Appeals of a decree enforcing said order. The Court of Appeals, sua sponte, struck the words “or any other labor organization of its employees” wherever they appeared in the Board’s order. 281 F. 2d 797. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded with directions that a judgment be entered which affirms and enforces the Board order. Labor Board v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., ante, p. 318.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue here is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the vacation of respondent’s Ohio murder conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which granted respondent’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Lonberger v. Jago, 635 F. 2d 1189 (1980), and Lonberger v. Jago, 651 F. 2d 447 (1981), held that it did. The Court of Appeals held that respondent’s plea of guilty to a previous Illinois felony charge, offered and admitted into evidence at his Ohio murder trial, was invalid under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969). It went on to hold that the admission into evidence of the Illinois conviction at the Ohio trial rendered respondent’s ensuing conviction in that proceeding unconstitutional under this Court’s decision in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967). The State claims that the Court of Appeals exceeded its authority, under our holding in Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 (1981), in concluding that the prior Illinois conviction was invalid. It also contends that even if the Court of Appeals were warranted in so concluding, the admission of that conviction at the Ohio murder trial did not render the Ohio conviction constitutionally infirm. We granted certiorari to consider, inter alia, the interrelationship between Boykin v. Alabama, supra, and Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S. 637 (1976).
I
There is apparently no dispute with respect to the operative facts which led to respondent’s indictment and conviction for the murder of Charita Lanier in Toledo, Ohio, on the evening of January 29, 1975. Lanier was brutally murdered in the living room of her home during that evening; blood stains led from the living room to the kitchen, where the victim’s partially clothed body was found in a freezer. An autopsy revealed that the victim bled to death after her throat had been slashed, and a bent, blood-stained knife found near the scene of the crime was identified as the murder weapon. The victim’s clothing was torn and sperm was detected in her vaginal canal.
The morning after the murder, the victim’s children told police that respondent, Robert Lonberger, had been at their home the previous evening. After the children had been sent to their upstairs bedroom, they heard their mother scream. When there was no response to his questions, the older child left his bedroom and went downstairs. The lights were out and when the child attempted to turn them on respondent grabbed his hand; he ordered the child back to bed. A pack of cigarettes of respondent’s brand was found in the house and blood-stained articles of clothing were discovered in his possession.
Respondent was indicted by a state grand jury on two counts of “aggravated murder.” The first count charged that respondent had murdered Lanier with “prior calculation and design,” in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01(A) (1975). The second count charged respondent with murder while committing rape, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01(B) (1975). Both counts of aggravated murder included a “specification,” described below, in which the prosecution alleged that respondent previously had been convicted of an “offense of which the gist was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(A)(5) (1975).
Respondent pleaded not guilty to the charges, and the State sought at trial to prove the specification of prior conviction for attempt to kill by introducing the record of a conviction of respondent in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill. It is the introduction of this conviction into evidence in the Ohio murder trial which has been the focus of constitutional objection on the part of respondent since that time, and upon which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit based its conclusion that respondent's conviction was constitutionally infirm. Because of its central role in this litigation, we find it desirable to describe in some detail the evidence before the Ohio court relating to this prior conviction.
It is fair to say that from the time the State first offered the record of the Illinois conviction until the present time, the opposing parties have never agreed as to the historical facts surrounding the acceptance of respondent’s plea of guilty to an indictment returned by a grand jury in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., some three years before he was tried on the Ohio murder charge. The State offered in evidence at the Ohio trial a copy of the grand jury indictment forming the basis for the Illinois charge, a certified copy of an Illinois record called a “conviction statement,” and the transcript of a hearing in the Circuit Court of Cook County occurring at the time respondent pleaded guilty.
These documents show that respondent was indicted by the Cook County grand jury in May 1971 on four counts: aggravated battery against Dorothy Maxwell, aggravated battery with a deadly weapon against Dorothy Maxwell, intentionally and knowingly attempting to kill Dorothy Maxwell by cutting her with a knife, and aggravated battery against Wendtian Maxwell with a deadly weapon. The “conviction statement,” prepared and authenticated by the Circuit Court of Cook County, recited in pertinent part that respondent was indicted for “AGGRAVATED BATTERY, ETC.,” that on March 10, 1972, respondent withdrew an earlier plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty, and that after the court “fully explained to the Defendant. . . before the entry of said PLEA OF GUILTY, the consequences of entering such PLEA OF GUILTY, the said Defendant still persisted in his PLEA OF GUILTY in manner and form as charged in the indictment in this cause.” App. 5. The third record offered in evidence in the Ohio proceedings is the transcript of the colloquy at the time of sentencing in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., id., at 6-15. It contains the following relevant exchanges at a time when the sentencing judge, respondent, respondent’s attorney, and the prosecuting attorney were shown to be present in open court:
“THE COURT: In other words, you are pleading guilty, that you did on August 25, 1968, commit the offense of aggravated battery on one Dorothy Maxwell, and that you did on the same date attempt on Dorothy Maxwell, with a knife, is that correct?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: And you did on the same date commit the offense of aggravated battery on one Wendtian Maxwell, is that correct?
“That is what you are pleading to, sir?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: And understand by pleading guilty to this indictment you are waiving your right to a trial by this Court or trial by this Court and a jury?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: Understand by pleading guilty I could sentence you from one to ten on the aggravated battery, and attempt one to twenty. So, I could sentence you to the penitentiary for a maximum of from one to forty years.
“Understand that?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: What do you wish to tell me insofar as stipulation and as far as facts concerned?
“MR. RANDALL [prosecuting attorney]: Let it be stipulated by and between the parties, Indictment 71-1554, it is both sufficient in law and in fact to sustain the charges contained therein, to sustain a finding of guilty on the charges involving Robert Lonberger. . . .
“MR. XINOS [respondent’s attorney]: So stipulated.”
Before respondent’s trial on the aggravated murder charges, the Ohio trial court conducted a hearing in limine to determine whether respondent’s guilty plea to the Illinois attempted murder charge was voluntary. The Illinois records were offered, and respondent took the stand and submitted himself to direct and cross-examination primarily as to his recollection of the Illinois proceedings which had taken place three years earlier. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial court made the following findings:
“The Court finds on the evidence presented that the defendant is an intelligent individual, well experienced in the criminal processes and well represented at all stages of the proceedings by competent and capable counsel in Illinois. On review of the certified copy of the Illinois proceedings and a transcript of the plea of guilty, the Court finds that every effort was taken to safeguard and to protect the constitutional rights of the defendant. Therefore, the Court finds that the defendant intelligently and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty in the Illinois court.” Id., at 99-100.
Evidence of respondent’s Illinois conviction was admitted at his Ohio trial, subject to an instruction that it be considered only in connection with the specification, and not as probative of guilt on the underlying murder count. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the second count of aggravated murder, one including the specification of the prior charge of attempted murder; after a sentencing hearing in accordance with Ohio law, the trial court imposed a sentence of death.
Respondent’s appeal to the Ohio Court of Appeals was partially successful; that court found as a matter of state law that the jury’s finding that respondent had not only murdered Charita Lanier, but raped her as well, did not satisfy the Ohio rule relating to proof of crime by circumstantial evidence. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-38. It did uphold the jury finding that respondent was guilty of the murder of Lanier, and that the specification based on the prior Illinois conviction was adequately proved. It reversed the judgment imposing a death penalty, and directed imposition of a sentence based solely on the conviction of murder. With respect to the admissibility and evidence of the prior Illinois conviction, the Ohio Court of Appeals said:
“The transcript from the Cook County Circuit Court proceedings at which appellant changed his plea to guilty indicated that he was represented by competent counsel. When questioned by the court, appellant answered affirmatively that he was pleading guilty to ‘the offense of aggravated battery on one Dorothy Maxwell, ... attempt on Dorothy Maxwell, with a knife . . . [and] the offense of aggravated battery on Wendtian Maxwell. . . .’ Appellant further affirmed that he understood that he was waiving his right to trial and to confront witnesses, that he understood the penalties that could be imposed, that he was motivated to plead guilty by an offer of a reduced sentence, and that he had not otherwise been threatened or promised anything. Through his counsel, appellant stipulated that there were sufficient facts to sustain the charges contained in the indictment. We find from the record of this proceeding and from the record of the pre-trial hearing in the instant case, that the trial court did not err in ruling that appellant’s guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly made and that the evidence of the prior conviction should be submitted to the jury.” Id., at A-42.
I — I t-H
It was the record of these proceedings in the Ohio state courts that formed the basis of respondent’s application for federal habeas in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The District Court denied relief, finding that “from a review of the record, this Court is satisfied that an ordinary person would have understood the nature of the charges to which petitioner was pleading guilty.” Id., at A-31. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court, and ordered that a writ of habeas corpus issue. Lonberger v. Jago, 635 F. 2d 1189 (1980). We granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded for reconsideration in the light of Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 (1981). Marshall v. Lonberger, 451 U. S. 902 (1981). On remand the Court of Appeals adhered to its previous decision. Lonberger v. Jago, 651F. 2d 447 (1981). We again granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 1141 (1982), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, referring to its earlier opinion, stated:
“The basis for our judgment was that Lonberger’s 1972 guilty plea to attempted murder was not demonstrably an intelligent one, and was therefore invalid under federal constitutional standards. This conclusion is directly contrary to the conclusions of both of the Ohio courts that considered the question of the validity of Lonberger’s 1972 plea. We now expressly hold that these factual determinations by the Ohio courts are not fairly supported by the records that were before them. This we are empowered to do by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(8). Sumner v. Mata, supra, requires that federal courts state their rationales for exercise of this power.
“The basis for our disagreement with the factual determinations of the state courts can be briefly stated. The question of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right is governed by federal standards. Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U. S. at 243 .... A guilty plea, which works as a waiver of numerous constitutional rights, cannot be truly voluntary if the defendant ‘has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.’ Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S. 637, 645 n. 13 . . . (1976). Accord, Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U. S. 329, 334 . ... (1941).
“The transcript of Lonberger’s 1972 plea is inadequate to show that Lonberger was aware that he was pleading guilty to a charge of attempted murder.” 651 F. 2d, at 449 (footnote omitted).
We entirely agree with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that the governing standard as to whether a plea of guilty is voluntary for purposes of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law, Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S. 637 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969), and not a question of fact subject to the requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). But the questions of historical fact which have dogged this case from its inception — what the Illinois records show with respect to respondent’s 1972 guilty plea, what other inferences regarding those historical facts the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit could properly draw, and related questions — are obviously questions of “fact” governed by the provisions of § 2254(d).
Section 2254(d) establishes a presumption of correctness for “a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia. ...” One of the eight exceptions to this presumption of correctness, and the one relied upon by the Court of Appeals in this case, is where the federal habeas court, reviewing the state-court record offered to support the factual finding, “on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(8).
In its treatment of the state courts’ factual findings, the Court of Appeals failed in at least one major respect to accord those determinations the “high measure of deference,” Sumner v. Mata, supra, to which they are entitled. This deference requires that a federal habeas court more than simply disagree with the state court before rejecting its factual determinations. Instead, it must conclude that the state court’s findings lacked even “fair support” in the record. The Court of Appeals’ treatment of the issue of respondent’s credibility failed to satisfy this standard. Following a recital of the findings of the Ohio trial court, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit states that “[n]o explicit findings were made concerning Lonberger’s credibility as a witness.” 651 F. 2d, at 448. Likewise, the Court of Appeals wrote:
“At the pretrial hearing, Lonberger testified that he ‘copped out to aggravated battery’ in 1972, but had no knowledge of other charges. The Ohio prosecutors attempted to discredit this testimony by introducing copies of the 1972 indictment charging Lonberger with ‘the offense of attempt.’ Lonberger denied that he had ever seen or read this indictment. The prosecutors sought to imply by their questioning of Lonberger that he must have heard of the ‘attempt’ charge either at his arraignment or in conversation with his attorneys. Lonberger testified that he had not, and the state produced no contrary evidence.” Id., at 449-450 (footnote omitted).
Finally, the Court of Appeals explicitly credited Lonberger’s testimony in a footnote rejecting the State’s reliance on Henderson v. Morgan, supra. 651 F. 2d, at 450, n. 3.
We are unsure whether the Court of Appeals’ reassessment of the effect of respondent’s testimony at the Ohio state trial court hearing was undertaken because of the failure of the trial court to make express findings as to respondent’s credibility, or whether the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit felt that it should assess for itself the weight that such evidence should have been accorded by the state trial court. In either event, we hold that it erroneously applied the “fairly supported by the record” standard enunciated in 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).
In LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U. S. 690 (1973), we dealt with a state-court hearing in which the trial judge likewise failed to make express findings as to the defendant’s credibility. We held that because it was clear under the applicable federal law that the trial court would have granted the relief sought by the defendant had it believed the defendant’s testimony, its failure to grant relief was tantamount to an express finding against the credibility of the defendant. We think the same is true in the present case. The assumption referred to in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 314-315 (1963), quoted in LaVallee v. Delle Rose, supra, at 694, “that the state trier of fact applied correct standards of federal law to the facts ...” leads inevitably to a similar conclusion here. Had the Ohio trial court credited respondent’s insistence that he had only been advised of or been aware of the battery charge at the time he pleaded guilty in Illinois, the Ohio trial court would have surely refused to allow the record of the Illinois conviction in evidence to prove the specification of attempted murder. The trial court’s ruling allowing the record of conviction to be admitted in evidence in support of the specification is tantamount to a refusal to believe the testimony of respondent.
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on respondent’s testimony, discussed above, and the fact that “the state produced no contrary evidence,” are quite wide of the mark for purposes of deciding whether factual findings are fairly supported by the record. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but not by them. In United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 343 U. S. 326 (1952), commenting on the deference which this Court gave to the findings of a District Court on direct appeal from a judgment in a bench trial, we stated:
“As was aptly stated by the New York Court of Appeals, although in a case of a rather different substantive nature: ‘Face to face with living witnesses the original trier of the facts holds a position of advantage from which appellate judges are excluded. In doubtful cases the exercise of his power of observation often proves the most accurate method of ascertaining the truth. . . . How can we say the judge is wrong? We never saw the witnesses. ... To the sophistication and sagacity of the trial judge the law confides the duty of appraisal. ’ Boyd v. Boyd, 252 N. Y. 422, 429, 169 N. E. 632, 634.” Id., at 339.
We greatly doubt that Congress, when it used the language “fairly supported by the record” considered “as a whole” intended to authorize broader federal review of state-court credibility determinations than are authorized in appeals within the federal system itself. While disbelief of respondent’s testimony may not form the basis for any affirmative findings by the state trial court on issues with respect to which the State bore the burden of proof, it certainly negates any inferences favorable to respondent such as those drawn by the Court of Appeals, based on his testimony before the Ohio trial court.
Thus, the factual conclusions which the federal habeas courts were bound to respect in assessing respondent’s constitutional claims were the contents of the Illinois court records, the finding of the Ohio trial court that respondent was “an intelligent individual, well experienced in the criminal processes and well represented at all stages of the proceedings by competent and capable counsel in Illinois,” supra, at 428, and the similar conclusion of the Ohio Court of Appeals, and the inferences fairly deducible from these facts. These records and findings show, with respect to the attempted murder charge, that it was one of the four counts contained in the Cook County indictment returned against respondent. The “conviction certificate” recites that at the time respondent pleaded guilty, he was duly advised by the court of the consequences of pleading guilty, and nonetheless adhered to his plea. The transcript, as appears from its face and as found by the Ohio Court of Appeals, shows that respondent answered affirmatively that he was pleading guilty, inter alia, to the offense of “attempt on Dorothy Maxwell, with a knife . . . .” Respondent’s attorney, in his presence, stipulated that the indictment was “both sufficient in law and in fact to sustain the charges contained therein, to sustain a finding of guilty on the charges involving [respondent].” Ibid. There is perhaps an arguable conflict between the recitation of the “conviction certificate” and the transcript by reason of the latter’s omission of the word “murder” after the word “attempt” in the colloquy between respondent and the court. For our purposes we assume that the transcript version, which is more favorable to respondent, was accurate.
It is well established that a plea of guilty cannot be voluntary in the sense that it constitutes an intelligent admission that the accused committed the offense unless the accused has received “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.” Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U. S. 329, 334 (1941), quoted in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S., at 645. In Henderson v. Morgan, we went on to make the following observations:
“Normally the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused. Moreover, even without such an express representation, it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.” Id., at 647.
Applying this standard to the factual determinations arising from the state-court proceedings which were “fairly supported by the record” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), we disagree with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in its conclusion that respondent’s plea to the Illinois charge was not “voluntary” in the constitutional meaning of that term. We think that the application of the principles enunciated in Henderson v. Morgan, supra, lead inexorably to the conclusion that the plea was voluntary. We think a person of respondent’s intelligence and experience in the criminal justice system would have understood, from the statements made at the sentencing hearing recorded in the transcript before us, that the presiding judge was inquiring whether the defendant pleaded guilty to offenses charged in the indictment against him. This is evident from the references in the proceeding by the judge to the fact the respondent was “pleading guilty to this indictment” and by respondent’s counsel’s stipulation that the indictment sustained the plea of guilty. Supra, at 427-428. Under Henderson, respondent must be presumed to have been informed, either by his lawyers or at one of the presentencing proceedings, of the charges on which he was indicted. Given this knowledge of the indictment and the fact that the indictment contained no other attempt charges, respondent could only have understood the judge’s reference to “attempt on Dorothy Maxwell, with a knife” as a reference to the indictment’s charge of attempt to kill. It follows, therefore, both that respondent’s argument that his plea of guilty was not made knowingly must fail, and that the admission in the Ohio murder trial of the conviction based on that plea deprived respondent of no federal right. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554 (1967). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Reversed.
Both the first and the second counts of aggravated murder, and the accompanying specifications, were submitted to the jury. No verdict was returned as to the first count or the specification accompanying that charge, and neither is relevant to our decision.
Under the Ohio statute, the death sentence could be imposed only for the crime of aggravated murder, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2929.03 (1975). Even as to aggravated murder, the prosecution was required separately to allege a specification and prove beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance contained in the specification, §2929.03(C). If the jury found the defendant guilty of both aggravated murder and the specification, then the trial judge was required to hold a sentencing hearing where the defendant could show mitigating circumstances, §§2929.03(D) and 2929.04. If no mitigating circumstances were found, the judge was required to impose the death sentence; a mandatory life sentence applied if mitigating circumstances were shown.
The likelihood that the state trial court would have reached such a conclusion is not diminished by the facts before us. The state courts found that respondent was represented by two lawyers who were competent and capable, and the record suggests that one of the two was a nationally respected public defender; either of them might well have informed respondent of the charges contained in the indictment against him. Moreover, respondent appeared in several court proceedings in connection with his attack on Dorothy Maxwell, at any one of which the indictment could have been read to him.
The method by which court records from one State are to be authenticated and proved in the courts of a second State, the weight to be given those records, and the extent to which they may be impeached by later oral testimony, are all matters generally left to the laws of the States. A State “is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).
The Sixth Circuit sought to distinguish Henderson on several grounds, none of which withstands analysis. First, it relied on “Lonberger’s testimony that his lawyers did not discuss the charge of ‘attempt’ with him.” This, however, requires rejection of the state courts’ necessary conclusions as to Lonberger’s testimony, which the federal habeas court was unjustified in doing. Supra, at 433-434. In addition, the Court of Appeals thought that the fact that respondent had changed lawyers following the return of the grand jury indictment somehow made it less likely that the presumption would operate. The mere fact of a change in representation, if it has any probative value, would suggest to us that it was even more likely than usual that one of the two lawyers informed respondent of the contents of the indictment. The Court of Appeals also relied on what it thought was a vague description of the attempt-to-kill offense in the indictment and the sentencing proceedings. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals’ apparent implication that the indictment failed to provide respondent’s counsel with sufficient information to enable them to describe to him the charges he faced: indeed, counsel stipulated that the indictment was “sufficient in law and fact” to sustain the charges against respondent. Finally, the Court of Appeals thought it “questionable whether [the Henderson presumption] is proper in a case ... in which a prior conviction forms an essential element of a later crime.” Whatever may be the case otherwise, there is surely no obstacle to use of the presumption in a case such as this, when the defendant is challenging a conviction which does not have a prior conviction as an element.
In Spencer, which we reaffirm, the Court upheld a conviction despite the introduction at the guilt-determination stage of trial of a defendant’s prior conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement. Central to our decision was the fact that the Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules: “It has never been thought that [decisions under the Due Process Clause] establish this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure.” 385 U. S., at 564. Applying these principles, we observed that the Texas procedural rules permitting introduction of the defendant’s prior conviction did not pose a sufficient danger of unfairness to the defendant to offend the Due Process Clause, in part because such evidence was accompanied by instructions limiting the jury’s use of the conviction to sentence enhancement. This analysis remains persuasive; as recognized in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U. S. 62, 73 (1979) (Rehnquist, j.), the “crucial assumption” underlying the system of trial by jury “is that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge. Were this not so, it would be pointless for a trial court to instruct a jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal conviction because the jury was improperly instructed.” Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979). Spencer also observed that in cases where documentary evidence is used to prove the prior crime, the evidence seldom, if ever, will be so inflammatory or “devastating,” Parker v. Randolph, supra, at 74-75, that the jury will be unable to follow its instructions. See, e. g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968). And, of course, if the jury considers a defendant’s prior conviction only for purposes of sentence enhancement no questions of fairness arise.
Justice Stevens’ dissent appears to rest on a view that the common law regarded the admission of prior convictions as grossly unfair and subject to some sort of blanket prohibition. In fact, the common law was far more ambivalent. See, e. g., Stone, Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 988 (1938). Alongside the general principle that prior convictions are inadmissible, despite their relevance to guilt, 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 194 (3d ed. 1940), the common law developed broad, vaguely defined exceptions — such as proof of intent, identity, malice, motive, and plan — whose application is left largely to the discretion of the trial judge, see Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S., at 560-561. In short, the common law, like our decision in Spencer, implicitly recognized that any unfairness resulting from admitting prior convictions was more often than not balanced by its probative value and permitted the prosecution to introduce such evidence without demanding any particularly strong justification.
Here, as in Spencer, the trial judge gave a careful and sound instruction requiring the jury to consider respondent’s prior conviction only for purposes of the specification. The extent to which the jury can and does consider limiting instructions, or for that matter any instructions, has been fully considered in cases such as Spencer, supra, Bruton, supra, Parker, supra, and Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967). The matter was put to rest for cases such as this by our decision in Spencer, supra, in which the Court quoted the remark of Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S., at 105, that a state rule of law “does not run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at the bar.”
Remarking on the state of the law of evidence with respect to reputation in criminal cases, the Court in Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469, 486 (1948), said:
“We concur in the general opinion of the courts, textwriters and the profession that much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the other. But somehow it has proved a workable even if clumsy system when moderated by discretionary controls in the hands of a wise and strong trial court. To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice.”
If this Court was thus willing to defer to “accumulated judicial experience” at the expense of “abstract logic,” id., at 487, in a case such as Michelson which arose in the federal court system, the Due Process Clause as construed in Spencer surely cannot require a State to do more.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we must determine whether federal legislation providing for controls over the allocation and pricing of petroleum products, passed in response to the oil crisis of the early 1970’s, or the legislation subsequently eliminating those controls, pre-empts gasoline price regulation by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
I
In 1973, Congress passed the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA), Pub. L. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627, 15 U. S. C. § 751 et seq., in reaction to severe market disruptions caused by an embargo on oil exports to the United States. The central provision of the legislation, upon which all the rest depended, was § 4, 15 U. S. C. § 753, which required the President to promulgate regulations governing allocation and pricing of petroleum products. The Act also contained an express pre-emption provision, § 6(b), 15 U. S. C. § 755(b), precluding state and local regulation of allocation and pricing in conflict with a regulation or order under § 4. As originally enacted, the EPAA provided for termination of the President’s regulatory authority early in 1975, but during that year Congress provided for temporary extensions, and then enacted the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), Pub. L. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (codified in scattered Titles and sections of United States Code), which amended the EPAA to provide for gradual decontrol. The EPCA extended the President’s EPAA regulatory obligations for 40 months, and thereafter granted him discretionary regulatory authority until September 30, 1981; on that date, the statute prescribed that “[t]he authority to promulgate and amend any regulation or to issue any o'rder under [the EPAA] shall expire.” § 461, 89 Stat. 955, 15 U. S. C. § 760g.
Before enactment of the EPAA, Puerto Rico had regulated the prices of gasoline and other petroleum products sold in the Commonwealth. The Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs (referred to in this litigation as DACO, apparently the acronym of its Spanish title, Departamento de Asuntos del Consumidor) was charged with regulating these and other commodities, but suspended its regulation of petroleum products when the EPAA was passed in 1973. In 1975, anticipating the expiration of the EPAA, DACO issued a regulation to restore its regulatory authority, but after the EPCA was passed it modified this regulation to make it effective only after federal price controls were lifted. Then in the spring of 1986 (414 years after the President’s regulatory authority was terminated), the Legislature of Puerto Rico imposed an excise tax on oil refiners, and DACO issued the regulations that are the subject of the challenge here. DACO Orders of March 26, April 23, and May 20, 1986 (App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a-45a, App. 7-12, 21-29). Among other requirements, these regulations prescribed that the Secretary of DACO be given 15 days’ notice of price increases, prohibited wholesalers from passing on the cost of the excise tax to retailers, and imposed maximum profit margins on sales by wholesalers to retailers. '
Respondents, several oil companies, brought actions that were consolidated in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico alleging, inter alia, that DACO’s orders were unconstitutional on pre-emption grounds, and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court enjoined DACO from enforcing its regulations, in part on the grounds that DACO’s authority was pre-empted by Congress’ decision to decontrol petroleum prices, and petitioners appealed this determination to the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA). (Petitioners also challenged certain other aspects of the District Court’s decision in an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which has stayed its proceedings.) A divided panel of the TECA affirmed. 811 F. 2d 1511 (1986). Because of the importance of the issue presented, we granted the petition for certiorari. 484 U. S. 814 (1987).
II
Although Puerto Rico has a unique status in our federal system, see, e. g., Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 596 (1976), the parties have assumed, and we agree, that the test for federal pre-emption of the law of Puerto Rico at issue here is the same as the test under the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, for preemption of the law of a State. See 48 U. S. C. § 734 (statutory laws of the United States generally “have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States”); Helfeld, How Much of the United States Constitution and Statutes Are Applicable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico?, 110 F. R. D. 452, 469 (1985) (Supremacy Clause applies to Puerto Rico). Cf. Examining Board, supra, at 597; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 675 (1974). Our Supremacy Clause cases typically involve analysis of the scope of pre-emptive intent underlying statutory provisions that impose federal regulation. See, e. g., Louisiana Public Service Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U. S. 355, 368-370 (1986); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 95-96 (1983); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67, 69-70 (1941). While the EPAA was operative, that typical question posed relatively little, difficulty, since §6(b) explicitly pre-empted state regulation “in conflict” with an EPAA regulation or order. Here, however, we are presented with the decidedly untypical claim that federal pre-emption exists despite, not only the absence of a statutory provision specifically announcing it, but the absence of any extant federal regulatory program with which the state regulation might conflict and which might therefore be thought to imply pre-emption. Respondents’ contention, in a nutshell, is that the EPAA evinced a federal intent to enter the field of petroleum allocation and price regulation, and that the EPCA never countermanded that intent, but merely changed the nature of the federally imposed regime from one of federal hands-on regulation to one of federally mandated free-market control.
We have suggested elsewhere that the Constitution permits congressional creation of such a regime. See, e. g., Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Comm’n, 461 U. S. 375, 384 (1983). But to say that it can be created is not to say it can be created subtly. As we have repeatedly stated, “ ‘ “we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”” Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 715 (1985), quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977), in turn quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). We do not find that clarity and manifestness in the statutory scheme respondents rely upon here, which consists of no more than (1) provisions for detailed Presidential regulation, which remain in the current version of the United States Code, but whose effect has, by subsequent statute, specifically been decreed to expire, and (2) a provision pre-empting state laws that conflict with any Presidential regulation or order under this expired authority.
In the last analysis, what respondents rely upon consists of nothing more than excerpts from the legislative history of the EPCA which in their view (though not in the view of petitioners) evidence a congressional intent that there be a free market in petroleum products. While we have frequently said that pre-emption analysis requires ascertaining congressional intent, see, e. g., Louisiana Public Service Comm’n, supra, at 369, we have never meant that to signify congressional intent in a vacuum, unrelated to the giving of meaning to an enacted statutory text. There is no text here — neither §6(b), which only pre-empts conflicts with actual federal regulation, nor any extant federal regulation that might plausibly be thought to imply exclusivity — to which expressions of pre-emptive intent in legislative history might attach. Respondents have brought to our attention statements that may reflect general congressional approval of a free market in petroleum products, or general congressional belief that such a market would result from enactment of the EPCA, or even general congressional desire that it result. But unenacted approvals, beliefs, and desires are not laws. Without a text that can, in light of those statements, plausibly be interpreted as prescribing federal pre-emption it is impossible to find that a free market was mandated by federal law.
Today’s conclusion that the DACO regulations are not preempted was plainly foreshadowed by our decision in Tully v. Mobil Oil Corp., 455 U. S. 245 (1982) (per curiam). In that case, the TECA had held that the EPAA pre-empted a state provision barring oil companies from passing on to subsequent purchasers the cost of the State’s gross-receipts tax. Since, by the time we decided that appeal, the EPCAimposed expiration date for Presidential authority under the EPAA had already passed, we vacated the judgment, agreeing with the TECA’s own determination that expiration of the EPAA “‘will signal the end of federal concern in this area.’” Id., at 246, quoting 653 F. 2d 497, 502 (1981). Our action was based on the theory that the pre-empting legislation was no more. 455 U. S., at 247, and n. 2.
Instead of following our decision in Tully, the TECA relied on language in our subsequent decision in Transcontinental Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd. of Miss., 474 U. S. 409 (1986), apparently finding there a modification of our preemption doctrine. In Transcontinental, we returned to an issue we had previously considered in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm’n of Kansas, 372 U. S. 84 (1963): whether a state regulation requiring a pipeline company to purchase gas ratably from owners with common interests in a gas source was pre-empted by federal legislation. The affirmative answer in Northern Natural had been based on the Court’s construction of the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq. In Transcontinental, the question presented was whether the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), 15 U. S. C. § 3301 et seq., “altered those characteristics of the federal regulatory scheme which provided the basis in Northern Natural for a finding of pre-emption. ” 474 U. S., at 417. The strongest evidence of such alteration was the NGPA’s withdrawal of the type of gas purchases at issue in Transcontinental from the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). We concluded, however, that the pre-emptive force of the NGA recognized in Northern Natural was equalled by the pre-emptive force of the NGPA, because the NGPA did not alter the comprehensive nature of the scheme, id., at 420-421, and did not eliminate the federal interest in consumer protection, id., at 423-424.
At one point in our Transcontinental opinion, we phrased the question as “whether Congress, in revising a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme to give market forces a more significant role in determining the supply, the demand, and the price of natural gas, intended to give the States the power it had denied FERC.” Id., at 422. In the decision below, the TECA apparently interpreted this as the enunciation of a new pre-emption test, and proceeded to search the legislative history of the EPCA for evidence of an affirmative intention that the States assume the price-regulating role that the Federal Government was abandoning. Finding none, and further finding the expression of congressional sentiments favoring the free market, it concluded that the States were pre-empted. This mistook our intent. Transcontinental was not meant to announce a new rule of burden-shifting whenever the Federal Government terminates or reduces its regulation of a field of commerce, replacing the normal need for finding a federal intent to pre-empt with a need to find a federal intent to retransfer authority to the States. To the contrary, a “clear and manifest purpose” of pre-emption is always required. We demanded an affirmative intent to retransfer authority in Transcontinental because only that could have refuted the pre-emptive intent already manifest in the revised, but nonetheless “comprehensive,” federal regulatory scheme.
Respondents would draw exaggerated inferences from another statement in Transcontinental, to the effect that “ ‘[a] federal decision to forgo regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative federal determination that the area is best left unregulated, and in that event would have as much preemptive force as a decision to regulate.’ ” Ibid., quoting Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp., 461 U. S., at 384. That was obviously not meant in an unqualified sense; otherwise, deliberate federal inaction could always imply pre-emption, which cannot be. There is no federal pre-emption in vacuo, without a constitutional text or a federal statute to assert it. Where a comprehensive federal scheme intentionally leaves a portion of the regulated field without controls, then the preemptive inference can be drawn — not from federal inaction alone, but from inaction joined with action.
That is not what we have here. Congress has withdrawn from all substantial involvement in petroleum allocation and price regulation. There being no extant action that can create an inference of pre-emption in an unregulated segment of an otherwise regulated field, pre-emption, if it is intended, must be explicitly stated. To adopt the imaginative analogy set forth in the Solicitor General’s amicus brief, repeal of EPAA regulation did not leave behind a pre-emptive grin without a statutory cat.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the TECA is
Reversed.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Specifically, § 6(b), as codified, 15 U. S. C. § 755(b), read as follows:
“The regulation under [§ 4] of this title and any order issued thereunder shall preempt any provision of any program for the allocation of crude oil, residual fuel oil, or any refined petroleum product established by any State or local government if such provision is in conflict with such regulation or any such order.”
This text permits the argument that the federal pre-emption excluded state and local price regulation only in connection with a state or local allocation program. That argument has not been made here, and would in any event only reinforce the conclusion that we reach. We shall assume, for purposes of our analysis, that the federal pre-emption of conflicting price regulation was complete.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether a California law imposing restrictions on violent video games comports with the First Amendment.
California Assembly Bill 1179 (2005), Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §§ 1746-1746.5 (West 2009) (Act), prohibits the sale or rental of “violent video games” to minors, and requires their packaging to be labeled “18.” The Act covers games “in which the range of options available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being, if those acts are depicted” in a manner that “[a] reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors,” that is “patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is suitable for minors,” and that “causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.” § 1746(d)(1)(A). Violation of the Act is punishable by a civil fine of up to $1,000. §1746.3.
Respondents, representing the video-game and software industries, brought a preenforcement challenge to the Act in the United States District Court for the Northern District
H-1 of California. That court concluded that the Act violated the First Amendment and permanently enjoined its enforcement. Video Software Dealers Assn. v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188 RMW (2007), App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. The Court of Appeals affirmed, Video Software Dealers Assn. v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F. 3d 950 (CA9 2009), and we granted certiorari, 559 U. S. 1092 (2010).
II
California correctly acknowledges that video games qualify for First Amendment protection. The Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public matters, but we have long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try. “Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.” Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948). Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas — and even social messages — through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with -the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection. Under our Constitution, “esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature... are for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.” United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 818 (2000). And whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, “the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary” when a new and different medium for communication appears. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 503 (1952).
The most basic of those principles is this: “[A]s a general matter,... government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U. S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are of course exceptions. “‘From 1791 to the present/... the First Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas/ and has never ‘include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.’ ” United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468 (2010) (quoting R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 382-383 (1992)). These limited areas — such as obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 483 (1957), incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447-449 (1969) (per curiam), and fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942)—represent “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem,” id., at 571-572.
Last Term, in Stevens, we held that new categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legislature that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated. Stevens concerned a federal statute purporting to criminalize the creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty. See 18 U. S. C. § 48 (amended 2010). The statute covered depictions “in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed” if that harm to the animal was illegal where “the creation, sale, or possession t[ook] place,” § 48(e)(1). A saving clause largely borrowed from our obscenity jurisprudence, see Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973), exempted depictions with “serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value,” § 48(b). We held that statute to be an impermissible content-based restriction on speech. There was no American tradition of forbidding the depiction of animal cruelty — though States have long had laws against committing it.
The Government argued in Stevens that lack of a historical warrant did not matter; that it could create new categories of unprotected speech by applying a “simple balancing test” that weighs the value of a particular category of speech against its social costs and then punishes that category of speech if it fails the test. Stevens, 559 U. S., at 470. We emphatically rejected that “startling and dangerous” proposition. Ibid. “Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.” Id., at 472. But without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription, a legislature may not revise the “judgment [of] the American people,” embodied in the First Amendment, “that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.” Id., at 470.
That holding controls this case. As in Stevens, California has tried to make violent-speech regulation look like obscenity regulation by appending a saving clause required for the latter. That does not suffice. Our cases have been clear that the obscenity exception to the First Amendment does not cover whatever a legislature finds shocking, but only depictions of “sexual conduct,” Miller, supra, at 24. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 20 (1971); Roth, supra, at 487, and n. 20.
Stevens was not the first time we have encountered and rejected a State’s attempt to shoehorn speech about violence into obscenity. In Winters, we considered a New York criminal statute “forbid[ding] the massing of stories of bloodshed and lust in such a way as to incite to crime against the person,” 333 U. S., at 514. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the provision as a law against obscenity. “[T]here can be no more precise test of written indecency or obscenity,” it said, “than the continuing and changeable experience of the community as to what types of books are likely to bring about the corruption of public morals or other analogous injury to the public order. ” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). That is of course the same expansive view of governmental power to abridge the freedom of speech based on interest balancing that we rejected in Stevens. Our opinion in Winters, which concluded that the New York statute failed a heightened vagueness standard applicable to restrictions upon speech entitled to First Amendment protection, 333 U. S., at 517-519, made clear that violence is not part of the obscenity that the Constitution permits to be regulated. The speech reached by the statute contained “no indecency or obscenity in any sense heretofore known to the law.” Id., at 519.
Because speech about violence is not obscene, it is of no consequence that California’s statute mimics the New York statute regulating obscenity for minors that we upheld in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968). That case approved a prohibition on the sale to minors of sexual material that would be obscene from the perspective of a child. We held that the legislature could “adjus[t] the definition of obscenity 'to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests... ’ of... minors.” Id., at 638 (quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 509 (1966)). And because “obscenity is not protected expression,” the New York statute could be sustained so long as the legislature’s judgment that the proscribed materials were harmful to children “was not irrational.” 390 U. S., at 641.
The California Act is something else entirely. It does not adjust the boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition designed for adults is not uncritically applied to children. California does not argue that it is empowered to prohibit selling offensively violent works to adults — and it is wise not to, since that is but a hair’s breadth from the argument rejected in Stevens. Instead, it wishes to create a wholly new category of content-based regulation that is permissible only for speech directed at children.
That is unprecedented and mistaken. “[Mjinors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, and only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of protected materials to them.” Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 212-213 (1975) (citation omitted). No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to protect children from harm, Ginsberg, supra, at 640-641; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 165 (1944), but that does not include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed. “Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.” Erznoznik, supra, at 213-214.
California’s argument would fare better if there were a longstanding tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions of violence, but there is none. Certainly the books we give children to read — or read to them when they are younger — contain no shortage of gore. Grimm’s Fairy Tales, for example, are grim indeed. As her just deserts for trying to poison Snow White, the wicked queen is made to dance in red hot slippers “till she fell dead on the floor, a sad example of envy and jealousy.” The Complete Brothers Grimm Fairy Tales 198 (2006 ed.). Cinderella’s evil stepsisters have their eyes pecked out by doves. Id., at 95. And Hansel and Gretel (children!) kill their captor by baking her in an oven. Id., at 54.
High-school reading lists are full of similar fare. Homer’s Odysseus blinds Polyphemus the Cyclops by grinding out his eye with a heated stake. 22 The Odyssey of Homer, Book IX, p. 125 (S. Butcher & A. Lang transis. 1909) (“Even so did we seize the fiery-pointed brand and whirled it round in his eye, and the blood flowed about the heated bar. And the breath of the flame singed his eyelids and brows all about, as the ball of the eye burnt away, and the roots thereof crackled in the flame”). In the Inferno, Dante and Virgil watch corrupt politicians struggle to stay submerged beneath a lake of boiling pitch, lest they be skewered by devils above the surface. Canto XXI, pp. 187-189 (A. Mandelbaum transl. Bantam Classic ed. 1982). And Golding’s Lord of the-Flies recounts how a schoolboy called Piggy is savagely murdered by other children while marooned on an island. W. Golding, Lord of the Flies 208-209 (1997 ed.).
This is not to say that minors’ consumption of violent entertainment has never encountered resistance. In the 1800’s, dime novels depicting crime and “penny dreadfuls” (named for their price and content) were blamed in some quarters for juvenile delinquency. See Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae 6-7. When motion pictures came along, they became the villains instead. “The days when the police looked upon dime novels as the most dangerous of textbooks in the school for crime are drawing to a close.... They say that the moving picture machine... tends even more than did the dime novel to turn the thoughts of the easily influenced to paths which sometimes lead to prison.” Moving Pictures as Helps to Crime, N. Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1909, quoted in Brief for Cato Institute 8. For a time, our Court did permit broad censorship of movies because of their capacity to be “used for evil,” see Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230, 242 (1915), but we eventually reversed course, Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U. S., at 502; see also Erznoznik, supra, at 212-214 (invalidating a drive-in movies restriction designed to protect children). Radio dramas were next, and then came comic books. Brief for Cato Institute 10-11. Many in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s blamed comic books for fostering a “preoccupation with violence and horror” among the young, leading to a rising juvenile crime rate. See Note, Regulation of Comic Books, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 490 (1955). But efforts to convince Congress to restrict comic books failed. Brief for Comic Book Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae 11-15. And, of course, after comic books came television and music lyrics.
California claims that video games present special problems because they are “interactive,” in that the player participates in the violent action on screen and determines its outcome. The latter feature is nothing new: Since at least the publication of The Adventures of You: Sugarcane Island in 1969, young readers of choose-your-own-adventure stories have been able to make decisions that determine the plot by following instructions about which page to turn to. Cf. Interactive Digital Software Assn. v. St. Louis County, 329 F. 3d 954, 957-958 (CA8 2003). As for the argument that video games enable participation in the violent action, that seems to us more a matter of degree than of kind. As Judge Posner has observed, all literature is interactive. “[T]he better it is, the more interactive. Literature when it is successful draws the reader into the story, makes him identify with the characters, invites him to judge them and quarrel with them, to experience their joys and sufferings as the reader’s own.” American Amusement Machine Assn. v. Kendrick, 244 F. 3d 572, 577 (CA7 2001) (striking down a similar restriction on violent video games).
Justice Alito has done considerable independent research to identify, see post, at 818-819, nn. 13-18, video games in which “the violence is astounding,” post, at 818. “Victims are dismembered, decapitated, disemboweled, set on fire, and chopped into little pieces_Blood gushes, splatters, and pools.” Ibid. Justice Alito recounts all these disgusting video games in order to disgust us — but disgust is not a valid basis for restricting expression. And the same is true of Justice Alito’s description, post, at 819, of those
Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny — that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest. R. A. V., 505 U. S., at 395. The State must specifically identify an “actual problem” in need of solving, Playboy, 529 U. S., at 822-823, and the curtailment of free speech must be actually necessary to the solution, see R. A. V, supra, at 395. That is a demanding standard. “It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.” Playboy, supra, at 818.
California cannot meet that standard. At the outset, it acknowledges that it cannot show a direct causal link between violent video games and harm to minors. Rather, relying upon our decision in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622 (1994), the State claims that it need not produce such proof because the legislature can make a predictive judgment that such a link exists, based on competing psychological studies. But reliance on Turner Broadcasting is misplaced. That decision applied intermediate scrutiny to a content-neutral regulation. Id., at 661-662. California’s burden is much higher, and because it bears the video games he has discovered that have a racial or ethnic motive for their violence — “‘ethnic cleansing’ [of]... African-Americans, Latinos, or Jews.” To what end does he relate this? Does it somehow increase the “aggressiveness” that- California wishes to suppress? Who knows? But it does arouse the reader’s ire, and the reader’s desire to put an end to this horrible message. Thus, ironically, Justice Alito’s argument highlights the precise danger posed by the California Act: that the ideas expressed by speech — whether it be violence, or' gore, or racism — and not its objective effects, may be the real reason for governmental proscription.
III risk of uncertainty, see Playboy, supra, at 816-817, ambiguous proof will not suffice.
The State’s evidence is not compelling. California relies primarily on the research of Dr. Craig Anderson and a few other research psychologists whose studies purport to show a connection between exposure to violent video games and harmful effects on children. These studies have been rejected by every court to consider them, and with good reason: They do not prove that violent video games cause minors to act aggressively (which would at least be a beginning). Instead, “[njearly all of the research is based on correlation, not evidence of causation, and most of the studies suffer from significant, admitted flaws in methodology.” 556 F. 3d, at 964. They show at best some correlation between exposure to violent entertainment and minuscule real-world effects, such as children’s feeling more aggressive or making louder noises in the few minutes after playing a violent game than after playing a nonviolent game.
Even taking for granted Dr. Anderson’s conclusions that violent video games produce some effect on children’s feelings of aggression, those effects are both small and indistinguishable from effects produced by other media. In his testimony in a similar lawsuit, Dr. Anderson admitted that the “effect sizes” of children’s exposure to violent video games are “about the same” as that produced by their exposure to violence on television. App. 1263. And he admits that the same effects have been found when children watch cartoons starring Bugs Bunny or the Road Runner, id., at 1304, or when they play video games like Sonic the Hedgehog that are rated “E” (appropriate for all ages), id., at 1270, or even when they “vie[w] a picture of a gun,” id., at 1315-1316.
Of course, California has (wisely) declined to restrict Saturday morning cartoons, the sale of games rated for young children, or the distribution of pictures of guns. The consequence is that its regulation is wildly underinclusive when judged against its asserted justification, which in our view is alone enough to defeat it. Underinclusiveness raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43, 51 (1994); Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U. S. 524, 540 (1989). Here, California has singled out the purveyors of video games for disfavored treatment — at least when compared to booksellers, cartoonists, and movie producers — and has given no persuasive reason why.
The Act is also seriously underinclusive in another respect — and a respect that renders irrelevant the contentions of the concurrence and the dissents that video games are qualitatively different from other portrayals of violence. The California Legislature is perfectly willing to leave this dangerous, mind-altering material in the hands of children so long as one parent (or even an aunt or uncle) says it’s OK. And there are not even any requirements as to how this parental or avuncular relationship is to be verified; apparently the child’s or putative parent’s, aunt’s, or uncle’s say-so suffices. That is not how one addresses a serious social problem.
California claims that the Act is justified in aid of parental authority: By requiring that the purchase of violent video games can be made only by adults, the Act ensures that parents can decide what games are appropriate. At the outset, we note our doubts that punishing third parties for conveying protected speech to children just in case their parents disapprove of that speech is a proper governmental means of aiding parental authority. Accepting that position would largely vitiate the rule that “only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of protected materials to [minors].” Erznoznik, 422 U. S., at 212-213.
But leaving that aside, California cannot show that the Act’s restrictions meet a substantial need of parents who wish to restrict their children’s access to violent video games biit cannot do so. The video-game industry has in place a voluntary rating system designed to inform consumers about the content of games. The system, implemented by the Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB), assigns age-specific ratings to each video game submitted: EC (Early Childhood); E (Everyone); E10+ (Everyone 10 and older); T (Teens); M (17 and older); and AO (Adults Only — 18 and older). App. 86. The Video Software Dealers Association encourages retailers to prominently display information about the ESRB system in their stores; to refrain from renting or selling adults-only games to minors; and to rent or sell “M” rated games to minors only with parental consent. Id., at 47. In 2009, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that, as a result of this system, “the video game industry outpaces the movie and music industries” in “(1) restricting target-marketing of mature-rated products to children; (2) clearly and prominently disclosing rating information; and (3) restricting children’s access to mature-rated products at retail.” FTC, Report to Congress, Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children 30 (Dec. 2009), online at http:// www.ftc.gov/os/2009/12/P994511violententertainment.pdf (as visited June 24, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (FTC Report). This system does much to ensure that minors cannot purchase seriously violent games on their own, and that parents who care about the matter can readily evaluate the games their children bring home. Filling the remaining modest gap in concerned parents’ control can hardly be a compelling state interest.
And finally, the Act’s purported aid to parental authority is vastly overinclusive. Not all of the children who are forbidden to purchase violent video games on their own have parents who care whether they purchase violent video games. While some of the legislation’s effect may indeed be in support of what some parents of the restricted children actually want, its entire effect is only in support of what the State thinks parents ought to want. This is not the narrow tailoring to “assisting parents” that restriction of First Amendment rights requires.
* * *
California’s effort to regulate violent video games is the latest episode in a long series of failed attempts to censor violent entertainment for minors. While we have pointed out above that some of the evidence brought forward to support the harmfulness of video games is unpersuasive, we do not mean to demean or disparage the concerns that underlie the attempt to regulate them — concerns that may and doubtless do prompt a good deal of parental oversight. We have no business passing judgment on the view of the California Legislature that violent video games (or, for that matter, any other forms of speech) corrupt the young or harm their moral development. Our task is only to say whether or not such works constitute a “well-defined and narrowly limited clas[s] of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem,” Chaplinsky, 315 U. S., at 571-572 (the answer plainly is no); and if not, whether the regulation of such works is justified by that high degree of necessity we have described as a compelling state interest (it is not). Even where the protection of children is the object, the constitutional limits on governmental action apply.
California’s legislation straddles the fence between (1). addressing a serious social problem and (2) helping concerned parents control their children. Both ends are legitimate, but when they affect First Amendment rights they must be pursued by means that are neither seriously under-inclusive nor seriously overinclusive. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546 (1993). As a means of protecting children from portrayals of violence, the legislation is seriously underinclusive, not only because it excludes portrayals other than video games, but also because it permits a parental or avuncular veto. And as a means of assisting concerned parents it is seriously overinclusive because it abridges the First Amendment rights of young people whose parents (and aunts and uncles) think violent video games are a harmless pastime. And the overbreadth in achieving one goal is not cured by the underbreadth in achieving the other. Legislation such as this, which is neither fish nor fowl, cannot survive strict scrutiny.
We affirm the judgment below.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito distinguishes Stevens on several grounds that seem to us ill founded. He suggests, post, at 814 (opinion concurring in judgment), that Stevens did not apply strict scrutiny. If that is so (and we doubt it), it would make this an a fortiori case. He says, post, at 814, that the California Act punishes the sale or rental rather than the “creation” or “possession” of violent depictions. That distinction appears nowhere in Stevens itself, and for good reason: It would make permissible the prohibition of printing or selling books — though not the writing of them. "Whether government regulation applies to creating, distributing, or consuming speech makes no difference. And finally, Justice Alito points out, post, at 814, that Stevens “left open the possibility that a more narrowly drawn statute” would be constitutional. True, but entirely irrelevant. Stevens said, 559 U. S., at 482, that the “crush-video” statute at issue there might pass muster if it were limited to videos of acts of animal cruelty that violated the law where the acts were performed. There is no contention that any of the virtual characters depicted in the imaginative videos at issue here are criminally liable.
The statute in Ginsberg restricted-the sale of certain depictions of ‘“nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse’” that were ‘“[h]armful to minors.’” A depiction was harmful to minors if it:
“(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and
“(ü) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and
“(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.” 390 U. S., at 646 (Appendix A to opinion of the Court) (quoting N. Y. Penal Law § 484-h(1)(f)).
Justice Thomas ignores the holding of Erznoznik, and denies that persons under 18 have any constitutional right to Gpoalc or bo spoken to without their parents’ consent. He cites no case, state or federal, supporting this view, and to our knowledge there is none. Most of his dissent is devoted to the proposition that parents have traditionally had the power to control what their children hear and say. This is true enough. And it perhaps follows from this that the state has the power to enforce parental prohibitions — to require, for example, that the promoters of a rock eoncort exclude those minors whose parents have advised the promoters that their children are forbidden to attend. But it does not follow that the state has the power to prevent children from hearing or saying anything without their parents’ prior consent. The latter would mean, for example, that it could be made criminal to admit persons under 18 to a political rally without their parents’ prior written consent — even a political rally in support of laws against corporal punishment of children, or laws in favor of greater rights for minors. And what is good for First Amendment rights of speech must be good for First Amendment rights of religion as well: It could be made criminal to admit a person under 18 to church, or to give a person under 18 a religious tract, without his parents’ prior consent. Our point is not, as Justice Thomas believes, post, at 836, n. 2, merely that such laws are “undesirable.” They are obviously an infringement upon the religious freedom of young people and thooo who wish to proselytizo young people. Such laws do not enforce parental authority over children’s speech and religion; they impose governmental authority, subject only to a parental veto. In the absence of any precedent for state control, uninvited by the parents, over a child’s speech and religion (Justice Thomas cites none), and in the absence of any justification for such control that would satisfy strict scrutiny, those laws must be unconstitutional. This argument is not, as Justice Thomas asserts, “circular,” ibid. It is the absence of any historical warrant or compelling justification for such restrictions, not our ipse dixit, that renders them invalid.
Justice Auto accuses us of pronouncing that playing violent video games “is not different in ‘kind’ ” from reading violent literature. Post, at 806. Well of course it is different in kind, but not in a way that causes the provision and viewing of violent video games, unlike the provision and reading of books, not to be expressive activity and hence not to enjoy First Amendment protection. Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat. But these cultural and intellectual differences are not constitutional ones. Crudely violont video games, tawdry TV shows, and cheap novels and magazines are no less forms of speech than The Divine Comedy, and restrictions upon them must survive strict scrutiny — a question to which we devote our attention in Part III, infra. Even if we can see in them “nothing of any possible value to society..., they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.” Winters v. New York, 338 U. S. 507, 510 (1948).
The crusade against comic books was led by a psychiatrist, Frederic Wertham, who told the Senate Judiciary Committee that “as long as the crime comic books industry exists in its present forms there are no secure homes.” Juvenile Delinquency (Comic Books): Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 84 (1954). Wertham’s objections extended even to Superman comics, which he described as “particularly injurious to the ethical development of children.” Id., at 86. Wertham’s crusade did convince the New York Legislature to pass a ban on the sale of certain comic books to minors, but it was vetoed by Governor Thomas Dewey on the ground that it was unconstitutional given our opinion in Winters, supra. See People v. Bookcase, Inc., 14 N. Y. 2d 409, 412-413, 201 N. E. 2d 14, 15-16 (1964).
See Video Software Dealers Assn. v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F. 3d 950, 963-964 (CA9 2009); Interactive Digital Software Assn. v. St. Louis County, 329 F. 3d 954 (CA8 2003); American Amusement Machine Assn. v. Kendrick, 244 F. 3d 572, 578-579 (CA7 2001); Entertainment Software Assn. v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832-833 (MD La, 2006); Entertainment Software Assn. v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1070 (Minn. 2006), aff’d, 519 F. 3d 768 (CA8 2008); Entertainment Software Assn. v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 653 (ED Mich. 2006); Entertainment Software Assn. v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1063 (ND Ill. 2005), aff’d, 469 F. 3d 641 (CA7 2006).
One study, for example, found that children who had just finished playing violent video games were more likely to fill in the blank letter in “explo_e” with a “d” (so that it reads “explode”) than with an “r” (“explore”). App. 496, 506 (internal quotation marks omitted). The prevention of this phenomenon, which might have been anticipated with common sense, is not a compelling state interest.
Justice Auto is mistaken in thinking that we fail to take account of “new and rapidly evolving technology,” post, at 806. The studies in question pertain to that new and rapidly evolving technology, and fail to show, with the degree of certitude that strict scrutiny requires, that this subject-matter restriction on speech is justified. Nor is Justice Alito correct in attributing to us the view that “violent video games really present no serious problem.” Ibid. Perhaps they do present a problem, and perhaps none of us would allow our own children to play them. But there are all sorts of “
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner brought this action for damages in the Federal District Court under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., for causing the death of her intestate. Count I alleged that “By reason of a defect or insufficiency, due to the negligence of the defendant, in its car, track, or roadbed, the car upon which the plaintiff’s decedent was riding was derailed . . .,” causing the decedent to be thrown from the car and killed. Count II, without specifying any particular acts of negligence, charged generally that the derailment and decedent’s death were the “result of the negligence of the defendant.” After the evidence was in, the Court, at the request of the respondent, directed the jury to return a verdict for the respondent on the first count. Respondent’s motion for directed verdict on the second count, on the ground that the evidence failed to justify a finding of negligence and that it showed that deceased was killed as the sole result of his own negligence, was overruled. The jury rendered a verdict for petitioner and judgment was entered on it. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the District Court with directions to render judgment for the respondent. 154 F. 2d 703.
The trial court charged the jury that the burden was upon petitioner to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the deceased's death was caused by respondent's negligence. It invoked the trial rule under which negligence may be inferred from unusual happenings growing out of conditions under a defendant’s control. Referring to this rule under the name of res ipsa loquitur, the court charged: “Of course if the deceased’s negligence was the sole cause of the accident the plaintiff here cannot recover. And since there can be no application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur if other causes than the negligence of the defendant, its agents or servants, might have produced the accident, the plaintiff is bound, she has the burden, to exclude the operation of such causes by a fair preponderance of the evidence before the rule can be applied. This is so because if there are other causes than the negligence of the defendant that might have caused the accident, the defendant cannot be said to be in exclusive control — one of the prerequisites to the application of the rule here invoked.” The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed because it thought that the jury should not be permitted to draw an inference of defendant’s negligence from an extraordinary accident growing out of a general set of circumstances which included activities of the injured person, even though a jury, under proper instructions, could find from the evidence that the injured person’s activities did not cause the injury. The Circuit Court’s limitation of the jury’s province by this interpretation of a doctrine of res ipsa loquitur raised a question of importance in the trial of cases arising under federal law. We granted certiorari to consider this question. 328 U. S. 830.
The testimony, so far as relevant to point the issues, may be briefly summarized. Four railroad cars were being pushed backward and eastward by an engine in order to put them on a siding north of the main track. It was the duty of deceased, a brakeman, to throw the switch before the first car reached it in order that the four cars would take the siding. There was evidence that he threw the switch and gave a signal to the engineer to back the cars. Respondent’s evidence was sufficient to authorize, but not to compel, the jury to find that the deceased negligently threw the switch while the lead car in the backward movement straddled the switch with one set of the car wheels on one side of the switch and one on the other. If true, this could mean that the wheels east of the switch would move down the main line and the others would enter the siding when the switch was thrown and the backward movement took place, thus probably causing derailment. If the jury had believed respondent’s evidence that this last car was astride the switch when it was thrown, it would have been authorized, under the court’s charge, to find for the respondent. But about 75 feet east of this switch, at a point where the south rail of the siding track intersected the north rail of the main track, there was a frog. There was testimony that this frog operated with a spring mechanism, and that if the spring failed to work when the wheels passed over it, the cars might be derailed. Some other evidence tended to show that, at the time the derailment occurred, splinters and planks were thrown into the air near the frog. Other evidence tended to show that planks and splinters were found on the track. Some testimony showed that they were close to the switch, and some that they were close to the frog. There was evidence that the frog and switch had been in good condition before the derailment and after the derailment. The cars had been operated and the tracks had been used previously, so far as the evidence showed, without any similar mishap.
In San Juan Light Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89, 98-99, this Court said: “when a thing which causes injury, without fault of the injured person, is shown to be under the exclusive control of the defendant, and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if the one having such control uses proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation, that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care.” Both prior to and after that case was decided, this Court has acted upon this rule in varying types of cases. Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129; Inland & Seaboard Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 139 U. S. 551, 555; Gleeson v. Virginia M. R. R., 140 U. S. 435; Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 240. See also Southern Ry. v. Bennett, 233 U. S. 80; Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N. Y. 108, 38 N. E. 2d 455, and cases collected, 153 A. L. R. 1134. The Circuit Court of Appeals thought, however, that the rule was improperly applied in this case because the railroad instrumentalities here were not under the “exclusive control” of the railroad; that “The thing that caused the injury could have been Jesionowski’s fault, or it could have been the railroad corporation’s fault.” 154 F. 2d 703, 705.
The Court’s reasoning was this: Petitioner was not entitled to have her case submitted to the jury except under the rule of res ipsa loquitur. That rule has rigidly defined prerequisities, one of which is that, to apply it, the defendant must have exclusive control of all the things used in an operation which might probably have caused injury. Here the railroad did not have exclusive control of all probable causative factors, since deceased had some immediate control over switching and signaling. “Exclusive control” of all probable causative factors, the court reasoned, means that res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied even though those non-exclusively controlled factors are clearly shown to have had no causal connection with the accident.
We cannot agree. Res ipsa loquitur, thus applied, would bar juries from drawing an inference of negligence on account of unusual accidents in all operations where the injured person had himself participated in the operations, even though it was proved that his operations of the things under his control did not cause the accident. This viewpoint unduly restricts the power of juries to decide questions of fact, and in this case the jury’s right to draw inferences from evidence and the sufficiency of that evidence to support a verdict are federal questions. A conceptualistic interpretation of res ipsa loquitur has never been used by this Court to reduce the jury’s power to draw inferences from facts. Such an interpretation unduly narrows the doctrine as this Court has applied it.
This Court said, in Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 240, a decision which cut through the mass of verbiage built up around the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, that “res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference; that they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where direct evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; that they call for explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily that they require it; that they make a case to be decided by the jury, not that they forestall the verdict.” Thus, the question here really is not whether the application of the rule relied on fits squarely into some judicial definition, rigidly construed, but whether the circumstances were such as to justify a finding that this derailment was a result of the defendant’s negligence. We hold that they were.
Derailments are extraordinary, not usual, happenings. When they do occur, a jury may fairly find that they occurred as a result of negligence. It is true that the jury might have found here that this accident happened as a result of the negligence of the deceased; but although the respondent offered evidence to establish this fact, it “did not satisfy the jury.” Southern Ry. v. Bennett, supra at 86. With the deceased freed from any negligent conduct in connection with the switch or the signaling, we have left an accident, ordinarily the result of negligence, which may be attributed only to the lack of care of the railroad, the only other agency involved. Once a jury, having been appropriately instructed, finds that the employee’s activities did not cause the derailment, the defendant remains as the exclusive controller of all the factors which may have caused the accident. It would run counter to common everyday experience to say that, after a finding by the jury that the throwing of the switch and the signaling did not contribute to the derailment, the jury was without authority to infer that either the negligent operation of the train or the negligent maintenance of the instrumentalities other than the switch was the cause of the derailment. It was uncontroverted that the railroad had exclusive control of both. We think that the facts support the jury’s findings both that the deceased’s conduct did not cause the accident and that the railroad’s negligence did.
Respondent also urges here, as it did in the Circuit Court of Appeals, that because the trial judge directed a verdict for it on the first count of the complaint, which charged a defect in the car, track or roadbed, the court was not justified in submitting to the jury the question of a defect in these respects under the second count. The Circuit Court held that this question was hot properly raised before it because respondent had failed on appeal to make “a concise statement” of the point as required by Rule 75 (d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent argues that the question was properly raised, though not specifically, by its general point that “the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to the facts of this case.” We cannot hold that the Circuit Court erred when it refused to consider the question because of respondent’s failure to comply with Rule 75 (d).
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Reed, Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Burton would affirm on the grounds stated in the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The motion to dispense with printing the jurisdictional statement is granted. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Me. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent is the executive secretary of an organization known as the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee (hereinafter referred to as the association) and as such has custody of its records. Prior to April 4, 1946, the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives, which was conducting an investigation into the activities of the association, had attempted without success to procure these records from respondent and from the chairman of the association’s executive board, Dr. Edward K. Barsky. On March 29, 1946, the Committee issued subpoenas to each of the known members of the executive board summoning them to appear in the Committee’s room on April 4, 1946, at 10 a. m., to testify and produce certain specified records of the association, and an identical subpoena directed to the association by name was served upon respondent Bryan in her official capacity.
Bryan and the members of the executive board appeared before the Committee at the date and time set out in the subpoenas and in response thereto. Each person so summoned failed to produce any of the records specified in the subpoenas. The members of the executive board made identical statements in which each declared that he or she did not have possession, custody or control of the records; that Miss Bryan, the executive secretary, did. Respondent admitted that the records were in her possession but refused to comply with the subpoena because “after consulting with counsel [she] came to the conclusion that the subpena was not valid” because the Committee had no constitutional right to demand the books and records. Asked whether the executive board supported her action, she refused to answer because she did not think the question pertinent.
The Committee on Un-American Activities then submitted its report and resolution to the House. Setting out at length the Committee’s attempts to procure the records of the association, the report concludes:
“The willful and deliberate refusal of Helen R. Bryan and the members of the executive board of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee as named herein to produce the books, papers, and records called for in the subpenas deprives your committee of evidence necessary in the conduct of its investigation of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, which evidence is pertinent to the said investigation and places the said persons in contempt of the House of Representatives of the United States.”
The resolution directing the Speaker to certify the Committee’s report to the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia for legal action was approved by the full House after debate.
Respondent was indicted for violation of R. S. § 102, in that she had failed to produce the records called for in the subpoenas and had thereby wilfully made default. At the trial she contended, inter alia, that she was not guilty of wilful default because a quorum of the Committee on Un-American Activities had not been present when she appeared on the return day. However, the trial court withdrew that issue from the jury’s consideration by instructing the jury “as a matter of law, that the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives was a validly constituted committee of the Congress, and was at the time of the defendant’s appearanee.” Respondent was found guilty, 72 F. Supp. 58, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, one judge dissenting, reversed the judgment on the ground that the presence of a quorum of the Committee at the hearing on April 4, 1946, was a material question of fact in the alleged offense and should have been submitted to' the jury. 84 U. S. App. D. C. 394, 174 F. 2d 525. We granted a writ of certiorari, 338 U. S. 846, to consider this important question affecting the procedures of congressional committees.
First. R. S. § 102 was enacted in 1857. Its purpose, as stated by its sponsors, was to avoid the procedural difficulties which had been experienced by the House of Representatives when, persons cited for contempt of the House were brought before its bar to show cause why they should not be committed, and, more important, to permit the imprisonment of a contemnor beyond the expiration of the current session of Congress. Transmission of the fact of the commission of a contempt to the prosecuting authority is made under the Seal of the House or Senate by the Speaker or President of the Senate. The judicial proceedings are intended as an alternative method of vindicating the authority of Congress to compel the disclosure of facts which are needed in the fulfillment of the legislative function. In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, 671-672 (1897); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125, 151 (1935).
“Default” is, of course, a failure to comply with the summons. In this case we may assume, without deciding, that the subpoena served on respondent required her to produce the records of the association before the Committee on Un-American Activities, sitting as a committee. Upon that assumption, respondent takes the position that, absent a quorum, the Committee was without power to receive the records on the return day; that she cannot be guilty of a default in failing to produce papers before an “agency organizationally defective,” which, for that reason, “cannot be obstructed.” Respondent does not and cannot, in view of the jury’s verdict, contest the finding that she deliberately and intentionally refused to produce the papers called for in the subpoena. Her contention is that a quorum of the Committee was required to meet to witness her refusal. Reliance is placed upon certain precedents of the House of Representatives, which hold that a committee report may be challenged in the House on the ground that a quorum of the committee was not present when the report was approved, and upon this Court’s recent decision in Christoffel v. United States, 338 U. S. 84 (1949).
The Christoffel case is inapposite. For that decision, which involved a prosecution for perjury before a congressional committee, rests in part upon the proposition that the applicable perjury statute requires that a “competent tribunal” be present when the false statement is made. There is no such requirement in R. S. § 102. It does not contemplate some affirmative act which is made punishable only if performed before a competent tribunal, but an intentional failure to testify or produce papers, however the contumacy is manifested. Respondent attempts to equate R. S. § 102 with the perjury statute considered in the Christoffel case by contending that it applies only to the refusal to testify or produce papers before a committee — i. e., in the presence of a quorum of the committee. But the statute is not so limited. In the first place, it refers to the wilful failure by any person “to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before... any committee of either House of Congress,” not to the failure to testify before a congressional committee. And the fact that appearance before a committee is not an essential element of the offense is further emphasized by additional language in the statute, which, after defining wilful default in the terms set out above, continues, “or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,....” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that R. S. § 102 is designed to punish the obstruction of inquiries in which the Houses of Congress or their committees are engaged. If it is shown that such an inquiry is, in fact, obstructed by the intentional withholding of documents, it is unimportant whether the subpoenaed person proclaims his refusal to respond before the full committee, sends a telegram to the chairman, or simply stays away from the hearing on the return day. His statements or actions are merely evidence from which a jury might infer an intent to default. A proclaimed refusal to respond, as in this case, makes that intent plain. But it would hardly be less plain if the witness embarked on a voyage to Europe on the day before his scheduled appearance before the committee.
Of course a witness may always change his mind. A default does not mature until the return date of the subpoena, whatever the previous manifestations of intent to default. But when the Government introduced evidence in this case that respondent had been validly served with a lawful subpoena directing her to produce records within her custody and control, and that on the day set out in the subpoena she intentionally failed to comply, it made out a prima facie case of wilful default.
Second. It is argued, however, that even if the Government is not required to prove presence of a quorum affirmatively, lack of a quorum is a defense raising material questions of fact which should have been submitted to the jury. The theory is that if the subpoena required production of the records before the Committee on UnAmerican Activities qua committee, respondent could not have complied with the subpoena in the absence of a quorum had she wished to do so, and therefore her default is not wilful, albeit deliberate and intentional. While she did not introduce any direct evidence at the trial, respondent appropriately raised the defense by cross-examination and by her motions, requests and objections.
Ordinarily, one charged with contempt of court for failure to comply with a court order makes a complete defense by proving that he is unable to comply. A court will not imprison a witness for failure to produce documents which he does not have, unless he is responsible for their unavailability, cf. Jurney v. MacCracken, supra, or is impeding justice by not explaining what happened to them, United States v. Goldstein, 105 F. 2d 150 (1939).
On the other hand, persons summoned as witnesses by competent authority have certain minimum duties and obligations which are necessary concessions to the public interest in the orderly operation of legislative and judicial machinery. A subpoena has never been treated as an invitation to a game of hare and hounds, in which the witness must testify only if cornered at the end of the chase. If that were the case, then, indeed, the great power of testimonial compulsion, so necessary to the effective functioning of courts and legislatures, would be a nullity. We have often iterated the importance of this public duty, which every person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform when properly summoned. See, e. g., Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 (1932).
Certain exemptions from attending or, having attended, giving testimony are recognized by all courts. But every such exemption is grounded in a substantial individual interest which has been found, through centuries of experience, to outweigh the public interest in the search for truth. Dean Wigmore stated the proposition thus: “For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to every man’s evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule.”
Every exemption from testifying or producing records thus presupposes a very real interest to be protected. If a privilege based upon that interest is asserted, its validity must be assessed. Since we assume in this case that the subpoenas refer to the production of papers before the Committee qua committee, we agree that respondent could rightfully have demanded attendance of a quorum of the Committee and declined to testify or to produce documents so long as a quorum was not present. But the courts need not treat as important that which the witness obviously regarded as unimportant. Testimonial compulsion is an intensely practical matter. If, therefore, a witness seeks to excuse a default on grounds of inability to comply with the subpoena, we think the defense must fail in the absence of even a modicum of good faith in responding to the subpoena. That such was the situation in this case does not admit of doubt.
In the first place, if respondent had legitimate reasons for failing to produce the records of the association, a decent respect for the House of Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas issued, would have required that she state her reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. At the time and place specified in the subpoenas the Chairman of the Committee and a number of other members — whether or not a quorum was present at any time is not clear from the record — presented themselves for the taking of testimony and receipt of papers. The defect in composition of the Committee, if any, was one which could easily have been remedied. But the Committee was not informed until the trial, two years after the refusal to produce the records, that respondent sought to excuse her noncompliance on the ground that a quorum of the Committee had not been present. For two years, now grown to four, the Committee’s investigation was obstructed by an objection which, so far as we are informed, could have been rectified in a few minutes.
Such a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers before a congressional committee cannot be condoned. Suppose one who has been summoned to produce papers fails to deliver them as required but refuses to give any reason. May he defend a prosecution for wilful default, many months later, on the ground that he had not been given a sufficient time to gather the papers? We think such a contention hardly tenable. Yet, at the return date, compliance with the subpoena was “impossible” just as in the present case. To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or remedy it is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. See Bevan v. Krieger, 289 U. S. 459, 464-465 (1933).
In the second place, the fact that the alleged defect upon which respondent now insists is, in her own estimation, an immaterial one, is clearly shown by her reliance before the Committee upon other grounds for failing to produce the records. She does not deny, and the transcript of the hearing makes it perfectly clear, that she would not have complied with the subpoenas no matter how the Committee had been constituted at the time. This Court considered a similar question in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906), where a witness had refused in the trial court to produce certain books and papers called for by a subpoena duces tecum on three grounds, one of which was that it was impossible to collect the records within the time allowed. The Court pointed out that “Had the witness relied solely upon the first ground, doubtless the court would have given him the necessary time.” 201 U. S. at p. 70. But having refused compliance for other reasons which the lower court could not remedy, the witness could not later complain of its refusal to do a meaningless act — to grant him additional time to gather papers which he had indicated he would not produce in any event. Here respondent would have the Committee go through the empty formality of summoning a quorum of its members to gather in solemn conclave to hear her refuse to honor its demands. Presumably the same formalism would be required if respondent had informed the Committee that she was not coming at all and did not do so.
In a not dissimilar case, Judge Learned Hand stated what we consider to be the basic question before us and gave the answer which we think must necessarily follow. He said:
“The question is no less than whether courts must put up with shifts and subterfuges in the place of truth and are powerless to put an end to trifling. They would prove themselves incapable of dealing with actualities if it were so, for there is no surer sign of a feeble and fumbling law than timidity in penetrating the form to the substance.” Loubriel v. United States, 9 F. 2d 807, 808 (1926).
We hold that the Government is not required to prove that a quorum of the Committee was present when the default occurred, and that under the circumstances disclosed by this record a defense of lack of a quorum was not open to respondent.
Third. Respondent also contended at the trial that the court erred in permitting the Government to read to the jury the testimony she had given before the House Committee when called upon to produce the records. She relies upon R. S. § 859, now codified in § 3486 of Title 18 U. S. C., which provides that “No testimony given by a witness before... any committee of either House,... shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against him in any court, except in a prosecution for perjury committed in giving such testimony....” Admittedly her testimony relative to production of the books comes within the literal language of the statute; but the trial court thought that to apply the statute to respondent’s testimony would subvert the congressional purpose in its passage. We agree.
We need not set out the history of the statute in detail. It should be noted, however, that its function was to provide an immunity in subsequent criminal proceedings to witnesses before congressional committees, in return for which it was thought that witnesses could be compelled to give self-incriminating testimony. That purpose was effectively nullified in 1892 by this Court’s decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, holding that R. S. § 860, a statute identical in all material respects with R. S. § 859, was not a sufficient substitute for the constitutional privilege of refusing to answer self-incriminating questions. Under that decision, a witness who is offered only the partial protection of a statute such as §§ 859 and 860 — that his testimony may not be used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings — rather than complete immunity from prosecution for any act concerning which he testifies may claim his privilege and remain silent with impunity.
Section 860 was ultimately repealed. Its usefulness undermined by the Counselman decision, it remained on the statute books until 1910, “a shield to the criminal and an obstruction to justice.” But the attention of Congress has not, apparently, been called to the anomaly presented by the continued existence of R. S. § 859, which, like § 860, was a constituent part of an immunity “bargain” declared invalid in the Counselman case. The courts must, therefore, give effect to the statute. Cameron v. United States, 231 U. S. 710, 720 (1914).
Since respondent did not refuse to answer the questions put to her by members of the House Committee, her argument is not of denial of any constitutional right but solely that R. S. § 859 bars use of her testimony in her trial for wilful default. The history of that statute, its original purpose, and its present status are all relevant considerations in its interpretation. Despite the fact that the literal language would encompass testimony elicited by the House Committee in its questioning of respondent relative to the production of the records of the association, the Court will not reach that result if it is contrary to the congressional intent and leads to absurd conclusions. United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486 (1869); Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139 (1911). And we are clearly of the opinion that the congressional purpose would be frustrated if the words, “in any criminal proceeding,” were read to include a prosecution for wilful default under R. S. §. 102.
That purpose was “more effectually to enforce the Attendance of Witnesses... and to compel them to discover Testimony.” It had been the experience of Congress prior to 1857 that witnesses could not be compelled to disclose desired information, in part because of insufficient penalties for nondisclosure, and in part because of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. In an attempt to surmount the latter obstacle, Congress enacted what became R. S. § 859. By granting an immunity, it was the congressional intent to compel testimony which had hitherto been unavailable.
It is now contended that the protection of the statute, which was extended to witnesses in an effort to obtain testimony, protects equally the person who wilfully withholds testimony and is prosecuted for his wilful default. This contention completely ignores the purpose of the immunity. In the first place, it imputes to Congress the contradictory and irrational purpose of granting an immunity from prosecution for contempt in order to obtain evidence of that contempt. And in the second place, it assumes that Congress had some purpose to compel testimony of the kind here involved — statements of refusal by the witness to answer questions or produce documents — in return for which it was willing to grant an immunity. Such an assumption cannot be made. These statements have always been available to the Houses of Congress in contempt proceedings. They are uniformly printed in the reports of committees recommending contempt action and are relied upon by the Houses when deliberating in contempt cases. In short, the purpose of the statute contradicts its application to testimony of this kind.
Furthermore, to hold such testimony inadmissible in a prosecution for wilful default is to conclude that Congress, for no discernable reason, made proof of contempt vastly more difficult before the courts than in its own chambers, since, as we have indicated, the Houses of Congress themselves are accustomed to rely upon such testimony. There is not a hint of any such purpose in the legislative history of the statute or the decisions construing it. On the contrary, this Court has often noted that prosecution under R. S. § 102 was intended “merely to supplement the power of contempt by providing for additional punishment.” Jurney v. MacCracken, supra, at 151.
The debates attending enactment of the statutes here in question and the decisions of this and other federal courts construing substantially identical statutes make plain the fact that Congress intended the immunity therein provided to apply only to past criminal acts concerning which the witness should be called to testify. The offense of contempt of Congress, with which we are presently concerned, on the other hand, matures only when the witness is called to appear before the committee to answer questions or produce documents and wilfully fails to do so. Until that moment he has committed no crime. There is, in our jurisprudence, no doctrine of “anticipatory contempt.” While the witness’ testimony may show that he has elected to perjure himself or commit contempt, he does not thereby admit his guilt of some past crime about which he has been summoned for questioning but commits the criminal act then and there.
In Glickstein v. United States, supra, this Court considered the problem thereby presented. It was there held that perjury committed in the course of testimony given pursuant to statute falls outside the purview of § 7 (9) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 25 (10), which, like R. S. § 859, provides that no testimony given by the witness (at a creditors’ meeting) shall be used against him in any criminal proceedings. In the Court’s view, such an immunity “relates to the past and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.” 222 U. S. at 142. The distinction is fully spelled out in a Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, Edelstein v. United States, 149 F. 636 (1906), which was cited with approval in the Glickstein case:
“To hold that the statute protects a bankrupt from the use of his evidence in a prosecution for perjury while actually testifying would defeat the obvious purposes of the act. It would, in effect, say to the bankrupt: You may forego the exercise of your constitutional privilege, and consent to testify concerning the conduct of your business, and in that way promote the efficient administration of your estate and benefit your creditors, and by so doing secure the immunity provided for; but if you give false testimony, calculated to embarrass the administration of your estate and to defeat the just rights of your creditors, and thereby commit a crime specially denounced against you, you shall enjoy the same immunity therefor. Moreover, it would, in effect, secure to the bankrupt the immunity in question for violating his part of the compact,"namely, to testify— that is, to testify truthfully — by virtue of which he secured a right to the immunity. We are not willing to impute to Congress any such contradictory and absurd purpose. The words ‘any criminal proceeding’ cannot sensibly or reasonably be construed so literally and generally as to include the criminal proceeding provided by law for false swearing in giving his testimony. They obviously have reference to such criminal proceedings as arise out of past transactions, about which the bankrupt is called to testify.” 149 F. at 643-644.
That statement is at least equally applicable to statements made by the witness in refusing to answer questions or produce papers. Such, in fact, was the rationale and decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in just such a case. See In re Kaplan Bros., 213 F. 753 (1914). And see Cameron v. United States, supra, 719; McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 42 (1924).
The same reasons.that led this Court to conclude that the clause excepting a prosecution for perjury from the reach of another immunity statute “was added only from superfluous caution and throws no light on the construction,” Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 141 (1913), lead us to hold that Congress did not intend the term, “any criminal proceeding,” to encompass a prosecution of the witness for wilful default under R. S. § 102. A contrary view would simply encourage the refusal of witnesses to answer questions or produce papers, quite contrary to the purpose of the statute.
Respondent advances several contentions which were not passed upon by the Court of Appeals. We do not decide them at this time. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter agrees with this opinion except as to the portion marked Third, involving the applicability of § 3486 of Title 18 U. S. C. to the facts of this case, which requires him to dissent from the judgment of reversal.
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
92 Cong. Rec. 3762, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
Id. at 3773.
11 Stat. 155, as amended, R. S. § 102, 2 U. S. C. § 192:
“Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.”
See, e. g., remarks of Representative Orr, Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 405 (1857).
R. S. § 104, 2 U. S. C. § 194.
The subpoena read as follows:
“BY AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA “To the Sergeant at Arms, or his Special Messenger:
“You are hereby commanded to summon the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 192 Lexington Avenue, New York City, a voluntary organization to be and appear before the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States, of which the Hon. John S. Wood is chairman, and to bring with you all books, ledgers, records and papers relating to the receipt and disbursement of money by or on account of the Joint AntiFascist Refugee Committee or any subsidiary or sub-committee thereof, together with all correspondence and memoranda of communications by any means whatsoever with persons in foreign countries. The said books, papers and records demanded herein are for the period from January 1, 1945 up to and including the date of this subpoena, in their chamber in the city of Washington, on April 4, 1946, at the hour of 10:00 A. M. then and there to testify touching matters of inquiry committed to said Committee; and [she] is not to depart without leave of said Committee.
“Herein fail not, and make return of this summons....”
Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) § 2192.
It is, of course, clear that respondent’s “inability” to comply with the subpoena because a quorum of the Committee was not present amounts to no more than the claim that she is excused from doing so. The jury found that she had power to produce the papers. The question therefore arises as to what possible prejudice respondent might have suffered if she had turned over the records to less than a quorum of the Committee. In the case of oral testimony, a witness might well desire to appear only if a quorum was present because of a feeling that some committee members, unrestrained by presence of a majority, might exceed proper bounds of inquiry. But that consideration is obviously inapplicable to the production of papers and is irrelevant here in any event since respondent testified.
See also, Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 443 (1932); Leber v. United States, 170 F. 881, 888 (1909); London Guarantee & Accident Co., Ltd. v. Doyle & Doak, 134 F. 125 (1905); State ex rel. Berge v. Superior Court, 154 Wash. 144, 281 P. 335 (1929).
See the court’s opinion in United States v. Barsky, 72 F. Supp. 165 (1947), affirmed, Barsky v. United States, 83 U. S. App. D. C. 127, 138, 167 F. 2d 241, 252 (1948).
R. S. § 859, as originally enacted in 1857, was a part of § 2 of a comprehensive statute, 11 Stat. 155, designed on the one hand to compel the testimony of witnesses and on the other hand to profect them from prosecution for crimes revealed by their testimony. Section 1 of the Act became R. S. § 102, 2 U. S. C. § 192. As first enacted, § 2 not only prevented the use of a witness’ testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings but gave him complete immunity from prosecution “for any fact or act touching which he shall be required to testify.” This latter provision was deleted in 1862, 12 Stat. 333, leaving only the partial protection of § 859, which was in effect declared insufficient to require a witness to give self-incriminatory testimony in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892).
R. S. § 860 applied to evidence obtained from a party or witness in any “judicial proceeding” and provided that such evidence should not be used against such person in any criminal proceeding.
See Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896).
H. R. Rep. No. 266, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., which was concurred in by the Senate Committee reporting the repealer, states:
“This section [860] was enacted apparently for the purpose of enabling the Government to compel the disclosure of incriminating testimony on condition that the witness disclosing the same would be given immunity. In the case of Counselman v. Hitchcock (142 U. S., 547) it was held that legislation can not abridge a constitutional privilege, and that it can not replace or supply one, at least unless it is so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect, and that said section 860 of the Revised Statutes does not supply a complete protection from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard, and is not a full substitute for that prohibition, and that in view of the constitutional provision (article 5 of the amendments) a statutory enactment to be valid must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates.
“Since the decision above referred to section 860 has possessed no usefulness whatever, but has remained in the law as an impediment to the course of justice. Under it a witness can not be compelled to give any incriminating testimony whatever, but if he chooses to go on the witness stand and testify as to any matter whatever, even of his own volition, and, whether incriminatory or not, his testimony can not thereafter be brought up against him in any criminal proceedings. He can not be confronted with his own testimony or his own previous statement under oath even on cross-examination. The statute has become a shield to the criminal and an obstruction to justice.”
In 1938 Congress made minor amendments to the statutes in question without recognizing their inconsistency with the Counselman case. 52 Stat. 943. See S. Rep. No. 2108, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424 (1943), is, of course, inapplicable. That decision relates to the necessity of making a claim of immunity under the particular statute there involved. The opinion specifically states that the constitutional privilege, as distinguished from the statutory immunity under consideration in that case, must be claimed. Id. at 427.
See 11 Stat. 155.
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 254, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., the Report of a Special Committee on Investigation of Air Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts, setting out in great detail the testimony of William P. MacCracken, Jr., et al., “in order that the Senate may determine whether or not any action shall be taken by the Senate with a view to proceeding against the said William P. MacCracken, Jr.... in the nature of a proceeding for contempt or otherwise....” See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935).
The incident giving rise to enactment of the statute illustrates the point. A correspondent of the New York Times, having made charges of corruption on the part of members of the House of Representatives in connection with pending legislation, was called before a select committee of the House and asked to name the Representatives involved. He declined to do so for the reason that the information had been given to him in confidence. The committee’s questions and the witness’ answers are set out at length in the Congressional Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 403-404, as a part of the committee’s report and resulted in his being called to the bar of the House “to answer as for a contempt of the authority of this House,” and in his subsequent commitment. These proceedings were carried on in conjunction with consideration of the statute in the House. The contention now made would impute to Congress an intent to deprive the courts of the very information upon which the House had acted in the case giving rise to the statute.
Representative Orr: “The bill provides that no persons called before that committee to testify before them shall be subjected to criminal prosecution for any offense
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The statutes at issue in this case make it a crime to “conspir[e]” to “possess with intent to . . . distribute ... a controlled substance.” 21 U. S. C. §§ 841 and 846. The Government charged petitioners with violating these statutes by conspiring “to possess with intent to distribute ,.. mixtures containing” two controlled substances, namely, “cocaine ... and cocaine base” (i. e., “crack”). App. 6. The District Judge instructed the jury that “the government must prove that the conspiracy . . . involved measurable amounts of cocaine or cocaine base.” App. 16 (emphasis added). The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. And the judge imposed sentences based on his finding that each petitioner’s illegal conduct had involved both cocaine and crack.
Petitioners argued (for the first time) in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that the judge’s sentences were unlawful insofar as they were based upon crack. They said that the word “or” in the judge’s instruction (permitting a guilty verdict if the conspiracy involved either cocaine or crack) meant that the judge must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine, which drug, they added, the Sentencing Guidelines treat more leniently than crack. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2Dl.l(c) (Nov. 1994) (drug table) (USSG). The Court of Appeals, however, held that the judge need not assume that only cocaine was involved. 105 P. 3d 1179 (1997). It pointed out that the Sentencing Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of the drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy. Id., at 1180. And it reasoned that the jury’s belief about which drugs were involved — cocaine, crack, or both — was therefore beside the point. Id., at 1181. In light of a potential conflict among the Circuits on this question, see, e. g., United States v. Bounds, 985 P. 2d 188, 194-195 (CA5 1993); United States v. Pace, 981 P. 2d 1123 (CA10 1992); United States v. Owens, 904 P. 2d 411 (CA8 1990), we granted certiorari.
"We agree that in the circumstances of this case the judge was authorized to determine for sentencing purposes whether crack, as well as cocaine, was involved in the offense-related activities. The Sentencing Guidelines instruct the judge in a case like this one to determine both the amount and the kind of “controlled substances” for which a defendant should be held accountable — and then to impose a sentence that varies depending upon amount and kind. See United States v. Watts, 519 U. S. 148 (1997) (per curiam) (judge may consider drug charge of which offender has been acquitted by jury in determining Guidelines sentence); Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389 (1995) (judge may impose higher Guidelines sentence on offender convicted of possessing marijuana based on judge’s finding that offender also engaged in uncharged cocaine conspiracy). Consequently, regardless of the jury’s actual, or assumed, beliefs about the conspiracy, the Guidelines nonetheless require the judge to determine whether the “controlled substances” at issue — and how much of those substances — consisted of cocaine, crack, or both. And that is what the judge did in this case.
Virtually conceding this Guidelines-related point, petitioners argue that the drug statutes, as well as the Constitution, required the judge to assume that the jury convicted them of a conspiracy involving only cocaine. Petitioners misapprehend the significance of this contention, however, for even if they are correct, it would make no difference to their case. That is because the Guidelines instruct a sentencing judge to base a drug-conspiracy offender’s sentence on the offender’s “relevant conduct.” USSG § IB 1.3. And “relevant conduct,” in a case like this, includes both conduct that constitutes the “offense of conviction,” id., § 1B1.3(a)(1), and conduct that is “part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction,” id., § 1B1.3(a)(2). Thus, the sentencing judge here would have had to determine the total amount of drugs, determine whether the drugs consisted of cocaine, crack, or both, and determine the total amount of each — regardless of whether the judge believed that petitioners’ crack-related conduct was part of the “offense of conviction,” or the judge believed that it was “part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan.” The Guidelines sentencing range — on either belief — is identical.
Of course, petitioners’ statutory and constitutional claims would make a difference if it were possible to argue, say, that the sentences imposed exceeded the maximum that the statutes permit for a cocaine-only conspiracy. That is because a maximum sentence set by statute trumps a higher sentence set forth in the Guidelines. USSG § 5G1.1. But, as the Government points out, the sentences imposed here were within the statutory limits applicable to a cocaine-only conspiracy, given the quantities of that drug attributed to each petitioner. Brief for United States 15-16, and nn. 6-7; see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)-(3); App. 42-47, 72-82, 107-112, 136-141, 163-169 (cocaine attributed to each petitioner). Cf. United States v. Orozca-Prada, 732 F. 2d 1076, 1083-1084 (GA2 1984) (court may not sentence defendant under statutory penalties for cocaine conspiracy when jury may have found only marijuana conspiracy). Petitioners’ statutory and constitutional claims also could have made a difference had it been possible to argue that their crack-related activities did not constitute part of the “same course of conduct or common scheme or plan.” Then, of course, the crack (had it not been part of the “offense of conviction”) would not have been part of the sentence-related “relevant conduct” at all. But petitioners have not made this argument, and, after reviewing the record (which shows a series of interrelated drug transactions involving both cocaine and crack), we do not see how any such claim could succeed.
Instead, petitioners argue that the judge might have made different factual findings if only the judge had known that the law required him to assume the jury had found a cocaine-only, not a coeaine-and-crack, conspiracy. It is sufficient for present purposes, however, to point out that petitioners did not make this particular argument in the District Court. Indeed, they seem to have raised their entire argument for the first time in the Court of Appeals. Thus, petitioners did not explain to the sentencing judge how their “jury-found-only-coeaine” assumption could have made a difference to the judge’s own findings, nor did they explain how this assumption (given the judge’s findings) should lead to greater leniency. Moreover, our own review of the record indicates that the judge’s Guidelines-based factfinding, while resting upon the evidence before the jury, did not depend on any particular assumption about the type of conspiracy the jury found. Nor is there any indication that the assumption petitioners urge (a cocaine-only conspiracy) would likely have made a difference in respect to discretionary leniency.
For these reasons, we need not, and we do not, consider the merits of petitioners’ statutory and constitutional claims.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal courts of appeals review federal sentences and set aside those they find “unreasonable.” See, e. g., United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 261-263 (2005). Several Circuits have held that, when doing so, they will presume that a sentence imposed within a properly calculated United States Sentencing Guidelines range is a reasonable sentence. See, e. g., 177 Fed. Appx. 357, 358 (CA4 2006) (per curiam) (case below); see also United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 2006) (USSG or Guidelines). The most important question before us is whether the law permits the courts of appeals to use this presumption. We hold that it does.
I
A
The basic crime in this case concerns two false statements which Victor Rita, the petitioner, made under oath to a federal grand jury. The jury was investigating a gun company called InterOrdnance. Prosecutors believed that buyers of an InterOrdnance kit, called a “PPSH 41 machinegun ‘parts kit,’” could assemble a machinegun from the kit, that those kits consequently amounted to machineguns, and that Inter-Ordnance had not secured proper registrations for the importation of the guns. App. 7, 16-19, 21-22.
