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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint on March 27, 1950, following a charge filed August 3, 1949, by the International Woodworkers of America, Local 6-7, against respondent, Dant & Russell, Ltd. The charge was filed in accordance with the procedure of the Act, § 10 (b), and was based on violations of § 8 (a) (1) and (3). After the usual proceedings, the Board ordered respondent to take appropriate remedial action to correct the charged unfair labor practices. The International Woodworkers Union was and is an affiliate of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. There were on file with the Board at the time the charge was made the non-Communist affidavits executed by the officers of the local union as required by § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 101. Affidavits executed by the officers of the C. I. 0. were filed with the Board prior to the issuance of the complaint but subsequent to the filing of the charge.
Section 9 (h) of the Act provided, at the time of the filing of the charge and the issuance of the complaint, that
“No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees, raised by a labor organization under subsection (c) of this section, no petition under section 9 (e)(1) shall be entertained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 10, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed ... by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate . . . that he is not a member of the Communist Party . . . .”
Respondent challenged the order on the ground that the Board could not issue a valid complaint based on a charge by a union if the charging union was not in compliance with § 9 (h) when the charge was filed in spite of the fact that at the time the complaint was issued, the union was in full compliance. In response to this challenge, the Board held that § 9 (h) required compliance “at the time of the issuance of the complaint, rather than at the time of the filing of the charge.” On petition for enforcement, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set aside the order on the single ground that, under i 9 (h), “the Board was not empowered to entertain the charge or to issue the complaint or the order.” This followed, according to the court, because our decision in Labor Board v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U. S. 322, had construed § 9 (h) as prohibiting the issuance of any complaint by the Board unless the charging labor organization was in full compliance at the time its charge was filed.
We do not think the Highland Park opinion supports the Court of Appeals opinion in the present case. That former opinion, dealing with a charge that the employer violated § 8 (a) (5) by refusing to bargain with the bargaining agent of the employees, § 9 (a), held only that the C. I. 0. was a “national or international labor organization” within the meaning of § 9 (h). For that reason the C. I. 0. was required to file non-Communist affidavits as a prerequisite to the achievement of full compliance status by its affiliates. There, the C. I. O.’s compliance with § 9 (h) occurred almost a year after the complaint had issued. Since compliance subsequent to the issuance of the complaint also occurred in the other decisions relied on by the court below, language in them concerning the institution of proceedings was not directed at charges under § 8 (a) (3) and therefore there was no occasion for those courts to analyze § 9 (h) to determine its applicability to the present situation.
In respondent’s view, and in the view of the Courts of Appeals that have considered this issue, § 9 (h) precludes noncomplying unions from filing “valid” charges, and prohibits the Board from taking any action on a charge filed by a noncomplying union. We do not agree. Section 9 (h) prohibited the Board from doing three things. It specifically stated that “unless” the prerequisite affidavits had been filed, the Board shall not (1) make an “investigation” as authorized by § 9 (c) concerning the representation of employees; (2) entertain a “petition under section 9 (e)(1),” as it then stood; or (3) issue a “complaint . . . pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 10.” It does not by its terms preclude either the filing of a charge by a noncomplying labor organization or the entertainment of the charge by the Board.
The “unless” clause limits the issuance of a “complaint.” It has no specific reference to the phrase “pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization.” If Congress had intended to enact such a requirement for the filing of the charge, it would have been a simple matter to have stated that “no charge shall be entertained.” We think the purpose of the “pursuant” phrase is to make it clear that the “unless” limitation on the issuance of complaints is restricted to charges filed by such labor organizations and does not apply to charges filed by individuals, or by employers against such organizations. The phrase so construed follows the pattern of the first phrase in § 9 (h) which applies to proceedings by employees for collective bargaining representation “raised by a labor organization under subsection (c) of this section.” That there is no such qualifying clause in § 9 (h) for the union-shop election clause provision of §9 (e)(1), as it then read, is in accord with this construction, for all petitions for such an election would then have been filed on behalf of a union.
The requirements for non-Communist affidavits in § 9 (h) make it unlawful for the Board to investigate a petition by a labor organization under § 9 (c) for collective bargaining representation. Likewise the absence of such affidavits kept the Board from entertaining a petition for a union-shop election under §9 (e)(1). The careful specification in § 9 (h) that these affidavits must be filed before investigation, entertainment or complaint shows that § 9 (h) was not directed at the filing of a charge. Such particularity distinguishes between charge and complaint.
This has been the position of the Board from the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act. Section 102.13 (b) (2) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, effective August 18, 1948, defines compliance with § 9 (h) of the Act in terms of requiring the affidavits to be “executed contemporaneously with the charge (or petition).” This, however, is a direction as to what should be done and is not an interpretation by the Board of the requirement of § 9 (h). According to § 102.13 (b), the definition of compliance is set down, “For the purpose of the regulations in this part.” The Board had made it clear in § 101.3 of these Rules that there is a 10-day period of grace given to charging unions to achieve compliance status. The Board states it has followed a practice of extending this period upon a proper showing that the union is making a diligent effort to comply. An interpretation that the Act permits the filing of a charge prior to compliance with § 9 (h) is the same as that made by the Board in an opinion as early as December 16, 1948, In the Matter of Southern Fruit Distributors, 80 N. L. R. B. 1283. That opinion was handed down by the Board before our ruling in the Highland Park case and the position has been maintained, though the Board failed to set out fully in its opinions the reason for its conclusion.
Respondent urges that the above construction of § 9 (h) weakens the over-all purpose of the section in that it allows the Board to provide noncomplying labor organizations with substantial benefits by the filing of the charge without any assurance of compliance.
Phrased differently, the argument is that the benefits of the Act may not flow to a labor organization unless the non-Communist affidavits are on file. We agree with the argument, and believe that it is in accord with our interpretation of § 9 (h). Since the remedial processes of the Act to cure practices forbidden by § 8 (a)(3) can only be invoked by the issuance of a complaint, we do not see how a noncomplying labor organization can be said to benefit from the fact that it need not be in compliance at the date of the filing of the charge. The filing of a charge, which is subject to dismissal within 10 days under the Board’s rule, unless reasonable assurance is given by the filing union that it will comply with the affidavit requirement, is of no benefit to the charging union unless it is followed by the issuance of a complaint. Absent the issuance of a complaint, the filing of a charge is a useless act.
Another factor militating against the construction of the Act adopted below arises out of the fluid and elective nature of the official personnel of labor unions. As a practical matter, elections of new officers, changes in organizational structures, difficulties and delays in auditing financial statements or in obtaining information with respect to the numerous details which § 9 (f) and (g) requires, make compliance at a given moment, or continuous compliance, a matter of happenstance. Under § 9 (f) and (g) the filing of union financial and organizational reports is also a condition precedent to the issuance of complaints under subsection (b) of § 10 of the Act. It would seem that the construction of § 9 (h) urged by respondent would lead to a like construction of §9 (f) and (g). Such normal noncompliance at the time of filing a charge should not work to frustrate the Act’s purpose of remedying unfair labor practices committed against unions which do have leadership willing to comply.
Finally, respondent makes the argument that its position is supported by the legislative history of § 9 (h). But in the face of the specific words of the statute, the legislative history does not persuade us. It contains no discussion of the necessity of filing § 9 (h) affidavits before filing the charge. The purpose of § 9 (h) was to stop the use of the Labor Board by union leaders unwilling to be limited in government by the processes of reason. That purpose was sought through the elimination of such leaders rather than by making difficult the union’s compliance with the Act. The legislative comments are to be read in that light. Indeed those comments are so lacking in definitiveness on the point here at issue that both parties suggest that § 9 (h) itself best shows the purpose of Congress.
We hold that the sought-for congressional intent is found in the language of the Act; and as we have found it, the decision below must be reversed.
Reversed.
National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U. S. C. § 158:
“ (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
“(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
“(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided,
29 U. S. C. § 160:
“(b) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board . . . shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board
Section 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) §159 (h).
The clause “no petition under section 9 (e) (1) shall be entertained” was deleted by Act of October 22, 1951, 65 Stat. 601.
195 F. 2d 299, 300. The Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits have taken similar positions where the affidavits were filed prior to the issuance of the complaints in Labor Board v. Nina Dye Works Co., Inc., 198 F. 2d 362; and Labor Board v. American Thread Co., 198 F. 2d 137, respectively. Each of these cases agreed with the analysis and conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the present case. See judgment of this Court reversing these decisions entered today, post, p. 924.
84 N. L. R. B. 744, 745.
Labor Board v. Postex Cotton Mills, 181 F. 2d 919; Labor Board v. J. I. Case Co., 189 F. 2d 599; Labor Board v. Clark Shoe Co., 189 F. 2d 731.
See S. 655, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., introduced by Senator Taft to amend § 9 (h) by forbidding entertainment by the Board of a charge under § 10 (b) unless the required affidavits are filed.
29 CFR §102.13:
“(b) For the purpose of the regulations in this part, compliance with section 9 (h) of the act means in the case of a national or international labor organization, that it has filed with the general counsel in Washington, D. C., and in the case of a local labor organization, that any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent body has filed with the general counsel in Washington, D. C., and that the labor organization has filed with the regional director in the region in which the proceeding is pending:
“(2) An affidavit by each officer referred to in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, executed contemporaneously with the charge (or petition) or within the preceding 12-month period, stating that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods.”
29 CFR §101.3:
“(b) In addition, the labor organization and every national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit must have complied with section 9 (h) of the act as follows: At the time of filing -the charge (or petition) or prior thereto, or within a reasonable period not to exceed 10 days thereafter, the national or international labor organization shall have on file with the general counsel in Washington, D. C., and the local labor organization shall have on file with the regional director in the region in which the proceeding is pending, or in which it customarily files cases, a declaration by an authorized agent executed contemporaneously or within the preceding 12-month period listing the titles of all offices of the filing organization and stating the names of the incumbents, if any, in each such office and the date of expiration of each incumbent’s term, and an affidavit from each such officer, executed contemporaneously or within the preceding 12-month period, stating that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of nor supports any organization that believes in or teaches the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods.”
Respondent asserts that this practice, which was followed by the Board in this case, contravenes § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act. That section requires every agency to publish in the Federal Register “statements of the general course and method by which its functions are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirement of all formal or informal procedures available,” and provides that “[n]o person shall in any manner be required to resort to organization or procedure not so published.” 5 U. S. C. § 1002 (a). The Board’s practice of extending the 10-day period on a proper showing by the labor organization can hardly be called a procedure to which respondent was required to resort.
In the Matter of H & H Manufacturing Co., Inc., 87 N. L. R. B. 1373. Compare a contrary position taken by the Third Circuit in Labor Board v. Nina Dye Works Co., Inc., 198 F. 2d 362.
N. L. R. B. Rules and Regulations and Statement of Procedure, 29 CFR §§ 101.3 and 102.13.
29 U. S. C. § 159:
“(f) ... No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees, raised by a labor organization under subsection (c) of this section, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b), of section 160 of this title, unless such labor organization and any national or international labor organization of which such labor organization is an affiliate or constituent unit (A) shall have prior thereto filed with the Secretary of Labor copies of its constitution and bylaws and a report, in such form as the Secretary may prescribe, showing— ....
“ (g) ... It shall be the obligation of all labor organizations to file annually with the Secretary of Labor, in such form as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, reports bringing up to date the information required to be supplied in the initial filing by subsection (f) (A) of this section, and to file with the Secretary of Labor and furnish to its members annually financial reports in the form and manner prescribed in subsection (f) (B) of this section. No labor organization shall be eligible for certification under this section as the representative of any employees, and no complaint shall issue under section 160 of this title with respect to a charge filed by a labor organization unless it can show that it and any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit has complied with its obligation under this subsection.”
The House Conference Report No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 46, speaks of the filing of the required data as a condition to the labor organization’s receiving “benefits under the act.” To the same effect see the analysis of the Act at 93 Cong. Rec. 6534. Senator Taft, in analyzing the differences between the Senate bill and the Conference Report, stated: “Subsection 9 (h) of the conference agreement embodies the principle . . . which would have prevented a labor organization from being eligible for certification if any of its . . . officers were members or affiliates of the Communist Party .... There was a similar provision in the House bill .... In reconciling the two provisions the conferees took into account the fact that representation proceedings might be indefinitely delayed if the Board was required to investigate the character of all the local and national officers as well as the character of the officers of the parent body or federation. The conference agreement provides that no certification shall be made or any complaint issued unless the labor organization in question submits affidavits executed by each of its officers ... to the effect that they are not members or affiliates” of organizations accepting the doctrine of violence in government. 93 Cong. Rec. 6444.
Referring to subsections 9 (f) and (g), containing provisions regarding financial reports, similar to those of § 9 (h), Senator Taft stated that “[t]he filing of such report is a condition of certification as bargaining agent under the law, and is also a condition of the right to file any charges under the . . . Act.” 93 Cong. Rec. 3839. Congressman Hartley’s remarks were that the section “prohibits labor organizations from invoking the processes of the act unless all of the officers file affidavits with the board that they are not members of the Communist Party . . . .” 93 Cong. Rec. 6383. In the House Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 51-52, it was stated that the bill which was enacted made several changes with respect to § 9 (f) and (g). “First, the filing of the information and reports is made a condition ... to eligibility for filing petitions for representation and eligibility for making changes.” To the same effect see also the subsequent statement of Congressman Hartley, in his book, “Our New National Labor Policy,” at pp. 162-163.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Edward McDonough alleges that respondent Youel Smith fabricated evidence and used it to pursue criminal charges against him. McDonough was acquitted, then sued Smith under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The courts below, concluding that the limitations period for McDonough's fabricated-evidence claim began to run when the evidence was used against him, determined that the claim was untimely. We hold that the limitations period did not begin to run until McDonough's acquittal, and therefore reverse.
I
This case arises out of an investigation into forged absentee ballots that were submitted in a primary election in Troy, New York, in 2009. McDonough, who processed the ballots in his capacity as a commissioner of the county board of elections, maintains that he was unaware that they had been forged. Smith was specially appointed to investigate and to prosecute the matter.
McDonough's complaint alleges that Smith then set about scapegoating McDonough (against whose family Smith harbored a political grudge), despite evidence that McDonough was innocent. Smith leaked to the press that McDonough was his primary target and pressured him to confess. When McDonough would not, Smith allegedly fabricated evidence in order to inculpate him. Specifically, McDonough alleges that Smith falsified affidavits, coached witnesses to lie, and orchestrated a suspect DNA analysis to link McDonough to relevant ballot envelopes.
Relying in part on this allegedly fabricated evidence, Smith secured a grand jury indictment against McDonough. McDonough was arrested, arraigned, and released (with restrictions on his travel) pending trial. Smith brought the case to trial a year later, in January 2012. He again presented the allegedly fabricated testimony during this trial, which lasted more than a month and ended in a mistrial. Smith then reprosecuted McDonough. The second trial also lasted over a month, and again, Smith elicited allegedly fabricated testimony. The second trial ended with McDonough's acquittal on all charges on December 21, 2012.
On December 18, 2015, just under three years after his acquittal, McDonough sued Smith and other defendants under § 1983 in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. Against Smith, McDonough asserted two different constitutional claims: one for fabrication of evidence, and one for malicious prosecution without probable cause. The District Court dismissed the malicious prosecution claim as barred by prosecutorial immunity, though timely. It dismissed the fabricated-evidence claim, however, as untimely.
McDonough appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed. 898 F.3d 259 (2018). The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's disposition of the malicious prosecution claim. As for the timeliness of the fabricated-evidence claim, because all agreed that the relevant limitations period is three years, id., at 265, the question was when that limitations period began to run: upon McDonough's acquittal, or at some point earlier. In essence, given the dates at issue, McDonough's claim was timely only if the limitations period began running at acquittal.
The Court of Appeals held that McDonough's fabricated-evidence claim accrued, and thus the limitations period began to run, "when (1) McDonough learned that the evidence was false and was used against him during the criminal proceedings; and (2) he suffered a loss of liberty as a result of that evidence." Ibid. This rule, in the Second Circuit's view, followed from its conclusion that a plaintiff has a complete fabricated-evidence claim as soon as he can show that the defendant's knowing use of the fabricated evidence caused him some deprivation of liberty. Id., at 266. Those events undisputedly had occurred by the time McDonough was arrested and stood trial. Ibid.
As the Second Circuit acknowledged, id., at 267, other Courts of Appeals have held that the statute of limitations for a fabricated-evidence claim does not begin to run until favorable termination of the challenged criminal proceedings. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 586 U. S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 915, 202 L.Ed.2d 641 (2019), and now reverse.
II
The statute of limitations for a fabricated-evidence claim like McDonough's does not begin to run until the criminal proceedings against the defendant (i.e., the § 1983 plaintiff) have terminated in his favor. This conclusion follows both from the rule for the most natural common-law analogy (the tort of malicious prosecution) and from the practical considerations that have previously led this Court to defer accrual of claims that would otherwise constitute an untenable collateral attack on a criminal judgment.
A
The question here is when the statute of limitations began to run. Although courts look to state law for the length of the limitations period, the time at which a § 1983 claim accrues "is a question of federal law," "conforming in general to common-law tort principles." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). That time is presumptively "when the plaintiff has 'a complete and present cause of action,' " ibid., though the answer is not always so simple. See, e.g., id., at 388-391, and n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 1091 ; Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 360, 125 S.Ct. 2478, 162 L.Ed.2d 343 (2005). Where, for example, a particular claim may not realistically be brought while a violation is ongoing, such a claim may accrue at a later date. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389, 127 S.Ct. 1091.
An accrual analysis begins with identifying " 'the specific constitutional right' " alleged to have been infringed. Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 911, 920, 197 L.Ed.2d 312 (2017) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (plurality opinion)). Though McDonough's complaint does not ground his fabricated-evidence claim in a particular constitutional provision, the Second Circuit treated his claim as arising under the Due Process Clause. 898 F.3d at 266. McDonough's claim, this theory goes, seeks to vindicate a " 'right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of evidence by a government officer.' " Ibid. (quoting Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 349 (CA2 2000) ); see also, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). We assume without deciding that the Second Circuit's articulations of the right at issue and its contours are sound, having not granted certiorari to resolve those separate questions. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480, n. 2, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (accepting the lower courts' characterization of the relevant claims).
B
As noted above, this Court often decides accrual questions by referring to the common-law principles governing analogous torts. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091 ; Heck, 512 U.S. at 483, 114 S.Ct. 2364. These "principles are meant to guide rather than to control the definition of § 1983 claims," such that the common law serves "'more as a source of inspired examples than of prefabricated components.' " Manuel, 580 U. S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 920.
Relying on our decision in Heck, McDonough analogizes his fabricated-evidence claim to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution, a type of claim that accrues only once the underlying criminal proceedings have resolved in the plaintiff's favor. 512 U.S. at 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364 ; Prosser & Keeton § 119, at 871, 874-875; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 653, 658 (1976) ; 3 D. Dobbs, P. Hayden, & E. Bublick, Law of Torts §§ 586, 590, pp. 388-389, 402-404 (2d ed. 2011) (Dobbs). McDonough is correct that malicious prosecution is the most analogous common-law tort here.
Common-law malicious prosecution requires showing, in part, that a defendant instigated a criminal proceeding with improper purpose and without probable cause. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653 ; see also Dobbs § 586, at 388-389; Prosser & Keeton § 119, at 871. The essentials of McDonough's claim are similar: His claim requires him to show that the criminal proceedings against him-and consequent deprivations of his liberty -were caused by Smith's malfeasance in fabricating evidence. At bottom, both claims challenge the integrity of criminal prosecutions undertaken "pursuant to legal process." See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364.
We follow the analogy where it leads: McDonough could not bring his fabricated-evidence claim under § 1983 prior to favorable termination of his prosecution. As Heck explains, malicious prosecution's favorable-termination requirement is rooted in pragmatic concerns with avoiding parallel criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter and the related possibility of conflicting civil and criminal judgments. See id., at 484-485, 114 S.Ct. 2364 ; see also Prosser & Keeton § 119, at 874; Dobbs § 589, at 402. The requirement likewise avoids allowing collateral attacks on criminal judgments through civil litigation. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364. These concerns track "similar concerns for finality and consistency" that have motivated this Court to refrain from multiplying avenues for collateral attack on criminal judgments through civil tort vehicles such as § 1983. Id., at 485, 114 S.Ct. 2364 ; see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (noting the "strong policy requiring exhaustion of state remedies" in order "to avoid the unnecessary friction between the federal and state court systems"); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) ("Since the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts"). Because a civil claim such as McDonough's, asserting that fabricated evidence was used to pursue a criminal judgment, implicates the same concerns, it makes sense to adopt the same rule.
Heck confirms the strength of this analogy. In Heck, a prisoner serving a 15-year sentence for manslaughter sought damages under § 1983 against state prosecutors and an investigator for alleged misconduct similar to that alleged here, including knowingly destroying exculpatory evidence and causing an illegal voice identification procedure to be employed at the prisoner's trial. 512 U.S. at 478-479, 114 S.Ct. 2364. The Court took as a given the lower courts' conclusion that those claims all effectively "challeng[ed] the legality of" the plaintiff's conviction. Id., at 480, n. 2, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Looking first to the common law, the Court observed that malicious prosecution "provide[d] the closest analogy to" such claims because, unlike other potentially analogous common-law claims, malicious prosecution "permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process." Id., at 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364.
Emphasizing the concerns with parallel litigation and conflicting judgments just discussed, see id., at 484-486, 114 S.Ct. 2364, the Court in Heck held that "in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid," a plaintiff in a § 1983 action first had to prove that his conviction had been invalidated in some way, id., at 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364. This favorable-termination requirement, the Court explained, applies whenever "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply" that his prior conviction or sentence was invalid. Id., at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364.
This case differs from Heck because the plaintiff in Heck had been convicted, while McDonough was acquitted. Although some claims do fall outside Heck's ambit when a conviction is merely "anticipated," Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393, 127 S.Ct. 1091, however, McDonough's claims are not of that kind, see infra, at 2159 - 2160. As articulated by the Court of Appeals, his claims challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him in essentially the same manner as the plaintiff in Heck challenged the validity of his conviction. And the pragmatic considerations discussed in Heck apply generally to civil suits within the domain of habeas corpus, not only to those that challenge convictions. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490-491, 93 S.Ct. 1827. The principles and reasoning of Heck thus point toward a corollary result here: There is not " 'a complete and present cause of action,' " Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, to bring a fabricated-evidence challenge to criminal proceedings while those criminal proceedings are ongoing. Only once the criminal proceeding has ended in the defendant's favor, or a resulting conviction has been invalidated within the meaning of Heck, see 512 U.S. at 486-487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, will the statute of limitations begin to run.
C
The soundness of this conclusion is reinforced by the consequences that would follow from the Second Circuit's approach, which would impose a ticking limitations clock on criminal defendants as soon as they become aware that fabricated evidence has been used against them. Such a rule would create practical problems in jurisdictions where prosecutions regularly last nearly as long as-or even longer than-the relevant civil limitations period. See Brief for Petitioner 53-55; Brief for Criminal Defense Organizations et al. as Amici Curiae 23-24. A significant number of criminal defendants could face an untenable choice between (1) letting their claims expire and (2) filing a civil suit against the very person who is in the midst of prosecuting them. The first option is obviously undesirable, but from a criminal defendant's perspective the latter course, too, is fraught with peril: He risks tipping his hand as to his defense strategy, undermining his privilege against self-incrimination, and taking on discovery obligations not required in the criminal context. See SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1376 (CADC 1980) (en banc). Moreover, as noted above, the parallel civil litigation that would result if plaintiffs chose the second option would run counter to core principles of federalism, comity, consistency, and judicial economy. See supra, at 2156 - 2157.
Smith suggests that stays and ad hoc abstention are sufficient to avoid the problems of two-track litigation. Such workarounds are indeed available when claims falling outside Heck's scope nevertheless are initiated while a state criminal proceeding is pending, see Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-394, 127 S.Ct. 1091 (noting the power of district courts to stay civil actions while criminal prosecutions proceed); Heck, 512 U.S. at 487-488, n. 8, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (noting possibility of abstention), but Smith's solution is poorly suited to the type of claim at issue here. When, as here, a plaintiff's claim "necessarily" questions the validity of a state proceeding, id., at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, there is no reason to put the onus to safeguard comity on district courts exercising case-by-case discretion-particularly at the foreseeable expense of potentially prejudicing litigants and cluttering dockets with dormant, unripe cases. Cf. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (noting that a scheme requiring "conscientious defense attorneys" to file unripe suits "would add to the burden imposed on courts, applicants, and the States, with no clear advantage to any"). The accrual rule we adopt today, by contrast, respects the autonomy of state courts and avoids these costs to litigants and federal courts.
In deferring rather than inviting such suits, we adhere to familiar principles. The proper approach in our federal system generally is for a criminal defendant who believes that the criminal proceedings against him rest on knowingly fabricated evidence to defend himself at trial and, if necessary, then to attack any resulting conviction through collateral review proceedings. McDonough therefore had a complete and present cause of action for the loss of his liberty only once the criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor.
III
Smith's counterarguments do not sway the result.
First, Smith argues that Heck is irrelevant to McDonough's claim, relying on this Court's opinion in Wallace. Wallace held that the limitations period begins to run on a § 1983 claim alleging an unlawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment as soon as the arrestee "becomes detained pursuant to legal process," not when he is ultimately released. 549 U.S. at 397, 127 S.Ct. 1091. The Court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on Heck, stating that the Heck rule comes "into play only when there exists 'a conviction or sentence that has not been... invalidated,' that is to say, an 'outstanding criminal judgment.' " Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393, 127 S.Ct. 1091. The Court thus declined to adopt the plaintiff's theory "that an action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought until that conviction occurs and is set aside," because doing so in the context of an action for false arrest would require courts and litigants "to speculate about whether a prosecution will be brought, whether it will result in conviction, and whether the pending civil action will impugn that verdict-all this at a time when it can hardly be known what evidence the prosecution has in its possession." Ibid. (citations omitted).
Smith is correct that Heck concerned a plaintiff serving a sentence for a still-valid conviction and that Wallace distinguished Heck on that basis, but Wallace did not displace the principles in Heck that resolve this case. A false-arrest claim, Wallace explained, has a life independent of an ongoing trial or putative future conviction-it attacks the arrest only to the extent it was without legal process, even if legal process later commences. See 549 U.S. at 389-390, 393, 127 S.Ct. 1091. That feature made the claim analogous to common-law false imprisonment. Id., at 389, 127 S.Ct. 1091. By contrast, a claim like McDonough's centers on evidence used to secure an indictment and at a criminal trial, so it does not require "speculat[ion] about whether a prosecution will be brought." Id., at 393, 127 S.Ct. 1091. It directly challenges-and thus necessarily threatens to impugn-the prosecution itself. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487, 114 S.Ct. 2364.
Second, Smith notes (1) that a fabricated-evidence claim in the Second Circuit (unlike a malicious prosecution claim) can exist even if there is probable cause and (2) that McDonough was acquitted. In other words, McDonough theoretically could have been prosecuted without the fabricated evidence, and he was not convicted even with it. Because a violation thus could exist no matter its effect on the outcome, Smith reasons, "the date on which that outcome occurred is irrelevant." Brief for Respondent 26.
Smith is correct in one sense. One could imagine a fabricated-evidence claim that does not allege that the violation's consequence was a liberty deprivation occasioned by the criminal proceedings themselves. See n. 2, supra. To be sure, the argument for adopting a favorable-termination requirement would be weaker in that context. That is not, however, the nature of McDonough's claim.
As already explained, McDonough's claim remains most analogous to a claim of common-law malicious prosecution, even if the two are not identical. See supra, at 2156 - 2157. Heck explains why favorable termination is both relevant and required for a claim analogous to malicious prosecution that would impugn a conviction, and that rationale extends to an ongoing prosecution as well: The alternative would impermissibly risk parallel litigation and conflicting judgments. See supra, at 2156 - 2157. If the date of the favorable termination was relevant in Heck, it is relevant here.
It does not change the result, meanwhile, that McDonough suffered harm prior to his acquittal. The Court has never suggested that the date on which a constitutional injury first occurs is the only date from which a limitations period may run. Cf. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389-391, and n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 1091 (explaining that the statute of limitations for false-arrest claims does not begin running when the initial arrest takes place). To the contrary, the injury caused by a classic malicious prosecution likewise first occurs as soon as legal process is brought to bear on a defendant, yet favorable termination remains the accrual date. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364.
Third and finally, Smith argues that the advantages of his rule outweigh its disadvantages as a matter of policy. In his view, the Second Circuit's approach would provide more predictable guidance, while the favorable-termination approach fosters perverse incentives for prosecutors (who may become reluctant to offer favorable resolutions) and risks foreclosing meritorious claims (for example, where an outcome is not clearly "favorable"). These arguments are unconvincing. We agree that clear accrual rules are valuable but fail to see how assessing when proceedings terminated favorably will be, on balance, more burdensome than assessing when a criminal defendant "learned that the evidence was false and was used against him" and deprived him of liberty as a result. 898 F.3d at 265. And while the risk of foreclosing certain claims and the potential incentive effects that Smith identifies could be valid considerations in other contexts, they do not overcome the greater danger that plaintiffs will be deterred under Smith's theory from suing for redress of egregious misconduct, see supra, at 2158-nor do they override the guidance of the common law and precedent.
IV
The statute of limitations for McDonough's § 1983 claim alleging that he was prosecuted using fabricated evidence began to run when the criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor-that is, when he was acquitted at the end of his second trial. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice KAGAN and Justice GORSUCH join, dissenting.
We granted certiorari to decide when "the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fabrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run." Pet. for Cert. i. McDonough, however, declined to take a definitive position on the "threshold inquiry in a [ 42 U.S.C.] § 1983 suit": " 'identify[ing] the specific constitutional right' at issue." Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 911, 920, 197 L.Ed.2d 312 (2017) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (plurality opinion)). Because it is only "[a]fter pinpointing that right" that courts can proceed to "determine the elements of, and rules associated with, an action seeking damages for its violation," Manuel, 580 U. S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 920, we should have dismissed this case as improvidently granted.
McDonough's failure to specify which constitutional right the respondent allegedly violated profoundly complicates our inquiry. McDonough argues that malicious prosecution is the common-law tort most analogous to his fabrication-of-evidence claim. But without " 'identify[ing] the specific constitutional right' at issue," we cannot adhere to the contours of that right when "applying, selecting among, or adjusting common-law approaches." Ibid. McDonough also contends that his suit is timely because he suffered a continuing constitutional violation, but this argument is similarly difficult to evaluate without identifying precisely what that violation was. Moreover, because the constitutional basis for McDonough's claim is unclear, we are unable to confirm that he has a constitutional claim at all. In my view, it would be both logical and prudent to address that antecedent question before addressing the statute of limitations for that claim.
McDonough also urges us to resolve the question presented by extending Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). But the analysis under both cases depends on what facts a § 1983 plaintiff would need to prove to prevail on his claim. And McDonough declines to take a position on that issue as well. See Brief for Petitioner 19 ("The Court thus does not need to delve into what the elements of McDonough's constitutional claim are"); see also id., at 37-38, n. 11.
Further complicating this case, McDonough raised a malicious-prosecution claim alongside his fabrication-of-evidence claim. The District Court dismissed that claim on grounds of absolute immunity. McDonough has not fully explained the difference between that claim and his fabrication claim, which he insists is both analogous to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution and distinct from his dismissed malicious-prosecution claim. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12; Reply Brief 3-4. Additionally, it appears that McDonough's fabrication claim could face dismissal on absolute-immunity grounds on remand. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29-32.
The Court, while recognizing that it is critical to ascertain the basis for a § 1983 claim when deciding how to "handl[e]" it, ante, at 2155, n. 2, attempts to evade these issues by "assum[ing] without deciding that the Second Circuit's articulations of the right at issue and its contours are sound." Ante, at 2155. But because the parties have not accepted the Second Circuit's view that the claim sounds in procedural due process, that claim as "articulated by the Court of Appeals" might be different from the claim McDonough actually brought. Ante, at 2157 - 2158. The better course would be to dismiss this case as improvidently granted and await a case in which the threshold question of the basis of a "fabrication-of-evidence" claim is cleanly presented. Moreover, even if the Second Circuit were correct that McDonough asserts a violation of the Due Process Clause, it would be preferable for the Court to determine the claim's elements before deciding its statute of limitations.
* * *
McDonough asks the Court to bypass the antecedent question of the nature and elements of his claim and first determine its statute of limitations. We should have declined the invitation and dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. I therefore respectfully dissent.
See Floyd v. Attorney General of Pa., 722 Fed.Appx. 112, 114 (CA3 2018) ; Mills v. Barnard, 869 F.3d 473, 484 (CA6 2017) ; Bradford v. Scherschligt, 803 F.3d 382, 388 (CA9 2015) ; Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 959-960 (CA5 2003) (en banc).
In accepting the Court of Appeals' treatment of McDonough's claim as one sounding in denial of due process, we express no view as to what other constitutional provisions (if any) might provide safeguards against the creation or use of fabricated evidence enforceable through a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 70, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) ("Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands"). Moreover, because the Second Circuit understood McDonough's due process claim to allege a deprivation of liberty, we have no occasion to consider the proper handling of a fabricated-evidence claim founded on an allegation that the use of fabricated evidence was so egregious as to shock the conscience, see, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998), or caused harms exclusively to "interests other than the interest in freedom from physical restraint," Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 283, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see also, e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 119, p. 870 (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser & Keeton) ("[O]ne who is wrongfully prosecuted may suffer both in reputation and by confinement"). Accordingly, we do not address what the accrual rule would be for a claim rooted in other types of harm independent of a liberty deprivation, as no such claim is before us. See 898 F.3d 259, 266 (CA2 2018).
The Second Circuit borrowed the common-law elements of malicious prosecution to govern McDonough's distinct constitutional malicious prosecution claim, which is not before us. See 898 F.3d at 268, n. 10. This Court has not defined the elements of such a § 1983 claim, see Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S. ----, ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct. 911, 921-922, 197 L.Ed.2d 312 (2017), and this case provides no occasion to opine on what the elements of a constitutional malicious prosecution action under § 1983 are or how they may or may not differ from those of a fabricated-evidence claim. Similarly, while noting that only McDonough's malicious prosecution claim was barred on absolute-immunity grounds below, we make no statement on whether or how the doctrine of absolute immunity would apply to McDonough's fabricated-evidence claim. Any further consideration of that question is properly addressed by the Second Circuit on remand, subject to ordinary principles of waiver and forfeiture.
Though McDonough was not incarcerated pending trial, he was subject to restrictions on his ability to travel and other "'restraints not shared by the public generally,' " Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 301, 104 S.Ct. 1805, 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984), and as the case comes to this Court, it is undisputed that McDonough has pleaded a liberty deprivation. See 898 F.3d at 266.
Smith urges the Court to steer away from the comparison to malicious prosecution, noting that the Second Circuit treats malicious prosecution claims and fabricated-evidence claims as distinct. See id., at 268, and n. 12. But two constitutional claims may differ yet still both resemble malicious prosecution more than any other common-law tort; comparing constitutional and common-law torts is not a one-to-one matching exercise. See, e.g., Heck, 512 U.S. at 479, 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (analogizing malicious prosecution to several distinct claims). Tellingly, Smith has not suggested an alternative common-law analogy. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 44-46.
Such considerations are why Congress has determined that a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not a § 1983 action, "is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement," Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), including confinement pending trial before any conviction has occurred, see id., at 491, 93 S.Ct. 1827 (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973) ).
Because McDonough was not free to sue prior to his acquittal, we need not reach his alternative argument that his claim was timely because it alleged a continuing violation.
Heck itself suggested that a similar rule might allow at least some Fourth Amendment unlawful-search claims to proceed without a favorable termination. See 512 U.S. at 487, n. 7, 114 S.Ct. 2364.
As for Smith's suggestion that the fabricated evidence could not have caused any liberty deprivation where, as here, there could have been probable cause and there was in fact an acquittal, it suffices to reiterate that we assume the contours of the claim as defined by the Second Circuit, see supra, at 2155 - 2156, 2156 - 2157, and nn. 2, 4, and thus accept its undisputed conclusion that there was a sufficient liberty deprivation here, see 898 F.3d at 266 ; see also Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F.3d 265, 277 (CA2 2016) (explaining that "a further deprivation of liberty can result from the fabrication of evidence
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted.- The judgment is, vacated and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353.
Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan dissent for the reasons stated in their dissenting opinions in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S., at 358,.360.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Douglas,
announced by Mr. Justice Reed.
The initial question presented in this case is the one we reserved in Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283, 305, viz. whether the presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court of the person detained is prerequisite to filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioners are some 120 Germans who are being held at Ellis Island, New York, for deportation to Germany. Their deportation has been directed under removal orders issued by the Attorney General who has found that each of them is dangerous to the public peace and safety of the United States because he has adhered to a government with which the United States is at war or to the principles thereof. These removal orders were issued under Presidential Proclamation 2655 of July 14, 1945 (10 Fed. Reg. 8947) pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, R. S. § 4067, 50 U. S. C. § 21. The orders are challenged by these petitions for writs of habeas corpus on several grounds, the principal one being that all of them exceed the statutory authority in that they were issued after actual hostilities with Germany ceased.
The petitions were filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia and alleged that petitioners were confined at Ellis Island, New York, and are “subject to the custody and control” of the Attorney General. Respondent moved to dismiss because, inter alia, petitioners were outside the territorial confines of the District of Columbia. The Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from the order of the District Court granting the motion.
The statute, 28 U. S. C. § 452, provides:
“The several justices of the Supreme Court and the several judges of the circuit courts of appeal and of the district courts, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty. A circuit judge shall have the same power to grant writs of habeas corpus within his circuit, that a district judge has within his district; and the order of the circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.”
The question at the threshold of the case is whether the words “within their respective jurisdictions” limit the district courts to inquiries into the causes of restraints of liberty of those confined or restrained within the territorial jurisdictions of those courts. There are few cases on all fours with the present one, the precise question not having frequently arisen in the lower federal courts. But the general view is that their jurisdiction is so confined. McGowan v. Moody, 22 App. D. C. 148, 158 et seq.; In re Bickley, 3 Fed. Cas. 332. And see In re Boles, 48 F. 75; Ex parte Gouyet, 175 F. 230, 233; United States v. Day, 50 F. 2d 816, 817; Jones v. Biddle, 131 F. 2d 853, 854; United States v. Schlotfeldt, 136 F. 2d 935, 940. Cf. Sanders v. Allen, 69 App. D. C. 307, 100 F. 2d 717; Tippitt v. Wood, 78 U. S. App. D. C. 332, 140 F. 2d 689. That is our view.
We start from the accepted premise that apart from specific exceptions created by Congress the jurisdiction of the district courts is territorial. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 467-468, and cases cited. It is not sufficient in our view that the jailer or custodian alone be found in the jurisdiction.
Although the writ is directed to the person in whose custody the party is detained, 28 U. S. C. § 455, the statutory scheme contemplates a procedure which may bring the prisoner before the court. For § 458 provides that “The person making the return shall at the same time bring the body of the party before the judge who granted the writ.” See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275. It would take compelling reasons to conclude that Congress contemplated the production of prisoners from remote sections, perhaps thousands of miles from the District Court that issued the writ. The opportunities for escape afforded by travel, the cost of transportation, the administrative burden of such an undertaking negate such a purpose. These are matters of policy which counsel us to construe the jurisdictional provision of the statute in the conventional sense, even though in some situations return of the prisoner to the court where he was tried and convicted might seem to offer some advantages.
The history of the statute supports this view. It came into the law as the Act of February 5, 1867, 14 Stat. 385. And see Act of August 29, 1842, 5 Stat. 539. Prior to that date it was the accepted view that a prisoner must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court in order to obtain from it a writ of habeas corpus. See Ex parte Graham, 4 Wash. C. C. 211; In re Bickley, 3 Fed. Cas. 332. Cf. United States v. Davis, 5 Cranch C. C. 622. The bill as introduced in the Senate was thought to contain an infirmity. The objection was made on the floor that it would permit “a district judge in Florida to bring before him some men convicted and sentenced and held under imprisonment in the State of Vermont or in any of the further States.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 730. As a result of that objection Senator Trumbull, who had charge of the bill, offered an amendment which added the words “within their respective jurisdictions.” Ibid, at 790. That amendment was adopted as a satisfactory solution of the imagined difficulty. Id. Thus the view that the jurisdiction of the District Court to issue the writ in cases such as this is restricted to those petitioners who are confined or detained within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is supported by the language of the statute, by considerations of policy, and by the legislative history of the enactment. We therefore do not feel free to weigh the policy considerations which are advanced for giving district courts discretion in cases like this. If that concept is to be imported into this statute, Congress must do so.
Respondent is willing to waive the point, so that we may make a decision on the merits. But the restriction is one which Congress has placed on the power of the District Court to act. Hence it may not be waived by the parties. United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226, 229.
Ex parte Endo, supra, p. 305, is not opposed to this view. In that case petitioner at the time suit was instituted was within the territorial jurisdiction of the habeas corpus court but had subsequently been removed to a different district and circuit. We held, in conformity with the policy underlying Rule 45 (1) of the Court, that jurisdiction of the District Court was not defeated in that manner, no matter how proper the motive behind the removal. We decided that in that situation the court can act as long as it can reach a person who has custody of the petitioner.
Since there is a defect in the jurisdiction of the District Court which remains uncured, we do not reach the question whether the Attorney General is the proper respondent (see §§455 and 458; Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564, 574; Jones v. Biddle, supra; Sanders v. Bennett, 80 U. S. App. D. C. 32, 148 F. 2d 19) and, if not, whether the objection may be waived, as respondent is willing to do. Cf. Ex parte Endo, supra, pp. 305-307.
Affirmed.
But see Ex parte Fong Yim, 134 F. 938; Ex parte Ng Quong Ming, 135 F. 378.
The principle which governed the decision was stated by Mr. Justice Washington as follows, 4 Wash. C. C. pp. 211-212:
“It is admitted that these courts, in the exercise of their common law and equity jurisdiction, have no authority, generally, to issue process into another district, except in cases where such authority has been specially bestowed by some law of the United States. The absence of such a power would seem necessarily to result from the organization of the court of the United States, by which two courts are allotted to each of the districts into which the United States are divided, the one denominated a district, and the other a circuit court. This division and appointment of particular courts for each district, necessarily confines the jurisdiction of these local tribunals within the limits of the respective districts within which they are directed to be holden. Were it otherwise, and the court of one district couH send compulsory process into any other, so as to draw to itself a jurisdiction over persons and things without the limits of its district, there would result a clashing of jurisdiction between the different courts not easily to be adjusted, and an oppression upon suitors too intolerable to be endured.”
The statute then read, “That the several courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges of such courts, within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States; . . 14 Stat. 385.
We need not determine the question of what process, if any, a person confined in an area not subject to the jurisdiction of any district court may employ to assert federal rights. Cf. Ex parte Betz; Ex parte Durant; Ex parte Wills; Ex parte Cutino; Ex parte Walczak; Ex parte McKinley; and Ex parte Murphy, all reported together. 329 U. S. 672.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for consideration in light of Elkins v. United States, ante, p. 206, decided this day.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissents on the basis of his dissenting opinion in Rios v. United States, ante, p. 233, and Elkins v. United States, ante, p. 233, decided this day.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Border Patrol officers stopped respondent’s car for a routine immigration search at the traffic checkpoint' on Interstate Highway 5 at San Clemente, Cal., on November 12, 1973. They found three aliens concealed in the trunk, and respondent was convicted on three counts of knowingly transporting aliens who were in the country illegally. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction in an unreported opinion, relying on dictum in its opinion in United States v. Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (CA9 1974), aff’d, post, p. 916, to the effect that our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), required probable cause for all vehicle searches in the border area, whether conducted by roving patrols or at traffic checkpoints. We granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 824 (1974).
Nothing in this record suggests that the Border Patrol officers had any special reason to suspect that respondent’s car was carrying concealed aliens. Nor does the Government contend that the San Clemente checkpoint is a functional equivalent of the border. Brief for United States 16. The only question for decision is whether vehicle searches at traffic checkpoints, like the roving-patrol search in Almeida-Sanchez, must be based on probable cause.
I
In Almeida-Sanchez we rejected the Government’s contention that the Nation’s strong interest in controlling immigration and the practical difficulties of policing the Mexican border combined to justify dispensing with both warrant and probable cause for vehicle searches by roving patrols near the border. The facts did not require us to decide whether the same rule would apply to traffic checkpoints, which differ from roving patrols in several important respects. 413 U. S., at 273; id., at 276 (Powell, J., concurring).
A consolidated proceeding on motions to suppress in this and similar cases produced an extensive factual record on the operation of traffic checkpoints in southern California. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (SD Cal. 1973). The San Clemente checkpoint is 62 air miles and 66 road miles north of the Mexican border. It is on the principal highway between San Diego and Los Angeles, and over 10 million vehicles pass the checkpoint in a year. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F. 2d 308, 312 (CA9 1975). The District Court in Baca described the checkpoint as follows:
“Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow lights over the highway stating ‘ALL VEHICLES, STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE.’ Three-quarters of a mile further north are two black on yellow signs suspended over the highway with flashing lights stating ‘WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS.' At the checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of California weighing station, are two large signs with flashing red lights suspended over the highway. These signs each state ‘STOP HERE — U. S. OFFICERS.' Placed on the highway are a number of orange traffic cones tunneling traffic into two lanes where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform, standing behind a white on red ‘STOP' sign checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are official U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red lights. In addition, there is a permanent building which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary detention facilities. There are also floodlights for nighttime operation.” 368 F. Supp., at 410-411.
The Border Patrol would prefer to keep this checkpoint in operation continuously, but bad weather, heavy traffic, and personnel shortages keep it closed about one-third of the time. When it is open, officers screen all northbound traffic. If anything about a vehicle or its occupants leads an officer to suspect that it may be carrying aliens, he will stop the car and ask the occupants about their citizenship. If the officer’s suspicion persists, or if the questioning enhances it, he will “inspect” portions of the car in which an alien might hide. Operations at other checkpoints are similar, although the traffic at some is light enough that officers can stop all vehicles for questioning and routinely inspect more of them.
The Government maintains that these characteristics justify dispensing with probable cause at traffic checkpoints despite the' Court’s holding in Almeida-Sanchez. It gives essentially two reasons for distinguishing that case. First, a checkpoint officer’s discretion in deciding which cars to search is limited by the location of the checkpoint. That location is determined by high-level Border Patrol officials, using criteria that include the degree of inconvenience to the public and the potential for safe operation, as well as the potential for detecting and deterring the illegal movement of aliens. By contrast, officers on roving patrol were theoretically free before Almeida-Sanchez to stop and search any car within 100 miles of the border. Second, the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.
These differences are relevant to the constitutional issue, since the central concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by government officials. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 767 (1966). The Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable also may limit police use of unnecessarily frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and investigation. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1968); Camara, supra, at 531; Schmerber, supra, at 771-772. While the differences between a roving patrol and a checkpoint would be significant in determining the propriety of the stop, which is considerably less intrusive than a search, Terry v. Ohio, supra, they do not appear to make any difference in the search itself. The greater regularity attending the stop does not mitigate the invasion of privacy that a search entails. Nor do checkpoint procedures significantly reduce the likelihood of embarrassment. Motorists whose cars are searched, unlike those who are only questioned, may not be reassured by seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars as well. Where only a few are singled out for a search, as at San Clemente, motorists may find the searches especially offensive. See Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 Yale L. J. 1007, 1012-1013 (1968).
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the checkpoint limits to any meaningful extent the officer’s discretion to select cars for search. The record in the consolidated proceeding indicates that only about 3% of the cars that pass the San Clemente checkpoint are stopped for either questioning or a search, 368 F. Supp., at 411. Throughout the system, fewer than 3% of the vehicles that passed through checkpoints in 1974 were searched, Brief for United States 29, and no checkpoint involved in Baca reported a search rate of more than 10% or 15%. 368 F. Supp., at 412-415. It is apparent from these figures that checkpoint officers exercise a substantial degree of discretion in deciding which cars to search. The Government maintains that they voluntarily exercise that discretion with restraint and search only vehicles that arouse their suspicion, and it insists the officers should be free of judicial oversight of any kind. Viewed realistically, this position would authorize the Border Patrol to search vehicles at random, for no officer ever would have to justify his decision to search a particular car.
This degree of discretion to search private automobiles is not consistent with the Fourth Amendment. A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy. To protect that privacy from official arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U. S., at 269-270; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51 (1970). We are not persuaded that the differences between roving patrols and traffic checkpoints justify dispensing in this case with the safeguards we required in Almeida-Sanchez. We therefore follow that decision and hold that at traffic checkpoints removed from the border and its functional equivalents, officers may not search private vehicles without consent or probable cause.
The Government lists in its reply brief some of the factors on which officers have relied in deciding which cars to search. They include the number of persons in a vehicle, the appearance and behavior of the driver and passengers, their inability to speak English, the responses they give to officers’ questions, the nature of the vehicle, and indications that it may be heavily loaded. All of these factors properly may be taken into account in deciding whether there is probable cause to search a particular vehicle. In addition, as we note today in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, at 884-885, the officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area and their prior experience with aliens and smugglers. In this case, however, the officers advanced no special reasons for believing respondent’s vehicle contained aliens. The absence of probable cause makes the search invalid.
II
The Government also contends that even if AlmeidaSanchez applies to checkpoint searches, the Court of Appeals erred in voiding this search because it occurred after the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez but before the Court of Appeals stated in United States v. Bowen, supra, that it would require probable cause for checkpoint searches. Examination of the Government’s brief in the Ninth Circuit indicates that it did not raise this question below. On the contrary, it represented to the court that the decision in Bowen would be “determinative of the issues in this case.” We therefore decline to consider this issue, which was raised for the first time in the petition for certiorari.
Affirmed.
Such places typically include the trunk, under the hood, and beneath the chassis. If the vehicle is a truck, a camper, or the like, the officer inspects the enclosed portion as well. But an immigration inspection is not always so confined. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), the officer removed the back seat cushion because there were reports that aliens had been found seated upright behind seats from which the springs had been removed. Id., at 286 (White, J., dissenting).
The degree of the invasion of privacy in an automobile search may vary with the circumstances, as there are significant differences between “an automobile and a home or office.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 48 (1970); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S., at 279 (Powell, J., concurring).
Not every aspect of a routine automobile “inspection,” as described in n. 1, supra, necessarily constitutes a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. There is no occasion in this case to define the exact limits of an automobile “search.”
Nor do we have occasion to decide whether a warrant could issue approving checkpoint searches based on information about the area as a whole, in the absence of cause to believe that a particular car is carrying concealed aliens, because the officers had no such warrant in this case and had not tried to obtain one. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, at 275 (Powell, J., concurring); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967). We also need not decide whether checkpoints and roving patrols must be treated the same for all purposes, or whether Border Patrol officers may lawfully stop motorists for questioning at an established checkpoint without reason to believe that a particular vehicle is carrying aliens. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, p. 873. Nor do we suggest that probable cause would be required for all inspections of private motor vehicles. It is quite possible, for example, that different considerations would apply to routine safety inspections required as a condition of road use.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions for decision are (1) whether §10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-706, is an independent grant to district courts of subject-matter jurisdiction to review a decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare not to reopen a previously adjudicated claim for social security benefits and (2), if not, whether § 205 (g) of the Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the Secretary’s decision.
I
Title II of the Social Security Act provides disability benefits for a claimant who demonstrates that he suffers a physical or mental disability within the meaning of the Act and that the disability arose prior to the expiration of his insured status. 42 U. S. C. §§416 (i), 423. The administrative process is begun when he files a claim with the Social Security Administration. 20 CFR §§ 404.905-404.907 (1976). If the claim is administratively denied, regulations permit administrative reconsideration within a six-month period. §§404.909-404.915. Should a request for reconsideration prove unsuccessful, the claimant may, within 60 days, ask for an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. V), and a discretionary appeal from an adverse determination of the law judge lies to the Appeals Council. 20 CFR §§ 404.945-404.947 (1976). Finally § 205 (g) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), authorizes federal judicial review of “any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which [the claimant] was a party . . . .”
The Act and regulations thus create an orderly administrative mechanism, with district court review of the final decision of the Secretary, to assist in the original processing of the more than 7,600,000 claims filed annually with the Administration. See Social Security Administration, The Year in Review—The Administration of Social Security Programs 1975, p. 54 (1976). By regulation, however, the administrative scheme provides for additional consideration of the claim. This is in the form of regulations for reopening of the agency determination within specified time limits after the date of initial determination: 12 months as a matter of right and four years “upon a finding of good cause,” which exists if new material evidence is provided or specific errors are discovered. 20 CFR §§ 404.957 (a), (b), 404.958 (1976). Moreover, the regulations permit reopening “[a]t any time” for the purpose of correcting clerical errors or errors on the face of relevant evidence. § 404.957 (c) (8).
On January 30, 1964, respondent filed his initial claim with the agency for disability payments and disability insurance benefits, alleging inability to work because of epilepsy and blackout spells. The claim proceeded through the several steps of the administrative procedures. An Administrative Law Judge found that respondent was ineligible for benefits on the ground that he had not demonstrated a relevant disability of sufficient severity. The Appeals Council, in June 1966, sustained this decision, and respondent did not pursue judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision under § 205 (g).
Almost seven years later, on March 5, 1973, respondent filed a second claim alleging the same bases for eligibility. His claim was again processed through administrative channels under the Secretary’s regulations. The Administrative Law Judge viewed the new application as barred by res judicata, see 20 CFR § 404.937 (1976), but also treated the application as requiring the determination “whether the claimant is entitled to have his prior application reopened . . . ." App. 33-34. Concluding that respondent’s evidence was “merely rep[e]titio[u]s and cumulative,” id., at 35, and finding no errors on the face of the evidence, ibid., the Administrative Law Judge denied reopening and dismissed the claim.
Respondent thereupon filed this action in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, challenging the Secretary’s decision not to reopen, and resting jurisdiction on § 205 (g), 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g). The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground stated in its unpublished memorandum that “this court is without jurisdiction to consider the subject matter of this suit.” Pet. for Cert. 13a-14a. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. Sanders v. Weinberger, 522 F. 2d 1167 (1975). The Court of Appeals agreed that jurisdiction to review a refusal to reopen a claim proceeding on the ground of abuse of discretion was not authorized by the Social Security Act. Id., at 1169. The court held, however, that § 205 (h) did not limit judicial review to those methods “expressly authorize[d]” by the Social Security Act itself. Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which “contains an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy,” afforded the District Court jurisdiction of respondent’s complaint. 522 F. 2d, at 1169. We granted certiorari sub nom. Mathews v. Sanders, 426 U. S. 905 (1976). We reverse.
II
A
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that its construction of § 10 of the APA as an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction is contrary to the conclusion reached by several other Courts of Appeals. 522 F. 2d, at 1169. This conflict is understandable. None of the codified statutory sections that constitute § 10 is phrased like the usual grant of jurisdiction to proceed in the federal courts. On the other hand, the statute undoubtedly evinces Congress’ intention and understanding that judicial review should be widely available to challenge the actions of federal administrative officials. Consequently, courts and commentators have sharply divided over whether the statute should be read to provide a distinct basis of jurisdiction for the review of agency actions. Three decisions of this Court arguably have assumed, with little discussion, that the APA is an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U. S. 367, 372 (1962). However, an Act of Congress enacted since our grant of certiorari in this case now persuades us that the better view is that the APA is not to be interpreted as an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to review agency actions.
On October 21, 1976, Congress enacted Pub. L. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721, which amends 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a) to eliminate the requirement of a specified amount in controversy as a prerequisite to the maintenance of “any [§ 1331] action brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.” The obvious effect of this modification, subject only to preclusion-of-review statutes created or retained by Congress, is to confer jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action, regardless of whether the APA of its own force may serve as a jurisdictional predicate. We conclude that this amendment now largely undercuts the rationale for interpreting the APA as an independent jurisdictional provision.
As noted previously, the actual text of § 10 of the APA nowhere contains an explicit grant of jurisdiction to challenge agency action in the federal courts. Furthermore, even the advocates of jurisdiction under the APA acknowledge that there is no basis for concluding that Congress, in enacting § 10 of the APA, actually conceived of the Act in jurisdictional terms. See, e. g., Byse & Fiocca, supra, n. 5, at 328. Thus, the argument in favor of APA jurisdiction rests exclusively on the broad policy consideration that, given the shortcomings of federal mandamus jurisdiction, such a construction is warranted by the rational policy of affording federal judicial review of actions by federal officials acting pursuant to federal law, notwithstanding the absence of the requisite jurisdictional amount. See id., at 330-331; Jaffe, supra, n. 5, at 165. We do not find this argument to be compelling in light of Congress’ apparent intention by the 1976 amendment to restructure afresh the scope of federal-question jurisdiction.
In amending § 1331, Congress obviously has expressly acted to fill the jurisdictional void created by the pre-existing amount-in-controversy requirement. This new jurisdictional grant was qualified, however, by the retention of § 205 (h) as preclusive of actions such as this that arise under the Social Security Act. Read together, the expansion of § 1331, coupled with the retention of § 205 (h), apparently expresses Congress’ view of the desired contours of federal-question jurisdiction over agency action. A broad reading of the APA in this instance would serve no purpose other than to modify Congress’ new jurisdictional enactment by overriding its decision to limit § 1331 through the preservation of § 205 (h). Squarely faced with the question of APA jurisdiction for the first time, Congress’ explicit entry into the jurisdictional area counsels against our reading the APA as an implied jurisdictional grant designed solely to fill such an interstitial gap in § 1331 jurisdiction. This is particularly so since neither the text nor the history of the APA speaks in favor of such a reading, and the 1976 Congress, in redefining § 1331, appears not to have envisioned the APA as playing any such stopgap role.
We thus conclude that the APA does not afford an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action.
B
Respondent contends that notwithstanding the above, the Social Security Act itself, specifically § 205 (g), should be construed to authorize judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary not to reopen a claim of benefits. All Courts of Appeals that have considered this contention have rejected it. We also agree that § 205 (g) cannot be read to authorize judicial review of alleged abuses of agency discretion in refusing to reopen claims for social security benefits.
The pertinent part of § 205 (g) provides:
“Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
This provision clearly limits judicial review to a particular type of agency action, a “final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing.” But a petition to reopen a prior final decision may be denied without a hearing as provided in § 205 (b), 42 U. S. C. § 405 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. V); see Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F. 2d 1, 4 (CA2 1966); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F. 2d 1005, 1007 (CA5 1975). Indeed, the opportunity to reopen final decisions and any hearing convened to determine the propriety of such action are afforded by the Secretary’s regulations and not by the Social Security Act. Moreover, an interpretation that would allow a claimant judicial review simply by filing—and being denied—a petition to reopen his claim would frustrate the congressional purpose, plainly evidenced in § 205 (g), to impose a 60-day limitation upon judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision on the initial claim for benefits. 20 CFR § 404.951 (1976). Congress’ determination so to limit judicial review to the original decision denying benefits is a policy choice obviously designed to forestall repetitive or belated litigation of stale eligibility claims. Our duty, of course, is to respect that choice.
Respondent argues, however, that Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), have rejected this interpretation of § 205 (g). We do not agree. It is true that both cases authorized judicial review under § 205 (g) of the Secretary’s decision to deny or discontinue social security benefits notwithstanding the absence of a prior § 205 (b) hearing. In both instances, however, the claimants challenged the Secretary’s decisions on constitutional grounds. Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions. Furthermore, since federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 is precluded by § 205 (h), Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 761, a decision denying § 205 (g) jurisdiction in Salfi or Eldridge would effectively have closed the federal forum to the adjudication of colorable constitutional claims. Thus those cases merely adhered to the well-established principle that when constitutional questions are in issue, the availability of judicial review is presumed, and we will not read a statutory scheme to take the “extraordinary” step of foreclosing jurisdiction unless Congress’ intent to do so is manifested by “ 'clear and convincing’ ” evidence. 422 U. S., at 762; Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974).
This is not one of those rare instances where the Secretary’s denial of a petition to reopen is challenged on constitutional grounds. Respondent seeks only an additional opportunity to establish that he satisfies the Social Security Act’s eligibility standards for disability benefits. Therefore, § 205 (g) does not afford subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The pertinent provisions of § 10, as codified in 6 U. S. C. §§ 701-704, are the following:
"§ 701. Application; definitions.
“(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that—
“(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
“ (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”
Ҥ 702. Right of review.
“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”
Ҥ 703. Form and venue of proceeding.
“The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action, including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction. Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency action is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement.” (Sections 702 and 703 were amended by Pub. L. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721, in respects to be discussed infra, at 105-107, insofar as it modifies the scope of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331.)
Ҥ 704. Actions reviewable.
“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsiderations, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.”
Section 205 (g) of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, as added and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), provides in pertinent part:
“Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow. . . .”
Section 205 (h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §405 (h), provides:
“The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under [§ 1331 et seq.] of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.”
This section has been held to require the exhaustion of available administrative procedures, to foreclose jurisdiction under the general grant of federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, and to route review through § 205 (g). See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 757, 761 (1975).
The Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have held that § 10 of the APA is an independent grant of jurisdiction. See Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F. 2d 410 (CA1 1973); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F. 2d 856 (CA4 1961); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F. 2d 1005 (CA5 1975); Sanders v. Weinberger, 522 F. 2d 1167 (CA7 1975) (case below); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F. 2d 53 (CA9 1970); Brennan v. Udall, 379 F. 2d 803 (CA10 1967); Pickus v. United States Board of Parole, 165 U. S. App. D. C. 284, 507 F. 2d 1107 (1974). The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits disagree. Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F. 2d 326 (CA3 1970); Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F. 2d 405 (CA6 1974); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F. 2d 529 (CA8 1967). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit views the question as unsettled. See South Windsor Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 541 F. 2d 910 (1976).
Compare, e. g., Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and “Nonstatutory” Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 308 (1967), K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 23.02 (Supp. 1976), and L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 165 (1965) (all advocating APA jurisdiction), with Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 389 (1970), and C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3568 (1975) (rejecting APA jurisdiction).
Title 5 U. S. C. § 702 makes clear that a person wronged by agency action “is entitled to judicial review thereof.” But § 703 suggests that this language was not intended as an independent jurisdictional foundation, since such judicial review is to proceed “in a court specified by statute” or “in a court of competent jurisdiction.” Both of these clauses seem to look to outside sources of jurisdictional authority. Thus, at best, the text of § 10 is ambiguous in providing a separate grant of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Respondent argues that Congress intended its modification of § 1331 to be supplementary to the APA, and, therefore, contemplated that the APA would remain as a distinct jurisdictional provision. But the contrary seems true, for the legislative history suggests that Congress believed that the APA does not confer jurisdiction over administrative action, and, therefore, deletion of the jurisdictional amount from § 1331 was warranted. This understanding was made explicit by the Senate Judiciary Committee: “An anomaly in Federal jurisdiction prevents an otherwise competent United States district court from hearing certain cases seeking ‘non-statutory’ review of Federal administrative action, absent the jurisdictional amount in controversy required by 28 U. S. C. section 1331, the general ‘Federal question’ provision. These cases ‘arise under’ the Federal Constitution or Federal statutes, and the committee believes they are appropriate matters for the exercise of Federal judicial power regardless of the monetary amount involved.” S. Rep. No. 94-996, p. 12 (1976) (emphasis supplied); see H. R. Rep. No. 94-1656, p. 13 (1976).
See Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F. 2d 1, 4-5 (CA2 1966); Davis v. Richardson, 460 F. 2d 772, 775 (CA3 1972); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F. 2d, at 1007-1008; Maddox v. Richardson, 464 F. 2d 617, 621 (CA6 1972); Stuckey v. Weinberger, 488 F. 2d 904, 909 (CA9 1973); Neighbors v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 511 F. 2d 80, 81 (CA10 1974).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision of this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide in this case whether a prisoner whose murder conviction became final before our decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985), is entitled to use that decision to challenge his capital sentence in a federal habeas corpus action. We hold that he cannot, for Caldwell announced a new rule as defined by Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), and the new rule does not come within Teague’s exception for watershed rules fundamental to the integrity of the criminal proceeding.
I
Over 10 years ago, petitioner Robert Sawyer murdered Frances Arwood, a visitor in the New Orleans, Louisiana, residence petitioner shared with his girlfriend, Cynthia Shano. On September 29, 1979, petitioner and his accomplice Charles Lane arrived at the residence after a night of drinking. They argued with Arwood and accused her of giving drugs to Shano’s children. For reasons that are not clear, petitioner and Lane struck Arwood repeatedly with their fists and dragged her by the hair into the bathroom. There they stripped the victim naked, literally kicked her into the bathtub, and subjected her to scalding, dunkings, and additional beatings. Petitioner left Lane to guard the victim, and apparently to rape her, while petitioner went to the kitchen to boil water to scald her. Petitioner kicked Arwood in the chest, causing her head to strike the tub or a windowsill and rendering her unconscious. The pair then dragged Arwood into the living room, where they continued to beat and kick her. Petitioner poured lighter fluid on the unconscious victim, particularly her torso and genital area, and set the lighter fluid afire. He told Lane that he had done this to show “just how cruel he could be.” There were further brutalities we do not recount. Arwood later died of her injuries.
Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death for the crime by a Louisiana jury in September 1980. At issue in this case are remarks made by the prosecutor in his closing argument during the sentencing phase of the trial. The prosecutor first stated, after discussing the proof of aggravating circumstances under Louisiana law:
“The law provides that if you find one of those circumstances then what you are doing as a juror, you yourself will not be sentencing Robert Sawyer to the electric chair. What you are saying to this Court, to the people of this Parish, to any appellate court, the Supreme Court of this State, the Supreme Court possibly of the United States, that you the people as a fact finding body from all the facts and evidence you have heard in relationship to this man’s conduct are of the opinion that there are aggravating circumstances as defined by the statute, by the State Legislature that this is a type of crime that deserves that penalty. It is merely a recommendation so try as he may, if Mr. Weidner tells you that each and every one of you I hope can live with your conscience and try and play upon your emotions, you cannot deny, it is a difficult decision. No one likes to make those type of decisions but you have to realize if but for this man’s actions, but for the type of life that he has decided to live, if of his own free choosing, I wouldn’t be here presenting evidence and making argument to you. You wouldn’t have to make the decision.” Tr. 982.
After emphasizing the brutal nature of the crime for which they had convicted petitioner, the prosecutor told the jury:
“There is really not a whole lot that can be said at this point in time that hasn’t already been said and done. The decision is in your hands. You are the people that are going to take the initial step and only the initial step and all you are saying to this court, to the people of this Parish, to this man, to all the Judges that are going to review this case after this day, is that you the people do not agree and will not tolerate an individual to commit such a heinous and atrocious crime to degrade such a fellow human being without the authority and the impact, the full authority and impact of the law of Louisiana. All you are saying is that this man from his actions could be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. No more and no less.” Id., at 984.
Finally, the prosecutor emphasized again that the jury’s decision would be reviewed by later decisionmakers:
“It’s all [you’re] doing. Don’t feel otherwise. Don’t feel like you are the one, because it is very easy for defense lawyers to try and make each and every one of you feel like you are pulling the switch. That is not so. It is not so and if you are wrong in your decision believe me, believe me there will be others who will be behind you to either agree with you or to say you are wrong so I ask that you do have the courage of your convictions.” Id., at 985.
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction and sentence. State v. Sawyer, 422 So. 2d 95 (1982). This Court granted certiorari and remanded the case with instructions to the Louisiana Supreme Court to reconsider its decision in light of Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983). Sawyer v. Louisiana, 463 U. S. 1223 (1983). The Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed the capital sentence on remand, Sawyer v. Louisiana, 442 So. 2d 1136 (1983). His conviction and sentence became final on April 2, 1984, when we denied certiorari, Sawyer v. Louisiana, 466 U. S. 931. Petitioner sought state collateral relief, which was denied. Sawyer v. Maggio, 479 So. 2d 360 (La. 1985); Sawyer v. Maggio, 480 So. 2d 313 (La. 1985).
Petitioner then filed the federal habeas corpus petition now before us, raising a host of constitutional claims. Relevant here is petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor’s closing argument violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution by diminishing the jury’s sense of responsibility for the capital sentencing decision, in violation of our decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985). Caldwell was decided over one year after petitioner’s conviction became final.
The District Court denied relief, concluding that the prosecutor’s remarks were of a different character from those in Caldwell, and that there was no reasonable probability that the sentence would have been different in the absence of the comments. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 848 F. 2d 582 (1988). The panel held that the facts in this case were “a far cry from those in Caldwell,” in large part due to the absence of any judicial approval of the prosecutor’s comments. Id., at 596. Following the panel decision, the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc. Id., at 606.
After the en banc court heard oral argument, but while the case was pending, a plurality held in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), that a rule of constitutional law established after a petitioner’s conviction has become final may not be used to attack the conviction on federal habeas corpus unless the rule falls within one of two narrow exceptions. The Fifth Circuit requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the question whether Teague barred petitioner’s claim for relief under Caldwell. The en banc court held that Caldwell announced a new rule within the meaning of Teague, a rule not within Teague’s second exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that guarantee the accuracy of a criminal proceeding. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief. 881 F. 2d 1273 (1989).
We granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 1042 (1990), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals, see Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F. 2d 1286 (CA10 1989), and now affirm.
II
We must address first whether, in relying on Caldwell, petitioner claims the benefit of a new rule, as defined by our decision in Teague. In Caldwell, we held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a death sentence by a sentencer that has been led to the false belief that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s capital sentence rests elsewhere. See 472 U. S., at 328-329; id., at 342 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). We determined that false information of this type might produce “substantial unreliability as well as bias in favor of death sentences.” Id., at 330.
At the outset we note that the parties dispute whether Caldwell, even if its rule applies, could support any claim for relief in petitioner’s case. The State emphasizes that the judge in this case, unlike Caldwell, see id., at 339, did not approve the prosecutor’s argument, and that the remarks in this case were less likely to mislead. Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the prosecutor’s remarks were similar to those in Caldwell, and were not cured by the judge’s instructions to the jury. We need not address the significant questions concerning the merits of petitioner’s Caldwell claim on these facts, or the question whether application of Caldwell to the facts presented here would itself involve a new rule of law. Rather, we address only whether Caldwell is available to petitioner as a ground upon which he may seek relief. Cf. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U. S. 401, 408, n. 4 (1989) (merit of Caldwell claim immaterial to disposition of case on procedural bar grounds).
Our review of the relevant precedents that preceded Caldwell convinces us that it is a new rule for purposes of Teague. On this point we are in accord with the Court of Appeals, as well as the other two Courts of Appeals that have addressed the question. See Clark v. Dugger, 901 F. 2d 908 (CA11 1990); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, supra. The rule of Teague serves to “validate] reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.” Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 414 (1990). Thus, we have defined new rules as those that were not “dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Teague, supra, at 301 (plurality opinion). The principle announced in Teague serves to ensure that gradual developments in the law over which reasonable jurists may disagree are not later used to upset the finality of state convictions valid when entered. This is but a recognition that the purpose of federal habeas corpus is to ensure that state convictions comply with the federal law in existence at the time the conviction became final, and not to provide a mechanism for the continuing reexamination of final judgments based upon later emerging legal doctrine.
Caldwell, of course, was not decided upon a clean slate. As the Court in Caldwell recognized, we had earlier addressed the question of improper prosecutorial comment in Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637 (1974). We stated in Donnelly that improper remarks by a prosecutor could at some point “so infec[t] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id., at 643. No such pervasive error was established in that case, and we took the occasion to warn against “holding every improper and unfair argument of a state prosecutor to be a federal due process violation.” Caldwell, supra, at 338. Caldwell, unlike Donnelly, was a capital case; and while noting the principle set forth in Donnelly, the Court in Caldwell determined to rely not on the Due Process Clause but on more particular guarantees of sentencing reliability based on the Eighth Amendment. In Donnelly we had reversed a Court of Appeals opinion vacating a conviction because prosecutorial comments were “potentially” misleading, 416 U. S., at 641, but in Caldwell we found that the need for reliable sentencing in capital cases required a new sentencing proceeding because false prosecutorial comment created an “unacceptable risk that ‘the death penalty [may have been] meted out arbitrarily or capriciously,’” 472 U. S., at 343 (opinion of O’Connor, J.).
Examination of our Eighth Amendment authorities that preceded Caldwell shows that it was not dictated by prior precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final. In Caldwell itself we relied on Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion); and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion), in support of the result. We cited these decisions for the general proposition that capital sentencing must have guarantees of reliability, and must be carried out by jurors who would view all of the relevant characteristics of the crime and the criminal, and take their task as a serious one. Petitioner, too, cites these and other cases in support of the argument that Caldwell was “rooted” in the Eighth Amendment command of reliable sentencing, and that application of these cases to misleading prosecutorial comment “[b]y analogy” would lead to the predictable Caldwell result. Brief for Petitioner 16.
We do not doubt that our earlier Eighth Amendment cases lent general support to the conclusion reached in Caldwell. But neither this fact, nor petitioner’s contention that state courts “would have found Caldwell to be a predictable development in Eighth Amendment law,” Brief for Petitioner 8, suffices to show that Caldwell was not a new rule. In petitioner’s view, Caldwell was dictated by the principle of reliability in capital sentencing. But the test would be meaningless if applied at this level of generality. Cf. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 639 (1987) (“[I]f the test of ‘clearly established law’ were to be applied at this level of generality, . . . [plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights”).
It is beyond question that no case prior to Caldwell invalidated a prosecutorial argument as impermissible under the Eighth Amendment. Eddings and Lockett invalidated statutory schemes that imposed an absolute prohibition against consideration of certain mitigating evidence by the sen-tencer. Woodson invalidated a capital sentencing statute providing for mandatory capital sentencing. Gardner invalidated a capital sentence based on information of which the defendant had no notice or opportunity to respond. These cases do not speak to the issue we decided in Caldwell. What we said in Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 491 (1990), applies here: “Even were we to agree with [petitioner’s] assertion that our decisions in Lockett and Eddings inform, or even control or govern, the analysis of his claim, it does not follow that they compel the rule that [petitioner] seeks.” Certainly Caldwell was not seen as compelled by the three Justices of this Court who found a “lack of authority” in our Eighth Amendment precedents for the approach taken there. See 472 U. S., at 350 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
From the point of view of a state court considering petitioner’s claim at the time his conviction became final, Saffle, supra, at 488, there were in fact indications in our decisions that the Caldwell rule was not a requirement of the Eighth Amendment. In a previous case raising an Eighth Amendment challenge to prosecutorial comment, we had rejected the petitioner’s claim. California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992 (1983). Indeed, the Mississippi Supreme Court had held without dissent in Caldwell that Ramos stood for the proposition that “states may decide whether it is error to mention to jurors the matter of appellate review.” See Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806, 813 (1983). The Mississippi court’s characterization of Ramos, of course, later proved to be incorrect. But this nonetheless suggests that prior to Caldwell our cases did not put other courts on notice that the Eighth Amendment compelled the Caldwell result.
Our opinion in Maggio v. Williams, 464 U. S. 46 (1983), provides more direct evidence that the rule of Caldwell cannot be described as dictated by existing law at the time petitioner’s claim became final. In Williams we vacated a stay of execution in a case presenting a claim very similar to that in Caldwell. Justice Stevens’ opinion concurring in the judgment described at length the prosecutor’s argument in that case, 464 U. S., at 53-54, one similar to the argument made in Caldwell. The Court, however, found that the prisoner’s challenge to the prosecutor’s statements “warrant[ed] little discussion.” 464 U. S., at 49. Although we stated that the failure to raise the claim of improper prosecutorial argument in an earlier habeas petition was “inexcusable,” we noted that the District Court in the second petition had given the claim “full consideration” under the “standard established in Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637 (1974),” and had found that the prosecutor’s closing argument “did not render Williams’ trial fundamentally unfair.” Id., at 49-50. Our opinion concluded by describing this and other claims raised by Williams as “insubstantial.” Id., at 52. Williams, of course, did not represent a rejection on the merits of the rule announced in Caldwell. But given our statements concerning so similar a claim in Williams, we do not think a state court viewing petitioner’s case at the time his conviction became final could have concluded that our Eighth Amendment precedents compelled such a rule.
We note also that, when petitioner’s conviction became final, there was some reason for doubt as to this Court’s view concerning what became a major premise of Caldwell, that misleading prosecutorial comment might cause a “bias in favor of death sentences.” 472 U. S., at 330. At the time of petitioner’s trial and appeal there was at least “some suggestion,” see Dugger v. Adams, 489 U. S., at 409, that comments tending to diminish the jury’s sense of sentencing responsibility would skew the result toward leniency rather than a death sentence. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 294, and n. 7 (1977) (Florida’s change to a system in which jury’s verdict was advisory might benefit defendants, as the jury “may have chosen leniency when they knew [the sentencing] decision rested ultimately on the shoulders of the trial judge, but might not have followed the same course if their vote were final”).
Petitioner places primary reliance on numerous state cases, decided prior to the finality of his conviction, that prohibited prosecutorial statements of the type later held to violate the Eighth Amendment in Caldwell. See, e. g., Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S. W. 2d 404, 408 (Ky. 1985); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S. W. 2d 671, 676 (Ky.), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 860 (1984); Wiley v. State, 449 So. 2d 756, 762 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 906 (1986); Williams v. State, 445 So. 2d 798, 811-812 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1117 (1985); State v. Robinson, 421 So. 2d 299, 233-234 (La. 1982); State v. Willie, 410 So. 2d 1019, 1033-1035 (La. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1051 (1984); State v. Jones, 296 N. C. 495, 501-502, 251 S. E. 2d 425, 427-429 (1979); State v. Gilbert, 273 S. C. 690, 696-698, 258 S. E. 2d 890, 894 (1979); State v. Tyner, 273 S. C. 646, 659-660, 258 S. E. 2d 559, 566 (1979); Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 334-335, 240 S. E. 2d 833, 839 (1977); Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 145-146, 240 S. E. 2d 37, 40 (1977), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 885 (1979); State v. White, 286 N. C. 395, 403-404, 211 S. E. 2d 445, 450 (1975); Prevatte v. State, 233 Ga. 929, 932-933, 214 S. E. 2d 365, 367-368 (1975); State v. Hines, 286 N. C. 377, 381-386, 211 S. E. 2d 201, 204-207 (1975). Petitioner argues that these authorities show that state courts anticipated the rule of Caldwell, and that no state reliance interest could be upset by retroactive application of the federal rule to overturn a state conviction that became final before Caldwell was decided.
The flaw in this argument is that “the availability of a claim under state law does not of itself establish that a claim was available under the United States Constitution.” Dugger v. Adams, supra, at 409. All of the cases cited by petitioner, with one arguable exception, are decisions of state law, and do not purport to construe the Eighth Amendment. These cases, moreover, apply state common-law rules prohibiting any mention of appellate review; they do not condemn false prosecutorial statements under the Eighth Amendment analysis employed in Caldwell. Reliance on state-law cases for the proposition that the rule adopted in Caldwell was an old one misapprehends the function of federal habeas corpus. As we have said, the “ ‘relevant frame of reference’ ” for the new rule inquiry “ ‘is not the purpose of the new rule whose benefit the [defendant] seeks, but instead the purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is made available.’” Teague, 489 U. S., at 306 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 682 (1971)). Federal habeas corpus serves to ensure that state convictions comport with the federal law that was established at the time petitioner’s conviction became final.
Petitioner points out, to support his argument that Caldwell applied an old rule, that our opinion there was based in part on the adoption by many state courts of rules that prohibited prosecutorial comments that could diminish the jury’s sense of sentencing responsibility. Brief for Petitioner 11; see 472 U. S., at 333-334, and n. 4. It is true that our cases have looked to the decisions of state courts and legislatures to inform Eighth Amendment analysis. But petitioner’s attempt to use this fact to show that Caldwell is an old rule is untenable. Under this view, state-court decisions would both inform this Court’s decisions on the substantive content of the Eighth Amendment and, by simultaneous effect, impose those standards back upon the States themselves with retroactive effect. This view is also inconsistent with our citation in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 329-330 (1989), of Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399 (1986), which relied for its Eighth Amendment analysis on the statutory or common law of a majority of the States, see id., at 408-409, as an example of a new rule.
One Louisiana case cited by petitioner disapproving pros-ecutorial comment on appellate review does discuss Eighth Amendment principles rather than relying solely on state law. Even in this case, however, the court cited Eighth Amendment cases only in its discussion of prosecutorial reference to the possibility of pardon. Its discussion of pros-ecutorial comment on appellate review, the issue before us here, referred to state-law rules. See State v. Willie, supra, at 1033 (La. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1051. Petitioner also cites post-Caldwell Louisiana cases, which cite Caldwell and state cases interchangeably, and state that Caldwell did not change prior law in the State. See State v. Smith, 554 So. 2d 676, 685 (La. 1989); State v. Clark, 492 So. 2d 862, 870-871 (La. 1986); State ex rel. Busby v. Butler, 538 So. 2d 164, 173 (La. 1988). To the extent these cases reflect state-court recognition that general Eighth Amendment principles pointed toward adoption of a Caldwell rule, or that Caldwell is congruent with pre-existing state law, they cannot serve to show that Caldwell was dictated by our Eighth Amendment precedent. State courts as well as federal can be expected to engage in application of the principles announced in prior Eighth Amendment decisions that are “susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.” Butler, 494 U. S., at 415.
Petitioner appears to contend that state courts will recognize federal constitutional protections only if they are compelled to do so by federal precedent and the threat of federal habeas review. Since some state courts had recognized a principle similar to Caldwell’s, this argument goes, the result in Caldwell must have been compelled by Eighth Amendment precedent. This argument is premised on a skepticism of state courts that we decline to endorse. State courts are coequal parts of our national judicial system and give serious attention to their responsibilities for enforcing the commands of the Constitution. It is not surprising that state courts, whether applying federal constitutional protections or seeking fair administration of their own state capital punishment law, would have taken care to exclude misleading prosecuto-rial comment. But this conscientious exercise of their powers of supervision and review could not dictate Caldwell as a principle of federal law under the Eighth Amendment.
HH HH HH
Under Teague, new rules may be applied m habeas corpus proceedings only if they come within “one of two narrow exceptions.” Saffle, 494 U. S., at 486. The first of these applies to new rules that place an entire category of primary-conduct beyond the reach of the criminal law, Teague, supra, at 311 (plurality opinion), or new rules that-prohibit imposition of a certain type of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense, Penry, supra, at 330. This exception has no application here. The second Teague exception applies to new “watershed rules of criminal procedure” that are necessary to the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding. Saffle, supra, at 495; Teague, 489 U. S., at 311-313 (plurality opinion). Petitioner here challenges the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Caldwell does not come within this exception.
Petitioner contends that the second Teague exception should be read to include new rules of capital sentencing that “preserve the accuracy and fairness of capital sentencing judgments.” Brief for Petitioner 30. But this test looks only to half of our definition of the second exception. Acceptance of petitioner’s argument would return the second exception to the broad definition that Justice Harlan first proposed in Desist, but later abandoned in Mackey, under which new rules that “significantly improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures are to be retroactively applied on ha-beas.” Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 262 (1969). In Teague, we modified Justice Harlan’s test to combine the accuracy element of the Desist test with the Mackey limitation of the exception to watershed rules of fundamental fairness. It is thus not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of trial. More is required. A rule that qualifies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also “ ‘alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements’ ” essential to the fairness of a proceeding. Teague, supra, at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, 401 U. S., at 693).
The scope of the Teague exceptions must be consistent with the recognition that “[a]pplication of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Teague, supra, at 309 (plurality opinion) (citing Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 150 (1970)). The “costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus thus generally far outweigh the benefits of this application.” Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638, 654 (1984) (opinion of Powell, J.). As we stated in Teague, because the second exception is directed only at new rules essential to the accuracy and fairness of the criminal process, it is “unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge.” 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion).
It is difficult to see any limit to the definition of the second exception if cast as proposed by petitioner. All of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence concerning capital sentencing is directed toward the enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some sense. Indeed, petitioner has not suggested any Eighth Amendment rule that would not be sufficiently “fundamental” to qualify for the proposed definition of the exception, and at oral argument in this case counsel was unable to provide a single example. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. In practical effect, petitioner asks us to overrule our decision in Penry that Teague applies to new rules of capital sentencing. This we decline to do.
At the time of petitioner’s trial and appeal, the rule of Don-nelly was in place to protect any defendant who could show that a prosecutor’s remarks had in fact made a proceeding fundamentally unfair. It was always open to this petitioner to challenge the prosecutor’s remarks at his sentencing proceeding, by making the showing required by Donnelly. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U. S., at 410 (defendant whose trial and appeal occurred prior to Caldwell “could have challenged the improper remarks by the trial judge at the time of his trial as a violation of due process. See Donnelly v. De-Christoforo, 416 U. S. 637 (1974)”); Maggio v. Williams, 464 U. S., at 49-50 (discussing application of Donnelly to improper remarks at sentencing). Petitioner has not contested the Court of Appeals’ finding that he has no claim for relief under the Donnelly standard. And as the Court of Appeals stated: “[T]he only defendants who need to rely on Caldwell rather than Donnelly are those who must concede that the prosecutorial argument in their case was not so harmful as to render their sentencing trial ‘fundamentally unfair. ’ ” 881 F. 2d, at 1293.
Rather than focusing on the prejudice to the defendant that must be shown to establish a Donnelly violation, our concern in Caldwell was with the “unacceptable risk” that misleading remarks could affect the reliability of the sentence. See 472 U. S., at 343 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). Caldwell must therefore be read as providing an additional measure of protection against error, beyond that afforded by Donnelly, in the special context of capital sentencing. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 168, 183-184, n. 14 (1986). The Caldivell rule was designed as an enhancement of the accuracy of capital sentencing, a protection of systemic value for state and federal courts charged with reviewing capital proceedings. But given that it was added to an existing guarantee of due process protection against fundamental unfairness, we cannot say this systemic rule enhancing reliability is an “absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness,” 489 U. S., at 314, of the type that may come within Teague s second exception.
Discussions of the nature of Caldivell error from other contexts also support our conclusion. In Dugger v. Adams, supra, we held that failure to consider a Caldwell claim would not come within a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to the doctrine of procedural default. Id., at 412, n. 6; see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478 (1986). We rejected the dissent’s contention that a fundamental miscarriage of justice had been shown in that “the very essence of a Caldwell claim is that the accuracy of the sentencing determination has been unconstitutionally undermined.” Dugger, supra, at 412, n. 6. Similarly, in Williams, supra, Justice Stevens concluded his discussion of a Caldivell-type claim by stating: “I question whether it can be said that this trial was fundamentally unfair. See Rose v. Lundy, [455 U. S. 509,] 543, and n. 8 [(1982)] (Stevens, J., dissenting).” 464 U. S., at 56. These cases, of course, involved different rules and contexts. Yet we think their rationale reflects a rejection of the argument that Caldwell represents a rule fundamental to the criminal proceeding.
Because petitioner seeks the benefit of a new rule that does not come within either of the Teague exceptions, his claim for habeas corpus relief is without merit. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Affirmed.
That Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 329 (1989), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 301 (1989), cite Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399 (1986), as crafting a “new” rule does not establish that state decisions are irrelevant in assessing the status of a right under the Federal Constitution. Cf. ante, at 240. Neither of these opinions discussed the citation to Ford, and the force of their conclusions is undermined by this Court’s subsequent reliance on state decisions in Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484 (1990), to determine whether the rule invoked in that ease was compelled by our Eighth Amendment decisions, see id., at 490-491 (citing state decisions). State decisions cannot be deemed relevant to the Teague inquiry only to the extent that they disprove the rootedness of a constitutional right.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The police in this case made a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a house where respondent Robert Olson was an overnight guest and arrested him. The issue is whether the arrest violated Olson’s Fourth Amendment rights. We hold that it did.
I
Shortly before 6 a.m. on Saturday, July 18, 1987, a lone gunman robbed an Amoco gasoline station in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and fatally shot the station manager. A police officer heard the police dispatcher report and suspected Joseph Ecker. The officer and his partner drove immediately to Ecker’s home, arriving at about the same time that an Oldsmobile arrived. The driver of the Oldsmobile took evasive action, and the car spun out of control and came to a stop. Two men fled the car on foot. Ecker, who was later identified as the gunman, was captured shortly thereafter inside his home. The second man escaped.
Inside the abandoned Oldsmobile, police found a sack of money and the murder weapon. They also found a title certificate with the name Rob Olson crossed out as a secured party, a letter addressed to a Roger R. Olson of 3151 Johnson Street, and a videotape rental receipt made out to Rob Olson and dated two days earlier. The police verified that a Robert Olson lived at 3151 Johnson Street.
The next morning, Sunday, July 19, a woman identifying herself as Dianna Murphy called the police and said that a man by the name of Rob drove the car in which the gas station killer left the scene and that Rob was planning to leave town by bus. About noon, the same woman called again, gave her address and phone number, and said that a man named Rob had told a Maria and two other women, Louanne and Julie, that he was the driver in the Amoco robbery. The caller stated that Louanne was Julie’s mother and that the two women lived at 2406 Fillmore Northeast. The detective-in-charge who took the second phone call sent police officers to 2406 Fillmore to check out Louanne and Julie. When police arrived they determined that the dwelling was a duplex and that Louanne Bergstrom and her daughter Julie lived in the upper unit but were not home. Police spoke to Louanne’s mother, Helen Niederhoffer, who lived in the lower unit. She confirmed that a Rob Olson had been staying upstairs but was not then in the unit. She promised to call the police when Olson returned. At 2 p.m., a pickup order, or “probable cause arrest bulletin,” was issued for Olson’s arrest. The police were instructed to stay away from the duplex.
At approximately 2:45 p.m., Niederhoffer called police and said Olson had returned. The detective-in-charge instructed police officers to go to the house and surround it. He then telephoned Julie from headquarters and told her Rob should come out of the house. The detective heard a male voice say, “tell them I left.” Julie stated that Rob had left, whereupon at 3 p.m. the detective ordered the police to enter the house. Without seeking permission and with weapons drawn, the police entered the upper unit and found respondent hiding in a closet. Less than an hour after his arrest, respondent made an inculpatory statement at police headquarters.
The Hennepin County trial court held a hearing and denied respondent’s motion to suppress his statement. App. 3-13. The statement was admitted into evidence at Olson’s trial, and he was convicted on one count of first-degree murder, three counts of armed robbery, and three counts of second-degree assault. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. 436 N. W. 2d 92 (1989). The court ruled that respondent had a sufficient interest in the Bergstrom home to challenge the legality of his warrantless arrest there, that the arrest was illegal because there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry, and that respondent’s statement was tainted by that illegality and should have been suppressed. Because the admission of the statement was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt, the court reversed Olson’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.
We granted the State’s petition for certiorari, 493 U. S. 806 (1989), and now affirm.
II
It was held in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), that a suspect should not be arrested in his house without an arrest warrant, even though there is probable cause to arrest him. The purpose of the decision was not to protect the person of the suspect but to protect his home from entry in the absence of a magistrate’s finding of probable cause. In this case, the court below held that Olson’s warrantless arrest was illegal because he had a sufficient connection with the premises to be treated like a householder. The State challenges that conclusion.
Since the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), it has been the law that “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143 (1978). A subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is “ ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable,”’” id., at 143-144, n. 12, quoting Katz, supra, at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
The State argues that Olson’s relationship to the premises does not satisfy the 12 factors which in its view determine whether a dwelling is a “home.” Aside from the fact that it is based on the mistaken premise that a place must be one’s “home” in order for one to have a legitimate expectation of privacy there, the State’s proposed test is needlessly complex. We need go no farther than to conclude, as we do, that Olson’s status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
As recognized by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the facts of this case are similar to those in Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960). In Jones, the defendant was arrested in a friend’s apartment during the execution of a search warrant and sought to challenge the warrant as not supported by probable cause.
“[Jones] testified that the apartment belonged to a friend, Evans, who had given him the use of it, and a key, with which [Jones] had admitted himself on the day of the arrest. On cross-examination [Jones] testified that he had a suit and shirt at the apartment, that his home was elsewhere, that he paid nothing for the use of the apartment, that Evans had let him use it ‘as a friend,’ that he had slept there ‘maybe a night,’ and that at the time of the search Evans had been away in Philadelphia for about five days.” Id., at 259.
The Court ruled that Jones could challenge the search of the apartment because he was “legitimately on [the] premises,” id., at 267. Although the “legitimately on [the] premises” standard was rejected in Rakas as too broad, 439 U. S., at 142-148, the Rakas Court explicitly reaffirmed the factual holding in Jones:
“We do not question the conclusion in Jones that the defendant in that case suffered a violation of his personal Fourth Amendment rights if the search in question was unlawful. . . .
“We think that Jones on its facts merely stands for the unremarkable proposition that a person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place.” 439 U. S., at 141-142.
Rakas thus recognized that, as an overnight guest, Jones was much more than just legitimately on the premises.
The distinctions relied on by the State between this case and Jones are not legally determinative. The State emphasizes that in this case Olson was never left alone in the duplex or given a key, whereas in Jones the owner of the apartment was away and Jones had a key with which he could come and go and admit and exclude others. These differences are crucial, it is argued, because in not disturbing the holding in Jones, the Court pointed out that while his host was away, Jones had complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it. Rakas, 439 U. S., at 149. We do not understand Rakas, however, to hold that an overnight guest can never have a legitimate expectation of privacy except when his host is away and he has a key, or that only when those facts are present may an overnight guest assert the “unremarkable proposition,” id., at 142, that a person may have a sufficient interest in a place other than his home to enable him to be free in that place from unreasonable searches and seizures.
To hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s home merely recognizes the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share. Staying overnight in another’s home is a longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society. We stay in others’ homes when we travel to a strange city for business or pleasure, when we visit our parents, children, or more distant relatives out of town, when we are in between jobs or homes, or when we house-sit for a friend. We will all be hosts and we will all be guests many times in our lives. From either perspective, we think that society recognizes that a houseguest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s home.
From the overnight guest’s perspective, he seeks shelter in another’s home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside. We are at our most vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings. It is for this reason that, although we may spend all day in public places, when we cannot sleep in our own home we seek out another private place to sleep, whether it be a hotel room, or the home of a friend. Society expects at least as much privacy in these places as in a telephone booth — “a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable,” Katz, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
That the guest has a host who has ultimate control of the house is not inconsistent with the guest having a legitimate expectation of privacy. The houseguest is there with the permission of his host, who is willing to share his house and his privacy with his guest. It is unlikely that the guest will be confined to a restricted area of the house; and when the host is away or asleep, the guest will have a measure of control over the premises. The host may admit or exclude from the house as he prefers, but it is unlikely that he will admit someone who wants to see or meet with the guest over the objection of the guest. On the other hand, few houseguests will invite others to visit them while they are guests without consulting their hosts; but the latter, who have the authority to exclude despite the wishes of the guest, will often be accommodating. The point is that hosts will more likely than not respect the privacy interests of their guests, who are entitled to a legitimate expectation of privacy despite the fact that they have no legal interest in the premises and do not have the legal authority to determine who may or may not enter the household. If the untrammeled power to admit and exclude were essential to Fourth Amendment protection, an adult daughter temporarily living in the home of her parents would have no legitimate expectation of privacy because her right to admit or exclude would be subject to her parents’ veto.
Because respondent’s expectation of privacy in the Bergstrom home was rooted in “understandings that are recognized and permitted by society,” Rakas, supra, at 144, n. 12, it was legitimate, and respondent can claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
III
In Payton v. New York, the Court had no occasion to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as ‘exigent circumstances,’ that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search,” 445 U. S., at 583. This case requires us to determine whether the Minnesota Supreme Court was correct in holding that there were no exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless entry into the house to make the arrest.
The Minnesota Supreme Court applied essentially the correct standard in determining whether exigent circumstances existed. The court observed that “a warrantless intrusion may be justified by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, Welsh [v. Wisconsin], 466 U. S. 740 [(1984)], or the need to prevent a suspect’s escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling.” 436 N. W. 2d, at 97. The court also apparently thought that in the absence of hot pursuit there must be at least probable cause to believe that one or more of the other factors justifying the entry were present and that in assessing the risk of danger, the gravity of the crime and likelihood that the suspect is armed should be considered. Applying this standard, the state court determined that exigent circumstances did not exist.
We are not inclined to disagree with this fact-specific application of the proper legal standard. The court pointed out that although a grave crime was involved, respondent “was known not to be the murderer but thought to be the driver of the getaway car,” ibid., and that the police had already recovered the murder weapon, ibid. “The police knew that Louanne and Julie were with the suspect in the upstairs duplex with no suggestion of danger to them. Three or four Minneapolis police squads surrounded the house. The time was 3 p.m., Sunday.... It was evident the suspect was going nowhere. If he came out of the house he would have been promptly apprehended.” Ibid. We do not disturb the state court’s judgment that these facts do not add up to exigent circumstances.
IV
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun dissent.
Because the absence of a warrant made respondent’s arrest illegal, the court did not review the trial court’s determination that the police had probable cause for the arrest. 436 N. W. 2d, at 95. Hence, we judge the case on the assumption that there was probable cause.
The State had not argued that, if the arrest was illegal, respondent’s statement was nevertheless not tainted by the illegality. Id., at 98. Likewise, at oral argument before this Court, counsel for the State expressly disavowed any claim that the statement was not a fruit of the arrest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. We will therefore not raise sua sponte the applicability of New York v. Harris, ante, p. 14, to the facts of this case.
The court left for the trial court on remand respondent’s claims that other evidence — statements by persons present at 2406 Fillmore at the time of the arrest and a statement by Ecker obtained after the police showed him respondent’s statement — should also have been suppressed as fruit of the illegal arrest.
The 12 factors are:
(1) the visitor has some property rights in the dwelling;
(2) the visitor is related by blood or marriage to the owner or lessor of the dwelling;
(3) the visitor receives mail at the dwelling or has his name on the door;
(4) the visitor has a key to the dwelling;
(5) the visitor maintains a regular or continuous presence in the dwelling, especially sleeping there regularly;
(6) the visitor contributes to the upkeep of the dwelling, either monetarily or otherwise;
(7) the visitor has been present at the dwelling for a substantial length of time prior to the arrest;
(8) the visitor stores his clothes or other possessions in the dwelling;
(9) the visitor has been granted by the owner exclusive use of a particular area of the dwelling;
(10) the visitor has the right to exclude other persons from the dwelling;
(11) the visitor is allowed to remain in the dwelling when the owner is absent; and
(12) the visitor has taken precautions to develop and maintain his privacy in the dwelling. Brief for Petitioner 21.
Of course, 2406 Fillmore need not be respondent’s “home,” temporary or otherwise, in order for him to enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy there. “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967), and provides sanctuary for citizens wherever they have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Id., at 359. Mr. Katz could complain because he had such an expectation in a telephone booth, not because it was his “home” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Similarly, if Olson had a reasonable expectation of privacy as a one-night guest, his warrantless seizure was unreasonable whether or not the upper unit at 2406 Fillmore was his home.
Olson, who had been staying at Eeker’s home for several days before the robbery, spent the night of the robbery on the floor of the Bergstroms’ home, with their permission. He had a change of clothes with him at the duplex.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘“fresh start’” to the “‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’” Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S. 279,286,287 (1991). Both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 of the Code permit an insolvent individual to discharge certain unpaid debts toward that end. Chapter 7 authorizes a discharge of prepetition debts following the liquidation of the debtor’s assets by a bankruptcy trustee, who then distributes the proceeds to creditors. Chapter 13 authorizes an individual with regular income to obtain a discharge after the successful completion of a payment plan approved by the bankruptcy court. Under Chapter 7 the debtor’s nonexempt assets are controlled by the bankruptcy trustee; under Chapter 13 the debtor retains possession of his property. A proceeding that is commenced under Chapter 7 may be converted to a Chapter 13 proceeding and vice versa. 11 U. S. C. §§ 706(a), 1307(a) and (c)..
An issue that has arisen with disturbing frequency is whether a debtor who acts in bad faith prior to, or in the course of, filing a Chapter 13 petition by, for example, fraudulently concealing significant assets, thereby forfeits his right to obtain Chapter 13 relief. The issue may arise at the outset of a Chapter 13 case in response to a motion by creditors or by the United States trustee either to dismiss the case or to convert it to Chapter 7, see § 1307(c). It also may arise in a Chapter 7 case when a debtor files a motion under § 706(a) to convert to Chapter 13. In the former context, despite the absence of any statutory provision specifically addressing the issue, the federal courts are virtually unanimous that prepetition bad-faith conduct may cause a forfeiture of any right to proceed with a Chapter 13 case. In the latter context, however, some courts have suggested that even a bad-faith debtor has an absolute right to convert at least one Chapter 7 proceeding into a Chapter 13 case even though the case will thereafter be dismissed or immediately-returned to Chapter 7. We granted certiorari to decide whether the Code mandates that procedural anomaly. 547 U. S. 1191 (2006).
I
On March 11,2003, petitioner, Robert Marrama, filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7, thereby creating an estate consisting of all his property “wherever located and by whomever held.” 11 U. S. C. § 541(a). Respondent Mark DeGiacomo is the trustee of that estate. Respondent Citizens Bank of Massachusetts (hereinafter Bank) is the principal creditor.
In verified schedules attached to his petition, Marrama made a number of statements about his principal asset, a house in Maine, that were misleading or inaccurate. For instance, while he disclosed that he was the sole beneficiary of the trust that owned the property, he listed its value as zero. He also denied that he had transferred any property other than in the ordinary course of business during the year preceding the filing of his petition. Neither statement was true. In fact, the Maine property had substantial value, and Marrama had transferred it into the newly created trust for no consideration seven months prior to filing his Chapter 7 petition. Marrama later admitted that the purpose of the transfer was to protect the property from his creditors.
After Marrama’s examination at the meeting of creditors, see 11 U. S. C. § 341, the trustee advised Marrama’s counsel that he intended to recover the Maine property as an asset of the estate. Thereafter, Marrama filed a “Verified Notice of Conversion to Chapter 13.” Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1017(f)(2), the notice of conversion was treated as a motion to convert, to which both the trustee and the Bank filed objections. Relying primarily on Marrama’s attempt to conceal the Maine property from his creditors, the trustee contended that the request to convert was made in bad faith and would constitute an abuse of the bankruptcy process. The Bank opposed the conversion on similar grounds.
At the hearing on the conversion issue, Marrama explained through counsel that his misstatements about the Maine property were attributable to “scrivener’s error,” that he had originally filed under Chapter 7 rather than Chapter 13 because he was then unemployed, and that he had recently become employed and was therefore eligible to proceed under Chapter 13. The Bankruptcy Judge rejected these arguments, ruling that there is no “Oops” defense to the concealment of assets and that the facts established a “bad faith” case. App. 34a~35a. The judge denied the request for conversion.
Marrama’s principal argument on appeal to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, for the First Circuit was that he had an absolute right to convert his case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 under the plain language of § 706(a) of the Code. The panel affirmed the decision of the Bankruptcy Court. It construed § 706(a), when read in connection with other provisions of the Code and the Bankruptcy Rules, as creating a right to convert a case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 that “is absolute only in the absence of extreme circumstances.” In re Marrama, 313 B. R. 525, 531 (2004). In concluding that the record disclosed such circumstances, the panel relied on Marrama’s failure to describe the transfer of the Maine residence into the revocable trust, his attempt to obtain a homestead exemption on rental property in Massachusetts, and his nondisclosure of an anticipated tax refund.
On appeal from the panel, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also rejected the argument that § 706(a) gives a Chapter 7 debtor an absolute right to convert to Chapter 13. In addition to emphasizing that the statute uses the word “may” rather than “shall,” the court added:
“In construing subsection 706(a), it is important to bear in mind that the bankruptcy court has unquestioned authority to dismiss a chapter 13 petition — as distinguished from converting the case to chapter 13 — based upon a showing of ‘bad faith’ on the part of the debtor. We can discern neither a theoretical nor a practical reason that Congress would have chosen to treat a first-time motion to convert a chapter 7 case to chapter 13 under subsection 706(a) differently from the filing of a chapter 13 petition in the first instance.” In re Marrama, 430 F. 3d 474, 479 (2005) (citations omitted).
While other Courts of Appeals and Bankruptcy Appellate Panels have refused to recognize any “bad faith” exception to the conversion right created by § 706(a), see n. 2, supra, we conclude that the courts in this case correctly held that Marrama forfeited his right to proceed under Chapter 13.
II
The two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code most relevant to our resolution of the issue are subsections (a) and (d) of 11 U. S. C. § 706, which provide:
“(a) The debtor may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title at any time, if the case has not been converted under section 1112,1208, or 1307 of this title. Any waiver of the right to convert a case under this subsection is unenforceable.
“(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a case may not be converted to a case under another chapter of this title unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter.”
Petitioner contends that subsection (a) creates an unqualified right of conversion. He seeks support from language in both the House and Senate Committee Reports on the provision. The Senate Report stated:
“Subsection (a) of this section gives the debtor the onetime absolute right of conversion of a liquidation case to a reorganization or individual repayment plan case. If the case has already once been converted from chapter 11 or 13 to chapter 7, then the debtor does not have that right. The policy of the provision is that the debtor should always be given the opportunity to repay his debts, and a waiver of the right to convert a case is unenforceable.” S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 94 (1978); see also H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 380 (1977) (using nearly identical language).
The Committee Reports’ reference to an “absolute right” of conversion is more equivocal than petitioner suggests. Assuming that the described debtor’s “opportunity to repay his debts” is a shorthand reference to a right to proceed under Chapter 13, the statement that he should “always” have that right is inconsistent with the earlier recognition that it is only a one-time right that does not survive a previous conversion to, or filing under, Chapter 13. More importantly, the broad description of the right as “absolute” fails to give full effect to the express limitation in subsection (d). The words “unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter” expressly conditioned Marrama’s right to convert on his ability to qualify as a “debtor” under Chapter 13.
There are at least two possible reasons why Marrama may not qualify as such a debtor, one arising under § 109(e) of the Code, and the other turning on the construction of the word “cause” in § 1307(c). The former provision imposes a limit on the amount of indebtedness that an individual may have in order to qualify for Chapter 13 relief. More pertinently, the latter provision, § 1307(c), provides that a Chapter 13 proceeding may be either dismissed or converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding “for cause” and includes a nonexclusive list of 10 causes justifying that relief. None of the specified causes mentions prepetition bad-faith conduct (although paragraph (10) does identify one form of Chapter 7 error— which is necessarily prepetition conduct — that would justify dismissal of a Chapter 13 case). Bankruptcy courts nevertheless routinely treat dismissal for prepetition bad-faith conduct as implicitly authorized by the words “for cause.” See n. 1, supra. In practical effect, a ruling that an individual’s Chapter 13 case should be dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 because of prepetition bad-faith conduct, including fraudulent acts committed in an earlier Chapter 7 proceeding, is tantamount to a ruling that the individual does not qualify as a debtor under Chapter 13. That individual, in other words, is not a member of the class of “ ‘honest but unfortunate debtor [s]’” that the bankruptcy laws were enacted to protect. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S., at 287. The text of § 706(d) therefore provides adequate authority for the denial of his motion to convert.
The class of honest but unfortunate debtors who do possess an absolute right to convert their eases from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 includes the vast majority of the hundreds of thousands of individuals who file Chapter 7 petitions each year. Congress sought to give these individuals the chance to repay their debts should they acquire the means to do so. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals observed, the reference in § 706(a) to the unenforceability of a waiver of the right to convert functions “as a consumer protection provision against adhesion contracts, whereby a debtor's creditors might be precluded from attempting to prescribe a waiver of the debtor’s right to convert to chapter 13 as a non-negotiable condition of its contractual agreements.” 430 F. 3d, at 479.
A statutory provision protecting a borrower from waiver is not a shield against forfeiture. Nothing in the text of either § 706 or § 1307(c) (or the legislative history of either provision) limits the authority of the court to take appropriate action in response to fraudulent conduct by the atypical litigant who has demonstrated that he is not entitled to the relief available to the typical debtor. On the contrary, the broad authority granted to bankruptcy judges to take any action that is necessary or appropriate “to prevent an abuse of process” described in § 105(a) of the Code, is surely adequate to authorize an immediate denial of a motion to convert filed under § 706 in lieu of a conversion order that merely postpones the allowance of equivalent relief and may provide a debtor with an opportunity to take action prejudicial to creditors.
Indeed, as the Solicitor General has argued in his brief amicus curiae, even if § 105(a) had not been enacted, the inherent power of every federal court to sanction “abusive litigation practices,” see Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U. S. 752, 765 (1980), might well provide an adequate justification for a prompt, rather than a delayed, ruling on an unmeritorious attempt to qualify as a debtor under Chapter 13.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
See, e. g., In re Alt, 305 F. 3d 413, 418-419 (CA6 2002); In re Leavitt, 171 F. 3d 1219,1224 (CA9 1999); In re Kestell, 99 F. 3d 146,148 (CA4 1996); In re Molitor, 76 F. 3d 218, 220 (CA8 1996); In re Gier, 986 F. 2d 1326, 1329-1330 (CA10 1993); In re Love, 957 F 2d 1350,1354 (CA7 1992); In re Sullivan, 326 B. R. 204, 211 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA1 2005) (per curiam).
See, e. g., In re Martin, 880 F. 2d 857, 859 (CA5 1989); In re Croston, 313 B. R. 447 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA9 2004); In re Miller, 303 B. R. 471 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA10 2003).
The trustee also noted that in his original verified schedules Marrama had claimed a property in Gloucester, Mass., as a homestead exemption, see 11 U. S. C. § 522(b)(2); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 188, §1 (West 2005), but testified at the meeting of creditors that he did not reside at the property and was receiving rental income from it, App. 71a-72a. Moreover, when asked at the meeting whether anyone owed him any money, Marrama responded “No,” id., at 50a, and in response to a similar question on Schedule B to his petition, which specifically requested a description of any “tax refunds,” Marrama indicated that he had “none,” Supp. App. 6. In fact, Marrama had filed an amended tax return in July 2002 in which he claimed the right to a refund, and shortly before the hearing on the motion to convert, the Internal Revenue Service informed the trustee that Marrama was entitled to a refund of $8,745.86, App. 30a-31a.
The parties dispute the accuracy of this representation. The trustee’s brief notes that Schedule I to Marrama’s original petition indicates that he had been employed by a flooring company at the time the case was filed. See Brief for Respondent Mark G. DeGiacomo 10, n. 7 (citing Supp. App. 18, 30). Marrama’s counsel stated during oral argument, however, that the income listed in Schedule I represented an estimate based on employment that had not yet begun. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. Since the sufficiency of the evidence of bad faith is not at issue, we may assume that Marrama did have more income available when he sought to convert than when he commenced the Chapter 7 case.
The judicial council of any circuit is authorized by statute to establish a bankruptcy appellate panel service, comprising bankruptcy judges, to hear appeals from the bankruptcy courts with the consent of the parties. See 28 U. S. C. § 158(b); Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 252 (1992). The First Circuit has established this service.
Subsection (e) of 11 U. S. C. §109 provides:
“Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $250,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $750,000, or an individual with regular income and such individual’s spouse, except a stockbroker or a commodity broker, that owe, on the date of the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts that aggregate less than $250,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $750,000 may be a debtor under chapter 13 of this title.”
These dollar limits are subject to adjustment for inflation every three years. See § 104(b).
Marrama initiated a new Chapter 13 case the day after we granted certiorari in the present case. The new case was dismissed on the grounds that, under § 109(e), he was ineligible to be a Chapter 13 debtor. See In re Marrama, 345 B. R. 458, 463-464, and n. 10 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass. 2006). As the Bankruptcy Judge made no such determination on the record before us in this case, and as it is not necessary to our decision that such a determination be made, we do not consider whether Marrama fails to meet the § 109(e) debt limit.
Title 11 U. S. C. § 1307(c) provides, in relevant part:
“Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, on request of a party in interest or the United States trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title, or may dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate, for cause, including—
“(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
“(2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required under chapter 123 of title 28;
“(3) failure to file a plan timely under section 1321 of this title;
“(10) only on request of the United States trustee, failure to timely file the information required by paragraph (2) of section 521.”
Section 521(2), which has since been amended and redesignated as § 521(a)(2), see 119 Stat. 38, imposes a duty on a debtor in a Chapter 7 proceeding to file within a certain time period a statement of intent with respect to the retention or surrender of property being used to secure debts. See 11 U. S. C. § 521(a)(2) (2000 ed., Supp. V).
Indeed, because § 521(a)(2) by its terms applies only to Chapter 7 debtors, at least one prominent treatise has assumed that this subsection could only apply to a debtor who has converted a case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13. See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1307.04[9] (rev. 15th ed. 2006).
We are advised by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts that 833,148 Chapter 7 cases were filed in fiscal year 2006. Memorandum from Steven R. Schlesinger, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Supreme Court Library (Dec. 13, 2006) (available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
We have no occasion here to articulate with precision what conduct qualifies as “bad faith” sufficient to permit a bankruptcy judge to dismiss a Chapter 13 case or to deny conversion from Chapter 7. It suffices to emphasize that the debtor’s conduct must, in fact, be atypical. Limiting dismissal or denial of conversion to extraordinary cases is particularly appropriate in light of the fact that lack of good faith in proposing a Chapter 13 plan is an express statutory ground for denying plan confirmation. 11 U. S. C. § 1325(a)(3); see In re Love, 957 F. 2d, at 1356 (“Because dismissal is harsh . . . the bankruptcy court should be more reluctant to dismiss a petition ... for lack of good faith than to reject a plan for lack of good faith under Section 1325(a)”).
Title 11 U. S. C. § 105(a) provides:
“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.”
Both the Chapter 7 trustee and the United States as amicus curiae argue in their briefs that in the interval between the allowance of a motion to convert under § 706(a) and the subsequent granting of a motion to dismiss under § 1307(c), the fact that the debtor would have possession of the property formerly under the control of the trustee would create an opportunity for the debtor to take actions that would impair the rights of creditors. Whether or not that risk is significant, under our understanding of the Code, the debtor’s prior misconduct may provide a sufficient justification for a denial of his motion to convert.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
Article IV, § 3, cl. 2, of the Constitution vests Congress with the “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the... Property belonging to the United States.” Shortly after the termination of hostilities in the Second World War, Congress enacted the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 377, as amended, 40 U. S. C. § 471 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III). The Act was designed, in part, to provide “an economical and efficient system for... the disposal of surplus property.” 63 Stat. 378, 40 U. S. C. §471. In furtherance of this policy, federal agencies are directed to maintain adequate inventories of the property under their control and to identify excess property for transfer to other agencies able to use it. See 63 Stat. 384, 40 U. S. C. §§ 483(b), (c). Property that has outlived its usefulness to the Federal Government is declared “surplus” and may be transferred to private or other public entities. See generally 63 Stat. 385, as amended, 40 U. S. C. §484.
The Act authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Secretary of Education) to assume responsibility for disposing of surplus real property “for school, classroom, or other educational use.” 63 Stat. 387, as amended, 40 U. S. C. §484(k)(l). Subject to the disapproval of the Administrator of General Services, the Secretary may sell or lease the property to nonprofit, tax-exempt educational institutions for consideration that takes into account “any benefit which has accrued or may accrue to the United States” from the transferee’s use of the property. 63 Stat. 387, 40 U. S. C. §§484(k)(l)(A), (C). By regulation, the Secretary has provided for the computation of a “public benefit allowance,” which discounts the transfer price of the property “on the basis of benefits to the United States from the use of such property for educational purposes.” 34 CFR § 12.9(a) (1980).
The property which spawned this litigation was acquired by the Department of the Army in 1942, as part of a larger tract of approximately 181 acres of land northwest of Philadelphia. The Army built on that land the Valley Forge General Hospital, and for 30 years thereafter, that hospital provided medical care for members of the Armed Forces. In April 1973, as part of a plan to reduce the number of military installations in the United States, the Secretary of Defense proposed to close the hospital, and the General Services Administration declared it to be “surplus property.”
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) eventually assumed responsibility for disposing of portions of the property, and in August 1976, it conveyed a 77-acre tract to petitioner, the Valley Forge Christian College. The appraised value of the property at the time of conveyance was $577,500. This appraised value was discounted, however, by the Secretary’s computation of a 100% public benefit allowance, which permitted petitioner to acquire the property without making any financial payment for it. The deed from HEW conveyed the land in fee simple with certain conditions subsequent, which required petitioner to use the property for 30 years solely for the educational purposes described in petitioner’s application. In that description, petitioner stated its intention to conduct “a program of education... meeting the accrediting standards of the State of Pennsylvania, The American Association of Bible Colleges, the Division of Education of the General Council of the Assemblies of God and the Veterans Administration.”
Petitioner is a nonprofit educational institution operating under the supervision of a religious order known as the Assemblies of God. By its own description, petitioner’s purpose is “to offer systematic training on the collegiate level to men and women for Christian service as either ministers or laymen.” App. 34. Its degree programs reflect this orientation by providing courses of study “to train leaders for church related ministries.” Id,., at 102. Faculty members must “have been baptized in the Holy Spirit and be living consistent Christian lives,” id., at 37, and all members of the college administration must be affiliated with the Assemblies of God, id., at 36. In its application for the 77-acre tract, petitioner represented that, if it obtained the property, it would make “additions to its offerings in the arts and humanities,” and would strengthen its “psychology” and “counselling” courses to provide services in inner-city areas.
In September 1976, respondents Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. (Americans United), and four of its employees, learned of the conveyance through a news release. Two months later, they brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, later transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to challenge the conveyance on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See id., at 10. In its amended complaint, Americans United described itself as a nonprofit organization composed of 90,000 “taxpayer members.” The complaint asserted that each member “would be deprived of the fair and constitutional use of his (her) tax dollar for constitutional purposes in violation of his (her) rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Ibid. Respondents sought a declaration that the conveyance was null and void, and an order compelling petitioner to transfer the property back to the United States. Id., at 12.
On petitioner’s motion, the District Court granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. App. to Pet. for Cert. A42. The court found that respondents lacked standing to sue as taxpayers under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), and had “failed to allege that they have suffered any actual or concrete injury beyond a generalized grievance common to all taxpayers.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A43.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which reversed the judgment of the District Court by a divided vote. Americans United v. U. S. Dept. of HEW, 619 F. 2d 252 (1980). All members of the court agreed that respondents lacked standing as taxpayers to challenge the conveyance under Flast v. Cohen, supra, since that case extended standing to taxpayers qua taxpayers only to challenge congressional exercises of the power to tax and spend conferred by Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution, and this conveyance was authorized by legislation enacted under the authority of the Property Clause, Art. IV, §3, cl. 2. Notwithstanding this significant factual difference from Flast, the majority of the Court of Appeals found that respondents had standing merely as “citizens,” claiming “‘injury in fact’ to their shared individuated right to a government that ‘shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.’” 619 F. 2d, at 261. In the majority’s view, this “citizen standing” was sufficient to satisfy the “case or controversy” requirement of Art. III. One judge, perhaps sensing the doctrinal difficulties with the majority’s extension of standing, wrote separately, expressing his view that standing was necessary to satisfy “the need for an available plaintiff,” without whom “the Establishment Clause would be rendered virtually unenforceable” by the judiciary. Id., at 267, 268. The dissenting judge expressed the view that respondents’ allegations constituted a “generalized grievance... too abstract to satisfy the injury in fact component of standing.” Id., at 269. He therefore concluded that their standing to contest the transfer was barred by this Court’s decisions in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974), and United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974). 619 F. 2d, at 270-271.
Because of the unusually broad and novel view of standing to litigate a substantive question in the federal courts adopted by the Court of Appeals, we granted certiorari, 450 U. S. 909 (1981), and we now reverse.
H-1 I
Article III of the Constitution limits the “judicial power” of the United States to the resolution of “cases” and “controversies.” The constitutional power of federal courts cannot be defined, and indeed has no substance, without reference to the necessity “to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.” Liverpool S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885). The requirements of Art. Ill are not satisfied merely because a party requests a court of the United States to declare its legal rights, and has couched that request for forms of relief historically associated with courts of law in terms that have a familiar ring to those trained in the legal process. The judicial power of the United States defined by Art. Ill is not an unconditioned authority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts. The power to declare the rights of individuals and to measure the authority of governments, this Court said 90 years ago, “is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy.” Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 345 (1892). Otherwise, the power “is not judicial... in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the courts of the United States.” United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48 (1852).
As an incident to the elaboration of this bedrock requirement, this Court has always required that a litigant have “standing” to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit. The term “standing” subsumes a blend of constitutional requirements and prudential considerations, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975), and it has not always been clear in the opinions of this Court whether particular features of the “standing” requirement have been required by Art. Ill ex proprio vigore, or whether they are requirements that the Court itself has erected and which were not compelled by the language of the Constitution. See Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 97.
A recent line of decisions, however, has resolved that ambiguity, at least to the following extent: at an irreducible minimum, Art. Ill requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to “show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury “fairly can be traced to the challenged action” and “is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision,” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 38, 41 (1976). In this manner does Art. Ill limit the federal judicial power “to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 97.
The requirement of “actual injury redressable by the court,” Simon, swpra, at 39, serves several of the “implicit policies embodied in Article III,” Flast, supra, at 96. It tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action. The “standing” requirement serves other purposes. Because it assures an actual factual setting in which the litigant asserts a claim of injury in fact, a court may decide the case with some confidence that its decision will not pave the way for lawsuits which have some, but not all, of the facts of the case actually decided by the court.
The Art. Ill aspect of standing also reflects a due regard for the autonomy of those persons likely to be most directly affected by a judicial order. The federal courts have abjured appeals to their authority which would convert the judicial process into “no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.” United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 687 (1973). Were the federal courts merely publicly funded forums for the ventilation of public grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential understanding, the concept of “standing” would be quite unnecessary. But the “cases and controversies” language of Art. Ill forecloses the conversion of courts of the United States into judicial versions of college debating forums. As we said in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972):
“The requirement that a party seeking review must allege facts showing that he is himself adversely affected... does serve as at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome.”
The exercise of judicial power, which can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it extends, is therefore restricted to litigants who can show “injury in fact” resulting from the action which they seek to have the court adjudicate.
The exercise of the judicial power also affects relationships between the coequal arms of the National Government. The effect is, of course, most vivid when a federal court declares unconstitutional an act of the Legislative or Executive Branch. While the exercise of that “ultimate and supreme function,” Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, supra, at 345, is a formidable means of vindicating individual rights, when employed unwisely or unnecessarily it is also the ultimate threat to the continued effectiveness of the federal courts in performing that role. While the propriety of such action by a federal court has been recognized since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), it has been recognized as a tool of last resort on the part of the federal judiciary throughout its nearly 200 years of existence:
“[Repeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The public confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to negative the actions of the other branches.” United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S., at 188 (Powell, J., concurring).
Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional structure requires neither that the Judicial Branch shrink from a confrontation with the other two coequal branches of the Federal Government, nor that it hospitably accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by other branches of government where the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury. Thus, this Court has “refrain[ed] from passing upon the constitutionality of an act [of the representative branches] unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.” Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 279 (1919). The importance of this precondition should not be underestimated as a means of “defining] the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power.” Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 95.
Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing. Thus, this Court has held that “the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 499. In addition, even when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. Ill, the Court has refrained from adjudicating “abstract questions of wide public significance” which amount to “generalized grievances,” pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches. Id., at 499-500. Finally, the Court has required that the plaintiff’s complaint fall within “the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 153 (1970).
Merely to articulate these principles is to demonstrate their close relationship to the policies reflected in the Art. Ill requirement of actual or threatened injury amenable to judicial remedy. But neither the counsels of prudence nor the policies implicit in the “case or controversy” requirement should be mistaken for the rigorous Art. Ill requirements themselves. Satisfaction of the former cannot substitute for a demonstration of “ ‘distinct and palpable injury’... that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 501). That requirement states a limitation on judicial power, not merely a factor to be balanced in the weighing of so-called “prudential” considerations.
We need not mince words when we say that the concept of “Art. Ill standing” has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court which have discussed it, nor when we say that this very fact is probably proof that the concept cannot be reduced to a one-sentence or one-paragraph definition. But of one thing we may be sure: Those who do not possess Art. Ill standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts of the United States. Article III, which is every bit as important in its circumscription of the judicial power of the United States as in its granting of that power, is not merely a troublesome hurdle to be overcome if possible so as to reach the “merits” of a lawsuit which a party desires to have adjudicated; it is a part of the basic charter promulgated by the Framers of the Constitution at Philadelphia in 1787, a charter which created a general government, provided for the interaction between that government and the governments of the several States, and was later amended so as to either enhance or limit its authority with respect to both States and individuals.
I — I
The injury alleged by respondents in their amended complaint is the “deprivation] of the fair and constitutional use of [their] tax dollar.” App. 10. As a result, our discussion must begin with Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923) (decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon). In that action a taxpayer brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the Maternity Act of 1921, which provided federal funding to the States for the purpose of improving maternal and infant health. The injury she alleged consisted of the burden of taxation in support of an unconstitutional regime, which she characterized as a deprivation of property without due process. “Looking through forms of words to the substance of [the] complaint,” the Court concluded that the only “injury” was the fact “that officials of the executive department of the government are executing and will execute an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional.” Id., at 488. Any tangible effect of the challenged statute on the plaintiff’s tax burden was “remote, fluctuating and uncertain.” Id., at 487. In rejecting this as a cognizable injury sufficient to establish standing, the Court admonished:
“The party who invokes the power [of judicial review] must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.... Here the parties plaintiff have no such case.” Id., at 488.
Following the decision in Frothingham, the Court confirmed that the expenditure of public funds in an allegedly unconstitutional manner is not an injury sufficient to confer standing, even though the plaintiff contributes to the public coffers as a taxpayer. In Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429 (1952), plaintiffs brought suit as citizens and taxpayers, claiming that a New Jersey law which authorized public school teachers in the classroom to read passages from the Bible violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing:
“This Court has held that the interests of a taxpayer in the moneys of the federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect to furnish a basis for an appeal to the preventive powers of the Court over their manner of expenditure.... Without disparaging the availability of the remedy by taxpayer’s action to restrain unconstitutional acts which result in direct pecuniary injury, we reiterate what the Court said of a federal statute as equally true when a state Act is assailed: ‘The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.’” Id., at 433-434 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, supra, at 488) (citations omitted).
In short, the Court found that plaintiffs’ grievance was “not a direct dollars-and-cents injury but is a religious difference.” 342 U. S., at 434. A case or controversy did not exist, even though the “clash of interests [was] real and... strong.” Id., at 436 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Court again visited the problem of taxpayer standing in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968). The taxpayer plaintiffs in Flast sought to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which they alleged were being used to support religious schools in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court developed a two-part test to determine whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue. First, because a taxpayer alleges injury only by virtue of his liability for taxes, the Court held that “a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution.” Id., at 102. Second, the Court required the taxpayer to “show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations upon the exercise of the taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8.” Id., at 102-103.
The plaintiffs in Flast satisfied this test because “[t]heir constitutional challenge [was] made to an exercise by Congress of its power under Art. I, § 8, to spend for the general welfare,” id., at 103, and because the Establishment Clause, on which plaintiffs’ complaint rested, “operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power conferred by Art..1, §8,” id., at 104. The Court distinguished Frothingham v. Mellon, supra, on the ground that Mrs. Frothingham had relied, not on a specific limitation on the power to tax and spend, but on a more general claim based on the Due Process Clause. 392 U. S., at 105. Thus, the Court reaffirmed that the “case or controversy” aspect of standing is unsatisfied “where a taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.” Id., at 106.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Flast, respondents fail the first prong of the test for taxpayer standing. Their claim is deficient in two respects. First, the source of their complaint is not a congressional action, but a decision by HEW to transfer a parcel of federal property. Flast limited taxpayer standing to challenges directed “only [at] exercises of congressional power.” Id., at 102. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S., at 228 (denying standing because the taxpayer plaintiffs “did not challenge an enactment under Art. I, § 8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch”).
Second, and perhaps redundantly, the property transfer about which respondents complain was not an exercise of authority conferred by the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, § 8. The authorizing legislation, the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, was an evident exercise of Congress’ power under the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Respondents do not dispute this conclusion, see Brief for Respondents Americans United et al. 10, and it is decisive of any claim of taxpayer standing under the Flast precedent.
Any doubt that once might have existed concerning the rigor with which the Flast exception to the Frothingham principle ought to be applied should have been erased by this Court’s recent decisions in United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974), and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, supra. In Richardson, the question was whether the plaintiff had standing as a federal taxpayer to argue that legislation which permitted the Central Intelligence Agency to withhold from the public detailed information about its expenditures violated the Accounts Clause of the Constitution. We rejected plaintiffs claim of standing because “his challenge [was] not addressed to the taxing or spending power, but to the statutes regulating the CIA.” 418 U. S., at 175. The “mere recital” of those claims “demonstrate[d] how far he [fell] short of the standing criteria of Flast and how neatly he [fell] within the Frothingham holding left undisturbed.” Id., at 174-175.
The claim in Schlesinger was marred by the same deficiency. Plaintiffs in that case argued that the Incompatibility Clause of Art. 1 prevented certain Members of Congress from holding commissions in the Armed Forces Reserve. We summarily rejected their assertion of standing as taxpayers because they “did not challenge an enactment under Art. I, § 8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch in permitting Members of Congress to maintain their Reserve status.” 418 U. S., at 228 (footnote omitted).
Respondents, therefore, are plainly without standing to sue as taxpayers. The Court of Appeals apparently reached the same conclusion. It remains to be seen whether respondents have alleged any other basis for standing to bring this suit.
IV
Although the Court of Appeals properly doubted respondents’ ability to establish standing solely on the basis of their taxpayer status, it considered their allegations of taxpayer injury to be “essentially an assumed role.” 619 F. 2d, at 261.
“Plaintiffs have no reason to expect, nor perhaps do they care about, any personal tax saving that might result should they prevail. The crux of the interest at stake, the plaintiffs argue, is found in the Establishment Clause, not in the supposed loss of money as such. As a matter of primary identity, therefore, the plaintiffs are not so much taxpayers as separationists....” Ibid.
In the court’s view, respondents had established standing by virtue of an “ ‘injury in fact’ to their shared individuated right to a government that ‘shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.’” Ibid. The court distinguished this “injury” from “the question of ‘citizen standing’ as such.” Id., at 262. Although citizens generally could not establish standing simply by claiming an interest in governmental observance of the Constitution, respondents had “set forth instead a particular and concrete injury” to a “personal constitutional right.” Id., at 265.
The Court of Appeals was surely correct in recognizing that the Art. Ill requirements of standing are not satisfied by “the abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution asserted by... citizens.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S., at 223, n. 13. This Court repeatedly has rejected claims of standing predicated on “‘the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law....’ Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, 129 [1922].” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 208 (1962). See Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, supra, at 216-222; Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1 (1972); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 (1937). Such claims amount to little more than attempts “to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air... generalized grievances about the conduct of government.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 106.
In finding that respondents had alleged something more than “the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance,” Schlesinger, supra, at 217, the Court of Appeals relied on factual differences which we do not think amount to legal distinctions. The court decided that respondents’ claim differed from those in Schlesinger and Richardson, which were predicated, respectively, on the Incompatibility and Accounts Clauses, because “it is at the very least arguable that the Establishment Clause creates in each citizen a ‘personal constitutional right’ to a government that does not establish religion.” 619 F. 2d, at 265 (footnote omitted). The court found it unnecessary to determine whether this “arguable” proposition was correct, since it judged the mere allegation of a legal right sufficient to confer standing.
This reasoning process merely disguises, we think with a rather thin veil, the inconsistency of the court’s results with our decisions in Schlesinger and Richardson. The plaintiffs in those cases plainly asserted a “personal right” to have the Government act in accordance with their views of the Constitution; indeed, we see no barrier to the assertion of such claims with respect to any constitutional provision. But assertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. Ill without draining those requirements of meaning.
Nor can Schlesinger and Richardson be distinguished on the ground that the Incompatibility and Accounts Clauses are in some way less “fundamental” than the Establishment Clause. Each establishes a norm of conduct which the Federal Government is bound to honor — to no greater or lesser extent than any other inscribed in the Constitution. To the extent the Court of Appeals relied on a view of standing under which the Art. Ill burdens diminish as the “importance” of the claim on the merits increases, we reject that notion. The requirement of standing “focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.” Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 99. Moreover, we know of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values or a complementary “sliding scale” of standing which might permit respondents to invoke the judicial power of the United States. “The proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S., at 227.
The complaint in this case shares a common deficiency with those in Schlesinger and Richardson. Although respondents claim that the Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. Ill, even though the disagreement is phrased in constitutional terms. It is evident that respondents are firmly committed to the constitutional principle of separation of church and State, but standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest or the fervor of his advocacy. “[T]hat concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204, is the anticipated consequence of proceedings commenced by one who has been injured in fact; it is not a permissible substitute for the showing of injury itself.
In reaching this conclusion, we do not retreat from our earlier holdings that standing may be predicated on noneconomic injury. See, e. g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S., at 686-688; Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U. S., at 153-154. We simply cannot see that respondents have alleged an injury of any kind, economic or otherwise, sufficient to confer standing. Respondents complain of a transfer of property located in Chester County, Pa. The named plaintiffs reside in Maryland and Virginia; their organizational headquarters are located in Washington, D. C. They learned of the transfer through a news release. Their claim that the Government has violated the Establishment Clause does not provide a special license to roam the country in search of governmental wrongdoing and to reveal their discoveries in federal court. The federal courts were simply not constituted as ombudsmen of the general welfare.
V
The Court of Appeals in this case ignored unambiguous limitations on taxpayer and citizen standing. It appears to have done so out of the conviction that enforcement of the Establishment Clause demands special exceptions from the requirement that a plaintiff allege “ ‘distinct and palpable injury to himself,’... that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 501). The court derived precedential comfort from Flast v. Cohen: “The underlying justification for according standing in Flast it seems, was the implicit recognition that the Establishment Clause does create in every citizen a personal constitutional right, such that any citizen, including taxpayers, may contest under that clause the constitutionality of federal expenditures.” 619 F. 2d, at 262. The concurring opinion was even more direct. In its view, “statutes alleged to violate the Establishment Clause may not have an individual impact sufficient to confer standing in the traditional sense.” Id., at 267-268. To satisfy “the need for an available plaintiff,” id., at 267, and thereby to assure a basis for judicial review, respondents should be granted standing because, “as a practical matter, no one is better suited to bring this lawsuit and thus vindicate the freedoms embodied in the Establishment Clause,” id., at 266.
Implicit in the foregoing is the philosophy that the business of the federal courts is correcting constitutional errors, and that “cases and controversies” are at best merely convenient vehicles for doing so and at worst nuisances that may be dispensed with when they become obstacles to that transcendent endeavor. This philosophy has no place in our constitutional scheme. It does not become more palatable when the underlying merits concern the Establishment Clause. Respondents’ claim of standing implicitly rests on the presumption that violations of the Establishment Clause typically will not cause injury sufficient to confer standing under the “traditional” view of Art
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are two public defenders working in the State of Oregon. Petitioner Bruce Tower, the Douglas County Public Defender, represented respondent Billy Irl Glover at one of Glover’s state trials on robbery charges, at which Glover was convicted. Petitioner Gary Babcock, the Oregon State Public Defender, represented Glover in Glover’s unsuccessful state-court appeal from this and at least one other conviction.
In an action brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, Glover alleges that petitioners conspired with various state officials, including the trial and appellate court judges and the former Attorney General of Oregon, to secure Glover’s conviction. Glover seeks neither reversal of his conviction nor compensatory damages, but asks instead for $5 million in punitive damages to be awarded against each petitioner. App. 5, 9. We conclude that public defenders are not immune from liability in actions brought by a criminal defendant against state public defenders who are alleged to have conspired with state officials to deprive the § 1983 plaintiff of federal constitutional rights.
I
Glover was arrested on February 1, 1976, in Del Norte County, Cal. Pet. for Cert, in Glover v. Dolan, O. T. 1978, No. 78-5457, p. 3. The State of California extradited Glover to Benton County, Ore., on December 6, 1976. Upon arriving in Oregon Glover immediately filed for habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court, seeking, apparently, a stay of his pending state-court trial. A hearing on this petition was held in January 1977, and immediate relief was denied.
Before any final disposition of his federal habeas action, Glover was tried and convicted on different robbery charges in at least two Oregon state courts. One trial — the trial to which this § 1983 action is directly linked — was held in Douglas County Circuit Court, case No. 76-0386. Glover was represented by petitioner Tower, and was convicted. Petitioner Babcock represented Glover in the appeal from that conviction. The conviction was summarily affirmed by the Oregon Court of Appeals on January 18, 1978. Oregon v. Glover, 32 Ore. App. 177, 573 P. 2d 780. A second robbery trial — the trial in connection with which Glover had filed his federal habeas action — was held in the Benton County Circuit Court, case No. 31159. Pet. for Cert. in No. 78-5457, supra, at 6, 9. On April 6, 1977, Glover was convicted; five days later he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. This conviction was affirmed on April 17, 1978. Oregon v. Glover, 33 Ore. App. 553, 577 P. 2d 91. Petitioner Babcock represented Glover in this state-court appeal as well.
Meanwhile, on December 6, 1977, the Federal Magistrate to whom Glover’s habeas petition had been referred recommended that it be dismissed. On March 6, 1978, the District Court dismissed the habeas petition on the ground that Glover had failed to exhaust state remedies. Glover v. Dolan, No. 77-276 (Dist. Ct. Ore.). Glover gave notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but the District Court refused to issue a certificate of probable cause. The Court of Appeals dismissed Glover’s application for a certificate of probable cause on July 12, 1978, agreeing with the District Court that Glover had failed to exhaust state remedies. Glover v. Dolan, No. 78-8077 (CA9). In a petitition for a writ of certiorari filed with this Court, Glover contended that the Ninth Circuit and the District Court had erred in requiring him to exhaust state-court remedies before bringing his federal habeas petition. This Court denied the petition for certiorari. 439 U. S. 1075 (1979).
While incarcerated in the Oregon State Penitentiary, Glover then initiated new lawsuits, again attacking his conviction simultaneously in both state and federal courts, and these suits, again, proceeded in parallel for almost three years. First, on December 11, 1980, Glover filed a petition for postconviction relief in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for Marion County, seeking to have his conviction set aside on the basis of the alleged conspiracy between his lawyers and various state officials. This state-court petition was later consolidated with a petition for postconviction relief filed in connection with Glover’s Benton County conviction. On the following day, December 12, 1980, Glover filed this § 1983 action against petitioners in Federal District Court. His factual allegations were identical to those made in the state-court petition — indeed, Glover simply appended copies of papers filed in state court to his federal-court complaint.
On April 1, 1981, the Federal District Court granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss Glover’s § 1983 action, relying on a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that had held public defenders absolutely immune from §1983 liability, Miller v. Barilla, 549 F. 2d 648 (1977). App. B to Pet. for Cert.
On February 23, 1983, the consolidated state-court petitions came to trial before the Marion County Circuit Court. The state court found that there had been no conspiracy to convict Glover and therefore denied Glover’s request for relief. Two weeks later, on March 1, 1983, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the Federal District Court’s decision and remanded for trial in light of this Court’s decisions in Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193 (1979), and Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U. S. 312 (1981). 700 F. 2d 556. On May 31, 1983, petitioners filed in this Court a petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On June 29, 1983, Glover filed a notice of appeal in the State Court of Oregon Court of Appeals on the consolidated judgment from the Marion County court. The Oregon Court of Appeals dismissed Glover’s appeal for failure to prosecute on August 22,1983. We issued a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on October 3, 1983. 464 U. S. 813.
II
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides that “[e]very person” who acts “under color of” state law to deprive another of constitutional rights shall be liable in a suit for damages. Petitioners concede, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that Glover’s conspiracy allegations “cast the color of state law over [petitioners’] actions.” Brief for Petitioners 14; see 700 F. 2d., at 558, n. 1.
In Polk County v. Dodson, supra, we held that appointed counsel in a state criminal prosecution, though paid and ultimately supervised by the State, does not act “under color of” state law in the normal course of conducting the defense. See also Ferri v. Ackerman, supra. In Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U. S. 24, 27-28 (1980), however, the Court held that an otherwise private person acts “under color of” state law when engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of federal rights. Glover alleges that petitioners conspired with state officials, and his complaint, therefore, includes an adequate allegation of conduct “under color of” state law.
Ill
On its face § 1983 admits no immunities. But since 1951 this Court has consistently recognized that substantive doctrines of privilege and immunity may limit the relief available in § 1983 litigation. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 417-419 (1976); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U. S. 522 (1984). The Court has recognized absolute §1983 immunity for legislators acting within their legislative roles, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), for judges acting within their judicial roles, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554-555 (1967), for prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, and for witnesses, Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325 (1983), and has recognized qualified immunity for state executive officers and school officials, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975).
Section 1983 immunities are “predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it.” Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Pulliam v. Allen, supra, at 529. If an official was accorded immunity from tort actions at common law when the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1871, the Court next considers whether § 1983’s history or purposes nonetheless counsel against recognizing the same immunity in §1983 actions. See Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 424-429; Briscoe v. LaHue, supra, at 335-337. Using this framework we conclude that public defenders have no immunity from § 1983 liability for intentional misconduct of the type alleged here.
No immunity for public defenders, as such, existed at common law in 1871 because there was, of course, no such office or position in existence at that time. The first public defender program in the United States was reportedly established in 1914. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 473, 476. Our inquiry, however, cannot stop there. Immunities in this country have regularly been borrowed from the English precedents, and the public defender has a reasonably close “cousin” in the English barrister. Like public defenders, barristers are not free to pick and choose their clients. They are thought to have no formal contractual relationship with their clients, and they are incapable of suing their clients for a fee. See Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A. C. 191; Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel — Reflections on “Criminal Malpractice,” 21 UCLA L. Rev. 1191, 1193-1195, nn. 7-9 (1974). It is therefore noteworthy that English barristers enjoyed in the 19th century, as they still do today, a broad immunity from liability for negligent misconduct. Rondel v. Worsley, supra, a recent decision from the House of Lords, traces this immunity from its origins in 1435 until the present. Nevertheless, it appears that even barristers have never enjoyed immunity from liability for intentional misconduct, id., at 287 (opinion of Lord Pearson), and it is only intentional misconduct that concerns us here.
In this country the public defender’s only 19th-century counterpart was a privately retained lawyer, and petitioners do not suggest that such a lawyer would have enjoyed immunity from tort liability for intentional misconduct. Cf. Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U. S. 494 (1880); Von Wallhoffen v. Newcombe, 10 Hun. 236 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1877); Hoopes v. Burnett, 26 Miss. 428 (1853). This pattern has continued. Petitioners concede that Oregon, the State in which they practice, has given no indication, by statute or appellate decision, that public defenders are immune under state tort law from liability for intentional misconduct. Indeed, few state appellate courts have addressed the question of public defender immunity; none to our knowledge has concluded that public defenders should enjoy immunity for intentional misconduct. It is true that at common law defense counsel would have benefited from immunity for defamatory statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, see Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 426, n. 23, and 439 (White, J., concurring in judgment), but this immunity would not have covered a conspiracy by defense counsel and other state officials to secure the defendant’s conviction.
Finally, petitioners contend that public defenders have responsibilities similar to those of a judge or prosecutor, and therefore should enjoy similar immunities. The threat of § 1983 actions based on alleged conspiracies among defense counsel and other state officials may deter counsel from engaging in activities that require some degree of cooperation with prosecutors — negotiating pleas, expediting trials and appeals, and so on. Ultimately, petitioners argue, the State’s attempt to meet its constitutional obligation to furnish criminal defendants with effective counsel will be impaired. At the same time, the federal courts may be inundated with frivolous lawsuits.
Petitioners’ concerns may be well founded, but the remedy petitioners urge is not for us to adopt. We do not have a license to establish immunities from §1983 actions in the interests of what we judge to be sound public policy. It is for Congress to determine whether § 1983 litigation has become too burdensome to state or federal institutions and, if so, what remedial action is appropriate. We conclude that state public defenders are not immune from liability under § 1983 for intentional misconduct, “under color of” state law, by virtue of alleged conspiratorial action with state officials that deprives their clients of federal rights.
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As we have already described swpra, at 916-919, Glover has already had more than one day in court. Indeed, those not familiar with the delicate intricacies of § 1983 jurisdiction might characterize Glover’s successful initiation and prosecution of entirely parallel and duplicative state and federal actions as a great waste of judicial resources. But it appears that by now, at least, Glover has exhausted or defaulted on state-court opportunities to have his conviction set aside on the basis of the alleged conspiracy among his lawyers and state officials. We therefore have no occasion to decide if a Federal District Court should abstain from deciding a § 1983 suit for damages stemming from an unlawful conviction pending the collateral exhaustion of state-court attacks on the conviction itself. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971) (federal court may not enjoin ongoing criminal proceeding); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973) (§1983 action for injunctive relief may not be used to bypass exhaustion requirements of federal habeas corpus action); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 339, n. 16 (1977) (this Court has had no occasion to determine whether a §1983 damages action may engage Younger principles); Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496, 518-519 (1982) (White, J., concurring in part) (“[A] defendant in a civil or administrative enforcement proceeding may not enjoin and sidetrack that proceeding by resorting to a § 1983 action in federal court”).
It is open to the District Court on remand to consider whether Glover is now collaterally estopped in this action by the state court’s finding that the conspiracy alleged in Glover’s §1983 complaint never occurred. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980); see n. 4, supra. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is affirmed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis filed in connection with Pet. for Cert. in Glover v. Dolan, O. T. 1978, No. 78-5457, p. 4; Glover v. Dolan, No. 77-276 (Dist. Ct. Ore.) (Magistrate’s Findings and Recommendation, Dec. 6,1977), reprinted in App. to Response to Pet. for Cert. in Glover v. Dolan, O. T. 1978, No. 78-5457, p. A-1.
Id., at A-2; Pet. for Cert, in Glover v. Dolan, O. T. 1978, No. 78-5457, p. 10; Glover v. Dolan, supra, at A-2.
We note that Glover’s § 1983 complaint, filed December 12, 1980, asserts that Glover has not “begun other lawsuits in state or federal court dealing with the same facts involved in this [§ 1983] action or otherwise relating to [his] imprisonment.” App. 2. This statement was apparently accurate when Glover signed the complaint, but had ceased to be so when the complaint was actually filed in Federal District Court. There is no reference in the decisions of the Federal District Court or Court of Appeals to the parallel proceedings that were then in progress in the state courts.
In its “Findings of Fact” the Marion County Court stated:
“1. The trial judge did not act to the prejudice of the petitioner in that:
“b) Trial judge did not arbitrarily exclude evidence and witnesses.
“c) Trial judge did not participate in a conspiracy against petitioner with the trial counsel.
“2. Petitioner was afforded effective assistance of trial counsel as trial counsel was adequately prepared for trial in securing the necessary evidence and witnesses.
“4. Petitioner was afforded effective assistance of appellate counsel. . . .” Marion County Circuit Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in No. 125,747, pp. 2-3, (June 2, 1983).
Windsor v. Gibson, 424 So. 2d 888 (Fla. App. 1982); Donigan v. Finn, 95 Mich. App. 28, 290 N. W. 2d 80 (1980); Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479, 406 A. 2d 735 (1979); Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A. 2d 871 (1975). But see Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 95 Misc. 2d 353, 407 N. Y. S. 2d 103 (Sup. 1978) (public defenders enjoy immunity for discretionary decisions taken in pursuance of their duties as public defenders).
See, e. g., Meadows v. Evans, 529 F. 2d 385, 386 (CA5 1976), aff’d en banc, 550 F. 2d 345, cert. denied, 434 U. S. 969 (1977); Martin v. Merola, 532 F. 2d 191, 194-195 (CA2 1976); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F. 2d 1249, 1251-1255 (CA1 1974); Alexander v. Emerson, 489 F. 2d 285 (CA5 1973).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under § 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (Act or UMTA), 78 Stat. 307, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 1609(c), a state or local government must make arrangements to preserve transit workers’ existing collective-bargaining rights before that government may receive federal financial assistance for the acquisition of a privately owned transit company. This case presents the issue whether § 13(c) by itself permits a union to sue in federal court for alleged violations of an arrangement of this kind or of the collective-bargaining agreement between the union and the local government transit authority.
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When the Act was under consideration in the Congress, that body was aware of the increasingly precarious financial condition of a number of private transportation companies across the country, and it feared that communities might be left without adequate mass transportation. See S. Rep. No. 82, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5, 19-20 (1963). The Act was designed in part to provide federal aid for local governments in acquiring failing private transit companies so that communities could continue to receive the benefits of mass transportation despite the collapse of the private operations. See § § 2(b) and 3, as amended, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1601(b) and 1602.
At the same time, however, Congress was aware that public ownership might threaten existing collective-bargaining rights of unionized transit workers employed by private companies. If, for example, state law forbade collective bargaining by state and local government employees, the workers might lose their collective-bargaining rights when a private company was acquired by a local government. See Urban Mass Transportation — 1963, Hearings on S. 6 and S. 917 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 318-323 (1963) (Senate Hearings) (statement of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director, Department. of Legislation, AFL-CIO). To prevent federal funds from being used to destroy the collective-bargaining rights of organized workers, Congress included § 13(c) in the Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 15-16 (1963).
Section 13(c) requires, as a condition of federal assistance under the Act, that the Secretary of Labor certify that “fair and equitable arrangements” have been made “to protect the interests of employees affected by [the] assistance.” The statute lists several protective steps that must be taken before a local government may receive federal aid; among these are the preservation of benefits under existing collective-bargaining agreements and the continuation of collective-bargaining rights. The protective arrangements must be specified in the contract granting federal aid.
B
In 1966, petitioner city of Jackson, Tenn., applied for federal aid to convert a failing private bus company into a public entity, petitioner Jackson Transit Authority. See App. 12a-16a. In order to satisfy § 13(c), the Authority so created entered into a “§ 13(c) agreement” with respondent Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, the union that represented the private company’s employees. See 29 CFR pt. 215 (1981). Among other things, the § 13(c) agreement guaranteed the preservation of the transit workers’ collective-bargaining rights. App. 16a-20a. The Secretary of Labor certified that the agreement was “fair and equitable.” Its substance was made a part of the grant contract between the city and the United States, and the city received approximately $279,000 in federal aid.
Thereafter, until 1975, the Authority’s unionized workers were covered by a series of collective-bargaining agreements. Six months after a new 3-year collective-bargaining agreement was signed in 1975, see id., at 31a, however, the Authority notified the union that it no longer considered itself bound by that contract. See id., at 45a.
Ultimately, the union filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. It sought damages and injunctive relief, alleging that petitioners had breached the § 13(c) agreement and the collective-bargaining contract. App. 8a, 10a-lla. The District Court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the suit because the complaint rested on contract rights that should be enforced only in a state court. 447 F. Supp. 88 (1977).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 650 F. 2d 1379 (1981). Relying on Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946), that court first determined that it had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1331, because the union’s claim arose under the laws of the United States, specifically § 13(c). The court then held that § 13(c) implicitly provides a federal private right of action. Section 13(c) reflects national labor policy, the Court of Appeals reasoned, and the rights protected by the statute are thus federal rights. The court concluded that it was consistent with the congressional intent behind § 13(c) to permit enforcement of these federal rights in federal court.
Because of the importance of the interpretation of § 13(c) for local transit labor relations, we granted certiorari. 454 U. S. 1079 (1981).
II
While the Court of Appeals treated this as a private right of action case, see, e. g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353 (1982), it does not fit comfortably in that mold. Indeed, since § 13(c) contemplates protective arrangements between grant recipients and unions as well as subsequent collective-bargaining agreements between those parties, see H. R. Rep. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1963), it is reasonable to conclude that Congress expected the § 13(c) agreement and the collective-bargaining agreement, like .ordinary contracts, to be enforceable by private suit upon a breach. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 18-19 (1979). The gist of the union’s position is not that § 13(c) creates an implied right of action to sue for violations of the statute. Instead, the union argues that “[i]t was the intent of Congress that federal law would determine the binding effect of labor protective agreements under § 13(c) and of the collective bargaining agreements reached pursuant to § 13(c) between unions and recipients of UMTA funds” so that those agreements “are enforceable in the federal courts.” Brief for Respondent 24.
The issue, then, is not whether Congress intended the union to be able to bring contract actions for breaches of the two contracts, but whether Congress intended such contract actions to set forth federal, rather than state, claims. Admittedly, since the private right of action decisions address the related question whether Congress intended that a particular party be able to bring suit under a federal statute, those decisions may provide assistance in resolving this case. But the precise question before us is whether the union’s contract actions are federal causes of action, not whether the union can bring suit at all to enforce its contracts. See Local Div. 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 667 F. 2d 1327, 1329-1334 (CA11 1982).
As the union points out, on several occasions the Court has determined that a plaintiff stated a federal claim when he sued to vindicate contractual rights set forth by federal statutes, despite the fact that the relevant statutes lacked express provisions creating federal causes of action. In Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S. 682 (1963), the Court held that a union had a federal cause of action to enforce an award of an airline adjustment board included in a collective-bargaining contract pursuant to § 204 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 184 (1958 ed.). Similarly, in Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Nemitz, 404 U. S. 37 (1971), the Court ruled that a railroad’s employees made out federal claims when they sought to enforce assurances made by the railroad to secure the Interstate Commerce Commission’s approval of a consolidation under a provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. §5(2)(f) (1970 ed.). And recently, in an analogous private right of action decision, the Court permitted a federal suit for rescission of a contract declared void by § 215 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-15, although the statute itself made no express provision for private suits. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S., at 18-19. See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 388 (1970) (recognizing federal right to rescind contracts rendered void by § 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78cc(b)); American Surety Co. v. Shulz, 237 U. S. 159 (1915) (finding federal-question jurisdiction to hear suit on su-persedeas bond required by Rev. Stat. § 1007).
These decisions demonstrate that suits to enforce contracts contemplated by federal statutes may set forth federal claims and that private parties in appropriate cases may sue in federal court to enforce contractual rights created by federal statutes. But they do not dictate the result in this case. Whenever we determine the scope of rights and remedies under a federal statute, the critical factor is the congressional intent behind the particular provision at issue. See, e. g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S., at 18; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 688 (1979); Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S., at 685-692; see also n. 9, infra. Thus, if Congress intended that § 13(c) agreements and collective-bargaining agreements be “creations of federal law,” Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S., at 692, and that the rights and duties contained in those contracts be federal in nature, see id., at 695, then the union’s suit states federal claims. Otherwise, the union’s complaint presents only state-law claims. See Miree v. De Kalb County, 433 U. S. 25 (1977).
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We begin with the language of the statute itself. See, e. g., Universities Research Assn., Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754,771 (1981). The bare language of § 13(c) is not conclusive. In some ways, the statute seems to make § 13(c) agreements and collective-bargaining contracts creatures of federal law. Section 13(c) demands “fair and equitable arrangements” as prerequisites for federal aid; it requires the approval of the Secretary of Labor for those arrangements; it specifies five different varieties of protective provisions that must be included among the § 13(c) arrangements; and it expressly incorporates the protective arrangements into the grant contract between the recipient and the Federal Government. See n. 2, supra. On the other hand, labor relations between local governments and their employees are the subject of a longstanding statutory exemption from the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U. S. C. § 152(2). Section 13(c) evinces no congressional intent to upset the decision in the National Labor Relations Act to permit state law to govern the relationships between local governmental entities and the unions representing their employees. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975) (noting reluctance to permit suit in federal court when “the cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law”).
While the statutory language supplies no definitive answer, the legislative history is conclusive. A consistent theme runs throughout the consideration of § 13(c): Congress intended that labor relations between transit workers and local governments would be controlled by state law.
In 1963, Secretary of Labor Wirtz presented the original version of § 13(c) to the relevant House and Senate Committees. Before both Committees, Members of Congress expressed concern about the effect of the statute on state laws. And Secretary Wirtz explained to both Committees that, while attempts would be made to accommodate state law to the preservation of collective-bargaining rights, state law would control local transit labor relations. The Secretary told the House Committee that “this proposal is submitted on this basis, . . . that the State laws must control.” Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1963, Hearings on H. R. 3881 before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 482 (1963) (House Hearings). A Committee member raised the issue again; the Secretary repeated that “State laws would be controlling in the situation,” though he suggested that there “would be few, if any, situations” where state law and § 13(c) could not be reconciled. House Hearings, at 486. When similar concerns were expressed during his testimony before the Senate Committee, the Secretary reiterated: “I should like it quite clear that I think that there could be no superseding here of the State law.” Senate Hearings, at 313.
The House and Senate Reports took the Secretary at his word. The House Report advised that § 13(c) would ensure protection of the interests of workers, but that “subject to the basic standards set forth in the bill, specific conditions for worker protection will normally be the product of local bargaining and negotiation.” H. R. Rep. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1963). The Senate Report was more direct: “In regard to the question as to whether these provisions would supersede State labor laws, the committee concurs in a statement made by the Secretary of Labor ‘that there could be no superseding of State laws by a provision of this kind.’ ” S. Rep. No. 82, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1963).
During the debates, the role of state law under § 13(c) was discussed at length. Senators Goldwater and Tower suggested that § 13(c) would supplant state law with federal law. 109 Cong. Rec. 5416 (1963). Senator Williams, one of the bill’s chief sponsors, replied: “The legislative history has to be corrected” because “we must have a record that will show that the bill does not preempt State law; it does not control or dominate with irrevocable authority local situations.” Id., at 5417. The proposed statute, Senator Williams continued, would not “preempt or be a substitute for State law.” Ibid. Senator Goldwater remained adamant that “we are attempting a major alteration in the Nation’s labor laws.” Id., at 5418. But Senator Sparkman, the Chairman of the Senate Committee, repeated the Secretary’s assurance that § 13(c) “will not supersede or displace or override” state law. 109 Cong. Rec. 5418 (1963).
The Senate returned to the issue during a colloquy between Senator Goldwater and Senator Morse. Senator Goldwater feared that the proposed statute would override state laws denying public employees the right to strike. Id., at 5673. Senator Morse assured Senator Goldwater otherwise that “the State law would supervene.” Ibid. When Senator Goldwater inquired about state laws other than those concerning the right to strike, Senator Morse replied in the same vein: “The amendment does not supersede any State policy.” Ibid.
In an important exchange, Senator Goldwater noted that local government employers were excluded from the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act, see 29 U. S. C. §152(2), and asked whether § 13(c) would be inconsistent with that exclusion. 109 Cong. Rec. 5673-5674 (1963). Senator Morse responded that the language of the bill “make[s] it clear that the Taft-Hartley exemptions are not changed by the amendment.” Id., at 5674. See also id., at 5422 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (state law could not be overridden “under any phase of the Taft-Hartley law”). Senator Morse underscored the purpose of the amendment: “I cannot emphasize the point more than I already have done in the legislative history in our debate. It deals with municipal and State problems, and not Federal problems.” Id., at 5674. Finally, Senator Goldwater asked whether state law would control if there were no specific state law forbidding strikes by public employees. Senator Morse adhered to the same course: “In the absence of any local law, it would be for the State court to decide whether [the employees] had that right.” Ibid.
A similar, but more abbreviated, interchange took place on the House floor. When some Congressmen questioned the effect of § 13(c) on state law, they were reassured by Congressman Multer that “[n]othing in this bill. . . will infringe upon local law, whether it be of a State or municipality.” 110 Cong. Ree. 14980 (1964). And Congressman Rains repeated, “there is not one line in this bill that would vitiate in any way any State or local law.” Ibid.
Thus, Congress made it absolutely clear that it did not intend to create a body of federal law applicable to labor relations between local governmental entities and transit workers. Section 13(c) would not supersede state law, it would leave intact the exclusion of local government employers from the National Labor Relations Act, and state courts would retain jurisdiction to determine the application of state policy to local government transit labor relations. Congress intended that § 13(c) would be an important tool to protect the collective-bargaining rights of transit workers, by ensuring that state law preserved their rights before federal aid could be used to convert private companies into public entities. See 109 Cong. Rec. 5673 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Morse) (if city proposed to reject collective bargaining, it would be ineligible for federal aid). But Congress designed § 13(c) as a means to accommodate state law to collective bargaining, not as a means to substitute a federal law of collective bargaining for state labor law.
IV
Given this explicit legislative history, we cannot read § 13(c) to create federal causes of action for breaches of § 13(c) agreements and collective-bargaining contracts between UMTA aid recipients and transit unions. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended those contracts to be governed by state law applied in state courts.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Originally, § 13(c) was § 10(c). In 1966, the Act was amended, and the section received its present designation. Pub. L. 89-562, § 2(b)(1), 80 Stat. 716. Throughout this opinion, it is referred to as § 13(c).
Section 13(c) reads in full:
“It shall be a condition of any assistance under section 3 of this Act that fair and equitable arrangements are made, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, to protect the interests of employees affected by such assistance. Such protective arrangements shall include, without being limited to, such provisions as may be necessary for (1) the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits (including continuation of pension rights and benefits) under existing collective bargaining agreements or otherwise; (2) the continuation of collective bargaining rights; (3) the protection of individual employees against a worsening of their positions with respect to their employment; (4) assurances of employment to employees of acquired mass transportation systems and priority of reemployment of employees terminated or laid off; and (5) paid training or retraining programs. Such arrangements shall include provisions protecting individual employees against a worsening of their positions with respect to their employment which shall in no event provide benefits less than those established pursuant to section 5(2)(f) of the Act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat. 379), as amended. The contract for the granting of any such assistance shall specify the terms and conditions of the protective arrangements.”
According to the union’s complaint, the Authority since 1966 had contracted with a private individual, T. 0. Petty, for the management of the transportation system. App. 6a-7a. The union negotiated its 1975 contract with Petty; when he left as manager of the system, the Authority claimed it was not bound by the contract he had negotiated. Id., at 47a. The union alleged that petitioners had promised in the § 13(c) agreement to be bound by the contracts Petty had signed and that petitioners violated both the § 13(c) agreement and the 1975 collective-bargaining contract. App. 7a-8a.
Prior to filing suit, the union asked the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Transportation to find that petitioners had violated the § 13(c) agreement and to ensure that petitioners complied with the agreement. Both Secretaries refused. See 650 F. 2d 1379, 1381 (CA6 1981).
In addition to relief directed at petitioners, the union requested that the two Secretaries be ordered to take appropriate enforcement action against petitioners to compel compliance with the § 13(c) agreement. App. 11a. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals refused the union’s request. See 447 F. Supp. 88, 90-92 (1977); 650 F. 2d, at 1387-1388. The union has not sought review of this ruling, and we express no opinion on that aspect of the litigation.
Several Courts of Appeals, in addition to the Sixth Circuit, have decided that § 13(e) authorizes federal suits for violations of § 13(c) agreements and collective-bargaining contracts between recipients of UMTA funds and transit unions. Division 587, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 663 F. 2d 875 (CA9 1981); Local Div. 714, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Greater Portland Transit District, 589 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1978); Local Div. 519, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. LaCrosse Municipal Transit Utility, 585 F. 2d 1340 (CA7 1978); Division 1287, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Kansas City Area Transportation Authority, 582 F. 2d 444 (CA8 1978), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1090 (1979). One Court of Appeals has reached the opposite conclusion. Local Div. 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 667 F. 2d 1327 (CA11 1982). In a related decision, the First Circuit has concluded that the terms of § 13(c) agreements do not override conflicting provisions of state law. Local Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Massachusetts, 666 F. 2d 618 (1981), cert. pending, No. 81-1817.
Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that, strictly speaking, the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 to hear the union’s suit. Under Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 681 (1946), jurisdiction exists if the complaint is “drawn so as to claim a right to recover under the Constitution and laws of the United States. ” The complaint alleged a violation of the § 13(c) agreement required by the UMTA and of the subsequent collective-bargaining agreement contemplated by the Act, and prayed for relief under federal law. We do not consider the union’s asserted federal claims to be “wholly insubstantial and frivolous,” 327 U. S., at 682-683, so that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the union’s suit. Thus, the District Court had jurisdiction for the purposes of determining whether the union stated a cause of action on which relief could be granted. Id., at 682. See also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647 (1963).
The statute also provides that the protective “arrangements shall include provisions . . . which shall in no event provide benefits less than those established pursuant to section 5(2)(f)....” As we explain, see n. 9, infra, this portion of the statute strengthens the union’s position, but we do not consider it at all determinative.
The union points to the fact that Congress rejected amendments that would have required the continuation of collective-bargaining rights only to the extent not inconsistent with state law. See 109 Cong. Rec. 5422 (1963); id., at 5582; id., at 5684; 110 Cong. Rec. 14980 (1964). But, as Senator Williams explained, those amendments were rejected not because Congress thought § 13(c) would supplant state labor law but because such an amendment was “clearly . . . unnecessary” to guarantee that § 13(c) would not “supersede or preempt or override State law.” 109 Cong. Rec. 5421 (1963). Accord: 110 Cong. Rec. 14980 (1964) (remarks of Reps. Multer and Rains).
Beyond the explanation given by Senator Williams and repeated on the House floor, the defeat of these amendments merely reflected a congressional intent that the Federal Government be able to seek changes in state law and ultimately to refuse financial assistance when state law prevented compliance with § 13(c). See 109 Cong. Rec. 5684 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Morse); id., at 5422 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
In light of the legislative history of § 13(e), we do not find Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979), or Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S. 682 (1963), to be controlling. Both cases turned on the language, purpose, and legislative history of the particular statute involved, see Transamerica, 444 U. S., at 18-19; Machinists, 372 U. S., at 685-695, and we read the congressional intent behind § 13(c) to be far different from the congressional purpose underlying the statutes at issue in those cases.
Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Nemitz, 404 U. S. 37 (1971), of course, is not to be overlooked. In that case, the Court decided that a railroad’s employees stated federal claims when they alleged a breach of an agreement entered into by the railroad under § 5(2)(f) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 5(2)(f) (1970 ed.). Section 13(c) refers to § 5(2)(f) and provides that the protective arrangements shall not provide benefits less than those established by § 5(2)(f). See nn. 2 and 7, swpra. If, when it passed § 13(c), Congress had expressed an awareness that § 5(2)(f) assurances could be enforced in federal court, or if there was reason to presume such awareness, the reference in § 13(c) to § 5(2)(f) would make this a different case. See generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353 (1982). But the legislative history contains no such congressional recognition. Furthermore, Nemitz was decided several years after § 13(c) was enacted. Consequently, we find the specific legislative history of § 13(c), not the holding of Nemitz, to be determinative.
The union relies upon the fact that Congress strengthened the language of § 13(c) during the course of its passage. Congress wrote § 13(c) to require protective provisions “necessary for” the protection of collective-bargaining rights, rather than provisions “as are found to be appropriate for” the protection of those rights, as the Kennedy administration had recommended. See House Hearings, at 476; 110 Cong. Rec. 14976 (1964). In addition, § 13(c)(2) was amended at the request of Senator Morse to require the “continuation” of collective-bargaining rights rather than the mere "encouragement” of the continuation of those rights. See 109 Cong. Rec. 5627 (1963); id., at 5685. But these alterations in the bill demonstrate only that Congress demanded that the Secretary ensure that state law preserved collective-bargaining rights before he provided federal aid for acquisition of a private transit company. When viewed in conjunction with the discussion of state law in the legislative history, the modifications of the original bill do not prove that Congress intended that federal rather than state law would govern a contract between a UMTA aid recipient and a union representing its employees.
Senator Javits summarized:
“[W]e have a balanced scheme. We do not override the [state] law; at the same time, we do not compel the Federal Government to go in where the law is adverse to the interest of labor and labor’s own point of view, and perhaps also even give encouragement to exempt a situation of this kind where the State desires to get this type of Federal help.” 109 Cong. Rec. 5422 (1963).
There remains the possibility that Congress might have intended a federal court to hear the union’s claims, but to apply state law. Such an anomalous result would be inconsistent with the emphasis in the legislative history that § 13(c) addresses “municipal and State problems, and not Federal problems,” id., at 5674. Thus, unless there is an independent source of jurisdiction, such as diversity or pendent jurisdiction, the union must sue in state court. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S., at 19, n. 8; Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505, 506-507 (1900).
Based on the legislative history, we could not permit the union to bring a federal suit if we characterized its complaint as alleging that petitioners violated § 13(c) itself by virtue of the alleged contractual breaches. See Brief for Respondent 33-34.
Nor does 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) permit the union to bring suit. As the Court held in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), § 1983 encompasses deprivations of rights secured by all “laws" of the United States, of which § 13(c) is, of course, one. But because we have determined that Congress did not intend that breaches of § 13(c) agreements or collective-bargaining contracts would constitute deprivations of federal rights secured by § 13(c), the union has no cause of action under § 1983. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 19-21 (1981).
There are other possible remedies for violations of § 13(c) agreements and collective-bargaining contracts. The union, of course, can pursue a contract action in state court. In addition, the Federal Government can respond by threatening to withhold additional financial assistance. See Local Div. 589, 666 F. 2d, at 634-635.
While we hold that the union cannot sue in federal court to enforce its contracts, we express no view on the entirely separate question whether the Federal Government could bring a federal suit against a UMTA funding recipient for violating the terms of its grant agreement with the Government. Such a suit would involve a different contract from the § 13(c) agreement and the collective-bargaining agreement at issue in this case. See generally Local Div. 732, 667 F. 2d, at 1338-1339; Local Div. No. 714, 589 F. 2d, at 13.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 48 Stat. 955, 28 U. S. C. § 400. Its aim is to have declared invalid a condition under which the respondent became a member of the Federal Reserve System. The California State Banking Commission authorized the establishment of the respondent provided it obtained federal deposit insurance. This requirement could be met either by direct application to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or through membership in the Federal Reserve System. § 12 B (e) and (f) of the Federal Reserve Act, 48 Stat. 162, 170, 49 Stat. 684, 687, 12 U. S. C. § 264 (e) and (f). Respondent sought such membership but its application was rejected. The promoters of the Bank, having requested the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to reconsider the application for membership, were advised that favorable action depended on a showing that the Transamerica Corporation, a powerful bank holding company, did not have, nor was intended to have, any interest in this Bank. Having been satisfied on this point, the Board of Governors granted membership to respondent subject to conditions of which the fourth is the bone of contention in this litigation.
This condition reads as follows:
“4. If, without prior written approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Trans-america Corporation or any unit of the Transamerica group, including Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association, or any holding company affiliate or any subsidiary thereof, acquires, directly or indirectly, through the mechanism of extension of loans for the purpose of acquiring bank stock, or in any other manner, any interest in such bank, other than such as may arise out of usual correspondent bank relationships, such bank, within 60 days after written notice from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, shall withdraw from membership in the Federal Reserve System.”
The Board of Governors gave the respondent this explanation for the condition:
“The application for membership has been approved upon representations that the bank is a bona fide local independent institution and that no holding company group has any interest in the bank at the time of its admission to membership, and that the directors and stockholders of the bank have no plans, commitments or understandings looking toward a change in the status of the bank as a local independent institution. Condition of membership numbered 4 is designed to maintain that status.”
Some time later, in 1944, Transamerica, without prior knowledge of the respondent, acquired 540 of the 5,000 shares of its outstanding stock. The Bank duly advised the Board of Governors of this fact, but requested that it be relieved of Condition No. 4. This, the Board of Governors declined to do. Then followed this action, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, against the Board of Governors for a declaration that Condition No. 4 was invalid and for an injunction against its enforcement. A motion by the defendants to dismiss the complaint, in that it failed to set forth a justiciable controversy, was denied. 64 F. Supp. 811. The defendants answered, claiming that the Bank’s acceptance of membership barred it from questioning the validity of Condition No. 4, and that in any case the condition was valid, and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The Bank, having filed a number of affidavits, moved for summary judgment. The District Court, in an unreported opinion, held that the Bank was bound by the condition on which it had accepted membership in the Federal Reserve System, and gave judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, one judge dissenting, reversed. It rejected the defense of estoppel and sustained the validity of the condition “only as a statement that, if the Board of Governors should determine, after hearing, that Trans-america’s ownership of the bank’s shares has resulted in a change for the worse in the character of the bank’s personnel, in its banking policies, in the safety of its deposits or in any other substantial way, it may require the bank to withdraw from the Federal Reserve System.” 161 F. 2d 636, 643-44. Accordingly, it remanded the case to the District Court for entry of a judgment construing Condition No. 4 to such effect. Since this ruling involves a matter of importance to the administration of the Federal Reserve Act, we brought the case here. 332 U. S. 755.
Condition No. 4 provides for withdrawal from membership in the Federal Reserve System, for violation of its provisions, “within 60 days after written notice from the Board of Governors . . . .” Section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act authorizes the Board of Governors to revoke the membership status of a bank “after hearing.” If the case contained no more than the foregoing elements, three questions would emerge:
(1) Was this action premature, brought as it was before the Board of Governors commenced revocation proceedings?
(2) If not, could the respondent attack the validity of a condition on the basis of which it had been accepted, and had enjoyed, membership? Compare Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 255.
(3) If so, did the Board of Governors have power to impose the condition as a means of guarding against acquisition by Transamerica of an interest in respondent?
However, with due regard for the considerations that should guide us in rendering a declaratory judgment, the record as a whole requires us to dispose of the case without reaching any of these questions.
Extended correspondence between Marriner S. Eccles, the then Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and A. P. Giannini, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Transamerica, together with the testimony of Eccles before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, set forth the reason for the Board’s insistence on the fourth condition. The Board sought to block “acquisition by Transamerica of stock in independent unit banks, especially when it constitutes a means of evading the requirements of the Federal agencies who will not permit its banks to establish additional branches.” Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, on H. R. 2634, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 15. The Board was concerned not that Transamerica might purchase some shares of independent banks for the ordinary purposes of investment, but that it would buy into banks in order to acquire control, and thereby turn banks, though outwardly independent, into parts of its own banking network. The Board of Governors was therefore carrying out the policy underlying Condition No. 4 when it formally disavowed any intention to invoke that condition against respondent merely because of acquisition by Transamerica of an interest in the Bank, with no indication of subversion of its independence. This action by the Board was taken after it had satisfied itself that Transamerica’s holding did not affect the Bank’s control. The Bank had vigorously insisted on its continued independence, in urging upon the Board the harmlessness of Transamerica’s ownership of some of the Bank’s stock, and the Board, upon independent investigation found such to be the fact. Accordingly, the Board concluded that “the public interest” called for no action.
A declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest. Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U. S. 491; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 297-98; H. R. Rep. No. 1264, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2; Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941) pp. 312-14. It is always the duty of a court of equity to strike a proper balance between the needs of the plaintiff and the consequences of giving the desired relief. Especially where governmental action is involved, courts should not intervene unless the need for equitable relief is clear, not remote or speculative.
The actuality of the plaintiff’s need for a declaration of his rights is therefore of decisive importance. And so we turn to the facts of the case at bar. The Bank has always insisted that it is independent of Transamerica; the Board of Governors has sustained the claim. The Bank stands on its right to remain in the Federal Reserve System; the Board acknowledges that right. The Bank disclaims any intention to give up its independence; the Board of Governors, having imposed the condition to safeguard this independence, disavows any action to terminate the Bank’s membership, so long as the Bank maintains the independence on which it insists. What the Bank really fears, and for which it now seeks relief, is that under changed conditions, at some future time, it may be required to withdraw from membership, and if this happens, so the argument runs, the Comptroller of the Currency, one of the Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, has agreed with the Federal Reserve Board to refuse any application by the Bank for deposit insurance as a non-member.
Thus the Bank seeks a declaration of its rights if it should lose its independence, or if the Board of Governors should reverse its policy and seek to invoke the condition even though the Bank remains independent and if then the Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation should not change their policy not to grant deposit insurance to the Bank as a non-member of the Federal Reserve System. The concurrence of these contingent events, necessary for injury to be realized, is too speculative to warrant anticipatory judicial determinations. Courts should avoid passing on questions of public law even short of constitutionality that are not immediately pressing. Many of the same reasons are present which impel them to abstain from adjudicating constitutional claims against a statute before it effectively and presently impinges on such claims.
It appears that the respondent could, if it wished, protect itself from the loss of its independence through adoption of by-laws forbidding any further sale or pledge of its shares to Transamerica or its affiliates. See California Corporations Code, L. 1947, c. 1038, § 501 (g). To this the Bank replies that even if its independence is maintained, the Board of Governors may change its policy, and seek enforcement of Condition No. 4, whether or not such enforcement is required by “the public interest” in having independent banks, which the condition now serves. Such an argument reveals the hypothetical character of the injury on the existence of which a jurisdiction rooted in discretion is to be exercised. In the light of all this, the difficulties deduced from the present uncertainty regarding the future enforcement of the condition, possibly leading to uninsured deposits, are too tenuous to call for adjudication of important issues of public law. We are asked to contemplate as a serious danger that a body entrusted with some of the most delicate and grave responsibilities in our Government will change a deliberately formulated policy after urging it on this Court against the Bank’s standing to ask for relief.
A determination of administrative authority may of course be made at the behest of one so immediately and truly injured by a regulation claimed to be invalid, that his need is sufficiently compelling to justify judicial intervention even before the completion of the administrative process. But, as we have seen, the Bank's grievance here is too remote and insubstantial, too speculative in nature, to justify an injunction against the Board of Governors, and therefore equally inappropriate for a declaration of rights. This is especially true in view of the type of proof offered by the Bank. Its claims of injury were supported entirely by affidavits. Judgment on issues of public moment based on such evidence, not subject to probing by judge and opposing counsel, is apt to be treacherous. Caution is appropriate against the subtle tendency to decide public issues free from the safeguards of critical scrutiny of the facts, through use of a declaratory summary judgment. Modern equity practice has tended away from a procedure based on affidavits and interrogatories, because of its proven insufficiencies. Equity Rule 46 forbade such practice save in exceptional cases. See Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U. S. 701; cf. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43 (a). Again, not the least of the evils that led to the Norris-LaGuardia Act was the frequent practice of issuing labor injunctions upon the basis of affidavits rather than after oral proof presented in open court. See Amidon, J., in Great Northern R. Co. v. Brosseau, 286 F. 414, 416; Swan, J., in Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 29 F. 2d 679, 681-82.
Where administrative intention is expressed but has not yet come to fruition (Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 324), or where that intention is unknown (Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 429-30), we have held that the controversy is not yet ripe for equitable intervention. Surely, when a body such as the Federal Reserve Board has not only not asserted a challenged power but has expressly disclaimed its intention to go beyond the legitimate “public interest” confided to it, a court should stay its hand.
Judgment reversed.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
“If at any time it shall appear to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System that a member bank has failed to comply with the provisions of this section or the regulations of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System made pursuant thereto, or has ceased to exercise banking functions without a receiver or liquidating agent having been appointed therefor, it shall be within the power of the board after hearing to require such bank to surrender its stock in the Federal reserve bank and to forfeit all rights and privileges of membership. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may restore membership upon due proof of compliance with the conditions imposed by this section.” 38 Stat. 251, 260, as amended, 46 Stat. 250, 251, 49 Stat. 684, 704, 12 U. S. C. § 327. See also § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 239, 5 U. S. C. § 1004.
The following is an extract from the minutes of a meeting of the Board on January 28,1946:
“Upon consideration of the latest report of examination of the Peoples Bank, Lakewood Village, California, from which the Board concluded that there had been no substantial change in the control, management or policy of the bank resulting from the acquisition by Transamerica Corporation of certain shares of the bank’s stock, the Board, by unanimous vote, decided that there was no present need in the public interest for any action by the Board with respect to the condition of membership of the bank relating to acquisition of its stock by Transamerica Corporation.”
“501. The by-laws of a corporation may make provisions not in conflict with law or its articles for:
“(g) Special qualifications of persons who may be shareholders, and reasonable restrictions upon the right to transfer or hypothecate shares.”
Likewise, the shareholders, or such of them as chose to, could presumably bind themselves not to sell or pledge to Transamerica, and by noting this agreement on their certificates could bind their transferees. Cf. Vannucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706.
The bank asserted, in its affidavits, not that lack of confidence had deterred depositors, but that deposits had been so heavy that capital expansion was in order, but might be disadvantaged by fear of prospective investors to risk personal assessment if deposits were uninsured.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Me. Chief Justice Waeren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
By leave of the Court, 382 U. S. 898, South Carolina has filed a bill of complaint, seeking a declaration that selected provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 violate the Federal Constitution, and asking for an injunction against enforcement of these provisions by the Attorney General. Original jurisdiction is founded on the presence of a controversy between a State and a citizen of another State under Art. Ill, § 2, of the Constitution. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439. Because no issues of fact were raised in the complaint, and because of South Carolina’s desire to obtain a ruling prior to its primary elections in June 1966, we dispensed with appointment of a special master and expedited our hearing of the case.
Recognizing that the questions presented were of urgent concern to the entire country, we invited all of the States to participate in this proceeding as friends of the Court. A majority responded by submitting or joining in briefs on the merits, some supporting South Carolina and others the Attorney General. Seven of these States also requested and received permission to argue the case orally at our hearing. Without exception, despite the emotional overtones of the proceeding, the briefs and oral arguments were temperate, lawyerlike and constructive. All viewpoints on the issues have been fully developed, and this additional assistance has been most helpful to the Court.
The Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century. The Act creates stringent new remedies for voting discrimination where it persists on a pervasive scale, and in addition the statute strengthens existing remedies for pockets of voting discrimination elsewhere in the country. Congress assumed the power to prescribe these remedies from § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, which authorizes the National Legislature to effectuate by “appropriate” measures the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting. We hold that the sections of the Act which are properly before us are an appropriate means for carrying out Congress’ constitutional responsibilities and are consonant with all other provisions of the Constitution. We therefore deny South Carolina’s request that enforcement of these sections of the Act_be enjoined.