Rita had bought a PPSH 41 machinegun parts kit. Rita, when contacted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), agreed to let a federal agent inspect the kit. Id., at 119-120; Supp. App. 5-8. But before meeting with the agent, Rita called InterOrdnance and then sent back the kit. He subsequently turned over to ATF a different kit that apparently did not amount to a maehinegun. App. 23-24,120; Supp. App. 2-5,8-10,13-14.
The investigating prosecutor brought Rita before the grand jury, placed him under oath, and asked him about these matters. Rita denied that the Government agent had asked him for the PPSH kit, and also denied that he had spoken soon thereafter about the PPSH kit to someone at InterOrdnance. App. 19, 120-121; Supp. App. 11-12. The Government claimed these statements were false, charged Rita with perjury, making false statements, and obstructing justice, and, after a jury trial, obtained convictions on all counts. App. 7-13, 94, 103.
B
The parties subsequently proceeded to sentencing. Initially, a probation officer, with the help of the parties, and after investigating the background both of the offenses and of the offender, prepared a presentence report. See Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 32(c)-(d); 18 U. S. C. § 3552(a). The completed report describes “offense characteristics,” “offender characteristics,” and other matters that might be relevant to the sentence, and then calculates a Guidelines sentence. The report also sets forth factors potentially relevant to a departure from the Guidelines or relevant to the imposition of an other-than-Guidelines sentence. It ultimately makes a sentencing recommendation based on the Guidelines. App. 115-136.
In respect to “offense characteristics,” for example, the report points out that the five counts of conviction all stem from a single incident. Id., at 122. Hence, pursuant to the Guidelines, the report, in calculating a recommended sentence, groups the five counts of conviction together, treating them as if they amounted to the single most serious count among them (and ignoring all others). See USSG § 3B1.1. The single most serious offense in Rita's case is “perjury.” The relevant Guideline, §2J1.3(c)(l), instructs the sentencing court (and the probation officer) to calculate the Guidelines sentence for “perjury... in respect to a criminal offense” by applying the Guideline for an “accessory after the fact,” as to that criminal offense, §2X3.1. And that latter Guideline says that the judge, for calculation purposes, should take as a base offense level, a level that is “6 levels lower than the offense level for the underlying offense” (emphasis added) (the offense that the perjury may have helped someone commit). Here the “underlying offense” consisted of InterOrdnance’s possible violation of the machinegun registration law. App. 124; USSG §2M5.2 (providing sentence for violation of 22 U. S. C. § 2778(b)(2), importation of defense articles without authorization). The base offense level for the gun registration crime is 26. See USSG §2M5.2. Six levels less is 20. And 20, says the presentence report, is the base offense level applicable to Rita for purposes of Guidelines sentence calculation. App. 45.
The presentence report next considers Rita’s “Criminal History.” Id., at 125. Rita was convicted in May 1986, and sentenced to five years’ probation for making false statements in connection with the purchase of firearms. Because this conviction took place more than 10 years before the present offense, it did not count against Rita. And because Rita had no other relevant convictions, the Guidelines considered him as having no “criminal history points.” Ibid. The report consequently places Rita in criminal history category I, the lowest category for purposes of calculating a Guidelines’ sentence.
The report goes on to describe other “Offender Characteristics.” Id., at 126. The description includes Rita’s personal and family data, Rita’s physical condition (including a detailed description of ailments), Rita’s mental and emotional health, the lack of any history of substance abuse, Rita’s vocational and nonvocational education, and Rita’s employment record. It states that he served in the Armed Forces for over 25 years, on active duty and in the Reserve. During that time he received 35 commendations, awards, or medals of different kinds. The report analyzes Rita’s financial condition. Id., at 126-132.
Ultimately, the report calculates the Guidelines sentencing range. Id., at 132. The Guidelines specify for base level 20, criminal history category I, a sentence of 33-to-41 months’ imprisonment. Ibid. The report adds that there “appears to be no circumstance or combination of circumstances that warrant a departure from the prescribed sentencing guidelines.” Id., at 133.
C
At the sentencing hearing, both Rita and the Government presented their sentencing arguments. Each side addressed the report. Rita argued for a sentence outside (and lower than) the recommended Guidelines 33-to-41 month range.
The judge made clear that Rita's argument for a lower sentence could take either of two forms. First, Rita might argue within the Guidelines’ framework, for a departure from the applicable Guidelines range on the ground that his circumstances present an “atypical case” that falls outside the “heartland” to which the United States Sentencing Commission intends each individual Guideline to apply. USSG § 5K2.0(a)(2). Second, Rita might argue that, independent of the Guidelines, application of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. IV) warrants a lower sentence. See Booker, 543 U. S., at 259-260.
Thus, the judge asked Rita’s counsel, “Are you going to put on evidence to show that [Rita] should be getting a downward departure, or under 3553, your client would be entitled to a different sentence than he should get under sentencing guidelines?” App. 52. And the judge later summarized:
“[Y]ou’re asking for a departure from the guidelines or a sentence under 3553 that is lower than the guidelines, and here are the reasons:
“One, he is a vulnerable defendant because he’s been involved in [government criminal justice] work which has caused people to become convicted criminals who are in prison and there may be retribution against him.
“Two, his military experience....” Id., at 64-65.
Counsel agreed, while adding that Rita’s poor physical condition constituted a third reason. And counsel said that he rested his claim for a lower sentence on “[j]ust [those] three” special circumstances, “[p]hysical condition, vulnerability in prison and the military service.” Id., at 65. Rita presented evidence and argument related to these three factors. The Government, while not asking for a sentence higher than the report’s recommended Guidelines range, said that Rita’s perjury had interfered with the Government’s potential “obstruction of justice” claim against InterOrdnance and that Rita, as a former Government criminal justice employee, should have known better than to commit perjury. Id., at 74-77. The sentencing judge asked questions about each factor.
After hearing the arguments, the judge concluded that he was “unable to find that the [report’s recommended] sentencing guideline range... is an inappropriate guideline range for that, and under 3553... the public needs to be protected if it is true, and I must accept as true the jury verdict.” Id., at 87. The court concluded: “So the Court finds that it is appropriate to enter” a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range, namely, a sentence of imprisonment “for a period of 33 months.” Ibid.
D
On appeal, Rita argued that his 33-month sentence was “unreasonable” because (1) it did not adequately take account of “the defendant’s history and characteristics,” and (2) it “is greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2).” Brief for Appellant in No. 05-4674 (CA4), pp. i, 8. The Fourth Circuit observed that it must set aside a sentence that is not “reasonable.” The Circuit stated that “a sentence imposed within the properly calculated Guidelines range... is presumptively reasonable.” 177 Fed. Appx., at 358 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It added that “while we believe that the appropriate circumstances for imposing a sentence outside the guideline range will depend on the facts of individual cases, we have no reason to doubt that most sentences will continue to fall within the applicable guideline range.” The Fourth Circuit then rejected Rita’s arguments and upheld the sentence. Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted).
E
Rita petitioned for a writ of certiorari. He pointed out that the Circuits are split as to the use of a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences. Compare United States v. Dorcely, 454 F. 3d 366, 376 (CADC 2006) (uses presumption); United States v. Green, 436 F. 3d 449, 457 (CA4 2006) (same); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F. 3d 551, 554 (CA5 2006) (same); United States v. Williams, 436 F. 3d 706, 708 (CA6 2006) (same); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F. 3d 606, 608 (CA7 2005) (same); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F. 3d 716, 717 (CA8 2005) (same); and United States v. Kristl, 437 F. 3d 1050, 1053-1054 (CA10 2006) (per curiam) (same), with United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F. 3d 514, 518 (CA1 2006) (en banc) (does not use presumption); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F. 3d 19, 27 (CA2 2006) (same); United States v. Cooper, 437 F. 3d 324, 331 (CA3 2006) (same); and United States v. Talley, 431 F. 3d 784, 788 (CA11 2005) (per curiam) (same).
We consequently granted Rita’s petition. We agreed to decide whether a court of appeals may afford a “presumption of reasonableness” to a “within-Guidelines” sentence. We also agreed to decide whether the District Court properly analyzed the relevant sentencing factors and whether, given the record, the District Court’s ultimate choice of a 33-month sentence was “unreasonable.”
II
The first question is whether a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines. We conclude that it can.
A
For one thing, the presumption is not binding. It does not, like a trial-related evidentiary presumption, insist that one side, or the other, shoulder a particular burden of persuasion or proof lest they lose their case. Cf., e. g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U. S. 44, 49-50, n. 3 (2003) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 143 (2000), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 (1973)). Nor does the presumption reflect strong judicial deference of the kind that leads appeals courts to grant greater factfinding leeway to an expert agency than to a district judge. Rather, the presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case. That double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.
Further, the presumption reflects the nature of the Guidelines-writing task that Congress set for the Commission and the manner in which the Commission carried out that task. In instructing both the sentencing judge and the Commission what to do, Congress referred to the basic sentencing objectives that the statute sets forth in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. IV). That provision tells the sentencing judge to consider (1) offense and offender characteristics; (2) the need for a sentence to reflect the basic aims of sentencing, namely, (a) “just punishment” (retribution), (b) deterrence, (c) incapacitation, (d) rehabilitation; (3) the sentences legally available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) Sentencing Commission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted disparities; and (7) the need for restitution. The provision also tells the sentencing judge to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with” the basic aims of sentencing as set out above.
Congressional statutes then tell the Commission to write Guidelines that will carry out these same § 3553(a) objectives. Thus, 28 U. S. C. § 991(b) indicates that one of the Commission’s basic objectives is to “assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in [§ 3553(a)(2)].” The provision adds that the Commission must seek to “provide certainty and fairness” in sentencing, to “avoi[d] unwarranted sentencing disparities,” to “maintai[n] sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices,” and to “reflect, to the extent practicable, [sentencing-relevant] advancement in [the] knowledge of human behavior.” Later provisions specifically instruct the Commission to write the Guidelines with reference to this statement of purposes, the statement that itself refers to § 3553(a). See 28 U. S. C. §§ 994(f), 994(m).
The upshot is that the sentencing statutes envision both the sentencing judge and the Commission as carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail, the other at wholesale.
The Commission has made a serious, sometimes controversial, effort to carry out this mandate. The Commission, in describing its Guidelines-writing efforts, refers to these same statutory provisions. It says that it has tried to embody in the Guidelines the factors and considerations set forth in § 3553(a). The Commission’s introductory statement recognizes that Congress “foresees guidelines that will further the basic purposes of criminal punishment, i. e., deterring crime, incapacitating the offender, providing just punishment, and rehabilitating the offender.” USSG § 1A1.1, intro, to comment., pt. A, ¶2 (The Statutory Mission). It adds that Congress “sought uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct,” as well as “proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of different severity.” Id., ¶ 3, at 2 (The Basic Approach).
The Guidelines commentary explains how, despite considerable disagreement within the criminal justice community, the Commission has gone about writing Guidelines that it intends to embody these ends. It says, for example, that the goals of uniformity and proportionality often conflict. The commentary describes the difficulties involved in developing a practical sentencing system that sensibly reconciles the two ends. It adds that a “philosophical problem arose when the Commission attempted to reconcile the differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal punishment.” Some would emphasize moral culpability and “just punishment”; others would emphasize the need for “crime control.” Rather than choose among differing practical and philosophical objectives, the Commission took an “empirical approach,” beginning with an empirical examination of 10,000 presentence reports setting forth what judges had done in the past and then modifying and adjusting past practice in the interests of greater rationality, avoiding inconsistency, complying with congressional instructions, and the like. Id., ¶ 3, at 3.
The Guidelines as written reflect the fact that the Sentencing Commission examined tens of thousands of sentences and worked with the help of many others in the law enforcement community over a long period of time in an effort to fulfill this statutory mandate. They also reflect the fact that different judges (and others) can differ as to how best to reconcile the disparate ends of punishment.
The Commission’s work is ongoing. The statutes and the Guidelines themselves foresee continuous evolution helped by the sentencing courts and courts of appeals in that process. The sentencing courts, applying the Guidelines in individual cases, may depart (either pursuant to the Guidelines or, since Booker, by imposing a non-Guidelines sentence). The judges will set forth their reasons. The courts of appeals will determine the reasonableness of the resulting sentence. The Commission will collect and examine the results. In doing so, it may obtain advice from prosecutors, defenders, law enforcement groups, civil liberties associations, experts in penology, and others. And it can revise the Guidelines accordingly. See generally 28 U. S. C. § 994(p) and note following § 994 (Commission should review and amend Guidelines as necessary, and Congress has power to revoke or amend Guidelines); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 393-394 (1989); USSG §1B1.10(c) (listing 24 amendments promulgated in response to evolving sentencing concerns); USSG § 1A1.1, comment.
The result is a set of Guidelines that seek to embody the § 3553(a) considerations, both in principle and in practice. Given the difficulties of doing so, the abstract and potentially conflicting nature of § 3553(a)’s general sentencing objectives, and the differences of philosophical view among those who work within the criminal justice community as to how best to apply general sentencing objectives, it is fair to assume that the Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve §3553(a)’s objectives.
An individual judge who imposes a sentence within the range recommended by the Guidelines thus makes a decision that is fully consistent with the Commission’s judgment in general. Despite Justice Souter’s fears to the contrary, post, at 390-392 (dissenting opinion), the courts of appeals’ “reasonableness” presumption, rather than having independent legal effect, simply recognizes the real-world circumstance that when the judge’s discretionary decision accords with the Commission’s view of the appropriate application of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is reasonable. Indeed, even the Circuits that have declined to adopt a formal presumption also recognize that a Guidelines sentence will usually be reasonable, because it reflects both the Commission’s and the sentencing court’s judgment as to what is an appropriate sentence for a given offender. See Fernandez, 443 F. 3d, at 27; Cooper, 437 F. 3d, at 331; Talley, 431 F. 3d, at 788.
We repeat that the presumption before us is an appellate court presumption. Given our explanation in Booker that appellate “reasonableness” review merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion, the presumption applies only on appellate review. The sentencing judge, as a matter of process, will normally begin by considering the presentence report and its interpretation of the Guidelines. 18 U. S. C. § 3552(a); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32. He may hear arguments by prosecution or defense that the Guidelines sentence should not apply, perhaps because (as the Guidelines themselves foresee) the case at hand falls outside the “heartland” to which the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply, USSG §5K2.0, perhaps because the Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations, or perhaps because the case warrants a different sentence regardless, see Rule 32(f). Thus, the sentencing court subjects the defendant’s sentence to the thorough adversarial testing contemplated by federal sentencing procedure. See Rules 32(f), (h), (i)(1)(C), and (i)(1)(D); see also Burns v. United States, 501 U. S. 129, 136 (1991) (recognizing importance of notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard at sentencing). In determining the merits of these arguments, the sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply. Booker, 543 U. S., at 259-260.
B
Rita and his supporting amici make two further arguments against use of the presumption. First, Rita points out that many individual Guidelines apply higher sentences in the presence of special facts, for example, brandishing a weapon. In many cases, the sentencing judge, not the jury, will determine the existence of those facts. A pro-Guidelines “presumption of reasonableness” will increase the likelihood that courts of appeals will affirm such sentences, thereby increasing the likelihood that sentencing judges will impose such sentences. For that reason, Rita says, the presumption raises Sixth Amendment “concerns.” Brief for Petitioner 28.
In our view, however, the presumption, even if it increases the likelihood that the judge, not the jury, will find “sentencing facts,” does not violate the Sixth Amendment. This Court’s Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence. Nor do they prohibit the sentencing judge from taking account of the Sentencing Commission’s factual findings or recommended sentences. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U. S. 270, 281-282 (2007) (citing Booker, supra, at 243-244; Blakely v. Washington, 542 U. S. 296, 304-305 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 602 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 471 (2000)).
The Sixth Amendment question, the Court has said, is whether the law forbids a judge to increase a defendant’s sentence unless the judge finds facts that the jury did not find (and the offender did not concede). Blakely, supra, at 303-304 (“When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts which the law makes essential to the punishment and the judge exceeds his proper authority” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see Cunningham, supra, at 283-284 (discussing Blakely) (“The judge could not have sentenced Blakely above the standard range without finding the additional fact of deliberate cruelty,” “[b]ecause the judge in Blakely’s case could not have imposed a sentence outside the standard range without finding an additional fact, the top of that range... was the relevant” maximum sentence for Sixth Amendment purposes); Booker, 543 U. S., at 244 (“Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”); id., at 232 (discussing Blakely) (“We rejected the State’s argument that the jury verdict was sufficient to authorize a sentence within the general 10-year sentence for class B felonies, noting that under Washington law, the judge was required to find additional facts in order to impose the greater 90-month sentence” (emphasis in original)).
A nonbinding appellate presumption that a Guidelines sentence is reasonable does not require the sentencing judge to impose that sentence. Still less does it prohibit the sentencing judge from imposing a sentence higher than the Guidelines provide for the jury-determined facts standing alone. As far as the law is concerned, the judge could disregard the Guidelines and apply the same sentence (higher than the statutory minimum or the bottom of the unenhanced Guidelines range) in the absence of the special facts (say, gun brandishing) which, in the view of the Sentencing Commission, would warrant a higher sentence within the statutorily permissible range. Thus, our Sixth Amendment cases do not forbid appellate court use of the presumption.
Justice Scalia concedes that the Sixth Amendment concerns he foresees are not presented by this case. Post, at 373-374 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). And his need to rely on hypotheticals to make his point is consistent with our view that the approach adopted here will not “raise a multitude of constitutional problems.” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 380-381 (2005). Similarly, Justice Scalia agrees that we have never held that “the Sixth Amendment prohibits judges from ever finding any facts” relevant to sentencing. Post, at 373. In sentencing, as in other areas, district judges at times make mistakes that are substantive. At times, they will impose sentences that are unreasonable. Circuit courts exist to correct such mistakes when they occur. Our decision in Booker recognized as much, 543 U. S., at 260-264. Booker held unconstitutional that portion of the Guidelines that made them mandatory. Id., at 233-234, 243-244. It also recognized that when district courts impose discretionary sentences, which are reviewed under normal appellate principles by courts of appeals, such a sentencing scheme will ordinarily raise no Sixth Amendment concern. Ibid.; see id., at 233 (opinion for the Court by Stevens, J.) (“Indeed, everyone agrees that the constitutional issues presented by these cases would have been avoided entirely if Congress had omitted from the [federal sentencing statute] the provisions that make the Guidelines binding on district judges”). That being so, our opinion in Booker made clear that today’s holding does not violate the Sixth Amendment.
Rita may be correct that the presumption will encourage sentencing judges to impose Guidelines sentences. But we do not see how that fact could change the constitutional calculus. Congress sought to diminish unwarranted sentencing disparity. It sought a Guidelines system that would bring about greater fairness in sentencing through increased uniformity. The fact that the presumption might help achieve these congressional goals does not provide cause for holding the presumption unlawful as long as the presumption remains constitutional. And, given our case law, we cannot conclude that the presumption itself violates the Sixth Amendment.
The fact that we permit courts of appeals to adopt a presumption of reasonableness does not mean that courts may adopt a presumption of unreasonableness. Even the Government concedes that appellate courts may not presume that every variance from the advisory Guidelines is unreasonable. See Brief for United States 34-35. Several courts of appeals have also rejected a presumption of unreasonableness. See, e. g., United States v. Howard, 454 F. 3d 700, 703 (CA7 2006); United States v. Matheny, 450 F. 3d 633, 642 (CA6 2006); United States v. Myers, 439 F. 3d 415, 417 (CA8 2006); United States v. Moreland, 437 F. 3d 424, 433 (CA4 2006). However, a number of Circuits adhere to the proposition that the strength of the justification needed to sustain an outside-Guidelines sentence varies in proportion to the degree of the variance. See, e. g., United States v. Smith, 445 F. 3d 1, 4 (CA1 2006); Moreland, supra, at 434; United States v. Armendariz, 451 F. 3d 352, 358 (CA5 2006); United States v. Davis, 458 F. 3d 491, 496 (CA6 2006); United States v. Dean, 414 F. 3d 725, 729 (CA7 2005); United States v. Dalton, 404 F. 3d 1029, 1033 (CA8 2005); United States v. Bishop, 469 F. 3d 896, 907 (CA10 2006); United States v. Crisp, 454 F. 3d 1285, 1291-1292 (CA11 2006). We will consider that approach next Term in Gall v. United States, No. 06-7949, cert. granted, post, p. 1113.
Second, Rita and his amici claim that use of a pro-Guidelines presumption on appeal conflicts with Congress’ insistence that sentencing judges apply the factors set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (and that the resulting sentence be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of sentencing set forth in that statute). We have explained above, however, why we believe that, where judge and Commission both determine that the Guidelines sentence is an appropriate sentence for the case at hand, that sentence likely reflects the § 3553(a) factors (including its “not greater than necessary” requirement). See supra, at 348. This circumstance alleviates any serious general conflict between § 3553(a) and the Guidelines, for the purposes of appellate review. And, for that reason, we find that nothing in § 3553(a) renders use of the presumption unlawful.
Ill
We next turn to the question whether the District Court properly analyzed the relevant sentencing factors. In particular, Rita argues that the court took inadequate account of § 3553(c) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), a provision that requires a sentencing judge, “at the time of sentencing,” to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” In our view, given the straightforward, conceptually simple arguments before the judge, the judge’s statement of reasons here, though brief, was legally sufficient.
The statute does call for the judge to “state” his “reasons.” And that requirement reflects sound judicial practice. Judicial decisions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in a judge's use of reason underlies the public’s trust in the judicial institution. A public statement of those reasons helps provide the public with the assurance that creates that trust.
That said, we cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as insisting upon a full opinion in every case. The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances. Sometimes a judicial opinion responds to every argument; sometimes it does not; sometimes a judge simply writes the word “granted” or “denied” on the face of a motion while relying upon context and the parties’ prior arguments to make the reasons clear. The law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge’s own professional judgment.
In the present context, a statement of reasons is important. The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority. See, e. g., United States v. Taylor, 487 U. S. 326, 336-337 (1988). Nonetheless, when a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation. Circumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence (in terms of § 3553(a) and other congressional mandates) in the typical case, and that the judge has found that the case before him is typical. Unless a party contests the Guidelines sentence generally under § 3553(a) — that is, argues that the Guidelines reflect an unsound judgment, or, for example, that they do not generally treat certain defendant characteristics in the proper way — or argues for departure, the judge normally need say no more. Cf. § 3553(c)(2) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). (Although, often at sentencing a judge will speak at length to a defendant, and this practice may indeed serve a salutary purpose.)
Where the defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence, however, the judge will normally go further and explain why he has rejected those arguments. Sometimes the circumstances will call for a brief explanation; sometimes they will call for a lengthier explanation. Where the judge imposes a sentence outside the Guidelines, the judge will explain why he has done so. To our knowledge, an ordinary explanation of judicial reasons as to why the judge has, or has not, applied the Guidelines triggers no Sixth Amendment “jury trial” requirement. Cf. Booker, 543 U. S., at 233 (“For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant”), and id., at 242 (requirement of finding, not articulation of it, creates Sixth Amendment problem).
By articulating reasons, even if brief, the sentencing judge not only assures reviewing courts (and the public) that the sentencing process is a reasoned process but also helps that process evolve. The sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant before him than the Commission or the appeals court. That being so, his reasoned sentencing judgment, resting upon an effort to filter the Guidelines’ general advice through §3553(a)’s list of factors, can provide relevant information to
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These four cases present issues of basic importance to the federal reclamation laws. The Supreme Court of California has refused to confirm certain contracts entered into between two state irrigation districts and a water agency on the one hand and the United States on the other, finding the contracts invalid on several grounds. 47 Cal. 2d 597, 681, 695, 699, 306 P. 2d 824, 886, 894, 875. Specifically involved are parts of two statutory enactments: Section 5 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, providing generally that no right to the use of water shall be sold for lands in excess of 160 acres in single ownership, and § 9 of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, providing, inter alia, for the repayment to the United States of funds expended on the construction of reclamation works, and authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to make contracts to furnish reclamation water at appropriate rates for irrigation. The opinion of the Supreme Court of California turned on an interpretation of a third provision, § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902. That section provides that the Act is not to be construed as interfering with state laws “relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation.” It further provides that in administering the Act the Secretary of the Interior “shall proceed in conformity with such laws... The California court held that this provision required the application of California law, and finding the provisions of the contracts contrary thereto, it refused confirmation. The water districts and agency involved, joined by the State of California, appealed, and we postponed the question of jurisdiction to the merits. 355 U. S. 803 (1957). We have concluded, for reasons hereinafter set forth, that we have no jurisdiction over the appeals. Treating the papers as petitions for certiorari, 28 U. S. C. § 2103, we grant certio-rari. On the merits, we deem the contracts controlled by federal law and valid as against the objections made.
I. The Background of the Litigation.
This litigation involves a dispute between landowners on the one hand and the combined State and Federal Governments on the other. As the Attorney General of California points out, there is no clash here between the United States and the State of California. Quite to the contrary, the United States and the various state agencies, with commendable faith and steadfastness to one another, have embarked upon and nearly completed a most complicated joint venture known as the Central Valley Project. There have at times been differences, but these are inevitable in the everyday implementation of such a giant undertaking. On the whole the parties have kept the ultimate goal firmly centered in their joint vision.
Central Valley is the largest single undertaking yet embarked upon under the federal reclamation program. It was born in the minds of far-seeing Californians in their endeavor to bring to that State’s parched acres a water supply sufficiently permanent to transform them into veritable gardens for the benefit of mankind. Failing in its efforts to finance such a giant undertaking, California almost a quarter of a century ago petitioned the United States to join in the enterprise. The Congress approved and adopted the project, pursuant to repeated requests of the State, and thus far has expended nearly half a billion dollars. The total cost is estimated to be as high as a billion dollars.
The saga of this project is fascinating. California has two somewhat parallel ranges of mountains running south from its northern border for two-thirds the length of the State. Known as the Sierra Nevada on the east and the Coast Range on the west, they converge on the north at Mount Shasta and are joined by the Tehachapi Mountains on the south, thereby forming the Central Valley Basin. The basin extends almost 500 miles between these ranges, from Shasta to Bakersfield, and has an average width of 120 miles, including more than a third of the area of California. The main valley floor, comprising about a third of the basin area, is an alluvial plain some 400 miles long and averaging 45 miles in width. The Sacramento River, with headwaters near Mount Shasta, flows south into San Francisco Bay, draining the northern portion of the basin. The San Joaquin River, which rises above Friant in the south, runs first west then north to join the Sacramento River in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, both finding a common outlet to the ocean through San Francisco Bay. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725 (1950).
Rainfall on the valley floor comes during the winter months — 85% from November to April — and summers are quite dry. At Red Bluff, just south of Mount Shasta, the average is 23 inches, while south at Bakersfield a scant 6 inches fall. The climate is ideal with a frost-free period of over seven months and a mild winter permitting production of some citrus as well as deciduous fruits and other specialized crops. The absence of rain, however, makes irrigation essential, particularly in the southern region.
In the mountain ranges precipitation is greater, and the winters more severe. The Northern Sierras average 80 inches of rainfall and the Southern 35 inches. The Coast Range experiences much less. In the higher recesses of the mountains precipitation is largely snow which, when it melts, joins the other runoff of the mountain areas to make up an annual average of 33,000,000 acre-feet of water coming from the mountain regions. Nature has not regulated the timing of the runoff water, however, and it is estimated that half of the Sierra runoff occurs during the three months of April, May, and June. Resulting floods cause great damage, and waste this phenomenal accumulation of water so vital to the valley’s rich alluvial soil. The object of the plan is to arrest this flow and regulate its seasonal and year-to-year variations, thereby creating salinity control to avoid the gradual encroachment of ocean water, providing an adequate supply of water for municipal and irrigation purposes, facilitating navigation, and generating power. The plan is now nearing completion and is actually in partial operation in some areas.
The completed project is built around these two great rivers, and includes a series of dams, three of which— Shasta, Folsom, and Trinity River — will furnish electric power. The state water plan contemplates that eventually 38 major reservoirs scattered at various points in this part of the State will store an estimated 30,000,000 acre-feet of water. The Shasta Dam and Reservoir sits at the head of the table on the north. With a capacity of 4,500,000 acre-feet of water, it, along with tributary dams and reservoirs, will control the floods from that area. The Trinity River, with headwaters west of Shasta on the western slope of the Coast Range, drains into the Pacific Ocean. A dam now under construction near Lewiston will impound some three-quarters of a million acre-feet of water which, by means of a tunnel, will be partially diverted into and supplement the waters of the Sacramento River lying to the east and across the mountains. The water supply facilities along the Sacramento River will regulate its flow, store surplus winter runoff for use in the Sacramento Valley, maintain navigation in the channel, protect the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta from salt intrusion from the Pacific, provide a water supply for the Contra Costa and Delta-Men-dota Canals, and generate a great deal of hydroelectric energy. The Contra Costa Canal services the south shore of Suisun Bay from Antioch to Martinez with water from the Delta for domestic, industrial, and irrigation use. The Delta-Mendota Canal transports surplus Sacramento River water to Mendota Pool on the San Joaquin River, 120 miles south of the Delta. The water is pumped from the Delta to the canal along the foothills of the Coast Range and by gravity it runs to the pool at Mendota. This exchange of water replaces that diverted from the San Joaquin by the dam at Friant. This latter dam forces the entire flow of the San Joaquin into Millerton Lake which has a capacity of 520,000 acre-feet of water. It is diverted from the lake by the Madera Canal to the north and the Friant-Kern Canal to the south. The former extends about 37 miles in length and services the Madera District, while the latter supplies water to the Ivanhoe District and others to the south. It will extend south about 160 miles to a point near Bakersfield, which sits at the foot of the Central Valley’s enormous table.
The power facilities of the project will, when finally completed, have a capacity of near a million kilowatts. Transmission lines, steam plants, and other essential facilities will be constructed so as to obtain the maximum utilization. It is estimated that through the sale of this power the United States will receive reimbursement for over half of its total reimbursable expenditures.
The over-all allocation of these enormous costs has not been definitely determined. That portion of the costs ultimately allocated to power facilities will be reimbursed at 4% interest, but that allocated to irrigation facilities will be reimbursed at no interest. Moreover, the Federal Government will receive no reimbursement for that portion of the cost allocated to numerous aspects of the project, such as navigation, flood control, salinity prevention, fish and wildlife preservation, and recreation. The irrigators will, therefore, be chargeable with but a small fraction of the total cost of the project.
We hasten to correct any impression that lands in the Central Valley had not been reclaimed and irrigated at the inception of the project. On the contrary, since California entered the Union it has worked diligently to bring water to its arid lands. Working largely through state irrigation districts, private interests have been ingenious in constructing smaller reservoirs, tapping underground sources, and attempting to prevent saline encroachment which would destroy the soil for agricultural purposes. Water has been called “the life blood of the State.” Competition for this vital natural resource has provoked such controversy that it has required amendments to the Constitution and continual legislative activity. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that in putting together the mosaic of Central Valley some litigation would ensue. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra.
II. Scope of the Appeals and Nature of the Contracts.
These four appeals contest the right of the United States and California to complete the venture and reap the rewards therefrom as provided by their respective laws.
It should be noted that the appeal involving the Santa Barbara County Water Agency, No. 125, does not involve the Central Valley Project, as it does not lie within that area. It concerns a project to supply water for irrigation and municipal uses along the south coastal area of Santa Barbara County. It includes a dam on the Santa Ynez River impounding water in Cachuma Reservoir. This river rises on the western slopes of the Coast Range and runs into the' Pacific. The Tecolote Tunnel will deliver water across the coastal range of mountains to the Santa Barbara County Agency through the lateral distribution systems of the Goleta and Carpenteria County Water Districts. The adoption of the project by the Congress in 1948 was based on the recommendation of the State Division of Water Resources Report stating that there was “an urgent and immediate need for substantial supplemental municipal and irrigation water supplies.... The city of Santa Barbara has a critical water situation at this time.... The underground water supplies in the county water districts are being seriously overdrawn. In some localities... wells are being damaged by salt water intrusion.” H. R. Doc. No. 587, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 10. While the contract is authorized under § 9 (c) of the 1939 Act, for our purposes it is identical to the others and will be discussed with them.
The remaining appeals involve areas in the southern portion of the Central Valley Basin. The Madera District includes the Friant Dam and Millerton Lake, the sites for which the United States has purchased outright. Water rights surrounding these areas were involved in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra, and have been acquired by the United States. These installations are, of course, vital to the operation of the project in the south of the valley. The Madera District will be furnished water from Millerton Lake by the Madera Canal. The Ivanhoe District is south of Friant and will be supplied water through the Friant-Kern Canal. It is interesting to note that irrigators in this district receive water diverted from the San Joaquin in which they never had nor were able to obtain any water right.
The contracts to which the Supreme Court of California took exception provide, in outline, that the United States will, after construction of the water supply facilities and the lateral distribution system for the irrigation districts, furnish water to the districts and the Santa Barbara County Agency for a period of 40 years. Incorporating the requirements of § 5 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, the contract provides that project water shall not be furnished to lands in excess of 160 acres in single ownership. This limitation applies only to “project water” and previously existing water supplies are unaffected thereby. “Large landowners,” i. e., those who own excess land, who wish that excess to have the benefit of project water must agree to sell their excess to other than large landowners within 10 years at a price, fixed by three appraisers, which will exclude potential enhancement of the price by reason of project water being available. Large landowners electing not to sell their excess may use existing water supplies in underground sources. Moreover, if they designate which of their holdings shall be considered nonexcess, the district would furnish water to that land under the terms provided in the contracts.
The repayment provisions as to the “distribution systems” require liquidation of the maximum stated expenditure of the United States by installments spread over 40 years, without interest, in accordance with § 9 (d) of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939. As to the “water supply facilities,” such as the dams and reservoirs, the contracts employ the more liberal provisions of § 9 (e) of that Act. Repayment, without interest, is to be included in the charge for water sold to the districts and the agency by the United States. The contract term runs for 40 years and, using the language of § 9 (e), the water rate is calculated so as to return to the United States “revenues at least sufficient to cover an appropriate share of the annual operation and maintenance cost and an appropriate share of such fixed charges as the Secretary deems proper, due consideration being given to that part of the cost of construction of works connected with water supply and allocated to irrigation.” The Congress has now supplemented these terms of the contracts by the Act of July 2, 1956, 70 Stat. 483. It provides that the districts and the agency shall be given “credit each year” for “so much of the amount paid... as is in excess of the share of the operation and maintenance costs of the project which the Secretary finds is properly chargeable....” The provision is retroactive and runs with the contract, and when this amount is equal to the amount owing on the total water supply expenditures allocated to irrigation, “no construction component shall be included in any charges made for the furnishing of water... The Act also permits renewal of the contract on terms that will reflect any “increases or decreases in construction, operation, and maintenance costs and improvement or deterioration in the [district’s] repayment capacity.” In addition, the Act provides that the districts and the agency “shall... have a first right (to which right the rights of the holders of any other type of irrigation water contract shall be subordinate) to a stated share or quantity of the project’s available water supply for beneficial use on the irrigable lands [within the district] and a permanent right to such share or quantity upon completion of payment of the amount” that is due on expenditures for water supply allocated to irrigation.
III. Action of the California Courts.
In the confirmation suits involving the Ivanhoe District, No. 122, and of the Madera District, No. 123, the trial court found the contracts and the proceedings leading to their execution invalid. The court reasoned that § 8 of the 1902 Act required that “whenever there is a conflict between the Federal Reclamation laws and the laws of the State, the law of California must prevail.” The court also found that in the light of the origin of the Central Valley Project, the United States was trustee of an express trust of which the Ivanhoe District and others were among the beneficiaries. It concluded that all applications to appropriate water are included in such trust and the beneficiaries have “an incomplete, incipient and conditional right in the water applied for” which is vested and runs with the land. The excess land provision was declared invalid and unenforceable as conflicting with both state law and the Reclamation Act. Application of the excess land provision to an irrigator would, the court found, be unconstitutional.
The Albonico litigation, No. 124, was an application for a mandatory order excluding lands in excess of 320 acres owned by the Albonicos from the Madera District. The court held that the excess land provisions were unconstitutional and that if applied to the Albonicos the mandatory order should issue.
The trial court in the Santa Barbara confirmation case, No. 125, contrary to the action in the other cases, upheld the contract and granted confirmation. The court found that the Master Contract was ratified and confirmed by the Interior Department’s Appropriation Act for 1951. 64 Stat. 595, 679.
The Supreme Court of California, by a 4-3 vote, reversed the trial court judgment validating the contract in No. 125, the Santa Barbara case, and affirmed each of the other judgments. The principal opinion was in the I van-hoe case to which we confine our discussion. The majority agreed with the.trial court that § 8 of the 1902 Act required the application of state law. It found that the excess lands provision was inapplicable and improper under state law, and that the contract was therefore invalid. This conclusion was posited on a trust theory of California water law which placed a trust on the State and the irrigation districts fQr the benefit of water users. In administering this trust the United States, the majority held, stood in the shoes of the State. The § 9 (e) provisions of the contract were found invalid on the grounds that no provision was made for repayment of a stated amount within 40 years or for transfer of title to the distribution systems to the respective districts after payment thereof, and that no permanent right to receive water was vested in the respective districts and their members. The court appears to have reached this conclusion by finding that the contract created a “debtor-creditor” relationship and that the United States was acting as a public utility without conforming to state law.
IV. The Jurisdictional Question.
We first face the dual aspects of the jurisdictional question: has California’s Supreme Court held a federal statute unconstitutional, and does its decision rest on an adequate state ground? Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 262 (1944).
As we read the reasons, heretofore mentioned, upon which the Supreme Court of California invalidated the contracts, we conclude that they rest upon neither ground. As to the rights and duties of the United States under the contracts, these are matters of federal law on which this Court has final word. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363 (1943). Our construction of the contract might dispel any features thereof found offensive. The other ground, namely, the 160-acre limitation., alone requires further consideration.
Appellants claim that California’s Supreme Court has held unconstitutional the federal statutes, § 5 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, as re-enacted in § 46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, relating to the 160-acre limitation. It appears to us, however, that the opinion actually turned on the court’s interpretation of § 8 of the 1902 Act. In effect, the court held that this section overrides all other sections of the Act, requiring that it be construed as not affecting state laws “relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation.” Turning to state law, the court by applying a “trust theory” held that the Federal Government could acquire no title to appropriative water rights free of a trust in the State of California for the benefit of the people of the State. This “limited measure of control” of the appropriative water, the court said, 47 Cal. 2d, at 620, 306 P. 2d, at 837, prevented the imposition of the 160-acre limitation because the beneficiaries of the trust, namely, the people of the State and particularly those in the districts involved, would be deprived by the acreage limitation of a right to the use of the water in the district. We think it plain that this was a construction of federal law and not a holding of unconstitutionality. This, of course, provides no basis for an appeal, but the importance of the case, as we earlier noted, requires that certiorari be granted.
We deem it equally clear that the judgments do not rest on an adequate state ground. The construction the opinion gave to § 8 of the 1902 Act nullified the specific mandate of § 5, as well as its re-enactment in the 1926 Act, and even though in the doing a state law may have been called into play, this would not immunize it from this Court’s review. Basically it is the interpretation of the Federal Act that opens the door to the application of the state law and leads to the striking down of the contracts made by the Secretary.
Nor would the suggestion that state law prevented the water districts and agencies of the State from entering into the contracts change this conclusion. We need not determine whether a State could in that manner frustrate the consummation of a federal project constructed at its own behest. The fact remains that the state law was, in fact, invoked only by the interpretation the court gave § 8.
V. Application op the Reclamation Laws to the Contracts.
At the outset we set aside as not necessary to decision here the question of title to or vested rights in unappropriated water. Cf. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 611-616 (1945). If the rights held by the United States are insufficient, then it must acquire those necessary to carry on the project, United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra, at 739, paying just compensation therefor, either through condemnation or, if already taken, through action of the owners in the courts. As we see it, the authority to impose the conditions of the contracts here comes from the power of the Congress to condition the use of federal funds, works, and projects on compliance with reasonable requirements. And, again, if the enforcement of those conditions impairs any compensable property rights, then recourse for just compensation is open in the courts.
As we have noted, the Supreme Court of California first concluded that the provisions of § 8 of the 1902 Act as to the application of state law were absolute, and controlled all provisions of the Act and other reclamation statutes having to do with “the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder....” We believe this erroneous insofar as the substantive provisions of § 5 of the 1902 Act are concerned. As we read § 8, it merely requires the United States to comply with state law when, in the construction and operation of a reclamation project, it becomes necessary for it to acquire water rights or vested interests therein. But the acquisition of water rights must not be confused with the operation of federal projects. As the Court said in Nebraska v. Wyoming, supra, at 615: “We do not suggest that where Congress has provided a system of regulation for federal projects it must give way before an inconsistent state system.” Section 5 is a specific and mandatory prerequisite laid down by the Congress as binding in the operation of reclamation projects, providing that “[n]o right to the use of water... shall be sold for a tract exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to any one landowner... We read nothing in § 8 that compels the United States to deliver water on conditions imposed by the State. To read § 8 to the contrary would require the Secretary to violate § 5, the provisions of which, as we shall see, have been national policy for over half a century. Without passing generally on the coverage of § 8 in the delicate area of federal-state relations in the irrigation field, we do not believe that the Congress intended § 8 to override the repeatedly reaffirmed national policy of § 5.
From the beginning of the federal reclamation program in 1902, the policy as declared by the Congress has been one requiring that the benefits therefrom be made available to the largest number of people, consistent, of course, with the public good. This policy has been accomplished by limiting the quantity of land in a single ownership to which project water might be supplied. It has been applied to public land opened up for entry under the reclamation law as well as privately owned lands, which might receive project water. See Taylor, The Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public Policy, 64 Yale L. J. 477.
Significantly, where a particular project has been exempted because of its peculiar circumstances, the Congress has always made such exemption by express enactment. See Act of September 3, 1954, 68 Stat. 1190, exempting the Santa Maria Project from the applicability of “excess land laws.” With respect to the Central Valley Project the Congress has again and again reaffirmed the specific requirements of § 5 and the action taken by the Secretary thereunder. As late as 1944 on consideration of the Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Bill the Senate refused, after vigorous debate, to concur in a conference report that would have exempted this project from the excess land requirements of § 5. 90 Cong Rec. 9493-9499. At the next Session of the Congress the disputed exemption was deleted from the bill and it was promptly passed. Likewise, the Secretary reported to the Congress from time to time the execution of contracts, similar to those involved here, wherein “the excess land limitations and other requirements of law are fully incorporated in the Central Valley contract form.” His annual report for 1950 and 1951 related the execution of the Madera, Ivanhoe, and Santa Barbara contracts involved here. In the latter report he mentions individual contracts with water users under the excess land laws, advising that these laws were “given active attention. Five recordable contracts providing for delivery of Central Valley Project water to 3,570 acres of excess land are the first to be executed on the project.” During this period the Congress reauthorized the project, additional units were added, see Act of October 14, 1949, 63 Stat. 852; H. R. Doc. No. 416, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 620-622; Act of September 26, 1950, 64 Stat. 1036, and the Act of August 12, 1955, 69 Stat. 719; H. R. Doc. No. 416, pp. 937-940, and large appropriations of funds thereto were granted annually.
In light of these congressional actions, it cannot be said that Congress intended that § 8 would, under the application of state law, make inapplicable the excess lands provisions of § 5 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 to the Central Valley Project. That possibility is foreclosed by subsequent and continuing action by the Congress ever since the inception of the project. Such a record constitutes ratification of administrative construction, and confirmation and approval of the contracts. Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U. S. 111, 119 (1947); Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U. S. 354, 361 (1941); Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd., v. United States, 300 U. S. 297, 302 (1937).
VI. The Constitutional Issues.
Appellees urge, however, that the federal statutes requiring insertion of these provisions in the contracts are unconstitutional as a denial of due process and equal protection of the law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. They assert that the excess acreage provisions amount to a taking of vested property rights both in land and irrigation district water, and discriminate between the nonexcess and the excess landowner. We cannot agree.
There can be no doubt of the Federal Government’s general authority to establish and execute the Central Valley and Santa Barbara County projects. As we said in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra, at 739, the Congress “elected to treat it [the Central Valley Project] as a reclamation project.” We upheld its power to pursue the project as “clear” and “ample,” an exercise of the general power “to promote the general welfare through large-scale projects for reclamation, irrigation, or other internal improvement.” Id., at 738. The Santa Barbara Project is supportable on the same grounds. Cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 65-67 (1936). In developing these projects the United States is expending federal funds and acquiring federal property for a valid public and national purpose, the promotion of agriculture. This power flows not only from the General Welfare Clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution, but also from Art. IV, § 3, relating to the management and disposal of federal property. As this Court said in United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29-30 (1940), this “power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations. 'And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine.’ ” See also United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 27 (1947), and Alabama v. Texas, 347 U. S. 272, 273-274 (1954).
Also beyond challenge is the power of the Federal Government to impose reasonable conditions on the use of federal funds, federal property, and federal privileges. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954), and Federal Power Comm’n v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U. S. 17 (1952). The lesson of these cases is that the Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives thereof. Conversely, a State cannot compel use of federal property on terms other than those prescribed or authorized by Congress. Public Utilities Comm’n of California v. United States, 355 U. S. 534 (1958). Article VI of the Constitution, of course, forbids state encroachment on the supremacy of federal legislative action.
In considering appellees’ specific constitutional contentions, it is well to recapitulate. The Central Valley Project is multi-purpose in nature. That portion of the project expense attributable to navigation, flood control, salinity prevention, recreation and fish and wildlife preservation is nonreimbursable. The remainder of the total expense, and the only part that is reimbursable, is divided between two main sources. The first is hydroelectric power which estimates indicate will be chargeable with over 50 percent of the reimbursable expense, plus interest on the part representing electric plants in service. The other is irrigation, which pays the rest without interest charge. In short, the project is a subsidy, the cost of which will never be recovered in full. Appellees argue that the same reasoning applies to power facilities, but there the Government is operating the generating facilities itself and the base rate upon which the power is sold includes an item for interest on the amount of expenditures allocated to that purpose. Hence the true relationship of debtor-creditor is maintained. In the light of these facts we believe that the language of the Court in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 131 (1942), is apposite: “It is hardly lack of due process for the Government to regulate that which it subsidizes.”
In any event, the provisions under attack are entirely ■ reasonable and do not deprive appellees of any rights to property or water. It is beyond dispute that excess land will be benefited by delivery of water to neighboring and nearby nonexcess land. This fact was recognized by the California Supreme Court in the Santa Barbara case. 47 Cal. 2d 699, 712, 306 P. 2d 875, 883. Furthermore the Chief Engineer of the Madera District so testified before the Senate Committee on Public Lands in 1944. The contracts themselves indirectly refer to the benefits that may accrue, through underground water improvement, to excess owners, by provisions which declare that such water shall not be considered as furnished by the project. In other words, any benefits to the underground water level under excess acreage will not be chargeable to the owner of such acreage, but still will be available to his excess land. We therefore find no substance in the contention that “possible severance” of the excess acreage will result in damage constituting a taking of property without just compensation. We deem it unnecessary to discuss other claims in this area, but repeat in connection therewith that if the United States takes any compensable water or property right the courts are open for redress.
As to the claim of discrimination in the 160-acre limitation, we believe that it overlooks the purpose for which the project was designed. The project was designed to benefit people, not land. It is a reasonable classification to limit the amount of project water available to each individual in order that benefits may be distributed in accordance with the greatest good to the greatest number of individuals. The limitation insures that this enormous expenditure will not go in disproportionate share to a few individuals with large land holdings. Moreover, it prevents the use of the federal reclamation service for speculative purposes. In short, the excess acreage provision acts as a ceiling, imposed equally upon all participants, on the federal subsidy that is being bestowed.
We also find the other contract provisions reasonable and necessary. As we have pointed out heretofore the Act of July 2, 1966, supra, answered most of the objections lodged against these requirements. That Act requires the Secretary, in all § 9 (d) and § 9 (e) contracts executed after its passage, (1) to include a renewal provision, (2) to provide that during the term of the contract or any renewal thereof the contracting parties shall have “first right... to a stated share or quantity of the project’s available water supply,” and (3) to determine as soon as feasible the total repayment obligation of the contracting parties, crediting against that obligation so much of the amount paid for water supply as is unnecessary for operation and maintenance costs until, and only until, that obligation has been liquidated. The Secretary is authorized to negotiate amendments to existing contracts to incorporate the foregoing amendments. In view of the declarations and privileges incorporated in these amendments we see no room for objection to the contracts on the ground that they infer that the water users are not entitled to water rights beyond the 40-year terms of the contracts, or that they do not make clear that the districts and landowners become free of indebtedness upon repayment.
That leaves two other objections, the first being
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider the claims of school officials and schoolchildren in 23 northern Mississippi counties that they are being unlawfully denied the economic benefits of public school lands granted by the United States to the State of Mississippi well over 100 years ago. Specifically, we must determine to what extent these claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and, with respect to those claims that are not barred, if any, whether the complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
r — i
The history of public school lands in the United States stretches back over 200 years. Even before the ratification of the Constitution, the Congress of the Confederation initiated a practice with regard to the Northwest Territory which was followed with most other public lands that eventually became States and were admitted to the Union. In particular, the Land Ordinance of 1785, which provided for the survey and sale of the Northwest Territory, “reserved the lot No. 16, of every township, for the maintenance of public schools within the said township....” 1 Laws of the United States 565 (1815). In 1802, when the eastern portion of the Northwest Territory became what is now the State of Ohio, Congress granted Ohio the lands that had been previously reserved under the 1785 Ordinance for the use of public schools in the State. 2 Stat. 175.
Following the Ohio example of reserving lands for the maintenance of public schools, “ ‘grants were made for common school purposes to each of the public-land States admitted to the Union. Between the years of 1802 and 1846 the grants were of every section sixteen, and, thereafter, of sections sixteen and thirty-six. In some instances, additional sections have been granted.’” Andrus v. Utah, 446 U. S. 500, 506-507, n. 7 (1980) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 240 U. S. 192, 198 (1916) (footnotes omitted)). Thus, the basic Ohio example has been followed with respect to all but a few of the States admitted since then. 446 U. S., at 522-523, n. 4 (Powell, J., dissenting). In addition to the school lands designated in this manner, Congress made provision for townships in which the pertinent section or sections were not available for one reason or another. Thus, Congress generally indemnified States for the missing designated sections, allowing the States to select lands in an amount equal to and in lieu of the designated but unavailable lands. See, e. g., ch. 83, 4 Stat. 179 (1826). See generally Andrus v. Utah, supra, at 507-508; Morrison, supra, at 200-202.
Although the basic pattern of school lands grants was generally consistent from State to State in terms of the reservation and grant of the lands, the specific provisions of the grants varied by State and over time. See generally B. Hib-bard, A History of the Public Land Policies 314-318 (1939). For example, in Indiana and Alabama, the school lands were expressly granted to the inhabitants of the townships directly. See 3 Stat. 290 (1816) (Indiana); 3 Stat. 491 (1819) (Alabama). In most of the other grants before 1845, the school lands were given instead to the States but were explicitly designated to be for the use of the townships in which they lay. See, e. g., 2 Stat. 233-234 (1803) (Mississippi); 3 Stat. 375 (1817) (same); 5 Stat. 58 (1836) (Arkansas). The Michigan grant in 1836, on the other hand, was simply “to the State for the use of schools.” See 5 Stat. 59. After 1845, the type of grant used in Michigan, granting the lands to the State for the use of its schools generally, became the norm. See, e. g., 9 Stat. 58 (1846) (Wisconsin); 11 Stat. 383 (1859) (Oregon). Finally, the most recent grants are phrased not as outright gifts to the States for a specific use but instead as express trusts. These grants also are stated to be to the States for the support of the schools in those States generally. In addition, though, under these grants the State is specifically designated a trustee, there are explicit restrictions on the management and disposition of the lands in trust, and the Federal Government expressly retains an ongoing oversight responsibility. See, e. g., 36 Stat. 574 (1910) (Arizona and New Mexico).
The history of the school lands grants in Mississippi generally follows the pattern thus described. In 1798, Congress created the Mississippi Territory, which included what is now about the southern third of the States of Mississippi and Alabama. 1 Stat. 549. In 180.3, Congress provided for the sale and survey of all Mississippi Territory lands to which Indian title had been extinguished but excepted “the section number sixteen, which shall be reserved in each township for the support of schools within the same.” 2 Stat. 233-234. In 1804, the Mississippi Territory was extended northward to the southern boundary of Tennessee. 2 Stat. 305. Two years later, Congress authorized the selection of lands in lieu of unavailable Sixteenth Sections in the Territory. 2 Stat. 401 (1806). Eventually, in 1817, Mississippi was admitted as a State, and a further Land Sales Act provided for the survey and sale of those lands in the northern part of the new State that had not been covered by the 1803 Act. The 1817 Act provided that these lands were to be “surveyed and divided in the manner provided by law for the surveying of the other public lands of the United States in the Mississippi territory”; thus, the Act required that “the section No. 16 in each township... shall be reserved for the support of schools therein.” 3 Stat. 375 (1817). The Sixteenth Section lands and lands selected in lieu thereof were granted to the State of Mississippi. See Lambert v. State, 211 Miss. 129, 137, 51 So. 2d 201, 203 (1951).
By their own terms, however, these Acts did not apply to the lands in northern Mississippi that were held by the Chickasaw Indian Nation, an area essentially comprising what came to be the northern 23 counties in the State. This land was held by the Chickasaws until 1832, when it was ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Pontitoc Creek. 7 Stat. 381. Although that Treaty provided that the land would be surveyed and sold “in the same manner and on the same terms and conditions as the other public lands,” id., at 382, no Sixteenth Section lands were reserved from sale. City of Corinth v. Robertson, 125 Miss. 31, 57, 87 So. 464, 465-466 (1921). In 1836, Congress attempted to remedy this oversight by providing for the reservation of lands in lieu of the Sixteenth Section lands and for the vesting of the title to these lands “in the State of Mississippi, for the use of schools within [the Chickasaw Cession] in said State.” 5 Stat. 116. These Chickasaw Cession Lieu Lands, some 174,555 acres, App. 36, were selected and given to the State. In 1856, however, with authority expressly given by Congress, 10 Stat. 6 (1852), the state legislature sold these lands and invested the proceeds, approximately $1,047,330, App. 36, in 8% loans to the State’s railroads. 1856 Miss. Laws, ch. 56. These railroads and the State’s investment in them, unfortunately, were subsequently destroyed during the Civil War and never replaced.
From these historical circumstances, the current practice in Mississippi with regard to Sixteenth Section lands has evolved directly. Under state law, these lands, which are still apparently held in large part by the State, “constitute property held in trust for the benefit of the public schools and must be treated as such.” Miss. Code Ann. §29-3-1(1) (Supp. 1985). In providing for the operation of these trusts, the legislature has retained the historical tie of these lands to particular townships in terms of both trust administration and beneficiary status. Thus, the State has delegated the management of this property to local school boards throughout the State: Where Sixteenth Section lands lie within a school district or where Lieu Lands were originally appropriated for a township that lies within a school district, the board of education of that district has “control and jurisdiction of said school trust lands and of all funds arising from any disposition thereof heretofore or hereafter made. ” Ibid. In this respect, the board of education is “under the general supervision of the state land commissioner.” Ibid. Further, the State has, by statute, set forth certain prescriptions for the management of these lands. See generally Miss. Code Ann. §§ 29-3-1 to 29-3-135 (1972 and Supp. 1985). Most important for purposes of this case, however, is Miss. Code Ann. § 29-3-109 (Supp. 1985), which provides:
“All expendable funds derived from sixteenth section or lieu lands shall be credited to the school districts of the township in which such sixteenth section lands may be located, or to which any sixteenth sections lieu lands may belong. Such funds shall not be expended except for the purpose of education of the educable children of the school district to which they belong, or as otherwise may be provided by law.”
Consequently, all proceeds from Sixteenth Section and Lieu Lands are allocated directly to the specific township in which these lands are located or to which those lands apply. With respect to the Chickasaw Cession counties, to which no lands now belong, the state legislature has for over 100 years paid “interest” on the lost principal acquired from the sale of those lands in the form of annual appropriations to the Chickasaw Cession schools. Originally, the rate was 8%, but since 1890 the rate has been 6%. See Miss. Const., Art. 8, § 212. The annual amount until 1985 was $62,191. App. 37.
The result of this dual treatment has for many years been a disparity in the level of school funds from Sixteenth Section lands that are available to the Chickasaw Cession schools as compared to the schools in the remainder of the State. In 1984, for example, the legislative appropriation for the Chickasaw Cession resulted in an estimated average per pupil income relative to the Sixteenth Section substitute appropriation of $0.63 per pupil. The average Sixteenth Section income in the rest of the State, in comparison, was estimated to be $75.34 per pupil. Id., at 44. It is this disparity which gave rise to the present action.
In 1981, the petitioners, local school officials and schoolchildren from the Chickasaw Cession, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against the respondents, an assortment of state officials, challenging the disparity in Sixteenth Section funds. The petitioners’ complaint traced the history of public school lands in Mississippi, characterizing as illegal several of the actions that resulted in there being now no Sixteenth Section lands in the Chickasaw Cession area. In particular, the petitioners asserted that the sale of the Chickasaw Cession school lands and unwise investment of the proceeds from that sale in the 1850’s had abrogated the State’s trust obligation to hold those lands for the benefit of Chickasaw Cession schoolchildren in perpetuity. The result of these actions, said the petitioners, was the disparity between the financial support available to the Chickasaw Cession schools and other schools in the State, which disparity in turn allegedly deprived the Chickasaw Cession schoolchildren of a minimally adequate level of education and of the equal protection of the laws.
Based on these allegations, the petitioners sought various forms of relief for breach of the trust regarding the Chickasaw Cession Sixteenth Section lands and for denial of equal protection. Specifically, the complaint sought a declaration that the state legislation purporting to implement the sale of the Chickasaw Cession school lands was void and unenforceable; the establishment by legislative appropriation or otherwise of a fund in a suitable amount to be held in perpetual trust for the benefit of plaintiffs; or in the alternative making available to plaintiffs Lieu Lands of the same value as the original Chickasaw Cession Sixteenth Section lands.
The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding the claims barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Papasan v. United States, 756 F. 2d 1087 (1985), agreeing that the relief requested in the complaint was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Noting that a federal court should not dismiss a constitutional complaint because it “seeks one remedy rather than another plainly appropriate one,” Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. 60, 65 (1978), however, the Court of Appeals deemed the equal protection claim to assert a current, ongoing, and disparate distribution of state funds for the support of local schools, the remedy for which would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Even so, it found dismissal of the complaint to be proper since such differential funding was not unconstitutional under this Court’s decision in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973).
We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 1004 (1985), and now vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings.
II
We first consider whether the Eleventh Amendment bars the petitioners’ claims and required dismissal of the complaint.
A
The Amendment provides:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
This language expressly encompasses only suits brought against a State by citizens of another State, but this Court long ago held that the Amendment bars suits against a State by citizens of that same State as well. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890). “[I]n the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 100 (1984). This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable. Id., at 100-101.
Where the State itself or one of its agencies or departments is not named as defendant and where a state official is named instead, the Eleventh Amendment status of the suit is less straightforward. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), held that a suit to enjoin as unconstitutional a state official’s action was not barred by the Amendment. This holding was based on a determination that an unconstitutional state enactment is void and that any action by a state official that is purportedly authorized by that enactment cannot be taken in an official capacity since the state authorization for such action is a nullity. As the Court explained in Young itself:
“If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.” Id., at 159-160.
Thus, the official, although acting in his official capacity, may be sued in federal court. See also Pennhurst, supra, at 102, 105; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 692 (1978).
Young, however, does not insulate from Eleventh Amendment challenge every suit in which a state official is the named defendant. In accordance with its original rationale, Young applies only where the underlying authorization upon which the named official acts is asserted to be illegal. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85 (1982). And it does not foreclose an Eleventh Amendment challenge where the official action is asserted to be illegal as a matter of state law alone. See Pennhurst, supra, at 104-106. In such a case, federal supremacy is not implicated because the state official is acting contrary to state law only.
We have also described certain types of cases that formally meet the Young requirements of a state official acting inconsistently with federal law but that stretch that case too far and would upset the balance of federal and state interests that it embodies. Young's, applicability has been tailored to conform as precisely as possible to those specific situations in which it is “necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to ‘the supreme authority of the United States.’” Pennhurst, supra, at 105 (quoting Young, supra, at 160). Consequently, Young has been focused on cases in which a violation of federal law by a state official is ongoing as opposed to cases in which federal law has been violated at one time or over a period of time in the past, as well as on cases in which the relief against the state official directly ends the violation of federal law as opposed to cases in which that relief is intended indirectly to encourage compliance with federal law through deterrence or directly to meet third-party interests such as compensation. As we have noted: “Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law. But compensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment.” Green v. Mansour, 474 U. S. 64, 68 (1985) (citation omitted).
Relief that in essence serves to compensate a party injured in the past by an action of a state official in his official capacity that was illegal under federal law is barred even when the state official is the named defendant. This is true if the •relief is expressly denominated as damages. See, e. g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459 (1945). It is also true if the relief is tantamount to an award of damages for a past violation of federal law, even though styled as something else. See, e. g., Green v. Mansour, supra, at 69-70; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 664-668 (1974). On the other hand, relief that serves directly to bring an end to a present violation of federal law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment even though accompanied by a substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 289-290 (1977); Edelman, supra, at 667-668.
For Eleventh Amendment purposes, the line between permitted and prohibited suits will often be indistinct: “[T]he difference between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young will not in many instances be that between day and night. ” Edelman, supra, at 667. Compare, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), with Green v. Mansour, supra. In discerning on which side of the line a particular case falls, we look to the substance rather than to the form of the relief sought, see, e. g., Edelman, supra, at 668, and will be guided by the policies underlying the decision in Ex parte Young.
B
The petitioners claim that the federal grants of school lands to the State of Mississippi created a perpetual trust, with the State as trustee, for the benefit of the public schools. Relying on Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U. S. 295 (1976), and Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway Dept., 385 U. S. 458 (1967), the petitioners contend that “[sjchool lands trusts impose specific burdens and obligations on the states, as well as the state officials who act as trustees, which include preserving the corpus, maximizing income, and, where the corpus is lost or converted wrongfully, continuing the payment of appropriate income indefinitely.” Brief for Petitioners 13. The idea that this last obligation exists is gleaned not from any prior judicial construction of school lands grants but instead from alleged federal common-law rules that purportedly govern such trusts. The petitioners rely on this asserted continuing obligation in contending that they seek only a prospective, injunctive remedy, permissible under Ex parte Young, requiring state officials to meet that continuing federal obligation by providing the Chickasaw Cession schools with appropriate trust income.
To begin with, it is not at all clear that the school lands grants to Mississippi created a binding trust. The respondents, in fact, contend that the school lands were given to the State in fee simple absolute and that no binding federal obligation was imposed. See Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U. S. 168 (1914); Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. 173 (1856). But even if the petitioners’ legal characterization is accepted, their trust claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The distinction between a continuing obligation on the part of the trustee and an ongoing liability for past breach of trust is essentially a formal distinction of the sort we rejected in Edelman. There, the Court of Appeals had upheld an award of “equitable restitution” against the state official, requiring the payment to the plaintiff class of “all AABD benefits wrongfully withheld.” 415 U. S., at 656. We found, to the contrary, that the “retroactive award of monetary relief... is in practical effect indistinguishable in many aspects from an award of damages against the State.” Id., at 668.
The characterization in that case of the legal wrong as the continuing withholding of accrued benefits is very similar to the petitioners’ characterization of the legal wrong here as the breach of a continuing obligation to comply with the trust obligations. We discern no substantive difference between a not-yet-extinguished liability for a past breach of trust and the continuing obligation to meet trust responsibilities asserted by the petitioners. In both cases, the trustee is required, because of the past loss of the trust corpus, to use its own resources to take the place of the corpus or the lost income from the corpus. Even if the petitioners here were seeking only the payment of an amount equal to the income from the lost corpus, such payment would be merely a substitute for the return of the trust corpus itself. That is, continuing payment of the income from the lost corpus is essentially equivalent in economic terms to a one-time restoration of the lost corpus itself: It is in substance the award, as continuing income rather than as a lump sum, of “ ‘an accrued monetary liability.’” Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S., at 289 (quoting Edelman, 415 U. S., at 664). Thus, we hold that the petitioners’ trust claim, like the claim we rejected in Edelman, may not be sustained.
C
The Court of Appeals held, however, that the petitioners’ equal protection claim was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We agree with that ruling. The complaint asserted:
“By their aforesaid past, present and future deprivations of and to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff class of the'use and benefits of their Sixteenth Section Lands, while at the same time granting to and securing to all other school districts and school children in the State of Mississippi in perpetuity the use and benefit of their Sixteenth Section Lands, the State Defendants have deliberately, intentionally, purposefully, and with design denied to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff class the equal protection of the laws in violation of their rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” App. 20.
The petitioners also alleged that these same actions denied them “their rights to an interest in a minimally adequate level of education, or reasonable opportunity therefor,” id., at 21, while assuring such right to the other schoolchildren in the State. Thus the complaint alleged a present disparity in the distribution of the benefits from the State’s Sixteenth Section lands.
This alleged ongoing constitutional violation — the unequal distribution by the State of the benefits of the State’s school lands — is precisely the type of continuing violation for which a remedy may permissibly be fashioned under Young. It may be that the current disparity results directly from the same actions in the past that are the subject of the petitioners’ trust claims, but the essence of the equal protection allegation is the present disparity in the distribution of the benefits of state-held assets and not the past actions of the State. A remedy to eliminate this current disparity, even a remedy that might require the expenditure of state funds, would ensure “ ‘compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question determination’ ” rather than bestow an award for accrued monetary liability. Milliken, supra, at 289 (quoting Edelman, supra, at 668). This claim is, in fact, in all essential respects the same as the equal protection claim for which relief was approved in Milliken. Consequently, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Eleventh Amendment would not bar relief necessary to correct a current violation of the Equal Protection Clause and that this claim may not properly be dismissed on this basis.
( — Í HH I — I
The question remains whether the petitioners equal protection claim, although not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, is legally insufficient and was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). We are bound for the purposes of this review to take the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. Miree v. DeKalb County, 438 U. S. 25 (1977); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U. S. 117 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319 (1972); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U. S. 167 (1957). Construing these facts and relevant facts obtained from the public record in the light most favorable to the petitioners, we must ascertain whether they state a claim on which relief could be granted.
A
In Rodriguez, the Court upheld against an equal protection challenge Texas’ system of financing its public schools, under which funds for the public schools were derived from two main sources. Approximately half of the funds came from the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program, a state program aimed at guaranteeing a certain level of minimum education for all children in the State. 411 U. S., at 9. Most of the remainder of the funds came from local sources — in particular local property taxes. Id., at 9, n. 21. As a result of this dual funding system, most specifically as a result of differences in amounts collected from local property taxes, “substantial interdistrict disparities in school expenditures [were] found... in varying degrees throughout the State.” Id., at 15.
In examining the equal protection status of these disparities, the Court declined to apply any heightened scrutiny based either on wealth as a suspect classification or on education as a fundamental right. As to the latter, the Court recognized the importance of public education but noted that education “is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.” Id., at 35. The Court did not, however, foreclose the possibility “that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [the right to speak or the right to vote].” Id., at 36. Given the absence of such radical denial of educational opportunity, it was concluded that the State’s school financing scheme would be constitutional if it bore “some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” Id., at 44.
Applying this standard, the dual Texas system was deemed reasonably structured to accommodate two separate forces:
“ ‘[T]he desire by members of society to have educational opportunity for all children, and the desire of each family to provide the best education it can afford for its own children.’
“... While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it permits and encourages a large measure of participation in and control of each district’s schools at the local level.” Id., at 49 (quoting J. Coleman, Foreword to G. Strayer & R. Haig, The Financing of Education in the State of New York vii (1923)).
Given this rational basis, the Court concluded that the mere “happenstance” that the quality of education might vary from district to district because of varying property values within the districts did not render the system “so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory.” 411 U. S., at 55. In particular, the Court found that “any scheme of local taxation— indeed the very existence of identifiable local governmental units — requires the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary.” Id., at 53-54.
Almost 10 years later, the Court again considered the equal protection status of the administration of the Texas public schools — this time in relation to the State’s decision not to expend any state funds on the education of children who were not “legally admitted” to the United States. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202 (1982). The Court did not, however, measurably change the approach articulated in Rodriguez. It reiterated that education is not a fundamental right and concluded that undocumented aliens were not a suspect class. 457 U. S., at 223-224. Nevertheless, it concluded that the justifications for the discrimination offered by the State were “wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.” Id., at 230.
B
The complaint in this case asserted not simply that the petitioners had been denied their right to a minimally adequate education but also that such a right was fundamental and that because that right had been infringed the State’s action here should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. App. 20. As Rodriguez and Plyler indicate, this Court has not yet definitively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded heightened equal protection review.
Nor does this case require resolution of these issues. Although for the purposes of this motion to dismiss we must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. See, e. g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F. 2d 713, 723 (CA7 1981), aff’d on other grounds, 460 U. S. 325 (1983). See generally 2A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶12.07, p. 12-64, and n. 6 (1985). The petitioners’ allegation that, by reason of the funding disparities relating to the Sixteenth Section lands, they have been deprived of a minimally adequate education is just such an allegation. The petitioners do not allege that schoolchildren in the Chickasaw Counties are not taught to read or write; they do not allege that they receive no instruction on even the educational basics; they allege no actual facts in support of their assertion that they have been deprived of a minimally adequate education. As we see it, we are not bound to credit and may disregard the allegation that the petitioners have been denied a minimally adequate education.
Concentrating instead on the disparities in terms of Sixteenth Section lands benefits that the complaint in fact alleged and that are documented in the public record, we are persuaded that the Court of Appeals properly determined that Rodriguez dictates the applicable standard of review. The differential treatment alleged here constitutes an equal protection violation only if it is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Applying this test, the Court of Appeals concluded that, historical roots aside, the essence of the petitioners’ claim was an attack on Mississippi’s system of financing public education. And it reasoned that the inevitability of disparities in income derived from real estate managed and administered locally, as in Rodriguez, supplied a rationale for the disparities alleged. To begin with, we disagree with the Court of Appeals’ apparent understanding of the crux of the petitioners’ claim. As we read their complaint, the petitioners do not challenge the overall organization of the Mississippi public school financing program. Instead, their challenge is restricted to one aspect of that program: The Sixteenth Section and Lieu Lands funding. All of the allegations in the complaint center around disparities in the distribution of these particular benefits, and no allegations concerning disparities in other public school funding programs are included.
Consequently, this is a very different claim than the claim made in Rodriguez. In Rodriguez, the contention was that the State's overall system of funding was unconstitutionally discriminatory. There, the Court examined the basic structure of that system and concluded that it was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. In reaching that conclusion, the Court necessarily found that funding disparities resulting from differences in local taxes were acceptable because related to the state goal of allowing a measure of effective local control over school funding levels. Rodriguez did not, however, purport to validate all funding variations that might result from a State’s public school funding decisions. It held merely that the variations that resulted from allowing local control over local property tax funding of the public schools were constitutionally permissible in that case.
Here, the petitioners’ claim goes neither to the overall funding system nor to the local ad valorem component of that system. Instead, it goes solely to the Sixteenth Section and Lieu Lands portion of the State’s public school funding. And, as to this claim, we are unpersuaded that Rodriguez resolves the equal protection question in favor of the State. The allegations of the complaint are that the State is distributing the income from Sixteenth Section lands or from Lieu Lands or funds unequally among the school districts, to the detriment of the Chickasaw Cession schools and their students. The Sixteenth Section and Lieu Lands in Mississippi were granted to and held by the State itself. Under state law, these lands “constitute property held in trust for the benefit of the public schools and must be treated as such,” Miss. Code Ann. § 29-3-1(1) (Supp. 1985), but in carrying out the trust, the State has vested the management of these lands in the local school boards throughout the State, under the supervision of the Secretary of State, and has credited the income from these lands to the “school districts of the township in which such sixteenth section lands may be located, or to which any sixteenth section lieu lands may belong,” such income to be used
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner city of Dallas adopted an ordinance restricting admission to certain dance halls to persons between the ages of 14 and 18. Respondent, the owner of one of these “teenage” dance halls, sued to contest the constitutional validity of the ordinance. The Texas Court of Appeals held that the ordinance violated the First Amendment right of persons between the ages of 14 and 18 to associate with persons outside that age group. We now reverse, holding that the First Amendment secures no such right.
In 1985, in response to requests for dance halls open only to teenagers, the city of Dallas authorized the licensing of “Class E” dance halls. The purpose of the ordinance was to provide a place where teenagers could socialize with each other, but not be subject to the potentially detrimental influences of older teenagers and young adults. The provision of the ordinance at issue here, Dallas City Code § 14-8.1 (1985), restricts the ages of admission to Class E dance halls to persons between the ages of 14 and 18. This provision, as enacted, restricted admission to those between 14 and 17, but it was subsequently amended to include 18-year-olds. Parents, guardians, law enforcement, and dance-hall personnel are excepted from the ordinance’s age restriction. The ordinance also limits the hours of operation of Class E dance halls to between 1 p.m. and midnight daily when school is not in session. § 14 — 5(d)(2).
Respondent operates the Twilight Skating Rink in Dallas and obtained a license for a Class E dance hall. He divided the floor of his roller-skating rink into two sections with moveable plastic cones or pylons. On one side of the pylons, persons between the ages of 14 and 18 dance, while on the other side, persons of all ages skate to the same music — usually soul and “funk” music played by a disc jockey. No age or hour restrictions are applicable to the skating rink. Respondent does not serve alcohol on the premises, and security personnel are present. The Twilight does not have a selective admissions policy. It charges between $3.50 and $5 per person for admission to the dance hall and between $2.50 and $5 per person for admission to the skating rink. Most of the patrons are strangers to each other, and the establishment serves as many as 1,000 customers per night.
Respondent sued in the District Court of Dallas County to enjoin enforcement of the age and hour restrictions of the ordinance. He contended that the ordinance violated substantive due process and equal protection under the United States and Texas Constitutions, and that it unconstitutionally infringed the rights of persons between the ages of 14 and 17 (now 18) to associate with persons outside that age bracket. The trial court upheld the ordinance, finding that it was rationally related to the city’s legitimate interest in ensuring the safety and welfare of children.
The Texas Court of Appeals upheld the ordinance’s time restriction, but it struck down the age restriction. 744 S. W. 2d 165 (1987). The Court of Appeals held that the age restriction violated the First Amendment associational rights of minors. To support a restriction on the fundamental right of “social association,” the court said that “the legislative body must show a compelling interest,” and the regulation “must be accomplished by the least restrictive means.” Id., at 168. The court recognized the city’s interest in “protecting] minors from detrimental, corrupting influences,” ibid., but held that the “City’s stated purposes . . . may be achieved in ways that are less intrusive on minors’ freedom to associate,” id., at 169. The Court of Appeals stated that “[a] child’s right of association may not be abridged simply on the premise that he ‘might’ associate with those who would persuade him into bad habits,” and that “neither the activity of dancing per se, nor association of children aged fourteen through eighteen with persons of other ages in the context of dancing renders such children peculiarly vulnerable to the evils that defendant City seeks to prevent.” Ibid. We granted certiorari, 488 U. S. 815 (1988), and now reverse.
The dispositive question in this case is the level of judicial “scrutiny” to be applied to the city’s ordinance. Unless laws “create suspect classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights,” San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 40 (1973), it need only be shown that they bear “some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose,” id., at 44. Respondent does not contend that dance-hall patrons are a “suspect classification,” but he does urge that the ordinance in question interferes with associational rights of such patrons guaranteed by the First Amendment.
While the First Amendment does not in terms protect a “right of association,” our cases have recognized that it embraces such a right in certain circumstances. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609 (1984), we noted two different sorts of “freedom of association” that are protected by the United States Constitution:
“Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected ‘freedom of association’ in two distinct senses. In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment — speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.” Id., at 617-618.
It is clear beyond cavil that dance-hall patrons, who may number 1,000 on any given night, are not engaged in the sort of “intimate human relationships” referred to in Roberts. The Texas Court of Appeals, however, thought that such patrons were engaged in a form of expressive activity that was protected by the First Amendment. We disagree.
The Dallas ordinance restricts attendance at Class E dance halls to minors between the ages of 14 and 18 and certain excepted adults. It thus limits the minors’ ability to dance with adults who may not attend, and it limits the opportunity of such adults to dance with minors. These opportunities might be described as “associational” in common parlance, but they simply do not involve the sort of expressive association that the First Amendment has been held to protect. The hundreds of teenagers who congregate each night at this particular dance hall are not members of any organized association; they are patrons of the same business establishment. Most are strangers to one another, and the dance hall admits all who are willing to pay the admission fee. There is no suggestion that these patrons “take positions on public questions” or perform any of the other similar activities described in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U. S. 537, 548 (1987).
The cases cited in Roberts recognize that “freedom of speech” means more than simply the right to talk and to write. It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes — for example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall — but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment. We think the activity of these dance-hall patrons — coming together to engage in recreational dancing — is not protected by the First Amendment. Thus this activity qualifies neither as a form of “intimate association” nor as a form of “expressive association” as those terms were described in Roberts.
Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not think the Constitution recognizes a generalized right of “social association” that includes chance encounters in dance halls. The Court of Appeals relied, mistakenly we think, on a statement from our opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 483 (1965), that “[t]he right to freely associate is not limited to ‘political’ assemblies, but includes those that ‘pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit’ of our citizens.” 744 S. W. 2d, at 168, quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 483. But the quoted language from Griswold recognizes nothing more than that the right of expressive association extends to groups organized to engage in speech that does not pertain directly to politics.
The Dallas ordinance, therefore, implicates no suspect class and impinges on no constitutionally protected right. The question remaining is whether the classification engaged in by the city survives “rational-basis” scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. The city has chosen to impose a rule that separates 14- to 18-year-olds from what may be the corrupting influences of older teenagers and young adults. Ray Couch, an urban planner for the city’s Department of Planning and Development, testified:
“ ‘[0]lder kids [whom the ordinance prohibits from entering Class E dance halls] can access drugs and alcohol, and they have more mature sexual attitudes, more liberal sexual attitudes in general. . . . And we’re concerned about mixing up these [older] individuals with youngsters that [sic] have not fully matured.’” 744 S. W. 2d, at 168, n. 3.
A Dallas police officer, Wesley Michael, testified that the age restriction was intended to discourage juvenile crime.
Respondent claims that this restriction “has no real connection with the City’s stated interests and objectives.” Brief for Respondent 13. Except for saloons and teenage dance halls, respondent argues, teenagers and adults in Dallas may associate with each other, including at the skating area of the Twilight Skating Rink. Id., at 14. Respondent also states, as did the court below, that the city can achieve its objectives through increased supervision, education, and prosecution of those who corrupt minors. Id., at 15.
We think respondent’s arguments misapprehend the nature of rational-basis scrutiny, which is the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), in rejecting the claim that Maryland welfare legislation violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court said:
“[A] State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78.
‘The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific.’ Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70. . . .
“. . . [The rational-basis standard] is true to the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.” Id., at 485-486 (footnote omitted).
We think that similar considerations support the age restriction at issue here. As we said in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303-304 (1976): “[I]n the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.” See also United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 177 (1980). The city could reasonably conclude, as Couch stated, that teenagers might be susceptible to corrupting influences if permitted, unaccompanied by their parents, to frequent a dance hall with older persons. See 7 E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations §24.210 (3d ed. 1981) (“Public dance halls have been regarded as being in that category of businesses and vocations having potential evil consequences”). The city could properly conclude that limiting dance-hall contacts between juveniles and adults would make less likely illicit or undesirable juvenile involvement with alcohol, illegal drugs, and promiscuous sex. It is true that the city allows teenagers and adults to roller-skate together, but skating involves less physical contact than dancing. The differences between the two activities may not be striking, but differentiation need not be striking in order to survive rational-basis scrutiny.
We hold that the Dallas ordinance does not infringe on any constitutionally protected right of association, and that a rational relationship exists between the age restriction for Class E dance halls and the city’s interest in promoting the welfare of teenagers. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Dallas also licenses Class A, B, and C dance halls, which differ in the number of days per week dancing is permitted; Class D is for dance instruction. Persons under 17 must be accompanied by a parent for admission to Class A, B, and C dance halls. Dallas City Code §§ 14-1, 14-8 (1985-1986). A dance-hall license is not needed if the dance is at any of the following locations: a private residence from which the general public is excluded; a place owned by the federal, state, or local government; a public or private elementary school, secondary school, college, or university; a place owned by a religious organization; or a private club. Ibid.
Section 14-8.1 of the Dallas City Code provides:
“(a) No person under the age of 14 years or over the age of 18 years may enter a Class E dance hall.
“(b) A person commits an offense if he is over the age of 18 years and:
“(1) enters a Class E dance hall; or
“(2) for the purposes of gaining admittance into a Class E dance hall, he falsely represents himself to be:
“(A) of an age from 14 years through 18 years;
“(B) a licensee or an employee of the dance hall;
“(C) a parent or guardian of a person inside the dance hall;
“(D) a governmental employee in the performance of his duties.
“(c) A licensee or an employee of a Class E dance hall commits an offense if he knowingly allows a person to enter or remain on the premises of a dance hall who is:
“(1) under the age of 14 years; or
“(2) over the age of 18 years.
“(d) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsections (b)(1) and (c)(2) that the person is:
“(1) a licensee or employee of a dance hall;
“(2) a parent or guardian of a person inside the dance hall; or
“(3) a governmental employee in the performance of his duties.”
The Court of Appeals held that respondent had standing to assert the associational rights of the teenage patrons of his establishment. 744 S. W. 2d 165, 168 (1987). That issue has not been raised before us.
The Court considered similar factors in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944), where it upheld, over claims of infringement on religious freedom and equal protection, a statute prohibiting children under 12 from selling newspapers on the street. After noting that the statute would have been invalid if applied to adults, the Court said:
“The state’s authority over children’s activities is broader than over like actions of adults. This is peculiarly true of public activities and in matters of employment. . . . Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the street. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state’s police power.” Id., at 168-169 (footnotes omitted).
See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion), quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528, 550 (plurality opinion) (“State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability and their need for ‘concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention’ ”); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968) (upholding right of State to prohibit sale of “girlie” magazines to minors).'
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents an important and longstanding issue of Fourth Amendment law. Does a defendant in a criminal proceeding ever have the right, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, subsequent to the ex parte issuance of a search warrant, to challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting the warrant?
In the present case the Supreme Court of Delaware held, as a matter of first impression for it, that a defendant under no circumstances may so challenge the veracity of a sworn statement used by police to procure a search warrant. We reverse, and we hold that, where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.
I
The controversy over the veracity of the search warrant affidavit in this case arose in connection with petitioner Jerome Franks’ state conviction for rape, kidnaping, and burglary. On Friday, March 5, 1976, Mrs. Cynthia Bailey told police in Dover, Del., that she had been confronted in her home earlier that morning by a man with a knife, and that he had sexually assaulted her. She described her assailant’s age, race, height, build, and facial hair, and gave a detailed description of his clothing as consisting of a white thermal undershirt, black pants with a silver or gold buckle, a brown leather three-quarter-length coat, and a dark knit cap that he wore pulled down around his eyes.
That same day, petitioner Franks coincidentally was taken into custody for an assault involving a 15-year-old girl, Brenda B.-, six days earlier. After his formal arrest, and while awaiting a bail hearing in Family Court, petitioner allegedly stated to Robert McClements, the youth officer accompanying him, that he was surprised the bail hearing was “about Brenda B.-. I know her. I thought you said Bailey. I don’t know her.” Tr. 175, 186. At the time of this statement, the police allegedly had not yet recited to petitioner his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
On the following Monday, March 8, Officer McClements happened to mention the courthouse incident to a detective, Ronald R. Brooks, who was working on the Bailey case. Tr. 186, 190-191. On March 9, Detective Brooks and Detective Larry D. Gray submitted a sworn affidavit to a Justice of the Peace in Dover, in support of a warrant to search petitioner’s apartment. In paragraph 8 of the affidavit’s “probable cause page” mention was made of petitioner’s statement to McClements. In paragraph 10, it was noted that the description of the assailant given to the police by Mrs. Bailey included the above-mentioned clothing. Finally, the affidavit also described the attempt made by police to confirm that petitioner’s typical outfit matched that of the assailant. Paragraph 15 recited: “On Tuesday, 3/9/76, your affiant contacted Mr. James Williams and Mr. Wesley Lucas of the Delaware Youth Center where Jerome Franks is employed and did have personal conversation with both these people.” Paragraphs 16 and 17 respectively stated: “Mr. James Williams revealed to your affiant that the normal dress of Jerome Franks does consist of a white knit thermal undershirt and a brown leather jacket,” and “Mr. Wesley Lucas revealed to your affiant that in addition to the thermal undershirt and jacket, Jerome Franks often wears a dark green knit hat.”
The warrant was issued on the basis of this affidavit. App. 9. Pursuant to the warrant, police searched petitioner’s apartment and found a white thermal undershirt, a knit hat, dark pants, and a leather jacket, and, on petitioner’s kitchen table, a single-blade knife. All these ultimately were introduced in evidence at trial.
Prior to the trial, however, petitioner’s counsel filed a written motion to suppress the clothing and the knife found in the search; this motion alleged that the warrant on its face did not show probable cause and that the search and seizure were in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id., at 11-12. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel orally amended the challenge to include an attack on the veracity of the warrant affidavit; he also specifically requested the right to call as witnesses Detective Brooks, Wesley Lucas of the Youth Center, and James D. Morrison, formerly of the Youth Center. Id., at 14-17. Counsel asserted that Lucas and Morrison would testify that neither had been personally interviewed by the warrant affiants, and that, although they might have talked to another police officer, any information given by them to that officer was “somewhat different” from what was recited in the affidavit. Id., at 16. Defense counsel charged that the misstatements were included in the affidavit not inadvertently, but in “bad faith.” Id., at 25. Counsel also sought permission to call Officer McClements and petitioner as witnesses, to seek to establish that petitioner’s courthouse statement to police had been obtained in violation of petitioner’s Miranda rights, and that the search warrant was thereby tainted as the fruit of an illegally obtained confession. Id., at 17, 27.
In rebuttal, the State’s attorney argued in detail, App. 15-24, (a) that Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§2306, 2307 (1974), contemplated that any challenge to a search warrant was to be limited to questions of sufficiency based on the face of the affidavit; (b) that, purportedly, a majority of the States whose practice was not dictated by statute observed such a rule; and (c) that federal cases on the issue were to be distinguished because of Fed. Rule Grim. Proc. 41 (e). He also noted that this Court had reserved the general issue of subfacial challenge to veracity in Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U. S. 528, 531-532 (1964), when it disposed of that case on the ground that, even if a veracity challenge were permitted, the alleged factual inaccuracies in that case’s affidavit “were of only peripheral relevancy to the showing of probable cause, and, not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not go to the integrity of the affidavit.” Id., at 532. The State objected to petitioner’s “going behind [the warrant affidavit] in any way,” and argued that the court must decide petitioner’s motion “on the four corners” of the affidavit. App. 21.
The trial court sustained the State’s objection to petitioner’s proposed evidence. Id., at 25, 27. The motion to suppress was denied, and the clothing and knife were admitted as evidence at the ensuing trial. Tr. 192-196. Petitioner was convicted. In a written motion for judgment of acquittal and/or new trial, Record Doc. No, 23, petitioner repeated his objection to the admission of the evidence, stating that he “should have been allowed to impeach the Affidavit used in the Search Warrant to show purposeful misrepresentation of information contained therein.” Id., at 2. The motion was denied, and petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years each and an additional consecutive life sentence.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed. 373 A. 2d 578 (1977). It agreed with what it deemed to be the “majority rule” that no attack upon the veracity of a warrant affidavit could be made:
“We agree with the majority rule for two reasons. First, it is the function of the issuing magistrate to determine the reliability of information and credibility of affiants in deciding whether the requirement of probable cause has been met. There has been no need demonstrated for interfering with this function. Second, neither the probable cause nor suppression hearings are adjudications of guilt or innocence; the matters asserted by defendant are more properly considered in a trial on the merits.” Id., at 580.
Because of this resolution, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that there was no need to consider petitioner's “other contentions, relating to the evidence that would have been introduced for impeachment purposes.” Ibid.
Franks’ petition for certiorari presented only the issue whether the trial court had erred in refusing to consider his allegation of misrepresentation in the warrant affidavit. Because of the importance of the question, and because of the conflict among both state and federal courts, we granted certiorari. 434 U. S. 889 (1977).
II
It may be well first to note how we are compelled to reach the Fourth Amendment issue proffered in this case. In particular, the State’s proposals of an independent and adequate state ground and of harmless error do not dispose of the controversy.
Respondent argues that petitioner’s trial counsel, who is not the attorney representing him in this Court, failed to include the challenge to the veracity of the warrant affidavit in the written motion to suppress filed before trial, contrary to the requirement of Del. Super. Ct. Rule Grim.. Proc. 41 (e) that a motion to suppress “shall state the grounds upon which it is made.” The Supreme Court of Delaware, however, disposed of petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim on the merits. A ruling on the merits of a federal question by the highest state court leaves the federal question open to review in this Court. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 234 U. S. 123, 134 (1914); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423, 436-437 (1959); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 241-242 (1969).
Respondent next suggests that any error here was harmless. Assuming, arguendo, respondent says, that petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was valid, and that the warrant should have been tested for veracity and the evidence excluded, it is still clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence complained of did not contribute to petitioner’s conviction. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 52-53 (1970). This contention falls of its own weight. The sole issue at trial was that of consent. Petitioner admitted, App. 37, that he had engaged in sexual relations with Mrs. Bailey on the day in question. She testified, Tr. 50-51, 69-70, that she had not consented to this, and that petitioner, upon first encountering her in the house, had threatened her with a knife to force her to submit. Petitioner claimed that she had given full consent and that no knife had been present. Id., at 254, 271. To corroborate its contention that consent was lacking, the State introduced in evidence a stainless steel, wooden-handled kitchen knife found by the detectives on the kitchen table in petitioner’s apartment four days after the alleged rape. Id., at 195-196; Magistrate’s Return on the Search Warrant March 9, 1976, Record Doc. No. 23. Defense counsel objected to its admission, arguing that Mrs. Bailey had not given any detailed description of the knife alleged to be involved in the incident and had claimed to have seen the knife only in “pitch blackness.” Tr. 195. The State obtained its admission, however, as a knife that matched the description contained in the search warrant, and Mrs. Bailey testified that the knife allegedly used was, like the knife in evidence, single-edged and not a pocket knife, and that the knife in evidence was the same length and thickness as the knife used in the crime. Id., at 69, 114-115. The State carefully elicited from Detective Brooks the fact that this was the only knife found in petitioner’s apartment. Id., at 196. Although respondent argues that the knife was presented to the jury as “merely exemplary of the generic class of weapon testimonially described by the victim,” Brief for Respondent 15-16, the State at trial clearly meant to suggest that this was the knife that had been used against Mrs. Bailey. Had the warrant been quashed, and the knife excluded from the trial as evidence, we cannot say with any assurance that the jury would have reached the same decision on the issue of consent, particularly since there was countervailing evidence on that issue.
We should note, in addition, why this case cannot be treated as was the situation in Rugendorf v. United States. There the Court held that no Fourth Amendment question was presented when the claimed misstatements in the search warrant affidavit “were of only peripheral relevancy to the showing of probable cause, and, not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not go to the integrity of the affidavit.” 376 U. S., at 532 (emphasis added). Rugendorf emphasized that the “erroneous statements... were not those of the affiant” and thus “fail[ed] to show that the affiant was in bad faith or that he made any misrepresentations to the Commissioner in securing the warrant.” Id., at 533. Here, whatever the judgment may be as to the relevancy of the alleged misstatements, the integrity of the affidavit was directly placed in issue by petitioner in his allegation that the affiants did not, as claimed, speak directly to Lucas and Morrison. Whether such conversations took place is surely a matter “within the personal knowledge of the affiant[s].” We also might note that although respondent's brief puts forth that the alleged misrepresentations in the affidavit were of little importance in establishing probable cause, Brief for Respondent 16, respondent at oral argument appeared to disclaim any reliance on Rugendorj. Tr. of Oral Arg. 30.