I.
The constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflects. Before enacting the measure, Congress explored with great care the problem of racial discrimination in voting. The House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary each held hearings for nine days and received testimony from a total of 67 witnesses. More than three full days were consumed discussing the bill on the floor of the House, while the debate in the Senate covered 26 days in all. At the close of these deliberations, the verdict of both chambers was overwhelming. The House approved the bill by a vote of 328-74, and the measure passed the Senate by a margin of 79-18.
Two points emerge vividly from the voluminous legislative history of the Act contained in the committee hearings and floor debates. First: Congress felt itself confronted by an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution. Second: Congress concluded that the unsuccessful rem-ediés which it had prescribed in the past would have to be replaced by sterner and more elaborate measures in order to satisfy the clear commands of the Fifteenth Amendment. We pause here to summarize the majority reports of the House and Senate Committees, which document in considerable detail the factual basis for these reactions by Congress. See H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-16 (hereinafter cited as House Report); S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-16 (hereinafter cited as Senate Report).
The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified in 1870. Promptly thereafter Congress passed the Enforcement Act of 1870, which made it a crime for public officers and private persons to obstruct exercise of the right to vote. The statute was amended in the following year to provide for detailed federal supervision of the electoral process, from registration to the certification of returns. As the years passed and fervor for racial equality waned, enforcement of the laws became spotty and ineffective, and most of their provisions were repealed in 1894. The remnants have had little significance in the recently renewed battle against voting discrimination.
Meanwhile, beginning in 1890, the States of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia enacted tests still in use which were specifically designed to prevent Negroes from voting. Typically, they made the ability to read and write a registration qualification and also required completion of a registration form. These laws were based on the fact that as of 1890 in each of the named States, more than two-thirds of the adult Negroes were illiterate while less than one-quarter of the adult whites were unable to read or write. At the same time, alternate tests were prescribed in all of the named States to assure that white illiterates would not be deprived of the franchise. These included grandfather clauses, property qualifications, “good character” tests, and the requirement that registrants “understand” or “interpret” certain matter.
The course of subsequent Fifteenth Amendment litigation in this Court demonstrates the variety and persistence of these and similar institutions designed to deprive Negroes of the right to vote. Grandfather clauses were invalidated in Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, and Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368. Procedural hurdles were struck down in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268. The white primary was outlawed in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, and Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461. Improper challenges were nullified in United States v. Thomas, 362 U. S. 58. Racial gerrymandering was forbidden by Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339. Finally, discriminatory application of voting tests was condemned in Schnell v. Davis, 336 U. S. 933; Alabama v. United States, 371 U. S. 37; and Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145.
According to the evidence in recent Justice Department voting suits, the latter stratagem is now the principal method used to bar Negroes from the polls. Discriminatory administration of voting qualifications has been found in all eight Alabama cases, in all nine Louisiana cases, and in all nine Mississippi cases which have gone to final judgment. Moreover, in almost all of these cases, the courts have held that the discrimination was pursuant to a widespread “pattern or practice.” White applicants for registration have often been excused altogether from the literacy and understanding tests or have been given easy versions, have received extensive help from voting officials, and have been registered despite serious errors in their answers. Negroes, on the other hand, have typically been required to pass difficult versions of all the tests, without any outside assistance and without the slightest error. The good-morals requirement is so vague and subjective that it has constituted an open invitation to abuse at the hands of voting officials. Negroes obliged to obtain vouchers from registered voters have found it virtually impossible to comply in areas where almost no Negroes are on the rolls.
In recent years, Congress has repeatedly tried to cope with the problem by facilitating case-by-case litigation against voting discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 authorized the Attorney General to seek injunctions against public and private interference with the right to vote on racial grounds. Perfecting amendments in the Civil Rights Act of 1960 permitted the joinder of States as parties defendant, gave the Attorney General access to local voting records, and authorized courts to register voters in areas of systematic discrimination.Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expedited the hearing of voting cases before three-judge courts and outlawed some of the tactics used to disqualify Negroes from voting in federal elections.
Despite the earnest efforts of the Justice Department and of many federal judges, these new laws have done little to cure the problem of voting discrimination. According to estimates by the Attorney General during hearings on the Act, registration of voting-age Negroes in Alabama rose only from 14.2% to 19.4% between 1958 and 1964; in Louisiana it barely inched ahead from 31.7% to 31.8% between 1956 and 1965; and in Mississippi it increased only from 4.4% to 6.4% between 1954 and 1964. In each instance, registration of voting-age whites ran roughly 50 percentage points or more ahead of Negro registration.
The previous legislation has proved ineffective for a number of reasons. Voting suits are unusually onerous to prepare, sometimes requiring as many as 6,000 man-hours spent combing through registration records in preparation for trial. Litigation has been exceedingly slow, in part because of the ample opportunities for delay afforded voting officials and others involved in the proceedings. Even when favorable decisions have finally been obtained, some of the States affected have merely switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees or have enacted difficult new tests designed to prolong the existing disparity between white and Negro registration. Alternatively, certain local officials have defied and evaded court orders or have simply closed their registration offices to freeze the voting rolls. The provision of the 1960 law authorizing registration by federal officers has had little impact on local maladministration because of its procedural complexities.
During the hearings and debates on the Act, Selma, Alabama, was repeatedly referred to as the pre-eminent example of the ineffectiveness of existing legislation. In Dallas County, of which Selma is the seat, there were four years of litigation by the Justice Department and two findings by the federal courts of widespread voting discrimination. Yet in those four years, Negro registration rose only from 156 to 383, although there are approximately 15,000 Negroes of voting age in the county. Any possibility that these figures were attributable to political apathy was dispelled by the protest demonstrations in Selma in the early months of 1965. The House Committee on the Judiciary summed up the reaction of Congress to these developments in the following words:
“The litigation in Dallas County took more than 4 years to open the door to the exercise of constitutional rights conferred almost a century ago. The problem on a national scale is that the difficulties experienced in suits in Dallas County have been encountered over and over again under existing voting laws. Four years is too long. The burden is too heavy — the wrong to our citizens is too serious — the damage to our national conscience is too great not to adopt more effective measures than exist today.
“Such is the essential justification for the pending bill.” House Report 11.
II.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 reflects Congress’ firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting. The heart of the Act is a complex scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most flagrant. Section 4 (a)-(d) lays down a formula defining the States and political subdivisions to which these new remedies apply. The first of the remedies, contained in § 4 (a), is the suspension of literacy tests and similar voting qualifications for a period of five years from the last occurrence of substantial voting discrimination. Section 5 prescribes a second remedy, the suspension of all new voting regulations pending review by federal authorities to determine whether their use would perpetuate voting discrimination. The third remedy, covered in §§ 6 (b), 7, 9, and 13 (a), is the assignment of federal examiners on certification by the Attorney General to list qualified applicants who are thereafter entitled to vote in all elections.
Other provisions of the Act prescribe subsidiary cures for persistent voting discrimination. Section 8 authorizes the appointment of federal poll-watchers in places to which federal examiners have already been assigned. Section 10 (d) excuses those made eligible to vote in sections of the country covered by § 4 (b) of the Act from paying accumulated past poll taxes for state and local elections. Section 12 (e) provides for balloting by persons denied access to the polls in areas where federal examiners have been appointed.
The remaining remedial portions of the Act are aimed at voting discrimination in any area of the country where it may occur. Section 2 broadly prohibits the use of voting rules to abridge exercise of the franchise on racial grounds. Sections 3, 6 (a), and 13 (b) strengthen existing procedures for attacking voting discrimination by means of litigation. Section 4 (e) excuses citizens educated in American schools conducted in a foreign language from passing English-language literacy tests. Section 10 (a)-(c) facilitates constitutional litigation challenging the imposition of all poll taxes for state and local elections. Sections 11 and 12 (a)-(d) authorize civil and criminal sanctions against interference with the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act.
At the outset, we emphasize that only some of the many portions of the Act are properly before us. South Carolina has not challenged §§ 2, 3, 4 (e), 6 (a), 8, 10, 12 (d) and (e), 13 (b), and other miscellaneous provisions having nothing to do with this lawsuit. Judicial review of these sections must await subsequent litigation. In addition, we find that South Carolina’s attack on §§ 11 and 12 (a)-(c) is premature. No person has yet been subjected to, or even threatened with, the criminal sanctions which these sections of the Act authorize. See United States v. Baines, 362 U. S. 17, 20-24. Consequently, the only sections of the Act to be reviewed at this time are §§ 4 (a)-(d), 5, 6 (b), 7, 9, 13 (a), and certain procedural portions of § 14, all of which are presently in actual operation in South Carolina. We turn now to a detailed description of these provisions and their present status.
Coverage formula.
The remedial sections of the Act assailed by South Carolina automatically apply to any State; or to any separate political subdivision such as a county or parish, for which two findings have been made: (1) the Attorney General has determined that on November 1, 1964, it maintained a “test or device,” and (2) the Director of the Census has determined that less than 50% of its voting-age residents were registered on November 1,1964, or voted in the presidential election of November 1964. These findings are not reviewable in any court and are final upon publication in the Federal Register. § 4 (b). As used throughout the Act, the phrase “test or device” means any requirement that a registrant or voter must “(1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class.” § 4 (c).
Statutory coverage of a State or political subdivision under § 4 (b) is terminated if the area obtains a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia, determining that tests and devices have not been used during the preceding five years to abridge the franchise on racial grounds. The Attorney General shall consent to entry of the judgment if he has no reason to believe that the facts are otherwise. §4 (a). For the purposes of this section, tests and devices are not deemed to have been used in a forbidden manner if the incidents of discrimination are few in number and have been promptly corrected, if their continuing effects have been abated, and if they are unlikely to recur in the future. § 4 (d). On the other hand, no area may obtain a declaratory judgment for five years after the final decision of a federal court (other than the denial of a judgment under this section of the Act), determining that discrimination through the use of tests or devices has occurred anywhere in the State or political subdivision. These declaratory judgment actions are to be heard by a three-judge panel, with direct appeal to this Court. §4 (a).
South Carolina was brought within the coverage formula of the Act on August 7, 1965, pursuant to appropriate administrative determinations which have not been challenged in this proceeding. On the same day, coverage was also extended to Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Virginia, 26 counties in North Carolina, and one county in Arizona. Two more counties in Arizona, one county in Hawaii, and one county in Idaho were added to the list on November 19, 1965. Thus far Alaska, the three Arizona counties, and the single county in Idaho have asked the District Court for the District of Columbia to grant a declaratory judgment terminating statutory coverage.
Suspension of tests.
In a State or political subdivision covered by § 4 (b) of the Act, no person may be denied the right to vote in any election because of his failure to comply with a “test or device.” §4 (a).
On account of this provision, South Carolina is temporarily barred from enforcing the portion of its voting laws which requires every applicant for registration to show that he:
“Can both read and write any section of [the State] Constitution submitted to [him] by the registration officer or can show that he owns, and has paid all taxes collectible during the previous year on, property in this State assessed at three hundred dollars or more.” S. C. Code Ann. §23-62 (4) (1965 Supp.).
The Attorney General has determined that the property qualification is inseparable from the literacy test, and South Carolina makes no objection to this finding. Similar tests and devices have been temporarily suspended in the other sections of the country listed above.
Review of new rules.
In a State or political subdivision covered by § 4 (b) of the Act, no person may be denied the right to vote in any election because of his failure to comply with a voting qualification or procedure different from those in force on November 1, 1964. This suspension of new rules is terminated, however, under either of the following circumstances: (1) if the area has submitted the rules to the Attorney General, and he has not interposed an objection within 60 days, or (2) if the area has obtained a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia, determining that the rules will not abridge the franchise on racial grounds. These declaratory judgment actions are to be heard by a three-judge panel, with direct appeal to this Court. § 5.
South Carolina altered its voting laws in 1965 to extend the closing hour at polling places from 6 p. m. to 7 p. m. The State has not sought judicial review of this change in the District Court for the District of Columbia, nor has it submitted the new rule to the Attorney General for his scrutiny, although at our hearing the Attorney General announced that he does not challenge the amendment. There are indications in the record that other sections of the country listed above have also altered their voting laws since November 1, 1964.
Federal examiners.
In any political subdivision covered by § 4 (b) of the Act, the Civil Service Commission shall appoint voting examiners whenever the Attorney General certifies either of the following facts: (1) that he has received meritorious written complaints from at least 20 residents alleging that they have been disenfranchised under color of law because of their race, or (2) that the appointment of examiners is otherwise necessary to effectuate the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment. In making the latter determination, the Attorney General must consider, among other factors, whether the registration ratio of non-whites to whites seems reasonably attributable to racial discrimination, or whether there is substantial evidence of good-faith efforts to comply with the Fifteenth Amendment. §6 (b). These certifications are not reviewable in any court and are effective upon publication in the Federal Register. § 4 (b).
The examiners who have been appointed are to test the voting qualifications of applicants according to regulations of the Civil Service Commission prescribing times, places, procedures, and forms. §§ 7 (a) and 9 (b). Any person who meets the voting requirements of state law, insofar as these have not been suspended by the Act, must promptly be placed on a list of eligible voters. Examiners are to transmit their lists at least once a month to the appropriate state or local officials, who in turn are required to place the listed names on the official voting rolls. Any person listed by an examiner is entitled to vote in all elections held more than 45 days after his name has been transmitted. § 7 (b).
A person shall be removed from the voting list by an examiner if he has lost his eligibility under valid state law, or if he has been successfully challenged through the procedure prescribed in § 9 (a) of the Act. § 7 (d). The challenge must be filed at the office within the State designated by the Civil Service Commission; must be submitted within 10 days after the listing is made available for public inspection; must be supported by the affidavits of at least two people having personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and must be served on the person challenged by mail or at his residence. A hearing officer appointed by the Civil Service Commission shall hear the challenge and render a decision within 15 days after the challenge is filed. A petition for review of the hearing officer's decision must be submitted within an additional 15 days after service of the decision on the person seeking review. The court of appeals for the circuit in which the person challenged resides is to hear the petition and affirm the hearing officer’s decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Any person listed by an examiner is entitled to vote pending a final decision of the hearing officer or the court. § 9 (a).
The listing procedures in a political subdivision. are terminated under either of the following circumstances: (1) if the Attorney General informs the Civil Service Commission that all persons listed by examiners have been placed on the official voting rolls, and that there is no longer reasonable cause to fear abridgment of the franchise on racial grounds, or (2) if the political subdivision has obtained a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia, ascertaining the same facts which govern termination by the Attorney General, and the Director of the Census has determined that more than 50% of the non-white residents of voting-age are registered to vote. A political subdivision may petition the Attorney General to terminate listing procedures or to authorize the necessary census, and the District Court itself shall request the census if the Attorney General’s refusal to do so is arbitrary or unreasonable. § 13 (a). The determinations by the Director of the Census are not reviewable in any court and are final upon publication in the Federal Register. § 4 (b).
On October 30, 1965, the Attorney General certified the need for federal examiners in two South Carolina counties, and examiners appointed by the Civil Service Commission have been serving there since November 8, 1965. Examiners have also been assigned to 11 counties in Alabama, five parishes in Louisiana, and 19 counties in Mississippi. The examiners are listing people found eligible to vote, and the challenge procedure has been employed extensively. No political subdivision has yet sought to have federal examiners withdrawn through the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia.
III.
These provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are challenged on the fundamental ground that they exceed the powers of Congress and encroach on an area reserved to the States by the Constitution. South Carolina and certain of the amici curiae also attack specific sections of the Act for more particular reasons. They argue that the coverage formula prescribed in § 4 (a)-(d) violates the principle of the equality of States, denies due process by employing an invalid presumption and by barring judicial review of administrative findings, constitutes a forbidden bill of attainder, and impairs the separation of powers by adjudicating guilt through legislation. They claim that the review of new voting rules required in § 5 infringes Article III by directing the District Court to issue advisory opinions. They contend that the assignment of federal examiners authorized in § 6 (b) abridges due process by precluding judicial review of administrative findings and impairs the separation of powers by giving the Attorney General judicial functions; also that the challenge procedure prescribed in § 9 denies due process on account of its speed. Finally, South Carolina and certain of the amici curiae maintain that §§ 4 (a) and 5, buttressed by § 14 (b) of the Act, abridge due process by limiting litigation to a distant forum.
Some of these contentions may be dismissed at the outset. The word “person” in the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be expanded to encompass the States of the Union, and to our knowledge this has never been done by any court. See International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 266, 164 So. 2d 314, 322, n. 5; cf. United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F. 2d 1, 8 (C. A. 5th Cir.). Likewise, courts have consistently regarded the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article I and the principle of the separation of powers only as protections for individual persons and private groups, those who are peculiarly vulnerable to nonjudicial determinations of guilt. See United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333. Nor does a State have standing as the parent of its citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against the Federal Government, the ultimate parens patriae of every American citizen. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 485-486; Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 18. The objections to the Act which are raised under these provisions may therefore be considered only as additional aspects of the basic question presented by the case: Has Congress exercised its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment in an appropriate manner with relation to the States?
The ground rules for resolving this question are clear. The language and purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment, the prior decisions construing its several provisions, and the general doctrines of constitutional interpretation, all point to one fundamental principle. As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting. Cf. our rulings last Term, sustaining Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258-259, 261-262; and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 303-304. We turn now to a more detailed description of the standards which govern our review of the Act.
Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment declares that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” This declaration has always been treated as self-executing and has repeatedly been construed, without further legislative specification, to invalidate state voting qualifications or procedures which are discriminatory on their face or in practice. See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649; Schnell v. Davis, 336 U. S. 933; Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461; United States v. Thomas, 362 U. S. 58; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339; Alabama v. United States, 371 U. S. 37; Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145. These decisions have been rendered with full respect for the general rule, reiterated last Term in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 91, that States “have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised.” The gist of the matter is that the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power. “When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right.” Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S., at 347.
South Carolina contends that the cases cited above are precedents only for the authority of the judiciary to strike down state statutes and procedures — that to allow an exercise of this authority by Congress would be to rob the courts of their rightful constitutional role. On the contrary, § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment expressly declares that “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” By adding this authorization, the Framers indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created in § 1. “It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the [Civil War] amendments fully effective.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345. Accordingly, in addition to the courts, Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting.
Congress has repeatedly exercised these powers in the past, and its enactments have repeatedly been upheld. For recent examples, see the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which was sustained in United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17; United States v. Thomas, supra; and Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420; and the Civil Rights Act of 1960, which was upheld in Alabama v. United States, supra; Louisiana v. United States, supra; and United States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128. On the rare occasions when the Court has found an unconstitutional exercise of these powers, in its opinion Congress had attacked evils not comprehended by the Fifteenth Amendment. See United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127.
The basic test to be applied in a case involving § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is the same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress with relation to the reserved powers of the States. Chief Justice Marshall laid down the classic formulation, 50 years before the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified:
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421.
The Court has subsequently echoed his language in describing each of the Civil War Amendments:
“Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., at 345-346.
This language was again employed, nearly 50 years later, with reference to Congress’ related authority under § 2 of the Eighteenth Amendment. James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545, 558-559.
We therefore reject South Carolina’s argument that Congress may appropriately do no more than to forbid violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in general terms— that the task of fashioning specific remedies or of applying them to particular localities must necessarily be left entirely to the courts. Congress is not circumscribed by any such artificial rules under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. In the oft-repeated words of Chief Justice Marshall, referring to another specific legislative authorization in the Constitution, “This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196.
IY.
Congress exercised its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment in an inventive manner when it enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965. First: The measure prescribes remedies for voting discrimination which go into effect without any need for prior adjudication. This was clearly a legitimate response to the problem, for which there is ample precedent under other constitutional provisions. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 302-304; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 120-121. Congress had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat widespread and persistent discrimination in voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome the obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits. After enduring nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might well decide to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims. The question remains, of course, whether the specific remedies prescribed in the Act were an appropriate means of combatting the evil, and to this question we shall presently address ourselves.
Second: The Act intentionally confines these remedies to a small number of States and political subdivisions which in most instances were familiar to Congress by name. This, too, was a permissible method of dealing with the problem. Congress had learned that substantial voting discrimination presently occurs in certain sections of the country, and it knew no way of accurately forecasting whether the evil might spread elsewhere in the future. In acceptable legislative fashion, Congress chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where immediate action seemed necessary. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 427; Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545, 550-554. The doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, and cases cited therein.
Coverage formula.
We now consider the related question of whether the specific States and political subdivisions within § 4 (b) of the Act were an appropriate target for the new remedies. South Carolina contends that the coverage formula is aw7kwardly designed in a number of respects and that it disregards various local conditions which have nothing to do with racial discrimination. These arguments, however, are largely beside the point. Congress began work with reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of the States and political subdivisions affected by the new remedies of the Act. The formula eventually evolved to describe these areas was relevant to the problem of voting discrimination, and Congress was therefore entitled to infer a significant danger of the evil in the few remaining States and political subdivisions covered by § 4 (b) of the Act. No
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are the owners and managing agents of two ships which are registered under the laws of Liberia and fly the Liberian flag. They sought injunctive relief in the state courts in Texas to bar picketing of their vessels by respondent unions. The trial court denied relief, finding that the dispute was “arguably” within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and that the jurisdiction of the state courts was therefore pre-empted. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, and we granted certiorari, 412 U. S. 927 (1973), to consider whether the activities here complained of were activities “affecting commerce” within the meaning of §§ 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 450, 29 U. S. C. §§ 152 (6) and (7). We hold that they were not, and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
I
The vessels Northwind and Theomana are ships of Liberian registry, carrying cargo between foreign ports and the United States. Northwind is owned by petitioner Westwind Africa Line, Ltd., a Liberian corporation, while Theomana is owned by petitioner SPS Bulkcarriers Corp., a Liberian corporation, and managed by petitioner Windward Shipping (London) Ltd., a British corporation. The crews of both vessels are composed entirely of foreign nationals, represented by foreign unions and employed under foreign articles of agreement.
Respondents are American maritime unions, apparently representing a substantial majority of American merchant seamen. Alarmed by an accelerating decline in the number of jobs available to their members, these unions agreed to undertake collective action against foreign vessels, which they saw as the major cause of their business recession. Specifically, these unions agreed to picket foreign ships, calling attention to the competitive advantage enjoyed by such vessels because of a difference between foreign and domestic seamen’s wages. All parties concede that such a difference does exist.
The picketing here occurred at the Port of Houston, Texas, in October 1971. Both Northwind and Theomana were docked within the port, and respondents established picket lines in front of each vessel. There were four pickets assigned to each vessel, carrying signs which read:
“ATTENTION TO THE PUBLIC THE WAGES AND BENEFITS PAID SEAMEN ABOARD THE VESSEL THEOMANA [NORTH-WIND] ARE SUBSTANDARD TO THOSE OF AMERICAN SEAMEN. THIS RESULTS IN EXTREME DAMAGE TO OUR WAGE STANDARDS AND LOSS OF OUR JOBS. PLEASE DO NOT PATRONIZE THIS VESSEL. HELP THE AMERICAN SEAMEN. WE HAVE NO DISPUTE WITH ANY OTHER VESSEL ON THIS SITE.”
[Printed names of the six unions.]
These signs were supplemented by pamphlets of similar import. The pickets were instructed not to discuss the picketing with anyone, and they appear to have followed their instructions.
The picketing, although neither obstructive nor violent, was not without effect. Longshoremen and other port workers refused to cross the picket lines to load and unload petitioners’ vessels. Petitioners filed separate suits in a Texas state court, asking the court to enjoin the picketing as tortious under Texas law. The primary basis for petitioners’ claim was that the picketing sought to induce the owners and crews to break pre-existing contracts. Respondents presented several defenses, contending in particular that the jurisdiction of the Texas court was pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act.
The trial court sustained this contention, holding that jurisdiction properly lay with the NLRB, and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. That court found that state jurisdiction was pre-empted by the Act when “the activities complained of are arguably either protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA as amended by the LMRA,” see San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), and that the conduct here met that test. The court rejected petitioners’ argument that the picketing interfered with the “maritime operations of foreign-flag ships,” see McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U. S. 10 (1963), in such manner as to remove it from the Board’s jurisdiction. The court concluded:
“If [the picketing] but voices a complaint as to foreign wages and urges the public not to patronize foreign vessels it does not engage in matters outside of commerce. It is peaceful picketing, publicizing a labor dispute, of such a character that its validity is suggested by the Court’s holding in the Marine Cooks case, supra. It is, at least arguably, a protected activity under section 7 of the LMRA. As such, it is an activity as to which the exclusive jurisdiction to determine its propriety has been preempted to the NLRB.”
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals too narrowly construed this Court’s decisions denying the NLRB jurisdiction in cases involving foreign-flag ships. We therefore begin by examining the principles established by those decisions for determining the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
II
In a series of cases decided over the past 17 years, this Court has discussed the application of the Labor Management Relations Act in situations which might be broadly described as disputes between unions representing workers in this country and owners of foreign-flag vessels operating in international maritime commerce. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138 (1957), is the leading case on the subject. In Benz the question was whether the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, precluded a diversity suit for damages brought in the United States District Court by foreign shipowners against picketing American unions. The picketing had been undertaken in Portland, Oregon, to support striking foreign crews employed under foreign articles and had resulted in the refusal of workers to load and repair the docked foreign ships. The District Court had awarded damages and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
This Court held that the shipowners’ action was not pre-empted by the Labor Management Relations Act. Studying the legislative history of the Act, the Court found no indication that it was intended to govern disputes between foreign shipowners and foreign crews. On the contrary, the Court concluded that the most revealing legislative history strongly suggested the bill was a “bill of rights ... for American workingmen and for their employers.” Id., at 144. (Emphasis in original.) The Court stated that this history “inescapably describes the boundaries of the Act as including only the workingmen of our own country and its possessions.” Ibid.
Recognition of the clear congressional purpose to apply the LMRA only to American workers and employers was doubtless a sufficient reason to place the picketing in Benz outside the Act. But the Court in that case made clear its reluctance to intrude domestic labor law willy-nilly into the complex of considerations affecting foreign trade, absent a clear congressional mandate to do so:
“For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of international discord are so evident, and retaliative action so certain.” Id., at 147.
In the 17 years since Benz was decided, Congress has in no way indicated any such “affirmative intention,” and this Court has continued to construe the LMRA in accordance with the dictates of that case.
The reasoning of Benz was reaffirmed in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U. S. 10 (1963), and Incres S. S. Co. v. Maritime Workers, 372 U. S. 24 (1963), decided together six years later. In McCulloch, we held that the National Labor Relations Board had improperly assumed jurisdiction under the Act to order an election involving foreign crews of foreign-flag ships. Rejecting the Board’s “balancing of contacts” theory, the Court said:
“[T]o follow such a suggested procedure to the ultimate might require that the Board inquire into the internal discipline and order of all foreign vessels calling at American ports.” 372 U. S., at 19.
In lucres we applied this rationale to a situation involving union picketing of a foreign ship in an effort to organize the foreign crew. Reversing the holding, of a New York state court that the picketing was arguably within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, the Court said:
“The Board’s jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor practices, like its jurisdiction to direct elections, is based upon circumstances 'affecting commerce,’ and we have concluded that maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien seamen are not in ‘commerce’ within the meaning of § 2 (6), 29 U. S. C. § 152 (6).” 372 U. S., at 27.
But Benz and its successor cases have not been read to exempt all organizational activities from the Act’s protections merely because those activities in some way were directed at an employer who was the owner of a foreign-flag vessel docked in an American port. In Longshoremen v. Ariadne Co., 397 U. S. 195 (1970), the Court held that the picketing of foreign ships to protest substandard wages paid by their owners to nonunion American longshoremen was “in ‘commerce’ within the meaning of § 2 (6), and thus might have been subject to the regulatory power of the National Labor Relations Board.” Id., at 200. The pickets in Ariadne, unlike the pickets in Benz or Inores, were primarily engaged in a dispute as to whether an employer should hire unionized or nonunionized American workers to perform longshoremen’s work, and the substandard wages which they were protesting were being paid to fellow American workers. The Court specifically noted: “[T]his dispute centered on the wages to be paid American residents.” Id., at 199.
The term “in commerce,” as used in the LMRA, is obviously not self-defining, and certainly the activities in Benz, McCulloch, and Inores, held not covered by the Act, were literally just as much “in commerce” as were the activities held covered in Ariadne. Those cases which deny jurisdiction to the NLRB recognize that Congress, when it used the words “in commerce” in the LMRA, simply did not intend that Act to erase longstanding principles of comity and accommodation in international maritime trade. In Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571, 577 (1953), the Court commented on the congressional intent with respect to the Jones Act of 1920 in these words:
“But Congress in 1920 wrote these all-comprehending words, not on a clean slate, but as a postscript to a long series of enactments governing shipping. All were enacted with regard to a seasoned body of maritime law developed by the experience of American courts long accustomed to dealing with admiralty problems in reconciling our own with foreign interests and in accommodating the reach of our own laws to those of other maritime nations.”
We are even more reluctant to attribute to Congress an intention to disrupt this comprehensive body of law by construction of an Act unrelated to maritime commerce and directed solely at American labor relations.
Ill
The picketing activities in this case do not involve the inescapable intrusion into the affairs of foreign ships that was present in Benz and lucres; respondents seek neither to organize the foreign crews for purpose of representation nor to support foreign crews in their own wage dispute with a foreign shipowner. But those cases do not purport to fully delineate the threshold of interference with the maritime operations of foreign vessels which makes the LMRA inapplicable.
The picket signs utilized at the docks where the Northwind and Theomana were tied up protested the wages paid to foreign seamen who were employed by foreign shipowners under contracts made outside the United States. At the very least, the pickets must have hoped to exert sufficient pressure so that foreign vessels would be forced to raise their operating costs to levels comparable to those of American shippers, either because of lost cargo resulting from the longshoremen’s refusal to load or unload the vessels, or because of wage increases awarded as a virtual self-imposed tariff to regain entry to American ports. Such a large-scale increase in operating costs would have more than a negligible impact on the “maritime operations” of these foreign ships, and the effect would be by no means limited to costs incurred while in American ports. Unlike Ariadne, the protest here could not be accommodated by a wage decision on the part of the shipowners which would affect only wages paid within this country.
In this situation, the foreign vessels’ lot is not a happy one. A decision by the foreign owners to raise foreign seamen’s wages to a level mollifying the American pickets would have the most significant and far-reaching effect on the maritime operations of these ships throughout the world. A decision to boycott American ports in order to avoid the difficulties induced by the picketing would be detrimental not only to the private balance sheets of the foreign shipowners but to the citizenry of a country as dependent on goods carried in foreign bottoms as is ours. Retaliatory action against American vessels in foreign ports might likewise be considered, but the employment of such tactics would probably exacerbate and broaden the present dispute. Virtually none of the predictable responses of a foreign shipowner to picketing of this type, therefore, would be limited to the sort of wage-cost decision benefiting American workingmen which the LMRA was designed to regulate. This case, therefore, falls under Benz rather than under Ariadne.
Since we hold that respondents’ picketing was not “in commerce” as defined by the Act, we do not reach the question of whether the activity was otherwise of such a nature that state courts would be precluded by the LMRA from entertaining an action to enjoin it. Our conclusion that the activities here involved were not “in commerce” within the meaning of §§ 2 (6) and (7) of the NLRA, as amended by the LMRA, resolves a question which, of course, is one for the courts in the first instance. Ariadne, 397 U. S., at 200. The Court of Civil Appeals was therefore wrong in holding that the courts of the State of Texas were prevented by the LMRA from entertaining petitioners’ suit for an injunction.
Reversed.
482 S. W. 2d 675 (1972).
The definitions in §§ 2 (6) and (7), 29 U. S. C. §§ 152 (6) and (7), as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, are as follows:
"(6) The term ‘commerce’ means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country.
“(7) The term ‘affecting commerce’ means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.”
Respondents describe themselves in their brief as “six labor organizations who collectively represent the overwhelming majority and practically almost all American merchant seamen.” Brief for Respondents 2.
The petitioners state:
“We do not contest the fact that the wages of foreign crews on foreign ships are substantially lower than those paid to American seamen on American ships.” Brief for Petitioners 19.
The brief notes some estimates that the American wage costs are between 2% to 4 times higher than the foreign wage costs. Id., at 19 n.
These pamphlets stated:
“To the Public — American Seamen have lost approximately 50% of their jobs in the past few years to foreign flag ships employing seamen at a fraction of the wages of American Seamen.
“American dollars flowing to these foreign ship owners operating ships at wages and benefits substandard to American Seamen, are hurting our balance of payments in addition to hurting our economy by the loss of jobs.
“A strong American Merchant Marine is essential to our national defense. The fewer American flag ships there are, the weaker our position will be in a period of national emergency.
“PLEASE PATRONIZE AMERICAN FLAG VESSELS, SAVE OUR JOBS, HELP OUR ECONOMY AND SUPPORT OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE BY HELPING TO CREATE A STRONG AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE.
“Our dispute is limited to the vessel picketed at this site, the S. S.” (App. 21).
The courts below considered only this ground advanced by respondents, finding it dispositive. We express no opinion on the merits of respondents’ other contentions.
482 S. W. 2d, at 678.
Id., at 680-682.
Id., at 682.
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138 (1957); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U. S. 10 (1963); Incres S. S. Co. v. Maritime Workers, 372 U. S. 24 (1963); Longshoremen v. Ariadne Co., 397 U. S. 195 (1970).
The Court in McCulloch also noted that the Board’s actions had “aroused vigorous protests from foreign governments and created international problems for our Government.” 372 U. S., at 17.
The evidence in Ariadne showed that the work at issue was performed partly by members of the foreign ships’ crews and partly by outside labor. 397 U. S., at 196. Those workers included in the classification “outside labor” were nonunion members. This Court noted that “[t]he participation of some crew members in the longshore work does not obscure the fact that this dispute centered on the wages to be paid American residents, who were employed by each foreign ship not to serve as members of its crew but rather to do casual longshore work.” Id., at 199.
The basic question at issue in Lauritzen was whether American or Danish law applied to a maritime tort which occurred in Havana Harbor. Although analysis of the Jones Act there obviously involved different considerations from analysis of the Labor Management Relations Act here, it is interesting to note that some arguments at least are common to both cases. In Lauritzen this Court rejected a “candid and brash appeal” made by the seamen and various amici that the Court should “extend the law to this situation as a means of benefiting seamen and enhancing the costs of foreign ship operation for the competitive advantage of our own.” 345 U. S., at 593. We observed at that time that such arguments were obviously better directed to Congress.
We do not find the rationale of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S. S. Co., 362 U. S. 365 (1960), to be applicable here. Although that case involved a labor situation strikingly similar to the situation involved in this case, the controlling question in Marine Cooks was the jurisdiction of a federal district court to enjoin picketing of a foreign-flag ship under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. The Court held that in such circumstances the district courts had no jurisdiction. However, as we later noted in McCulloch, 372 U. S., at 18, Marine Cooks “cannot be regarded as limiting the earlier Benz holding . . . since no question as to ‘whether the picketing . . . was tortious under state or federal law' was either presented or decided.” Obviously the question whether Congress intended the federal courts to stay out of the labor injunction business involves significantly different considerations from the question whether Congress intended the Labor Management Relations Act to apply to the type of picketing of foreign ships involved here.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Robert Van Arsdall was convicted of murder in a Delaware trial court. The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed his conviction on the ground that the trial court, by improperly restricting defense counsel’s cross-examination designed to show bias on the part of a prosecution witness, had violated respondent’s confrontation rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and that such violation required automatic reversal. 486 A. 2d 1 (1984). While we agree that the trial court’s ruling was contrary to the mandate of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, we conclude that the Supreme Court of Delaware was wrong when it declined to consider whether that ruling was harmless in the context of the trial as a whole.
Shortly after midnight on January 1, 1982, Doris Epps was stabbed to death in an apartment in Smyrna, Delaware, after an all-day New Year’s Eve party. Respondent and Daniel Pregent, who by respondent’s testimony were the only two people in the apartment with Epps at the time she was killed, were arrested at the scene of the crime and charged with Epps’ murder. At separate trials, respondent was convicted and Pregent was acquitted.
The State’s case against respondent was based on circumstantial evidence, and proceeded on the theory that respondent had either killed Epps or assisted Pregent in doing so. Several of the partygoers testified about the party and the scene after the killing. The party, which lasted from late in the morning of December 31, 1981, until shortly before midnight, was held in the adjacent apartments of Pregent and Robert Fleetwood. Respondent, who was one of at least a dozen guests who attended the party during the course of the day, had stopped in for two brief periods in the late afternoon and early evening and then returned for a third time at about 11:30 p.m. By that time the party was over. Pregent had quarreled with a female guest, kicked a hole in a hallway wall and had to be restrained. An intoxicated Epps had been placed on a sofa bed in Pregent’s apartment after passing out. And shortly before 11 p.m., a second altercation of some kind occurred, prompting Fleetwood to close the party in his apartment to everyone except his two friends, Alice Meinier and Mark Mood. When respondent returned to Pregent’s apartment at about 11:30, only Pregent and Epps were present.
Robert Fleetwood was the 10th of 16 prosecution witnesses. In addition to recounting uncontroverted facts about the party, he testified that sometime between 11 and 11:30 p.m. he walked across the hall, looked into Pregent’s living room from the doorway, and saw respondent sitting on the edge of the sofa bed next to Pregent’s feet. Fleetwood, who did not have a complete view of the bed, did not see Epps or anyone else in the apartment. Upon returning to his own apartment, Fleetwood stayed awake long enough to hear nearby bells ring in the New Year, at which point he passed out. App. 82-85.
Meinier, who with Mood had remained awake in Fleet-wood’s apartment, testified that at roughly 1 a.m. respondent knocked at Fleetwood’s door. Respondent’s shirt and hands were spattered with blood, and he was holding a long, blood-covered knife. According to Meinier, respondent stated that “he had gotten in a fight” but that he “got them back.” Id., at 130. After turning the knife over to Mood and washing his hands, respondent said “I think there’s something wrong across the hall.” Id., at 132. Meinier went to Pregent’s apartment and discovered Epps’ body lying in a pool of blood on the kitchen floor. Mood then summoned the police, who found respondent in Fleetwood’s apartment and Pregent asleep on the blood-splattered sofa bed in his living room.
In addition to the testimony of the partygoers and the arresting officers, the State introduced Pregent’s postarrest statement, respondent’s two postarrest statements, and the testimony of a forensic expert. Among other things, the expert testified about the nature and source of the bloodstains on respondent’s clothing.
During Fleetwood’s cross-examination, defense counsel sought to impeach Fleetwood by questioning him about the dismissal of a criminal charge against him — being drunk on a highway — after he had agreed to speak with the prosecutor about Epps’ murder. When the prosecutor objected, the trial court allowed counsel to question Fleetwood on the matter outside the presence of the jury. Fleetwood acknowledged that the drunkenness charge had been dropped in exchange for his promise to speak with the prosecutor about the murder, but he denied that the agreement had affected his testimony. The trial court barred any cross-examination about that agreement, citing Delaware Rule of Evidence 403. The court also refused to permit defense counsel to cross-examine Fleetwood about his being questioned by the police in connection with an unrelated homicide that had occurred after Epps’ murder. On voir dire conducted outside the presence of the jury, Fleetwood denied that he had been offered any favors, inducements, promises, or deals concerning that homicide investigation in exchange for his testimony at respondent’s trial.
Respondent was the only defense witness. Consistent with his second statement to the police, he attributed Epps’ murder to Pregent. Consistent with Fleetwood’s testimony, he stated that he had returned to Pregent’s apartment, after drinking with friends, by about 11:30 p.m.
Defense counsel admitted in their opening and closing arguments to the jury that respondent was in Pregent’s apartment when Epps was killed. In closing argument, after attempting to discredit Fleetwood’s testimony (largely by emphasizing his intoxication), counsel stressed that all that testimony proved was what respondent “never denied,” that “he was at Danny Pregent’s apartment before Doris Epps was murdered.” App. 188-189. The jury found respondent guilty of first-degree murder and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony.
bn appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed respondent’s conviction on the authority of the Confrontation Clause. Noting that “the bias of a witness is subject to exploration at trial and is ‘always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony,”’ 486 A. 2d, at 6 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974)), the court found that the trial judge’s ruling denied respondent his constitutional right to effective cross-examination. By barring any cross-examination of Fleetwood about the dismissal of the public drunkenness charge, the ruling kept from the jury facts concerning bias that were central to assessing Fleetwood’s reliability. The court rejected the State’s argument that since “Fleetwood’s basic testimony was cumulative in nature and unimportant,” the Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 486 A. 2d, at 7. The court held that “a blanket prohibition against exploring potential bias through cross-examination” is “a per se error,” so that “the actual prejudicial impact of such an error is not examined.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 473 U. S. 923 (1985), and now vacate and remand.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The right of confrontation, which is secured for defendants in state as well as federal criminal proceedings, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965), “means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S., at 315. Indeed, “‘[t]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.’” Id., at 315-316 (quoting 5 J. Wig-more, Evidence § 1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940)) (emphasis in original). Of particular relevance here, “[w]e have recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Davis, supra, at 316-317 (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474, 496 (1959)). It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. And as we observed earlier this Term, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U. S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis in original).
In this case, however, the trial court prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that Fleetwood would be biased as a result of the State’s dismissal of his pending public drunkenness charge. By thus cutting off all questioning about an event that the State conceded had taken place and that a jury might reasonably have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony, the court’s ruling violated respondent’s rights secured by the Confrontation Clause.
The State somewhat tentatively suggests that a defendant should have to show “outcome determinative” prejudice in order to state a violation of the Confrontation Clause: Unless the particular limitation on cross-examination created a reasonable possibility that the jury returned an inaccurate guilty verdict, that limitation would not violate the Confrontation Clause. We disagree. While some constitutional claims by their nature require a showing of prejudice with respect to the trial as a whole, see, e. g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984) (ineffective assistance of counsel), the focus of the Confrontation Clause is on individual witnesses. Accordingly, the focus of the prejudice inquiry in determining whether the confrontation right has been violated must be on the particular witness, not on the outcome of the entire trial. It would be a contradiction in terms to conclude that a defendant denied any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him nonetheless had been afforded his right to “confrontation]” because use of that right would not have affected the jury’s verdict. We think that a criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby “to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Davis v. Alaska, supra, at 318. Respondent has met that burden here: A reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of Fleetwood’s credibility had respondent’s counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.
After concluding that the trial judge’s ruling was constitutional error, the Delaware Supreme Court rebuffed the State’s effort to show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,” Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967). In so doing, it offered no explanation why the Chapman harmless-error standard, which we have applied in other Confrontation Clause cases, e. g., Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 427 (1972), is inapplicable here. We find respondent’s efforts to defend the automatic reversal rule unconvincing.
As we have stressed on more than one occasion, the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one. E. g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 508-509 (1983); Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 135 (1968). In Chapman, this Court rejected the argument that all federal constitutional errors, regardless of their nature or the circumstances of the case, require reversal of a judgment of conviction. The Court reasoned that in the context of a particular case, certain constitutional errors, no less than other errors, may have been “harmless” in terms of their effect on the factfinding process at trial. Since Chapman, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. E. g., United States v. Hasting, supra (improper comment on defendant’s silence at trial); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U. S. 220, 232 (1977) (admission of identification obtained in violation of right to counsel); Harrington v. California, supra (admission of nontestifying codefendant’s statement). The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 230 (1975), and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error. Cf. R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 50 (1970) (“Reversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it”).
At the same time, we have observed that some constitutional errors — such as denying a defendant the assistance of counsel at trial, or compelling him to stand trial before a trier of fact with a financial stake in the outcome — are so fundamental and pervasive that they require reversal without regard to the facts or circumstances of the particular case. Chapman, supra, at 23, n. 8 (citing, inter alia, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), and Turney v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927)). The error at issue here is obviously quite different, however, as this Court’s post -Chapman decisions demonstrate. In Harrington v. California, for example, we expressly rejected the claim that the admission into evidence of a statement made by a nontestifying codefendant, in violation of Bruton v. United States, supra, can never be harmless. Harrington, which we have expressly reaffirmed on more than one occasion, see, e. g., Schneble v. Florida, supra; Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973), demonstrates that the denial of the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness does not fit within the limited category of constitutional errors that are deemed prejudicial in every case.
Respondent seeks to blunt the force of Harrington in essentially two ways. First, he suggests that this Court’s decision in Davis v. Alaska forecloses application of harmless-error analysis to the particular sort of Confrontation Clause violation involved here, citing the following language near the end of the Court’s opinion:
“[Davis] was thus denied the right of effective cross-examination which ‘ “would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it.” Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 3.’” 415 U. S., at 318 (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129, 131 (1968)).
Read properly, however, Davis does not support an automatic reversal rule, and the above-quoted language merely reflects the view that on the facts of that case the trial court’s error had done “serious damage” to the petitioner’s defense.
Davis was charged with stealing a safe from a bar. The police found the stolen safe abandoned near the home of Richard Green, who testified at trial that he had seen Davis engaged in suspicious activity near this site on the day of the crime. Defense counsel was barred from eliciting on cross-examination that Green was on juvenile probation for burglary both at the time of his pretrial identification of Davis and at the time of trial. The defense sought to suggest that Green may have slanted his account in the State’s favor either to shift suspicion away from himself or to avoid revocation of probation for failing to “cooperate.” 415 U. S., at 310-311. This Court reversed Davis’ conviction, emphasizing that Green’s tesimony was “crucial” and that there was a “real possibility” that pursuit of the excluded line of impeachment evidence would have done “[sjerious damage to the strength of the State’s case.” Id., at 319. So despite the absence of a reference to Chapman, Davis plainly rests on the conclusion that on the facts of that case, the error might well have contributed to the guilty verdict. Davis should not be read as establishing, without analysis, a categorical exception to the harmless-error rule.
Respondent’s second argument in support of a per se reversal rule is that the Confrontation Clause error in this case, which like Davis involved the exclusion of evidence, is analytically distinct from that in Harrington v. California, which involved the erroneous admission of harmless testimony. Because it is impossible to know how wrongfully excluded evidence would have affected the jury, the argument runs, reversal is mandated. But Harrington cannot be so easily dispatched. Respondent, like Harrington, was denied an opportunity to cast doubt on the testimony of an adverse witness. In both cases the prosecution was thus able to introduce evidence that was not subject to constitutionally adequate cross-examination. And in both cases the reviewing court should be able to decide whether the not-fully-impeached evidence might have affected the reliability of the factfinding process at trial.
Accordingly, we hold that the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to Chapman harmless-error analysis. The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. These factors include the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. Cf. Harrington, 395 U. S., at 254; Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S., at 432.
We believe that the determination whether the Confrontation Clause error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is best left to the Delaware Supreme Court in the first instance. Accordingly, that court’s judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
When asked about his understanding of why the charge was dropped, respondent stated:
“Well, I did understand that I did feel that you wanted to make sure that I knew what I was talking about and I do feel that you wanted to make sure I had my story together before coming in here. So that is why I did feel that it was dropped.” App. 106.
Delaware Rule of Evidence 403, which is virtually identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, provides:
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
Respondent asserts that this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this case because the Delaware Supreme Court’s automatic reversal rule rests on an adequate and independent state ground. He argues that the rule was adopted not on the basis of federal constitutional law but as a prophylactic device, announced under that court’s “superintending” authority, to “send an unequivocal message” to state trial judges about the importance of permitting liberal cross-examination. Brief for Respondent 41. We disagree.
“[W]e will not assume that a state-court decision rests on adequate and independent state grounds when the ‘state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.’” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 327 (1985) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040-1041 (1983)). The opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court, which makes use of both federal and state eases in its analysis, lacks the requisite “plain statement” that it rests on state grounds. Michigan v. Long, supra, at 1042, 1044. Indeed, the opinion makes no reference to any “superintending” authority, and nowhere suggests the existence of a state prophylactic rule designed to insure protection for a federal constitutional right. We read the decision below as resting on federal law.
The Delaware Supreme Court did not decide whether the trial court erred in preventing respondent from cross-examining Fleetwood about the unrelated homicide investigation. 486 A. 2d 1, 7, n. 3 (1984). We likewise decline to consider that question.
Bruton had held that the receipt at a joint trial of the incriminating statement of a nontestifying codefendent deprived Bruton of his right to cross-examine an adverse witness. In Harrington, the trial court admitted the pretrial statements of two codefendants who did not testify. The statements implicated Harrington by placing him at the scene of the robbery, and their admission plainly violated Bruton. This Court nevertheless affirmed Harrington’s conviction, over his objection that Bruton error could never be harmless. Noting that the wrongfully admitted evidence was cumulative and that the untainted proof of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, the Court concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 395 U. S., at 254.
Respondent does not contend that he was denied the opportunity to elicit exculpatory evidence from Fleetwood.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, including re-entry of its judgment affirming petitioner’s conviction and consideration of the appointment of counsel for petitioner in connection with seeking review in this Court of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 18 U. S. C. §§ 3006A (c), 3006A (d) (6), 3006A (g). See also H. R. Rep. No. 1709, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1964); Report of the Committee to Implement the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, presented to a Special Session of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 36 F. R. D. 285, 291 (1965); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 44 (a); Doherty v. United States, ante, p. 28.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
When a consumer purchases goods or services, the consumer's State often imposes a sales tax. This case requires the Court to determine when an out-of-state seller can be required to collect and remit that tax. All concede that taxing the sales in question here is lawful. The question is whether the out-of-state seller can be held responsible for its payment, and this turns on a proper interpretation of the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
In two earlier cases the Court held that an out-of-state seller's liability to collect and remit the tax to the consumer's State depended on whether the seller had a physical presence in that State, but that mere shipment of goods into the consumer's State, following an order from a catalog, did not satisfy the physical presence requirement. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 87 S.Ct. 1389, 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967) ; Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992). The Court granted certiorari here to reconsider the scope and validity of the physical presence rule mandated by those cases.
I
Like most States, South Dakota has a sales tax. It taxes the retail sales of goods and services in the State. S.D. Codified Laws §§ 10-45-2, 10-45-4 (2010 and Supp. 2017). Sellers are generally required to collect and remit this tax to the Department of Revenue. § 10-45-27.3. If for some reason the sales tax is not remitted by the seller, then in-state consumers are separately responsible for paying a use tax at the same rate. See §§ 10-46-2, 10-46-4, 10-46-6. Many States employ this kind of complementary sales and use tax regime.
Under this Court's decisions in Bellas Hess and Quill, South Dakota may not require a business to collect its sales tax if the business lacks a physical presence in the State. Without that physical presence, South Dakota instead must rely on its residents to pay the use tax owed on their purchases from out-of-state sellers. "[T]he impracticability of [this] collection from the multitude of individual purchasers is obvious." National Geographic Soc. v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 555, 97 S.Ct. 1386, 51 L.Ed.2d 631 (1977). And consumer compliance rates are notoriously low. See, e.g., GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters: Sales Taxes, States Could Gain Revenue from Expanded Authority, but Businesses Are Likely to Experience Compliance Costs 5 (GAO-18-114, Nov. 2017) (Sales Taxes Report); California State Bd. of Equalization, Revenue Estimate: Electronic Commerce and Mail Order Sales 7 (2013) (Table 3) (estimating a 4 percent collection rate). It is estimated that Bellas Hess and Quill cause the States to lose between $8 and $33 billion every year. See Sales Taxes Report, at 11-12 (estimating $8 to $13 billion); Brief for Petitioner 34-35 (citing estimates of $23 and $33.9 billion). In South Dakota alone, the Department of Revenue estimates revenue loss at $48 to $58 million annually. App. 24. Particularly because South Dakota has no state income tax, it must put substantial reliance on its sales and use taxes for the revenue necessary to fund essential services. Those taxes account for over 60 percent of its general fund.
In 2016, South Dakota confronted the serious inequity Quill imposes by enacting S. 106-"An Act to provide for the collection of sales taxes from certain remote sellers, to establish certain Legislative findings, and to declare an emergency." S. 106, 2016 Leg. Assembly, 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016) (S.B. 106). The legislature found that the inability to collect sales tax from remote sellers was "seriously eroding the sales tax base" and "causing revenue losses and imminent harm... through the loss of critical funding for state and local services." § 8(1). The legislature also declared an emergency: "Whereas, this Act is necessary for the support of the state government and its existing public institutions, an emergency is hereby declared to exist." § 9. Fearing further erosion of the tax base, the legislature expressed its intention to "apply South Dakota's sales and use tax obligations to the limit of federal and state constitutional doctrines" and noted the urgent need for this Court to reconsider its precedents. §§ 8(11), (8).
To that end, the Act requires out-of-state sellers to collect and remit sales tax "as if the seller had a physical presence in the state." § 1. The Act applies only to sellers that, on an annual basis, deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into the State or engage in 200 or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods or services into the State. Ibid. The Act also forecloses the retroactive application of this requirement and provides means for the Act to be appropriately stayed until the constitutionality of the law has been clearly established. §§ 5, 3, 8(10).
Respondents Wayfair, Inc., Overstock.com, Inc., and Newegg, Inc., are merchants with no employees or real estate in South Dakota. Wayfair, Inc., is a leading online retailer of home goods and furniture and had net revenues of over $4.7 billion last year. Overstock.com, Inc., is one of the top online retailers in the United States, selling a wide variety of products from home goods and furniture to clothing and jewelry; and it had net revenues of over $1.7 billion last year. Newegg, Inc., is a major online retailer of consumer electronics in the United States. Each of these three companies ships its goods directly to purchasers throughout the United States, including South Dakota. Each easily meets the minimum sales or transactions requirement of the Act, but none collects South Dakota sales tax. 2017 S.D. 56, ¶¶ 10-11, 901 N.W.2d 754, 759-760.
Pursuant to the Act's provisions for expeditious judicial review, South Dakota filed a declaratory judgment action against respondents in state court, seeking a declaration that the requirements of the Act are valid and applicable to respondents and an injunction requiring respondents to register for licenses to collect and remit sales tax. App. 11, 30. Respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Act is unconstitutional. 901 N.W.2d, at 759-760. South Dakota conceded that the Act cannot survive under Bellas Hess and Quill but asserted the importance, indeed the necessity, of asking this Court to review those earlier decisions in light of current economic realities. 901 N.W.2d, at 760 ; see also S.B. 106, § 8. The trial court granted summary judgment to respondents. App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a.
The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. It stated: "However persuasive the State's arguments on the merits of revisiting the issue, Quill has not been overruled [and] remains the controlling precedent on the issue of Commerce Clause limitations on interstate collection of sales and use taxes." 901 N.W.2d, at 761. This Court granted certiorari. 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 735, 199 L.Ed.2d 602 (2018).
II
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States." Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause "reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-326, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979). Although the Commerce Clause is written as an affirmative grant of authority to Congress, this Court has long held that in some instances it imposes limitations on the States absent congressional action. Of course, when Congress exercises its power to regulate commerce by enacting legislation, the legislation controls. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 89 L.Ed. 1915 (1945). But this Court has observed that "in general Congress has left it to the courts to formulate the rules" to preserve "the free flow of interstate commerce." Id., at 770, 65 S.Ct. 1515.
To understand the issue presented in this case, it is instructive first to survey the general development of this Court's Commerce Clause principles and then to review the application of those principles to state taxes.
A
From early in its history, a central function of this Court has been to adjudicate disputes that require interpretation of the Commerce Clause in order to determine its meaning, its reach, and the extent to which it limits state regulations of commerce. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824), began setting the course by defining the meaning of commerce. Chief Justice Marshall explained that commerce included both "the interchange of commodities" and "commercial intercourse." Id., at 189, 193. A concurring opinion further stated that Congress had the exclusive power to regulate commerce. See id., at 236 (opinion of Johnson, J.). Had that latter submission prevailed and States been denied the power of concurrent regulation, history might have seen sweeping federal regulations at an early date that foreclosed the States from experimentation with laws and policies of their own, or, on the other hand, proposals to reexamine Gibbons'broad definition of commerce to accommodate the necessity of allowing States the power to enact laws to implement the political will of their people.
Just five years after Gibbons, however, in another opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court sustained what in substance was a state regulation of interstate commerce. In Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, 7 L.Ed. 412 (1829), the Court allowed a State to dam and bank a stream that was part of an interstate water system, an action that likely would have been an impermissible intrusion on the national power over commerce had it been the rule that only Congress could regulate in that sphere. See id., at 252. Thus, by implication at least, the Court indicated that the power to regulate commerce in some circumstances was held by the States and Congress concurrently. And so both a broad interpretation of interstate commerce and the concurrent regulatory power of the States can be traced to Gibbons and Willson.
Over the next few decades, the Court refined the doctrine to accommodate the necessary balance between state and federal power. In Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1852), the Court addressed local laws regulating river pilots who operated in interstate waters and guided many ships on interstate or foreign voyages. The Court held that, while Congress surely could regulate on this subject had it chosen to act, the State, too, could regulate. The Court distinguished between those subjects that by their nature "imperatively deman[d] a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States," and those that "deman[d] th[e] diversity, which alone can meet... local necessities." Id., at 319. Though considerable uncertainties were yet to be overcome, these precedents still laid the groundwork for the analytical framework that now prevails for Commerce Clause cases.
This Court's doctrine has developed further with time. Modern precedents rest upon two primary principles that mark the boundaries of a State's authority to regulate interstate commerce.
First, state regulations may not discriminate against interstate commerce; and second, States may not impose undue burdens on interstate commerce. State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce face "a virtually per se rule of invalidity." Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 161 L.Ed.2d 796 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). State laws that "regulat[e] even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest... will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970) ; see also Southern Pacific, supra, at 779, 65 S.Ct. 1515. Although subject to exceptions and variations, see, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976) ; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 106 S.Ct. 2080, 90 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986), these two principles guide the courts in adjudicating cases challenging state laws under the Commerce Clause.
B
These principles also animate the Court's Commerce Clause precedents addressing the validity of state taxes. The Court explained the now-accepted framework for state taxation in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). The Court held that a State "may tax exclusively interstate commerce so long as the tax does not create any effect forbidden by the Commerce Clause." Id., at 285, 97 S.Ct. 1076. After all, "interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes." D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31, 108 S.Ct. 1619, 100 L.Ed.2d 21 (1988). The Court will sustain a tax so long as it (1) applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services the State provides. See Complete Auto, supra, at 279, 97 S.Ct. 1076.
Before Complete Auto, the Court had addressed a challenge to an Illinois tax that required out-of-state retailers to collect and remit taxes on sales made to consumers who purchased goods for use within Illinois. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S., at 754-755, 87 S.Ct. 1389. The Court held that a mail-order company "whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail" lacked the requisite minimum contacts with the State required by both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. Id., at 758, 87 S.Ct. 1389. Unless the retailer maintained a physical presence such as "retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State," the State lacked the power to require that retailer to collect a local use tax. Ibid. The dissent disagreed: "There should be no doubt that this large-scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market is a sufficient 'nexus' to require Bellas Hess to collect from Illinois customers and to remit the use tax." Id., at 761-762, 87 S.Ct. 1389 (opinion of Fortas, J., joined by Black and Douglas, JJ.).
In 1992, the Court reexamined the physical presence rule in Quill. That case presented a challenge to North Dakota's "attempt to require an out-of-state mail-order house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use within the State." 504 U.S., at 301, 112 S.Ct. 1904. Despite the fact that Bellas Hess linked due process and the Commerce Clause together, the Court in Quill overruled the due process holding, but not the Commerce Clause holding; and it thus reaffirmed the physical presence rule. 504 U.S., at 307-308, 317-318, 112 S.Ct. 1904.
The Court in Quill recognized that intervening precedents, specifically Complete Auto, "might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time today." 504 U.S., at 311, 112 S.Ct. 1904. But, nevertheless, the Quill majority concluded that the physical presence rule was necessary to prevent undue burdens on interstate commerce. Id., at 313, and n. 6, 112 S.Ct. 1904. It grounded the physical presence rule in Complete Auto's requirement that a tax have a "'substantial nexus' " with the activity being taxed. 504 U.S., at 311, 112 S.Ct. 1904.
Three Justices based their decision to uphold the physical presence rule on stare decisis alone. Id., at 320, 112 S.Ct. 1904 (Scalia, J., joined by KENNEDY and THOMAS, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Dissenting in relevant part, Justice White argued that "there is no relationship between the physical-presence/nexus rule the Court retains and Commerce Clause considerations that allegedly justify it." Id., at 327, 112 S.Ct. 1904 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
III
The physical presence rule has "been the target of criticism over many years from many quarters." Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1148, 1150-1151 (C.A.10 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Quill, it has been said, was "premised on assumptions that are unfounded" and "riddled with internal inconsistencies." Rothfeld, Quill : Confusing the Commerce Clause, 56 Tax Notes 487, 488 (1992). Quill created an inefficient "online sales tax loophole" that gives out-of-state businesses an advantage. A. Laffer & D. Arduin, Pro-Growth Tax Reform and E-Fairness 1, 4 (July 2013). And "while nexus rules are clearly necessary," the Court "should focus on rules that are appropriate to the twenty-first century, not the nineteenth." Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate Over State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 13 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 549, 553 (2000). Each year, the physical presence rule becomes further removed from economic reality and results in significant revenue losses to the States. These critiques underscore that the physical presence rule, both as first formulated and as applied today, is an incorrect interpretation of the Commerce Clause.
A
Quill is flawed on its own terms. First, the physical presence rule is not a necessary interpretation of the requirement that a state tax must be "applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State." Complete Auto, 430 U.S., at 279, 97 S.Ct. 1076. Second, Quill creates rather than resolves market distortions. And third, Quill imposes the sort of arbitrary, formalistic distinction that the Court's modern Commerce Clause precedents disavow.
1
All agree that South Dakota has the authority to tax these transactions. S.B. 106 applies to sales of "tangible personal property, products transferred electronically, or services for delivery into South Dakota." § 1 (emphasis added). "It has long been settled" that the sale of goods or services "has a sufficient nexus to the State in which the sale is consummated to be treated as a local transaction taxable by that State." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 184, 115 S.Ct. 1331, 131 L.Ed.2d 261 (1995) ; see also 2 C. Trost & P. Hartman, Federal Limitations on State and Local Taxation 2d § 11:1, p. 471 (2003) ("Generally speaking, a sale is attributable to its destination").
The central dispute is whether South Dakota may require remote sellers to collect and remit the tax without some additional connection to the State. The Court has previously stated that "[t]he imposition on the seller of the duty to insure collection of the tax from the purchaser does not violate the [C]ommerce [C]lause." McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 50, n. 9, 60 S.Ct. 388, 84 L.Ed. 565 (1940). It is a " 'familiar and sanctioned device.' " Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 212, 80 S.Ct. 619, 4 L.Ed.2d 660 (1960). There just must be "a substantial nexus with the taxing State." Complete Auto, supra, at 279, 97 S.Ct. 1076.
This nexus requirement is "closely related," Bellas Hess, 386 U.S., at 756, 87 S.Ct. 1389 to the due process requirement that there be "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax," Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-345, 74 S.Ct. 535, 98 L.Ed. 744 (1954). It is settled law that a business need not have a physical presence in a State to satisfy the demands of due process. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Although physical presence " 'frequently will enhance' " a business' connection with a State, " 'it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted... [with no] need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted.' " Quill, 504 U.S., at 308, 112 S.Ct. 1904. Quill itself recognized that "[t]he requirements of due process are met irrespective of a corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing State." Ibid.
When considering whether a State may levy a tax, Due Process and Commerce Clause standards may not be identical or coterminous, but there are significant parallels. The reasons given in Quill for rejecting the physical presence rule for due process purposes apply as well to the question whether physical presence is a requisite for an out-of-state seller's liability to remit sales taxes. Physical presence is not necessary to create a substantial nexus.
The Quill majority expressed concern that without the physical presence rule "a state tax might unduly burden interstate commerce" by subjecting retailers to tax-collection obligations in thousands of different taxing jurisdictions. Id., at 313, n. 6, 112 S.Ct. 1904. But the administrative costs of compliance, especially in the modern economy with its Internet technology, are largely unrelated to whether a company happens to have a physical presence in a State. For example, a business with one salesperson in each State must collect sales taxes in every jurisdiction in which goods are delivered; but a business with 500 salespersons in one central location and a website accessible in every State need not collect sales taxes on otherwise identical nationwide sales. In other words, under Quill, a small company with diverse physical presence might be equally or more burdened by compliance costs than a large remote seller. The physical presence rule is a poor proxy for the compliance costs faced by companies that do business in multiple States. Other aspects of the Court's doctrine can better and more accurately address any potential burdens on interstate commerce, whether or not Quill's physical presence rule is satisfied.
2
The Court has consistently explained that the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent States from engaging in economic discrimination so they would not divide into isolated, separable units. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978). But it is "not the purpose of the [C]ommerce [C]lause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden." Complete Auto, supra, at 288, 97 S.Ct. 1076 (internal quotation marks omitted). And it is certainly not the purpose of the Commerce Clause to permit the Judiciary to create market distortions. "If the Commerce Clause was intended to put businesses on an even playing field, the [physical presence] rule is hardly a way to achieve that goal." Quill, supra, at 329, 112 S.Ct. 1904 (opinion of White, J.).
Quill puts both local businesses and many interstate businesses with physical presence at a competitive disadvantage relative to remote sellers. Remote sellers can avoid the regulatory burdens of tax collection and can offer de facto lower prices caused by the widespread failure of consumers to pay the tax on their own. This "guarantees a competitive benefit to certain firms simply because of the organizational form they choose" while the rest of the Court's jurisprudence "is all about preventing discrimination between firms." Direct Marketing, 814 F.3d, at 1150-1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). In effect, Quill has come to serve as a judicially created tax shelter for businesses that decide to limit their physical presence and still sell their goods and services to a State's consumers-something that has become easier and more prevalent as technology has advanced.
Worse still, the rule produces an incentive to avoid physical presence in multiple States. Distortions caused by the desire of businesses to avoid tax collection mean that the market may currently lack storefronts, distribution points, and employment centers that otherwise would be efficient or desirable. The Commerce Clause must not prefer interstate commerce only to the point where a merchant physically crosses state borders. Rejecting the physical presence rule is necessary to ensure that artificial competitive advantages are not created by this Court's precedents. This Court should not prevent States from collecting lawful taxes through a physical presence rule that can be satisfied only if there is an employee or a building in the State.
3
The Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence has "eschewed formalism for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and effects." West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201, 114 S.Ct. 2205, 129 L.Ed.2d 157 (1994). Quill, in contrast, treats economically identical actors differently, and for arbitrary reasons.
Consider, for example, two businesses that sell furniture online. The first stocks a few items of inventory in a small warehouse in North Sioux City, South Dakota. The second uses a major warehouse just across the border in South Sioux City, Nebraska, and maintains a sophisticated website with a virtual showroom accessible in every State, including South Dakota. By reason of its physical presence, the first business must collect and remit a tax on all of its sales to customers from South Dakota, even those sales that have nothing to do with the warehouse. See National Geographic, 430 U.S., at 561, 97 S.Ct. 1386 ; Scripto, Inc., 362 U.S., at 211-212, 80 S.Ct. 619. But, under Quill, the second, hypothetical seller cannot be subject to the same tax for the sales of the same items made through a pervasive Internet presence. This distinction simply makes no sense. So long as a state law avoids "any effect forbidden by the Commerce Clause," Complete Auto, 430 U.S., at 285, 97 S.Ct. 1076 courts should not rely on anachronistic formalisms to invalidate it. The basic principles of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence are grounded in functional, marketplace dynamics; and States can and should consider those realities in enacting and enforcing their tax laws.
B
The Quill Court itself acknowledged that the physical presence rule is "artificial at its edges." 504 U.S., at 315, 112 S.Ct. 1904. That was an understatement when Quill was decided; and when the day-to-day functions of marketing and distribution in the modern economy are considered, it is all the more evident that the physical presence rule is artificial in its entirety.
Modern e-commerce does not align analytically with a test that relies on the sort of physical presence defined in Quill. In a footnote, Quill rejected the argument that "title to 'a few floppy diskettes' present in a State" was sufficient to constitute a "substantial nexus," id., at 315, n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 1904. But it is not clear why a single employee or a single warehouse should create a substantial nexus while "physical" aspects of pervasive modern technology should not. For example, a company with a website accessible in South Dakota may be said to have a physical presence in the State via the customers' computers. A website may leave cookies saved to the customers' hard drives, or customers may download the company's app onto their phones. Or a company may lease data storage that is permanently, or even occasionally, located in South Dakota. Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 584 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1186, 200 L.Ed.2d 610 (2018) (per curiam ). What may have seemed like a "clear," "bright-line tes[t]" when Quill was written now threatens to compound the arbitrary consequences that should have been apparent from the outset. 504 U.S., at 315, 112 S.Ct. 1904.
The "dramatic technological and social changes" of our "increasingly interconnected economy" mean that buyers are "closer to most major retailers" than ever before-"regardless of how close or far the nearest storefront." Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 575 U.S. ----, ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1124, 1135, 191 L.Ed.2d 97 (2015) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). Between targeted advertising and instant access to most consumers via any internet-enabled device, "a business may be present in a State in a meaningful way without" that presence "being physical in the traditional sense of the term." Id., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1135. A virtual showroom can show far more inventory, in far more detail, and with greater opportunities for consumer and seller interaction than might be possible for local stores. Yet the continuous and pervasive virtual presence of retailers today is, under Quill, simply irrelevant. This Court should not maintain a rule that ignores these substantial virtual connections to the State.
C
The physical presence rule as defined and enforced in Bellas Hess and Quill is not just a technical legal problem-it is an extraordinary imposition by the Judiciary on States' authority to collect taxes and perform critical public functions. Forty-one States, two Territories, and the District of Columbia now ask this Court to reject the test formulated in Quill. See Brief for Colorado et al. as Amici Curiae. Quill's physical presence rule intrudes on States' reasonable choices in enacting their tax systems. And that it allows remote sellers to escape an obligation to remit a lawful state tax is unfair and unjust. It is unfair and unjust to those competitors, both local and out of State, who must remit the tax; to the consumers who pay the tax; and to the States that seek fair enforcement of the sales tax, a tax many States for many years have considered an indispensable source for raising revenue.
In essence, respondents ask this Court to retain a rule that allows their customers to escape payment of sales taxes-taxes that are essential to create and secure the active market they supply with goods and services. An example may suffice. Wayfair offers to sell a vast selection of furnishings. Its advertising seeks to create an image of beautiful, peaceful homes, but it also says that " '[o]ne of the best things about buying through Wayfair is that we do not have to charge sales tax.' " Brief for Petitioner 55. What Wayfair ignores in its subtle offer to assist in tax evasion is that creating a dream home assumes solvent state and local governments. State taxes fund the police and fire departments that protect the homes containing their customers' furniture and ensure goods are safely delivered; maintain the public roads and municipal services that allow communication with and access to customers; support the "sound local banking institutions to support credit transactions [and] courts to ensure collection of the purchase price," Quill, 504 U.S., at 328, 112 S.Ct. 1904 (opinion of White, J.); and help create the "climate of consumer confidence" that facilitates sales, see ibid. According to respondents, it is unfair to stymie their tax-free solicitation of customers. But there is nothing unfair about requiring companies that avail themselves of the States' benefits to bear an equal share of the burden of tax collection. Fairness dictates quite the opposite result. Helping respondents' customers evade a lawful tax unfairly shifts to those consumers who buy from their competitors with a physical presence that satisfies Quill -even one warehouse or one salesperson-an increased share of the taxes. It is essential to public confidence in the tax system that the Court avoid creating inequitable exceptions. This is also essential to the confidence placed in this Court's Commerce Clause decisions. Yet the physical presence rule undermines that necessary confidence by giving some online retailers an arbitrary advantage over their competitors who collect state sales taxes.
In the name of federalism and free markets, Quill does harm to both. The physical presence rule it defines has limited States' ability to seek long-term prosperity and has prevented market participants from competing on an even playing field.
IV
"Although we approach the reconsideration of our decisions with the utmost caution, stare decisis is not an inexorable command." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) ; alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, stare decisis can no longer support the Court's prohibition of a valid exercise of the States' sovereign power.
If it becomes apparent that the Court's Commerce Clause decisions prohibit the States from exercising their
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
A writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of the Commonwealth of Virginia was granted in this case, 363 U. S. 802, in the belief that it duly presented for the Court’s consideration the question whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution requires that the State must, in appropriate circumstances, appoint counsel to assist an indigent prisoner under sentence of conviction for a state crime in prosecuting his appeal. After hearing oral argument, and upon full consideration of the case, we find that the record does not adequately establish that the Virginia court found or was required to find that there was presented to it the federal claim on which the case was brought here. The case thus fails to present a federal question, and the writ must be dismissed as improvidently granted.
So ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The jury is a central foundation of our justice system and our democracy. Whatever its imperfections in a particular case, the jury is a necessary check on governmental power. The jury, over the centuries, has been an inspired, trusted, and effective instrument for resolving factual disputes and determining ultimate questions of guilt or innocence in criminal cases. Over the long course its judgments find acceptance in the community, an acceptance essential to respect for the rule of law. The jury is a tangible implementation of the principle that the law comes from the people.
In the era of our Nation's founding, the right to a jury trial already had existed and evolved for centuries, through and alongside the common law. The jury was considered a fundamental safeguard of individual liberty. See The Federalist No. 83, p. 451 (B. Warner ed. 1818) (A. Hamilton). The right to a jury trial in criminal cases was part of the Constitution as first drawn, and it was restated in the Sixth Amendment. Art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ; Amdt. 6.
By operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is applicable to the States. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-150, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968).
Like all human institutions, the jury system has its flaws, yet experience shows that fair and impartial verdicts can be reached if the jury follows the court's instructions and undertakes deliberations that are honest, candid, robust, and based on common sense. A general rule has evolved to give substantial protection to verdict finality and to assure jurors that, once their verdict has been entered, it will not later be called into question based on the comments or conclusions they expressed during deliberations. This principle, itself centuries old, is often referred to as the no-impeachment rule. The instant case presents the question whether there is an exception to the no-impeachment rule when, after the jury is discharged, a juror comes forward with compelling evidence that another juror made clear and explicit statements indicating that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in his or her vote to convict.
I
State prosecutors in Colorado brought criminal charges against petitioner, Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez, based on the following allegations. In 2007, in the bathroom of a Colorado horse-racing facility, a man sexually assaulted two teenage sisters. The girls told their father and identified the man as an employee of the racetrack. The police located and arrested petitioner. Each girl separately identified petitioner as the man who had assaulted her.
The State charged petitioner with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexual assault on a child. Before the jury was empaneled, members of the venire were repeatedly asked whether they believed that they could be fair and impartial in the case. A written questionnaire asked if there was "anything about you that you feel would make it difficult for you to be a fair juror." App. 14. The court repeated the question to the panel of prospective jurors and encouraged jurors to speak in private with the court if they had any concerns about their impartiality. Defense counsel likewise asked whether anyone felt that "this is simply not a good case" for them to be a fair juror. Id., at 34. None of the empaneled jurors expressed any reservations based on racial or any other bias. And none asked to speak with the trial judge.
After a 3-day trial, the jury found petitioner guilty of unlawful sexual contact and harassment, but it failed to reach a verdict on the attempted sexual assault charge. When the jury was discharged, the court gave them this instruction, as mandated by Colorado law:
"The question may arise whether you may now discuss this case with the lawyers, defendant, or other persons. For your guidance the court instructs you that whether you talk to anyone is entirely your own decision.... If any person persists in discussing the case over your objection, or becomes critical of your service either before or after any discussion has begun, please report it to me." Id., at 85-86.
Following the discharge of the jury, petitioner's counsel entered the jury room to discuss the trial with the jurors. As the room was emptying, two jurors remained to speak with counsel in private. They stated that, during deliberations, another juror had expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward petitioner and petitioner's alibi witness. Petitioner's counsel reported this to the court and, with the court's supervision, obtained sworn affidavits from the two jurors.
The affidavits by the two jurors described a number of biased statements made by another juror, identified as Juror H.C. According to the two jurors, H.C. told the other jurors that he "believed the defendant was guilty because, in [H.C.'s] experience as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women." Id., at 110. The jurors reported that H.C. stated his belief that Mexican men are physically controlling of women because of their sense of entitlement, and further stated, " 'I think he did it because he's Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want.' " Id., at 109. According to the jurors, H.C. further explained that, in his experience, "nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls." Id., at 110. Finally, the jurors recounted that Juror H.C. said that he did not find petitioner's alibi witness credible because, among other things, the witness was " 'an illegal.' " Ibid. (In fact, the witness testified during trial that he was a legal resident of the United States.)
After reviewing the affidavits, the trial court acknowledged H.C.'s apparent bias. But the court denied petitioner's motion for a new trial, noting that "[t]he actual deliberations that occur among the jurors are protected from inquiry under [Colorado Rule of Evidence] 606(b)." Id., at 90. Like its federal counterpart, Colorado's Rule 606(b) generally prohibits a juror from testifying as to any statement made during deliberations in a proceeding inquiring into the validity of the verdict. See Fed. Rule Evid. 606(b). The Colorado Rule reads as follows:
"(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jurors' attention, (2) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror may not be received on a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying." Colo. Rule Evid. 606(b) (2016).
The verdict deemed final, petitioner was sentenced to two years' probation and was required to register as a sex offender. A divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction, agreeing that H.C.'s alleged statements did not fall within an exception to Rule 606(b) and so were inadmissible to undermine the validity of the verdict. - -- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 5457362.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of 4 to 3. 350 P.3d 287 (2015). The prevailing opinion relied on two decisions of this Court rejecting constitutional challenges to the federal no-impeachment rule as applied to evidence of juror misconduct or bias. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987) ; Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 521, 190 L.Ed.2d 422 (2014). After reviewing those precedents, the court could find no "dividing line between different types of juror bias or misconduct," and thus no basis for permitting impeachment of the verdicts in petitioner's trial, notwithstanding H.C.'s apparent racial bias. 350 P.3d, at 293. This Court granted certiorari to decide whether there is a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule for instances of racial bias. 578 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1513, 194 L.Ed.2d 602 (2016).
Juror H.C.'s bias was based on petitioner's Hispanic identity, which the Court in prior cases has referred to as ethnicity, and that may be an instructive term here. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion). Yet we have also used the language of race when discussing the relevant constitutional principles in cases involving Hispanic persons. See, e.g.,ibid. ; Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 186 L.Ed.2d 474 (2013) ; Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189-190, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981) (plurality opinion). Petitioner and respondent both refer to race, or to race and ethnicity, in this more expansive sense in their briefs to the Court. This opinion refers to the nature of the bias as racial in keeping with the primary terminology employed by the parties and used in our precedents.
II
A
At common law jurors were forbidden to impeach their verdict, either by affidavit or live testimony. This rule originated in Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). There, Lord Mansfield excluded juror testimony that the jury had decided the case through a game of chance. The Mansfield rule, as it came to be known, prohibited jurors, after the verdict was entered, from testifying either about their subjective mental processes or about objective events that occurred during deliberations.
American courts adopted the Mansfield rule as a matter of common law, though not in every detail. Some jurisdictions adopted a different, more flexible version of the no-impeachment bar known as the "Iowa rule." Under that rule, jurors were prevented only from testifying about their own subjective beliefs, thoughts, or motives during deliberations. See Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866). Jurors could, however, testify about objective facts and events occurring during deliberations, in part because other jurors could corroborate that testimony.
An alternative approach, later referred to as the federal approach, stayed closer to the original Mansfield rule. See Warger, supra, at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 526. Under this version of the rule, the no-impeachment bar permitted an exception only for testimony about events extraneous to the deliberative process, such as reliance on outside evidence-newspapers, dictionaries, and the like-or personal investigation of the facts.
This Court's early decisions did not establish a clear preference for a particular version of the no-impeachment rule. In United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 13 L.Ed. 1023 (1852), the Court appeared open to the admission of juror testimony that the jurors had consulted newspapers during deliberations, but in the end it barred the evidence because the newspapers "had not the slightest influence" on the verdict. Id., at 366. The Reid Court warned that juror testimony "ought always to be received with great caution." Ibid. Yet it added an important admonition: "cases might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse" juror testimony "without violating the plainest principles of justice." Ibid.
In a following case the Court required the admission of juror affidavits stating that the jury consulted information that was not in evidence, including a prejudicial newspaper article. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151, 13 S.Ct. 50, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892). The Court suggested, furthermore, that the admission of juror testimony might be governed by a more flexible rule, one permitting jury testimony even where it did not involve consultation of prejudicial extraneous information. Id., at 148-149, 13 S.Ct. 50 ; see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 382-384, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912) (stating that the more flexible Iowa rule "should apply," but excluding evidence that the jury reached the verdict by trading certain defendants' acquittals for others' convictions).
Later, however, the Court rejected the more lenient Iowa rule. In McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915), the Court affirmed the exclusion of juror testimony about objective events in the jury room. There, the jury allegedly had calculated a damages award by averaging the numerical submissions of each member. Id., at 265-266, 35 S.Ct. 783. As the Court explained, admitting that evidence would have "dangerous consequences": "no verdict would be safe" and the practice would "open the door to the most pernicious arts and tampering with jurors." Id., at 268, 35 S.Ct. 783 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet the Court reiterated its admonition from Reid, again cautioning that the no-impeachment rule might recognize exceptions "in the gravest and most important cases" where exclusion of juror affidavits might well violate "the plainest principles of justice." 238 U.S., at 269, 35 S.Ct. 783 (quoting Reid, supra, at 366; internal quotation marks omitted).
The common-law development of the no-impeachment rule reached a milestone in 1975, when Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 606(b). Congress, like the McDonald Court, rejected the Iowa rule. Instead it endorsed a broad no-impeachment rule, with only limited exceptions.
The version of the rule that Congress adopted was "no accident." Warger, 574 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 527. The Advisory Committee at first drafted a rule reflecting the Iowa approach, prohibiting admission of juror testimony only as it related to jurors' mental processes in reaching a verdict. The Department of Justice, however, expressed concern over the preliminary rule. The Advisory Committee then drafted the more stringent version now in effect, prohibiting all juror testimony, with exceptions only where the jury had considered prejudicial extraneous evidence or was subject to other outside influence. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 265 (1972). The Court adopted this second version and transmitted it to Congress.
The House favored the Iowa approach, but the Senate expressed concern that it did not sufficiently address the public policy interest in the finality of verdicts. S.Rep. No. 93-1277, pp. 13-14 (1974). Siding with the Senate, the Conference Committee adopted, Congress enacted, and the President signed the Court's proposed rule. The substance of the Rule has not changed since 1975, except for a 2006 modification permitting evidence of a clerical mistake on the verdict form. See 574 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct. 521.
The current version of Rule 606(b) states as follows:
"(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's statement on these matters.
"(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:
"(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention;
"(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or
"(C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form."
This version of the no-impeachment rule has substantial merit. It promotes full and vigorous discussion by providing jurors with considerable assurance that after being discharged they will not be summoned to recount their deliberations, and they will not otherwise be harassed or annoyed by litigants seeking to challenge the verdict. The rule gives stability and finality to verdicts.
B
Some version of the no-impeachment rule is followed in every State and the District of Columbia. Variations make classification imprecise, but, as a general matter, it appears that 42 jurisdictions follow the Federal Rule, while 9 follow the Iowa Rule. Within both classifications there is a diversity of approaches. Nine jurisdictions that follow the Federal Rule have codified exceptions other than those listed in Federal Rule 606(b). See Appendix, infra. At least 16 jurisdictions, 11 of which follow the Federal Rule, have recognized an exception to the no-impeachment bar under the circumstances the Court faces here: juror testimony that racial bias played a part in deliberations. Ibid. According to the parties and amici, only one State other than Colorado has addressed this issue and declined to recognize an exception for racial bias. See Commonwealth v. Steele, 599 Pa. 341, 377-379, 961 A.2d 786, 807-808 (2008).
The federal courts, for their part, are governed by Federal Rule 606(b), but their interpretations deserve further comment. Various Courts of Appeals have had occasion to consider a racial bias exception and have reached different conclusions. Three have held or suggested there is a constitutional exception for evidence of racial bias. See United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87-88 (C.A.1 2009) (holding the Constitution demands a racial-bias exception); United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1119-1121 (C.A.9 2001) (finding persuasive arguments in favor of an exception but not deciding the issue); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1158-1160 (C.A.7 1987) (observing that in some cases fundamental fairness could require an exception). One Court of Appeals has declined to find an exception, reasoning that other safeguards inherent in the trial process suffice to protect defendants' constitutional interests. See United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1240-1241 (C.A.10 2008). Another has suggested as much, holding in the habeas context that an exception for racial bias was not clearly established but indicating in dicta that no such exception exists. See Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 237-239 (C.A.3 2003) (Alito, J.). And one Court of Appeals has held that evidence of racial bias is excluded by Rule 606(b), without addressing whether the Constitution may at times demand an exception. See Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369, 373-374 (C.A.5 1981).
C
In addressing the scope of the common-law no-impeachment rule before Rule 606(b)'s adoption, the Reid and McDonald Courts noted the possibility of an exception to the rule in the "gravest and most important cases." Reid, 12 How., at 366 ; McDonald, 238 U.S., at 269, 35 S.Ct. 783. Yet since the enactment of Rule 606(b), the Court has addressed the precise question whether the Constitution mandates an exception to it in just two instances.
In its first case, Tanner, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90, the Court rejected a Sixth Amendment exception for evidence that some jurors were under the influence of drugs and alcohol during the trial. Id., at 125, 107 S.Ct. 2739. Central to the Court's reasoning were the "long-recognized and very substantial concerns" supporting "the protection of jury deliberations from intrusive inquiry." Id., at 127, 107 S.Ct. 2739. The Tanner Court echoed McDonald's concern that, if attorneys could use juror testimony to attack verdicts, jurors would be "harassed and beset by the defeated party," thus destroying "all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference." 483 U.S., at 120, 107 S.Ct. 2739 (quoting McDonald, supra, at 267-268, 35 S.Ct. 783 ). The Court was concerned, moreover, that attempts to impeach a verdict would "disrupt the finality of the process" and undermine both "jurors' willingness to return an unpopular verdict" and "the community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople." 483 U.S., at 120-121, 107 S.Ct. 2739.
The Tanner Court outlined existing, significant safeguards for the defendant's right to an impartial and competent jury beyond post-trial juror testimony. At the outset of the trial process, voir dire provides an opportunity for the court and counsel to examine members of the venire for impartiality. As a trial proceeds, the court, counsel, and court personnel have some opportunity to learn of any juror misconduct. And, before the verdict, jurors themselves can report misconduct to the court. These procedures do not undermine the stability of a verdict once rendered. Even after the trial, evidence of misconduct other than juror testimony can be used to attempt to impeach the verdict. Id., at 127, 107 S.Ct. 2739. Balancing these interests and safeguards against the defendant's Sixth Amendment interest in that case, the Court affirmed the exclusion of affidavits pertaining to the jury's inebriated state. Ibid.
The second case to consider the general issue presented here was Warger, 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 521, 190 L.Ed.2d 422. The Court again rejected the argument that, in the circumstances there, the jury trial right required an exception to the no-impeachment rule. Warger involved a civil case where, after the verdict was entered, the losing party sought to proffer evidence that the jury forewoman had failed to disclose prodefendant bias during voir dire. As in Tanner, the Court put substantial reliance on existing safeguards for a fair trial. The Court stated: "Even if jurors lie in voir dire in a way that conceals bias, juror impartiality is adequately assured by the parties' ability to bring to the court's attention any evidence of bias before the verdict is rendered, and to employ nonjuror evidence even after the verdict is rendered." 574 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 529.
In Warger, however, the Court did reiterate that the no-impeachment rule may admit exceptions. As in Reid and McDonald, the Court warned of "juror bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial right has been abridged." 574 U.S., at ---- - ----, n. 3, 135 S.Ct., at 529, n. 3. "If and when such a case arises," the Court indicated it would "consider whether the usual safeguards are or are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the process." Ibid.
The recognition in Warger that there may be extreme cases where the jury trial right requires an exception to the no-impeachment rule must be interpreted in context as a guarded, cautious statement. This caution is warranted to avoid formulating an exception that might undermine the jury dynamics and finality interests the no-impeachment rule seeks to protect. Today, however, the Court faces the question that Reid,McDonald, and Warger left open. The Court must decide whether the Constitution requires an exception to the no-impeachment rule when a juror's statements indicate that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in his or her finding of guilt.
III
It must become the heritage of our Nation to rise above racial classifications that are so inconsistent with our commitment to the equal dignity of all persons. This imperative to purge racial prejudice from the administration of justice was given new force and direction by the ratification of the Civil War Amendments.
"[T]he central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192, 85 S.Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964). In the years before and after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it became clear that racial discrimination in the jury system posed a particular threat both to the promise of the Amendment and to the integrity of the jury trial. "Almost immediately after the Civil War, the South began a practice that would continue for many decades: All-white juries punished black defendants particularly harshly, while simultaneously refusing to punish violence by whites, including Ku Klux Klan members, against blacks and Republicans." Forman, Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 Yale L.J. 895, 909-910 (2004). To take one example, just in the years 1865 and 1866, all-white juries in Texas decided a total of 500 prosecutions of white defendants charged with killing African-Americans. All 500 were acquitted. Id., at 916. The stark and unapologetic nature of race-motivated outcomes challenged the American belief that "the jury was a bulwark of liberty," id., at 909, and prompted Congress to pass legislation to integrate the jury system and to bar persons from eligibility for jury service if they had conspired to deny the civil rights of African-Americans, id., at 920-930. Members of Congress stressed that the legislation was necessary to preserve the right to a fair trial and to guarantee the equal protection of the laws. Ibid.
The duty to confront racial animus in the justice system is not the legislature's alone. Time and again, this Court has been called upon to enforce the Constitution's guarantee against state-sponsored racial discrimination in the jury system. Beginning in 1880, the Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit the exclusion of jurors on the basis of race. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305-309, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880). The Court has repeatedly struck down laws and practices that systematically exclude racial minorities from juries. See, e.g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 26 L.Ed. 567 (1881) ; Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394, 55 S.Ct. 784, 79 L.Ed. 1500 (1935) (per curiam ); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 73 S.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed. 1244 (1953) ; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 74 S.Ct. 667, 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954) ; Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977). To guard against discrimination in jury selection, the Court has ruled that no litigant may exclude a prospective juror on the basis of race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ; Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991) ; Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992). In an effort to ensure that individuals who sit on juries are free of racial bias, the Court has held that the Constitution at times demands that defendants be permitted to ask questions about racial bias during voir dire. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973) ; Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 ; Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986).
The unmistakable principle underlying these precedents is that discrimination on the basis of race, "odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice." Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555, 99 S.Ct. 2993, 61 L.Ed.2d 739 (1979). The jury is to be "a criminal defendant's fundamental 'protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.' " McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (quoting Strauder, supra, at 309). Permitting racial prejudice in the jury system damages "both the fact and the perception" of the jury's role as "a vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) ; cf. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 315, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054 (1931) ; Buck v. Davis, ante, at 22.
IV
A
This case lies at the intersection of the Court's decisions endorsing the no-impeachment rule and its decisions seeking to eliminate racial bias in the jury system. The two lines of precedent, however, need not conflict.
Racial bias of the kind alleged in this case differs in critical ways from the compromise verdict in McDonald, the drug and alcohol abuse in Tanner, or the pro-defendant bias in Warger. The behavior in those cases is troubling and unacceptable, but each involved anomalous behavior from a single jury-or juror-gone off course. Jurors are presumed to follow their oath, cf. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001), and neither history nor common experience show that the jury system is rife with mischief of these or similar kinds. To attempt to rid the jury of every irregularity of this sort would be to expose it to unrelenting scrutiny. "It is not at all clear... that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it." Tanner, 483 U.S., at 120, 107 S.Ct. 2739.
The same cannot be said about racial bias, a familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the administration of justice. This Court's decisions demonstrate that racial bias implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns. An effort to address the most grave and serious statements of racial bias is not an effort to perfect the jury but to ensure that our legal system remains capable of coming ever closer to the promise of equal treatment under the law that is so central to a functioning democracy.
Racial bias is distinct in a pragmatic sense as well. In past cases this Court has relied on other safeguards to protect the right to an impartial jury. Some of those safeguards, to be sure, can disclose racial bias. Voir dire at the outset of trial, observation of juror demeanor and conduct during trial, juror reports before the verdict, and nonjuror evidence after trial are important mechanisms for discovering bias. Yet their operation may be compromised, or they may prove insufficient.
For instance, this Court has noted the dilemma faced by trial court judges and counsel in deciding whether to explore potential racial bias at voir dire. See Rosales-Lopez, supra ; Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976). Generic questions about juror impartiality may not expose specific attitudes or biases that can poison jury deliberations. Yet more pointed questions "could well exacerbate whatever prejudice might exist without substantially aiding in exposing it." Rosales-Lopez, supra, at 195, 101 S.Ct. 1629 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in result).
The stigma that attends racial bias may make it difficult for a juror to report inappropriate statements during the course of juror deliberations. It is one thing to accuse a fellow juror of having a personal experience that improperly influences her consideration of the case, as would have been required in Warger. It is quite another to call her a bigot.
The recognition that certain of the Tanner safeguards may be less effective in rooting out racial bias than other kinds of bias is not dispositive. All forms of improper bias pose challenges to the trial process. But there is a sound basis to treat racial bias with added precaution. A constitutional rule that racial bias in the justice system must be addressed-including, in some instances, after the verdict has been entered-is necessary to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in jury verdicts, a confidence that is a central premise of the Sixth Amendment trial right.
B
For the reasons explained above, the Court now holds that where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.
Not every offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility will justify setting aside the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial inquiry. For the inquiry to proceed, there must be a showing that one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury's deliberations and resulting verdict. To qualify, the statement must tend to show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror's vote to convict. Whether that threshold showing has been satisfied is a matter committed to the substantial discretion of the trial court in light of all the circumstances, including the content and timing of the
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This proceeding attacks, under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States, the validity of a state tax imposed upon the franchise of a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing business within the State when (1) the business consists solely of interstate commerce, and (2) the tax is computed at a nondiscriminatory rate on that part of the corporation’s net income which is reasonably attributable to its business activities within the State. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we hold this application of the tax invalid.
Petitioner, Spector Motor Service, Inc., is a Missouri corporation engaged exclusively in interstate trucking. It instituted this action in 1942 in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Tax Commissioner of that State. It sought to enjoin collection of assessments and penalties totaling $7,795.50, which had been levied against it, for various periods between June 1, 1935, and December 31, 1940, under the Connecticut Corporation Business Tax Act of 1935 and amendments thereto. It asked also for a declaratory judgment as to its liability, if any, under that Act. It claimed that the tax imposed by the Act did not apply to it and that, if it did, such application violated both the Connecticut Constitution and the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. Finally, it alleged that it had no plain, speedy and efficient remedy at law or in equity in the state courts and that the collection of the taxes and penalties by the means provided in the statute would cause it irreparable injury. The District Court took jurisdiction, held that the Act did not apply to petitioner and granted the injunction sought. 47 F. Supp. 671. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one judge dissenting, reversed. 139 F. 2d 809. It held that the tax did apply to petitioner and was constitutional. We granted certiorari, 322 U. S. 720, but, after hearing, remanded the cause to the District Court with directions to retain the bill pending the determination of proceedings to be brought in the state court in conformity with the opinion rendered, 323 U. S. 101.
Petitioner thereupon sought a declaratory judgment in the Superior Court for Hartford County, Connecticut. The Superior Court held that the tax was applicable to petitioner but invalid under the Commerce Clause. 15 Conn. Supp. 205. The Supreme Court of Errors of the State of Connecticut likewise held that petitioner was subject to the tax but it declined to pass on the effect of the Commerce Clause. 135 Conn. 37, 70, 61 A. 2d 89, 105. On a motion asking it to dissolve its original injunction, the United States District Court declined to do so. 88 F. Supp. 711. It reviewed the recent decisions and held that, applying the Act to petitioner, as required by the interpretation of it by the state courts, such application violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, acting through the same majority as on the previous occasion, reversed. One judge dissented for the reasons stated by the district judge and by the judge who had dissented on the former appeal. 181 F. 2d 150. We granted certiorari because of the fundamental nature of the issue and the apparent conflict between the judgment below and previous judgments of this Court. 340 U. S. 806. The case was argued twice at this term.
The United States District Court had jurisdiction over this case in the first instance because of the uncertainty of the adequacy of a remedy in the state courts, and it did not lose that jurisdiction by virtue of the later clarification of the procedure in the courts of Connecticut. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U. S. 203; Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 255 U. S. 288.
The vital issue which remains is whether the application of the tax to petitioner violates the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. We come to that issue now with the benefit of a statement from the state court of final jurisdiction showing exactly what it is that the State has sought to tax. The all-important “operating incidence” of the tax is thus made clear. After full consideration and with knowledge that its statement would be made the basis of determining the validity of the application of the tax under the Commerce Clause, that court said:
“The tax is then a tax or excise upon the franchise of corporations for the privilege of carrying on or doing business in the state, whether they be domestic or foreign. Stanley Works v. Hackett, 122 Conn. 547, 551, 190 A. 743. Net earnings are used merely for the purpose of determining the amount to be paid by each corporation, a measure which, by the application of the rate charged, was intended to impose upon each corporation a share of the general tax burden as nearly as possible equivalent to that borne by other wealth in the state. As regards a corporation doing business both within and without the state, the intention was, by the use of a rather complicated formula, to measure the tax by determining as fairly as possible the proportionate amount of its business done in this state. There is no ground upon which the tax can be said to rest upon the use of highways by motor trucks . . . 135 Conn. at 56-57, 61 A. 2d at 98-99.
The incidence of the tax is upon no intrastate commerce activities because there are none. Petitioner is engaged only in interstate transportation. Its principal place of business is in Illinois. It is authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission to do certain interstate trucking and by the Connecticut Public Utilities Commission to do part of such interstate trucking in Connecticut. Petitioner has filed with the Secretary of State of Connecticut a certificate of its incorporation in Missouri, has designated an agent in Connecticut for service of process and has paid the state fee required in that connection. It has not been authorized by the State of Connecticut to do intrastate trucking and does not engage in it. See Terminal Taxicab Co. v. District of Columbia, 241 U. S. 252, 253-254.
Petitioner’s business is the interstate transportation of freight by motor truck between east and west. When a full truckload is to be shipped to or from any customer in Connecticut, petitioner’s over-the-road trucks go directly to the customer’s place of business. In the case of less-than-truckload shipments, pickup trucks operated by petitioner gather the freight from customers for assembly into full truckloads at either of two terminals maintained within the State. “The pickup trucks merely act as a part of the interstate transportation of the freight.” 135 Conn. at 44, 61 A. 2d at 93.
The tax does not discriminate between interstate and intrastate commerce. Neither the amount of the tax nor its computation need be considered by us in view of our disposition of the case. The objection to its validity does not rest on a claim that it places an unduly heavy burden on interstate commerce in return for protection given by the State. The tax is not levied as compensation for the use of highways or collected in lieu of an ad valorem property tax. Those bases of taxation have been disclaimed by the highest court of the taxing State. It is not a fee for an inspection or a tax on sales or use. It is a “tax or excise” placed unequivocally upon the corporation’s franchise for the privilege of carrying on exclusively interstate transportation in the State. It serves no purpose for the State Tax Commissioner to suggest that, if there were some intrastate commerce involved or if an appropriate tax were imposed as compensation for petitioner’s use of the highways, the same sum of money as is at issue here might be collected lawfully from petitioner. Even though the financial burden on interstate commerce might be the same, the question whether a state may validly make interstate commerce pay its way depends first of all upon the constitutional channel through which it attempts to do so. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249; McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327.
Taxing power is inherent in sovereign states, yet the states of the United States have divided their taxing power between the Federal Government and themselves. They delegated to the United States the exclusive power to tax the privilege to engage in interstate commerce when they gave Congress the power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. While the reach of the reserved taxing power of a state is great, the constitutional separation of the federal and state powers makes it essential that no state be permitted to exercise, without authority from Congress, those functions which it has delegated exclusively to Congress. Another example of this basic separation of powers is the inability of the states to tax the agencies through which the United States exercises its sovereign powers. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 425-437; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 445-449; Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441.
The answer in the instant case has been made clear by the courts of Connecticut. It is not a matter of labels. The incidence of the tax provides the answer. The courts of Connecticut have held that the tax before us attaches solely to the franchise of petitioner to do interstate business. The State is not precluded from imposing taxes upon other activities or aspects of this business which, unlike the privilege of doing interstate business, are subject to the sovereign power of the State. Those taxes may be imposed although their payment may come out of the funds derived from petitioner’s interstate business, provided the taxes are so imposed that their burden will be reasonably related to the powers of the State and nondiscriminatory.
This Court heretofore has struck down, under the Commerce Clause, state taxes upon the privilege of carrying on a business that was exclusively interstate in character. The constitutional infirmity of such a tax persists no matter how fairly it is apportioned to business done within the state. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203 (measured by percentages of “corporate excess” and net income); Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555 (measured by percentage of capital stock and surplus). See Interstate Pipe Line Co.v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 669, et seq. (dissenting opinion which discusses the issue on the assumption that the activities were in interstate commerce); Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Co., 330 U. S. 422; Freeman v. Hewit, supra.
Our conclusion is not in conflict with the principle that, where a taxpayer is engaged both in intrastate and interstate commerce, a state may tax the privilege of carrying on intrastate business and, within reasonable limits, may compute the amount of the charge by applying the tax rate to a fair proportion of the taxpayer’s business done within the state, including both interstate and intrastate. Interstate Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, supra; International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416; Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Comm’r of Corporations and Taxation, 298 U. S. 553. The same is true where the taxpayer’s business activity is local in nature, such as the transportation of passengers between points within the same state, although including interstate travel, Central Greyhound Lines v. Medley, 334 U. S. 653, or the publication of a newspaper, Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250. See also, Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80.
In this field there is not only reason but long-established precedent for keeping the federal privilege of carrying on exclusively interstate commerce free from state taxation. To do so gives lateral support to one of the cornerstones of our constitutional law — M’Culloch v. Maryland, supra.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, which reversed that of the District Court, is accordingly
Reversed.
“Sec. 418c. Imposition op tax. Every mutual savings bank, savings and loan association and building and loan association doing business in this state, and every other corporation or association carrying on business in this state which is required to report to the collector of internal revenue for the district in which such corporation or association has its principal place of business for the purpose of assessment, collection and payment of an income tax [with exceptions not material here] . . . shall pay, annually, a tax or excise upon its franchise for the privilege of carrying on or doing business within the state, such tax to be measured by the entire net income as herein defined received by such corporation or association from business transacted within the state during the income year and to be assessed at the rate of two per cent; . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Conn. Gen. Stat. Cum. Supp. 1935.
This section was amended in 1937 by inserting in the first italicized clause, after the words “every other corporation or association carrying on,” the words “or having the right to carry on.” Conn. Gen. Stat. Cum. Supp. 1939, § 354e. Our conclusion is the same as to the assessments levied before and those levied after the amendment.
The current revision of the statute, as subsequently amended, appears in Conn. Gen. Stat., 1949, §§ 1896-1921.
“. . .no [United States] district court shall have jurisdiction of any suit to enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax imposed by or pursuant to the laws of any State where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in the courts of such State.” 50 Stat. 738, 28 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 41 (1). See 28 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. Ill) § 1341.
Wisconsin v. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444.
See Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U. S. 542; Aero Transit Co. v. Board of Comm’rs, 332 U. S. 495; Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245 (Conn. excise tax on the use of the highways). Cf. Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80; McCarroll v. Dixie Lines, 309 U. S. 176.
See Interstate Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 679; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450; Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688.
The decision in Memphis Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U. S. 649, upheld a Tennessee tax on earnings of the taxpayer within that State where the earnings were derived from the intrastate distribution of gas by the taxpayer in a joint enterprise with the Memphis Power & Light Company. Any suggestion in that opinion as to the possible validity of such a tax if applied to earnings derived wholly from interstate commerce is not essential to the decision in the case.
See International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416; Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501; Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U. S. 62; Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331; Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77; Hans Rees’ Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a companion case to O’Shea v. Littleton, ante, p. 488, involving claims which the respondents, 17 black and two white residents of Cairo, Illinois, individually and as representatives of the class they purport to represent, set forth in that portion of their amended civil rights complaint which alleged wrongful conduct on the part of Peyton Berbling, individually and in his capacity as State’s Attorney for Alexander County, Illinois, the county in which the city of Cairo is located. As discussed in O’Shea, the complaint alleged a broad range of racially discriminatory patterns and practices in the administration of the criminal justice system in Alexander County by the Police Commissioner of Cairo, Magistrate Michael O’Shea and Associate Judge Dorothy Spomer of the Alexander County Circuit Court, State’s Attorney Berbling, and Earl Shepherd, an investigator for Berbling. Allegedly, a decade of active, but lawful, efforts to achieve racial equality for the black residents of Cairo had resulted in continuing intentional conduct on the part of those named as defendants in the complaint to deprive the plaintiff-respondents of the evenhanded protection of the criminal laws, in violation of various amendments to the Constitution and 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985.
In particular, the complaint charged State’s Attorney Berbling with purposeful racial discrimination, under color of state law, by neglecting to provide for respondents’ safety though knowing of the possibility of racial disorders, by refusing to prosecute persons who threaten respondents’ safety and property, and by refusing to permit respondents to give evidence against white persons who threaten them. It was alleged, with particular incidents recounted as to some charges, that “Berbling has denied and continues to deny” the constitutional rights of respondents and members of their class by following the practices of (a) refusing to initiate criminal proceedings and to hear criminal charges against white persons upon complaint by members of respondents’ class, (b) submitting misdemeanor complaints which have been filed by black persons against whites to a grand jury, rather than proceeding by information or complaint, and then either interrogating witnesses and complainants before the grand jury with purposeful intent to racially discriminate, or failing to interrogate them at all, (c) inadequately prosecuting the few criminal proceedings instituted against whites at respondents’ behest in order to lose the cases or settle them on terms more favorable than those brought against blacks, (d) recommending substantially greater bonds and sentences in cases involving respondents and members of their class than for cases involving whites, (e) charging respondents and members of their class with significantly more serious charges for conduct which would result in no charge or a minor charge against a white person, and (f) depriving respondents of their right to give evidence concerning the security of members of their class. Each of these practices was alleged to be willful, malicious, and carried out with intent to deprive respondents and members of their class of the benefits of the county criminal justice system and to deter them from peacefully boycotting or otherwise engaging in protected First Amendment activity. Since there was asserted to be no adequate remedy at law, respondents requested that Berbling be enjoined from continuing these'practices, that he be required to “submit a monthly report to' [the District Court] concerning the nature, status and disposition of any complaint brought to him by plaintiffs or members of their class, or by white persons against plaintiffs or members of their class,” and that the District Court maintain continuing jurisdiction in this action.
The District Court dismissed that portion of the complaint requesting injunctive relief against Berbling, as well as against Investigator Shepherd, Magistrate O’Shea, and Judge Dorothy Spomer, for want of jurisdiction to grant any such remedy, which was perceived as directed against discretionary acts on the part of these elected state officials. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that whatever quasi-judicial immunity from injunctive proscription it had previously recognized was appropriate for a prosecutor, was not absolute, and since respondents’ alternative remedies at law were thought to be inadequate, an injunctive remedy might be available if respondents could prove their claims of racial discrimination at trial.
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on October 6, 1972. At the subsequent election in November of that year, petitioner W. C. Spomer was chosen by the voters to succeed Berbling as State’s Attorney for Alexander County, and Spomer took office on December 4. In the petition for certiorari filed with this Court on January 3, 1973, seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ approval of the possibility of some form of injunctive relief addressed to the State’s Attorney in the course of his prosecutorial role, petitioner Spomer relied upon Supreme Court Rule 48 (3), which provides that “[w]hen a public officer is a party to a proceeding here in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does not abate and his successor is automatically substituted as a party.” Respondents did not oppose the substitution, and we granted certiorari and set the case for argument together with O’Shea v. Littleton, ante, p. 488. 411 U. S. 915 (1973).
It has become apparent, however, that there is nothing in the record upon which we may firmly base a conclusion that a concrete controversy between W. C. Spomer and the respondents is presented to this Court for resolution. No allegations in the complaint cited any conduct of W. C. Spomer as the basis for equitable or any other relief. Indeed, Spomer is not named as a defendant in the complaint at all, and, of course, he never appeared before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. The injunctive relief requested against former State’s Attorney Berbling, moreover, is based upon an alleged practice of willful and malicious racial discrimination evidenced by enumerated instances in which Berbling favored white persons and disfavored Negroes. The wrongful conduct charged in the complaint is personal to Berbling, despite the fact that he was also sued in his then capacity as State’s Attorney. No charge is made in the complaint that the policy of the office of State’s Attorney is to follow the intentional practices alleged, apart from the allegation that Berbling, as the incumbent at the time, was then continuing the practices he had previously followed. Cf. Allen v. Regents of the University System of Georgia, 304 U. S. 439, 444-445 (1938). Nor have respondents ever attempted to substitute Spomer for Berbling after the Court of Appeals decision, so far as the record shows, or made any record allegations that Spomer intends to continue the asserted practices of Berbling of which they complain. The plain fact is that, on the record before us, respondents have never charged Spomer with anything and do not presently seek to enjoin him from doing anything. Under these circumstances, recognizing that there may no longer be a controversy between respondents and any Alexander County State’s Attorney concerning injunctive relief to be applied in futuro, see Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U. S. 582, 588 (1961), we remand to the Court of Appeals for a determination, in the first instance, of whether the former dispute regarding the availability of injunctive relief against the State’s Attorney is now moot and whether respondents will want to, and should be permitted to, amend their complaint to include claims for relief against the petitioner. Cf. Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 739 (1947).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded for further consideration and proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Specific examples of Berbling’s practice were alleged as follows:
“(1) On March 28, 1969, defendant refused to permit James Wilson to file criminal charges against Charlie Sullivan, a white man, who pointed a gun at him as he (Wilson) attempted to move into the house next door to Charlie Sullivan on 22nd Street, in Cairo, Illinois. Sullivan threatened Wilson with the gun and told him to move the truck containing household furnishings and leave the area, thereby attempting to prevent James Wilson from holding property.
“(2) On or about March 29, 1969, defendant refused to permit James Wilson to file criminal charges against Charlie Sullivan who fired shots from a gun around James Wilson’s home to intimidate his family in order to prevent James Wilson from holding property.
“(3) In January, 1970, defendant refused to permit Robert Martin to file charges against Charlie Sullivan, who tried to run him down in a truck while peacefully marching in exercise of his First Amendment rights.
“(4) In June, 1970, defendant refused to permit Ezell Littleton to file charges against a white man who without cause or justification assaulted and battered him.
“(5) In June, 1970, defendant refused to permit Rev. Manker Harris to file charges against two white policemen of the City of Cairo for attempted murder and/or malicious prosecution.
“(6) On August 10, 1970, defendant Berbling, through a subordinate, defendant Earl Shepherd, refused to permit plaintiff Hazel James to file criminal charges against Raymond Hurst, a white man, who had kicked plaintiff James in the stomach while she was peacefully demonstrating against the racially discriminatory practices of merchants and of public officials of the City of Cairo.
“(7) In May, 1969, Plaintiff Ewing and eight others could have [brought] and desired to bring criminal charges against a white man who threatened them with a shotgun, but did not because they knew of defendant’s practice of refusing to take complaints and were discouraged from making useless gestures.”
Cited in support of this allegation was an incident when “Morris Garrett (a 13 year old boy), on August 8, 1970, during a demonstration against the racially discriminatory practices of merchants and public officials of the City of Cairo, was struck by one Tom Madra. A complaint was filed which was presented to the grand jury. Morris Garrett appeared before the grand jury. Defendant Berbling, rather than question him regarding the incident, asked him such questions as ‘did you get paid for picketing?’ A no-true bill was returned by the grand jury.”
Two episodes of this type were described:
“(1) On August 13, 1970, Cheryl Garrett and Y-vonda Taylor, ages 18 and 16 respectively, were shot at by one Jack Guetterman, Jr. Rev. Walter Garrett and Ezell Littleton, following a telephone call from the young girls, went to the scene of the shooting. Shortly thereafter police officers arrived. While Rev. Walter Garrett was discussing the situation with one police officer, one Jack Guetterman, ' Sr. struck Rev. Garrett in the face, causing him to fall to the ground. A complaint was filed by Rev. Walter Garrett respecting this incident. Defendant Berbling presented the complaint to the grand jury, but Rev. Garrett was not interrogated at all respecting the incident. Ezell Littleton, who witnessed the assault, was not called to testify.
“(2) On or about August 8, 1970, Curtis Johnson was struck by one A1 Moss while demonstrating against the racially discriminatory practices of merchants and public officials of the City of Cairo. A complaint was filed, which was presented to the grand jury. Curtis Johnson, however, was not interrogated by defendant Berb-ling respecting the incident.”
Thus, respondents alleged that Berbling sought the “dropping of a criminal charge arising out of a complaint filed by Frank Hollis, a black person, against Tom Madra, a white person, in return for which [Berbling] would drop pending criminal charges against several of the [respondents].”
Damages were also sought against Berbling for these practices and for an alleged conspiracy with his investigator, Shepherd, to refuse to prosecute those who threatened respondents’ safety and to prevent them from giving evidence against whites concerning acts threatening their personal safety. As to the latter, the sixth example in n. 1, supra, was reiterated. The Court of Appeals held that “insofar as defendant Berbling was acting within his prosecu-torial function he has a quasi-judicial immunity from suit for damages under the Civil Rights Acts,” 468 F. 2d 389, 410, and remanded to allow respondents to amend the complaint and to have the District Court determine in the first instance whether some of the acts then alleged would be sufficiently removed from quasi-judicial activity “to warrant removing the cloak of immunity from them.” Id., at 410-411. Berbling’s petition for certiorari questioning this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ ruling was not timely filed in this Court and has been denied. No. 72-1107, post, p. 1143. No question concerning damage relief is involved in the case presently before us.
The scope of any injunction which might be found warranted was not finally established or restricted. It was suggested that an initial decree might require “only periodic reports of various types of aggregate data on actions on bail and sentencing and dispositions of complaints,” and confidence was expressed that the District Court would be able to establish further guides as required and, if necessary, to consider individual decisions. 468 F. 2d, at 415.
State’s Attorney W. C. Spomer should not be confused with Judge Dorothy Spomer, a petitioner in O’Shea v. Littleton, ante, p. 488.
In their brief in opposition to the petition, p. 6, respondents stated that they “seek only equitable relief against petitioner W. C. Spomer. Because the amended complaint asks relief against Berbling in his individual as well as his official capacity, he remains a party in interest in this action.” Of course, Spomer, not Berbling, filed for review of the -Court of Appeals’ decision, respecting injunctive relief, and Berbling is not before the Court in this case. Nor did respondents ever seek relief of any kind against Spomer by their complaint.
This Court's Rule 48(3), governing automatic substitution of successor public officers when the predecessor was a party “in his official capacity,” is based upon Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 25 (d), as amended in 1961. Prior to the 1961 amendment, substitution was not automatic. The history and application of former and present Rule 25 (d) are sketched in 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 25.09 [1]— [3] (2d ed. 1969). Of particular relevance is- the Advisory Committee Note on the 1961 “automatic substitution” amendment to Rule 25 (d), which suggests that “[i]n general it will apply whenever effective relief would call for corrective behavior by the one then having official status and power, rather than one who has lost that status and power through ceasing to hold office.” See id., ¶ 25.09 [3], at 25-403, 25-404. The question of whether corrective behavior is thought to be necessary is, of course, dependent on whether the dispute with the predecessor continues with the successor.
Despite the statement respondents made in their brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari, n. 8, supra, the record does not contain any indication that respondents have ever sought in-junctive relief against Spomer in any proceedings in the District-Court or the Court of Appeals. Nor would they have had reason to do so in the absence of knowledge that he would succeed Berbling. While Spomer did substitute himself in place of his predecessor, and his counsel made the somewhat extraordinary statement at oral argument that “there is nothing in this record, nor will there be on the part of my client, to indicate that he would change the policies which are alleged to have been exercised by his predecessor,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, to determine whether respondents have a live controversy with Spomer, we must look to the charges they press. Indeed, counsel for respondents observed at oral argument of this case that “in order for us to proceed against Mr. Spomer, it would be necessary for us to investigate the facts to see that the concession apparently made by the State’s Attorney is true and amend our complaint.” Id., at 19. This merely serves to underscore our concern that we are being asked to render an opinion on the merits of what is now and may continue to be a hypothetical or abstract dispute. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937); United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U. S. 146, 157 (1961); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 245-246 (1971).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Respondent Jerry Nachtigal was charged with operating a motor vehicle in Yosemite National Park while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of 36 CFR §§ 4.23(a)(1) and (a)(2) (1992). Driving under the influence (DUI) is a class B misdemeanor and carries a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment, § 1.3(a); 18 U. S. C. § 3581(b)(7), and a $5,000 fine, §§ 3571(b)(6) and (e). As an alternative to a term of imprisonment, the sentencing court may impose a term of probation not to exceed five years. §§ 3561(a)(3), (b)(2). The sentencing court has discretion to attach a host of discretionary conditions to the probationary term. § 3563(b).
Respondent moved for a jury trial. Applying our decision in Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U. S. 538 (1989), the Magistrate Judge denied the motion. He reasoned that because DUI carries a maximum term of imprisonment of six months, it is presumptively a “petty” offense which is not embraced by the jury trial guaranty of the Sixth Amendment. He rejected respondent’s contention that the additional penalties transformed DUI into a “serious” offense for Sixth Amendment purposes. Respondent was then tried by the Magistrate Judge and convicted of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of 36 CFR § 4.23(a)(1) (1992). He was fined $750 and placed on unsupervised probation for one year.
The District Court reversed the Magistrate Judge on the issue of entitlement to a jury trial, commenting that the language in our opinion in Blanton was “at variance with the Ninth Circuit precedent of United States v. Craner, [652 F. 2d 23 (1981)],” and electing to follow Craner because our opinion in Blanton did not “expressly overrule” Craner.: App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a, 20a.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court, holding that Blanton is “[inapposite,” that Craner controls, and that -respondent is entitled to a jury trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a-4a, judgt. order reported at 953 F. 2d 1389 (1992). The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the Secretary of the Interior, and not Congress, set the maximum prison term at six months, “[t]here is no controlling legislative determination” regarding the seriousness of the offense. App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a; see also United States v. Craner, 652 F. 2d 23, 25 (CA9 1981). The court also found it significant that the Secretary of the Interior, in whom Congress vested general regulatory authority to fix six months as the maximum sentence for any regulatory offense dealing with the use and management of the national parks, monuments, or reservations, see 16 U. S. C. §3, chose the harshest penalty available for DUI offenses. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a-4a; see also Craner, supra, at 25. Finally, the court noted that seven of the nine States within the Ninth Circuit guarantee a jury trial for a DUI offense. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a-4a; see also Craner, supra, at 27.
Unlike the Court of Appeals and the District Court, we think that this case is quite obviously controlled by our decision in Blanton. We therefore grant the United States’ petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis is granted.
In Blanton, we held that in order to determine whether the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial attaches to a particular offense, the court must examine “objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense.” Blanton, 489 U. S., at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted). The best indicator of society’s views is the maximum penalty set by the legislature. Ibid. While the word “penalty” refers both to the term of imprisonment and other statutory penalties, we stated that “[pjrimary emphasis ... must be placed on the maximum authorized period of incarceration.” Id., at 542. We therefore held that offenses for which the maximum period of incarceration is six months or .less are presumptively “‘petty.’” A defendant can overcome this presumption, and become entitled to a jury trial, only by showing that the additional penalties, viewed together with the maximum prison term, are so severe that the legislature clearly determined that the offense is a “ ‘serious’” one. Id., at 543. Finally, we expressly stated that the statutory penalties in other States are irrelevant to the question whether a particular legislature deemed a particular offense “‘serious.’” Id., at 545, n. 11.
Applying the above rule, we held that DUI was a petty offense under Nevada law. Since the maximum prison term was six months, the presumption described above applied. We did not find it constitutionally significant that the defendant would automatically lose his license for up to 90 days, and would be required to attend, at his own expense, an alcohol abuse education course. Id., at 544, and n. 9. Nor did we believe that a $1,000 fine or an alternative sentence of 48 hours’ community service while wearing clothing identifying him as a DUI offender was more onerous than six months in jail. Id., at 544-545.
The present case, we think, requires only a relatively routine application of the rule announced in Blanton. Because the maximum term of imprisonment is six months, DUI under 36 CFR § 4.23(a)(1) (1992) is presumptively a petty offense to which no jury trial right attaches. The Court of Appeals refused to apply the Blanton presumption, reasoning that the Secretary of the Interior, and not Congress, ultimately determined the maximum prison term. But there is a controlling legislative determination present within the regulatory scheme. In 16 U. S. C. § 3, Congress set six months as the maximum penalty the Secretary could impose for a violation of any of his regulations. The Court of Appeals offered no persuasive reason why this congressional determination is stripped of its “legislative” character merely because the Secretary has final authority to decide, within the limits given by Congress, what the maximum prison sentence will be for a violation of a given regulation.
The additional penalties imposed under the regulations are not sufficiently severe to overcome this presumption. As we noted in Blanton, it is a rare case where “a legislature packs an offense it deems ‘serious’ with onerous penalties that nonetheless do not puncture the 6-month incarceration line.” Blanton, 489 U. S., at 543 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the federal DUI offense carries a maximum fine of $5,000, and respondent faced, as an alternative to incarceration, a maximum 5-year term of probation. While the maximum fine in this case is $4,000 greater than the one in Blanton, this monetary penalty “cannot approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison term entails.” Id., at 542.
Nor do we believe that the probation alternative renders the DUI offense “serious.” Like a monetary penalty, the liberty infringement caused by a term of probation is far less intrusive than incarceration. Ibid. The discretionary probation conditions do not alter this conclusion; while they obviously entail a greater infringement on liberty than probation without attendant conditions, they do not approximate the severe loss of liberty caused by imprisonment for more than six months.
We hold that the Court of Appeals was wrong in refusing to recognize that this case was controlled by our opinion in Blanton rather than by its previous opinion in Craner. An individual convicted of driving under the influence in violation of 36 CFR § 4.23(a)(1) (1992) is not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. The petition of the United States for certiorari is accordingly granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
There are 21 discretionary conditions which the sentencing court may impose upon a defendant. Under 18 U. S. C. § 3563(b), a court may require, among other things, that the defendant (1) pay restitution; (2) take part in a drug and alcohol dependency program offered by an institution, and if necessary, reside at the institution; (3) remain in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons during nights and weekends for a period not exceeding the term of imprisonment; (4) reside at or participate in a program of a community correctional facility for all or part of the probationary term; or (5) remain at his place of residence during nonworking hours, and, if necessary, this condition may be monitored by telephonic or electronic devices. §§ 3563(b)(3), (b)(10), (b)(11), (b)(12), (b)(20).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Marshall, announced by Mr. Justice Brennan.
The question for decision is whether title to land abandoned by the stream of the Colorado River as a result of a federal rechanneling project vests in the State of Arizona, as owner of the beds under navigable streams within its borders, or in petitioner cattle company, as the owner of land riparian to the river at the time of the rechanneling.
The circumstances that give rise to this case are as follows. In 1910, the subject land was conveyed by federal patent, as part of a larger parcel, to the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co. A survey conducted in 1905 and 1906, and approved by the Surveyor General of the United States in 1906, indicates that as of the date of the patent, the Santa Fe parcel abutted the east bank of the Colorado River. Upon admission to the Union in 1912, Arizona succeeded the Federal Government to title to the bed of the Colorado River. The exact location of the river in 1912 in relation to the subject property is unclear from the record, but it is generally agreed that between 1903 and 1959 (when it was rechanneled) the river moved gradually eastward, eroding its east bank and depositing alluvion on its west bank, resulting in the submergence by erosion of the subject land. As the river crept eastward, the boundary between upland owners and the state-owned riverbed moved mechanically with it, transferring title to the lands which became part of the riverbed to the State. The operation of Hoover Dam, begun in 1938, reduced the flow of water in the Colorado River and substantially decreased its annual flood stage high-water mark. Nonetheless, by 1955, when the Bonelli Cattle Co. acquired title to the subject portion of the original Santa Fe grant, all but 60 acres in the southeast corner of its parcel was covered by water. In 1959, a Federal Bureau of Reclamation Project deepened and rechanneled the Colorado River in the area of the subject land, thereby confining the stream of the river to a substantially reduced portion of the Bonelli property.
In 1962, the Bonelli Cattle Co. filed the instant action to quiet title to the land from which the river had withdrawn as a result of the federal rechanneling project. The state trial court granted judgment for Bonelli and against the State of Arizona. The Arizona Court of Appeals, the State’s intermediate appellate court, affirmed, upholding Bonelli’s contention that if the changes in the river were accretive, the surfaced land belonged to Bonelli, as a riparian owner, and if the change were avulsive, the land nonetheless belonged to Bonelli under the doctrine of re-emergence.
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act, Arizona holds title to the beds of all navigable waters within its borders and thus to the subject land as a result of the gradual eastward movement of the river. The Arizona Supreme Court found that, because the federal rechannelization project was an “engineering relocation of the waters of the river by artificial means,” it was, under state law, an avulsive change, which did not divest the State of its title to the exposed land which had formerly been part of the riverbed. The court denied a rehearing and, in a supplemental opinion, clarified the extent of the dry land owned by the State. It held that the high-water mark of the river, to which the State's ownership extends, was fixed by the natural state of the river as it existed in 1938, before the operation of Hoover Dam. We granted certiorari, 410 U. S. 908 (1973). We hold that the ownership of the subject land is governed by federal law, and that the land surfaced by the narrowing of the river channel belongs, not to the State as owner of the riverbed, but to Bonelli as riparian owner. We need not, therefore, reach the question of whether the Arizona Supreme Court properly determined the average high-water mark of the river.
I
The first issue we must decide is whether state or federal law governs this controversy. The State of Arizona claims title to the subject land by virtue of the equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act, the basic principles of which are as follows. When the Original Colonies ratified the Constitution, they succeeded to the Crown’s title and interest in the beds of navigable waters within their respective borders. As new States were forged out of the federal territories after the formation of the Union, they were “admitted [with] the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction... as the original States possess within their respective borders.” Mumford v. Wardwell, 6 Wall. 423, 436 (1867). Accordingly, title to lands beneath navigable waters passed from the Federal Government to the new States, upon their admission to the Union, under the equal-footing doctrine. See, e. g., Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 (1894); Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm’rs, 18 Wall. 57, 65-66 (1873).
In order for the States to guarantee full public enjoyment of their navigable watercourses, it has been held that their title to the bed of a navigable river mechanically follows the river’s gradual changes in course. See Oklahoma v. Texas, 268 U. S. 252 (1925). Thus, where portions of a riparian owner’s land are encroached upon by a navigable stream, under federal law, the State succeeds to title in the bed of the river to its new high-water mark.
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 did not disturb these doctrines or their inherent limitations. The Act merely confirmed the States’ pre-existing rights in the beds of the navigable waterways within their boundaries by, in effect, quitclaiming all federal claims thereto. And, consonant with the above-described common-law doctrine concerning title to the bed of a river that has shifted course, the Submerged Lands Act quitclaims all federal rights to title to lands beneath the navigable streams, as “hereafter modified by accretion, erosion, and reliction.” 43 U. S. C. §1301 (a)(1).
The State of Arizona asserts title to the subject land on the basis of the following application of these principles. When Arizona achieved statehood in 1912, it assumed title to the land beneath the stream of the Colorado River, by virtue of the equal-footing doctrine. It subsequently acquired title to the subject land when it was submerged by the river’s eastward movement. The State asserts that once having acquired title, it was not divested of its proprietary interest in the land by the subsequent withdrawal of the water due to the rechanneling of the river.
Having concluded that title to the subject land was thus vested in the State as a matter of settled federal law, the state courts determined that local law controlled whether petitioner, as a riparian owner, had any interest in the land thereafter. As the Court said in Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158, 176 (1918): “[I]t is for the States to establish for themselves such rules of property as they deem expedient with respect to the navigable waters within their borders and the riparian lands adjacent to them....”
We continue to adhere to the principle that it is left to the States to determine the rights of riparian owners in the beds of navigable streams which, under federal law, belong to the State. But this doctrine does not require that state law govern the instant controversy. The issue before us is not what rights the State has accorded private owners in lands which the State holds as sovereign; but, rather, how far the State’s sovereign right extends under the equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act — whether the State retains title to the lands formerly beneath the stream of the Colorado River or whether that title is defeasible by the withdrawal of those waters. As this Court observed in Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 22 (1935): “The question as to the extent of this federal grant, that is, as to the limit of the land conveyed,... is necessarily a federal question.... [I] t involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted under federal law.”
Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra, and the cases cited therein are not to the contrary. In Arkansas v. Tennessee, for example, we held that federal law governed the question of how far into the river channel a State held title. Only then did this Court turn to state law to determine whether riparian owners had been accorded any rights in that land. But even the State’s disposition of its submerged land vis-a-vis private owners was to be “in each case limited by the interstate boundary,” a matter determined by federal law. 246 U. S., at 176. Similarly, in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 (1894), the Court held that under settled federal law, the tidelands there at issue belonged to the State in its sovereign capacity; hence whether the State had accorded riparian owners any interests in the tidelands properly remained a matter of local law; “if [the States] choose to resign to the riparian proprietor rights which properly belong to them in their sovereign capacity, it is not for others to raise objections.” Id., at 43. In Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 338 (1877), the Court left it to the States to decide whether to accord title to the land beneath non-tidal navigable waters to riparian owners after recognizing that under federal law such lands belong to the States. See also Scott v. Lattig, 227 U. S. 229, 24.2 (1913).
The present case, however, does not involve a question of the disposition of lands, the title to which is vested in the State as a matter of settled federal law. The very question to be decided is the nature and extent of the title to the bed of a navigable stream held by the State under the equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act. In this case, the question of title as between the State and a private landowner necessarily depends on a construction of a “right asserted under federal law.”
II
We cannot accept the State's argument that the equal-footing doctrine supports its claim to the disputed land. Historically, title to the beds beneath navigable waters is held by the sovereign, Barney v. Keokuk, supra, at 338, as a public trust for the protection of navigation and related purposes.
“[Tjitle to the... lands under water... enures to the State within which they are situated.... Such title... [is] held in trust for the public purposes of navigation and fishery.” Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 381 (1891).
See United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799, 808 (1950). As this Court observed in an earlier federal water law case:
“Such waters... are incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation and improvement; and their natural and primary uses are public in their nature, for highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing....” Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at 11.
The State's title is to the “[riverjbed as a bed,” and the State of Arizona will continue to hold title to the bed beneath the Colorado River to its present high-water mark. But the exposed land involved here is no longer, as described in Shively, “incapable of ordinary and private occupation... [whose] primary uses are public in their nature, for highways of navigation....” The equal-footing doctrine was never intended to provide a State with a windfall of thousands of acres of dry land exposed when the main thread of a navigable stream is changed. It would be at odds with the fundamental purpose of the original grant to the States to afford a State title to land from which a navigable stream had receded unless the land was exposed as part of a navigational or related public project of which it was a necessary and integral part or unless, of course, the artificial accretion was somehow caused by the upland owner himself. There has been no showing that the rechannelization project was undertaken to give the State title to the subject lands for the protection of navigation or related public goals. Indeed, the State of Arizona did not participate in the rechannelization of the Colorado River, although it had implicitly assented to the project.
The advance of the Colorado’s waters divested the title of the upland owners in favor of the State in order to guarantee full public enjoyment of the watercourse. But, when the water receded from the land, there was no longer a public benefit to be protected; consequently, the State, as sovereign, has no need for title. That the cause of the recession was artificial, or that the rate was perceptible, should be of no effect.
Nor does the Submerged Lands Act provide a basis for the State's claim to the subject lands. The Arizona Supreme Court incorrectly construed this Act as a grant by Congress to the States of lands “formerly... beneath navigable waters.” The Act did not abrogate the federal law of accretion, but defined lands beneath navigable waters as being those covered by streams as “hereafter modified by accretion, erosion, and reliction.” Contrary to the implication raised by the Arizona Supreme Court, the Act creates no new rights for the States in the beds of their inland waterways. The Act is not a grant of title to land but only a quitclaim of federal proprietary rights in the beds of navigable waterways. The Act specifically excepts from its scope lands lawfully conveyed or patented by the United States. Since the Act does not extend to the States any interest beyond those afforded by the equal-footing doctrine, the State can no more base its claim to lands unnecessary to a navigational purpose on.the Submerged Lands Act than on that doctrine.
Ill
The question remains as to who owns the subject land under the applicable federal common law. It is, of course, clear that the State of Arizona did hold title to the subject property before the waters of the river receded. Both the State and the Solicitor General of the United States as amicus curiae, urge that the federal common-law doctrine of avulsion is applicable and thus that the State remains holder of title in the former riverbed. Bonelli, the only private claimant, argues that the narrowing of the river course should properly be characterized as an artificial accretion, hence that the disputed land, which had originally been lost from the Bonelli parcel to the river by erosion, should once again belong to it as the riparian owner.
Federal law recognizes the doctrine of accretion whereby the “grantee of land bounded by a body of navigable water acquires a right to any... gradual accretion formed along the shore.” Hughes v. Washington, 389 U. S. 290, 293 (1967); accord, Jones v. Johnston, 18 How. 150, 156 (1856). When there is a gradual and imperceptible accumulation of land on a navigable riverbank, by way of alluvion or reliction, the riparian owner is the beneficiary of title to the surfaced land:
“It is the established rule that a riparian proprietor of land bounded by a stream, the banks of which are changed by the gradual and imperceptible process of accretion or erosion, continues to hold to the stream as his boundary; if his land is increased he is not accountable for the gain, and if it is diminished he has no recourse for the loss.” Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 624 (1912).
There are a number of interrelated reasons for the application of the doctrine of accretion. First, where lands are bounded by water, it may well be regarded as the expectancy of the riparian owners that they should continue to be so bounded. Second, the quality of being riparian, especially to navigable water, may be the land’s “most valuable feature” and is part and parcel of the ownership of the land itself. Hughes v. Washington, supra, at 293; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 504 (1871). Riparianness also encompasses the vested right to future alluvion, which is an “essential attribute of the original property.” County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, 68 (1874). By requiring that the upland owner suffer the burden of erosion, and by giving him the benefit of accretions, riparianness is maintained. Finally, there is a compensation theory at work. Riparian land is at the mercy of the wanderings of the river. Since a riparian owner is subject to losing land by erosion beyond his control, he should benefit from any addition to his lands by the accretions thereto which are equally beyond his control. Ibid. The effect of the doctrine of accretion is to give the riparian owner a “ ‘ “fee, determinable upon the occupancy of his soil by the river,” and [to afford] the State [a title] to the river bed [which is] likewise a... “qualified” fee, “determinable in favor of the riparians upon the abandonment of the bed by the river.” ’ ”
The doctrine of accretion applies to changes in the river course due to artificial as well as natural causes. County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, supra, at 64-69; United States v. Claridge, 416 F. 2d 933 (CA9 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 961 (1970) (changes in the Colorado River’s course, caused by the construction of Hoover Dam, are accretive). Where accretions to riparian land are caused by conditions created by strangers to the land, the upland owner remains the beneficiary thereof.
But the federal law is otherwise where “a stream suddenly and perceptibly abandons its old channel.” Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S., at 624-625. Such an avulsive change does not affect title and the boundary established by the former river stream remains at that line, even if the result is to cut off a landowner’s riparian rights. St. Louis v. Ruts, 138 U. S. 226, 245 (1891). The rationale for the doctrine of avulsion is a need to mitigate the hardship that a shift in title caused by a sudden movement of the river would cause the abutting landowners were the accretion principle to be applied. As this Court, quoting from 8 Op. Atty. Gen. 175, observed in Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359, 362 (1892):
“ ‘ [When in] deserting its original bed, the river forces for itself a new channel in another direction, then the nation, through whose territory the river thus breaks its way, suffers injury by the loss of territory greater than the benefit of retaining the natural river boundary, and that boundary remains in the middle of the deserted river bed.’ ”
The Arizona Supreme Court held that because the re-channeling of the Colorado River was an “engineering relocation of the waters of the river by artificial means/’ it was, under state law, an avulsion and did not divest the State of title to the land from which the river had withdrawn. But federal law must be applied with a view toward the limited nature of the sovereign’s rights in the riverbed, and an analysis of the interests of the State, and Bonelli, in light of the rationales for the federal common-law doctrines of accretion and avulsion, compels the conclusion that, as between the State, as owner of the riverbed, and Bonelli, as a riparian owner, the surfacing of the subject land should be treated as accretion; hence title to the disputed land should be vested in Bonelli.
The rationale for the application of the doctrine of avulsion is not applicable to this dispute because of the limited interests of the State in the subject property. The Federal Government, which holds a paramount navigable servitude in the river, determined that it was too wide and shallow to permit navigation in the area of the subject land, and that the river therefore needed to be deepened and rechanneled. The resulting changes in the river’s thread actually enhanced the State’s interest in the navigability of the river. The State’s acquisition of the exposed land here could only be a windfall, since unnecessary to the State’s purpose in holding title to the beds of the navigable streams within its borders. Accordingly, the narrowing of the river and vesting of title to the surfaced land in riparian owners does not detract from the State’s legitimate interest in title to the riverbed, so as to require mitigation of the accretion principle by application of the doctrine of avulsion.
The policies behind the doctrine of accretion are, however, fully applicable. That doctrine guarantees the riparian character of land by automatically granting to a riparian owner title to lands which form between his holdings and the river and thus threaten to destroy that valuable feature of his property. The riparian owner is at the mercy,, not only of the natural forces which create such intervening lands, but also, because of the navigational servitude, of governmental forces which may similarly affect the riparian quality of his estate. Accordingly, where land cast up in the Federal Government's exercise of the servitude is not related to furthering the navigational or related public interests, the accretion doctrine should provide a disposition of the land as between the riparian owner and the State. See Michaelson v. Silver Beach Assn., 342 Mass. 251, 173 N. E. 2d 273 (1961).
Similarly, riparian lands may suffer noncompensable losses or be deprived of their riparian character altogether by the State or Federal Government in the exercise of the navigational servitude. In compensation for such losses, land surfaced in the course of such governmental activity should inure to the riparian owner where not necessary to the navigational project or its purpose. In the case before us, all of the subject land, which composed a substantial portion of Bonelli’s parcel, was lost to the State by erosion to serve the public interest in the navigability of the river. Now that the land has resurfaced in the process of rechannelization, it should return to the estate of the riparian owner.
“No other rule can be applied on just principles. Every proprietor whose land is thus bounded [by a navigable stream], is subject to loss, by the same means which may add to his territory: and as he is without remedy for his loss, in this way, he cannot be held accountable for his gain.” New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 717 (1836).
Finally, recognition of the State’s claim to the subject land would raise a serious constitutional issue as to whether the State’s assertion of title is a taking without compensation, a question which we find unnecessary to decide on our view of the case. As Mr. Justice Stewart warned in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U. S., at 298 (concurring opinion):
“Although the State in this case made no attempt to take the accreted lands by eminent domain, it achieved the same result by effecting a retroactive transformation of private into public property — without paying for the privilege of doing so.... [T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids such confiscation by a State, no less through its courts than through its legislature, and no less when a taking is unintended than when it is deliberate...
In the exercise of its navigational servitude, the State or Federal Government may decrease the value of riparian property without compensation because the property is held subject to the exercise of that servitude. The government may, without paying compensation, deprive a riparian owner of his common-law right to use flowing water, St. Anthonys Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm’rs, 168 U. S. 349 (1897), or to build a wharf over the water, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 (1894). We have held that the State may deprive the owner of the riparian character of his property in the exercise of its navigational servitude. United States v. Rands, 389 U. S. 121 (1967). But there is no claim here by the State that depriving Bonelli of the subject land is necessary to any navigational or related purpose. Cf. United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411, 419 (1926); Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P. 2d 3 (1967), cert, denied, 390 U. S. 949 (1968). Moreover, what is involved in this case is not just the diminution or elimination of riparian rights, but the State’s attempt to completely divest all of Bonelli’s title and interest in the subject land. See Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall., at 504.
IV
We hold that title to the subject land, which was exposed by the federal rechannelization of the Colorado River, is vested in petitioner Bonelli Cattle Co. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Me. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The federal patent to the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad conveyed a parcel of land in township 19 North of Range 22 West, described as follows:
“The lots one, two, three, four, five and six, the south half of the northeast quarter, the south half of the northwest quarter, the northeast quarter of the southwest quarter, and the southeast quarter of section three, containing five hundred eighty-nine and forty hundredths acres.”
The map of the area, approved by the Surveyor General, indicates that, as of 1906, lots 5 and 6 of the Santa Fe parcel abutted the Colorado River. Petitioner Bonelli Cattle Co. was deeded a parcel of land constituting roughly the eastern half of the original Santa Fe grant. The Bonelli deed described the subject property as the “E[ast] % [of] Section 3, excepting Lot 2 thereof.”
The rechannelization also surfaced a small usable pocket of land on the west bank of the Colorado River which was part of the Bonelli parcel. This land is not in Arizona by virtue of the Boundary Compact between Arizona and Nevada, approved by Congress, Pub. L. 87-50, 75 Stat. 93, and hence is not involved in the present controversy.
11 Ariz. App. 412, 464 P. 2d 999 (1970).
107 Ariz. 465, 489 P. 2d 699 (1971).
108 Ariz. 258, 495 P. 2d 1312 (1972).
Before the operation of Hoover Dam, the river’s annual spring floods covered substantially more of the adjacent land than at any time thereafter. It is to the high-water mark of the river at this annual flood stage that the State of Arizona claims title.
See Joint Res. No. 8, To Admit the Territories of New Mexico and Arizona as States into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, 37 Stat. 39.
67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq.
See discussion, infra, at 321-324.
The Colorado River has been determined to be a navigable waterway, Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423 (1931), and, once found to be navigable, it remains so. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 408 (1940).
Petitioner Bonelli and the Solicitor General of the United States, as amicus curiae, assert that this case should be governed by federal law for a different reason. In Hughes v. Washington, 389 U. S. 290 (1967), this Court held that where an upland property owner traced its title to a pre-statehood federal patent, the owner’s right to accretions is a question of federal law. Id., at 292. We are here again concerned with the right to accretions conveyed by a pre-statehood federal patent, but it is unclear whether, at the time of Santa Fe Pacific’s patent, the portion of the land which ultimately became Bonelli’s parcel was actually riparian. Bonelli argues that its remote grantor, the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, was given a-patent by the United States which afforded it the right to riparian accretions as governed by federal law, and that it was expected that the river might wander within the parcel of land making parts thereof riparian which were not so at the time of the patent. Petitioner argues that its predecessor was therefore entitled to pass onto his successors all the rights he had in the property- — including his riparian rights. We need not, however, decide whether Hughes compels the application of federal law to the controversy before us, because the State’s claim in this ease is premised on a construction of the federal equal-footing doctrine and the congressionally enacted Submerged Lands Act.
State v. Gill, 259 Ala. 177, 183, 66 So. 2d 141, 145 (1953). For a perceptive discussion of the historical antecedents for the sovereign’s rights in the beds of navigable waterways and of the State’s modem interests in those lands, see Lundquist, Artificial Additions to Riparian Land: Extending the Doctrine of Accretion, 14 Ariz. L. Rev. 315 (1972).
152 U. S., at 11.
The Supreme Court of Arizona relied on this Court’s decisions in Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 9 How. 471 (1850), and Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845), for the proposition that a federal rechan-neling project could not diminish the extent of the State’s landholdings. Those decisions involved post-statehood federal patents of land covered by navigable waters at the time of statehood. This Court held only that since title to lands beneath navigable waters was vested in Alabama at statehood, the Federal Government did not thereafter own the subject lands, hence its attempted conveyance was void. The Court did not intimate that the operation of federal law could not diminish the State’s title to lands formerly beneath navigable waters.
For a discussion of the navigational-purpose limitation on the State’s interest in the lands beneath its waterways, see United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411, 419 (1926); Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 416, 432 P. 2d 3, 8-9 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 949 (1968); Michaelson v. Silver Beach Assn., 342 Mass. 251, 173 N. E. 2d 273 (1961). The extent of the State’s interests should not be narrowly construed because it is denominated a navigational purpose. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F. 2d 199 (CA5 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 910 (1971) (recognizing conservation as a proper interest). Since the State asserts no public need for ownership of the subject land we do not attempt to define the exact parameters of the permissible public purposes.
In contrast, this Court’s decision in Marine R. & Coal Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 47 (1921), involved a determination of federal rights in land created when the Federal Government itself filled in tidelands belonging to it under a series of interstate compacts.
108 Ariz., at 259, 495 P. 2d, at 1313 (emphasis added).
43 U. S. C. § 1301 (a)(1).
The legislative history of the Act indicates that it was intended to be merely confirmatory of the State’s existing rights in the beds of their navigable waterways. S. Rep. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 6-8 (1953); People v. Hecker, 179 Cal. App. 2d 823, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1960). See generally 1953 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1395-1640. Congress was concerned about this Court’s decision in United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947), which held that the Federal Government had a “paramount interest” in the marginal sea-lands “outside of inland waters, but within territorial limits” — and that the States had no title in those lands. See H. R. Rep. No. 1778, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1948). That concern is irrelevant to the case before us, which involves an inland waterway.
43 U. S. C. §1301 (f).
E. g., Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359, 365-366 (1892); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371 (1891); Anderson-Tully Co. v. Tingle, 166 F. 2d 224, 227-228 (CA5), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 816 (1948).
107 Ariz., at 472, 489 P. 2d, at 706 (Lockwood, J., dissenting), quoting, State v. R. E. Janes Gravel Co., 175 S. W. 2d 739, 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Maufrais v. State, 142 Tex. 559, 180 S. W. 2d 144 (1944).
See sources collected at Burns v. Forbes, 412 F. 2d 995, 997 n. 2 (CA3 1969); cf. Beaver v. United States, 350 F. 2d 4, 11 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 937 (1966); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 233 La. 915, 98 So. 2d 236, aff’d on rehearing, 233 La. 940, 98 So. 2d 244 (1957).
See, e. g., Philadelphia
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Petitioners, the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and its Secretary, seek review of a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordering them to make payments to various nursing homes. These payments represent the amount that Florida was found to have underpaid these nursing homes in the course of its Medicaid reimbursements from July 1, 1976, to October 18, 1977. Because we conclude that the court below misapplied the prevailing standard for finding a waiver of the State’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, we grant a writ of certiorari and reverse.
I
In 1972, Congress amended the Medicaid Program to provide that every “skilled nursing facility and intermediate care facility” must be reimbursed by participating States on a “cost related basis.” 86 Stat. 1426, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (13)(E). This amendment was to take effect on July 1, 1976, ibid., and had the effect of altering some reimbursement arrangements based on “flat rates” established by the States. Regulations implementing this change were not promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) until 1976. As a result, the regulations provided that HEW would not enforce the new “cost related” reimbursement requirement until January 1, 1978. 46 CFR §250.30 (a)(3) (iv) (1976).
In March 1977, respondents, an association of Florida nursing homes and various individual nursing homes in southern Florida, brought suit in federal court against the Secretary of HEW and petitioners. They argued that the delay in enforcement created by the implementing regulations was inconsistent with the statutory directive that cost-related reimbursements begin on July 1, 1976. In addition to prospective relief, they sought retroactive relief in the form of payments by the State of the difference between the reimbursement they had received since July 1, 1976, and the amounts they would have received under a cost-related system. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held the regulations invalid, relying on its previous decision in Golden Isles Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Califano, 442 F. Supp. 201 (1977), aff’d, 616 F. 2d 1355 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Taylor v. Golden Isles Con valescent Center, Inc., 449 U. S. 872 (1980). These two cases were consolidated for consideration of the availability of retroactive relief, and the District Court held that such relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling that the regulations were invalid, but reversed the District Court’s determination that retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 616 F. 2d 1355 (1980). The court acknowledged that retroactive monetary relief against a State in federal court is forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment “if not consented to by the state.” Id., at 1362. It found the requisite consent, however, based on two acts of the State. First, Florida law provides that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is a “body corporate” with the capacity to “sue and be sued,” Fla. Stat. § 402.34 (1979). 616 F. 2d, at 1363. In addition to this general waiver of sovereign immunity, the court found a specific waiver of the Eleventh Amendment’s immunity from suit in federal court in an agreement under the Medicaid Program in which the Department agreed to “recognize and abide by all State and Federal Laws, Regulations, and Guidelines applicable to participation in and administration of, the Title XIX Medicaid Program.” Ibid. “By contracting with appellants to be bound by all federal laws applicable to the Medicaid program, the state has expressly waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and consented to suit in federal court regarding any action by providers alleging a breach of these laws.” Ibid.
II
The analysis in this case is controlled by our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). There we applied the Eleventh Amendment to retroactive grants of welfare benefits and discussed the proper standard for a waiver of this immunity by a State. On the latter issue we stated that “we will find waiver only where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’ ” Id., at 673, quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 (1909). We added that the “mere fact that a State participates in a program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in the federal courts.” 415 U. S., at 673.
The holding below, finding a waiver in this case, cannot be reconciled with the principles set out in Edelman. As the Court of Appeals recognized, the State’s general waiver of sovereign immunity for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services “does not constitute a waiver by the state of its constitutional immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in federal court.” 616 F. 2d, at 1363. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 441 (1900). And the fact that the Department agreed explicitly to obey federal law in administering the program can hardly be deemed an express waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. This agreement merely stated a customary condition for any participation in a federal program by the State, and Edelman already established that neither such participation in itself, nor a concomitant agreement to obey federal law, is sufficient to waive the protection of the Eleventh Amendment. 415 U. S., at 673-674.
We therefore reverse the decision below.
It is so ordered.
Justice Marshall dissents and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, substantially for the reasons stated in his dissent in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 688 (1974).
Justice Blackmun also dissents and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals substantially for the reasons stated in Justice Marshall’s dissent in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 688 (1974).
In a commentary accompanying the new regulations, the Secretary noted that no States would be able to accumulate needed data in time to meet the statutory deadline of July 1, 1976. For this reason, cost-related reimbursement was not required under the regulations until January 1, 1978, but the States were “encouraged to meet each requirement of the regulations as soon as possible.” 41 Fed. Reg. 27305 (1976).
The Golden Isles case and this case remained consolidated on appeal. The decision below, however, produced two separate petitions for cer-tiorari. The first, Taylor v. Golden Isles Convalescent Center, Inc., cert. denied, 449 U. S. 872 (1980), involved jurisdictional and venue issues. The present petition relates only to the availability of retroactive relief.
Petitioners argue that under Florida law a waiver of immunity can only be accomplished by a state statute. See Fla. Const., Art. 10, § 13. No such waiver is present here.
In addition, it is worth noting that in October 1976 Congress repealed a provision requiring States participating in Medicaid to waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity. Pub. L. 94-552, 90 Stat. 2540. This repeal was made retroactive to January 1, 1976.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
MR. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents for decision important questions regarding the applicability to the United States of the restrictions against stay of state court proceedings contained in 28 U. S. C. § 2283 and the propriety of the injunction decreed by the District Court and sustained by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner in 1953 had filed a peti-tory action in a Louisiana state court against respondent-mineral-lessees of the United States. In that action, a suit by one out of possession claiming title to, and possession of, immovables, petitioner sought to have itself declared owner of the mineral rights under land owned by the United States, and it also sought an accounting for oil and other minerals removed by respondent-lessees under their lease from the United States. Petitioner founded its claim on Louisiana Act No. 315 of 1940, La. Rev. Stat., 1950, § 9:5806, which, it alleged, made “impre-scriptible” a reservation of mineral rights.in a deed of December 21,1938, to the United States by its predecessor in title.
Respondent-lessees filed exceptions in the state court proceedings, urging that under Louisiana law the lessor should be made a party and the lessees discharged from the suit, that this was essentially a suit against the United States, which had not consented to be sued, that the United States was an indispensable party, and that no cause of action had been stated. The state trial court found that a cause of action had been stated, and it overruled the exceptions.
At this point the United States, joining petitioner and other interested parties as defendants, brought the present suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to quiet title to the mineral rights; it also sought a preliminary injunction to restrain petitioner from prosecuting its action in the state court. The United States based its claim of ownership on the provision in the 1938 deed from petitioner’s predecessor in title that the reservation of mineral rights would expire on April 1,1945, subject to certain conditions not material to this case. The United States claimed that irreparable injury in the form of loss of royalties would result from any temporary, wrongful dispossession of its lessees by the state court proceedings. Affidavits were also submitted in support of the claim that permanent loss of wells currently producing oil would probably result from any temporary cessation of production. The petitioner moved to dismiss the United States’ complaint on the ground that the state court had already assumed jurisdiction over the property in question; in the alternative, petitioner moved to stay the federal proceedings pending determination of the state court action because questions of state law were involved.
The District Court held that, since the United States was not a party to the state court suit, the title of the United States could be tried only in the federal court action and that an injunction against prosecution of the state proceedings should issue to protect its jurisdiction pending determination of the ownership of the property. 127 F. Supp. 439. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the preliminary injunction was proper because “the district court under the clear provisions of the statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1345, became vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the title of the United States to the mineral rights claimed by appellant.” 224 F. 2d 381, 383-384. Because of the presence of important and difficult questions of federal-state relations, questions more difficult than the Government appears to have found them, we granted certiorari. 350 U. S. 964.
28 U. S. C. § 2283 provides:
“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”
It must first be decided whether this section applies to stays sought by the United States because different answers to this question will put different aspects on other issues in the case. An analogous problem was presented in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, where the Court held that the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. § 101, that no federal court had jurisdiction, subject to qualifications, to issue an injunction in labor disputes to prohibit certain acts, did not apply to the United States. Thé Norris-LaGuardia Act, like 28 U. S. C. § 2283, effected, in general language, a limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Furthermore, since it was largely the diversity jurisdiction which spawned the substantive problems that the Norris-LaGuardia Act removed from the federal courts, the limitations on the federal courts imposed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, like those of 28 U. S. C. § 2283, were in an area of federal-state relations calling for particular circumspection in adjudication.
In interpreting the general language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court relied heavily on “an old and well-known rule,” albeit a rule of construction, “that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.” 330 U. S., at 272. While, strictly speaking, any “pre-existing” rights would have to be found in the 1789-1793 pre-statute period, the rationale of the rule requires not that the rights be “preexisting” but rather that they would exist apart from the statute. There can be no doubt, apart from the restrictions of 28 U. S. C. § 2283, of the right of the United States to enjoin state court proceedings whenever the prerequisites for relief by way of injunction be present. Treating the rule invoked in the United Mine Workers case merely as an aid to construction, it would by itself lead us to hold that the general language of 28 U. S. C. § 2283 did not apply to the United States in the absence of countervailing considerations, such as significant legislative history pointing toward its inclusion or inferences clearly to be drawn from relevant presuppositions for so including it.
In United Mine Workers, the Court did not rely entirely on the rule of construction because its reading of the Act as a whole and the legislative history supported the conclusion that the United States was not to be included. In this case, there is no legislative material to support or to gainsay the applicability of the rule of construction. There is, however, a persuasive reason why the federal court’s power to stay state court proceedings might have been restricted when a private party was seeking the stay but not when the United States was seeking similar relief. The statute is designed to prevent conflict between federal and state courts. This policy is much more compelling when it is the litigation of private parties which threatens to draw the two judicial systems into conflict than when it is the United States which seeks a stay to prevent threatened irreparable injury to a national interest. The frustration of superior federal interests that would ensue from precluding the Federal Government from obtaining a stay of state court proceedings except under the severe restrictions of 28 U. S. C. § 2283 would be so great that we cannot reasonably impute such a purpose to Congress from the general language of 28 U. S. C. § 2283 alone. It is always difficult to feel confident about construing an ambiguous statute when the aids to construction are so meager, but the interpretation excluding the United States from the coverage of the statute seems to us preferable in the context of healthy federal-state relations.
The question still remains whether the granting of an injunction was proper in the circumstances of this case. We start with one certainty. The suit in the federal court was the only one that could finally determine the basic issue in the litigation — whether the title of the United States to the mineral rights was affected by Louisiana Act No. 315 of 1940. The United States was not a party to the state suit and, under settled principles, title to land in possession of the United States under a claim of interest cannot be tried as against the United States by a suit against persons holding under the authority of the United States. See United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196. Although the state court might mould petitioner’s suit to try title into a suit for possession or might merely order respondent-lessees to account for minerals removed, nevertheless such proceedings could not settle the basic issue in the litigation and might well cause confusion if they resulted in a judgment inconsistent with that subsequently rendered by the federal court.
Petitioner relies heavily on United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463. There, in a federal district court proceeding, the United States was claiming by assignment certain funds of three Russian insurance companies that were being held in the custody of a state court, in connection with the liquidation of the companies, subject to court orders concerning distribution to claimants under the state insurance laws. On the basis of this claim, the United States sought to enjoin distribution of the funds and to require payment of them to it. This Court, affirming dismissal of the complaints and denial of the injunction, held that the state court had obtained jurisdiction over the funds first and that the litigation should be resolved in that court. The Court also noted that there were numerous other claimants, indispensable parties, who had not been made parties to the federal court suit. In remitting the United States to the state court, the Court saw no “impairment of any rights” of the United States or “any sacrifice of its proper dignity as a sovereign.” Id., at 480-481.
The situation in the present case is different. All the parties in the state court proceeding have been joined in the federal proceeding. Moreover, the Bank of New York case presented the more unusual situation where the United States, like any private claimant, made a claim against funds that it never possessed and that were in the hands of depositaries appointed by the state court. In this case, a private party is seeking by a state proceeding to obtain property currently in the hands of persons holding under the United States; the United States is seeking to protect that possession and quiet title by a federal court proceeding. Therefore, since the position of the United States is essentially a defensive one, we think that it should be permitted to choose the forum in this case, even though the state litigation has the elements of an action characterized as quasi in rem. We therefore hold that the District Court properly exercised its jurisdiction to entertain the suit in the federal court and to prevent the effectuation of state court proceedings that might conflict with the ultimate federal court judgment.
One further aspect of the case remains to be considered. The District Court advanced this additional ground for its decision:
"Moreover-, if the state court suit is allowed to proceed to final judgment, the rights of the United States to the property in question will actually be determined ‘behind its back’ ... for the reason that, since ownership of these mineral rights will turn on an interpretation of a state statute . . . this court and the appellate federal courts may be required, under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins ... to follow that judgment in spite of the fact that the United States is not a party to those proceedings. . . .” 127 F. Supp., at 444.
But the fact that the United States is not a party to the state court litigation does not mean that the federal court should initiate interpretation of a state statute. In fact, where questions of constitutionality are involved — and the Government contends that an application of the state statute adverse to its interests would be unconstitutional — our rule has been precisely the opposite: “as questions of federal constitutional power have become more and more intertwined with preliminary doubts about local law, we have insisted that federal courts do not decide questions of constitutionality on the basis of preliminary guesses regarding local law.” Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105; see Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U. S. 368, 383; Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 498-502.
The Government contends that Act No. 315 of 1940 does not apply when the parties themselves have contracted for a reservation of specific duration and that if the statute is construed to apply to this situation, it would impair the obligation of the Government’s contract. Petitioner disagrees. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has never considered the specific issue or even discussed generally the rationale of the statute, especially with reference to problems of constitutionality. The District Court recognized the importance of the statute in deciding this case; it also recognized that a problem of interpretation was involved, that the statute cannot be read by him who runs. What are the situations to which the statute is applicable? Is the statute merely declaratory of prior Louisiana law? What are the problems that it was designed to meet? The answers to these questions are, or may be, relevant. Before attempting to answer them and to decide their relation to the issues in the case, we think it advisable to have an interpretation, if possible, of the state statute by the only court that can interpret the statute with finality, the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Louisiana declaratory judgment procedure appears available to secure such an interpretation, La. Rev. Stat., 1950, 13:4231 et seq., and the United States of course may appear to urge its interpretation of the statute. See Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 512-513. It need hardly be added that the state courts in such a proceeding can decide definitively only questions of state law that are not subject to overriding-federal law.
We therefore modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals to permit an interpretation of the state statute to be sought with every expedition in the state court in conformity with this opinion.
Modified and affirmed.
The reservation, in its pertinent portion, provided: “The Vendor reserves from this sale the right to mine and remove, or to grant to others the right to mine and remove, all oil, gas and other valuable minerals which may be deposited in or under said lands, and to remove any oil, gas or other valuable minerals from the premises; the right to enter upon said lands at any time for the purpose of mining and removing said oil, gas and minerals, said right, subject to the conditions hereinafter set forth, to expire April 1, 1945, it being understood, however, that the vendors will pay to the United States of America, 5% of the gross proceeds received by them as royalties or otherwise from all oil or minerals so removed from in or under the aforedescribed lands, until such time as the vendors shall have paid to the United States of America, the sum of $25,000, being the purchase price paid by said United States of America for the aforedescribed properties.
“Provided that at the termination of the ten (10) year period of reservation, if not extended, or at the termination of any extended period in case the operation has not been carried on for the number of days stated, the right to mine shall terminate, and complete fee in the land become vested in the United States.
“The reservation of the oil and mineral rights herein made for the original period of ten (10) years and for any extended period or periods in accordance with the above provisions shall not be affected by any subsequent conveyance of all or any of the aforementioned properties by the United States of America, but said mineral rights shall, subject to the conditions above ... set forth, remain vested in the vendors.”
Act No. 315 provides: “. . . when land is acquired by conventional deed or contract, condemnation or expropriation proceedings by the United States of America, or any of its subdivisions or agencies, from any person, firm or corporation, and by the act of acquisition, verdict or judgment, oil, gas, and/or other minerals or royalties are reserved, or the land so acquired is by the act of acquisition conveyed subject to a prior sale or reservation of oil, gas and/or other minerals or royalties, still in force and effect, said rights so reserved or previously sold shall be imprescriptible." See also the prior Act No. 151 of 1938 providing that prescription should not run against a reservation of mineral rights in real estate acquired by the United States or the State of Louisiana.
The basic provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2283 go back to 1793, 1 Stat. 335.
Most of the lower federal courts that have considered this problem have, without much discussion, reached the same result. E. g., United States v. Taylor’s Oak Ridge Corp., 89 F. Supp. 28; United States v. Cain, 72 F. Supp. 897; United States v. Phillips, 33 F. Supp. 261, reversed on other grounds, 312 U. S. 246; United States v. McIntosh, 57 F. 2d 573; United States v. Babcock, 6 F. 2d 160, reversed for modification, 9 F. 2d 905; United States v. Inaba, 291 F. 416. But see United States v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co., 90 F. 2d 970; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 62 F. Supp. 1017, appeal dismissed by stipulation, 151 F. 2d 1022.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V), forbids retaliation by employers against employees who report workplace race or gender discrimination. The question here is whether this protection extends to an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in answering questions during an employer’s internal investigation. We hold that it does.
I
In 2002, respondent Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (Metro), began looking into rumors of sexual harassment by the Metro School District’s employee relations director, Gene Hughes. 211 Fed. Appx. 373, 374 (CA6 2006). When Veronica Frazier, a Metro human resources officer, asked petitioner Vicky Crawford, a 30-year Metro employee, whether she had witnessed “inappropriate behavior” on the part of Hughes, id., at 374-375, Crawford described several instances of sexually harassing behavior: once, Hughes had answered her greeting, “‘Hey Dr. Hughes, [wjhat’s up?/ ” by grabbing his crotch and saying “ ‘[Y]ou know what’s up’ he had repeatedly “ ‘put his crotch up to [her] window’ and on one occasion he had entered her office and “ ‘grabbed her head and pulled it to his crotch/ ” id., at 375, and n. 1. Two other employees also reported being sexually harassed by Hughes. Id., at 375. Although Metro took no action against Hughes, it did fire Crawford and the two other accusers soon after finishing the investigation, saying in Crawford’s case that it was for embezzlement. Ibid. Crawford claimed Metro was retaliating for her report of Hughes’s behavior and filed a charge of a Title VII violation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), followed by this suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Ibid.
The Title VII antiretaliation provision has two clauses, making it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... [1] because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or [2] because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-3(a). The one is known as the “opposition clause,” the other as the “participation clause,” and Crawford accused Metro of violating both.
The District Court granted summary judgment for Metro. It held that Crawford could not satisfy the opposition clause because she had not “instigated or initiated any complaint,” but had “merely answered questions by investigators in an already-pending internal investigation, initiated by someone else.” Memorandum Opinion, No. 3:03-cv-0996 (MD Tenn., Jan. 6,2005), App. C to Pet. for Cert. 16a-17a. It concluded that her claim also failed under the participation clause, which Sixth Circuit precedent confined to protecting “'an employee’s participation in an employer’s internal investigation . . . where that investigation occurs pursuant to a pending EEOC charge’ ” (not the case here). Id., at 15a (emphasis deleted) (quoting Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F. 3d 537, 543 (CA6 2003)).
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same grounds, holding that the opposition clause “'demands active, consistent “opposing” activities to warrant... protection against retaliation,’” 211 Fed. Appx., at 376 (quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 Fed. Appx. 607, 610 (CA6 2004)), whereas Crawford did “not claim to have instigated or initiated any complaint prior to her participation in the investigation, nor did she take any further action following the investigation and prior to her firing,” 211 Fed. Appx., at 376. Again like the trial judge, the Court of Appeals understood that Crawford could show no violation of the participation clause because her “ ‘employer’s internal investigation’ ” was not conducted “‘pursuant to a pending EEOC charge.’” Ibid, (quoting Abbott, supra, at 543).
Because the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with those of other Circuits, particularly as to the opposition clause, see, e. g., McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F. 3d 256, 262 (CA7 1996), we granted Crawford’s petition for certiorari. 552 U. S. 1162 (2008). We now reverse and remand for further proceedings.
II
The opposition clause makes it “unlawful ... for an employer to discriminate against any... employe[e]... because he has opposed any practice made . . . unlawful ... by this subchapter.” §2000e-3(a). The term “oppose,” being left undefined by the statute, carries its ordinary meaning, Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979): “[t]o resist or antagonize ...; to contend against; to confront; resist; withstand,” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1710 (2d ed. 1957). Although these actions entail varying expenditures of energy, “resist frequently implies more active striving than OPPOSE.” Ibid.; see also Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1359 (2d ed. 1987) (defining “oppose” as “to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion”).
The statement Crawford says she gave to Frazier is thus covered by the opposition clause, as an ostensibly disapproving account of sexually obnoxious behavior toward her by a fellow employee, an answer she says antagonized her employer to the point of sacking her on a false pretense. Crawford’s description of the louche goings-on would certainly qualify in the minds of reasonable jurors as “resist[ant]” or “antagonistic]” to Hughes’s treatment, if for no other reason than the point argued by the Government and explained by an EEOC guideline: “When an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a form of employment discrimination, that communication” virtually always “constitutes the employee’s opposition to the activity.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9 (citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §§8-II-B(l), (2), p. 614:0003 (Mar. 2003)); see also Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U. S. 389, 399 (2008) (explaining that EEOC compliance manuals “reflect ‘a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance’ ” (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 642 (1998))). It is true that one can imagine exceptions, like an employee’s description of a supervisor’s racist joke as hilarious, but these will be eccentric cases, and this is not one of them.
The Sixth Circuit thought answering questions fell short of opposition, taking the view that the clause “ ‘demands active, consistent “opposing” activities to warrant. . . protection against retaliation/” 211 Fed. Appx., at 376 (quoting Bell, supra, at 610), and that an employee must “instigat[e] or initiat[e]” a complaint to be covered, 211 Fed. Appx., at 376. But though these requirements obviously exemplify opposition as commonly understood, they are not limits of it.
“Oppose” goes beyond “active, consistent” behavior in ordinary discourse, where we would naturally use the word to speak of someone who has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it. Countless people were known to “oppose” slavery before Emancipation, or are said to “oppose” capital punishment today, without writing public letters, taking to the streets, or resisting the government. And we would call it “opposition” if an employee took a stand against an employer’s discriminatory practices not by “instigating” action, but by standing pat, say, by refusing to follow a supervisor’s order to fire a junior worker for discriminatory reasons. Cf. McDonnell, supra, at 262 (finding employee covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 where his employer retaliated against him for failing to prevent his subordinate from filing an EEOC charge). There is, then, no reason to doubt that a person can “oppose” by responding to someone else’s question just as surely as by provoking the discussion, and nothing in the statute requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.
Metro and its amici support the Circuit panel’s insistence on “active” and “consistent” opposition by arguing that the lower the bar for retaliation claims, the less likely it is that employers will look into what may be happening outside the executive suite. As they see it, if retaliation is an easy charge when things go bad for an employee who responded to enquiries, employers will avoid the headache by refusing to raise questions about possible discrimination.
The argument is unconvincing, for we think it underestimates the incentive to enquire that follows from our decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775 (1998). Ellerth and Faragher hold “[a]n employer . . . subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with ... authority over the employee.” Ellerth, supra, at 765; Faragher, supra, at 807. Although there is no affirmative defense if the hostile environment “culminates in a tangible employment action” against the employee, Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 765, an employer does have a defense “[w]hen no tangible employment action is taken” if it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any” discriminatory conduct and “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise,” ibid. Employers are thus subject to a strong inducement to ferret out and put a stop to any discriminatory activity in their operations as a way to break the circuit of imputed liability. Ibid.; see also Brief for Petitioner 24-28, and nn. 31-35 (citing studies demonstrating that Ellerth and Faragher have prompted many employers to adopt or strengthen procedures for investigating, preventing, and correcting discriminatory conduct). The possibility that an employer might someday want to fire someone who might charge discrimination traceable to an internal investigation does not strike us as likely to diminish the attraction of an Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense.
That aside, we find it hard to see why the Sixth Circuit’s rule would not itself largely undermine the Ellerth-Faragher scheme, along with the statute’s “‘primary objective’” of “avoiding] harm” to employees. Faragher, supra, at 806 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417 (1975)). If it were clear law that an employee who reported discrimination in answering an employer’s questions could be penalized with no remedy, prudent employees would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII offenses against themselves or against others. This is no imaginary horrible given the documented indications that “[f]ear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination.” Brake, Retaliation, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 18, 20 (2005); see also id., at 37, and n. 58 (compiling studies). The appeals court’s rule would thus create a real dilemma for any knowledgeable employee in a hostile work environment if the boss took steps to assure a defense under our cases. If the employee reported discrimination in response to the enquiries, the employer might well be free to penalize her for speaking up. But if she kept quiet about the discrimination and later filed a Title VII claim, the employer might well escape liability, arguing that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct [any discrimination] promptly” but “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of . . . preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.” Ellerth, supra, at 765. Nothing in the statute’s text or our precedent supports this catch-22.
Because Crawford’s conduct is covered by the opposition clause, we do not reach her argument that the Sixth Circuit misread the participation clause as well. But that does not mean the end of this case, for Metro’s motion for summary judgment raised several defenses to the retaliation charge besides the scope of the two clauses; the District Court never reached these others owing to its ruling on the elements of retaliation, and they remain open on remand.
Ill
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Because this case arises out of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for Metro, “we are required to view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, [Crawford].” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 195, n. 2 (2004) (per curiam).
Metro suggests in passing that it was unclear whether Crawford actually opposed Hughes’s behavior because some of her defensive responses were “inappropriate,” such as telling Hughes to “bite me” and “flip[ping] him a bird.” Brief for Respondent 1-2 (internal quotation marks omitted). This argument fails not only because at the summary judgment stage we must “view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in [Crawford’s] favor,” Brosseau, 543 U. S., at 195, n. 2, but also because Crawford gave no indication that Hughes’s gross clowning was anything but offensive to her.
Metro also argues that “[Requiring the employee to actually initiate a complaint. .. conforms with the employee’s ‘obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm’ articulated in Faragher and Ellerth.” Brief for Respondent 28 (quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 807 (1998)). But that mitigation requirement only applies to employees who are suffering discrimination and have the opportunity to fix it by “tak[ing] advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer,” 524 U. S., at 807; it is based on the general principle “that a victim has a duty ‘to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize . . . damages,’ ” id,., at 806 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 231, n. 15 (1982)). We have never suggested that employees have a legal obligation to report discrimination against others to their employer on their own initiative, let alone lose statutory protection by failing to speak. Extending the mitigation requirement so far would make no sense; employees will often face retaliation not for opposing discrimination they themselves face, but for reporting discrimination suffered by others. Thus, they are not “victims” of anything until they are retaliated against, and it would be absurd to require them to “mitigate” damages they may be unaware they will suffer.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent California Electric Power Company produces electricity in California, partially by hydroelectric projects licensed under Part I of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063, as amended by Title II of the Public Utility Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 838, 16 U. S. C. § 791a et seq., and markets the greater portion of it, subject to respondent Public Utilities Commission’s authority, in that State. The jurisdictional dispute which is our present concern relates only to certain power sales by the Company to the Navy Department and to Mineral County, Nevada, for consumption there. This power, following production, is transmitted at 55,000 volts to the Company’s Mill Creek substation in California, about 25 miles from the border, on its own lines. There it is figuratively taken over by the Navy and by the County, and delivered on their lines at the same high voltage to Hawthorne, Nevada, where it is stepped down for local distribution and consumption. The Navy’s power is used at its ammunition depot, largely in official industrial operations; between 15% and 29%, however, is distributed for consumption in the private households and enterprises of tenants at the Navy’s low-cost housing project nearby. These sales are metered individually and each purchaser is billed according to his own use. The power purchased by the County is all resold to local consumers, with the exception of minor line losses and official use.
The Navy’s contract for purchase of the power was negotiated in 1943, and provided for termination on 60-day notice; the County’s was entered into in 1945 for a stated period of three years. In 1947 the Power Company applied to the State Commission for a general rate increase which, after hearings at which the Navy was represented, was granted. Thereafter, the Company terminated its Navy contract and failed to renew that with the County, giving notice of its intention to apply the new schedule to these sales. Both purchasers demurred, and the Company reapplied to the State Commission for a ruling as to the applicability of the general schedule to these particular operations. After some early state exploratory hearings, the Federal Power Commission, on February 15, 1950, issued an order to the Company to show cause as to why the rates were not subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. Thus joined, the issues were heard by both agencies at a joint proceeding on March 20 and 21, 1950. Both eventually decided in favor of their own asserted authority. The State Commission’s supporting opinion was denied review by the California Supreme Court on January 21, 1952, thus affirming its holding, while that of the Federal Power Commission was likewise approved by the Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, California Electric Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 199 F. 2d 206. As a federal question concerning the applicability of Part II of the Act was raised, certiorari was granted, 344 U. S. 810, to bring the record here from the state proceedings under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3).
I.
Federal authority, which we think obtains, is asserted under Part II of the Federal Power Act. This applies “to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” § 201(b). Regulation of the rates of such sales — other types of authority in connection with such interstate transmission operations are granted in other sections — -rests on §§ 205 (a) and 206 (a). The preliminary issue as to whether the operations in question fall within the concept of interstate commerce, on which the federal power initially depends, can be shortly disposed of, for Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U. S. 497, 509-515, firmly established that commerce includes the transportation of public property, while the irrelevance of the fact that this electricity is transmitted across the state boundary over lines owned by the Navy and by the County, as purchasers, may be seen from Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 319 U. S. 61, 69, 71, and Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498.
The most serious contentions pressed in opposition to application of Part II, arise from the self-limiting statement therein that the Act is “to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.” So respondents contend that Power Commission jurisdiction only begins where the local regulatory power ends, and point to Part I, § 20, as supporting their contention that the limitation applies to the facts of this case. Section 20 provides that when power from projects licensed under Part I, which that energy sold to the Navy and the County includes,
“shall enter into interstate or foreign commerce the rates... and the service... by any... licensee... or by any person, corporation, or association purchasing power from such licensee for sale and distribution or use in public service shall be reasonable... to the customer... and whenever any of the States directly concerned has not provided a commission or other authority to enforce the requirements of this section within such State... or such States are unable to agree through their properly constituted authorities on the services... or on the rates... jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the commission... to regulate... so much of the services... and... rates... therefor as constitute interstate or foreign commerce....” 41 Stat. 1073, 16 U. S. C. § 813.
Both Nevada and California have regulatory agencies with certain rate powers. And we may assume, though the Government asserts otherwise, that both agencies can enforce reasonable rate orders and have not disagreed. Respondents point to this as satisfying § 20, and thus ousting any Part II regulation. In short, they contend — what at first blush may appear anomalous— that federal rate jurisdiction under Part II may be prohibited by the fact that some portion of the power sold originated in hydroelectric projects federally licensed under Part I. We do not agree.
Admittedly, § 20 contemplated state regulation. And it may well be, as indicated by the congressional hearings, that Congress quite frankly chose the local authorities to regulate the bulk of interstate sales of electricity from licensed projects. In fact, a contrary view would have been almost astonishing as an historical proposition, for neither the large interstate operations of electric utilities that have developed during the last thirty years, nor the concomitant desirability of federal regulation, could have been foreseen in 1920. Long-range transmission was not then adequately developed, nor had the various local utilities by then undergone the integration into large centralized systems which later came about. So we may assume that Congress, as a policy judgment, accepted and adapted the substantial tradition of local utility regulation to power production licensed under the federal Act.
But there is no evidence that this was done with any firm intent to settle with the states a power essentially national. For whatever views of the draftsmen of § 20 as to the efficacy of state regulation, the jurisdictional lines between local and national authority were not finally determined until this Court’s opinion in Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83. This decision followed the Federal Water Power Act by some seven years. In short, that case established what has unquestionably become a fixed premise of our constitutional law but what was not at all clear in 1920, that the Commerce Clause forbade state regulation of some utility rates. State power was held not to extend to an interstate sale “in wholesale quantities, not to consumers, but to distributing companies for resale to consumers.” 273 U. S., at 89. Attleboro reiterated and accepted the holding of Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 252 U. S. 23, that sales across the state line direct to consumers is a local matter within the authority of the agency of the importing state. But it prohibited regulation of wholesale sales for resale by either interested commission.
Respondents seek to escape that doctrine, however, by pointing to the fact that there was not there involved sales of electricity produced at a project licensed under Part I. They admit that absent § 20 of that Part, the later Part II authority would apply exclusively and determine the result. But, they say, § 20 creates an exception, which the language of Attleboro did not reach, for hydroelectric energy transmitted across state lines under the aegis of coordinated state regulation. In short, it is alleged that § 20 “conferred jurisdiction” on the states.
We do not agree. Attleboro declared state regulation of interstate transmission of power for resale forbidden as a direct burden on commerce. The states may act as to such a subject only when Congress has specifically granted permission for the exercise of this state power over articles moving interstate which would otherwise be immune. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 560-562. Section 20 cannot bear this interpretation; it did not establish the source of the energy as a significant factor determining whether state or -federal authority applied. It is quite different from those few unique federal statutes this Court has heretofore considered, "subjecting interstate commerce... to present and future state prohibitions,” or regulation, Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 326, in the exercise of the constitutional commerce power. Its language indicates no consideration or desire to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause; it merely states that the federal power shall not be invoked unless certain conditions of state inability to regulate obtain. Section 20 quite obviously is not based on any recognition of the constitutional barrier, but rather assumes what Attleboro held did not exist — state authority to reach interstate sales of energy for resale; its sole concern is the application of federal regulation on the possible failure of the states to empower their regulatory agencies or their inability to agree.
Nor can it soundly be said that Congress in § 20 of Part I charged the states with responsibility of regulating rates of interstate sales of electricity through the use of the federal power over government property. U. S. Const.. Art. 4, § 3, cl. 2. As indicated in our discussion of the commerce power, there was in 1920 when § 20 was enacted no full appreciation of the limits of state power over sales of electricity for export or import for resale. So the language of § 20 required reasonable rates to consumers of electricity moving interstate and then added the provision that when no state commission was provided to enforce reasonable rates, or the states interested could not agree, the Federal Power Commission could act. We do not think such an arrangement for water power electricity as Part I, § 20, provides can be held to block the general authority of Part II. See note 13, infra.
The actions of the Congress following the Attleboro decision do not reflect any different interpretation of § 20. We note some interest in the application of that section in the light of the opinion, but nothing that is decisive of respondents’ contentions. In 1929, Senator Couzens introduced an amendment to his then pending bill, S. 6, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., to establish federal regulation of communications. The amendment, § 47 et seq., would have established a federal rate authority over all interstate power sales. “Power” was defined, § 47 (a) (4), to include electric energy, “whether or not produced by a licensee under the Federal Water Power Act.” The bill was referred to Committee, but Congress took no final action. In the next year, the same Committee held hearings on S. Res. 80, concerning a purported breakdown in the investigative powers of the Federal Power Commission as it then was constituted. The decision of the Commission of February 28, 1929, reported F. P. C. Ninth Ann. Rep. 119, was introduced. This argued that, as a result of Attleboro, the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over rates of interstate wholesale-for-resale sales of licensed hydroelectric power, until displaced by a § 20 agreement of the interested states which received congressional approval as a compact.