Ill
Whether the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the derivative exclusionary rule made applicable to the States under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), ever mandate that a defendant be permitted to attack the veracity of a warrant affidavit after the warrant has been issued and executed, is a question that encounters conflicting values. The bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection, of course, is the Warrant Clause, requiring that, absent certain exceptions, police obtain a warrant from a neutral and disinterested magistrate before embarking upon a search. In deciding today that, in certain circumstances, a challenge to a warrant’s veracity must be permitted, we derive our ground from language of the Warrant Clause itself, which surely takes the affiant's good faith as its premise: “[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation... Judge Frankel, in United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (SDNY 1966), aff’d, Docket No. 31369 (CA2, June 12, 1967) (unreported), put the matter simply: “[W]hen the Fourth Amendment demands a factual showing sufficient to comprise 'probable cause,’ the obvious assumption is that there will be a truthful showing” (emphasis in original). This does not mean “truthful” in the sense that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct, for probable cause may be founded upon hearsay and upon information received from informants, as well as upon information within the affiant’s own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily. But surely it is to be “truthful” in the sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true. It is established law, see Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S. 41, 47 (1933); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 485-486 (1958); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 114-115 (1964), that a warrant affidavit must set forth particular facts and circumstances underlying the existence of probable cause, so as to allow the magistrate to make an independent evaluation of the matter. If an informant’s tip is the source of information, the affidavit must recite “some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded” that relevant evidence might be discovered, and “some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed,... was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” Id., at 114. Because it is the magistrate who must determine independently whether there is probable cause, Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948); Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 270-271 (1960), it would be an unthinkable imposition upon his authority if a warrant affidavit, revealed after the fact to contain a deliberately or recklessly false statement, were to stand beyond impeachment.
In saying this, however, one must give cognizance to competing values that lead us to impose limitations. They perhaps can best be addressed by noting the arguments of respondent and others against allowing veracity challenges. The arguments are several:
First, respondent argues that the exclusionary rule, created in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), is not a personal constitutional right, but only a judicially created remedy extended where its benefit as a deterrent promises to outweigh the societal cost of its use; that the Court has declined to apply the exclusionary rule when illegally seized evidence is used to impeach the credibility of a defendant’s testimony, Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954), is used in a grand jury proceeding, United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), or is used in a civil trial, United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976); and that the Court similarly has restricted application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus review of a state conviction. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976). Respondent argues that applying the exclusionary rule to another situation — the deterrence of deliberate or reckless untruthfulness in a warrant affidavit — is not justified for many of the same reasons -that led to the above restrictions; interfering with a criminal conviction in order to deter official misconduct is a burden too great to impose on society.
Second, respondent argues that a citizen’s privacy interests are adequately protected by a requirement that applicants for a warrant submit a sworn affidavit and by the magistrate’s independent determination of sufficiency based on the face of the affidavit. Applying the exclusionary rule to attacks upon veracity would weed out a minimal number of perjurious government statements, says respondent, but would overlap unnecessarily with existing penalties against perjury, including criminal prosecutions, departmental discipline for misconduct, contempt of court, and civil actions.,
Third, it is argued that the magistrate' already is equipped to conduct a fairly vigorous inquiry into the accuracy of the factual affidavit supporting a warrant application. He may question the affiant, or summon other persons to give testimony at the warrant proceeding. The incremental gain from a post-search adversary proceeding, it is said, would not be great.
Fourth, it is argued that it would unwisely diminish the solemnity and moment of the magistrate’s proceeding to mate his inquiry into probable cause reviewable in regard to veracity. The less final, and less deference paid to, the magistrate’s determination of veracity, the less initiative will he use in that task. Denigration of the magistrate’s function would be imprudent insofar as his scrutiny is the last bulwark preventing any particular invasion of privacy before it happens.
Fifth, it is argued that permitting a post-search evidentiary hearing on issues of veracity would confuse the pressing issue of guilt or innocence with the collateral question as to whether there had been official misconduct in the drafting of the affidavit. The weight of criminal dockets, and the need to prevent diversion of attention from the main issue of guilt or innocence, militate against such an added burden on the trial courts. And if such hearings were conducted routinely, it is said, they would be misused by defendants as a convenient source of discovery. Defendants might even use the hearings in an attempt to force revelation of the identity of informants.
Sixth and finally, it is argued that a post-search veracity challenge is inappropriate because the accuracy of an affidavit in large part is beyond the control of the affiant. An affidavit may properly be based on hearsay, on fleeting observations, and on tips received from unnamed informants whose identity often will be properly protected from revelation under McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 (1967).
None of these considerations is trivial., Indeed, because of them, the rule announced today has a limited scope, both in regard to when exclusion of the seized evidence is mandated, and when a hearing on allegations of misstatements must be accorded. But neither do the considerations cited by respondent and others have a fully controlling weight; we conclude that they are insufficient to justify an absolute ban on post-search impeachment of veracity. On this side of the balance, also, there are pressing considerations:
First, a flat ban on impeachment of veracity could denude the probable-cause requirement of all real meaning. The requirement that a warrant not issue “but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,” would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer was able to use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrate probable cause, and, having misled the magistrate, then was able to remain confident that the ploy was worthwhile. It is this specter of intentional falsification that, we think, has evoked such widespread opposition to the flat nonimpeachment rule from the commentators, from the American Law Institute in its Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, § SS290.3 (1) (Prop. Off. Draft 1975), from the federal courts of appeals, and from state courts. On occasion, of course, an instance of deliberate falsity will be exposed and confirmed without a special inquiry either at trial, see United States ex rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 400 F. Supp. 1152, 1171-1172 (NJ 1975), vacated and remanded by order sub nom. Albanese v. Yeager, 541 F. 2d 275 (CA3 1976), or at a hearing on the sufficiency of the affidavit, cf. United States v. Upshaw, 448 F. 2d 1218, 1221-1222 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 934 (1972). A flat non-impeachment rule would bar re-examination of the warrant even in these cases.
Second, the hearing before the magistrate not always will suffice to discourage lawless or reckless misconduct. The pre-search proceeding is necessarily ex parte, since the subject of the search cannot be tipped off to the application for a warrant lest he destroy or remove evidence. The usual reliance of our legal system on adversary proceedings itself should be an indication that an ex parte inquiry is likely to be less vigorous. The magistrate has no acquaintance with the information that may contradict the good faith and reasonable basis of the affiant’s allegations. The pre-search proceeding will frequently be marked by haste, because of the understandable desire to act before the evidence disappears; this urgency will not always permit the magistrate to make an extended independent examination of the affiant or other witnesses.
Third, the alternative sanctions of a perjury prosecution, administrative discipline, contempt, or a civil suit are not likely to fill the gap. Mapp v. Ohio implicitly rejected the adequacy of these alternatives. Mr. Justice Douglas noted this in his concurrence in Mapp, 367 U. S., at 670, where he quoted from Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 42 (1949): “ ‘Self-scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heights if we expect a District Attorney to prosecute himself or his associates for well-meaning violations of the search and seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or his associates have ordered.’ ”
Fourth, allowing an evidentiary hearing, after a suitable preliminary proffer of material falsity, would not diminish the importance and solemnity of the warrant-issuing process. It is the ex parte nature of the initial hearing, rather than the magistrate’s capacity, that is the reason for the review. A magistrate’s determination is presently subject to review before trial as to sufficiency without any undue interference with the dignity of the magistrate’s function. Our reluctance today to extend the rule of exclusion beyond instances of deliberate misstatements, and those of reckless disregard, leaves a broad field where the magistrate is the sole protection of a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights, namely, in instances where police have been merely negligent in checking or recording the facts relevant to a probable-cause determination.
Fifth, the claim that a post-search hearing will confuse the issue of the defendant’s guilt with the issue of the State’s possible misbehavior is footless. The hearing will not be in the presence of the jury. An issue extraneous to guilt already is examined in any probable-cause determination or review of probable cause. Nor, if a sensible threshold showing is required and sensible substantive requirements for suppression are maintained, need there be any new large-scale commitment of judicial resources; many claims will wash out at an early stage, and the more substantial ones in any event would require judicial resources for vindication if the suggested alternative sanctions were truly to be effective. The requirement of a substantial preliminary showing should suffice to prevent the misuse of a veracity hearing for purposes of discovery or obstruction. And because we are faced today with only the question of the integrity of the affiant’s representations as to his own activities, we need not decide, and we in no way predetermine, the difficult question whether a reviewing court must ever require the revelation of the identity of an informant once a substantial preliminary showing of falsity has been made. McCray v. Illinois, 38.6 U. S. 300 (1967), the Court’s earlier disquisition in this area, concluded only that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require the State to expose an informant’s identity routinely, upon a defendant’s mere demand, when there was ample evidence in the probable-cause hearing to show that the informant was reliable and his information credible.
Sixth and finally, as to the argument that the exclusionary rule should not be extended to a “new” area, we cannot regard any such extension really to be at issue here. Despite the deep skepticism of Members of this Court as to the wisdom of extending the exclusionary rule to collateral areas, such as civil or grand jury proceedings, the Court has not questioned, in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress evidence from the State’s case where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 422 (1977) (Burger, C. J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 538 (White, J., dissenting). We see no principled basis for distinguishing between the question of the sufficiency of an affidavit, which also is subject to a post-search reexamination, and the question of its integrity.
IV
In sum, and to repeat with some embellishment what we stated at the beginning of this opinion: There is, of course, a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant. To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained. Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient. The deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose impeachment is permitted today is only that of the affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant. Finally, if these requirements are met, and if, when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is required. On the other hand, if the remaining content is insufficient, the defendant is entitled, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, to his hearing. Whether he will prevail at that hearing is, of course, another issue.
Because of Delaware’s absolute rule, its courts did not have occasion to consider the proffer put forward by petitioner Franks. Since the framing of suitable rules to govern proffers is a matter properly left to the States, we decline ourselves to pass on petitioner’s proffer. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Delaware is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF THE COURT
J. P. Court #7
IN THE MATTER OF: Jerome Franks, B/M, DOB: 10/9/54 and 222 S. Governors Ave., Apt. #3, Dover, Delaware. A two room apartment located on the South side, second floor, of a white block building on the west side of S. Governors Avenue, Between Loockerman Street and North Street, in the City of Dover, The ground floor of this building houses Wayman’s Barber Shop.
State- of Delaware 1 County of Kent J
Be it remembered that on this 9th day of March A. D. 1976 before me John Green, personally appeared Det. Ronald R. Brooks and Det. Larry Gray of the Dover Police Department who being by me duly sworn depose and say:
That they have reason to believe and do believe that in the 222 S. Governors Avenue, Apartment #3, Dover, Delaware. A two room apartment located on the south side second floor of a white block building on the west side of S. Governors Avenue between Loockerman Street and North Street in the City of Dover. The ground floor of this building houses Wayman’s Barber Shop the occupant of which is Jerome Franks there has been and/or there is now located and/or concealed certain property in said house, place, conveyance and/or on the person or persons of the occupants thereof, consisting of property, papers, articles, or things which are the instruments of criminal offense, and/or obtained in the commission of a crime, and/or designated to be used in the commission of a crime, and not reasonably calculated to be used for any other purpose and/or the possession of which is unlawful, papers, articles, or things which are of an evidentiary nature pertaining to the commission of a crime or crimes specified therein and in particular, a white knit thermal undershirt; a brown % length leather jacket with a tie-belt; a pair of black mens pants; a dark colored knit hat; a long thin bladed knife or other instruments or items relating to the crime.
Articles, or things were, are, or will be possessed and/or used in violation of Title 11, Sub-Chapter D, Section 763, Delaware Code in that [see attached probable-cause page].
Wherefore, affiants pray that a search warrant may be issued authorizing a search of the aforesaid 222 S. Governors Avenue, Apartment #3, Dover, Delaware. A two room apartment located on the south side second floor of a white block building on the west side of S. Governors Avenue between Loockerman St. and North Street, in the City of Dover in the manner provided by law.
/s/ Det. Ronald R. Brooks Affiant
/s/ Det. Larry D. Gray Affiant
SWORN to (or affirmed) and subscribed before me this 9th day of March A. D. 1976.
/s/ John [illegible] Green Judge Ct 7
The facts tending to establish probable cause for the issuance of this search warrant are:
1. On Saturday, 2/28/76, Brenda L. B. -, W/F/15, reported to the Dover Police Department that she had been kidnapped and raped.
2. An investigation of this complaint was conducted by Det. Boyce Failing of the Dover Police Department.
3. Investigation of the aforementioned complaint revealed that Brenda B. -, while under the influence of drugs, was taken to 222 S. Governors Avenue, Apartment 3, Dover, Delaware.
4. Investigation of the aforementioned complaint revealed that 222 S. Governors Avenue, Apartment #3, Dover, Delaware, is the residence of Jerome Franks, B/M DOB: 10/9/54.
5. Investigation of the aforementioned complaint revealed that on Saturday, 2/2[8]/76, Jerome Franks did have sexual contact with Brenda B. - without her consent.
6. On Thursday, 3/4/76 at the Dover Police Department, Brenda B. -revealed to Det. Boyce Failing that Jerome Franks was the person who committed the Sexual Assault against her.
7. On Friday, 3/5/76, Jerome Franks was placed under arrest by Cpl. Robert McClements of the Dover Police Department, and charged with Sexual Misconduct.
8. On 3/5/76 at Family Court in Dover, Delaware, Jerome Franks did, after being arrested on the charge of Sexual Misconduct, ma[k]e a statement to Cpl. Robert McClements, that he thought the charge was concerning Cynthia Bailey not Brenda B.-.
9. On Friday, 3/5/76, Cynthia C. Bailey, W/F/21 of 132 North Street, Dover, Delaware, did report to Dover Police Department that she had been raped at her residence during the night.
10. Investigation conducted by your affiant on Friday, 3/5/76, revealed the perpetrator of the crime to be an unknown black male, approximately 5'7", 150 lbs., dark complexion, wearing white thermal undershirt, black pants with a belt having a silver or gold buckle, a brown leather % length coat with a tie belt in the front, and a dark knit cap pulled around the eyes.
11. Your affiant can state, that during the commission of this crime, Cynthia Bailey was forced at knife point and with the threat of death to engage in sexual intercourse with the perpetrator of the crime.
12. Your affiant can state that entry was gained to the residence of Cynthia Bailey through a window located on the east side of the residence.
13. Your affiant can state that the residence of Jerome Franks is within a very short distance and direct sight of the residence of Cynthia Bailey.
14. Your affiant can state that the description given by Cynthia Bailey of the unknown black male does coincide with the description of Jerome Franks.
15. On Tuesday, 3/9/76, your affiant contacted Mr. James Williams and Mr. Wesley Lucas of the Delaware Youth Center where Jerome Franks is employed and did have personal conversation with both these people.
16. On Tuesday,
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
This appeal presents a challenge under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to a state statute which authorizes the transfer of a state prisoner, without his consent, to a state mental hospital upon a finding by a physician or psychologist that the prisoner suffers from a mental disease or defect and that he cannot be given proper treatment within the facility in which he is confined.
Appellee Larry D. Jones was convicted of the crime of robbery and was sentenced to a prison term of three to nine years. In May 1974, he began serving his sentence at the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, a state prison. In January 1975, appellee was transferred to the penitentiary hospital; two days later he was placed in solitary confinement in the prison adjustment center. While there, appellee set his mattress on fire and suffered serious burns. Appellee was transferred by ambulance to the burn unit of a private hospital where he remained for some four months. In April 1975, immediately following his release from the hospital, appellee was transferred to the security unit of the Lincoln Regional Center, a hospital facility owned and operated by the State of Nebraska for the purpose of providing treatment for persons afflicted with emotional and mental disorders.
In advance of his transfer to Lincoln Regional Center, appellee was examined by a psychiatrist as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-180 (1976). The evidence adduced before the District Court revealed that, when asked by the examining psychiatrist whether or not he wished to be transferred, ap-pellee answered that he did. However, the District Court deemed the transfer to have been involuntary because appellee was offered no means of obtaining independent advice on the subject and because, in the view of the District Court, appellee “may well not have been competent to exercise a free choice.” It is undisputed that, in transferring appellee from a prison facility to a mental institution, the correctional authorities exercised the authority conferred on them by the state statute challenged here.
In April 1976, appellee filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska seeking to intervene in a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner who, like appellee, had been transferred from the State Penal Complex to Lincoln Regional Center.
The three-judge District Court agreed that due process attached to plaintiffs’ asserted liberty interest and declared § 83-180 (1) unconstitutional as applied. Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 569. The District Court also enjoined the transfer of any state prisoner from a penal facility to a mental institution except in compliance with procedures similar to those identified in this Court’s opinions in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974). Additional procedures set forth by the District Court require the State to furnish the inmate with effective and timely notice of his rights and, in the case of an indigent inmate, with legal counsel. We noted probable jurisdiction.
On November 17, 1977, the Nebraska Board of Parole granted appellee parole for the purpose of allowing him to receive in-patient psychiatric care at the Veterans Hospital in Danville, Ill. During the course of oral argument in this Court, appellee’s counsel advised the Court that appellee has accepted the parole offered to him and agreed to treatment at the Veterans Hospital. Moreover, according to counsel, appellee is now cooperating with the medical staff assigned to his care and voluntarily taking medication prescribed for him.
In light of these disclosures, the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska is hereby vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court for consideration of the question of mootness.
Vacated and remanded.
Nebraska Rev. Stat. § 83-180 (1976) provides in relevant part:
“[W]hen a physician or psychologist designated by the [Director of Correctional Sevices] finds that a person committed to the [Department of Correctional Services] suffers from a mental disease or defect, the chief executive officer may order such person to be segregated from other persons in the facility. If the physician or psychologist is of the opinion that the person cannot be given proper treatment in that facility, the director may arrange for his transfer for examination, study, and treatment to any medical-correctional facility, or to another institution in the Department of Public Institutions where proper treatment is available. A person who is so transferred shall remain subject to the jurisdiction and custody of the Department of Correctional Services and shall be returned to the department when, prior to the expiration of his sentence, treatment in such facility is no longer necessary.”
This lawsuit was initially brought by a single plaintiff, Charles Miller. On August 18, 1976, plaintiff’s suit was certified as a class action. After a hearing, the action was decertified. Thereafter, William McKinley Hines, William George Foote, and Larry D. Jones were added as individual plaintiffs-intervenors. Hines, who had been returned to state prison and released on parole, did not participate in the proceedings before the District Court, which ordered him dismissed as a plaintiff-intervenor on September 12, 1977. Prior to the entry of the judgment below, Miller and Foote each completed his maximum sentence and received a final discharge. Jones is the sole appellee in this Court.
Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 569, 571 n. 3.
434 U. S. 1060 (1978).
The District Court rendered its judgment in this case on October 14, 1977.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 13, 19, 41-44.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, the Court held that by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 the United States had quitclaimed to Louisiana the lands underlying the Gulf of Mexico within three geographical miles of the coastline. The United States was declared entitled to the lands further seaward. In the decree, as in the Submerged Lands Act, “coast line” was defined as “the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters.” We reserved jurisdiction “to entertain such further proceedings, enter such orders and issue such writs as may... be deemed necessary or advisable to give proper force and effect to this decree.” Before the Court now are cross-motions by the United States and Louisiana for a supplemental decree designating the boundary of the lands under the Gulf owned by Louisiana. The segments of that boundary line that lie three miles outward from “that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea” are for the most part easily determinable. The controversy here is primarily over the location of that part of the coastline that consists of “the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters.”
More than three years ago, in United States v. California, 381 U. S. 139, we held that Congress had left to the Court the task of defining “inland waters,” and we adopted for purposes of the Submerged Lands Act the definitions contained in the international Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, ratified by the United States in 1961. The United States asserts that the same definitions should determine the location of the “line marking the seaward limit of inland waters” of Louisiana. Louisiana, on the other hand, contends that this line has already been determined pursuant to an 1895 Act of Congress which directed the drawing of “lines dividing the high seas from rivers, harbors and inland waters,” and has proposed a decree based upon this contention. Alternatively, Louisiana argues that, even assuming the applicability of the definitions contained in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the decree proposed by the United States reflects too restrictive a construction of the Convention’s provisions in derogation of relevant principles of international law.
I.
The “Inland Water Line.”
Comprehensive congressional regulation of maritime navigation began with the Act of April 29, 1864, which promulgated rules applicable to all vessels of domestic registry on any waters. These rules were patterned on emerging international standards, and when most other maritime nations subsequently changed their rules, the United States Congress in 1885 enacted conforming “Revised International Rules and Regulations” to govern American ships “upon the high seas and in all coast waters of the United States, except such as are otherwise provided for.” The 1864 Act was therefore repealed except as to navigation “within the harbors, lakes, and inland waters of the United States.” In 1889 the International Maritime Conference drafted new International Rules, which were promptly adopted by Congress. Article 30 of those rules provided that “ [n] othing in these rules shall interfere with the operation of a special rule, duly made by local authority, relative to the navigation of any harbor, river, or inland waters.”
The United States already had in the 1864 Act such special inland rules for ships of American registry. In order to clarify the areas and ships to which the International and Inland Rules would respectively apply, Congress in 1895 provided that the rules of the 1864 Act were to govern the navigation of all vessels “on the harbors, rivers and inland waters of the United States.” The 1895 Act went on to provide:
“The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized, empowered and directed from time to time to designate and define by suitable bearings or ranges with light houses, light vessels, buoys or coast objects, the lines dividing the high seas from rivers, harbors and inland waters."
The authority thus vested in the Secretary of the Treasury has since been transferred several times to various federal officials and now resides with the Commandant of the Coast Guard; and from time to time the lines authorized by the 1895 Act have been designated along portions of the United States coast. When the Submerged Lands Act was passed in 1953, such lines had been drawn in the Gulf only along some segments of the Louisiana shore, but in that year the Commandant of the Coast Guard drew new lines applicable to all the waters off the Louisiana coast. In 1954 the Louisiana Legislature declared that it “accepted and approved” this demarcation, which it now calls the “Inland Water Line,” as its boundary. Louisiana now argues that this line encloses inland waters and is therefore “the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters,” and thus its “coastline” within the meaning of the Submerged Lands Act.
Louisiana argues initially that the 1895 Act is in pari materia with the Submerged Lands Act. Congress, it is said, must have contemplated that a technical term such as “inland waters” should have the same meaning in different statutes. The phrase appears, however, in quite different contexts in the two pieces of legislation. While the Submerged Lands Act established boundaries between the lands of the States and the Nation, Congress’ only concern in the 1895 Act was with the problem of navigation in waters close to this Nation’s shores. There is no evidence in the legislative history that it was the purpose of Congress in 1953 to tie the meaning of the phrase “inland waters” to the 1895 statute. For instance, during the Senate Committee hearings on the Submerged Lands Act, the following exchange took place between Senator Anderson and the Assistant Attorney-General of Louisiana:
"Senator Anderson-. Was there not a so-called Government line drawn along the coast of Louisiana?
“Mr. Madden. Only a partial line, Senator. I remember the old statute that authorized, I believe it was first the Secretary of Commerce, or the Treasury, to fix a line to show the demarcation between inland waters and the high seas. I think the Coast Guard has attempted to draw a partial line over on the east side of Louisiana.
“Senator Anderson-. We went through all that in the hearing a couple of years ago, and found that was of no value to us whatsoever.”
Louisiana’s position that the Submerged Lands Act must necessarily be read as referring to the 1895 Act is thus not tenable. After a lengthy review of the legislative history of the Submerged Lands Act in United States v. California, we reached the conclusion that Congress deliberately “chose to leave the definition of inland waters where it found it — in the Court’s hands.” 381 U. S., at 157. We adhere to that view, and turn to Louisiana’s other arguments in support of the “Inland Water Line.”
We further decided in United States v. California that the provisions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone were “the best and most workable definitions available,” 381 U. S., at 165, and we adopted them for purposes of the Submerged Lands Act. Yet Louisiana asserts that the Court is not precluded by the California decision from adopting the “Inland Water Line” in this case. Essentially the argument is that the Convention was not intended either to be the exclusive determinant of inland or territorial waters or to divest a nation of waters which it had long considered subject to its sole jurisdiction. By the long-standing, continuous, and unopposed exercise of jurisdiction to regulate navigation on waters within the “Inland Water Line,” the United States is said to have established them as its inland waters under traditional principles of international law. Alternatively, Louisiana suggests that, even assuming the exclusivity of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the “Inland Water Line,” by virtue of this assertion of sovereignty, has created “historic bays” within the exception of Article 7 of the Convention. We have concluded, however, that nothing in either the enactment of the 1895 Act or its administration indicates that the United States has ever treated that line as a territorial boundary.
Under generally accepted principles of international law, the navigable sea is divided into three zones, distinguished by the nature of the control which the contiguous nation can exercise over them. Nearest to the nation’s shores are its inland, or internal waters. These are subject to the complete sovereignty of the nation, as much as if they were a part of its land territory, and the coastal nation has the privilege even to exclude foreign vessels altogether. Beyond the inland waters, and measured from their seaward edge, is a belt known as the marginal, or territorial, sea. Within it the coastal nation may exercise extensive control but cannot deny the right of innocent passage to foreign nations. Outside the territorial sea are the high seas, which are international waters not subject to the dominion of any single nation.
Whether particular waters are inland has depended on historical as well as geographical factors. Certain shoreline configurations have been deemed to confine bodies of water, such as bays, which are necessarily inland. But it has also been recognized that other areas of water closely connected to the shore, although they do not meet any precise geographical test, may have achieved the status of inland waters by the manner in which they have been treated by the coastal nation. As we said in United States v. California, it is generally agreed that historic title can be claimed only when the “coastal nation has traditionally asserted and maintained dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations.” 381 U. S., at 172.
While there is not complete accord on the definition of historic inland waters, it is universally agreed that the reasonable regulation of navigation is not alone a sufficient exercise of dominion to constitute a claim to historic inland waters. On the contrary, control of navigation has long been recognized as an incident of the coastal nation’s jurisdiction over the territorial sea. Article 17 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone embodies this principle in its declaration that “[f]oreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage [in the territorial sea] shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal State... and, in particular, with such laws and regulations relating to transport and navigation.” Because it is an accepted regulation of the territorial sea itself, enforcement of navigation rules by the coastal nation could not constitute a claim to inland waters from whose seaward border the territorial sea is measured.
But even if a nation could base a claim to historic inland waters on its continuous regulation of navigation, it is clear that no historic title can accrue when the coastal nation disclaims any territorial reach by such an exercise of jurisdiction. For at least the last 25 years, during which time Congress has twice re-enacted both the International and Inland Rules, the responsible officials have consistently disclaimed any but navigational significance to the “Inland Water Line.” When the line was for the first time completed off the entire Louisiana shore, the Commandant of the Coast Guard declared:
“The establishment of descriptive lines of demarcation is solely for purposes connected with navigation and shipping.... These lines are not for the purpose of defining Federal or State boundaries, nor do they define or describe Federal or State jurisdiction over navigable waters.”
As early as 1943 the Coast Guard had differentiated the “Inland Water Line” from other boundaries with territorial significance. Its manual on Admiralty Law Enforcement, published that year, discussed the principles of international law relating to the definitions and jurisdictional attributes of inland waters, the territorial sea, and the high seas. The manual then contrasted the line drawn under the 1895 Act.
“NAVIGATION RULE: Now let us consider another line of demarcation. As shown in Chapter V, there are different rules for navigation on the ‘inland waters’ and the ‘high seas’: the Inland Rules and the International Rules. But here we do not apply the previous definition, but adopt a new one for convenience. The Secretary of Commerce has fixed a series of lines along our coast, lines not following the natural curvature of our shores, and not following any three-mile natural perimeter, and the Inland Rules apply inside this line, while the International Rules apply outside the line....
“Quite obviously, this artificial line does not truly separate the high seas from the inland waters of the United States. It simply marks the area within which the Inland Rules apply, and outside of which the International Rules control.”
In United States v. California we held that the United States’ disclaimer to the Court of any historic title was decisive in the light of the “questionable evidence of continuous and exclusive assertions of dominion over the disputed waters.” 381 U. S., at 175. In this case, not only-are there long-standing, extrajudicial disclaimers of historic title, but also the United States has never treated the “Inland Water Line” as delimiting an area within which it can exercise jurisdiction over anything but navigation.
There is no indication that in enacting the navigation rules and authorizing the designation of an “Inland Water Line” Congress believed it was also determining the Nation’s territorial boundaries. Indeed, it seems unlikely that Congress, if it had intended that result, would have delegated such authority to the Secretary of the Treasury, to be exercised in his discretion “from time to time” and by reference to navigational aids rather than in accordance with prevailing principles of international law. Consistently with their limited statutory purpose, the lines have always been drawn, and frequently altered, solely with regard to contemporary navigational needs. And in the only instance called to our attention in which the “Inland Water Line” was mentioned by the United States in its international relations, the State Department in 1929 cautioned that the “lines do not represent territorial boundaries, but are for navigational purposes.” We must therefore reject Louisiana’s contention that the United States has historically treated the “Inland Water Line” as the territorial boundary of its inland waters.
Finally, Louisiana argues that only adoption of the current “Inland Water Line” will fulfill the “requirements of definiteness and stability which should attend any congressional grant of property rights belonging to the United States.” United States v. California, 381 U. S. 139, 167. Any fine drawn by application of the rules of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone would be ambulatory and would vary with the frequent changes in the shoreline. This will lead, it is said, to continuing uncertainty and endless litigation concerning the location of the Louisiana coastline under the Submerged Lands Act, because the shoreline is constantly shifting as the Mississippi River and violent Gulf storms remold the soft, silt-like delta soil. This problem was not encountered on the rock-hard, comparatively straight California coast, and Louisiana contends that there is nothing in the Submerged Lands Act which requires that inland waters be given the same definition for every part of the United States coast. Just as the Court was free in United States v. California to adopt the definition which best solved the problems of that case, the argument concludes, we are free in this ease to adopt a different definition more suited to the peculiarities of the highly unstable Louisiana shore.
We do not, however, so broadly construe our function under the Submerged Lands Act. Our adoption in United States v. California of the definitions contained in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone was “for purposes of the Submerged Lands Act/’ and not simply for the purpose of delineating the California coastline. Congress left to this Court the task of defining a term used in the Act, not of drawing state boundaries by whatever method might seem appropriate in a particular case. It would be an extraordinary principle of construction that would authorize or permit a court to give the same statute wholly different meanings in different cases, and it would require a stronger showing of congressional intent than has been made in this case to justify the assumption of such unconfined power. Finally, we note that if the inconvenience of an ambulatory coastline proves to be substantial, there is nothing in this decision which would obstruct resolution of the problems through appropriate legislation or agreement between the parties. Such legislation or agreement might, for example, freeze the coastline as of an agreed-upon date.
Even if we were free to adopt varying definitions of inland waters for different portions of the United States coast, we are not convinced that the policy in favor of a certain and stable coastline, strong as it is, would necessarily outweigh countervailing policy considerations under the Submerged Lands Act. We recognized in California the desirability of “a single coastline for both the administration of the Submerged Lands Act and the conduct of our future international relations.” 381 U. S., at 165. The adoption of the “Inland Water Line” for Louisiana would be completely at odds with this desideratum. Moreover, adoption of a new definition of inland waters in this case would create uncertainty and encourage controversy over the coastlines of other States, unsure as to which, if either, of the two definí-tions would be applied to them. This uncertainty might be compounded by the absence of any “Inland Water Line” around much of the United States. And we cannot assume that, in enacting the Submerged Lands Act, Congress envisioned that the ownership of potentially vast resources might thereafter be determined “from time to time” by the Coast Guard, acting solely in the interest of navigational convenience.
For these reasons, we conclude that that part of Louisiana’s coastline which, under the Submerged Lands Act, consists of “the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters,” is to be drawn in accordance with the definitions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
II.
Application of the Convention on the Territoeial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
Many issues divide the parties concerning the application of the provisions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone to the Louisiana coast. Some of these issues, which involve simply interpretation of the Convention, we have been able to decide on the basis of the materials now before us. Others, however, are primarily factual questions involving the construction and application of the Convention’s provisions with respect to particularized geographical configurations. Several of these factual disputes cannot be properly resolved without evidentiary hearings, and as to others we think it would be wise at all events in this technical and unfamiliar area to have the benefit, preliminarily, of the judgment of a detached referee. Accordingly, we have decided to refer to a Special Master the task of resolving in the first instance several of the particularized disputes over the precise boundary between the submerged Gulf lands belonging to the United States and those belonging to Louisiana.
1. Dredged channels. A recurring question in the application of the Convention to the Louisiana coast is whether dredged channels in the Gulf leading to inland harbors comprise inland waters. In support of its contention that dredged channels, as such, are inland waters, Louisiana relies principally on Article 8 of the Convention:
“For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost permanent harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour system shall be regarded as forming part of the coast.”
Incontestably, Louisiana argues, the channels “form an integral part of the harbour system”; that they are “harbour works” as well should also be obvious in light of the enormous cost and effort which the United States has expended in dredging and maintaining them.
The United States argues more convincingly, however, that Article 8 applies only to raised structures. The discussions of the Article by the 1958 Geneva Conference and the International Law Commission reveal that the term “harbour works” connoted “structures” and “installations” which were “part of the land” and which in some sense enclosed and sheltered the waters within. It is not enough that the dredged channels may be an “integral part of the harbour system”; even raised structures which fit that description, such as lighthouses, are not considered “harbour works” unless they are “connected with the coast.” Thus, Article 8 provides that “harbour works... shall be regarded as forming part of the coast” (emphasis supplied), a description which hardly fits underwater channels. As part of the “coast,” the breadth of the territorial sea is measured from the harbor works’ low-water lines, attributes not possessed by dredged channels. We must therefore conclude that Article 8 does not establish dredged channels as inland waters.
Louisiana also contends that the legislative history of the Submerged Lands Act reveals a clear congressional purpose to include such channels as inland waters. Early versions of the bill contained a definition of the term “inland waters” for the purposes of the Act, and that definition included “channels.” The definition was later deleted, but Louisiana contends that the sole purpose of the deletion was to avoid a construction of the definition which would exclude other areas from inland waters. In United States v. California, 381 U. S. 139, 150-160, we reviewed at length the pertinent legislative history and concluded that the only sure inference which could be drawn from the deletion of the definition was that Congress thought the highly technical question should be left to the courts. We remain of that view. Moreover, it is far from clear that the word “channels” in the deleted definition encompassed dredged channels in the open sea. From the context in which the word appears, it is far more likely that the definition referred only to bodies of water bordered by land.
2. The territorial sea of low-tide elevations. Article 11 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone deals with the subject of low-tide elevations:
“1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally-formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low-tide but submerged at high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.
“2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own.”
The question presented by the application of this provision to the Louisiana coast is whether the territorial sea — or, for purposes of this case, the three-mile grant to Louisiana under the Submerged Lands Act — is to be measured from low-tide elevations which lie within three miles of the baseline across the mouth of a bay but more than three miles from any point on the mainland or an island.
The United States argues that the phrase “at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland” does not refer to the territorial sea as a situs. Rather it uses the width of the territorial sea only as a measurement of distance — a circumlocution made necessary by the failure of the 1958 Geneva Conference to agree upon a uniform width. And that distance — three miles in this case — is to be measured from the “mainland,” a term which does not comprise baselines across bodies of water but is limited to the low-water mark on dry land. Louisiana, on the other hand, interprets the Article as covering all low-tide elevations situated anywhere within the territorial sea. And the drawing of baselines across the mouths of bays is an integral step in the determination of the area of the territorial sea. Moreover, Louisiana argues, the term “mainland” does include inland waters. The theory of the Convention, it is argued, reflects a long-standing principle of international law — that bays and other inland waters are practically assimilated to the dry land and treated for all legal purposes as if they were a part of it.
The parties agree that Article 11 on its face is not wholly dispositive of the issue, and that the language does not preclude either construction. Each party, therefore, relies on the origins of the Article and the statements of its drafters. When the provision was first proposed to the International Law Commission in 1952, it read as follows:
“Elevations of the sea bed situated within the territorial sea, though only above water at low tide, are taken into consideration for the determination of the base line of the territorial sea.” (Emphasis supplied.)
After several amendments to the rapporteur’s draft, the Commission in 1954 adopted a version with substantially the same meaning:
“Drying rocks and shoals which are wholly or partly within the territorial sea may be taken as points of departure for delimiting the territorial sea.” (Emphasis supplied.)
As the discussion made clear, both drafts of the Article covered all low-tide elevations within the territorial sea, however measured. Moreover, the provision was thought to embody long-standing principles of international law.
The draft encountered a serious objection, however, which led to its further amendment by the International Law Commission. If every low-tide elevation “within the territorial sea” was to have a territorial sea of its own, then
“a country like Holland might extend its territorial sea very considerably by advancing from one shoal to another, claiming that a shoal situated within the territorial sea of another shoal had itself a territorial sea.”
To avoid this undue extension of the territorial sea, the final draft of the Commission was revised to read as follows:
“Drying rock and drying shoals which are wholly or partly within the territorial sea, os measured from the mainland or an island, may be taken as points of departure for measuring the extension of the territorial sea.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that under the International Law Commission version of Article 11, the “territorial sea, as measured from the mainland” included those portions which extended from baselines enclosing bays. The sole purpose of the amendment to the initial proposals was to indicate that “drying rocks and drying shoals could only be used once as points of departure for extending the territorial sea and that the process could not be repeated by leapfrogging, as it were, from one rock or shoal to another.”
The United States contends that by changing the language of the International Law Commission draft to its present form in the Convention, the Geneva Conference intended also to change its meaning. Precisely the opposite conclusion, however, flows from an inspection of the history of the Convention. The amendment was advanced by the United States; yet its explanation for the proposal contained not the slightest indication that any change in the basic meaning of the Article was intended. Surely there would have been some discussion of the reference to the territorial sea as a measure of distance rather than as a situs had it been the purpose of the United States or the Conference to alter so significantly the meaning of prior drafts and the existing international consensus. Instead, the expert to the Secretariat of the Conference explained “that all the proposals on article 11 corresponded entirely to the intentions of the International Law Commission.” We therefore conclude that low-tide elevations situated in the territorial sea as measured from bay-closing lines are part of the coastline from which the three-mile grant of the Submerged Lands Act extends.
3. The semicircle test. Article 7 (2) defines a bay as follows:
“For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation.”
(a) In several areas along the Louisiana coast the parties raise the problem of whether and to what extent indentations within or tributary to another indentation can be included in the area of the latter for purposes of the semicircle test. Louisiana argues that a closing line should be drawn across what it calls “Outer Vermilion Bay” from Tigre Point to Shell Keys. That body of water does not meet the semicircle test unless the area of Vermilion Bay, joined to “Outer Vermilion Bay” only by a channel between the mainland and Marsh Island, is included. Similarly, Louisiana contends that “Ascension Bay,” whose headlands are said to be the jetties at Belle Pass on the west and Southwest Pass on the east, is a bay under Article 7 (2). Again, however, its area will satisfy the semicircle test only if deemed to include the waters of the Barataria Bay-Caminada Bay complex, which are separated from the outer indentation by a string of islands.
Louisiana argues that the area of tributary bays or other indentations must be included within that of the primary indentation. Article 7 (3) provides that “[f]or the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the low-water marks of its natural entrance points.” (Emphasis supplied.) The italicized phrase, it is said, constitutes a direction to follow the low-water line wherever it goes, including into other indentations, in drawing the perimeter of the primary bay. The general rule is well recognized, Louisiana argues, by the United States Department of State among others, that the area of bays within bays is included in calculating the semicircle test.
The United States does not reject the notion that some indentations which would qualify independently as bays may nonetheless be considered as part of larger indentations for purposes of the semicircle test; but it denies the existence of any rule that all tributary waters are so includible. Article 7 (2), it emphasizes, refers to “that indentation.” The inner bays can be included, therefore, only if they can reasonably be considered part of the single, outer indentation. And that cannot be said of inland waters which, like Vermilion Bay and Barataría Bay-Caminada Bay, are wholly separated from the outer body of water and linked only by narrow passages or channels.
For purposes of this lawsuit, we find it unnecessary to provide a complete answer to the questions posed by the parties. “Outer Vermilion Bay,” if it is to qualify under the semicircle test, must include the waters of Vermilion Bay. Yet Vermilion Bay is itself a part of the much larger indentation which includes West and East Cote Blanche Bays and Atchafalaya Bay, and which opens to the sea between Marsh Island and Point au Fer. Recognition of the unitary nature of this larger indentation follows from Louisiana’s insistence that the low-water mark must be followed around the entire indentation. If, as Louisiana posits, the western headland of the indentation is at Tigre Point, then a closing line across its mouth to Point au Fer far exceeds the 24-mile limit imposed by Article 7 (4). It follows that “Outer Vermilion Bay” is neither itself a bay nor part of a larger bay under the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
We have concluded, on the other hand, that the area of “Ascension Bay” does include the Barataría Bay-Caminada Bay complex and therefore meets the semicircle test. Those inner bays are separated from the larger “Ascension Bay” only by the string of islands across their entrances. If those islands are ignored, the entrance to Barataría and Caminada Bays is sufficiently wide that those bays and “Ascension Bay” can reasonably be deemed a single large indentation even under the United States’ approach. Article 7 (3) provides that for the purposes of calculating the semicircle test, “[i]slands within an indentation shall be included as if they were part of the water areas of the indentation.” The clear purpose of the Convention is not to permit islands to defeat the semicircle test by consuming areas of the indentation. We think it consistent with that purpose that islands should not be permitted to defeat the semicircle test by sealing off one part of the indentation from the rest. Treating the string of islands “as if they were part of the water areas” of the single large indentation within which they lie, “Ascension Bay” does meet the semicircle test.
(b) Another issue involving the semicircle test arises in East Bay in the Mississippi River Delta. Since East Bay does not meet the semicircle test on a closing line between its seawardmost headlands — the tip of the jetty at Southwest Pass and the southern end of South Pass — it does not qualify as a bay under Article 7 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. There is a line which can be drawn within East Bay, however, so as to satisfy the semicircle test. Louisiana argues that, just as under Article 7 (5) a 24-mile line can be drawn within a bay whose mouth is more than 24 miles wide, so also can a line which satisfies the semicircle test be drawn within a bay whose mouth is too wide to meet that test.
The analogy is unsound. A bay whose mouth is wider than 24 miles is nevertheless a bay. But an indentation that does not meet the semicircle test is not a bay but open sea. If an indentation which satisfies the semicircle test is a true bay, therefore, it cannot be on the theory that the closing line carves out a portion of a larger bay. The enclosed indentation must by its own features qualify as a bay.
The United States argues that the area within East Bay enclosed by Louisiana’s proposed line does not constitute a bay because there is no “well-marked indentation” with identifiable headlands which encloses “landlocked” waters. Indeed, it is said, there is not the slightest curvature of the coast at either asserted entrance point. We do not now decide whether the designated portion of East Bay meets these criteria, but hold only that they must be met. We cannot accept Louisiana’s argument that an indentation which satisfies the semicircle test ipso facto qualifies as a bay under the Convention. Such a construction would fly in the face of Article 7 (2), which plainly treats the semicircle test as a minimum requirement. And we have found nothing in the history of the Convention which would support so awkward a construction.
4. Islands at the mouth of a bay. Article 7 (3) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone provides:
“For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the low-water marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semicircle shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they were part of the water areas of the indentation.”
While the only stated relevance of such islands is to the semicircle test, it is clear that the lines across the various mouths are to be the baselines for all purposes. The application of this provision to the string of islands across the openings to the Lake Pelto-Terrebonne Bay-Timbalier Bay complex has raised the following questions: (a) between what points on the islands are the closing lines to be drawn, and (b) should the lines be drawn landward of a direct line between the entrance points on the mainland?
(a) It is Louisiana’s primary contention that when islands appear in the mouth of a bay, the lines closing the bay and separating inland from territorial waters should be drawn between the mainland headlands and the seawardmost points on the islands. This position, however, is refuted by the language of Article 7 (3), which provides for the drawing of baselines “across the different mouths” (emphasis supplied), not across the most seaward tips of the islands. There is no suggestion in the Convention that a mouth caused by islands is to he located in a manner any different from a mouth between points on the mainland — that is, by “a line joining the low-water marks of [the bay’s] natural entrance points
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Japan and the United States became involved in a controversy whether the respondent Girard should be tried by a Japanese court for causing the death of a Japanese woman. The basis for the dispute between the two Governments fully appears in the affidavit of Robert Dechert, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, an exhibit to a government motion in the court below, and the joint statement of Secretary of State John Poster Dulles and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, printed as appendices to this opinion, post, pp. 531, 544.
Girard, a Specialist Third Class in the United States Army, was engaged on January 30,1957, with members of his cavalry regiment in a small unit exercise at Camp Weir range area, Japan. Japanese civilians were present in the area, retrieving expended cartridge cases. Girard and another Specialist Third Class were ordered to guard a machine gun and some items of clothing that had been left nearby. Girard had a grenade launcher on his rifle. He placed an expended 30-caliber cartridge case in the grenade launcher and projected it by firing a blank. The expended cartridge case penetrated the back of a Japanese woman gathering expended cartridge cases and caused her death.
The United States ultimately notified Japan that Girard would be delivered to the Japanese authorities for trial. Thereafter, Japan indicted him for causing death by wounding. Girard sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The writ was denied, but Girard was granted declaratory relief and an injunction against his delivery to the Japanese authorities. 152 F. Supp. 21. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and, without awaiting action by that court on the appeal, invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (1). Girard filed a cross-petition for certiorari to review the denial of the writ of habeas corpus. We granted both petitions. U. S. Supreme Court Rule 20; 354 U. S. 928.
A Security Treaty between Japan and the United States, signed September 8, 1951, was ratified by the Senate on March 20, 1952, and proclaimed by the President effective April 28, 1952. Article III of the Treaty authorized the making of Administrative Agreements between the two Governments concerning “[t]he conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan...” Expressly acting under this provision, the two Nations, on February 28, 1952, signed an Administrative Agreement covering, among other matters, the jurisdiction of the United States over offenses committed in Japan by members of the United States armed forces, and providing that jurisdiction in any case might be waived by the United States. This Agreement became effective on the same date as the Security Treaty (April 28, 1952) and was considered by the Senate before consent was given to the Treaty.
Article XVII, paragraph 1, of the Administrative Agreement provided that upon the coming into effect of the “Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces,” signed June 19, 1951, the United States would conclude with Japan an agreement on criminal jurisdiction similar to the corresponding provisions of the NATO Agreement. The NATO Agreement became effective August 23, 1953, and the United States and Japan signed on September 29, 1953, effective October 29, 1953, a Protocol Agreement pursuant to the covenant in paragraph 1 of Article XVII.
Paragraph 3 of Article XVII, as amended by the Protocol, dealt with criminal offenses in violation of the laws of both Nations and provided:
“3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply:
“(a) The military authorities of the United States shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the United States armed forces or the civilian component in relation to
“(i) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States, or offenses solely against the person or property of another member of the United States armed forces or the civilian component or of a dependent;
“(ii) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty.
“(b) In the case of any other offense the authorities of Japan shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
“(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance.”
Article XXVI of the Administrative Agreement established a Joint Committee of representatives of the United States and Japan to consult on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of the Agreement; and provided that if the Committee “... is unable to resolve any matter, it shall refer that matter to the respective Governments for further consideration through appropriate channels.”
In the light of the Senate’s ratification of the Security Treaty after consideration of the Administrative Agreement, which had already been signed, and its subsequent ratification of the NATO Agreement, with knowledge of the commitment to Japan under the Administrative Agreement, we are satisfied that the approval of Article III of the Security Treaty authorized the making of the Administrative Agreement and the subsequent Protocol embodying the NATO Agreement provisions governing jurisdiction to try criminal offenses.
The United States claimed the right to try Girard upon the ground that his act, as certified by his commanding officer, was “done in the performance of official duty” and therefore the United States had primary jurisdiction. Japan insisted that it had proof that Girard’s action was without the scope of his official duty and therefore that Japan had the primary right to try him.
The Joint Committee, after prolonged deliberations, was unable to agree. The issue was referred to higher authority, which authorized the United States representatives on the Joint Committee to notify the appropriate Japanese authorities, in accordance with paragraph 3 (c) of the Protocol, that the United States had decided not to exercise, but to waive, whatever jurisdiction it might have in the case. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense decided that this determination should be carried out. The President confirmed their joint conclusion.
A sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction. The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 7 Cranch 116, 136. Japan’s cession to the United States of jurisdiction to try American military personnel for conduct constituting an offense against the laws of both countries was conditioned by the covenant of Article XVII, section 3, paragraph (c) of the Protocol that
“... The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance.”
The issue for our decision is therefore narrowed to the question whether, upon the record before us, the Constitution or legislation subsequent to the Security Treaty prohibited the carrying out of this provision authorized by the Treaty for waiver of the qualified jurisdiction granted by Japan. We find no constitutional or statutory barrier to the provision as applied here. In the absence of such encroachments, the wisdom of the arrangement is exclusively for the determination of the Executive and Legislative Branches.
The judgment of the District Court in No. 1103 is reversed, and its judgment in No. 1108 is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WILLIAM S. GIRARD
United States Army Specialist 3/C, Petitioner vs. CHARLES E. WILSON Secretary of Defense et al, Respondents
H' °* 47-57
AFFIDAVIT WITH RESPECT TO FACTS
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA! CITY AND COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA! bb‘
ROBERT DECHERT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
I am the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. Personnel of my office collect, collate, and maintain files on the arrangements with regard to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction entered into between the United States and foreign countries. I have reviewed and am familiar with the various communications relating to the incident involving Specialist Third Class William S. Girard which occurred in Japan on 30 January 1957 and state, as a result of such review, and upon information and belief, that the facts surrounding that incident are as follows:
The Situation at Camp Weir Firing Range, January 30.
On the afternoon of 30 January 1957, about 30 members of Company F, 8th Cavalry Regiment, were engaged in a small unit exercise at Camp Weir range area, Japan, involving an attack by one squad on a hill defended by another squad. Specialist 3/C William S. Girard was in the “attacking” force. The Commanding Officer of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, COLONEL HERBERT A. JORDAN, states that during the morning he was appalled at the large numbers of Japanese civilian trespassers present in the area and interfering with the conduct of the exercise. He estimates that their number was in excess of 150. In one case a group of six to eight civilians pounced on a machine gun position as soon as the gun ceased firing and, before the gunner could clear his weapon, physically pushed him away from the gun in order to retrieve expended cartridge cases.
The maneuver area consists of approximately eight square miles. It is provided by the Japanese Government for part-time use of United States forces. The Japanese Defense Force uses the same area about 40% of the time. When the area is not in use by either the United States or Japanese armed forces, Japanese civilians are permitted to farm or otherwise use the area. The Japanese civilians of the local village follow the practice of scavenging the expended brass cartridge cases from the maneuver area.
Upon the failure of efforts of military personnel to move the trespassers out of the danger area, Col. Jordan directed that all ball ammunition be withdrawn from the troops, and that blank ammunition be substituted in the afternoon exercise. He also directed that the Japanese police be contacted for assistance in clearing trespassers from the area, so that normal field training might be resumed. Up until the early afternoon, when the shooting incident occurred, this assistance was not forthcoming.
The Shooting Incident.
After one squad had attacked the hill and before the squads had changed their respective positions so that the attacking force became the defending force, and vice versa, two soldiers, Girard and Specialist 3/C Victor N. Nickel, of the “defending” force, were ordered by their platoon leader, SECOND LIEUTENANT BILLY M. MAHON, who was personally directing their activities to guard a machine gun and some items of personal clothing that had been left on a nearby ridge.
GIRARD in an early statement made during the course of the investigation, stated that he was ordered to get the Japanese away. He is quoted as having stated that he did not receive orders to fire at them to get them away. There is no evidence, other than the statement of Girard, that he was ordered to get the Japanese away.
LIEUT. MAHON stated that he was advised that a machine gun and several field jackets had been left on the other side of Hill 655 and that he instructed Specialist 3/C Girard and Specialist 3/C Nickel to guard the machine gun and keep the Japanese from stealing personal equipment. There were about 20 or 30 Japanese in the area; some were near the machine gun. SPECIALIST 3/C VICTOR N. NICKEL said the Japanese were “just collecting the cartridges, so there was no need of chasing them away”.
Girard had a grenade launcher on his rifle. He had been armed with this same weapon during the morning exercises in which he had participated and during which he had fired 80 rounds of ball ammunition. After the two soldiers had arrived on the ridge, Girard, on two occasions, placed an expended 30-caliber cartridge case in the grenade launcher and projected it by firing a blank. At his second shot, a Japanese woman, Mrs. Naka Sakai, fell. An autopsy disclosed that an expended 30-caliber cartridge case had penetrated her back in an upward direction to a depth of 3%-4 inches, causing her death. The exact distance between Girard and the victim at the time of the incident is uncertain. The Japanese witnesses put it about eighteen meters (approximately 20 yards). On one occasion, Girard stepped off what he thought to be the distance and found it to be 29 feet; on other occasions, he has estimated it to be 20-30 yards. Nickel puts it as 25-30 yards. Girard has stated that he did not intentionally point the rifle at the woman and did not believe the cartridge case would injure anyone if it hit them.
According to the U. S. military authorities in Japan, the act of firing an empty shell case from a grenade launcher is not authorized.
ONOSAKI, a Japanese witness, stated that Girard, after enticing him and the victim toward Girard by throwing some brass on the ground and indicating that it was all right for them to pick it up, suddenly shouted for them to get out and thereupon fired one shot in the direction of Onosaki. As the victim was running away, Onosaki stated that Girard, holding his rifle at the waist, fired a second shot at the victim at a distance of about eight to ten meters. This testimony is corroborated in part by other Japanese who were located at a distance of from 100-150 meters.
Both Girard and Nickel have made a number of statements. NICKEL at first denied knowing anything about the incident. GIRARD admitted only that he had fired one round over the heads of the Japanese. Both gradually changed their testimony. NICKEL, but not Girard, admits to throwing brass on the ground. GIRARD admits that he knew his weapon, fired in the manner in which he fired it, was fairly accurate at short ranges, but denies that he knew of its striking power; he further states that he fired from the waist over the woman’s head and did not intend to hit or wound her, but only to scare the Japanese away.
In one statement, NICKEL, after admitting that he had collected a pile of empty cartridges and had on about five occasions thrown them toward the Japanese, the nearest of whom was a little over 10 yards away, has this to say: “To tell you the truth I don’t know if Girard had told you this or not, but Girard told me to throw those cartridges. The purpose was to scare the Japanese off by firing over their heads when they came to pick up the cartridges.” After stating that about six Japanese came down to pick up the cartridges, NICKEL concludes: “He (Girard) stood up carrying the gun, and went about two feet to my right. Japanese people started to run away, probably thinking that they were being chased. This one Mama-San also ran. Then Girard fired holding the gun at his hip... he held the gun at the hip and fired in the direction of the woman... at an angle of about 45 degrees from his body. He fired over the head of this person... I regard myself as a friend of Girard in my company. If I said I saw (the incident), I would be letting him down, so I lied. Then I went to Camp Drew and received various advice from an investigator there. Then I decided to tell the truth. One other reason is that Girard told the investigator that Nickel was watching.”
In this connection, GIRARD says: “... while I was going toward the machine gun, I did talk to Nickel. I do not recall what I talked to him about... but I am positive that nothing was spoken about cartridges... I do not remember telling him to throw some cartridges. If I said I did not positively talk to him about it I’d be telling a lié... what I want to say is, as far as I can remember, I do not recall talking about it.” GIRARD states that he has qualified as a marksman [average shot] and a sharpshooter [better than average shot] with the M-l with which he was armed on the day in question, and that he twice has qualified as an expert with the.45 caliber pistol; that he has seen soldiers fire empty cartridges out of a grenade launcher on about 10 occasions; and he said, “I did not have an exact idea how far an empty cartridge would travel, but I knew that it travelled quite a ways... prior to that incident I knew that the empty cartridge fired like that would travel straight forward.”
At a later time Specialist 3/C Nickel requested that he be permitted to make a further statement with respect to the case. Upon this occasion he stated that Girard had asked him to gather up some empty cartridge cases for the purpose of luring the Japanese people closer to their position; that he and Girard were in a foxhole together and that at Girard’s request, in order to draw the Japanese closer, he, Nickel, threw empty cartridge cases from the foxhole; that Girard said, “throw the brass a little closer”; that Girard motioned with his hands for the brass pickers to come closer and said, “Daijobu”, which meant for them to come closer; that Girard fired at the Japanese man, and then fired at the Japanese woman and shot her; that Girard was in a standing position and fired from the shoulder; that he (Girard) tried to get the Japanese to take the woman’s body away after he shot her; and that Girard told him (Nickel) that if “they” asked how he held his weapon to say he fired from the waist and also to say that “We did not throw any brass.”
The Certificate as to Official Duty
On 7 February 1957 Girard’s commanding officer filed a certificate of official duty with the local Japanese authorities. That certificate read as follows:
COMPANY F
8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT
7 February 1957
SUBJECT: Certificate as to Official Duty
THRU: Provost Marshal Regional Camp Whittington APO 201
TO: Chief Procurator Maebashi District Maebashi City, Honshu, Japan
1. Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 43 of the Agreed Views of the Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee with respect to the Protocol amending Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement between the United States and Japan, I certify that GIRARD, William S, RA 16 452 809, Specialist Third Class, Company F, 8th Cavalry Regiment, APO 201, was in the performance of his official duty at 1350 hours, 30 January 1957, Camp Weir Range Area, when he was involved in the following incident: On 30 January 1957, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, was engaged in routine training at Camp Weir Range Area. Company F was conducting blank firing exercises. Specialist Third Class William S. GIRARD was instructed by his platoon leader to move near a position near an unguarded machine gun to guard the machine gun and items of field equipment that were in the immediate area. GIRARD, following instructions, moved to the designated position near the machine gun. While performing his duties as guard, he fired an expended cartridge case, as a warning, which struck and killed SAKAI, Naka, Kami-Shinden, Somamura, Gumma Prefecture, who had entered the range area for the purpose of gathering expended cartridge cases.
2. The United States will exercise jurisdiction in this case, unless notification is given immediately that proof to the contrary exists.
3. Should this incident result in trial of the above individual by general court-martial, you will be notified of the date of trial in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 45 of the above mentioned Agreed Views.
CARL C. ALLIGOOD 1st Lt. Infantry Commanding
The Japanese Notice of “Existence of Contrary Proof”.
On 9 February 1957 the local Japanese authorities notified the United States commanding officer who had issued the certificate of official duty that they considered that proof contrary to the certificate existed. This notification stated:
MAEBASHI DISTRICT PUBLIC PROCURATOR’S OFFICE
Maebashi, 9 February 1957
TO: Mr. CARL C. ALLIGOOD, 1st Lt Infantry, Command, F Co., 2nd Bn 8th Cavalry Regiment
Re: Notification of the existence of the contrary proof.
Dear Sir:
Reference is made to the letter from you dated on 8 February 1957, regarding to the “On Duty” status of the case involving SP3 GIRARD S. WILLIAM, which we received on 8 February 1957.
This is to inform you that this office considers the proof contrary thereto exists, basing upon our examinations.
/s/ Nagami Sakai
Chief Procurator
Maebashi Public Procurator’s Office
The Japanese Statement in the Criminal Jurisdiction Sub-Committee of the Joint Committee
In accordance with the provisions of Agreed View No. 43, on 16 February 1957 the Japanese brought the matter up in the Joint Committee and requested that it be referred to the Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee. On 7 March 1957 the United States representative agreed to this procedure. The matter was discussed in the Subcommittee on 12 March 1957 at which time the Japanese submitted a summary which contained the following:
“He (Girard) and Nickel went to the gun and, about 13.15 hrs he picked up and threw expended cartridge cases in the direction of the slope south of the hill, and, beckoning Hidehara Onozeki (male) and Naka Sakai (female) who had been at a place in the south-west of Hill 655 to gather empty cartridge cases, etc., cried out to them ‘PAPA-SAN, DAIJOBU’, ‘MAMA-SAN, DAIJOBU’ (‘Old man, O.K., old lady, O.K.’), etc. in Japanese and thus let the 2 Japanese pick up expended cartridge cases he had thrown. Then he, pointing to the nearby hole for Naka Sakai, cried out to her in Japanese ‘MAMA-SAN, TAKUSAN-NE’ (‘Old lady, plenty more!’), and hinting thereby that there remained some expended cartridge cases in it, induced her to go to the hole. But, at that moment, Hideharu Onozeki who was picking up expended cartridge cases on the said slope became suspicious of the suspects behaviour and tried to run away. Then the suspect suddenly shouted to Ono-seki 'GE-ROU! HEY!’ and fired a blank shot towards him, placing an expended cartridge case in the grenade launcher attached to the rifle which he had carried with him. Then he cried out 'GE-ROU! HEY! ’ to Naka Sakai who was in the hole, and, when he saw her running off towards the north slope of the hill, he, holding the stock of the rifle under his arm, fired standing a blank shot toward her about eight (8) meters away with an expended cartridge case put in the grenade launcher, just in the same manner as he had done to Hideharu Onozeki, as the result of which he made her sustain a penetrating wound on the left side of her back which proved fatal on the spot because of the loss of blood resulting from a cut in the main artery.”
The Japanese conclusion was stated as follows :
“Sp-3 William S. Girard, the suspect in this case, had been instructed to guard a machine gun and equipment at the time of occurrence of the case. It is evident, however, as shown in the above finding of facts, that the incident arose when he, materially deviating from the performance of such duty of his, wilfully threw expended cartridge cases away towards Naka Sakai and Hideharu Onozeki, and, thus inviting them to come near to him, he fired towards them. Therefore, the incident is not considered to have arisen out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty.”
Discussions in the Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee of the Joint Committee.
At the same time the following exchange occurred:
U. S.: Do you agree that Girard was on duty as a guard, and that the incident arose while he was on such duty?
Japan: We admit that he was on duty, but it is our position that the shooting had no connection with his duty of guarding the machine gun. The act of Girard in throwing out brass and enticing the victim toward him had no connection with guarding the machine gun.
U. S.: Your statement of fact does not take into account Girard’s statement of his intent. That is, that he fired for the purpose of scaring the Japanese away and thus insure the safety of the machine gun.
Japan: The evidence shows that there was no danger to the Machine gun. Nickel made a statement to this effect. Thus, we do not consider that Girard actually fired to protect the machine gun. The Japanese were only picking up brass in the vicinity; they were not interfering in any way with Girard’s mission to guard the machine ■gun. There was thus no necessity or reason for Girard to shoot at them to insure the safety of the machine gun. Its safety was never in danger. Further, according to the statement of Lt. Mahon, firing an empty cartridge from a grenade launcher is not authorized, and any superior of Girard’s observing such an action by Girard would have been obliged to interfere and prevent Girard from firing his weapon in this manner.
U. S.: However, if we give full weight to Girard’s statement, we must conclude that he did, in fact, fire to scare the Japanese away and thus insure safety of the machine gun. He may have been mistaken in believing that it was necessary to act in this manner, but we cannot escape the fact that, according to his own statement, he fired for this purpose. If you were to believe Girard’s statement, would you consider that he was acting in the performance of official duty?
Japan: Your question is based on a supposition that is not supported by the evidence, and we are not prepared to answer it.
U. S.: In determining official duty in this case, is it not important to consider Girard’s intent as disclosed by his own statement?
Japan: In determining that the incident did not arise in the performance of official duty, we considered all the evidence. A number of Japanese witnesses were interrogated immediately after the incident. We considered their testimony as well as the testimony of Girard and Nickel. In determining Girard's intent, it is necessary to consider all the evidence, not just his version of the incident. When all of the evidence is considered, it appears that Girard’s statement that he fired to scare the Japanese away and thus protect the machine gun is not worthy of belief, as the weight of the evidence contradicts Girard’s statement. It is our position that the evidence shows that the firing had no significant connection with the guarding of the machine gun.
Investigation of the Incident.
Investigations of the facts relating to the alleged offense were conducted by both the U. S. Army in Japan, and the local Japanese authorities.
Interpretation of “Official Duty”.
The following interpretation of the term “official duty” appears in a circular of the United States Army Forces, Far East which was published in January 1956:
“The term 'official duty’ as used in Article XVII, Official Minutes, and the Agreed Views is not meant to include all acts by members of the armed forces and civilian component during periods while they are on duty, but is meant to apply only to acts which are required to be done as a function of those duties which the individuals are performing. Thus, a substantial departure from the acts a person is required to perform in a particular duty usually will indicate an act outside of his ‘official duty.’ ”
Action in the Joint Committee.
As a result of lengthy discussions extending from early March to mid-May 1957, it was finally agreed in the Joint Committee that the United States military authorities would notify the appropriate Japanese authorities, in accordance with paragraph 3c of Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement, that the United States had decided not to exercise jurisdiction in the case. This action was thereafter taken.
The Action of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State.
On June 4, 1957 the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson announced that after careful review of all available facts in the case, they had concluded that the Joint Committee’s agreement that Girard be tried in the courts of Japan was reached in full accord with procedures established by the Treaty and Agreement, and that in order to preserve the integrity of the pledges of the U. S., this determination by the Joint Committee must be carried out.
Present Status of Girard.
At the present time Specialist 3/C Girard is administratively restricted to the limits of Camp Whittington.
Girard voluntarily enlisted in the Regular Army on October 28, 1954 for a three year term which will expire on October 27, 1957.
/s/ ROBERT DECHERT
ROBERT DECHERT
General Counsel
Department of Defense
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of June 1957.
My commission expires: March 6, 1961.
(SEAL) /s/ LAURA E. LITCHARD
NOTARY PUBLIC
APPENDIX B.
JOINT STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE, JOHN FOSTER DULLES and SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, CHARLES E. WILSON
The case of U. S. Army Specialist 3rd Class William S. Girard has far-reaching implications, involving as it does the good faith of the United States in carrying out a joint decision reached under procedures established by treaty and agreement with Japan.
The case involves actions by Girard which caused the death of Naka Sakai, a Japanese woman, on January 30, 1957. The issue arose as to whether or not Girard should be tried by U. S. court-martial or by a Japanese court. After careful deliberation in the Joint U. S.-Japan Committee established by the two Governments pursuant to treaty arrangements, the U. S. representative on this Committee was authorized to agree, and on May 16,1957, did agree, that the United States would not exercise its asserted right of primary jurisdiction in this case. In view of this completed action, attempting to prolong the dispute over the jurisdictional issue would create a situation which could basically affect U. S. relations not only with Japan, but also with many other nations.
For these reasons, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson have carefully reviewed all the available facts in the case. They have now concluded that the Joint Committee's agreement that Girard be tried in the courts of Japan was reached in full accord with procedures established by the Treaty and Agreement, and that in order to preserve the integrity of the pledges of the United States, this determination by the Joint Committee must be carried out.
The Secretaries’ review disclosed the following:
The incident occurred in a maneuver area provided by the Japanese Government for part-time use of United States forces. The Japanese Defense Force uses the same area about 40% of the time. When the area is not in use by either the United States or Japanese armed forces, Japanese civilians are permitted to farm or otherwise use the area.
Efforts to keep civilians away from the area during such military exercises have not proved effective. In this particular case, red boundary flags were, as customary, erected as a warning to civilians to keep off, and local authorities were notified of the proposed exercises. But, as was frequently the case, a number of Japanese civilians were in the area gathering empty brass cartridge cases at the time of the incident. These civilians had created such a risk of injury to themselves in the morning exercises when live ammunition was used that the American officer in charge withdrew live ammunition from the troops prior to the afternoon exercises. In the interval between two simulated attacks during the afternoon, Girard and another soldier, Specialist 3rd Class Victor M. Nickel, were ordered by their platoon leader, a Lieutenant, to guard a machine gun and several field jackets at the top of a hill. Girard and Nickel were not issued live ammunition for this duty.
It was while these soldiers were performing this duty that the incident occurred. Mrs. Naka Sakai, a Japanese civilian, died a few moments after being hit in the back by an empty brass rifle shell case fired by Girard from his rifle grenade launcher. She was not over 30 yards from Girard and was going away from him when he fired the rifle. Girard had previously fired similarly in the vicinity of a Japanese man, who was not hit.
Girard’s action in firing empty shell cases from the rifle grenade launcher was not authorized. He asserted that he fired from the waist, intending only to frighten the Japanese civilians. Others stated, but Girard denied, that empty shell cases were thrown out to entice the Japanese to approach.
Under the U. S.-Japanese Security Treaty and Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement under that Treaty, as established by the Protocol adopted September 23, 1953, the authorities of Japan have the prior right to jurisdiction to try members of the United States armed forces for an injury caused to a Japanese national, unless such injury is one “arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty.”
The Japanese authorities have taken the position that Girard’s action in firing the shell cases was outside the scope of his guard duty and was, therefore, not “done in the performance of official duty.”
The Commanding General of Girard’s division certified that Girard’s action was done in the performance of official duty.
In accordance with the procedure established under the Treaty and Administrative Agreement, the disputed matter was, on March 7, 1957, taken before the Joint U. S.-Japan Committee established under the provisions of the Treaty and Administrative Agreement previously referred to.
Various meetings were held between the United States and Japanese representatives on the Joint Committee. As is customary, a representative of the American Embassy in Tokyo also attended these meetings in the capacity of observer. Both sides continued to press their respective claims to primary jurisdiction, and the Committee was unable to reach agreement.
The Commanding General, Far East Command, reported the facts to the Department of the Army, the executive agent for the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense considered having the Joint Committee refer the matter in dispute to the two Governments for settlement, but rejected this procedure as inadvisable under the circumstances. Department of Defense instructions were accordingly issued, through the Department of the Army, to the Far East Command to the effect that the U. S. representative on the Joint Committee should continue to press the claim for jurisdiction, but that, in case of continued deadlock, he was authorized to waive jurisdiction to Japan. After three weeks of additional negotiations, the U. S. representative waived jurisdiction in the name of the United States.
Girard was subsequently indicted by the Japanese judicial authorities for causing a death by wounding — the least serious homicide charge for which he could have been indicted under Japanese law. In determining whether Girard’s actions were in violation of law, all the facts, as presented by both sides, must now be weighed by the Japanese court, just as they would by a U. S. court-martial, if trial were held under U. S. jurisdiction.
In accordance with Public Law 777 of the 84th Congress, the
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
In answering a question on cross-examination at his trial, in the Municipal Court of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for violating a municipal ordinance, petitioner referred to an alleged assailant as “chicken shit.” In consequence he was prosecuted and convicted under an information that charged him with “direct contempt,” in violation of another Tulsa ordinance, “by his insolent behavior during open court and in the presence of [the judge], to wit: by using the language 'chicken-shit’ . . . .” The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in an unreported order and opinion, affirmed.
This single isolated usage of street vernacular, not directed at the judge or any officer of the court, cannot constitutionally support the conviction of criminal contempt. “The vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice.” Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 376 (1947). In using the expletive in answering the question on cross-examination “[i]t is not charged that [petitioner] here disobeyed any valid court order, talked loudly, acted boisterously, or attempted to prevent the judge or any other officer of the court from carrying on his court duties.” Holt v. Virginia, 381 U. S. 131, 136 (1965); see also In re Little, 404 U. S. 553 (1972). In the circumstances, the use of the expletive thus cannot be held to “constitute an imminent . . . threat to the administration of justice.”
In affirming, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected petitioner’s contention that the conviction must be taken as resting solely on the use of the expletive. Rather, that court concluded from its examination of the trial record that, in addition to the use of the expletive, petitioner made “discourteous responses” to the trial judge. The court therefore held that the conviction should be affirmed because “[c]oupling defendant’s expletive with the discourteous responses, it is this Court’s opinion there was sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could find defendant was in direct contempt of court.” (Emphasis supplied.)
However, the question is not upon what evidence the trial judge could find petitioner guilty but upon what evidence the trial judge did find petitioner guilty. There is no transcript of the contempt proceeding since the proceeding was not stenographically recorded. The trial judge did, however, enter a “Judgment and Sentence,” and we read that document clearly to establish that the trial judge rested the -.conviction upon the use of the expletive only. For the single charge of “insolent behavior” specified in the information was “to wit: by using the language 'chicken-shit^ . . . ,” and the Judgment and Sentence, referring expressly to the information, records that petitioner was “duly and legally tried and convicted of said offense” and, further, that “the Court does now hereby adjudge and sentence the said defendant for the said offense by him committed.” (Emphasis supplied.) The Court of Criminal Appeals thus denied petitioner constitutional due process in sustaining the trial court by treating the conviction as a conviction upon a charge not made. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196 (1948).
The motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceeding not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Assuming, arguendo, (1) that the information sufficiently charged petitioner for both use of the expletive and his allegedly “discourteous responses,” and (2) that there was evidence of the latter offense, reversal is still required, since the record fails to “negate the possibility,” Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 588 (1969), that the conviction was based solely or in part on the use of the expletive. “[W]hen a single-count . . . information charges the commission of a crime by virtue of the defendant’s having done both a constitutionally protected act and one which may be unprotected, and a guilty verdict ensues without elucidation, there is an unacceptable danger that the trier of fact will have regarded the two acts as 'intertwined’ and have rested the conviction on both together.” Ibid. Cf. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U. S. 564 (1970). And this principle is not limited, nor should it be, to cases in which the conviction may have been based on protected speech. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 291-292 (1942). Here, the “Judgment and Sentence” not only does not dispel the possibility that petitioner’s conviction was based solely or partially on the use of the expletive, but plainly supports the opposite conclusion.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
When the Court in 1793 held that a State could be sued in the federal courts by a citizen of another State (Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419), the Eleventh Amendment was passed precluding it. But this is an immunity which a State may waive at its pleasure (Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 24) as by a general appearance in litigation in a federal court (Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447-448) or by statute. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 468-470. The conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity will not be lightly inferred. Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171. Nor will a waiver of. immunity from suit in state courts do service for a waiver of immunity where the litigation is brought in the federal court. Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590, 591-592. And where a public instrumentality is created with the.right “to sue and be sued” that waiver of immunity in the particular setting may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special character in the state, not the federal, courts. Cf. Delaware River Comm’n v. Colburn, 310 U. S. 419. Suits against agencies of a State based on maritime torts are no exception to these rules. Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490.
The question here is whether Tennessee and Missouri have waived their immunity under the facts of this case.
Congress, under conditions specified in 33 U. S. C. § 525 et seg., gave its consent to the construction of bridges over the navigable waters in the United States. Respondent is a “body corporate and politic” created by Missouri (13 Vernon’s Ann. Stat., Tit. 14, § 234.360) and Tennessee (P. L. 1949, cc. 167, 168) acting pursuant to the Compact Clause of the Constitution. Art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The compact prepared by the two States and submitted to the Congress provided in Art. I, §§ 1 and 2, that respondent should have the power to build a bridge and operate ferries across the Mississippi at specified points and in Art. I, § 3, that it should have the power “to contract, to sue and be sued in its own name.” Congress granted its consent to the compact, 63 Stat. 930, stating in a proviso:
“That nothing herein contained- shall be construed to affect, impair, or diminish any right, power, or jurisdiction of the United States or of any court, department, board, bureau, officer, or official of the United States, over or in regard to any navigable waters, or any commerce between the States or with foreign countries, or any .bridge, railroad, highway, pier, wharf, or' other facility or improvement, or any other person, matter, or thing, forming the subject matter of the .aforesaid compact or agreement or otherwise affected by the terms thereof.” (Italics added.)
The facts are that petitioner’s husband was employed on a ferryboat operated by respondent as a common carrier ácross the Mississippi between a point in Missouri and one in Tennessee. He met his death when he was trapped in the pilothouse of the ferryboat as it sank, following a collision with another boat. Suit was brought under the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. § 688, charging respondent with negligence.
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that respondent is an agency of the States of Tennessee and Missouri and immune from suit in tort. 153 F. Supp. 512. The Court of Appeals, agreeing with that view, affirmed. 254 F. 2d 857. The case is here on certiorari: 358 U. S. 811.
The construction of a compact sanctioned by Congress under Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, of the Constitution presents a federal question. Delaware River Comm’n v. Colburn, supra, at 427. Moreover, the meaning of a compact is a question on which this Court has the final say. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U. S. 22, 28: The rule is no different when the contention is that a State has, by compact, waived its immunity from suit. Of course, when the alleged basis of waiver of the Eleventh Amendment’s immunity is a state statute, the question to be answered is whether the State has intended to waive its immunity. Chandler v. Dix, supra. But where the waiver is, as here, claimed to arise from a compact between several States, the Court is called on to interpret not unilateral state action but the terms of a consensual agreement, the meaning of which, because made by different States acting under the Constitution and with congressional approval, is a question, of federal law. Delaware River Comm’n v. Colburn, supra: In making that interpretation we must, treat the compact as a living interstate agreement which performs high functions in our federalism, including the operation of vast interstate enterprises.
The Court of Appeals laid emphasis on the law of Missouri, which, it said, construes a sue-and-be-sued provision as-not authorizing a suit for negligence against a public corporation. It likewise cited Tennessee decisions strictly construing statutes permitting suits against the State. We assume arguendo that this suit must be considered as one against the States since this bi-state corporation is a joint or common agency of Tennessee and Missouri. But we disagree with the construction given by the Court of Appeals to the sue-and-be-sued clause. For the resolution of that question we turn to federal not state law. Congress might of course adopt as federal law the law of either or both of the States. Delaware River Comm’n v. Colburn, supra. Cf. Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U. S. 39; Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154; Myers v. Matley, 318 U. S. 622. But Congress took, no such step here. It approved a sue-and-be-sued clause in a compact under conditions that make it clear that the States accepting it waived any immunity from suit which they otherwise might have.
This compact, approved by Congress in 1949, was made in an era when the immunity of corporations performing governmental functions was not in favor in the federal field. In Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381, decided nearly 10 years before the present compact was made, the authority to sue and be sued contained in a federal charter granted a government corporation was held to be broad enough to include suits in torts, at least where the duties relied upon “have their source in contract even though the guilty agents may be merely tort-feasors.” Id., at 395. There the underlying contract was a bailment; here it is employment. To draw a distinction in either, the Keifer case or in this case between- tort and contract would be to “make application-of a steadily growing policy of governmental liability contingent upon irrelevant procedural factors. These, in our law, are still deeply rooted in historical accidents to which the expanding conceptions of public morality regarding governmental responsibility should not be subordinated.” Id., at 396.
This case, like the Keifer case, involves the launching of a governmental corporation into an industrial or business field. ‘In view of the federal climate of opinion which by that time had grown up around the sue-and-be-sued clause, we cannot believe that Congress intended to confine it more narrowly here than in the Keifer case. But we need not rest on that alone. Congress, when it approved this compact, attached a condition that “nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect, impair, or diminish any right, power, or jurisdiction of . . . any court . ; . of the United States over or in regard to any navigable waters or any commerce between the States . . . We need not stop to catalogue all the ends that may be served by this proviso. See S. Rep. No. 1198, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 1429, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. It is argued that the proviso was included to make plain that the bonds issued by the agency were taxable by the United States.' We must go further, however, to find a rational purpose since another proviso of the Act of Congress specifically stated: “That any obligations issued and outstanding, including the income derived therefrom, under the terms of the compact or agreement^ and any amendments thereto, shall be subject to the tax laws of the United States.” Whatever may be the several effects of the other proviso with which we are presently concerned, one result seems to us clear. This proviso, read in light of the sue-and-be-sued clause in the compact, reserves the jurisdiction of the federal courts to act in any matter arising under the compact over which they would have jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the Mississippi is a navigable stream and that interstate commerce is involved. There is no more apt illustration of the involvement of the commerce power and the power over maritime matters than the Jones Act. O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U. S. 36, 39-43. This is not enlarging the jurisdiction of. the federal courts but only recognizing as one of its appropriate applications the business activities of an agency active in commerce and maritime matters.
The States who are parties to the compact by accepting it and acting under it assume the conditions that Congress under the Constitution attached. So if there be doubt as to the meaning of the sue-and-be-sued clause in the setting of the compact prior to approval by Congress, the doubt dissipates when the condition attached by Congress is accepted and acted upon by the two States.
Finally we can find no more reason for excepting state or bi-state corporations from “employer” as Used in the Jones Act than we could for excepting them either from the Safety Appliance Act (United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175) or the Railway Labor Act (California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553). In the latter case we reviewed at length federal legislation governing employer-employee relationships and said, “When Congress wished to exclude state employees, it expressly so provided.” 353 U. S., at 564. The Jones Act (46 U. S. C. § 688) has no exceptions from tíie broad sweep of the words “Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may” etc. The rationale of United States v. California, supra, and California v. Taylor, supra, makes it impossible for us to mark a distinction here and hold that this bi-state agency is not an employer under the Jones Act.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Stewart concur in the judgment and opinion of the Court with the understanding that we do not reach the constitutional question as to whether the Eleventh Amendment immunizes from suit agencies created by' two or more States under state compacts which the Constitution requires to. be approved by the Congress.
“When Chisholm dared to sue the ‘sovereign state’ of Georgia, all the states were so indignant that Congress moved with vehement speed to prevent subsequent affronts to the dignity of states. More than the dignity of a sovereign state was probably at issue, however. When the Eleventh Amendment was proposed many states were in financial difficulties and had defaulted on their debts. The states could therefore use the new amendment not only in • defense of theoretical sovereignty but also in a more practical way to forestall suits by individual creditors!” Irish and Prothro, The Politics of American Democracy (1959), p. 123.
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to apy suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
“No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State
That is true even though the matter in dispute concerns a question of state law on which the courts or other agencies of the State have spoken. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U. S. 22, 30-32. While we show deference to state law in construing a compact, state law as pronounced, in prior adjudications and rulings is not binding. Ibid.
The Court in Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U. S. 92, 104, spoke of two methods under our Constitution of settling controversies between States. One is our original jurisdiction defined in Art. Ill, §2. The other is the compact: “The compact — the legislative means — adapts to our Union of sovereign States the age-old treaty-making power of independent sovereign nations. Adjustment by compact without a judicial or quasi-judicial determination of existing rights had been practiced in the Colonies, was practiced by the States before the adoption of the Constitution, and had been extensively practiced in the United States for nearly half a century before this Court first applied the judicial means in settling the boundary dispute in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 723-25.”
See Port of New York Authority, 42 Stat. 174; New York and New Jersey Tunnel Agreement, 41 Stat. 158; Kansas City Water Works Agreement, 42 Stat. 1058; New York-Vermont Bridge Agreement, 45 Stat. 120; Delaware River Toll Bridge Compact, 61 Stat. 752; Menominee River Bridge Compact, 45 Stat. 300.
“Historically the consent of Congress, as a prerequisite to the validity of agreements by States, appears as the republican transformation of the needed approval by the Crown. . But the Constitution plainly had two very practical objectives in view in conditioning agreement by States upon consent of Congress. For only Congress is the appropriate organ for' determining what arrangements between States might fall within the prohibited class of ‘Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation’, and what arrangements come within the permissive class of ‘Agreement or Compact.’ But even the permissive agreements may affect the interests of States other than those parties to the agreement: the national, and not merely a regional, interest may be involved. Therefore, Congress must exercise national supervision through its power to grant or withhold consent, or to.grant it under appropriate conditions. The framers thus astutely created a mechanism of legal control over affairs that are projected beyond State lines and yet may not call for, nor be capable of, national treatment. They allowed interstate adjustments but duly safeguarded the national interest.” Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution — A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L. J. 685, 694^695.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents instituted a garnishment action against petitioner as defendant and Miller Harris Instrument Co., her employer, as garnishee. The complaint alleged a claim of $420 on a promissory note. The garnishee filed its answer stating it had wages of $63.18 under its control earned .by petitioner and unpaid, and that it would pay one-half to petitioner as a subsistence allowance and hold the other half subject to the order of the court.
Petitioner moved that the garnishment proceedings be dismissed for failure to satisfy the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained the lower state court in approving the procedure. 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N. W. 2d 259. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari. 393 U. S. 1078.
The Wisconsin statute gives a plaintiff 10 days in which to serve the summons and complaint on the defendant after service on the garnishee. In this case petitioner was served the same day as the garnishee. She nonetheless claims that the Wisconsin garnishment procedure violates that due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment, in that notice and an opportunity to be heard are not given before the in rem seizure of the wages. What happens in Wisconsin is that the clerk of the court issues the summons at the request of the creditor’s lawyer; and it is the latter who by serving the garnishee sets in motion the machinery whereby the wages are frozen. They may, it is true, be unfrozen if the trial of the main suit is ever had and the wage earner wins on the merits. But in the interim the wage earner is deprived of his enjoyment of earned wages without any opportunity to be heard and to tender any defense he may have, whether it be fraud or otherwise.
Such summary procedure may well meet the requirements of due process in extraordinary situations. Cf. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 253-254; Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594, 598-600; Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 110-112; Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U. S. 29, 31. But in the present case no situation requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest is presented by the facts; nor is the Wisconsin statute narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual condition. Petitioner was a resident of this Wisconsin community and in personam jurisdiction was readily obtainable.
The question is not whether the Wisconsin law is a wise law or unwise law. Our concern is not what philosophy Wisconsin should or should not embrace. See Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233. We do not sit as a super-legislative body. In this case the sole question is whether there has been a taking of property without that procedural due process that is required by the Fourteenth Amendment. We have dealt over and over again with the question of what constitutes “the right to be heard” (Schroeder v. New York, 371 U. S. 208, 212) within the meaning of procedural due process. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314. In the latter case we said that the right to be heard “has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.” 339 U. S., at 314. In the context of this case the question is whether the interim freezing of the wages without a chance to be heard violates procedural due process.
A procedural rule that may satisfy due process for attachments in general, see McKay v. McInnes, 279 U. S. 820, does not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case. The fact that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all property in its modern forms. We deal here with wages — a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system. We turn then to the nature of that property and problems of procedural due process.
A prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type is a taking which may impose tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to support. Until a recent Act of Congress, § 304 of which forbids discharge of employees on the ground that their wages have been garnished, garnishment often meant the loss of a job. Over and beyond that was the great drain on family income. As stated by Congressman Reuss:
“The idea of wage garnishment in advance of judgment, of trustee process, of wage attachment, or whatever it is called is a most inhuman doctrine. It compels the wage earner, trying to keep his family together, to be driven below the poverty level.”
Recent investigations of the problem have disclosed the grave injustices made possible by prejudgment garnishment whereby the sole opportunity to be heard comes after the taking. Congressman Sullivan, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs who held extensive hearings on this and related problems stated:
“What we know from our study of this problem is that in a vast number of cases the debt is a fraudulent one, saddled on a poor ignorant person who is trapped in an easy credit nightmare, in which he is charged double for something he could not pay for even if the proper price was called for, and then hounded into giving up his pound of flesh, and being fired besides.” 114 Cong. Rec. 1832.
The leverage of the creditor on the wage earner is enormous. The creditor tenders not only the original debt but the “collection fees” incurred by his attorneys in the garnishment proceedings:
“The debtor whose wages are tied up by a writ of garnishment, and who is usually in need of money, is in no position to resist demands for collection fees. If the debt is small, the debtor will be under considerable pressure to pay the debt and collection charges in order to get his wages back. If the debt is large, he will often sign a new contract of ‘payment schedule’ which incorporates these additional charges.”
Apart from those collateral consequences, it appears that in Wisconsin the statutory exemption granted the wage earner is “generally insufficient to support the debtor for any one week.”
The result is that a prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall. Where the taking of one’s property is so obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing (cf. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 423) this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due process.
Reversed.
Wis. Stat. § 267.18 (2) (a) provides:
“When wages or salary are the subject of garnishment action, the garnishee shall pay over to the principal defendant on the date when such wages or salary would normally be payable a subsistence allowance, out of the wages or salary then owing, in the sum of $25 in the case of an individual without dependents or $40 in the case of an individual with dependents; but in no event in excess of 50 per cent of the wages or salary owing. Said subsistence allowance shall be applied to the first wages or salary earned in the period subject to said garnishment action.”
Wis. Stat. §267.07 (1).
Wis. Stat. §267.04 (1).
82 Stat. 146, Act of May 29, 1968.
114 Cong. Rec. 1832.
Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington — An Empirical Study, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 743, 753 (1968). And see Comment, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 759.
See n. 1, supra.
Comment, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 759, 767.
“For a poor man — and whoever heard of the wage of the affluent being attached? — to lose part of his salary often means his family will go without the essentials. No man sits by while his family goes hungry or without heat. He either files for consumer bankruptcy and tries to begin again, or just quits his job and goes on relief. Where is the equity, the common sense, in such a process?” Congressman Gonzales, 114 Cong. Eec. 1833. For the impact of garnishment on personal bankruptcies see H. R. Rep. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-21.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 407 of the Social Security Act, 75 Stat. - 75, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 607, part of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, provides benefits to families whose dependent children have been deprived of parental support because of the unemployment of the father, but does not provide such benefits when the mother becomes unemployed. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that this distinction violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and ordered that benefits be paid to families deprived of support because of the unemployment of the mother to the same extent they are paid to families deprived of support because of the unemployment of the father. 460 F. Supp. 737 (1978). In these appeals, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), in No. 78-437, challenges the holding on the constitutionality of § 407, but does not question the relief ordered by the District Court; the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare (DPW), in No. 78-689, acquiesces in the decision on the merits, but contests the relief.
I
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 49 Stat. 626, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., provides financial assistance to families with needy dependent children. The program is administered by participating States, in conformity with federal standards, and is financed by the Federal Government and the States on a matching-funds basis. King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 316-317 (1968); Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, 253 (1974).
As originally enacted in 1935, the AFDC program provided benefits to families whose dependent children were needy because of the death, absence, or incapacity of a parent. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 418 (1977). This provision, which forms the core of the AFDC program today, is gender neutral: benefits are available to any family so long as one parent of either sex is dead, absent from the home, or incapacitated, and the family otherwise meets the financial requirements of eligibility. 42 U. S. C. § 606.
In 1961, and again in 1962, Congress temporarily extended the AFDC program to provide assistance to families whose dependent children were deprived of support because of a parent’s unemployment. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S., at 419; Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 709-710 (1975). Again, this provision was gender neutral. A “dependent child,” for purposes of determining eligibility for AFDC benefits, was defined to include “a needy child . . . who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment ... of a parent.” 75 Stat. 75 (emphasis added).
In 1968, as part of a general revision of the Social Security Act, Congress made this extension permanent. In so doing, however, it added a gender qualification to the statute. The definition of “dependent child” in § 407 was amended to include a “needy child . . . who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment ... of his father.” 42 U. S. C. § 607 (a) (emphasis added). This portion of the AFDC program is known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF). Although all 50 States have chosen to participate in the basic AFDC program, only 26 States (plus Guam and the District of Columbia) take part in the AFDC-UF program. One of these is the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Appellees are two couples who, it is stipulated, satisfy all the requirements for AFDC-UF benefits except for the requirement that the unemployed parent be the father. Cindy and William Westcott are married and have an infant son. They applied to the Massachusetts DPW for public assistance, but were informed that they did not qualify because William, who was unable to find work, had not previously been employed for a sufficient period to qualify as an “unemployed” father under the Act and applicable regulations. Cindy, until her recent unemployment, was the family breadwinner, and would have satisfied the “unemployment” criteria had she been male.
Susan and John Westwood are also married and have an infant son. They applied for Medicaid benefits as a family eligible for, but not receiving, AFDC-UF benefits. They, too, were turned down on the ground that John’s prior work history was insufficient. Susan, like Cindy Westcott, had been the family breadwinner before losing her job, and would have qualified the family for benefits had she been male.
Appellees instituted this class action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, naming as defendants the Secretary of HEW and the Commissioner of the DPW. Appellees alleged that § 407 and its implementing regulations discriminate on the basis of gender in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
The District Court certified the case as a class action, and granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment. 460 F. Supp. 737 (1978). The court found that the gender qualification of § 407 was not substantially related to the achievement of any important governmental interests. 460 F. Supp., at 748-751. It was, rather, the product of an “archaic and over-broad generalization” — that “mothers in two parent families are not breadwinners, so that loss of their earnings would not substantially affect the families’ well being.” Id., at 751. The court accordingly declared § 407 unconstitutional “insofar as it establishes a classification which discriminates . . . solely on the basis of sex.” 460 F. Supp., at 754.
The District Court then turned to the question of relief. The court saw two remedial alternatives: a simple injunction against further operation of the AFDC-UF program, or extension of the program to all families with needy children where either parent is unemployed. Id., at 753. The court decided that extension, rather than nullification, was the proper remedial course; it noted the strength of Congress’ commitment to the “specific goal of assisting needy children,” and emphasized that if provision of benefits “were halted because of the constitutional defect, many persons would lose their very means of subsistence.” Id., at 753-754. The court therefore, by order dated April 20, 1978, enjoined the Commissioner from refusing to grant benefits to families made needy by the unemployment of the mother “in the same amounts and under the same standards” as he grants benefits to families made needy by the unemployment of the father. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-437, pp. 41A-42A. The court likewise enjoined the Secretary from refusing to provide federal matching funds for payment of such benefits. Id., at 40A-41A.