The first positive congressional action in the field, of course, was the Federal Power Act of 1935. The sweep of the statute is wholly inconsistent with any asserted state power as fixed by § 20 of the 1920 Act. We have examined the legislative history; its purport is quite clear. Part II was intended to “fill the gap”- — the phrase is repeated many times in the hearings, congressional debates and contemporary literature — left by Attleboro in utility regulation. Congress interpreted that case as prohibiting state control of wholesale rates in interstate commerce for resale, and so armed the Federal Power Commission with precisely that power. There is nothing to indicate that Congress’ conception of the states’ disability in 1935, or of the power it gave the Commission by Part II, did not include Part I electricity. In fact, the unqualified statements concerning Part II favor the opposite construction, for we find the Act explained time and again as empowering the agency with rate authority over interstate wholesale sales for resale; not once is this authority spoken of as one conditioned on the electricity concerned having been produced by steam generators or at nonlicensed dams.
This would largely determine our interpretation of the ambiguous reference to “matters... subject to regulation by the States,” § 201 (a), if nothing more were available to work with. However, there is other proof that Congress did not have in mind § 20-type state regulation. The limiting clause is spoken of only as protecting state regulation of local affairs, including rates of intrastate and interstate-for-consumption sales: “Facilities for local distribution and for the production and transmission of energy solely for one’s own use and not for resale are excluded.” Hearings, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 385. The phrase is not once mentioned as the distinct affirmation of state power over interstate sales for resale under § 20 that respondents apparently would recognize it to be. There are indeed further reasons for rejecting respondents’ construction of § 201 (a). The nature of the generating facilities, in the first place, has no functional significance for rate regulation; the same considerations that lead Congress to enact federal authority over interstate electricity in general would have been similarly applicable to power generated at licensed projects. Secondly, contemporary literature was frankly divided over whether any power over interstate sales for resale remained with the states after Attleboro. We cannot assume that Congress enacted Part II with the purpose of permitting the states to regulate hydroelectric energy through § 20. This is especially so in view of the dearth of legislative discussion of the matter.
So we conclude that the limitations of § 201 (a) on federal regulation cannot, and were not intended to, preserve an exclusive state regulation of wholesale hydroelectric sales across state borders. Even if we conceived of the matter as one peculiarly limited to the statutory wording of § 201 (a), our statement that “[exceptions to the primary grant of jurisdiction in the section are to be strictly construed,” Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 331 U. S. 682, 690-691, would be as applicable here as to § 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act. “Production” and “distribution” are elsewhere specifically excluded from Commission jurisdiction, § 201 (b); the phrase relied on in § 201 (a) was originally drafted as a declaration of “policy,” and the rewording which gave it its present more succinct form was unaccompanied by any “mention [of] this change as one of substance.” Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 319 U. S. 61, 76, referring to H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 26. “It cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction, even if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly expressed purpose.” Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U. S. 515, 527. To conceive of it now as a bench mark of the Commission’s power, or an affirmation of state authority over any interstate sales for resale, would be to speculate about a congressional purpose for which there is no support.
Part II is a direct result of Attleboro. They are to be read together. The latter left no power in the states to regulate licensees’ sales for resale in interstate commerce, while the former established federal jurisdiction over such sales. Discussion of the constitutional problem as reflected in that statute and the Natural Gas Act in recent cases supports this conclusion. Especially in the litigation arising under the Gas Act has this Court expressed the view that the limitations established on Commission jurisdiction therein were designed to coordinate precisely with those constitutionally imposed on the states. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 609-610; Panhandle Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S. 507, 514-515; Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 331 U. S. 682, 690-691; Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498, 506.
II.
We turn next to a definitional problem raised by respondents, relating to the sales to Mineral County. In short, it is this: §201 extends Commission jurisdiction to “sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” Subsection (d) of that section states:
“The term'sale of electric energy at wholesale’ when used in this Part means a sale of electric energy to any person for resale.”
And § 3 (4) equates “person” with “individual or a corporation,” while § 3 (3) excludes municipalities defined in § 3 (7) from the scope of the latter term. So respondents argue that the sales to Mineral County are neatly and decisively excluded from Part II rate regulation.
The use of these sections in support of an indirect exception to Part II has no support in the statutory scheme as a whole. Sections 306 and 313 (a), in fact, look quite the other way. They provide for complaints and petitions for rehearing by municipalities. And § 3 (7) contemplates municipalities as users and distributors of power. To accept respondents’ contention as to Mineral County would thwart the premise of these provisions: that such political subdivisions of the states can be aggrieved by the failure of a public utility selling power to them to satisfy the requirements of Part II.
Nor do we find any evidence of conscious coordination of §§ 3 (3), (4) and 201 (d) from the legislative history. True, they were simultaneously enacted, and, in fact, the interpolation of the word “person” into § 201 (d) occurred after the §§ 3 (3) and 3 (4) definitions were in existence in S. 2796, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., as passed by the Senate and reported to the House, June 13, 1935. But this alteration came at the insistence of the House. The Senate had provided for jurisdiction over sales occurring before or after interstate transmission,'ibid., §201 (f), and the House amendment, from which § 201 (d) in its present form stemmed, covered sales during the transmission across state lines for the first time. So the House Report is, we think, significant in its redefinition of the section: “A ‘wholesale’ transaction is defined to mean the sale of electric energy for resale.” H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8. We conclude, therefore, that the Congress attached no significance of substance to the addition of the word “person,” and in fact did not intend it as a limitation on Commission jurisdiction. Indeed quite the contrary was sought by the House amendment of §201 (d).
A third factor, in addition to the statutory scheme and legislative history of § 201 (d), is the rejection of respondents’ contention by the Commission and courts. Three circuits have just recently done so, and the Federal Power Commission’s long assertion that it has authority over rates of sales to municipalities has probably risen to tLe dignity of an agency “policy.” We have often stated our sympathy with established administrative interpretations such as this. Cf. United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U. S. 534, 549.
Where the language and purpose of the questioned statute is clear, courts, of course, follow the legislative direction in interpretation. Where the words are ambiguous, the judiciary may properly use the legislative history to reach a conclusion. And that method of determining congressional purpose is likewise applicable when the literal words would bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135; International Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U. S. 237, 243; Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 427, 432. So here, since it is our judgment that neither the legislative aim nor the realities of coordinated rate regulation compel it, we reject respondents’ plea that the Federal Power Commission can exercise no authority over sales to Mineral County, and, for similar reasons, the Company’s contention in No. 205 that the sales to the Navy are not sales to a “person.”
III.
The claim that the sales here occurred over “local distribution” facilities, § 201 (b), and were not “for resale” because the contracts did not state as much, are insubstantial. The sales were made in California but the facilities supplied “local distribution” only after the current was subdivided for individual consumers. But a final question- — whether the Federal Power Commission may exercise rate authority over the entire amount of power sold or merely that which is resold by the Navy and the County- — requires rather more extended discussion.
Certainly the concrete fact of resale of some portion of the electricity transmitted from a state to a point outside thereof invokes federal jurisdiction at the outset, despite the fact that the power thus used traveled along its interstate route “commingled” with other power sold by the same seller and eventually directly consumed by the same purchaser-distributor. But the Government argues from this that all the power exchanged between the same parties over the same facilities is subject to Commission order, irrespective of whether resold or not. For this proposition it relies on an alleged similarity between the problem as thus stated and that decided in Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 343 U. S. 414, 419. We held there that the federal rate authority must apply to all electricity sold, despite the fact that it was made up of power transmitted across state lines as well, as that produced locally. The impossibility of separating interstate from intrastate electricity consumed by each purchaser is patent. In such a case, federal rate jurisdiction must attach-to each distributor’s negotiated agreement with the seller irrespective of occasional and unpredictable use of non-jurisdictional intrastate power.
There, however, the problem was whether the sales of electricity were in “interstate commerce.” Here, it is a different one whether the entire sale is a “sale for resale.” For purposes of this case, we need not decide the question of whether a somewhat similar “commingling” — of power resold with that consumed directly by the purchaser — requires entire federal jurisdiction. For, even assuming arguendo respondents’ proposition that it may be proportionally limited, we hold that the record before us in this case does not present a set of facts or findings justifying that result. By the statute, Commission jurisdiction extends to “sales for resale,” “but not to any other sale.” § 201 (b). The problem, then, in applying respondents’ suggested interpretation, is to decide just what power transaction falls within this category of “sale for resale”— whether one involving the entire volume of electricity transmitted to the Navy or merely that which the buyer resells to others; the determinant is the delineation of “sale for resale.” See Panhandle Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S. 507, 516-517. Assuming respondents’ theory, this would turn, of course, on whether an essentially separate transaction covering the power directly consumed by the purchaser is identifiable. The present record will not permit such a finding. It may be that as an engineering proposition, accurate measurement of the volume resold and the volume directly consumed by the two parties is possible for each billing period. But there is no record evidence of separate rates, separate negotiations, separate contracts or separate rate regulation by official bodies, in short that the “sales” themselves were separate, and it is in these terms that the Act would require us to fix the limits of the jurisdictional grant. The attention of the Commission was not directed towards this matter. The question will not be ripe for our consideration until the California Commission has had an opportunity to perfect the record and to consider the problem.
Reversed.
California Electric Power Co., 50 Cal. P. U. C. 749, and California Electric Power Co., 89 P. U. R. (N. S.) 359, respectively.
There was some doubt as to the effect of the apparently conflicting orders, reflecting on the wisdom of our exercise of the power to review. The respondents contend that the state order merely permitted, but did not require, application of the higher rates to the Navy and County sales. The distinction, whatever its abstract attraction, misses the point that we are here considering whether or not the state agency had jurisdiction at the outset to consider these rates at all. That the order would have no concrete effect on the prices petitioners must pay is irrelevant and unlikely as well.
The Federal Power Commission merely ordered the Company to cease charging other than filed rates and so, while constituting a determinative assertion of its jurisdiction, apparently does not foreclose the submission of a new schedule, with usual rate-making procedures before the federal body. 18 CFR §§ 35.3, 35.5, 35.20.
§ 205 (a): “A11 rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just and reasonable...
§ 206 (a): “Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order.”
§ 201 (a): “It is hereby declared that the business of transmitting and selling electric energy... is affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation of matters relating to... the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce is necessary in the public interest, such Federal regulation, however, to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.”
Section 201 (b) states, in apparently similar vein, that the Act is not to “deprive a State or State commission of its lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across a State line.” The provision certainly does not go beyond that of § 201 (a), noted in the opinion, in limiting federal authority. This is true, not only because of the substantial similarity of the language, but also because it appears not to have been drafted with state rate regulation in mind. Rather, 79 Cong. Rec. 10527 indicates that the provision was intended to preserve the validity of certain state statutes prohibiting or regulating the volume of state power exported. Compare S. 2796, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., as introduced, § 201 (b), and idem as reported in the House, Union Calendar No. 451, § 201 (b). It has been so construed. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 5 F. P. C. 221, 235.
Section 20’s reference to state agreement has never been wholly clear. See footnotes 13, 16 and 19, infra. Our opinion, Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 343 U. S. 414, did not settle the issue, and it has been judicially discussed only rarely.
Hearings, House Committee on Water Power, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 65.
It was, of course, more than historical accident that caused the simultaneous passage of the Holding Company Act and the Federal Power Act; in fact, their mutual consideration by the 79th Congress, 1st Sess., see 79 Cong. Rec. passim, strikingly indicates Congress’ realization that state regulation had failed, both because of the giantism of the holding company and because of inability to reach interstate sales. See Davis, Influence of Federal Trade Commission’s Investigations, 14 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 21.
See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U. S. 190; Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U. S. 48; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311; Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U. S. 334, 350.
Compare the Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313 (alcoholic beverages), the Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 Stat. 699, 27 U. S. C. § 122 (same); 32 Stat. 193 (oleomargarine); the Reed Amendment to the National Appropriation Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 1069 (alcoholic beverages); the Hawes-Cooper Act, 45 Stat. 1084, 49 U. S. C. § 60; and the Ashurst-Sumners Act, 49 Stat. 494, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1761, 1762 (convict-made goods).
Hearings, House Committee on Water Power, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-66, 95-97, is most illuminating in this regard. O. C. Merrill presented the views of the Secretaries of Agriculture, Interior and War. He discussed at some length the problem of sales across state lines and suggested that the proposed § 20 solution was desirable. It left regulation to the interested states “if they do it; and they are doing it now.” Ibid., at 97. “The intention of the draft was this: That in so far as the local authorities have the power, and exercise it, over rates and service, the Federal commission should leave it alone.” Ibid., at 62. There is no suggestion that § 20 was conceived as an act of federal permission; indeed Merrill explicitly states his ignorance as to whether any permission was needed: “I do not know whether the question has even come before the courts as to whether such business is or is not interstate commerce, within the meaning of the commerce clause of the Constitution, so that exclusive jurisdiction would be vested in the Federal Government, if it wished to exercise it.” Mr. Doremus: “It might be a power which Congress could exercise, or, if it failed to exercise it, could be left in the jurisdiction of the State.” Mr. Merrill: “It is my judgment that so long as it is satisfactorily handled by the several States it had better be left with them.” Ibid., at 97.
See Hearings, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 6, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. Section 47 (h) stated that the purpose of the amendments was not to "abridge the jurisdiction or authority of any State to regulate, to the same extent as if this Act had not been passed, the rates and charges for the sale to consumers within the State of any power transmitted in interstate commerce,” unless a “substantial number” of those consumers sought federal regulation.
Hearings, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. Res. 80, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 265.
“In cases of interstate and foreign commerce of the character illustrated in the Pennssdvania Gas Co. case [direct sales to consumers], supra, I [the Chief Counsel of the Commission; the Commission approved the statement as its own Decision February 28, 1929] am of the opinion that the Federal Power Commission has no jurisdiction over any matter for the regulation of which the State has already provided a commission with the requisite authority. This appears to be the very situation which Congress had in mind when it conferred a conditional jurisdiction upon the commission. If such a State commission does not exist, the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission applies in full. If the State has a commission with authority over a part only of the matters specified in section 20, the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission extends to the remainder of such matters.
“In cases of interstate and foreign commerce of the character illustrated in the Attleboro case, supra, it seems clear that the States individually have no jurisdiction at all; that having no individual jurisdiction they can not acquire it jointly by agreements between themselves, except by specific authorization of Congress in the manner hereinafter discussed; and that, in absence of such authorization, the only 'agency with authority to regulate, in cases of this kind, the specific matters set forth in section 20 is the Federal Power Commission.” F. P. C. Ninth Ann. Rep. 123-124.
The Report went on to state that § 20 could not be interpreted as a “permissive” statute. Ibid., 127-129. The “compact” interpretation of § 20 was adopted in Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 124 F. 2d 800.
See footnote 16, infra.
The conception of the Federal Commission’s new function was perhaps more revolutionary than could be gathered by merely comparing the new Act with § 20. For it appears that despite the latter provision for limited rate regulation, in fact substantially nothing in that direction had been attempted, at least by 1930. Hearings, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. Res. 80, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 79, 262. The Commission had only three accountants, all of whom were concerned with evaluation of proposed licensed hydroelectric projects. Ibid., 38.
In fact, Colonel Tyler, Chief Engineer, Federal Power Commission, expressly alluded to the fact that, for federal authority to be effective, it would have to reach all interstate electricity, and not just that which is produced at licensed dams. Ibid., at 195. Here, of course, respondents theorize that a small admixture of hydroelectric power will defeat federal jurisdiction.
In fact, the House Report on the bill, commenting on § 305 of the Act, stated that specific reference to officials of licensees had been
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted.
In our original opinion in this case, 357 U. S. 449, we held the Alabama judgment of civil contempt against this petitioner, together with the $100,000 fine which it carried, constitutionally impermissible in the circumstances disclosed by the record. We declined, however, to review the trial court’s restraining order prohibiting petitioner from engaging in further activities in the State, that order then not being properly before us. 357 U. S., at 466-467. Our mandate, issued on August 1, 1958, accordingly remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Alabama “for proceedings not inconsistent with” our opinion.
In due course the petitioner moved in the Supreme Court of Alabama that our mandate be forwarded to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County for the further proceedings which were left open by our decision. After the motion had been twice renewed the Supreme Court of Alabama on February 12, 1959, “again affirmed” the contempt adjudication and $100,000 fine which this Court had set aside. Finding that the Circuit Court had determined that petitioner had. failed to “produce the documents described” in its production order, the State Supreme Court concluded that this Court was “mistaken” in considering that, except for the refusal to provide its membership .lists, petitioner had complied, or tendered satisfactory compliance, with such order. This conclusion was considered as “necessitating another affirmance of. the [contempt] judgment,” involving, so the State Court thought, matters not covered by the opinion and mandate of this Court.
We have reviewed the petition, the response of the State and all of the briefs and the record filed here in the former proceedings. Petitioner there claimed that it had satisfactorily complied with the production order, except as to its membership lists, and this the State did not deny. In fact, asidé from the procedural point, both the State and petitioner, in the certiorari papers posed one idéntical question, namely, had the petitioner “the .constitutional right to refuse tp. produce records.of its membership in Alabama, relevant to issues in a judicial proceeding to. which it is a party, on the mere speculation that these members may be exposed to economic and social sanctions by private citizens of Alabama because of their membership?” (State’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, p. 2.) The State made not even an indication that other portions of the production order had not been complied with and, therefore, required its affirmance. On the contrary, the State on this phase of the case relied entirely on petitioner’s refusal' to furnish the “records of its membership.” That was also the basis on which ,the issue was- briefed and argued before us by both sides after certiorari had been granted. That was the view of the record which underlay this Court’s conclusion that petitioner had “apparently complied satisfactorily with the production order, except for the membership lists,” 357 U. S., at 465. And that was the premise on which the Court disposed of the case. The- State plainly accepted this view of the issue presented by the Record and by its argument on it, for it - did not seek a rehearing or suggest a clarification or correction of our opinion in that regard.
It now for the first time hére says that it “has never agreed, and does not now agree, that the petitioner has complied with the trial court’s order to produce with the exception of membership. The respondent, in fact, specifically denies that the petitioner has produced or offered to produce in all aspects except for lists of membership.” This denial comes too late. The State is bound by its previously taken position, namely, that decision of the sole question regarding the membership lists, is' dispositive of the whole case.
We take it from the record now before us that the Supreme Court of Alabama evidently was not acquainted with the detailed basis of the proceedings here and the consequent ground for our defined disposition. Petitioner was, as the Supreme Court of Alabama held, obliged to produce the items included in the Circuit Court’s order. It having claimed here its satisfactory compliance with the order, except as to its membership lists, and the State having not denied this claim, it was taken as true.
. In these circumstances the Alabama Supreme Court is foreclosed from re-examining the grounds of our disposition. “Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of,, is considered as finally settled,” Sibbald v. United States, 12 Pet. 488, 492. See also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304; Tyler v. Magwire, 17 Wall. 253.
This requires that thie judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama be reversed. Upon further proceedings in the Circuit Court, if it appears that further production is necessary, that court may, of course, require the petitioner to produce such further items, not inconsistent with this and our earlier opinion, that may be appropriate, reasonable and constitutional under the circumstances then appearing.
We assume that the State Supreme Court, thus advised, will not fail to proceed promptly with the disposition of the matters left open under our mandate for further proceedings, 357 U. S., at 466-467, and, therefore, deny petitioner’s application in No. 674, Misc., for a writ of mandamus.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Petitioner’s motion was first made on November 5, 1958, and was renewed, on November 19, 1958, and on December 1, 1958, by mailing to the Attorney General and filing with the Alabama Supreme Court copies of the original.
In its previous order, on which the former proceeding here was based, the Alabama Supreme Court held that certiorari did not- lie to review the merits of the contempt adjudication, and dismissed the original petition for certiorari on that ground, 265 Ala. 349, 91 So. 2d 214. Its opinion on which the present proceedings are based includes this statement: “Lest there be no misapprehension on the part of the bench and bar of Alabama, we here reaffirm the well recognized and uniform pronouncements of this Court with respect to the functions and- limitations of common-law certiorari, and the distinctions between that and other methods of review. 265 Ala. 349, 91 So. 2d 214, supra. As we stated in American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Dawkins, 268 Ala. 13, 104 So. 2d 827, 834: ‘We cannot hurdle or make shipwreck of well-known rules of procedure in order to accommodate a single case.’ ” 268 Ala. 531, 532, 109 So. 2d 138-139.
Question I in the petition for certiorari was as follows: “Whether the refusal of petitioner to produce names and addresses of its Alabama members was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s interdiction against state interference with First Amendment rights?”
See Note 5, infra.
Indeed had the State denied this claim it would have raised additional serious constitutional issues. As we noted in our original opinion the contempt adjudication not only carried a .fine of serious proportions, but under Alabama law it had the effect of foreclosing “petitioner from obtaining a hearing on the merits of the underlying ouster action, . or from taking any steps to dissolve the temporary restraining order which had been issued ex parte, until it purged itself of contempt.” 357 U. S., at 454. Yet upon the facts disclosed by the record, the validity of a contempt decree carrying these consequences would, apart from the refusal to produce the membership lists, have depended upon nothing more substantial than the reasonableness of the degree of petitioner’s tendered compliance. For example, Item “5”'of the production order called for: “All files, letters, copies of letters, telegrams and other correspondence, dated or occurring within the last twelve months next preceding the date of filing the petition for injunction, pertaining to or between the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc., and persons, corporations, associations, groups, chapters and partnerships within the State of Alabama.”- Petitioner’s tender was this: “the-files in the.offices of respondent [petitioner] are filed under subject matter headings. Therefore, to comply with this paragraph would require respondent to search all of its files in order to secure all information requested. Respondent receives correspondence in its offices at the rate of 50,000 letters alone per year and files are maintained for a period of ten years. Respondent produces, however, all memoranda'to branches during the twelve months period next preceding June 1, 1956, which would include its branches in the State of Alabama.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this action we are required to reconcile two somewhat intermittent and conflicting lines of authority as to whether a damages action may be brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 to redress the allegedly unconstitutional administration of a state tax system. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that such suits were barred by both 28 U. S. C. § 1841 (Tax Injunction Act) and the principle of comity, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed by an equally divided court sitting en banc. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals, 450 U. S. 1039, and we now affirm. Before setting forth the facts, we think that a description of the past and at times divergent decisions of this Court may shed light upon the proper disposition of this case.
I
This Court, even before the enactment of §1983, recognized the important and sensitive nature of state tax systems and the need for federal-court restraint when deciding cases that affect such systems. As Justice Field wrote for the Court shortly before the enactment of § 1983:
“It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public.” Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110 (1871).
After this Court conclusively decided that federal courts may enjoin state officers from enforcing an unconstitutional state law, Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), Congress also recognized that the autonomy and fiscal stability of the States survive best when state tax systems are not subject to scrutiny in federal courts. Thus, in 1937 Congress provided:
“The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U. S. C. § 1341 (hereinafter § 1341 or Act).
This legislation, and the decisions of this Court which preceded it, reflect the fundamental principle of comity between federal courts and state governments that is essential to “Our Federalism,” particularly in the area of state taxation. See, e. g., Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481 (1913); Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276 (1909). Even after enactment of § 1341 it was upon this comity that we relied in holding that federal courts, in exercising the discretion that attends requests for equitable relief, may not even render declaratory judgments as to the constitutionality of state tax laws. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943).
Contrasted with this statute and line of cases are our holdings with respect to 42 U. S. C. §1983. In 1871, shortly after Justice Field wrote of the vital and vulnerable nature of state tax systems, Congress enacted § 1983 with its familiar language:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
Obviously § 1983 cut a broad swath. By its terms it gave a federal cause of action to prisoners, taxpayers, or anyone else who was able to prove that his constitutional or federal rights had been denied by any State. In addition, the statute made no mention of any requirement that state remedies be exhausted before resort to the federal courts could be had under 28 U. S. C. § 1343. The combined effect of this newly created federal cause of action and the absence of an express exhaustion requirement was not immediately realized. It was not until our decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), that § 1983 was held to authorize immediate resort to a federal court whenever state actions allegedly infringed constitutional rights:
“Although the legislation was enacted because of the conditions that existed in the South at that time, it is cast in general language and is as applicable to Illinois as it is to the States whose names were mentioned over and again in the debates. It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.” 365 U. S., at 183.
The immediacy of federal relief under § 1983 was reemphasized in McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 (1963), where the Court stated: “It is immaterial whether [the state official’s] conduct is legal or illegal as a matter of state law. Such claims are entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts.” Id., at 674 (citation and footnote omitted). And in the unargued per curiam opinion of Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249 (1971), the Court concluded that “[petitioners were . . . entitled to have their actions treated as claims for relief under the Civil Rights Acts, not subject . . . to exhaustion requirements.” Id., at 251. See also Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 472-473 (1974).
Thus, we have two divergent lines of authority respecting access to federal courts for adjudication of the constitutionality of state laws. Both cannot govern this case. On one hand, § 1341, with its antecedent basis in the comity principle of Matthews v. Rodgers, supra, and Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, supra, bars at least federal injunctive challenges to state tax laws. Added to this authority is our decision in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, supra, holding that declaratory judgments are barred on the basis of comity. On the other hand is the doctrine originating in Monroe v. Pape, supra, that comity does not apply where § 1983 is involved, and that a litigant challenging the constitutionality of any state action may proceed directly to federal court. With this divergence of views in mind, we turn now to the facts of this case, a § 1983 challenge to the administration of state tax laws which implicates both lines of authority. We hold that at least as to such actions, which is all we need decide here, the principle of comity controls.
I — » HH
Petitioner Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association is a nonprofit corporation formed by taxpayers in St. Louis County (County) to promote equitable enforcement of property tax laws in Missouri. Petitioners J. David and Lynn F. Cassilly own real property with recent improvements in the County. Petitioners filed suit under § 1983 alleging that respondents, the County’s Tax Assessors, Supervisors, and Director of Revenue, and three members of the Missouri State Tax Commission, had deprived them of equal protection and due process of law by unequal taxation of real property.
The complaint focuses on two specific practices by respondents. First, petitioners allege that County properties with new improvements are assessed at approximately 3354% of their current market value, while properties without new improvements are assessed at approximately 22% of their current market value. This disparity allegedly results from respondents’ failure to reassess old property on a regular basis, the last general reassessment having occurred in 1960. Second, petitioners allege that property owners who successfully appeal their property assessments, as did the Cassillys in 1977, are specifically targeted for reassessment the next year.
Petitioners have previously sought some relief from respondents’ assessments in state proceedings. In 1975, petitioner David Cassilly and others brought an action in which the State Circuit Court ordered respondent Antonio to reassess all real property in the County. On direct appeal, however, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the State Tax Commission, not the Circuit Court, should supervise the reassessment process. State ex rel. Cassilly v. Riney, 576 S. W. 2d 325 (1979) (en banc). In 1977, the Cassillys appealed the tax assessed on their home to the County Board of Equalization and received a reduction in assessed value from 3314% to 29%. When their home was again assessed at 3314% in 1978, the Cassillys once more appealed to the Board of Equalization. That appeal was pending at the commencement of this litigation.
The Cassillys brought this §1983 action in federal court seeking actual damages in the amount of overassessments from 1975 to 1979, and punitive damages of $75,000 from each respondent. Petitioner Fair Assessment sought actual damages in the amount of expenses incurred in efforts to obtain equitable property assessments for its members. As in all other § 1983 actions, the award of such damages would first require a federal-court declaration that respondents, in administering the state tax, violated petitioners’ constitutional rights.
Ill
As indicated by our discussion in Part I, § 1341 and our comity cases have thus far barred federal courts from granting injunctive and declaratory relief in state tax cases. Because we decide today that the principle of comity bars federal courts from granting damages relief in such cases, we do not decide whether that Act, standing alone, would require such a result. The correctness of the result in this case is demonstrated by an examination of the pre-Act decisions of this Court, the legislative history of the Act, our post-Act decision in the Great Lakes case, and more recent recognition of the principles of federalism.
A
Prior to enactment of § 1341, virtually all federal cases challenging state taxation sought equitable relief. Consequently, federal-court restraint in state tax matters was based upon the traditional doctrine that courts of equity will stay their hand when remedies at law are plain, adequate, and complete. See, e. g., Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481 (1913); Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276 (1909). Even with this basis in equity law, these cases recognized that the doctrine of equitable restraint was of “notable application,” Boise Artesian Water Co., supra, at 281, and carried “peculiar force,” Matthews, supra, at 525, in suits challenging the constitutionality of state tax laws. Such restraint was particularly appropriate because of the delicate balance between the federal authority and state governments, and the concomitant respect that should be accorded state tax laws in federal court. As the Court in Matthews explained:
“The reason for this guiding principle [of equitable restraint] is of peculiar force in cases where the suit, like the present one, is brought to enjoin the collection of a state tax in courts of a different, though paramount sovereignty. The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations, require that such relief should be denied in every case where the asserted federal right may be preserved without it.” 284 U. S., at 525.
Thus, in 1909 we could state that “[a]n examination of the decisions of this court shows that a proper reluctance to interfere by prevention with the fiscal operations of the state governments has caused it to refrain from so doing in all cases where the Federal rights of the persons could otherwise be preserved unimpaired.” Boise Artesian Water Co., supra, at 282.
B
This policy of equitable restraint based on notions of comity did not completely clear the federal courts of state tax cases. Indeed, the Senate Report on the bill that was to become § 1341 referred to “[t]he existing practice of the Federal courts in entertaining tax-injunction suits against State officers . . . .” S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). An examination of the cases of that era demonstrates, however, that this practice resulted not from a repudiation of the principle of comity, but from federal-court determinations that available state remedies did not adequately protect the federal rights asserted. See, e. g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 242 (1936); Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. 2d 145 (CA5), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 688 (1936). See also Note, Federal Court Interference with the Assessment and Collection of State Taxes, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 783, n. 13 (1946); Note, The Tax Injunction Act and Suits for Monetary Relief, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 736, 744, and nn. 40, 41 (1979).
Congress’ response to this practice of the federal courts— enactment of § 1341 — was motivated in large part by comity concerns. As we said of the Act just last Term:
“The statute ‘has its roots in equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal operations.’ Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. [68,] 73 [(1976)]. This last consideration was the principal motivating force behind the Act: this legislation was first and foremost a vehicle to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes. 81 Cong. Rec. 1415 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone) . . . .” Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U. S. 503, 522 (1981) (footnote omitted).
Neither the legislative history of the Act nor that of its precursor, 28 U. S. C. § 1342, suggests that Congress intended that federal-court deference in state tax matters be limited to the actions enumerated in those sections. See H. R. Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937); 81 Cong. Rec. 1415 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone). Thus, the principle of comity which predated the Act was not restricted by its passage.
C
The post-Act vitality of the comity principle is perhaps best demonstrated by our decision in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943). Several Louisiana taxpayers brought an action in Federal District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the state tax law as applied to them was unconstitutional and void. Although § 1341 was raised as a possible bar to the suit, as it has been raised in this case, “we [found] it unnecessary to inquire whether the words of the statute may be so construed as to prohibit a declaration by federal courts concerning the invalidity of a state tax.” 319 U. S., at 299. Instead, “we [were] of the opinion that those considerations which have led federal courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes, save in exceptional cases, require[d] a like restraint in the use of the declaratory judgment procedure.” Ibid. Those considerations were, of course, principles of federalism:
“ ‘The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations, require that such relief should be denied in every case where the asserted federal right may be preserved without it.’ ... Interference with state internal economy and administration is inseparable from assaults in the federal courts on the validity of state taxation, and necessarily attends injunctions, interlocutory or final, restraining collection of state taxes. These are the considerations of moment which have persuaded federal courts of equity to deny relief to the taxpayer . . . .” Id., at 298 (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S., at 525).
The Court’s reliance in Great Lakes upon the necessity of federal-court respect for state taxing schemes demonstrates not only the post-Act vitality of the comity principle, but also its applicability to actions seeking a remedy other than in-junctive relief. The focus was not on the specific form of relief requested, but on the fact that “in every practical sense [it] operate[d] to suspend collection of the state taxes until the litigation [was] ended.” 319 U. S., at 299. As will be seen below, the relief sought in this case would have a similarly disruptive effect.
D
The principle of comity has been recognized and relied upon by this Court in several recent cases dealing with matters other than state taxes. Its fullest articulation was given in the now familiar language of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), a case in which we held that traditional principles of equitable restraint bar federal courts from enjoining pending state criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary circumstances:
“Th[e] underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in separate ways. . . . [T]he concept [represents] a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, ‘Our Federalism,’ born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation’s history and its future.” Id., at 44-45.
The principles of federalism recognized in Younger have not been limited to federal-court interference in state criminal proceedings, but have been extended to some state civil actions. E. g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975). Although these modern expressions of comity have been limited in their application to federal cases which seek to enjoin state judicial proceedings, a limitation which we do not abandon here, they illustrate the principles that bar petitioners’ suit under § 1983. As we said in Rosewell, swpra, “the reasons supporting federal noninterference [with state taxation] are just as compelling today as they were in 1937.” 450 U. S., at 527. As will be seen in the next part, petitioners’ § 1983 action would be no less disruptive of Missouri’s tax system than would the historic equitable efforts to enjoin the collection of taxes, efforts which were early held barred by considerations of comity.
IV
In arguments primarily addressed to the applicability of the Act, petitioners contend that damages actions are inherently less disruptive of state tax systems than injunctions or declaratory judgments, and therefore should not be barred by prior decisions of this Court. Petitioners emphasize that their § 1983 claim seeks recovery from individual state officers, not from state coffers, and that the doctrine of qualified immunity will protect such officers’ good-faith actions and will thus avoid chilling their administration of the Missouri tax scheme.
We disagree. Petitioners will not recover damages under § 1983 unless a district court first determines that respondents’ administration of the County tax system violated petitioners’ constitutional rights. In effect, the district court must first enter a declaratory judgment like that barred in Great Lakes. We are convinced that such a determination would be fully as intrusive as the equitable actions that are barred by principles of comity. Moreover, the intrusiveness of such §1983 actions would be exacerbated by the nonexhaustion doctrine of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). Taxpayers such as petitioners would be able to invoke federal judgments without first permitting the State to rectify any alleged impropriety.
In addition to the intrusiveness of the judgment, the very maintenance of the suit itself would intrude on the enforcement of the state scheme. As the District Court in this case stated:
“To allow such suits would cause disruption of the states’ revenue collection systems equal to that caused by anticipatory relief. State tax collection officials could be summoned into federal court to defend their assessments against claims for refunds as well as prayers for punitive damages, merely on the assertion that the tax collected was willfully and maliciously discriminatory against a certain type of property. Allowance of such claims would result in this Court being a source of appellate review of all state property tax classifications.” 478 F. Supp. 1231, 1233-1234 (1979).
This intrusion, although undoubtedly present in every § 1983 claim, is particularly highlighted by the facts of this case. Defendants are not one or two isolated administrators, but virtually every key tax official in St. Louis County. They include the County Executive, the Director of Revenue, the Tax Assessor, and three supervising members of the State Tax Commission. In addition, the actions challenged in the complaint — unequal assessment of new and old property and retaliatory assessment of property belonging to those who successfully appeal to the Board of Equalization — may well be the result of policies or practicalities beyond the control of any individual officer. For example, failure annually to reassess old property may well result from a practical allocation of limited resources. In addition, according to respondents’ attorney at oral argument, Missouri law requires that all property, including property which belongs to those who successfully appeal to the Board of Equalization, be assessed at 3314% of market value. Thus, a judicial determination of official liability for the acts complained of, even though necessarily based upon a finding of bad faith, would have an undeniable chilling effect upon the actions of all County officers governed by the same practicalities or required to implement the same policies. There is little doubt that such officials, faced with the prospect of personal liability to numerous taxpayers, not to mention the assessment of attorney’s fees under 42 U. S. C. §1988, would promptly cease the conduct found to have infringed petitioners’ constitutional rights, whether or not those officials were acting in good faith. In short, petitioners’ action would “in every practical sense operate to suspend collection of the state taxes . . . ,” Great Lakes, 319 U. S., at 299, a form of federal-court interference previously rejected by this Court on principles of federalism.
Y
This case is therefore controlled by principles articulated even before enactment of § 1983 and followed in later decisions such as Matthews and Great Lakes. The recovery of damages under the Civil Rights Act first requires a “declaration” or determination of the unconstitutionality of a state tax scheme that would halt its operation. And damages actions, no less than actions for an injunction, would hale state officers into federal court every time a taxpayer alleged the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim. We consider such interference to be contrary to “[t]he scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts.” Matthews, 284 U. S., at 525.
Therefore, despite the ready access to federal courts provided by Monroe and its progeny, we hold that taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts. Such taxpayers must seek protection of their federal rights by state remedies, provided of course that those remedies are plain, adequate, and complete, and may ultimately seek review of the state decisions in this Court. See Huffman v. Pursue, Inc., 420 U. S., at 605; Matthews v. Rodgers, supra, at 526.
The adequacy of available Missouri remedies is not at issue in this case. The District Court expressly found “that [petitioners] have means to rectify what they consider an unjust situation through the state’s own processes,” 478 F. Supp., at 1234, and petitioners do not contest this finding. In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court has expressly held that plaintiffs such as petitioners may assert a § 1983 claim in state court. See, e. g., Stafford v. Muster, 582 S. W. 2d 670, 681 (1979); Shapiro v. Columbia Union National Bank & Trust Co., 576 S. W. 2d 310 (1978).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 478 F. Supp. 1231 (1979), aff’d, 622 F. 2d 415 (1980).
Compare Fulton Market Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F. 2d 1071 (CA7 1978), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1121 (1979), with Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, supra; Ludwin v. City of Cambridge, 592 F. 2d 606 (CA1 1979); and Bland v. McHann, 463 F. 2d 21 (CA5 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 966 (1973).
We held in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600 (1979), that 28 U. S. C. § 1343, the jurisdictional counterpart of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, was narrower in scope than the latter. Because there can be no doubt that a claim of denial of due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, which these petitioners asserted, would come under the narrower construction of § 1343 adopted by the Court in Chapman, supra, it is unnecessary to pursue here the difference between § 1983 and § 1343.
The result we reach today was foreshadowed by our decision last Term in Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U. S. 503 (1981), wherein we stated that “even where the Tax Injunction Act would not bar federal-court interference in state tax administration, principles of federal equity may nevertheless counsel the withholding of relief. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 301 (1943).” Id., at 525-526, n. 33. We need not decide in this case whether the comity spoken of would also bar a claim under § 1983 which requires no scrutiny whatever of state tax assessment practices, such as a facial attack on tax laws colorably claimed to be discriminatory as to race.
Of course, the Court had not yet broadly interpreted the Civil Rights Act to permit federal damages actions for state violations of constitutional rights, brought prior to exhaustion of state remedies. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). The closest pre-Act case to a federal damages action was a suit for refund of state taxes allegedly assessed in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. First National Bank v. Board of County Commissioners, 264 U. S. 450 (1924). Consistent with the federal-court deference for state tax matters of which we speak today, the Court held that the action was barred by the parties’ failure to exhaust their available state remedies. Id., at 456. Although declaratory actions were available before 1937, they were seldom used. See Note, Federal Declaratory Judgments on the Validity of State Taxes, 50 Yale L. J. 927, 929-930, and n. 14 (1941).
Justice BRENNAN has cogently explained the reasons behind federal-court deference for state tax administration:
“The special reasons justifying the policy of federal noninterference with state tax collection are obvious. The procedures for mass assessment and collection of state taxes and for administration and adjudication of taxpayers’ disputes with tax officials are generally complex and necessarily designed to operate according to established rules. State tax agencies are organized to discharge their responsibilities in accordance with the state procedures. If federal declaratory relief were available to test state tax assessments, state tax administration might be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might escape the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by state law. During the pendency of the federal suit the collection of revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed, with consequent damage to the State’s budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the risk of taxpayer insolvency. Moreover, federal constitutional issues are likely to turn on questions of state tax law, which, like issues of state regulatory law, are more properly heard in the state courts.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 128, n. 17 (1971) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
0ther federal courts have reached this same conclusion. For example, in Advertiser Co. v. Wallace, 446 F. Supp. 677, 680 (MD Ala. 1978), the court concluded that “[although perhaps less coercive than anticipatory relief and less intrusive than a refund, the damage award plaintiff seeks, especially its request for punitive damages, still is designed to deter collection of the taxes now being assessed by defendants.” And the court in Evangelical Catholic Communion, Inc. v. Thomas, 373 F. Supp. 1342, 1344 (Vt. 1973), correctly stated:
“It is elementary that constitutional rights must be found to have been abridged in order for damages to be recovered in a civil rights action. Thus the plaintiffs in this action cannot recover damages without a determination by this court that the taxation of their Newbury property was effected in violation of their constitutional rights. If we were to make such a determination, we would, in effect, be issuing a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of the tax levied on the plaintiffs. As the court is prohibited from issuing such a declaratory judgment, . . . the court is also precluded as a matter of law from adjudicating the plaintiffs’ damages claims.”
We discern no significant difference, for purposes of the principles recognized in this case, between remedies which are “plain, adequate, and complete,” as that phrase has been used in articulating the doctrine of equitable restraint, and those which are “plain, speedy and efficient,” within the meaning of §1341. See, e. g., Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. 68, 73-74 (1976); Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 622-623 (1946); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S., at 297-299; Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S., at 525-526. Both phrases refer to the obvious precept that plaintiffs seeking protection of federal rights in federal courts should be remitted to their state remedies if their federal rights will not thereby be lost. Numerous federal decisions have treated the adequacy of state remedies, and it is to that body of law that federal courts should look in seeking to determine the occasions for the comity spoken of today.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Me. Justice Stewaet
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent, Kenneth Donaldson, was civilly committed to confinement as a mental patient in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee in January 1957. He was kept in custody there against his will for nearly 15 years. The petitioner, Dr. J. B. O’Connor, was the hospital’s superintendent during most of this period. Throughout his confinement Donaldson repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, demanded his release, claiming that he was dangerous to no one, that he was not mentally ill, and that, at any rate, the hospital was not providing treatment for his supposed illness. Finally, in February 1971, Donaldson brought this lawsuit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, alleging that O’Connor, and other members of the hospital staff named as defendants, had intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his constitutional right to liberty. After a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict assessing both compensatory and punitive damages against O’Connor and a codefendant. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment, 493 F. 2d 507. We granted O’Connor’s petition for certiorari, 419 U. S. 894, because of the important constitutional questions seemingly presented.
I
Donaldson’s commitment was initiated by his father, who thought that his son was suffering from “delusions.” After hearings before a county judge of Pinellas County, Fla., Donaldson was found to be suffering from “paranoid schizophrenia” and was committed for “care, maintenance, and treatment” pursuant to Florida statutory provisions that have since been repealed. The state law was less than clear in specifying the grounds necessary for commitment, and the record is scanty as to Donaldson’s condition at the time of the judicial hearing. These matters are, however, irrelevant, for this case involves no challenge to the initial commitment, but is focused, instead, upon the nearly 15 years of confinement that followed.
The evidence sit the trial showed that the hospital staff had the power to release a patient, not dangerous to himself or others, even if he remained mentally ill and had been lawfully committed. Despite many requests, O’Connor refused to allow that power to be exercised in Donaldson’s case. At the trial, O’Connor indicated that he had believed that Donaldson would have been unable to make a “successful adjustment outside the institution,” but could not recall the basis for that conclusion. O’Connor retired as superintendent shortly before this suit was filed. A few months thereafter, and before the trial, Donaldson secured his release and a judicial restoration of competency, with the support of the hospital staff.
The testimony at the trial demonstrated, without contradiction, that Donaldson had posed no danger to others during his long confinement, or indeed at any point in his life. O’Connor himself conceded that he had no personal or secondhand knowledge that Donaldson had ever committed a dangerous act. There was no evidence that Donaldson had ever been suicidal or been thought likely to inflict injury upon himself. One of O’Connor’s codefendants acknowledged that Donaldson could have earned his own living outside the hospital. He had done so for some 14 years before his commitment, and immediately upon his release he secured a responsible job in hotel administration.
Furthermore, Donaldson’s frequent requests for release had been supported by responsible persons willing to provide him any care he might need on release. In 1963, for example, a representative of Helping Hands, Inc., a halfway house for mental patients, wrote O’Connor asking him to release Donaldson to its care. The request was accompanied by a supporting letter from the Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, which a codefendant conceded was a “good clinic.” O’Connor rejected the offer, replying that Donaldson could be released only to his parents. That rule was apparently of O’Connor’s own making. At the time, Donaldson was 55 years old, and, as O’Connor knew, Donaldson’s parents were too elderly and infirm to take responsibility for him. Moreover, in his continuing correspondence with Donaldson’s parents, O’Connor never informed them of the Helping Hands offer. In addition, on four separate occasions between 1964 and 1968, John Lembcke, a college classmate of Donaldson’s and a longtime family friend, asked O’Connor to release Donaldson to his care. On each occasion O’Connor refused. The record shows that Lembcke was a serious and responsible person, who was willing and able to assume responsibility for Donaldson’s welfare.
The evidence showed that Donaldson’s confinement was a simple regime of enforced custodial care, not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness. Numerous witnesses, including one of O’Connor’s codefendants, testified that Donaldson had received nothing but custodial care while at the hospital. O’Connor described Donaldson’s treatment as “milieu therapy.” But witnesses from the hospital staff conceded that, in the context of this case, “milieu therapy” was a euphemism for confinement in the “milieu” of a mental hospital. For substantial periods, Donaldson was simply kept in a large room that housed 60 patients, many of whom were under criminal commitment. Donaldson’s requests for ground privileges, occupational training, and an opportunity to discuss his case with O’Connor or other staff members were repeatedly denied.
At the trial, O’Connor’s principal defense was that he had acted in good faith and was therefore immune from any liability for monetary damages. His position, in short, was that state law, which he had believed valid, had authorized indefinite custodial confinement of the “sick,” even if they were not given treatment and their release could harm no one.
The trial judge instructed the members of the jury that they should find that O’Connor had violated Donaldson’s constitutional right to liberty if they found that he had
“confined [Donaldson] against his will, knowing that he was not mentally ill or dangerous or knowing that if mentally ill he was not receiving treatment for his alleged mental illness.
“Now, the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not a danger to himself or others. Without such treatment there is no justification from a constitutional stand-point for continued confinement unless you should also find that [Donaldson] was dangerous to either himself or others.”
The trial judge further instructed the jury that O’Con-nor was immune from damages if he
“reasonably believed in good faith that detention of [Donaldson] was proper for the length of time he was so confined ....
“However, mere good intentions which do not give rise to a reasonable belief that detention is lawfully required cannot justify [Donaldson’s] confinement in the Florida State Hospital.”
The jury returned a verdict for Donaldson against O’Connor and a codefendant, and awarded damages of $38,500, including $10,000 in punitive damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court in a broad opinion dealing with “the far-reaching question whether the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to treatment to persons involuntarily civilly committed to state mental hospitals.” 493 F. 2d, at 509. The appellate court held that when, as in Donaldson’s case, the rationale for confinement is that the patient is in need of treatment, the Constitution requires that minimally adequate treatment in fact be provided. Id., at 521. The court further expressed the view that, regardless of the grounds for involuntary civil commitment, a person confined against his will at a state mental institution has “a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition.” Id., at 520. Conversely, the court’s opinion implied that it is constitutionally permissible for a State to confine a mentally ill person against his will in order to treat his illness, regardless of whether his illness renders him dangerous to himself or others. See id., at 522-527.
II
We have concluded that the difficult issues of constitutional law dealt with by the Court of Appeals are not presented by this case in its present posture. Specifically, there is no reason now to decide whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the State, or whether the State may compulsorily confine a nondangerous, mentally ill individual for the purpose of treatment. As we view it, this case raises a single, relatively simple, but nonetheless important question concerning every man’s constitutional right to liberty.
The jury found that Donaldson was neither dangerous to himself nor dangerous to others, and also found that, if mentally ill, Donaldson had not received treatment. That verdict, based on abundant evidénce, makes the issue before the Court a narrow one. We need not decide whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may be confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement of such a person — to prevent injury to the public, to ensure his own survival or safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 736-737; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 509. For the jury found that none of the above grounds for continued confinement was present in Donaldson’s case.
Given the jury’s findings, what was left as justification for keeping Donaldson in continued confinement? The fact that state law may have authorized confinement of the harmless mentally ill does not itself establish a constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement. See Jackson v. Indiana, supra, at 720-723; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U. S. 245, 248-250. Nor is it enough that Donaldson’s original confinement was founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis, if in fact it was, because even if his involuntary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after that basis no longer existed. Jackson v. Indiana, supra, at 738; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, supra.
A finding of “mental illness” alone cannot justify a State’s locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement. Assuming that that term can be given a reasonably precise content and that the “mentally ill” can be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.
May the State confine the mentally ill merely to ensure them a living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private community? That the State has a proper interest in providing care and assistance to the unfortunate goes without saying. But the mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover, while the State may arguably confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of family or friends. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488-490.
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One might as well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person’s physical liberty. See, e. g., Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 24-26; Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 615; Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592; cf. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534.
In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends. Since the jury found, upon ample evidence, that O’Con-nor, as an agent of the State, knowingly did so confine Donaldson, it properly concluded that O’Connor violated Donaldson’s constitutional right to freedom.
Ill
O’Connor contends that in any event he should not be held personally liable for monetary damages because his decisions were made in “good faith.” Specifically, O’Connor argues that he was acting pursuant to state law which, he believed, authorized confinement of the mentally ill even when their release would not compromise their safety or constitute a danger to others, and that he could not reasonably have been expected to know that the state law as he understood it was constitutionally invalid. A proposed instruction to this effect was rejected by the District Court.
The District Court did instruct the jury, without objection, that monetary damages could not be assessed against O’Connor if he had believed reasonably and in good faith that Donaldson’s continued confinement was “proper,” and that punitive damages could be awarded only if O’Connor had acted “maliciously or wantonly or oppressively.” The Court of Appeals approved those instructions. But that court did not consider whether it was error for the trial judge to refuse the additional instruction concerning O’Connor’s claimed reliance on state law as authorization for Donaldson’s continued confinement. Further, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals acted with the benefit of this Court’s most recent decision on the scope of the qualified immunity possessed by state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308.
Under that decision, the relevant question for the jury is whether O’Connor “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of [Donaldson], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to [Donaldson].” Id., at 322. See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 247-248; Wood v. Strickland, supra, at 330 (opinion of Powell, J.). For purposes of this question, an official has, of course, no duty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments. Wood v. Strickland, supra, at 322.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to enable that court to consider, in light of Wood v. Strickland, whether the District Judge’s failure to instruct with regard to the effect of O’Connor’s claimed reliance on state law rendered inadequate the instructions as to O’Connor’s liability for compensatory and punitive damages.
It is so ordered.
Donaldson’s original complaint was filed as a class action on behalf of himself and all of his fellow patients in an entire department of the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee. In addition to a damages claim, Donaldson’s complaint also asked for habeas corpus relief ordering his release, as well as the release of all members of the class. Donaldson further sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the hospital to provide adequate psychiatric treatment.
After Donaldson’s release and after the District Court dismissed the action as a class suit, Donaldson filed an amended complaint, repeating his claim for compensatory and punitive damages. Although the amended complaint retained the prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief, that request was eliminated from the case prior to trial. See 493 F. 2d 507, 512-513.
The judicial commitment proceedings were pursuant to § 394.22 (11) of the State Public Health Code, which provided:
“Whenever any person who has been adjudged mentally incompetent requires confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others, the said judge shall direct that such person be forthwith delivered to a superintendent of a Florida state hospital, for the mentally ill, after admission has been authorized under regulations approved by the board of commissioners of state institutions, for care, maintenance, and treatment, as provided in sections 394.09, 394.24, 394.25, 394.26 and 394.27, or make such other disposition of him as he may be permitted by law Fla. Laws 1955— 1956 Extra. Sess., c. 31403, § 1, p. 62.
Donaldson had been adjudged “incompetent” several days earlier under §394.22 (1), which provided for such a finding as to any person who was
“incompetent by reason of mental illness, sickness, drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, insanity, or other mental or physical condition, so that he is incapable of caring for himself or managing his property, or is likely to dissipate or lose his property or become the victim of designing persons, or inflict harm on himself or others Fla. Gen. Laws 1955, c. 29909, § 3, p. 831.
It would appear that § 394.22 (11) (a) contemplated that involuntary commitment would be imposed only on those “incompetent” persons who “require [d] confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others.” But this is not certain, for § 394.22 (11) (c) provided that the judge could adjudicate the person a “harmless incompetent” and release him to a guardian upon a finding that he did “not require confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others and that treatment in the Florida State Hospital is unnecessary or would be without benefit to such person Fla. Gen. Laws 1955, c. 29909, § 3, p. 835 (emphasis added). In this regard, it is noteworthy that Donaldson’s “Order for Delivery of Mentally Incompetent” to the Florida State Hospital provided that he required “confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others, or to insure proper treatment.” (Emphasis added.) At any rate, the Florida commitment statute provided no judicial procedure whereby one still incompetent could secure his release on the ground that he was no longer dangerous to himself or others.
Whether the Florida statute provided a “right to treatment” for involuntarily committed patients is also open to dispute. Under §394.22 (11) (a), commitment “to prevent self-injury or violence to others” was “for care, maintenance, and treatment.” Recently Florida has totally revamped its civil commitment law and now provides a statutory right to receive individual medical treatment. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.459 (1973).
The sole statutory procedure for release required a judicial reinstatement of a patient’s “mental competency.” Public Health Code §§ 394.22 (15) and (16), Fla. Gen. Laws 1955, c. 29909, § 3, pp. 838-841. But this procedure could be initiated by the hospital staff. Indeed, it was at the staff’s initiative that Donaldson was finally restored to competency, and liberty, almost immediately after O’Connor retired from the superintendency.
In addition, witnesses testified that the hospital had always had its own procedure for releasing patients — for “trial visits,” “home visits,” “furloughs,” or “out of state discharges” — even though the patients had not been judicially restored to competency. Those conditional releases often became permanent, and the hospital merely closed its books on the patient. O’Connor did not deny at trial that he had the power to release patients; he conceded that it was his “duty” as superintendent of the hospital “to determine whether that patient having once reached the hospital was in such condition as to request that he be considered for release from the hospital.”
There was some evidence that Donaldson, who is a Christian Scientist, on occasion refused to take medication. The trial judge instructed the jury not to award damages for any period of confinement during which Donaldson had declined treatment.
At the close of Donaldson’s case in chief, O’Connor moved for a directed verdict on the ground that state law at the time of Donaldson’s confinement authorized institutionalization of the mentally ill even if they posed no danger to themselves or others. This motion was denied. At the close of all the evidence, O’Connor asked that the jury be instructed that "if defendants acted pursuant to a statute which was not declared unconstitutional at the time, they cannot be held accountable for such action.” The District Court declined to give this requested instruction.
The District Court defined treatment as follows:
“You are instructed that a person who is involuntarily civilly committed to a mental hospital does have a constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give him a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition.” (Emphasis added.)
O’Connor argues that this statement suggests that a mental patient has a right to treatment even if confined by reason of dangerousness to himself or others. But this is to take the above paragraph out of context, for it is bracketed by paragraphs making clear the trial judge’s theory that treatment is constitutionally required only if mental illness alone, rather than danger to self or others, is the reason for confinement. If O’Connor had thought the instructions ambiguous on this point, he could have objected to them and requested a clarification. He did not do so. We accordingly have no occasion here to decide whether persons committed on grounds of dangerousness enjoy a “right to treatment.”
In pertinent part, the instructions read as follows:
“The Plaintiff claims in brief that throughout the period of his hospitalization he was not mentally ill or dangerous to himself or others, and claims further that if he was mentally ill, or if Defendants believed he was mentally ill, Defendants withheld from him the treatment necessary to improve his mental condition. '
“The Defendants claim, in brief, that Plaintiff’s detention was legal and proper, or if his detention was not legal and proper, it was the result of mistake, without malicious intent.
“In order to prove his claim under the Civil Rights Act, the burden is upon the Plaintiff in this case to establish by a preponderance of the evidence in this case the following facts:
“That the Defendants confined Plaintiff against his will, knowing that he was not mentally ill or dangerous or knowing that if mentally ill he was not receiving treatment for his alleged mental illness.
“[T]hat the Defendants’ acts and conduct deprived the Plaintiff of his Federal Constitutional right not to be denied or deprived of his liberty without due process of law as that phrase is defined and explained in these instructions ....
“You are instructed that a person who is involuntarily civilly committed to a mental hospital does have a constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give him a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition.
“Now, the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not a danger to himself or others. Without such treatment there is no justification from a constitutional stand-point for continued confinement unless you should also find that the Plaintiff was dangerous either to himself or others.”
The trial judge had instructed that punitive damages should be awarded only if “the act or omission of the Defendant or Defendants which proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff was maliciously or wantonly or oppressively done.”
Given the jury instructions, see n. 6 supra, it is possible that the jury went so far as to find that O’Connor knew not only that Donaldson was harmless to himself and others but also that he was not mentally ill at all. If it so found, the jury was permitted by the instructions to rule against O’Connor regardless of the nature of the “treatment” provided. If we were to construe the jury’s verdict in that fashion, there would remain no substantial issue in this case: That a wholly sane and innocent person has a constitutional right not to be physically confined by the State when his freedom will pose a danger neither to himself nor to others cannot be seriously doubted.
The judge’s instructions used the phrase “dangerous to himself.” Of course, even if there is no foreseeable risk of self-injury or suicide, a person is literally “dangerous to himself” if for physical or other reasons he is helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom either through his own efforts or with the aid of willing family members or friends. While it might be argued that the judge’s instructions could have been more detailed on this point, O’Connor raised no objection to them, presumably because the evidence clearly showed that Donaldson was not “dangerous to himself” however broadly that phrase might be defined.
O’Connor argues that, despite the jury’s verdict, the Court must assume that Donaldson was receiving treatment sufficient to justify his confinement, because the adequacy of treatment is a “nonjusticiable” question that must be left to the discretion of the psychiatric profession. That argument is unpersuasive. Where “treatment” is the sole asserted ground for depriving a person of liberty, it is plainly unacceptable to suggest that the courts are powerless to determine whether the asserted ground is present. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715. Neither party objected to the jury instruction defining treatment. There is, accordingly, no occasion in this case to decide whether the provision of treatment, standing alone, can ever constitutionally justify involuntary confinement or, if it can, how much or what kind of treatment would suffice for that purpose. In its present posture this case involves not involuntary treatment but simply involuntary custodial confinement.
See n. 5, supra. During his years of confinement, Donaldson unsuccessfully petitioned the state and federal courts for release from the Florida State Hospital on a number of occasions. None of these claims was ever resolved on its merits, and no evidentiary hearings were ever held. O’Connor has not contended that he relied on these unsuccessful court actions as an independent intervening reason for continuing Donaldson’s confinement, and no instructions on this score were requested.
Upon remand, the Court of Appeals is to consider only the question whether O’Connor is to be held liable for monetary damages for violating Donaldson’s constitutional right to liberty. The jury found, on substantial evidence and under adequate instructions, that O’Connor deprived Donaldson, who was dangerous neither to himself nor to others and was provided no treatment, of the constitutional right to liberty. Cf. n. 8, supra. That finding needs no further consideration. If the Court of Appeals holds that a remand to the District Court is necessary, the only issue to be determined in that court will be whether O’Connor is immune from liability for monetary damages.
Of necessity our decision vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court’s opinion of precedential effect, leaving this Court’s opinion and judgment as the sole law of the case. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U. S. 36.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Schmuck v. United States, 489 U. S. 705 (1989), we held that a defendant who requests a jury instruction on a lesser offense under Rule 81(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure must demonstrate that “the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense.” Id., at 716. This ease requires us to apply this elements test to the offenses described by 18 U. S. C. §§ 2113(a) and (b) (1994 ed. and Supp. IV). The former punishes “[wjhoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes... from the person or presence of another... any... thing of value belonging to, or in the... possession of, any bank....” The latter, which entails less severe penalties, punishes, inter alia, “[wjhoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any... thing of value exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the... possession of, any bank....” We hold that § 2113(b) requires an element not required by § 2113(a) — three in fact — and therefore is not a lesser included offense of § 2113(a). Petitioner is accordingly prohibited as a matter of law from obtaining a lesser included offense instruction on the offense described by § 2113(b).
f — I
On September 9, 1997, petitioner Floyd J. Carter donned a ski mask and entered the Collective Federal Savings Bank in Hamilton Township, New Jersey. Carter confronted a customer who was exiting the bank and pushed her back inside. She screamed, startling others in the bank. Undeterred, Carter ran into the bank and leaped over the customer service counter and through one of the teller windows. One of the tellers rushed into the manager’s office. Meanwhile, Carter opened several teller drawers and emptied the money into a bag. After having removed almost $16,000 in currency, Carter jumped back over the counter and fled from the scene. Later that day, the police apprehended him.
A grand jury indicted Carter, charging him with violating § 2113(a). While not contesting the basic facts of the episode, Carter pleaded not guilty on the theory that he had not taken the bank’s money “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” as § 2113(a) requires. Before trial, Carter moved that the court instruct the jury on the offense described by § 2113(b) as a lesser included offense of the offense described by § 2113(a). The District Court, relying on United States v. Mosley, 126 F. 3d 200 (CA3 1997), denied the motion in a preliminary ruling. At the close of the Government’s ease, the District Court denied Carter’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and indicated that the preliminary ruling denying the lesser included offense instruction would stand. The jury, instructed on § 2113(a) alone, returned a guilty verdiet, and the District Court entered judgment pursuant to that verdiet.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion, relying on its earlier decision in Mosley. Judgment order reported at 185 F. 3d 863 (1999). While the Ninth Circuit agrees with the Third that a lesser offense instruction is precluded in this context, see United States v. Gregory, 891 F. 2d 732, 734 (CA9 1989), other Circuits have held to the contrary, see United States v. Walker, 75 F. 3d 178, 180 (CA4 1996); United States v. Brittain, 41 F. 3d 1409, 1410 (CA10 1994). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 528 U. S. 1060 (1999), and now affirm.
II
In Schmuck, supra, we were called upon to interpret Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e)’s provision that “[t]he defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged.” We held that this provision requires application of an elements test, under which “one offense is not ‘necessarily included’ in another unless the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense.” 489 U. S., at 716. The elements test requires “a textual comparison of criminal statutes,” an approach that, we explained, lends itself to “certain and predictable” outcomes. Id., at 720.
Applying the test, we held that the offense of tampering with an odometer, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1984 and 1990e(a) (1982 ed.), is not a lesser included offense of mail fraud, 18 U. S. C. §1341. We explained that mail fraud requires two elements — (1) having devised or intending to devise a scheme to defraud (or to perform specified fraudulent acts), and (2) use of the mail for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme (or specified fraudulent acts). The lesser offense of odometer tampering, however, requires the element of knowingly and willfully causing an odometer to be altered, an element that is absent from the offense of mail fraud. Accordingly, the elements of odometer tampering are not a subset of the elements of mail fraud, and a defendant charged with the latter is not entitled to an instruction on the former under Rule 31(e). Schmuck, supra, at 721-722.
Turning to the instant ease, the Government contends that three elements required by §2113(b)’s first paragraph are not required by § 2113(a): (1) specific intent to steal; (2) asportation; and (3) valuation exceeding $1,000. The statute provides:
Ҥ2113. Bank robbery and incidental crimes
“(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association...
“Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
“(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; or
‘Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value not exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”
A “textual comparison” of the elements of these offenses suggests that the Government is correct. First, whereas subsection (b) requires that the defendant act “with intent to steal or purloin,” subsection (a) contains no similar requirement. Second, whereas subsection (b) requires that the defendant “tak[e] and carr[y] away” the property, subsection (a) only requires that the defendant “tak[e]” the property. Third, whereas the first paragraph of subsection (b) requires that the property have a “value exceeding $1,000,” subsection (a) contains no valuation requirement. These extra clauses in subsection (b) “cannot be regarded as mere surplusage; [they] mea[n] something.” Potter v. United States, 155 U. S. 438, 446 (1894).
Carter urges that the foregoing application of Schmuck’s elements test is too rigid and submits that ordinary principles of statutory interpretation are relevant to the Schmuck inquiry. We do not dispute the latter proposition. The Schmuck test, after all, requires an exercise in statutory interpretation before the comparison of elements may be made, and it is only sensible that normal principles of statutory construction apply. We disagree, however, with petitioner’s conclusion that such principles counsel a departure in this ease from what is indicated by a straightforward reading of the text.
Ill
We begin with the arguments pertinent to the general relationship between §§ 2118(a) and (b). Carter first contends that the structure of §2113 supports the view that subsection (b) is a lesser included offense of subsection (a). He points to subsection (c) of §2118, which imposes criminal liability on a person who knowingly “receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of, any property or money or other thing of value which has been taken or stolen from a bank... in violation of subsection (b).” (Emphasis added.) It would be anomalous, posits Carter, for subsection (e) to apply — as its text plainly provides — only to the fence who receives property from a violator of subsection (b) but not to the fence who receives property from a violator of subsection (a). The anomaly disappears, he concludes, only if subsection (b) is always violated when subsection (a) is violated — i. e., only if subsection (b) is a lesser included offense of subsection (a).
But Carter’s anomaly — even if it truly exists — is only an anomaly. Petitioner does not claim, and we tend to doubt, that it rises to the level of absurdity. Cf. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 509-511 (1989); id., at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). For example, it may be that violators of subsection (a) generally act alone, while violators of subsection (b) are commonly assisted by fences. In such a state of affairs, a sensible Congress may have thought it necessary to punish only the fences of property taken in violation of subsection (b). Or Congress may have thought that a defendant who violates subsection (a) usually — if not inevitably — also violates subsection (b), so that the fence may be punished by reference to that latter violation. In any event, nothing in subsection (c) purports to redefine the elements required by the text of subsections (a) and (b).
Carter’s second argument is more substantial. He submits that, insofar as subsections (a) and (b) are similar to the common-law crimes of robbery and larceny, we must assume that subsections (a) and (b) require the same elements as their common-law predecessors, at least absent Congress’ affirmative indication (whether in text or legislative history) of an intent to displace the common-law scheme. While we (and the Government) agree that the statutory crimes at issue here bear a close resemblance to the common-law crimes of robbery and larceny, see Brief for United States 29 (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *229, *232); accord, post, at 278-279, that observation is beside the point. The canon on imputing common-law meaning applies only when Congress makes use of a statutory term with established meaning at common law, and Carter does not point to any such term in the text of the statute.
This limited scope of the canon on imputing common-law meaning has long been understood. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246 (1952), for example, we articulated the canon in this way:
“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.” Id., at 263 (emphasis added).
In other words, a “duster of ideas” from the common law should be imported into statutory text only when Congress employs a common-law term, and not when, as here, Congress simply describes an offense analogous to a common-law crime without using common-law terms.
We made this clear in United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482 (1997). At issue was whether 18 U. S. C. § 1014 — which punishes a person who “knowingly makes any false statement or report... for the purpose of influencing in any way the action” of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insured bank “upon any application, advance,... commitment, or loan” — requires proof of the materiality of the “false statement.” The defendants contended that since materiality was a required element of “false statement”-type offenses at common law, it must also be required by § 1014. Although Justice Stevens in dissent thought the argument to be meritorious, we rejected it:
‘‘[Fjundamentally, we disagree with our colleague’s apparent view that any term that is an element of a common-law crime carries with it every other aspect of that common-law crime when the term is used in a statute. Justice Stevens seems to assume that because ‘false statement’ is an element of perjury, and perjury criminalizes only material statements, a statute criminalizing ‘false statements’ covers only material statements. By a parity of reasoning, because common-law perjury involved statements under oath, a statute criminalizing a false statement would reach only statements under oath. It is impossible to believe that Congress intended to impose such restrictions sub silentio, however, and so our rule on imputing common-law meaning to statutory terms does not sweep so broadly.” 519 U. S., at 492, n. 10 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
Similarly, in United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407 (1957), we declined to look to the analogous common-law crime because the statutory term at issue — “stolen”—had no meaning at common law. See id., at 411-412 (“[WJhile ‘stolen’ is constantly identified with larceny, the term was never at common law equated or exclusively dedicated to larceny” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
By contrast, we have not hesitated to turn to the common law for guidance when the relevant statutory text does contain a term with an established meaning at common law. In Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1 (1999), for example, we addressed whether materiality is required by federal statutes punishing a “scheme or artifice to defraud.” Id., at 20, and 20-21, nn. 3-4 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§1341, 1343, 1344). Unlike the statute in Wells, which contained no common-law term, these statutes did include a common-law term— “defraud.” 527 U. S., at 22. Because common-law fraud required proof of materiality, we applied the canon to hold that these federal statutes implicitly contain a materiality requirement as well. Id., at 23. Similarly, in Evans v. United States, 504 U. S. 255, 261-264 (1992), we observed that “extortion” in 18 U. S. C. § 1951 was a common-law term, and proceeded to interpret this term by reference to its meaning at common law.
Here, it is undisputed that “robbery” and “larceny” are terms with established meanings at common law. But neither term appears in the text of § 2113(a) or § 2113(b). While the term “robbery” does appear in §2113’s title, the title of a statute “ ‘[is] of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase’” in the statute itself. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998) (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528-529 (1947) (modifications in original)). And Carter does not claim that this title illuminates any such ambiguous language. Accordingly, the canon on imputing common-law meaning has no bearing on this ease.
<
We turn now to Carter’s more specific arguments concerning the “extra” elements of § 2113(b). While conceding the absence of three of §2113(b)’s requirements from the text of § 2113(a) — (1) “intent to steal or purloin”; (2) “takes and carries away,” i. e., asportation; and (3) “value exceeding $1,000” (first paragraph) — Carter claims that the first two should be deemed implicit in § 2113(a), and that the third is not an element at all.
A
As to “intent to steal or purloin,” it will be recalled that the text of subsection (b) requires a specific “intent to steal or purloin,” whereas subsection (a) contains no explicit mens rea requirement of any kind. Carter nevertheless argues that such a specific intent requirement must be deemed implicitly present in § 2113(a) by virtue of “our cases interpreting criminal statutes to include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its tei’ms does not contain them.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994). Properly applied to §2113, however, the presumption in favor of scienter demands only that we read subsection (a) as requiring proof of general intent — that is, that the defendant possessed knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime (here, the taking of property of another by force and violence or intimidation).
Before explaining why this is so under our cases, an example, United States v. Lewis, 628 F. 2d 1276, 1279 (CA10 1980), cert, denied, 450 U. S. 924 (1981), will help to make the distinction between “general” and “specific” intent less esoteric. In Lewis, a person entered a bank and took money from a teller at gunpoint, but deliberately failed to make a quick getaway from the bank in the hope of being arrested so that he would be returned to prison and treated for alcoholism. Though this defendant knowingly engaged in the acts of using force and taking money (satisfying “general intent”), he did not intend permanently to deprive the bank of its possession of the money (failing to satisfy “specific intent”). See generally 1W. LaPave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.5, p. 315 (1986) (distinguishing general from specific intent).
The presumption in favor of scienter requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from “otherwise innocent conduct.” X-Citement Video, supra, at 72. In Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600 (1994), for example, to avoid criminalizing the innocent activity of gun ownership, we interpreted a federal firearms statute to require proof that the defendant knew that the weapon he possessed had the characteristics bringing it within the scope of the statute. Id., at 611-612. See also, e. g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419, 426 (1985); Morissette, 342 U. S., at 270-271. By contrast, some situations may call for implying a specific intent requirement into statutory text. Suppose, for example, a statute identical to § 2113(b) but without the words “intent to steal or purloin.” Such a statute would run the risk of punishing seemingly innocent conduct in the case of a defendant who peaceably takes money believing it to be his. Reading the statute to require that the defendant possess general intent with respect to the actus reus — i. e., that he know that he is physically taking the money — would fail to protect the innocent actor. The statute therefore would need to be read to require not only general intent, but also specific intent — i. e., that the defendant take the money with “intent to steal or purloin.”
In this case, as in Staples, a general intent requirement suffices to separate wrongful from “otherwise innocent” conduct. Section 2113(a) certainly should not be interpreted to apply to the hypothetical person who engages in forceful taking of money while sleepwalking (innocent, if aberrant activity), but this result is accomplished simply by requiring, as Staples did, general intent — i. e., proof of knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime. And once this mental state and actus reus are shown, the concerns underlying the presumption in favor of scienter are fully satisfied, for a forceful taking — even by a defendant who takes under a good-faith claim of right — falls outside the realm of the “otherwise innocent.” Thus, the presumption in favor of scienter does not justify reading a specific intent requirement — “intent to steal or purloin” — into § 2113(a).
Independent of his reliance upon the presumption in favor of scienter, Carter argues that the legislative history of § 2113 supports the notion that an “intent to steal” requirement should be read into § 2113(a). Carter points out that, in 1934, Congress enacted what is now § 2113(a), but with the adverb “feloniously” (which all agree is equivalent to “intent to steal”) modifying the verb “takes.” Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 304, §2(a), 48 Stat. 783. In 1937, Congress added what is now § 2113(b). Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 747, 50 Stat. 749. Finally, in 1948, Congress made two changes to §2113, deleting “feloniously” from what is now § 2113(a) and dividing the “robbery” and “larceny” offenses into their own separate subsections. 62 Stat. 796.
Carter concludes that the 1948 deletion of “feloniously” was merely a stylistic change, and that Congress had no intention, in deleting that word, to drop the requirement that the defendant “feloniously” take the property — that is, with intent to steal. Such reasoning, however, misunderstands our approach to statutory interpretation. In analyzing a statute, we begin by examining the text, see, e. g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 475 (1992), not by "psychoanalyzing those who enacted it,” Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U. S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). While “feloniously” no doubt would be sufficient to convey a specific intent requirement akin to the one spelled out in subsection (b), the word simply does not appear in subsection (a).
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 283-284, this reading is not a fanciful one. The absence of a specific intent requirement from subsection (a), for example, permits the statute to reach eases like Lewis, see supra, at 268, where an ex-convict robs a bank because he wants to be apprehended and returned to prison. (The Government represents that indictments on this same fact pattern (which invariably plead out and hence do not result in reported decisions) are brought “as often as every year,” Brief for United States 22, n. 13.) It can hardly be said, therefore, that it would have been absurd to delete “feloniously” in order to reach such defendants. And once we have made that determination, our inquiry into legislative motivation is at an end. Cf. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S., at 510-511.
B
Turning to the second element in dispute, it will be recalled that, whereas subsection (b) requires that the defendant “tak[e] and earr[y) away the property,” subsection (a) requires only that the defendant “tak[e]” the property. Carter contends that the “takes” in subsection (a) is equivalent to “takes and carries away” in subsection (b). While Carter seems to acknowledge that the argument is at war with the text of the statute, he urges that text should not be dispositive here because nothing in the evolution of § 2113(a) suggests that Congress sought to discard the asportation requirement from that subsection.
But, again, our inquiry focuses on an analysis of the textual product of Congress’ efforts, not on speculation as to the internal thought processes of its Members. Congress is certainly free to outlaw bank theft that does not involve aspor-tation, and it hardly would have been absurd for Congress to do so, since the taking-without-asportation scenario is no imagined hypothetical. See, e. g., State v. Boyle, 970 S. W. 2d 835, 836, 838-839 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (construing state statutory codification of common-law robbery to apply to defendant who, after taking money by threat of force, dropped the money on the spot). Indeed, a leading treatise applauds the deletion of the asportation requirement from the elements of robbery. See 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 8.11, at 439. No doubt the common law’s decision to require asportation also has its virtues. But Congress adopted a different view in § 2113(a), and it is not for us to question that choice.
C
There remains the requirement in §2113(b)’s first paragraph that the property taken have a “value exceeding $1,000” — a requirement notably absent from § 2113(a). Carter, shifting gears from his previous arguments, concedes the textual point but claims that the valuation requirement does not affect the Schmuck elements analysis because it is a sentencing factor, not an element. We disagree. The structure of subsection (b) strongly suggests that its two paragraphs — the first of which requires that the property taken have “value exceeding $1,000,” the second of which refers to property of “value not exceeding $1,000” — describe distinct offenses. Each begins with the word “[w]hoever,” proceeds to describe identically (apart from- the differing valuation requirements) the elements of the offense, and concludes by stating the prescribed punishment. That these provisions “stand on their own grammatical feet” strongly suggests that Congress intended the valuation requirement to be an element of each paragraph’s offense, rather than a sentencing factor of some base § 2113(b) offense. Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227, 234 (1999). Even aside from the statute’s structure, the “steeply higher penalties” — an enhancement from a 1-year to a 10-year maximum penalty on proof of valuation exceeding $1,000 — leads us to conclude that the valuation requirement is an element of the first paragraph of subsection (b). See Castillo v. United States, ante, at 127; Jones, 526 U. S., at 233. Finally, the constitutional questions that would be raised by interpreting the valuation requirement to be a sentencing factor persuade us to adopt the view that the valuation requirement is an element. See id., at 239-252.
The dissent agrees that the valuation requirement of subsection (b)’s first paragraph is an element, but nonetheless would hold that subsection (b) is a lesser included offense of subsection (a). Post, at 287-289. The dissent reasons that the “value not exceeding $1,000” component of §2113(b)’s second paragraph is not an element of the offense described in that paragraph. Hence, the matter of value does not prevent §2113(b)’s second paragraph from being a lesser included offense of § 2113(a). And if a defendant wishes to receive an instruction on the first paragraph of § 2113(b) — which entails more severe penalties than the second paragraph, but is a more realistic option from the jury’s standpoint in a case such as this one where the value of the property clearly exceeds $1,000 — the dissent sees no reason to bar him from making that election, even though the “value exceeding $1,000” element of §2113(b)’s first paragraph is clearly absent from § 2118(a).
This novel maneuver creates a problem, however. Since subsection (a) contains no valuation requirement, a defendant indicted for violating that subsection who requests an instruction under subsection (b)’s first paragraph would effectively “waive... his [Fifth Amendment] right to notice by indictment of the ‘value exceeding $1,000’ element.” Post, at 289. But this same course would not be available to the prosecutor who seeks the insurance policy of a lesser included offense instruction under that same paragraph after determining that his case may have fallen short of proving the elements of subsection (a). For, whatever authority defense counsel may possess to waive a defendant’s constitutional rights, see generally New York v. Hill, 528 U. S. 110 (2000), a prosecutor has no such power. Thus, the prosecutor would be disabled from obtaining a lesser included offense instruction under Rule 31(c), a result plainly contrary to Schmuck, in which we explicitly rejected an interpretive approach to the Rule that would have permitted “the defendant, by in effect waiving his right to notice,... [to] obtain a lesser [included] offense instruction in circumstances where the constitutional restraint of notice to the defendant would prevent the prosecutor from seeking an identical instruction,” 489 U. S., at 718.
* * *
We hold that § 2113(b) is not a lesser included offense of § 2113(a), and therefore that petitioner is not entitled to a jury instruction on § 2113(b). The judgment of the Third Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
We granted certiorari in Mosley to address the issue that we resolve today, Mosley v. United States, 523 U. S. 1019 (1997), but dismissed the petition in that case upon the death of the petitioner, 525 U. S. 120 (1998) (per curiam).
By “lesser offense,” Schmuck meant lesser in terms of magnitude of punishment. When the elements of such a “lesser offense” are a subset of the elements of the charged offense, the “lesser offense” attains the status of a “lesser included offense.”
A defendant must also satisfy the “independent prerequisite... that the evidence at trial... be such that a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense, yet acquit him of the greater.” Schmuck, 489 U. S., at 716, n. 8 (citing Keeble v. United States, 412 U. S. 205, 208 (1973)). In light of our holding that petitioner fails to satisfy the elements test, we need not address the latter requirement in this case.
The dissent claims that our decision in United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482 (1997), is not in point because we went on in Wells to discuss the evolution of the statute (specifically, a recodification of numerous sections), which revealed Congress’ apparent eare in retaining a materiality requirement in certain sections while omitting it in others, such as the one before us in Wells. According to the dissent, a similar statutory evolution is not present here. See post, at 286. But, even assuming the dissent is correct in this latter regard, the holding in Wells simply cannot be deemed to rest on our discussion of the statute’s evolution. Rather, we characterized that discussion as supporting a result we had already reached on textual grounds. See 519 U. S., at 492 (“Statutory history confirms the natural reading”).
Congress could have simply punished “robbery” or “larceny” as some States have done (and as Congress itself has done elsewhere, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §§2112, 2114, 2115), thereby leaving the definition of these terms to the common law, but Congress instead followed the more prevalent legislative practice of spelling out elements of these crimes. See 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §8.11, p. 438, n. 6 (1986).
This interpretive principle exists quite apart from the canon on imputing common-law meaning. See, e. g., X-Citement Video, 513 U. S., at 70 (applying presumption in favor of scienter to statute proscribing the shipping or receiving of visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, without first inquiring as to the existence of a common-law antecedent to this offense); Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600 (1994) (similar).
The dissent claims that the Lewis court determined that the jury could have found specific intent to steal on the facts presented, and thus disputes our characterization of the case as illustrating a situation where a defendant acts only with general intent. Post, at 283-284 (citing Lewis, 628 F. 2d, at 1279). The dissent fails to acknowledge, however, that the Lewis court made this determination only because some evidence suggested that, if the defendant had not been arrested, he would have kept the stolen money. Ibid. The Lewis court, implicitly acknowledging the possibility that some defendant (if not Lewis) might unconditionally intend to turn himself in after completing a bank theft, proceeded to hold, in the alternative, that § 2113(a) covers a defendant who acts only with general intent. See ibid.
Numerous Courts of Appeals agree. While holding that § 2113(a)’s version of bank robbery is not a specific intent crime, these courts have construed the statute to contain a general intent requirement. See United States v. Gonyea, 140 F. 3d 649, 653-654, and n. 10 (CA6 1998) (collecting cases).
Relatedly, Carter argues that, even if a sensible Congress might have deleted “feloniously,” the 1948 Congress did not adequately explain an intention to do so in the legislative history to the 1948 Act. He points to the House Report, which states that Congress intended only to make “changes in phraseology.” H. R. Rep. No. 304,80th Cong., 1st Sess., A135 (1947). Carter further suggests that the phraseology concern with “felo-niously
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit for reclassification of federal civil service positions and for backpay. It presents a substantial issue concerning the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the relief available in that tribunal.
I
The plaintiff-respondents, Herman R. Testan and Francis L. Zarrilli, are trial attorneys employed in the Office of Counsel, Defense Personnel Support Center, Defense Supply Agency, in Philadelphia. They represent the Government in certain matters that come before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals of the Department of Defense. Their positions are subject to the Classification Act, 5 U. S. C. § 5101 et seq., and they are presently classified at civil service grade GS-13.
In December 1969 respondents, through their Chief Attorney, requested their employing agency to reclassify their positions to grade GS-14. The asserted ground was that their duties and responsibilities met the requirements for the higher grade under standards promulgated by the Civil Service Commission in General Attorney Series GS-905-0. In addition, they contended that their duties were identical to those of other trial attorneys in positions classified as GS-14 in the Contract Appeals Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, and that under the principle of “equal pay for substantially equal work,” prescribed in § 5101 (1)(A), they were entitled to the higher classification.
The agency, after an audit by a position classification specialist, concluded that the respondents’ assigned duties were properly classified at the GS-13 level under the Commission’s classification standards. On appeal, the Commission reached the same conclusion and denied reclassification. The Commission also ruled that comparison of the positions held by the respondents with those of attorneys employed by the referenced Logistics Command was not a proper method of classification.
The two respondents then instituted this suit in the Court of Claims. Each sought an order directing reclassification of his position as of the date (May 8, 1970) of the first administrative denial of his request, and back-pay, computed at the difference between his salary and grade GS-14 (and the claimed appropriate within-grade step), from that date. The trial judge, in a long opinion, App. 43-117, concluded that the respondents were not entitled to backpay due to their allegedly wrongful'classi-fieation. Id., at 57. But he also concluded that the Commission’s refusal to reclassify respondents to GS-14 was arbitrary, discriminatory, and not supported by substantial evidence, ibid., and that as a matter of law the respondents were entitled to an order remanding the case to the Commission with directions so to. reclassify the respondents. Id., at 58, 117.
The Court of Claims considered the case en banc and divided 4-3. The majority disapproved the trial judge’s recommendation that the court was empowered to direct the reclassification of respondents to GS-14, for the Court of .Claims is not authorized to create an entitlement to a governmental position. “If entitlement depends on the exercise of discretion by someone else we cannot substitute our own discretion.” 205 Ct. Cl. 330, 332, 499 F. 2d 690, 691 (1974). The majority felt, however, that if the Commission were to determine that it had made an erroneous classification, that determination “could create a legal right which we could then enforce by a money judgment.” Id., at 333, 499 F. 2d, at 691.
The majority agreed with the trial judge that the Commission’s failure to compare respondents’ positions with those of the Logistics Command attorneys was arbitrary and capricious. Id., at 331, 499 F. 2d, at 691. The court observed: “Ordinarily ... it is not arbitrary and capricious to refuse to consider the grade of employees other than the ones complaining.” But it went on to say: “This case is peculiar in its facts,” for the employees “all belong to a small readily manageable cadre, their jobs have a large nexus of duties shared in common, and the other employees are specifically pointed out by the complaining employees.” Id., at 332, 499 F. 2d, at 691. The court ruled that it had the power under the remand statute, 86 Stat. 652, now codified as part of 28 U. S. C. § 1491 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), to order the Commission to reconsider its classification decision “under proper directions.” Accordingly, and pursuant to its Rule 149 (b), the court remanded the case to the Commission to make the comparison and to report the result to the court.
The dissent argued that the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is limited to money judgments and, since none had been or could be ordered in this case, the court was without jurisdiction even to remand the case to the Civil Service Commission. In addition, the respondents had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, for they were asking for positions, and pay, to which they had never been appointed. The dissent further argued that there is no constitutional right to a governmental position to which one has not been appointed; that the salary of a Government job is payable only to the person appointed to that position; and that the court has no authority to take over the appointing power that the Constitution, Art. II, § 2, has placed in the Executive Department. It asserted that the decision of the majority was but a declaratory judgment, a legal function not within the court’s jurisdiction. Finally, the dissent argued that the classification decision of the Commission was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. 205 Ct. Cl., at 334-338, 499 F. 2d, at 692-694.
We granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue in the measure of the Court of Claims' statutory jurisdiction, and because of the significance of the court's decision upon the Commission's administration of the civil service classification system. 420 U. S. 923 (1975).
II
We turn to the respective statutes that are advanced as support for the action taken by the Court of Claims.
A. The Tucker Act. The central provision establishing the jurisdiction of the court is that part of the Tucker Act now codified as 28 U. S. C. § 1491:
"The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or un-liquidated damages in cases not soui~ding in tort."
This Court recently had occasion to examine the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under this statutory formulation. In United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1 (1969), the Court reviewed a decision (182 Ct. Cl. 631, 390 F. 2d 894) in which the Court of Claims had concluded that it was empowered to exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201. This Court observed that the Court of Claims was established by Congress in 1855; that "[t]hroughout its entire history," until the King case was filed, "its jurisdiction has been limited to money claims against the United States Government”; that decided cases in this Court had “reaffirmed this view of the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Claims,” and “the passage of the Tucker Act in 1887 had not expanded that jurisdiction to equitable matters”; that “neither the Act creating the Court of Claims nor any amendment to it” granted that court jurisdiction of the case before it because King’s claim was “not limited to actual, presently due money damages from the United States”; and that what King was requesting was “essentially equitable relief of a kind that the Court of Claims has held throughout its history ... it does not have the power to grant.” 395 U. S., at 2-3. The Court then went on to hold that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not grant the Court of Claims authority to issue declaratory judgments. Cited in support of all this were Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 557 (1962) (Harlan, J.) (plurality opinion); United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1 (1889); and United States v. Alire, 6 Wall. 573, 575 (1868). See Lee v. Thornton, 420 U. S. 139 (1975); Richardson v. Morris, 409 U. S. 464 (1973); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 589-591 (1941).
The Tucker Act, of course, is itself only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages. The Court of Claims has recognized that the Act merely confers jurisdiction upon it whenever the substantive right exists. Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605-607, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1007-1009 (1967). We therefore must determine whether the two other federal statutes that are invoked by the respondents confer a substantive right to recover money damages from the United States for the period of their allegedly wrongful civil service classifications.
B. The Classification Act. Inasmuch as the trial judge proposed, App. 57, that the respondents were not entitled to backpay under the Back Pay Act, 5 U. S. C. § 5596, and the Court of Claims held that there was no need for it to reach and construe that Act, 205 Ct. Cl., at 333, 499 F. 2d, at 691, it is implicit in the court’s decision in favor of respondents that a violation of the Classification Act gives rise to a claim for money damages for pay lost by reason of the allegedly wrongful classifications.
It long has been established, of course, that the United States, as sovereign, “is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S., at 586. And it has been said, in a Court of Claims context, that a waiver of the traditional sovereign immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” United States v. King, 395 U. S., at 4; Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 276 (1957). Thus, except as Congress has consented to a cause of action against the United States, “there is no jurisdiction in the Court of Claims more than in any other court to entertain suits against the United States.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S., at 587-588.
We find no provision in the Classification Act that expressly makes the United States liable for pay lost through allegedly improper classifications. To be sure, in the “purpose” section of the Act, 5 U. S. C. § 5101 (1)(A), Congress stated that it was “to provide a plan for classification of positions whereby . . . the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work will be followed.” And in subsequent sections, there are set forth substantive standards for grading particular positions, and provisions for procedures to ensure that those standards are met. But none of these several sections contains an express provision for an award of backpay to a person who has been erroneously classified.
In answer to this fact, the respondents and the amid make two observations. They first argue that the Tucker Act fundamentally waives sovereign immunity with respect to any claim invoking a constitutional provision or a federal statute or regulation, and makes available any and all generally accepted and important forms of redress, including money damages. It is said that the Government has confused two very different issues, namely, whether there has been a waiver of sovereignty, and whether a substantive right has been created, and it is claimed that where there has been a violation of a substantive right, the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity as to all measures necessary to redress that violation.
The argument does not persuade us. As stated above, the Tucker Act is merely jurisdictional, and grant of a right of action must be made with specificity. The respondents do not rest their claims upon a contract; neither do they seek the return of money paid by them to the Government. It follows' that the asserted entitlement to money damages depends upon whether any federal statute “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.” Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl., at 607, 372 F. 2d, at 1009; Mosca v. United States, 189 Ct. Cl. 283, 290, 417 F. 2d 1382, 1386 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U. S. 911 (1970). We are not ready to tamper with these established principles because it might be thought that they should be responsive to a particular conception of enlightened governmental policy. See Brief for Amici Curiae 9-11. In a suit against the United States, there cannot be a right to money damages without a waiver of sovereign immunity, and we regard as unsound the argument of amici that all substantive rights of necessity create a waiver of sovereign immunity such that money damages are available to redress their violation.
We perceive nothing in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102 (1974), cited by the amici with other cases centering in the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”), that lends support to the respondents. These Fifth Amendment cases are tied to the language, purpose, and self-executing aspects of that constitutional provision, Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16 (1933), and are not authority to the effect that the Tucker Act eliminates from consideration the sovereign immunity of the United States.