Although the Commissioner originally had agreed that this was the appropriate remedy, Juris. Statement in No. 78-689, p. 6, he later sought modification of the District Court’s order, so as to effect a more limited extension of the AFDC-UF program. The Commissioner requested that he be permitted to pay benefits “only to those families where needy children have been deprived of parental support or care by the unemployment of the family’s principal wage-earner.” App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-689, p. 3a (emphasis added). This modification, he argued, would accomplish a gender-neutral extension of the program at a much lower cost. Id., at 4a. On August 9, 1978, the District Court denied the Commissioner’s motion, believing that “any reformulation of the statutory scheme . . . which goes beyond the remedy already ordered in this case is properly left to Congressional action.” Id., at 13a.
The Secretary, pursuant to 28 U. S. C § 1252, appealed directly to this Court from the District Court’s April 20 decision holding § 407 unconstitutional. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-437, p. 43A. The Commissioner took a separate appeal, also pursuant to § 1252, from the District Court’s August 9 refusal to modify its remedial order. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-689, p. 15a. We noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases for argument. 439 U. S. 1044 (1978).
II
THE SECRETARY’S APPEAL
The Secretary advances two arguments in support of .the constitutionality of § 407. First, he contends that although § 407 incorporates a gender distinction, it does not discriminate against women as a class. Second, he urges that the distinction is substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective: the need to deter real or pretended desertion by the father in order to make his family eligible for AFDC benefits.
A
The Secretary readily concedes that § 407 entails a gender distinction. Brief for Appellant in No. 78-437, p. 36. He submits, however, that the Act does not award AFDC benefits to a father where it denies them to a mother. Rather, the grant or denial of aid based on the father’s unemployment necessarily affects, to an equal degree, one man, one woman, and one or more children. As the Secretary puts it, even if the statute is “gender-based,” it is not “gender-biased.” Ibid.
We are not persuaded by this analysis. For mothers who are the primary providers for their families, and who are unemployed, § 407 is obviously gender biased, for it deprives them and their families of benefits solely on the basis of their sex. The Secretary’s argument, at bottom, turns on the fact that the impact of the gender qualification is felt by family units rather than individuals. But this Court has not hesitated to strike down gender classifications that result in benefits being granted or denied to family units on the basis of the sex of the qualifying parent. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973) (military quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975) (survivor’s benefits); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977) (survivor’s benefits); Califano v. Jablon, 430 U. S. 924 (1977), summarily aff’g 399 F. Supp. 118 (Md. 1975) (spousal benefits). Here, as in those cases, the statute “discriminates against one particular category of family — that in which the female spouse is a wage earner.” Goldfarb, 430 U. S., at 209 (plurality opinion).
The Secretary appears to acknowledge the force of these precedents, but suggests that each involved benefits that either were a form of compensation earned by a woman as a member of the labor force, or were directly related to such compensation. In the present case, in contrast, the benefits are part of a noncontributory welfare program. Thus, the Secretary argues, the gender qualification of § 407 is distinguishable from those contained in the earlier cases, for it does not denigrate “the efforts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their families’ support.” Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 645.
The distinction between employment-related benefits and other forms of government largesse may be relevant to equal protection analysis, for example in determining whether the differential treatment of survivor’s benefits denigrates the efforts of the deceased spouse. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 645-647; Goldfarb, 430 U. S., at 206-207 (plurality opinion). This does not mean, however, that the Constitution is indifferent to a statute that conditions the availability of noncontributory welfare benefits on the basis of gender. The Secretary’s argument to the contrary in effect invites a return to the discredited view that welfare benefits are a “privilege” not subject to the guarantee of equal protection. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374 (1971). Putting labels aside, the exclusion here is if anything more pernicious than those in Frontiero, Wiesenfeld, and Goldfarb. AFDC-UF benefits are not “fringe benefits,” nor are they a type of social assistance paid without regard to need. Rather, they are subsistence payments made available as a last resort to families that would otherwise lack basic necessities. The deprivation imposed by § 407, moreover, is not a mere procedural barrier, like the proof-of-dependency requirement in Frontiero and Goldfarb, but is an absolute bar to qualification for aid. We therefore reject the contention that the classification imposed by § 407 does not discriminate on the basis of gender.
B
The Secretary next argues that the gender distinction imposed by § 407 survives constitutional scrutiny because it is substantially related to achievement of an important governmental objective. Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. 268, 279 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 316-317 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976). The Secretary identifies two important objectives served by § 407.
First and most obviously, the statute was intended to provide aid for children deprived of basic sustenance because of a parent’s unemployment. H. R. Rep. No. 28, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1961). As then HEW Secretary Ribicoff put it in testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee, “there is no justification whatsoever for denying to the child of the unemployed parent the food that you give to the child of the parent who deserts or is absent or dead.” Hearings on H. R. 3864 and 3865 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, S7th Cong., 1st Sess., 102 (1961). The appellant Secretary does not contend, however, that the gender qualification of § 407 serves to achieve this goal. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 7-8. Nor could he, since families where the mother is the principal wage earner and is unémployed are often in as much need of AFDC-UF benefits and Medicaid as families where the father is unemployed.
Second, the statute was designed to remedy a structural fault in the original AFDC program. Under that program, a family was eligible for benefits if deprived of parental support because of the “continued absence from the home ... of a parent.” 42 U. S. C. §606 (a). In times of economic adversity, this provision was thought to create an incentive for the father to desert, or to pretend to desert, in order to make the family eligible for assistance. Section 407, by providing AFDC benefits to families rendered needy by parental unemployment, was intended to reduce this incentive and thereby promote the goal of family stability. The Secretary submits that reducing the incentive for the father to desert was an important objective of the AFDC-UF program, and he argues that the gender qualification is substantially related to its achievement.
We perceive, however, at least two flaws in this argument. Although it is relatively clear that Congress was concerned about the problem of parental desertion, see S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 160 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 28, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1961), there is no evidence that the gender distinction was designed to address this problem. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 648. Both the original AFDC program, and the temporary versions of the AFDC-UF program enacted in 1961 and 1962, were gender neutral. The gender qualification added to the permanent version of AFDC-TJF in 1968 escaped virtually unnoticed in the hearings and floor debates. The only explanation for this addition is contained in the following passage, which appears in nearly identical form in both the House and Senate Reports:
“This program was originally conceived by Congress as one to provide aid for the children of unemployed fathers. However, some States make families in which the father is working but the mother is unemployed eligible for assistance. The bill would not allow such situations. Under the bill, the program could apply only to the children of unemployed fathers.” S. Rép. No. 744, at 160.
See also H. R. Rep. No. 554, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 108 (1967).
This suggests that the gender qualification was part of the general objective of the 1968 amendments to tighten standards for eligibility and reduce program costs. Congress was concerned that certain States were making AFDC-TJF assistance available to families where the mother was out of work, but the father remained fully employed and able to support the family. Apparently, Congress was not similarly concerned about States making benefits available where the father was out of work, but the mother remained fully employed. From all that appears, Congress, with an image of the “traditional family” in mind, simply assumed that the father would be the family breadwinner, and that the mother’s employment role, if any, would be secondary. In short, the available evidence indicates that the gender distinction was inserted to reduce costs and eliminate what was perceived to be a type of superfluous eligibility for AFDC-UF benefits. There is little to suggest that the gender qualification had anything to do with reducing the father’s incentive to desert.
Even if the actual purpose of the gender qualification was to deal with the problem of paternal desertion, it does not appear that the classification is substantially related to the achievement of that goal. The Secretary argues there is “[s]olid statistical evidence” that fathers are more susceptible to pressure to desert than mothers, and thus that Congress was justified in excluding families headed by unemployed mothers from the AFDC-UF program. - Brief for Appellant in No. 78-437, p. 33. We may assume, for purposes of discussion, that Congress could legitimately view paternal desertion as a problem separate and distinct from maternal desertion. Even so, the gender qualification of § 407 is not substantially related to the stated purpose. There is no evidence, in the legislative history or elsewhere, that a father has less incentive to desert in a family where the mother is the breadwinner and becomes unemployed, than in a family where the father is the breadwinner and becomes unemployed. In either case, the family’s need will be equally great, and the father will be equally subject to pressure to leave the home to make the family eligible for benefits. The Secretary urges that Congress could take “one firm step” toward the goal of eliminating the incentive to desert, quoting Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 57-58 (1977). But Congress may not legislate “one step at a time” when that step is drawn along the line of gender, and the consequence is to exclude one group of families altogether from badly needed subsistence benefits. Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489 (1955).
We conclude that the gender classification of § 407 is not substantially related to the attainment of any important and valid statutory goals. It is, rather, part of the “baggage of sexual stereotypes,” Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S., at 283, that presumes the father has the “primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,” Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7, 10 (1975), while the mother is the “ 'center of home and family life/ ” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522, 534 n. 15 (1975). Legislation that rests on such presumptions, without more, cannot survive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Ill
THE COMMISSIONER’S APPEAL
A
“Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion,” Mr. Justice Harlan noted, “there exist two remedial alternatives: a court may either declare [the statute] a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by the exclusion.” Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 361 (1970) (concurring in result). In previous cases involving equal protection challenges to underinclusive federal benefits statutes, this Court has suggested that extension, rather than nullification, is the proper course. See, e. g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 637-638 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S., at 691 and n. 25 (plurality opinion). Indeed, this Court regularly has affirmed District Court judgments ordering that welfare benefits be paid to members of an unconstitutionally excluded class. E. g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977), aff’g 396 F. Supp. 308, 309 (EDNY 1975); Califano v. Silbowitz, 430 U. S. 924 (1977), summarily aff’g 397 F. Supp. 862, 871 (SD Fla. 1975); Jablon v. Califano, 430 U. S. 924 (1977), summarily aff’g 399 F. Supp. 118, 132-133 (Md. 1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975), aff’g 367 F. Supp. 981, 991 (NJ 1973); United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (1973), aff’g 345 F. Supp. 310, 315-316 (DC 1972); Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972), summarily aff’g 346 F. Supp. 1226, 1237 (Md.).
The District Court ordered extension rather than invalidation by way of remedy here, and equitable considerations surely support its choice. Approximately 300,000 needy children currently receive AFDC-UF benefits, see 42 Soc. Sec. Bull. 78 (Jan. 1979), and an injunction suspending the program’s operation would impose hardship on beneficiaries whom Congress plainly meant to protect. The presence in the Social Security Act of a strong severability clause, 42 U. S. C. § 1303, likewise counsels against nullification, for it evidences a congressional intent to minimize the burdens imposed by a declaration of unconstitutionality upon innocent recipients of government largesse.
There is no need, however, to elaborate here the conditions under which invalidation rather than extension of an under-inclusive federal benefits statute should be ordered, for no party has presented that issue for review. All parties before the District Court agreed that extension was the appropriate remedy. Juris. Statement in No. 78-689, p. 6; Motion to Affirm 5; Juris. Statement in No. 78-437, p. 6 n. 5. Appellees support that remedy here, and the Secretary, while arguing in favor of § 407’s constitutionality, urges that, if the statute is invalidated, the District Court’s remedy should be affirmed. Brief for Federal Appellee in No. 78-689, pp. 5-10. The Commissioner likewise argues that extension, rather than nullification, is proper, Tr. of Oral Arg. 18; indeed, the Commissioner did not appeal from the District Court’s April 20 extension order, but only from its August 9 refusal to limit extension along “principal wage-earner” fines. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-689, p. 15a. Since no party has presented the issue of extension versus nullification for review, we would be inclined to consider it only if the power to order extension were clearly beyond the constitutional competence of a federal district court. This Court’s previous decisions, however, which routinely have affirmed District Court judgments ordering extension of federal welfare programs, suggest strongly that no such remedial incapacity exists.
B
The narrower question presented by the Commissioner’s appeal concerns not the merits of extension versus nullification, but rather the form that extension should take. The District- Court ordered that benefits be paid to families in which either the mother or the father is unemployed within the meaning of the Act. The Commissioner agrees that either the mother’s or the father’s unemployment should be able to qualify a needy family for benefits, but proposes to award them only if the parent in question can show that he or she is both unemployed and the family’s “principal wage-earner.” Citing the legislative history of the AFDC-UF program, the Commissioner argues that his proposed remedy comports with Congress’ intent to aid families made needy by their breadwinner’s unemployment. This argument, as the preceding portions of this opinion show, is not without force. We may assume arguendo that, if Congress knew in 1968 what it knows now, it might well have adopted the “principal wage-earner” model suggested by the Commissioner. But this does not mean that the AFDC-UF program should be restructured along these lines by a federal court.
First, the Commissioner's proposed remedy would have the effect of terminating benefits to many families currently receiving them. Under the Act and implementing regulations, benefits are paid to needy families of all unemployed fathers, whether or not the father is actually the “principal wage-earner.” See 42 U. S, C. § 607 (a); 45 CFR § 233.100 (a) (1) (1978). No one contends that the Act and regulations, insofar as they provide benefits to families of <all unemployed fathers, are invalid. Absent some such showing of invalidity, we would hesitate to terminate needy families’ entitlement to statutory benefits merely because the unemployed father cannot prove “breadwinner” status.
Second, the Commissioner’s proposed remedy would involve a restructuring of the Act that a court should not undertake lightly. Whenever a court extends a benefits program to redress unconstitutional underinclusiveness, it risks infringing legislative prerogatives. The extension ordered by the District Court possesses at least the virtue of simplicity: by ordering that “father” be replaced by its gender-neutral equivalent, the court avoided disruption of the AFDC-UF program, for benefits simply will be paid to families with an unemployed parent on the same terms that benefits have long been paid to families with an unemployed father. The “principal wage-earner” solution, by contrast, would introduce a term novel in the AFDC scheme, and would pose definitional and policy questions best suited to legislative or administrative elaboration. The Commissioner, with his “principal wage-earner” gloss on parental unemployment, in essence asks this Court to redefine “unemployment” within the meaning of the Act. Yet “Congress in § 407 (a) expressly delegated to the Secretary the power to prescribe standards for determining what constitutes 'unemployment’ for purposes of AFDC-UF eligibility. In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term.” Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S., at 425 (emphasis in original).
The remedy the Commissioner proposes, of course, undeniably would be cheaper than the remedy the District Court decreed, in part because it would terminate some current recipients’ eligibility. Although cost may prove a dispositive factor in other contexts, we do not regard it as controlling here. The United States, which will bear the main burden of added coverage through federal matching grants, urges that the District Court’s remedy be affirmed. The AFDC-UF program, furthermore, is optional with the States, id., at 431, and any State is free to drop out of it if dissatisfied with the added expense. This Court, in any event, is ill-equipped both to estimate the relative costs of various types of coverage, and to gauge the effect that different levels of expenditures would have upon the alleviation of human suffering. Under these circumstances, any fine-tuning of AFDC coverage along “principal wage-earner” lines is properly left to the democratic branches of the Government. In sum, we believe the District Court, in an effort to render the AFDC-UF program gender neutral, adopted the simplest and most equitable extension possible.
The judgment of the District Court accordingly is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
To be eligible for benefits under the AFDC-UF program, a family must meet both financial and categorical requirements. The financial requirements are determined by the participating States, and vary widely from one State to another. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 408-409 (1970). The categorical requirements, however, are largely determined by the Federal Government. The Act itself specifies that the father must have had 6 or more quarters of work in any 13-quarter period ending within one year prior to the application for aid, and must be currently employed for less than 100 hours per month. 42 U. S. C. § 607 (b) (1) (C). In addition, § 407 of the Act gives the Secretary of HEW authority to promulgate regulations further defining the “unemployment” that will render a family eligible for AFDC-UF benefits. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425 (1977). The regulations, like the statute, speak in terms of the unemployment of the “father.”' 45 CFR §233.100 (a)(1) (1978).
In States that participate in both the AFDC program and the Medicaid program, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq., individuals who qualify for AFDC benefits are also entitled to receive Medicaid benefits. § 1396a (a)(10).
The class was defined as
“those Massachusetts families with two parents in the home and with minor dependent children, born or unborn, who would otherwise be eligible for AFDC under Massachusetts AFDC program, and hence Medicaid as well, but for the sex discrimination in the federal statute [42 U. S. C. § 607] and Massachusetts regulations [6 CHSR III, Subch. A, Pt. 301, § 301.03; Pt. 303, Subpt. A, §§303.01 & 303.04] which provide for the granting of federally funded AFDC and Medicaid to families deprived of support because of the unemployment of their father, but not to families deprived of support because of the mother’s unemployment.” App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-437, pp. 39A-40A.
The Secretary does not contest the class certification. Juris. Statement in No. 78-437, p. 5 n. 4.
The Commissioner proposed to define “principal wage-earner” as the parent whose earned income or unemployment compensation was greater during the six months preceding the month of application. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 78-689, pp. 7a-8a.
During the Senate floor debate on the Conference Report, Senator Muskie briefly noted and opposed the gender limitation of § 407. 113 Cong. Rec. 36914 (1967).
The overriding purpose of the 1968 AFDC amendments was “[t]o give greater emphasis to getting appropriate members of families drawing aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) payments into employment and thus no longer dependent on the welfare rolls.” H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1967). The principal changes in the AFDC-UF program designed to accomplish this end included provisions “to authorize a Federal definition of unemployment by the Secretary (but within certain limits set forth in the legislation), to tie the program more closely to the work and training program authorized by the bill, and to protect only the children of unemployed fathers who have had a recent attachment to the work force.” Id., at 108.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that both the House and Senate Reports included material dealing specifically with the problem of parental desertion, yet none of this material mentioned the gender qualification of § 407. H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 102-103 (1967); S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 160-163 (1967).
“If any provision of this chapter, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter, and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.” 42 U. S. C. § 1303.
The Act, for example, provides benefits to two-parent families made needy by the incapacity of either parent, regardless of which parent may have been the “principal wage-earner.” 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed tax deficiencies against petitioners David and Louise Gitlitz and Philip and Eleanor Winn because they used nontaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their bases in S corporation stock and to deduct suspended losses. In this case we must answer two questions. First, we must decide whether the Internal Revenue Code (Code) permits taxpayers to increase bases in their S corporation stock by the amount of an S corporation’s discharge of indebtedness excluded from gross income. And, second, if the Code permits such an increase, we must decide whether the increase occurs before or after taxpayers are required to reduce the S corporation’s tax attributes.
I
David Gitlitz and Philip Winn were shareholders of P. D. W. & A., Inc., a corporation that had elected to be taxed under Subchapter S of the Code, 26 U. S. C. §§ 1361-1379 (1994 ed. and Supp. III). Subchapter S allows shareholders of qualified corporations to elect a “pass-through” taxation system under which income is subjected to only one level of taxation. See Bufferd v. Commissioner, 506 U. S. 523, 525 (1993). The corporation’s profits pass through directly to its shareholders on a pro rata basis and are reported on the shareholders’ individual tax returns. See § 1366(a)(1)(A). To prevent double taxation of income upon distribution from the corporation to the shareholders, § 1367(a)(1)(A).permits shareholders to increase their corporate bases by items of income identified in § 1366(a) (1994 ed. and Supp. III). Corporate losses and deductions are passed through in a similar manner, see § 1366(a)(1)(A), and the shareholders’ bases in the S corporation’s stock and debt are decreased accordingly, see §§ 1367(a)(2)(B), 1367(b)(2)(A). However, a shareholder cannot take corporate losses and deductions into account on his personal tax return to the extent that such items exceed his basis in the stock and debt of the S corporation. See § 1366(d)(1) (Supp. III). If those items exceed the basis, the excess is “suspended” until the shareholder’s basis becomes large enough to permit the deduction. See §§ 1366(d)(1), (2) (1994 ed. and Supp. III).
In 1991, P. D. W. & A. realized $2,021,296 of discharged indebtedness. At the time, the corporation was insolvent in the amount of $2,181,748. Because it was insolvent even after the discharge of indebtedness was added to its balance sheet, P. D. W. & A. excluded the entire discharge of indebtedness amount from gross income under 26 U. S. C. §§ 108(a) and 108(d)(7)(A). On their tax returns, Gitlitz and Winn increased their bases in P. D. W. & A. stock by their pro rata share (50 percent each) of the amount of the corporation’s discharge of indebtedness. Petitioners’ theory was that the discharge of indebtedness was an “item of income” subject to pass-through under § 1366(a)(1)(A). They used their increased bases to deduct on their personal tax returns corporate losses and deductions, including losses and deductions from previous years that had been suspended under § 1366(d). Gitlitz and Winn each had losses (including suspended losses and operating losses) that totaled $1,010,648. With the upward basis adjustments of $1,010,648 each, Gitlitz and Winn were each able to deduct the full amount of their pro rata share of P. D. W. & A.’s losses.
The Commissioner determined that petitioners could not use P. D. W. & A.’s discharge of indebtedness to increase their bases in the stock and denied petitioners’ loss deductions. Petitioners petitioned the Tax Court to review the deficiency determinations. The Tax Court, in its initial opinion, granted relief to petitioners and held that the discharge of indebtedness was an “item of income” and therefore could support a basis increase. See Winn v. Commissioner, 73 TCM 3167 (1997), ¶ 97,286 RIA Memo withdrawn and reissued, 75 TCM 1840 (1998), ¶ 98,071 RIA Memo TC. In light of the Tax Court’s decision in Nelson v. Commis sioner, 110 T. C. 114 (1998), aff’d, 182 E 3d 1152 (CA10 1999), however, the Tax Court granted the Commissioner’s motion for reconsideration and held that shareholders may not use an S corporation’s untaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their bases in corporate stock. See Winn v. Commissioner, 75 TCM 1840 (1998), ¶ 98,071 RIA Memo TC.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. See 182 F. 3d 1143 (CA10 1999). It assumed that excluded discharge of indebtedness is an item of income subject to pass-through to shareholders pursuant to § 1366(a)(1)(A), id., at 1148, 1151, n. 7, but held that the discharge of indebtedness amount first had to be used to reduce certain tax attributes of the S corporation under § 108(b), and that only the leftover amount could be used to increase basis. The Court of Appeals explained that, because the tax attribute to be reduced (in this case the corporation’s net operating loss) was equal to the amount of discharged debt, the entire amount of discharged debt was absorbed by the reduction at the corporate level, and nothing remained of the discharge of indebtedness to be passed through to the shareholders under § 1366(a)(1)(A). Id., at 1151. Because Courts of Appeals have disagreed on how to treat discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent S corporation, compare Gaudiano v. Commissioner, 216 F. 3d 524, 535 (CA6 2000) (holding that tax attributes are reduced before excluded discharged debt income is passed through to shareholders), cert. pending, No. 00-459; Witzel v. Commissioner, 200 F. 3d 496, 498 (CA7 2000) (same), cert. pending, No. 99-1693; and 182 F. 3d, at 1150 (case below), with United States v. Farley, 202 F. 3d 198, 206 (CA3 2000) (holding that excluded discharged debt income is passed through to shareholders before tax attributes are reduced), cert. pending, No. 99-1675 [Reporter’s Note: See post, p. 1111]; see also Pugh v. Commissioner, 213 F. 3d 1324, 1330 (CA11 2000) (holding that excluded discharged debt income is subject to pass-through and can increase basis), cert. pending, No. 00-242, we granted certiorari. 529 U. S. 1097 (2000).
I
Before we can reach the issue addressed by the Court of Appeals — whether the increase in the taxpayers’ corporate bases occurs before or after the taxpayers are required to reduce the S corporation’s tax attributes — we must address the argument raised by the Commissioner. The Commissioner argues that the discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent S corporation is not an “item of income” and thus never passes through to shareholders. Under a plain reading of the statute, we reject this argument and conclude that excluded discharged debt is indeed an “item of income,” which passes through to the shareholders and increases their bases in the stock of the S corporation.
Section 61(a)(12) states that discharge of indebtedness generally is included in gross income. Section 108(a)(1) provides an express exception to this general rule:
“Gross income does not include any amount which (but for this subsection) would be includible in gross income by reason of the discharge ... of indebtedness of the taxpayer if—
“(B) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent.”
The Commissioner contends that this exclusion from gross income alters the character of the discharge of indebtedness so that it is no longer an “item of income.” However, the text and structure of the statute do not support the Commissioner’s theory. Section 108(a) simply does not say that discharge of indebtedness ceases to be an item of income when the S corporation is insolvent. Instead it provides only that discharge of indebtedness ceases to be included in gross income. Not all items of income are included in gross income, see § 1366(a)(1) (providing that “items of income,” including “tax-exempt” income, are passed through to shareholders), so mere exclusion of an amount from gross income does not imply that the amount ceases to be an item of income. Moreover, §§ 101 through 136 employ the same construction to exclude various items from gross income: “Gross income does not include . . . .” The consequence of reading this language in the manner suggested by the Commissioner would be to exempt all items in these sections from pass-through under § 1366. However, not even the Commissioner encourages us to reach this sweeping conclusion. Instead the Commissioner asserts that discharge of indebtedness is unique among the types of items excluded from gross income because no economic outlay is required of the taxpayer receiving discharge of indebtedness. But the Commissioner is unable to identify language in the statute that makes this distinction relevant, and we certainly find none.
On the contrary, the statute makes clear that §108(a)’s exclusion does not alter the character of discharge of indebtedness as an item of income. Specifically, § 108(e)(1) reads:
“Except as otherwise provided in this section, there shall be no insolvency exception from the general rule that gross income includes income from the discharge of indebtedness.”
This provision presumes that discharge of indebtedness is always “income,” and that the only question for purposes of § 108 is whether it is includible in gross income. If discharge of indebtedness of insolvent entities were not actually “income,” there would be no need to provide an exception to its inclusion in gross income; quite simply, if discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent entity were not “income,” it would necessarily not be included in gross income.
Notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, the Commissioner argues, generally, that excluded discharge of indebtedness is not income and, specifically, that it is not “tax-exempt income” under § 1366(a)(1)(A). First, the Commissioner argues that § 108 merely codified the “judicial insolvency exception,” and that, under this exception, discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent taxpayer was not considered income. The insolvency exception was a rule that the discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent taxpayer was not taxable income. See, e. g., Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F. 2d 95 (CA5 1934); Astoria Marine Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 798 (1949). But the exception has since been limited by § 108(e). Section 108(e) precludes us from relying on any understanding of the judicial insolvency exception that was not codified in § 108. And as explained above, the language and logic of §108 clearly establish that, although discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent taxpayer is not included in gross income, it is nevertheless income.
The Commissioner also relies on a Treasury Regulation to support his theory that no income is realized from the discharge of the debt of an insolvent:
“Proceedings under Bankruptcy Act.
“(1) Income is not realized by a taxpayer by virtue of the discharge, under section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U. S. C. 32), of his indebtedness as the result of an adjudication in bankruptcy, or by virtue of an agreement among his creditors not consummated under any provision of the Bankruptcy Act, if immediately thereafter the taxpayer’s liabilities exceed the value of his assets.” 26 CFR § 1.61-12(b) (2000).
Even if this regulation could be read (countertextually) to apply outside the bankruptcy context, it merely states that “[i]ncome is not realized.” The regulation says nothing about whether discharge of indebtedness is income subject to pass-through under § 1366.
Second, the Commissioner argues that excluded discharge of indebtedness is not “tax-exempt” income under § 1366(a)(1)(A), but rather “tax-deferred” income. According to the Commissioner, because the taxpayer is required to reduce tax attributes that could have provided future tax benefits, the taxpayer will pay taxes on future income that otherwise would have been absorbed by the forfeited tax attributes. Implicit in the Commissioner’s labeling of such income as “tax-deferred,” however, is the erroneous assumption that § 1366(a)(1)(A) does not include “tax-deferred” income. Section 1366 applies to “items of income.” This section expressly includes “tax-exempt” income, but this inclusion does not mean that the statute must therefore exclude “tax-deferred” income. The section is worded broadly enough to include any item of income, even tax-deferred income, that “could affect the liability for tax of any shareholder.” § 1366(a)(1)(A). Thus, none of the Commissioner’s contentions alters our conclusion that discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent S corporation is an item of income for purposes of § 1366(a)(1)(A).
III
Having concluded that excluded discharge of indebtedness is . an “item of income” and is therefore subject to pass-through to shareholders under § 1366, we must resolve the sequencing question addressed by the Court of Appeals— whether pass-through is performed before or after the reduction of the S corporation’s tax attributes under § 108(b). Section 108(b)(1) provides that “[t]he amount excluded from gross income under [§ 108(a)] shall be applied to reduce the tax attributes of the taxpayer as provided [in this section].” Section 108(b)(2) then lists the various tax attributes to be reduced in the order of reduction. The first tax attribute to be reduced, and the one at issue in this case, is the net operating loss. See § 108(b)(2)(A). Section 108(d)(7)(B) specifies that, for purposes of attribute reduction, the shareholders’ suspended losses for the taxable year of discharge are to be treated as the S corporation’s net operating loss. If tax attribute reduction is performed before the discharge of indebtedness is passed through to the shareholders (as the Court of Appeals held), the shareholders’ losses that exceed basis are treated as the corporation’s net operating loss and are then reduced by the amount of the discharged debt. In this case, no suspended losses would remain that would permit petitioners to take deductions. If, however, attribute reduction is performed after the discharged debt income is passed through (as petitioners argue), then the shareholders would be able to deduct their losses (up to the amount of the increase in basis caused by the discharged debt). Any suspended losses remaining then will be treated as the S corporation’s net operating loss and will be reduced by the amount of the discharged debt. Therefore, the sequence of the steps of pass-through and attribute reduction determines whether petitioners here were deficient when they increased their bases by the discharged debt amount and deducted their losses.
The sequencing question is expressly addressed in the statute. Section 108(b)(4)(A) directs that the attribute reductions “shall be made after the determination of the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year of the discharge.” (Emphases added.) See also § 1017(a) (applying the same sequencing when § 108 attribute reduction affects basis of corporate property). In order to determine the “tax imposed,” an S corporation shareholder must adjust his basis in his corporate stock and pass through all items of income and loss. See §§ 1866,1367 (1994 ed. and Supp. III). Consequently, the attribute reduction must be made after the basis adjustment and pass-through. In the case of petitioners, they must pass through the discharged debt, increase corporate bases, and then deduct their losses, all before any attribute reduction could occur. Because their basis increase is equal to their losses, petitioners have no suspended losses remaining. They, therefore, have no net operating losses to reduce.
Although the Commissioner has now abandoned the reasoning of the Court of Appeals below, we address the primary arguments made in the Courts of Appeals against petitioners’ reading of the sequencing provision. First, one court has expressed the concern that, if the discharge of indebtedness is passed through to the shareholder before the tax attributes are reduced, then there can never be any discharge of indebtedness remaining “at the corporate level,” § 108(d)(7)(A), by which to reduce tax attributes. Gaudino, 216 F. 3d, at 533. This concern presumes that tax attributes can be reduced only if the discharge of indebtedness itself remains at the corporate level. The statute, however, does not impose this restriction. Section 108(b)(1) requires only that the tax attributes be reduced by “[t]he amount excluded from gross income” (emphasis added), and that amount is not altered by the mere pass-through of the income to the shareholder.
Second, courts have discussed the policy concern that, if shareholders were permitted to pass through the discharge of indebtedness before reducing any tax attributes, the shareholders would wrongly experience a “double windfall”: They would be exempted from paying taxes on the full amount of the discharge of indebtedness, and they would be able to increase basis and deduct their previously suspended losses. See, e.g., 182 F. 3d, at 1147-1148. Because the Code’s plain text permits the taxpayers here to receive these benefits, we need not address this policy concern.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Each man filed a joint tax return with his wife.
Section 1366(a)(1) provides:
“In determining the tax under this chapter of a shareholder for the shareholder’s taxable year in which the taxable year of the S corporation ends . . . , there shall be taken into account the shareholder’s pro rata share of the corporation’s—
“(A) items of income (including tax-exempt income), loss, deduction, or credit the separate treatment of which could affect the liability for tax of any shareholder ....”
In Nelson, the Tax Court held that excluded discharge of indebtedness does not pass through to an S corporation’s shareholders because § 108 is an exception to normal S corporation pass-through rules. Specifically, the court held that, because § 108(d)(7)(A) requires that “subsections (a) [and (b) of § 108] shall be applied at the corporate level” in the case of an S corporation, it precludes any pass-through of the discharge of indebtedness to the shareholder level. See Nelson, 110 T. C., at 121-124.
Section 108(b)(1) reads: “The amount excluded from gross income under [§ 108(a)(1)] shall be applied to reduce the tax attributes of the taxpayer ....”
The Commissioner has altered his arguments throughout the course of this litigation. According to the Tax Court, during the first iteration of this case the Commissioner made several arguments but then settled on a “final” one — that the discharge of indebtedness of the insolvent S corporation was not an “item of income,” see 73 TCM 3167 (1997), ¶ 97,286 RIA Memo TC. In the Court of Appeals, the Commissioner argued instead that, because any pass-through of excluded discharge of indebtedness to petitioners took place after any reduction of tax attributes and by then the income would have been fully absorbed by the tax attributes, no discharged debt remained to flowthrough to petitioners. The Commissioner relegated to a footnote his argument that discharge of indebtedness is not an “item of income.” See Brief for Appellee in Nos. 98-9009 and 98-9010 (CA10), p. 33, n. 14.
The Commissioner also contends, as does the dissent, that because § 108(d)(7)(A) mandates that the discharged debt amount be determined and applied to reduce tax attributes “at the corporate level,” rather than at the shareholder level, the discharged debt, even if it is some type of income, simply cannot pass through to shareholders. In other words, the Commissioner contends' that § 108(d)(7)(A) excepts excluded discharged debt from the general pass-through provisions for S corporations. However, § 108(d)(7)(A) merely directs that the exclusion from gross income and the tax attribute reduction be made at the corporate level. Section 108(d)(7)(A) does not state or imply that the debt discharge provisions shall apply only “at the corporate level.” The very purpose of Subchap-ter S is to tax at the shareholder level, not the corporate level. Income is determined at the S corporation level, see § 1863(b), not in order to tax the corporation, see § 1363(a) (exempting an S corporation from income tax), but solely to pass through to the S corporation’s shareholders the corporation’s income. Thus, the controlling provision states that, in determining a shareholder’s liability, “there shall be taken into account the shareholder’s pro rata share of the corporation’s . . . items of income (including tax-exempt income)_” § 1366(a)(1). Nothing in § 108(d)(7)(A) suspends the operation of these ordinary pass-through rules.
Under this scenario, the shareholders’ losses would be reduced by the discharge of indebtedness. However, it is unclear precisely what would happen to the discharge of indebtedness. The Court of Appeals below stated that the discharged debt would be “absorbed” by the reduction to the extent of the net operating loss and that therefore only the excess excluded discharged debt would remain to pass through to the shareholders. 182 F. 3d 1143, 1149 (CA10 1999). In contrast, another Court of Appeals suggested, albeit in dictum, that the full amount of the discharge might still pass through to the shareholder and be used to increase basis; the discharged debt amount would reduce the net operating loss but would not be absorbed by it. Witzel v. Commissioner, 200 F. 3d 496, 498 (CA7 2000). We need not resolve this issue because we conclude that the discharge of indebtedness passes through before any attribute reduction takes place.
The Commissioner has abandoned his argument related to the sequencing issue before this Court. This abandonment is particularly odd given that the sequencing issue predominated in the Commissioner’s argument to the Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding the Commissioner’s attempt at oral argument to distance himself from the reasoning of the Court of Appeals on this issue — the Commissioner represented to us that the Court of Appeals developed its reading of the statute sua sponte, Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-24, 27 — it is apparent from the Commissioner’s brief in the Court of Appeals that the Commissioner supplied the very sequencing theory that the Court of Appeals adopted. Compare, e. g., Brief for Appellee in Nos. 98-9009 and 98-9010 (CA10), p. 28 (“First, the discharge of indebtedness income that is excluded under Section 108(a) at the corporate level is temporarily set aside and has no tax consequences .... Second, PDW & A computes its tax attributes, i. e., taxpayers’ suspended losses. Third, the excluded discharge of indebtness income is applied against and eliminates the suspended losses. Because the excluded income is applied against — and offset by — the suspended losses, no item of income flows through to taxpayers under Section 1366(a), and no upward basis adjustment is made under Section 1367(a)” (citations omitted)), with, e. g., 182 F. 3d, at 1151 (“PDW & A first must compute its discharge of indebtedness income and set this figure aside temporarily. The corporation then must calculate its net operating loss tax attribute.... Finally, the corporation must apply the excluded discharged debt to reduce its tax attributes. In this case, the net operating loss tax attribute fully absorbs the corporation’s excluded- discharge of indebtedness income. Thus, there are no items of income to pass through to Gitlitz and Winn”).
Similar to this argument is the contention that, in cases such as this one in which the shareholders’ suspended losses are fully deducted before attribute reduction could take place, no net operating loss remains and no attribute reduction can occur, thus rendering § 108(b) inoperative. However, there will be other cases in which § 108(b) will be inoperative. In particular, if a taxpayer has no tax attributes at all, there will be no reduction. Certainly the statute does not condition the exclusion under § 108(a) on the ability of the taxpayer to reduce attributes under § 108(b). Likewise, in the case of shareholders similarly situated to petitioners in this case, there is also the possibility that other attributes, see §§ 108(b)(2)(B)-(G), could be reduced.
The benefit at issue in this ease arises in part because § 108(d)(7)(A) permits the exclusion of discharge of indebtedness income from gross income for an insolvent S corporation even when the S corporation shareholder is personally solvent. We are aware of no other instance in which § 108 directly benefits a solvent entity. However, the result is required by statute. Between 1982 and 1984, §108 provided that the exclusion from gross income and the reduction in tax attributes occurred at the shareholder level. See Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-354, § 3(e), 96 Stat. 1689. This provision, which paralleled the current taxation of partnerships at the partner level, see 26 U. S. C. § 108(d)(6), prevented solvent shareholders from benefiting as a result of their S corporation’s insolvency. In 1984, however, Congress amended the Code to provide that §108 be applied “at the corporate level.” Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, § 721(b), 98 Stat. 966. It is as a direct result of this amendment that the solvent petitioners in this case are able to benefit from § 108’s exclusion.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion in which Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Stevens joined.
On August 15, 1977, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted a petition for writ of mandamus ordering petitioner, a judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, “to proceed immediately” to adjudicate a claim based upon the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and brought by respondent, Calvert Fire Insurance Co., against American Mutual Reinsurance Co., despite the pendency of a substantially identical proceeding between the same parties in the Illinois state courts. 560 F. 2d 792, 797. The Court of Appeals felt that our recent decision in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976), compelled the issuance of the writ. We granted certiorari to consider the propriety of the use of mandamus to review a District Court’s decision to defer to concurrent state proceedings, 434 U. S. 1008, and we now reverse.
I
Respondent Calvert writes property and casualty insurance. American Mutual operates a reinsurance pool whereby a number of primary insurers protect themselves against unanticipated losses. Membership in the pool requires both the payment of premiums by pool members and indemnification of the pool in the event that losses exceed those upon which the premiums are calculated. Calvert joined the pool in early 1974, but in April of that year notified American Mutual of its election to rescind the agreement by which it became a member.
In July 1974, American Mutual sued in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., to obtain a declaration that the pool agreement between it and Calvert was in full force and effect. Six months later, Calvert in its answer to that suit asserted that the pool agreement was not enforceable against it because of violations by American Mutual of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Illinois Securities Act, the Maryland Securities Law, and the state common law of fraud. With its answer Calvert filed a counterclaim seeking $2 million in damages from American Mutual on all of the grounds that it set up in defense except for the defense based on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Since § 27 of that Act, 48 Stat. 902, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78aa (1976 ed.), granted the district courts of the United States exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the Act, Calvert on the same day filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking damages from American Mutual for an alleged violation of Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1977), issued under § 10 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b) (1976 ed.). Joined with this Rule 10b-5 count were claims based on each of the other grounds asserted by it in defense to American Mutual’s state-court action.
In February 1975, more than seven months after it had begun its state-court action, but less than one month after Calvert had filed its answer and counterclaim in that action and its complaint in the federal court, American Mutual moved to dismiss or abate the latter. The claim for dismissal was based on the substantive assertion that the reinsurance agreement was not a “security” within the meaning of the 1933 or 1934 Act. The motion to abate was based on the fact that the state proceedings commenced six months before the federal proceedings included every claim and defense except the claim for damages based on Rule 10b-5 under the 1934 Act.
In May 1975, Judge Will substantially granted American Mutual’s motion to defer the federal proceeding until the completion of the state proceedings, observing that a tentative trial date had already been set by the state court. Federal litigation of the same issues would therefore be duplicatiye and wasteful. He rejected Calvert’s contention that the court should proceed with the entire case because of its exclusive jurisdiction under the 1934 Act, noting that the state court was bound to provide the equitable relief sought by Calvert by recognizing a valid Rule 10b-5 claim as a defense to the state action. Only Calvert’s claim for damages under Rule 10b-5 was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court. Petitioner therefore stayed all aspects of Calvert’s federal action subject to' the concurrent jurisdiction of both courts, recognizing “only Calvert’s very limited claim for monetary damages under the 1934 Securities Act as a viable claim in this court.” App. to Pet. for Cert. B-9. On May 9, 1975, Judge Will heard oral argument on the basic question of whether Calvert's interest in the reinsurance pool is a security within the meaning of the 1934 Act. He has not yet rendered a decision on that issue.
Judge Will rejected two motions to reconsider his stay order and refused to certify an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b). On May 26, 1976, Calvert petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Will to proceed to adjudicate its Rule 10b-5 claims. Nearly 14 months later, on August 15, 1977, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and directed Judge Will to “proceed immediately with Calvert's claim for damages and equitable relief under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.” 560 F. 2d, at 797.
We granted certiorari to consider Judge Will's contention that the issuance of the writ of mandamus impermissibly-interfered with the discretion of a district court to control its own docket. 434 U. S. 1008 (1978).
II
The correct disposition of this case hinges in large part on the appropriate standard of inquiry to be employed by a court of appeals in determining whether to issue a writ of mandamus to a district court. On direct appeal, a court of appeals has broad authority to “modify, vacate, set aside or reverse” an order of a district court, and it may direct such further action on remand “as may be just under the circumstances.” 28 U. S. C. § 2106. By contrast, under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a), courts of appeals may issue a writ of mandamus only when “necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.” Whereas a simple showing of error may suffice to obtain a reversal on direct appeal, to issue a writ of mandamus under such circumstances “would undermine the settled limitations upon the power of an appellate court to review interlocutory orders.” Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 98 n. 6 (1967).
As we have repeatedly reaffirmed in cases such as Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U. S. 394, 402 (1976), and Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U. S. 379, 382 (1953), the “traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.” Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U. S. 21, 26 (1943). Calvert makes no contention that petitioner has exceeded the bounds of his jurisdiction. Rather, it contends that the District Court, in entering the stay order, has refused “to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.” Ibid. There can be no doubt that, where a district court persistently and without reason refuses to adjudicate a case properly before it, the court of appeals may issue the writ “in order that [it] may exercise the jurisdiction of review given by law.” Insurance Co. v. Comstock, 16 Wall. 258, 270 (1873). “Otherwise the appellate jurisdiction could be defeated and the purpose of the statute authorizing the writ thwarted by unauthorized action of the district court obstructing the appeal.” Roche, supra, at 25:
To say that a court of appeals has the power to direct a district court to proceed to judgment in a pending case “when it is its duty to do so,” 319 U. S., at 26, states the standard but does not decide this or any other particular case. It is essential that the moving party satisfy “the burden of showing that its right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and indisputable.' ” Bankers Life & Cas. Co., supra, at 384, quoting United States v. Duell, 172 U. S. 576, 582 (1899). Judge Will urges that Calvert does not have a “clear and indisputable” right to the adjudication of its claims in the District Court without regard to the concurrent state proceedings. To that issue we now must turn.
Ill
It is well established that “the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.” McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 282 (1910). It is equally well settled that a district court is “under no compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction,” Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U. S. 491, 494 (1942), where the controversy may be settled more expeditiously in the state court. Although most of our decisions discussing the propriety of stays or dismissals of duplicative actions have concerned conflicts of jurisdiction between two federal district courts, e. g., Kerotest Mfg. Co., v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U. S. 180 (1952); Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248 (1936), we have recognized the relevance of those cases in the analogous circumstances presented here. See Colorado River, 424 U. S., at 817-819. In both situations, the decision is largely committed to the “carefully considered judgment,” id., at 818, of the district court.
This power has not always been so clear. In McClellan, on facts similar to those presented here, this Court indicated that the writ might properly issue where the District Court had stayed its proceedings in deference to concurrent state proceedings. Such an automatic exercise of authority may well have been appropriate in a day when Congress had authorized fewer claims for relief in the federal courts, so that duplicative litigation and the concomitant tension between state and federal courts could rarely result. However, as the overlap between state claims and federal claims increased, this Court soon recognized that situations would often arise when it would be appropriate to defer to the state courts.
“Ordinarily it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same parties. Gratuitous interference with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a state court litigation should be avoided.” Brillhart, supra, at 495.
The decision in such circumstances is largely committed to the discretion of the district court. 316 U. S., at 494. Furthermore, Colorado River, supra, at 820, established that such deference may be equally appropriate even when matters of substantive federal law are involved in the case.
It is true that Colorado River emphasized “the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” 424 U. S., at 817. That language underscores our conviction that a district court should exercise its discretion with this factor in mind, but it in no way undermines the conclusion of Brillhart that the decision whether to defer to the concurrent jurisdiction of a state court is, in the last analysis, a matter committed to the district court's discretion. Seizing upon the phrase “unflagging obligation” in an opinion which upheld the correctness of a district court’s final decision to dismiss because of concurrent jurisdiction does little to bolster a claim for the extraordinary writ of mandamus in a case such as this where the District Court has rendered no final decision.
We think it of considerably more importance than did the Court of Appeals that Colorado River came before the Court of Appeals on appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1291 following outright dismissal of the action by the District Court, rather than through an effort on the part of the federal-court plaintiff to seek mandamus. Calvert contends here, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed, that Judge Will’s order deferring the federal proceedings was “equivalent to a dismissal.” 560 F. 2d, at 796. We are loath to rest our analysis on this ubiquitous phrase, for if used carelessly or without a precise definition it may impede rather than assist sound resolution of the underlying legal issue.
Obviously, if Judge Will had dismissed Calvert’s action Calvert could have appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals, which could have required such action of Judge Will “as may be just under the circumstances.” 28 U. S. C. § 2106. Since he did not dismiss the action, Calvert remained free to urge reconsideration of his decision to defer based on new information as to the progress of the state case; to this extent, at least, deferral was not “equivalent to a dismissal.”
There are sound reasons for our reiteration of the rule that a district court’s decision to defer proceedings because of concurrent state litigation is generally committed to the discretion of that court. No one can seriously contend that a busy federal trial judge, confronted both with competing demands on his time for matters properly within his jurisdiction and with inevitable scheduling difficulties because of the unavailability of lawyers, parties, and witnesses, is not entrusted with a wide latitude in setting his own calendar. Had Judge Will simply decided on his own initiative to defer setting this case for trial until the state proceedings were completed, his action would-have been the “equivalent” of granting the motion of American Mutual to defer, yet such action would at best have afforded Calvert a highly dubious claim for mandamus. We think the fact that the judge accomplished this same result by ruling favorably on a party’s motion to defer does not change the underlying legal question.
Although the District Court’s exercise of its discretion may be subject to review and modification in a proper interlocutory appeal, cf. Landis, 299 U. S., at 256-259, we are convinced that it ought not to be overridden by a writ of mandamus. Where a matter is committed to the discretion of a district court, it cannot be said that a litigant’s right to a particular result is “clear and indisputable.”
Calvert contends that a district court is without power to stay proceedings, in deference to a contemporaneous state action, where the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the issue presented. Whether or not this is so, petitioner has not purported to stay consideration of Calvert’s claim for damages under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which is the only issue which may not be concurrently resolved by both courts. It is true that petitioner has not yet ruled upon this claim. Where a district court obstinately refuses to adjudicate a matter properly before it, a court of appeals may issue the writ to correct “unauthorized action of the district court obstructing the appeal.” Roche, 319 U. S., at 25, citing Ex parte United States, 287 U. S. 241 (1932). Calvert, however, has neither alleged nor proved such a heedless refusal to proceed as a basis for the issuance of the writ here. Its petition offers only the bare allegation that Judge Will “in effect” abated the damages claim in deference to the state proceedings. App. 12. Judge Will has never issued such an order, and the sparse record before us will not support any such inference. So far as appears, the delay in adjudicating the damages claim is simply a product of the normal excessive load of business in the District Court, compounded by “the unfortunate consequence of making the judge a litigant” in this mandamus proceeding. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U. S. 258, 260 (1947).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
Calvert's answer in the state action explicitly contended that it was “entitled to rescission of its purchase of the aforesaid security” because of the alleged Rule 10b-5 violation. App. to Pet. for Cert. D-5. It sought identical equitable relief in its federal complaint. Id., at E-6. See Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F. 2d 817, 822 (CA9 1975); Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F. 2d 750, 754 (CA7 1970).
The state court, however, has reached a decision on the issue. The Circuit Court concluded that the agreement was not a security, and therefore struck the federal issues from Calvert's answer and counterclaim. On an interlocutory appeal the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the agreement was not a security within the meaning of either the 1933 or the 1934 Act and that, in any event, § 2 (b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1012 (b) (1976 ed.), exempted insurance from the reach of the federal securities laws. American Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App. 3d 922, 367 N. E. 2d 104 (1977), pet. for leave to appeal denied, No. 50,085 (Jan. 26, 1978), cert. denied, 436 U. S. 906 (1978).
As already noted, the stay order did not apply to Calvert’s claim for damages under Rule 10b-5. Judge Will had stayed Calvert’s claim for equitable relief because the state court had jurisdiction to rescind the agreement by recognition of a Rule 10b-5 defense.
The petition did not seek to require Judge Will to proceed with the state-law claims or the federal claim based on the 1933 Act. 560 F. 2d 792, 794 n. 2.
Although Calvert’s petition addressed only its Rule 10b-5 claims, the court went on to note: “The logic behind our holding in this case supports the conclusion that the stay of 1933 Act claims, as well as the 1934 Act claims, was improper.” 560 F. 2d, at 797 n. 6.
A classic example of the proper issuance of the writ to protect eventual appellate jurisdiction is Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336 (1976), in which a case had been remanded to the state courts on grounds utterly unauthorized by the controlling statute. The dissenters in that case urged that Congress had intended to bar all review of remand orders, not that mandamus would have been inappropriate absent such a bar. Id., at 354 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Stewart, J., dissenting).
This Court there held, not that the writ should issue, but that the Court of Appeals should have required the District Judge to show cause why the writ should not issue. Judge Carland presented an affidavit to this Court attempting to defend his stay order on the basis of substantially completed state proceedings. As that affidavit was not in the record before the Court of Appeals, this Court did not “pass upon the sufficiency of those proceedings to authorize the orders in question," 217 U. S., at 283, but directed the Court of Appeals to do so in the first instance.
Although in at least one instance we approved the issuance of the writ upon a mere showing of abuse of discretion, La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U. S. 249, 257 (1957), we warned soon thereafter against the dangers of such a practice. “Courts faced with petitions for the peremptory writs must be careful lest they suffer themselves to be misled by labels such as 'abuse of discretion’ and 'want of power’ into interlocutory review of non-appealable orders on the mere ground that they may be erroneous.” Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 98 n. 6 (1967).
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500 (1959), is not to the contrary. Both the Court and the dissenters agreed that mandamus should issue to protect a clear right to a jury trial. Id., at 511; ibid. (Stewart, J., dissenting). The Court simply concluded that it was “not permissible,” id., at 508, for the District Court to postpone a jury trial until after most of the relevant issues had been settled in an equitable action before the court. Here, we have repeatedly recognized that it is permissible for a district court to defer to the concurrent jurisdiction of a state court.
That a litigant’s right 'to proceed with a duplicative action in a federal court can never be said to be “clear and indisputable” is made all the more apparent by our holding earlier this Term in General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U. S. 12 (1977), that a state court lacks the power to restrain vexatious litigation in the federal courts. There, we reaffirmed the principle that “[fjederal courts are fully capable of preventing their misuse for purposes of harassment.” Id., at 19.
The only other issue encompassed by the writ was Calvert’s Rule 10b-5 claim for equitable relief. It is not disputed here that the state court has jurisdiction to rescind the agreement as Calvert requests. That being conceded, we find no merit in Calvert’s further argument that the statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction in any way distinguishes this aspect of the case from our earlier decisions in which both the state and federal courts had power to grant the desired relief.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to decide whether a state-court judge has absolute immunity from a suit for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for his decision to dismiss a subordinate court employee. The employee, who had been a probation officer, alleged that she was demoted and discharged on account of her sex, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that the judge’s decisions were not judicial acts for which he should be held absolutely immune.
I
Respondent Howard Lee White served as Circuit Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit of the State of Illinois and Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court in Jersey County. Under Illinois law, Judge White had the authority to hire adult probation officers, who were removable in his discretion. 111. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶204-1 (1979). In addition, as designee of the Chief Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Judge White had the authority to appoint juvenile probation officers to serve at his pleasure. 111. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, ¶706-5 (1979).
In April 1977, Judge White hired petitioner Cynthia A. Forrester as an adult and juvenile probation officer. Forrester prepared presentence reports for Judge White in adult offender cases, and recommendations for disposition and placement in juvenile cases. She also supervised persons on probation and recommended revocation when necessary. In July 1979, Judge White appointed Forrester as Project Supervisor of the Jersey County Juvenile Court Intake and Referral Services Project, a position that carried increased supervisory responsibilities. Judge White demoted Forrester to a nonsupervisory position in the summer of 1980. He discharged her on October 1, 1980.
Forrester filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois in July 1982. She alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., and § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. A jury found that Judge White had discriminated against Forrester on account of her sex, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The jury awarded her $81,818.80 in compensatory damages under § 1983. Forrester’s other claims were dismissed in the course of the lawsuit.
After Judge White’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied, he moved for a new trial. The District Court granted this motion, holding that the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Judge White then moved for summary judgment on the ground that he was entitled to “judicial immunity” from a civil damages suit. This motion, too, was granted. Forrester appealed.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment. The majority reasoned that judges are immune for activities implicating the substance of their decisions in the cases before them, although they are not shielded “from the trials of life generally.” 792 F. 2d 647, 652 (1986). Some members of a judge’s staff aid in the performance of adjudicative functions, and the threat of suits by such persons could make a judge reluctant to replace them even after losing confidence in their work. This could distort the judge’s decisionmaking and thereby indirectly affect the rights of litigants. Here, Forrester performed functions that were “inextricably tied to discretionary decisions that have consistently been considered judicial acts.” Id., at 657. Unless Judge White felt free to replace Forrester, the majority thought, the quality of his own decisions might decline. The Court of Appeals therefore held that Judge White was absolutely immune from Forrester’s civil damages suit. In view of this holding, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether the District Court had erred in granting Judge White’s motion for a new trial.
In dissent, Judge Posner argued that judicial immunity should protect only adjudicative functions, and that employment decisions are administrative functions for which judges should not be given absolute immunity.
In Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Mo., 729 F. 2d 541, 549, cert. denied, 469 U. S. 828 (1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a judge was not immune from civil damages for his decision to demote a hearing officer. We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 1083 (1987), to resolve the conflict.
II
Suits for monetary damages are meant to compensate the victims of wrongful actions and to discourage conduct that may result in liability. Special problems arise, however, when government officials are exposed to liability for damages. To the extent that the threat of liability encourages these officials to carry out their duties in a lawful and appropriate manner, and to pay their victims when they do not, it accomplishes exactly what it should. By its nature, however, the threat of liability can create perverse incentives that operate to inhibit officials in the proper performance of their duties. In many contexts, government officials are expected to make decisions that are impartial or imaginative, and that above all are informed by considerations other than the personal interests of the decisionmaker. Because government officials are engaged by definition in governing, their decisions will often have adverse effects on other persons. When officials are threatened with personal liability for acts taken pursuant to their official duties, they may well be induced to act with an excess of caution or otherwise to skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide their conduct. In this way, exposing government officials to the same legal hazards faced by other citizens may detract from the rule of law instead of contributing to it.
Such considerations have led to the creation of various forms of immunity from suit for certain government officials. Aware of the salutary effects that the threat of liability can have, however, as well as the undeniable tension between official immunities and the ideal of the rule of law, this Court has been cautious in recognizing claims that government officials should be free of the obligation to answer for their acts in court. Running through our cases, with fair consistency, is a “functional” approach to immunity questions other than those that have been decided by express constitutional or statutory enactment. Under that approach, we examine the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions. Officials who seek exemption from personal liability have the burden of showing that such an exemption is justified by overriding considerations of public policy, and the Court has recognized a category of “qualified” immunity that avoids unnecessarily extending the scope of the traditional concept of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974); Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982).
This Court has generally been quite sparing in its recognition of claims to absolute official immunity. One species of such legal protection is beyond challenge: the legislative immunity created by the Speech or Debate Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6, cl. 1. Even here, however, the Court has been careful not to extend the scope of the protection further than its purposes require. See, e. g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 622-627 (1972); see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 123-133 (1979); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169 (1966); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881). Furthermore, on facts analogous to those in the case before us, the Court indicated that a United States Congressman would not be entitled to absolute immunity, in a sex-discrimination suit filed by a personal aide whom he had fired, unless such immunity was afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause. Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 246 (1979); see also id., at 246, n. 25 (reserving question of qualified immunity).
Among executive officials, the President of the United States is absolutely immune from damages liability arising from official acts. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731 (1982). This immunity, however, is based on the President’s “unique position in the constitutional scheme,” id., at 749, and it does not extend indiscriminately to the President’s personal aides, see Harlow, supra, or to Cabinet level officers, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985). Nor are the highest executive officials in the States protected by absolute immunity under federal law. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra.
Ill
As a class, judges have long enjoyed a comparatively sweeping form of immunity, though one not perfectly well defined. Judicial immunity apparently originated, in medieval times, as a device for discouraging collateral attacks and thereby helping to establish appellate procedures as the standard system for correcting judicial error. See Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 Duke L. J. 879. More recently, this Court found that judicial immunity was “the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries, and has never been denied, that we are aware of, in the courts of this country.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872). Besides protecting the finality of judgments or discouraging inappropriate collateral attacks, the Bradley Court concluded, judicial immunity also protected judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants. Id., at 348.
In the years since Bradley was decided, this Court has not been quick to find that federal legislation was meant to diminish the traditional common-law protections extended to the judicial process. See, e. g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967). On the contrary, these protections have been held to extend to Executive Branch officials who perform quasi-judicial functions, see Butz v. Economou, supra, at 513-514, or who perform prosecutorial functions that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430 (1976). The common law’s rationale for these decisions — freeing the judicial process of harassment or intimidation — has been thought to require absolute immunity even for advocates and witnesses. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325 (1983); Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 512.
One can reasonably wonder whether judges, who have been primarily responsible for developing the law of official immunities, are not inevitably more sensitive to the ill effects that vexatious lawsuits can have on the judicial function than they are to similar dangers in other contexts. Cf. id., at 528, n. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although Congress has not undertaken to cut back the judicial immunities recognized by this Court, we should be at least as cautious in extending those immunities as we have been when dealing with officials whose peculiar problems we know less well than our own. At the same time, we cannot pretend that we are writing on a clean slate or that we should ignore compelling reasons that may well justify broader protections for judges than for some other officials.
The purposes served by judicial immunity from liability in damages have been variously described. In Bradley v. Fisher, supra, at 348, and again in Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 554, the Court emphasized that the nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have. As Judge Posner pointed out in his dissenting opinion below, this is the principal characteristic that adjudication has in common with legislation and with criminal prosecution, which are the two other areas in which absolute immunity has most generously been provided. 792 F. 2d, at 660. If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits. Id., at 660-661. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or control, and it would manifestly detract from independent and impartial adjudication. Nor are suits against judges the only available means through which litigants can protect themselves from the consequences of judicial error. Most judicial mistakes or wrongs are open to correction through ordinary mechanisms of review, which are largely free of the harmful side-effects inevitably associated with exposing judges to personal liability.
When applied to the paradigmatic judicial acts involved in resolving disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of a court, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity has not been particularly controversial. Difficulties have arisen primarily in attempting to draw the line between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have been done by judges. Here, as in other contexts, immunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.
This Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity. The decided cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform. Thus, for example, the informal and ex parte nature of a proceeding has not been thought to imply that an act otherwise within a judge’s lawful jurisdiction was deprived of its judicial character. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349, 363, n. 12 (1978). Similarly, acting to disbar an attorney as a sanction for contempt of court, by invoking a power “possessed by all courts which have authority to admit attorneys to practice,” does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 354. As the Bradley Court noted: “Against the consequences of [judges’] erroneous or irregular action, from whatever motives proceeding, the law has provided for private parties numerous remedies, and to those remedies they must, in such cases, resort.” Ibid.
Administrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as judicial acts. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880), for example, this Court declined to extend immunity to a county judge who had been charged in a criminal indictment with discriminating on the basis of race in selecting trial jurors for the county’s courts. The Court reasoned:
“Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he was a county judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge. . . . That the jurors are selected for a court makes no difference. So are court-criers, tipstaves, sheriffs, &c. Is their election or their appointment a judicial act?” Id., at 348.
Although this case involved a criminal charge against a judge, the reach of the Court’s analysis was not in any obvious way confined by that circumstance.
Likewise, judicial immunity has not been extended to judges acting to promulgate a code of conduct for attorneys. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719 (1980). In explaining why legislative, rather than judicial, immunity furnished the appropriate standard, we said: “Although it is clear that under Virginia law the issuance of the Bar Code was a proper function of the Virginia Court, propounding the Code was not an act of adjudication but one of rulemaking.” Id., at 731. Similarly, in the same case, we held that judges acting to enforce the Bar Code would be treated like prosecutors, and thus would be amenable to suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. Id., at 734-737. Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U. S. 522 (1984). Once again, it was the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that informed our immunity analysis.
IV
In the case before us, we think it clear that Judge White was acting in an administrative capacity when he demoted and discharged Forrester. Those acts —like many others involved in supervising court employees and overseeing the efficient operation of a court — may have been quite important in providing the necessary conditions of a sound adjudicative system. The decisions at issue, however, were not themselves judicial or adjudicative. As Judge Posner pointed out below, a judge who hires or fires a probation officer cannot meaningfully be distinguished from a district attorney who hires and fires assistant district attorneys, or indeed from any other Executive Branch official who is responsible for making such employment decisions. Such decisions, like personnel decisions made by judges, are often crucial to the efficient operation of public institutions (some of which are at least as important as the courts), yet no one suggests that they give rise to absolute immunity from liability in damages under § 1983.
The majority below thought that the threat of vexatious lawsuits by disgruntled ex-employees could interfere with the quality of a judge’s decisions:
“The evil to be avoided is the following: A judge loses confidence in his probation officer, but hesitates to fire him because of the threat of litigation. He then retains the officer, in which case the parties appearing before the court are the victims, because the quality of the judge’s decision-making will decline.” 792 F. 2d, at 658.
There is considerable force in this analysis, but it in no way serves to distinguish judges from other public officials who hire and fire subordinates. Indeed, to the extent that a judge is less free than most Executive Branch officials to delegate decisionmaking authority to subordinates, there may be somewhat less reason to cloak judges with absolute immunity from such suits than there would be to protect such other officials. This does not imply that qualified immunity, like that available to Executive Branch officials who make similar discretionary decisions, is unavailable to judges for their employment decisions. See, e. g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183 (1984). Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 818. Absolute immunity, however, is “strong medicine, justified only when the danger of [officials’ being] deflect[ed from the effective performance of their duties] is very great.” 792 F. 2d, at 660 (Posner, J., dissenting). The danger here is not great enough. Nor do we think it significant that, under Illinois law, only a judge can hire or fire probation officers. To conclude that, because a judge acts within the scope of his authority, such employment decisions are brought within the court’s “jurisdiction,” or converted into “judicial acts,” would lift form above substance. Under Virginia law, only that State’s judges could promulgate and enforce a Bar Code, but we nonetheless concluded that neither function was judicial in nature. See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, supra.
We conclude that Judge White was not entitled to absolute immunity for his decisions to demote and discharge Forrester. In so holding, we do not decide whether Judge White is entitled to a new trial, or whether he may be able to claim a qualified immunity for the acts complained of in Forrester’s suit. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Blackmun joins in all but Part II of this opinion.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
An amendment to the Oregon Constitution prohibits judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury “unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict.” The question presented is whether that prohibition is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We hold that it is not.
I
Petitioner Honda Motor Co., Ltd., manufactured and sold the three-wheeled all-terrain vehicle that overturned while respondent was driving it, causing him severe and permanent injuries. Respondent brought suit alleging that petitioner knew or should have known that the vehicle had an inherently and unreasonably dangerous design. The jury found petitioner liable and awarded respondent $919,390.39 in compensatory damages and punitive damages of $5 million. The compensatory damages, however, were reduced by 20% to $735,512.31, because respondent’s own negligence contributed to the accident. On appeal, relying on our then-recent decision in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1 (1991), petitioner argued that the award of punitive damages violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the punitive damages were excessive and because Oregon courts lacked the power to correct excessive verdicts.
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the Oregon Supreme Court. The latter court relied heavily on the fact that the Oregon statute governing the award of punitive damages in product liability actions and the jury instructions in this case contain substantive criteria that provide at least as much guidance to the factfinders as the Alabama statute and jury instructions that we upheld in Haslip. The Oregon Supreme Court also noted that Oregon law provides an additional protection by requiring the plaintiff to prove entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance. Recognizing that other state courts had interpreted Haslip as including a “clear... constitutional mandate for meaningful judicial scrutiny of punitive damage awards,” Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal. 3d 105, 118, 813 P. 2d 1348, 1356 (1991); see also Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., Inc., 88 Md. App. 672, 596 A. 2d 687 (1991), the court nevertheless declined to “interpret Haslip to hold that an award of punitive damages, to comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, always must be subject to a form of post-verdict or appellate review that includes the possibility of remittitur.” 316 Ore. 263, 284, 851 P. 2d 1084, 1096 (1993). It also noted that trial and appellate courts were “not entirely powerless” because a judgment may be vacated if “there is no evidence to support the jury’s decision,” and because “appellate review is available to test the sufficiency of the jury instructions.” Id., at 285, 851 P 2d, at 1096-1097.
We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1068 (1994), to consider whether Oregon’s limited judicial review of the. size of punitive damages awards is consistent with our decision in Haslip.
II
Our recent cases have recognized that the Constitution imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1 (1991); TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443 (1993). Although they fail to “draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable,” id., at 458; Haslip, 499 U. S., at 18, a majority of the Justices agreed that the Due Process Clause imposes a limit on punitive damages awards. A plurality in TXO assented to the proposition that “grossly excessive” punitive damages would violate due process, 509 U. S., at 453-455, while Justice O’Connor, who dissented because she favored more rigorous standards, noted that “[i]t is thus common ground that an award may be so excessive as to violate due process,” id., at 480. In the case before us today we are not directly concerned with the character of the standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive awards; rather, we are confronted with the question of what procedures are necessary to ensure that punitive damages are not imposed in an arbitrary manner. More specifically, the question is whether the Due Process Clause requires judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awards.
The opinions in both Haslip and TXO strongly emphasized the importance of the procedural component of the Due Process Clause. In Haslip, the Court held that the common-law method of assessing punitive damages did not violate procedural due process. In so holding, the Court stressed the availability of both “meaningful and adequate review by the trial court” and subsequent appellate review. 499 U. S., at 20. Similarly, in TXO, the plurality opinion found that the fact that the “award was reviewed and upheld by the trial judge” and unanimously affirmed on appeal gave rise “to a strong presumption of validity.” 509 U. S., at 457. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) considered it sufficient that traditional common-law procedures were followed. In particular, he noted that “ ‘procedural due process’ requires judicial review of punitive damages awards for reasonableness.” Id., at 471.
All of those opinions suggest that our analysis in this case should focus on Oregon’s departure from traditional procedures. We therefore first contrast the relevant common-law practice with Oregon’s procedure, which that State’s Supreme Court once described as “a system of trial by jury in which the judge is reduced to the status of a mere monitor.” Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 187 Ore. 89, 113, 210 P. 2d 461, 471 (1949). We then examine the constitutional implications of Oregon’s deviation from established common-law procedures.
Ill
Judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards has been a safeguard against excessive verdicts for as long as punitive damages have been awarded. One of the earliest reported cases involving exemplary damages, Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C. P. 1763), arose out of King George Ill’s attempt to punish the publishers of the allegedly seditious North Briton, No. 45. The King’s agents arrested the plaintiff, a journeyman printer, in his home and detained him for six hours. Although the defendants treated the plaintiff rather well, feeding him “beef steakes and beer, so that he suffered very little or no damages,” 2 Wils., at 205, 95 Eng. Rep., at 768, the jury awarded him £300, an enormous sum almost 300 times the plaintiff’s weekly wage. The defendant’s lawyer requested a new trial, arguing that the jury’s award was excessive. Plaintiff’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that “in cases of tort... the court will never interpose in setting aside verdicts for excessive damages.” Id., at 206, 95 Eng. Rep., at 768. While the court denied the motion for new trial, the Chief Justice explicitly rejected plaintiff’s absolute rule against review of damages amounts. Instead, he noted that when the damages are “outrageous” and “all mankind at first blush must think so,” a court may grant a new trial “for excessive damages.” Id., at 207, 95 Eng. Rep., at 769. In accord with his view that the amount of an award was relevant to the motion for a new trial, the Chief Justice noted that “[u]pon the whole I am of opinion the damages are not excessive.” Ibid.
Subsequent English cases, while generally deferring to the jury’s determination of damages, steadfastly upheld the court’s power to order new trials solely on the basis that the damages were too high. Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 2 Black. W. 929, 96 Eng. Rep. 549 (C. R 1773) (Damages “may be so monstrous and excessive, as to be in themselves an evidence of passion or partiality in the jury”); Sharpe v. Brice, 2 Black. W. 942, 96 Eng. Rep. 557 (C. P. 1774) (“It has never been laid down, that the Court will not grant a new trial for excessive damages in any cases of tort”); Leith v. Pope, 2 Black. W. 1327, 1328, 96 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 (C. P. 1779) (“[I]n cases of tort the Court will not interpose on account of the largeness of damages, unless they are so flagrantly excessive as to afford an internal evidence of the prejudice and partiality of the jury”); Jones v. Sparrow, 5 T. R. 257, 101 Eng. Rep. 144 (K. B. 1793) (new trial granted for excessive damages); Goldsmith v. Lord Sefton, 3 Anst. 808, 145 Eng. Rep. 1046 (Exch. 1796) (same); Hewlett v. Cruchley, 5 Taunt. 277, 281, 128 Eng. Rep. 696, 698 (C. P. 1813) (“[I]t is now well acknowledged in all the Courts of Westminster-hall, that whether in actions for criminal conversation, malicious prosecutions, words, or any other matter, if the damages are clearly too large, the Courts will send the inquiry to another jury”).
Respondent calls to our attention the case of Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 244, 95 Eng. Rep. 790 (C. P. 1764), in which the court asserted that “there is not one single case, (that is law), in all the books to be found, where the court has granted a new trial for excessive damages in actions for torts.” Id., at 249, 95 Eng. Rep., at 793. Respondent would infer from that statement that 18th-century common law did not provide for judicial review of damages. Respondent’s argument overlooks several crucial facts. First, the Beardmore case antedates all but one of the cases cited in the previous paragraph. Even if respondent’s interpretation of the case were correct, it would be an interpretation the English courts rejected soon thereafter. Second, Beardmore itself cites at least one case that it concedes granted a new trial for excessive damages, Chambers v. Robinson, 2 Str. 691, 93 Eng. Rep. 787 (K. B. 1726), although it characterizes the case as wrongly decided. Third, to say that “there is not one single case... in all the books” is to say very little, because then, much more so than now, only a small proportion of decided cases was reported. For example, for 1764, the year Beardmore was decided, only 16 Common Pleas cases are recorded in the standard reporter. 2 Wils. 208-257, 95 Eng. Rep. 769-797. Finally, the inference respondent would draw, that 18th-century English common law did not permit a judge to order new trials for excessive damages, is explicitly rejected by Beardmore itself, which cautioned against that very inference: “We desired to be understood that this court does not say, or lay down any rule that there can never happen a case of such excessive damages in tort where the court may not grant a new trial.” 2 Wils., at 250, 95 Eng. Rep., at 793.
Common-law courts in the United States followed their English predecessors in providing judicial review of the size of damages awards. They too emphasized the deference ordinarily afforded jury verdicts, but they recognized that juries sometimes awarded damages so high as to require correction. Thus, in 1822, Justice Story, sitting as Circuit Justice, ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff agreed to a reduction in his damages. In explaining his ruling, he noted:
“As to the question of excessive damages, I agree, that. the court may grant a new trial for excessive damages____ It is indeed an exercise of discretion full of delicacy and difficulty. But if it should clearly appear that the jury have committed a gross error, or have acted from improper motives, or have given damages excessive in relation to the person or the injury, it is as much the duty of the court to interfere, to prevent the wrong, as in any other case.” Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 761-762 (No. 1, 578) (CC Mass. 1822).
See also Whipple v. Cumberland Mfg. Co., 29 F. Cas. 934, 937-938 (No. 17, 516) (CC Me. 1843).
In the 19th century, both before and after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, many American courts reviewed damages for “partiality” or “passion and prejudice.” Nevertheless, because of the difficulty of probing juror reasoning, passion and prejudice review was, in fact, review of the amount of awards. Judges would infer passion, prejudice, or partiality from the size of the award. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1,41 (1808) (In cases of personal injury, “a verdict may be set aside for excessive damages” when “from the exorbitancy of them the court must conclude that the jury acted from passion, partiality, or corruption”); Taylor v. Giger, 3 Ky. 586, 587 (1808) (“In actions of tort... a new trial ought not to be granted for excessiveness of damages, unless the damages found are so enormous as to shew that the jury were under some improper influence, or were led astray by the violence of prejudice or passion”); McConnell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. 234, 235 (N. Y. 1815) (granting new trial for excessive damages and noting: “That Courts have a legal right to grant new trials, for excessive damages in actions for torts, is no where denied...”); Belknap v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 49 N. H. 358, 374 (1870) (setting aside both compensatory and punitive damages, because “[w]e think it evident that the jury were affected by some partiality or prejudice”).
Nineteenth-century treatises similarly recognized judges’ authority to award new trials on the basis of the size of damages awards. 1 D. Graham, A Treatise on the Law of New Trials 442 (2d ed. 1855) (“[E]ven in personal torts, where the jury find outrageous damages, clearly evincing partiality, prejudice and passion, the court will interfere for the relief of the defendant, and order a new trial”); T. Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Measure of Damages 707 (5th ed. 1869) (“The court again holds itself at liberty to set aside verdicts and grant new trials... whenever the damages are so excessive as to create the belief that the jury have been misled either by passion, prejudice, or ignorance”); 3 J. Sutherland, A Treatise on the Law of Damages 469 (1883) (When punitive damages are submitted to the jury, “the amount which they may think proper to allow will be accepted by the court, unless so exorbitant as to indicate that they have been influenced by passion, prejudice or a perverted judgment”).
Modern practice is consistent with these earlier authorities. In the federal courts and in every State, except Oregon, judges review the size of damages awards. See Dagnello v. Long Island R. Co., 289 F. 2d 797, 799-800, n. 1, (CA2 1961) (citing cases from all 50 States except Alaska, Maryland, and Oregon); Nome v. Ailak, 570 P. 2d 162, 173-174 (Alaska 1977); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., Inc., 88 Md. App., at 716-722, 596 A. 2d, at 709-711, cert. denied, 605 A. 2d 137 (Md. 1992); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S. W. 2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981); Draper, Exeessiveness or Inadequacy of Punitive Damages Awarded in Personal Injury or Death Cases, 12 A. L. R. 5th 195 (1993); Schnapper, Judges Against Juries— Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 237.
IV
There is a dramatic difference between the judicial review of punitive damages awards under the common law and the scope of review available in Oregon. An Oregon trial judge, or an Oregon appellate court, may order a new trial if the jury was not properly instructed, if error occurred during the trial, or if there is no evidence to support any punitive damages at all. But if the defendant’s only basis for relief is the amount of punitive damages the jury awarded, Oregon provides no procedure for reducing or setting aside that award. This has been the law in Oregon at least since 1949 when the State Supreme Court announced its opinion in Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 187 Ore. 89, 210 P. 2d 461 (1949), definitively construing the 1910 amendment to the Oregon Constitution.
In that case the court held that it had no power to reduce or set aside an award of both compensatory and punitive damages that was admittedly excessive. It recognized that the constitutional amendment placing a limitation on its power was a departure from the traditional common-law approach. That opinion’s characterization of Oregon’s “lonely eminence” in this regard, id., at 113, 210 P. 2d, at 471, is still an accurate portrayal of its unique position. Every other State in the Union affords postverdict judicial review of the amount of a punitive damages award, see supra, at 426, and subsequent decisions have reaffirmed Oregon judges’ lack of authority to order new trials or other relief to remedy excessive damages. Fowler v. Courtemanche, 202 Ore. 413, 448, 274 P. 2d 258, 275 (1954) (“If this court were authorized to exercise its common law powers, we would unhesitatingly hold that the award of $35,000 as punitive damages was excessive...”); Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 127 Ore. App. 511, 873 P. 2d 413 (1994) (Oregon court cannot examine jury award to ensure compliance with $500,000 statutory limit on noneconomic damages).
Respondent argues that Oregon’s procedures do not deviate from common-law practice, because Oregon judges have the power to examine the size of the award to determine whether the jury was influenced by passion and prejudice. This is simply incorrect. The earliest Oregon cases interpreting the 1910 amendment squarely held that Oregon courts lack precisely that power. Timmins v. Hale, 122 Ore. 24, 43-44, 256 P. 770, 776 (1927); McCulley v. Homestead Bakery, Inc., 141 Ore. 460, 465-466, 18 P. 2d 226, 228 (1933). Although dicta in later cases have suggested that the issue might eventually be revisited, see Van Lorn, 187 Ore., at 106, 210 P. 2d, at 468, the earlier holdings remain Oregon law. No Oregon court for more than half a century has inferred passion and prejudice from the size of a damages award, and no court in more than a decade has even hinted that courts might possess the power to do so. Finally, if Oregon courts could evaluate the excessiveness of punitive damages awards through passion and prejudice review, the Oregon Supreme Court would have mentioned that power in this very case. Petitioners argued that Oregon procedures were unconstitutional precisely because they failed to provide judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards. The Oregon Supreme Court responded by rejecting the idea that judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards was required by Haslip. 316 Ore., at 263, 851 P. 2d, at 1084. As the court noted, two state appellate courts, including the California Supreme Court, had reached the opposite conclusion. Id., at 284, n. 13, 851 P. 2d, at 1096, n. 13. If, as respondent claims, Oregon law provides passion and prejudice review of excessive verdicts, the Oregon Supreme Court would have had a more obvious response to petitioners’ argument.
Respondent also argues that Oregon provides adequate review, because the trial judge can overturn a punitive damages award if there is no substantial evidence to support an award of punitive damages. See Fowler v. Courtemanche, 202 Ore., at 448-449, 274 P. 2d, at 275. This argument is unconvincing, because the review provided by Oregon courts ensures only that there is evidence to support some punitive damages, not that there is evidence to support the amount actually awarded. While Oregon’s judicial review ensures that punitive damages are not awarded against defendants entirely innocent of conduct warranting exemplary damages, Oregon, unlike the common law, provides no assurance that those whose conduct is sanctionable by punitive damages are not subjected to punitive damages of arbitrary amounts. What we are concerned with is the possibility that a culpable defendant may be unjustly punished; evidence of culpability warranting some punishment is not a substitute for evidence providing at least a rational basis for the particular deprivation of property imposed by the State to deter future wrongdoing.
V
Oregon’s abrogation of a well-established common-law protection against arbitrary deprivations of property raises a presumption that its procedures violate the Due Process Clause. As this Court has stated from its first due process cases, traditional practice provides a touchstone for constitutional analysis. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 361 (1970); Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U. S. 604 (1990); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1 (1991). Because the basic procedural protections of the common law have been regarded as so fundamental, very few cases have arisen in which a party has complained of their denial. In fact, most of our due process decisions involve arguments that traditional procedures provide too little protection and that additional safeguards are necessary to ensure compliance with the Constitution. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94 (1921); Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U. S. 604 (1990); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1 (1991).
Nevertheless, there are a handful of cases in which a party has been deprived of liberty or property without the safeguards of common-law procedure. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884); Turney v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948); In re Winship, 397 U. S„ at 361. When the absent procedures would have provided protection against arbitrary and inaccurate adjudication, this Court has not hesitated to find the proceedings violative of due process. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948); In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 361. Of course, not all deviations from established procedures result in constitutional infirmity. As the Court noted in Hurtado, to hold all procedural change unconstitutional “would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement.” 110 U. S., at 529. A review of the cases, however, suggests that the case before us is unlike those in which abrogations of common-law procedures have been upheld.
In Hurtado, for example, examination by a neutral magistrate provided criminal defendants with nearly the same protection as the abrogated common-law grand jury procedure. Id., at 538. Oregon, by contrast, has provided no similar substitute for the protection provided by judicial review of the amount awarded by the jury in punitive damages. Similarly, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), this Court upheld the extension of state-court jurisdiction over persons not physically present, in spite of contrary well-established prior practice. That change, however, was necessitated by the growth of a new business entity, the corporation, whose ability to conduct business without physical presence had created new problems not envisioned by rules developed in another era. See Burnham, 495 U. S., at 617. In addition, the dramatic improvements in communication and transportation made litigation in a distant forum less onerous. No similar social changes suggest the need for Oregon’s abrogation of judicial review, nor do improvements in technology render unchecked punitive damages any less onerous. If anything, the rise of large, interstate and multinational corporations has aggravated the problem of arbitrary awards and potentially biased juries.
Punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property. Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a defendant’s net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses, particularly those without strong local presences. Judicial review of the amount awarded was one of the few procedural safeguards which the common law provided against that danger. Oregon has removed that safeguard without providing any substitute procedure and without any indication that the danger of arbitrary awards has in any way subsided over time. For these reasons, we hold that Oregon’s denial of judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
VI
Respondent argues that Oregon has provided other safeguards against arbitrary awards and that, in any event, the exercise of this unreviewable power by the jury is consistent with the jury’s historic role in our judicial system.
Respondent points to four safeguards provided in the Oregon courts: the limitation of punitive damages to the amount specified in the complaint, the clear and convincing standard of proof, preverdict determination of maximum allowable punitive damages, and detailed jury instructions. The first, limitation of punitive damages to the amount specified, is hardly a constraint at all, because there is no limit to the amount the plaintiff can request, and it is unclear whether an award exceeding the amount requested could be set aside. See Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 127 Ore. App. 511, 873 P. 2d 413 (1994) (Oregon Constitution bars court from examining jury award to ensure compliance with $500,000 statutory limit on noneconomic damages). The second safeguard, the clear and convincing standard of proof, is an important check against unwarranted imposition of punitive damages, but, like the “no substantial evidence” review discussed supra, at 429, it provides no assurance that those whose conduct is sanctionable by punitive damages are not subjected to punitive damages of arbitrary amounts. Regarding the third purported constraint, respondent cites no cases to support the idea that Oregon courts do or can set maximum punitive damages awards in advance of the verdict. Nor are we aware of any court which implements that procedure. Respondent’s final safeguard, proper jury instruction, is a well-established and, of course, important check against excessive awards. The problem that concerns us, however, is the possibility that a jury will not follow those instructions and may return a lawless, biased, or arbitrary verdict.
In support of his argument that there is a historic basis for making the jury the final arbiter of the amount of punitive damages, respondent calls our attention to early civil and criminal cases in which the jury was allowed to judge the law as well as the facts. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U. S. 356, 374, n. 11 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). As we have already explained, in civil cases, the jury’s discretion to determine the amount of damages was constrained by judicial review. The criminal cases do establish — as does our practice today — that a jury’s arbitrary decision to acquit a defendant charged with a crime is completely unreviewable. There is, however, a vast difference between arbitrary grants of freedom and arbitrary deprivations of liberty or property. The Due Process Clause has nothing to say about the former, but its whole purpose is to prevent the latter. A decision to punish a tortfeasor by means of an exaction of exemplary damages is an exercise of state power that must comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The common-law practice, the procedures applied by every other State, the strong presumption favoring judicial review that we have applied in other areas of the law, and elementary considerations of justice all support the conclusion that such a decision should not be committed to the unreviewable discretion of a jury.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Oregon Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The jury instructions, in relevant part, read: “ ‘Punitive damages may be awarded to the plaintiff in addition to general damages to punish wrongdoers and to discourage wanton misconduct. In order for plaintiff to recover punitive damages against the defendant[s], the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendants have] shown wanton disregard for the health, safety, and welfare of others.... If you decide this issue against the defendants], you may award punitive damages, although you are not required to do so, because punitive damages are discretionary. In the exercise of that discretion, you shall consider evidence, if any, of the following: First, the likelihood at the time of the sale [of the three-wheeled vehicle] that serious harm would arise from defendants’ misconduct. Number two, the degree of the defendants’ awareness of that likelihood. Number three, the duration of the misconduct. Number four, the attitude and conduct of the defendants] upon notice of the alleged condition of the vehicle. Number five, the financial condition of the defendants]. And the amount of punitive damages may not exceed the sum of $5 million.’ ” 316 Ore. 263, 282, n. 11, 851 P. 2d 1084,1095, n. 11 (1993).
As in many early cases, it is unclear whether this case specifically concerns punitive damages or merely ordinary compensatory damages. Since there is no suggestion that different standards of judicial review were applied for punitive and compensatory damages before the 20th century, no effort has been made to separate out the two classes of cases. See Brief for Legal Historians Daniel R. Coquillette et al. as Amici Curiae 2, 3, 6-7, 15 (discussing together “punitive damages, personal injury, and other cases involving difficult-to-quantify damages”).
While Justice Story’s grant of a new trial was clearly in accord with established common-law procedure, the remittitur — withdrawal of new trial if the plaintiff agreed to a specific reduction of damages — may have been an innovation. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 482-485 (1935). On the other hand, remittitur may have a better historical pedigree than previously thought. See King v. Watson, 2 T. R. 199-200, 100 Eng. Rep. 108 (R. B. 1788) (“[0]n a motion in the Common Pleas to set aside the verdict for excessive damages... the Court recommended a compromise, and on Hurry’s agreeing to accept 1500 [pounds] they discharged the rule”).
This aspect of passion and prejudice review has been recognized in many opinions of this Court. Brouining-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U. S. 257, 272 (1989); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 21, n. 10 (1991); id., at 27 (Scalia, J., concurring); TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443, 467 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id., at 476-478 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
The amended Article VII, §3, of the Oregon Constitution provides: “In actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of this State, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict.”
“The court is of the opinion that the verdict of $10,000.00 is excessive. Some members of the court think that only the award of punitive damages is excessive; others that both the awards of compensatory and punitive damages are excessive. Since a majority are of the opinion that this court has no power to disturb the verdict, it is not deemed necessary to discuss the grounds for these divergent views.” Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 187 Ore., at 93, 210 P. 2d, at 462 (1949).
“The guaranty of the right to jury trial in suits at common law, incorporated in the Bill of Rights as one of the first ten amendments of the Constitution of the United States, was interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States to refer to jury trial as it had been theretofore known in England; and so it is that the federal judges, like the English judges, have always exercised the prerogative of granting a new trial when the verdict was clearly against the weight of the evidence, whether it be because excessive damages were awarded or for any other reason. The state courts were conceded similar powers.... [U]p to 1910, when the people adopted Art. VII, §3, of our Constitution, there was no state in the union, so far as we are advised, where
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Thomas
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion,
in which The CHIEF Justice and Justice Scalia joined.
In this case, we must determine whether the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit correctly applied our decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), in concluding that the evidence against respondent Frank West was insufficient, as a matter of due process, to support his state-court conviction for grand larceny.
I
Between December 13 and December 26, 1978, someone broke into the Westmoreland County, Virginia, home of Angelo Cardova and stole items valued at approximately $3,500. On January 10,1979, police conducted a lawful search of the Gloucester County, Virginia, home of West and his wife. They discovered several of the items stolen from the Car-dova home, including various electronic equipment (two television sets and a record player); articles of clothing (an imitation mink coat with the name “Esther” embroidered in it, a silk jacket emblazoned “Korea 1970,” and a pair of shoes); decorations (several wood earvings and a mounted lobster); and miscellaneous household objects (a mirror framed with seashells, a coffee table, a bar, a sleeping bag, and some silverware). These items were valued at approximately $800, and the police recovered other, unspecified items of Cardo-va’s property with an approximate value of $300.
West was charged with grand larceny. Testifying at trial on his own behalf, he admitted to a prior felony conviction, but denied having taken anything from Cardova’s house. He explained that he had bought and sold “a lot of... merchandise” from “several guys” at “flea bargain places” where, according to West, “a lot of times you buy things... that are stolen” although “you néver know it.” App. 21. On cross-examination, West said that he had bought many of the stolen items from a Ronnie Elkins, whom West claimed to have known for years. West testified that he purchased one of the wood carvings, the jacket, mounted lobster, mirror, and bar from Elkins for about $500. West initially guessed, and then twice positively asserted, that this sale occurred before January 1, 1979. In addition, West claimed to have purchased the coat from Elkins for $5 around January 1, 1979. His testimony did not make clear whether he was describing one transaction or two, whether there were any other transactions between himself and Elkins, where the transactions occurred, and whether the transactions occurred at flea markets. West testified further that he had purchased one of the television sets in an entirely separate transaction in Goochland County, from an individual whose name he had forgotten. Finally, West testified that he did not remember how he had acquired the second television, the coffee table, and the silverware.
Under then-applicable Virginia law, grand larceny was defined as the wrongful and nonconsensual taking of property worth at least $100, with the intent to deprive the owner of it permanently. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-95 (1975); Skeeter v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 722, 725, 232 S. E. 2d 756, 758 (1977). Virginia law permits an inference that a person who fails to explain, or falsely explains, his exclusive possession of recently stolen property is the thief. See, e. g., Moehring v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 564, 568, 290 S. E. 2d 891, 893 (1982); Best v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 387, 389, 282 S. E. 2d 16, 17 (1981). The trial court instructed the jurors about this permissive inference, but warned that the inference did not compromise their constitutional obligation to acquit unless they found that the State had established every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970).
The jury returned a guilty verdict, and West received a 10-year prison sentence. West petitioned for an appeal, contending (among other things) that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In May 1980, the Supreme Court of Virginia refused the petition — a disposition indicating that the court found the petition without merit, see Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697, 700, 204 S. E. 2d 421, 424 (1974). Seven years later, West filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the same court, supported by an affidavit executed by Ronnie Elkins in April 1987. West renewed his claim that the original trial record contained insufficient evidence to support the conviction, and he argued in the alternative that Elkins’ affidavit, which tended to corroborate West’s trial testimony in certain respects, constituted new evidence entitling him to a new trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia again denied relief. West then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which rejected both claims and denied relief.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. 931 F. 2d 262 (1991). As the court correctly recognized, a claim that evidence is insufficient to support a conviction as a matter of due process depends on "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S., at 319 (emphasis in original). Five considerations led the court to conclude that this standard was not met: first, the items were recovered no sooner than two weeks after they had been stolen; second, only about a third of the items stolen from Cardova (measured by value) were recovered from West; third, the items were found in West’s house in plain view, and not hidden away as contraband; fourth, West’s explanation of his possession was not so “inherently implausible,” even if it were disbelieved, that it could “fairly be treated as positive evidence of guilt”; and fifth, there was no corroborating evidence (such as fingerprints or eyewitness testimony) beyond the fact of mere possession. See 931 F. 2d, at 268-270. The court viewed West’s testimony as “at most, a neutral factor,” id., at 270, despite noting his “confusion” about the details of his alleged purchases, id., at 269, and despite conceding that his testimony “at first blush... may itself seem incredible,” id., at 270, n. 7. In holding that the Jackson standard was not met, the court did not take into consideration the fact that the Supreme Court of Virginia had twice previously concluded otherwise.
After the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by an equally divided court, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 34-35, the warden and the State Attorney General sought review in this Court on, among other questions, whether the Court of Appeals had applied Jackson correctly in this case. We granted certiorari, 502 U. S. 1012 (1991), and requested additional briefing on the question whether a federal habeas court should afford deference to state-court determinations applying law to the specific facts of a case, 502 U. S. 1021 (1991). We now reverse.
II
The habeas corpus statute permits a federal court to entertain a petition from a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a). The court must “dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” § 2243. For much of our history, we interpreted these bare guidelines and their predecessors to reflect the common-law principle that a prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus could challenge only the jurisdiction of the court that had rendered the judgment under which he was in custody. See, e.g., In re Wood, 140 U. S. 278, 285-287 (1891) (Harlan, J.); Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202 (1830) (Marshall, C. J.). Gradually, we began to expand the category of claims deemed to be jurisdictional for habeas purposes. See, e. g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 377 (1880) (court without jurisdiction to impose sentence under unconstitutional statute); Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 176 (1874) (court without jurisdiction to impose sentence not authorized by statute). Next, we began to recognize federal claims by state prisoners if no state court had provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate those claims. See, e. g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 91-92 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 335-336 (1915). Before 1953, however, the inverse of this rule also remained true: Absent an alleged jurisdictional defect, “habeas corpus would not lie for a [state] prisoner... if he had been given an adequate opportunity to obtain full and fair consideration of his federal claim in the state courts.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 459-460 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 478-499 (1963). In other words, the state-court judgment was entitled to “absolute respect,” Kuhlmann v. Wil son, 477 U. S. 436, 446 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added), and a federal habeas court could not review it even for reasonableness.
We rejected the principle of absolute deference in our landmark decision in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953). There, we held that a state-court judgment of conviction “is not res judicata” on federal habeas with respect to federal constitutional claims, id., at 458, even if the state court has rejected all such claims after a full and fair hearing. Instead, we held, a district court must determine whether the state-court adjudication “has resulted in a satisfactory conclusion.” Id., at 463. We had no occasion to explore in detail the question whether a “satisfactory” conclusion was one that the habeas court considered correct, as opposed to merely reasonable, because we concluded that the constitutional claims advanced in Brown itself would fail even if the state courts’ rejection of them were reconsidered de novo. See id., at 465-476. Nonetheless, we indicated that the federal courts enjoy at least the discretion to take into consideration the fact that a state court has previously rejected the federal claims asserted on habeas. See id., at 465 (“As the state and federal courts have the same responsibilities to protect persons from violation of their constitutional rights, we conclude that a federal district court may decline, without a rehearing of the facts, to award a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner where the legality of such detention has been determined, on the facts presented, by the highest state court with jurisdiction”).
In an influential separate opinion endorsed by a majority of the Court, Justice Frankfurter also rejected the principle of absolute deference to fairly litigated state-court judgments. He emphasized that a state-court determination of federal constitutional law is not “binding” on federal habeas, id., at 506, regardless of whether the determination involves a pure question of law, ibid., or a “so-called mixed questio[n]” requiring the application of law to fact, id., at 507. Nonetheless, he stated quite explicitly that a “prior State determination may guide [the] discretion [of the district court] in deciding upon the appropriate course to be followed in disposing of the application.” Id., at 500. Discussing mixed questions specifically, he noted further that “there is no need for the federal judge, if he could, to shut his eyes to the State consideration.” Id., at 508.
In subsequent eases, we repeatedly reaffirmed Brown’s teaching that mixed constitutional questions are “open to review on collateral attack,” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 342 (1980), without ever explicitly considering whether that “review” should be de novo or deferential. In some of these eases, we would have denied habeas relief even under de novo review, see, e. g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 698 (1984) (facts make it “clear” that habeas petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 201 (1972) (facts disclose “no substantial likelihood” that habeas petitioner was subjected to unreliable pretrial lineup); in others, we would have awarded habeas relief even under deferential review, see, e. g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 405 (1977) (facts provide “no reasonable basis” for finding valid waiver of right to counsel); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 725 (1961) (facts show “clear and convincing” evidence of biased jury); and in yet others, we remanded for application of a proper legal rule without addressing that standard of review question, see, e, g., Cuyler, supra, at 342, 350. Nonetheless, because these cases never qualified our early citation of Brown for the proposition that a federal habeas court must reexamine mixed constitutional questions “independently,” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 318 (1963) (dictum), we have gradually come to treat as settled the rule that mixed constitutional questions are “subject to plenary federal review” on habeas, Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 112 (1985)..
Jackson itself contributed to this trend. There, we held that a conviction violates due process if supported only by evidence from which “no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U. S., at 317. We stated explicitly that a state-court judgment applying the Jackson rule in a particular case “is of course entitled to deference” on federal habeas. Id., at 323; see also id., at 336, n. 9 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“State judges are more familiar with the elements of state offenses than are federal judges and should be better able to evaluate sufficiency claims”). Notwithstanding these principles, however, we then indicated that the habeas court itself should apply the Jackson rule, see id., at 324, rather than merely reviewing the state courts’ application of it for reasonableness. Ultimately, though, we hád no occasion to resolve our conflicting statements on the standard of review question, because we concluded that the habeas petitioner was not entitled, to relief even under our own de novo application of Jackson. See id., at 324-326.
Despite our apparent adherence to a standard of de novo habeas review with respect to mixed constitutional questions, we have implicitly questioned that standard, at least with respect to pure legal questions, in our recent retroactivity precedents. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 313-314 (1989), a majority of this Court endorsed the retroactivity analysis advanced by Justice O’Connor for a plurality in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). Under Teague, a ha-beas petitioner generally cannot benefit from a new rule of criminal procedure announced after his conviction has become final on direct appeal. See id., at 305-310 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). Teague defined a “new” rule as one that was “not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id., at 301 (emphasis in origi-, nal). In Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 415 (1990), we explained that the definition includes all rules “susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.” Thus, if a state court has reasonably rejected the legal claim asserted by a habeas petitioner under existing law, then the claim seeks the benefit of a “new” rule under Butler, and is therefore not cognizable on habeas under Teague. In other words, a federal ha-beas court “must defer to the state court’s decision rejecting the claim unless that decision is patently unreasonable.” Butler, supra, at 422 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Teague was premised on the view that retroactivity questions in habeas corpus proceedings must take account of the nature and function of the writ, which we describéd as “ ‘a collateral remedy... not designed as a substitute for direct review/” 489 U. S., at 306 (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 682-683 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)) (emphasis in Mackey). Justice Stevens reasoned similarly in Jackson, where he stressed that habeas corpus "is not intended as a substitute for appeal, nor as a device for reviewing the merits of guilt determinations at criminal trials,” but only “to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” 443 U. S., at 332, n. 5 (opinion concurring in judgment); see also Greer v. Miller, 483 U. S. 756, 768-769 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Indeed, the notion that different standards should apply on direct and collateral review runs throughout our recent habeas jurisprudence. We have said, for example, that new rules always have retroactive application to criminal cases pending on direct review, see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 320-328 (1987), but that they generally do not have retroactive application to criminal eases pending on habeas, see Teague, supra, at 305-310 (opinion of O’Con-nor, J.)- We have held that the Constitution guarantees the right to counsel on a first direct appeal, see, e. g., Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 355-358 (1963), but that it guarantees no right to counsel on habeas, see, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555 (1987). On direct review, we have announced and enforced the rule that state courts must exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 654-660 (1961). We have also held, however, that claims under Mapp are not cognizable on habeas as long as the state courts have provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate them at trial or on direct review. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 489-496 (1976).
These differences simply reflect the fact that habeas review “entails significant costs.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126 (1982). Among other things, “‘[i]t disturbs the State’s significant interest in repose for concluded litigation, denies society the right to punish some admitted offenders, and intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority.’ ” Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195, 210 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255, 282 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). In various contexts, we have emphasized that these costs, as well as the countervailing benefits, must be taken into consideration in defining the scope of the writ. See, e. g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 738-739 (1991) (procedural default); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 490-493 (1991) (abuse of the writ); Teague, supra, at 308-310 (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (retroactivity); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S., at 444-455 (opinion of Powell, J.) (successive petitions); Stone v. Powell, supra, at 491-492, n. 31 (cogniza-bility of particular claims).
In light of these principles, petitioners ask that we reconsider our statement in Miller v. Fenton that mixed constitutional questions are “subject to plenary federal review” on habeas, 474 U. S., at 112. By its terms, Teague itself is not directly controlling, because West sought federal habeas relief under Jackson, which was decided a year before his conviction became final on direct review. Nonetheless, petitioners contend, the logic of Teague makes our statement in Miller untenable. Petitioners argue that if deferential review for reasonableness strikes an appropriate balance with respect to purely legal claims, then it must strike an appropriate balance with respect to mixed questions as well. Moreover, they note that under the habeas statute itself, a state-court determination of a purely factual question must be “presumed correct,” and can be overcome only by “convincing evidence,” unless one of eight statutorily enumerated exceptions is present. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). It makes no sense, petitioners assert, for a habeas court generally to review factual determinations and legal determinations deferentially, but to review applications of law to fact de novo. Finally, petitioners find the prospect of deferential review for mixed questions at least implicit in our recent statement that Teague concerns are fully implicated “by the application of an old rule in a manner that was not dictated by precedent.” Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. 222, 228 (1992) (emphasis added). For these reasons, petitioners invite us to reaffirm that a habeas judge need not — and indeed may not — “shut his eyes” entirely to state-court applications of law to fact. Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 508 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). West develops two principal counterarguments: first, that Congress implicitly codified a de novo standard with respect to mixed constitutional questions when it amended the habeas statute in 1966; and second, that de novo federal review is necessary to vindicate federal constitutional rights.
We need not decide such far-reaching issues in this case. As in both Brown and Jackson, the claim advanced by the habeas petitioner must fail even assuming that the state court's rejection of it should be reconsidered de novo. Whatever the appropriate standard of review, we conclude that there was more than enough evidence to support West’s conviction.
The ease against West was strong. Two to four weeks after the Cardova home had been burglarized, over 15 of the items stolen were recovered from West's home. On direct examination at trial, West said nothing more than that he frequently bought and sold items at different flea markets. He failed to offer specific information about how he had come'to acquire any of the stolen items, and he did not even mention Ronnie Elkins. by name. When pressed on cross-examination about the details of his purchases, West contradicted himself repeatedly about where he supposedly had bought the stolen goods, and he gave vague, seemingly evasive answers to various other questions. See n. 1, supra. He said further that he could not remember how he had acquired such major household items as a television set and a coffee table, and -he failed to offer any explanation whatsoever about how he had acquired Cardova’s record player, among other things. Moreover, he testified that he had acquired Cardova’s second television set from a seller other than Elkins (who remained unidentified) in an entirely unrelated (but roughly contemporaneous) transaction. Finally, he failed to produce any other supporting evidence, such as testimony from Elkins, whom he claimed to have known for years and done business with on a regular basis.
As the trier of fact, the jury was entitled to disbelieve West’s uncorroborated and eonfüsed testimony. In evaluating that testimony, moreover, the jury was entitled to discount West’s credibility on account of his prior felony conviction, see Va. Code Ann. §19.2-269 (1990); Sadoski v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1069, 254 S. E. 2d 100 (1979), and to take into account West’s demeanor when testifying, which neither the Court of Appeals nor we may review. And if the jury did disbelieve West, it was further entitled to consider whatever it concluded to be perjured testimony as affirmative evidence of guilt, see, e. g., Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 620-621 (1896); United States v. Zafiro, 945 F. 2d 881, 888 (CA7 1991) (Posner, J.), cert. granted on other grounds, 503 U. S. 935 (1992); Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F. 2d 265, 269 (CA2 1952) (L. Hand, J.).
In Jackson, we emphasized repeatedly the deference owed to the trier of fact and, correspondingly, the sharply limited nature of constitutional sufficiency review. We said that “all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” 443 U. S., at 319 (emphasis in original); that the prosecution need not affirmatively “rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt,” id., at 326; and that a reviewing court “faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution,” ibid. Under these standards, we think it clear that the trial record contained sufficient evidence to support West’s conviction.
Having granted relief on West’s Jackson claim, the Court of Appeals declined to address West’s additional claim that he was entitled to a new trial, as a matter of due process, on the basis of newly discovered evidence. See 931 F. 2d, at 271, n. 9. As that claim is not properly before us, we decline to address it here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The quality of West’s testimony on these matters can best be appreciated by example:
“Q Axe those items that you bought at a flea market?
“A Well, I didn’t buy these items at a flea market, no sir.
“Q Whose items are they?
“A They are some items that I got from a Ronnie Elkins.
“Q All of the items you bought from him?
“A I can’t say all.
"Q Which ones did you buy from him?
“A I can’t say, because I don't have an inventory.
“Q Can you tell me the ones you bought from Ronnie Elkins?
“A Yes, I am sure I can.
“Q Which ones?
“A I would say the platter.
“Q How about the sea shell mirror?
“A Yes, sir, I think so.
“Q Where did you buy that?
“A In Newport News at a flea market.” App. 21-22.
“Q I want to know about your business transactions with Ronnie Elkins..
“A I buy and sell different items from different individuals at flea markets.
“Q Tell us where that market is.
“A In Richmond. You have them in Gloucester.
“Q Where is Ronnie Elkins’ flea market?
“A He does not have one.
“Q Didn’t you say you bought some items from Ronnie Elkins?
“A At a flea market.
“Q Tell the jury where that is at [sic].
"A In Gloucester.
“Q Tell the jury about this flea market and Ronnie Elkins, some time around January 1, and these items, not the other items.
"A Ronnie Elkins does not own a flea market.
“Q Tell the jury, if you will, where Ronnie Elkins was on the day that you bought the items?
"A I don’t remember. It was before January 1.
“Q Where was it?
“A I bought stuff from him in Richmond, Gloucester, and Newport News.” Id., at 26-27.
The instruction on the permissive inference read:
“If you belie[ve] from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that property of a value of $100.00 or more was stolen from Angelo F. C[a]rdova, and that it was recently thereafter found in the exclusive and personal possession of the defendant, and that such possession has been unexplained or falsely denied by the defendant, then such possession is sufficient to raise an inference that the defendant was the thief; and if such inference, taking into consideration the whole evidence, leads you to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the theft, then you shall find the defendant guilty.” App. 34.
Several other instructions emphasized that despite the permissive inference, “[t]he burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt every material and necessary element of the offense charged against the defendant.” Ibid.
Justice O’Connor offers three criticisms of our summary of the history of habeas corpus before 1963, none of which we find convincing. First, she contends that the full-and-fair litigation standard in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915), and Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923), served no purpose other than to define the scope of the underlying alleged constitutional violation. See post, at 297-299. Frank and Moore involved claims, rejected by the state appellate courts, that a trial had been so dominated by a mob as to violate due process. In Frank, we denied relief not because the state appellate court had decided the federal claim correctly (the relevant question on direct review), and not even because the state appellate court had decided the federal claim reasonably, but only “because Frank’s federal claims had been considered by a competent and unbiased state tribunal,” Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 476 (1976). In Moore, which reaffirmed Frank expressly, see 261 U. S., at 90-91, we ordered the District Court to consider the mob domination claim on the merits because the state appellate court's “perfunctory treatment” of it “was not in fact acceptable corrective process.” Noia, 372 U. S., at 458 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Bator, 76 Harv. L. Rev., at 488-489. In both cases, a claim that the habeas petitioner had been denied due process at trial was not cognizable on habeas unless the petitioner also had been denied a full and fair opportunity to raise that claim on appeal.
Second, Justice O’Connor states that we mischaracterize the views of Justice Powell about the history of habeas law between 1915 and 1953. See post, at 299. In fact, however, Justice Powell has often recounted exactly the same familiar history that we summarize above. In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), for example, he described Frank as having “modestly expanded” the “scope of the writ” in order to “encompass those cases where the defendant’s federal constitutional claims had not been considered in the state-court proceeding.” 443 U. S., at 580 (opinion concurring in judgment). Similarly, in Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), he described Frank as having extended “[t]he scope of federal ha-beas corpus” to permit consideration of “whether the applicant had been given an adequate opportunity in state court to raise his constitutional claims.” 412 U. S., at 255-256 (concurring opinion). In neither case, nor in Kuhlmann, did Justice Powell even suggest that federal habeas was available before 1963 to a prisoner who had received a full and fair opportunity to litigate his federal claim in state court.
Third, Justice O’Connor criticizes our failure to acknowledge Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224 (1924), which she describes as the first case explicitly to hold that “res judicata is not strictly followed on federal ha-beas.” Post, at 299. Salinger, however, involved the degree of preclu-sive effect of a habeas judgment upon subsequent habeas petitions filed by a federal prisoner. This case, of course, involves the degree of preclusive effect of a criminal conviction upon an initial habeas petition filed by a state prisoner. We cannot fault ourselves for limiting our focus to the latter context. But even assuming its relevance, Salinger hardly advances the position advocated by Justice O’Connor that a habeas court must exercise de novo review with respect to mixed questions of law and fact. Despite acknowledging that a prior habeas judgment is not entitled to absolute preclusive effect under the doctrine of res judicata, Salinger also indicated that the prior habeas judgment “may be considered, and even given controlling weight.” 265 U. S., at 231 (emphasis added).
Justice O'Connor contends that the inclusion of this passage in a section of our opinion entitled “Right to a Plenary Hearing” makes clear that we were discussing only the resolution of factual questions. See post, at 300-301. In our introduction to that section, however, we indicated that both factual and legal questions were at issue. See 344 U. S., at 460 (noting contentions “that the District Court committed error when it took no evidence and heard no argument on the federal constitutional issues” (emphasis added)). Indeed, if only factual questions were at issue, we would have authorized a denial of the writ not whenever the state-court proceeding “has resulted in a satisfactory conclusion” (as we did), id., at 463 (emphasis added), but only whenever the state-court proceeding has resulted in satisfactory factfinding.
Justice O’Connor quotes Justice Frankfurter for the proposition that a district judge on habeas “ ‘must exercise his ownjudgment’ ” with respect to mixed questions. Post, at 300 (quoting 344 U. S., at 507). Although we agree with Justice O’Connor that this passage by itself suggests a de novo standard, it is not easily reconciled with
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Me. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1947 petitioner Michelson was convicted of bribing a federal revenue agent. The Government proved a large payment by accused to the agent for the purpose of influencing his official action. The defendant, as a witness on his own behalf, admitted passing the money but claimed it was done in response to the agent’s demands, threats, solicitations, and inducements that amounted to entrapment. It is enough for our purposes to say that determination of the issue turned on whether the jury should believe the agent or the accused.
On direct examination of defendant, his own counsel brought out that, in 1927, he had been convicted of a misdemeanor having to do with trading in counterfeit watch dials. On cross-examination it appeared that in 1930, in executing an application for a license to deal in second-hand jewelry, he answered “No” to the question whether he had theretofore been arrested or summoned for any offense.
Defendant called five witnesses to prove that he enjoyed a good reputation. Two of them testified that their acquaintance with him extended over a period of about thirty years and the others said they had known him at least half that long. A typical examination in chief was as follows:
“Q. Do you know the defendant Michelson?
“A. Yes.
“Q. How long do you know Mr. Michelson?
“A. About 30 years.
“Q. Do you know other people who know him?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Have you had occasion to discuss his reputation for honesty and truthfulness and for being a law-abiding citizen?
“A. It is very good.
“Q. You have talked to others?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And what is his reputation?
“A. Very good.”
These are representative of answers by three witnesses ; two others replied, in substance, that they never had heard anything against Michelson.
On cross-examination, four of the witnesses were asked, in substance, this question: “Did you ever hear that Mr. Michelson on March 4, 1927, was convicted of a violation of the trademark law in New York City in regard to watches?” This referred to the twenty-year-old conviction about which defendant himself had testified on direct examination. Two of them had heard of it and two had not.
To four of these witnesses the prosecution also addressed the question the allowance of which, over defendant’s objection, is claimed to be reversible error:
“Did you ever hear that on October 11, -1920, the defendant, Solomon Michelson, was arrested for receiving stolen goods?”
None of the witnesses appears to have heard of this.
The trial court asked counsel for the prosecution, out of presence of the jury, “Is it a fact according to the best information in your possession, that Michelson was arrested for receiving stolen goods?” Counsel replied that it was, and to support his good faith exhibited a paper record which defendant’s counsel did not challenge.
The judge also on three occasions warned the jury, in terms that are not criticized, of the limited purpose for which this evidence was received.
Defendant-petitioner challenges the right of the prosecution so to cross-examine his character witnesses. The Court of Appeals held that it was permissible. The opinion, however, points out that the practice has been severely criticized and invites us, in one respect, to change the rule. Serious and responsible criticism has been aimed, however, not alone at the detail now questioned by the Court of Appeals but at common-law doctrine on the whole subject of proof of reputation or character. It would not be possible to appraise the usefulness and propriety of this cross-examination without consideration of the unique practice concerning character testimony, of which such cross-examination is a minor part.
Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant’s evil character to establish a probability of his guilt. Not that the law invests the defendant with a presumption of good character, Greer v. United States, 245 U. S. 559, but it simply closes the whole matter of character, disposition and reputation on the prosecution’s case-in-chief. The state may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.
But this line of inquiry firmly denied to the State is opened to the defendant because character is relevant in resolving probabilities of guilt. He may introduce affirmative testimony that the general estimate of his character is so favorable that the jury may infer that he would not be likely to commit the offense charged. This privilege is sometimes valuable to a defendant for this Court has held that such testimony alone, in some circumstances, may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt and that in the federal courts a jury in a proper case should be so instructed. Edgington v. United States, 164 U. S. 361.
When the defendant elects to initiate a character inquiry, another anomalous rule comes into play. Not only is he permitted to call witnesses to testify from hearsay, but indeed such a witness is not allowed to base his testimony on anything but hearsay. What commonly is called “character evidence” is only such when “character” is employed as a synonym for “reputation.” The witness may not testify about defendant's specific acts or courses of conduct or his possession of a particular disposition or of benign mental and moral traits; nor can he testify that his own acquaintance, observation, and knowledge of defendant leads to his own independent opinion that defendant possesses a good general or specific character, inconsistent with commission of acts charged. The witness is, however, allowed to summarize what he has heard in the community, although much of it may have been said by persons less qualified to judge than himself. The evidence which the law permits is not as to the personality of defendant but only as to the shadow his daily life has cast in his neighborhood. This has been well described in a different connection as “the slow growth of months and years, the resultant picture of forgotten incidents, passing events, habitual and daily conduct, presumably honest because disinterested, and safer to be trusted because prone to suspect .... It is for that reason that such general repute is permitted to be proven. It sums up a multitude of trivial details. It compacts into the brief phrase of a verdict the teaching of many incidents and the conduct of years. It is the average intelligence drawing its conclusion.” Finch, J., in Badger v. Badger, 88 N. Y. 546, 552.
While courts have recognized logical grounds for criticism of this type of opinion-based-on-hearsay testimony, it is said to be justified by “overwhelming considerations of practical convenience” in avoiding innumerable collateral issues which, if it were attempted to prove character by direct testimony, would complicate and confuse the trial, distract the minds of jurymen and befog the chief issues in the litigation. People v. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N. Y. 408, 419, 82 N. E. 718, 721.
Another paradox in this branch of the law of evidence is that the delicate and responsible task of compacting reputation hearsay into the “brief phrase of a verdict” is one of the few instances in which conclusions are accepted from a witness on a subject in which he is not an expert. However, the witness must qualify to give an opinion by showing such acquaintance with the defendant, the community in which he has lived and the circles in which he has moved, as to speak with authority of the terms in which generally he is regarded. To require affirmative knowledge of the reputation may seem inconsistent with the latitude given to the witness to testify when all he can say of the reputation is that he has “heard nothing against defendant.” This is permitted upon assumption that, if no ill is reported of one, his reputation must be good. But this answer is accepted only from a witness whose knowledge of defendant’s habitat and surroundings is intimate enough so that his failure to hear of any relevant ill repute is an assurance that no ugly rumors were about.
Thus the law extends helpful but illogical options to a defendant. Experience taught a necessity that they be counter-weighted with equally illogical conditions to keep the advantage from becoming an unfair and unreasonable one. The price a defendant must pay for attempting to prove his good name is to throw open the entire subject which the law has kept closed for his benefit and to make himself vulnerable where the law otherwise shields him. The prosecution may pursue the inquiry with contradictory witnesses to show that damaging rumors, whether or not well-grounded, were afloat— for it is not the man that he is, but the name that he has which is put in issue. Another hazard is that his own witness is subject to cross-examination as to the contents and extent of the hearsay on which he bases his conclusions, and he may be required to disclose rumors and reports that are current even if they do not affect his own conclusion. It may test the sufficiency of his knowledge by asking what stories were circulating concerning events, such as one’s arrest, about which people normally comment and speculate. Thus, while the law gives defendant the option to show as a fact that his reputation reflects a life and habit incompatible with commission of the offense charged, it subjects his proof to tests of credibility designed to prevent him from profiting by a mere parade of partisans.
To thus digress from evidence as to the offense to hear a contest as to the standing of the accused, at its best opens a tricky line of inquiry as to a shapeless and elusive subject matter. At its worst it opens a veritable Pandora’s box of irresponsible gossip, innuendo and smear. In the frontier phase of our law’s development, calling friends to vouch for defendant’s good character, and its counterpart — calling the rivals and enemies of a witness to impeach him by testifying that his reputation for veracity was so bad that he was unworthy of belief on his oath — were favorite and frequent ways of converting an individual litigation into a community contest and a trial into a spectacle. Growth of urban conditions, where one may never know or hear the name of his next-door neighbor, have tended to limit the use of these techniques and to deprive them of weight with juries. The popularity of both procedures has subsided, but courts of last resort have sought to overcome danger that the true issues will be obscured and confused by investing the trial court with discretion to limit the number of such witnesses and to control cross-examination. Both propriety and abuse of hearsay reputation testimony, on both sides, depend on numerous and subtle considerations difficult to detect or appraise from a cold record, and therefore rarely and only on clear showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion will Courts of Appeals disturb rulings of trial courts on this subject.
Wide discretion is accompanied by heavy responsibility on trial courts to protect the practice from any misuse. The trial judge was scrupulous to so guard it in the case before us. He took pains to ascertain, out of presence of the jury, that the target of the question was an actual event, which would probably result in some comment among acquaintances if not injury to defendant’s reputation. He satisfied himself that counsel was not merely taking a random shot at a reputation imprudently exposed or asking a groundless question to waft an unwarranted innuendo into the jury box.
The question permitted by the trial court, however, involves several features that may be worthy of comment. Its form invited hearsay; it asked about an arrest, not a conviction, and for an offense not closely similar to the one on trial; and it concerned an occurrence many years past.
Since the whole inquiry, as we have pointed out, is calculated to ascertain the general talk of people about defendant, rather than the witness’ own knowledge of him, the form of inquiry, “Have you heard?” has general approval, and “Do you know?” is not allowed.
A character witness may be cross-examined as to an arrest whether or not it culminated in a conviction, according to the overwhelming weight of authority. This rule is sometimes confused with that which prohibits cross-examination to credibility by asking a witness whether he himself has been arrested.
Arrest without more does not, in law any more than in reason, impeach the integrity or impair the credibility of a witness. It happens to the innocent as well as the guilty. Only a conviction, therefore, may be inquired about to undermine the trustworthiness of a witness.
Arrest without more may nevertheless impair or cloud one’s reputation. False arrest may do that. Even to be acquitted may damage one’s good name if the community receives the verdict with a wink and chooses to remember defendant as one who ought to have been convicted. A conviction, on the other hand, may be accepted as a misfortune or an injustice, and even enhance the standing of one who mends his ways and lives it down. Reputation is the net balance of so many debits and credits that the law does not attach the finality to a conviction, when the issue is reputation, that is given to it when the issue is the credibility of the convict.
The inquiry as to an arrest is permissible also because the prosecution has a right to test the qualifications of the witness to bespeak the community opinion. If one never heard the speculations and rumors in which even one’s friends indulge upon his arrest, the jury may doubt whether he is capable of giving any very reliable conclusions as to his reputation.
In this case the crime inquired about was receiving stolen goods; the trial was for bribery. The Court of Appeals thought this dissimilarity of offenses too great to sustain the inquiry in logic, though conceding that it is authorized by preponderance of authority. It asks us to substitute the Illinois rule which allows inquiry about arrest, but only for very closely similar if not identical charges, in place of the rule more generally adhered to in this country and in England. We think the facts of this case show the proposal to be inexpedient.
The good character which the defendant had sought to establish was broader than the crime charged and included the traits of “honesty and truthfulness” and “being a law-abiding citizen.” Possession of these characteristics would seem as incompatible with offering a bribe to a revenue agent as with receiving stolen goods. The crimes may be unlike, but both alike proceed from the same defects of character which the witnesses said this defendant was reputed not to exhibit. It is not only by comparison with the crime on trial but by comparison with the reputation asserted that a court may judge whether the prior arrest should be made subject of inquiry. By this test the inquiry was permissible. It was proper cross-examination because reports of his arrest for receiving stolen goods, if admitted, would tend to weaken the assertion that he was known as an honest and law-abiding citizen. The cross-examination may take in as much ground as the testimony it is designed to verify. To hold otherwise would give defendant the benefit of testimony that he was honest and law-abiding in reputation when such might not be the fact; the refutation was founded on convictions equally persuasive though not for crimes exactly repeated in the present charge.
The inquiry here concerned an arrest twenty-seven years before the trial. Events a generation old are likely to be lived down and dropped from the present thought and talk of the community and to be absent from the knowledge of younger or more recent acquaintances. The court in its discretion may well exclude inquiry about rumors of an event so remote, unless recent misconduct revived them. But two of these witnesses dated their acquaintance with defendant as commencing thirty years before the trial. Defendant, on direct examination, voluntarily called attention to his conviction twenty years before. While the jury might conclude that a matter so old and indecisive as a 1920 arrest would shed little light on the present reputation and hence propensities of the defendant, we cannot say that, in the context of this evidence and in the absence of objection on this specific ground, its admission was an abuse of discretion.
We do not overlook or minimize the consideration that “the jury almost surely cannot comprehend the judge’s limiting instruction,” which disturbed the Court of Appeals. The refinements of the evidentiary rules on this subject are such that even lawyers and judges, after study and reflection, often are confused, and surely jurors in the hurried and unfamiliar movement of a trial must find them almost unintelligible. However, limiting instructions on this subject are no more difficult to comprehend or apply than those upon various other subjects; for example, instructions that admissions of a co-defendant are to be limited to the question of his guilt and are not to be considered as evidence against other defendants, and instructions as to other problems in the trial of conspiracy charges. A defendant in such a case is powerless to prevent his cause from being irretrievably obscured and confused; but, in cases such as the one before us, the law foreclosed this whole confounding line of „ inquiry, unless defendant thought the net advantage from opening it up would be with him. Given this option, we think defendants in general and this defendant in particular have no valid complaint at the latitude which existing law allows to the prosecution to meet by cross-examination an issue voluntarily tendered by the defense. See Greer v. United States, 245 U. S. 559.
We end, as we began, with the observation that the law regulating the offering and testing of character testimony may merit many criticisms. England and some states have overhauled the practice by statute. But the task of modernizing the long-standing rules on the subject is one of magnitude and difficulty which even those dedicated to law reform do not lightly undertake.
The law of evidence relating to proof of reputation in criminal cases has developed almost entirely at the hands of state courts of last resort, which have such questions frequently before them. This Court, on the other hand, has contributed little to this or to any phase of the law of evidence, for the reason, among others, that it has had extremely rare occasion to decide such issues, as the paucity of citations in this opinion to our own writings attests. It is obvious that a court which can make only infrequent sallies into the field cannot recast the body of case law on this subject in many, many years, even if it were clear what the rules should be.
We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters . and the profession that much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the other. But somehow it has proved a workable even if clumsy system when moderated by discretionary controls in the hands of a wise and strong trial court. To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice.
The present suggestion is that we adopt for all federal courts a new rule as to cross-examination about prior arrest, adhered to by the courts of only one state and rejected elsewhere. The confusion and error it would engender would seem too heavy a price to pay for an almost imperceptible logical improvement, if any, in a system which is justified, if at all, by accumulated judicial experience rather than abstract logic.
The judgment is
Affirvied.
The first count charged petitioner with bribing in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 91 (now 18 U. S. C. § 201) and the affirmance of his conviction on this count by the Court of Appeals, 165 F. 2d 732, is the judgment here under review. The second count charged “offering” the bribe as a violation of the same statute but his conviction on this count was reversed by the Court of Appeals and is not here involved.
Details appear in the Court of Appeals opinion, 165 F. 2d 732.
In ruling on the objection when the question was first asked, the Court said:
“. . . I instruct the jury that what is happening now is this: the defendant has called character witnesses, and the basis for the evidence given by those character witnesses is the reputation of the defendant in the community, and since the defendant tenders the issue of his reputation the prosecution may ask the witness if she has heard of various incidents in his career. I say to you that regardless of her answer you are not to assume that the incidents, asked about actually took place. All that is happening is that this witness’ standard of opinion of the reputation of the defendant is being tested. Is that clear?”
In overruling the second objection to the question the Court said:
“Again I say to the jury there is no proof that Mr. Michelson was arrested for receiving stolen goods in 1920, there isn’t any such proof. All this witness has been asked is whether he had heard of that. There is nothing before you on that issue. Now would you base your decision on the case fairly in spite of the fact that that question has been asked? You would? All right.”
The charge included the following:
“In connection with the character evidence in the case I permitted a question whether or not the witness knew that in 1920 this defendant had been arrested for receiving stolen goods. I tried to give you the instruction then that that question was permitted only to test the standards of character evidence that these character witnesses seemed to have. There isn’t any proof in the case that could be produced before you legally within the rules of evidence that this defendant was arrested in 1920 for receiving stolen goods, and that fact you are not to hold against him; nor are you to assume what the consequences of that arrest were. You just drive it from your mind so far as he is concerned, and take it into consideration only in weighing the evidence of the character witnesses.”
Footnote 8 to that court’s opinion reads as follows:
“Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 988, after noting that ‘such inquiries are almost universally admitted,’ not as ‘impeachment by extrinsic testimony of particular acts of misconduct,’ but as means of testing the character ‘witness’ grounds of knowledge,’ continues with these comments: ‘But the serious objection to them is that practically the above distinction — between rumors of such conduct, as affecting reputation, and the fact of it as violating the rule against particular facts — cannot be maintained in the mind of the jury. The rumor of the misconduct, when admitted, goes far, in spite of all theory and of the judge’s charge, towards fixing the misconduct as a fact upon the other person, and thus does three improper things,— (1) it violates the fundamental rule of fairness that prohibits the use of such facts, (2) it gets at them by hearsay only, and not by trustworthy testimony, and (3) it leaves the other person no means of defending himself by denial or explanation, such as he would otherwise have had if the rule had allowed that conduct to be made the subject of an issue. Moreover, these are not occurrences of possibility, but of daily practice. This method of inquiry or cross-examination is frequently resorted to by counsel for the very purpose of injuring by indirection a character which .they are forbidden directly to attack in that way; they rely upon the mere putting of the question (not caring that it is answered negatively) to convey their covert insinuation. The value of the inquiry for testing purposes is often so small and the opportunities of its abuse by underhand ways are so great that the practice may amount to little more than a mere subterfuge, and should be strictly supervised by forbidding it to counsel who do not use it in good faith.’
“Because, as Wigmore says, the jury almost surely cannot comprehend the judge’s limiting instruction, the writer of this opinion wishes that the United States Supreme Court would tell us to follow what appears to be the Illinois rule, i. e., that such questions are improper unless they relate to offenses similar to those for which the defendant is on trial. See Aiken v. People, 183 Ill. 215, 55 N. E. 695; cf. People v. Hannon, 381 Ill. 206, 44 N. E. (2d) 923.”
A judge of long trial and appellate experience has uttered a warning which, in the opinion of the writer, we might well have heeded in determining whether to grant certiorari here:
“. . . evidence of good character is to be used like any other, once it gets before the jury, and the less they are told about the grounds for its admission, or what they shall do with it, the more likely they are to use it sensibly. The subject seems to gather mist which discussion serves only to thicken, and which we can scarcely hope to dissipate by anything further we can add.” L. Hand in Nash v. United States, 54 F. 2d 1006, 1007.
In opening its cyclopedic review of authorities from many jurisdictions, Corpus Juris Secundum summarizes that the rules regulating proof of character “have been criticized as illogical, unscientific, and anomalous, explainable only as archaic survivals of compurgation or of states of legal development when the jury personally knew the facts on which their verdict was based.” 32 C. J. S. Evidence §433.
See Maguire, Evidence: Common Sense and Common Law (1947). Compare pp. 203-209 and pp. 74-76.
Greer v. United States, 245 U. S. 559; 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940) §57; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th ed., 1935) § 330. This was not the earlier rule in English common law and is not now the rule in some civil law countries. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., § 1940) § 193.
This would be subject to some qualification, as when a prior crime is an element of the later offense; for example, at a trial for being an habitual criminal. There are also well-established exceptions where evidence as to other transactions or a course of fraudulent conduct is admitted to establish fraudulent intent as an element of the crime charged. See, e. g., Fall v. United States, 60 App. D. C. 124, 49 F. 2d 506, certiorari denied, 283 U. S. 867; Hatem v. United States, 42 F. 2d 40, certiorari denied, 282 U. S. 887; Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425; Allis v. United States, 155 U. S. 117; Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342.
As long ago as 1865, Chief Justice Cockburn said, “The truth is, this part of our law is an anomaly. Although, logically speaking, it is quite clear that an antecedent bad character would form quite as reasonable a ground for the presumption and probability of guilt as previous good character lays the foundation of innocence, yet you cannot, on the part of the prosecution, go into evidence as to bad character.” Reg. v. Rowton, 10 Cox’s Criminal Cases 25, 29-30. And see 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940) § 55.
1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940) § 57.
1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940) §56; Underhill, Criminal Evidence (4th ed., 1935) § 165; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th ed., 1935) §§ 330, 336.
5 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940) § 1609; Underhill, Criminal Evidence (4th ed., 1935) § 170; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th ed., 1935) § 333.
People v. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N. Y. 408, 420, 82 N. E. 718, 722. The law apparently ignores the existence of such human ciphers as Kipling’s Tomlinson, of whom no ill is reported but no good can be recalled. They win seats with the righteous for character evidence purposes, however hard their lot in literature.
Id,.; 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940) §1614; Underhill, Criminal Evidence (4th ed., 1935) § 171; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th ed., 1935) § 334.
1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940) §58; Underhill, Criminal Evidence (4th ed., 1935) § 167; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th ed., 1935) § 330.
A classic example in the books is a character witness in a trial for murder. She testified she grew up with defendant, knew his reputation for peace and quiet, and that it was good. On cross-examination she was asked if she had heard that the defendant had shot anybody and, if so, how many. She answered, “three or four,” and gave the names of two but could not recall the names of the others. She still insisted, however, that he was of “good character.” The jury seems to have valued her information more highly than her judgment, and on appeal from conviction the cross-examination was held proper. People v. Laudiero, 192 N. Y. 304, 309, 85 N. E. 132. See also People v. Elliott, 163 N. Y. 11, 57 N. E. 103.
See, e. g., Mannix v. United States, 140 F. 2d 250. It has been held that the question may not be hypothetical nor assume unproven facts and ask if they would affect rhe conclusion, Little v. United States, 93 F. 2d 401; Pittman v. United States, 42 F. 2d 793; Filippelli v. United States, 6 F. 2d 121; and that it may not be so asked as to detail evidence or circumstances of a crime of which defendant was accused. People v. Marendi, 213 N. Y. 600, 107 N. E. 1058. It has been held error to use the question to get before the jury a particular derogatory newspaper article. Sloan v. United, States, 31 F. 2d 902. The proof has been confined to general reputation and that among a limited group such as fellow employees in a particular building held inadmissible. Williams v. United States, 168 U. S. 382.
This procedure was recommended by Wigmore. But analysis of his innovation emphasizes the way in which law on this subject has evolved from pragmatic considerations rather than from theoretical consistency. The relevant information that it is permissible to lay before the jury is talk or conversation about the defendant’s being arrested. That is admissible whether or not an actual arrest had taken place; it might even be more significant of repute if his neighbors were ready to arrest him in rumor when the authorities were not in fact. But before this relevant and proper inquiry can be made, counsel must demonstrate privately to the court an irrelevant and possibly unprovable fact — the reality of arrest. From this permissible inquiry about reports of arrest, the jury is pretty certain to infer that defendant had in fact been arrested and to draw its own conclusions as to character from that fact. The Wigmore suggestion thus limits legally relevant inquiries to those based on legally irrelevant facts in order that the legally irrelevant conclusion which the jury probably will draw from the relevant questions will not be based on unsupported or untrue innuendo. It illustrates Judge Hand’s suggestion that the system may work best when explained least. Yet, despite its theoretical paradoxes and deficiencies, we approve the procedure as calculated in practice to hold the inquiry within decent bounds.
See Stewart v. United States, 70 App. D. C. 101, 104 F. 2d 234; Little v. United States, 93 F. 2d 401; Filippelli v. United States, 6 F. 2d 121.
See Mannix v. United States, 140 F. 2d 250; Josey v. United States, 77 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 135 F. 2d 809; Spalitto v. United States, 39 F. 2d 782, and authorities there cited.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in considering its own rule which we are urged to adopt, recognized that “the rule adhered to in this State is not consistent with the great weight of authority in this country and in England.” People v. Hannon, 381 Ill. 206, 209, 44 N. E. 2d 923. Authorities in all states are collected in 71 A. L. R. 1504.
Criminal Evidence Act, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36. See also 51 L. Q. Rev. 443, for discussion of right to cross-examine about prior arrests. For review of English and state legislation, see 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940) § 194, et seq. The Pennsylvania statute (Act of March 15, 1911, P. L. 20, § 1) discussed by Wigmore has been amended (Act of July 3, 1947, P. L. 1239, § 1, 19 PS §711). The current statute and Pennsylvania practice were considered recently by the Superior Court of that state. Commonwealth v. Hurt, 163 Pa. Super. 232, 60 A. 2d 828.
The American Law Institute, in promulgating its “Model Code of Evidence,” includes the comment, “Character, wherever used in these Rules, means disposition not reputation. It denotes what a person is, not what he is reputed to be. No rules are laid down as to proof of reputation, when reputation is a fact to be proved. When reputation is a material matter, it is provable in the same manner as is any other disputed fact.” Rule 304. The latter sentence may seem an oversimplification in view of the decisions we have reviewed.
See note 21.
It must not be overlooked that abuse of cross-examination to test credibility carries its own corrective. Authorities on practice caution the bar of the imprudence as well as the unprofessional nature of attacks on witnesses or defendants which are likely to be resented by the jury. Wellman, Art of Cross-Examination (1927) p. 167, et seq.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These two federal estate tax cases present a common issue for our determination; Whether a federal court or agency in a federal estate tax controversy is conclusively bound by a state trial court adjudication of property rights or characterization of property interests when the United States is not made a party to such proceeding.
In No. 673, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F. 2d 1009, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that since the state trial court had “authoritatively determined” the rights of the parties, it was not required to delve into the correctness of that state court decree. In No. 240, Second National Bank of New Haven, Executor v. United States, 351 F. 2d 489, another panel of the same Circuit held that the “decrees of the Connecticut Probate Court . . . under no circumstances can be construed as binding” on a federal court in subsequent litigation involving federal revenue laws. Whether these cases conflict in principle or not, which is disputed here, there does exist a widespread conflict among the circuits over the question and we granted certiorari to resolve it. 385 U. S. 966, 968. We hold that where the federal estate tax liability turns upon the character of a property interest held and transferred by the decedent under state law, federal authorities are not bound by the determination made of such property interest by a state trial court.
I.
(a) No. 673, Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch.
In 1930, decedent, a resident of New York, created a revocable trust which, as amended in 1931, provided that the income from the corpus was to be paid to his wife during her lifetime. The instrument also gave her a general power of appointment, in default of which it provided that half of the corpus was to go to his heirs and the remaining half was to go to those of his wife. In 1951 the wife executed an instrument purporting to release the general power of appointment and convert it into a special power. Upon decedent’s death in 1957, respondent, in paying federal estate taxes, claimed a marital deduction for the value of the widow’s trust. The Commissioner determined, however, that the trust corpus did not qualify for the deduction under § 2056 (b)(5) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code and levied a deficiency. Respondent then filed a petition for redetermination in the Tax Court. The ultimate outcome of the controversy hinged on whether the release executed by Mrs. Bosch in 1951 was invalid — as she claimed it to be — in which case she would have enjoyed a general power of appointment at her husband’s death and the trust would therefore qualify for the marital deduction. While the Tax Court proceeding was pending, the respondent filed a petition in the Supreme Court of New York for settlement of the trustee’s account; it also sought a determination as to the validity of the release under state law. The Tax Court, with the Commissioner’s consent, abstained from making its decision pending the outcome of the state court action. The state court found the release to be a nullity; the Tax Court then accepted the state court judgment as being an “authoritative exposition of New York law and adjudication of the property rights involved,” 43 T. C. 120, 124, and permitted the deduction. On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that “[t]he issue is . . . not whether the federal court is ‘bound by’ the decision of the state tribunal, but whether or not a state tribunal has authoritatively determined the rights under state law of a party to the federal action.” 363 F. 2d, at 1013. The court concluded that the “New York judgment, rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over parties and subject matter, authoritatively settled the rights of the parties, not only for New York, but also for purposes of the application to those rights of the relevant provisions of federal tax law.” Id., at 1014. It declared that since the state court had held the wife to have a general power of appointment under its law, the corpus of the trust qualified for the marital deduction. We do not agree and reverse.
(b) No. 240, Second National Bank of New Haven, Executor v. United States.
Petitioner in this case is the executor of the will of one Brewster, a resident of Connecticut who died in September of 1958. The decedent’s will, together with a codicil thereto, was admitted to probate by the Probate Court for the District of Hamden, Connecticut. The will was executed in 1958 and directed the payment “out of my estate my just debts and funeral expenses and any death taxes which may be legally assessed . . . .” It further directed that the '‘provisions of any statute requiring the apportionment or proration of such taxes among the beneficiaries of this will or the transferees of such property, or the ultimate payment of such taxes by them, shall be without effect in the settlement of my estate.” The will also provided for certain bequests and left the residue in trust; one-third of the income from such trust was to be given to decedent’s wife for life, and the other two-thirds for the benefit of his grandchildren that were living at the time of his death. In July of 1958, the decedent executed a codicil to his will, the pertinent part of which gave his wife a general testamentary power of appointment over the corpus of the trust provided for her. This qualified it for the marital deduction as provided by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 2056 (b)(5). In the federal estate tax return filed in 1959, the widow’s trust was claimed as part of the marital deduction and that was computed as one-third of the residue of the estate before the payment of federal estate taxes. It was then deducted, along with other deductions not involved here, from the total value of the estate and the estate tax was then computed on the basis of the balance. The Commissioner disallowed the claimed deduction and levied a deficiency which was based on the denial of the widow’s allowance as part of the marital deduction and the reduction of the marital deduction for the widow’s, trust, by requiring that the estate tax be charged to the full estate prior to the deduction of the widow’s trust. After receipt of the deficiency notice, the petitioner filed an application in the state probate court to determine, under state law, the proration of the federal estate taxes paid. Notice of such proceeding was given all interested parties and the District Director of Internal Revenue. The guardian ad litem for the minor grandchildren filed a verified report stating that there was no legal objection to the proration of the federal estate tax as set out in the application of the executor. Neither the adult grandchildren nor the District Director of Internal Revenue filed or appeared in the Probate Court. The court then approved the application, found that the decedent’s will did not negate the application of the state proration statute and ordered that the entire federal tax be prorated and charged against the grandchildren’s trusts. This interpretation allowed the widow a marital deduction of some $3,600,000 clear of all federal estate tax. The Commissioner, however, subsequently concluded that the ruling of the Probate Court was erroneous and not binding on him, and he assessed a deficiency. After payment of the deficiency, petitioner brought this suit in the United States District Court for a refund. On petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, the Government claimed that there was a genuine issue of material fact, i. e., whether the probate proceedings had been adversary in nature. The District Court held that the “decrees of the Connecticut Probate Court . . . under no circumstances can be construed as binding and conclusive upon a federal court in construing and applying the federal revenue laws.” 222 F. Supp. 446, 457. The court went on to hold that under the standard applied by the state courts, there was no “clear and unambiguous direction against proration,” and that therefore the state proration statute applied. Id., at 454. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the decedent’s will “would seem to be clear and unambiguous to the effect that taxes were to come out of his residual estate and that despite any contrary statute the testator specifically wished to avoid any proration.” 35,1 F. 2d, at 491. It agreed with the District Court that, in any event, the judgment of the State Probate Court was not binding on the federal court.
II.
Petitioner in No. 240 raises the additional point that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in holding that decedent’s will clearly negated the application of the state proration statute. While we did not limit the grant of certiorari, we affirm without discussion the holding of the Court of Appeals on the point. The issue presents solely a question of state law and “[w]e ordinarily accept the determination of local law by the Court of Appeals . . . and we will not disturb it here.” Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 530, 534 (1949); General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U. S. 159, 165 (1956); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U. S. 588, 596 (1959). The Court of Appeals did not pass on the correctness of the resolution of the state law problem involved in Bosch, No. 673, and it is remanded for that purpose.
III.
The problem of what effect must be given a state trial court decree where the matter decided there is determinative of federal estate tax consequences has long burdened the Bar and the courts. This Court has not addressed itself to the problem for nearly a third of a century. In Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 35 (1934), this Court, declining to find collusion between the parties on the record as presented there, held that a prior in personam judgment in the state court to which the United States was not made a party, “[o]bviously . . . had not the effect of res judicata, and could not furnish the basis for invocation of the full faith and credit clause At 43. In Freuler’s wake, at least three positions have emerged among the circuits. The first of these holds that
“. . . if the question at issue is fairly presented to the state court for its independent decision and is so decided by the court the resulting judgment if binding upon the parties under the state law is conclusive as to their property rights in the federal tax case . . . .” Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F. 2d 218, 225.
The opposite view is expressed in Faulkerson’s Estate v. United States, 301 F. 2d 231. This view seems to approach that of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), in that the federal court will consider itself bound by the state court decree only after independent examination of the state law as determined by the highest court of the State. The Government urges that an intermediate position be adopted; it suggests that a state trial court adjudication is binding in such cases only when the judgment is the result of an adversary proceeding in the state court. Pierpont v. C. I. R., 336 F. 2d 277. Also see the dissent of Friendly, J., in Bosch, No. 673.
We look at the problem differently. First, the Commissioner was not made a party to either of the state proceedings here and neither had the effect of res judicata, Freuler v. Helvering, supra; nor did the principle of collateral estoppel apply. It can hardly be denied that both state proceedings were brought for the purpose of directly affecting federal estate tax liability. Next, it must be remembered that it was a federal taxing statute that the Congress enacted and upon which we are here passing. Therefore, in construing it, we must look to the legislative history surrounding it. We find that the report of the Senate Finance Committee recommending enactment of the marital deduction used very guarded language in referring to the very question involved here. It said that “proper regard,” not finality, “should be given to interpretations of the will” by state courts and then only when entered by a court “in a bona fide adversary proceeding.” S. Rep. No. 1013, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 4. We cannot say that the authors of this directive intended that the decrees of state trial courts were to be conclusive and binding on the computation of the federal estate tax as levied by the Congress. If the Congress had intended state trial court determinations to have that effect on the federal actions, it certainly would have said so — which it did not do. On the contrary, we believe it intended the marital deduction to be strictly construed and applied. Not only did it indicate that only “proper regard” was to be accorded state decrees but it placed specific limitations on the allowance of the deduction as set out in §§ 2056 (b), (c), and (d). These restrictive limitations clearly indicate the great care that Congress exercised in the drawing of the Act and indicate also a definite concern with the elimination of loopholes and escape hatches that might jeopardize the federal revenue. This also is in keeping with the long-established policy of the Congress, as expressed in the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1652. There it is provided that in the absence of federal requirements such as the Constitution or Acts of Congress, the “laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.” This Court has held that judicial decisions are “laws of the . . . state” within the section. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra; Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949); King v. Order of Travelers, 333 U. S. 153 (1948). Moreover, even in diversity cases this Court has further held that while the decrees of “lower state courts” should be “attributed some weight . . . the decision [is] not controlling . . where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the point. King v. Order of Travelers, supra, at 160-161. And in West v. A. T. & T. Co., 311 U. S. 223 (1940), this Court further held that “an intermediate appellate state court ... is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” At 237. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, under some conditions, federal authority may not be bound even by an intermediate state appellate court ruling. It follows here then, that when the application of a federal statute is involved, the decision of a state trial court as to an underlying issue of state law should a fortiori not be controlling. This is but an application of the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, where state law as announced by the highest court of the State is to be followed. This is not a diversity case but the same principle may be applied for the same reasons, viz., the underlying substantive rule involved is based on state law and the State’s highest court is the best authority on its own law. If there be no decision by that court then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after giving “proper regard” to relevant rulings of other courts of the State. In this respect, it may be said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198 (1956).
We believe that this would avoid much of the uncertainty that would result from the “non-adversary” approach and at the same time would be fair to the taxpayer and protect the federal revenue as well.
The judgment in No. 240 is therefore affirmed while that in No. 673 is reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Illustrative of the conflict among the circuits are: Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F. 2d 218 (C. A. 3d Cir., 1955); Faulkerson’s Estate v. United States, 301 F. 2d 231 (C. A. 7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U. S. 887 (1962); Pierpont v. C. I. R., 336 F. 2d 277 (C. A. 4th Cir., 1964), cert. denied, 380 U. S. 908 (1965).
Section. 2056 (b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §2056 (b)(5), provides:
“(5) Life estate with power of appointment in surviving spouse.— In the case of an interest in property passing from the decedent, if his surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest, . . . with power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest, . . . (exercisable in favor of such surviving spouse, or of the estate of such surviving spouse, or in favor of either, whether or not in each case the power is exercisable in favor of others), and with no power in any other person to appoint any part of the interest, or such specific portion, to any person other than the surviving spouse—
“(A) the interest . . . thereof so passing shall, for purposes of subsection (a), be considered as passing to the surviving spouse, and
“(B) no part of the interest so passing shall, for purposes of paragraph (1)(A), be considered as passing to any person other than the surviving spouse.
“This paragraph shall apply only if such power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion thereof, whether exercisable by will or during life, is exercisable by such spouse alone and in all events.”
It may be claimed that Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5 (1937), dealt with the problem presently before us but that case involved the question of the effect of a property right determination by a state appellate court.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions presented by this case are (1) whether a white defendant has standing to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude all black potential jurors from his petit jury, and (2) whether such exclusion violates his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury.
H
Petitioner Daniel Holland was charged in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, with aggravated kidnaping, rape, deviate sexual assault, armed robbery, and aggravated battery. According to his allegations, a venire of 30 potential jurors was assembled, 2 of whom were black. Petitioner’s counsel objected to those of the State’s peremptory challenges that struck the two black venire members from the petit jury, on the ground that petitioner had a Sixth Amendment right to “be tried by a representative cross section of the community.” App. 7-8. The trial judge overruled the objection, and petitioner was subsequently convicted of all except the aggravated battery charge. The convictions were reversed by the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, 147 Ill. App. 3d 323, 497 N. E. 2d 1230 (1986), on grounds that are irrelevant here, but on further appeal by the State were reinstated by the Illinois Supreme Court, which rejected petitioner’s Equal Protection Clause and Sixth Amendment challenges to the exclusion of the black jurors. 121 Ill. 2d 136, 520 N. E. 2d 270 (1987). We granted Holland’s petition for certiorari asserting that the Sixth Amendment holding was error. 489 U. S. 1051 (1989).
rH h-i
The threshold question is whether petitioner, who is white, has standing to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to the exclusion of blacks from his jury. We hold that he does.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 96 (1986), we said that to establish a prima facie Equal Protection Clause violation in the discriminatory exclusion of petit jurors, the defendant “must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group . . . and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race.” (Emphasis added.) We have never suggested, however, that such a requirement of correlation between the group identification of the defendant and the group identification of excluded venire members is necessary for Sixth Amendment standing. To the contrary, our cases hold that the Sixth Amendment entitles every defendant to object to a venire that is not designed to represent a fair cross section of the community, whether or not the systematically excluded groups are groups to which he himself belongs. See, e. g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975). Thus, in Taylor, we found standing in circumstances analogous to petitioner’s:
“The State first insists that Taylor, a male, has no standing to object to the exclusion of women from his jury. But Taylor’s claim is that he was constitutionally entitled to a jury drawn from a venire constituting a fair cross section of the community and that the jury that tried him was not such a jury by reason of the exclusion of women. Taylor was not a member of the excluded class; but there is no rule that claims such as Taylor presents may be made only by those defendants who are members of the group excluded from jury service. ” Id., at 526.
Of course, in this case petitioner seeks an extension of the fair-cross-section requirement from the venire to the petit jury—but that variation calls into question the scope of the Sixth Amendment guarantee, not his standing to assert it. We proceed, then, to the merits of the claim.
III
Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor intentionally used his peremptory challenges to strike all black prospective jurors solely on the basis of their race, thereby preventing a distinctive group in the community from being represented on his jury. This, he contends, violated the Sixth Amendment by denying him a “fair possibility” of a petit jury representing a cross section of the community. Petitioner invites us to remedy the perceived violation by incorporating into the Sixth Amendment the test we devised in Batson to permit black defendants to establish a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Under petitioner’s approach, a defendant of any race could establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment by objecting to the use of peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from the jury. The burden would then shift to the prosecutor to show that the exercise of his peremptory challenges was not based on intentional discrimination against the black potential jurors solely because of their race. Only if the prosecutor could then show nonracial grounds for the strikes would no Sixth Amendment violation be found.
We reject petitioner’s fundamental thesis that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to eliminate a distinctive group in the community deprives the defendant of a Sixth Amendment right to the “fair possibility” of a representative jury. While statements in our prior cases have alluded to such a “fair possibility” requirement, satisfying it has not been held to require anything beyond the inclusion of all cognizable groups in the venire, see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U. S. 162 (1986); Duren, supra; Taylor, supra, and the use of a jury numbering at least six persons, see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 (1978); Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970). A prohibition upon the exclusion of cognizable groups through peremptory challenges has no conceivable basis in the text of the Sixth Amendment, is without support in our prior decisions, and would undermine rather than further the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury.
It has long been established that racial groups cannot be excluded from the venire from which a jury is selected. That constitutional principle was first set forth not under the Sixth Amendment but under the Equal Protection Clause. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). In that context, the object of the principle and the reach of its logic are not established by our common-law traditions of jury trial, but by the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of unequal treatment in general and racial discrimination in particular. That prohibition therefore has equal application at the petit jury and the venire stages, as our cases have long recognized. Thus, in a decision rendered only 12 years after the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, striking down a West Virginia law that excluded blacks from jury service, we said:
“[I]t is hard to see why the statute of West Virginia should not be regarded as discriminating against a colored man when he is put upon trial for an alleged criminal offence against the State. It is not easy to comprehend how it can be said that while every white man is entitled to a trial by a jury selected from persons of his own race or color, or, rather, selected without discrimination against his color, and a negro is not, the latter is equally protected by the law with the former. Is not protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice, a right, a legal right, under the constitutional amendment? And how can it be maintained that compelling a colored man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the State has expressly excluded every man of his race, because of color alone, however well qualified in other respects, is not a denial to him of equal legal protection?” Strauder, supra, at 309.
Four Terms ago, in Batson, we squarely held that race-based exclusion is no more permissible at the individual petit jury stage than at the venire stage — not because the two stages are inseparably linked, but because the intransigent prohibition of racial discrimination contained in the Fourteenth Amendment applies to both of them.
Our relatively recent cases, beginning with Taylor v. Louisiana, hold that a fair-cross-section venire requirement is imposed by the Sixth Amendment, which provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . The fair-cross-section venire requirement is obviously not explicit in this text, but is derived from the traditional understanding of how an “impartial jury” is assembled. That traditional understanding includes a representative ve-nire, so that the jury will be, as we have said, “drawn from a fair cross section of the community,” Taylor, 419 U. S., at 527 (emphasis added). But it has never included the notion that, in the process of drawing the jury, that initial representativeness cannot be diminished by allowing both the accused and the State to eliminate persons thought to be inclined against their interests — which is precisely how the traditional peremptory-challenge system operates. As we described that system in Swain v. Alabama. 380 U. S. 202 (1965):
“[The peremptory challenge] is often exercised ... on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty. For the question a prosecutor or defense counsel must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but whether one from a different group is less likely to be.” Id., at 220-221 (citation and footnote omitted).
The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does). Without that requirement, the State could draw up jury lists in such manner as to produce a pool of prospective jurors disproportionately ill disposed towards one or all classes of defendants, and thus more likely to yield petit juries with similar disposition. The State would have, in effect, unlimited peremptory challenges to compose the pool in its favor. The fair-cross-section venire requirement assures, in other words, that in the process of selecting the petit jury the prosecution and defense will compete on an equal basis.
But to say that the Sixth Amendment deprives the State of the ability to “stack the deck” in its favor is not to say that each side may not, once a fair hand is dealt, use peremptory challenges to eliminate prospective jurors belonging to groups it believes would unduly favor the other side. Any theory of the Sixth Amendment leading to that result is implausible. The tradition of peremptory challenges for both the prosecution and the accused was already venerable at the time of Blackstone, see 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 346-348 (1769), was reflected in a federal statute enacted by the same Congress that proposed the Bill of Rights, see Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §30, 1 Stat. 119, was recognized in an opinion by Justice Story to be part of the common law of the United States, see United States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 480, 483-484 (1827), and has endured through two centuries in all the States, see Swain, supra, at 215-217. The constitutional phrase “impartial jury” must surely take its content from this unbroken tradition. One could plausibly argue (though we have said the contrary, see Stilson v. United States, 250 U. S. 583, 586 (1919)) that the requirement of an “impartial jury” impliedly compels peremptory challenges, but in no way could it be interpreted directly or indirectly to prohibit them. We have gone out of our way to make this clear in our opinions. In Lockhart, we said: “We have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle to invalidate the use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at large.” 476 U. S., at 173. In Taylor, we “emphasized that in holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition.” 419 U. S., at 538. Accord, Duren v. Missouri, 439 U. S., at 363-364, and n. 20.
The fundamental principle underlying today’s decision is the same principle that underlay Lockhart, which rejected the claim that allowing challenge for cause, in the guilt phase of a capital trial, to jurors unalterably opposed to the death penalty (so-called “Wii/ierspoow-excludables”) violates the fair-cross-section requirement. It does not violate that requirement, we said, to disqualify a group for a reason that is related “to the ability of members of the group to serve as jurors in a particular case.” 476 U. S., at 175 (emphasis added). The “representativeness” constitutionally required at the venire stage can be disrupted at the jury-panel stage to serve a State’s “legitimate interest.” Ibid. In Lockhart the legitimate interest was “obtaining a single jury that can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial.” Id., at 175-176. Here the legitimate interest is the assurance of impartiality that the system of peremptory challenges has traditionally provided.
The rule we announce today is not only the only plausible reading of the text of the Sixth Amendment, but we think it best furthers the Amendment’s central purpose as well. Although the constitutional guarantee runs only to the individual and not to the State, the goal it expresses is jury impartiality with respect to both contestants: neither the defendant nor the State should be favored. This goal, it seems to us, would positively be obstructed by a petit jury cross-section requirement which, as we have described, would cripple the device of peremptory challenge. We have acknowledged that that device occupies “an important position in our trial procedures,” Batson, 476 U. S., at 98, and has indeed been considered “a necessary part of trial by jury,” Swain v. Alabama, 880 U. S., at 219. Peremptory challenges, by enabling each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial toward the other side, are a means of “eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both sides,” ibid., thereby “assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury,” Batson, supra, at 91 (emphasis added).
Petitioner seeks to minimize the harm that recognition of his claim would cause to the peremptory challenge system by assuring us that the striking of identifiable community groups other than blacks need not be accorded similar treatment. That is a comforting assurance, but the theory of petitioner’s case is not compatible with it. If the goal of the Sixth Amendment is representation of a fair cross section of the community on the petit jury, then intentionally using peremptory challenges to exclude any identifiable group should be impermissible — which would, as we said in Lockhart, “likely require the elimination of peremptory challenges.” 476 U. S., at 178.
Justice Marshall argues that prohibiting purposeful peremptory challenge of members of distinctive groups “would leave the peremptory challenge system almost entirely untouched” because the Court is unlikely to recognize many groups as “distinctive.” Post, at 502. Misplaced optimism on this subject is cost free to those who in any event “would . . . eliminat[e] peremptory challenges entirely in criminal cases,” Batson, supra at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring), but we see no justification for indulging it. To support his prediction, Justice Marshall states that the only groups the Court has recognized as distinctive thus far have been women and certain racial groups, post, at 502 (citing Lock-hart, 476 U. S., at 175). That is true enough, but inasmuch as those groups happen to constitute all the groups we have considered in the venire context, what it demonstrates is not how difficult it is to meet our standards for distinctiveness, but how few groups are systematically excluded from the venire. As we have discussed, however, many groups are regularly excluded from the petit jury through peremptory challenge. Lockhart itself suggests, quite rightly, that even so exotic a group as “Witherspoon-ex.clu&shles” would be a distinctive group whose rejection at the venire stage would violate the Sixth Amendment. 476 U. S., at 176. If, as Justice Marshall would have it, rejection at the venire stage and rejection at the panel stage are one and the same, there is every reason to believe that many commonly exercised bases for peremptory challenge would be rendered unavailable.
Dispassionate analysis does not bear out Justice Marshall’s contentions that we have “ignor[ed] precedent after precedent,” post, at 503, “rejected]. . . the principles underlying a whole line of cases,” ibid., and suffer from “selective amnesia with respect to our cases in this area,” post, at 500. His dissent acknowledges that the fair-cross-section decisions it discusses — Taylor, Duren, and Lockhart — “Yeierr[ed] to exclusion of prospective jurors from venires, not their exclusion from petit juries by means of peremptory challenges,” post, at 496. It nonetheless counts those cases as “well-grounded precedents,” post, at 490, because “the particular context does not affect the analysis,” post, at 496. That may be the dissent’s view, but it was assuredly not the view expressed in the cases themselves. As noted earlier, all three of those opinions specifically disclaimed application of their analysis to the petit jury. See supra, at 482-483. Last Term, in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), we were asked to decide the very same question we decide today— “whether,” as Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion put it, “the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross section requirement should now be extended to the petit jury.” Id., at 292. We did not reach that question because the four-Justice plurality, with Justice White agreeing as to the result, held that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced,” id., at 310, and found that in asserting a fair-cross-section requirement at the petit jury stage petitioner was urging adoption of such a “new rule,” id., at 301 — that is, a rule producing a result “not dictated by [prior] precedent,” ibid, (emphasis in original). Though there were four Justices in dissent, only two of them expressed the view that a petit jury fair-cross-section requirement was compelled by prior precedent. See id., at 340-344 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In short, there is no substance to the contention that what we hold today “ignor[es] precedent after precedent.”
Justice Marshall’s dissent rolls out the ultimate weapon, the accusation of insensitivity to racial discrimination — which will lose its intimidating effect if it continues to be fired so randomly. It is not remotely true that our opinion today “lightly . . . set[s] aside” the constitutional goal of “eliminat[ing] racial discrimination in our system of criminal justice.” Post, at 503-504. The defendant in this case is not a black man, but a convicted white rapist who seeks to use the striking of blacks from his jury to overturn his conviction. His Sixth Amendment claim would be just as strong if the object of the exclusion had been, not blacks, but postmen, or lawyers, or clergymen, or any number of other identifiable groups. Race as such has nothing to do with the legal issue in this case. We do not hold that the systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury system through peremptory challenges is lawful; it obviously is not, see Batson, supra. . We do not even hold that the exclusion of blacks through peremptory challenges in this particular trial was lawful. Nor do we even hold that this particular (white) defendant does not have a valid constitutional challenge to such racial exclusion. All we hold is that he does not have a valid constitutional challenge based on the Sixth Amendment — which no more forbids the prosecutor to strike jurors on the basis of race than it forbids him to strike them on the basis of innumerable other generalized characteristics.
To be sure, as Justice Marshall says, the Sixth Amendment sometimes operates “as a weapon to combat racial discrimination,” post, at 504, n. 2 — just as statutes against murder sometimes operate that way. But it is no more reasonable to portray this as a civil rights case than it is to characterize a proposal for increased murder penalties as an antidiscrimination law. Since only the Sixth Amendment claim, and not the equal protection claim, is at issue, the question before us is not whether the defendant has been unlawfully discriminated against because he was white, or whether the excluded jurors have been unlawfully discriminated against because they were black, but whether the defendant has been denied the right to “trial ... by an impartial jury.” The earnestness of this Court’s commitment to racial justice is not to be measured by its willingness to expand constitutional provisions designed for other purposes beyond their proper bounds.
The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is
Affirmed.
Justice Stevens asserts that our “historical claims are significantly overstated,” and that we “will have to do better than Blackstone and the 1790 Congress” for support. Post, at 518, n. 15. As to the former, he quotes “[w]hat Blackstone actually said” — namely, that the King had no peremptory challenges but only challenges for cause. Ibid. But Justice Stevens’ quotation should have continued to the next two sentences of what Blackstone actually said: “However it is held, that the king need not assign his cause of challenge, till all the panel is gone through, and unless there cannot be a full jury without the persons so challenged. And then, and not sooner, the king’s counsel must shew the cause: otherwise the juror shall be sworn.” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 347 (1769).
íhe 1790 legislation provided that if, in a treason or capital prosecution, the defendant should refuse to plead, or should repeatedly exercise peremptory challenges past a certain number (35 for treason, 20 for other capital cases), “the court . . . shall notwithstanding proceed to . . . trial ... as if [the defendant] had pleaded not guilty.” 1 Stat. 119. The statute’s relevance to the present inquiry is that it constitutes acknowledgment of the common-law practice of peremptory challenge, a practice that unquestionably extended to defense and prosecution alike. The Supreme Court decision cited in text, United States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 480 (1827), specifically interpreted the Act to permit “[t]he acknowledged right of peremptory challenge existing in the crown before the statute of 33 Edw. I., and the uniform practice which has prevailed since that statute,” id., at 484 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens relies upon a later case, United States v. Shackleford, 18 How. 588, 590 (1856), which said that the 1790 Act does not demand that prosecutorial peremptory challenges remain available in all federal courts despite the Act of July 20, 1840, 5 Stat. 394, which required peremptory challenges to conform with state law. This entirely misses our point — which is not that the 1790 Act made the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge a part of federal statutory law, but merely that (as Marchant held) it acknowledged the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge to be part of the well-established common law that formed the background of the Sixth Amendment. Far from refuting this, Shackleford reinforces it, referring to the “qualified right [of peremptory challenge], existing at common law, by the government.” 18 How., at 590.
Justice Stevens contends that the historical record is in any event of not much importance to the question before us, since “[t]he Court has forsworn reliance on venerable history to give meaning to the Sixth Amendment’s numerosity and unanimity requirements,” and so should not rely upon it here either. Post, at 518. We have certainly held that a departure from historical practice regarding number and unanimity of jurors does not necessarily deny the right of jury trial. But that is quite different from saying that adherence to historical practice can deny the right of jury trial. Under a historically unencumbered Sixth Amendment of the sort Justice Stevens apparently envisions, it would be conceivable that a 12-person or a unanimous jury is unconstitutional.
Justice Stevens states that a prosecutor’s “assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black ... is impermissible since Batson.” Post, at 519. It is undoubtedly true that, since Batson, -such an assumption violates the Equal Protection Clause. That has nothing to do with whether it (and, necessarily, many other group-based assumptions) violates the Sixth Amendment.
As noted at the outset, petitioner did not seek review of the denial of his Equal Protection Clause claim. Our grant of certiorari was limited to the Sixth Amendment question, and the equal protection question has been neither briefed nor argued.
Justice Stevens’ contention that the equal protection question should nonetheless be decided, post, at 506-507, contradicts this Court’s Rule 14.1(a), which states: “Only the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.” It is almost unprecedented to accept certiorari on a question involving one constitutional provision and then to decide the ease under a different constitutional provision neither presented, briefed, nor argued. The exception was Batson, where, as accurately described in Chief Justice Burger’s dissent, “the Court departed] dramatically from its normal procedure without any explanation.” 476 U. S., at 115. Justice Stevens asserts that Batson “makes it appropriate” to reach the equal protection claim here, post, at 507. We decline to convert Batson from an unexplained departure to an unexplained rule.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Rule 3003(c) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure sets out the requirements for filing proofs of claim in Chapter 9 Municipality and Chapter 11 Reorganization cases. Rule 3003(c)(3) provides that the “court shall fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or interest may be filed.” Rule 9006 is a general rule governing the computation, enlargement, and reduction of periods of time prescribed in other bankruptcy rules. Rule 9006(b)(1) empowers a bankruptcy court to permit a late filing if the movant’s failure to comply with an earlier deadline “was the result of excusable neglect.” In this case, we are called upon to decide whether an attorney’s inadvertent failure to file a proof of claim within the deadline set by the court can constitute “excusable neglect” within the meaning of the Rule. Finding that it can, we affirm.
HH
On April 12, 1989, petitioner filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The petition sought relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Petitioner also filed a list of its 20 largest unsecured creditors, including all but one of respondents here. The following month, after obtaining extensions of time from the Bankruptcy Court, petitioner filed a statement of financial affairs and schedules of its assets and liabilities. The schedules, as amended, listed all of the respondents except Ft. Oglethorpe Associates Limited Partnership as creditors holding contingent, unliqui-dated, or disputed claims; the Ft. Oglethorpe partnership was not listed at all. Under § 1111 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1111(a), and Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(2), all such creditors are required to file a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court before the deadline, or “bar date,” established by the court.
On April 13,1989, the day after petitioner filed its Chapter 11 petition, the Bankruptcy Court mailed a “Notice for Meeting of Creditors” to petitioner’s creditors. Along with the announcement of a May 5 meeting was the following passage:
“You must file a proof of claim if your claim is scheduled as disputed, contingent or unliquidated, is unlisted or you do not agree with the amount. See 11 U. S. C. Sec. 1111 & Bankruptcy rule 3003. Bar date is August 3, 1989.” App. 29a.
The notice was received and read by Mark A. Berlin, president of the corporate general partners of each of the respondents. Berlin duly attended the creditors’ meeting on May 5. The following month, respondents retained an experienced bankruptcy attorney, Marc Richards, to represent them in the proceedings. Berlin stated in an affidavit that he provided Richards with a complete copy of the case file, including a copy of the court’s April 13,1989, notice to creditors. Berlin also asserted that he inquired of Richards whether there was a deadline for filing claims and that Richards assured him that no bar date had been set and that there was no urgency in filing proofs of claim. Id., at 121a. Richards and Berlin both attended a subsequent meeting of creditors on June 16, 1989.
Respondents failed to file any proofs of claim by the August 3, 1989, bar date. On August 23, 1989, respondents filed their proofs, along with a motion that the court permit the late filing under Rule 9006(b)(1). In particular, respondents’ counsel explained that the bar date, of which he was unaware, came at a time when he was experiencing “a major and significant disruption” in his professional life caused by his withdrawal from his former law firm on July 31, 1989. Id., at 56a. Because of this disruption, counsel did not have access to his copy of the case file in this matter until mid-August. Ibid.
The Bankruptcy Court refused the late filing. Following precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court held that a party may claim “excusable neglect” only if its “ ‘failure to timely perform a duty was due to circumstances which were beyond [its] reasonable [control.’ ” Id., at 124a (quoting In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F. 2d 814, 817 (CA11 1985) (some internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Biscayne 21 Condominium Associates, Inc. v. South Atlantic Financial Corp., 475 U. S. 1015 (1986)). Finding that respondents had received notice of the bar date and could have complied, the court ruled that they could not claim “excusable neglect.”
On appeal, the District Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found “respectable authority for the narrow reading of ‘excusable neglect’ ” adopted by the Bankruptcy Court, but concluded that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit would follow “a more liberal approach.” App. 157a. Embracing a test announced by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the District Court remanded with instructions that the Bankruptcy Court evaluate respondents’ conduct against several factors, including: “ ‘ “(1) whether granting the delay will prejudice the debtor; (2) the length of the delay and its impact on efficient court administration; (3) whether the delay was beyond the reasonable control of the person whose duty it was to perform; (4) whether the creditor acted in good faith; and (5) whether clients should be penalized for their counsel’s mistake or neglect.” ’ ” Id., at 158a~159a (quoting In re Dix, 95 B. R. 134, 138 (CA9 Bkrtcy. Appellate Panel 1988) (in turn quoting In re Magouirk, 693 F. 2d 948, 951 (CA9 1982))). The District Court also suggested that the Bankruptcy Court consider whether the failure to comply with the bar date “resulted from negligence, indifference or culpable conduct on the part of a moving creditor or its counsel.” App. 159a.
On remand, the Bankruptcy Court applied the so-called Dix factors and. again denied respondents’ motion. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court found (1) that petitioner would not be prejudiced by the late filings; (2) that the 20-day delay in filing the proofs of claim would have no adverse impact on efficient court administration; (3) that the reason for the delay was not outside respondents’ control; (4) that respondents and their counsel acted in good faith; and (5) that, in light of Berlin’s business sophistication and his actual knowledge of the bar date, it would not be improper to penalize respondents for the neglect of their counsel. App. 168a-172a. The court also found that respondents’ counsel was negligent in missing the bar date and, “[t]o a degree,” indifferent to it. Id., at 172a. In weighing these considerations, the Bankruptcy Court “attache[d] considerable importance to Dix factors 3 and 5,” and concluded that a ruling in respondents’ favor, notwithstanding their actual notice of the bar date, “would render nugatory the fixing of the claims’ bar-date in this case.” Id., at 173a. The District Court affirmed the ruling.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that “excusable neglect” was not limited to cases where the failure to act was due to circumstances beyond the movant’s control. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court that the five “Dix factors” were helpful, although not necessarily exhaustive, guides. In re Pioneer Investment Services Co., 943 F. 2d 673, 677 (1991). The court found, however, that the Bankruptcy Court had misapplied the fifth Dix factor to this case. Because Berlin had inquired of counsel whether there were any impending filing deadlines and been told that none existed, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Bankruptcy Court had “inappropriately penalized the [respondents] for the errors of their counsel.” 943 F. 2d, at 677.
The Court of Appeals also found “it significant that the notice containing the bar date was incorporated in a document entitled ‘Notice for Meeting of Creditors.’ ” Id., at 678. “Such a designation,” the court explained, “would not have put those without extensive experience in bankruptcy on notice that the date appended to the end of this notice was intended to be the final date for filing proof of claims'.” Ibid. Indeed, based on a comparison between the notice in this case and the model notice set out in Official Bankruptcy Form 16, the court concluded that the notice given respondents contained a “dramatic ambiguity,” which could well have confused “[e]ven persons experienced in bankruptcy.” Ibid. Having determined that the fifth Dix factor favored respondents rather than petitioner, the Court of Appeals found that the record demonstrated “excusable neglect.”
Because of the conflict in the Courts of Appeals over the meaning of “excusable neglect,” we granted certiorari, 504 U. S. 984 (1992), and now affirm.
II
A
There is, of course, a range of possible explanations for a party’s failure to comply with a court-ordered filing deadline. At one end of the spectrum, a party may be prevented from complying by forces beyond its control, such as by an act of God or unforeseeable human intervention. At the other, a party simply may choose to flout a deadline. In between lie cases where a party may choose to miss a deadline although for a very good reason, such as to render first aid to an accident victim discovered on the way to the courthouse, as well as cases where a party misses a deadline through inadvertence, miscalculation, or negligence. Petitioner contends that the Bankruptcy Court was correct when it first interpreted Rule 9006(b)(1) to require a showing that the mov-ant’s failure to comply with the court’s deadline was caused by circumstances beyond its reasonable control. Petitioner suggests that exacting enforcement of filing deadlines is essential to the Bankruptcy Code’s goals of certainty and finality in resolving disputed claims. Under petitioner’s view, any showing of fault on the part of the late filer would defeat a claim of “excusable neglect.”
We think that petitioner’s interpretation is not consonant with either the language of the Rule or the evident purposes underlying it. First, the Rule grants a reprieve to out-of-time filings that were delayed by “neglect.” The ordinary meaning of “neglect” is “to give little attention or respect” to a matter, or, closer to the point for our purposes, “to leave undone or unattended to especially] through carelessness.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 791 (1983) (emphasis added). The word therefore encompasses both simple, faultless omissions to act and, more commonly, omissions caused by carelessness. Courts properly assume, absent sufficient indication to the contrary, that Congress intends the words in its enactments to carry “their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979). Hence, by empowering the courts to accept late filings “where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect,” Rule 9006(b)(1), Congress plainly contemplated that the courts would be permitted, where appropriate, to accept late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances beyond the party’s control.
Contrary to petitioner’s suggestion, this flexible understanding of “excusable neglect” accords with the policies underlying Chapter 11 and the bankruptcy rules. The “excusable neglect” standard of Rule 9006(b)(1) governs late filings of proofs -of claim in Chapter 11 cases but not in Chapter 7 cases. The rules’ differentiation between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 filings corresponds with the differing policies of the two chapters. Whereas the aim of a Chapter 7 liquidation is the prompt closure and distribution of the debtor’s estate, Chapter 11 provides for reorganization with the aim of rehabilitating the debtor and avoiding forfeitures by creditors. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U. S. 198, 203 (1983). In overseeing this latter process, the bankruptcy courts are necessarily entrusted with broad equitable powers to balance the interests of the affected parties, guided by the overriding goal of ensuring the success of the reorganization. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 466 U. S. 513, 627-528 (1984). This context suggests that Rule 9006’s allowance for late filings due to “excusable neglect” entails a correspondingly equitable inquiry.
The history of the present bankruptcy rules confirms this view. Rule 9006(b) is derived from Rule 906(b) of the former bankruptcy rules, which governed bankruptcy proceedings under the former Bankruptcy Act. Like Rule 9006(b)(1), former Rule 906(b) permitted courts to accept late filings “where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.” The forerunner of Rule 3003(c), which now establishes the requirements for filing claims in Chapter 11 cases, was former Rule 10-401(b), which established the filing requirements for proofs of claim in reorganization cases under Chapter X of the former Act, Chapter ll’s predecessor. The Advisory Committee’s Notes accompanying that former Rule make clear that courts were entrusted with the authority under Rules 10-401(b) and 906(b) to accept tardy filings “in accordance with the equities of the situation”:
“If the court has fixed a bar date for the filing of proofs of claim, it may still enlarge that time within the provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 906(b) which is made applicable in this subdivision. This policy is in accord with Chapter X generally which is to preserve rather than to forfeit rights. In § 102 it rejects the notion expressed in §57n of the Act that claims must be filed within a six-month period to participate in any distribution. Section 224(4) of Chapter X of the Act permits distribution to certain creditors even if they fail to file claims and § 204 fixes a minimum period of 5 years before distribution rights under a plan may be forfeited. This approach was intentional as expressed in Senate Report 1916 (75th Cong., 3d Sess., April 20, 1938):
“ ‘Sections 204 and 205 insure participation in the benefits of the reorganization to those who, through inadvertence or otherwise, have failed to file their claims or otherwise evidence their interests during the pendency of the proceedings.’
“This attitude is carried forward in the rules, first by dispensing with the need to file proofs of claims and stock interests in most instances and, secondly, by permitting enlargement of the fixed bar date in a particular case with leave of court and for cause shown in accordance with the equities of the situation.” Advisory Committee’s Note accompanying Rule 10-401(b), reprinted in 13A J. Moore & L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 10-401.01, p. 10-401-4 (14th ed. 1977).
This history supports our conclusion that the enlargement of prescribed time periods under the “excusable neglect” standard of Rule 9006(b)(1) is not limited to situations where the failure to timely file is due to circumstances beyond the control of the filer.
Our view that the phrase “excusable neglect” found in Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) is not limited as petitioner would have it is also strongly supported by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which use that phrase in several places. Indeed, Rule 9006(b)(1) was patterned after Rule 6(b) of those Rules. Under Rule 6(b), where the specified period for the performance of an act has elapsed, a district court may enlarge the period and permit the tardy act where the omission is the “result of excusable neglect.” As with Rule 9006(b)(1), there is no indication that anything other than the commonly accepted meaning of the phrase was intended by its drafters. It is not surprising, then, that in applying Rule 6(b), the Courts of Appeals have generally recognized that “excusable neglect” may extend to inadvertent delays. Although inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute “excusable” neglect, it is clear that “excusable neglect” under Rule 6(b) is a somewhat “elastic concept” and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by circumstances beyond the control of the movant.
The “excusable neglect” standard for allowing late filings is also used elsewhere in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When a party should have asserted a counterclaim but did not, Rule 13(f) permits the counterclaim to be set up by amendment where the omission is due to “oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires.” In the context of such a provision, it is difficult indeed to imagine that “excusable neglect” was intended to be limited as petitioner insists it should be.
The same is true of Rule 60(b)(1), which permits courts to reopen judgments for reasons of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” but only on motion made within one year of the judgment. Rule 60(b)(6) goes further, however, and empowers the court to reopen a judgment even after one year has passed for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” These provisions are mutually exclusive, and thus a party who failed to take timely action due to “excusable neglect” may not seek relief more than a year after the judgment by resorting to subsection (6). Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 863, and n. 11 (1988). To justify relief under subsection (6), a party must show “extraordinary circumstances” suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay. See ibid.; Ackermann v. United States, 340 U. S. 193, 197-200 (1950); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 613-614 (1949). If a party is partly to blame for the delay, relief must be sought within one year under subsection (1) and the party’s neglect must be excusable. In Klapprott, for example, the petitioner had been effectively prevented from taking a timely appeal of a judgment by incarceration, ill health, and other factors beyond his reasonable control. Four years after a default judgment had been entered against him, he sought to reopen the matter under Rule 60(b) and was permitted to do so. As explained by Justice Black:
“It is contended that the one-year limitation [of subsection (1)] bars petitioner on the premise that the petition to set aside the judgment showed, at most, nothing but ‘excusable neglect.’ And of course, the one-year limitation would control if no more than ‘neglect’ was disclosed by the petition. In that event the petitioner could not avail himself of the broad ‘any other reason’ clause of 60(b). But petitioner’s allegations set up an extraordinary situation which cannot fairly or logically be classified as mere ‘neglect’ on his part. The undenied facts set out in the petition reveal far more than a failure to defend... due to inadvertence, indifference, or careless disregard of consequences.” Id., at 613.
Justice Frankfurter, although dissenting on other grounds, agreed that Klapprott’s allegations of inability to comply with earlier deadlines took his case outside the scope of “excusable neglect” “because ‘neglect’ in the context of its subject matter carries the idea of negligence and not merely of non-action.” Id., at 630.
Thus, at least for purposes of Rule 60(b), “excusable neglect” is understood to encompass situations in which the failure to comply with a filing deadline is attributable to negligence. Because of the language and structure of Rule 60(b), a party’s failure to file on time for reasons beyond his or her control is not considered to constitute “neglect.” See Klapprott, supra. This latter result, however, would not obtain under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1). Had respondents here been prevented from complying with the bar date by an act of God or some other circumstance beyond their control, the Bankruptcy Court plainly would have been permitted to find “excusable neglect.” At the same time, reading Rule 9006(b)(1) inflexibly to exclude every instance of an inadvertent or negligent omission would ignore the most natural meaning of the word “neglect” and would be at odds with the accepted meaning of that word in analogous contexts.
B
This leaves, of course, the Rule’s requirement that the party’s neglect of the bar date be “excusable.” It is this requirement that we believe will deter ^editors or other parties from freely ignoring court-ordered deadlines in the hopes of winning a permissive reprieve under Rule 9006(b)(1). With regard to determining whether a party’s neglect of a deadline is excusable, we are in substantial agreement with the factors identified by the Court of Appeals. Because Congress has provided no other guideposts for determining what sorts of neglect will be considered “excusable,” we conclude that the determination is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission. These include, as the Court of Appeals found, the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith. See 943 F. 2d, at 677.
There is one aspect of the Court of Appeals' analysis, however, with which we disagree. The Court of Appeals suggested that it would be inappropriate to penalize respondents for the omissions of their attorney, reasoning that “the ultimate responsibility of filing the... proof[s] of clai[m] rested with [respondents’] counsel.” Ibid. The court also appeared to focus its analysis on whether respondents did all they reasonably could in policing the conduct of their attorney, rather than on whether their attorney, as respondents’ agent, did all he reasonably could to comply with the court-ordered bar date. In this, the court erred.
In other contexts, we have held that clients must be held accountable for the acts and omissions of their attorneys. In Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626 (1962), we held that a client may be made to suffer the consequence of dismissal of its lawsuit because of its attorney’s failure to attend a scheduled pretrial conference. In so concluding, we found “no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner’s claim because of his counsel’s unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty-on the client.”. Id., at 633. To the contrary,-, the Court wrote:
“Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have ‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’” Id., at 633-634 (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320, 326 (1880)).
This principle also underlies our decision in United States v. Boyle, 469 U. S. 241 (1985), that a client could be penalized for counsel’s tardy filing of a tax return. This principle applies with equal force here and requires that respondents be held accountable for the acts and omissions of their chosen counsel. Consequently, in determining whether respondents’ failure to file their proofs of claim prior to the bar date was excusable, the proper focus is upon whether the neglect of respondents and their counsel was excusable.
Ill
Although the Court of Appeals in this case erred in not attributing to respondents the fault of their counsel, we conclude that its result was correct nonetheless. First, petitioner does not challenge the findings made below concerning the respondents’ good faith and the absence of any danger of prejudice to the debtor or of disruption to efficient judicial administration posed by the late filings. Nor would we be inclined in any event to unsettle factual findings entered by a Bankruptcy Court and affirmed by both the District Court and Court of Appeals. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U. S. 656, 665 (1987). Indeed, in this case, the Bankruptcy Court took judicial notice of the fact that the debtor’s second amended plan of reorganization, offered after this litigation was well underway, takes account of respondents’ claims. App. 168a-169a. As the Court of Appeals found, the lack of any prejudice to the debtor or to the interests of efficient judicial administration, combined with the good faith of respondents and their counsel, weigh strongly in favor of permitting the tardy claim.
In assessing the culpability of respondents’ counsel, we give little weight to the fact that counsel was experiencing upheaval in his law practice at the time of the bar date. We do, however, consider significant that the notice of the bar date provided by the Bankruptcy Court in this case was outside the ordinary course in bankruptcy cases. As the Court of Appeals noted, ordinarily the bar date in a bankruptcy case should be prominently announced and accompanied by an explanation of its significance. See 943 F. 2d, at 678. We agree with the court that the “peculiar and inconspicuous placement of the bar date in a notice regarding a creditors!’] meeting,” without any indication of the significance of the bar date, left a “dramatic ambiguity” in the notification. Ibid. This is not to say, of course, that respondents’ counsel was not remiss in failing to apprehend the notice. To be sure, were there any evidence of prejudice to petitioner or to judicial administration in this case, or any indication at all of bad faith, we could not say that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in declining to find the neglect to be “excusable.” In the absence of such a showing, however, we conclude that the unusual form of notice employed in this case requires a finding that the neglect of respondents’ counsel was, under all the circumstances, “excusable.”
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c), in relevant part, provides:
“(c) Filing Proof of Claim.
“(1) Who May File. Any creditor or indenture trustee may file a proof of claim within the time prescribed by subdivision (c)(3) of this rule.
“(2) Who Must File. Any creditor or.equity security holder whose claim or interest is not scheduled or scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated shall file a proof of claim or interest within the time prescribed by subdivision (c)(3) of this rule; any creditor who fails to do so shall not be treated as a creditor with respect to such claim for the purposes of voting and distribution.
“(3) Time for Filing. The court shall fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or interest may be filed. Notwithstanding the expiration of such time, a proof of claim may be filed to the extent and under the conditions stated in Rule 3002(c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4).”
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) provides:
“(b) Enlargement.
“(1) In General. Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subdivision, when an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) on motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.
“(2) Enlargement Not Permitted. The court may not enlarge the time for taking action under Rules 1007(d), 1017(b)(3), 2003(a) and (d), 7062, 9023, and 9024.
“(3) Enlargment Limited. The court may enlarge the time for taking action under Rules 1006(b)(2), 1017(e), 3002(c), 4003(b), 4004(a), 4007(c), 8002, and 9033, only to the extent and under the conditions stated in those rules.”