The respondents and the amici next argue that the violation of any statute or regulation relating to federal employment automatically creates a cause of action against the United States for money damages because, if this were not so, the employee would then have a right without a remedy, inasmuch as he is denied access to the one forum where he may seek redress.
Here again we are not persuaded. Where the United States is the defendant and the plaintiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or retained, the basis of the federal claim — whether it be the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation — does not create a cause of action for money damages unless, as the Court of Claims has stated, that basis “in itself... can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.” Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl., at 607, 372 F. 2d, at 1008, 1009. We see nothing akin to this in the Classification Act or in the context of a suit seeking reclassification.
The present action, of course, is not one concerning a wrongful discharge or a wrongful suspension. In that situation, at least since the Civil Service Act of 1883, the employee is entitled to the emoluments of his position until he has been legally disqualified. United States v. Wickersham, 201 U. S. 390 (1906). There is no claim here that either respondent has been denied the benefit of the position to which he was appointed. The claim, instead, is that each has been denied the benefit of a position to which he should have been, but was not, appointed. The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has been duly appointed to it. United States v. McLean, 95 U. S. 750 (1878); Ganse v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 183, 186, 376 F. 2d 900, 902 (1967). The Classification Act does not purport by its terms to change that rule, and we see no suggestion in it or in its legislative history that Congress intended to alter it.
The case of Selman v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 675, 498 F. 2d 1354 (1974), pressed upon us by the respondents, if correct, is clearly distinguishable. The pay claims there rested flatly upon the mandatory provision contained in 37 U. S. C. § 202 (l) to the effect that an officer “serving as Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Navy is entitled to the basic pay of a rear admiral (lower half) or brigadier general, as appropriate.” Neither the Classification Act nor the Back Pay Act contains any mandatory provision of this kind.
The situation, as we see it, is not that Congress has left the respondents remediless, as they assert, for their allegedly wrongful civil service classification, but that Congress has not made available to a party wrongfully classified the remedy of money damages through retroactive classification. There is a difference between prospective reclassification, on the one hand, and retroactive reclassification resulting in money damages, on the. other. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). Respondents, of course, have an administrative avenue of prospective relief available to them under the elaborate and structured provisions of the Classification Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 5101-5115. The amici so recognize. Brief for Amici Curiae 13-15. Among the Act’s provisions along this line are those requiring the Civil Service Commission to engage in supervisory review of an agency’s classifications, and, where necessary, to review and reclassify individual positions, 5 U. S. C. §5110; allowing the Commission to reclassify, § 5112; and allowing the Commission even to revoke or suspend the agency’s authority to classify its own positions, § 5111. Indeed, as the amid describe it: “[T]he Act is not merely a hortatory catalogue of high principles.” Brief for Amici Curiae 15. The built-in avenue of administrative relief is one response to these statutory requirements. Review and reclassification may be brought into play at the request of an employee. 5 U. S. C. § 5112 (b). And respondents, as has been- noted, did just that. A second possible ave-, nue of relief — and it, too, seemingly, is only prospective— is by way of mandamus, under 28 U. S. C. § 1361, in a proper federal district court. In this way, also, the respondents have asserted their claims. See n. 5, supra.
The respondents, thus, are not entirely without remedy. They are without the remedies in the Court of Claims of retroactive classification and money damages to which they assert they are entitled. Additional remedies of this kind are for the Congress to provide and not for the courts to construct.
Finally, we note that if the respondents were correct in their claims to retroactive classification and money damages, many of the federal statutes — such as the Back Pay Act — that expressly provide money damages as a remedy against the United States in carefully limited circumstances would be rendered superfluous.
The Court of Claims, in the present case, sought to avoid all this by its remand to the Civil Service Commission for further proceedings. If, then, the Commission were to find that the respondents were entitled to a higher grade, the Court of Claims announced that it would be prepared on appropriate motion to enter ah award of money damages for the respondents for whatever backpay they lost during the period of their wrongful classifications. See Chambers v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 186, 451 F. 2d 1045 (1971). The remand statute, Pub. L. 92-415, 86 Stat. 652, now codified as part of 28 U. S. C. § 1491 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), authorizes the Court of Claims to “issue orders directing restoration to . . . position, placement in appropriate duty . . . status, and correction of applicable records” in order to complement the relief afforded by a money judgment, and also to “remand appropriate matters to any administrative . . . body” in a case “within its jurisdiction.” The remand statute, thus, applies only to cases already within the court’s jurisdiction. The present litigation is not such a case.
Respondents cite Allison v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 263, 451 F. 2d 1035 (1971), and Pettit v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 207, 488 F. 2d 1026 (1973), as precedent for the remand order in this case. Those cases found the employees’ “entitlement” to money damages in an Executive Order, and to that extent might be distinguishable from the instant case. But cf. Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F. 2d 93 (CA6 1971); Onotta v. United States, 415 F. 2d 1271 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 934 (1970); Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 350 F. 2d 451 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 978 (1966). To the extent, however, that AUison and Pettit rely on the concept that an admission of misclassification by an agency automatically gives rise to a cause of action for money damages against the United States, their reasoning is identical to the Court of Claims’ reasoning in the instant case; and to the extent that analysis is now rejected, the analysis of Allison and Pettit is necessarily rejected. See also Chambers v. United States, supra.
C. The Back Pay Act. This statute, which the Court of Claims found unnecessary to evaluate in arriving at its decision, does not apply, in our view, to wrongful-classification claims. The Act does authorize retroactive recovery of wages whenever a federal employee has “undergone an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action that has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or a part of” the compensation to which the employee is otherwise entitled. 5 U. S. C. § 5596 (b). The statute’s language was intended to provide a monetary remedy for wrongful reductions in grade, removals, suspensions, and “other unwarranted or unjustified actions affecting pay or allowances [that] could occur in the course of reassignments and change from full-time to part-time work.” S. Rep. No. 1062, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1966). The Commission consistently has so construed the Back Pay Act. See 5 CFR § 550.803 (e) (1975). So has the Court of Claims. See Desmond v. United States, 201 Ct. Cl. 507, 527 (1973).
For many years federal personnel actions were viewed as entirely discretionary and therefore not subject to any judicial review, and in the absence of a statute eliminating that discretion, courts refused to intervene where an employee claimed that he had been wrongfully discharged. Compare Keim v. United States, 177 U. S. 290, 293-296 (1900), with United States v. Wicker sham, 201 U. S. 390 (1906). See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 69-70 (1974). Relief was invariably denied where the claim was that the employee had been denied a promotion on improper grounds. See Keim v. United States, 177 U. S., at 296; United States v. McLean, 95 U. S., at 753.
Congress, of course, now has provided specifically in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 5 U. S. C. § 7501, for administrative review of a claim of wrongful adverse action, and in the Back Pay Act for the award of money damages for a wrongful deprivation of pay. But federal agencies continue to have discretion in determining most matters relating to the terms and conditions of federal employment. One continuing aspect of this is the rule, mentioned above, that the federal employee is entitled to receive only the salary of the position to which he was appointed, even though he may have performed the duties of another position or claims that he should have been placed in a higher grade. Congress did not override this rule, or depart from it, with its enactment of the Back Pay Act. It could easily have so provided had that been its intention.
In support of their contention that the Back Pay Act authorizes a claim in the situation here presented, respondents and amici cite only two cases other than the Court of Claims cases whose reasoning is directly in question here. Neither case supports the proposition. Walker v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 749 (DC 1973). (cited by respondents), addressed the issue of the retro-activity of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Ainsworth v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 110, 399 F. 2d 176 (1968) (cited by amici), involved the rights of an employee who had been discharged and subsequently reinstated.
Neither of these cases provides a reason for doubting that the Back Pay Act, as its words so clearly indicate, was intended to grant a monetary cause of action only to those who were subjected to a reduction in their duly appointed emoluments or position.
III
We therefore conclude that neither the Classification Act nor the Back Pay Act creates a substantive right in the respondents to backpay for the period of their claimed wrongful classifications. This makes it unnecessary for us to consider the additional argument advanced by the United States that the Classification Act does not require that positions held by employees of one agency be compared with those of employees in another agency.
The Court of Claims was in error when it remanded the case to the Civil Service Commission for further proceedings. That court’s judgment is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to dismiss the respondents’ suit.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Title 5, §5101. “Purpose.
“It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a plan for classification of positions whereby— •
“(1) in determining the rate of basic pay which an employee will receive—
“(A) the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work will be followed . ,
There is no suggestion that the plaintiff-respondents have not properly pursued and exhausted their administrative remedies.
The decision of the Court of Claims in this case is not inconsistent, as to these issues, with other recent cases resolved by divided votes in that court. See Chambers v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 186, 451 F. 2d 1045 (1971); Allison v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 263, 451 F. 2d 1035 (1971); Small v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 11, 470 F. 2d 1020 (1972); Pettit v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 207, 488 F. 2d 1026 (1973). But see Applegate v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 999, 521 F. 2d 1406 (1975); Roseman v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 998, 521 F. 2d 1406 (1975); Kaeserman v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 983 (1975); Barnum v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 1024, 529 F. 2d 531 (1975).
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1494 also grants the Court of Claims jurisdiction to determine the amount due from the United States "by reason of any unsettled account of any officer . of . the United State."
The amici acknowledge that it is conceivable that the respondents will be able to obtain reclassification for the future through the mandamus action they instituted in 1971. See Testan v. Hampton, Civ. No. 71-2250 (ED Pa.). That suit apparently lies dormant subject to reactivation. The Government states that if respondents proceed with the action, the United States “will not contest the district court’s jurisdiction to entertain respondents’ claim for prospective equitable relief.” Reply Brief for United States 17 n. 7.
Brief for Respondents 12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-28.
The committee reports relating to Pub. L. 92-415 expressly confirm the understanding that the remand statute “does not extend the class of cases over which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction.” S. Rep. No. 92-1066, p. 1 (1972); H. R. Rep. No. 92-1023, p. 3 (1972).
In 1972, Congress made Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to federal employees. 86 Stat. 103, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e (a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The nature of that explicit waiver of sovereign immunity is presently before the Court. See Brown v. General Services Administration, 507 F. 2d 1300 (CA2 1974), cert. granted, 421 U. S. 987 (1975).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case brings before us a constitutional challenge to §§ 101 (b) (1) (D) and 101 (b) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Act), 66 Stat. 182, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101 (b) (1) (D) and 1101 (b) (2).
I
The Act grants special preference immigration status to aliens who qualify as the “children” or “parents” of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents. Under § 101 (b) (1), a “child” is defined as an unmarried person under 21 years of age who is a legitimate or legitimated child, a stepchild, an adopted child, or an illegitimate child seeking preference by virtue of his relationship with his natural mother. The definition does not extend to an illegitimate child seeking preference by virtue of his relationship with his natural father. Moreover, under § 101 (b) (2), a person qualifies as a “parent” for purposes of the Act solely on the basis of the person’s relationship with a “child.” As a result, the natural father of an illegitimate child who is either a United States citizen or permanent resident alien is not entitled to preferential treatment as a “parent.”
The special preference immigration status provided for those who satisfy the statutory “parent-child” relationship depends on whether the immigrant’s relative is a United States citizen or permanent resident alien. A United States citizen is allowed the entry of his “parent” or “child” without regard to either an applicable numerical quota or the labor certification requirement. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1151 (a), (b), 1182 (a) (14). On the other hand, a United States permanent resident alien is allowed the entry of the “parent” or “child” subject to numerical limitations but without regard to the labor certification requirement. 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a) (14); see 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 2.40 n. 18 (rev. ed. 1975).
Appellants are three sets of unwed natural fathers and their illegitimate offspring who sought, either as an alien father or an alien child, a special immigration preference by virtue of a relationship to a citizen or resident alien child or parent. In each instance the applicant was informed that he was ineligible for an immigrant visa unless he qualified for admission under the general numerical limitations and, in the case of the alien parents, received the requisite labor certification.
Appellants filed this action in July 1974 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York challenging the constitutionality of §§ 101 (b)(1) and 101 (b) (2) of the Act under the First, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Appellants alleged that the statutory provisions (i) denied them equal protection by discriminating against natural fathers and their illegitimate children “on the basis of the father’s marital status, the illegitimacy of the child and the sex of the parent without either compelling or rational justification”; (ii) denied them due process of law to the extent that there was established “an unwarranted conclusive presumption of the absence of strong psychological and economic ties between natural fathers and their children born out of wedlock and not legitimated”; and (iii) “seriously burden[ed] and infringe [d] upon the rights of natural fathers and their children, born out of wedlock and not legitimated, to mutual association, to privacy, to establish a home, to raise natural children and to be raised by the natural father.” App. 11-12. Appellants sought to enjoin permanently enforcement of the challenged statutory provisions to the extent that the statute precluded them from qualifying for the special preference accorded other “parents” and “children.”
A three-judge District Court was convened to consider the constitutional issues. After noting that Congress’ power to fashion rules for the admission of aliens was “exceptionally broad,” the District Court held, with one judge dissenting, that the statutory provisions at issue were neither “wholly devoid of any conceivable rational purpose” nor “fundamentally aimed at achieving a goal unrelated to the regulation of immigration.” Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 165, 166 (1975). The court therefore granted judgment for the Government and dismissed the action.
We noted probable jurisdiction sub nom. Fiallo v. Levi, 426 U. S. 919 (1976), and for the reasons set forth below we affirm.
II
At the outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over” the admission of aliens. Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 339 (1909); accord, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 766 (1972). Our cases “have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 210 (1953); see, e. g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 (1952); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581 (1889). Our recent decisions have not departed from this long-established rule. Just last Term, for example, the Court had occasion to note that “the power over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review.” Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 101 n. 21 (1976), citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra, at 713; accord, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 81-82 (1976). And we observed recently that in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, “Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Id., at 80.
Appellants apparently do not challenge the need for special judicial deference to congressional policy choices in the immigration context, but instead suggest that a “unique coalescing of factors” makes the instant case sufficiently unlike prior immigration cases to warrant more searching judicial scrutiny. Brief for Appellants 52-55. Appellants first observe that since the statutory provisions were designed to reunite families wherever possible, the purpose of the statute was to afford rights not to aliens but to United States citizens and legal permanent residents. Appellants then rely on our border-search decisions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975), for the proposition that the courts must scrutinize congressional legislation in the immigration area to protect against violations of the rights of citizens. At issue in the border-search cases, however, was the nature of the protections mandated by the Fourth Amendment with respect to Government procedures designed to stem the illegal entry of aliens. Nothing in the opinions in those cases suggests that Congress has anything but exceptionally broad power to determine which classes of aliens may lawfully enter the country. See 413 U. S., at 272; 422 U. S., at 883-884.
Appellants suggest a second distinguishing factor. They argue that none of the prior immigration cases of this Court involved “double-barreled” discrimination based on sex and illegitimacy, infringed upon the due process rights of citizens and legal permanent residents, or implicated “the fundamental constitutional interests of United States citizens and permanent residents in a familial relationship.” Brief for Appellants 53-54; see id., at 16-18. But this Court has resolved similar challenges to immigration legislation based on other constitutional rights of citizens, and has rejected the suggestion that more searching judicial scrutiny is required. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, supra, for example, United States citizens challenged the power of the Attorney General to deny a visa to an alien who, as a proponent of “the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of World communism,” was ineligible to receive a visa under 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a) (28) (D) absent a waiver by the Attorney General. The citizen-appellees in that case conceded that Congress could prohibit entry of all aliens falling into the class defined by § 1182 (a) (28) (D). They contended, however, that the Attorney General’s statutory discretion to approve a waiver was limited by the Constitution and that their First Amendment rights were abridged by the denial of Mandel’s request for a visa. The Court held that “when the Executive exercises this [delegated] power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant.” 408 U. S., at 770. We can see no reason to review the broad congressional policy choice at issue here under a more exacting standard than was applied in Kleindienst v. Mandel, a First Amendment case.
Finally, appellants characterize our prior immigration cases as involving foreign policy matters and congressional choices to exclude or expel groups of aliens that were “specifically and clearly perceived to pose a grave threat to the national security,” citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 (1952), “or to the general welfare of this country,” citing Boutilier v. INS, 387 U. S. 118 (1967). Brief for Appellants 54. We find no indication in our prior cases that the scope of judicial review is a function of the nature of the policy choice at issue. To the contrary, “[s]ince decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary,” and “[t]he reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S., at 81-82. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, supra, at 588-589. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed in his concurrence in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy:
“The conditions of entry for every alien, the particular classes of aliens that shall be denied entry altogether, the basis for determining such classification, the right to terminate hospitality to aliens, the grounds on which such determination shall be based, have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.” 342 U. S., at 596-597.
III
As originally enacted in 1952, §101 (b) (1) of the Act defined a “child” as an unmarried legitimate or legitimated child or stepchild under 21 years of age. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Attorney General subsequently concluded that the failure of this definition to refer to illegitimate children rendered ineligible for preferential nonquota status both the illegitimate alien child of a citizen mother, Matter of A, 5 I. & N. Dec. 272, 283-284 (A. G. 1953), and the alien mother of a citizen born out of wedlock, Matter of F, 7 I. & N. Dec. 448 (B. I. A. 1957). The Attorney General recommended that the matter be brought to the attention of Congress, Matter of A, supra, at 284, and the Act was amended in 1957 to include what is now 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (b) (1) (D). See n. 1, supra. Congress was specifically concerned with the relationship between a child born out of wedlock and his or her natural mother, and the legislative history of the 1957 amendment reflects an intentional choice not to provide preferential immigration status by virtue of the relationship between an illegitimate child and his or her natural father.
This distinction is just one of many drawn by Congress pursuant to its determination to provide some—but not all—families with relief from various immigration restrictions that would otherwise hinder reunification of the family in this country. In addition to the distinction at issue here, Congress has decided that children, whether legitimate or not, cannot qualify for preferential status if they are married or are over 21 years of age. 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (b) (1). Legitimated children are ineligible for preferential status unless their legitimation occurred prior to their 18th birthday and at a time when they were in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents. § 1101 (b) (1) (C). Adopted children are not entitled to preferential status unless they were adopted before the age of 14 and have thereafter lived in the custody of their adopting or adopted parents for at least two years, § 1101 (b) (1) (E). And stepchildren cannot qualify unless they were under 18 at the time of the marriage creating the stepchild relationship. § 1101 (b) (1) (B).
With respect to each of these legislative policy distinctions, it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a different point and that the statutory definitions deny preferential status to parents and children who share strong family ties. Cf. Mathews v. Diaz, supra, at 83-84. But it is clear from our cases, see Part II, supra, that these are policy questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government, and we have no judicial authority to substitute our political judgment for that of the Congress.
Appellants suggest that the distinction drawn in § 101 (b) (1) (D) is unconstitutional under any standard of review since it infringes upon the constitutional rights of citizens and legal permanent residents without furthering legitimate governmental interests. Appellants note in this regard that the statute makes it more difficult for illegitimate children and their natural fathers to be reunited in this country than for legitimate or legitimated children and their parents, or for illegitimate children and their natural mothers. And appellants also note that the statute fails to establish a procedure under which illegitimate children and their natural fathers could prove the existence and strength of their family relationship. Those are admittedly the consequences of the congressional decision not to accord preferential status to this particular class of aliens, but the decision nonetheless remains one “solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.” Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S., at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Congress obviously has determined that preferential status is not warranted for illegitimate children and their natural fathers, perhaps because of a perceived absence in most cases of close family ties as well as a concern with the serious problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity determinations. See Trimble v. Gordon, ante, at 771. In any event, it is not the judicial role in cases of this sort to probe and test the justifications for the legislative decision. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S., at 770.
IV
We hold that §§ 101 (b) (1) (D) and 101 (b) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 are not unconstitutional by virtue of the exclusion of the relationship between an illegitimate child and his natural father from the preferences accorded by the Act to the “child” or “parent” of a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident.
Affirmed.
Section 101 (b) (1), as set forth in 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (b), provides:
“(1) The term 'child' means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is—
“(A) a legitimate child; or
“(B) a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the child had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred; or
“(C) a child legitimated under the law of the child’s residence or domicile, or under the law of the father’s residence or domicile, whether in or outside the United States, if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such legitimation.
“(D) an illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its natural mother;
“(E) a child adopted while under the age of fourteen years if the child has thereafter been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two years: Provided, That no natural parent of any such adopted child shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this chapter.
“(F) a child, under the age of fourteen at the time a petition is filed in his behalf to accord a classification as an immediate relative under section 1151 (b) of this title [§ 201 (b)], who is an orphan because of the death or disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, or separation or loss from, both parents, or for whom the sole or surviving parent is incapable of providing the proper care which will be provided the child if admitted to the United States and who has in writing irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption; who has been adopted abroad by a United States citizen and his spouse who personally saw and observed the child prior to or during the adoption proceedings; or who is coming to the United States for adoption by a United States citizen and spouse who have complied with the preadoption requirements, if any, of the child’s proposed residence: Provided, That no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any such child shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this chapter.”
Effective January 1, 1977, the parent-child relationship no longer triggers an exemption from the labor certification requirement. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, § 5, 90 Stat. 2705. The 1976 amendments contain a saving clause, § 9, however, which provides that the amendments
“shall not operate to affect the entitlement to immigrant status or the order of consideration for issuance of an immigrant visa of an alien entitled to a preference status, under section 203 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as in effect on the day before the effective date of this Act, on the basis of a petition filed with the Attorney General prior to such effective date.”
Appellant Ramon Martin Fiallo, a United States citizen by birth, currently resides in the Dominican Republic with his natural father, appellant Ramon Fiallo-Sone, a citizen of that country. The father initiated procedures to obtain an immigrant visa as the “parent” of his illegitimate son, but the United States Consul for the Dominican Republic informed appellant Fiallo-Sone that he could not qualify for the preferential status accorded to “parents” unless he legitimated Ramon Fiallo.
Appellant Cleophus Warner, a naturalized United States citizen, is the unwed father of appellant Serge Warner, who was born in 1960 in the French West Indies. In 1972 Cleophus Warner petitioned the Immigration and Naturalization Service to classify Serge as Warner’s “child” for purposes of obtaining an immigrant visa, but the petition was denied on the ground that there was no evidence that Serge was Warner’s legitimate or legitimated offspring.
Appellants Trevor Wilson and Earl Wilson, permanent resident aliens, are the illegitimate children of appellant Arthur Wilson, a citizen of Jamaica. Following the death of their mother in 1974, Trevor and Earl sought to obtain an immigrant visa for their father. We are informed by the appellees that although the application has not yet been rejected, denial is certain since the children are neither legitimate nor legitimated offspring of Arthur Wilson.
Writing for the Court in Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 (1954), Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted that “much could be said for the view” that due process places some limitations on congressional power in the immigration area, “were we writing on a clean slate.”
“But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of Congress under review, there is not merely 'a page of history’ . . . but a whole volume. Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of government. In the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due process. . . . But that the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government. . . .
“We are not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or more sensitive to human rights than our predecessors, especially those who have been most zealous in protecting civil liberties under the Constitution, and must therefore under our constitutional system recognize congressional power in dealing with aliens . . . .” Id., at 530-532.
We are no more inclined to reconsider this line of cases today than we were five years ago when we decided Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 767 (1972).
The appellees argue that the challenged sections of the Act, embodying as they do “a substantive policy regulating the admission of aliens into the United States, [are] not an appropriate subject for judicial review.” Brief for Appellees 15, 19-24. Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens, and there is no occasion to consider in this case whether there may be actions of the Congress with respect to aliens that are so essentially political in character as to be nonjusticiable.
The thoughtful dissenting opinion of our Brother Marshall would be persuasive if its basic premise were accepted. The dissent is grounded on the assumption that the relevant portions of the Act grant a “fundamental right” to American citizens, a right “given only to the citizen” and not to the putative immigrant. Post, at 806, 808, 816. The assumption is facially plausible in that the families of putative immigrants certainly have an interest in their admission. But the fallacy of the assumption is rooted deeply in fundamental principles of sovereignty.
We are dealing here with an exercise of the Nation’s sovereign power to admit or exclude foreigners in accordance with perceived national interests. Although few, if any, countries have been as generous as the United States in extending the privilege to immigrate, or in providing sanctuary to the oppressed, limits and classifications as to who shall be admitted are traditional and necessary elements of legislation in this area. It is true that the legislative history of the provision at issue here establishes that congressional concern was directed at “the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united.” H. R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1957). See also H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 29 (1952) (statute implements “the underlying intention of our immigration laws regarding the preservation of the family unit”). To accommodate this goal, Congress has accorded a special “preference status” to certain aliens who share relationships with citizens or permanent resident aliens. But there are widely varying relationships and degrees of kinship, and it is appropriate for Congress to consider not only the nature of these relationships but also problems of identification, administration, and the potential for fraud. In the inevitable process of “line drawing,” Congress has determined that certain classes of aliens are more likely than others to satisfy national objectives without undue cost, and it has granted preferential status only to those classes.
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote years ago, the formulation of these “[p]olicies pertaining to the entry of aliens . . . is entrusted exclusively to Congress.” Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S., at 531. This is not to say, as we make clear in n. 5, supra, that the Government’s power in this area is never subject to judicial review. But our cases do make clear that despite the impact of these classifications on the interests of those already within our borders, congressional determinations such as this one are subject only to limited judicial review.
S. Rep. No. 1057, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1957) (the amendment was designed “to clarify the law so that the illegitimate child would in relation to his mother enjoy the same status under the immigration laws as a legitimate child”) (emphasis added) ; H. R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1957) (the amendment was designed “to alleviate hardship and provide for a fair and humanitarian adjudication of immigration cases involving children born out of wedlock and the mothers of such children”) (emphasis added); 103 Cong. Rec. 14659 (1957) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (the amendment “would clarify the law so that an illegitimate child would, in relation to his mother, enjoy the same status under immigration laws as a legitimate child”) (emphasis added).
The inherent difficulty of determining the paternity of an illegitimate child is compounded when it depends upon events that may have occurred in foreign countries many years earlier. Congress may well have given substantial weight, in adopting the classification here challenged, to these problems of proof and the potential for fraudulent visa applications that would have resulted from a more generous drawing of the line. Moreover, our cases clearly indicate that legislative distinctions in the immigration area need not be as “ 'carefully tuned to alternative considerations,’ ” Trimble v. Gordon, ante, at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 513 (1976)), as those in the domestic area.
Appellants insist that the statutory distinction is based on an overbroad and outdated stereotype concerning the relationship of unwed fathers and their illegitimate children, and that existing administrative procedures, which had been developed to deal with the problems of proving paternity, maternity, and legitimation with respect to statutorily recognized “parents” and “children,” could easily handle the problems of proof involved in determining the paternity of an illegitimate child. We simply note that this argument should be addressed to the Congress rather than the courts. Indeed, in that regard it is worth noting that a bill introduced in the 94th Congress would have eliminated the challenged distinction. H. R. 10993, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether federal courts may craft an exception to the full faith and credit statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1738, for claims brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Petitioners, who own and operate a hotel in San Francisco, California (hereinafter City), initiated this litigation in response to the application of a city ordinance that required them to pay a $567,000 “conversion fee” in 1996. After the California courts rejected petitioners’ various state-law takings claims, they advanced in the Federal District Court a series of federal takings claims that depended on issues identical to those that had previously been resolved in the state-court action. In order to avoid the bar of issue preclusion, petitioners asked the District Court to exempt from § 1738’s reach claims brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Petitioners’ argument is predicated on Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985), which held that takings claims are not ripe until a State fails “to provide adequate compensation for the taking.” Id., at 195. Unless courts disregard § 1738 in takings cases, petitioners argue, plaintiffs will be forced to litigate their claims in state court without any realistic possibility of ever obtaining review in a federal forum. The Ninth Circuit’s rejection of this argument conflicted with the Second Circuit’s decision in Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Serv., 342 F. 3d 118 (2003). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 543 U. S. 1032 (2004), and now affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
I
The San Remo Hotel is a three-story, 62-unit hotel in the Fisherman’s Wharf neighborhood in San Francisco. In December 1906, shortly after the great earthquake and fire destroyed most of the City, the hotel — then called the “New California Hotel” — opened its doors to house dislocated individuals, immigrants, artists, and laborers. The City officially licensed the facility to operate as a hotel and restaurant in 1916, and in 1922 the hotel was given its current name. When the hotel fell into financial difficulties and a “dilapidated condition” in the early 1970’s, Robert and Thomas Field purchased the facility, restored it, and began to operate it as a bed and breakfast inn. See San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 5 (Cal. App. 2000) (officially depublished).
In 1979, San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors responded to “a severe shortage” of affordable rental housing for elderly, disabled, and low-income persons by instituting a moratorium on the conversion of residential hotel units into tourist units. San Francisco Residential Hotel Unit Conversion and Demolition Ordinance (hereinafter Hotel Conversion Ordinance or HCO) §§41.3(aHg), App. to Pet. for Cert. 195a-197a. Two years later, the City enacted the first version of the Hotel Conversion Ordinance to regulate all future conversions. San Francisco Ordinance No. 330-81, codified in §41.1 et seq. Under the 1981 version of the HCO, a hotel owner could convert residential units into tourist units only by obtaining a conversion permit. And those permits could be obtained only by constructing new residential units, rehabilitating old ones, or paying an “in lieu” fee into the City’s Residential Hotel Preservation Fund Account. See §§41.12-41.13, App. to Pet. for Cert. 224a-231a. The City substantially strengthened the HCO in 1990 by eliminating several exceptions that had existed in the 1981 version and increasing the size of the “in lieu” fee hotel owners must pay when converting residential units. See 145 F. 3d 1095,1099 (CA9 1998).
The genesis of this protracted dispute lies in the 1981 HCO’s requirement that each hotel “file an initial unit usage report containing” the “number of residential and tourist units in the hotel[s] as of September 23,1979.” § 41.6(b)(1), App. to Pet. for Cert. 206a. Jean Iribarren was operating the San Remo Hotel, pursuant to a lease from petitioners, when this requirement came into effect. Iribarren filed the initial usage report for the hotel, which erroneously reported that all of the rooms in the hotel were “residential” units. The consequence of that initial classification was that the City zoned the San Remo Hotel as “residential hotel” — in other words, a hotel that consisted entirely of residential units. And that zoning determination ultimately meant that, despite the fact that the San Remo Hotel had operated in practice as a tourist hotel for many years, 145 F. 3d, at 1100, petitioners were required to apply for a conditional use permit to do business officially as a “tourist hotel,” San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 27 Cal. 4th 643, 654, 41 P. 3d 87, 94 (2002).
After the HCO was revised in 1990, petitioners applied to convert all of the rooms in the San Remo Hotel into tourist use rooms under the relevant HCO provisions and requested a conditional use permit under the applicable zoning laws. In 1993, the City Planning Commission granted petitioners’ requested conversion and conditional use permit, but only after imposing several conditions, one of which included the requirement that petitioners pay a $567,000 “in lieu” fee. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the HCO requirement was unconstitutional and otherwise improperly applied to their hotel. See id., at 656, 41 P. 3d, at 95. The City Board of Supervisors rejected petitioners’ appeal on April 19,1993.
In March 1993, petitioners filed for a writ of administrative mandamus in California Superior Court. That action lay dormant for several years, and the parties ultimately agreed to stay that action after petitioners filed for relief in Federal District Court.
Petitioners filed in federal court for the first time on May 4, 1993. Petitioners’ first amended complaint alleged four counts of due process (substantive and procedural) and takings (facial and as-applied) violations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, one count seeking damages under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, for those violations, and one pendent state-law claim. The District Court granted respondents summary judgment. As relevant to this action, the court found that petitioners’ facial takings claim was untimely under the applicable statute of limitations, and that the as-applied takings claim was unripe under Williamson County, 473 U. S. 172.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, petitioners took the unusual position that the court should not decide their federal claims, but instead should abstain under Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941), because a return to state court could conceivably moot the remaining federal questions. See App. 67-68; see also 145 F. 3d, at 1101. The Court of Appeals obliged petitioners’ request with respect to the facial challenge, a request that respondents apparently viewed as an “outrageous act of chutzpah.” Id., at 1105. That claim, the court reasoned, was “ripe the instant the 1990 ECO was enacted,” id., at 1102, and appropriate for Pullman abstention principally because petitioners’ “entire case” hinged on the propriety of the planning commission’s zoning designation — the precise subject of the pending state mandamus action, 145 E 3d, at 1105. The court, however, affirmed the District Court’s determination that petitioners’ as-applied takings claim — the claim that the application of the HCO to the San Remo Hotel violated the Takings Clause — was unripe. Because petitioners had failed to pursue an inverse condemnation action in state court, they had not yet been denied just compensation as contemplated by Williamson County. 145 F. 3d, at 1105.
At the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the court appended a footnote stating that petitioners would be free to raise their federal takings claims in the California courts. If, however, they wanted to “retain [their] right to return to federal court for adjudication of [their] federal claim, [they] must make an appropriate reservation in state court.” Id., at 1106, n. 7. That is precisely what petitioners attempted to do when they reactivated the dormant California case. Yet petitioners advanced more than just the claims on which the federal court had abstained, and phrased their state claims in language that sounded in the rules and standards established and refined by this Court’s takings jurisprudence. Petitioners claimed, for instance, that “imposition of the fee ‘fails to substantially advance a legitimate government interest’ and that ‘[t]he amount of the fee imposed is not roughly proportional to the impact’ of the proposed tourist use of the San Remo Hotel.” 27 Cal. 4th, at 656, 41 P. 3d, at 95 (quoting petitioners’ second amended state complaint). The state trial court dismissed petitioners’ amended complaint, but the intermediate appellate court reversed. The court held that petitioners’ claim that the payment of the “in lieu” fee effected a taking should have been evaluated under heightened scrutiny. Under more exacting scrutiny, the fee failed this Court’s “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests because, inter alia, it was based on the original flawed designation that the San Remo Hotel was an entirely “residential use” facility. See id., at 657-658, 41 P. 3d, at 96-97 (summarizing appellate court opinion (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The California Supreme Court reversed over the partial dissent of three justices. The court initially noted that petitioners had reserved their federal causes of action and had sought no relief for any violation of the Federal Constitution. Id., at 649, n. 1, 41 P. 3d, at 91, n. I. In the portion of its opinion discussing the Takings Clause of the California Constitution, however, the court noted that “we appear to have construed the clauses congruently.” Id., at 664, 41 P. 3d, at 100-101 (citing cases). Accordingly, despite the fact that petitioners sought relief only under California law, the state court decided to “analyze their takings claim under the relevant decisions of both this court and the United States Supreme Court.” Ibid., 41 P. 3d, at 101.
The principal constitutional issue debated by the parties was whether a heightened level of scrutiny applied to the claim that the housing replacement fee “ ‘does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.’” Ibid, (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1016 (1992)). In resolving that debate the court focused on our opinions in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994). Rejecting petitioners’ argument that heightened scrutiny should apply, the court emphasized the distinction between discretionary exactions imposed by executive officials on an ad hoc basis and “‘generally applicable zoning regulations’” involving “‘legislative determinations.’” 27 Cal. 4th, at 666-668, 41 P. 3d, at 102-104 (quoting, e.g., Dolan, 512 U. S., at 385, 391, n. 8). The court situated the HCO within the latter category, reasoning that the ordinance relied upon fixed fees computed under a formula that is generally applicable to broad classes of property owners. The court concluded that the less demanding “reasonable relationship” test should apply to the HCO’s monetary assessments, 27 Cal. 4th, at 671, 41 P. 3d, at 105.
Applying the “reasonable relationship” test, the court upheld the HCO on its face and as applied to petitioners. As to the facial challenge, the court concluded that the HCO’s mandated conversion fees “bear a reasonable relationship to loss of housing... in the generality or great majority of cases....” Id., at 673, 41 P. 3d, at 107. With respect to petitioners’ as-applied challenge, the court concluded that the conversion fee was reasonably based on the number of units designated for conversion, which itself was based on petitioners’ own estimate that had been provided to the City in 1981 and had remained unchallenged for years. Id., at 678, and n. 17, 41 P. 3d, at 110-111, and n. 17. The court therefore reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court’s order dismissing petitioners’ complaint.
Petitioners did not seek a writ of certiorari from the California Supreme Court’s decision in this Court. Instead, they returned to Federal District Court by filing an amended complaint based on the complaint that they had filed prior to invoking Pullman abstention. The District Court held that petitioners’ facial attack on the HCO was not only barred by the statute of limitations, but also by the general rule of issue preclusion. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 85a-86a. The District Court reasoned that 28 U. S. C. § 1738 requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to any state-court judgment that would have preclusive effect under the laws of the State in which the judgment was rendered. Because California courts had interpreted the relevant substantive state takings law coextensively with federal law, petitioners’ federal claims constituted the same claims that had already been resolved in state court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court rejected petitioners’ contention that general preclusion principles should be cast aside whenever plaintiffs “must litigate in state court pursuant to Pullman and/or Williamson County.” 364 F. 3d 1088, 1096 (CA9 2004). Relying on unambiguous Circuit precedent and the absence of any clearly contradictory decisions from this Court, the Court of Appeals found itself bound to apply general issue preclusion doctrine. Given that general issue preclusion principles governed, the only remaining question was whether the District Court properly applied that doctrine; the court concluded that it did. The court expressly rejected petitioners’ contention “that California takings law is not coextensive with federal takings law,” ibid., and held that the state court’s application of the “reasonable relationship” test was an “ ‘equivalent determination’ of such claims under the federal takings clause,” id., at 1098. We granted certiorari and now affirm.
II
Article IV, § 1, of the United States Constitution demands that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” In 1790, Congress responded to the Constitution’s invitation by enacting the first version of the full faith and credit statute. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. The modern version of the statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1788, provides that “judicial proceedings... shall have the same fifil faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State....” This statute has long been understood to encompass the doctrines of res judicata, or “claim preclusion,” and collateral estoppel, or “issue preclusion.” See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 94-96 (1980).
The general rule implemented by the full faith and credit statute — that parties should not be permitted to relitigate issues that have been resolved by courts of competent jurisdiction — predates the Republic. It “has found its way into every system of jurisprudence, not only from its obvious fitness and propriety, but because without it, an end could never be put to litigation.” Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, 114 (1821). This Court has explained that the rule
“is demanded by the very object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for, the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property, if, as between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put in issue and actually determined by them.” Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, 49 (1897).
As this case is presented to us, under our limited grant of certiorari, we have only one narrow question to decide: whether we should create an exception to the full faith and credit statute, and the ancient rule on which it is based, in order to provide a federal forum for litigants who seek to advance federal takings claims that are not ripe until the entry of a final state judgment denying just compensation. See Williamson County, 473 U. S. 172.
The essence of petitioners’ argument is as follows: because no claim that a state agency has violated the federal Takings Clause can be heard in federal court until the property owner has “been denied just compensation” through an available state compensation procedure, id., at 195, “federal courts [should be] required to disregard the decision of the state court” in order to ensure that federal takings claims can be “considered on the merits in... federal court,” Brief for Petitioners 8, 14. Therefore, the argument goes, whenever plaintiffs reserve their claims under England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964), federal courts should review the reserved federal claims de novo, regardless of what issues the state court may have decided or how it may have decided them.
We reject petitioners’ contention. Although petitioners were certainly entitled to reserve some of their federal claims, as we shall explain, England does not support their erroneous expectation that their reservation would fully negate the preclusive effect of the state-court judgment with respect to any and all federal issues that might arise in the future federal litigation. Federal courts, moreover, are not free to disregard 28 U. S. C. § 1738 simply to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can have their day in federal court. We turn first to England.
Ill
England involved a group of plaintiffs who had graduated from chiropractic school, but sought to practice in Louisiana without complying with the educational requirements of the State’s Medical Practice Act. 375 U. S., at 412. They filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the Act. The District Court invoked Pullman abstention and stayed the proceedings to enable the Louisiana courts to decide a preliminary and essential question of state law— namely, whether the state statute applied at all to chiropractors. 375 U. S., at 413. The state court, however, reached beyond the state-law question and held not only that the statute applied to the plaintiffs but also that its application was consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The Federal District Court then dismissed the federal action without addressing the merits of the federal claim.
On appeal, we held that when a federal court abstains from deciding a federal constitutional issue to enable the state courts to address an antecedent state-law issue, the plaintiff may reserve his right to return to federal court for the disposition of his federal claims. Id., at 419. In that case, the antecedent state issue requiring abstention was distinct from the reserved federal issue. See id., at 418-419. Our discussion of the “typical case” in which reservations of federal issues are appropriate makes clear that our holding was limited to cases that are fundamentally distinct from petitioners’. “Typical” England cases generally involve federal constitutional challenges to a state statute that can be avoided if a state court construes the statute in a particular manner. In such cases, the purpose of abstention is not to afford state courts an opportunity to adjudicate an issue that is functionally identical to the federal question. To the contrary, the purpose of Pullman abstention in such cases is to avoid resolving the federal question by encouraging a state-law determination that may moot the federal controversy. See 375 U. S., at 416-417, and n. 7. Additionally, our opinion made it perfectly clear that the effective reservation of a federal claim was dependent on the condition that plaintiffs take no action to broaden the scope of the state court’s review beyond decision of the antecedent state-law issue.
Our holding in England does not support petitioners’ attempt to relitigate issues resolved by the California courts. With respect to petitioners’ facial takings claims, the Court of Appeals invoked Pullman abstention after determining that a ripe federal question existed — namely, “the facial takings challenge to the 1990 HCO.” 145 F. 3d, at 1105. It did so because “ ‘land use planning is a sensitive area of social policy’” and because petitioners’ pending state mandamus action had the potential of mooting their facial challenge to the HCO by overturning the City’s original classification of the San Remo Hotel as a “residential” property. Ibid. Thus, petitioners were entitled to insulate from preclusive effect one federal issue — their facial constitutional challenge to the HCO — while they returned to state court to resolve their petition for writ of mandate.
Petitioners, however, chose to advance broader issues than the limited issues contained within their state petition for writ of administrative mandamus on which the Ninth Circuit relied when it invoked Pullman abstention. In their state action, petitioners advanced not only their request for a writ of administrative mandate, 27 Cal. 4th, at 653, 41 P. 3d, at 93, but also their various claims that the HCO was unconstitutional on its face and as applied for (1) its failure to substantially advance a legitimate interest, (2) its lack of a nexus between the required fees and the ultimate objectives sought to be achieved via the ordinance, and (3) its imposition of an undue economic burden on individual property owners. Id., at 672-676, 41 P. 3d, at 106-109. By broadening their state action beyond the mandamus petition to include their “substantially advances” claims, petitioners effectively asked the state court to resolve the same federal issues they asked it to reserve. England does not support the exercise of any such right.
Petitioners’ as-applied takings claims fare no better. As an initial matter, the Court of Appeals did not abstain with respect to those claims. Instead, the court found that they were unripe under Williamson County. The court therefore affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of those claims. 145 F. 3d, at 1106. Unlike their “substantially advances” claims, petitioners’ as-applied claims were never properly before the District Court, and there was no reason to expect that they could be relitigated in full if advanced in the state proceedings. See Allen, 449 U. S., at 101, n. 17. In short, our opinion in England does not support petitioners’ attempt to circumvent § 1738.
IV
Petitioners’ ultimate submission, however, does not rely on England alone. Rather, they argue that federal courts simply should not apply ordinary preclusion rules to state-court judgments when a case is forced into state court by the ripeness rule of Williamson County. For support, petitioners rely on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in Santini, 342 F. 3d, at 130.
In Santini, the Second Circuit held that parties “who litigate state-law takings claims in state court involuntarily” pursuant to Williamson County cannot be precluded from having those very claims resolved “by a federal court.” 342 F. 3d, at 130. The court did not rest its decision on any provision of the federal full faith and credit statute or our cases construing that law. Instead, the court reasoned that “[i]t would be both ironic and unfair if the very procedure that the Supreme Court required [plaintiffs] to follow before bringing a Fifth Amendment takings claim... also precluded [them] from ever bringing a Fifth Amendment takings claim.” Ibid. We find this reasoning unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, both petitioners and Santini ultimately depend on an assumption that plaintiffs have a right to vindicate their federal claims in a federal forum. We have repeatedly held, to the contrary, that issues actually decided in valid state-court judgments may well deprive plaintiffs of the “right” to have their federal claims relitigated in federal court. See, e. g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U. S. 75, 84 (1984); Allen, 449 U. S., at 103-104. This is so even when the plaintiff would have preferred not to litigate in state court, but was required to do so by statute or prudential rules. See id., at 104. The relevant question in such cases is not whether the plaintiff has been afforded access to a federal forum; rather, the question is whether the state court actually decided an issue of fact or law that was necessary to its judgment.
In Allen, the plaintiff, Willie McCurry, invoked the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in an unsuccessful attempt to suppress evidence in a state criminal trial. After he was convicted, he sought to remedy his alleged constitutional violation by bringing a suit for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 against the officers who had entered his home. Relying on “ ‘the special role of federal courts in protecting civil rights’ ” and the fact that § 1983 provided the “only route to a federal forum,” the Court of Appeals held that McCurry was entitled to a federal trial unencumbered by collateral estoppel. 449 U. S., at 93. We rejected that argument emphatically.
“The actual basis of the Court of Appeals’ holding appears to be a generally framed principle that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court, regardless of the legal posture in which the federal claim arises. But the authority for this principle is difficult to discern. It cannot lie in the Constitution, which makes no such guarantee, but leaves the scope of the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to the wisdom of Congress. And no such authority is to be found in §1983 itself.... There is, in short, no reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a person claiming a federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he would rather not have been engaged at all.” Id., at 103-104 (footnote omitted).
As in Allen, we are presently concerned only with issues actually decided by the state court that are dispositive of federal claims raised under § 1983. And, also as in Allen, it is clear that petitioners would have preferred not to have been forced to have their federal claims resolved by issues decided in state court. Unfortunately for petitioners, it is entirely unclear why their preference for a federal forum should matter for constitutional or statutory purposes.
The only distinction between this case and Allen that is possibly relevant is the fact that petitioners here originally invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court, which abstained on Pullman grounds while petitioners returned to state court. But petitioners’ as-applied takings claims were never properly before the District Court because they were unripe. And, as we have already explained, the Court of Appeals invoked Pullman abstention only with respect to petitioners’ “substantially advances” takings challenge, which petitioners then gratuitously presented to the state court. At a bare minimum, with respect to the facial takings claim, petitioners were “in an offensive posture in [their] state-court proceeding, and could have proceeded first in federal court had [they] wanted to litigate [their ‘substantially advances’] federal claim in a federal forum.” Migra, 465 U. S., at 85, n. 7. Thus, the only distinction between this case and Allen is a distinction of no relevant significance.
The second reason we find petitioners’ argument unpersuasive is that it assumes that courts may simply create exceptions to 28 U. S. C. § 1738 wherever courts deem them appropriate. Even conceding, arguendo, the laudable policy goal of making federal forums available to deserving litigants, we have expressly rejected petitioners’ view. “Such a fundamental departure from traditional rules of preclusion, enacted into federal law, can be justified only if plainly stated by Congress.” Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 485 (1982). Our cases have therefore made plain that “an exception to § 1738 will not be recognized unless a later statute contains an express or implied partial repeal.” Id., at 468 (citing Allen, 449 U. S., at 99). Even when the plaintiff’s resort to state court is involuntary and the federal interest in denying finality is robust, we have held that Congress “must ‘clearly manifest’ its intent to depart from § 1738.” 456 U. S., at 477.
The same concerns animate our decision here. Congress has not expressed any intent to exempt from the full faith and credit statute federal takings claims. Consequently, we apply our normal assumption that the weighty interests in finality and comity trump the interest in giving losing litigants access to an additional appellate tribunal. As we explained in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U. S. 394 (1981):
“[W]e do not see the grave injustice which would be done by the application of accepted principles of res judi-cata. ‘Simple justice’ is achieved when a complex body of law developed over a period of years is evenhandedly applied. The doctrine of res judicata serves vital public interests beyond any individual judge’s ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case. There is simply ‘no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata.'" Id., at 401 (quoting Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U. S. 726, 733 (1946)).
Third, petitioners have overstated the reach of Williamson County throughout this litigation. Petitioners were never required to ripen the heart of their complaint — the claim that the HCO was facially invalid because it failed to substantially advance a legitimate state interest — in state court. See Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534 (1992). Petitioners therefore could have raised most of their facial takings challenges, which by their nature requested relief distinct from the provision of “just compensation,” directly in federal court. Alternatively, petitioners had the option of reserving their facial claims while pursuing their as-applied claims along with their petition for writ of administrative mandamus. Petitioners did not have the right, however, to seek state review of the same substantive issues they sought to reserve. The purpose of the England reservation is not to grant plaintiffs a second bite at the apple in their forum of choice.
With respect to those federal claims that did require ripening, we reject petitioners’ contention that Williamson County prohibits plaintiffs from advancing their federal claims in state courts. The requirement that aggrieved property owners must seek “compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so,” 473 U. S., at 194, does not preclude state courts from hearing simultaneously a plaintiff’s request for compensation under state law and the claim that, in the alternative, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Reading Williamson County to preclude plaintiffs from raising such claims in the alternative would erroneously interpret our cases as requiring property owners to “resort to piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures.” MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U. S. 340, 350, n. 7 (1986).
It is hardly a radical notion to recognize that, as a practical matter, a significant number of plaintiffs will necessarily litigate their federal takings claims in state courts. It was settled well before Williamson County that “a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” 473 U. S., at 186. As a consequence, there is scant precedent for the litigation in federal district court of claims that a state agency has taken property in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. To the contrary, most of the cases in our takings jurisprudence, including nearly all of the cases on which petitioners rely, came to us on writs of eertiorari from state courts of last resort.
Moreover, this is not the only area of law in which we have recognized limits to plaintiffs’ ability to press their federal claims in federal courts. See, e. g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 116 (1981) (holding that taxpayers are “barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts”). State courts are fully competent to adjudicate constitutional challenges to local land-use decisions. Indeed, state courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal courts do in resolving the complex factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and land-use regulations.
At base, petitioners’ claim amounts to little more than the concern that it is unfair to give preclusive effect to state-court proceedings that are not chosen, but are instead required in order to ripen federal takings claims. Whatever the merits of that concern may be, we are not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve the availability of a federal forum. The Court of Appeals was correct to decline petitioners’ invitation to ignore the requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 1738. The judgment of the
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane.” Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 409-410 (1986). The prohibition applies despite a prisoner’s earlier competency to be held responsible for committing a crime and to be tried for it. Prior findings of competency do not foreclose a prisoner from proving he is incompetent to be executed because of his present mental condition. Under Ford, oncé a prisoner makes the requisite preliminary showing that his current mental state would bar his execution, the Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, entitles him to an adjudication to determine his condition. These determinations are governed by the substantive federal baseline for competency set down in Ford.
Scott Louis Panetti, referred to here as petitioner, was convicted and sentenced to death in a Texas state court. After the state trial court set an execution date, petitioner made a substantial showing he was not competent to be executed. The state court rejected his claim of incompeteney on the merits. Filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, petitioner claimed again that his mental condition barred his execution; that the Eighth Amendment set forth a substantive standard for competency different from the one advanced by the State; and that prior state-court proceedings on the issue were insufficient to satisfy the procedural requirements mandated by Ford. The State denied these assertions and argued, in addition, that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s claims.
We conclude we have statutory authority to adjudicate the claims petitioner raises in his habeas application; we find the state court failed to provide the procedures to which petitioner was entitled under the Constitution; and we determine that the federal appellate court employed an improperly restrictive test when it considered petitioner’s claim of incompeteney on the merits. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remand the case for further consideration.
I
On a morning in 1992 petitioner awoke before dawn, dressed in camouflage, and drove to the home of his estranged wife’s parents. Breaking the front-door lock, he entered the house and, in front of his wife and daughter, shot and killed his wife’s mother and father. He took his wife and daughter hostage for the night before surrendering to police.
Tried for capital murder in 1995, petitioner sought to represent himself. The court ordered a psychiatric evaluation, which indicated that petitioner suffered from a fragmented personality, delusions, and • hallucinations. 1 App. 9-14. The evaluation noted that petitioner had been hospitalized numerous times for these disorders. Id., at 10; see also id., at 222. Evidence later revealed that doctors had prescribed medication for petitioner’s mental disorders that, in the opinion of one expert, would be difficult for a person not suffering from extreme psychosis even to tolerate. See id., at 233 (“I can’t imagine anybody getting that dose waking up for two to three days. You cannot take that kind of medication if you are close to normal without absolutely being put out”). Petitioner’s wife described one psychotic episode in a petition she filed in 1986 seeking extraordinary relief from the Texas state courts. See id., at 38-40. She explained that petitioner had become convinced the devil had possessed their home and that, in an effort to cleanse their surroundings, petitioner had buried a number of valuables next to the house and engaged in other rituals. Id., at 39. Petitioner nevertheless was found competent to be tried and to waive counsel. At trial he claimed he was not guilty by reason of insanity.
During his trial petitioner engaged in behavior later described by his standby counsel as “bizarre,” “scary,” and “trance-like.” Id., at 26, 21, 22. According to the attorney, petitioner’s behavior both in private and in front of the jury made it evident that he was suffering from “mental incompetence,” id., at 26; see also id., at 22-23, and the net effeet of this dynamic was to render the trial “truly a judicial farce, and a mockery of self-representation,” id., at 26. There was evidence on the record, moreover, to indicate that petitioner had stopped taking his antipsychotic medication a few months before trial, see id., at 339,345, a rejection of medical advice that, it appears, petitioner has continued to this day with one brief exception, see Brief for Petitioner 16-17. According to expert testimony, failing to take this medication tends to exacerbate the underlying mental dysfunction. See id., at 16, 18, n. 12; see also 1 App. 195, 228. And it is uneontested that, less than two months after petitioner was sentenced to death, the state trial court found him incompetent to waive the appointment of state habeas counsel. See Brief for Petitioner 15, n. 10. It appears, therefore, that petitioner’s condition has only worsened since the start of trial.
The jury found petitioner guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Petitioner challenged his conviction and sentence both on direct appeal and through state habeas proceedings. The Texas courts denied his requests for relief. See Panetti v. State, No. 72,230 (Crim. App., Dec. 3, 1997) (en banc); Ex parte Panetti, No. 37,145-01 (Crim. App., May 20,1998) (en banc). This Court twice denied a petition for certiorari. Panetti v. Texas, 525 U. S. 848 (1998); Panetti v. Texas, 524 U. S. 914 (1998).
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2254 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. His claims were again rejected, both by the District Court, Panetti v. Johnson, Cause No. A-99-CV-260-SS (2001), and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Panetti v. Cockrell, 73 Fed. Appx. 78 (2003) (judgt. order), and we again denied a petition for certiorari, Panetti v. Dretke, 540 U. S. 1052 (2003). Among the issues petitioner raised in the course of these state and federal proceedings was his competency to stand trial and to waive counsel. Petitioner did not argue, however, that mental illness rendered him incompetent to be executed.
On October 31, 2003, Judge Stephen B. Abies of the 216th Judicial District Court in Gillespie County, Texas, set petitioner’s execution date for February 5, 2004. See First Order Setting Execution in Cause No. 3310; Order Setting Execution in Cause No. 3310. On December 10, 2003, counsel for petitioner filed with Judge Abies a motion under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 46.05 (Vernon Supp. Pamphlet 2006). Petitioner claimed, for the first time, that due to mental illness he was incompetent to be executed. The judge denied the motion without a hearing. When petitioner attempted to challenge the ruling, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction, indicating it has authority to review an Art. 46.05 determination only when a trial court has determined a prisoner is incompetent. Ex parte Panetti, No. 74,868 (Jan. 28, 2004) (per curiam).
Petitioner returned to federal court, where he filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254 and a motion for stay of execution. On February 4, 2004, the District Court stayed petitioner’s execution to “allow the state court a reasonable period of time to consider the evidence of [petitioner’s] current mental state.” Order in Case No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 1 App. 113-114,116.
The state court had before it, at that time, petitioner’s renewed motion to determine competency to be executed (hereinafter Renewed Motion To Determine Competency). Attached to the motion were a letter and a declaration from two individuals, a psychologist and a law professor, who had interviewed petitioner while on death row on February 3, 2004. The new evidence, according to counsel, demonstrated that petitioner did not understand the reasons he was about to be executed.
Due to the absence of a transcript, the state-court proceedings after this point are not altogether clear. The claims raised before this Court nevertheless make it necessary to recount the procedural history in some detail. Based on the docket entries and the parties’ filings it appears the following occurred.
The state trial court ordered the parties to participate in a telephone conference on February 9, 2004, to discuss the status of the case. There followed a court directive instructing counsel to submit, by February 20, the names of mental health experts the court should consider appointing pursuant to Art. 46.05(f). See ibid. (“If the trial court determines that the defendant has made a substantial showing of incompetency, the court shall order at least two mental health experts to examine the defendant”). The court also gave the parties until February 20 to submit any motions concerning the competency procedures and advised it would hold another status conference on that same date. Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider in Cause No. 3310, pp. 1-2 (Mar. 4, 2004) (hereinafter Motion to Reconsider).
On February 19, 2004, petitioner filed 10 motions related to the Art. 46.05 proceedings. They included requests for transcription of the proceedings, a competency hearing comporting with the procedural due process requirements set forth in Ford, and funds to hire a mental health expert. See Motion to Transcribe All Proceedings Related to Competency Determination Under Article 46.05 in Cause No. 3310; Motion to Ensure that the Article 46.05 “Final Competency Hearing” Comports with the Procedural Due Process Requirements of Ford in Cause No. 3310; Ex Parte Motion for Prepayment of Funds to Hire Mental Health Expert to Assist Defense in Article 46.05 Proceedings in Cause No. 3310.
On February 20, the court failed to hold its scheduled status conference. Petitioner’s counsel called the courthouse and was advised Judge Abies was out of the office for the day. Counsel then called the Gillespie County District Attorney, who explained that the judge had informed state attorneys earlier that week that he was canceling the conference he had set and would appoint the mental health experts without input from the parties. Motion to Reconsider 2.
On February 23, 2004, counsel for petitioner received an order, dated February 20, advising that the court was appointing two mental health experts pursuant to Art. § 46.05(f). Order in Cause No. 3310, p. 1 (Feb. 26, 2004), 1 App. 59. On February 25, at an informal status conference, the court denied two of petitioner’s motions, indicating it would consider the others when the court-appointed mental health experts completed their evaluations. Motion to Reconsider 3. On March 4, petitioner filed a motion explaining that a delayed ruling would render a number of the motions moot. Id., at 1. There is no indication the court responded to this motion.
The court-appointed experts returned with their evaluation on April 28, 2004. Concluding that petitioner “knows that he is to be executed, and that his execution will result in his death,” and, moreover, that he “has the ability to understand the reason he is to be executed,” the experts alleged that petitioner’s uncooperative and bizarre behavior was due to calculated design: “Mr. Panetti deliberately and persistently chose to control and manipulate our interview situation,” they claimed. 1 App. 75. They maintained that petitioner “could answer questions about relevant legal issues... if he were willing to do so.” Ibid.
The judge sent a letter to counsel, including petitioner’s attorney, Michael C. Gross, dated May 14, 2004. It said:
“Dear Counsel:
“It appears from the evaluations performed by [the court-appointed experts] that they are of the opinion that [petitioner] is competent to be executed in accordance with the standards set out in Art. 46.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
“Mr. Gross, if you have any other matters you wish to have considered, please file them in the case papers and get me copies by 5:00 p.m. on May 21, 2004.” Id., at 77-78.
Petitioner responded with a filing entitled “Objections to Experts’ Report, Renewed Motion for Funds To Hire Mental Health Expert and Investigator, Renewed Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and Motion for Competency Hearing” in Cause No. 3310 (May 21, 2004), 1 App. 82-95 (hereinafter Objections to Experts’ Report). In this filing petitioner criticized the methodology and conclusions of the court-appointed experts; asserted his continued need for a mental health expert as his own criticisms of the report were “by necessity limited,” id., at 1; again asked the court to rule on his outstanding motions for funds and appointment of counsel; and requested a competency hearing. Petitioner also argued, as a more general matter, that the process he had received thus far failed to comply with Art. 46.05 and the procedural mandates set by Ford.
The court, in response, closed the case. On May 26, it released a short order identifying the report submitted by the court-appointed experts and explaining that “[b]ased on the aforesaid doctors’ reports, the Court finds that [petitioner] has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is incompetent to be executed.” Order Regarding Competency To Be Executed in Cause No. 3310, 1 App. 99. The order made no mention of petitioner’s motions or other filings. Petitioner did not appeal the ruling to the Court of Criminal Appeals, and he did not petition this Court for certiorari.
This background leads to the matter now before us. Petitioner returned to federal court, seeking resolution of the §2254 petition he had filed on January 26. The District Court granted petitioner’s motions to reconsider, to stay his execution, to appoint counsel, and to provide funds. The court, in addition, set the case for an evidentiary hearing, which included testimony by a psychiatrist, a professor, and two psychologists, all called by petitioner, as well as two psychologists and three correctional officers, called by respondent. See 1 App. 117-135, 362-363; see also id., at 136-336. We describe the substance of the experts’ testimony in more detail later in our opinion.
On September 29,2004, the District Court denied petitioner’s habeas application on the merits. It concluded that the state trial court had failed to comply with Art. 46.05; found the state proceedings “constitutionally inadequate” in light of Ford; and reviewed petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim without deferring to the state court’s finding of competency. Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp. 2d 702, 706, 705-706 (WD Tex. 2004). The court nevertheless denied relief. It found petitioner had not shown incompetency as defined by Circuit precedent. Id., at 712. “Ultimately,” the court explained, “the Fifth Circuit test for competency to be executed requires the petitioner know no more than the fact of his impending execution and the factual predicate for the execution.” Id., at 711. The Court of Appeals affirmed, Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F. 3d 815 (CA5 2006), and we granted certiorari, 549 U. S. 1106 (2007).
II
We first consider our jurisdiction. The habeas corpus application on review is the second one petitioner has filed in federal court. Under the gatekeeping provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(2), “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed” except under certain, narrow circumstances. See §§2244(b)(2)(A)-(B).
The State maintains that, by direction of §2244, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate petitioner’s § 2254 application. Its argument is straightforward: “[Petitioner’s] first federal habeas application, which was fully and finally adjudicated on the merits, failed to raise a Ford claim,” and, as a result, “[his] subsequent habeas application, which did raise a Ford claim, was a ‘second or successive’ application” under the terms of § 2244(b)(2). Supplemental Brief for Respondent 1. The State contends, moreover, that any Ford claim brought in an application governed by §2244’s gatekeeping provisions must be dismissed. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 4-6 (citing §§2244(b)(2)(AMB)).
The State acknowledges that Ford-based incompetency claims, as a general matter, are not ripe until after the time has run to file a first federal habeas petition. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 6. The State nevertheless maintains that its rule would not foreclose prisoners from raising Ford claims. Under Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U. S. 637 (1998), the State explains, a federal court is permitted to review a prisoner’s Ford claim once it becomes ripe if the prisoner preserved the claim by filing it in his first federal habeas application. Under the State’s approach a prisoner contemplating a future Ford claim could preserve it by this means.
The State’s argument has some force. The results it would produce, however, show its flaws. As in Martinez-Villareal, if the State’s “interpretation of ‘second or successive’ were correct, the implications for habeas practice would be far reaching and seemingly perverse.” 523 U. S., at 644. A prisoner would be faced with two options: forgo the opportunity to raise a Ford claim in federal court; or raise the claim in a first federal habeas application (which generally must be filed within one year of the relevant state-court ruling), even though it is premature. The dilemma would apply not only to prisoners with mental conditions indicative of incompeteney but also to those with no early sign of mental illness. All prisoners are at risk of deteriorations in their mental state. As a result, conscientious defense attorneys would be obliged to file unripe (and, in many cases, meritless) Ford claims in each and every § 2254 application. This counterintuitive approach would add to the burden imposed on courts, applicants, and the States, with no clear advantage to any.
We conclude there is another reasonable interpretation of §2244, one that does not produce these distortions and inefficiencies.
The phrase “second or successive” is not self-defining. It takes its full meaning from our case law, including decisions predating the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 486 (2000) (citing Martinez-Villareal, supra); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 664 (1996). The Court has declined to interpret “second or successive” as referring to all § 2254 applications filed second or successively in time, even when the later filings address a state-court judgment already challenged in a prior §2254 application. See, e. g., Slack, 529 U. S., at 487 (concluding that a second §2254 application was not “second or successive” after the petitioner’s first application, which had challenged the same state-court judgment, had been dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies); see also id., at 486 (indicating that “pre-AEDPA law governed]” the case before it but implying that the Court would reach the same result under AEDPA); see also Martinez-Villareal, supra, at 645.
Our interpretation of § 2244 in Martinez-Villareal is illustrative. There the prisoner filed his first habeas application before his execution date was set. In the first application he asserted, inter alia, that he was incompetent to be executed, citing Ford. The District Court, among other holdings, dismissed the claim as premature; and the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. When the State obtained a warrant for the execution, the prisoner filed, for the second time, a habeas application raising the same incompetency claim. The State argued that because the prisoner “already had one ‘fully-litigated habeas petition, the plain meaning of § 2244(b)... requires his new petition to be treated as successive.’ ” 523 U. S., at 643.
We rejected this contention. While the later filing “may have been the second time that [the prisoner] had asked the federal courts to provide relief on his Ford claim,” the Court declined to accept that there were, as a result, “two separate applications, [with] the second... necessarily subject to § 2244(b).” Ibid. The Court instead held that, in light of the particular circumstances presented by a Ford claim, it would treat the two filings as a single application. The petitioner “was entitled to an adjudication of all of the claims presented in his earlier, undoubtedly reviewable, application for federal habeas relief.” 523 U. S., at 643.
Our earlier holding does not resolve the jurisdictional question in the instant ease. Martinez-Villareal did not address the applicability of § 2244(b) “where a prisoner raises a Ford claim for the first time in a petition filed after the federal courts have already rejected the prisoner’s initial habeas application.” Id., at 645, n. Yet the Court’s willingness to look to the “implications for habeas practice” when interpreting §2244 informs the analysis here. Id., at 644. We conclude, in accord with this precedent, that Congress did not intend the provisions of AEDPA addressing “second or successive” petitions to govern a filing in the unusual posture presented here: a §2254 application raising a Ford-based incompetency claim filed as soon as that claim is ripe.
Our conclusion is confirmed when we consider AEDPA’s purposes. The statute’s design is to “further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 337 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cf. Day v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 198, 205-206 (2006) (“The AEDPA statute of limitation promotes judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources, safeguards the accuracy of state court judgments by requiring resolution of constitutional questions while the record is fresh, and lends finality to state court judgments within a reasonable time” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
These purposes, and the practical effects of our holdings, should be considered when interpreting AEDPA. This is particularly so when petitioners “run the risk” under the proposed interpretation of “forever losing their opportunity for any federal review of their unexhausted claims.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U. S. 269, 275 (2005). See also Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, 381 (2003). In Rhines “[w]e recognize[d] the gravity of [the] problem” posed when petitioners file applications with only some claims exhausted, as well as “the difficulty [this problem] has posed for petitioners and federal district courts alike.” 544 U. S., at 275, 276. We sought to ensure our “solution to this problem [was] compatible with AEDPÁ’s purposes.” Id., at 276. And in Castro we resisted an interpretation of the statute that would “produce troublesome results,” “create procedural anomalies,” and “close our dóors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication that such was Congress’ intent.” 540 U. S., at 380, 381. See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 437 (2000); Johnson v. United States, 544 U. S. 295, 308-309 (2005); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 178 (2001); cf. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U. S. 129, 131-134 (1987).
An empty formality requiring prisoners to file unripe Ford claims neither respects the limited legal resources available to the States nor encourages the exhaustion of state remedies. See Duncan, supra, at 178. Instructing prisoners to file premature claims, particularly when many of these claims will not be colorable even at a later date, does not conserve judicial resources, “reducfe] piecemeal litigation,” or “streamlin[e] federal habeas proceedings.” Burton v. Stewart, 549 U. S. 147, 154 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). AEDPA’s concern for finality, moreover, is not implicated, for under none of the possible approaches would federal courts be able to resolve a prisoner’s Ford claim before execution is imminent. See Martinez-Villareal, supra, at 644-645 (acknowledging that the District Court was unable to resolve the prisoner’s incompetency claim at the time of his initial habeas filing). And last-minute filings that are frivolous and designed to delay executions can be dismissed in the regular course. The requirement of a threshold preliminary showing, for instance, will, as a general matter, be imposed before a stay is granted or the action is allowed to proceed.
There is, in addition, no argument that petitioner’s actions constituted an abuse of the writ, as that concept is explained in our cases. Cf. Felker, 518 U. S., at 664 (“[AEDPA’s] new restrictions on successive petitions constitute a modified res judicata rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas corpus practice ‘abuse of the writ’ ”). To the contrary, we have confirmed that claims of incompetency to be executed remain unripe at early stages of the proceedings. See Martinez-Villareal, 523 U. S., at 644-645; see also ibid, (suggesting that it is therefore appropriate, as a general matter, for a prisoner to wait before seeking resolution of his incompetency claim); Ford, 477 U. S. 399 (remanding the case to the District Court to resolve Ford’s incompetency claim, even though Ford had brought that claim in a second federal habeas petition); Barnard v. Collins, 13 F. 3d 871, 878 (CA5 1994) (“[0]ur research indicates no reported decision in which a federal circuit court or the Supreme Court has denied relief of a petitioner’s competency-to-be-executed claim on grounds of abuse of the writ”). See generally McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 489-497 (1991).
In the usual case, a petition filed second in time and not otherwise permitted by the terms of § 2244 will not survive AEDPA’s “second or successive” bar. There are, however, exceptions. We are hesitant to construe a statute, implemented to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism, in a manner that would require unripe (and, often, factually unsupported) claims to be raised as a mere formality, to the benefit of no party.
The statutory bar on “second or successive” applications does not apply to a Ford claim brought in an application filed when the claim is first ripe. Petitioner’s habeas application was properly filed, and the District Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate his claim.
III
A
Petitioner claims that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, as elaborated by Ford, entitled him to certain procedures not provided in the state court; that the failure to provide these procedures constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law; and that under § 2254(d) this misapplication of Ford allows federal-court review of his incompetency claim without deference to the state court’s decision.
We agree with petitioner that no deference is due. The state court’s failure to provide the procedures mandated by Ford constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established law as determined by this Court. It is uncontested that petitioner made a substantial showing of incompetency. This showing entitled him to, among other things, an adequate means by which to submit expert psychiatric evidence in response to the evidence that had been solicited by the state court. And it is clear from the record that the state court reached its competency determination after failing to provide petitioner with this process, notwithstanding counsel’s sustained effort, diligence, and compliance with court orders. As a result of this error, our review of petitioner’s underlying incompetency claim is unencumbered by the deference AEDPA normally requires.
Ford identifies the measures a State must provide when a prisoner alleges incompetency to be executed. The four-justice plurality in Ford concluded as follows:
“Although the condemned prisoner does not enjoy the same presumptions accorded a defendant who has yet to be convicted or sentenced, he has not lost the protection of the Constitution altogether; if the Constitution renders the fact or timing of his execution contingent upon establishment of a further fact, then that fact must be determined with the high regard for truth that befits a decision affecting the life or death of a human being. Thus, the ascertainment of a prisoner’s sanity as a predicate to lawful execution calls for no less stringent standards than those demanded in any other aspect of a capital proceeding.” 477 U. S., at 411-412.
Justice Powell’s concurrence, which also addressed the question of procedure, offered a more limited holding. When there is no majority opinion, the narrower holding controls. See Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 193 (1977). Under this rule Justice Powell’s opinion constitutes “clearly established” law for purposes of § 2254 and sets the minimum procedures a State must provide to a prisoner raising a Ford-based competency claim.
Justice Powell’s opinion states the relevant standard as follows. Once a prisoner seeking a stay of execution has made “a substantial threshold showing of insanity,” the protection afforded by procedural due process includes a “fair hearing” in accord with fundamental fairness. Ford, 477 U. S., at 426, 424 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). This protection means a prisoner must be accorded an “opportunity to be heard,” id., at 424 (internal quotation marks omitted), though “a constitutionally acceptable procedure may be far less formal than a trial,” id., at 427. As an example of why the state procedures on review in Ford were deficient, Justice Powell explained, the determination of sanity “appeared] to have been made solely on the basis of the examinations performed by state-appointed psychiatrists.” Id., at 424. “Such a procedure invites arbitrariness and error by preventing the affected parties from offering contrary medical evidence or even from explaining the inadequacies of the State’s examinations.” Ibid.
Justice Powell did not set forth “the precise limits that due process imposes in this area.” Id., at 427. He observed that a State “should have substantial leeway to determine what process best balances the various interests at stake” once it has met the “basic requirements” required by due process. Ibid. These basic requirements include an opportunity to submit “evidence and argument from the prisoner’s counsel, including expert psychiatric evidence that may differ from the State’s own psychiatric examination.” Ibid.
Petitioner was entitled to these protections once he had made a “substantial threshold showing of insanity.” Id., at 426. He made this showing when he filed his Renewed Motion To Determine Competency — a fact disputed by no party, confirmed by the trial court’s appointment of mental health experts pursuant to Article 46.05(f), and verified by our independent review of the record. The Renewed Motion to Determine Competency included pointed observations made by two experts the day before petitioner’s scheduled execution; and it incorporated, through petitioner’s first Motion To Determine Competency, references to the extensive evidence of mental dysfunction considered in earlier legal proceedings.
In light of this showing, the state court failed to provide petitioner with the minimum process required by Ford.
The state court refused to transcribe its proceedings, notwithstanding the multiple motions petitioner filed requesting this process. To the extent a more complete record may have put some of the court’s actions in a more favorable light, this only constitutes further evidence of the inadequacy of the proceedings. Based on the materials available to this Court, it appears the state court on repeated occasions conveyed information to petitioner’s counsel that turned.out not to be true; provided at least one significant update to the State without providing the same notice to petitioner; and failed in general to keep petitioner informed as to the opportunity, if any, he would have to present his case. There is also a strong argument the court violated state law by failing to provide a competency hearing. See Tex. Code Grim. Proc. Ann., Art. 46.05(k). If this did, in fact, constitute a violation of the procedural framework Texas has mandated for the adjudication of incompetency claims, the violation undermines any reliance the State might now place on Justice Powell’s assertion that “the States should have substantial leeway to determine what process best balances the various interests at stake.” Ford, supra, at 427. See also, e. g., Brief for Respondent 16. What is more, the order issued by the state court implied that its determination of petitioner’s competency was made solely on the basis of the examinations performed by the psychiatrists it had appointed — precisely the sort of adjudication Justice Powell warned would “invit[e] arbitrariness and error,” Ford, supra, at 424.
The state court made an additional error, one that Ford makes clear is impermissible under the Constitution: It failed to provide petitioner with an adequate opportunity to submit expert evidence in response to the report filed by the court-appointed experts. The court mailed the experts’ report to both parties in the first week of May. The report, which rejected the factual basis for petitioner’s claim, set forth new allegations suggesting that petitioner’s bizarre behavior was due, at least in part, to deliberate design rather than mental illness. Petitioner’s counsel reached the reasonable conclusion that these allegations warranted a response. See Objections to Experts’ Report 13, and n. 1. On May 14, the court told petitioner’s counsel, by letter, to file “any other matters you wish to have considered” within a week. Petitioner, in response, renewed his motions for an evidentiary hearing, funds to hire a mental health expert, and other relief. He did not submit at that time expert psychiatric evidence to challenge the court-appointed experts’ report, a decision that in context made sense: The court had said it would rule on his outstanding motions
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1945, Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company-sought from the Federal Power Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity, required by § 7 (c) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 825, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (c), for the construction and operation of a pipe line to carry natural gas from Texas to Michigan and Wisconsin. A prerequisite for such a certificate is adequate reserves of gas. To obtain these reserves Michigan-Wisconsin entered into an agreement with Phillips Petroleum Company on December 11, 1945, whereby the latter undertook to make available gas from the Hugoton Gas Field, sprawling over Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas, which it produced or purchased from others. Phillips had contracted with petitioners, Skelly Oil Company, Stanolind Oil and Gas Company, and Magnolia Petroleum Company, to purchase gas produced by them in the Hugoton Field for resale to Michigan-Wisconsin. Each contract provided that “in the event Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company shall fail to secure from the Federal Power Commission on or before [October 1, 1946] a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the construction and operation of its pipe line, Seller [a petitioner] shall have the right to terminate this contract by written notice to Buyer [Phillips] delivered to Buyer at any time after December 1, 1946, but before the issuance of such certificate.” The legal significance of this provision is at the core of this litigation.
The Federal Power Commission, in response to the application of Michigan-Wisconsin, on November 30, 1946, ordered that “A certificate of public convenience and necessity be and it is hereby issued to applicant [Michigan-Wisconsin], upon the terms and conditions of this order,” listing among the conditions that there be no transportation or sale of natural gas by means of the sanctioned facilities until all necessary authorizations were obtained from the State of Wisconsin and the communities proposed to be served, that Michigan-Wisconsin should have the approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission for its plan of financing, that the applicant should file for the approval of the Commission a schedule of reasonable rates, and that the sanctioned facilities should not be used for the transportation of gas to Detroit and Ann Arbor except with due regard for the rights and duties of Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, which had intervened before the Federal Power Commission, in its established service for resale in these areas, such rights and duties to be set forth in a supplemental order. It was also provided that Michigan-Wisconsin should have fifteen days from the issue of the supplemental order to notify the Commission whether the certificate “as herein issued is acceptable to it.” Finally, the Commission’s order provided that for purposes of computing the time within which applications for rehearing could be filed, “the date of issuance of this order shall be deemed to be the date of issuance of the opinions, or of the supplemental order referred to herein, whichever may be the later.” 5 F. P. C. 953, 954, 956.
News of the Commission’s action was released on November 30, 1946, but the actual content of the order was not made public until December 2, 1946. Petitioners severally, on December 2, 1946, gave notice to Phillips of termination of their contracts on the ground that Michigan-Wisconsin had not received a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Thereupon Michigan-Wisconsin and Phillips brought suit against petitioners in the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. Alleging that a certificate of public convenience and necessity, “within the meaning of said Natural Gas Act and said contracts” had been issued prior to petitioners’ attempt at termination of the contracts, they invoked the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for a declaration that the contracts were still “in effect and binding upon the parties thereto.” Motions by petitioners to have Michigan-Wisconsin dropped as a party plaintiff were sustained, but motions to dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction were denied. The case then went to the merits, and the District Court decreed that the contracts between Phillips and petitioners had not been “effectively terminated and that each of such contracts remain [sic] in full force and effect.” The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, 174 F. 2d 89, and we brought the case here, 338 U. S. 846, because it raises in sharp form the question whether a suit like this “arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States,” 28 U. S. C. § 1331, so as to enable District Courts to give declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 48 Stat. 955, as amended, now 28 U. S. C. § 2201.
“[T]he operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240. Congress enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend their jurisdiction. When concerned as we are with the power of the inferior federal courts to entertain litigation within the restricted area to which the Constitution and Acts of Congress confine them, “jurisdiction” means the kinds of issues which give right of entrance to federal courts. Jurisdiction in this sense was not altered by the Declaratory Judgment Act. Prior to that Act, a federal court would entertain a suit on a contract only if the plaintiff asked for an immediately enforceable remedy like money damages or an injunction, but such relief could only be given if the requisites of jurisdiction, in the sense of a federal right or diversity, provided foundation for resort to the federal courts. The Declaratory Judgment Act allowed relief to be given by way of recognizing the plaintiff’s right even though no immediate enforcement of it was asked. But the requirements of jurisdiction — the limited subject matters which alone Congress had authorized the District Courts to adjudicate — were not impliedly repealed or modified. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 300; Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 551-52.
If Phillips sought damages from petitioners or specific performance of their contracts, it could not bring suit in a United States District Court on the theory that it was asserting a federal right. And for the simple reason that such a suit would “arise” under the State law governing the contracts. Whatever federal claim Phillips may be able to urge would in any event be injected into the case only in anticipation of a defense to be asserted by petitioners. “Not every question of federal law emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the basis of the suit.” Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109, 115; compare 28 U. S. C. § 1257, with 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Ever since Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 586, 589, it has been settled doctrine that where a suit is brought in the federal courts “upon the sole ground that the determination of the suit depends upon some question of a Federal nature, it must appear, at the outset, from the declaration or the bill of the party suing, that the suit is of that character.” But “a suggestion of one party, that the other will or may set up a claim under the Constitution or laws of the United States, does not make the suit one arising under that Constitution or those laws.” Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 464. The plaintiff’s claim itself must present a federal question “unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74, 75-76; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, 152.
These decisions reflect the current of jurisdictional legislation since the Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, first entrusted to the lower federal courts wide jurisdiction in cases “arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties.” U. S. Const. Art. Ill, § 2. “The change is in accordance with the general policy of these acts, manifest upon their face, and often recognized by this court, to contract the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts [which became the District Courts] of the United States.” Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, supra at 462. See also Arkansas v. Kansas & Texas Coal Co., 183 U. S. 185, 188, and Gully v. First National Bank, supra at 112-14. With exceptions not now relevant Congress has narrowed the opportunities for entrance into the federal courts, and this Court has been more careful than in earlier days in enforcing these jurisdictional limitations. See Gully v. First National Bank, supra at 113.
To be observant of these restrictions is not to indulge in formalism or sterile technicality. It would turn into the federal courts a vast current of litigation indubitably arising under State law, in the sense that the right to be vindicated was State-created, if a suit for a declaration of rights could be brought into the federal courts merely because an anticipated defense derived from federal law. Not only would this unduly swell the volume of litigation in the District Courts but it would also embarrass those courts — and this Court on potential review — in that matters of local law may often be involved, and the District Courts may either have to decide doubtful questions of State law or hold cases pending disposition of such State issues by State courts. To sanction suits for declaratory relief as within the jurisdiction of the District Courts merely because, as in this case, artful pleading anticipates a defense based on federal law would contravene the whole trend of jurisdictional legislation by Congress, disregard the effective functioning of the federal judicial system and distort the limited procedural purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act. See Developments in the Law — Declaratory Judgments — 1941-1949, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 787, 802-03 (1949). Since the matter in controversy as to which Phillips asked for a declaratory judgment is not one that “arises under the . . . laws ... of the United States” and since as to Skelly and Stanolind jurisdiction cannot be sustained on the score of diversity of citizenship, the proceedings against them should have been dismissed.
As to Magnolia, a Texas corporation, a different situation is presented. Since Phillips was a Delaware corporation, there is diversity of citizenship. Magnolia had qualified to do business in Oklahoma and appointed an agent for service of process in accordance with the prevailing Oklahoma statute. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 452 (1937). Magnolia claimed that the subject matter of this proceeding did not arise in Oklahoma within the meaning of its consent to be sued. This contention was rejected below, and we do not reexamine the local law as applied by the lower courts. Under the doctrine of Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, venue was properly laid in Oklahoma; that the declaratory remedy which may be given by the federal courts may not be available in the State courts is immaterial.
Therefore, in the case of Magnolia we must reach the merits. They relate to two matters: (1) the clause in the contract with Phillips permitting its termination at any time after December 1, 1946, but before the “issuance” of “a certificate of public convenience and necessity” by the Federal Power Commission; and (2) whether this provision was satisfied by Magnolia’s notice of termination of December 2, 1946, despite the Commission’s order of November 30, 1946. The phraseology “certificate of public convenience and necessity” in the contract is identic with the phrase in § 7 (c) of the Natural Gas Act. The Court of Appeals equated the term of the contract with that in the statute and in effect deemed its problem to be the proper construction of what constitutes the “issuance” of a “certificate of public convenience and necessity” within the meaning of § 7 (c). So viewing the matter, the court held that the order of November 30, 1946, satisfied the requirement of the contract, and that therefore a certificate of public convenience and necessity had been issued within the terminal period of the contract, and that its termination was not timely.
It will be recalled that the order of November 30,1946, had three parts: (A) it stated that “A certificate of public convenience and necessity be and it is hereby issued to applicant [Michigan-Wisconsin]”; (B) it imposed certain conditions upon the grant, some of which were to be set forth in a supplemental order; and (C) it said that “For the purpose of computing the time within which applications for rehearing may be filed, the date of issuance of this order shall be deemed to be the date of issuance of the opinions, or of the supplemental order referred to herein, whichever may be the later.” 5 F. P. C. at 954, 956. The course of reasoning by which the Court of Appeals concluded that the order of November 30, 1946, satisfied the statutory requirement for a certificate of public convenience and necessity can be briefly summarized. It relied on the grammatical argument that the Commission used the present tense in its order and subsequently referred to it as an order “issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity,” e. g., 6 F. P. C. 1, 37; the conditional nature of the order was not deemed to impair its efficacy since § 7 (e) of the Natural Gas Act authorized the Commission “to attach to the issuance of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require”; and the provision of the order connecting the date of the order’s issuance with the time defined for securing a rehearing was thought relevant only to the supplemental order.
We are not persuaded now to rest decision on the analysis of the Court of Appeals which led to its conclusion. We need not linger long on the merely grammatical argument of that court; it is given more weight than it can bear. Of course, the Commission has considerable administrative discretion to decide when an order may fairly be deemed to have been “issued.” Section 16 of the Act provides that “Orders of the Commission shall be effective on the date and in the manner which the Commission shall prescribe.” But surely a certificate cannot be said to have been issued for purposes of defining rights and the seeking of reconsideration by an aggrieved person if its substance is merely in the bosom of the Commission. Knowledge of the substance must to some extent be made manifest. Here the content of the order of November 30, 1946, was not made public until December 2,1946, the date of the termination notice.
The Commission itself in its rule for computing rehearing time distinguishes between “adoption” of an order and its “issuance.” However, as a matter of usage, the Commission has referred to an order as having “issued” a certificate on a particular date when in fact the date was that of “adoption.” See, e. g., Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 5 F. P. C. 813, 897; cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 5 F. P. C. 824, 901. Finally, the restriction of the Court of Appeals of the rehearing provision of Part C to the supplemental order finds no support on the face of the order of November 30, 1946. There is nothing to indicate that Part C was not to apply to the entire order for purposes of § 19 of the Act, which allows a rehearing by a party aggrieved “within thirty days after the issuance of such order” and makes such rehearing a prerequisite to judicial review. See 6 F. P. C. 323.
Since the requirements of the Natural Gas Act for the issuance of “a certificate of public convenience and necessity” may be distributive in scope, varying with the different contexts in which the question must be examined, this is not the occasion to decide that these requirements have a single uniform content. Whether the statutory requirement here was satisfied is not a question of fact, the finding of which by the District Court is to be respected unless clearly erroneous. The District Court merely found that the content of the piece of paper dated November 30, 1946, was that day agreed upon in executive session of the Commission and that that fact was made known. But this leaves untouched the legal significance of this action of the Commission, and the Court ought not now in darkness to pronounce on this question.
We are not restricted to disposition of the controversy on so truncated a treatment of the issues that underlie the record. Considering the fact that so to dispose of the case would involve determination of an important problem concerning a regulatory statute with implications of public importance that private litigants naturally enough do not wholly represent and that on these matters neither the courts below nor this Court had the benefit of the experience and illumination of the agency entrusted with the enforcement of the Act, the due administration of justice requires that we should exercise our discretionary power in reviewing cases to “require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” 28 U. S. C. § 2106; Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U. S. 14, 25. Accordingly, we think that the proper disposition requires that we vacate the judgment as to Magnolia and remand the case in order that the Court of Appeals either itself or by sending the case back to the District Court can further explore, through ways that may be appropriate, the issues which have been laid bare. See Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U. S. 249.
The impact of the litigation both here and below was on the proper construction of § 7 (c). Even though the language of the contract may be identic with that of § 7 (c), this language in the contract may have a scope independent of the proper construction of § 7 (c). The same words, in different settings, may not mean the same thing. Compare opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, with his dissent in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 219. Parties do not necessarily endow statutory language in a contract with the scope of the statute, particularly when the same term may have variant meanings for different applications of the statute. See Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S. 481, 483. Of course the statutory meaning in the context of the entire Natural Gas Act may not be irrelevant. In remanding the case we do not mean to foreclose this line of inquiry.
In respect to Magnolia, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. As to Skelly and Stanolind, we reverse the judgment with directions that the cause be dismissed.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Black agrees with the Court of Appeals and would affirm its judgment.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or disposition of this case.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson,
with whom
Mr. Justice Burton joins, dissenting in part.
I concur in that part of the Court’s judgment that directs dismissal of the cause as to Skelly and Stanolind. I have real doubts as to whether there is a federal question here at all, even though interpretation of the contract between private parties requires an interpretation of a federal statute and the action of a federal regulatory body. But the Court finds it unnecessary to reach that question because it holds that the federal question, if any, is not a part of the plaintiff’s claim and that jurisdiction does not, therefore, attach. While this result is not a necessary one, I am not prepared to dissent from it at this time.
But I am forced to dissent from the vacation and remand of the cause in respect to Magnolia. I think that, as to this petitioner, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. The Court decides that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Federal Power Commission had issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company on November 30, 1946, despite the fact that on that date the Commission adopted an order stating that “A certificate of public convenience and necessity be and it is hereby issued to Applicant, upon the terms and conditions of this order, . . . .” This disregard for what the District Court found to be the Commission’s express intention is based upon two alternative grounds. First, it is suggested that while the order issuing the certificate was “adopted” on November 30, it was not “issued” until December 2. Second, it is said that Part C of the November 30 order, which concerned the date of issuance of the order for purposes of applications for rehearing, precludes a finding that a certificate was issued on November 30. Neither of these grounds, in my judgment, supports the Court’s conclusion.
As to the first, which was not argued here nor in the Court of Appeals, it is true that the Commission’s rules provide that an order is not to be deemed “issued” until the full text is mimeographed and mailed to the parties to the proceeding. This usually follows within two or three days after the order is “adopted.” The only purpose of the postponement of the date of issuance of the order, so far as we are informed, is to postpone the running of the 30-day period for applications for rehearing until the full text is available to the parties who have standing to ask for rehearing.
But the Commission uniformly refers to the date of adoption of the order as the date upon which the certificate of public convenience and necessity was “issued.” It did so in this case, when, on March 12, 1947, it issued a supplemental order referring to its “order of November 30, 1946, issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity.” Furthermore, the District Court found as a fact that
“On November 30, a Saturday, the Commission in executive session made an order granting, with conditions, a certificate of public convenience and necessity to the Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company. During this session as the members of the Commission came to agreement as to the wording of the order, Mr. Fuquay, the secretary of the Commission, prepared the order in full and exact text. The secretary was directed by the Commission to release the order immediately.”
Following adjournment on that day, the secretary sent a telegram to the parties to the proceeding, informing them that the “Commission today . . . adopted Opinion and Order, in Docket No. G-669, issuing certificate, with conditions, to Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Company.” On the same day, releases to the press were made announcing the action taken by the Commission.