The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have taken a narrow view of “excusable neglect” under Rule 9006(b)(1), requiring a showing that the delay was caused by circumstances beyond the movant’s control. See In re Davis, 936 F. 2d 771, 774 (CA4 1991); In re Danielson, 981 F. 2d 296, 298 (CA7 1992); Hanson v. First Bank of South Dakota, N. A., 828 F. 2d 1310, 1314-1315 (CA8 1987); In re Analytical Systems, Inc., 933 F. 2d 939, 942 (CA11 1991). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, by contrast, has applied a more flexible analysis similar to that employed by the Court of Appeals in the present case. In re Centric Corp., 901 F. 2d 1514, 1517-1518, cert. denied sub nom. Trustees of Centennial State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Centric Corp., 498 U. S. 852 (1990). The Courts of Appeals similarly have divided in their interpretations of “excusable neglect” as found in Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Some courts have required a showing that the movant’s failure to meet the deadline was beyond its control, see, e. g., 650 Park Ave. Corp. v. McRae, 836 F. 2d 764, 767 (CA2 1988); Pratt v. McCarthy, 850 F. 2d 590, 592 (CA9 1988), while others have adopted a more flexible approach similar to that employed by the Court of Appeals in this case, see, e. g., Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Larson, 827 F. 2d 916 (CA3 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Secretary of Transp. of Pennsylvania, 484 U. S. 1032 (1988); Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement Plan of Sperry-Hutchinson Co., 896 F. 2d 228, 232-233 (CA7 1990).
The time-computation and time-extension provisions of Rule 9006, like those of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6, are generally applicable to any time requirement found elsewhere in the rules unless expressly excepted. Subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) of Rule 9006 enumerate those time requirements excluded from the operation of the “excusable neglect” standard. One of the time requirements listed as excepted in Rule 9006(b)(3) is that governing the filing of proofs of claim in Chapter 7 cases. Such filings are governed exclusively by Rule 3002(e). See Rule 9006(b)(3); In re Coastal Alaska Lines, Inc., 920 F. 2d 1428, 1432 (CA9 1990). By contrast, Rule 9006(b) does not make a similar exception for Rule 3003(c), which, as noted earlier, establishes the time requirements for proofs of claim in Chapter 11 cases. Consequently, Rule 9006(b)(1) must be construed to govern the permissibility of late filings in Chapter 11 bankruptcies. See Advisory Committee’s Note accompanying Rule 9006(b)(1).
See Advisory Committee’s Note accompanying Rule 9006(b).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) provides:
“(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b) and (c)(2), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b), and 74(a), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.”
See, e. g., United States v. Borromeo, 945 F. 2d 750, 753-754 (CA4 1991); Hill v. Marshall, No. 86-3987, 1988 U. S. App. LEXIS 14742, *4 (CA6, Nov. 4, 1988); Dominic v. Hess Oil V. I. Corp., 841 F. 2d 513, 517 (CA3 1988); Sony Corp. v. Elm State Electronics, Inc., 800 F. 2d 317, 319 (CA2 1986); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Bar Assn. of District of Columbia, 89 U. S. App. D. C. 185, 186, 190 F. 2d 664, 665 (1951). But see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Olympus Corp., 931 F. 2d 1551, 1552-1553 (CA Fed. 1991).
4A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1165, p. 479 (2d ed. 1987).
The Courts of Appeals generally have given a similar interpretation to “excusable neglect” in the context of Rule 45(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which, like Rule 9006(b), was modeled after Rule 6(b). See, e. g., United States v. Roberts, 978 F. 2d 17, 21-24 (CA1 1992); Warren v. United States, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 160, 163, 358 F. 2d 627, 530 (1965); Calland v. United States, 323 F. 2d 405, 407-408 (CA7 1963).
In assessing what constitutes “excusable neglect
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Fortas
delivered the opinion of the Court. I
I.
Petitioner isservinga life sentence in the Tennessee State Penitentiary. In February 1965 he was transferred to the maximum security building in the prison for violation of a prison regulation which provides:
“No inmate will advise, assist or otherwise contract to aid another, either with or without a fee, to prepare Writs or other legal matters. It is not intended that an innocent man be punished. When a man believes he is unlawfully held or illegally convicted, he should prepare a brief or state his complaint in letter form and address it to his lawyer or a judge. A formal Writ is not necessary to receive a hearing. False charges or untrue complaints may be punished. Inmates are forbidden to set themselves up as practitioners for the purpose of promoting a business of writing Writs.”
In July 1965 petitioner filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee a “motion for law books and a typewriter,” in which he sought relief from his confinement in the maximum security building. The District Court treated this motion as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and, after a hearing, ordered him released from disciplinary confinement and restored to the status of an ordinary prisoner. The District Court held that the regulation was void because it in effect barred illiterate prisoners from access to federal habeas corpus and conflicted with 28 U. S. C. § 2242. 252 F. Supp. 783.
By the time the District Court order was entered, petitioner had been transferred from the maximum security building, but he had been put in a disciplinary cell block in which he was entitled to fewer privileges than were given ordinary prisoners. Only when he promised to refrain from assistance to other inmates was he restored to regular prison conditions and privileges. At a second hearing, held in March 1966, the District Court explored these issues concerning the compliance of the prison officials with its initial order. After the hearing, it reaffirmed its earlier order.
The State appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the regulation did not unlawfully conflict with the federal right of habeas corpus. According to the Sixth Circuit, the interest of the State in preserving prison discipline and in limiting the practice of law to licensed attorneys justified whatever burden the regulation might place on access to federal habeas corpus. 382 F. 2d 353.
II.
This Court has constantly emphasized the fundamental importance of the writ of habeas corpus in our constitutional scheme, and the Congress has demonstrated its solicitude for the vigor of the Great Writ. The Court has steadfastly insisted that “there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired.” Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 26 (1939).
Since the basic purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be denied or obstructed. For example, the Court has held that a State may not validly make the writ available only to prisoners who could pay a $4 filing fee. Smith v. Bennett, 366 U. S. 708 (1961). And it has insisted that, for the indigent as well as for the affluent prisoner, post-conviction proceedings must be more than a formality. For instance, the State is obligated to furnish prisoners not otherwise able to obtain it, with a transcript or equivalent recordation of prior habeas corpus hearings for use in further proceedings. Long v. District Court, 385 U. S. 192 (1966). Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956).
Tennessee urges, however, that the contested regulation in this case is justified as a part of the State’s disciplinary administration of the prisons. There is no doubt that discipline and administration of state detention facilities are state functions. They are subject to federal authority only where paramount federal constitutional or statutory rights supervene. It is clear, however, that in instances where state regulations applicable to inmates of prison facilities conflict with such rights, the regulations may be invalidated.
For example, in Lee v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333 (1968), the practice of racial segregation of prisoners was justified by the State as necessary to maintain good order and discipline. We held, however, that the practice was constitutionally prohibited, although we were careful to point out that the order of the District Court, which we affirmed, made allowance for “the necessities of prison security and discipline.” Id., at 334. And in Ex parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546 (1941), this Court invalidated a state regulation which required that habeas corpus petitions first be submitted to prison authorities and then approved by the “legal investigator” to the parole board as “properly drawn” before being transmitted to the court. Here again, the State urged that the requirement was necessary to maintain prison discipline. But this Court held that the regulation violated the principle that “the state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.” 312 U. S., at 549. Cf. Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U. S. 255, 257 (1942).
There can be no doubt that Tennessee could not constitutionally adopt and enforce a rule forbidding illiterate or poorly educated prisoners to file habeas corpus petitions. Here Tennessee has adopted a rule which, in the absence of any other source of assistance for such prisoners, effectively does just that. The District Court concluded that “[f]or all practical purposes, if such prisoners cannpt have the assistance of a 'jail-house lawyer,’ their possibly valid constitutional claims will never be heard in any court.” 252 F. Supp., at 784. The record supports this conclusion.
Jails and penitentiaries include among their inmates a high percentage of persons who are totally or functionally illiterate, whose educational attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is limited. This appears to be equally true of Tennessee’s prison facilities.
In most federal courts, it is the practice to appoint counsel in post-conviction proceedings only after a petition for post-conviction relief passes initial judicial evaluation and the court has determined that issues are presented calling for an evidentiary hearing. E. g., Taylor v. Pegelow, 335 F. 2d 147 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Marshall v. Wilkins, 338 F. 2d 404 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1964). See 28 U. S. C. § 1915 (d); R. Sokol, A Handbook of Federal Habeas Corpus 71-73 (1965).
It has not been held that there is any general obligation of the courts, state or federal, to appoint counsel for prisoners who indicate, without more, that they wish to seek post-conviction relief. See, e. g., Barker v. Ohio, 330 F. 2d 594 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1964). Accordingly, the initial burden of presenting a claim to post-conviction relief usually rests upon the indigent prisoner himself with such help as he can obtain within the prison walls or the prison system. In the case of all except those who are able to help themselves — usually a few old hands or exceptionally gifted prisoners — the prisoner is, in effect, denied access to the courts unless such help is available.
It is indisputable that prison “writ writers” like petitioner are sometimes a menace to prison discipline and that their petitions are often so unskillful as to be a burden on the courts which receive them. But, as this Court held in Ex parte Hull, supra, in declaring invalid a state prison regulation which required that prisoners’ legal pleadings be screened by state officials:
“The considerations that prompted [the regulation’s] formulation are not without merit, but the state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.” 312 U. S., at 549.
Tennessee does not provide an available alternative to the assistance provided by other inmates. The warden of the prison in which petitioner was confined stated that the prison provided free notarization of prisoners’ petitions. That obviously meets only a formal requirement. He also indicated that he sometimes allowed prisoners to examine the listing of attorneys in the Nashville telephone directory so they could select one to write to in an effort to interest him in taking the case, and that “on several occasions” he had contacted the public defender at the request of an inmate. There is no contention, however, that there is any regular system of assistance by public defenders. In its brief the State contends that “[t]here is absolutely no reason to believe that prison officials would fail to notify the court should an inmate advise them of a complete inability, either mental or physical, to prepare a habeas application on his own behalf,” but there is no contention that they have in fact ever done so.
This is obviously far short of the showing required to demonstrate that, in depriving prisoners of the assistance of fellow inmates, Tennessee has not, in substance, deprived those unable themselves, with reasonable adequacy, to prepare their petitions, of access to the constitutionally and statutorily protected availability of the writ of habeas corpus. By contrast, in several States, the public defender system supplies trained attorneys, paid from public funds, who are available to consult with prisoners regarding their habeas corpus petitions. At least one State employs senior law students to interview and advise inmates in state prisons. Another State has a voluntary program whereby members of the local bar association make periodic visits to the prison to consult with prisoners concerning their cases. We express no judgment concerning these plans, but their existence indicates that techniques are available to provide alternatives if the State elects to prohibit mutual assistance among inmates.
Even in the absence of such alternatives, the State may impose reasonable restrictions and restraints upon the acknowledged propensity of prisoners to abuse both the giving and the seeking of assistance in the preparation of applications for relief: for example, by limitations on the time and location of such activities and the imposition of punishment for the giving or receipt of consideration in connection with such activities. Cf. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F. 2d 632 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1961) (sustaining as reasonable regulations on the time and location of prisoner work on their own petitions). But unless and until the State provides some reasonable alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief, it may not validly enforce a regulation such as that here in issue, barring inmates from furnishing such assistance to other prisoners.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
28 U. S. C. §2242 provides in part: “Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.”
E. g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963).
28 U. S. C. §§ 2241-2255.
See Note, Constitutional Law: Prison “No-Assistance” Regulations and the Jailhouse Lawyer, 1968 Duke L. J. 343, 347-348, 360-361.
Tennessee Department of Correction, Departmental Report: Fiscal Years 1965-1966, 1966-1967.
Tennessee’s post-conviction procedure provides for appointment of counsel “if necessary.” Tenn. Code Ann. §§40-3821, 40-2019 (Supp. 1967).
See, e. g., Speetor, A Prison Librarian Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 365 (1968).
Note, supra, n. 4, at 349, n. 27, and 359. See also Rossmoore & Koenigsberg, Habeas Corpus and the Indigent Prisoner, 11 Rutgers L. Rev. 611, 619-622 (1957).
At the time of the second hearing in petitioner’s case, the warden testified, the State was considering setting up a program under which senior law students from Vanderbilt Law School would assist prisoners in the preparation of post-conviction relief applications. For whatever it may be worth, petitioner testified that he would stop helping other inmates if such a system were in existence.
One State has designated an inmate as the oficial prison writ-writer. See Note, supra, n. 4, at 359.
In reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals relied on the power of the State to restrict the practice of law to licensed attorneys as a source of authority for the prison regulation. The power of the States to control the practice of law cannot be exercised so as to abrogate federally protected rights. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); Sperry v. Florida, 373 U. S. 379 (1963). In any event, the type of activity involved here — preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief — though historically and traditionally one which may benefit from the sendees of a trained and dedicated lawyer, is a function often, perhaps generally, performed by laymen. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2242 apparently contemplates that in many situations petitions for federal habeas corpus relief will be prepared by laymen.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether the maintenance and enforcement of a patent obtained by fraud on the Patent Office may be the basis of an action under § 2 of the Sherman Act, and therefore subject to a treble damage claim by an injured party under § 4 of the Clayton Act. The respondent, Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. (hereafter Food Machinery), filed this suit for infringement of its patent No. 2,328,655 covering knee-action swing diffusers used in aeration equipment for sewage treatment systems. Petitioner, Walker Process Equipment, Inc. (hereafter Walker), denied the infringement and counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid. After discovery, Food Machinery moved to dismiss its complaint with prejudice because the patent had expired. Walker then amended its counterclaim to charge that Food Machinery had “illegally monopolized interstate and foreign commerce by fraudulently and in bad faith obtaining and maintaining ... its patent . . . well knowing that it had no basis for ... a patent.” It alleged fraud on the basis that Food Machinery had sworn before the Patent Office that it neither knew nor believed that its invention had been in public use in the United States for more than one year prior to filing its patent application when, in fact, Food Machinery was a party to prior use within such time. The counterclaim further asserted that the existence of the patent had deprived Walker of business that it would have otherwise enjoyed. Walker prayed that Food Machinery’s conduct be declared a violation of the antitrust laws and sought recovery of treble damages.
The District Court granted Food Machinery’s motion and dismissed its infringement complaint along with Walker’s amended counterclaim, without leave to amend and with prejudice. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 335 F. 2d 315. We granted cer-tiorari, 379 U. S. 957. We have concluded that the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are present. In such event the treble damage provisions of § 4 of the Clayton Act would be available to an injured party.
I.
As the case reaches us, the allegations of the counterclaim, as to the fraud practiced upon the Government by Food Machinery as well as the resulting damage suffered by Walker, are taken as true. We, therefore, move immediately to a consideration of the legal issues presented.
Both Walker and the United States, which appears as amicus cunde, argue that if Food Machinery obtained its patent by fraud and thereafter used the patent to exclude Walker from the market through “threats of suit” and prosecution of this infringement suit, such proof would establish a prima facie violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. On the other hand, Food Machinery says that a patent monopoly and a Sherman Act monopolization cannot be equated; the removal of the protection of a patent grant because of fraudulent procurement does not automatically result in a § 2 offense. Both lower courts seem to have concluded that proof of fraudulent procurement may be used to bar recovery for infringement, Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U. S. 806 (1945), but not to establish invalidity. As the Court of Appeals expressed the proposition, “only the government may ‘annul or set aside’ a patent,” citing Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 434 (1872). It went on to state that no case had “decided, or hinted that fraud on the Patent Office may be turned to use in an original affirmative action, instead of as an equitable defense. . . . Since Walker admits that its anti-trust theory depends on its ability to prove fraud on the Patent Office, it follows that . . . Walker’s second amended counterclaim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” 335 F. 2d, at 316.
II.
We have concluded, first, that Walker’s action is not barred by the rule that only the United States may sue to cancel or annul a patent. It is true that there is no statutory authority for a private annulment suit and the invocation of the equitable powers of the court might often subject a patentee “to innumerable vexatious suits to set aside his patent.” Mo wry, supra, at 441. But neither reason applies here. Walker counterclaimed under the Clayton Act, not the patent laws. While one of its elements is the fraudulent procurement of a patent, the action does not directly seek the patent’s annulment. The gist of Walker’s claim is that since Food Machinery obtained its patent by fraud it cannot enjoy the limited exception to the prohibitions of § 2 of the Sherman Act, but must answer under that section and § 4 of the Clayton Act in treble damages to those injured by any monopolistic action taken under the fraudulent patent claim. Nor can the interest in protecting patentees from “innumerable vexatious suits” be used to frustrate the assertion of rights conferred by the antitrust laws. It must be remembered that we deal only with a special class of patents, i. e., those procured by intentional fraud.
Under the decisions of this Court a person sued for infringement may challenge the validity of the patent on various grounds, including fraudulent procurement. E. g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U. S. 806 (1945); Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U. S. 238 (1944); Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U. S. 240 (1933). In fact, one need not await the filing of a threatened suit by the patentee; the validity of the patent may be tested under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201 (1964 ed.). See Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U. S. 180, 185 (1952). At the same time, we have recognized that an injured party may attack the misuse of patent rights. See, e. g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U. S. 661 (1944). To permit recovery of treble damages for the fraudulent procurement of the patent coupled with violations of § 2 accords with these long-recognized procedures. It would also promote the purposes so well expressed in Precision Instrument, supra, at 816:
“A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. ... [It] is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open market. The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.”
III.
Walker’s counterclaim alleged that Food Machinery obtained the patent by knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent Office. Proof of this assertion would be sufficient to strip Food Machinery of its exemption from the antitrust laws. By the same token, Food Machinery’s good faith would furnish a complete defense. This includes an honest mistake as to the effect of prior installation upon patentability — so-called “technical fraud.”
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of trade or commerce under § 2 of the Sherman Act, it would then be necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant market for the product involved. Without a definition of that market there is no way to measure Food Machinery’s ability to lessen or destroy competition. It may be that the device — knee-action swing diffusers — used in sewage treatment systems does not comprise a relevant market. There may be effective substitutes for the device which do not infringe the patent. This is a matter of proof, as is the amount of damages suffered by Walker.
As respondent points out, Walker has not clearly articulated its claim. It appears to be based on a concept of per se illegality under § 2 of the Sherman Act. But in these circumstances, the issue is premature. As the Court summarized in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253 (1963), the area of per se illegality is carefully limited. We are reluctant to extend it on the bare pleadings and absent examination of market effect and economic consequences.
However, even though the per se claim fails at this stage of litigation, we believe that the case should be remanded for Walker to clarify the asserted violations of § 2 and to offer proof thereon. The trial court dismissed its suit not because Walker failed to allege the relevant market, the dominance of the patented device therein, and the injurious consequences to Walker of the patent’s enforcement, but rather on the ground that the United States alone may “annul or set aside” a patent for fraud in procurement. The trial court has not analyzed any economic data. Indeed, no such proof has yet been offered because of the disposition below. In view of these considerations, as well as the novelty of the claim asserted and the paucity of guidelines available in the decided cases, this deficiency cannot be deemed crucial. Fairness requires that on remand Walker have the opportunity to make its § 2 claims more specific, to prove the alleged fraud, and to establish the necessary elements of the asserted § 2 violation.
Reversed and remanded.
26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 2 (1964 ed.):
“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”
38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1964 ed.):
“Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
The patent in question was issued in the name of the inventor, Lannert. But he had previously assigned the patent rights to his employer, Chicago Pump Company, a division of Food Machinery.
See, e. g., United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U. S. 371, 376 (1952).
This conclusion applies with equal force to an assignee who maintains and enforces the patent with knowledge of the patent’s infirmity.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The punishment for bank robbery of a fine of not more than $5,000 and imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both, 18 U. S. C. § 2113 (a), may be enhanced to a fine of not more than $10,000 and imprisonment for not more than 25 years, or both, when the robbery is committed “by the use of a dangerous weapon or device,” 18 U. S. C. 12113(d). Another statute, 18 U. S. C. § 924 (c), provides that whoever “uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States . . . shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years,” and “[i]n the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection,” to imprisonment for not less than 2 nor more than 25 years; “nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of such felony.” Petitioners were convicted of two separate bank robberies committed with firearms. The question for decision is whether §§ 2113(d) and 924 (c) should be construed as intended by Congress to authorize, in the case of a bank robbery committed with firearms, not only the imposition of the increased penalty under § 2113 (d), but also the imposition of an additional consecutive penalty under § 924 (c).
On September 8, 1975, petitioners, using handguns to intimidate the bank’s employees, robbed some $40,000 from the East End Branch of the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro, Ky. App. 20. Less than two months later, on November 4, 1975, petitioners returned to Middlesboro and this time, again using handguns, robbed the West End Branch of the Commercial Bank of about the same amount.
Petitioners received a separate jury trial for each robbery. After the trial for the first robbery, they were convicted of both aggravated bank robbery, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 2113 (a) and (d), and of using firearms to commit the robbery, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924 (c). They were sentenced to consecutive terms of 25 years’ imprisonment on the robbery count and 10 years’ imprisonment on the firearms count. After the trial for the second robbery, petitioners were again convicted of one count of aggravated bank robbery in violation of §§2113 (a) and (d) and of one count of using firearms to commit the crime in violation of § 924 (c); again each received a 25-year sentence for the robbery and a 10-year sentence for the firearms count, the sentences to run consecutively to each other and to the sentences previously imposed.
During the sentencing proceedings following each conviction, counsel for petitioners argued that the imposition of cumulative penalties for the two crimes was impermissible because the § 2113 (d) charge merged with the firearms offense for purposes of sentencing. The District Court disagreed, holding that “the statutes and the legislative history indicat [e] an intention [by § 924(c)] to impose an additional punishment.” App. 17. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed without a published opinion, 542 F. 2d 1177 (1976). We granted certiorari, 430 U. S. 964 (1977), to resolve an apparent conflict between the decision below and the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Eagle, 539 F. 2d 1166 (1976). We reverse.
II
Quite clearly, §§ 924 (c) and 2113 (d) are addressed to the same concern and designed to combat the same problem: the use of dangerous weapons — most particularly firearms — to commit federal felonies. Although we agree with the Court of Appeals that § 924 (c) creates an offense distinct from the underlying federal felony, United States v. Ramirez, 482 F. 2d 807 (CA2 1973); United States v. Sudduth, 457 F. 2d 1198 (CA1 1972), we believe that this is the beginning and not the end of the analysis necessary to answer the question presented for decision.
In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932), this Court set out the test for determining “whether two offenses are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative punishment.” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 166 (1977). We held that “[t]he applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, supra, at 304. See also Brown v. Ohio, supra, at 166; Ianelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770 (1975); Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386 (1958). The Blockburger test has its primary relevance in the double jeopardy context, where it is a guide for determining when two separately defined crimes constitute the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes. Brown v. Ohio, supra.
Cases in which the Government is able to prove violations of two separate criminal statutes with precisely the same factual showing, as here, raise the prospect of double jeopardy and the possible need to evaluate the statutes in light of the Blockburger test. That test, the Government argues, is satisfied in this litigation. We need not reach the issue. Before an examination is made to determine whether cumulative punishments for the two offenses are constitutionally permissible, it is necessary, following our practice of avoiding constitutional decisions where possible, to determine whether Congress intended to subject the defendant to multiple penalties for the single criminal transaction in which he engaged. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U. S. 137, 155 (1977). Indeed, the Government concedes that “there remains at least a possibility that Congress, although constitutionally free to impose additional penalties for violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924 (c) in a case like the present one, has otherwise disclosed its intention not to do so.” Brief for United States 11. We believe that several tools of statutory construction applied to the statutes “in a case like the present one” — where the Government relied on the same proofs to support the convictions under both statutes — require the conclusion that Congress cannot be said to have authorized the imposition of the additional penalty of § 924 (c) for commission of bank robbery with firearms already subject to enhanced punishment under § 2113 (d). Cf. Gore v. United States, supra.
Ill
First is the legislative history of § 924 (c). That provision, which was enacted as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968, was not included in the original Gun Control bill, but was offered as an amendment on the House floor by Representative Poff. 114 Cong. Rec. 22231 (1968). In his statement immediately following his introduction of the amendment, Representative Poff observed: 4
“For the sake of legislative history, it should be noted that my substitute is not intended to apply to title 18, sections 111, 112, or 113 which already define the penalties for the use of a firearm in assaulting officials, with sections 2113 or 2114 concerning armed robberies of the mail or banks, with section 2231 concerning armed assaults upon process servers or with chapter 44 which defines other firearm felonies.” Id., at 22232.
This statement is clearly probative of a legislative judgment that the purpose of § 924 (c) is already served whenever the substantive federal offense provides enhanced punishment for use of a dangerous weapon. Although these remarks are of course not dispositive of the issue of § 924 (c)’s reach, they are certainly entitled to weight, coming as they do from the provision’s sponsor. This is especially so because Representative Poff’s explanation of the scope of his amendment is in complete accord with, and gives full play to, the deterrence rationale of § 924 (c). United States v. Eagle, 539 F. 2d, at 1172. Subsequent events in the Senate and the Conference Committee pertaining to the statute buttress our conclusion that Congress’ view of the proper scope of § 924 (c) was that expressed by Representative Poff. Shortly after the House adopted the Poff amendment, the Senate passed an amendment to the Gun Control Act, introduced by Senator Dominick, that also provided for increased punishment whenever a firearm was used to commit a federal offense. 114 Cong. Rec. 27142 (1968). According to the analysis of its sponsor, the Senate amendment, contrary to Mr. Poff’s view of § 924 (c), would have permitted the imposition of an enhanced sentence for the use of a firearm in the commission of any federal crime, even where allowance was already made in the provisions of the substantive offense for augmented punishment where a dangerous weapon is used. Id., at 27143. A Conference Committee, with minor changes, subsequently adopted the Poff version of § 924 (c) in preference to the Dominick amendment. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 31-32 (1968).
Second, to construe the statute to allow the additional sentence authorized by § 924 (c) to be pyramided upon a sentence already enhanced under § 2113 (d) would violate the established rule of construction that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971). See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U. S. 275, 284-285 (1978). The legislative history of § 924 (c) is of course sparse, yet what there is — particularly Representative Poff’s statement and the Committee rejection of the Dominick amendment — points in the direction of a congressional view that the section was intended to be unavailable in prosecutions for violations of § 2113 (d). Even where the relevant legislative history was not nearly so favorable to the defendant as this, this Court has steadfastly insisted that “doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.” Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81, 84 (1955); Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169 (1958). See Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322 (1957). As we said in Ladner: “This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” 358 U. S., at 178. If we have something “more than a guess” in this case, that something — Representative Poff’s commentary and the Conference Committee’s rejection of the Dominick amendment — is incremental knowledge that redounds to petitioners’ benefit, not the Government’s.
Finally, our result is supported by the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern, even if the general provision was enacted later. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 489-490 (1973). Cf. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 51.05 (4th ed. 1973). This guide to statutory construction has special cogency where a court is called upon to determine the extent of the punishment to which a criminal defendant is subject for his transgressions. In this context, the principle is a corollary of the rule of lenity, ah outgrowth of our reluctance to increase or multiply punishments absent a clear and definite legislative directive. Indeed, at one time, the Government was not insensitive to these concerns respecting the availability of the additional penalty under § 924 (c). In 1971, the Department of Justice found the interpretive preference for specific criminal statutes over general criminal statutes of itself sufficient reason to advise all United States Attorneys not to prosecute a defendant under §924 (c)(1) where the substantive statute the defendant was charged with violating already “provid [ed] for increased penalties where a firearm is used in the commission of the offense.” 19 U. S. Attys. Bull. 63 (U. S. Dept. of Justice, 1971).
Obviously, the Government has since changed its view of the relationship between §§ 924 (c) and 2113 (d). We think its original view was the better view of the congressional understanding as to the proper interaction between the two statutes. Accordingly, we hold that in a prosecution growing out of a single transaction of bank robbery with firearms, a defendant may not be sentenced under both § 2113 (d) and § 924 (c). The cases are therefore reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Title 18 U. S. C. §§2113 (a) and (d) provide:
“(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association; or
“Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union, or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit union, or in such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony affecting such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan association and in violation of any statute of the United States, or any larceny—
“Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
“(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the fife of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.”
The complete text of 18 U. S. C. § 924 (c) provides:
“(c) Whoever—
“(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or
“(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
“shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years. In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than two nor more than twenty-five years and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence in the case of a second or subsequent conviction of such person or give him a probationary sentence, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of such felony.”
In agreement with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in these cases are the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, United States v. Crew, 538 F. 2d 575 (1976), and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Perkins v. United States, 526 F. 2d 688 (1976).
Both the Senate and House Reports on the 1934 Bank Robbery Act, which first made bank robbery a federal offense and which included the provisions of § 2113 (d), state that the legislation was directed at the rash of “gangsterism” by which roving bandits in the Southwest and Northwest would rob banks and then elude capture by state authorities by crossing state lines. S. Rep. No. 537, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934); H. R. Rep. No. 1461, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934). The vast majority of such bank robberies were undoubtedly accomplished by the use of guns of various sorts. Indeed, as originally proposed, the provision that became § 2113 (d) covered only the use of “dangerous weapons.” The “or device” language was added in response to concern expressed on the House floor that the provision would not reach the conduct of a bank robber who walked into a bank with a bottle of nitroglycerin and threatened to blow it up unless his demands were met. 78 Cong. Rec. 8132-8133 (1934). Thus, although § 2113 (d) undoubtedly covers bank robberies with weapons and devices other than firearms, the use of guns to commit barde robbery was the primary evil § 2113 (d) was designed to deter.
On the other hand, although the overriding purpose of § 924 (c) was to combat the increasing use of guns to commit federal felonies, the ambit of that provision is broader. The section imposes increased penalties when a “firearm” is used to commit, or is unlawfully carried during the commission of any federal felony. Title 18 U. S. C. § 921 (a) (3) (D) defines “firearm” to include “any destructive device.” A “destructive device,” in turn, is defined by § 921 (a) (4) (A) to include “any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas — (i) bomb, (ii) grenade, (iii) rocket . . . , (iv) missile . . . , (v) mine, or (vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses.” See United States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 774 (SDNY 1970).
The Double Jeopardy Clause “protects against multiple punishments for the same offense,” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 717 (1969), and prohibits multiple prosecutions for the “same offense,” Jeffers v. United States, 432 U. S. 137, 150-151 (1977).
In its attempt to demonstrate that §§924 (c) and 2113 (d) are distinct and separately punishable offenses under the Blockburger test, the Government apparently reads the phrase “by the use of a dangerous weapon or device” in § 2113 (d) to modify the word “assaults” as well as the phrase “puts in jeopardy the life of any person.” Brief for United States 9-10. The lower courts are divided on this issue. Those of the opinion that § 2113 (d) is to be read as the Government reads it include United States v. Crew, supra, at 577. See Perkins v. United States, supra; United States v. Waters, 461 F. 2d 248 (CA10 1972). Other courts read the provision disjunctively, and hold that the phrase “by the use of a dangerous weapon or device” modifies only the phrase “puts in jeopardy the life of any person” and not the word “assaults.” United States v. Beasley, 438 F. 2d 1279 (CA6 1971); United States v. Rizzo, 409 F. 2d 400 (CA7 1969). See United States v. Coulter, 474 F. 2d 1004 (CA9 1973). Although we have never authoritatively construed §2113 (d), we have implicitly given it the same gloss as the Government. Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322, 329 n. 11 (1957). We now expressly adopt this reading of the statute. As Judge McCree observed in Beasley: “[The language of §2113 (d)] clearly requires the commission of something more than the elements of the offense described in § 2113 (a). Subsection (a) punishes an attempt to take ‘from the person or presence of another any . . . thing of value ... in the . . . custody ... of any bank . . .’ when that taking is done ‘by force and violence, or by intimidation.’ Force and violence is the traditional language of assault, and something more than an assault must be present to authorize the additional five year penalty under § 2113 (d).
“. . . In order to give lawful meaning to Congress’ enactment of the aggravating elements in 18 TJ. S. C. § 2113 (d), the phrase ‘by the use of a dangerous weapon or device’ must be read, regardless of punctuation, as modifying both the assault provision and the putting in jeopardy provision.” 438 F. 2d, at 1283-1284 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Because the provision was passed on the same day it was introduced on the House floor, it is the subject of no legislative hearings or committee reports.
Title 18 U. S. C. §§ 111, 112, and 2231 provide for an increased maximum penalty where a “deadly or dangerous weapon” is used to commit the substantive offense. Title 18 U. S. C. §§ 113 (c) and 2114 enhance the punishment available for commission of the substantive offense when the defendant employs a “dangerous weapon.”
The prohibitions on suspended sentences and probation were made applicable only to second and subsequent convictions, and restrictions on concurrent sentences were eliminated. Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1889, amended § 924 (c) by reimposing the restriction that no sentence under that section could be served concurrently with any term imposed for the underlying felony. The amendment also reduced the minimum mandatory sentence of imprisonment for repeat offenders from five to two years.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the regulation by the State of Kansas of the price of natural gas sold at wellhead in the intrastate market. It presents a federal Contract Clause issue and a statutory issue.
I
On September 27, 1975, The Kansas Power & Light Company (KPL), a public utility and appellee here, entered into two intrastate natural gas supply contracts with Clinton Oil Company, the predecessor-in-interest of appellant Energy Reserves Group, Inc. (ERG). Under the first contract, KPL agrees to purchase gas directly at the wellhead on the Spivey-Grabs Field in Kingman and Harper Counties in southern Kansas. The second contract obligates KPL to purchase from the same field residue gas, that is, gas remaining after certain recovery and processing steps are completed. The original contract price was $1.50 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) of gas. The contracts continue in effect for the life of the field or for the life of the processing plants associated with the field.
A
Each contract contains two clauses known generically as indefinite price escalators. The first is a governmental price escalator clause; this provides that if a governmental authority fixes a price for any natural gas that is higher than the price specified in the contract, the contract price shall be increased to that level. The second is a price redetermination clause; this gives ERG the option to have the contract price redetermined no more than once every two years. The new price is then set by averaging the prices being paid under three other gas contracts chosen by the parties.
When the price is increased pursuant to either of these clauses, each contract requires KPL to seek from the Kansas Corporation Commission (Commission) approval to pass the increase through to consumers. App. to Juris. Statement 69a. The application for approval is to be submitted within 5 days after a price increase resulting from governmental action, or no fewer than 60 days before a price redetermination increase is to become effective. Ibid. If the Commission refuses to permit the pass-through and KPL elects not to pay the increase, ERG has the option to terminate the agreement on 30 days’ written notice.
Each contract states that the purpose of the price escalator clauses is “solely” to compensate ERG for “anticipated” increases in its operating costs and in the value of its gas. Id., at 70a. Each contract also provides: “Neither party shall be held in default for failure to perform hereunder if such failure is due to compliance with,” ibid., any “relevant present and future state and federal laws.” Id., at 69a.
In 1977, ERG invoked the price redetermination clause, and the parties agreed on a price of $1.77 per Mcf, effective November 27 of that year. The Commission approved the pass-through of this increase to consumers. KPL paid the new price through 1978.
B
On December 1, 1978, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (Act), Pub. L. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350, 15 U. S. C. §3301 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V), designed in principal part to encourage increased natural gas production, became effective. The Act replaced the federal price controls that had been established under the Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821, with price ceilings that rise monthly based on “an inflation adjustment factor” and other considerations. Different ceilings are set for different types of gas. Section 102 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. §3312 (1976 ed., Supp. V), sets a gradually increasing ceiling price for newly discovered or newly produced natural gas. The December 1978 ceiling price under § 102 was $2,078 per million British thermal units. Section 104 sets ceiling prices for “old” interstate gas, that is, gas from already discovered and producing wells. Section 109 sets another ceiling price for categories of natural gas not covered by the other sections of the Act. As of December 1978, the § 109 ceiling price was $1.63 per million Btu’s.
In another departure from the 1938 Natural Gas Act, the new Act extended federal price regulation to the intrastate gas market. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1126, pp. 67-68 (1978); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1752, pp. 67-68 (1978). Section 105 of the Act establishes the rule for applying price ceilings to intrastate gas, described as gas not committed to interstate commerce on November 8, 1978. It provides, in its subsection (b)(1), that the maximum lawful price of such gas “shall be the lower of... the price under the terms of the existing contract, to which such natural gas was subject on [November 9, 1978],... or... the maximum lawful price... computed for such month under section 102 (relating to new natural gas).” The parties agree that § 105(b)(1) governs these contracts.
The Act, by § 602(a), also permits a State “to establish or enforce any maximum lawful price for the first sale of natural gas produced in such State which does not exceed the applicable maximum lawful price, if any, under title I of this Act.”
C
In direct response to the Act, the Kansas Legislature promptly imposed price controls on the intrastate gas market. In May 1979, the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act (Kansas Act), 1979 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 171, codified as Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 55 — 1401 to 55-1415 (Supp. 1982), was enacted. The Kansas Act applies only to natural gas contracts executed before April 20, 1977, § 55-1403, and controls natural gas prices until December 31, 1984, § 55-1411. Section 55-1404 prohibits consideration either of ceiling prices set by federal authorities or of prices paid in Kansas under other contracts in the application of governmental price escalator clauses and price redetermination clauses. Section 55-1405 of the Kansas Act, however, permits indefinite price escalator clauses to operate after March 1, 1979, to raise the price of old intrastate gas up to the federal Act’s § 109 ceiling price. Section §55-1406 exempts new gas and gas from stripper wells.
D
On November 20, 1978, ERG and other gas suppliers having similar contracts with KPL notified KPL that gas prices would be escalated to the § 102 price on December 1, pursuant to the governmental price escalator clause. KPL sought pass-through approval from the Commission for this increase by an application filed December 7, one day too late to satisfy the 5-day contractual requirement. KPL never elected to pay the higher price.
On June 5, 1979, ERG notified KPL that it would terminate the contracts within 30 days because KPL had failed to apply to the Commission for pass-through authority within five days of December 1, 1978, had failed to obtain Commission approval, and had failed to pay the increased price ERG contends was required by the governmental price escalator clause. KPL’s response was that the clause was not triggered by the Act and that the Kansas Act prohibited its activation. ERG then filed an action in the District Court of Harper County, Kan., praying for a declaratory judgment that it had the contractual right to terminate the contracts.
On July 24, in light of KPL’s refusal to terminate, ERG requested an increase up to the Act’s § 102 ceiling price under the price redetermination clause. The increase was to be effective in November 1979, the next redetermination date possible under the contracts. KPL conceded that the price redetermination clause permitted such an increase, but contended that § 55-1404 of the Kansas Act had extinguished the utility’s obligation to comply with that clause. ERG then filed an amended complaint, alleging that it was entitled to terminate the contracts because of KPL’s refusal to redetermine the price. KPL counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the contracts were still in effect.
On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the state trial court held that the Act’s imposition of price ceilings on intrastate gas did not trigger the governmental escalator clause. It also found that the Kansas Act did not violate the Contract Clause, reasoning that Kansas has a legitimate interest in addressing and controlling the serious economic dislocations that the sudden increase in gas prices would cause, and that the Kansas Act reasonably furthered that interest. App. to Juris. Statement 25a, 42a, 45a. The Supreme Court of Kansas, by unanimous vote, affirmed. 230 Kan. 176, 630 P. 2d 1142 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction. 456 U. S. 904 (1982).
HH t — 1
ERG raises both statutory and constitutional issues in challenging the ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court. The constitutional issue is whether the Kansas Act impairs ERG’s contracts with KPL in violation of the Contract Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §10, cl. I. The statutory issue is whether the federal enactment of §105 triggered the governmental price escalator clause. As to the latter issue, if § 105’s enactment did have that effect, ERG was entitled to a price increase on December 1,1978. If not, ERG could rely only on the price redetermination clause for any increase. That clause could not be exercised until November 1979. The statutory issue thus controls the timing of any increase. The constitutional issue, on the other hand, affects the price that ERG may claim under either clause. If ERG prevails, the price may be escalated to the § 102 ceiling; if ERG does not prevail, the price may be escalated only to the § 109 ceiling. We consider the Contract Clause issue first.
A
Although the language of the Contract Clause, is facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the State “to safeguard the vital interests of its people.” Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 434 (1934). In Blaisdell, the Court approved a Minnesota mortgage moratorium statute, even though the statute retroactively impaired contract rights. The Court balanced the language of the Contract Clause against the State’s interest in exercising its police power, and concluded that the statute was justified.
The Court in two recent cases has addressed Contract Clause claims. In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S. 1 (1977), the Court held that New Jersey could not retroactively alter a statutory bond covenant relied upon by bond purchasers. One year later, in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. 234 (1978), the Court invalidated a Minnesota statute that required an employer who closed its office in the State to pay a “pension funding charge” if its pension fund at the time was insufficient to provide full benefits for all employees with at least 10 years’ seniority. Although the legal issues and facts in these two cases differ in certain ways, they clarify the appropriate Contract Clause standard.
The threshold inquiry is “whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.” Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U. S., at 244. See United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 17. The severity of the impairment is said to increase the level of scrutiny to which the legislation will be subjected. Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U. S., at 245. Total destruction of contractual expectations is not necessary for a finding of substantial impairment. United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 26-27. On the other hand, state regulation that restricts a party to gains it reasonably expected from the contract does not necessarily constitute a substantial impairment. Id., at 31, citing El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S. 497, 515 (1965). In determining the extent of the impairment, we are to consider whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past. Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U. S., at 242, n. 13, citing Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Assn., 310 U. S. 32, 38 (1940) (“When he purchased into an enterprise already regulated in the particular to which he now objects, he purchased subject to further legislation upon the same topic”). The Court, long ago observed: “One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them.” Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 357 (1908).
If the state regulation constitutes a substantial impairment, the State, in justification, must have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 22, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem. Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U. S., at 247, 249. Furthermore, since Blaisdell, the Court has indicated that the public purpose need not be addressed to an emergency or temporary situation. United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 22, n. 19; Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Assn., 310 U. S., at 39-40. One legitimate state interest is the elimination of unforeseen windfall profits. United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 31, n. 30. The requirement of a legitimate public purpose guarantees that the State is exercising its police power, rather than providing a benefit to special interests.
Once a legitimate public purpose has been identified, the next inquiry is whether the adjustment of “the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation’s] adoption.” United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 22. Unless the State itself is a contracting party, see id., at 23, “[a]s is customary in reviewing economic and social regulation,... courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.” Id., at 22-23.
B
The threshold determination is whether the Kansas Act has impaired substantially ERG’s contractual rights. Significant here is the fact that the parties are operating in a heavily regulated industry. See Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Assn., 310 U. S., at 38. State authority to regulate natural gas prices is well established. See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179 (1950). At the time of the execution of these contracts, Kansas did not regulate natural gas prices specifically, but its supervision of the industry was extensive and intrusive. Moreover, under the authority of §5(a) of the 1938 Natural Gas Act, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) set “just and reasonable” rates for prices of gas both at the wellhead and in pipelines. Although prices in the intrastate market have diverged somewhat from those in the interstate market due to the recent shortage of natural gas, the regulation of interstate prices effectively limits intrastate price increases.
It is in this context that the indefinite escalator clauses at issue here are to be viewed. In drafting each of the contracts, the parties included a statement of intent, which made clear that the escalator clause was designed to guarantee price increases consistent with anticipated increases in the value of ERG’s gas. App. to Juris. Statement 70a. While it is not entirely inconceivable that ERG in September 1975 anticipated the deregulation of gas prices introduced by the Act in 1978, we think this is highly unlikely, and we read the statement of intent to refer to nothing more than changes in value resulting from changes in the federal regulator’s “just and reasonable” rates. In exchange for these anticipated increases, KPL agreed to accept gas from the Spivey-Grabs field for the lifetime of that field. Thus, at the time of the execution of the contracts, ERG did not expect to receive deregulated prices. The very existence of the governmental price escalator clause and the price redetermination clause indicates that the contracts were structured against the background of regulated gas prices. If deregulation had not occurred, the contracts undoubtedly would have called for a much smaller price increase than that provided by the Kansas Act’s adoption of the § 109 ceiling.
Moreover, the contracts expressly recognize the existence of extensive regulation by providing that any contractual terms are subject to relevant present and future state and federal law. This latter provision could be interpreted to incorporate all future state price regulation, and thus dispose of the Contract Clause claim. Regardless of whether this interpretation is correct, the provision does suggest that ERG knew its contractual rights were subject to alteration by state price regulation. Price regulation existed and was foreseeable as the type of law that would alter contract obligations. Reading the Contract Clause as ERG does would mean that indefinite price escalator clauses could exempt ERG from any regulatory limitation of prices whatsoever. Such a result cannot be permitted. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S., at 357. In short, ERG’s reasonable expectations have not been impaired by the Kansas Act. See El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S., at 515.
C
To the extent, if any, the Kansas Act impairs ERG’s contractual interests, the Kansas Act rests on, and is prompted by, significant and legitimate state interests. Kansas has exercised its police power to protect consumers from the escalation of natural gas prices caused by deregulation. The State reasonably could find that higher gas prices have caused and will cause hardship among those who use gas heat but must exist on limited fixed incomes.
The State also has a legitimate interest in correcting the imbalance between the interstate and intrastate markets by permitting intrastate prices to rise only to the § 109 level. By slowly deregulating interstate prices, the Act took the cap off intrastate prices as well. The Kansas Act attempts to coordinate the intrastate and interstate prices by supplementing the federal Act’s regulation of intrastate gas. Congress specifically contemplated such action:
“The conference agreement provides that nothing in this Act shall affect the authority of any State to establish or enforce any maximum lawful price for sales of gas in intrastate commerce which does not exceed the applicable maximum lawful price, if any, under Title I of this Act. This authority extends to the operation of any indefinite price escalator clause.” S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1126, pp. 124-125 (1978); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1752, pp. 124-125 (1978).
There can be little doubt about the legitimate public purpose behind the Act.
Nor are the means chosen to implement these purposes deficient, particularly in light of the deference to which the Kansas Legislature’s judgment is entitled. On the surface, the State’s Act seems limited to altering indefinite price escalation clauses of intrastate contracts that affect less than 10% of the natural gas consumed in Kansas. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. To analyze properly the Kansas Act’s effect, however, we must consider the entire state and federal gas price regulatory structure. Only natural gas subject to indefinite price escalator clauses poses the danger of rapidly increasing prices in Kansas. Gas under contracts with fixed escalator clauses and interstate gas purchased by the utilities subject to § 109 would not escalate as would intrastate gas subject to indefinite price escalator clauses. The Kansas Act simply brings the latter category into line with old interstate gas prices by limiting the operation of the indefinite price escalator clauses.
The Kansas Act also rationally exempts the types of new gas the production of which Congress sought to encourage through the higher § 102 prices. Finally, the Act is a temporary measure that expires when federal price regulation of certain categories of gas terminates. The Kansas statute completes the regulation of the gas market by imposing gradual escalation mechanisms on the intrastate market, consistent with the new national policy toward gas regulation.
We thus resolve the constitutional issue against ERG.
rH HH I — I
We turn to ERG’s statutory contention that the Kansas courts misconstrued § 105 as fixing the contract price at the November 9,1978, level. While, on this point, the opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court is not entirely clear to us, it does not appear so to construe § 105. And KPL, in fact, does not contend that it did. Instead, the court recognized that § 105 permits the indefinite price escalator clauses to continue to operate to raise the contract price up to the lawful ceiling. See Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F. 2d 360, 379 (CA5 1981) (“[T]he NGPA does not preclude escalation of area rate clauses [a type of indefinite price escalators] to NGPA prices”), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1142 (1982).
The actual point of dispute is whether the governmental price escalator clauses in these contracts were triggered by the enactment of §105. The Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that the Act could trigger a governmental price escalator clause. 230 Kan., at 184, 630 P. 2d, at 1149. In this case, however, it held that “[t]he NGPA did not trigger a price increase because the contracts herein did not contain a sufficient escalation mechanism.” Id., at 185, 630 P. 2d, at 1150. We agree that, as a matter of federal statutory interpretation, the Act does not trigger such clauses automatically. See 44 Fed. Reg. 16895, 16904 (1979). Section 105(b)(1) provides that the ceiling price shall be the lower of the § 102 price and “the price under the terms of the existing contract, to which such natural gas was subject on [November 9, 1978], as such contract was in effect on such date.” By this language, Congress set a ceiling for the operation of contractual provisions; it did not prescribe a price:
“[T]he price under the contract may escalate through the operation of both fixed price escalator clauses and indefinite price escalator clauses in existence as of the date of enactment, but the price may not exceed the new gas price [provided by § 102].
“... The conferees do not intend that the mere establishment of the ceiling prices under this Act shall trigger indefinite price escalator clauses in existing intrastate contracts.” S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1126, pp. 82-83 (1978); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1752, pp. 82-83 (1978).
See Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F. 2d, at 379.
The Kansas Supreme Court relied on its prior decision in Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 229 Kan. 631, 629 P. 2d 190, clarified, 230 Kan. 166, 630 P. 2d 1129 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 928 (1982), which interpreted the effect of § 105 on a similar contract provision. In that decision, it read § 105 to set the lawful ceiling at the lower price provided by the contract. In light of our discussion above, we view this reading of the federal statute as unassailable. The Kansas Supreme Court’s further holding in this case that these particular governmental price escalator clauses were insufficient to escalate the gas price is an interpretation of state law to which, of course, we defer.
HH C
The regulation of energy production and use is a matter of national concern. Congress set out on a new path with the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. In pursuing this path, Congress explicitly envisioned that the States would regulate intrastate markets in accordance with the overall national policy. The Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act is one State’s effort to balance the need to provide incentives for the production of gas against the need to protect consumers from hardships brought on by deregulation of a traditionally regulated commodity. We see no constitutional or statutory infirmity in Kansas’ attempt. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas is therefore
Affirmed.
The governmental price escalator provision states:
“If any federal or Kansas regulatory or governmental authority having jurisdiction in the premises shall at any time hereafter fix a price per MCF applicable to any natural gas of any vintage produced in Kansas, higher than the contract price then in effect under this gas contract, the price to he paid for gas thereafter shall be increased to equal such regulated price. In that event, the increased price shall be effective as of the date of action of the governmental or regulatory authority establishing the regulated price, or its effective date, whichever is later....” App. to Juris. Statement 66a.
The price redetermination provision states in relevant part:
“SELLER shall have the option to cause the price being paid for its gas by BUYER to be redetermined every two years, beginning in 1977. The request for a price redetermination shall be given in writing by SELLER to BUYER not later than 120 days prior to the beginning of the Contract Year for which the price redetermination is requested....
“... Within the same one hundred twenty (120) days following SELLER’S request for a price redetermination, the parties shall mutually redetermine the price by considering three (3) contracts under which the highest prices are actually being paid for flowing gas ninety (90) days prior to the date the redetermined price is to be effective. The contracts to be considered shall, (a) have a primary term of one (1) or more years, (b) be for gas produced in Kansas, (c) be for gas purchased by an interstate or intrastate company selling or using an average daily volume of 5,000 MCF or more of gas for the twelve (12) months period ending ninety (90) days prior to the date the redetermined price is to be effective, (d) not be for the purchase of Spivey-Grabs Field gas by BUYER under contracts dated in 1975, (e) not include more than one contract of any one purchaser in any one field, and (f) not be for a price then subject to regulatory suspense or refunds....
“After the BUYER and SELLER have decided on the three contracts and appropriate prices to be used from each one for this redetermination, the weighted average price per MCF being paid under the three contracts shall be calculated. This price shall become the redetermined price to be paid by BUYER to SELLER.” Id., at 67a-68a.
On June 9, 1978, the Commission gave KPL permission to implement a purchased-gas price adjustment. This authorized an automatic pass-through to consumers of wholesale gas cost increases upon written notice to the Commission. The Commission retained authority to review and revoke any pass-through under its normal standards for reviewing rate increases.
In pertinent part, § 105 provides:
“(a) Application. — The maximum lawful price computed under subsection (b) shall apply to any first sale of natural gas delivered during any month in the case of natural gas, sold under any existing contract or any successor to an existing contract, which was not committed or dedicated to interstate commerce on the day before the enactment of this Act.
“(b) Maximum lawful price.—
“(1) General rule. — Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the maximum lawful price under this section shall be the lower of—
“(A) the price under the terms of the existing contract, to which such natural gas was subject on the date of the enactment of this Act [November 9, 1978], as such contract was in effect on such date; or
“(B) the maximum lawful price, per million Btu’s, computed for such month under section 102 (relating to new natural gas).”
Section 105(b)(2) applies to contracts under which the price of gas on November 9, 1978, exceeded the § 102 price.
ERG asserts that the Kansas Act is special interest legislation designed to permit KPL to avoid gas price increases and to aid KPL in this and other litigation. ERG notes that KPL supported the bill, that the Special Joint Committee approved the bill by only a narrow margin, and that several members of the Committee’s minority believed the bill to be special interest legislation. Brief for Appellant 9-12. The bill, however, was supported by the Governor, labor unions, farmers, and municipal representatives, and was passed by substantial margins in both Houses of the Kansas Legislature. Although KPL purchases a sizable portion of the gas affected by the Kansas Act, there are other purchasers as well. Moreover, as indicated in n. 3, swpra, KPL already had obtained from the Commission a purchased-gas price adjustment that allowed it to pass through to its customers any gas cost increase.
Section 55-1404 provides, with certain exceptions, that “on or after December 1, 1978, the price allowed to be paid pursuant to federal legislation or any regulation by an agency implementing such legislation, or the price paid or to be paid for any sale of natural gas in the state of Kansas shall not be taken into account in applying any indefinite price escalator clause contained in any gas purchase contract subject to this act, to the extent that such contract provides for the sale in the state of Kansas, of gas produced within this state which was not committed or dedicated to interstate commerce on November 8, 1978. This section shall not require a reduction of any price contained in any gas purchase contract subject to this act below the price actually paid prior to the date of enactment of this act.”
The court held that an emergency situation existed because the anticipated sudden escalation of intrastate gas prices threatened to boost dramatically both gas and electricity utility rates. The court suggested that because ERG had not attempted to exercise the price redetermination clause prior to the date of enactment, the Kansas Act was being applied only prospectively. The court concluded, however, that the State’s interest and chosen means could justify a retroactive application. 230 Kan., at 189-190, 630 P. 2d, at 1153.
“No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts...
If fairly possible, we of course construe a statute so as to avoid a constitutional question. Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749-750 (1961). Because, however, the statutory issue affects only the operation of the governmental price escalator clause, its resolution in no way obviates the need to scrutinize the Kansas Act under the Contract Clause.
The Court listed five factors that were then deemed to be significant in its analysis: whether the Act (1) was an emergency measure; (2) was one to protect a basic societal interest, rather than particular individuals; (3) was tailored appropriately to its purpose; (4) imposed reasonable conditions; and (5) was limited to the duration of the emergency. 290 U. S., at 444-447.
See also Malone v. White Motor Corp., 444 U. S. 911 (1979), summarily aff’g 599 F. 2d 283 (CA8).
In Allied, Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, the Court held that the Minnesota pension law severely impaired established contractual relations between employers and employees. The State had not acted to meet an important general social problem. The pension statute had a very narrow focus: it was aimed at specific employers. Indeed, it even may have been directed at one particular employer planning to terminate its pension plan when its collective-bargaining agreement expired. See 438 U. S., at 247-248, and n. 20.
See generally Note, A Process-Oriented Approach to the Contract Clause, 89 Yale L. J. 1623, 1647-1648 (1980) (distinguishing public from private contracts). In United States Trust Co., but not in Allied Structural Steel Co., the State was one of the contracting parties. When a State itself enters into a contract, it cannot simply walk away from its financial obligations. In almost every case, the Court has held a governmental unit to its contractual obligations when it enters financial or other markets. See United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 25-28; W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56 (1935); Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432 (1878). But see Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U. S. 502 (1942). When the State is a party to the contract, “complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake.” United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 26. In the present case, of course, the stricter standard of United States Trust Co. does not apply because Kansas has not altered its own contractual obligations.
In addition to the Kansas and federal regulations, 38 States regulate various aspects of gas production and sale. See Interstate Oil Compact Commission, Summary of State Statutes and Regulations for Oil and Gas Production (1979).
For some time, the Court has recognized the validity of state regulation of the production and sale of natural gas in furtherance of conservation goals. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, 210 (1900); see also 5 E. Kuntz, Law of Oil and Gas § 70.2, p. 307 (1978); cf. Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U. S. 258, 266 (1937) (state statute retrospectively regulating the contractual sale of natural gas containing different amounts of hydrogen sulfide does not violate Contract Clause of Texas Constitution). On several occasions, the Court has approved state price regulation of natural gas that did not interfere with interstate commerce. See, e. g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U. S. 190 (1950); Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179 (1950); Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 252 U. S. 23 (1920); 5 E. Kuntz, supra, § 75.2, p. 371.
Kansas in the past has regulated the wellhead price of natural gas. See Cities Service Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm’n, 355 U. S. 391 (1958), rev’g 180 Kan. 454, 304 P. 2d 528 (1956). Although this Court struck down the
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents an issue of the appropriateness of an extension of the judicially created exclusionary rule: Is evidence seized by a state criminal law enforcement officer in good faith, but nonetheless unconstitutionally, inadmissible in a civil proceeding by or against the United States?
I
In November 1968 the Los Angeles police obtained a warrant directing a search for bookmaking paraphernalia at two specified apartment locations in the city and, as well, on the respective persons of Morris Aaron Levine and respondent Max Janis. The warrant was issued by a judge of the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District. It was based upon the affidavit of Officer Leonard Weissman. After the search, made pursuant to the warrant, both the respondent and Levine were arrested and the police seized from respondent property consisting of $4,940 in cash and certain wagering records.
Soon thereafter, Officer Weissman telephoned an agent of the United States Internal Revenue Service and informed the agent that Janis had been arrested for bookmaking activity. With the assistance of Weissman, who was familiar with bookmakers’ codes, the revenue agent analyzed the wagering records that had been seized and determined from them the gross volume of respondent’s gambling activity for the five days immediately preceding the seizure. Weissman informed the agent that he had conducted a surveillance of respondent’s activities that indicated that respondent had been engaged in bookmaking during the 77-day period from September 14 through November 30, 1968, the day of the arrest.
Respondent had not filed any federal wagering tax return pertaining to bookmaking activities for that 77-day period. Based exclusively upon its examination of the evidence so obtained by the Los Angeles police, the Internal Revenue Service made an assessment jointly against respondent and Levine for wagering taxes, under § 4401 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 4401, in the amount of $89,026.09, plus interest. The amount of the assessment was computed by first determining respondent’s average daily gross proceeds for the five-day period covered by the seized material and analyzed by the agent, and then multiplying the resulting figure by 77, the period of the police surveillance of respondent’s activities. The assessment having been made, the Internal Revenue Service exercised its statutory authority, under 26 U. S. C. § 6331, to levy upon the $4,940 in cash in partial satisfaction of the assessment against respondent.
Charges were filed in due course against respondent and Levine in Los Angeles Municipal Court for violation of the local gambling laws. They moved to quash the search warrant. A suppression hearing was held by the same judge who had issued the warrant. The defendants pressed upon the court the case of Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), which had been decided just three weeks earlier and after the search warrant had been issued. They urged that the Weissman affidavit did not set forth, in sufficient detail, the underlying circumstances to enable the issuing magistrate to determine in-dependency the reliability of the information supplied by the informants. The judge granted the motion to quash the warrant. He then ordered that all items seized pursuant to it be returned except the cash that had been levied upon by the Internal Revenue Service. App. 78-80.
In June 1969 respondent filed a claim for refund of the $4,940. The claim was not honored, and 18 months later, in December 1970, respondent filed suit for that amount in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The Government answered and counterclaimed for the substantial unpaid balance of the assessment. In pretrial proceedings, it was agreed that the “sole basis of the computation of the civil tax assessment... was... the items obtained pursuant to the search warrant... and the information furnished to [the revenue agent] by Officer Weissman with respect to the duration of [respondent’s] alleged wagering activities.” Id., at 18. Respondent then moved to suppress the evidence seized, and all copies thereof in the possession of the Service, and to quash the assessment. Id., at 23-24.
At the outset of the hearing on the motion, the District Court observed that it was “reluctantly holding that the affidavit supporting the search warrant is insufficient under the Spinelli and Aguilar [v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964)] doctrines.” Id., at 47. It then concluded that “[a] 11 of the evidence utilized as the basis” of the assessment “was obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the search pursuant to the defective search warrant,” and that, consequently, the assessment “was based in substantial part, if not completely, on illegally procured evidence... in violation of [respondent's] Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” 73-1 USTC ¶ 16,083, p. 81,392 (1973). The court concluded that Janis was entitled to a refund of the $4,940, together with interest thereon, “for the reason that substantially all, if not all, of the evidence utilized by the defendants herein in making their assessment... was illegally obtained, and, as such, the assessment was invalid.” Ibid. Further, where, as here, “illegally obtained evidence constitutes the basis of a federal tax assessment,” the respondent was “not required to prove the extent of the refund to which he claims he is entitled.” Id., at 81,393. Instead, it was sufficient if he prove “that substantially all, if not all, of the evidence upon which the assessment was based was the result of illegally obtained evidence.” Accordingly, the court ordered that the civil tax assessment made by the Internal Revenue Service “against all the property and assets of... Janis be quashed,” and entered judgment for the respondent. Ibid. The Government's counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by unpublished memorandum without opinion, affirmed on the basis of the District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Pet. for Cert. 12A.
Because of the obvious importance of the question, we granted certiorari. 421 U. S. 1010 (1975).
II
Some initial observations about the procedural posture of the case in the District Court are indicated. If there is to be no limit to the burden of proof the respondent, as “taxpayer,” must carry, then, even though he were to obtain a favorable decision on the inadmissibility-of-evidence issue, the respondent on this record could not possibly defeat the Government’s counterclaim. The Government notes, properly we think, that the litigation is composed of two separate elements: the refund suit instituted by the respondent, and the collection suit instituted by the United States through its counterclaim. In a refund suit the taxpayer bears the burden of proving the amount he is entitled to recover. Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U. S. 281 (1932). It is not enough for him to demonstrate that the assessment of the tax for which refund is sought was erroneous in some respects.
This Court has not spoken with respect to the burden of proof in a tax collection suit. The Government argues here that the presumption of correctness that attaches to the assessment in a refund suit must also apply in a civil collection suit instituted by the United States under the authority granted by §§ 7401 and 7403 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. §§ 7401 and 7403. Thus, it is said, the defendant in a collection suit has the same burden of proving that he paid the correct amount of his tax liability.
The policy behind the presumption of correctness and the burden of proof, see Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247, 259-260 (1935), would appear to be applicable in each situation. It accords, furthermore, with the burden-of-proof rule which prevails in the usual preassessment proceeding in the United States Tax Court. Lucas v. Structural Steel Co., 281 U. S. 264, 271 (1930); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 115 (1933); Rule 142(a) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Tax Court (1973). In any event, for purposes of this case, we assume that this is so and that the burden of proof may be said technically to rest with respondent Janis.
Respondent, however, submitted no evidence tending either to demonstrate that the assessment was incorrect or to show the correct amount of wagering tax liability, if any, on his part. In the usual situation one might well argue, as the Government does, that the District Court then could not properly grant judgment for the respondent on either aspect of the suit. But the present case may well not be the usual situation. What we have is a “naked” assessment without any foundation whatsoever if what was seized by the Los Angeles police cannot be used in the formulation of the assessment. The determination of tax due then may be one “without rational foundation and excessive,” and not properly subject to the usual rule with respect to the burden of proof in tax cases. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U. S. 507, 514-515 (1935). See 9 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 50.65 (1971).
There appears, indeed, to be some debate among the Federal Courts of Appeals, in different factual contexts, as to the effect upon the burden of proof in a tax case when there is positive evidence that an assessment is incorrect. Some courts indicate that the burden of showing the amount of the deficiency then shifts to the Commissioner. Others hold that the burden of showing the correct amount of the tax remains with the taxpayer. However that may be, the debate does not extend to the situation where the assessment is shown to be naked and without any foundation. The courts then appear to apply the rule of the Taylor case. See United States v. Rexach, 482 F. 2d 10, 16-17, n. 3 (CA1), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1039 (1973); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F. 2d 579 (CA2), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 986 (1969); Suarez v. Commisioner, 58 T. C. 792, 814-815 (1972). But cf. Compton v. United States, 334 F. 2d 212, 216 (CA4 1964).
Certainly, proof that an assessment is utterly without foundation is proof that it is arbitrary and erroneous. For purposes of this case, we need not go so far as to accept the Government’s argument that the exclusion of the evidence in issue here is insufficient to require judgment for the respondent or even to shift the burden to the Government. We are willing to assume that if the District Court was correct in ruling that the evidence seized by the Los Angeles police may not be used in formulating the assessment (on which both the levy and the counterclaim were based), then the District Court was also correct in granting judgment for Janis in both aspects of the present suit. This assumption takes us, then, to the primary issue.
Ill
This Court early pronounced a rule that the Fifth Amendment’s command that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself” renders evidence falling within the Amendment’s prohibition inadmissible. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886). It was not until 1914, however, that the Court held that the Fourth Amendment alone may be the basis for excluding from a federal criminal trial evidence seized by a federal officer in violation solely of that Amendment. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383. This comparatively late judicial creation of a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is not particularly surprising. In contrast to the Fifth Amendment’s direct command against the admission of compelled testimony, the issue of admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is determined after, and apart from, the violation. In Weeks it was held, however, that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to state officers, and, therefore, that material seized unconstitutionally by a state officer could be admitted in a federal criminal proceeding. This was the “silver platter” doctrine.
In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), the Court determined that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reflected the Fourth Amendment to the extent of providing those protections against intrusions that are “ 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ” Id., at 27. Nonetheless, the Court, in not applying the Weeks doctrine in a state trial to the product of a state search, held:
“Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State’s reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective.” 338 U. S., at 31.
Not long thereafter, the Court ruled that means used by a State to procure evidence could be sufficiently offensive to the concept of ordered liberty as to make admission of the evidence so procured a violation of the Due Process Clause, Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952), but that such a violation would exist only in the most extreme case, Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128 (1954).
Thus, as matters then stood, the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the States, but a State could allow an official to engage in a violation thereof with no judicial sanction except in the most extreme case. In addition, federal authorities, if they happened upon a State so inclined, could profit from the State’s action by receiving on a silver platter evidence unconstitutionally obtained. The federal authorities, profiting thereby, had no judicially created reason to discourage unconstitutional searches by a State, and the States, having no judicially mandated controls, were free to engage in such searches.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, was decided in 1960. Invoking its “supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts,” id., at 216, the Court held that
“evidence obtained by state officers during a search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the defendant’s immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible over the defendant’s timely objection in a federal criminal trial.” Id., at 223.
The rule thus announced apparently served two purposes. First, it assured that a State, which could admit the evidence in its own proceedings if it so chose, nevertheless would suffer some deterrence in that its federal counterparts would be unable to use the evidence in federal criminal proceedings. Second, the rule discouraged federal authorities from using a state official to circumvent the restrictions of Weeks.
Only one year later, however, the exclusionary rule was made applicable to state criminal trials. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). The Court ruled:
“Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government.” Id., at 655.
The debate within the Court on the exclusionary rule has always been a warm one. It has been unaided, unhappily, by any convincing empirical evidence on the effects of the rule. The Court, however, has established that the “prime purpose” of the rule, if not the sole one, “is to deter future unlawful police conduct.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974). See United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975). Thus,
“[i]n sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S., at 348.
And
“[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” Ibid.
In the complex and turbulent history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state.
IV
In the present case we are asked to create judicially a deterrent sanction by holding that evidence obtained by a state criminal law enforcement officer in good-faith reliance on a warrant that later proved to be defective shall be inadmissible in a federal civil tax proceeding. Clearly, the enforcement of admittedly valid laws would be hampered by so extending the exclusionary rule, and, as is nearly always the case with the rule, con-cededly relevant and reliable evidence would be rendered unavailable.
In evaluating the need for a deterrent sanction, one must first identify those who are to be deterred. In this case it is the state officer who is the primary object of the sanction. It is his conduct that is to be controlled. Two factors suggest that a sanction in addition to those that presently exist is unnecessary. First, the local law enforcement official is already “punished” by the exclusion of the evidence in the state criminal trial. That, necessarily, is of substantial concern to him. Second, the evidence is also excludable in the federal criminal trial, Elkins v. United States, supra, so that the entire criminal enforcement process, which is the concern and duty of these officers, is frustrated.
Jurists and scholars uniformly have recognized that the exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what concededly is relevant evidence. See, e. g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 429 (1974). And alternatives that would be less costly to societal interests have been the subject of extensive discussion and exploration.
Equally important, although scholars have attempted to determine whether the exclusionary rule in fact does have any deterrent effect, each empirical study on the subject, in its own way, appears to be flawed. It would not be appropriate to fault those who have attempted empirical studies for their lack of convincing data. The number of variables is substantial, and many cannot be measured or subjected to effective controls. Record-keeping before Mapp was spotty at best, a fact which thus severely hampers before-and-after studies. Since Mapp, of course, all possibility of broad-scale controlled or even semi-controlled comparison studies has been eliminated. “Response” studies are hampered by the presence of the respondents’ interests. And extrapolation studies are rendered highly inconclusive by the changes in legal doctrines and police-citizen relationships that have taken place in the 15 years since Mapp was decided.
We find ourselves, therefore, in no better position than the Court was in 1960 when it said:
“Empirical statistics are not available to show that the inhabitants of states which follow the exclusionary rule suffer less from lawless searches and seizures than do those of states which admit evidence unlawfully obtained. Since as a practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative, it is hardly likely that conclusive factual data could ever be assembled. For much the same reason, it cannot positively be demonstrated that enforcement of the criminal law is either more or less effective under either rule.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S., at 218.
If the exclusionary rule is the “strong medicine” that its proponents claim it to be, then its use in the situations in which it is now applied (resulting, for example, in this case in frustration of the Los Angeles police officers’ good-faith duties as enforcers of the criminal laws) must be assumed to be a substantial and efficient deterrent. Assuming this efficacy, the additional marginal deterrence provided by forbidding a different sovereign from using the evidence in a civil proceeding surely does not outweigh the cost to society of extending the rule to that situation. If, on the other hand, the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted. Under either assumption, therefore, the extension of the rule is unjustified.
In short, we conclude that exclusion from federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion. This Court, therefore, is not justified in so extending the exclusionary rule.
Respondent argues, however, that the application of the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings long has been recognized in the federal courts. He cites a number of cases. But respondent does not critically distinguish between those cases in which the officer committing the unconstitutional search or seizure was an agent of the sovereign that sought to use the evidence, on the one hand, and those cases, such as the present one, on the other hand, where the officer has no responsibility or duty to, or agreement with, the sovereign seeking to use the evidence.
The seminal cases that apply the exclusionary rule to a civil proceeding involve “intrasovereign” violations, a situation we need not consider here. In some cases the courts have refused to create an exclusionary rule for either intersovereign or intrasovereign violations in proceedings other than strictly criminal prosecutions. See United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F. 2d 1161 (CA2 1970) (intrasovereign/parole revocation); United States v. Schipani, 435 F. 2d 26 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 983 (1971) (intersovereign/sentenc-ing). And in Compton v. United States, 334 F. 2d 212, 215-216 (1964), a case remarkably like this one, the Fourth Circuit held that the presumption of correctness given a tax assessment was not affected by the fact that the assessment was based upon evidence unconstitutionally seized by state criminal law enforcement officers. Only one case cited by the respondent squarely holds that there must be an exclusionary rule barring use in a civil proceeding by one sovereign of material seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment by an officer of another sovereign. In Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T. C. 792 (1972) (reviewed by the court, with two judges dissenting), the Tax Court determined that the exclusionary rule should be applied in a situation similar to the one that confronts us here. The court concluded that
“any competing consideration based upon the need for effective enforcement of civil tax liabilities (compare Elkins v. United States...) must give way to the higher goal of protection of the individual and the necessity for preserving confidence in, rather than encouraging contempt for, the processes of Government.” Id., at 805.
No appeal was taken.
We disagree with the broad implications of this statement of the Tax Court for two reasons. To the extent that the court did not focus on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, the law has since been clarified. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974); United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975). Moreover, the court did not distinguish between intersover-eign and intrasovereign uses of unconstitutionally seized material. Working, as we must, with the absence of convincing empirical data, common sense dictates that the deterrent effect of the exclusion of relevant evidence is highly attenuated when the “punishment” imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or against a different sovereign. In Elkins the Court indicated that the assumed interest of criminal law enforcement officers in the criminal proceedings of another sovereign counterbalanced this attenuation sufficiently to justify an exclusionary rule. Here, however, the attenuation is further augmented by the fact that the proceeding is one to enforce only the civil law of the other sovereign.
This attenuation, coupled with the existing deterrence effected by the denial of use of the evidence by either sovereign in the criminal trials with which the searching officer is concerned, creates a situation in which the imposition of the exclusionary rule sought in this case is unlikely to provide significant, much less substantial, additional deterrence. It falls outside the offending officer’s zone of primary interest. The extension of the exclusionary rule, in our view, would be an unjustifiably drastic action by the courts in the pursuit of what is an undesired and undesirable supervisory role over police officers. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976).
In the past this Court has opted for exclusion in the anticipation that law enforcement officers would be deterred from violating Fourth Amendment rights. Then, as now, the Court acted in the absence of convincing empirical evidence and relied, instead, on its own assumptions of human nature and the interrelationship of the various components of the law enforcement system. In the situation before us, we do not find sufficient justification for the drastic measure of an exclusionary rule. There comes a point at which courts, consistent with their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches. We find ourselves at that point in this case. We therefore hold that the judicially created exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the use in the civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. R fi0 or<W-
Me. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Officer Weissman’s affidavit, App. 69-74, stated: He and Sergeant Briggs of the Los Angeles Police Department each had received information from an informant concerning respondent Janis and Levine and concerning telephone numbers the two men used for bookmaking. Police investigation disclosed that Janis had two telephones with unpublished numbers, including the number given by Weissman’s informant, and that there was a third published number at the same address in the name of Nancy L. Janis. The unpublished numbers given by Weissman’s informant as being used by Levine were found to be maintained by Levine at a different address, and that address was the one given by Briggs’ informant as being Levine’s base of operations. Both informants stated that Levine and Janis were working in concert. Each officer regarded his informant as reliable; the informant had given information in the past that led to arrests for bookmaking and, in the case of Briggs’ informant, to convictions as well. Preliminary hearings and trials were pending for persons arrested with the aid of Weissman’s informant. Each officer and his informant believed that it was necessary for the informant’s safety, and his future usefulness to law enforcement officers, that his identity be kept secret.
Weissman further stated:
“Prom the nature and context of the information supplied by the informant to this affiant, and from the nature and context of the information which was supplied to Sgt. Briggs, as told to this affiant, it is believed that the informants... at all times mentioned in this affidavit, unless otherwise specified, were speaking with personal knowledge.” Id., at 73.
The affidavit, taken in its entirety, bears some similarity to the affidavit the Court later considered in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 420-422 (1969). Spinelli was a 5-3 decision handed down two months after the Los Angeles warrant in the present case had been issued. Mr. Justice White joined the opinion in Spinelli, id., at 423-429, but, in doing so, referred, id., at 427, to the “tension between Draper [v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959)],” on the one hand, and Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), on the other, and, “[p] ending full-scale reconsideration” of Draper “or of the Nathanson-Aguilar cases,” joined “the opinion of the Court and the judgment of reversal, especially since a vote to affirm would produce an equally divided Court.” 393 U. S., at 429.
The Internal Revenue Service’s Certificate of Assessments and Payments, App. 81, shows a credit of $5,097, the amount actually seized by the police and subjected to the Service’s subsequent levy. The Government acknowledges, however, that $157 of this amount was money belonging to Levine. It was applied upon the joint assessment made against both Janis and Levine. Levine has not sought a refund of the $157. Brief for United States 5 n. 1. The present case, therefore, concerns only the $4,940 taken from respondent Janis.
Officer Weissman testified that there was no departmental policy to call the Internal Revenue Service in a situation of this kind. He did it “as a matter of police procedure.” He would not do it, he said, on what he “would consider a small-size book, but I considered this one a major-size book. So, I, therefore, did it.” App. 42. He further stated that some of his fellow officers had acted similarly, but that he did not think “that they all have done it.” Ibid. The District Court did not rest its conclusion on any federal involvement in, or encouragement of, the search. We therefore must assume, for purposes of this opinion, that there was no federal involvement. See n. 31, infra.
The wagering excise tax at the time was 10% of the amount of the wagers. § 4401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §4401 (a). The rate was reduced to 2%, effective December 1, 1974, by Pub. L. 93-499, §3 (a), 88 Stat. 1550.
The Government advises us that, in order to avoid multiple litigation, its policy is to counterclaim in. a refund suit, just as it did here, where there is an outstanding unpaid assessment and the refund suit and the counterclaim involve the same facts. Brief for United States 17 n. 4.
The Certificate of Assessments and Payments was stipulated "to be admissible without objection.” App. 20. The Government did not seek to introduce the wagering records obtained by the Los Angeles police.
The Government has not asserted that, absent the seized materials, it would have had grounds for an assessment against respondent and Levine.
The situation may be described as having some resemblance to that for which the Court has developed an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, § 7421 (a) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 7421 (a). See Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 370 U. S. 1 (1962); Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725 (1974); Commissioner v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U. S. 752 (1974); Laing v. United States, 423 U. S. 161 (1976); Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U. S. 614 (1976).
Taylor, although decided more than 40 years ago, has never been cited by this Court on the burden-of-proof issue. The Courts of Appeals, the Court of Claims, the Tax Court, and the Federal District Courts, however, frequently have referred to that aspect of the case.
E. g., Foster v. Commissioner, 391 F. 2d 727, 735 (CA4 1968); Herbert v. Commissioner, 377 F. 2d 65, 69 (CA9 1967). See Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F. 2d 995, 999 (CA5 1970).
E. g., United States v. Rexach, 482 F. 2d 10, 15-17 (CA1), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1039 (1973); Psaty v. United States, 442 F. 2d 1154, 1158-1161 (CA3 1971); Ehlers v. Vinal, 382 F. 2d 58, 65-66 (CA8 1967). See Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F. 2d, at 998.
Although the present case presents only the issue whether such evidence may be used in the formulation of the assessment, there appears to be no difference between that question and the issue whether the evidence is to be excluded in the refund or collection suit itself. We perceive no principled distinction to be made between the use of the evidence as the basis of an assessment and its use in the case in chief.
“[T]he raptured privacy of the victims’ homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late.” Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). “The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 217 (1960). See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347-348 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 656 (1961); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 413 (1966); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
In Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S., at 207 n. 1, the Court noted that the appellation stems from Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s plurality opinion in Lustig v. United States, 338 U. S. 74 (1949):
“The crux of that doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter.” Id., at 78-79.
The absence of this Court’s imposition of controls did not mean, of course, that the States were running unchecked in their pursuit of evidence. Not only were there tort remedies and internal disciplinary sanctions available, but, as the Court noted in Elkins: “Not more than half the states continue totally to adhere to the rule that evidence is freely admissible no matter how it was obtained. Most of the others have adopted the exclusionary rule in its entirety; the rest have adopted it in part.” 364 U.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Court must interpret, once again, § 924(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code. This provision prohibits the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, or the possession of a firearm in furtherance of such crimes. § 924(c)(1)(A). A violation of the statute carries a mandatory minimum term of five years’ imprisonment, § 924(c)(l)(A)(i); but if the firearm is a ma-ehinegun, the statute requires a 30-year mandatory minimum sentence, § 924(c)(l)(B)(ii). Whether a firearm was used, carried, or possessed is, as all concede, an element of the offense. At issue here is whether the fact that the firearm was a machinegun is an element to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt or a sentencing factor to be proved to the judge at sentencing.
In an earlier case the Court determined that an analogous machinegun provision in a previous version of § 924 constituted an element of an offense to be proved to the jury. Castillo v. United States, 530 U. S. 120 (2000). The Castillo decision, however, addressed the statute as it existed before congressional amendments made in 1998. And in a case after Castillo, the brandishing provision in the post-1998 version of § 924 was held to provide a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense. Harris v. United States, 536 U. S. 545 (2002). In light of the 1998 amendments and the Harris decision, the question of how to interpret §924’s machinegun provision is considered once more in the instant case.
I
On June 16, 2005, respondents Martin O’Brien and Arthur Burgess attempted to rob an armored car making a scheduled delivery of cash to a bank. Along with a third collaborator, respondents hid in a minivan and waited for the armored car to make its stop. Each of the men carried a firearm. Containing nearly $2 million and attended by two guards, the armored car arrived. A guard began to unload boxes of coins. The three men came out of the van and, while one of them brandished his weapon, they ordered the guards to get on the ground. One guard did so, but the other ran to a nearby restaurant. Respondents abandoned the robbery and fled without taking any money. No shots were fired, and no one was injured.
Authorities apprehended respondents and recovered the three firearms used during the attempted robbery. The firearms were a semiautomatic Sig-Sauer pistol, an AK-47 semiautomatic rifle, and a Cobray pistol. The Cobray pistol had been manufactured as, and had the external appearance of, a semiautomatic firearm. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, though, it operated as a fully automatic weapon, apparently due to some alteration of its original firing mechanism. Respondents dispute whether the Cobray in fact did operate as a fully automatic weapon.
Respondents were indicted on multiple counts. Relevant here are counts three and four, both of which charged offenses under § 924(c). Count three charged respondents with using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, which carries a statutory minimum of five years’ imprisonment. Count four charged respondents in more specific terms, alleging use of a machinegun (the Cobray) in furtherance of a crime of violence, as proscribed by §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and (B)(ii). The latter provision mandates a minimum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment.
The Government moved to dismiss count four on the basis that it would be unable to establish the count beyond a reasonable doubt. (The issues in the present case do not require the Court to consider any contention that a defendant who uses, carries, or possesses a firearm must be aware of the weapon’s characteristics. This opinion expresses no views on the point.)
The Government then maintained that the machinegun provision in § 924(c)(l)(B)(ii) was a sentencing factor, so that, if respondents were convicted of carrying a firearm under count three, the court could determine at sentencing that the particular firearm was a machinegun, thus activating the 30-yéár mandatory minimum. The District Court dismissed count four, as the Government requested, but rejected the Government’s position that the machinegun provision was a sentencing enhancement to be determined by the court at sentencing once there was a conviction on count three. It ruled that the machinegun provision states an element of a crime. Thus, to invoke the 30-year minimum sentence, the Government was required to charge in the indictment, and then prove to the jury, that the Cobray was a machinegun.
At this point, after the District Court foreclosed the possibility of respondents’ facing a 30-year minimum, respondents pleaded guilty to the remaining counts, including count three. The District Court sentenced O’Brien to a 102-month term for his § 924(c) conviction, to run consecutively with his sentence on two other counts. It sentenced Burgess to an 84-month term for his § 924(c) conviction, also to run consecutively to his sentence on the other charges. The Government appealed the District Court’s ruling that the §924 machinegun provision constitutes an element of an offense instead of a sentencing factor.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. It looked primarily to Castillo, 530 U. S. 120, which held that the machinegun provision in an earlier version of § 924(c) constituted an element of an offense, not a sentencing factor. The court noted that the statute under consideration in Castillo had been revised by Congress, “break[ing] what was a single run-on sentence into subpara-graphs,” and it acknowledged that the earlier repealed version of the statute was “slightly more favorable to the [respondents] than the current version[,] but not markedly so.” 542 F. 3d 921, 925 (2008). It found “no evidence that the breaking up of the sentence into the present subdivisions or recasting of language was anything more than a current trend — probably for ease of reading — to convert lengthy sentences in criminal statutes into subsections in the fashion of the tax code.” Id., at 926. The court concluded: “Absent a clearer or more dramatic change in language or legislative history expressing a specific intent to assign judge or jury functions, we think that Castillo is close to binding,” and any reconsideration of the issue should be left to this Court. Ibid.; see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions”).
We granted certiorari. 557 U. S. 966 (2009).
II
Elements of a crime must be charged in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227, 282 (1999). Sentencing factors, on the other hand, can be proved to a judge at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 91-92 (1986). Though one exception has been established, see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 228 (1998), “ '[i]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.’” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 490 (2000) (quoting Jones, supra, at 252-253 (Stevens, J., concurring)). In other words, while sentencing factors may guide or confine a judge’s discretion in sentencing an offender “within the range prescribed by statute,” Apprendi, supra, at 481, judge-found sentencing factors cannot increase the maximum sentence a defendant might otherwise receive based purely on the facts found by the jury.
Subject to this constitutional constraint, whether a given fact is an element of the crime itself or a sentencing factor is a question for Congress. When Congress is not explicit, as is often the case because it seldom directly addresses the distinction between sentencing factors and elements, courts look to the provisions and the framework of the statute to determine whether a fact is an element or a sentencing factor. Almendarez-Torres, supra, at 228. In examining whether the machinegun provision in § 924 is an element or a sentencing factor, the analysis must begin with this Court’s previous examination of the question in Castillo.
In Castillo, the Court considered a prior version of § 924, which provided:
“(c)(1) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . , uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle [or a] short-barreled shotgun to imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years....” 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V).
In determining whether the machinegun provision in the just-quoted version of § 924 constituted an element or a sentencing factor, the Court in Castillo observed that the bare statutory language was “neutral.” 530 U. S., at 124. It examined five factors directed at determining congressional intent: (1) language and structure, (2) tradition, (3) risk of unfairness, (4) severity of the sentence, and (5) legislative history. Id., at 124-131. The Court unanimously concluded that the machinegun provision provided an element of an offense, noting that the first four factors favored treating it as such while legislative history did not significantly favor either side. Ibid.
Ill
A
Section 924(c) was amended to its current form in 1998.
The amendment had been enacted when the Court considered Castillo, supra, at 125, but the pre-1998 version of the statute was at issue there. The instant case concerns the post-1998 (and current) version of the statute, which provides:
“(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—
“(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
“(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and “(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
“(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation of this subsection—
“(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years; or
“(ii) is a maehinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 80 years.” 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1).
The 1998 amendment did make substantive changes to the statute, to be discussed below; but for purposes of the present case the most apparent effect of the amendment was to divide what was once a lengthy principal sentence into separate subparagraphs. This Court’s observation in considering the first Castillo factor, that “Congress placed the element 'uses or carries a firearm’ and the word 'machinegun' in a single sentence, not broken up with dashes or separated into subsections,” 580 U. S., at 124-125, no longer holds true. Aside from this new structure, however, the 1998 amendment of § 924 did nothing to affect the second through fifth Castillo factors. Each of the factors, except for legislative history (which, assuming its relevance, remains relatively silent), continues to favor the conclusion that the machinegun provision is an element of an offense.
Legal tradition and past congressional practice are the second Castillo factor. The factor is to be consulted when, as here, a statute’s text is unclear as to whether certain facts constitute elements or sentencing factors. Sentencing factors traditionally involve characteristics of the offender— such as recidivism, cooperation with law enforcement, or acceptance of responsibility. Id., at 126. Characteristics of the offense itself are traditionally treated as elements, and the use of a machinegun under § 924(c) lies “closest to the heart of the crime at issue.” Id., at 127. This is no less true today than it was 10 years ago in Castillo. Unsurprisingly, firearm type is treated as an element in a number of statutes, as “numerous gun crimes make substantive distinctions between weapons such as pistols and machine-guns.” Ibid.; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(4), 922(b)(4), and 922(o)(l).
The Government counters that this tradition or pattern has evolved since the version of § 924(c) under review in Castillo was enacted. The Government contends that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines altered the tradition by treating the possession of a firearm as a sentencing factor. Brief for United States 23 (citing United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2K2.1(a)(5) (Nov. 1998) (raising base offense level “if the offense involved a firearm”))-
The argument is not persuasive. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987, establishing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, was enacted four years before the version of § 924 under review in Castillo, see Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 6460,102 Stat. 4373. While the resulting Guidelines were not effective until 1987, this was still before the 1988 enactment of the statute at issue in Castillo, and 13 years before this Court’s conclusion in Castillo that firearm type is traditionally treated as an offense element. The Government cannot claim the benefit of any shift in how the law traditionally treats firearm type from the Guidelines, for that supposed shift would have occurred before the 1988 version of § 924 was enacted. The Guidelines were explicitly taken into account when this Court analyzed the traditions in Castillo. 530 U. S., at 126 (discussing Federal Sentencing Guidelines in determining what traditionally qualifies as a sentencing factor).
The third Castillo factor, potential unfairness, was unchanged by the restructuring of § 924. The Court explained in Castillo that treating the machinegun provision as a sentencing factor “might unnecessarily produce a conflict between the judge and the jury” because “a jury may well have to decide which of several weapons” a defendant used. Id., at 128. The concern was that the judge may not know which weapon the jurors determined a defendant used, and “a judge’s later, sentencing-related decision that the defendant used the machinegun, rather than, say, the pistol, might conflict with the jury’s belief that he actively used the pistol.” Ibid. This same concern arises under the current version of § 924, where jurors might have to determine which among several weapons a defendant used, carried, or possessed in furtherance of a crime.
The Government’s response, that permitting a judge to make this finding would “streamlin[e] guilt-stage proceedings, without interfering with the accuracy of fact-finding,” Brief for United States 33, is unconvincing. It does not address the particular unfairness concern expressed in Castillo, which was not alleviated by the restructuring of § 924. And the Government does not suggest that it would be subjected to any unfairness if the machinegun provision continues to be treated as an element.
The fourth Castillo factor, the severity of the sentence accompanying a finding that a defendant carried a machinegun under § 924, was also unaffected by the statute’s restructuring. A finding that a defendant carried a machinegun under §924, in contrast to some less dangerous firearm, vaults a defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence from 5 to 30 years, 530 U. S., at 131, or from 7 to 30 years if, as in this case, the firearm was brandished, § 924(c)(l)(A)(ii). This is not akin to the “incremental changes in the minimum” that one would “expect to see in provisions meant to identify matters for the sentencing judge’s consideration,” Harris, 536 U. S., at 554 (from 5 years to 7 years); it is a drastic, sixfold increase that strongly suggests a separate substantive crime.
There is one substantive difference between the old and new versions of § 924 that might bear on this fourth factor. The previous version of § 924 provided mandatory sentences: 5 years for using or carrying a firearm and 30 years if the firearm is a machinegun, for example. See § 924(c)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The current statute provides only mandatory mínimums: not less than 5 years for using or possessing a firearm; not less than 7 for brandishing it; and not less than 30 if the firearm is a machinegun. §§ 924(c)(l)(A)(i), (ii), (B)(ii). The Government argues that this difference is critical because a 30-year sentence is conceivable under the statute even without a finding that the particular weapon is a machinegun. Brief for United States 25.
This is a distinction in theory, perhaps, but not in practice. Neither the Government nor any party or amicus has identified a single defendant whose conviction under § 924 for possessing or brandishing a nonspecific firearm led to a sentence approaching the 30-year sentence that is required when the firearm is a machinegun. Respondents advise, without refutation, that most courts impose the mandatory minimum of 7 years’ imprisonment for brandishing a nonspecific weapon and the longest sentence that has come to the litigants’ or the Court’s attention is 14 years. Brief for Respondent O’Brien 46, 48 (citing United States v. Batts, 317 Fed. Appx. 329 (CA4 2009) (per curiam)); see also Harris, supra, at 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Indeed, in the instant case, Burgess received the statutory minimum 7-year sentence, and O’Brien received only 18 months more than that. Once the machinegun enhancement was off the table, the Government itself did not seek anything approaching 30-year terms, instead requesting 12-year terms for each respondent.
The immense danger posed by machineguns, the moral depravity in choosing the weapon, and the substantial increase in the minimum sentence provided by the statute support the conclusion that this prohibition is an element of the crime, not a sentencing factor. It is not likely that Congress intended to remove the indictment and jury trial protections when it provided for such an extreme sentencing increase. See Jones, 526 U. S., at 233 (“It is at best questionable whether the specification of facts sufficient to increase a penalty range by two-thirds, let alone from 15 years to life, was meant to carry none of the process safeguards that elements of an offense bring with them for a defendant’s benefit”). Perhaps Congress was not concerned with parsing the distinction between elements and sentencing factors, a matter more often discussed by the courts when discussing the proper allocation of functions between judge and jury. Instead, it likely was more focused on deterring the crime by creating the mandatory minimum sentences. But the severity of the increase in this case counsels in favor of finding that the prohibition is an element, at least absent some clear congressional indication to the contrary.
The fifth factor considered in Castillo was legislative history, and the Court there found it to be of little help. 530 U. S., at 130 (“Insofar as this history may be relevant, however, it does not significantly help the Government”). The 1998 amendment has its own legislative record, discussed below, but the parties accurately observe that it is silent as to congressional consideration of the distinction between elements and sentencing factors. Brief for United States 29; Brief for Respondent O’Brien 28-29. This silence is not neutral, however, because as explained below, it tends to counsel against finding that Congress made a substantive change to this statutory provision.