Skelly, Stanolind and Magnolia were not parties to this proceeding. It may very well be that the date of issuance of the order granting the certificate is December 2 or some later date — for purposes of rehearing upon application of the parties. But I think there is no question that the certificate, as distinguished from the order, was issued on November 30. That is the Commission’s view, as indicated by its supplemental order. The fact that it takes a few days to get its orders mimeographed and the Commission has adopted a rule that, in fairness to the parties, the time for rehearing shall not begin to run until such orders, in full text, are available, does not mean that the issuance of the certificate is also held in abeyance until that time.
The second argument requires but short answer. Part C provides that
“For the purpose of computing the time within which applications for rehearing may be filed, the date of issuance of this order shall be deemed to be the date of issuance of the opinions, or of the supplemental order referred to herein, whichever may be the later.”
The paragraph means just what it says. I do not understand the Court to hold that the Commission cannot thus postpone the running of the time for rehearing. Computation of that time, as I have indicated, has no necessary relation to the date of issuance of the certificate.
I think that the Commission intended to and did issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company on November 30, 1946, whatever the date of its order, for purposes of computation of time for rehearing. The crucial clause of the contract refers to “the issuance of such certificate [of public convenience and necessity].” By their inclusion of a provision dependent upon the action of a federal agency, it is obvious that the parties intended that the contract should be construed with reference to the effective date of agency action under the statutes and the practices of the Commission. The District Court so concluded. I can see no reason, therefore, to remand the cause for further proceedings. In my view, effective agency action was taken on November 30, 1946. As to Magnolia, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Rule 13 (b) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure provides: “In computing any period of time involving the date of the issuance of an order by the Commission, the day of issuance of an order shall be the day the Office of the Secretary mails or delivers copies of the order (full text) to the parties or their attorneys of record, or makes such copies public, whichever be the earlier. . . . The day of issuance of an order may or may not be the day of its adoption by the Commission.” 18 C. F. R. § 1.13 (b). A deposition taken of the' Secretary of the Commission gave light on this point. The Commission’s previous rule on rehearing time is in 18 C. F. R. Cum. Supp. § 50.75.
Rule 13 (c) provides: “Orders of the Commission shall be effective as of the dates of issuance unless otherwise specifically provided in the orders.” 18 C. F. R. § 1.13 (c). This provision may be of significance if the effectiveness of a certificate is an issue in proceedings under § 20 or § 21 of the Act. The Court of Appeals did not discuss the bearing of these rules upon this case.
The significance of the conditions in qualifying what is formally called a “certificate” in the order of November 30, 1946, is precisely one of those matters upon which Commission practice and experience may shed helpful light.
In its conclusions of law, the District Court stated: “The certificate issued by the Commission to Michigan-Wisconsin on November 30, 1946, although containing terms and conditions, was and is a certificate issued under the requirements of the Natural Gas Act and one that is provided for by that act. A consideration of the contracts between plaintiff and defendants, together with the contract between plaintiff and Michigan-Wisconsin, compels a conclusion that such certificate was one within the contemplation of the parties and satisfied the terms of the contracts.”
The context suggests that in the second sentence the District Court may still have been focusing upon statutory meaning.
See, e. g., Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 5 F. P. C. 813, 897; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 5 F. P. C. 824, 901.
The District Court stated as one of its conclusions of law: “The certificate issued by the Commission to Michigan-Wisconsin on November 30, 1946, although containing terms and conditions, was and is a certificate issued under the requirements of the Natural Gas Act and one that is provided for by that act. A consideration of the contracts between plaintiff and defendants, together with the contract between plaintiff and Michigan-Wisconsin, compels a conclusion that such certificate was one within the contemplation of the parties and satisfied the terms of the contracts.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the Attorney General, when deciding whether to grant a discretionary waiver of deportation under the applicable provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 95 Stat. 1616, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1251(a)(1)(H), may take into account acts of fraud committed by the alien in connection with his entry into the United States.
' Respondent Yueh-Shaio Yang and his wife, Hai-Hsia Yang, were born and married in the People’s Republic of China, and subsequently moved to Taiwan. In order to gain entry to the United States, they executed the following scheme: After divorcing respondent in Taiwan, Hai-Hsia traveled to the United States in 1978 and, using $60,000 provided by respondent, obtained a fraudulent birth certificate and passport in the name of Mary Wong, a United States citizen. Respondent then remarried Hai-Hsia in Taiwan under her false identity and fraudulently obtained an immigrant visa to enter the United States as the spouse of a United States citizen. In 1982, four years after his fraudulent entry, respondent submitted an application for naturalization, which fraudulently stated that his wife “Mary” was a United States citizen by birth and that respondent had been lawfully admitted for permanent residence. In 1985, while respondent’s naturalization application was still pending, respondent and his wife obtained another divorce in order to permit her to obtain a visa under her true name (as the relative of a daughter who had obtained United States citizenship).
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) ultimately learned of respondent’s unlawful entry, and in 1992 issued an order to show cause why he should not be deported. The INS maintained that respondent was de-portable under 8 U. S. C. § 1251(a)(1)(A), because he was ex-cludable from the United States at the time of entry under the former 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182(a)(14), (19), and (20) (1988 ed.). Respondent conceded that he was deportable and filed a request for a waiver of deportation under § 1251(a)(1)(H). The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s denial of this request. The Board concluded that respondent was statutorily eligible for a waiver, but denied it as a matter of discretion. Although the Board did not consider respondent’s fraudulent entry in 1978 as itself an adverse factor, it did consider, among other things, respondent’s “acts of immigration fraud before and after his 1978 entry into the United States,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a, including his first sham divorce to facilitate his wife’s unlawful entry, his 1982 application for naturalization, and his second sham divorce to assist his wife in obtaining an immigrant visa under her real name.
visa The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted respondent’s petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Yang v. INS, 58 F. 3d 452 (1995). The Ninth Circuit held that the Board abused its discretion by considering as an adverse factor respondent’s participation in his wife’s fraudulent entry, because those acts were “inextricably intertwined with Mr. Yang’s own efforts to secure entry into the country and must be considered part of the initial fraud.” Id., at 453. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the Board improperly considered respondent’s fraudulent application for naturalization as an adverse factor because that application “must be considered an extension of the initial fraud.” Ibid. We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 1110 (1996).
Section 1251(a)(1)(H) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“The provisions of this paragraph relating to the deportation of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens described in section 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) of this title [who have obtained a visa, documentation, entry or INA benefit by fraud or misrepresentation] . . . may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, be waived for any alien ... who—
“(i) is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence; and
"(ii) was possession of an immigrant visa or equivalent document and was otherwise admissible to the United States at the time of such entry except for those grounds of inadmissibility specified under paragraphs (5)(A) and (7)(A) of section 1182(a) of this title [relating to possession of valid labor certifications, immigrant visas and entry documents] which were a direct result of that fraud or misrepresentation.”
The meaning of this language is clear. While it establishes certain prerequisites to eligibility for a waiver of deportation, it imposes no limitations on the factors that the Attorney General (or her delegate, the INS, see 8 CFR §2.1 (1996)) may consider in determining who, among the class of eligible aliens, should be granted relief. We have described the Attorney General’s suspension of deportation under a related and similarly phrased provision of the INA as “ ‘an act of grace’ ” which is accorded pursuant to her “unfettered discretion,” Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 354 (1956) (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 492 (1935)), and have quoted approvingly Judge Learned Hand’s likening of that provision to “ ‘a judge’s power to suspend the execution of a sentence, or the President’s to pardon a convict,’” 351 U. S., at 354, n. 16 (quoting United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d 489, 491 (CA2 1950)).
Respondent contends, however, that the portion of § 1251(a)(l)(H)(ii) requiring the alien to be “otherwise admissible” — that is, not excludable on some ground other than the entry fraud — precludes the Attorney General from considering the alien’s fraudulent entry at all. The text will not bear such a reading. Unlike the prior version of the waiver-of-deportation statute at issue in INS v. Errico, 385 U. S. 214 (1966), under which the Attorney General had no discretion to deny a waiver if the statutory requirements were met, satisfaction of the requirements under § 1251(a)(1)(H), including the requirement that the alien have been “otherwise admissible,” establishes only the alien’s eligibility for the waiver. Such eligibility in no way limits the considerations that may guide the Attorney General in exercising her discretion to determine who, among those eligible, will be accorded grace. It could be argued that if the Attorney General determined that any entry fraud or misrepresentation, no matter how minor and no matter what the attendant circumstances, would cause her to withhold waiver, she would not be exercising the conferred discretion at all, but would be making a nullity of the statute. But that is a far cry from respondent’s argument that all entry fraud must be excused, which is untenable.
Respondent asserts (and the United States acknowledges) that it is the settled policy of the INS to disregard entry fraud or misrepresentation, no matter how egregious, in making the waiver determination. See Delmundo v. INS, 43 F. 3d 436, 440 (CA9 1994). This is such a generous disposition that it may suggest a belief on the part of the agency that the statute requires it; and such a belief is also suggested by the INS’s frequent concessions in litigation that the underlying fraud for which the alien is deportable “should not be considered as an adverse factor in the balancing equation,” Liwanag v. INS, 872 F. 2d 685, 687 (CA5 1989); see also Braun v. INS, 992 F. 2d 1016, 1020 (CA9 1993); Start v. INS, 803 F. 2d 539, 542 (CA9 1986), withdrawn, 862 F. 2d 787 (1988). (Such concessions were facilitated, no doubt, by the Ninth Circuit’s frequent intimations that the statute forbade consideration of the initial fraud. See Hernandez-Robledo v. INS, 777 F. 2d 536, 541 (1985); see also Braun, supra, at 1020; Delmundo, supra, at 441.) Before us, however, the United States disclaims such a position — and even if that were the agency’s view we could not permit it to overcome the unmistakable text of the law. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 229-230 (1994). But that does not render the INS’s practice irrelevant. Though the agency’s discretion is unfettered at the outset, if it announces and follows — by rule or by settled course of adjudication — a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy (as opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned as “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). The INS has not, however, disregarded its general policy here; it has merely taken a narrow view of what constitutes “entry fraud” under that policy, excluding events removed in time and circumstance from respondent’s entry: his preentry and postentry sham divorces, and the fraud in his 1982 application for naturalization. The “entry fraud” exception being, under the current statute, a rule of the INS’s own invention, the INS is entitled, within reason, to define that exception as it pleases. The Ninth Circuit held that the acts of fraud counted against respondent can be described as “inextricably intertwined” with, or an “extension” of, the fraudulent entry itself because they were essential to its ultimate success or concealment. Perhaps so, but it is up to the Attorney General whether she will adopt an “inextricably intertwined” or “essential extension” augmentation of her “entry fraud” exception. It is assuredly rational, and therefore lawful, for her to distinguish aliens such as respondent who engage in a pattern of immigration fraud from aliens who commit a single, isolated act of misrepresentation. for the Ninth
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Our jurisdiction over this matter is not in question. See 5 U. S. C. § 702. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRA), Div. C., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. 104-208,110 Stat. 3009, provides that “[notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any . . . decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is specified under [Title 8 U. S. C.] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General _” IIRA § 306(a). That provision does not take effect, however, until April 1,1997. See IIRA §§ 306(c)(1), 309(a) (as amended by Pub. L. 104-302, §2,110 Stat. 3656).
The last clause of the quoted provision is less than artfully drawn, since the phrase “that fraud or misrepresentation” has no apparent antecedent. The antecedent was unmistakable in the prior version of the provision, which, in its prologue, that [the aliens] were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who have sought to procure or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States, by fraud or misrepresentation.” 8 U. S. C. § 1251(f) (1988 ed.). In the prologue of the current provision, that explicit (but lengthy) reference to fraud or misrepresentation has been replaced by citation of § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), which uses almost the same language to define a class of excludable aliens. We think it if not obvious, then at least inevitable, that the phrase “that fraud or misrepresentation” refers to the fraud or misrepresentation for which waiver is sought, alluded to, through citation of § 1182 (a) (6)(G)(i), in the prologue.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Aside from an initial question of our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), this case requires us to decide whether a defendant charged with a felony under the District of Columbia Code may be tried by a judge who does not have protection with respect to tenure and salary under Art. Ill of the Constitution. We hold that under its Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, power to legislate for the District of Columbia, Congress may provide for trying local criminal cases before judges who, in accordance with the District of Columbia Code, are not accorded life tenure and protection against reduction in salary. In this respect, the position of the District of Columbia defendant is similar to that of the citizen of any of the 50 States when charged with violation of a state criminal law: Neither has a federal constitutional right to be tried before jhdges with tenure and salary guarantees.
I
The facts are uncomplicated. In January 1971, two officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department observed a moving automobile with license tags suggesting that it was a rented vehicle. Although no traffic or other violation was then indicated, the officer stopped the vehicle for a spot-check of the driver’s license and car-rental agreement. Palmore, the driver of the vehicle, produced a rental agreement from the glove compartment'of the car and explained why the car appeared to be, but was not, overdue. During this time, one of the officers observed the hammer mechanism of a gun protruding from under the armrest in the front seat of the vehicle. Palmore was arrested and later charged with the felony of carrying an unregistered pistol in the District of Columbia after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of the District of Columbia Code, §22-3204 (1967). He was tried and found guilty in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Under Title I of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 473 (Reorganization Act), the judges of the Superior Court are appointed by the President and serve for terms of 15 years. D. C. Code Ann. §§ 11-1501 (a), 11-1502 (Supp. V, 1972). Palmore moved to dismiss the indictment against him, urging that only a court “ordam[ed] and establish [ed]” in accordance with Art. Ill of the United States Constitution could constitutionally try him for a felony prosecution under the District of Columbia Code. He also moved to suppress the pistol as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. The motions were denied in the Superior Court, and Palmore was convicted.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that under the plenary power to legislate for the District of Columbia, conferred by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution, Congress had “constitutional power to proscribe certain criminal conduct only in the District and to select the appropriate court, whether it is created by virtue of article III or article I, to hear and determine these particular criminal cases within the District.” 290 A. 2d 573, 576-577 (1972). Palmore filed a notice of appeal with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and his jurisdictional statement here, purporting to perfect an appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). We postponed further consideration of our jurisdiction to review this case by way of appeal to the hearing on the merits. 409 U. S. 840 (1972).
II
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1257 specifies the circumstances under which the final judgments of the highest court of a State may be reviewed in this Court by way of appeal or writ of certiorari. As amended in 1970 by § 172 (a)(1) of the Reorganization Act, 84 Stat. 590, the term “highest court of a State” as used in § 1257 includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Appeal lies from such courts only where a statute of the United States is struck down, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (1), or where a statute of a State is sustained against federal constitutional attack, id., § 1257 (2). Because the statute at issue was upheld in this case, an appeal to this Court from that judgment lies only if the statute was a “statute of any state” within the meaning of § 1257 (2). Palmore insists that it is, but we cannot agree.
The 1970 amendment to § 1257 plainly provided that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals should be treated as the “highest court of a State,” but nowhere in § 1257, or elsewhere, has Congress provided that the words “statute of any state,” as used in § 1257 (2), are to include the provisions of the District of Columbia Code. A reference to “state statutes” would ordinarily not include provisions of the District of Columbia Code, which was enacted, not by a state legislature, but by Congress, and. which applies only within the boundaries of the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia is constitutionally distinct from the States, Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445 (1805); cf. National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582 (1949). Nor does it follow from the decision to treat the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as a state court that the District Code was to be considered a state statute for the purposes of § 1257. We are entitled to assume that in amending § 1257, Congress legislated with care, and that had Congress intended to equate the District Code and state statutes for the purposes of § 1257, it would have said so expressly, and not left the matter to mere implication.
Jurisdictional statutes are to be construed “with precision and with fidelity to the terms by which Congress has expressed its wishes,” Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206, 212 (1968); and we are particularly prone to accord “strict construction of statutes authorizing appeals” to this Court. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41, 42 n. 1 (1970). We will not, therefore, hold that Congress intended to treat the District of Columbia Code as a state statute for the purposes of § 1257 (2). Cf. Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U. S. 104, 112-114 (1889).
Palmore relies on Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298 (1922), where an enactment of the territorial legislature of Puerto Rico was held to be a statute of a State within the meaning of the then-applicable statutory provisions governing appeals to this Court. That result has been codified in 28 U. S. C. § 1258; but, even so, the Balzac rationale was severely undermined in Fornaris, where we held that a statute passed by the legislature of Puerto Rico is not “a State statute” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2), and that it should not be treated as such in the absence of more definitive guidance from Congress.
We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction of the appeal filed in this case. Palmore presents federal constitutional issues, however, that are reviewable by writ of certiorari under § 1257 (3); and treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for writ of certiorari, cf. 28 U. S. C. § 2103, we grant the petition limited to the question of whether Palmore was entitled to be tried by a court ordained and established in accordance with Art. Ill, § 1, of the Constitution. It is to this issue that we now turn.
III
Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have power “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over” the District of Columbia. The power is plenary. Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes. Congress “may exercise within the District all legislative powers that the legislature of a State might exercise within the State; and may vest and distribute the judicial authority in and among courts and magistrates, and regulate judicial proceedings before them, as it may think fit, so long as it does not contravene any provision of the Constitution of the United States.” Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 5 (1899). This has been the characteristic view in this Court of congressional powers with respect to the District. It is apparent that the power of Congress under Clause 17 permits it to legislate for the District in a manner with respect to subjects that would exceed its powers, or at least would be very unusual, in the context of national legislation enacted under other powers delegated to it under Art. I, § 8. See Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404, 408 (1886).
Pursuant to its Clause 17 authority, Congress has from time to time enacted laws that compose the District of Columbia Code. The 1970 Reorganization Act amended the Code by creating the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the courts being expressly “established pursuant to article I of the Constitution.” D. C. Code Ann. § 11-101 (2) (Supp. V, 1972). See n. 2, supra. The Superior Court, among other things, was vested with jurisdiction to hear criminal cases involving alleged violations of the criminal laws applicable only to the District of Columbia, id., § 11-923; the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, with jurisdiction to hear appeals in such cases. Id., § 11-721. At the same time, Congress exercised its powers under Art. I, § 8, cl. 9, and Art. Ill to redefine the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id., §§ 11-301, 11-501, and 11-502. As the Committee on the District of Columbia said, H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, p. 44:
“This title makes clear (section 11-101) that the District of Columbia Courts (the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia) are Article I courts, created pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution, and not Article III courts. The authority under which the local courts are established has not been statutorily provided in prior law; the Supreme Court of the United States has not declared the local system to be either Article I or Article III courts, decisions having indicated that the District of Columbia courts are, in this respect, both fish and fowl. This expression of the intent of the Congress clarifies the status of the local courts.”
It was under the judicial power conferred on the Superior Court by the 1970 Reorganization Act that Palmore was convicted of violation of § 22-3204 of the District of Columbia Code (1967). The conviction was clearly within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, unless, as Palmore contends, Art. III of the Constitution requires that prosecutions for District of Columbia felonies must be presided over by a judge having the tenure and salary protections provided by Art. III.
Palmore’s argument is straightforward: Art. III vests the “judicial Power” of the United States in courts with judges holding office during good behavior and whose salary cannot be diminished; the “judicial Power” that these courts are to exercise “shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority...”; the District of Columbia Code, having been enacted by Congress, is a law of the United States; this prosecution for violation of § 22-3204 of the Code is therefore a case arising under the laws of the United States, involves an exercise of the “judicial Power” of the United States, and must therefore be tried by an Art. III judge.
This position ultimately rests on the proposition that an Art. Ill judge must preside over every proceeding in which a charge, claim, or defense is based on an Act of Congress or a law made under its authority. At the very least, it asserts that criminal offenses under the laws passed by Congress may not be prosecuted except in courts established pursuant to Art. III. In our view, however, there is no support for this view in either constitutional text or in constitutional history and practice.
Article III describes the judicial power as extending to all cases, among others, arising under the laws of the United States; but, aside from this Court, the power is vested “in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The decision with respect to inferior federal courts, as well as the task of defining their jurisdiction, was left to the discietion of Congress. That body was not constitutionally required to create inferior Art. III courts to hear and decide cases within the judicial power of the United States, including those criminal cases arising under the laws of the United States. Nor, if inferior federal courts were created, was it required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. III. “[T]he judicial power of the United States... is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this court) dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court)... and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.” Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245 (1845). Congress plainly understood this, for until 1875 Congress refrained from providing the lower federal courts with general federal-question jurisdiction. Until that time, the state courts provided the only forum for vindicating many important federal claims. Even then, with exceptions, the state courts remained the sole forum for the trial of federal cases not involving the required jurisdictional amount, and for the most part retained concurrent jurisdiction of federal claims properly within the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
It was neither the legislative nor judicial view, therefore, that trial and decision of all federal questions were reserved for Art. III judges. Nor, more particularly, has the enforcement of federal criminal law been deemed the exclusive province of federal Art. III courts. Very early in our history, Congress left the enforcement of selected federal criminal laws to state courts and to state court judges who did not enjoy the protections prescribed for federal judges in Art. III. See Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 545, 551-553, 570-572 (1925); F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 293 (1927) ; Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1947). More recently, this Court unanimously held that Congress could constitutionally require state courts to hear and decide Emergency Price Control Act cases involving the enforcement of federal penal laws; the fact “that Rhode Island has an established policy against enforcement by its courts of statutes of other states and the United States which it deems penal, cannot be accepted as a ‘valid excuse.’” Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386, 392 (1947). Although recognizing the contrary sentiments expressed in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 615-616 (1842), and other cases, the sense of the Testa opinion was that it merely reflected longstanding constitutional decision and policy represented by such cases as Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 (1876), and Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1 (1912).
It is also true that throughout our history, Congress has exercised its power under Art. IY to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” by creating territorial courts and manning them with judges appointed for a term of years. These courts have not been deemed subject to the strictures of Art. Ill, even though they characteristically enforced not only the civil and criminal laws of Congress applicable throughout the United States, but also the laws applicable only within the boundaries of the particular territory. Speaking for a unanimous Court in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), Mr. Chief Justice Marshall held that the territorial courts of Florida, although not Art. III courts, could hear and determine cases governed by the admiralty and maritime law that ordinarily could be heard only by Art. III judges. “[T]he same limitation does not extend to the territories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state government.” Id., at 546. This has been the consistent view of this Court. Territorial courts, therefore, have regularly tried criminal cases arising under the general laws of Congress, as well as those brought under territorial laws.
There is another context in which criminal cases arising under federal statutes are tried, and defendants convicted, in non-Art. III courts. Under its Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” Congress has declared certain behavior by members of the Armed Forces to be criminal and provided for the trial of such cases by court-martial proceedings in the military mode, not by courts ordained and established under Art. III. Within their proper sphere, courts-martial are constitutional instruments to carry out congressional and executive will. Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 79, 82 (1857). The “exigencies of military discipline require the existence of a special system of military courts in which not all of the specific procedural protections deemed essential in Art. III trials need apply,” O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258, 261 (1969); and “the Constitution does not provide life tenure for those performing judicial functions in military trials,” Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 17 (1955).
“The same confluence of practical considerations that dictated the result in [American Ins. Co. v. Canter, supra], has governed the decision in later cases sanctioning the creation of other courts with judges of limited tenure,” Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 547 (1962), such as the Court of Private Land Claims, United States v. Coe, 155 U. S. 76, 85-86 (1894) ; the Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445 (1899); Ex parte Joins, 191 U. S. 93 (1903); Wallace v. Adams, 204 U. S. 415 (1907); courts created in unincorporated districts outside the mainland, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 266-267 (1901); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S., at 312-313, and the Consular Courts established by concessions from foreign countries, In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 464-465, 480 (1891).
IV
Whatever may be true in other instances, however, it is strongly argued that O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933), constrains us to hold that all of the courts of the District of Columbia must be deemed Art. Ill courts and that the judges presiding over them must be appointed to serve during their good behavior in accordance with the requirements of Art. III. O’Donoghue involved the question whether the judges of the District of Columbia’s Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were constitutionally protected from having their salaries reduced by an Act of Congress. This Court, over three dissents and contrary to extensive prior dicta, see Ex parte Bakelite Corp,, 279 U. S. 438, 450 (1929); Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50 (1884); Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428 (1923); Federal Radio Comm’n v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 (1930), held that the two courts under consideration were constitutional courts exercising the judicial power of the United States and that the judges in question weremot subject to the salary reduction legislation as they would have been had they been judges of legislative courts.
We cannot agree that O’Donoghue governs this case. The District of Columbia courts there involved, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, had authority not only in the District, but also over all those controversies, civil and criminal, arising under the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and having nationwide application. These courts, as this Court noted in its opinion, were “of equal rank and power with those of other inferior courts of the federal system... O’Donoghue, supra, at 534. Relying heavily on congressional intent, the Court considered that Congress, by consistently providing the judges of these courts with lifetime tenure, had indicated a “congressional practice from the beginning [which] recognize [d] a complete parallelism between the courts of the District [of Columbia] and the district and circuit courts of appeals of the United States.” Id., at 549. Moreover, these courts, constituted as they were, and being closer to the legislative department, “exercise a more extensive jurisdiction in cases affecting the operations of the general government and its various departments,” id., at 535, and were the only courts within the District in which District inhabitants could exercise their “right to have their cases arising under the Constitution heard and determined by federal courts created under, and vested with the judicial power conferred by, Art. III.” Id., at 540.
The case before us is a far cry from O’Donoghue. Here Congress has expressly created two systems of courts in the District. One of them is made up of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which are constitutional courts manned by Art. Ill judges to which the citizens of the District must or may resort for consideration of those constitutional and statutory matters of general concern which so moved the Court in O’Donoghue. The other system is made up of strictly local, courts, the Superior Court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. These courts were expressly created pursuant to the plenary Art. I power to legislate for the District of Columbia, D. C. Code Ann. § 11-101 (2) (Supp. V, 1972), and to exercise the “powers of... a State government in all cases where legislation is possible.” Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141, 147 (1889).
The O’Donoghue Court had before it District of Columbia courts in which the consideration of “purely local affairs [was] obviously subordinate and incidental.” O’Donoghue, supra, at 539. Here, on the other hand, we have courts the focus of whose work is primarily upon cases arising under the District of Columbia Code and to other matters of strictly local concern. They handle criminal cases only under statutes that are applicable to the District of Columbia alone. O’Donoghue did not concern itself with courts like these, and it is not controlling here.
V
It is apparent that neither this Court nor Congress has read the Constitution as requiring every federal question arising under the federal law, or even every criminal prosecution for violating an Act of Congress, to be tried in an Art. Ill court before a judge enjoying lifetime tenure and protection against salary reduction. Rather, both Congress and this Court have recognized that state courts are appropriate forums in which federal questions and federal crimes may at times be tried; and that the requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment. Here, Congress reorganized the court system in the District of Columbia and established one set of courts in the District with Art. III characteristics and devoted to matters of national concern. It also created a wholly separate court system designed primarily to concern itself with local law and to serve as a local court system for a large metropolitan area.
From its own studies, Congress had concluded that there was a crisis in the judicial system of the District of Columbia, that case loads had become unmanageable, and that neither those matters of national concern nor those of strictly local cognizance were being promptly tried and disposed of by the existing court system. See, e. g., 115 Cong. Rec. 25538 (1969); 116 Cong. Rec. 8091-8092 (1970). The remedy in part, was to relieve the regular Art. Ill courts, that is, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, from the smothering responsibility for the great mass of litigation, civil and criminal, that inevitably characterizes the court system in a major city and to confine the work of those courts to that which, for the most part, they were designed to do, namely, to try cases arising under the Constitution and the nationally applicable laws of Congress. The other part of the remedy, equally essential, was to establish an entirely new court system with functions essentially similar to those of the local courts found in the 50 States of the Union with responsibility for trying and deciding those distinctively local controversies that arise under local law, including local criminal laws having little, if any, impact beyond the local jurisdiction. S. Rep. No. 91-405, pp. 1-3, 5, 18; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 23-24, 33.
Furthermore, Congress, after careful consideration, determined that it preferred, and had the power to utilize, a local court system staffed by judges without lifetime tenure. S. Rep. No. 91-405, supra, at 17-18; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, at 44. Congress made a deliberate choice to create judgeships with terms of 15 years, D. C. Code Ann. § 11-1502 (Supp. V, 1972), and to subject judges in those positions to removal or suspension by a judicial commission under certain established circumstances. Id., §§ 11-1502, 11-1521 et seq. It was thought that such a system would be more workable and efficient in administering and discharging the work of a multifaceted metropolitan court system. See S. Rep. No. 91-405, supra, at 8-11; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, at 35-39.
In providing for fixed terms of office, Congress was cognizant of the fact that “virtually no State has provided” for tenure during good behavior, S. Rep. No. 91-405, supra, at 8, see H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, at 38, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals noting that 46 of the 50 States have not provided life tenure for trial judges who hear felony cases, 290 A. 2d, at 578 n. 12; and the provisions of the Act, with respect to court administration and to judicial removal and suspension, were considered by some as a model for the States. 115 Cong. Rec. 25538 (1969). See Hearings on H. R. 13689 and 12854 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the District of Columbia, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 69, 71 (1969).
We do not discount the importance attached to the tenure and salary provisions of Art. Ill, but we conclude that Congress was not required to provide an Art. Ill court for the trial of criminal cases arising under its laws applicable only within the District of Columbia. Palmore’s trial in the Superior Court was authorized by Congress’ Art. I power to legislate for the District in all cases whatsoever. Palmore was no more disadvantaged and no more entitled to an Art. Ill judge than any other citizen of any of the 50 States who is tried for a strictly local crime. Nor did his trial by a nontenured judge deprive him of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment any more than the trial of the citizens of the various States for local crimes by judges without protection as to tenure deprives them of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is affirmed.
So ordered.
The section provided:
“No person shall within the District of Columbia carry either openly or concealed on or about his person, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him, a pistol, without a license therefor issued as hereinafter provided, or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so concealed. Whoever violates this section shall be punished as provided in section 22-3215, unless the violation occurs after he has been convicted in the District of Columbia of a violation of this section or of a felony, either in the District of Columbia or in another jurisdiction, in which case he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years.”
Before passage of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, the local court system consisted of one appellate court and three trial courts, two of which, the juvenile court and the tax court, were courts of special jurisdiction. The third trial court, the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, was one of quite limited jurisdiction, its criminal jurisdiction consisting solely of that exercised concurrently with the United States District Court over misdemeanors and petty offenses, D. C. Code Ann. § 11-963 (1967). The court's civil jurisdiction was restricted to cases where the amount in controversy did not exceed $10,000, and it had jurisdiction over cases involving title to real property only as part of a divorce action. Id., §§ 11-961 and 11-1141. The judgments of the appellate court, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, were subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id., § 11-321.
The United States District Court for the District had concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of General Sessions over most of the criminal and civil matters handled by that court, id., §§ 11-521, 11-522, and 11-523, and had exclusive jurisdiction over felony offenses, even though committed in violation of locally applicable laws, id., § 11-521. Thus, the District Court was filling the role of both a local and federal court.
Seeking to improve the performance of the court system, Congress, in Title I of the Reorganization Act, invested the local courts with jurisdiction equivalent to that exercised by state courts. S. Rep. No. 91-405, pp. 2-3; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 23-24. The three former trial courts were combined into the new Superior Court of the District of Columbia, D. C. Code Ann. § 11-901 (Supp. V, 1972), which was vested, with a minor exception, id., § 11-502 (3), with exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal cases, including felonies, brought under laws applicable exclusively to the District, id., § 11-923 (b). Its civil jurisdiction reached all civil actions and any other matter at law or in equity, brought in the District of Columbia, except those in which exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the United States District Court. Id., § 11-921. The local appeals court, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, would ultimately not be subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals, id., § 11-301, and was declared to be the “highest court of the District of Columbia” for purposes of further review by this Court. Id., § 11-102.
In addition to the shift in jurisdiction, the number of local judges was increased, their tenure was lengthened from 10 to 15 years, and their salaries were increased and fixed at a percentage of that of judges of the United States courts. Id., §§ 11-702, 11-703, 11-903, 11-904, and 11-1502; D. C. Code Ann. §§ 11-702, 11-902, 11-1502, 47-2402 (1967). The Reorganization Act established a Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure to deal with suspension, retirement, or removal of local judges, D. C. Code Ann. §11-1521 et seq. (Supp. V, 1972). It also provided for improved administration of the local courts, id., § 11-1701 et seq., including authorization for an Executive Officer responsible for the administration of the local court system. Id., § 11-1703.
The 15-year term is subject to the provision for mandatory retirement at age 70. D. C. Code Ann. § 11-1502. (Supp. V, 1972).
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1257 provides:
“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
“(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity.
“(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
“ (3) By writ o'f certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Further consideration of the question of jurisdiction postponed to the hearing of the case on the merits limited to the following questions: 1) Do the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c)permit Arizona's use of a commission to adopt congressional districts? 2) Does Arizona Legislature have standing to bring this suit?
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 337 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 337 (a), provides, with stated exceptions, for the nonrecognition of gain or loss from a corporation’s “sale or exchange” of property that takes place during the 12-month period following the corporation’s adoption of a plan of complete liquidation that is effectuated within that period. The issue in this case is whether, when a fire destroys corporate property prior to the adoption of a plan of complete liquidation, but the fire insurance proceeds are received after the plan’s adoption, the gain realized is or is not to be recognized to the corporation.
I
The facts are not contested. Taxpayer, Central Tablet Manufacturing Company, an Ohio corporation, for many years prior to May 14, 1966, was engaged at Columbus, Ohio, in the manufacture and sale of writing tablets, school supplies, art materials, and related items. It filed its federal income tax returns on the accrual basis of accounting and for the fiscal year ended October 31.
On August 13, 1965, a majority of the taxpayer’s production and maintenance employees went on strike. As a consequence, production was reduced to about 5% of normal volume. On September 10, during the strike, an accidental fire largely destroyed the taxpayer’s plant, its manufacturing equipment and machinery, and its business offices. The damage was never repaired, the strike was never settled, and the taxpayer never again engaged in manufacturing.
At the time of the fire, the taxpayer carried fire and extended coverage insurance on its building, machinery, and inventory. It also carried business interruption insurance. Negotiations relating to the taxpayer’s claim for business interruption loss began about October 8, 1965, and those on its claims for building and personal property losses began about November 1. There was dispute as to the estimated period of loss to be covered by the business interruption insurance; as to the probable duration of the strike had the fire not taken place; as to the applicability of the building policy’s coinsurance clause; as to the extent of the equipment loss due to the fire rather than to rain; as to the value of the building and equipment at the time of the fire; and as to the cost of repair of repairable machinery and equipment. The threshold liability of the insurance carriers, however, despite their not unusual rejection of the initial formal proofs of claim, was never seriously questioned.
Eight months after the fire, at a special meeting on May 14, 1966, the shareholders of Central Tablet decided to dissolve the corporation and adopted a plan of dissolution and complete liquidation pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.86 (1964). App. 38. About six days later, the taxpayer and the insurers settled the building claim; payment of that claim was received in mid-June. In August, the taxpayer settled its personal property claim and received payment on it in November. On May 3, 1967, all assets remaining after liquidating distributions to the shareholders were conveyed to a Columbus bank in trust for the shareholders pending the payment of taxes and the collection of remaining insurance and other claims. On the same date, the taxpayer filed a certificate of dissolution with the Ohio Secretary of State. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1701.86 (H) and (I) (1964). All this was accomplished within 12 months of the adoption of the plan on May 14,1966.
The business interruption claim was settled in August 1967 and payment thereof was received in September of that year.
The fire insurance proceeds exceeded the taxpayer’s adjusted income tax basis in the insured property. Gain, therefore, was realized and ordinarily would be recognized and taxed to the corporation. § 1033 (a) (3) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1033 (a) (3); Tobias v. Commissioner, 40 T. C. 84, 95 (1963). The taxpayer, however, resorting to § 337 (a), did not report this gain or any part of the business interruption insurance payment in its income tax returns for fiscal 1965 or for any other year. In January 1968, upon audit, the Internal Revenue Service asserted a deficiency in the taxpayer’s income tax for fiscal 1965. This was attributable to the Service’s inclusion in gross income for that year of (a) capital gain equal to the excess of the fire insurance proceeds over adjusted basis, (b) fiscal 1965’s pro rata share of the business interruption insurance payment, and (c) an amount not at issue here. A deficiency in the taxpayer’s fiscal 1963 tax was also asserted; this was attributable to a decrease in operating loss carryback from fiscal 1966 because of adjustments in the treatment of the insurance proceeds. The taxpayer paid the deficiencies, filed claims for refund, and, in due time, instituted the present action in federal court to recover the amounts so paid.
The District Court followed the decision in United States v. Morton, 387 F. 2d 441 (CA8 1968), which concerned a taxpayer on the cash, rather than the accrual, basis, and held that § 337 (a) was available to the taxpayer. 339 F. Supp. 1134 (SD Ohio 1972). Judgment for the taxpayer was entered. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, refusing to follow Morton, reversed and remanded. 481 F. 2d 954 (1973). In view of the indicated conflict in the decisions of the Eighth and Sixth Circuits, we granted certiorari. 414 U. S. 1111 (1973).
II
The only issue before us is whether § 337 (a) has application in a situation where, as here, the involuntary conversion occasioned by the fire preceded the adoption of the plan of complete liquidation. This depends upon whether the “sale or exchange,” referred to in § 337 (a), took place when the fire occurred or only at some post-plan point, such as the subsequent settlement of the insurance claims, or their payment.
Stated simply, it is the position of the Government that the fire was a single destructive event that effected the conversion (and, therefore, the “sale or exchange”) prior to the adoption of the plan of liquidation, thereby rendering § 337 (a) inapplicable. It is the position of the taxpayer, on the other hand, that the fire was not such a single destructive event at all, but was only the initial incident in a series of events — the fire; the preparation and filing of proofs of claim; their preliminary rejection; the negotiations; ultimate dollar agreement by way of settlement; the preparation and submission of final proofs of claim; their formal acceptance; and payment — that stretched over a period of time and came to a meaningful conclusion only after the adoption of the plan, and that, consequently, § 337 (a) ' is applicable.
In order to keep this narrow issue in perspective, it is desirable and necessary to examine the background and the history of § 337.
A corporation is a taxable entity separate and distinct from its shareholders. Ordinarily, a capital gain realized by the corporation is taxable to it. The shareholders, of course, benefit by that realization of gain and the consequent increase in their corporation’s assets. The value of their shares, in theory, is thereby enhanced. This increment in value, however, is not taxed at that point to the shareholder. His taxable transaction occurs when he disposes of his shares. The capital gain realized by the corporation, and taxed to it, may be said to be subject to a “second” tax later, that is, when the shareholder disposes of his shares. There is nothing unusual about this. It is a reality of tax law, and it is due to the separateness of the corporation and the shareholder as taxable entities.
This “double tax” possibility took on technical aspects, however, when the capital gain was realized at about the time of, or in connection with, a corporation’s liquidation. If liquidation was deemed to have taken place subsequent to the sale or exchange, there was a “second” tax to the shareholder in addition to the tax on the gain to the corporation. On the other hand, because a corporation itself realizes no gain for income tax purposes upon the mere liquidation and distribution of its assets to shareholders, § 311 of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 311; see General Utilities Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200 (1935), if the liquidation was deemed to have preceded the sale or exchange of the asset, there was no “first” tax to the corporation. Thus, the timing of the gain transaction, in relation to the corporation’s liquidation, had important tax consequence's. See generally B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 11-53 (3d ed. 1971). In short, before § 337 came into the Internal Revenue Code, the overall income tax burden for the liquidating corporate taxpayer and its shareholders was less if the corporation clearly made its distribution of assets prior to the sale or exchange of any of them at a gain.
All this seemed simple and straightforward. The application of the rule, however, as fact situations varied, engendered profound confusion which was enhanced by two decisions by this Court approximately 25 years ago. In Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331 (1945), the Court held that a liquidating corporation could not escape taxation on the gain realized from the sale of its sole asset if the corporation itself had arranged the sale prior to liquidation and distribution of the asset to the shareholders. This was so even though the sale was consummated after the distribution. Subsequently, in United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U. S. 451 (1950), the Court reached exactly the opposite conclusion in a case where the shareholders, rather than the corporation, had negotiated the sale of the distributed assets and, prior to the corporation’s liquidation, had been in touch with the purchaser and had offered to acquire the property and sell it to the purchaser. Mr. Justice Black, who wrote for a unanimous court in both cases, recognized that “the distinction between sales by a corporation as compared with distribution in kind followed by shareholder sales may be particularly shadowy and artificial when the corporation is closely held,” id., at 454-455, but the Court, nonetheless, determined that the distinction was mandated by the Code:
“The oddities in tax consequences that emerge from the tax provisions here controlling appear to be inherent in the present tax pattern. For a corporation is taxed if it sells all its physical properties and distributes the cash proceeds as liquidating dividends, yet is not taxed if that property is distributed in kind and is then sold by the shareholders. In both instances the interest of the shareholders in the business has been transferred to the purchaser. . . . Congress having determined that different tax consequences shall flow from different methods by which the shareholders of a closely held corporation may dispose of corporate property, we accept its mandate.” Id., at 455-456.
These two cases obviously created a situation where the tax consequences were dependent upon the resolution of often indistinct facts as to whether the negotiations leading to the sale had been conducted by the corporation or by the shareholders. Particularly in the case of a closely held corporation, where there was little, if any, significant difference between management and ownership, this analytical formalism was unsatisfactory and, indeed, was a trap for the unwary. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 49 (1954); H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., a106 (1954). See Cary, The Effect of Taxation on Selling Out a Corporate Business for Cash, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 423 (1950).
It was in direct response to the Court Holding-Cumberland confusion and disparate treatment that Congress produced § 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The report of the House Committee on Ways and Means on the bill (H. R. 8300) which became the 1954 Code explained the purpose of § 337:
“Your committee’s bill eliminates questions arising as a result of the necessity of determining whether a corporation in process of liquidating made a sale of assets or whether the shareholder receiving the assets made the sale. Compare Commissioner v. Court Holding Company (324 U. S. 331), with U. S. v. Cumberland Public Service Company (338 U. S. 451). This last decision indicates that if the distributee actually makes the sale after receipt of the property then there will be no tax on the sale at the corporate level. In order to eliminate questions resulting only from formalities, your committee has provided that if a corporation in process of liquidation sells assets there will be no tax at the corporate level, but any gain realized will be taxed to the dis-tributee-shareholder, as ordinary income or capital gain depending on the character of the asset sold.” H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 38-39 (1954).
See also id., at a106-a109, where it was said, at a106: “Your committee intends in section [337] to provide a definitive rule which will eliminate any uncertainty.” See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 48-49, 258-260 (1954).
There is nothing in the legislative history indicating that § 337 was enacted in ordér to eliminate “double taxation” as such. Rather, the statute was designed to eliminate the formalistic distinctions recognized and perhaps encouraged by the decisions in Court Holding and Cumberland. See Kovey, When Will Section 337 Shield Fire Loss Proceeds? A Current Look at a Burning Issue, 39 J. Taxation 258, 259 n. 2 (1973); Note, Tax-Free Sales in Liquidation Under Section 337, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 780 (1963). See also West Street-Erie Boulevard Corp. v. United States, 411 F. 2d 738, 740-741 (CA2 1969). The statute was meant to establish a strict but clear rule, with a specified time limitation, upon which planners might rely and which would serve to bring certainty and stability into the corporation liquidation area. The taxpayer here recognizes this statutory purpose. Brief for Petitioner 6-7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 3 — 4.
Inasmuch as § 337 was drafted to meet and deal with the Court Holding-Cumberland situation, where there had been a sale, the statute on its face relates only to “the sale or exchange” of property. It is not surprising, therefore, that further confusion resulted when the Internal Revenue Service found itself confronted by liquidating corporate taxpayers who sought § 337 (a) treatment for casualty gains. Following the Court's decision in Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U. S. 247 (1941), the Internal Revenue Service at first refused to consider § 337 as applicable to a casualty situation at all. Rev. Rul. 56-372, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 187. When this was rejected in the courts, the Service reversed its position and treated an involuntary conversion that occurred after adoption of a plan of complete liquidation as a “sale or exchange” with resulting nonrecognition. Rev. Rui. 64-100, 1964-1 Cum. Bull. (Part I) 130.
It is at this point that the issue of the instant case emerges and comes into focus. Although it is now settled that an involuntary conversion by fire is a sale or exchange under § 337 (a), the question that is determinative here remains unresolved: When does the involuntary conversion by a preplan fire take place? Since the statute prescribes a strict 12-month postplan period, it is crucial for the taxpayer that the conversion be deemed to have occurred after the plan of liquidation was adopted.
Ill
Predictably, the taxpayer analogizes the involuntary conversion to a true sale, and it argues that the conversion does not occur until settlement is reached and the insurance obligations are finally determined and paid. This essentially is the reasoning employed in the Morton case.
There is nothing to indicate that Congress considered this problem when § 337 (a) was adopted. The fact that attention was invariably focused on an actual sale would indicate that the casualty situation was not legislatively anticipated. Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl. 123, 129, 180 F. Supp. 373, 376 (1960). Recourse to legislative history, therefore, is somewhat circumstantial in nature. There is, however, one guiding fact, namely, the above-mentioned clear purpose of Congress, in its enactment of § 337 (a), to avoid the Court Holding-Cumberland formalities.
The taxpayer’s analogy to the ordinary sale transaction has some superficial appeal. It fails, however, to give sufficient consideration to the underlying purpose of §337 (a). To be sure, under normal circumstances, a true sale is not complete until the mutual obligations (if not the precise terms) are fixed. The Internal Revenue Service has recognized this explicitly in the Regulations by making § 337 (a) available where a sale is negotiated by the corporation prior to the adoption of the plan but is not completed until after the plan is adopted. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2 (a). This merely acknowledges that the parties are free to avoid an executory sales contract until it is made final. If the transaction is not completed until after the plan of liquidation is adopted, the corporation is rightfully entitled to § 337 (a) treatment. This result is fully consistent with the aim of Congress to avoid the factual determination that led to the Court Hólding-Cumberland dichotomy. The fact that the corporation and its shareholders are given this limited opportunity to plan, preliminary and prior to liquidation, for disposal of assets does not mean that the Congress intended to make this opportunity available in every conceivable fact situation.
With a fire loss, the obligation to pay arises upon the fire. Unlike an executory contract to sell, the casualty cannot be rescinded. Details, including even the basic question of liability, may be contested, but the fundamental contractual obligation that precipitates the transformation from tangible property into a chose in action consisting of a claim for insurance proceeds is fixed by the fire. Although the parties remain free to arrive at an acceptable settlement, the obligation itself has come into being, and it is the value of the insured property at that point that governs the claim. In other words, the terms of the obligation cannot be changed unilaterally by the insurer once the fire has occurred.
The fact that the ultimate extent of the gain may not be known or final settlement reached until some later time does not prevent the occurrence of a “sale or exchange” even in the context of a normal commercial transaction. See, e. g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404 (1931). The taxpayer’s efforts to draw an analogy to a true sale is therefore of limited utility. See Note, Involuntary Conversions and § 337 of the Internal Revenue Code, 31 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 417, 427-428 (1974).
When the casualty occurs during the 12-month period after the plan of liquidation is adopted, § 337 (a)’s applicability follows as a matter of course. The presence of § 337 (a) creates an expectation in the liquidating corporation that it will not be taxed on gains from sales or exchanges of corporate assets during the 12-month period. The taxpayer corporation then need not be concerned with the formalities of sale and disposal in order to avoid tax on capital gains. Put another way, once the plan is adopted, corporate property is colored with the reasonable expectation that if it is sold or exchanged within 12 months, any resulting gain will not be taxed to the corporation. It follows that if, after the plan is adopted, property is destroyed by casualty, with consequent replacement by insurance proceeds, § 337 (a) treatment is available. The property colored by the expectation has been replaced by insurance proceeds.
When, however, the casualty occurs prior to the adoption of the plan and the corporation’s commitment to liquidate, none of these considerations attaches. Moreover, there is nothing in the purpose of § 337 which dictates the extension of its benefits to this preplan situation. Before the adoption of the plan the corporation has no expectation of avoiding tax if it disposes of property at a gain. The corporation, of course, is the beneficiary of the insurance, and both at the time the policy is executed and at the time of the fire, the destroyed property is an asset of the corporation. Prior to the adoption of the plan, § 337 (a)’s “expectation” simply is not present. For all practical purposes, the disposal of Central Tablet's insured property occurred at the time of its fire. At that time the taxpayer possessed all incidents of ownership. It had evidenced no intention to liquidate. The fire was irremediable. Regardless of the formalities and negotiations that prefaced the actual insurance settlements, the property was parted with at the time of its destruction. When the casualty occurs prior to the corporation’s committing itself to liquidation, no Court Holding-Cumberland problem is presented.
IV
This interpretation is fully consistent with the manner in which condemnation, the other principal form of involuntary conversion, is treated under § 337. In condemnation, the legally operative event for purposes of the statute is the passage of title under federal or state law, as the case may be, to the condemning authority. This means that in many jurisdictions the “sale or exchange” under § 337 (a) occurs prior to the determination of the amount of condemnation compensation and, indeed, possibly without advance warning to the corporation owner. Rev. Rui. 59-108, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 72. It has been uniformly recognized that a corporate taxpayer may not avail itself of § 337 (a) where its plan of liquidation is adopted after title has passed by way of condemnation even where no settlement as to condemnation price has been reached or where the corporation had no advance notice of the proposed taking. Covered Wagon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 369 F. 2d 629, 633-635 (CA8 1966); Likins-Foster Honolulu Corp. v. Commissioner, 417 F. 2d 285 (CA10 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 987 (1970); Dwight v. United States, 328 F. 2d 973 (CA2 1964); Wendell v. Commissioner, 326 F. 2d 600 (CA2 1964). The taxpayer’s position here would favor the casualty taxpayer over the condemnation taxpayer.
Although perhaps not an exact parallel, the one date in the casualty loss situation analogous to the passage of title in the condemnation context is the date of the casualty. The fire is the event which fixes the legal obligation to pay the insurance proceeds. As with a non-qualifying preplan condemnation, the fire is the single irrevocable event of significance, and it occurs when title and control over the property are in the corporation. The chose in action against the insurer arises at that time. This is unlike the executory sales contract consummated after the adoption of a plan; there, either of the parties is free unilaterally to avoid whatever preliminary agreement had been reached at the preliquidation negotiations. As with condemnation, the involuntary character of the fire distinguishes it from the normal sale, and, as with condemnation, for purposes of § 337 (a), it is irrelevant that the precise dollar amount of the insurer’s obligation remains uncertain. In the casualty situation, the owner of the insured property is deprived of aspects of ownership when the fire occurs in much the same way as the owner of condemned property is deprived at the time title passes. In each case the triggering event is involuntary and irrevocable. Because of the statutorily imposed chronology, the event operates to prevent the corporation’s receiving the favorable treatment of §337 (a). As the Court Holding decision exemplifies, “This may appear a harsh result, but if it is to be corrected Congress must act; the courts have no power to do so.” Dwight v. United States, 328 F. 2d, at 974.
y
Again, although not precisely parallel and certainly not controlling, concluding that the “sale or exchange” takes place at the time of the fire is consistent with the accepted method for determining the holding period of destroyed property in the ascertainment of its long- or short-term capital gain or loss consequences. Where property is destroyed, the holding period terminates at the moment of destruction. Rose v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 298 (SD Cal. 1964); Steele v. United States, 52-2 U. S. Tax Cas. ¶ 9451 (SD Fla. 1952); see Draper v. Commissioner, 32 T. C. 545, 548-549 (1959). Cf. Comment, Extending Section 337 to Liquidations Triggered by the Involuntary Conversion of Corporate Assets, 62 Geo. L. J. 1203, 1213 n. 55 (1974). Were we to accept the taxpayer’s argument, we would be left with the anomalous situation of having the “sale” take place after the holding period has terminated for capital gain or loss purposes.
VI
The situation presented by the instant case has been brought to the attention of Congress with the suggestion that the nonrecognition treatment provided by § 337 (a) be extended to preplan involuntary conversions. Congress, however, has not acted on this suggestion. It, of course, has provided some tax relief to the victim of a casualty gain by permitting nonrecognition of the gain if the victim-taxpayer uses the proceeds to replace the destroyed property in a specified manner. § 1033 (a) (3) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1033 (a)(3). But Congress has never disclosed an intention to permit the corporate victim of a casualty with ensuing gain to have the option of liquidating after the casualty occurs and obtaining the benefit of nonrecognition under § 337 (a). If this is desirable policy, it is for the Congress, not the courts, to effectuate. The fact that a tax-oriented and tax-knowledgeable corporation in theory could utilize § 1033 (a) (3) and rebuild with its insurance proceeds without being taxed for the gain, and then adopt a plan of liquidation, surely does not change the result. Tax consequences follow what has taken place, not what might have taken place. Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U. S. 134, 148-149 (1974).
Had Congress enacted § 337 for the avowed purpose of freeing a corporation from tax on gains whenever it decides to liquidate, the result, here might well be different. Section 337, however, was not designed to accomplish that broad result. As has been noted, § 337 was designed for the limited purpose of avoiding the technical and formalistic determination of control as between the corporation and the shareholders. By the enactment of § 337 (a), the benefit of any existing doubt in that context was given to the corporate taxpayer. But § 337 (a) is narrowly and specifLally drawn. It applies only to a complete liquidation and then only to one fully accomplished in a specified short time. It has no application to a sale or exchange before the adoption of the plan or to one more than 12 months after the adoption. If the statute’s precise conditions are not fulfilled, the tax consequences that normally prevail will ensue. Indeed, the statute is not always beneficial, for it operates to make a loss as well as a gain on the sale or exchange nonrecognizable.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Ҥ 337. Gain or loss on sales or exchanges in connection with certain liquidations.
“(a) General rule.
“If—
“(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June 22, 1954, and
“(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less 'assets retained to meet claims, “then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month period.” 26 U. S. C. §337 (a).
The deficiencies, including interest, amounted to $70,051.30 for fiscal 1965 and $11,930.30 for fiscal 1963.
Kinney v. United States, 73-1 U. S. Tax Cas. ¶ 9140 (ND Cal. 1972), decided before the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in the present case, and now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, also followed Morton. The corporate taxpayer in Kinney was on the accrual basis.
Because the District Court ruled that § 337 (a) had application to Central Tablet’s situation, there was no occasion for it to determine in what taxable year the gain to the corporation accrued if it were ultimately decided that § 337 (a) was not applicable. That question remains for resolution upon remand. We intimate no view as to that issue. See generally 2 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 12.65 and p. 236 (Malone rev. 1967).
In Flaccus the Court held that fire insurance proceeds did not result in gain from a “sale or exchange” of capital assets within the meaning of § 117 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 715. This result was overcome statutorily by the enactment of § 151 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 846, now carried over into § 1231 (a) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1231 (a).
Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl. 123, 180 F. Supp. 373 (1960); Kent Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 288 F. 2d 812 (CA4 1961). In each of these cases the court relied upon the Flac-cws-inspired statutory amendment, referred to in the preceding footnote, for its conclusion that an involuntary conversion was covered by § 337 (a). In Towanda the Court of Claims permitted § 337 (a) treatment where both the fire and the settlement occurred during the 12-month period following the adoption of .the plan of liquidation. It observed, “It is not conceivable that Congress would have drawn a distinction between a gain from a voluntary conversion and an involuntary one, had the possibility of an involuntary conversion during liquidation come to its attention” (emphasis supplied). 149 Ct. Cl., at 129, 180 F. Supp., at 376. In Kent, the Fourth Circuit disallowed § 337 (a) treatment where both the fire and the settlement took place prior to the adoption of a plan of liquidation. 288 F. 2d, at 816. (It upheld that taxpayer's argument, however, that the casualty gain there sustained was entitled to nonrecognition specially provided under § 392 (b) of the 1954 Code.) Neither case presented the factual sequence of the case before us.
The Regulations make the date of the sale dependent “primarily upon the intent of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the contract and the surrounding circumstances.” § 1.337-2 (a). They provide that an “executory contract to sell is to be distinguished from a contract of sale.” This distinction recognizes the significance of the point in time where the parties can no longer opt out of a transaction. Certainly, a fire insurer has no right to opt out of its coverage and basic liability after the fire takes place; in this respect, the executory contract situation referred to in the Regulations is distinguishable.
For tax purposes, the formality of filing a proof of claim usually does not change the substance of this conclusion. In any event, the formalities were observed here. The insurer’s adjuster was in attendance even while the fire was in progress. App. 42. Notice was immediately given the insurance companies and proofs of loss were promptly submitted. Id., at 13-14. Negotiations began within a month. The adjusters, in making the not uncommon rejection of initial proofs of claim, denied the extent, but hardly the fact, of coverage. Id., at 14^15.
In 1959 the Advisory Group made the following recommendation to the House Committee on Ways and Means:
“The advisory group considers it appropriate and desirable to extend the nonrecognition treatment provided by section 337 (a) to all involuntary conversions. Since an involuntary conversion cannot be foreseen and it is impractical to require adoption of the liquidation plan on or before the day of the conversion, it is proposed, as to such conversions, to relax the strict requirements of the section with respect to the time of adoption of the liquidation plan. Since the time of receipt of the proceeds of an involuntary conversion may depend on factors beyond the control of the corporation and receipt within a 12-month period is often impossible, it is proposed also to relax the distribution requirements with respect to such conversions. Accordingly, it is recommended that an involuntary conversion within the meaning of section 1033 be considered a sale or exchange for purposes of section 337, and that the requirements of paragraph (1) (B) regarding the time of distribution, and the requirement of paragraph (1) that the sale or exchange occur within the 12-month period referred to therein, be considered satisfied if such 12-month period begins not later than 60 days after the disposition of the converted property, as defined in section 1033 (a) (2), and the proceeds of the conversion are distributed within such 12-month period or within 60 days after the receipt thereof by the corporation, whichever is later.” Hearings on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 532 (1959). It is true that this recommendation was made before the Internal Revenue Service had recognized a casualty as a “sale or exchange,” within the language of § 337 (a), and that the Service has adopted at least part of the recommendation without congressional action. Nonetheless, the Advisory Group clearly recognized that even if the involuntary conversion were a “sale or exchange,” § 337 (a) did not reach the conversion that occurred prior to the adoption of the plan of liquidation, and it proposed “to relax the strict requirements of the section” with respect thereto.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit for seaman’s wages accruing from services rendéred in foreign commerce. Federal jurisdiction was claimed under 28 U. S. C. § 1333 which’ grants exclusive jurisdiction to the district courts in any “admiralty or maritime” case. A collective-bargaining agreement contained provisions concerning wages payable when seamen were dismissed or when their' employment was terminated ; and it provided-a grievance procedure and for arbitration of disputed claims. Those procedures were not pursued by the seaman, He sued in . the federal court-.instead.
The District Court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the principles we announced in a series of decisions starting, with Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, and extending to Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650, governed this maritime case and that the federal court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the maritime claim but only to enforce the grievance procedure or an arbitration award that might be given. The Court of Appeals reversed by a divided vote, 408 F. 2d 1065, and we granted certiorari, 398 U. S. 957.
. The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, provides a federal remedy to enforce grievance and arbitration provisions of collective-barg;: ining agreements in an industry “affecting commerce,” § 31 (a), 29 U. S. C. § 185 (a); and it is clear that “com ierce” includes foreign comlnerce. 29 U. S. C. § 152 "). It is also clear that this employee’s basic wage an 1 the overtime rate of pay were fixed or determinable by the collective-bargaining agreement. And it is generally true, as stated in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 184, that when the employee’s claim “is based upon breach of the collective bargaining agreement, he is bound by terms of that agreement which govern the manner in which contractual rights may be enforced.”
The question here is not the continuing validity of Lincoln Mills and its progeny. The question is .a distinctly different one, and that is whether the earlier, express, and alternative method of collecting seamen’s wages contained in 46 U. S. C. § 596 has been displaced by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act or whether so far as seamen and their wages are concerned § 301 is only an optional method of resolving the controversy.
Title 46 U. S. C. § 596, which derives from the Act of July 20, 1790, § 6, 1 Stat. 133, provides in relevant part :
“The master or owner of any vessel making coasting voyages shall pay to every seaman his wages . within two days after the termination of the agreement under which he was shipped,; or at the time such seaman is discharged, whichever first happens; and in case of vessels making foreign voyages, or from a port on the Atlantic to a port on the Pacific, or vice versa, within twenty-four hours after the cargo hás been discharged, or within four days after the seaman has been discharged, whichever first happens; and in all cases the seaman shall be entitled to be paid at the time of his discharge on account of wages a sum equal to one-third part of the balance due him. Every master dr owner who refuses or neglects to make payment in the manner hereinbefore mentioned without sufficient cause shall pay to the seaman a sum equal to two days’ pay for each and every day during which payment is delayed beyond the respective periods, which sum shall be recoverable as wages in any claim, made ber fore the court . . .. (Italics added.)
Moreover, 46 U. S. C. § 597, which also derives from the 1790 Act, provides:
“Every seaman on a. vessel of the United States shall be entitled to receive on démand from the master of the vessel to which he belongs one-half part of the balance , of his wages earned and remaining unpaid at the time when such demand is made at every port where such vessel, after the voyage has been commenced, shall load or deliver cargo before the voyage is ended, and all stipulations in. the contract to the contrary shall be void: Provided, Such a demand, shall not be made before the expiration of, nor oftener than once in five days nor more than once in the same harbor on the same entry. . .
The statutory remedy speaks in terms of the amount of wages due and owing and the penalties for nonpayment, and it specifies the timetable within which the payments must be made. Section 596 speaks of a penalty for nonpayment recoverable “as wages in any claim made before the court.” This implies a right to make the claim to the court and not a duty to make it before a grievance committee or before an arbiter. Hence § 596 does not wholly jibe with § 301. We often must legislate interstitially to iron out inconsistencies within a statute or to fill gaps resulting from legislative oversight or-to resolve ambiguities resulting from-a legis-. lative compromise. It.is earnestly urged that the grievance procedure established in the collective-bargaining agreement can give effect to these payments and penalty provisions and that the agreement is therefore not in derogation of the ancient statutory remedy which Congress has provided.
Seamen from the start were wards of admiralty. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 287. In 1872 it was provided that the federal courts might appoint shipping commissioners “to superintend the shipping and discharge of seamen” in our merchant fleet. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., -1836. Commissioners indeed served, 46 U. S. C. § 541 (1940 ed.), as an administrative adjunct of the federal courts until July 16, 1946, when § 104 of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946 abolished them. 60 Stat. 1098. No other administrative agency was substituted. The federal. courts remained as the guardians of seamen, the agencies chosen by Congress, to enforce their rights — a guardian concept which, so far as wage claims are concerned, is not much different from what it was in the 18th century.
We reviewed the legislative history of § 301 in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S., at 451-456. The matter of foremost concern in Congress was the enforceability of collective-bargaining agreements. The' essence of § 301 was a new federal policy governed by federal law — “that federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way.” Id., at 455. Enforcement by or against labor unions was the main burden of § 301, though standing by individual employees to secure declarations of their legal rights under the collective agreement was recognized. Id., at 456. Since the emphasis was on suits by unions and against unions, little attention was given to the assertion of claims by individual employees and none whatsoever concerning the impact of § 301 on the special protective procedures governing the collection of wages of maritime workers. We can find no suggestion in the legislative history of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 that grievance procedures and arbitration were to take the place of the old shipping commissioners or to assume part or all of the roles served by the federal courts protective of the rights of seamen since 1790.
It is earnestly urged that the literalness of the old statute should give way to the progressive philosophy of the new procedures.
It is said that arbitration would be most appropriate because “a familiarity with the customs and practices of shipping would be distinctly helpful in assessing the validity of the claims,” and the “underlying wage claims [are] based on factual disputes.” Resolving factual disputes is hardly uncommon in federal district courts. And while an arbitrator in the area may have expertise, for 180 years federal courts have been protecting the rights of seamen and are not without knowledge in tbe area..
It is also said that the informal, readily available grievance and arbitration procedures might defeat any overreaching and delay by the employer which § 596 was designed to reach. We do not hold that § 596 is the exclusive remedy of the seaman. He may, if he chooses, use the processes of grievánce and arbitration. Yet, unlike Congress, we are not in a position to say that his interests usually will be best served through § 301 rather than through § 596.
The . literal conflict between this ancient seaman’s statute and the relatively new grievance procedure is one which we think . Congress rather than this Court should resolve. We :do not sit as a legislative committee of revision. . We know that this employee has a justiciable claim. We know it is the kind of claim that is grist for the judicial mill. We know that in § 596 Congress allowed it to be recoverable when made to a court. We know that this District Court has the case properly before it under the head of maritime jurisdiction. We hesitate to route this claimant through the relatively new administrative remedy of the collective agreement and shut the courthouse door on him when Congress, since 1790, has said that it is open to members of his. class.
What we decide today has nothing whatsoever to do. with grievance claims of the maritime unions against employers or the claims of employers against them, for neither is touched by § 596. We deal only with'the sea-, man’s personal wage claims.
Maritime unions, of course; like other unions, gain “prestige” by processing grievance claims. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, supra, at 653. And employer interests are served “by limiting the choice of remedies available to aggrieved employees.” Ibid. In Maddox, there was no express exception governing individual claims of employees from § 301 grievance procedures and we declined to carve one out under the circumstances there present. The circumstances here, are quite, different because of the express judicial remedy created by § 596. The reluctance in Maddox to redesign the statutory regime of § 301 makes us equally reluctant to redesign the statutory regime of § 596.
The chronology of the two statutes — § 596 and § .301-makes clear that the judicial remedy was made explicit in § 596 and was not clearly taken away by § 301. What Congress has plainly granted we hesitate to deny.. Since the history of § 301 is silent on the abrogation of existing statutory remedies of seamen in the maritime field, we construe it to provide only an optional remedy to them. We would require much more to hold that § 301 reflects a philosophy of legal compulsion that overrides the explicit judicial remedy provided by 46 U. S'. C. § 596.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the judgment and opinion of the Court while still adhering to his . dissent in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650.
“I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from ■ molar to molecular motions.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 221 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Cardozo, in speaking of the construction of laws to achieve justice and harmony, said:
“All departments of the law have been touched and elevated by this spirit. In some, however, the method of sociology works in harmony with the method of philosophy or of evolution or of tradition.' Those, therefore, are the fields where logic and coherence and consistency must still be sought as ends. • In others, it seems to displace the methods that compete with it. Those are the fields where the virtues of consistency must yield within those interstitial limits where judicial power moves.” Selected Writings 136 (Hall ed. 1947). •
And see Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 1838, 1863, 2172, 2206, 3437, 3572, 3911.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under Illinois law, public employees are forced to subsidize a union, even if they choose not to join and strongly object to the positions the union takes in collective bargaining and related activities. We conclude that this arrangement violates the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.
We upheld a similar law in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977), and we recognize the importance of following precedent unless there are strong reasons for not doing so. But there are very strong reasons in this case. Fundamental free speech rights are at stake. Abood was poorly reasoned. It has led to practical problems and abuse. It is inconsistent with other First Amendment cases and has been undermined by more recent decisions. Developments since Abood was handed down have shed new light on the issue of agency fees, and no reliance interests on the part of public-sector unions are sufficient to justify the perpetuation of the free speech violations that Abood has countenanced for the past 41 years. Abood is therefore overruled.
I
A
Under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA), employees of the State and its political subdivisions are permitted to unionize. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 5, § 315/6(a) (West 2016). If a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit vote to be represented by a union, that union is designated as the exclusive representative of all the employees. §§ 315/3(s)(1), 315/6(c), 315/9. Employees in the unit are not obligated to join the union selected by their co-workers, but whether they join or not, that union is deemed to be their sole permitted representative. See §§ 315/6(a), (c).
Once a union is so designated, it is vested with broad authority. Only the union may negotiate with the employer on matters relating to "pay, wages, hours [,] and other conditions of employment." § 315/6(c). And this authority extends to the negotiation of what the IPLRA calls "policy matters," such as merit pay, the size of the work force, layoffs, privatization, promotion methods, and non-discrimination policies. § 315/4; see § 315/6(c); see generally, e.g., Illinois Dept. of Central Management Servs. v. AFSCME, Council 31, No. S-CB-16-17 etc., 33 PERI ¶ 67 (ILRB Dec. 13, 2016) (Board Decision).
Designating a union as the employees' exclusive representative substantially restricts the rights of individual employees. Among other things, this designation means that individual employees may not be represented by any agent other than the designated union; nor may individual employees negotiate directly with their employer. §§ 315/6(c)-(d), 315/10(a)(4); see Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL 117638, 402 Ill.Dec. 1, 51 N.E.3d 753, 782 ; accord, Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683-684, 64 S.Ct. 830, 88 L.Ed. 1007 (1944). Protection of the employees' interests is placed in the hands of the union, and therefore the union is required by law to provide fair representation for all employees in the unit, members and nonmembers alike. § 315/6(d).
Employees who decline to join the union are not assessed full union dues but must instead pay what is generally called an "agency fee," which amounts to a percentage of the union dues. Under Abood, nonmembers may be charged for the portion of union dues attributable to activities that are "germane to [the union's] duties as collective-bargaining representative," but nonmembers may not be required to fund the union's political and ideological projects. 431 U.S., at 235, 97 S.Ct. 1782 ; see id., at 235-236, 97 S.Ct. 1782. In labor-law parlance, the outlays in the first category are known as "chargeable" expenditures, while those in the latter are labeled "nonchargeable."
Illinois law does not specify in detail which expenditures are chargeable and which are not. The IPLRA provides that an agency fee may compensate a union for the costs incurred in "the collective bargaining process, contract administration[,] and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours [,] and conditions of employment." § 315/6(e); see also § 315/3(g). Excluded from the agency-fee calculation are union expenditures "related to the election or support of any candidate for political office." § 315/3(g); see § 315/6(e).
Applying this standard, a union categorizes its expenditures as chargeable or nonchargeable and thus determines a nonmember's "proportionate share," § 315/6(e); this determination is then audited; the amount of the "proportionate share" is certified to the employer; and the employer automatically deducts that amount from the nonmembers' wages. See ibid. ; App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a; see also Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct. 2618, 2633-2634, 189 L.Ed.2d 620 (2014) (describing this process). Nonmembers need not be asked, and they are not required to consent before the fees are deducted.
After the amount of the agency fee is fixed each year, the union must send nonmembers what is known as a Hudson notice. See Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 106 S.Ct. 1066, 89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986). This notice is supposed to provide nonmembers with "an adequate explanation of the basis for the [agency] fee." Id., at 310, 106 S.Ct. 1066. If nonmembers "suspect that a union has improperly put certain expenses in the [chargeable] category," they may challenge that determination. Harris, supra, at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2633.
As illustrated by the record in this case, unions charge nonmembers, not just for the cost of collective bargaining per se, but also for many other supposedly connected activities. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a-39a. Here, the nonmembers were told that they had to pay for "[l]obbying," "[s]ocial and recreational activities," "advertising," "[m]embership meetings and conventions," and "litigation," as well as other unspecified "[s]ervices" that "may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local bargaining unit." Id., at 28a-32a. The total chargeable amount for nonmembers was 78.06% of full union dues. Id., at 34a.
B
Petitioner Mark Janus is employed by the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services as a child support specialist. Id., at 10a. The employees in his unit are among the 35,000 public employees in Illinois who are represented by respondent American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (Union). Ibid. Janus refused to join the Union because he opposes "many of the public policy positions that [it] advocates," including the positions it takes in collective bargaining. Id., at 10a, 18a. Janus believes that the Union's "behavior in bargaining does not appreciate the current fiscal crises in Illinois and does not reflect his best interests or the interests of Illinois citizens." Id., at 18a. Therefore, if he had the choice, he "would not pay any fees or otherwise subsidize [the Union]." Ibid. Under his unit's collective-bargaining agreement, however, he was required to pay an agency fee of $44.58 per month, id., at 14a-which would amount to about $535 per year.
Janus's concern about Illinois' current financial situation is shared by the Governor of the State, and it was the Governor who initially challenged the statute authorizing the imposition of agency fees. The Governor commenced an action in federal court, asking that the law be declared unconstitutional, and the Illinois attorney general (a respondent here) intervened to defend the law. App. 41. Janus and two other state employees also moved to intervene-but on the Governor's side. Id., at 60.
Respondents moved to dismiss the Governor's challenge for lack of standing, contending that the agency fees did not cause him any personal injury. E.g., id., at 48-49. The District Court agreed that the Governor could not maintain the lawsuit, but it held that petitioner and the other individuals who had moved to intervene had standing because the agency fees unquestionably injured them. Accordingly, "in the interest of judicial economy," the court dismissed the Governor as a plaintiff, while simultaneously allowing petitioner and the other employees to file their own complaint. Id., at 112. They did so, and the case proceeded on the basis of this new complaint.
The amended complaint claims that all "nonmember fee deductions are coerced political speech" and that "the First Amendment forbids coercing any money from the nonmembers." App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. Respondents moved to dismiss the amended complaint, correctly recognizing that the claim it asserted was foreclosed by Abood. The District Court granted the motion, id., at 7a, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 851 F.3d 746 (2017).
Janus then sought review in this Court, asking us to overrule Abood and hold that public-sector agency-fee arrangements are unconstitutional. We granted certiorari to consider this important question. 582 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 54, 198 L.Ed.2d 780 (2017).
II
Before reaching this question, however, we must consider a threshold issue. Respondents contend that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution because petitioner "moved to intervene in [the Governor's] jurisdictionally defective lawsuit." Union Brief in Opposition 11; see also id., at 13-17; State Brief in Opposition 6; Brief for Union Respondent i, 16-17; Brief for State Respondents 14, n. 1. This argument is clearly wrong.
It rests on the faulty premise that petitioner intervened in the action brought by the Governor, but that is not what happened. The District Court did not grant petitioner's motion to intervene in that lawsuit. Instead, the court essentially treated petitioner's amended complaint as the operative complaint in a new lawsuit. App. 110-112. And when the case is viewed in that way, any Article III issue vanishes. As the District Court recognized-and as respondents concede-petitioner was injured in fact by Illinois' agency-fee scheme, and his injuries can be redressed by a favorable court decision. Ibid. ; see Record 2312-2313, 2322-2323. Therefore, he clearly has Article III standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). It is true that the District Court docketed petitioner's complaint under the number originally assigned to the Governor's complaint, instead of giving it a new number of its own. But Article III jurisdiction does not turn on such trivialities.
The sole decision on which respondents rely, United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 34 S.Ct. 550, 58 L.Ed. 893 (1914), actually works against them. That case concerned a statute permitting creditors of a government contractor to bring suit on a bond between 6 and 12 months after the completion of the work. Id., at 162, 34 S.Ct. 550. One creditor filed suit before the 6-month starting date, but another intervened within the 6-to-12-month window. The Court held that the "[t]he intervention [did] not cure th[e] vice in the original [prematurely filed] suit," but the Court also contemplated treating "intervention... as an original suit" in a case in which the intervenor met the requirements that a plaintiff must satisfy-e.g., filing a separate complaint and properly serving the defendants. Id., at 163-164, 34 S.Ct. 550. Because that is what petitioner did here, we may reach the merits of the question presented.
III
In Abood, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an agency-shop arrangement like the one now before us, 431 U.S., at 232, 97 S.Ct. 1782, but in more recent cases we have recognized that this holding is "something of an anomaly," Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U.S. 298, 311, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012), and that Abood's "analysis is questionable on several grounds," Harris, 573 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2632 ; see id., at ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2632-2634 (discussing flaws in Abood's reasoning). We have therefore refused to extend Abood to situations where it does not squarely control, see Harris, supra, at ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2638-2639, while leaving for another day the question whether Abood should be overruled, Harris, supra, at ----, n. 19, 134 S.Ct., at 2638, n. 19 ; see Knox, supra, at 310-311, 132 S.Ct. 2277.
We now address that question. We first consider whether Abood's holding is consistent with standard First Amendment principles.
A
The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids abridgment of the freedom of speech. We have held time and again that freedom of speech "includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) ; see Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-797, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) ; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985) ; Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-257, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974) ; accord, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 9, 106 S.Ct. 903, 89 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (plurality opinion). The right to eschew association for expressive purposes is likewise protected. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) ("Freedom of association... plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate"); see Pacific Gas & Elec., supra, at 12, 106 S.Ct. 903 ("[F]orced associations that burden protected speech are impermissible"). As Justice Jackson memorably put it: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (emphasis added).
Compelling individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable violates that cardinal constitutional command, and in most contexts, any such effort would be universally condemned. Suppose, for example, that the State of Illinois required all residents to sign a document expressing support for a particular set of positions on controversial public issues-say, the platform of one of the major political parties. No one, we trust, would seriously argue that the First Amendment permits this.
Perhaps because such compulsion so plainly violates the Constitution, most of our free speech cases have involved restrictions on what can be said, rather than laws compelling speech. But measures compelling speech are at least as threatening.
Free speech serves many ends. It is essential to our democratic form of government, see, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), and it furthers the search for truth, see, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). Whenever the Federal Government or a State prevents individuals from saying what they think on important matters or compels them to voice ideas with which they disagree, it undermines these ends.
When speech is compelled, however, additional damage is done. In that situation, individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions. Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning, and for this reason, one of our landmark free speech cases said that a law commanding "involuntary affirmation" of objected-to beliefs would require "even more immediate and urgent grounds" than a law demanding silence. Barnette, supra, at 633, 63 S.Ct. 1178 ; see also Riley, supra, at 796-797, 108 S.Ct. 2667 (rejecting "deferential test" for compelled speech claims).
Compelling a person to subsidize the speech of other private speakers raises similar First Amendment concerns. Knox, supra, at 309, 132 S.Ct. 2277 ; United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410, 121 S.Ct. 2334, 150 L.Ed.2d 438 (2001) ; Abood, supra, at 222, 234-235, 97 S.Ct. 1782. As Jefferson famously put it, "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhor[s] is sinful and tyrannical." A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 545 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) (emphasis deleted and footnote omitted); see also Hudson, 475 U.S., at 305, n. 15, 106 S.Ct. 1066. We have therefore recognized that a "'significant impingement on First Amendment rights' " occurs when public employees are required to provide financial support for a union that "takes many positions during collective bargaining that have powerful political and civic consequences." Knox, supra, at 310-311, 132 S.Ct. 2277 (quoting Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455, 104 S.Ct. 1883, 80 L.Ed.2d 428 (1984) ).
Because the compelled subsidization of private speech seriously impinges on First Amendment rights, it cannot be casually allowed. Our free speech cases have identified "levels of scrutiny" to be applied in different contexts, and in three recent cases, we have considered the standard that should be used in judging the constitutionality of agency fees. See Knox, supra ; Harris, supra ; Friedrichs v. California Teachers Assn., 578 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1083, 194 L.Ed.2d 255 (2016) (per curiam ) (affirming decision below by equally divided Court).
In Knox, the first of these cases, we found it sufficient to hold that the conduct in question was unconstitutional under even the test used for the compulsory subsidization of commercial speech. 567 U.S., at 309-310, 321-322, 132 S.Ct. 2277. Even though commercial speech has been thought to enjoy a lesser degree of protection, see, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-563, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), prior precedent in that area, specifically United Foods, supra, had applied what we characterized as "exacting" scrutiny, Knox, 567 U.S., at 310, 132 S.Ct. 2277, a less demanding test than the "strict" scrutiny that might be thought to apply outside the commercial sphere. Under "exacting" scrutiny, we noted, a compelled subsidy must "serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
In Harris, the second of these cases, we again found that an agency-fee requirement failed "exacting scrutiny." 573 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2641. But we questioned whether that test provides sufficient protection for free speech rights, since "it is apparent that the speech compelled" in agency-fee cases "is not commercial speech." Id., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2639.
Picking up that cue, petitioner in the present case contends that the Illinois law at issue should be subjected to "strict scrutiny." Brief for Petitioner 36. The dissent, on the other hand, proposes that we apply what amounts to rational-basis review, that is, that we ask only whether a government employer could reasonably believe that the exaction of agency fees serves its interests. See post, at 2489 (KAGAN, J., dissenting) ("A government entity could reasonably conclude that such a clause was needed"). This form of minimal scrutiny is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence, and we reject it here. At the same time, we again find it unnecessary to decide the issue of strict scrutiny because the Illinois scheme cannot survive under even the more permissive standard applied in Knox and Harris.
In the remainder of this part of our opinion (Parts III-B and III-C), we will apply this standard to the justifications for agency fees adopted by the Court in Abood. Then, in Parts IV and V, we will turn to alternative rationales proffered by respondents and their amici.
B
In Abood, the main defense of the agency-fee arrangement was that it served the State's interest in "labor peace," 431 U.S., at 224, 97 S.Ct. 1782. By "labor peace," the Abood Court meant avoidance of the conflict and disruption that it envisioned would occur if the employees in a unit were represented by more than one union. In such a situation, the Court predicted, "inter-union rivalries" would foster "dissension within the work force," and the employer could face "conflicting demands from different unions." Id., at 220-221, 97 S.Ct. 1782. Confusion would ensue if the employer entered into and attempted to "enforce two or more agreements specifying different terms and conditions of employment." Id., at 220, 97 S.Ct. 1782. And a settlement with one union would be "subject to attack from [a] rival labor organizatio [n]." Id., at 221, 97 S.Ct. 1782.
We assume that "labor peace," in this sense of the term, is a compelling state interest, but Abood cited no evidence that the pandemonium it imagined would result if agency fees were not allowed, and it is now clear that Abood's fears were unfounded. The Abood Court assumed that designation of a union as the exclusive representative of all the employees in a unit and the exaction of agency fees are inextricably linked, but that is simply not true. Harris, supra, at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2640.
The federal employment experience is illustrative. Under federal law, a union chosen by majority vote is designated as the exclusive representative of all the employees, but federal law does not permit agency fees. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7102, 7111(a), 7114(a). Nevertheless, nearly a million federal employees-about 27% of the federal work force-are union members. The situation in the Postal Service is similar. Although permitted to choose an exclusive representative, Postal Service employees are not required to pay an agency fee, 39 U.S.C. §§ 1203(a), 1209(c), and about 400,000 are union members. Likewise, millions of public employees in the 28 States that have laws generally prohibiting agency fees are represented by unions that serve as the exclusive representatives of all the employees. Whatever may have been the case 41 years ago when Abood was handed down, it is now undeniable that "labor peace" can readily be achieved "through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms" than the assessment of agency fees. Harris, supra, at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2639 (internal quotation marks omitted).
C
In addition to the promotion of "labor peace," Abood cited "the risk of 'free riders' " as justification for agency fees, 431 U.S., at 224, 97 S.Ct. 1782. Respondents and some of their amici endorse this reasoning, contending that agency fees are needed to prevent nonmembers from enjoying the benefits of union representation without shouldering the costs. Brief for Union Respondent 34-36; Brief for State Respondents 41-45; see, e.g., Brief for International Brotherhood of Teamsters as Amicus Curiae 3-5.
Petitioner strenuously objects to this free-rider label. He argues that he is not a free rider on a bus headed for a destination that he wishes to reach but is more like a person shanghaied for an unwanted voyage.
Whichever description fits the majority of public employees who would not subsidize a union if given the option, avoiding free riders is not a compelling interest. As we have noted, "free-rider arguments... are generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections." Knox, 567 U.S., at 311, 132 S.Ct. 2277. To hold otherwise across the board would have startling consequences. Many private groups speak out with the objective of obtaining government action that will have the effect of benefiting nonmembers. May all those who are thought to benefit from such efforts be compelled to subsidize this speech?
Suppose that a particular group lobbies or speaks out on behalf of what it thinks are the needs of senior citizens or veterans or physicians, to take just a few examples. Could the government require that all seniors, veterans, or doctors pay for that service even if they object? It has never been thought that this is permissible. "[P]rivate speech often furthers the interests of nonspeakers," but "that does not alone empower the state to compel the speech to be paid for." Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U.S. 507, 556, 111 S.Ct. 1950, 114 L.Ed.2d 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). In simple terms, the First Amendment does not permit the government to compel a person to pay for another party's speech just because the government thinks that the speech furthers the interests of the person who does not want to pay.
Those supporting agency fees contend that the situation here is different because unions are statutorily required to "represen[t] the interests of all public employees in the unit," whether or not they are union members. § 315/6(d); see, e.g., Brief for State Respondents 40-41, 45; post, at 2490 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). Why might this matter?
We can think of two possible arguments. It might be argued that a State has a compelling interest in requiring the payment of agency fees because (1) unions would otherwise be unwilling to represent nonmembers or (2) it would be fundamentally unfair to require unions to provide fair representation for nonmembers if nonmembers were not required to pay. Neither of these arguments is sound.
First, it is simply not true that unions will refuse to serve as the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit if they are not given agency fees. As noted, unions represent millions of public employees in jurisdictions that do not permit agency fees. No union is ever compelled to seek that designation. On the contrary, designation as exclusive representative is avidly sought. Why is this so?
Even without agency fees, designation as the exclusive representative confers many benefits. As noted, that status gives the union a privileged place in negotiations over wages, benefits, and working conditions. See § 315/6(c). Not only is the union given the exclusive right to speak for all the employees in collective bargaining, but the employer is required by state law to listen to and to bargain in good faith with only that union. § 315/7. Designation as exclusive representative thus "results in a tremendous increase in the power" of the union. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950).
In addition, a union designated as exclusive representative is often granted special privileges, such as obtaining information about employees, see § 315/6(c), and having dues and fees deducted directly from employee wages, §§ 315/6(e)-(f). The collective-bargaining agreement in this case guarantees a long list of additional privileges. See App. 138-143.
These benefits greatly outweigh any extra burden imposed by the duty of providing fair representation for nonmembers. What this duty entails, in simple terms, is an obligation not to "act solely in the interests of [the union's] own members."
Brief for State Respondents 41; see Cintron v. AFSCME, Council 31, No. S-CB-16-032, p. 1, 34 PERI ¶ 105 (ILRB Dec. 13, 2017) (union may not intentionally direct "animosity" toward nonmembers based on their "dissident union practices"); accord, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 271, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) ; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967).
What does this mean when it comes to the negotiation of a contract? The union may not negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement that discriminates against nonmembers, see Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202-203, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944), but the union's bargaining latitude would be little different if state law simply prohibited public employers from entering into agreements that discriminate in that way. And for that matter, it is questionable whether the Constitution would permit a public-sector employer to adopt a collective-bargaining agreement that discriminates against nonmembers. See id., at 198-199, 202, 65 S.Ct. 226 (analogizing a private-sector union's fair-representation duty to the duty "the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates"); cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) (recognizing that government may not "impose penalties or withhold benefits based on membership in a disfavored group" where doing so "ma [kes] group membership less attractive"). To the extent that an employer would be barred from acceding to a discriminatory agreement anyway, the union's duty not to ask for one is superfluous. It is noteworthy that neither respondents nor any of the 39 amicus briefs supporting them-nor the dissent-has explained why the duty of fair representation causes public-sector unions to incur significantly greater expenses than they would otherwise bear in negotiating collective-bargaining agreements.
What about the representation of nonmembers in grievance proceedings? Unions do not undertake this activity solely for the benefit of nonmembers-which is why Illinois law gives a public-sector union the right to send a representative to such proceedings even if the employee declines union representation. § 315/6(b). Representation of nonmembers furthers the union's interest in keeping control of the administration of the collective-bargaining agreement, since the resolution of one employee's grievance can affect others. And when a union controls the grievance process, it may, as a practical matter, effectively subordinate "the interests of [an] individual employee... to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58, n. 19, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) ; see Stahulak v. Chicago, 184 Ill.2d 176, 180-181, 234 Ill.Dec. 432, 703 N.E.2d 44, 46-47 (1998) ; Mahoney v. Chicago, 293 Ill.App.3d 69, 73-74, 227 Ill.Dec. 209, 687 N.E.2d 132, 135-137 (1997) (union has " 'discretion to refuse to process' " a grievance, provided it does not act "arbitrar[ily]" or "in bad faith" (emphasis deleted) ).
In any event, whatever unwanted burden is imposed by the representation of nonmembers in disciplinary matters can be eliminated "through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms" than the imposition of agency fees. Harris, 573 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2639 (internal quotation marks omitted). Individual nonmembers could be required to pay for that service or could be denied union representation altogether. Thus, agency fees cannot be sustained on the ground
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Me. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this federal income tax case is whether the respondent, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company (CB&Q), an interstate common carrier railroad, may depreciate the cost of certain facilities paid for prior to June 22, 1954, not by it or by its shareholders, but from public funds.
Starting about 1930, CB&Q entered into a series of contracts with various Midwestern States. By these agreements the States were to fund some or all of the costs of construction of specified improvements, and the railroad apparently was to bear, at least in part, the costs of maintenance and replacement of the improvements once they had been installed. In 1933, as part of the program of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195, Congress authorized federal reimbursement to the States of the shares of the costs the States incurred in the construction of those improvements that inured to the benefit of public safety and improved highway traffic control. In 1944 Congress went further and authorized reimbursement, with stated limitations, to the States for the entire cost of the improvements, subject to the condition that a railroad that received a benefit from a facility so constructed was liable to the Government for up to 10% of the cost of the project pro rata in relation to the benefit received by the railroad.
Under these programs CB&Q received, at public expense, highway undercrossings and overcrossings having a cost of $1,538,543; crossing signals, signs, and floodlights having a cost of $548,877; and jetties and bridges having a cost of $58,721. These improvements, aggregating $2,146,141, were carried on the railroad’s books as capital assets even though most of the agreements between CB&Q and the several States did not expressly convey title to the railroad.
CB&Q instituted a timely suit in the Court of Claims alleging, among other things, that it had overpaid its 1955 federal income tax because it had failed to assert, as a deduction on its return as filed, allowable depreciation on the subsidized assets. By a 4-to-3 decision on this issue (only one of several in the case), the Court of Claims concluded that, under § 167 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 167, CB&Q was entitled to the depreciation deduction it claimed. This was on the theory that the subsidies qualified as contributions to the railroad’s capital under §§ 362 and 1052 (c) of that Code, 26 U. S. C. §§ 362 and 1052 (c), and under § 113 (a)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court of Claims majority relied on Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U. S. 583 (1950), and reasoned that, even though the governmental payments for the facilities may not have been intended as contributions to the railroad’s capital, the “principal purpose” being, instead, “to benefit the community-at-large,” 197 Ct. Cl., at 276, 455 F. 2d, at 1000, the facilities did in fact enlarge the railroad’s working capital, were used in its business, and produced economic benefits for it, thereby qualifying as contributions to its capital under the cited section of the 1939 Code. The three dissenting judges disagreed with this interpretation of Brown Shoe, and, instead, relied on Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U. S. 98 (1943). They concluded that the critical features were the donor’s attitude, purpose, and intent, and that, with governmental payments, there could be no intention to confer a benefit upon CB&Q. Instead, as the findings revealed, the intention was to expedite traffic flow and to improve public safety at highway-railroad crossings. 197 Ct. Cl., at 315, 320, 455 F. 2d, at 1023, 1026.