Four of the five factors the Court relied upon in Castillo point in the same direction they did 10 years ago. How the 1998 amendment affects the remaining factor — the provision’s language and structure — requires closer examination.
B
In Castillo, the Court interpreted § 924(c) in its original version, though Congress had at that point already amended the provision. Here, the applicable principle is that Congress does not enact substantive changes sub silentio. See Director of Revenue of Mo. v. CoBank ACB, 531 U. S. 316, 323 (2001). In light of Castillo’s determination that the machinegun provision in the previous version of § 924 is an element, a change should not be inferred “[a]bsent a clear indication from Congress of a change in policy.” Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S. 279, 290 (1991); see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 313, n. 12 (1994) (“[W]hen this Court construes a statute, it is explaining its understanding of what the statute has meant continuously since the date when it became law”).
The Government argues that the 1998 amendment restructuring § 924(c) demonstrates the congressional judgment to reclassify the machinegun provision as a sentencing factor, rather than as an offense element. But the better understanding, as the Government acknowledged in its submission in Castillo, is that “there is nothing to suggest that the 1998 amendments were intended to change, rather than simply reorganize and clarify, [§924]’s treatment of firearm type.” Brief for United States, O. T. 1999, No. 99-658, p. 41. A closer review of the 1998 amendment confirms this.
There are three principal differences between the previous and current versions of § 924(c): two substantive changes and a third regarding the stylistic structure of the statute. The first difference, as discussed above, supra, at 229, is that the amendment changed what were once mandatory sentences into mandatory minimum sentences. A person convicted of the primary offense of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence was once to “be sentenced to imprisonment for five years,” but under the current version he or she is to “be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years.”
The second difference is that the amended version includes the word “possesses” in addition to “uses or carries” in its principal paragraph, and then adds the substantive provisions in §§ 924(c)(l)(A)(ii) and (iii), which provide mandatory mínimums for brandishing (7 years) and discharging (10 years) the firearm. These provisions are new substantive additions to the text of the previous version, which provided a bare 5-year mandatory minimum for any offender who “use[d] or carrie[d] a firearm,” without concern for how the firearm was used.
The changes were a direct response to this Court’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995), which held that the word “use” in the preamendment version of §924 “must connote more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who commits a drug offense.” Id., at 143. The Court in Bailey went on to observe that, “[h]ad Congress intended possession alone to trigger liability under § 924(c)(1), it easily could have so provided” by using the word “possess,” as it had so frequently done in other statutory provisions. Ibid. Three years later, Congress made the change and added the word “possesses” to the principal paragraph. Congress additionally provided mandatory sentences above the 5-year minimum depending on whether and how the firearm was used. Sections 924(c)(l)(A)(ii) and (iii) provide sentencing enhancements for brandishing or discharging the firearm, and the Court has held that these enhancements are sentencing factors to be found by a judge. See Harris, 536 U. S., at 552-556; see also Dean v. United States, 556 U. S. 568, 573-574 (2009) (referring to the brandishing and discharge provisions as “sentencing factors”). The 1998 amendment was colloquially known as the “Bailey Fix Act.” 144 Cong. Rec. 26608 (1998) (remarks of Sen. De-Wine); see also Dean, supra, at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Aside from shifting the mandatory sentences to mandatory minimums, and this so-called Bailey fix, Congress left the substance of the statute unchanged. Neither of these substantive changes suggests that Congress meant to transform the machinegun provision from an element into a sentencing factor.
The Government stresses a third, structural, difference in the statute, pointing out that the machinegun provision now resides in a separate subparagraph, § 924(c)(1)(B), whereas it once resided in the principal paragraph that unmistakably lists offense elements. This structural or stylistic ehange, though, does not provide a “clear indication” that Congress meant to alter its treatment of machineguns as an offense element. See Grogan, 498 U. S., at 290. A more logical explanation for the restructuring is that it broke up a lengthy principal paragraph, which exceeded 250 words even before adding more to it for the Bailey fix, into a more readable statute. This is in step with current legislative drafting guidelines, which advise drafters to break lengthy statutory provisions into separate subsections that can be read more easily. See House Legislative Counsel’s Manual on Drafting Style, HLC No. 104.1, § 312, pp. 23-25 (1995); Senate Office of the Legislative Counsel, Legislative Drafting Manual § 112, pp. 10-11 (1997).
While the Court has indicated that placing factors in separate subsections is one way Congress might signal that it is treating them as sentencing factors as opposed to elements, Castillo, 530 U. S., at 124-125, Harris, 536 U. S., at 552-553, it has rejected the view that this structural consideration predominates even when other factors point in the other direction, id., at 553 (“[E]ven if a statute ‘has a look to it suggesting that the numbered subsections are only sentencing provisions,’ ” the Court will not ignore “compelling evidence to the contrary” (quoting Jones, 526 U. S., at 232)). For instance, in Jones the Court found that the federal carjacking statute set forth elements of multiple offenses despite a structure similar to the statute at issue here. Id., at 232-239. And in Harris, the Court was careful to point out that, unlike the case at bar, the other Castillo factors “reinforce[d] the single-offense interpretation implied by the statute’s structure.” 536 U. S., at 553.
In examining the amended version of § 924(c)’s structure, there is an additional consideration that supports interpreting the machinegun provision to be an offense element. As explained above, the brandishing and discharge provisions codified in §§ 924(c)(l)(A)(ii) and (iii) do state sentencing factors. See Harris, supra, at 552-556; Dean, supra, at 573-574. Had Congress intended to treat firearm type as a sentencing factor, it likely would have listed firearm types as clauses (iv) and (v) of subparagraph (A), instead of as clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (B). By listing firearm type in stand-alone subparagraph (B), Congress set it apart from the sentencing factors in (A)(ii) and (iii); this is consistent with preserving firearm type as an element of a separate offense.
To be sure, there are some arguments in favor of treating the machinegun provision as a sentencing factor. The current structure of § 924(c) is more favorable to that interpretation than was true in Castillo, particularly because the machinegun provision is now positioned between the sentencing factors provided in (A)(ii) and (iii), see Harris, supra, at 552-556, and the recidivist provisions in (C)(i) and (ii), which are typically sentencing factors as well. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U. S., at 230. These points are overcome, however, by the substantial weight of the other Castillo factors and the principle that Congress would not enact so significant a change without a clear indication of its purpose to do so. The evident congressional purpose was to amend the statute to counteract Bailey and to make the statute more readable but not otherwise to alter the substance of the statute. The analysis and holding of Castillo control this case. The machinegun provision in § 924(c)(l)(B)(ii) is an element of an offense.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
An amendment to the California Constitution provides that state courts shall not order mandatory pupil assignment or transportation unless a federal court would do so to remedy a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The question for our decision is whether this provision is itself in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
HH
This litigation began almost 20 years ago in 1963, when minority students attending school in the Los Angeles Unified School District (District) filed a class action in state court seeking desegregation of the District’s schools. The case went to trial some five years later, and in 1970 the trial court issued an opinion finding that the District was substantially segregated in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions. The court ordered the District to prepare a desegregation plan for immediate use. App. 139.
On the District’s appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed, but on a different basis. Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P. 2d 28 (1976). While the trial court had found de jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, see App. 117, 120-121, the California Supreme Court based its affirmance solely upon the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution. The court explained that under the California Constitution “state school boards... bear a constitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin.” 17 Cal. 3d, at 290, 551 P. 2d, at 34. The court remanded to the trial court for preparation of a “reasonably feasible” plan for school desegregation. Id., at 310, 551 P. 2d, at 48.
On remand, the trial court rejected the District’s mostly voluntary desegregation plan but ultimately approved a second plan that included substantial mandatory school reassignment and transportation — “busing”—on a racial and ethnic basis. The plan was put into effect in the fall of 1978, but after one year’s experience, all parties to the litigation were dissatisfied. See 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 636, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495, 497 (1981). Although the plan continued in operation, the trial court began considering alternatives in October 1979.
In November 1979 the voters of the State of California ratified Proposition I, an amendment to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the State Constitution. Proposition I conforms the power of state courts to order busing to that exercised by the federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment:
“[N]o court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under federal decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause... ”
Following approval of Proposition I, the District asked the Superior Court to halt all mandatory reassignment and busing of pupils. App. 185. On May 19, 1980, the court denied the District’s application. The court reasoned that Proposition I was of no effect in this case in light of the court’s 1970 finding of de jure segregation by the District in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shortly thereafter, the court ordered implementation of a revised desegregation plan, one that again substantially relied upon mandatory pupil reassignment and transportation.
The California Court of Appeal reversed. 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1981). The court found that the trial court’s 1970 findings of fact would not support the conclusion that the District had violated the Federal Constitution through intentional segregation. Thus, Proposition I was applicable to the trial court's desegregation plan and would bar that part of the plan requiring mandatory student reassignment and transportation. Moreover, the court concluded that Proposition I was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 654, 170 Cal. Rptr., at 509. The court found no obligation on the part of the State to retain a greater remedy at state law against racial segregation than was provided by the Federal Constitution. Ibid. The court rejected the claim that Proposition I was adopted with a discriminatory purpose. Id., at 654-655,170 Cal. Rptr., at 509.
Determining Proposition I to be applicable and constitutional, the Court of Appeal vacated the orders entered by the Superior Court. The California Supreme Court denied hearing. App. to Pet. for Cert. 73a. We granted certiorari. 454 U. S. 892 (1981).
II
We agree with the California Court of Appeal m rejecting the contention that once a State chooses to do “more” than the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never recede. We reject an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment so destructive of a State’s democratic processes and of its ability to experiment. This interpretation has no support in the decisions of this Court.
Proposition I does not inhibit enforcement of any federal law or constitutional requirement. Quite the contrary, by its plain language the Proposition seeks only to embrace the requirements of the Federal Constitution with respect to mandatory school assignments and transportation. It would be paradoxical to conclude that by adopting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of the State thereby had violated it. Moreover, even after Proposition I, the California Constitution still imposes a greater duty of desegregation than does the Federal Constitution. The state courts of California continue to have an obligation under state law to order segregated school districts to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or not there has been a finding of intentional segregation. The school districts themselves retain a state-law obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to desegregate, and they remain free to adopt reassignment and busing plans to effectuate desegregation.
Nonetheless, petitioners contend that Proposition I is unconstitutional on its face. They argue that Proposition I employs an “explicit racial classification” and imposes a “race-specific” burden on minorities seeking to vindicate state-created rights. By limiting the power of state courts to enforce the state-created right to desegregated schools, petitioners contend, Proposition I creates a “dual court system” that discriminates on the basis of race. They emphasize that other state-created rights may be vindicated by the state courts without limitation on remedies. Petitioners argue that the “dual court system” created by Proposition I is unconstitutional unless supported by a compelling state interest.
We would agree that if Proposition I employed a racial classification it would be unconstitutional unless necessary to further a compelling state interest. “A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964). But Proposition I does not embody a racial classification. It neither says nor implies that persons are to be treated differently on account of their race. It simply forbids state courts to order pupil school assignment or transportation in the absence of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The benefit it seeks to confer — neighborhood schooling — is made available regardless of race in the discretion of school boards. Indeed, even if Proposition I had a racially discriminatory effect, in view of the demographic mix of the District it is not.clear which race or races would be affected the most or in what way. In addition, this Court previously has held that even when a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect on a racial minority, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if a discriminatory purpose can be shown.
Similarly, the Court has recognized that a distinction may exist between state action that discriminates on the basis of race and state action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race-related matters. This distinction is implicit in the Court’s repeated statement that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of race-related legislation or policies that were not required by the Federal Constitution in the first place. In Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 414 (1977), we found that the school board’s mere repudiation of an earlier resolution calling for desegregation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 376 (1967), and again in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385, 390, n. 5 (1969), we were careful to note that the laws under review did more than “mere[ly] repeal” existing antidiscrimination legislation. In sum, the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification.
Were we to hold that the mere repeal of race-related legislation is unconstitutional, we would limit seriously the authority of States to deal with the problems of our heterogeneous population. States would be committed irrevocably to legislation that has proved unsuccessful or even harmful in practice. And certainly the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment would not be advanced by an interpretation that discouraged the States from providing greater protection to racial minorities. Nor would the purposes of the Amendment be furthered by requiring the States to maintain legislation designed to ameliorate race relations or to protect racial minorities but which has produced just the opposite effects. Yet these would be the results of requiring a State to maintain legislation that has proved unworkable or harmful when the State was under no obligation to adopt the legislation in the first place. Moreover, and relevant to this case, we would not interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to require the people of a State to adhere to a judicial construction of their State Constitution when that Constitution itself vests final authority in the people.
III
Petitioners seek to avoid the force of the foregoing considerations by arguing that Proposition I is not a “mere repeal.” Relying primarily on the decision in Hunter v. Erickson, supra, they contend that Proposition I does not simply repeal a state-created right but fundamentally alters the judicial system so that “those seeking redress from racial isolation in violation of state law must be satisfied -with less than full relief from a state court.” We do not view Hunter as controlling here, nor are we persuaded by petitioners’ characterization of Proposition I as something more than a mere repeal.
In Hunter the Akron city charter had been amended by the voters to provide that no ordinance regulating real estate on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin could take effect until approved by a referendum. As a result of the charter amendment, a fair housing ordinance, adopted by the City Council at an earlier date, was no longer effective. In holding the charter amendment invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the charter amendment was not a simple repeal of the fair housing ordinance. The amendment “not only suspended the operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also required the approval of the electors before any future [anti-discrimination] ordinance could take effect.” 393 U. S., at 389-390. Thus, whereas most ordinances regulating real property would take effect once enacted by the City Council, ordinances prohibiting racial discrimination in housing would be forced to clear an additional hurdle. As such, the charter amendment placed an impermissible, “special burde[n] on racial minorities within the governmental process.” Id., at 391.
Hunter involved more than a “mere repeal” of the fair housing ordinance; persons seeking antidiscrimination housing laws — presumptively racial minorities — were “singled out for mandatory referendums while no other group... face[d] that obstacle.” James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 142 (1971). By contrast, even on the assumption that racial minorities benefited from the busing required by state law, Proposition I is less than a “repeal” of the California Equal Protection Clause. As noted above, after Proposition I, the State Constitution still places upon school boards a greater duty to desegregate than does the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nor can it be said that Proposition I distorts the political process for racial reasons or that it allocates governmental or judicial power on the basis of a discriminatory principle. “The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.” Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147 (1940). Remedies appropriate in one area of legislation may not be desirable in another. The remedies available for violation of the antitrust laws, for example, are different than those available for violation of the Civil Rights Acts. Yet a “dual court system” — one for the racial majority and one for the racial minority — is not established simply because civil rights remedies are different from those available in other areas. Surely it was constitutional for the California Supreme Court to caution that although “in some circumstances busing will be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation plan,” in other circumstances “its ‘costs,’ both in financial and educational terms, will render its use inadvisable.” See n. 3, swpra. It was equally constitutional for the people of the State to determine that the standard of the Fourteenth Amendment was more appropriate for California courts to apply in desegregation cases than the standard repealed by Proposition I.
In short, having gone beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution, the State was free to return in part to the standard prevailing generally throughout the United States. It could have conformed its law to the Federal Constitution in every respect. That it chose to pull back only in part, and by preserving a greater right to desegregation than exists under the Federal Constitution, most assuredly does not render the Proposition unconstitutional on its face.
H-t <1
The California Court of Appeal also rejected petitioners claim that Proposition I, if facially valid, was nonetheless unconstitutional because enacted with a discriminatory purpose. The court reasoned that the purposes of the Proposition were well stated in the Proposition itself. Voters may have been motivated by any of these purposes, chief among them the educational benefits of neighborhood schooling. The court found that voters also may have considered that the extent of mandatory busing, authorized by state law, actually was aggravating rather than ameliorating the desegregation problem. See n. 1, supra. It characterized petitioners’ claim of discriminatory intent on the part of millions of voters as but “pure speculation.” 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 655, 170 Cal. Rptr., at 509.
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967), the Court considered the constitutionality of another California Proposition. In that case, the California Supreme Court had concluded that the Proposition was unconstitutional because it gave the State’s approval to private racial discrimination. This Court agreed, deferring to the findings made by the California court. The Court noted that the California court was “armed... with the knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage and potential impact” of the Proposition and “familiar with the milieu in which that provision would operate.” Id., at 378. Similarly, in this case, again involving the circumstances of passage and the potential impact of a Proposition adopted at a statewide election, we see no reason to differ with the conclusions of the state appellate court.
Under decisions of this Court, a law neutral on its face still may be unconstitutional if motivated by a discriminatory purpose. In determining whether such a purpose was the motivating factor, the racially disproportionate effect of official action provides “an ‘important starting point.’” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S., at 274, quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977).
Proposition I in no way purports to limit the power of state courts to remedy the effects of intentional segregation with its accompanying stigma. The benefits of neighborhood schooling are racially neutral. This manifestly is true in Los Angeles where over 75% of the public school body is composed of groups viewed as racial minorities. See nn. 1 and 16, supra. Moreover, the Proposition simply removes one ■means of achieving the state-created right to desegregated education. School districts retain the obligation to alleviate segregation regardless of cause. And the state courts still may order desegregation measures other than pupil school assignment or pupil transportation.
Even if we could assume that Proposition I had a disproportionate adverse effect on racial minorities, we see no reason to challenge the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the voters of the State were not motivated by a discriminatory purpose. See 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 654-655, 170 Cal. Rptr., at 509. In this case the Proposition was approved by an overwhelming majority of the electorate. It received support from members of all races. The purposes of the Proposition are stated in its text and are legitimate, nondiscriminatory objectives. In these circumstances, we will not dispute the judgment of the Court of Appeal or impugn the motives of the State’s electorate.
Accordingly the judgment of the California Court of Appeal is
Affirmed.
In 1980 the District included 562 schools with 650,000 students in an area of 711 square miles. In 1968 when the case went to trial, the District was 53.6% white, 22.6% black, 20% Hispanic, and 3.8% Asian and other. By October 1980 the demographic composition had altered radically: 23.7% white, 23.3% black, 45.3% Hispanic, and 7.7% Asian and other. See 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 642, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495, 501 (1981).
“The findings in this case adequately support the trial court’s conclusion that the segregation in the defendant school district is de jure in nature. We shall explain, however, that we do not rest our decision on this characterization because we continue to adhere to our conclusion in [Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P. 2d 878 (1963)] that school boards in California bear a constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation'regardless of its cause.’ ” Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d, at 285, 551 P. 2d, at 30. The court explained that federal cases were not controlling:
“In focusing primarily on... federal decisions... defendant ignores a significant line of California decisions, decisions which authoritatively establish that in this state school boards do bear a constitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin.” Id., at 290, 551 P. 2d, at 33-34.
In stating general principles to guide the trial court on remand, the State Supreme Court discussed the “busing” question: “While critics have sometimes attempted to obscure the issue, court decisions time and time again emphasized that ‘busing’ is not a constitutional end in itself but is simply one potential tool which may be utilized to satisfy a school district’s constitutional obligation in this field.... [I]n some circumstances busing will be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation plan, while in other instances its ‘costs,’ both in financial and educational terms, will render its use inadvisable.” Id., at 309, 551 P. 2d, at 47. It noted as well that a state court should not intervene to speed the desegregation process so long as the school board takes “reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation,” id., at 305, 551 P. 2d, at 45, and that “a court cannot properly issue a ‘busing’ order so long as a school district continues to meet its constitutional obligations.” Id., at 310, 551 P. 2d, at 48.
The plan provided for the mandatory reassignment of approximately 40,000 students in the fourth through eighth grades. Some of these children were bused over long distances requiring daily round-trip bus rides of as long as two to four hours. In addition, the plan provided for the voluntary transfer of some 30,000 students.
Respondent Bustop, Inc., unsuccessfully sought to stay implementation of the plan. See Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U. S. 1380 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U. S. 1384 (1978) (Powell, J., in chambers).
Proposition I was placed before the voters following a two-thirds vote of each house of the state legislature. Cal. Const., Art. 18, § 1. The State Senate approved the Proposition by a vote of 28 to 6, the State Assembly by a vote of 62 to 17. The voters favored the Proposition by a vote of 2,433,312 (68.6%) to 1,112,923 (31.4%). The Proposition received a majority of the vote in each of the State’s 58 counties and in 79 of the State’s 80 assembly districts. California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote, November 6, 1979, Election 3-4, 43-49.
Proposition I added a lengthy proviso to Art. 1, § 7(a), of the California Constitution. Following passage of Proposition I, § 7 now provides, in relevant part:
“(a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that nothing contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obligations or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation. In enforcing this subdivision or any other provision of this Constitution, no court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under federal decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
“Nothing herein shall prohibit the governing board of a school district from voluntarily continuing or commencing a school integration plan after the effective date of this subdivision as amended.
“In amending this subdivision, the Legislature and people of the State of California find and declare that this amendment is necessary to serve compelling public interests, including those of making the most effective use of the limited financial resources now and prospectively available to support public education, maximizing the educational opportunities and protecting the health and safety of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of parents to participate in the educational process, preserving harmony and tranquility in this state and its public schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel resources, and protecting the environment.”
The Superior Court ordered the immediate implementation of the revised plan. The District was unsuccessful in its effort to gain a stay of the plan pending appeal. See Board of Education v. Superior Court, 448 U. S. 1343 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).
“When the 1970 findings of the trial court are reviewed in the light of the correct applicable federal law, it is apparent that no specific segregative intent with discriminatory purpose was found. The thrust of the findings of the trial court was that passive maintenance by the Board of a neighborhood school system in the face of widespread residential racial imbalance amounted to de jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.... But a school board has no duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to meet and overcome the effect of population movements.” 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 645-646, 170 Cal. Rptr., at 503.
The Court of Appeal also rejected the claim that Proposition I deprived minority children of a “vested right” to desegregated education in violation of due process. See id., at 655-656,170 Cal. Rptr., at 509-510. Petitioners no longer advance this claim.
On March 16, 1981, the District directed that mandatory pupil reassignment under the Superior Court’s revised plan be terminated on April 20, 1981. On that date, parents of children who had been reassigned were given the option of returning their children to neighborhood schools. According to respondent Board of Education, approximately 7,000 pupils took this option of whom 4,300 were minority students. Brief for Respondent Board of Education 10.
The state courts refused to enjoin termination of the plan. On April 17, 1981, however, the United States District Court for the Central District of California issued a temporary restraining order preventing termination of the plan. Los Angeles NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 513 F. Supp. 717. The District Court found that there was a “fair chance” that intentional segregation by the District could be demonstrated. Id,., at 720. The District Court’s order was vacated on the following day by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Los Angeles Unified School District v. District Court, 650 F. 2d 1004 (1981). On remand the District Court denied the District’s motion to dismiss. This ruling has been certified for interlocutory appeal. See Brief for Respondent Board of Education 10, n. 4.
On September 10, 1981, the Superior Court approved a new, voluntary desegregation plan.
Respondent Bustop, Inc., argues that far from doing “more” than the Fourteenth Amendment requires, the State actually violated the Amendment by assigning students on the basis of race when such assignments were not necessary to remedy a federal constitutional violation. See Brief for Respondent Bustop, Inc., 10-18. We do not reach this contention.
In this respect this case differs from the situation presented in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, ante, p. 457.
In an opinion delivered after Proposition I was enacted, the California Supreme Court stated that “the amendment neither releases school districts from their state constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to alleviate segregation regardless of its cause, nor divests California courts of authority to order desegregation measures other than pupil school assignment or pupil transportation.” McKinny v. Oxnard Union High School District Board of Trustees, 31 Cal. 3d 79, 92-93, 642 P. 2d 460, 467 (1982). Moreover, the Proposition only limits state courts when enforcing the State Constitution. Thus, the Proposition would not bar state-court enforcement of state statutes requiring busing for desegregation or for any other purpose. Cf. Brown v. Califano, 201 U. S. App. D. C. 235, 244, 627 F. 2d 1221, 1230 (1980) (legislation limiting power of federal agency to require busing by local school boards held constitutional in view of the “effective avenues for desegregation” left open by the legislation).
“[I]t is racial discrimination in the judicial apparatus of the state, not racial discrimination in the state’s schools, that petitioners challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment in this case.” Brief for Petitioners 48.
In Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969), the Court invalidated a city charter amendment which placed a special burden on racial minorities in the political process. The Court considered that although the law was neutral on its face, “the reality is that the law’s impact falls on the minority.” Id., at 391. In light of this reality and the distortion of the political process worked by the charter amendment, the Court considered that the amendment employed a racial classification despite its facial neutrality. In this case the elements underlying the holding in Hunter are missing. See infra.
A neighborhood school policy in itself does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 28 (1971) (“Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis. All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes”). Cf. 20 U. S. C. § 1701: “(a) The Congress declares it to be the policy of the United States that — (1) all children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educational opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin; and (2) the neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school assignments.”
In the Los Angeles School District, white students are now the racial minority, see n. 1, supra. Similarly, in Los Angeles County, racial minorities, including those of Spanish origin, constitute the majority of the population. See U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1980 Census of Population and Housing, California, Advance Reports 6 (Mar. 1981).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 238-248 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977); James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 141 (1971).
Proposition I is not limited to busing for the purpose of racial desegregation. It applies neutrally to “pupil school assignment or pupil transportation” in general. Even so, it is clear that court-ordered busing in excess of that required by the Fourteenth Amendment, as one means of desegregating schools, prompted the initiation and probably the adoption of Proposition I.
See Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 443 U. S., at 531, n. 5 (“Racial imbalance, we noted in Dayton I, is not per se a constitutional violation, and rescission of prior resolutions proposing desegregation is unconstitutional only if the resolutions were required in the first place by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
In Hunter we noted that “we do not hold that mere repeal of an existing [antidiscrimination] ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment.” 393 U. S., at 390, n. 5. In Reitman the Court held that California Proposition 14 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment not because it repealed two pieces of antidiscrimination legislation, but because the Proposition involved the State in private racial discrimination: “Here we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing law forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market.” 387 U. S., at 380-381.
Of course, if the purpose of repealing legislation is to disadvantage a racial minority, the repeal is unconstitutional for this reason. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967).
See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 228 (1971) (“To hold... that every public facility or service, once opened, constitutionally ‘locks in’ the public sponsor so that it may not be dropped... would plainly discourage the expansion and enlargement of needed services in the long run”) (Burger, C. J., concurring); Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395 (“Opponents of state antidiscrimination statutes are now in a position to argue that such legislation should be defeated because, if enacted, it may be unrepealable”) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In his dissenting opinion in Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395, Justice Harlan remarked upon the need for legislative flexibility when dealing with the “delicate and troublesome problems of race relations.” He noted: “The lines that have been and must be drawn in this area, fraught as it is with human sensibilities and frailties of whatever race or creed, are difficult ones. The drawing of them requires understanding, patience, and compromise, and is best done by legislatures rather than by courts. When legislation in this field is unsuccessful there should be wide opportunities for legislative amendment, as well as for change through such processes as the popular initiative and referendum.” 387 U. S., at 395-396.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. See id., at 7-8 (“The fact that a state may be free to remove a right or remove a duty, does not mean that it has the same freedom to leave the right in place but simply, in a discriminatory way we argue, provide less than full judicial remedy”).
“In the case before us... the city of Akron has not attempted to allocate governmental power on the basis of any general principle. Here, we have a provision that has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their interest.” 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring).
The Hunter Court noted that although “the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner,” id., at 391, a charter amendment making it more difficult to pass antidiscrimination legislation could only disadvantage racial minorities in the governmental process.
Petitioners contend that Proposition I only restricts busing for the purpose of racial discrimination. The Proposition is neutral on its face, however, and respondents — as well as the State in its amicus brief — take issue with petitioners’ interpretation of the provision.
Similarly, a “dual constitution” is not established when the State chooses to go beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution in some areas but not others. Nor is a “dual executive branch” created when an agency is given enforcement powers in one area but not in another. Cf. Brown v. Califano, 201 U. S. App. D. C. 235, 627 F. 2d 1221 (1980) (upholding federal legislation prohibiting a federal executive agency, but not local school officials or federal courts, from requiring busing).
The Proposition contains its own statement of purpose:
“[T]he Legislature and people of the State of California find and declare that this amendment is necessary to serve compelling public interests, including those of making the most effective use of the limited financial resources now and prospectively available to support public education, maximizing the educational opportunities and protecting the health and safety of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of parents to participate in the educational process, preserving harmony and tranquility in this state and its public schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel, resources, and protecting the environment.”
Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 253 (“The extent of deference
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice O’Connor
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy join.
In this case, we decide whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the State of California from sentencing a repeat felon to a prison term of 25 years to life under the State’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law.
r — <
A
California’s three strikes law reflects a shift in the State’s sentencing policies toward incapacitating and deterring repeat offenders who threaten the public safety. The law was designed “to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 667(b) (West 1999). On March 3, 1993, California Assemblymen Bill Jones and Jim Costa introduced Assembly Bill 971, the legislative version of what would later become the three strikes law. The Assembly Committee on Public Safety defeated the bill only weeks later. Public outrage over the defeat sparked a voter initiative to add Proposition 184, based loosely on the bill, to the ballot in the November 1994 general election.
On October 1, 1993, while Proposition 184 was circulating, 12-year-old Polly Klaas was kidnaped from her home in Petaluma, California. Her admitted killer, Richard Allen Davis, had a long criminal history that included two prior kidnaping convictions. Davis had served only half of his most recent sentence (16 years for kidnaping, assault, and burglary). Had Davis served his entire sentence, he would still have been in prison on the day that Polly Klaas was kidnaped.
Polly Klaas’ murder galvanized support for the three strikes initiative. Within days, Proposition 184 was on its way to becoming the fastest qualifying initiative in California history. On January 3, 1994, the sponsors of Assembly Bill 971 resubmitted an amended version of the bill that conformed to Proposition 184. On January 31,1994, Assembly Bill 971 passed the Assembly by a 63 to 9 margin. The Senate passed it by a 29 to 7 margin on March 3, 1994. Governor Pete Wilson signed the bill into law on March 7, 1994. California voters approved Proposition 184 by a margin of 72 to 28 percent on November 8, 1994.
California thus became the second State to enact a three strikes law. In November 1993, the voters of Washington State approved their own three strikes law, Initiative 593, by a margin of 3 to 1. U. S. Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Justice, J. Clark, J. Austin, & D. Henry, “Three Strikes and You’re Out”: A Review of State Legislation 1 (Sept. 1997) (hereinafter Review of State Legislation). Between 1993 and 1995, 24 States and the Federal Government enacted three strikes laws. Ibid. Though the three strikes laws vary from State to State, they share a common goal of protecting the public safety by providing lengthy prison terms for habitual felons.
B
California’s current three strikes law consists of two virtually identical statutory schemes “designed to increase the prison terms of repeat felons.” People v. Superior Court of San Diego Cty. ex rel. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th 497, 504, 917 P. 2d 628, 630 (1996) (Romero). When a defendant is convicted of a felony, and he has previously been convicted of one or more prior felonies defined as “serious” or “violent” in Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 667.5 and 1192.7 (West Supp. 2002), sentencing is conducted pursuant to the three strikes law. Prior convictions must be alleged in the charging document, and the defendant has a right to a jury determination that the prosecution has proved the prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. § 1025; § 1158 (West 1985).
If the defendant has one prior “serious” or “violent” felony conviction, he must be sentenced to “twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.” § 667(e)(1) (West 1999); § 1170.12(c)(1) (West Supp. 2002). If the defendant has two or more prior “serious” or “violent” felony convictions, he must receive “an indeterminate term of life imprisonment.” § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999); § 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2002). Defendants sentenced to life under the three strikes law become eligible for parole on a date calculated by reference to a “minimum term,” which is the greater of (a) three times the term otherwise provided for the current conviction, (b) 25 years, or (c) the term determined by the court pursuant to §1170 for the underlying conviction, including any enhancements. §§667(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (West 1999); §§ 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (West Supp. 2002).
Under California law, certain offenses may be classified as either felonies or misdemeanors. These crimes are known as “wobblers.” Some crimes that would otherwise be misdemeanors become “wobblers” because of the defendant’s prior record. For example, petty theft, a misdemeanor, becomes a “wobbler” when the defendant has previously served a prison term for committing specified theft-related crimes. §490 (West 1999); §666 (West Supp. 2002). Other crimes, such as grand theft, are “wobblers” regardless of the defendant’s prior record. See § 489(b) (West 1999). Both types of “wobblers” are triggering offenses under the three strikes law only when they are treated as felonies. Under California law, a “wobbler” is presumptively a felony and “remains a felony except when the discretion is actually exercised” to make the crime a misdemeanor. People v. Wil liams, 27 Cal. 2d 220, 229, 163 P. 2d 692, 696 (1945) (emphasis deleted and internal quotation marks omitted).
In California, prosecutors may exercise their discretion to charge a “wobbler” as either a felony or a misdemeanor. Likewise, California trial courts have discretion to reduce a “wobbler” charged as a felony to a misdemeanor either before preliminary examination or at sentencing to avoid imposing a three strikes sentence. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 17(b)(5), 17(b)(1) (West 1999); People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty. ex rel. Alvarez, 14 Cal. 4th 968, 978, 928 P. 2d 1171, 1177-1178 (1997). In exercising this discretion, the court may consider “those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions,” such as “the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense,... [and] the general objectives of sentencing.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
California trial courts can also vacate allegations of prior “serious” or “violent” felony convictions, either on motion by the prosecution or sua sponte. Romero, supra, at 529-530, 917 P. 2d, at 647-648. In ruling whether to vacate allegations of prior felony convictions, courts consider whether, “in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the [three strikes’] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part.” People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 4th 148, 161, 948 P. 2d 429, 437 (1998). Thus, trial courts may avoid imposing a three strikes sentence in two ways: first, by reducing “wobblers” to misdemeanors (which do not qualify as triggering offenses), and second, by vacating allegations of prior “serious” or “violent” felony convictions.
C
On parole from a 9-year prison term, petitioner Gary Ewing walked into the pro shop of the El Segundo Golf Course in Los Angeles County on March 12, 2000. He walked out with three golf clubs, priced at $399 apiece, concealed in his pants leg. A shop employee, whose suspicions were aroused when he observed Ewing limp out of the pro shop, telephoned the police. The police apprehended Ewing in the parking lot.
Ewing is no stranger to the criminal justice system. In 1984, at the age of 22, he pleaded guilty to theft. The court sentenced him to six months in jail (suspended), three years’ probation, and a $300 fine. In 1988, he was convicted of felony grand theft auto and sentenced to one year in jail and three years’ probation. After Ewing completed probation, however, the sentencing court reduced the crime to a misdemeanor, permitted Ewing to withdraw his guilty plea, and dismissed the case. In 1990, he was convicted of petty theft with a prior and sentenced to 60 days in the county jail and three years’ probation. In 1992, Ewing was convicted of battery and sentenced to 30 days in the county jail and two years’ summary probation. One month later, he was convicted of theft and sentenced to 10 days in the county jail and 12 months’ probation. In January 1993, Ewing was convicted of burglary and sentenced to 60 days in the county jail and one year’s summary probation. In February 1993, he was convicted of possessing drug paraphernalia and sentenced to six months in the county jail and three years’ probation. In July 1993, he was convicted of appropriating lost property and sentenced to 10 days in the county jail and two years’ summary probation. In September 1993, he was convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm and trespassing and sentenced to 30 days in the county jail and one year’s probation.
In October and November 1993, Ewing committed three burglaries and one robbery at a Long Beach, California, apartment complex over a 5-week period. He awakened one of his victims, asleep on her living room sofa, as he tried to disconnect her video cassette recorder from the television in that room. When she screamed, Ewing ran out the front door. On another occasion, Ewing accosted a victim in the mailroom of the apartment complex. Ewing claimed to have a gun and ordered the victim to hand over his wallet. When the victim resisted, Ewing produced a knife and forced the victim back to the apartment itself. While Ewing rifled through the bedroom, the victim fled the apartment screaming for help. Ewing absconded with the victim’s money and credit cards.
On December 9,1993, Ewing was arrested on the premises of the apartment complex for trespassing and lying to a police officer. The knife used in the robbery and a glass cocaine pipe were later found in the back seat of the patrol car used to transport Ewing to the police station. A jury convicted Ewing of first-degree robbery and three counts of residential burglary. Sentenced to nine years and eight months in prison, Ewing was paroled in 1999.
Only 10 months later, Ewing stole the golf clubs at issue in this case. He was charged with, and ultimately convicted of, one count of felony grand theft of personal property in excess of $400. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 484 (West Supp. 2002); §489 (West 1999). As required by the three strikes law, the prosecutor formally alleged, and the trial court later found, that Ewing had been convicted previously of four serious or violent felonies for the three burglaries and the robbery in the Long Beach apartment complex. See § 667(g) (West 1999); § 1170.12(e) (West Supp. 2002).
At the sentencing hearing, Ewing asked the court to reduce the conviction for grand theft, a “wobbler” under California law, to a misdemeanor so as to avoid a three strikes sentence. See §§ 17(b), 667(d)(1) (West 1999); § 1170.12(b)(1) (West Supp. 2002). Ewing also asked the trial court to exercise its discretion to dismiss the allegations of some or all of his prior serious or violent felony convictions, again for purposes of avoiding a three strikes sentence. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th, at 529-531, 917 P. 2d, at 647-648. Before sen-fencing Ewing, the trial court took note of his entire criminal history, including the fact that he was on parole when he committed his latest offense. The court also heard arguments from defense counsel and a plea from Ewing himself.
In the end, the trial judge determined that the grand theft should remain a felony. The court also ruled that the four prior strikes for the three burglaries and the robbery in Long Beach should stand. As a newly convicted felon with two or more “serious” or “violent” felony convictions in his past, Ewing was sentenced under the three strikes law to 25 years to life.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed in an unpublished opinion. No. B143745 (Apr. 25, 2001). Relying on our decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980), the court rejected Ewing’s claim that his sentence was grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment. Enhanced sentences under recidivist statutes like the three strikes law, the court reasoned, serve the “legitimate goal” of deterring and incapacitating repeat offenders. The Supreme Court of California denied Ewing’s petition for review, and we granted certiorari, 535 U. S. 969 (2002). We now affirm.
II
A
The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, contains a “narrow proportionality principle” that “applies to noncapital sentences.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 996-997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); cf. Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 371 (1910); Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660, 667 (1962) (applying the Eighth Amendment to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment). We have most recently addressed the proportionality principle as applied to terms of years in a series of cases beginning with Rummel v. Estelle, supra.
In Rummel, we held that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment for a State to sentence a three-time offender to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Id., at 284-285. Like Ewing, Rummel was sentenced to a lengthy prison term under a recidivism statute. Rummel’s two prior offenses were a 1964 felony for “fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or services,” and a 1969 felony conviction for “passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36.” Id., at 265. His triggering offense was a conviction for felony theft — “obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses.” Id., at 266.
This Court ruled that “[hjaving twice imprisoned him for felonies, Texas was entitled to place upon Rummel the onus of one who is simply unable to bring his conduct within the social norms prescribed by the criminal law of the State.” Id., at 284. The recidivism statute “is nothing more than a societal decision that when such a person commits yet another felony, he should be subjected to the admittedly serious penalty of incarceration for life, subject only to the State’s judgment as to whether to grant him parole.” Id., at 278. We noted that this Court “has on occasion stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.” Id., at 271. But “[ojutside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” Id., at 272. Although we stated that the proportionality principle “would . . . come into play in the extreme example ... if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment,” id., at 274, n. 11, we held that “the mandatory life sentence imposed upon this petitioner does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,” id., at 285.
In Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370 (1982) (per curiam), the defendant was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 20 years in prison for possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of marijuana and distribution of marijuana. We held that such a sentence was constitutional: “In short, Rummel stands for the proposition that federal courts should be reluctant to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment, and that successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences should be exceedingly rare.” Id., at 374 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Three years after Rummel, in Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277, 279 (1983), we held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited “a life sentence without possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent felony.” The triggering offense in Solem was “uttering a ‘no account’ check for $100.” Id., at 281. We specifically stated that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments “prohibits .. . sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed,” and that the “constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century.” Id., at 284, 286. The Solem Court then explained that three factors may be relevant to a determination of whether a sentence is so disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id., at 292.
Applying these factors in Solem, we struck down the defendant’s sentence of life without parole. We specifically noted the contrast between that sentence and the sentence in Rummel, pursuant to which the defendant was eligible for parole. 463 U. S., at 297; see also id., at 300 (“[T]he South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally different from the parole system that was before us in Rummel”). Indeed, we explicitly declined to overrule Rummel: “[Q]ur conclusion today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle.” 463 U. S., at 303, n. 32; see also id., at 288, n. 13 (“[O]ur decision is entirely consistent with this Court’s prior cases — including Rummel v. Estelle”).
Eight years after Solem, we grappled with the proportionality issue again in Harmelin. Harmelin was not a recidivism case, but rather involved a first-time offender convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. He was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. A majority of the Court rejected Harmelin’s claim that his sentence was so grossly disproportionate that it violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court, however, could not agree on why his proportionality argument failed. Justice Scalia, joined by The Chief Justice, wrote that the proportionality principle was “an aspect of our death penalty jurisprudence, rather than a generalizable aspect of Eighth Amendment law.” 501 U. S. at 994. He would thus have declined to apply gross disproportionality principles except in reviewing capital sentences. Ibid.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of Illinois, the Illinois Commerce Commission, and the Milwaukee Road Commuters’ Association, aggrieved by an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission fixing intrastate passenger fares for the Milwaukee Road’s Chicago suburban commuter service higher than the fares authorized by the State Commission, brought this action in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, seeking relief under 28 U. S. C. § 1336. The ICC order, 297 I. C. C. 353, was made under 49 U. S. C. § 13 (4), which authorizes the ICC to prescribe intrastate fares if it finds that “. . . any such . . . [existing intrastate] fare . . . causes . . . any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate . . . commerce.” The three-judge District Court set aside the order, enjoined its enforcement, and remanded the case to the ICC for further proceedings. 146 F. Supp. 195. The District Court held, inter alia, that the ICC failed to make findings appropriate to show that the existing fares caused undue, unreasonable or unjust discrimination against interstate commerce. The judgment was appealed under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We noted probable jurisdiction, 352 U. S. 939.
The ICC found that the Milwaukee Road’s 1954 passenger revenues from the Chicago suburban commuter service fell short by $306,038 of meeting the out-of-pocket cost of the service. This was the basis of the conclusion that the existing intrastate fares caused undue discrimination against interstate commerce. To remove this discrimination the ICC prescribed fares to produce $383,000 additional annual revenue, enough to eliminate the determined out-of-pocket loss and to allow $77,000 annually as a contribution to indirect costs and taxes. The question for our decision is whether the District Court properly set aside the ICC order as void for lack of findings necessary to support an order under § 13 (4).
The Chicago suburban commuter service, except for a relatively insignificant exception mentioned below, is entirely an intrastate service. It is provided in two directions from Chicago’s Union Station. One direction, wholly within Illinois, is west from Chicago some 37 route miles to Elgin, Illinois. The other direction is north from Chicago to Walworth, Wisconsin; however, 62 of the 74 route miles in that direction, and 24 of the 26 station stops, are located within Illinois. Total 1954 passenger revenues from this service were $1,796,231 from 4,869,064 passengers. Commuters traveling on commutation and multiple-ride tickets numbered 3,910,526 of this total and accounted for $1,374,261 of the revenue.
Commuter fares of most of the railroads providing commuter service in the Chicago area have been determined, at least since 1950, in joint hearings conducted by the ICC and the State Commission under 49 U. S. C. § 13 (3). 297 I. C. C. 353, 354. On July 24, 1952, however, the Milwaukee Road, instead of filing petitions or schedules with both Commissions, filed a petition with the State Commission only requesting
“authority to discontinue all off-peak Chicago suburban passenger trains and'consolidate certain peak-hour trains and also to increase one-way, round-trip and commutation fares to such extent as will after taking into consideration the economy effected by such discontinuances and consolidation of trains, give respondent sufficient revenues to permit operation of the Chicago 'suburban service without an out-of-pocket loss.” 297 I. C. C., at 355.
The State Commission did not act on the application until 1954. Meanwhile the Milwaukee Road changed the suburban service from a steam to a diesel operation. The State Commission found that the cost savings effected by this change eliminated the out-of-pocket loss and, on November 10, 1954, denied the application. The Milwaukee Road thereupon, in February 1955, petitioned the ICC for relief under § 13 (4).
This case presents once again the problem of adjusting state and federal interests in the regulation of intrastate rates. These intrastate rates are primarily the State’s concern and federal power is dominant “only so far as necessary to alter rates which injuriously affect interstate transportation.” North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507, 511. Thus, whenever this federal power is exerted within what would otherwise be the domain of state power, the justification for its exercise must “clearly appear.” Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 212. The statute provides a practical method of minimizing the inevitable irritations inherent in the conflict by requiring the ICC to notify the State whenever there is brought before it any fare imposed by state authority. In addition, the ICC may confer with the state regulatory authority, or may hold joint hearings with the state agency, when the State’s rate-making authority may be affected by the action taken by the ICC. 49 U. S. C. § 13 (3).
The occasion for the exercise of the federal power asserted by § 13 (4) is the necessity for effecting the required contribution by intrastate traffic of its proportionate share of the revenues necessary to pay a carrier’s operating cost and to yield a fair return. When intrastate revenues fall short of producing their fair proportionate share of required total revenues, they work an undue discrimination against interstate commerce, and the ICC may remove the discrimination by fixing intrastate rates high enough reasonably to protect interstate commerce. Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. United States, 292 U. S. 474, 479; Wisconsin R. Comm’n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 586; United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70, 75. In determining whether an undue revenue discrimination against interstate commerce is caused by intrastate rates, the ICC may consider “among other things, the need, in the public interest, of adequate and efficient railway transportation service and the need of revenues sufficient to sustain such service,” a standard written into 49 U. S. C. § 15a (2). King v. United States, 344 U. S. 254, 264. No formal requirements are prescribed for the findings to be made by the ICC under § 13 (4). United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70, 80. Reasonable determinations suffice. Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1, 9. But the justification for the exercise of this exceptional federal power to interfere with intrastate rates must be made definitely and clearly apparent. Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 212.
In the instant case the ICC interfered with suburban commuter rates — intrastate rates peculiarly localized in impact upon the Chicago suburban community. In substance, the ICC found that because this single segment of the Milwaukee Road’s intrastate operations in Illinois did not meet out-of-pocket costs, there was an undue discrimination against the road’s interstate operations, without regard to the contribution of other Illinois intrastate revenues, freight or passenger, concerning which both the record and the findings are entirely silent.
We think this is a case where the ICC cannot be sustained in altering intrastate rates merely because the Chicago suburban commuter traffic — of the Milwaukee Road’s total intrastate Illinois traffic, freight and passenger — is not remunerative or reasonably compensatory. Cf. Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194; North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507. The limited and exceptional federal power asserted by § 13 (4) over intrastate rates must be exercised with “scrupulous regard for maintaining the [primary] power of the state in this field.” North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507, 511. It is of course desirable that each particular intrastate service should as nearly as may be pay its own way and return a profit — but the State Commission, not the ICC, has the responsibility in the first instance to achieve that desired end. Passenger deficits have become chronic in the railroad industry and it has become necessary to make up these deficits from more remunerative services. The ICC has recognized this practical reality of today’s railroading and has changed its rate-fixing policy so that if interstate passenger service inevitably and inescapably cannot bear its direct costs and its share of joint or indirect costs, the ICC feels compelled in a general rate case to take the passenger deficit into account in the adjustment of interstate freight rates and charges. King v. United States, 344 U. S. 254, 261. An equally broad power must be conceded to a state commission in the exercise of its primary authority to prescribe and adjust intrastate rates.
In view of that policy, we do not think that the deficit from this single commuter operation can fairly be adjudged to work an undue discrimination against the Milwaukee Road’s interstate operations without findings which take the deficit into account in the light of the carrier’s other intrastate revenues from Illinois traffic, freight and passenger. The basic objective of § 13 (4), applied in the light of § 15a (2) to this case, is to prevent a discrimination against the carrier’s interstate traffic which would result from saddling that traffic with an undue burden of providing intrastate services. A fair picture of the intrastate operation, and whether the intrastate traffic unduly discriminates against interstate traffic, is not shown, in this case, by limiting consideration to the particular commuter service in disregard of the revenue contributed by the other intrastate services.
A requirement for findings which reflect the commuter service deficit in the totality of intrastate revenues is not a departure from previous holdings of this Court. The precise situation presented by this case has not heretofore been considered by the Court. The previous cases involving Commission orders increasing intrastate rates in the interest of the carrier’s revenue (as distinguished from cases of discrimination against particular persons and localities, see Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342) involved statewide orders raising intrastate rates. In passenger fare cases, ICC orders were sustained on a showing that following general increases in interstate passenger rates, state commissions refused to increase intrastate passenger rates to the same level for what were essentially identical services. Wiscon sin R. Comm’n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563; New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591. It was held that the state passenger rates in that circumstance were not producing their fair proportionate share. In North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507, also a passenger fare case, the ICC order was not sustained because the findings were held to be insufficient. Nonpassenger fare cases in which ICC orders raising intrastate rates were sustained were United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70; Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1; and King v. United States, 344 U. S. 254. The order was not sustained, however, in an earlier Florida case, Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194. The only case ostensibly based upon a revenue discrimination caused by a local operation was not a passenger fare case. Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. United States, 292 U. S. 474. Basically the discrimination there complained of, however, was a persons-and-locality discrimination against interstate shippers.
It should also be noted that in King v. United States, supra, the Court adverted to those very factors among the ICC’s findings whose absence in the present case we find to be a fatal defect. The Court there emphasized the ICC finding that the entire intrastate traffic, freight and passenger, constituted a revenue drain upon the carrier’s revenues from interstate traffic. Since the Commission has not in this case found whether or not the commuter rates, viewed in the light of the Illinois intrastate operation as a whole, constitute an undue revenue discrimination against the Milwaukee Road’s interstate operations, the judgment of the District Court in remanding the case to the Commission for further consideration must be affirmed.
The District Court also held that the ICC erred in considering evidence which was not presented by the Milwaukee Road to the State Commission. The evidence in question concerned certain depreciation and maintenance-of-way expenses totaling $258,172, which the ICC took into account in computing out-of-pocket costs. The District Court said:
“If different evidence is to be offered or a different basis of fares is to be urged before the interstate commission, the state commission should have been given a chance to fix fares on the same evidence and the same basis.
“Where a railroad seeks the fixing of higher intrastate rates by the interstate commission after failing in such endeavor before a state commission, § 13 (4) does not contemplate that the state commission is to be considered only a way station in a journey to the interstate commission.” 146 F. Supp. 195, 201, 202.
This holding in effect restricts the ICC in decisions under § 13 (4) to the identical evidence presented by the railroad to the State Commission. So to restrict the ICC’s consideration as to whether intrastate rates work an undue discrimination against interstate commerce might seriously interfere with the Commission’s duty to remove the discrimination to protect the exclusive federal domain of interstate commerce. It is contrary to this Court’s holding in Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194. There the State Commission had not affirmatively prescribed the existing rates which the ICC increased. It was urged that until the State Commission did so § 13 (4) granted no power to the ICC to prescribe higher rates. This Court rejected this contention, saying “To hold . . . that there can be no adjustment of intrastate rates by the Interstate Commerce Commission so far as may be needed to protect interstate commerce until the State itself has first 'sat in judgment on the issue of the lawfulness of those intrastate rates’ would be to impose a limitation not required by the terms of the statute and repugnant to the grant of authority.” Id., at 210.
In this case the ICC might more wisely have arranged for joint hearings under § 13 (3) or have deferred action pending an opportunity for the State Commission to consider this evidence. However, nothing in the statute compels either course or denies the ICC the power to determine the question presented by the railroad’s petition, whatever may have been the evidence presented before the State Commission. See North Carolina v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 718, affirmed, 350 U. S. 805; Illinois v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 36, 47, affirmed, 342 U. S. 930.
Finally, it is argued that the District Court erred in setting aside so much of the ICC order as authorized an increase in the interstate fares to the two Wisconsin points. We believe, however, that these rates are so interwoven with and so closely bound to the intrastate rates that a proper disposition of this case reasonably requires that the Commission reconsider them as part of its reconsideration of the entire Chicago suburban commuter service. The only reason why the ICC increased the interstate rates was to make them conform to the increased intrastate rates.
Paragraph 3 of the District Court judgment dated June 14, 1956, is modified to provide that the remand to the ICC shall be for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
24 Stat. 383, as amended, 41 Stat. 484, 49 U. S. C. § 13 (4):
“Whenever in any such investigation the commission, after full hearing, finds that any such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice causes any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce, which is forbidden and declared to be unlawful, it shall prescribe the rate, fare, or charge, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, thereafter to be charged, and the classification, regulation, or practice thereafter to be observed, in such manner as, in its judgment, will remove such advantage, preference, prejudice, or discrimination. Such rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices shall be observed while in effect by the carriers parties to such proceeding affected thereby, the law of any State or the decision or order of any State authority to the contrary notwithstanding.”
The injunction was stayed pending the hearing of the appeal to this Court. The excess fares are being impounded under a provision of the stay order providing for their refund to the persons who paid them in the event the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
The Milwaukee Road is the appellant in No. 12. The United States is the appellant in No. 27. The ICC is the appellant in No. 28. Bach appeals from the particular provisions of the judgment by which it is aggrieved.
The interstate fares to the two Wisconsin points were also raised in this proceeding by an ICC order entered November 21, 1955, and Order No. 26550, Passenger Fares and Surcharges, 214 I. C. C. 174, was modified so as to permit the rates to be made effective. No affirmative order raising the intrastate rates was made, however, until March 2, 1956. The ICC report allowed the Milwaukee Road and the Illinois Commerce Commission 60 days in which to adjust the intrastate rates on the bases prescribed in the report. Failing such adjustment the order of March 2, 1956, prescribing the intrastate rates was entered and Order No. 11703, Intrastate Rates Within Illinois, 59 I. C. C. 350, was modified to permit the Milwaukee Road to make the intrastate rates effective.
24 Stat. 383, as amended, 41 Stat. 484, 49 U. S. C. § 13 (3):
“Whenever in any investigation under the provisions of this chapter, or in any investigation instituted upon petition of the carrier concerned, which petition is authorized to be filed, there shall be brought in issue any rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice, made or imposed by authority of any State, the commission, before proceeding to hear and dispose of such issue, shall cause the State or States interested to be notified of the proceeding. The commission may confer with the authorities of any State having regulatory jurisdiction over the class of persons and corporations subject to this chapter or chapter 12 of this title with respect to the relationship between rate structures and practices of carriers subject to the jurisdiction of such State bodies and of the commission; and to that end is authorized and empowered, under rules to be prescribed by it, and which may be modified from time to time, to hold joint hearings with any such State regulating bodies on any matters wherein the commission is empowered to act and where the rate-making authority of a State is or may be affected by the action taken by the commission. The commission is also authorized to avail itself of the cooperation, services, records, and facilities of such State authorities in the enforcement of any provision of this chapter or chapter 12 of this title.”
Wisconsin R. Comm’n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 586. “The effective operation of the [Interstate Commerce] act will reasonably and justly require that intrastate traffic should pay a fair proportionate share of the cost of maintaining an adequate railway system.”
This would seem to be particularly required here in light of the Commission’s recognition “that the deficit from the [Milwaukee Road’s] total passenger operations is relatively greater than from its suburban operations.” 297 I. C. C. 353, 359.
The Commission found that the Milwaukee Road earned in 1954 from its freight operations $37,293,050, and suffered a deficit from all passenger operations of $22,824,532, resulting in a net railway operating income of $14,568,518. This represented a return of approximately 2%.
We agree with the District Court that that portion of the prescribed increases designed to produce $77,000 annually as a contribution to indirect costs and taxes is not based upon adequate findings. There is no finding of the total of indirect costs and taxes to which contribution is to be made, nor any finding from which we may infer how the ICC derived its conclusion that a $77,000 contribution was fair. It is axiomatic that to know whether something is a fair proportionate part of something else, we must be told what the something else is.
On the other hand we cannot agree with the District Court that there was not support in the evidence for the ICC’s finding that the prescribed rates would be just and reasonable for the future. The ICC did not rely solely upon the comparison with the similar fares of the Northwestern, for there was ample other evidence in the record to sustain their findings. But the factors which determine the reasonableness of a rate are so different from the factors which determine what is a fair proportionate share of a carrier’s total income that a finding of the reasonableness of the rates prescribed does not embrace all the findings necessary to support the exercise of the § 13 (4) power.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 buyers have an express cause of action for rescission against sellers who make material misstatements or omissions “by means of a prospectus.” The question presented is whether this right of rescission extends to a private, secondary transaction, on the theory that recitations in the purchase agreement are part of a “prospectus.”
I
Petitioners Gustafson, McLean, and Butler (collectively Gustafson) were in 1989 the sole shareholders of Alloyd, Inc., a manufacturer of plastic packaging and automatic heat sealing equipment. Alloyd was formed, and its stock was issued, in 1961. In 1989, Gustafson decided to sell Alloyd and engaged KPMG Peat Marwick to find a buyer. In response to information distributed by KPMG, Wind Point Partners II, L. P., agreed to buy substantially all of the issued and outstanding stock through Alloyd Holdings, Inc., a new corporation formed to effect the sale of Alloyd’s stock. The shareholders of Alloyd Holdings were Wind Point and a number of individual investors.
In preparation for negotiating the contract with Gustafson, Wind Point undertook an extensive analysis of the company, relying in part on a formal business review prepared by KPMG. Alloyd’s practice was to take inventory at year’s end, so Wind Point and KPMG considered taking an earlier inventory to use in determining the purchase price. In the end they did not do so, relying instead on certain estimates and including provisions for adjustments after the transaction closed.
On December 20,1989, Gustafson and Alloyd Holdings executed a contract of sale. Alloyd Holdings agreed to pay Gus-tafson and his coshareholders $18,709,000 for the sale of the stock plus a payment of $2,122,219, which reflected the estimated increase in Alloyd’s net worth from the end of the previous year, the last period for which hard financial data were available. Article IV of the purchase agreement, entitled “Representations and Warranties of the Sellers,” included assurances that the company’s financial statements “present fairly... the Company’s financial condition” and that between the date of the latest balance sheet and the date the agreement was executed “there ha[d] been no material adverse change in... [Alloyd’s] financial condition.” App. 115, 117. The contract also provided that if the year-end audit and financial statements revealed a variance between estimated and actual increased value, the disappointed party would receive an adjustment.
The year-end audit of Alloyd revealed that Alloyd’s actual earnings for 1989 were lower than the estimates relied upon by the parties in negotiating the adjustment amount of $2,122,219. Under the contract, the buyers had a right to recover an adjustment amount of $815,000 from the sellers. Nevertheless, on February 11,1991, the newly formed company (now called Alloyd Co., the same as the original company) and Wind Point brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking outright rescission of the contract under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act or Act). Alloyd (the new company) claimed that statements made by Gustafson and his coshareholders regarding the financial data of their company were inaccurate, rendering untrue the representations and warranties contained in the contract. The buyers further alleged that the contract of sale was a “prospectus,” so that any misstatements contained in the agreement gave rise to liability under § 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Pursuant to the adjustment clause, the defendants remitted to the purchasers $815,000 plus interest, but the adjustment did not cause the purchasers to drop the lawsuit.
Relying on the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F. 2d 682 (1991), the District Court granted Gustafson’s motion for summary judgment, holding “that section 12(2) claims can only arise out of the initial stock offerings.” App. 20. Although the sellers were the controlling shareholders of the original company, the District Court concluded that the private sale agreement “cannot be compared to an initial offering” because “the purchasers in this case had direct access to financial and other company documents, and had the opportunity to inspect the seller’s property.” Id., at 21.
On review, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of that court’s intervening decision in Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc. v. Allen & Co. Inc., 993 F. 2d 578 (1993). In Pacific Dunlop the court reasoned that the inclusion of the term “communication” in the Act’s definition of prospectus meant that the term “prospectus” was defined “very broadly” to include all written communications that offered the sale of a security. Id., at 582. Rejecting the view of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Ballay, the Court of Appeals decided that § 12(2)’s right of action for rescission “applies to any communication which offers any security for sale... including the stock purchase agreement in the present case.” 993 F. 2d, at 595. We granted certio-rari to resolve this Circuit conflict, 510 U. S. 1176 (1994), and we now reverse.
II
The rescission claim against Gustafson is based upon § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §77i(2). In relevant part, the section provides that any person who
“offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 77c of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission,
“shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.”
As this case reaches us, we must assume that the stock purchase agreement contained material misstatements of fact made by the sellers and that Gustafson would not sustain its burden of proving due care. On these assumptions, Alloyd would have a right to obtain rescission if those misstatements were made “by means of a prospectus or oral communication.” The Courts of Appeals agree that the phrase “oral communication” is restricted to oral communications that relate to a prospectus. See Pacific Dunlop, supra, at 588; Ballay, supra, at 688. The determinative question, then, is whether the contract between Alloyd and Gustafson is a “prospectus” as the term is used in the 1933 Act.
Alloyd argues that “prospectus” is defined in a broad manner, broad enough to encompass the contract between the parties. This argument is echoed by the dissents. See post, at 585-586 (opinion of Thomas, J.); post, at 596 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). Gustafson, by contrast, maintains that prospectus in the 1933 Act means a communication soliciting the public to purchase securities from the issuer. Brief for Petitioners 17-18.
Three sections of the 1933 Act are critical in resolving the definitional question on which the case turns: § 2(10), which defines a prospectus; § 10, which sets forth the information that must be contained in a prospectus; and § 12, which imposes liability based on misstatements in a prospectus. In seeking to interpret the term “prospectus,” we adopt the premise that the term should be construed, if possible, to give it a consistent meaning throughout the Act. That principle follows from our duty to construe statutes, not isolated provisions. See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 713 (1975); Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 650 (1974).
A
We begin with § 10. It provides, in relevant part:
“Except to the extent otherwise permitted or required pursuant to this subsection or subsections (c), (d), or (e) of this section—
“(1) a prospectus relating to a security other than a security issued by a foreign government or political subdivision thereof, shall contain the information contained in the registration statement...;
“(2) a prospectus relating to a security issued by a foreign government or political subdivision thereof shall contain the information contained in the registration statement... 15 U. S. C. §77j(a).
Section 10 does not provide that some prospectuses must contain the information contained in the registration statement. Save for the explicit and well-defined exemptions for securities listed under §3, see 15 U. S. C. §77c (exempting certain classes of securities from the coverage of the Act), its mandate is unqualified: “[A] prospectus... shall contain the information contained in the registration statement.”
Although § 10 does not define what a prospectus is, it does instruct us what a prospectus cannot be if the Act is to be interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, one in which the operative words have a consistent meaning throughout. There is no dispute that the contract in this ease was not required to contain the information contained in a registration statement and that no statutory exemption was required to take the document out of § 10’s coverage. Cf. 15 U. S. C. §77c. It follows that the contract is not a prospectus under § 10. That does not mean that a document ceases to be a prospectus whenever it omits a required piece of information. It does mean that a document is not a prospectus within the meaning of that section if, absent an exemption, it need not comply with § 10’s requirements in the first place.
An examination of § 10 reveals that, whatever else “prospectus” may mean, the term is confined to a document that, absent an overriding exemption, must include the “information contained in the registration statement.” By and large, only public offerings by an issuer of a security, or by controlling shareholders of an issuer, require the preparation and filing of registration statements. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 77d, 77e, 77b(ll). It follows, we conclude, that a prospectus under § 10 is confined to documents related to public offerings by an issuer or its controlling shareholders.
This much (the meaning of prospectus in § 10) seems not to be in dispute. Where the courts are in disagreement is with the implications of this proposition for the entirety of the Act, and for § 12 in particular. Compare Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F. 2d, at 688-689 (suggesting that the term “prospectus” is used in a consistent manner in both §§10 and 12), with Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc. v. Allen & Co., 998 F. 2d, at 584 (rejecting that view). We conclude that the term “prospectus” must have the same meaning under §§10 and 12. In so holding, we do not, as the dissent by Justice Ginsburg suggests, make the mistake of treating § 10 as a definitional section. See post, at 597. Instead, we find in § 10 guidance and instruction for giving the term a consistent meaning throughout the Act.
The 1938 Act, like every Act of Congress, should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions. Only last Term we adhered to the “normal rule of statutory construction” that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U. S. 332, 342 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U. S. 209, 230 (1993); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932). That principle applies here. If the contract before us is not a prospectus for purposes of § 10 — as all must and do concede — it is not a prospectus for purposes of § 12 either.
The conclusion that prospectus has the same meaning, and refers to the same types of communications (public offers by an issuer or its controlling shareholders), in both §§ 10 and 12 is reinforced by an examination of the structure of the 1933 Act. Sections 4 and 5 of the Act together require a seller to file a registration statement and to issue a prospectus for certain defined types of sales (public offerings by an issuer, through an underwriter). See 15 U. S. C. §§ 77d, 77e. Sections 7 and 10 of the Act set forth the information required in the registration statement and the prospectus. See §§77g, 77j. Section 11 provides for liability on account of false registration statements; § 12(2) for liability based on misstatements in prospectuses. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 77k, 111. Following the most natural and symmetrical reading, just as the liability imposed by § 11 flows from the requirements imposed by §§ 5 and 7 providing for the filing and content of registration statements, the liability imposed by § 12(2) cannot attach unless there is an obligation to distribute the prospectus in the first place (or unless there is an exemption).
Our interpretation is further confirmed by a reexamination of § 12 itself. The section contains an important guide to the correct resolution of the case. By its terms, § 12(2) exempts from its coverage prospectuses relating to the sales of government-issued securities. See 15 U. S. C. § 111 (excepting securities exempted by § 77c(a)(2)). If Congress intended § 12(2) to create liability for misstatements contained in any written communication relating to the sale of a security — including secondary market transactions — there is no ready explanation for exempting government-issued securities from the reach of the right to rescind granted by § 12(2). Why would Congress grant immunity to a private seller from liability in a rescission suit for no reason other than that the seller’s misstatements happen to relate to securities issued by a governmental entity? No reason is apparent. The anomaly disappears, however, when the term “prospectus” relates only to documents that offer securities sold to the public by an issuer. The exemption for government-issued securities makes perfect sense on that view, for it then becomes a precise and appropriate means of giving immunity to governmental authorities.
The primary innovation of the 1933 Act was the creation of federal duties — for the most part, registration and disclosure obligations — in connection with public offerings. See, e. g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 195 (1976) (the 1933 Act “was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings”); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 752 (1975) (“The 1933 Act is a far narrower statute [than the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)] chiefly concerned with disclosure and fraud in connection with offerings of securities — primarily, as here, initial distributions of newly issued stock from corporate issuers”); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 777-778 (1979) (“[T]he 1933 Act was primarily concerned with the regulation of new offerings”); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U. S. 119, 122, n. 5 (1953) (“ ‘[T]he bill does not affect transactions beyond the need of public protection in order to prevent recurrences of demonstrated abuses’ ”), quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1933). We are reluctant to conclude that § 12(2) creates vast additional liabilities that are quite independent of the new substantive obligations the Act imposes. It is more reasonable to interpret the liability provisions of the 1933 Act as designed for the primary purpose of providing remedies for violations of the obligations it had created. Indeed, §§ 11 and 12(1) — the statutory neighbors of § 12(2)— afford remedies for violations of those obligations. See § 11,15 U. S. C. § 77k (remedy for untrue statements in registration statements); § 12(1), 15 U. S. C. § 77((1) (remedy for sales in violation of § 5, which prohibits the sale of unregistered securities). Under our interpretation of “prospectus,” § 12(2) in similar manner is linked to the new duties created by the Act.
On the other hand, accepting Alloyd’s argument that any written offer is a prospectus under § 12 would require us to hold that the word “prospectus” in § 12 refers to a broader set of communications than the same term in §10. The Court of Appeals was candid in embracing that conclusion: “[T]he 1933 Act contemplates many definitions of a prospectus. Section 2(10) gives a single, broad definition; section 10(a) involves an isolated, distinct document — a prospectus within a prospectus; section 10(d) gives the Commission authority to classify many.” Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F. 2d, at 584. The dissents take a similar tack. In the name of a plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation, the dissents discover in the Act two different species of prospectuses: formal (also called §10) prospectuses, subject to both §§10 and 12, and informal prospectuses, subject only to § 12 but not to § 10. See post, at 598-599 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.); see also post, at 588-589 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Nowhere in the statute, however, do the terms “formal prospectus” or “informal prospectus” appear. Instead, the Act uses one term — “prospectus”— throughout. In disagreement with the Court of Appeals and the dissenting opinions, we cannot accept the conclusion that this single operative word means one thing in one section of the Act and something quite different in another. The dissenting opinions’ resort to terms not found in the Act belies the claim of fidelity to the text of the statute.
Alloyd, as well as Justice Thomas in his dissent, respond that if Congress had intended § 12(2) to govern only initial public offerings, it would have been simple for Congress to have referred to the § 4 exemptions in § 12(2). See Brief for Respondents 25-26; post, at 590 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The argument gets the presumption backwards. Had Congress meant the term “prospectus” in § 12(2) to have a different meaning than the same term in § 10, that is when one would have expected Congress to have been explicit. Congressional silence cuts against, not in favor of, Alloyd’s argument. The burden should be on the proponents of the view that the term “prospectus” means one thing in §12 and another in §10 to adduce strong textual support for that conclusion. And Alloyd adduces none.
B
Alloyd’s contrary argument rests to a significant extent on §2(10), or, to be more precise, on one word of that section. Section 2(10) provides that “[t]he term ‘prospectus’ means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security.” 15 U. S. C. §77b(10). Concentrating on the word “communication,” Alloyd argues that any written communication that offers a security for sale is a “prospectus.” Inserting its definition into § 12(2), Alloyd insists that a material misstatement in any communication offering a security for sale gives rise to an action for rescission, without proof of fraud by the seller or reliance by the purchaser. In Al-loyd’s view, §2(10) gives the term “prospectus” a capacious definition that, although incompatible with § 10, nevertheless governs in § 12.
The flaw in Alloyd’s argument, echoed in the dissenting opinions, post, at 587 (opinion of Thomas, J.); post, at 597 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.), is its reliance on one word of the definitional section in isolation. To be sure, §2(10) defines a prospectus as, inter alia, a “communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security.” 15 U. S. C. §77b(10). The word “communication,” however, on which Alloyd’s entire argument rests, is but one word in a list, a word Alloyd reads altogether out of context.
The relevant phrase in the definitional part of the statute must be read in its entirety, a reading which yields the interpretation that the term “prospectus” refers to a document soliciting the public to acquire securities. We find that definition controlling. Alloyd’s argument that the phrase “communication, written or by radio or television,” transforms any written communication offering a security for sale into a prospectus cannot consist with at least two rather sensible rules of statutory construction. First, the Court will avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955). If “communication” included every written communication, it would render “notice, circular, advertisement, [and] letter” redundant, since each of these are forms of written communication as well. Congress with ease could have drafted §2(10) to read: “The term ‘prospectus’ means any communication, written or by radio or television, that offers a security for sale or confirms the sale of a security.” Congress did not write the statute that way, however, and we decline to say it included the words “notice, circular, advertisement, [and] letter” for no purpose.
The constructional problem is resolved by the second principle Alloyd overlooks, which is that a word is known by the company it keeps (the doctrine of noscitur a sociis). This rule we rely upon to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving “unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961). The rule guided our earlier interpretation of the word “security” under the 1934 Act. The 1934 Act defines the term “security” to mean, inter alia, “any note.” We concluded, nevertheless, that in context “the phrase ‘any note’ should not be interpreted to mean literally ‘any note,’ but must be understood against the background of what Congress was attempting to accomplish in enacting the Securities Acts.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U. S. 56, 63 (1990). These considerations convince us that Alloyd’s suggested interpretation is not the correct one.
There is a better reading. From the terms “prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, [or] letter,” it is apparent that the list refers to documents of wide dissemination. In a similar manner, the list includes communications “by radio or television,” but not face-to-face or telephonic conversations. Inclusion of the term “communication” in that list suggests that it too refers to a public communication.
When the 1933 Act was drawn and adopted, the term “prospectus” was well understood to refer to a document soliciting the public to acquire securities from the issuer. See Black’s Law Dictionary 959 (2d ed. 1910) (defining “prospectus” as a “document published by a company... or by persons acting as its agents or assignees, setting forth the nature and objects of an issue of shares... and inviting the public to subscribe to the issue”). In this respect, the word “prospectus” is a term of art, which accounts for congressional confidence in employing what might otherwise be regarded as a partial circularity in the formal, statutory definition. See 15 U. S. C. § 77b(10) (“The term ‘prospectus’ means any prospectus...”). The use of the term “prospectus” to refer to public solicitations explains as well Congress’ decision in § 12(2) to grant buyers a right to rescind without proof of reliance. See H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1933) (“The statements for which [liable persons] are responsible, although they may never actually have been seen by the prospective purchaser, because of their wide dissemination, determine the market price of the security...”).
The list of terms in § 2(10) prevents a seller of stock from avoiding liability by calling a soliciting document something other than a prospectus, but it does not compel the conclusion that Alloyd urges us to reach and that the dissenting opinions adopt. Instead, the term “written communication” must be read in context to refer to writings that, from a functional standpoint, are similar to the terms “notice, circular, [and] advertisement.” The term includes communications held out to the public at large but that might have been thought to be outside the other words in the definitional section.
C
Our holding that the term “prospectus” relates to public offerings by issuers and their controlling shareholders draws support from our earlier decision interpreting the one provision of the Act that extends coverage beyond the regulation of public offerings, § 17(a) of the 1933 Act. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768 (1979). In Naftalin, though noting that “the 1933 Act was primarily concerned with the regulation of new offerings,” the Court held that § 17(a) was “intended to cover any fraudulent scheme in an offer or sale of securities, whether in the course of an initial distribution or in the course of ordinary market trading.” The Court justified this holding — which it termed “a major departure from th[e] limitation [of the 1933 Act to new offerings]” — by reference to both the statutory language and the unambiguous legislative history. Id., at 777-778. The same considerations counsel in favor of our interpretation of § 12(2).
The Court noted in Naftalin that § 17(a) contained no language suggesting a limitation on the scope of liability under § 17(a). See id., at 778 (“[T]he statutory language... makes no distinctions between the two kinds of transactions”). Most important for present purposes, § 17(a) does not contain the word “prospectus.” In contrast, as we have noted, § 12(2) contains language, i. e., “by means of a prospectus or oral communication,” that limits § 12(2) to public offerings. Just as the absence of limiting language in § 17(a) resulted in broad coverage, the presence of limiting language in § 12(2) requires a narrow construction.
Of equal importance, the legislative history relied upon in Naftalin showed that Congress decided upon a deliberate departure from the general scheme of the Act in this one instance, and “made abundantly clear” its intent that § 17(a) have broad coverage. See ibid, (quoting legislative history stating that “ ‘fraud or deception in the sale of securities maybe prosecuted regardless of whether... or not it is of the class of securities exempted under sections 11 or 12,’” S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1933)). No comparable legislative history even hints that §12(2) was intended to be a freestanding provision effecting expansion of the coverage of the entire statute. The intent of Congress and the design of the statute require that § 12(2) liability be limited to public offerings.
D
It is understandable that Congress would provide buyers with a right to rescind, without proof of fraud or reliance, as to misstatements contained in a document prepared with care, following well-established procedures relating to investigations with due diligence and in the context of a public offering by an issuer or its controlling shareholders. It is not plausible to infer that Congress created this extensive liability for every casual communication between buyer and seller in the secondary market. It is often difficult, if not altogether impractical, for those engaged in casual communications not to omit some fact that would, if included, qualify the accuracy of a statement. Under Alloyd’s view any casual communication between buyer and seller in the aftermarket could give rise to an action for rescission, with no evidence of fraud on the part of the seller or reliance on the part of the buyer. In many instances buyers in practical effect would have an option to rescind, impairing the stability of past transactions where neither fraud nor detrimental reliance on misstatements or omissions occurred. We find no basis for interpreting the statute to reach so far.
Ill
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as ami-cus, and Justice Ginsburg in dissent, rely on what they call the legislative background of the Act to support Alloyd’s construction. With a few minor exceptions, however, their reliance is upon statements by commentators and judges written after the Act was passed, not while it was under consideration. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 19-23; post, at 599-601 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Material not available to the lawmakers is not considered, in the normal course, to be legislative history. After-the-fact statements by proponents of a broad interpretation are not a reliable indicator of what Congress intended when it passed the law, assuming extratextual sources are to any extent reliable for this purpose.
The SEC does quote one contemporaneous memorandum prepared by Dean Landis. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 13-14 (citing James M. Landis, Reply to Investment Bankers Association Objections of May 5, 1933, p. 5). The statement is quite consistent with our construction. Landis observed that, in contrast to the liabilities imposed by the Act “ ‘that flow from the fact of non-registration or registration,’ ” dealings may violate § 12(2) “ ‘even though they are not related to the fact of registration.’” See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 13 (emphasis added). This, of course, is true. The liability imposed by § 12(2) has nothing to do with the fact of registration, that is, with the failure to file a registration statement that complies with §§7 and 11 of the Act. Instead, the liability imposed by § 12(2) turns on misstatements contained in the prospectus. And, one might point out, securities exempted by §3 of the Act do not require registration, although they are covered by § 12. Landis’ observation has nothing to do with the question presented here: whether a prospectus is a document soliciting the public to purchase securities from the issuer.
The SEC also relies on a number of writings, the most prominent a release by the Federal Trade Commission, stating that § 12(2) applied to securities outstanding on the effective date of the 1933 Act. See id., at 19-20. Again, this is an issue not in dispute. Although the Act as passed exempted securities from registration if sold by the issuer within 60 days of the passage of the Act, see 1933 Securities Act, § 3(a)(1), the limitation did not apply to §12(2). See 15 U. S. C. § 111. Instead, actions brought under § 12(2) are subject to the limitation of actions provision in § 13. See 15 U. S. C. § 77m (one year from the date of discovery). A buyer who discovered a material omission in a prospectus after the passage of the Act could sue for rescission under §12(2) even though the prospectus had been issued before enactment of the statute. This tells us nothing one way or the other, however, about whether the term “prospectus” is limited to a document soliciting the public to purchase securities from the issuer.
In large measure the writings on which both the SEC and Justice Ginsburg rely address a question on which there is no disagreement, that is, “to what securities does § 12(2) apply?” We agree with the SEC that § 12(2) applies to every class of security (except one issued or backed by a governmental entity), whether exempted from registration or not, and whether outstanding at the time of the passage of the Act or not. The question before us is the coverage of § 12(2), and the writings offered by the SEC are of little value on this point.
If legislative history is to be considered, it is preferable to consult the documents prepared by Congress when deliberating. The legislative history of the Act concerning the precise question presented supports our interpretation with much clarity and force. Congress contemplated that § 12(2) would apply only to public offerings by an issuer (or a controlling shareholder). The House Report stated: “The bill affects only new offerings of securities.... It does not affect the ordinary redistribution of securities unless such redistribution takes on the characteristics of a new offering.” H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1933). The observation extended to §12(2) as well. Part II, §6 of the House Report is entitled “Civil Liabilities.” See id., at 9. It begins: “Sections 11 and 12 create and define the civil liabilities imposed by the act.... Fundamentally, these sections entitle the buyer of securities sold upon a registration statement... to sue for recovery of his purchase price.” Ibid.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Skilling v. United States, ante, p. 358.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Section 455(a) of 28 U. S. C. (1994 ed.) provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” In this tobacco-products liability case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that § 455(a) required disqualification of a District Judge whose name appeared erroneously, prior to his appointment to the bench, on a motion to file an amicus brief in a similar suit against some of the same defendants. Republic of Panama v. American Tobacco Co., 250 F. 3d 315 (2001) (per curiam) (Republic of Panama II). We grant the writ of certiorari and reverse.
Petitioner, Sao Paulo State, brought this suit against respondent tobacco companies in Louisiana state court. It alleged that respondents had conspired to conceal the health risks of smoking, thereby preventing it from adopting policies that would have reduced smoking by Sao Paulo citizens. It seeks compensation for the costs of treating their smoking-related health problems. The suit was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and assigned to District Judge Carl J. Barbier, who had presided over a companion case, Republic of Panama v. American Tobacco Co., No. 98-3279, 1999 WL 350030 (ED La., May 28,1999) (Republic of Panama I), vacated and remanded, 217 F. 3d 343 (CA5 2000). As in that ease, respondents filed a motion seeking Judge Barbier’s recusal under § 455(a) because of his involvement, prior to appointment to the bench, in a similar suit against some of the respondents.
Almost nine years before the present suit was commenced, Judge Barbier’s name appeared on a motion to file an amicus curiae brief in Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1991). The motion was submitted by the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association (LTLA), and erroneously listed Judge Barbier as the association’s president, a position from which he had retired about six months earlier. The motion also correctly listed as a member of the LTLA’s amicus curiae committee which approved the brief Michael St. Martin, who represents petitioner in the case before us. The amicus brief itself — which did not list either Judge Barbier or Mr. St. Martin — supported the Gilboy plaintiff’s claim that cigarettes are addictive and cause cancer, and that the defendants failed to warn consumers about these dangers. Brief for LTLA as Amicus Curiae in No. 90-C-2686 (La. Sup. Ct.), App. to Brief in Opposition 9a; Gilboy, supra, at 1266.
Respondents argued that Judge Barbier’s association with the Gilboy amicus brief created an “appearance of partiality” requiring disqualification under § 455(a). Brief in Opposition 3. Judge Barbier disagreed. Adopting his reasons for denying recusal in Republic of Panama I, he refused to disqualify himself because his name appeared in error on the motion to file the amicus brief and because he took no part in preparation or approval of the brief. Minute Entry in Civ. Action Nos. 00-0922, 98-3279 (ED La., May 26, 2000), App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a; Tr. of Proceeding on Motion for Recusal in Republic of Panama I, pp. 21, 37-40 (Feb. 3, 1999), App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a-51a (Tr. of Proceeding). Indeed, he was previously unaware of it, which he found unsurprising because the LTLA affixed the president’s name to all motions to file amicus briefs, despite the fact that the president had absolutely no role in preparation or approval of the briefs. Tr. of Status Conf. in Republic of Panama I, pp. 7-8 (Dec. 21, 1998), App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a (Tr. of Status Conf.); Tr. of Proceeding 37-40, App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a-51a. Judge Barbier also noted in Republic of Panama I that he had never practiced law with Mr. St. Martin or any other lawyer listed on the motion, had no personal knowledge of the disputed facts in Gilboy, had never taken a position with respect to any of the issues raised in petitioner’s suit, and had never been involved in a tobacco-related case “one way or another in my whole legal career.” Tr. of Status Conf. 9, App. to Pet. for Cert. 54a. See also Tr. of Proceeding 39-40, App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a-51a.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, citing its prior decision reversing Judge Barbier’s order denying recusal in Republic of Panama I. In that case, the Fifth Circuit said:
“The fact that Judge Barbier’s name was listed on a motion to file an amicus brief which asserted similar allegations against tobacco companies to the ones made in this case may lead a reasonable person to doubt his impartiality. Also, Judge Barbier was listed on this filing with the attorney who is currently representing the Republic of Panama. The trial judge’s assertions that he did not participate directly in the writing or researching of the amicus brief do not dissipate the doubts that a reasonable person would probably have about the court’s impartiality. We acknowledge that this is a close case for recusal.” 217 F. 3d, at 347.
Judge Parker concurred, agreeing that the court was bound by its decision in Republic of Panama I, but arguing that that decision was “erroneous because it requires recusal on the basis of a judge’s public statements on the law made prior to becoming a judge . . . .” Republic of Panama II, supra, at 318. Rehearing en banc was denied over the dissent of six judges, who argued that the decision below amounts to an “issue recusal” rule, requiring disqualification whenever a judge has pre-judicial association with a legal position. 265 F. 3d 299, 306 (2001) (joint dissent of Wiener and Parker, JJ.).
We need not consider the argument advanced by the dissenting judges, since this case is easily disposed of on other grounds. The Fifth Circuit’s decision is inconsistent with Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 847 (1988), which stated that § 455(a) requires judicial recusal “if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge would have actual knowledge” of his interest or bias in the case. Id., at 861 (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit reached the conclusion that recusal was required because it considered what a reasonable person would believe without knowing (or giving due weight to the fact) that the judge’s name was added mistakenly and without his knowledge to a pro forma motion to file an amicus brief in á separate controversy. Although Judge Barbier was indeed a leader of the LTLA at that time (he was a member of the association’s executive committee), he took no part in the preparation or approval of the amicus brief; indeed, he was only “vaguely aware” of the case. Tr. of Status Conf. 8, App. to Pet. for Cert. 54a. The decision whether his “impartiality might reasonably be questioned” should not have been made in disregard of these facts; and when they are taken into account we think it self-evident that a reasonable person would not believe he had any interest or bias.
Accordingly, we grant the petition for certiorari, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Arizona for further consideration in light of Chambers v. Maroney, ante, p. 42.
Mr. Justice Harlan would vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Supreme Court of Arizona for the reasons stated in his separate opinion in Chambers v. Maroney, ante, p. 55.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises the question whether admiralty jurisdiction extends to claims arising from agency contracts. In Minturn v. Maynard, 17 How. 477 (1855), this Court held that an agent who had advanced funds for repairs and supplies necessary for a vessel could not bring a claim in admiralty against the vessel’s owners. Minturn has been interpreted by some lower courts as establishing a per se rule excluding agency contracts from admiralty. We now consider whether Minium should be overruled.
I—
This case arose over an unpaid bill for fuels acquired for the vessel, Green Harbour ex William Hooper (Hooper). The Hooper is owned by respondent Central Gulf Lines, Inc. (Central Gulf) and was chartered by the Waterman Steamship Corporation (Waterman) for use in maritime commerce. Petitioner Exxon Corporation (Exxon) was Waterman’s exclusive worldwide supplier of gas and bunker fuel oil for some 40 years.
In 1983, Waterman and Exxon negotiated a marine fuel requirements contract. Under the terms of the contract, upon request, Exxon would supply Waterman’s vessels with marine fuels when the vessels called at ports where Exxon could supply the fuels directly. Alternatively, in ports where Exxon had to rely on local suppliers, Exxon would arrange for the local supplier to provide Waterman vessels with fuel. In such cases, Exxon would pay the local supplier for the fuel and then invoice Waterman. Thus, while Exxon’s contractual obligation was to provide Waterman’s vessels with fuel when Waterman placed an order, it met that obligation sometimes in the capacity of “seller” and other times in the capacity of “agent.”
In the transaction at issue here, Exxon acted as Waterman’s agent, procuring bunker fuel for the Hooper from Arabian Marine Operating Co. (Arabian Marine) of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. In October 1983, Arabian Marine delivered over 4,000 tons of fuel to the Hooper in Jeddah and invoiced Exxon for the cost of the fuel. Exxon paid for the fuel and invoiced Waterman, in turn, for $763,644. Shortly thereafter, Waterman sought reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; Waterman never paid the full amount of the fuel bill. During the reorganization proceedings, Central Gulf agreed to assume personal liability for the unpaid bill if a court were to hold the Hooper liable in rem for that cost.
Subsequently, Exxon commenced this litigation in federal district court against Central Gulf in personam and against the Hooper in rem. Exxon claimed to have a maritime lien on the Hooper under the Federal Maritime Lien Act, 46 U. S. C. §971 (1982 ed.). The District Court noted that “[a] prerequisite to the existence of a maritime lien based on a breach of contract is that the subject matter of the contract must fall within the admiralty jurisdiction.” 707 F. Supp. 155, 158 (SDNY 1989). Relying on the Second Circuit’s decision in Peralta Shipping Corp. v. Smith & Johnson (Shipping) Corp., 739 F. 2d 798 (CA2 1984), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 1031 (1985), the District Court concluded that it did not have admiralty jurisdiction over the claim. See 707 F. Supp., at 159-161. In Peralta, the Second Circuit held that it was constrained by this Court's decision in Minturn v. Maynard, supra, and by those Second Circuit cases faithfully adhering to Minturn, to follow a per se rule excluding agency contracts from admiralty jurisdiction. See Peralta, supra, at 802-804. The District Court also rejected the argument that Exxon should be excepted from the Minturn rule because it had provided credit necessary for the Hooper to purchase the fuel and thus was more than a mere agent. To create such an exception, the District Court reasoned, “‘would blur, if not obliterate, a rather clear admiralty distinction.’” 707 F. Supp., at 161, quoting Peralta, supra, at 804.
The District Court denied Exxon’s motion for reconsideration. The court first rejected Exxon’s claim that in procuring fuel for Waterman it was acting as a.seller rather than an agent. Additionally, the District Court declined Exxon’s invitation to limit the Minturn rule to either general agency or preliminary service contracts. Finally, the District Court determined that even if it were to limit Minturn, Exxon’s contract with Waterman was both a general agency contract and a preliminary services contract and thus was excluded from admiralty jurisdiction under either exception. See 717 F. Supp. 1029, 1031-1037 (SDNY 1989).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarily affirmed the judgment of the District Court “substantially for the reasons given” in the District Court’s two opinions. App. to Pet. for Cert. A2, judgt. order reported at 904 F. 2d 33 (1990). We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits as to the scope of the Minturn decision and to consider whether Minturn should be overruled. 498 U. S. 1045 (1991). Today we are constrained to overrule Minturn and hold that there is no per se exception of agency contracts from admiralty jurisdiction.
II
Section 1333(1) of Title 28 U. S. C. grants federal district courts jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.” In determining the boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction, we look to the purpose of the grant. See Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1, 24 (1871). As we recently reiterated, the “fundamental interest giving rise to maritime jurisdiction is ‘the protection of maritime commerce.’” Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U. S. 358, 367 (1990), quoting Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U. S. 668, 674 (1982). This case requires us to determine whether the limits set upon admiralty jurisdiction in Minturn are consistent with that interest.
The decision in Minturn has confounded many, and we think the character of that three-paragraph opinion is best appreciated when viewed in its entirety:
“The respondents were sued in admiralty, by process in personam. The libel charges that they are owners of the steamboat Gold Hunter; that they had appointed the libellant their general agent or broker; and exhibits a bill, showing a balance of accounts due libellant for money paid, laid out, and expended for the use of respondents, in paying for supplies, repairs, and advertising of the steamboat, and numerous other charges, together with commissions on the disbursements, &c.
“The court below very properly dismissed the libel, for want of jurisdiction. There is nothing in the nature of a maritime contract in the case. The libel shows nothing but a demand for a balance of accounts between agent and principal, for which an action of assumpsit, in a common law court, is the proper remedy. That the money advanced and paid for respondents was, in whole or in part, to pay bills due by a steamboat for repairs or supplies, will not make the transaction maritime, or give the libellant a remedy in admiralty. Nor does the local law of California, which authorizes an attachment of vessels for supplies or repairs, extend to the balance of accounts between agent and principal, who have never dealt on the credit, pledge, or security of the vessel.
“The case is too plain for argument.” 17 How. 477.
While disagreeing over what sorts of agency contracts fall within Minium’s ambit, lower courts have uniformly agreed that Minturn states a per se rule barring at least some classes of agency contracts from admiralty. See n. 4, supra.
Minturn appears to have rested on two rationales: (1) that the agent’s claim was nothing more than a “demand for a balance of accounts” which could be remedied at common law through an action of assumpsit; and (2) that the agent had no contractual or legal right to advance monies “on the credit, pledge, or security of the vessel.” The first rationale appears to be an application of the then-accepted rule that “the admiralty has no jurisdiction at all in matters of account between part owners,” The Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. 175, 182 (1837), or in actions in assumpsit for the wrongful withholding of money, see Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U. S. 532, 534 (1956) (“A line of authorities emerged to the effect that admiralty had no jurisdiction to grant relief in such cases”). The second rationale appears to be premised on the then-accepted rule that a contract would not be deemed maritime absent a “hypothecation” or a pledge by the vessel’s owner of the vessel as security for debts created pursuant to the contract. In other words, to sue in admiralty on a contract, the claimant had to have some form of a lien interest in the vessel, even if the action was one in personam. See e. g., Gardner v. The New Jersey, 9 F. Cas. 1192, 1195 (No. 5233) (D. Pa. 1806); see generally, Note, 17 Conn. L. Rev. 595, 597-598 (1985).
Both of these rationales have since been discredited. In Archawski, supra, the Court held that an action cognizable as assumpsit would no longer be automatically excluded from admiralty. Rather, “admiralty has jurisdiction, even where the libel reads like indebitatus assumpsit at common law, provided that the unjust enrichment arose as a result of the breach of a maritime contract.” 350 U. S., at 536. Only 16 years after Minturn was decided, the Court also cast considerable doubt on the “hypothecation requirement.” In Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1 (1871), the Court explained that, in determining whether a contract falls within admiralty, “the true criterion is the nature and subject-matter of the contract, as whether it was a maritime contract, having reference to maritime service or maritime transactions.” Id., at 26. Several subsequent cases followed this edict of Dunham and rejected the relevance of the hypothecation requirement to establishing admiralty jurisdiction. See North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Railway & Shipbuild ing Co., 249 U. S. 119, 126 (1919); Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U. S. 21, 47-48 (1934).
Thus, to the extent that Mintum’s theoretical underpinnings can be discerned, those foundations are no longer the law of this Court. Minturifs approach to determining admiralty jurisdiction, moreover, is inconsistent with the principle that the “nature and subject-matter” of the contract at issue should be the crucial consideration in assessing admiralty jurisdiction. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, supra, at 26. While the Mint-urn Court viewed it as irrelevant “[t]hat the money advanced and paid for respondents was, in whole or in part, to pay bills due by a steamboat for repairs or supplies,” the trend in modern admiralty case law, by contrast, is to focus the jurisdictional inquiry upon whether the nature of the transaction was maritime. See e. g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U. S. 731, 735-738 (1961). See also Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Dimon S. S. Corp., 290 U. S. 117, 124 (1933) (“Admiralty is not concerned with the form of the action, but with its substance”).
Finally, the proposition for which Minturn stands —a per se bar of agency contracts from admiralty— ill serves the purpose of the grant of admiralty jurisdiction. As noted, the admiralty jurisdiction is designed to protect maritime commerce. See supra, at 608. There is nothing in the nature of an agency relationship that necessarily excludes such relationships from the realm of maritime commerce. Rubrics such as “general agent” and “special agent” reveal nothing about whether the services actually performed pursuant to a contract are maritime in nature. It is inappropriate, therefore, to focus on the status of a claimant to determine whether admiralty jurisdiction exists. Cf. Sisson, 497 U. S., at 364, n. 2 (“the demand for tidy rules can go too far, and when that demand entirely divorces the jurisdictional inquiry from the purposes that support the exercise of jurisdiction, it has gone too far”).
We conclude that Minturn is incompatible with current principles of admiralty jurisdiction over contracts and therefore should be overruled. We emphasize that our ruling is a narrow one. We remove only the precedent of Minturn from the body of rules that have developed over what types of contracts are maritime. Rather than apply a rule excluding all or certain agency contracts from the realm of admiralty, lower courts should look to the subject matter of the agency contract and determine whether the services performed under the contract are maritime in nature. See generally Kossick, supra, at 735-738 (analogizing the substance of the contract at issue to established types of “maritime” obligations and finding the contract within admiralty jurisdiction).
Ill
There remains the question whether admiralty jurisdiction extends to Exxon’s claim regarding the delivery of fuel in Jeddah. We conclude that it does. Like the District Court, we believe it is clear that when Exxon directly supplies marine fuels to Waterman’s ships, the arrangement is maritime in nature. See 707 F. Supp., at 161. Cf. The Golden Gate, 52 F. 2d 397 (CA9 1931) (entertaining an action in admiralty for the value of fuel oil furnished to a vessel), cert. denied sub nom. Knutsen v. Associated Oil Co., 284 U. S. 682 (1932). In this case, the only difference between the New York delivery over which the District Court asserted jurisdiction, see n. 2, supra, and the Jeddah delivery was that, in Jeddah, Exxon bought the fuels from a third party and had the third party deliver them to the Hooper. The subject matter of the Jeddah claim, like the New York claim, is the value of the fuel received by the ship. Because the nature and subject-matter of the two transactions are the same as they relate to maritime commerce, if admiralty jurisdiction extends to one, it must extend to the other. Cf. North Pacific, supra, at 128 (“[T]here is no difference in character as to repairs made upon ... a vessel . . . whether they are made while she is afloat, while in dry dock, or while hauled up [on] land. The nature of the service is identical in the several cases, and the admiralty jurisdiction extends to all”). We express no view on whether Exxon is entitled to a maritime lien under the Federal Maritime Lien Act. That issue is not before us, and we leave it to be decided on remand.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The relevant provision of the Federal Maritime Lien Act has been amended and recodified at 46 U. S. C. § 31342.
In the same action, Exxon also claimed a maritime lien on the Hooper for a separate unpaid fuel bill for approximately 42 tons of gas oil Exxon had supplied directly to the Hooper in New York. The District Court held that because Exxon was the “supplier” rather than an agent with respect to the New York delivery, the claim for $13,242 fell within the court’s admiralty jurisdiction. The court granted summary judgment in Exxon’s favor on this claim. 707 F. Supp., at 161-162. This ruling is not at issue here.
The preliminary contract rule, which excludes “preliminary services” from admiralty, was enunciated in the Second Circuit as early as 1881. See The Thames, 10 F. 848 (SDNY 1881) (“The distinction between preliminary services leading to a maritime contract and such contracts themselves have [sic] been affirmed in this country from the first, and not yet departed from”). In the Second Circuit, the agency exception to admiralty jurisdiction — the Minturn rule — has been fused with the preliminary contract rule. See Cory Bros. & Co. v. United States, 51 F. 2d 1010, 1012 (CA2 1931) (explaining Minturn as involving a preliminary services contract). In denying Exxon’s motion for reconsideration, the District Court declined to “disentangle” the two rules, asserting that Circuit precedent had established the rule of Minturn “as a subset of the preliminary contract rule.” 717 F. Supp. 1029, 1036 (SDNY 1989).
Compare E. S. Binnings, Inc. v. MTV Saudi Riyadh, 815 F. 2d 660, 662-665, and n. 4 (CA11 1987) (general agency contracts for performance of preliminary services excluded from admiralty jurisdiction); and Peralta Shipping Corp. v. Smith & Johnson (Shipping) Corp., 739 F. 2d 798 (CA2 1984) (all general agency contracts excluded), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 1031 (1985) with Hinkins Steamship Agency, Inc. v. Freighters. Inc., 498 F. 2d 411, 411-412 (CA9 1974) (per curiam) (looking to the character of the work performed by a “husbanding agent’’ and concluding that the contract was maritime because the services performed were “necessary for the continuing voyage”); and id., at 412 (arguably limiting Minturn to general agency as opposed to special agency contracts); and Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S. A., 290 F. 2d 697, 703-704, and n. 15 (CA5 1961) (holding an agency contract for management and operation of a vessel within admiralty jurisdiction and limiting Minturn to actions for “an accounting as such”). See also Ameejee Valleejee & Sons v. M/V Victoria U., 661 F. 2d 310, 312 (CA4 1981) (espousing a “general proposition of law” that a general agent may not invoke admiralty jurisdiction while a special agent can).
As early as 1870, however, this Court narrowed the reach of Minturn and cast doubt on its validity. See The Kalorama, 10 Wall. 204, 217 (1870) (distinguishing Minturn and allowing agents who had advanced funds for repairs and supplies for a vessel to sue in admiralty where it was “expressly agreed that the advances should be furnished on the credit of the steamer”).
These decisions were part of a larger trend started in the 19th century of eschewing the restrictive prohibitions on admiralty jurisdiction that prevailed in England. See e. g.. Waring v. Clarke. 5 How. 441, 464-459 (1847) (holding that the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction did not adopt the statutory and judicial rules limiting admiralty jurisdiction in England); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 456-457 (1852) (rejecting the English tide-water doctrine that “measureplj the jurisdiction of the admiralty by the tide"); Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall., at 26 (rejecting the English locality rule on maritime contracts “which concedes [admiralty] jurisdiction, with a few exceptions, only to contracts made upon the sea and to be executed thereon").
As noted, the District Court regarded the services performed by Exxon in the Jeddah transaction as “preliminary” and characterized the rule excluding agency contracts from admiralty as “a subset” of the preliminary contract doctrine. See supra, at 607, and n. 3. This Court has never ruled on .the validity of the preliminary contract doctrine, nor do we reach that question here. However, we emphasize that Mintu rn has been overruled and that courts should focus on the nature of the services performed by the agent in determining whether an agency contract is a maritime contract.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
These cases are a sequel to our decision in City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U. S. 162, last; Term. The Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad (C&EI) filed a notice under § 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 72 Stat. 571, 49 U. S. C. .§ 13a (1), proposing to discontinue a pair of trains known as the “Georgian,” operated by it between Chicago, Illinois, and Evansville, Indiana, and operated in conjunction with trains of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad (L&N) between.Evansville, Indiana, and Atlanta, Georgia, crossing Kentucky and Tennessee en route.. Part of-this litigation grows out of the ICC’s approval of the C&EI’s discontinuance of the Chicago-Evansville segment of the “Georgian,” evidenced by its termination of its investigation.
The L&N also operates the “Hummingbird.” between Cincinnati, Ohio, and New Orleans, Louisiana. The “Hummingbird” connects with the “Georgian” at Nashville, Tennessee, where coaches and sleepers are transferred between the two trains. Following the ICC’s approval of C&EI’s discontinuance, the L&N served notice of discontinuance of the “Hummingbird” which the ICC also approved.
In City of Chicago v. United States, supra, we held that ICC decisions to discontinue such an investigation were reviewable and remanded the cases- back to the District Court. That court then ordered consolidation . and remanded back to the ICC for further hearings, holding that the notice served by the C&EI on the Governors of Illinois and Indiana and at every station along the Chicago-Evansville run was inadequate because the people of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia, and the Governors of those States were not notified. The “Hummingbird” discontinuance was also remanded to the ICC because of its close relationship with the “Georgian.” These appeals followed.
We note jurisdiction and reverse. Section 13a (1) provides: .
“A carrier or carriers subject to this part, if their rights with respect to the - discontinuance or change ... of the operation or service of any train . . . are súbject to any provision of the constitution or statutes of any State . ; . shall mail to the Governor of each State in which such train . .. . operated, and post in every station, depot or other facility served thereby, notice ... of any such proposed discontinuance or change.”
This section, as we read it, required C&EI to give notice in Illinois and Indiana, the only- States in which the line now in controversy has operated. No provision is made in § 13a (1) for notice to States served by connecting railroads which might be affected by a discontinuance.
The dissent finds ambiguity in the phrase “such train” in § 13a (1). It is argued that two interpretations of “such train” are possible: either the train of the C&EI between Chicago and Evansville or the “Georgian” between Chicago and Atlanta. By allowing discontinuance under § 13a (1), however, the ICC must have interpreted “such train” to refer to a train operated by one railroad only; and it. was only the Chicago-Evansville discontinuance that was before it at the time. The Commission ruled that: “Copies of the notices were duly served and posted in the manner required by section 13a (1) and our rules and regulations thereunder.” 331 I. C. C. 447, 448. We defer on this issue to the definition of “train” given by the administrative agency which has oversight of the problem. See, e. g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-17; Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U. S. 410, 417-418.
It is true that the C&EI and the L&-N functioned in close harmony. Discontinuance of service on one line might have a substantial effect on the other. But this relationship is not unique in railroading. Congress is not unaware of the mutual interdependence of railroads. It designed a federal regulatory system that displaced a state regulatory system when the state system could defeat a carrier’s attempt to discontinue a train. Hence we think it distorts § 13a (1) to treat if. so as to require the giving of notice to States which had no regulatory-power over the carrier.
Accordingly, the decisions in No's. 386 and 410 are reversed. Since Nos. 387 and 396 were remanded to the Commission solely because of their relation to Nos. 386 and 410, those decisions are also reversed. The causes aré remanded to the District Court for review of any questions on the merits which may remain unresolved. •
It is so ordered.
No issue as to the adequacy of the notice given in the L&N proceeding is raised here.
The regulation at the time provided for “[a] certificate [stating] that a copy of the notice * * * has been mailed to the Governor and railroad regulatory body of each State in which the subject train or ferry is operated.” (49 CFR § 143.5 (j),-formerly § 43.5 (j) (see 32 Fed. Reg. 5606)).
Until 1958 railroad discontinuances required approval of the appropriate regulatory agency in each of the States in which the line operated. Congress knew of the financial difficulties of the railroads and concluded that the problem of discontinuance had to be removed from its parochial setting where state agencies 'too often required the “maintenance of uneconomic and unnecessary services and facilities.” S. Rep. No. 1647, 85th Cong.,'2d Sess., 22. Therefore, Congress vested power over discontinuances in a body aware of the national transportation problems and needs. See generally City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U. S. 162 (1969), and Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 93 (1964).
The problem of discontinuance of services as put to the Congress by the Association of American Railroads was described as follows: “[S]uch matters are subject to approval of State regulatory commissions and authority for. such discontinuances or abandonments must be obtained within the scope of statutes or procedures under which those State commissions operate.” Problems of the Railroads, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 25 (Jan. 13, 1958).
The legislation was responsive to that need and may not be easily construed to do more than track the jurisdiction of a' State over the carrier in question.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
announced the entry of the following order and decree:
Since our opinion which was announced in this case June 23, 1947, two stipulations have been filed in this Court, signed by the Attorney General and Secretary of the Interior of the United States on the one hand and by the Attorney General of the State of California on the other hand. In these stipulations the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Interior purport to renounce and disclaim for the United States Government paramount governmental power over certain particularly described submerged lands in the California coastal area. In such stipulations the United States Attorney General and Secretary of the Interior furthermore purport to bind the United States to agreements which purport to authorize state lessees of California coastal submerged lands to continue to occupy and exploit those lands, and which agreements also purport to authorize California under conditions set out to execute leases for other submerged coastal lands.
Robert E. Lee Jordan has filed a petition in this Court praying that he be permitted to file a motion as amicus curiae or in the alternative as an intervenor to have the foregoing stipulations and agreements set aside and declared null and void on the ground among others that the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Interior are without authority to bind the United States by agreements which it is alleged would if valid alienate and surrender the Government’s paramount power over the submerged lands concerning which the stipulations are made.
It is ordered that the petition of Robert E. Lee Jordan to file the motion here to declare the stipulations null and void be denied, without prejudice to the assertion of any right he may have in a proper district court.
It is further ordered that the stipulations between the United States Attorney General and the Secretary of the Interior on the one hand and the Attorney General of California on the other, which stipulations purport to bind the United States, be stricken as irrelevant to any issues now before us.
And for the purpose of carrying into effect the conclusions of this Court as stated in its opinion announced June 23, 1947, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1. The United States of America is now, and has been at all times pertinent hereto, possessed of paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the lands, minerals and other things underlying the Pacific Ocean lying seaward of the ordinary low-water mark on the coast of California, and outside of the inland waters, extending seaward three nautical miles and bounded on the north and south, respectively, by the northern and southern boundaries of the State of California. The State of California has no title thereto or property interest therein.
2. The United States is entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for in the complaint.
3. Jurisdiction is reserved by this Court to enter such further orders and to issue such writs as may from time to time be deemed advisable or necessary to give full force and effect to this decree.
Inasmuch as the stipulations of July 26, 1947, have been stricken, Mb. Justice Frankfurter desires explicitly to note his understanding that insofar as the meaning or scope or validity of the stipulations may give rise to any legal issue, no such issue has been before the Court or has here been considered.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves a discrimination between two classes of widows of coal miners who died prior to December 6, 1974— those whose husbands were receiving pensions when they died and those whose husbands were still working although they were eligible for pensions. The 1974 collective-bargaining agreement between the United Mine Workers of America and the Bituminous Coal Operators’ Association, Inc., increased the health benefits for widows in the former class but made no increase for those in the latter class. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that this discrimination was arbitrary and therefore violated § 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA). 205 U. S. App. D. C. 330, 640 F. 2d 416 (1981). We granted certiorari to decide whether § 302(c)(5) authorizes federal courts to review for reasonableness the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement allocating health benefits among potential beneficiaries of an employee benefit trust fund. 454 U. S. 814.
HM
A description of the origin of the discrimination may explain why the Court of Appeals considered it arbitrary. The 1950 collective-bargaining agreement between the union and the operators established a fund to provide pension, health, and other benefits for certain miners and their dependents. That agreement defined the operators’ obligation to contribute to the fund but delegated the authority to define the amount of benefits and the conditions of eligibility to the trustees of the fund. In 1967 the trustees adopted two resolutions governing benefits for widows. Under the first, a widow of a retired miner who was receiving a pension at the time of his death was entitled to a death benefit of $2,000 payable over a 2-year period, and a widow of a miner who was eligible for a pension but who was still working at the time of his death was entitled to a $5,000 benefit payable over a 5-year period. The second resolution authorized hospital and medical-care benefits for unremarried widows of deceased miners while they were receiving the widows’ benefit authorized by the first resolution. The effect of these two resolutions was to provide a greater health benefit for widows of working miners who were eligible for pensions than for widows of miners who were receiving pension benefits.
In 1974, because of their concerns about compliance with minimum funding standards of the recently enacted Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §1001 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), and about the actuarial soundness of the 1950 fund, the union and the operators agreed to restructure the industry’s benefit program. They agreed that the amount of benefits and the eligibility requirements, as well as the level of contributions, should be specified in their collective-bargaining agreement. They also decided to replace the single 1950 fund with four separate funds, two of which provided pension benefits while two others, the “1950 Benefit Trust” and the “1974 Benefit Trust,” provided health and death benefits. The 1950 Benefit Trust, which is at issue in this case, extended lifetime health coverage to certain widows of miners who died before December 6, 1974, the effective date of the 1974 collective-bargaining agreement.
During the 1974 negotiations, the union originally demanded that all unremarried widows who were entitled to health benefits for either two years or five years under the old plan be extended lifetime health coverage. Both the amount and the uncertainty of the cost of such coverage for these widows concerned the operators. Relatively early in the negotiations they nevertheless accepted the demand as it related to widows of miners who would die after the agreement became effective, but they objected to the requested increase for widows of already deceased miners. The operators estimated that the latter class consisted of between 25,000 and 50,000 widows, whereas the union’s estimate was approximately 40,000. Of that total, about 10% were believed to be widows of miners who had been working at the time of their death, even though eligible for pensions, and thus already had been entitled to five years of health benefits. In the final stages of the 1974 negotiations, after a strike had begun, the operators made a package proposal to the union that excluded this smaller group of perhaps 4,000 or 5,000 widows from any increased health benefits. Besides making it possible to conclude an otherwise acceptable, complex collective-bargaining agreement and to avoid a prolonged strike, the union received no separately identifiable quid pro quo for the rejection of this portion of its demands.
II
Respondents are widows of coal miners who died in 1967 and 1971, respectively. Their husbands were over age 55, had been employed in the industry for over 20 years, and had spent most of their careers in the employ of contributing employers. They were eligible for pensions but were still working at the time of their deaths. Under the 1950 plan, respondents were entitled to $5,000 death benefits and health benefits for five years. They received no additional benefits from the 1974 agreement. Had their husbands applied for the pensions for which they were eligible, they now would be entitled to lifetime health coverage.
On their own behalf and as representatives of a class of similarly situated widows and dependents of deceased coal miners, respondents brought this action against the trustees of the funds in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They alleged that the requirement that a miner actually be receiving a pension for which he was eligible at the time of his death in order to make his survivors eligible for lifetime health benefits has no rational relationship with the purposes of the trust funds and therefore was illegal under §302 of the LMRA. They prayed that the requirement be declared null and void and that the trustees be ordered to pay to them health benefits retrospectively and prospectively.
After certifying the respondents’ class, and after indicating that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of arbitrariness, the court scheduled a hearing to give the petitioners an opportunity to prove that the discrimination against respondents was not arbitrary. At that hearing the District Court received documents prepared during the 1974 collective-bargaining negotiations and heard the testimony of participants in those negotiations. Based on that evidence, the District Court found that “the question of whether or not to provide plaintiffs the benefits they now seek was the subject of explicit, informed and intense bargaining.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a. The court rejected the argument that the eligibility requirement was arbitrary and capricious and held that “the trustees are bound to adhere to the terms of the agreement.” Ibid. The court concluded:
“Public policy dictates the limited role of courts in reviewing collectively bargained agreements. The familiar history of the anguished relations between the bargaining parties in this case only underscores the delicacy of the balance set in each agreement. Plaintiffs’ relief, if indeed any is due, cannot come from the courts.” Ibid.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. Relying on the § 302(c)(5) requirement that jointly administered pension trusts be maintained “for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of [the contributing] employer, and their families and dependents,” the court held that any rule denying benefits to employees on whose behalf significant contributions had been made must be explained to its satisfaction, particularly if benefits were authorized for others who had worked a lesser period of time for contributing employers. 205 U. S. App. D. C., at 335, 640 F. 2d, at 421. In this case, the trustees were unable to produce an acceptable explanation for the discrimination between widows of pensioners and widows of pension-eligible miners. Specifically, the court held that it was “not enough that the particular eligibility standards were adopted simply because that enabled resolution of a collective bargaining dispute.” Id., at 338, 640 F. 2d, at 424. Recognizing the legitimacy of a concern about actuarial soundness of pension trust funds, the court held that “financial integrity must be secured by methods dividing beneficiaries from nonbeneficiaries on lines reasonably calculated to further the fund’s purposes.” Id., at 337-338, 640 F. 2d, at 423-424.
Judge Robb, in dissent, agreed with the reasoning of the District Court and added the observation that the discrimination against widows of active miners was rational because those widows had received a larger death benefit than widows of pensioners, and because their needs may have been lesser than those of the families of pensioners since their husbands had continued to work after they were eligible for pensions.
Ill
The Court of Appeals held that the requirement in § 302(c)(5) that an employee benefit trust fund be maintained “for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees . . . and their families and dependents” means that eligibility rules fixed by a collective-bargaining agreement must meet a reasonableness standard. The statutory language hardly embodies this reasonableness requirement. Its plain meaning is simply that employer contributions to employee benefit trust funds must accrue to the benefit of employees and their families and dependents, to the exclusion of all others. Indeed, this has been this Court’s consistent interpretation of § 302(c)(5).
Just last Term, the Court reiterated that “the ‘sole purpose’ of § 302(c)(5) is to ensure that employee benefit trust funds ‘are legitimate trust funds, used actually for the specified benefits to the employees of the employers who contribute to them ....’” NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U. S. 322, 331 (quoting 93 Cong. Rec. 4678 (1947), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, p. 1305 (Leg. Hist. LMRA)). See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U. S. 419, 425-426. Accord, Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U. S. 401, 410-411; Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U. S. 459, 474 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This reading is amply supported by the legislative history. See, e. g., 93 Cong. Rec. 4877 (1947), 2 Leg. Hist. LMRA, at 1312; 93 Cong. Rec., at 4752-4753, 2 Leg. Hist. LMRA, at 1321-1322. The section was meant to protect employees from the risk that funds contributed by their employers for the benefit of the employees and their families might be diverted to other union purposes or even to the private benefit of faithless union leaders. Proponents of this section were concerned that pension funds administered entirely by union leadership might serve as “war chests” to support union programs or political factions, or might become vehicles through which “racketeers” accepted bribes or extorted money from employers.
Our interpretation of the purpose of the “sole and exclusive benefit” requirement is reinforced by the other requirements of § 302(c)(5). Section 302(c)(5) is an exception in a criminal statute that broadly prohibits employers from making direct or indirect payments to unions or union officials. Each of the specific conditions that must be satisfied to exempt employer contributions to pension funds from the criminal sanction is consistent with the nondiversion purpose. The fund must be established “for the sole and exclusive benefit” of employees and their families and dependents; contributions must be held in trust for that purpose and must be used exclusively for health, retirement, death, disability, or unemployment benefits; the basis for paying benefits must be specified in a written agreement; and the fund must be jointly administered by representatives of management and labor. All the conditions in the section fortify the basic requirement that employer contributions be administered for the sole and exclusive benefit of employees. None of the conditions places any restriction on the allocation of the funds among the persons protected by § 302(c)(5).
The Court of Appeals did not attempt to ground its holding on the text or legislative history of § 302(c)(5). Rather, the court relied upon cases in which trustees of employee benefit trust funds, not the collective-bargaining agreement, fixed the eligibility rules and benefit levels. The Court of Appeals has held in those cases “that the Trustees have ‘full authority . . . with respect to questions of coverage and eligibility’ and that the court’s role is limited to ascertaining whether the Trustees’ broad discretion has been abused by the adoption of arbitrary or capricious standards.” Pete v. United Mine Workers of America Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 171 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 9, 517 F. 2d 1275, 1283 (1975) (en banc) (footnote omitted). Noting that “[t]he institutional arrangements creating this Fund and specifying the purposes to which it is to be devoted are cast expressly in fiduciary form,” the court stated that “the Trustees, like all fiduciaries, are subject to judicial correction in a proper case upon a showing that they have acted arbitrarily or capriciously towards one of the persons to whom their trust obligations run.” Kosty v. Lewis, 115 U. S. App. D. C. 343, 346, 319 F. 2d 744, 747 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U. S. 964. Those cases, however, provide no support for the Court of Appeals’ holding in this case. The petitioner trustees were not given “full authority” to determine eligibility requirements and benefit levels, for these were fixed by the 1974 collective-bargaining agreement. By the terms of the trust created by that agreement, the trustees are obligated to enforce these determinations unless modification is required to comply with applicable federal law. The common law of trusts does not alter this obligation. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U. S., at 336-337; Restatement (Second) of Trusts §164 (1959). Cf. 29 U. S. C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Absent- conflict with federal law, then, the trustees breached no fiduciary duties in administering the 1950 Benefit Trust in accordance with the terms established in the 1974 collective-bargaining agreement.
Section 302(c)(5) plainly does not impose the Court of Appeals’ reasonableness requirement, and respondents do not offer any alternative federal law to sustain the court’s holding. There is no general requirement that the complex schedule of the various employee benefits must withstand judicial review under an undefined standard of reasonableness. This is no less true when the potential beneficiaries subject to discriminatory treatment are not members of the bargaining unit; we previously have recognized that former members and their families may suffer from discrimination in collective-bargaining agreements because the union need not “affirmatively . . . represent [them] or . . . take into account their interests in making bona fide economic decisions in behalf of those whom it does represent.” Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. 157, 181, n. 20. Moreover, because finite contributions must be allocated among potential beneficiaries, inevitably financial and actuarial considerations sometimes will provide the only justification for an eligibility condition that discriminates between different classes of potential applicants for benefits. As long as such conditions do not violate federal law or policy, they are entitled to the same respect as any other provision in a collective-bargaining agreement.
The substantive terms of jointly administered employee benefit plans must comply with the detailed and comprehensive standards of the ERISA. The terms of any collective-bargaining agreement must comply with federal laws that prohibit discrimination on grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; that protect veterans; that regulate certain industries; and that preserve our competitive economy. Obviously, an agreement must also be substantively consistent with the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq Moreover, in the collective-bargaining process, the union must fairly represent the interests of all employees in the unit. But when neither the collective-bargaining process nor its end product violates any command of Congress, a federal court has no authority to modify the substantive terms of a collective-bargaining contract.
The record in this case discloses no violation of § 302(c)(5) or of any other federal law. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed.
It is so ordered.
That section provides in relevant part:
“The provisions of this section [forbidding transfers between employer and representatives of employees] shall not be applicable ... (5) with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents (or of such employees, families, and dependents jointly with the employees of other employers making similar payments, and their families and dependents): Provided, That (A) such payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurancé to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer, and employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of employees may agree upon . . . ; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such pension or annuities. . . .” 61 Stat. 157, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 186(c) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, in creating the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950, provided in part:
“Subject to the stated purposes of this Fund, the Trustees shall have full authority, within the terms and provisions of the ‘Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947,’ and other applicable law, with respect to questions of coverage and eligibility, priorities among classes of benefits, amounts of benefits, methods of providing or arranging for provisions for benefits, investment of trust funds, and all other related matters.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 78a.
Resolution No. 68, adopted on January 19, 1967, established “a Widows and Survivors Benefit of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) as a result of the death of miners who at the time of death were regularly employed in a classified job in the bituminous coal industry by coal operators signatory to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, as amended, other than those exempted from said Agreement, and two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) in the event of the death of miners who at the time of death were receiving Trust Fund pensions and not employed outside the coal industry. . . .” App. to Pet. for Cert. 82a. The $5,000 benefit was payable in 60 monthly installments and the $2,000 benefit was payable in 22 monthly installments. Id., at 85a.
Resolution No. 69, also adopted on January 19, 1967, provided in part: “The following persons shall be eligible for benefits herein provided for hospital and medical care . . . : .
“5. Unremarried widows and unmarried dependent children under twenty-two (22) years of age of deceased miners described in Subpara-graph B of this Paragraph I as long as they are the recipients of Widows and Survivors Benefits provided in Paragraph II of Resolution No. 68.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 90a.
Article II, E(3), of the 1950 Benefit Trust provides that lifetime health benefits shall be provided to the survivors “of a miner who died. . . [pjrior to the effective date of this Plan ... at a time when he was receiving a retirement or disability pension under the eligibility rules then in effect of the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 114a. “By the trustee’s interpretation, this clause applies to survivors of miners who died while collecting pensions and, as well, to survivors of those who, though not actually receiving retirement payments at death, had ceased work and applied for them. This construction, however, excludes widows and dependents of those miners who were eligible for pensions but who continued working and later died before applying for health-care benefits.” 205 U. S. App. D. C. 330, 333, 640 F. 2d 416, 419 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
Federal district courts have jurisdiction to restrain violations of § 302. 29 U. S. C. § 186(e).
“The class represents all surviving spouses and dependents of deceased miners who satisfied the age and service requirements for pension benefits at the time of death and who
“(1) were working in classified service in the coal industry at the time of death and had not applied for a pension, or
“(2) had applied for and were eligible to receive pension benefits but were not receiving such benefits at the time of death because of their return to classified service in the coal industry.” 449 F. Supp. 941, 942 (1978).
The Court in Arroyo stated:
“Those members of Congress who supported [§ 302] were concerned with corruption of collective bargaining through bribery of employee representatives by employers, with extortion by employee representatives, and with the possible abuse by union officers of the power which they might achieve if welfare funds were left to their sole control. Congressional attention was focussed particularly upon the latter problem because of the demands which had then recently been made by a large international union for the establishment of a welfare fund to be financed by employers’ contributions and administered exclusively by union officials. See United States v. Ryan, 350 U. S. 299.
“Congress believed that if welfare funds were established which did not define with specificity the benefits payable thereunder, a substantial danger existed that such funds might be employed to perpetuate control of union officers, for political purposes, or even for personal gain. See 92 Cong. Rec. 4892-4894, 4899, 5181, 5345-5346; S. Rep. No. 105,80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 52; 93 Cong. Rec. 4678, 4746-4747. To remove these dangers, specific standards were established to assure that welfare funds would be established only for purposes which Congress considered proper and expended only for the purposes for which they were established. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 274, 290” (footnotes omitted).
Senator Taft, the primary author of the LMRA, stated:
“Certainly unless we impose some restrictions we shall find that the welfare fund will become merely a war chest for the particular union, and that the employees for whose benefit it is supposed to be established, for certain definite welfare purposes, will have no legal rights and will not receive the kind of benefits to which they are entitled after such deductions from their wages.”
Senator Ball, one of the sponsors of the floor amendment that became § 302, stated:
“All that is sought to be done by the amendment is to protect the rights of employees. After all, on any reasonable basis, payments by an employer to such a fund are in effect compensation to his employees. All that is sought to be done in the amendment is to see to it that the rights of employees in the fund are protected. . . .
“In other words, when the union has complete control of this fund, when there is no detailed provision in the agreement creating the fund respecting the benefits which are to go to employees, the union and its leadership will always come first in the administration of the fund, and the benefits to which the employees supposedly are entitled will come second.”
See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U. S. 322, 328-329; H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 66-67 (1947), 1 Leg. Hist. LMRA, at 570-571.
In NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., supra, at 330, the Court held that in enacting § 302(c)(5) “Congress intended to impose on trustees traditional fiduciary duties.” The Court did not decide, nor do we decide today, whether federal courts sitting as courts of equity are authorized to enforce those duties. It is, of course, clear that compliance with the specific standards of § 302(c)(5) in the administration of welfare funds is enforceable in federal district courts under § 302(e) of the LMRA. See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U. S. 419, 426-427.
“The Trustees are authorized, upon approval by the Employers and the Union, to make such changes in the Plans and Trusts hereunder as they may deem to be necessary or appropriate.
“They are also authorized and directed, after adquate notice and consultation with the Employers and Union, to make such changes in the Plans and Trusts hereunder, including any retroactive modifications or amendments, which shall be necessary:
“(a) to conform the terms of each Plan and Trust to the requirements of ERISA, or any other applicable federal law, and the regulations issued thereunder;
“(d) to comply with all applicable court or government decisions or ruling.” National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974, art. XX, § (h)(5), App. to Pet. for Cert. 106a.
We also recognized that these persons are not without protection: “Under established contract principles, vested retirement rights may not be altered without the pensioner’s consent. See generally Note, 70 Col. L. Rev. 909, 916-920 (1970). The retiree, moreover, would have a federal remedy under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act for breach of contract if his benefits were unilaterally changed. See Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195, 200-201 (1962); Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U. S. 459, 470 (1960).” 404 U. S., at 181, n. 20.
See, e. g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U. S. 188 (Equal Pay Act).
See, e. g., Fishgold v. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275, 285.
See, e. g., Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Nemitz, 404 U. S. 37.
See, e. g., Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657.
See, e. g., NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U. S. 322; Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 17.
See, e. g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 177; Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U. S. 892; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330; Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192. See also Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768.
See, e. g., Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, 444 U. S. 212, 218-219; H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U. S. 99, 105-108; NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 488; Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283, 295-296; NLRB v. American National Ins. Co., 343 U. S. 395, 404.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the respondent has standing to bring an action as a federal taxpayer alleging that certain provisions concerning public reporting of expenditures under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 208, 50 U. S. C. § 403a et seq., violate Art. I, § 0, cl. 7, of the Constitution which provides:
“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”
Respondent brought this suit in the United States District Court on a complaint in which he recites attempts to obtain from the Government information concerning detailed expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency. According to the complaint, respondent wrote to the Government Printing Office in 1967 and requested that he be provided with the documents “published by the Government in compliance with Article I, section 9, clause (7) of the United States Constitution.” The Fiscal Service of the Bureau of Accounts of the Department of the Treasury replied, explaining that it published the document known as the Combined Statement of Receipts, Expenditures, and Balances of the United States Government. Several copies of the monthly and daily reports of the office were sent with the letter. Respondent then wrote to the same office and, quoting part of the CIA Act, asked whether this statute did not “cast reflection upon the authenticity of the Treasury’s Statement.” He also inquired as to how he could receive further information on the expenditures of the CIA. The Bureau of Accounts replied stating that it had no other available information.
In another letter, respondent asserted that the CIA Act was repugnant to the Constitution and requested that the Treasury Department seek an opinion of the Attorney General. The Department answered declining to seek such an opinion and this suit followed. Respondent’s complaint asked the court to “issue a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from publishing their 'Combined Statement of Receipts, Expenditures and Balances of the United States Government’ and representing it as the fulfillment of the mandates of Article I Section 9 Clause 7 until same fully complies with those mandates.” In essence, the respondent asked the federal court to declare unconstitutional that provision of the Central Intelligence Agency Act which permits the Agency to account for its expenditures "solely on the certificate of the Director . . . 50 U. S. C. § 403j (b). The only injury alleged by respondent was that he “cannot obtain a document that sets out the expenditures and receipts” of the CIA but on the contrary was “asked to accept a fraudulent document.” The District Court granted a motion for dismissal on the ground respondent lacked standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), and that the subject matter raised political questions not suited for judicial disposition.
The Court of Appeals sitting en banc, with three judges dissenting, reversed, 465 F. 2d 844 (CA3 1972), holding that the respondent had standing to bring this action. The majority relied chiefly on Flast v. Cohen, supra, and its two-tier test that taxpayer standing rests on a showing of (a) a “logical link” between the status as a taxpayer and the challenged legislative enactment, i. e., an attack on an enactment under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution; and (b) a “nexus” between the plaintiff’s status and a specific constitutional limitation imposed on the taxing and spending power. 392 U. S., at 102-103. While noting that the respondent did not directly attack an appropriations act, as did the plaintiff in Flast, the Court of Appeals concluded that the CIA statute challenged by the respondent was “integrally related,” 465 F. 2d, at 853, to his ability to challenge the appropriations since he could not question an appropriation about which he had no knowledge. The Court of Appeals seemed to rest its holding on an assumption that this case was a prelude to a later case challenging, on the basis of information obtained in this suit, some particular appropriation for or expenditure of the CIA; respondent stated no such an intention in his complaint. The dissenters took a different approach urging denial of standing principally because, in their view, respondent alleged no specific injury but only a general interest common to all members of the public.
We conclude that respondent lacks standing to maintain a suit for the relief sought and we reverse.
I
As far back as Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), this Court held that judicial power may be exercised only in a case properly before it — a “case or controversy” not suffering any of the limitations of the political-question doctrine, not then moot or calling for an advisory opinion. In Baker v. Can, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962), this limitation was described in terms that a federal court cannot
“ ‘pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.’ Liverpool Steamship Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39.”
Recently in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970), the Court, while noting that “ [generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such,” id., at 151, emphasized that “[o]ne generalization is, however, necessary and that is that the question of standing in the federal courts is to be considered in the framework of Article III which restricts judicial power to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ ”
Although the recent holding of the Court in Flast v. Cohen, supra, is a starting point in an examination of respondent’s claim to prosecute this suit as a taxpayer, that case must be read with reference to its principal predecessor, Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923). In Frothingham, the injury alleged was that the congressional enactment challenged as unconstitutional would, if implemented, increase the com plain - ant's future federal income taxes. Denying standing, the Frothingham Court rested on the “comparatively minute[,] remote, fluctuating and uncertain,” id., at 487, impact on the taxpayer, and the failure to allege the kind of direct injury required for standing.
“The party who invokes the [judicial] power must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.” Id., at 488.
When the Court addressed the question of standing in Flast, Mr. Chief Justice Warren traced what he described as the “confusion” following Frothingham as to whether the Court had announced a constitutional doctrine barring suits by taxpayers challenging federal expenditures as unconstitutional or simply a policy rule of judicial self-restraint. In an effort to clarify the confusion and to take into account intervening developments, of which class actions and joinder under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were given as examples, the Court embarked on “a fresh examination of the limitations upon standing to sue in a federal court and the application of those limitations to taxpayer suits.” 392 U. S., at 94. That re-examination led, however, to the holding that a “taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power.” Id., at 105-106. (Emphasis supplied.) In so holding, the Court emphasized that Art. Ill requirements are the threshold inquiry:
“The ‘gist of the question of standing’ is whether the party seeking relief has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness . . . upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’ ” Id., at 99, citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204.
The Court then announced a two-pronged standing test which requires allegations: (a) challenging an enactment under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, §8, of the Constitution; and (b) claiming that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed on the taxing and spending power. 392 U. S., at 102-103. While the “impenetrable barrier to suits against Acts of Congress brought by individuals who can assert only the interest of federal taxpayers,” id., at 85, had been slightly lowered, the Court made clear it was reaffirming the principle of Frothingham, precluding a taxpayer’s use of “a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.” Id., at 106. The narrowness of that holding is emphasized by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Flast:
“In concluding that the appellants therefore have standing to sue, we do not undermine the salutary principle, established by Frothingham and reaffirmed today, that a taxpayer may not 'employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.' ” Id., at 114.
II
Although the Court made it very explicit in Flast that a “fundamental aspect of standing” is that it focuses primarily on the party seeking to get his complaint before the federal court rather than “on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated,” id., at 99, it made equally clear that
“in ruling on [taxpayer] standing, it is both appropriate and necessary to look to the substantive issues for another purpose, namely, to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.” Id., at 102.
We therefore turn to an examination of the issues sought to be raised by respondent’s complaint to determine whether he is “a proper and appropriate party to invoke federal judicial power,” ibid., with respect to those issues.
We need not and do not reach the merits of the constitutional attack on the statute; our inquiry into the “substantive issues” is for the limited purpose indicated above. The mere recital of the respondent’s claims and an examination of the statute under attack demonstrate how far he falls short of the standing criteria of Flast and how neatly he falls within the Frothingham holding left undisturbed. Although the status he rests on is that he is a taxpayer, his challenge is not addressed to the taxing or spending power, but to the statutes regulating the CIA, specifically 50 U. S. C. §403j(b). That section provides different accounting and reporting requirements and procedures for the CIA, as is also done with respect to other governmental agencies dealing in confidential areas.
Respondent makes no claim that appropriated funds are being spent in violation of a “specific constitutional .limitation upon the . . . taxing and spending power . . . .” 392 U. S., at 104. Rather, he asks the courts to compel the Government to give him information on precisely how the CIA spends its funds. Thus there is no “logical nexus” between the asserted status of taxpayer and the claimed failure of the Congress to require the Executive to supply a more detailed report of the expenditures of that agency.
The question presented thus is simply and narrowly whether these claims meet the standards for taxpayer standing set forth in Flast; we hold they do not. Respondent is seeking “to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government.” 392 U. S., at 106. Both Frothingham and Flast, supra, reject that basis for standing.
Ill
The Court of Appeals held that the basis of taxpayer standing
“need not always be the appropriation and the spending of [taxpayer’s] money for an invalid purpose. The personal stake may come from an injury in fact even if it is not directly economic in nature. Association of Data Processing Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, [397 U. S. 150,] 154 (1970).” 465 F. 2d, at 853.
The respondent’s claim is that without detailed information on CIA expenditures — and hence its activities— he cannot intelligently follow the actions of Congress or the Executive, nor can he properly fulfill his obligations as a member of the electorate in voting for candidates seeking national office.
This is surely the kind of a generalized grievance described in both Frothingham and Flast since the impact on him is plainly undifferentiated and “common to all members of the public." Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633, 634 (1937); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 13 (1972). While we can hardly dispute that this respondent has a genuine interest in the use of funds and that his interest may be prompted by his status as a taxpayer, he has not alleged that, as a taxpayer, he is in danger of suffering any particular concrete injury as a result of the operation of this statute. As the Court noted in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972):
“[A] mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization ‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of the APA.” Id., at 739.
Ex parte Levitt, supra, is especially instructive. There Levitt sought to challenge the validity of the commission of a Supreme Court Justice who had been nominated and confirmed as such while he was a member of the Senate. Lévitt alleged that the appointee had voted for an increase in the emoluments provided by Congress for Justices of the Supreme Court during the term for which he was last elected to the United States Senate. The claim was that the appointment violated the explicit prohibition of Art. I, § 6, cl. 2, of the Constitution. The Court disposed of Lévitt’s claim, stating:
“It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immedi ately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.” 302 U. S., at 634. (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, if Levitt’s allegations were true, they made out an arguable violation of an explicit prohibition of the Constitution. Yet even this was held insufficient to support standing because, whatever Levitt’s injury, it was one he shared with “all members of the public.” Respondent here, like the petitioner in Lévitt, also fails to clear the threshold hurdle of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204. See supra, at 171, and Flast, supra.
It can. be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process. Any other conclusion would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts. The Constitution created a representative Government with the representatives directly responsible to their constituents at stated periods of two, four, and six years; that the Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of course, completely disable the citizen who is not satisfied with the “ground rules” established by the Congress for reporting expenditures of the Executive Branch. Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. Ill jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls. Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to them.
As our society has become more complex, our numbers more vast, our lives more varied, and our resources more strained, citizens increasingly request the intervention of the courts on a greater variety of issues than at any period of our national development. The acceptance of new categories of judicially cognizable injury has not eliminated the basic principle that to invoke judicial power the claimant must have a “personal stake in the outcome,” Baker v. Carr, supra, at 204, or a “particular, concrete injury,” Sierra Club, supra, at 740-741, n. 16, or “a direct injury,” Ex parte Levitt, supra, at 634; in short, something more than “generalized grievances,” Flast, supra, at 106. Respondent has failed to meet these fundamental tests; accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 1S
Reversed.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, see post, p. 235.]
Respondent’s complaint alleged that he was “a member of the electorate, and a loyal citizen of the United States.” At the same time, he states that he ‘‘does not challenge the formulation of the issue contained in the petition for certiorari.” Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Pet. for Cert. 1. The question presented there was: “Whether a federal taxpayer has standing to challenge the provisions of the Central Intelligence Act which provide that appropriations to and expenditures by that Agenc shall not be made public, on the ground that such secrecy contravenes Article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution.” Pet. for Cert. 2.
App. 15-16. Respondent’s complaint also asked for a three-judge district court and this application was denied by a single District Judge with directions to place the case on the calendar in the usual manner. The Court of Appeals, in the judgment under review, ordered that, on remand, the case be considered by a three-judge court. The District Court has granted a stay of respondent’s motion to convene a three-judge court, pending disposition of this petition for writ of certiorari. On September 26, 1972, the Third Circuit denied a petition for mandamus,, filed by respondent, to compel the immediate convening of a three-judge court.
The majority found that the respondent had standing to bring this suit as a taxpayer. One judge held that he had standing as a citizen. This case was originally argued before a panel consisting of two Circuit Judges and one District Judge sitting by designation. After a second round of briefs, the Court of Appeals determined sita sponte to hear the case en banc without further argument. The District Judge sat with the Court of Appeals en banc. This point was not raised in the question presented in the petition for certiorari but the Solicitor General, in a footnote, called attention to the District Judge’s participation. He expressed the view that, although 28 U. S. C. § 4G (c) limits en banc hearings to circuit judges in active service (and any retired circuit judge who participated in the initial hearing), the error was harmless. Brief for United States 5-6, n. 4. In these circumstances we need not reach the question.
397 U. S., at 161. See also K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 22.09-6, p. 753 (Supp. 1970).
In Frothingham, the plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of the Federal Maternity Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 224, which provided for financial grants to States with programs for reducing maternal and infant mortality. She alleged violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause on the ground that the legislation encroached on an area reserved to the States.
In some cases, the operative effect of this “look at the substantive issues” could lead to the conclusion that the “substantive issues” were nonjusticiable and in consequence no one would have standing. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 9 (1973); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 95 (1968); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 508-509 (1961).
See 28 U. S. C. § 537 (Federal Bureau of Investigation); 31 U. S. C. § 107 (foreign affairs); 42 U. S. C. § 2017 (b) (Atomic Energy Commission).
Congress has taken notice of the need of the public for more information concerning governmental operations, but at the same time it has continued traditional restraints on disclosure of confidential information. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. §552; Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73 (1973).
The Court of Appeals thus appeared to rely on Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970). Abstracting some general language of that opinion from the setting and controlling facts of that case, the Court of Appeals overlooked the crucial factor that standing in that case arose under a specific statute, Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U. S. C. § 1861. The petitioners in Data Processing alleged competitive economic injury to private business enterprise due to a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency permitting national banks to sell their data processing services to other banks and to bank customers whose patronage the data processing companies sought. We recognized standing for those private business proprietors who were engaged in selling the same kind of services the Comptroller- allowed banks to sell; we held only that the claims of impermissible competition were “arguably . . . within the zone of interests protected” by § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act. 397 U. S., at 156. In short, Congress had provided competitor standing. The Court saw no indication that Congress had sought to preclude judicial review of administrative ridings of the Comptroller of the Currency as to the limitations Congress placed on national banks.
“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time . . . .”
Although we need not reach or decide precisely what is meant by “a regular Statement and Account,” it is clear that Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting it considers appropriate in the public interest. It is therefore open to serious question whether the Framers of the Constitution ever imagined that general directives to the Congress or the Executive would be subject to enforcement by an individual citizen. While the available evidence is neither qualitatively nor quantitatively conclusive, historical analysis of the genesis of cl. 7 suggests that it was intended to permit some degree of secrecy of governmental operations. The ultimate weapon of enforcement available to the Congress would, of course, be the “power of the purse.” Independent of the statute here challenged by respondent, Congress could grant standing to taxpayers or citizens, or both, limited, of course, by the “cases” and “controversies” provisions of Art. III.
Not controlling, but surely not unimportant, are nearly two centimes of acceptance of a reading of cl. 7 as vesting in Congress plenary power to spell out the details of precisely when and with what specificity Executive agencies must report the expenditure of appropriated funds and to exempt certain secret activities from comprehensive public reporting. See 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 618-619 (1911); 3 id., at 326-327; 3 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 462 (1836); D. Miller, Secret Statutes of the United States 10 (1918).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The judgments are affirmed. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U. S. 9, 12.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a state-court action brought by one who is a “supervisor” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act §2(11), 29 U. S. C. §152(11), for interference by a union with his contractual relationships with his employer is pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act).
r — H
Respondent Robert C. Jones was offered a supervisory-position by the Georgia Power Co. (Company). Jones reported for work on June 12, 1978. By agreement, he took vacation time after his second day on the job and reported for work again on June 20, 1978. On this latter date he was discharged.
Jones believed that the Company had been persuaded to discharge him by the union bargaining agent, Local 926 of the International Union of Operating Engineers (Union). The reason for the Union’s hostility, he believed, was his decision years ago to work for a nonunion employer. On June 28, 1978, Jones filed a charge with the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) against the Union, alleging that the Union had “procured” his discharge, “and thereby coerced [the Company] in the selection of its supervisors and bargaining representative, because [Jones] had not been a member in good standing of said labor organization.” Allegedly, this action violated §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and (B) of the Act. App. to Juris. Statement 25a.
In a letter dated July 19, 1978, the Regional Director said that further proceedings on respondent’s charge were unwarranted and that he would not issue a complaint. He explained that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the Union had caused Jones’ discharge; there was also a lack of evidence indicating that the Union had restrained or coerced the Company in the selection of its representative for purposes of collective bargaining. The Regional Director had instead come to the conclusion that Jones’ discharge had been a part of changes in the Company’s supervisory structure and that the Union had merely participated in discussions regarding the changes.
Instead of appealing to the General Counsel, Jones proceeded to state court, suing both the Union and the Company. Count I of his complaint claimed that the Union had interfered with the contract between him and the Company. The allegations were simple. He pleaded that he had been a member of Local 926 from 1969 to 1974, when he resigned from the Union. More recently, the Company had offered him the job of equipment supervisor at one of its plants, and he and the Company had entered into a contract in reliance on which he had terminated his prior employment. The crucial allegation was that petitioner Thomas D. Archer, the business agent and representative of the Union, had “maliciously and with full intent, intimidated and coerced Georgia Power Company, or caused Georgia Power Company to be intimidated and coerced, into breaching its employment contract with the Plaintiff. ” Respondent prayed for a judgment of $80,000 against petitioners, to be composed of $25,000 in lost wages, $50,000 in punitive damages, and $5,000 in attorney’s fees, interest, and costs. Count II of his complaint sought relief against the Company and alleged that the Company had breached its employment contract.
The Georgia trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the common-law tort action had been pre-empted because the subject matter of the complaint was arguably within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. The court observed that there was no justification for allowing joint federal-state control over the alleged conduct, since the state interest in protecting state citizens from the alleged conduct was insignificant and the risk of interference with the Board’s jurisdiction was substantial.
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the case against the Union. 159 Ga. App. 693, 285 S. E. 2d 30 (1981). Following Georgia precedent it considered to be controlling, Sheet Metal Workers International Assn. v. Carter, 133 Ga. App. 872, 212 S. E. 2d 645 (1975), and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Briscoe, 143 Ga. App. 417, 239 S. E. 2d 38 (1977), the State Court of Appeals held the cause of action not pre-empted because Georgia had a deep and abiding interest in protecting its citizens’ contractual rights and because the cause of action, which sounded in tort, was so unrelated to the concerns of the federal labor laws that it would not interfere with the administration of those laws. As an additional reason for not finding preemption, the court stated that the Union’s acts were not even arguably within the ambit of § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA, thus purporting to distinguish Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U. S. 701 (1963). The Georgia Supreme Court denied review, and petitioners appealed.
We postponed to the hearing on the merits consideration of our appellate jurisdiction. 456 U. S. 987 (1982). Petitioners now acknowledge that this is not a mandatory appeal. We agree, but, treating the papers as a petition for writ of certio-rari, we grant the petition. Concluding that the Georgia Court of Appeals erred, we reverse.
The issue before us “is a variant of a familiar theme.” San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 239 (1959). The Court has often been asked to determine whether particular state causes of action or regulations may coexist with the comprehensive amalgam of substantive law and regulatory arrangements that Congress set up in the NLRA to govern labor-management relations affecting interstate commerce. E. g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U. S. 180 (1978); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U. S. 290 (1977); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 (1966); Garmon, supra. Our approach to the pre-emption issue has thus been stated and restated. First, we determine whether the conduct that the State seeks to regulate or to make the basis of liability is actually or arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. Garmon, supra, at 245; see Sears, supra, at 187-190. Although the “Garmon guidelines [are not to be applied] in a literal, mechanical fashion,” Sears, supra, at 188, if the conduct at issue is arguably prohibited or protected otherwise applicable state law and procedures are ordinarily pre-empted. Farmer, supra, at 296. When, however, the conduct at issue is only a peripheral concern of the Act or touches on interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not be inferred that Congress intended to deprive the State of the power to act, we refuse to invalidate state regulation or sanction of the conduct. Garmon, supra, at 243-244. The question of whether regulation should be allowed because of the deeply rooted nature of the local interest involves a sensitive balancing of any harm to the regulatory scheme established by Congress, either in terms of negating the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction or in terms of conflicting substantive rules, and the importance of the asserted cause of action to the State as a protection to its citizens. See Sears, supra, at 188-189; Farmer, supra, at 297.
Not only is this case a variant of a familiar theme, but we have heard this same tune before. In Iron Workers v. Perko, supra, the Court considered whether a common-law tort action for interference with a contract of employment was pre-empted by the NLRA. Perko, a member of the Iron Workers’ Union, was employed at times as a superintendent and at other times as a foreman. While acting as a superintendent, he violated a Union rule, and his membership was suspended in consequence. Union representatives then told Perko’s employer that because of Perko’s transgression Union members would no longer take orders from him. Some weeks thereafter he was discharged on account of his dispute with the Union.
We concluded that Perko’s common-law cause of action was pre-empted because it was founded on conduct that for several reasons was arguably within the ambit of §7 or §8. First, Perko was discharged both as a superintendent and a foreman. Even conceding that the position of superintendent was supervisory and beyond the reach of the Act, the foreman’s position was arguably nonsupervisory and covered by the Act. Hence, Perko’s discharge arguably violated the proscription of § 8(b)(1)(A) against a union interfering with the protected rights of employees and that of § 8(b)(2) against causing an employer to discriminate against an employee contrary to § 8(a)(3). Second, the Union arguably violated § 8(b)(1)(A), since causing the discharge of a supervisor might coerce employees, who would fear meeting their supervisor’s fate, into forgoing their § 7 rights to engage in concerted action. Third, the Union’s conduct might also have violated § 8(b)(1)(B), which prohibits unions from restraining or coercing “an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.” Perko, we concluded, may well have had sufficient grievance-handling responsibilities to come within the realm of supervisors whose selection the Union could not seek to dictate.
Since Jones, unlike Perko, had a job only as a supervisor and not also as an employee, the Union does not rely on the first reason given in Perko for finding the challenged conduct arguably subject to the proscriptions of the Act. It is urged that the other two reasons given in Perko for such a holding are fully applicable here. The Union adds that Jones’ cause of action threatens to punish the workers’ arguably protected conduct in protesting, noncoercively, the selection of people for supervisory positions whether or not they entail collective-bargaining responsibilities. For these reasons, the Union submits that Jones’ state-court action is preempted. We agree.
Ill
In Perko, the Court thought the Board could reasonably construe § 8(b)(1)(A) to prohibit the discharge of a supervisor for failure to observe Union rules because the discharge would inevitably tend to coerce nonsupervisory employees to submit to Union regimentation and hence coerce them in the exercise of their § 7 rights. In that event, the Board could also order the Union to reimburse the supervisor for his lost wages. The Board’s subsequent holdings apply a variant of this approach in the construction industry, where it is not unusual for workers to fluctuate, as Perko did, 373 U. S., at 706, between supervisory and nonsupervisory positions. In Local Union No. 725, Plumbers, 225 N. L. R. B. 138 (1976), enf’d, 572 F. 2d 550 (CA5 1978), the Union caused the employer to breach a promise to hire the charging party as a supervisor. For two reasons, the Board held that the Union had violated § 8(b)(1)(A) and was liable to the charging party for backpay. First, it was found that certain employees depending on Union job referrals had learned of the Union’s conduct and were thereby intimidated in the exercise of their rights under the Act. Second, the Board reasoned that “because workers in the construction industry frequently cycle in and out of supervisory jobs, discrimination against [an individual] in his attempt to become a supervisor would carry over to intimidate him once he again became a statutory employee.” See 572 F. 2d, at 552. The Board’s “fluctuating status” approach is arguably applicable to this case. Jones was employed in the construction industry, and, in view of the low-level supervisory position he held, it was not unlikely that he would from time to time serve in a nonsupervisory position. It also is as clear here as it was in Perko that the Union’s conduct was arguably prohibited by § 8(b)(1)(B), which forbids a union to coerce an employer in the choice of his bargaining representative. In Perko, there was some doubt whether Perko was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act; here there is no doubt in that respect. Of course, not every supervisor is a “representative ‘for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances’ ” within the meaning of § 8(b)(1)(B), Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U. S. 790, 811, n. 21 (1974). But in this case, Jones was to occupy the position of equipment supervisor; it is enough if in this position he would be authorized or expected to deal with grievances arising under the collective-bargaining agreement, American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 437 U. S. 411, 427, n. 25 (1978); and Jones’ complaint filed with the Regional Director indicated that he would have collective-bargaining responsibilities. It is at least arguable that this was the case; and it was for the Board, not the state courts, to decide whether Jones was the kind of a supervisor who could invoke § 8(b)(1)(B). We thus agree with the Union and the Board that the Union, if it was responsible for Jones’ discharge, arguably coerced the Company in the choice of its collective-bargaining representative.
h-4 <
For several reasons, none of them sound m our view, the Georgia Court of Appeals thought that the Act did not preempt the cause of action that Jones submitted to the state courts. First, the Court of Appeals may have interpreted the Regional Director’s letter as indicating that the Board lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Jones’ complaint because of Jones’ supervisory status. That is plainly not the case, for the Regional Director’s statement did not decline jurisdiction but addressed the merits of the complaint. See generally Garmon, 359 U. S., at 245-246.
Second, the Court of Appeals believed that the Regional Director’s rejection of the complaint for insufficient evidence of a violation satisfied all of the interests of the federal law and cleared the way for a state cause of action. If this position was grounded on the notion that supervisors do not have a cause of action in any circumstances, it is contrary to Board cases and to Perko. If, as seems more likely, the argument is that the complainant adequately submitted his dispute to the Board, it is untenable. Jones did not exhaust his administrative remedies, for he did not appeal to the General Counsel. Beyond that, the Garmon pre-emption doctrine not only mandates the substantive pre-emption by the federal labor law in the areas to which it applies, but also protects the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board over matters arguably within the reach of the Act. Even if Jones had satisfied ordinary primary-jurisdiction requirements, which he did not, he would not have taken adequate account of the decision of Congress to vest in one administrative agency nationwide jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies within the Act’s purview. Matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board are normally for it, not a state court, to decide. This implements the congressional desire to achieve uniform as well as effective enforcement of the national labor policy.
In addition to relying on the reasoning of the Georgia Court of Appeals, Jones argues that there should be no preemption because the state cause of action and the unfair labor practice charge are not sufficiently alike. Jones relies on Sears, Roebuck & Co., where we said that “the critical inquiry” in deciding whether a state claim is pre-empted because the challenged conduct is arguably prohibited by the federal labor laws is “whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to ... or different from . . . that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board.” 436 U. S., at 197. Jones asserts that a § 8(b)(1)(B) unfair labor practice claim is made out only by proving coercion of an employer in the selection of its bargaining representative, whereas, he explains, to make out his state cause of action it need only be shown that the Union caused, either coercively or noncoercively, the employer’s selection of a supervisor. Because federal law does not forbid noncoerced, but union-caused discharges, it is said that the state cause of action is as distinct from the federal unfair labor practice claim as were the causes of action this Court found not preempted in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 (1966); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U. S. 290 (1977); and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra.
We reject this argument. First, the argument concedes that the state cause of action is pre-empted to the extent that it covers coercive influence on the employer; and we note that Jones’ complaint in the state court alleged that the Union agent had “intimidated and coerced” Georgia Power into breaching its contract with Jones. Jones thus sought to prove a coerced discharge and breach of contract, the very claim that is concededly pre-empted. Second, permitting state causes of action for noncoercive interference with contractual relationships to go forward in the state courts would continually require the state court to decide in the first instance whether the Union’s conduct was coercive, and hence beyond its power to sanction, or noncoercive, and thus the proper subject of a state suit. Decisions on such questions of federal labor law should be resolved by the Board.
Third, even if the Georgia law reaches noncoercive interference with contractual relationships, a fundamental part of such a claim is that the Union actually caused the discharge and hence was responsible for the employer’s breach of contract. Of course, this same crucial element must be proved to make out a § 8(b)(1)(B) case: the discharge must be shown to be the result of Union influence. Even on Jones’ view of the elements of his state-law cause of action, the federal and state claims are thus the same in a fundamental respect, and here the Regional Director had concluded that the Union was not at fault.
This was not the case in Sears. There the state-court action was for trespass. It challenged only the location of the Union picketing. The unfair labor practice charge, however, would have focused on whether the picketing had recogni-tional or work reassignment objectives, issues “completely unrelated to the simple question whether a trespass had occurred.” 436 U. S., at 198. Permitting the trespass action to go forward accordingly created “no realistic risk of interference with the Labor Board’s primary jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices.” Ibid. The same cannot be said here. The Regional Director concluded that the Union had in no way been responsible for Jones’ discharge. That same issue of causation would have been presented for decision had Jones’ case come before the Board, just as the issue would recurringly be at the core of § 8(b)(1)(B) cases. Despite the Regional Director’s determination, and the Board’s undoubted jurisdiction to decide the issue had a complaint issued, Jones sought to relitigate the question in the state courts. The risk of interference with the Board’s jurisdiction is thus obvious and substantial.
We thus cannot agree that Jones’ efforts to recover damages from the Union for interference with his contractual relationships with his employer was of only peripheral concern to the federal labor policy. Our decisions in Perko and its companion case, Plumbers v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690 (1963), refute Jones’ submission. They also foreclose any claim that Jones’ action against the Union for interference with his job is so deeply rooted in local law that Georgia’s interest in enforcing that law overrides the interference with the federal labor law that prosecution of the state action would entail.
Beyond this is the proposition, pressed by the Union, that although an employer may not be coerced in its choice of a collective-bargaining agent employees have the protected right to exert noncoercive influence on the choice of low-level supervisors.
“[CJourts have generally held over Board protest that employees’ strikes over changes in even low level supervisory personnel are not protected. See Henning & Cheadle, Inc. v. NLRB, [522 F. 2d 1050, 1055 (CA7 1975)]; American Art Clay Co. v. NLRB, [328 F. 2d 88, 90-91 (CA7 1964)]; Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, [325 F. 2d 531, 538-539 (CA5 1963)]. On the other hand, courts have found protected the writing of letters expressing opposition, NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 167 F. 2d 983 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 335 U. S. 845 . . . (1948), or the simple voicing of complaints, NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 F. 2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960). By thus examining both the substantive interest and the means of advancing it, courts have balanced more finely the competing interests involved. The result is a general absence of per se rules.” Abilities and Goodwill, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F. 2d 6, 9 (CA1 1979).
Thus, had Jones’ complaint come before the Board, his complaint would arguably have been rejected on the ground that the Union’s conduct in this case was protected activity.
Finally, the argument is made that Jones should be permitted to go forward in the state court because he could be awarded punitive damages and attorney’s fees, whereas he would be limited to backpay if his complaint had gone forward before the Board. But such a claim was squarely rejected in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S., at 246-247.
The judgment below is accordingly
Reversed.
A supervisor is defined as follows:
“(11) The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.” §2(11), 61 Stat. 138.
Supervisors are expressly excluded from the definition of employee in § 2(3), 29 U. S. C. § 152(3). Only “employees” are given rights under § 7, 29 U. S. C. § 157, which provides in relevant part:
“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).” 61 Stat. 140.
We refer to Jones as respondent because, as we shall explain, see n. 7, infra, we review this case on writ of certiorari rather than on appeal.
Sections 8(a) and 8(b) define certain employer and union practices as unfair labor practices. As pertinent to this case, § 8(b), 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b), provides:
“It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7... or (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances;
“(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section . . .”
Section 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(3), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer—
“(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . .”
The following is the text of the letter:
July 19, 1978
Robert C. Jones
2954 Orchard Lane, S. E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30354
Re: International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 926 Case 10-CB-2905
Dear Mr. Jones:
The above-captioned case charging a violation under Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, has been carefully investigated and considered.
As a result of the investigation, it does not appear that further proceedings on the charge are warranted. The Region concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the Union caused your discharge or that it restrained or coerced the Employer in the selection of its representative for the purposes of collective bargaining. Rather, it appears that the Employer implemented certain changes in its supervisory structure which included your removal from the project. While the Union did participate in discussions regarding the changes, there was no evidence that it engaged in any unlawful conduct regarding your status as a supervisor. I am, therefore, refusing to issue complaint in this matter.
Form NLRB-4938, Procedure for Filing an Appeal, is attached. The appeal period expires at the close of business on August 1, 1978.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Curtis L. Mack Regional Director
App. to Juris. Statement 26a.
Appeal to the General Counsel is provided by 29 CFR § 102.19 (1982). Respondent said he “didn’t see much point” in taking such an appeal. App. 105 (deposition of Robert C. Jones, Feb. 20, 1979).
The court affirmed the dismissal of the cause of action against the employer. The merits of that decision are not before us.
Petitioners initially argued in their jurisdictional statement that they were entitled to a mandatory appeal. They believed that this case fell within 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2), which allows parties an appeal as of right when a state statute is challenged in state court as being repugnant to the laws of the United States and the state court upholds the validity of the statute. The Georgia right-to-work law, Ga. Code Ann. § 54-905 (1981), recodified at Ga. Code Ann. § 34-6-24 (1982), was identified as the statute whose validity had been wrongly upheld. Petitioners now acknowledge that the Georgia Court of Appeals did not consider the question of whether the NLRA prohibited Jones’ reliance on the State’s right-to-work law; the court held only that the Georgia common-law tort action for interference with contractual relations was not pre-empted by the national labor laws. Petitioners’ current perception appears correct. Because a common-law cause of action cannot be said to be a “statute” for purposes of § 1257(2), this case is not within our § 1257(2) appellate jurisdiction.
The NLRA has been held to pre-empt state law and state causes of action relating to conduct that is neither protected nor prohibited, where it is determined that Congress intended the conduct to be unregulated and left to the free play of economic forces. See Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132, 140 (1976); Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252, 260 (1964). This branch of the pre-emption doctrine is not at issue in this case.
Since the Board’s decision in Local 725, it has become evident that the Board will not adhere to the general proposition voiced in Perko that the discharge of a supervisor for failure to abide by union rules is alone enough to discourage employees from exercising their § 7 rights. Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N. L. R. B. 402, 404 (1982). The Board asserts, however, that the holding in Local 725, reflecting the peculiarities of the construction industry, survives its later decision.
Recognizing that an employer so frequently draws his collective-bargaining representative from the existing pool of supervisors, the Board has held that the Union violates § 8(b)(1)(B) by coercing the choice of a supervisor even without proving that the supervisor in question actually has collective-bargaining authority. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has disagreed with the Board in this respect. NLRB v. Rochester Musicians Assn. Local 66, 514 F. 2d 988, 992 (1975). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, on the other hand, has not entirely rejected the Board’s position. Newspaper Guild, Erie Newspaper Guild, Local 187 v. NLRB, 489 F. 2d 416, 420-422 (1973).
In Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, we held that an action for a malicious and injurious libel in the course of a labor dispute, although an unfair practice and prohibited by the Act, was not pre-empted since it was unprotected conduct and since remedying injury to reputation was of only slight concern to the national labor policy and was a matter deeply rooted in state law. For similar reasons, in Farmer v. Carpenters we held that insofar as the state-court suit rested on claims of discriminatory hiring hall referrals and breach of contract, it was pre-empted, but that it was not pre-empted and could go forward insofar as it alleged the outrageous and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We deal with Sears, Roebuck & Co. in the text, infra, this page and 683.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The most significant issue raised by this case is whether the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 has abolished private proprietary rights, existing under state law, to use waters of a navigable stream for power purposes. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it has not. We agree also that in computing a federal licensee’s amortization reserve, required by § 10 (d) of that Act, as amended, the Federal Power Commission was not justified in disallowing the expenses paid or incurred by the licensee in this ease for the use of such rights.
March 2, 1921, Niagara Falls Power Company, a New York corporation, predecessor in interest of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, a New York corporation, respondent herein, secured from the Federal Power Commission the federal license with which we are concerned. It was the first such license issued under the Federal Water Power Act of 1920. Its term was 50 years. It authorized the diversion of water for power purposes from the Niagara River, above the Falls, and the return of it below the Falls, all in New York. The daily diversion, in the aggregate, could not exceed 19,500 cubic feet per second (c.f. s.).
Section 10 (d) of the Act requires each licensee, after 20 years of operation under such a license, to establish and maintain amortization reserves out of any surplus thereafter earned and accumulated in excess of a reasonable return upon the licensee’s net investment. Section 14 makes such net investment, plus severance damages, a principal measure of the price the Government is to pay when and if it takes over all or part of the property. In 1942, the Commission expressly held that § 14 applied to this licensee.
In 1947, Article 11 of the license was amended so as to specify a 6% rate of return and to require 50% of the licensee’s surplus earnings to be paid into its amortization reserves. As so amended, the article read:
“After the first twenty (20) years of operation of the project under this license, namely after March 1, 1941, six (6) per cent per annum shall be the specified rate of return on the net investment in the project for determining surplus earnings in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 (d) of the Act for the establishment and maintenance of amortization reserves to be held until termination of the license, or in the discretion of the Commission, to be applied from time to time in reduction of the net investment in the project, and one-half of all surplus earnings in excess of six (6) per cent per annum received in any calendar year shall be paid into and held in such amortization reserves.”
In 1948, the Commission began this proceeding to determine the licensee’s amortization reserve liability. It was the Commission’s first such effort under § 10 (d). In 1949, pursuant to a revised staff report, the Commission directed the holder of this license to show cause why one-half of its surplus earnings from March 2, 1941, through December 31, 1946, in the amount of $994,521.33, should not be set aside in an amortization reserve, and why a like proportion of its subsequent surplus earnings should not be set aside annually upon a comparable basis. In 1950, the Commission’s presiding examiner recommended that the licensee’s initial reserve be $914,432.04, and the Commission approved that figure in preference to $515,432.04 proposed by the licensee. One Commissioner filed a concurring statement and one dissented. 9 F. P. C. 228. However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, one judge dissenting, upheld the licensee and remanded the case to the Commission with instructions to modify its order accordingly. 91 U. S. App. D. C. 395, 202 F. 2d 190. The decision turned primarily upon the court’s conclusion that neither the Federal Water Power Act nor the issuance of a license thereunder had abolished the licensee’s private proprietary rights to use the waters of Niagara River for power purposes. That issue was inescapable because the Commission, in computing the licensee’s required amortization reserve, had found that certain annual payments and discounts made by the licensee for its use of private water rights, existing under state law, along the Niagara River, were not allowable expenses for the reason that the Commission considered those rights no longer existent. The Court of Appeals held precisely the contrary and we granted certiorari because of the important bearing of the. decision upon the Federal Water Power Act. 345 U. S. 955.
The immediate issue thus presented is whether the licensee’s amortization reserve under § 10 (d), for the period from March 2, 1941, through December 31, 1946, should be $914,432.04 or $515,432.04. That difference of $399,000 is one-half of the $798,000 which the Commission believes should be included in the surplus earnings of the licensee for the period. It consists of—
1. $577,500 paid by the licensee, at the rate of $99,000 a year, for its use, for power purposes, of 730 c. f. s. of the “International Paper water rights,” and
2. $220,500 allowed by the licensee as a discount, at the rate of $37,800 a year, on certain sales of electric power in consideration of permission to use, for power purposes, 262.6 c. f. s. of the “Pettebone-Cataract water rights.”
The Court of Appeals held that although respondent’s predecessor, in 1921, had received a federal license for this project, it nevertheless was justified in continuing to meet the financial obligations which it had assumed in return for permission to use water rights originally granted and still existing under the law of New York. That court, accordingly, approved each of the foregoing items of expense and fixed the licensee’s initial amortization reserve at $515,432.04.
It was not questioned in the Court of Appeals or here that the licensee originally had acquired, in return for the above-stated payments and discounts, some kind or degree of private proprietary rights under the law of New York to use water from the Niagara River for power purposes. Accordingly, we do not consider it necessary to review here the intricate transactions which resulted in the above-described payments and discounts. We accept the conclusion of the Court of Appeals “that the International Paper and Pettebone-Cataract water rights are valid under the law of New York.” 91 U. S. App. D. C., at 406, 202 F. 2d, at 202. For further recognition of these water rights under state law, see Water Power & Control Commission v. Niagara Falls Power Co., 262 App. Div. 460, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 371, aff’d, 289 N. Y. 353, 45 N. E. 2d 907; Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 185 Misc. 696, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 777.
Neither is it necessary for us to discuss the licensee’s expenses in 1947 or thereafter. They must be treated in the same way as those above mentioned, except to note that the discounts allowed in return for the Pettebone-Cataract water rights ceased with the licensee’s purchase of those rights in 1947. See 91 U. S. App. D. C., at 400-401, 202 F. 2d, at 196.
We are not required to determine the nature of the rights claimed by respondent except to recognize that they are usufructuary rights to use the water for the generation of power, as distinguished from claims to the legal ownership of the running water itself. They are rights to use the force of the fall of the water, coupled with an obligation to return the water to the river under specified conditions. The rights under consideration originally were attached to riparian lands above and below the Falls. However, they long have been separated from such lands and, thus separated, they have been transferred or leased to respondent. Under the law of New York, they constitute a form of real estate known as corporeal heredita-ments. The Commission does not now contest the purchase prices which have been paid for any of these rights. The Commission’s present objection is limited to respondent’s deduction, in the computation of its amortization reserves, of the annual payments and discounts it has made and which it proposes to make for the use of such rights. The Commission contends (1) that Congress not only may constitutionally abolish such local water rights without compensation but that it already has done so, and (2) that, although the licensee’s contested expenditures may be lawful, or even obligatory, between the parties, they must be disallowed in computing the licensee’s amortization reserve under § 10 (d).
We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that, even though respondent’s water rights are of a kind that is within the scope of the Government’s dominant servitude, the Government has not exercised its power to abolish them.
While we recognize the dominant servitude, in favor of the United States, under which private persons hold physical properties obstructing navigable waters of the United States and all rights to use the waters of those streams, we recognize also that the exercise of that servitude, without making allowances for preexisting rights under state law, requires clear authorization. A classic example of such a clear authorization appears in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 53. The Act of March 3, 1909, there authorized the exercise of the dominant right of the United States to take all of a navigable river’s flow for purposes of interstate commerce. It did so in explicit terms. It said:
“Sec. 11.... the ownership in fee simple absolute by the United States of all lands and property of every kind and description north of the present Saint Marys Falls Ship Canal throughout its entire length and lying between said ship canal and the international boundary line at Sault Sainte Marie, in the State of Michigan, is necessary for the purposes of navigation of said waters and the waters connected therewith.
“The Secretary of War is hereby directed to take proceedings immediately for the acquisition by condemnation or otherwise of all of said lands and property of every kind and description, in fee simple absolute....
“Every permit, license, or authority of every kind, nature, and description heretofore issued or granted by the United States, or any official thereof, to the Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company... shall cease and determine and become null and void on January first, nineteen hundred and eleven... 35 Stat. 820, 821.
In that case the Government took the entire flow of the stream exclusively for purposes of interstate commerce. The Court accordingly recognized the Government’s absolute right, within the bed of the stream, to use all of the waters flowing in the stream, for purposes of interstate commerce, without compensating anyone for the use of those waters.
That decision is not applicable here. The issue here is whether the much more general and regulatory language of the Federal Water Power Act shall be given the same drastic effect as was required there by the language of the Act of March 3, 1909. We find nothing in the Federal Water Power Act justifying such an interpretation. Neither it, nor the license issued under it, expressly abolishes any existing proprietary rights to use waters of the Niagara River. Unlike the statute in the Chandler-Dunbar case, the Federal Water Power Act mentions no specific properties. It makes no express assertion of the paramount right of the Government to use the flow of the Niagara or of any other navigable stream to the exclusion of existing users. On the contrary, the plan of the Act is one of reasonable regulation of the use of navigable waters, coupled with encouragement of their development as power projects by private parties.
The Act—
“discloses both a vigorous determination of Congress to make progress with the development of the long idle water power resources of the Nation and a determination to avoid unconstitutional invasion of the jurisdiction of the States....
“The Act leaves to the States their traditional jurisdiction subject to the admittedly superior right of the Federal Government, through Congress, to regulate interstate and foreign commerce....” First Iowa Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U. S. 152, 171.
The Act treats usufructuary water rights like other property rights. While leaving the way open for the exercise of the federal servitude and of federal rights of purchase or condemnation, there is no purpose expressed to seize, abolish or eliminate water rights without compensation merely by force of the Act itself.
The references in the Act to preexisting water rights carry a natural implication that those rights are to survive, at least until taken over by purchase or otherwise. Riparian water rights, like other real property rights, are determined by state law. Title to them is acquired in conformity with that law. The Federal Water Power Act merely imposes upon their owners the additional obligation of using them in compliance with that Act.
The legislative history of the Act discloses no substantial support for the drastic policy which the Commission seeks to read into it. To convert this Act from a regulatory Act to one automatically abolishing preexisting water rights on a nationwide scale calls for a convincing explanation of that purpose. We find none. In fact, the legislative history points the other way. Representative William L. La Follette, of Washington, a member of the House Special Committee on Water Power which reported substantially the same bill as that which in 1920 became the Federal Water Power Act, said of it in 1918:
“This bill is not based on either the Government’s ownership or its sovereign authority, but on the hypothesis that we as representatives of the States have authority to act for the States in matters of this character and pass laws for the general good, by the establishment of a limited trusteeship or commission composed of officials of the Government, to carry out and administer this law in such a way as not to infringe any of the rights of the States nor to impede or restrict navigation, but rather to benefit it.... Under this bill we only allow the commission a supervisory power over those functions entirely within the State’s jurisdiction for the period covered by any license, the State having exercised its rights in advance of issue.” 56 Cong. Rec. 9110.
Shortly thereafter he added:
“If we put in this language [of §9 (b)], which is practically taken from that Supreme Court decision [United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316], as to the property rights of the States as to the bed and the banks and to the diversion of the water, then it is sure that we have not infringed any of the rights of the States in that respect, or any of their rules of property.... We are earnestly trying not to infringe the rights of the States.” Id., at 9810.
In 1930, this Court passed upon the basic question now before us when it came here in a different connection. In Ford & Son v. Little Falls Co., 280 U. S. 369, Mr. Justice Stone, writing for a unanimous Court, held that a riparian owner of a right to use water for power purposes in the navigable Mohawk River, in New York State, was entitled to an injunction against the uncompensated destruction of that right by a subsequent licensee under the Federal Water Power Act. The New York Supreme Court had granted such an injunction and awarded damages. This Court affirmed that decision, although the federal license then before the Court had authorized the licensee to raise the navigable waters of the Hudson River to such an extent that they would destroy the value of the riparian owner’s right, under state law, to use the fall of tributary waters of the Mohawk for power purposes. It was thus held that the Federal Water Power Act had not abolished the complainant’s private proprietary water rights, existing under New York law, to use navigable waters for power purposes.
“[E]ven though the rights which the respondents [the riparian owners] here assert be deemed subordinate to the power of the national government to control navigation, the present legislation does not purport to authorize a licensee of the Commission to impair such rights recognized by state law without compensation.” Id., at 377.
After quoting from §§10 (c) (liability for damages caused by the licensed project), 27 (saving clause as to proprietary rights under state law), 21 (condemnation rights) and 6 (licensee’s acceptance of the conditions of the Act), the Court added:
“While these sections are consistent with the recognition that state laws affecting the distribution or use of water in navigable waters and the rights derived from those laws may be subordinate to the power of the national government to regulate commerce upon them, they nevertheless so restrict the operation of the entire act that the powers conferred by it on the Commission do not extend to the impairment of the operation of those laws or to the extinguishment of rights acquired under them without remuneration. We think the interest here asserted by the respondents, so far as the laws of the state are concerned, is a vested right acquired under those laws and so is one expressly saved by § 27 from destruction or appropriation by licensees without compensation, and that it is one which petitioner [the licensee], by acceptance of the license under the provisions of § 6, must be deemed to have agreed to recognize and protect.” Id., at 378-379.
Parallel reasoning has been applied in a case involving a conflict between a licensee and the holder of state-recognized rights to use water from a navigable stream for irrigation purposes. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725, 734. See also, as to state-created water rights for power purposes, Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 335 U. S. 359, 372; Pike Rapids Power Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 99 F. 2d 902; United States v. Central Stockholders’ Corp., 52 F. 2d 322; Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773, 793; Great Northern R. Co. v. Washington Electric Co., 197 Wash. 627, 86 P. 2d 208.
In First Iowa Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U. S. 152, at 175-176, § 27 of the Act was discussed in relation to conditions controlling the approval of projects. The language there used is applicable to proprietary water rights for power purposes as well as those for other proprietary uses. To any extent that statements in Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 F. 606, cited in the First Iowa case, indicate a different interpretation, they are not controlling.
Respondent’s private property rights are rooted in state law, subject to the paramount rights of the State and Nation. In the instant case, both the State and the Nation have made limited assertions of their superior rights. New York has done so through its rental charges and the Nation through its license. Neither, however, has laid claim to such an exclusive right to the waters as eliminates the limited use which respondent here seeks to make of them.
The findings of the Commission and the action of the Court of Appeals disclose no sufficient additional circumstances demonstrating the unreasonableness of the expenses in question.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is
Affirmed.
Me. Justice Reed withdrew from the consideration and decision of this case.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
[For dissenting opinion, see p. 258.]
The Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, is now Part I of the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838, 16 U. S. C. §§ 791a-825r.
“Sec. 10. All licenses issued under this Part shall be on the following conditions:
“(d) That after the first twenty years of operation, out of surplus earned thereafter, if any, accumulated in excess of a specified reasonable rate of return upon the net investment of a licensee in any project or projects under license, the licensee shall establish and maintain amortization reserves, which reserves shall, in the discretion of the Commission, be held until the termination of the license or be applied from time to time in reduction of the net investment. Such specified rate of return and the proportion of such surplus earnings to be paid into and held in such reserves shall be set forth in the license....” 49 Stat. 842, 843, 16 U. S. C. § 803 (d).
This limit soon was increased to 19, 725 e. f. s., 6 F. P. C. 184, 185, and later to 20,000 c. f. s., see 9 F. P. C. 228, 244, n. 28. The Treaty between the United States and Great Britain relating to boundary waters between the United States and Canada, proclaimed May 13, 1910, limited the diversion from the United States side to 20,000 and from the Canadian side to 36,000 c. f. s. 36 Stat. 2448, 2450. As to additional emergency and temporary diversions, see 55 Stat. 1276, 1380; 1 U. S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 694.
49 Stat. 844-845, 16 U. S. C. § 807. See also, § 16 as to compensation to be paid for temporary use of the property by the Government, 41 Stat. 1072, 16 U. S. C. § 809; § 20 as to rate fixing, 41 Stat. 1073-1074, 16 U. S. C. § 813; and § 26 as to a purchase by the Government at a judicial sale, 41 Stat. 1076, 16 U. S. C. § 820. “Net investment” is defined in § 3 as follows:
"(13) 'net investment’ in a project means the actual legitimate original cost thereof as defined and interpreted in the 'classification of investment in road and equipment of steam roads, issue of 1914, Interstate Commerce Commission,’ plus similar costs of additions thereto and betterments thereof, minus the sum of the following items properly allocated thereto, if and to the extent that such items have been accumulated during the period of the license from earnings in excess of a fair return on such investment: (a) Unappropriated surplus, (b) aggregate credit balances of current depreciation accounts, and (c) aggregate appropriations of surplus or income held in amortization, sinking fund, or similar reserves, or expended for additions or betterments or used for the purposes for which such reserves were created....” 49 Stat. 839, 16 U. S. C. §796 (13).
In the instant case the Commission explains that—
“Section 10 (d) is part of a larger pattern of fairness set up by the act to induce water-power development. Licensees are assured a 'fair return,’ but the public is safeguarded against profiteering by a licensee through profits beyond a fair return. At the end of the license period and upon'recapture’ by the Federal Government, earnings throughout the license period are to be tested against a fair return standard set up in section 3 (13).” 9 F. P. C., at 248.
This resulted from the decision that the “fair value” provisions of §23 (a), 49 Stat. 846, 16 U. S. C. §816, applied to licenses to use water rights previously held under permits from the Federal Government, whereas this licensee’s prior water rights, if any, arise under the law of New York. In re Niagara Falls Power Co., 3 F. P. C. 206, aff’d by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 137 F. 2d 787.
A proceeding seeking the Commission’s approval of a further amendment to Article 11 was consolidated with the show-cause proceedings in the instant case. In response, the Commission, in 1950, ordered that article amended to read:
“After the first 20 years of operation of the project under this license, 6 percent per annum shall be the specified rate of return on the net investment in the project for determining surplus earnings and for the establishment and maintenance of amortization reserves, pursuant to section 10 (d) of the act; one-half of all earnings in excess of 6 percent per annum shall be paid into such amortization reserves and such amortization reserves shall be established, maintained and disposed of in accordance with the terms of the act and such rules, regulations and orders of the Commission as may be adopted pursuant thereto.” 9 F. P. C., at 259.
Under the above amendment, the method of setting aside the amortization reserves may be prescribed by the Commission. 9 F. P. C., at 232-233, 239.
Per curiam. Kimbrough Stone, Circuit Judge, retired, from the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation; Wilbur K. Miller, Circuit Judge. Dissenting, Bazelon, Circuit Judge.
For computations, see Appendix, infra, p. 257.
Respondent’s corporate history and the devolution of the title to the International Paper and the Pettebone-Cataract water rights are described by the Court of Appeals in 91 U. S. App. D. C. 395, at 398-402, 402-407, 202 F. 2d 190, at 194-197, 198-202. See also, Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 137 F. 2d 787. For a detailed examination of the facts and issues of the instant case, see Schwartz, Niagara Mohawk v. FPC: Have Private Water Rights Been Destroyed by the Federal Power Act?, 102 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 31.
“... While the right to its use, as it flows along in a body, may become a property right, yet the water itself, the corpus of the stream, never becomes or, in the nature of things, can become, the subject of fixed appropriation or exclusive dominion, in the sense that property in the water itself can be acquired, or become the subject of transmission from one to another. Neither sovereign nor subject can acquire anything more than a mere usufructuary right therein, and in this case the state never acquired, or could acquire, the ownership of the aggregated drops that comprised the mass of flowing water in the lake and outlet, though it could and did acquire the right to its use.” Sweet v. Syracuse, 129 N. Y. 316, 335, 27 N. E. 1081, 1084.
A riparian owner in New York has a right to use the waters of an abutting stream as part of his estate. United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois Pulp & Paper Co., 226 N. Y. 38, 123 N. E. 200; Waterford Electric Light Co. v. New York, 208 App. Div. 273, 203 N. Y. S. 858, aff’d without opinion, 239 N. Y. 629, 147 N. E. 225.
Recovery by the International Paper Company for the deprivation of its use of the instant water rights in 1917 was authorized by this Court in 1931. Referring to the 730 c. f. s. now before us, Mr. Justice Holmes said for the Court: “From this canal the petitioner, the International Paper Company, was entitled, by conveyance and lease, to draw and was drawing 730 cubic feet per second, — a right that by the law of New York was a corporeal hereditament and real estate.” International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 399, 405. The Government was obliged to pay for taking those diversionary rights by condemnation and they are the ones for which respondent is now paying an annual rental of $99,000. The deprivation, therefore, was not an exercise of the Government’s dominant servitude, but was a compensable taking by condemnation of the paper company’s recognized right to use the water. “[T]he Government took the property that the petitioner owned as fully as the Power Company owned the residue of the water power in the canal.” Id,., at 408. See also, Van Etten v. City of New York, 226 N. Y. 483, 124 N. E. 201, and People ex rel. Niagara Falls Hydraulic Power Co. v. Smith, 70 App. Div. 543, 546, 75 N. Y. S. 1100, 1101, aff’d without opinion, 175 N. Y. 469, 67 N. E. 1088.
The existence of the Pettebone-Cataract water rights, under the law of New York prior to the Federal Water Power Act, is recognized by the courts of that state. Hydraulic Power Co. v. Pettibone Cataract Paper Co., 112 Misc. 528, 183 N. Y. Supp. 373, aff’d, 198 App. Div. 644, 191 N. Y. Supp. 12.
Furthermore, Article 13 of the license recognizes at least the possibility of the survival of these rights after the issuance of the license. It provides that in the event the United States or a new licensee shall take over the project “Such taking over of the project shall also be subject to the rights, if any, of Pettebone-Cataract Paper Company and Cataract City Milling Company to withdraw water at a rate not exceeding 265 cubic feet per second from the Hydraulic Canal or Basin of Licensee, and to the rights, if any, of International Paper Company. (Italics supplied.)” 6 F. P. C. 184, 185.
In 1947, the licensee secured the approval of the New York Public Service Commission, and of the Securities & Exchange Commission.(under § 12 (d) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 824, 15 U. S. C. § 791 (d)), of its purchase of the Pettebone-Cataract rights from the licensee’s parent corporation for $728,415.48. Having thus completed their purchase, the licensee petitioned the Commission to amend Article 13 by striking from it the above italicized reference to these rights. The Commission declined and, accordingly, the original reference to the Pettebone-Cataract rights, as well as that to the rights of the International Paper Company, remains in the license.
The Commission’s denial of the requested amendment was on the ground that its consent to the omission of the original equivocal reference to the rights “might be construed as recognizing other alleged water rights claimed by another company.” 6 F. P. C., at 188. The Commission took the position that the rights in question had no existence after the enactment of the Federal Water Power Act and it now regards itself as controlled by that reasoning. 9 F. P. C., at 252, 258-259. Its action, however, was not considered by the Court of Appeals to be dispositive of the issue and it is not binding upon us.
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U. S. 499; United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U. S. 592; United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U. S. 377. See also, United States v. Kansas City Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799.
It was in this connection that the Court pointed out the inconceivability of private ownership in the running water of navigable streams as distinguished from private proprietary rights to the use of such water for power and other purposes. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S., at 69-70.
Chapman v. Federal Power Commission, 345 U. S. 153, 167-168; First Iowa Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U. S. 152, 180-181. The Act was dedicated to “encouraging private enterprise and the investment of private capital” in power projects on a basis consistent with the public interest. H. R. Rep. No. 61, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3. The bill was to provide “a method by which the water powers of the country, wherever located, can be developed by public or private agencies under conditions which will give the necessary security to the capital invested and at the same time protect and preserve every legitimate public interest.” Statement of David F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture. Id., at 5.
Section 14 even provides: “nor shall the values allowed for water rights, rights-of-way, lands, or interest in lands [used in computing a licensee’s net investment] be in excess of the actual reasonable cost thereof at the time of acquisition by the licensee:....” (Emphasis supplied.) 49 Stat. 844-845, 16 U. S. C. § 807.
In §3 (11) “project” is said to include “all water-rights... necessary or appropriate in the maintenance and operation of such unit,” 49 Stat. 838, 839; §4 (b) empowers the Commission, in determining the original cost of a project and the net investment in it, to require licensees to show “the price paid for water rights” as well as for lands, 49 Stat. 839; § 9 (b) requires an applicant for a license to submit evidence of whatever compliance he has made with the requirements of state law with respect to “the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power purposes,” 41 Stat. 1068; § 14 requires, when taking over a licensed project, that the “values allowed for water rights” shall not be “in excess of the actual reasonable cost thereof at the time of acquisition by the licensee” (Commissioner Smith emphasized the significance of this clause, 9 F. P. C., at 261), 49 Stat. 844-845; § 23 (b) recognizes the application of state laws to projects where interstate or foreign commerce, public lands and reservations are not affected, 49 Stat. 846; § 27 provides that “nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein,” 41 Stat. 1077. See 16 U. S. C. §§ 796-821.
In 1917, the Senate Committee on Commerce said:
“[T]he bill is so framed as to protect and maintain the constitutional power and control of the Federal Government over navigable streams, as well as the sovereignty of the States and the rights of riparian proprietors over and in the beds and waters of those
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