Because the Court of Claims decision apparently would afford a precedent for the tax treatment of substantial sums, we granted certiorari. 409 U. S. 947.
I
Section 23 (l) of the 1939 Code and its successor, § 167 (a) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 167 (a), allow a taxpayer “as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear ... of property used in the trade or business.” In the usual situation the taxpayer himself incurs cost in acquiring the assets as to which the depreciation deduction is asserted. But there are other and different situations formally recognized in the governing tax statutes. A familiar example is gift property. Another is property acquired by a corporation from its shareholders as paid-in surplus or as a contribution to capital. Another, and the one that is pertinent here, is covered by § 113 (a)(8) of the 1939 Code and by the contrasting provisions of §§ 362 (a) and (c) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. §§362 (a) and (c). This concerns a contribution to capital by a nonshare-holder. See Treas. Reg. Ill, § 29.113 (a)(8)-l (1943). Under §§ 113 (a)(8) and 114 (a) of the earlier Code, the nonshareholder-contributed asset in the hands of the receiving corporation had the same basis, subject to adjustment, for depreciation purposes as it had in the hands of the transferor; under the 1954 Code, however, its basis for the transferee is zero.
Pertinent to all this is the Court’s decision in Edwards v. Cuba R. Co., 268 U. S. 628 (1925). The Court there held that subsidies granted by the Cuban Government to a railroad to promote construction in Cuba “were not profits or gains from the use or operation of the railroad,” and did not constitute income to the receiving corporation. Id., at 633. The holding in Edwards, taken with § 113 (a)(8) of the 1939 Code, produced a seemingly anomalous result, for it meant that a corporate taxpayer receiving property from a nonshareholder as a contribution to capital not only received the property free from income tax but was allowed to assert a deduction for depreciation on the asset so received tax free. This result also ensued under the Court’s holding in Brown Shoe and led to the enactment of the zero-basis provision, referred to above, in § 362 (c) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 362 (c). Veterans Foundation v. Commissioner, 317 F. 2d 456, 458 (CA10 1963).
CB&Q argues that this very result should follow here. It is said that the railroad received no taxable income and incurred no income tax liability when it received, at governmental expense prior to June 22, 1954, the facilities as to which CB&Q now asserts depreciation. And, in providing the facilities, CB&Q argues, the Government intended to make a contribution to the railroad’s capital, within the meaning of § 113 (a)(8), thereby permitting CB&Q to depreciate the Government’s cost in the assets. Whether the governmental subsidies qualified as income to the railroad is an issue not raised in this case, and we intimate no opinion with respect to it. The United States, however, asserts that the subsidies did not constitute a “contribution to capital” under §113 (a)(8), and that, accordingly, the transferee railroad’s tax basis is zero and no depreciation deduction is available.
Our inquiry, therefore, is a narrow one: whether the nonshareholder payment in this case constituted a “contribution to capital,” within the meaning of § 113 (a) (8). Because both Detroit Edison and Brown Shoe bear upon the issue, we turn to those two decisions.
l — l 1 — 1
Detroit Edison concerned customers’ payments to a utility for the estimated costs of construction of service facilities (primary power lines) that the utility otherwise was not obligated to provide. For its tax years 1936 and 1937, to which the Revenue Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1648, applied, the utility claimed the full cost of the facilities in its base for computing depreciation. The Commissioner disallowed, for depreciation purposes, that portion of the cost paid by customers and not refundable. The Board of Tax Appeals, 45 B. T. A. 358 (1941), and the Court of Appeals, 131 F. 2d 619 (CA6 1942), sustained the Commissioner. This Court affirmed.
Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for a unanimous Court (the Chief Justice not participating), observed, “The end and purpose of it all [depreciation] is to approximate and reflect the financial consequences to the taxpayer of the subtle effects of time and use on the value of his capital assets.” 319 U. S., at 101. The statute, § 113 (a) of the 1936 Act, it was said, “means . . . cost to the taxpayer,” even though the property “may have a cost history quite different from its cost to the taxpayer.” Also, the “taxpayer’s outlay is the measure of his re-coupment through depreciation accruals.” 319 U. S., at 102. The utility’s attempt to avoid this result by its contention that the payments were gifts or contributions to its capital, and entitled to the transferors’ bases, was rejected.
“It is enough to say that it overtaxes imagination to regard the farmers and other customers who furnished these funds as makers either of donations or contributions to the Company. The transaction neither in form nor in substance bore such a semblance.
“The payments were to the customer the price of the service. . . . They have not been taxed as income. . . . But it does not follow that the Company must be permitted to recoup through untaxed depreciation accruals on investment it has refused to make.” Id., at 102-103.
Detroit Edison, by itself, would appear almost to foreclose CB&Q’s claims here, for there is an obvious parallel between the customers’ payment for the utility service facilities in Detroit Edison, and the governmental payments for improvements to the railroad’s service facilities in the case before us.
But Detroit Edison was not the last word. Brown Shoe was decided seven years later, and the opposite tax result was reached by an 8-1 vote of the Court, with Mr. Justice Black in dissent without opinion.
Brown Shoe concerned a corporate taxpayer’s excess profits tax, under the Second Revenue Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 974, as amended, for its fiscal years 1942 and 1943. Community groups paid cash or transferred property to the taxpayer as an inducement for the location or expansion of factory operations in their communities. Contracts were entered into, and in each instance the taxpayer obligated itself to locate or enlarge a facility in the community and to operate it for at least a minimum term. The value of the payments and transfers was the focus of the controversy between the taxpayer and the Commissioner, for depreciation on the transferred assets was claimed and their inclusion in equity invested capital was asserted. The Tax Court overruled the Commissioner’s disallowance with respect to the acquisitions paid for with cash, but sustained the Commissioner with respect to buildings transferred. 10 T. C. 291 (1948). The Court of Appeals upheld the Commissioner on both items. 175 F. 2d 305 (CA8 1949). This Court reversed.
Mr. Justice Clark, writing the opinion for the majority of the Court, concluded that the assets transferred by the community groups to the taxpayer were contributions to capital, within the meaning of § 113 (a)(8) of the 1939 Code. The Court noted that in time they would wear out and, if the taxpayer continued in business, the physical plant eventually would have to be replaced. Detroit Edison was cited and recognized, but was considered not to be controlling. In Brown Shoe there were "neither customers nor payments for service,” and therefore the Court “may infer a different purpose in the transactions between petitioner and the community groups.” 339 U. S., at 591. The only expectation of the groups was that “such contributions might prove advantageous to the community at large.” Thus, it was said, “the transfers manifested a definite purpose to enlarge the working capital of the company.” Ibid.
The Court thus professed to distinguish and not at all to overrule Detroit Edison. It did so on an analysis of the purposes behind the respective transfers in the two cases. Where the facts were such that the trans-ferors could not be regarded as having intended to make contributions to the corporation, as in Detroit Edison, the assets transferred were not depreciable. But where the transfers were made with the purpose, not of receiving direct service or recompense, but only of obtaining advantage for the general community, as in Brown Shoe, the result was a contribution to capital.
Ill
It seems fair to say that neither in Detroit Edison nor in Brown Shoe did the Court focus upon the use to which the assets transferred were applied, or upon the economic and business consequences for the transferee corporation. Instead, the Court stressed the intent or motive of the transferor and determined the tax character of the transaction by that intent or motive. Thus, the decisional distinction between Detroit Edison and Brown Shoe rested upon the nature of the benefit to the transferor, rather than to the transferee, and upon whether that benefit was direct or indirect, specific or general, certain or speculative. These factors, of course, are simply indicia of the transferor’s intent or motive.
That this line of inquiry, and these distinctions, have relatively little to do with the economic and business consequences of the transaction seems self-evident. In both cases the assets transferred were actually used in the transferee's trade or business for the production of income. In neither case did the transferee provide the investment for the assets sought to be depreciated. Yet in both cases, the assets in question were transferred for a consideration pursuant to an agreement. If, at first glance, Detroit Edison and Brown Shoe seem somewhat inconsistent, they may be reconciled, and indeed must be, on the ground that in Detroit Edison the transferor intended no contribution to the transferee’s capital, whereas in Brown Shoe the transferors did have that intent.
The statutory phrase “contribution to capital” is nowhere expressly defined in either the 1939 Code or the 1954 Code, and our prior decisions provide only limited guidance as to its precise meaning. Detroit Edison might be said to be only a holding that a payment for services is not a contribution to capital. Brown Shoe sheds little additional light, for the Court stated only that because the community payments were not compensation for specific services rendered, and did not constitute gifts, they must have been made in order to enlarge the working capital of the company. 339 U. S., at 591.
But other characteristics of a contribution to capital are implicit in the two cases and become apparent when viewed in the light of the facts presently before us. In Brown Shoe, for example, the contributed funds were intended to benefit not only the transferors but the transferee as well, for the assets were put to immediate use by the taxpayer for the generation of additional income. Without benefit to the taxpayer, the agreement certainly would not have been made. Perhaps to some extent this was true in Detroit Edison; that taxpayer, however, was a public utility, and the anticipated revenue from the service lines to the customers would not have warranted the investment by the utility itself. 319 U. S., at 99. Its benefit, therefore, was marginal.
We can distill from these two cases some of the characteristics of a nonshareholder contribution to capital under the Internal Revenue Codes. It certainly must become a permanent part of the transferee’s working capital structure. It may not be compensation, such as a direct payment for a specific, quantifiable service provided for the transferor by the transferee. It must be bargained for. The asset transferred foreseeably must result in benefit to the transferee in an amount commensurate with its value. And the asset ordinarily, if not always, will be employed in or contribute to the production of additional income and its value assured in that respect.
By this measure, the assets with which this case is concerned clearly do not qualify as contributions to capital. Although the assets were not payments for specific, quantifiable services performed by CB&Q for the Government as a customer, other characteristics of the transaction lead us to the conclusion that, despite this, the assets did not qualify as contributions to capital. The facilities were not in any real sense bargained for by CB&Q. Indeed, except for the orders by state commissions and the governmental subsidies, the facilities most likely would not have been constructed at all. See Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Walters, 294 U. S. 405, 421-424 (1935). The transaction in substance was unilateral: CB&Q would accept the facilities if the Government would require their construction and would pay for them. Any incremental economic benefit to CB&Q from the facilities was marginal; its extent and importance were indicated and accounted for by the requirement that the railroad pay not to exceed 10% of the cost in relation to its own benefit. The facilities were peripheral to its business and did not materially contribute to the production of further income by the railroad. They simply replaced existing facilities or provided new, better, and safer ones where none otherwise would have been deemed necessary. As the Court of Claims found, the facilities were constructed “primarily for the benefit of the public to improve safety and to expedite highway traffic flow,” and the need of the railroad for capital funds was not considered, 197 Ct. Cl., at 326. While some incremental benefit from lower accident rates, from reduced expenses of operating crossing facilities, and from possibly higher train speed might have resulted, these were incidental and insubstantial in relation to the value now sought to be depreciated, and they were presumably considered in computing the railroad’s maximum 10% liability under the Act. In our view, no substantial incremental benefit in terms of the production of income was foreseeable or taken into consideration at the time the facilities were transferred. Accordingly, no contribution to capital was effected.
CB&Q nevertheless contends that it is entitled to depreciate the facilities because of its obligation to maintain and replace them. Whatever may be the desirability of creating a depreciation reserve under these circumstances, as a matter of good business and accounting practice, the answer is, as Judge Davis of the Court of Claims observed in dissent, 197 Ct. Cl., at 318, 455 F. 2d, at 1025, “Depreciation reflects the cost of an existing capital asset, not the cost of a potential replacement.” Reisinger v. Commissioner, 144 F. 2d 475, 478 (CA2 1944). See United States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295, 300-301 (1927); Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U. S. 333, 335-336 (1929); Helvering v. Lazarus Co., 308 U. S. 252, 254 (1939); Massey Motors v. United States, 364 U. S. 92 (1960); Fribourg Nav. Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U. S. 272 (1966).
We conclude that the governmental subsidies did not constitute contributions to CB&Q’s capital, within the meaning of §113 (a)(8) of the 1939 Code; that the assets in question in the hands of CB&Q have a zero basis, under §§113 and 114 of that Code and § 1052 (c) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1052 (c); and that CB&Q is therefore precluded from claiming a depreciation allowance with respect to those assets. The judgment of the Court of Claims on this issue is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
National Industrial Recovery Act, §204 (a)(1), 48 Stat. 203.
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944, §5, 58 Stat. 840.
The Court of Claims, both the majority and dissenters, asserted, and indeed found, that the $1,538,543 figure related to highway undercrossings and overcrossings. 197 Ct. Cl. 264, 271-272, 325, 455 F. 2d 993, 997-998 (1972). CB&Q, in its Brief, p. 3, and in oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 25, claims that this figure has to do only with railroad bridges and that the assets sought to be depreciated relate only to railroad use. According to CB&Q, no facilities directly related to highway use are involved. Inasmuch as the resolution of this factual issue would not affect the result we reach, it need not be resolved.
The parties are in agreement as to what the adjusted bases of the assets in question would be, and as to the applicable rates of depreciation, if depreciation for tax purposes is allowable at all.
The Trial Commissioner and the Court of Claims made the following finding of fact:
“9. The facilities noted in finding 7 were constructed primarily for the benefit of the public to improve safety and to expedite highway traffic flow. Plaintiff [CB&Q], however, received benefits from the facilities, among others, probable lower accident rates, reduced expenses of operating crossing facilities, and, where permitted, higher train speed limits, all of which permitted plaintiff to function more efficiently and presumably less expensively.” 197 Ct. CL, at 326-327.
The Solicitor General asserts, Pet. for Cert. 15-16, that $623,000,000 in federal funds were paid out for projects and improvements at railroad-highway grade crossings alone between 1934 and 1954. See U. S. Department of Transportation, Report to Congress: Railroad-Highway Safety, Part I: A Comprehensive Statement of the Problem 38 (1971). The Commissioner of Internal Revenue estimates that, taking into account grants of this kind to railroads and federal grants to utility companies, depreciation on property with asserted cost bases between a half billion and one billion dollars is dependent upon the resolution of this issue and is still litigable. Pet. for Cert. 16.
Section 113 (a) of the 1939 Code and § 1012 of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1012, state the general rule that the “basis of property shall be the cost of such property.”
Section 113 (a)(2) of the 1939 Code provides that with respect to “property . . . acquired by gift after December 31, 1920, the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the donor or the last preceding owner by whom it was not acquired by gift, except . . . .” This provision was carried over into § 1015 (a) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1015 (a). The language of § 362 (c) of the 1954 Code, to the effect that the basis of a nonshareholder’s contribution made on or after June 22, 1954, to the capital of a corporation shall be zero in the hands of the transferee, has been said not to affect the availability of a carryover basis with respect to gifts. See H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Ses’s., A128 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 272 (1954); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders ¶ 3.14, pp. 3-51 and n. 81 (3d ed. 1971); 3A J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation §21.134 (1968 rev.).
Section 113 (a) (8) of the 1939 Code; § 362 (a) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. §362 (a).
Ҥ 113. Adjusted basis for determining gain or loss.
“(a) Basis (unadjusted) of property.
“The basis of property shall be the cost of such propertj''; except that—
“ (8) Property acquired by issuance of stock or as paid-in surplus.
“If the property was acquired after December 31, 1920, by a corporation—
“(A) by the issuance of its stock or securities in connection with a transaction described in section 112 (b) (5) (including, also, cases where part of the consideration for the transfer of such property to the corporation was property or money, in addition to such stock or securities), or
“(B) as paid-in surplus or as a contribution to capital, then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the trans-feror, increased in the amount of gain or decreased in the amount of loss recognized to the transferor upon such transfer under the law applicable to the year in which the transfer was made.”
Ҥ 362. Basis to corporations.
“ (a) Property acquired by issuance of stock or as paid-in surplus.
“If property was acquired on or after June 22, 1954, by a corporation—
“(1) in connection with a transaction to which section 351 (relating to transfer of property to corporation controlled by trans-feror) applies, or
“(2) as paid-in surplus or as a contribution to capital, then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the trans-feror, increased in the amount of gain recognized to the transferor on such transfer.
“(c) Special rule for certain contributions to capital.
“(1) Property other than money.
“Notwithstanding subsection (a)(2), if property other than money—
“(A) is acquired by a corporation, on or after June 22, 1954, as a contribution to capital, and
“(B) is not contributed by a shareholder as such, then the basis of such property shall be zero.
“(2) Money.
“Notwithstanding subsection (a)(2), if money- — ■
“(A) is received by a corporation, on or after June 22, 1954, as a contribution to capital, and
“(B) is not contributed by a shareholder as such, then the basis of any property acquired with such money during the 12-month period beginning on the day the contribution is received shall be reduced by the amount of such contribution.”
See, for example, Teleservice Co. v. Commissioner, 254 F. 2d 105 (CA3 1958), cert, denied, 357 U. S. 919 (1959); United Grocers, Ltd. v. United States, 308 F. 2d 634 (CA9 1962). There is support in the legislative history of § 118 of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 118, providing for the exclusion from gross income of “any contribution to the capital of the taxpayer,” for the indirect benefit — prepayment-for-future-services distinction. H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 17 (1954).
The distinctions wrought by Detroit Edison and Brown Shoe have been the subject of scholarly criticism. See, for example, Note, Taxation of Nonshareholder Contributions to Corporate Capital, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 619 (1969); Landis, Contributions to Capital of Corporations, 24 Tax L. Rev. 241 (1969); Note, Tax Consequences of Non-Shareholder Contributions to Corporate Capital, 66 Yale L. J. 1085 (1957); Freeman & Speiller, Tax Consequences of Subsidies to Induce Business Location, 9 Tax. L. Rev. 255 (1954). In the article last cited the authors suggest that Detroit Edison and Brown Shoe are irreconcilable, the latter in effect overruling the former. Id., at 262. See also The Supreme Court, 1949 Term, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 114, 149-151 (1950).
Counsel for CB&Q stated at oral argument that the railroad was under a “preexisting legal obligation to construct these facilities” that were funded by the governmental subsidies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 30, 35-36.
The Government does not challenge the CB&Q’s right to depreciate those portions of a facility for which it was required to pay.
See n. 5, supra.
The Government has argued, in the alternative, that, by virtue of a “terms letter” agreement entered into by CB&Q and the Commissioner with respect to a change in the railroad's accounting method from retirement to straight-line depreciation, CB&Q irrevocably agreed to exclude donated property, or contributions or grants in aid of construction from any source, from its depreciation base. Because of our conclusion that the governmental payments did not qualify as contributions to capital, we need not determine whether the "terms letter” agreement barred CB&Q from claiming depreciation on the assets in question.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In order to combat child pornography, Ohio enacted Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.323(A)(3) (Supp. 1989), which provides in pertinent part:
“(A) No person shall do any of the following:
“(3) Possess or view any material or performance that shows a minor who is not the person’s child or ward in a state of nudity, unless one of the following applies:
“(a) The material or performance is sold, disseminated, displayed, possessed, controlled, brought or caused to be brought into this state, or presented for a bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other proper purpose, by or to a physician, psychologist, sociologist, scientist, teacher, person pursuing bona fide studies or research, librarian, clergyman, prosecutor, judge, or other person having a proper interest in the material or performance.
“(b) The person knows that the parents, guardian, or custodian has consented in writing to the photographing or use of the minor in a state of nudity and to the manner in which the material or performance is used or transferred.”
Petitioner, Clyde Osborne, was convicted of violating this statute and sentenced to six months in prison, after the Columbus, Ohio, police, pursuant to a valid search, found four photographs in Osborne’s home. Each photograph depicts a nude male adolescent posed in a sexually explicit position.
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Osborne’s conviction, after an intermediate appellate court did the same. State v. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 525 N. E. 2d 1363 (1988). Relying on one of its earlier decisions, the court first rejected Osborne’s contention that the First Amendment prohibits the States from proscribing the private possession of child pornography.
Next, the court found that § 2907.323(A)(3) is not unconstitutionally overbroad. In so doing, the court, relying on the statutory exceptions, read § 2907.323(A)(3) as only applying to depictions of nudity involving a lewd exhibition or graphic focus on a minor’s genitals. The court also found that scienter is an essential element of a §2907.323(A)(3) offense. Osborne objected that the trial judge had not insisted that the government prove lewd exhibition and scienter as elements of his crime. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected these contentions because Osborne had failed to object to the jury instructions given at his trial and the court did not believe that the failures of proof amounted to plain error.
The Ohio Supreme Court denied a motion for rehearing, and granted a stay pending appeal to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction last June. 492 U. S. 904.
I
The threshold question in this case is whether Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography or whether, as Osborne argues, our decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), compels the contrary result. In Stanley, we struck down a Georgia law outlawing the private possession of obscene material. We recognized that the statute impinged upon Stanley’s right to receive information in the privacy of his home, and we found Georgia’s justifications for its law inadequate. Id., at 564-568.
Stanley should not be read too broadly. We have previously noted that Stanley was a narrow holding, see United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U. S. 123, 127 (1973), and, since the decision in that case, the value of permitting child pornography has been characterized as “exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 762 (1982). But assuming, for the sake of argument, that Osborne has a First Amendment interest in viewing and possessing child pornography, we nonetheless find this case distinct from Stanley because the interests underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley. Every court to address the issue has so concluded. See, e. g., People v. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d 313, 327-328, 522 N. E. 2d 1200, 1206-1207 (1988); Felton v. State, 526 So. 2d 635, 637 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App.), aff’d sub nom. Ex parte Felton, 526 So. 2d 638, 641 (Ala. 1988); State v. Davis, 53 Wash. App. 502, 505, 768 P. 2d 499, 501 (1989); Savery v. State, 767 S. W. 2d 242, 245 (Tex. App. 1989); United States v. Boffardi, 684 F. Supp. 1263, 1267 (SDNY 1988).
In Stanley, Georgia primarily sought to proscribe the private possession of obscenity because it was concerned that obscenity would poison the minds of its viewers. 394 U. S., at 565. We responded that “[wjhatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.” Id., at 566. The difference here is obvious: The State does not rely on a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne’s mind. Rather, Ohio has enacted §2907.323(A)(3) in order to protect the victims of child pornography; it hopes to destroy a market for the exploitative use of children.
“It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’... The legislative judgment, as well as the judgment found in relevant literature, is that the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child. That judgment, we think, easily passes muster under the First Amendment.” Ferber, 458 U. S., at 756-758 (citations omitted). It is also surely reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess and view the product, thereby decreasing demand. In Ferber, where we upheld a New York statute outlawing the distribution of child pornography, we found a similar argument persuasive: “The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation. Tt rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.’” Id., at 761-762, quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 498 (1949).
Osborne contends that the State should use other measures, besides penalizing possession, to dry up the child pornography market. Osborne points out that in Stanley we rejected Georgia’s argument that its prohibition on obscenity possession was a necessary incident to its proscription on obscenity distribution. 394 U. S., at 567-568. This holding, however, must be viewed in light of the weak interests asserted by the State in that case. Stanley itself emphasized that we did not “mean to express any opinion on statutes making criminal possession of other types of printed, filmed, or recorded materials.... In such cases, compelling reasons may exist for overriding the right of the individual to possess those materials.” Id., at 568, n. 11.
Given the importance of the State’s interest in protecting the victims of child pornography, we cannot fault -Ohio for attempting to stamp out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain. According to the State, since the time of our decision in Ferber, much of the child pornography market has been driven underground; as a result, it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child pornography problem by only attacking production and distribution. Indeed, 19 States have found it necessary to proscribe the possession of this material.
Other interests also support the Ohio law. First, as Ferber recognized, the materials produced by child pornographers permanently record the victim’s abuse. The pornography’s continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come. 458 U. S., at 759. The State’s ban on possession and viewing encourages the possessors of these materials to destroy them. Second, encouraging the destruction of these materials is also desirable because evidence suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity.
Given the gravity of the State’s interests in this context, we find that Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography.
II
Osborne next argues that even if the State may constitutionally ban the possession of child pornography, his conviction is invalid because §2907.323(A)(3) is unconstitutionally overbroad in that it criminalizes an intolerable range of constitutionally protected conduct. In our previous decisions discussing the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, we have repeatedly emphasized that where a statute regulates expressive conduct, the scope of the statute does not render it unconstitutional unless its overbreadth is not only “real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. ” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 615 (1973). Even where a statute at its margins infringes on protected expression, “facial invalidation is inappropriate if the ‘remainder of the statute... covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable... conduct....’” New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S., at 770, n. 25.
The Ohio statute, on its face, purports to prohibit the possession of “nude” photographs of minors. We have stated that depictions of nudity, without more, constitute protected expression. See Ferber, supra, at 765, n. 18. Relying on this observation, Osborne argues that the statute as written is substantially overbroad. We are skeptical of this claim because, in light of the statute’s exemptions and “proper purposes” provisions, the statute may not be substantially overbroad under our cases. However that may be, Osborne’s overbreadth challenge, in any event, fails because the statute, as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court on Osborne’s direct appeal, plainly survives overbreadth scrutiny. Under the Ohio Supreme Court reading, the statute prohibits “the possession or viewing of material or performance of a minor who is in a state of nudity, where such nudity constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the genitals, and where the person depicted is neither the child nor the ward of the person charged.” 37 Ohio St. 3d, at 252, 525 N. E. 2d, at 1368. By limiting the statute’s operation in this manner, the Ohio Supreme Court avoided penalizing persons for viewing or possessing innocuous photographs of naked children. We have upheld similar language against overbreadth challenges in the past. In Ferber, we affirmed a conviction under a New York statute that made it a crime to promote the “ ‘lewd exhibition of [a child’s] genitals.’ ” 458 U. S., at 751. We noted that “[t]he term ‘lewd exhibition of the genitals’ is not unknown in this area and, indeed, was given in Miller [v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973),] as an example of a permissible regulation.” Id., at 765.
The Ohio Supreme Court also concluded that the State had to establish scienter in order to prove a violation of § 2907.323 (A)(3) based on the Ohio default statute specifying that recklessness applies when another statutory provision lacks an intent specification. See n. 9, supra. The statute on its face lacks a mens rea requirement, but that omission brings into play and is cured by another law that plainly satisfies the requirement laid down in Ferber that prohibitions on child pornography include some element of scienter. 458 U. S., at 765.
Osborne contends that it was impermissible for the Ohio Supreme Court to apply its construction of §2907.323(A)(3) to him — i. e., to rely on the narrowed construction of the statute when evaluating his overbreadth claim. Our cases, however, have long held that a statute as construed “may be applied to conduct occurring prior to the construction, provided such application affords fair warning to the defendant.” Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 491, n. 7 (1965) (citations omitted). In Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974), for example, we reviewed the petitioners’ convictions for mailing and conspiring to mail an obscene advertising brochure under 18 U. S. C. § 1461. That statute makes it a crime to mail an “obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance.” In Hamling, for the first time, we construed the term “obscenity” as used in § 1461 “to be limited to the sort of ‘patently offensive representations or depictions of that specific “hard core” sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. California.’” In light of this construction, we rejected the petitioners’ facial challenge to the statute as written, and we affirmed the petitioners’ convictions under the section after finding that the petitioners had fair notice that their conduct was criminal. 418 U. S., at 114-116.
Like the Hamling petitioners, Osborne had notice that his conduct was proscribed. It is obvious from the face of §2907.323(A) (3) that the goal of the statute is to eradicate child pornography. The provision criminalizes the viewing and possessing of material depicting children in a state of nudity for other than “proper purposes.” The provision appears in the “Sex Offenses” chapter of the Ohio Code. Section 2907.323 is preceded by §2907.322, which proscribes “[p]andering sexually oriented matter involving a minor,” and followed by §2907.33, which proscribes “[deception to obtain matter harmful to juveniles.” That Osborne’s photographs of adolescent boys in sexually explicit situations constitute child pornography hardly needs elaboration. Therefore, although § 2907.323(A)(3) as written may have been imprecise at its fringes, someone in Osborne’s position would not be surprised to learn that his possession of the four photographs at issue in this case constituted a crime.
Because Osborne had notice that his conduct was criminal, his case differs from three cases upon which he relies: Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 (1964), Rabe v. Washing ton, 405 U. S. 313 (1972), and Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188 (1977). In Bouie, the petitioners had refused to leave a restaurant after being asked to do so by the restaurant’s manager. Although the manager had not objected when the petitioners entered the restaurant, the petitioners were convicted of violating a South Carolina trespass statute proscribing “ ‘entry upon the lands of another... after notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry.’” 378 U. S., at 349. Affirming the convictions, the South Carolina Supreme Court construed the trespass law as also making it a crime for an individual to remain on another’s land after being asked to leave. We reversed the convictions on due process grounds because the South Carolina Supreme Court’s expansion of the statute was unforseeable and therefore the petitioners had no reason to suspect that their conduct was criminal. Id., at 350-352.
Likewise, in Rabe v. Washington, supra, the petitioner had been convicted of violating a Washington obscenity statute that, by its terms, did not proscribe the defendant’s conduct. On the petitioner’s appeal, the Washington Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the petitioner’s conviction, after construing the Washington obscenity statute to reach the petitioner. We overturned the conviction because the Washington Supreme Court’s broadening of the statute was unexpected; therefore the petitioner had no warning that his actions were proscribed. Id., at 315.
And, in Marks v. United States, supra, we held that the retroactive application of the obscenity standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), to the potential detriment of the defendant violated the Due Process Clause because, at the time that the defendant committed the challenged conduct, our decision in Memoirs v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413 (1966), provided the governing law. The defendant could not suspect that his actions would later become criminal when we expanded the range of constitutionally proscribable conduct in Miller.
Osborne suggests that our decision here is inconsistent with Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87 (1965). We disagree. In Shuttlesworth, the defendant had been convicted of violating an Alabama ordinance that, when read literally, provided that “a person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police officer of that city.” Id., at 90. We stated that “[t]he constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration.” Ibid. As subsequently construed by the Alabama Supreme Court, however, the ordinance merely made it criminal for an individual who was blocking free passage along a public street to disobey a police officer's order to move. We noted that “[i]t is our duty, of course, to accept this state judicial construction of the ordinance.... As so construed, we cannot say that the ordinance is unconstitutional, though it requires no great feat of imagination to envisage situations in which such an ordinance might be unconstitutionally applied.” Id., at 91. We nevertheless reversed the defendant’s conviction because it was not clear that the State had convicted the defendant under the ordinance as construed rather than as written. Id., at 91-92. Shuttlesworth, then, stands for the proposition that where a State Supreme Court narrows an unconstitutionally overbroad statute, the State must ensure that defendants are convicted under the statute as it is subsequently construed and not as it was originally written; this proposition in no way conflicts with our holding in this case.
Finally, despite Osborne’s contention to the contrary, we do not believe that Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U. S. 576 (1989), supports his theory of this case. In Oakes, the petitioner challenged a Massachusetts pornography statute as overbroad; since the time of the defendant’s alleged crime, however, the State had substantially narrowed the statute through a subsequent legislative enactment — an amendment to the statute. In a separate opinion, five Justices agreed that the state legislature could not cure the potential over-breadth problem through the subsequent legislative action; the statute was void as written. Id., at 585-586.
Osborne contends that Oakes stands for a similar but distinct proposition that, when faced with a potentially overinclusive statute, a court may not construe the statute to avoid overbreadth problems and then apply the statute, as construed, to past conduct. The implication of this argument is that if a statute is overbroad as written, then the statute is void and incurable. As a result, when reviewing a conviction under a potentially overbroad statute, a court must either affirm or strike down the statute on its face, but the court may not, as the Ohio Supreme Court did in this case, narrow the statute, affirm on the basis of the narrowing construction, and leave the statute in full force. We disagree.
First, as indicated by our earlier discussion, if we accepted this proposition, it would require a radical reworking of our law. Courts routinely construe statutes so as to avoid the statutes’ potentially overbroad reach, apply the statute in that case, and leave the statute in place. In Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957), for example, the Court construed the open-ended terms used in 18 U. S. C. § 1461, which prohibits the mailing of material that is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile.” Justice Harlan characterized Roth in this way:
“The words of §1461, ‘obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile,’ connote something that is portrayed in a manner so offensive as to make it unacceptable under current community mores. While in common usage the words have different shades of meaning, the statute since its inception has always been taken as aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of sex. Although the statute condemns such material irrespective of the effect it may have upon those into whose hands it falls, the early case of United States v. Bennet, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093 (No. 14571), put a limiting gloss upon the statutory language: the statute reaches only indecent material which, as now expressed in Roth v. United States, supra, at 489, ‘taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.’” Manuel Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U. S. 478, 482-484 (1962) (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).
See also, Hamling, 418 U. S., at 112 (quoting the above). The petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in Roth, and federal obscenity law was left in force. 354 U. S., at 494. We, moreover, have long respected the State Supreme Courts’ ability to narrow state statutes so as to limit the statute’s, scope to unprotected conduct. See, e. g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968).
Second, we do not believe that Oakes compels the proposition that Osborne urges us to accept. In Oakes, Justice Scalia, writing for himself and four others, reasoned:
“The overbreadth doctrine serves to protect constitutionally legitimate speech not merely ex post, that is, after the offending statute is enacted, but also ex ante, that is, when the legislature is contemplating what sort of statute to enact. If the promulgation of overbroad laws affecting speech was cost free... that is, if no conviction of constitutionally proscribable conduct would be lost, so long as the offending statute was narrowed before the final appeal... then legislatures would have significantly reduced incentive to stay within constitutional bounds in the first place. When one takes ac-' count of those overbroad statutes that are never challenged, and of the time that elapses before the ones that are challenged are amended to come within constitutional bounds, a substantial amount of legitimate speech would be ‘chilled’....” 491 U. S., at 586 (emphasis in original).
In other words, five of the Oakes Justices feared that if we allowed a legislature to correct its mistakes without paying for them (beyond the inconvenience of passing a new law), we would decrease the legislature’s incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first place.
Legislators who know they can cure their own mistakes by amendment without significant cost may not be as careful to avoid drafting overbroad statutes as they might otherwise be. But a similar effect will not be likely if a judicial construction of a statute to eliminate overbreadth is allowed to be applied in the case before the court. This is so primarily because the legislatures cannot be sure that the statute, when examined by a court, will be saved by a narrowing construction rather than invalidated for overbreadth. In the latter event, there could be no convictions under that law even of those whose own conduct is unprotected by the First Amendment. Even if construed to obviate overbreadth, applying the statute to pending cases might be barred by the Due Process Clause. Thus, careless drafting cannot be considered to be cost free based on the power of the courts to eliminate overbreadth by statutory construction.
There are also other considerations. Osborne contends that when courts construe statutes so as to eliminate over-breadth, convictions of those found guilty of unprotected conduct covered by the statute must be reversed and any further convictions for prior reprehensible conduct are barred. Furthermore, because he contends that overbroad laws implicating First Amendment interests are nullities and incapable of valid application from the outset, this would mean that judicial construction could not save the statute even as applied to subsequent conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. The overbreadth doctrine, as we have recognized, is indeed “strong medicine,” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S., at 613, and requiring that statutes be facially invalidated whenever overbreadth is perceived would very likely invite reconsideration or redefinition of the doctrine in a way that would not serve First Amendment interests.
III
Having rejected Osborne’s Stanley and overbreadth arguments, we now reach Osborne’s final objection to his conviction: his contention that he was denied due process because it is unclear that his conviction was based on a finding that each of the elements of § 2907.323(A)(3) was present. According to the Ohio Supreme Court, in order to secure a conviction under § 2907.323(A)(3), the State must prove both scienter and that the defendant possessed material depicting a lewd exhibition or a graphic focus on genitals. The jury in this case was not instructed that it could convict Osborne only for conduct that satisfied these requirements.
The State concedes the omissions in the jury instructions, but argues that Osborne waived his right to assert this due process challenge because he failed to object when the instructions were given at his trial. The Ohio Supreme Court so held, citing Ohio law. The question before us now, therefore, is whether we are precluded from reaching Osborne’s due process challenge because counsel’s failure to comply with the procedural rule constitutes an independent state-law ground adequate to support the result below. We have no difficulty agreeing with the State that Osborne’s counsel’s failure to urge that the court instruct the jury on scienter constitutes an independent and adequate state-law ground preventing us from reaching Osborne’s due process contention on that point. Ohio law states that proof of scienter is required in instances, like the present one, where a criminal statute does not specify the applicable mental state. See n. 9, supra. The state procedural rule, moreover, serves the State’s important interest in ensuring that counsel do their part in preventing trial courts from providing juries with erroneous instructions.
With respect to the trial court’s failure to instruct on lewdness, however, we reach a different conclusion: Based upon our review of the record, we believe that counsel’s failure to object on this point does not prevent us from considering Osborne’s constitutional claim. Osborne’s trial was brief: The State called only the two arresting officers to the stand; the defense summoned only Osborne himself. Right before trial, Osborne’s counsel moved to dismiss the case, contending that § 2907.323(A)(3) is unconstitutionally overbroad. Counsel stated:
“I’m filing a motion to dismiss based on the fact that [the] statute is void for vagueness, overbroad... The statute’s overbroad because... a person couldn’t have pictures of his own grandchildren; probably couldn’t even have nude photographs of himself.
“Judge, if you had some nude photos of yourself when you were a child, you would probably be violating the law....
“So grandparents, neighbors, or other people who happen to view the photograph are criminally liable under the statute. And on that basis I’m going to ask the Court to dismiss the case.” Tr. 3-4.
The prosecutor informed the trial judge that a number of Ohio state courts had recently rejected identical motions challenging § 2907.323(A)(3). Tr. 5-6. The court then overruled the motion. Id., at 7. Immediately thereafter, Osborne’s counsel proposed various jury instructions. Ibid.
Given this sequence of events, we believe that we may reach Osborne’s due process claim because we are convinced that Osborne’s attorney pressed the issue of the State’s failure of proof on lewdness before the trial court and, under the circumstances, nothing would be gained by requiring Osborne’s lawyer to object a second time, specifically to the jury instructions. The trial judge, in no uncertain terms, rejected counsel’s argument that the statute as written was overbroad. The State contends that counsel should then have insisted that the court instruct the jury on lewdness because, absent a finding that this element existed, a conviction would be unconstitutional. Were we to accept this position, we would “Torce resort to an arid ritual of meaningless form,’... and would further no perceivable state interest.” James v. Kentucky, 466 U. S. 341, 349 (1984), quoting Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 320 (1958), and citing Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 448-449 (1965). As Justice Holmes warned us years ago, “[w]hatever springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.” Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 22, 24 (1923).
Our decision here is analogous to our decision in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965). In that case, the Alabama Supreme Court had held that a defendant had waived his Confrontation Clause objection to the reading into evidence of a confession that he had given. Although not following the precise procedure required by Alabama law, the defendant had unsuccessfully objected to the prosecution’s use of the confession. We followed “our consistent holdings that the adequacy of state procedural bars to the assertion of federal questions is itself a federal question” and stated that “[i]n determining the sufficiency of objections we have applied the general principle that an objection which is ample and timely to bring the alleged federal error to the attention of the trial court and enable it to take appropriate corrective action is sufficient to serve legitimate state interests, and therefore sufficient to preserve the claim for review here.” Id., at 422. Concluding that “[n]o legitimate state interest would have been served by requiring repetition of a patently futile objection,” we held that the Alabama procedural ruling did not preclude our consideration of the defendant’s constitutional claim. Id., at 421-422. We reach a similar conclusion in this case.
IV
To conclude, although we find Osborne’s First Amendment arguments unpersuasive, we reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial in order to ensure that Osborne’s conviction stemmed from a finding that the State had proved each of the elements of § 2907.323(A)(3).
So ordered.
Osborne contends that the subject in all of the pictures is the same boy; Osborne testified at trial that he was told that the youth was 14 at the time that the photographs were taken. App. 16. The government maintains that three of the pictures are of one boy and one of the pictures is of another. Three photographs depict the same boy in different positions: sitting with his legs over his head and his anus exposed; lying down with an erect penis and with an electrical object in his hand; and lying down with a plastic object which appears to be inserted in his anus. The fourth photograph depicts a nude standing boy; it is unclear whether this subject is the same boy photographed in the other pictures because the photograph only depicts the boy’s torso.
Osborne also unsuccessfully raised a number of other challenges that are not at issue before this Court.
We have since indicated that our decision in Stanley was “firmly grounded in the First Amendment.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186, 195 (1986).
Georgia also argued that its ban on possession was a necessary complement to its ban on distribution (see discussion infra, at 110) and that the possession law benefited the public because, according to the State, exposure to obscene material might lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence. 394 U. S., at 566. We found a lack of empirical evidence supporting the latter claim and stated that “ ‘[a]mong free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law....”’ Id., at 566-567 (citation omitted).
As the dissent notes, see post, at 141, n. 16, the Stanley Court cited illicit possession of defense information as an example of the type of offense for which compelling state interests might justify a ban on possession. Stanley, however, did not suggest that this crime exhausted the entire category of proscribable offenses.
Ala. Code § 13A-12-192 (1988); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3553 (1989); Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-6-403 (Supp. 1989); Fla. Stat. §827.071 (1989); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-100 (1989); Idaho Code § 18-1507 (1987); 111. Rev. Stat., eh. 38, ¶ 11-20- 1 (1987); Kans. Stat. Ann. §21-3516 (Supp. 1989); Minn. Stat. §617.247 (1988); Mo. Rev. Stat. §573.037 (Supp. 1989); Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-809 (1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. §200.730 (1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§2907.322 and 2907.323 (Supp. 1989); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §1021.2 (Supp. 1989); S. D. Codified Laws Ann. §§22-22-23, 22-22-23.1 (1988); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.26 (1989 and Supp. 1989-1990); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-3(l)(a) (Supp. 1989); Wash. Rev. Code §9.68A.070 (1989); W. Va. Code § 61-8C-3 (1989).
The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, for example, states: “Child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing child victims. A child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult or to pose for sexually explicit photos can sometimes be convinced by viewing other children having ‘fun’ participating in the activity.” 1 Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, Final Report 649 (1986) (footnotes omitted). See also, D. Campagna and D. Poffenberger, Sexual Trafficking in Children 118 (1988); S. O’Brien, Child Pornography 89 (1983).
In the First Amendment context, we permit defendants to challenge statutes on overbreadth grounds, regardless of whether the individual defendant’s conduct is constitutionally protected. “The First Amendment doctrine of substantial overbreadth
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue for decision involves several aspects of when a federal court may refuse to enforce an arbitration award rendered under a collective-bargaining agreement.
I
Misco, Inc. (Misco, or the Company), operates a paper converting plant in Monroe, Louisiana. The Company is a party to a collective-bargaining agreement with the United Paper-workers International Union, AFL-CIO, and its union local (the Union); the agreement covers the production and maintenance employees at the plant. Under the agreement, the Company or the Union may submit to arbitration any grievance that arises from the interpretation or application of its terms, and the arbitrator’s decision is final and binding upon the parties. The arbitrator’s authority is limited to interpretation and application of the terms contained in the agreement itself. The agreement reserves to management the right to establish, amend, and enforce “rules and regulations regulating the discipline or discharge of employees” and the procedures for imposing discipline. Such rules were to be posted and were to be in effect “until ruled on by grievance and arbitration procedures as to fairness and necessity.” For about a decade, the Company’s rules had listed as causes for discharge the bringing of intoxicants, narcotics, or controlled substances on to plant property or consuming any of them there, as well as reporting for work under the influence of such substances. At the time of the events involved in this case, the Company was very concerned about the use of drugs at the plant, especially among employees on the night shift.
Isiah Cooper, who worked on the night shift for Misco, was one of the employees covered by the collective-bargaining agreement. He operated a slitter-rewinder machine, which uses sharp blades to cut rolling coils of paper. The arbitrator found that this machine is hazardous and had caused numerous injuries in recent years. Cooper had been reprimanded twice in a few months for deficient performance. On January 21,1983, one day after the second reprimand, the police searched Cooper’s house pursuant to a warrant, and a substantial amount of marijuana was found. Contemporaneously, a police officer was detailed to keep Cooper’s car under observation at the Company’s parking lot. At about 6:30 p.m., Cooper was seen walking in the parking lot during work hours with two other men. The three men entered Cooper’s car momentarily, then walked to another car, a white Cutlass, and entered it. After the other two men later returned to the plant, Cooper was apprehended by police in the backseat of this car with marijuana smoke in the air and a lighted marijuana cigarette in the frontseat ashtray. The police also searched Cooper’s car and found a plastic scales case and marijuana gleanings. Cooper was arrested and charged with marijuana possession.
On January 24, Cooper told the Company that he had been arrested for possession of marijuana at his home; the Company did not learn of the marijuana cigarette in the white Cutlass until January 27. It then investigated and on February 7 discharged Cooper, asserting that in the circumstances, his presence in the Cutlass violated the rule against having drugs on the plant premises. Cooper filed a grievance protesting his discharge the same day, and the matter proceeded to arbitration. The Company was not aware until September 21, five days before the arbitration hearing was scheduled, that marijuana had been found in Cooper’s car. That fact did not become known to the Union until the hearing began. At the hearing it was stipulated that the issue was whether the Company had “just cause to discharge the Grievant under Rule II. 1” and, “[i]f not, what if any should be the remedy.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a.
The arbitrator upheld the grievance and ordered the Company to reinstate Cooper with backpay and full seniority. The arbitrator based his finding that there was not just cause for the discharge on his consideration of seven criteria. In particular, the arbitrator found that the Company failed to prove that the employee had possessed or used marijuana on company property: finding Cooper in the backseat of a car and a burning cigarette in the frontseat ashtray was insufficient proof that Cooper was using or possessed marijuana on company property. Id., at 49a-50a. The arbitrator refused to accept into evidence the fact that marijuana had been found in Cooper’s car on company premises because the Company did not know of this fact when Cooper was discharged and therefore did not rely on it as a basis for the discharge.
The Company filed suit in District Court, seeking to vacate the arbitration award on several grounds, one of which was that ordering reinstatement of Cooper, who had allegedly possessed marijuana on the plant premises, was contrary to public policy. The District Court agreed that the award must be set aside as contrary to public policy because it ran counter to general safety concerns that arise from the operation of dangerous machinery while under the influence of drugs, as well as to state criminal laws against drug possession. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting. The court ruled that reinstatement would violate the public policy “against the operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol.” 768 F. 2d 739, 743 (CA5 1985). The arbitrator had found that Cooper was apprehended on company premises in an atmosphere of marijuana smoke in another’s car and that marijuana was found in his own car on the company lot. These facts established that Cooper had violated the Company’s rules and gave the Company just cause to discharge him. The arbitrator did not reach this conclusion because of a “narrow focus on Cooper’s procedural rights” that led him to ignore what he “knew was in fact true: that Cooper did bring marijuana onto his employer’s premises. ” Ibid. Even if the arbitrator had not known of this fact at the time he entered his award, “it is doubtful that the award should be enforced today in light of what is now known.” Ibid.
Because the Courts of Appeals are divided on the question of when courts may set aside arbitration awards as contravening public policy, we granted the Union’s petition for a writ of certiorari, 479 U. S. 1029 (1987), and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
The Union asserts that an arbitral award may not be set aside on public policy grounds unless the award orders conduct that violates the positive law, which is not the case here. But in the alternative, it submits that even if it is wrong in this regard, the Court of Appeals otherwise exceeded the limited authority that it had to review an arbitrator’s award entered pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement. Respondent, on the other hand, defends the public policy decision of the Court of Appeals but alternatively argues that the judgment below should be affirmed because of erroneous findings by the arbitrator. We deal first with the opposing alternative arguments.
A
Collective-bargaining agreements commonly provide grievance procedures to settle disputes between union and employer with respect to the interpretation and application of the agreement and require binding arbitration for unsettled grievances. In such cases, and this is such a case, the Court made clear almost 30 years ago that the courts play only a limited role when asked to review the decision of an arbitrator. The courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract. “The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards.” Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593, 596 (1960). As long as the arbitrator’s award “draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement,” and is not merely “his own brand of industrial justice,” the award is legitimate. Id., at 597.
“The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving party should not be deprived of the arbitrator’s judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it connotes that was bargained for.
“The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim.” Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564, 567-568 (1960) (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
See also AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649-650 (1986).
The reasons for insulating arbitral decisions from judicial review are grounded in the federal statutes regulating labor-management relations. These statutes reflect a decided preference for private settlement of labor disputes without the intervention of government: The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 154, 29 U. S. C. § 173(d), provides that “[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.” See also AT&T Technologies, supra, at 650. The courts have jurisdiction to enforce collective-bargaining contracts; but where the contract provides grievance and arbitration procedures, those procedures must first be exhausted and courts must order resort to the private settlement mechanisms without dealing with the merits of the dispute. Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator’s view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract that they have agreed to accept. Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts. To resolve disputes about the application of a collective-bargaining agreement, an arbitrator must find facts and a court may not reject those findings simply because it disagrees with them. The same is true of the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract. The arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract; but the parties having authorized the arbitrator to give meaning to the language of the agreement, a court should not reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract. Enterprise Wheel, supra, at 599. So, too, where it is contemplated that the arbitrator will determine remedies for contract violations that he finds, courts have no authority to disagree with his honest judgment in that respect. If the courts were free to intervene on these grounds, the speedy resolution of grievances by private mechanisms would be greatly undermined. Furthermore, it must be remembered that grievance and arbitration procedures are part and parcel of the ongoing process of collective bargaining. It is through these processes that the supplementary rules of the plant are established. As the Court has said, the arbitrator’s award settling a dispute with respect to the interpretation or application of a labor agreement must draw its essence from the contract and cannot simply reflect the arbitrator’s own notions of industrial justice. But as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision. Of course, decisions procured by the parties through fraud or through the arbitrator’s dishonesty need not be enforced. But there is nothing of that sort involved in this case.
B
The Company’s position, simply put, is that the arbitrator committed grievous error in finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Cooper had possessed or used marijuana on company property. But the Court of Appeals, although it took a distinctly jaundiced view of the arbitrator’s decision in this regard, was not free to refuse enforcement because it considered Cooper’s presence in the white Cutlass, in the circumstances, to be ample proof that Rule II. 1 was violated. No dishonesty is alleged; only improvident, even silly, factfinding is claimed. This is hardly a sufficient basis for disregarding what the agent appointed by the parties determined to be the historical facts.
Nor was it open to the Court of Appeals to refuse to enforce the award because the arbitrator, in deciding whether there was just cause to discharge, refused to consider evidence unknown to the Company at the time Cooper was fired. The parties bargained for arbitration to settle disputes and were free to set the procedural rules for arbitrators to follow if they chose. Article VI of the agreement, entitled “Arbitration Procedure,” did set some ground rules for the arbitration process. It forbade the arbitrator to consider hearsay evidence, for example, but evidentiary matters were otherwise left to the arbitrator. App. 19. Here the arbitrator ruled that in determining whether Cooper had violated Rule II. 1, he should not consider evidence not relied on by the employer in ordering the discharge, particularly in a case like this where there was no notice to the employee or the Union prior to the hearing that the Company would attempt to rely on after-discovered evidence. This, in effect, was a construction of what the contract required when deciding discharge cases: an arbitrator was to look only at the evidence before the employer at the time of discharge. As the arbitrator noted, this approach was consistent with the practice followed by other arbitrators. And it was consistent with our observation in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S 543, 557 (1964), that when the subject matter of a dispute is arbitrable, “procedural” questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are to be left to the arbitrator.
Under the Arbitration Act, the federal courts are empowered to set aside arbitration awards on such grounds only when “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct... in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy.” 9 U. S. C. § 10(c). See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U. S. 145 (1968). If we apply that same standard here and assume that the arbitrator erred in refusing to consider the disputed evidence, his error was not in bad faith or so gross as to amount to affirmative misconduct. Finally, it is worth noting that putting aside the evidence about the marijuana found in Cooper’s car during this arbitration did not forever foreclose the Company from using that evidence as the basis for a discharge.
Even if it were open to the Court of Appeals to have found a violation of Rule II. 1 because of the marijuana found in Cooper’s car, the question remains whether the court could properly set aside the award because in its view discharge was the correct remedy. Normally, an arbitrator is authorized to disagree with the sanction imposed for employee misconduct. In Enterprise Wheel, for example, the arbitrator reduced the discipline from discharge to a 10-day suspension. The Court of Appeals refused to enforce the award, but we reversed, explaining that though the arbitrator’s decision must draw its essence from the agreement, he “is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies.” 363 U. S., at 597 (emphasis added). The parties, of course, may limit the discretion of the arbitrator in this respect; and it may be, as the Company argues, that under the contract involved here, it was within the unreviewable discretion of management to discharge an employee once a violation of Rule II. 1 was found. But the parties stipulated that the issue before the arbitrator was whether there was “just” cause for the discharge, and the arbitrator, in the course of his opinion, cryptically observed that Rule II. 1 merely listed causes for discharge and did not expressly provide for immediate discharge. Before disposing of the case on the ground that Rule II. 1 had been violated and discharge was therefore proper, the proper course would have been remand to the arbitrator for a definitive construction of the contract in this respect.
C
The Court of Appeals did not purport to take this course in any event. Rather, it held that the evidence of marijuana in Cooper’s car required that the award be set aside because to reinstate a person who had brought drugs onto the property was contrary to the public policy “against the operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol.” 768 F. 2d, at 743. We cannot affirm that judgment.
A court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s award under a collective-bargaining agreement because it is contrary to public policy is a specific application of the more general doctrine, rooted in the common law, that a court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate law or public policy. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U. S. 757, 766 (1983); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 34-35 (1948). That doctrine derives from the basic notion that no court will lend its aid to one who founds a cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act, and is further justified by the observation that the public’s interests in confining the scope of private agreements to which it is not a party will go unrepresented unless the judiciary takes account of those interests when it considers whether to enforce such agreements. E. g., McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 639, 654-655 (1899); Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U. S. 353, 356-358 (1931). In the common law of contracts, this doctrine has served as the foundation for occasional exercises of judicial power to abrogate private agreements.
In W. R. Grace, we recognized that “a court may not enforce a collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy,” and stated that “the question of public policy is ultimately one for resolution by the courts.” 461 U. S., at 766. We cautioned, however, that a court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s interpretation of such contracts is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate “some explicit public policy” that is “well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.’” Ibid, (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U. S. 49, 66 (1945)). In W. R. Grace, we identified two important public policies that were potentially jeopardized by the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract: obedience to judicial orders and voluntary compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We went on to hold that enforcement of the arbitration award in that case did not compromise either of the two public policies allegedly threatened by the award. Two points follow from our decision in W. R. Grace. First, a court may refuse to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement when the specific terms contained in that agreement violate public policy. Second, it is apparent that our decision in that case does not otherwise sanction a broad judicial power to set aside arbitration awards as against public policy. Although we discussed the effect of that award on two broad areas of public policy, our decision turned on our examination of whether the award created any explicit conflict with other “laws and legal precedents” rather than an assessment of “general considerations of supposed public interests.” 461 U. S., at 766. At the very least, an alleged public policy must be properly framed under the approach set out in W. R. Grace, and the violation of such a policy must be clearly shown if an award is not to be enforced.
As we see it, the formulation of public policy set out by the Court of Appeals did not comply with the statement that such a policy must be “ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.’” Ibid, (quoting Muschany v. United States, supra, at 66). The Court of Appeals made no attempt to review existing laws and legal precedents in order to demonstrate that they establish a “well-defined and dominant” policy against the operation of dangerous machinery while under the influence of drugs. Although certainly such a judgment is firmly rooted in common sense, we explicitly held in W. R. Grace that a formulation of public policy based only on “general considerations of supposed public interests” is not the sort that permits a court to set aside an arbitration award that was entered in accordance with a valid collective-bargaining agreement.
Even if the Court of Appeals’ formulation of public policy is to be accepted, no violation of that policy was clearly shown in this case. In pursuing its public policy inquiry, the Court of Appeals quite properly considered the established fact that traces of marijuana had been found in Cooper’s car. Yet the assumed connection between the marijuana gleanings found in Cooper’s car and Cooper’s actual use of drugs in the workplace is tenuous at best and provides an insufficient basis for holding that his reinstatement would actually violate the public policy identified by the Court of Appeals “against the operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol.” 768 F. 2d, at 743. A refusal to enforce an award must rest on more than speculation or assumption.
In any event, it was inappropriate for the Court of Appeals itself to draw the necessary inference. To conclude from the fact that marijuana had been found in Cooper’s car that Cooper had ever been or would be under the influence of marijuana while he was on the job and operating dangerous machinery is an exercise in factfinding about Cooper’s use of drugs and his amenability to discipline, a task that exceeds the authority of a court asked to overturn an arbitration award. The parties did not bargain for the facts to be found by a court, but by an arbitrator chosen by them who had more opportunity to observe Cooper and to be familiar with the plant and its problems. Nor does the fact that it is inquiring into a possible violation of public policy excuse a court for doing the arbitrator’s task. If additional facts were to be found, the arbitrator should find them in the course of any further effort the Company might have made to discharge Cooper for having had marijuana in his car on company premises. Had the arbitrator found that Cooper had possessed drugs on the property, yet imposed discipline short of discharge because he found as a factual matter that Cooper could be trusted not to use them on the job, the Court of Appeals could not upset the award because of its own view that public policy about plant safety was threatened. In this connection it should also be noted that the award ordered Cooper to be reinstated in his old job or in an equivalent one for which he was qualified. It is by no means clear from the record that Cooper would pose a serious threat to the asserted public policy in every job for which he was qualified.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
So ordered.
App. 20-21. The language quoted is from Article XI of the agreement, which concerns maintenance of discipline. Article VI of the agreement sets out the arbitration procedure. Id,., at 18-20. The reserved rights of management are specified in Article IV of the agreement. Id., at 13-15.
Rule II. 1 lists the following as causes for discharge: “Bringing intoxicants, narcotics, or controlled substances into, or consuming intoxicants, narcotics or controlled substances in the plant, or on plant premises. Reporting for duty under the influence of intoxicants, narcotics, or controlled substances.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a.
Cooper later pleaded guilty to that charge, which was not related to his being in a car with a lighted marijuana cigarette in it. The authorities chose not to prosecute for the latter incident.
The Company asserted that being in a car with a lit marijuana cigarette was a direct violation of the company rule against having an illegal substance on company property. App. 23.
These considerations were the reasonableness of the employer’s position, the notice given to the employee, the timing of the investigation undertaken, the fairness of the investigation, the evidence against the employee, the possibility of discrimination, and the relation of the degree of discipline to the nature of the offense and the employee’s past record.
The arbitrator stated: “One of the rules in arbitration is that the Company must have its proof in hand before it takes disciplinary action against an employee. The Company does not take the disciplinary action and then spend eight months digging up supporting evidence to justify its actions. In addition, the use of the gleanings evidence prevented the Grievant from knowing the full extent of the charge against him. Who knows what action the Grievant or the Union would have taken if the gleanings evidence had been made known from the outset of the Company’s investigation.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a.
The decision below accords with the broader view of the courts’ power taken by the First and Seventh Circuits. See, e. g., United States Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 736 F. 2d 822 (CA1 1984); E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. Grasselli Employees Independent Assn, of East Chicago, Inc., 790 F. 2d 611 (CA7), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 853 (1986). A narrower view has been taken by the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits. See, e. g., Bevles Co. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F. 2d 1391 (CA9 1986); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Assn. International, 257 U. S. App. D. C. 181, 808 F. 2d 76 (1987); American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 252 U. S. App. D. C. 169, 789 F. 2d 1 (1986).
Labor arbitrators have stated that the correctness of a discharge “must stand or fall upon the reason given at the time of discharge,” see, e. g., West Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 10 Lab. Arb. 117, 118 (1947), and arbitrators often, but not always, confine their considerations to the facts known to the employer at the time of the discharge. 0. Fairweather, Practice and Procedure in Labor Arbitration 308-306 (2d ed. 1983); F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 634-635 (3d ed. 1973).
The Arbitration Act does not apply to “contracts of employment of. . . workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” 9 U. S. C. § 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in the wake of the holding that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185, empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization” under the federal labor laws. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957) (construing 29 U. S. C. § 185). See, e. g., Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F. 2d 1123 (CA3 1969); Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 150, 351 F. 2d 576 (CA7 1965).
Even in the very rare instances when an arbitrator’s procedural aberrations rise to the level of affirmative misconduct, as a rule the court must not foreclose further proceedings by settling the merits according to its own judgment of the appropriate result, since this step would improperly substitute a judicial determination for the arbitrator’s decision that the parties bargained for in the collective-bargaining agreement. Instead, the court should simply vacate the award, thus leaving open the possibility of further proceedings if they are permitted under the terms of the agreement. The court also has the authority to remand for further proceedings when this step seems appropriate. See, e. g., Amalgamated Food & Allied Workers Union, Local 56 v. Great A&P Tea Co., 415 F. 2d 185 (CA3 1969) (vacating and remanding to the arbitrators for decision after finding that the arbitrators declined to arbitrate the issues submitted). See also 9 U. S. C. § 10(e) (“Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators”).
The issue of safety in the workplace is a commonplace issue for arbitrators to consider in discharge cases, and it was a matter for the arbitrator in the first instance to decide whether Cooper’s alleged use of drugs on the job would actually pose a danger. That is not a problem here, for the arbitrator recognized that being under the influence of marijuana while operating slitter-rewinder machinery was indeed dangerous, and no one disputed this point. '
We need not address the Union’s position that a court may refuse to enforce an award on public policy grounds only when the award itself violates a statute, regulation, or other manifestation of positive law, or compels conduct by the employer that would violate such a law.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Black,
announced by Mr. Chief Justice Warren.
Appellees, a group of interstate railroads operating in Arkansas,, brought this action in a United States District Court asking that court to declare two Arkansas statutes unconstitutional and to enjoin two Arkansas Prosecuting Attorneys, appellants here, from enforcing or attempting to enforce the two state statutes. The railroad brotherhoods, also appellants here, were allowed to intervene in the District Court in order to defend the validity of the state statutes. One of those statutes, enacted in 1907, makes it an offense for a railroad operating a line of more than 50 miles to haul freight trains consisting of more than 25 cars without having a train crew consisting of not “less than an engineer, a fireman, a conductor and three brakemen . . . .” The second statute challenged by the railroads, enacted in 1913, makes it an offense for any railroad operating with lines 100 miles or more in length to engage in switching activities in cities of designated populations, with “less than one [1] engineer, a fireman, a foreman and three [3] helpers. ...” The complaint charged that, as applied to the plaintiff railroads, both statutes (1) operate in an “arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory and unreasonable” manner in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) unduly interfere with, burden and needlessly increase the cost of interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution, and contrary to the National Transportation Policy expressed in the Interstate Commerce Act; (3) discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of local or intrastate commerce; and (4) by seeking to regulate and control the number of persons working on interstate railroad locomotives and cars invade a field of legislation pre-empted by the Federal Government primarily through federal enactment of Public Law 88-108 passed by Congress in 1963. This law was passed to avert a nationwide railroad strike threatened by a labor dispute between the national railroads and the brotherhoods over the number of employees that should be used on trains.
In their complaint the railroads admitted that this Court had on three separate occasions, in 1911, in 1916, and again in 1931, sustained the constitutionality of both state statutes against the same Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges made in the present action. The complaint alleged, however, that improvements have now been so great in locomotives, freight cars, couplers, brakes, trackage, roadbeds, and operating methods that the facts on which the prior holdings rested no longer exist. The brotherhoods and the two defendant Prosecuting Attorneys answered the complaint asserting the ■ constitutionality of the Acts and denying that there had been a change in conditions so significant as to justify any departure from this Court’s prior decisions. The brotherhoods’ answer alleged that modern developments had actually multiplied the dangers of railroading thus making the Arkansas statutes more necessary than ever. The pleadings therefore, at least to some extent, presented factual issues calling for the introduction and determination of evidence under prior holdings of this Court. See, e. g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761. At this stage of the trial, however, the railroads, claiming there was no substantial dispute in the evidence with reference to any relevant issues, filed a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. alleging that: (1) Both state statutes are “pre-empted by federal legislation in conflict therewith, to-wit: Public Law 88-108 and the award of Arbitration Board No. 282 pursuant thereto; the Railway Labor Act . . . ; and the Interstate Commerce Act . . . particularly the preamble thereto”; (2) the state statutes constitute discriminatory legislation against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause; and (3) the state statutes deny the railroads equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Without hearing any evidence the three-judge court convened to consider the case sustained the railroads’ motion for summary judgment, holding, one judge dissenting, that the Arkansas statutes are “in substantial conflict with Public Law 88-108 . . . and the proceedings thereunder, and are therefore unenforceable against the plaintiffs . . . 239 F. Supp. 1, 29. The District Court did not purport to rule on the other questions presented in the motion for summary judgment and the complaint. We noted probable jurisdiction, 381 TJ. S. 949.
A few weeks ago this Court held in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, ante, p. 111, that an allegation that a state statute is pre-empted by a federal statute does not allege the unconstitutionality of the state statute so as to call for the convening of a three-judge court under 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1964 ed.). Thus, under Swift, the pre-emption issue in this case standing alone would not have justified a three-judge court, and hence would not have justified direct appeal to us under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 (1964 ed.). The complaint here, however, also challenged the Arkansas statutes as being in violation of the Commerce, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses. In briefs submitted to us after oral argument the appellants have argued that all these constitutional challenges are so insubstantial as a matter of law that they are insufficient to make this an appropriate case for a three-judge court. We cannot accept that argument. Whatever the ultimate holdings on the questions may be we cannot dismiss them as insubstantial on their face. Nor does the fact that the pre-emption issue alone was passed on by the District Court keep this from being a three-judge case. Had all the issues been tried by the District Court and had that court enjoined enforcement of the state laws on pre-emption alone, we would have had jurisdiction of a direct appeal to us under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 (1964 ed.). Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73. The same is true here where the state laws were enjoined on the basis of pre-emption but the other constitutional challenges were left undecided. Thus we have jurisdiction and so proceed to the merits.
I.
We first consider the question of pre-emption. Congress unquestionably has power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the number of employees who shall be used to man trains used in interstate commerce. In the absence of congressional legislation on that subject, however, the States have extensive power of their own to regulate in this field, particularly to protect the safety of railroad employees and the public. This Court said in Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Norwood, one of the previous decisions upholding the constitutionality of these Arkansas statutes, that:
“In the absence of a clearly expressed purpose so to do Congress will not be held to have intended to prevent the exertion of the police power of the States for the regulation of the number of men to be employed in such crews.” 283 U. S., at 256.
See also the same case, 290 U. S. 600.
In view of Norwood and the two preceding cases, all of which sustained the constitutionality of the Arkansas statutes over charges of federal pre-emption, the question' presented to this Court is whether in adding the 1963 compulsory arbitration Act to previous federal legislation, Congress intended to pre-empt this field and supersede state legislation like that of Arkansas, or, stated another way, whether application of the Arkansas law “would operate to frustrate the purpose of the [1963] federal legislation.” Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252, 258.
Since the railroad unions first gained strength in this country the problem of manning trains has presented an issue of constant dispute between the railroads and the unions. Some States, such as Arkansas, believing perhaps that many railroads might not voluntarily assume the expense necessary to hire enough workers for their trains to make the operations as safe as they could and should be, passed laws providing for the minimum size of the train crews. Where these laws were not in effect the question of the size of the crews was settled by collective bargaining, though not without great difficulty. It was this sensitive and touchy problem which brought on the explosive collective bargaining impasse that triggered the 1963 Act which the railroads now contend was intended to permanently supersede the 1907 and 1913 Arkansas statutes. Such a permanent supersession would, of course, amount to an outright repeal of the statutes by Congress.
The particular dispute which eventually led to the enactment of Public Law 88-108 began in 1959 when the Nation’s major railroads notified the brotherhoods that they considered it to be the right of management to have the unrestricted discretion to decide how many employees should be used to man trains, and that they did not intend to submit that subject to collective bargaining in the future. The brotherhoods protested, serving counter-proposals on the railroads. As a result the representatives of each side met to try to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement. On the question of the size of the crews the negotiators stuck and would not budge. The railroad negotiators insisted that changed conditions, particularly the substitution of diesel and electrically propelled engines for steam engines, had made firemen completely unnecessary employees. They continued to insist that the railroads should be left free to decide for themselves when and how many firemen should be used, if any at all. Throughout all negotiations, and up to now, the brotherhoods have insisted that a fireman is needed even on a diesel engine, particularly to aid the engineer as a lookout for safety purposes, and to help make needed repairs and adjustments while the train is moving, should the engine for any reason fail to function. Agreement on this question proving impossible in the 1959 negotiations, President Eisenhower, acting at the request of both sides, appointed a Presidential Commission to try to adjust the dispute. After long investigation and consideration the Commission reported. Its report was unsatisfactory to the brotherhoods, not wholly satisfactory to the railroads, and did not result in any settlement. The dispute dragged on. Another report was made by the President’s Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy but it also failed to bring about an agreement.
All efforts at agreement having failed, President Kennedy, on July 22, 1963, reported to Congress that on July 29 the railroads “can be expected to initiate work rules changes .... And the brotherhoods thereupon can be expected to strike.” “This Nation,” he said, “stands on the brink of a nationwide rail strike that would, in very short order, create widespread economic chaos and distress.” Pointing out the disastrous consequences that might occur to the country should a strike take place, the President recommended legislation to provide “for an interim remedy while awaiting the results of further bargaining by the parties.” He recommended that “for a 2-year period during which both the parties and the public can better inform themselves on this problem . . . interim work rules changes proposed by either party to which both parties cannot agree should be submitted for approval, disapproval or modification to the Interstate Commerce Commission in accordance with the procedures and provisions of section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act . . . .” President Kennedy repeatedly emphasized to the Congress his hope that the dispute could eventually be settled by collective bargaining. He stated his belief that advances in railroad technology had made it necessary to reduce the railroad labor force, but he insisted that the public should help bear the burden of this reduction in order that it not fall entirely on those employees who would lose their jobs. He warned the Congress that it was highly necessary “ Tor workers to enjoy reasonable protection against the harsh effects of too sudden change.’ ” In his message the President expressed no desire to have Congress pass a law that would finally and completely dispose of the problem of the number of men who should man the crew of a train, but instead warned that “It would be wholly inappropriate to make general and permanent changes in our labor relations statutes on this basis” and that any “ ‘revolutionary changes even for the better carry a high price in disruption . . . (that) might exceed the value of the improvements.’ ” Thus the President’s message did not in any way indicate a purpose on his part to disturb the existing pattern of full-crew laws by supersession of them, either temporarily or permanently.
Congress enacted the bill proposed by the President with one significant change. He had recommended that a binding determination of the issues not resolved by collective bargaining be made by the Interstate Commerce Commission. At least one brotherhood witness testified before the Senate Commerce Committee to an apprehension. that the Interstate Commerce Commission if given the power requested would declare States’ full-crew laws superseded by orders of the Commission. Subsequent to this both the House and Senate Committees dropped a section of the proposed bill that would have vested power in the Commission to make binding settlements. Instead of that section the Act passed by Congress provided for establishment of an arbitration board to consist of seven members, two appointed by the railroads, two by the únions and three to be appointéd by the President should the four members named by the railroads and unions fail to agree among themselves on an additional three. The arbitration board was given power to resolve the dispute over the firemen and full-crew questions. Their award was to be a complete and final disposition of these issues for a period not exceeding two years from the date the awards would take effect. Awards were made by such a board which the railroads now claim call for supersession of the state laws. We hold that neither the Act itself nor the awards made under it can have such an effect.
The text of the Act and the awards made under it contain no section specifically pre-empting the States’ full-crew laws nor is there any specific saving clause indicating lack of intent to pre-empt them. Appellees argue, however, that the terms of the Act and the awards are inconsistent with the operation of the state laws and thus the laws are no longer valid. But Congress wanted to do as little as possible in solving the dispute which was before it, and we note that this dispute was not over the size of crews in States which had full-crew laws, for there the size of crews was regulated by statute and not by collective bargaining agreements. The railroads made this very point before the Senate Commerce Committee when a spokesman for three railroads, in commenting on the few jobs that would be lost if the brotherhoods accepted the railroads’ proposal, said, “25.9 percent of the firemen positions in freight and yard service must be maintained because of the provisions of so-called full-crew laws of the States of [listing 13 States including Arkansas].” It appears, therefore, that Congress did not need to pre-empt the state laws in order to eliminate this collective bargaining impasse, and further examination of the legislative history of Public Law 88-108 confirms our view that Congress had no intention of superseding the state full-crew laws by passage of that Act.
The President’s proposal was interpreted and explained to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce by the Secretary of Labor. On the subject of state full-crew laws he told that Committee:
“I call attention to such statements as those of the Missouri Railroad Company v. Norwood, the Supreme Court case in 1930 in which the Court said, 'In the absence of a clearly stated purpose so to do Congress will not be held to have intended to prevent the assertion of the police power of the States for the regulation of the number of men to be employed in such crews.’ It would be the intention reflected here that the issuance of an interim ruling, subject to termination in a time period or at the agreement of the parties, would not have the effect of affecting any State full crew law.”
The Chairman of the House Committee on several occasions emphatically stated both in the hearings and on the House floor that the bill was not intended, either as proposed or as passed, to supersede state laws. On one occasion he said:
“This issue was raised in the course of the hearings before the committee. Questions were asked of the various people representing management and the labor industry and witnesses representing the labor brotherhoods, the employees’ representatives, and the Secretary of Labor. It was made rather clear in the course of the hearings that it would in no way affect the provisions of State laws. The committee in executive session discussed the question and concluded that it was not the intent of the committee in any way to affect State laws. On page 14 of the committee report we included, in order that this history might be made, this language: 'The committee does not intend that any award made under this section may supersede or modify any State law relating to the manning of trains.’ ”
The Chairman of the Committee then went on to tell the House, after referring td'this Court’s holding in Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Norwood,
“Therefore, since this bill does not mention the subject of State laws, and since, as the committee report shows, we do not intend to affect these laws, I am confident they are not affected by the bill.
“I think that is about as clear as we can make it.”
Many statements like those quoted above point to the fact that both the Senate and the House members did not intend by enacting Public Law 88-108 to supersede state laws. This sentiment was voiced by witnesses representing both labor and railroads as well as by public officials of the Nation. The railroads seek to offset these carefully considered expressions by reference to a single incident. On one of the occasions when Representative Harris, Chairman of the House Committee reporting the bill, had stated that the Act would not supersede the state law, Representative Smith of Virginia, Chairman of the Rules Committee of the House, interrupted Representative Harris to make the statement set out below. This single statement by Congressman Smith was hardly enough to cast doubt in the minds of the members of the House as to the accuracy of the statement made by Congressman Harris, Chairman of the Committee which reported the bill. The substance of Congressman Smith’s statement was:
“I think the provisions of the Constitution are such and the decisions of the courts are such that there is no way in which a State can overcome the power of the Federal Government under the interstate commerce clause.”
This statement was, of course, correct but it has little relevance as to whether the bill was intended to exercise the power of the Federal Government to supersede state laws.
In the face of the clear congressional history of this Act we could not hold that either the Act itself or the arbitration awards made under it supersede the Arkansas state laws.
II.
The railroads contend that the District Court would have been justified in holding the two Arkansas Acts unconstitutional on the second ground of their motion for summary judgment which is that the two Acts “constitute discriminatory legislation against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce.” Aside from the fact that such an argument was apparently rejected in the prior cases upholding the constitutionality of the Arkansas statutes we think it is wholly without merit. The argument is based on the fact that the 1907 state law exempts railroads with less than 50 miles of track and the 1913 law exempts railroads with less than 100 miles of track. None of the State’s 17 intrastate railroads have more than 50 miles of track. It turns out that none of them are subject to either of the two state laws while 10 of the 11 interstate railroads are subject to the 1907 Act and eight of them are subject to the 1913 Act. It is impossible for us to say as a matter of law that this difference in treatment by the State, based on the differing mileage of railroads, is without any rational basis as the railroads contend. Certainly some regulations based on different mileage of railroads might be wholly rational, reasonable, and desirable. We cannot say on the record now before us that classification according to the length of mileage in these two statutes constitutes discrimination against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 137.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for consideration of the constitutional issues left undecided by its previous judgment.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Ark. Laws 1907, Act 116, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§73-720 through 73-722 (1957).
Ark. Act 67 of 1913, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§73-726 through 73-729 (1957).
77 Stat. 132, 45 U. S. C. following § 157 (1964 ed.).
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453.
St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518.
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U. S. 249, 290 U. S. 600. See also latter case below, 13 F. Supp. 24.
Hearings before Senate Committee on Commerce on S. J. Res. No. 102, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 629.
S. Rep. No. 459, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 9.
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. J. Res. No. 102, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 707.
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. J. Res. No. 565, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 78.
109 Cong. Rec. 16122 (1963). See also the Committee Report referred to by Chairman Harris, H. R. Rep. No. 713, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 14.
“Mr. SMITH of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, the colloquy between the gentleman from California [Mr. Sisk], and the chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. HaRris], raises a question that has not previously been discussed on the floor of the House. It was discussed in the committee yesterday before the Committee on Rules. I do not like to remain silent in view of the statement that a State law can overcome the constitutional provision which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Government in matters of interstate commerce. I do not know what precedents may have been found with reference to this question, but of course, in the matter of purely intrastate commerce under our Constitution the State, of course, would have authority, but when it comes to dealing with interstate commerce I think the provisions of the Constitution are such and the decisions of the courts are such that, there is no way in which a State can overcome the power of the Federal Government under the interstate commerce clause.
“I simply wanted to make my own position clear with reference to that question, for whatever it may be worth.
“Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
“Mr. SMITH of Virginia. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.
“Mr. EDMONDSON. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules for yielding to me at this point. Would this not mean in effect that about the only kind of train operation in which State laws would prevail would be in the switching of cars involving switch engine operations?
“Mr. SMITH of Virginia. Of course, it is just a question of what is or what constitutes interstate commerce. Now, as you know, the decisions of the courts and the actions of the Congress have gone a long way in putting almost everything under interstate commerce.” 109 Cong. Rec. 16122 (1963).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Review was granted by this Court to determine whether the Attorney General was justified in refusing to suspend deportation of an alien under § 19 (c), as amended, 62 Stat. 1206, of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874, 889, 8 U. S. C. §§ 101, 155 (c), on the sole ground that the alien was ineligible for naturalization. The alien’s eligibility for naturalization, the substantive question in this case, depends upon whether the alien was “residing” in the United States and therefore liable for military service under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, when he made application to be relieved from the liability. Section 3 (a) of that Act as amended, the applicable section, provides that “any person who makes such application shall thereafter be debarred from becoming a citizen of the United States.”
The grant of certiorari also covered a procedural question: whether the Attorney General’s refusal on the ground stated to grant suspension of deportation was subject to judicial review otherwise than by habeas corpus.
The allegations of the alien’s complaint have not been controverted. Kristensen, a Danish citizen, entered the United States on August 17, 1939, as a temporary visitor for sixty days, to attend the New York World’s Fair and visit relatives. The outbreak of World War II prevented his return to Denmark. Successive extensions of stay were applied for and granted, but eventually economic necessity compelled Kristensen to become employed and thereby violate his visitor’s status. The process of deportation on the ground of violation of his visitor’s status was begun in May 1940, stayed for the duration of World War II, and reopened in 1946. A warrant of deportation was issued in 1941 but was withdrawn on June 10, 1946, to permit the alien to submit an application for suspension of deportation under § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act, supra, which allows such suspension when deportation would result in serious economic detriment to the United States citizen wife of an alien. This relief was refused on the sole ground of Kristensen’s asserted ineligibility for citizenship resulting from his having filed with his Selective Service Board on March 30, 1942, after registration, an application for relief from service under § 3 (a) of the Selective Training and Service Act, supra. Eligibility is a statutory prerequisite to the Attorney General’s exercise of his discretion to suspend deportation in this case.
Respondent, not then nor thereafter in custody, sought a declaratory judgment that the Attorney General and other immigration and naturalization officials must, in passing upon his application for suspension of deportation, decide on the basis that he is eligible for naturalization in the United States. He also sought to enjoin the Attorney General and other officials from exercising their authority under § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act on the assumption of respondent’s ineligibility.
The District Court dismissed the complaint without opinion, apparently for failure to state a ground for relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed on the ground that, under the facts alleged, Kristensen could not have been subject to the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 at the time he made his claim for exemption, and therefore the claim was without effect and did not render him ineligible for naturalization. 86 U. S. App. D. C. 48, 179 F. 2d 796. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, applied only to aliens “residing in the United States” and “absent any showing of acts or declarations indicating an intention to remain at the time the form was filed, the immigration authorities erroneously construed 'residing in the United States’ when they held it applicable to an alien in this country under a temporary visitor’s visa whose deportation had been ordered and then stayed because of war.”
We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question in the administration of the immigration and naturalization laws. The principle of the decision below is in conflict with that applied in Benzian v. Godwin, 168 F. 2d 952. An important procedural question also exists in view of the Government’s insistence that habeas corpus is the only available judicial remedy for aliens in deportation proceedings. Before we consider these questions, however, we turn to a jurisdictional problem.
Federal Jurisdiction. — The Government properly presents for our consideration an issue of federal jurisdiction not heretofore raised. The quaere is whether this proceeding involves a justiciable question under Article III of the Constitution. It is said the Attorney General’s suspension of deportation is merely a recommendation to Congress, and that federal courts cannot intervene because at this point a court order does not finally control the deportation of the alien. This argument is founded on § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act which provides that, if deportation is suspended longer than six months, a detailed report must be made to Congress, and, if Congress fails to approve the suspension before the termination of the session next following the session in which the case is reported, the Attorney General must thereupon proceed with the deportation.
While such a jurisdictional point may be raised at any time, we do not think there is basis for the objection here. The statute gives the Attorney General the power to suspend deportation for a minimum of six months and until Congress acts or the time for action elapses. The Attorney General’s power is final for such deferment of deportation. That other forces may come into play later with authority to take other steps does not detract from that finality. The United States relies particularly on Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103. The congressional power here is quite distinct from the Presidential power concerning overseas licensing in the Chicago & Southern case. The license in question there was ineffective until the President acted. The delay here is effective despite subsequent congressional action. This litigation, whatever its ultimate effect, is aimed only at the delay. The judgment sought in this proceeding would be binding and conclusive on the parties if entered and the question is justiciable.
Declaratory Judgment. — The United States does not challenge finality for purpose of review. However, the Government does contend that the Immigration Act provision, § 19 (a), making the Attorney General’s decision on deportation “final” precludes judicial review except by habeas corpus of his refusal to grant suspension of deportation. The procedural question as thus narrowed is whether an administrative decision against a requested suspension of deportation under § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act can be challenged by an alien free from custody through a declaratory judgment or whether, to secure redress, he must await the traditional remedy of habeas corpus after his arrest for deportation.
The Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 889, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 165 (a), authorized the deportation of any alien found in the United States in violation of the immigration laws, and always provided that administrative decision as to deportation “shall be final.” The end of that administrative proceeding creates a situation which is subject to test on constitutional grounds through habeas corpus by one in custody. We do not find it necessary to consider the applicability of § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243, to this proceeding. Where an official’s authority to act depends upon the status of the person affected, in this case eligibility for citizenship, that status, when in dispute, may be determined by a declaratory judgment proceeding after the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Under § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act the exercise of the Attorney General’s appropriate discretion in suspending deportation is prohibited in the case of aliens ineligible for citizenship. The alien is determined to have a proscribed status by this administrative ruling of ineligibility. Since the administrative determination is final, the alien can remove the bar to consideration of suspension only by a judicial determination of his eligibility for citizenship. This is an actual controversy between the alien and immigration officials over the legal right of the alien to be considered for suspension. As such a controversy over federal laws, it is within the jurisdiction of federal courts, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, and the terms of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201.
It was so held in Perkins v. Big, 307 U. S. 325, where a declaratory judgment action was brought against the Secretary of Labor, then the executive official in charge of deportation of aliens, the Secretary of State, and the Commissioner of Immigration, to settle citizenship status. The Department of Labor had notified Miss Elg, who was not in custody, that she was not a citizen and was illegally remaining in the United States, and the Department of State had refused her a passport “solely on the ground that she had lost her native born American citizenship.” The District Court sustained a motion to dismiss the proceeding against the Secretary of State because his function as to passports was discretionary, but declared against the contention of the Secretary of Labor and held that Miss Elg had not lost her American citizenship. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed both the dismissal of the Secretary of State from the proceeding and the holding that Miss Elg was a citizen, and also determined that the case was properly brought within the Declaratory Judgment Act. Perkins v. Elg, 69 App. D. C. 175, 99 F. 2d 408. The United States raised no question on its petition for certiorari as to the propriety of the declaratory judgment action. Miss Elg, however, obtained certiorari from the dismissal of the proceeding against the Secretary of State, and the United States defended the judgment of dismissal on the ground that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not add to federal court jurisdiction but merely gave an additional remedy. In the Government’s brief it was said judicial jurisdiction would be expanded without warrant “by permitting the court to substitute its discretion for that of the executive departments in a matter belonging to the proper jurisdiction of the latter.” We rejected that contention and reversed the Court of Appeals on this point, saying,
“The court below, properly recognizing the existence of an actual controversy with the defendants (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227), declared Miss Elg To be a natural born citizen of the United States,’ and we think that the decree should include the Secretary of State as well as the other defendants. The decree in that sense would in no way interfere with the exercise of the Secretary’s discretion with respect to the issue of a passport but would simply preclude the denial of a passport on the sole ground that Miss Elg had lost her American citizenship.” 307 U. S. 349-350.
So here a determination that Kristensen is not barred from citizenship by § 3 (a) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 only declares that he has such status as entitles him to consideration under § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act. We think that the present proceeding is proper.
Eligibility for Naturalization. — Under § 3 (a) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Kristensen was liable for service if “residing” in the United States within the meaning of the Act. Section 3 (a) also provided that if he applied “to be relieved from such liability” as a subject of a neutral country he would be excused from service but would thereafter be debarred from our citizenship.
If Kristensen was not “residing” at the time of his application for relief, he could not then have had “such liability” for service. If there was no “liability” for service, the disqualification for citizenship under the penalty clause could not arise because the applicant had not made the “application” referred to in the statute as “such application.” “Such application” refers to an application to be relieved from “such liability.” As there was no “liability” for service, his act in applying for relief from a nonexistent duty could not create the bar against naturalization. By the terms of the statute, that bar only comes into existence when an alien resident liable for service asks to be relieved.
The question, then, is whether Kristensen was “residing,” within the meaning of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 and regulations issued thereunder, at the time of his application, March 30, 1942. As we conclude that he was not a resident under the Act at the time of his application for relief from military service, we do not decide whether Denmark was a neutral country. Nor need we determine whether the bar against citizenship has been removed by the termination of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.
The phrase of § 3 (a), “every other male person residing in the United States,” when used as it is, in juxtaposition with “every male citizen,” falls short of saying that every person in the United States is subject to military service. But the Act did not define who was a “male person residing in the United States,” liable for training and service after December 20,1941. 55 Stat. 845. Such preeisiveness was left for administrative regulation. Section 10 (a) and (b), 54 Stat. 893, 894, authorized the President to prescribe rules and regulations for the Act with power of delegation. The President prescribed the first regulations on September 23, 1940, and authorized the Director to prescribe amendments. Exec. Order 8545, 3 CFR, 1943 Cum. Supp., 719, 722. Amendments promulgating the regulations here applicable were issued, effective February 7,1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 855. They are set out below. Under these regulations it would seem that Kristensen, who never declared an intention to become a citizen of the United States and who entered the United States in August 1939, was not classified as a resident neutral alien until May 16, 1942. Otherwise, there would have been no occasion for § 611.13 (b), which declares the male alien who remains in the United States after May 16, 1942, to be a resident. Until that date he was in the same category as the newly arrived nondeclarant alien who, under the regulations and the Act, did not become a resident for three months. The application for relief from service was made on March 30, 1942.
The regulations, quoted above, either made an alien in Kristensen’s situation a nonresident of the United States for the purpose of the Selective Training and Service Act, between February 7 and May 17, 1942, or they were nondeterminative of status in that period. In the absence of a determinative regulation, the meaning of the word “residing” in § 3 (a) requires examination. The meaning of that word, of course, depends upon the meaning of “residence.” “Residence” sometimes equals domicile, as in voting. Again, as in taxation, one who is not a mere transient or sojourner is a “resident.” § 29.211-2, Income Tax Regulations. The definition varies with the statute. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), § 9, comment e. See Carroll v. United States, 133 F. 2d 690, 693. In a naturalization case where eligibility depended upon the required residence in the United States, it was held that an enforced service in the German army 1914^1918 and subsequent foreign residence until 1921 on account of lack of means and inability to obtain a passport did not break the continuity of American residence. The court there said,
“We shall not try to define what is the necessary attitude of mind to create or retain a residence under this statute, and how it differs from the choice of a 'home/ which is the test of domicile. Frankly it is doubtful whether courts have as yet come to any agreement on the question. But there is substantial unanimity that, however construed in a statute, residence involves some choice, again like domicile, and that presence elsewhere through constraint has no effect upon it.”
When we consider that § 3 (a) was obviously intended to require military service from all who sought the advantages of our life and the protection of our flag, we cannot conclude, without regulations so defining residence, that a sojourn within our borders made necessary by the conditions of the times was residence within the meaning of the statute.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the judgment of the Court.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissents from the holding of the Court that respondent was not “residing” in the United States within the meaning of § 3 (a) of the Act. See the opinion of Judge Frank in Benzian v. Godwin, 168 F. 2d 952.
Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
“(c) In the case of any alien . . . who is deportable under any law of the United States and who has proved good moral character for the preceding five years, the Attorney General may ... (2) suspend deportation of such alien if he is not ineligible for naturalization or if ineligible, such ineligibility is solely by reason of his race, if he finds (a) that such deportation would result in serious economic detriment to a citizen or legally resident alien who is the spouse, parent, or minor child of such deportable alien; . . . . If the deportation of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this subsection for more than six months, a complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the reasons for such suspension. These reports shall be submitted on the 1st and 15th day of each calendar month in which Congress is in session. If during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a ease is reported, the Congress passes a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it favors the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings. If prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, the Congress does not pass such a concurrent resolution, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien in the manner provided by law.”
Section 3 (a) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, as amended, 55 Stat. 845, provides in part:
“Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every male citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the United States . . . shall be liable for training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States: Provided, That any citizen or subject of a neutral country shall be relieved from liability for training and service under this Act if, prior to his induction into the land or naval forces, he has made application to be relieved from such liability in the manner prescribed by and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the President, but any person who makes such application shall thereafter be debarred from becoming a citizen of the United States . . . .”
See note 1.
While respondent alleged that his application for deferment was filed because of erroneous advice received from a member of the local Selective Service Board, it sufficiently, though inartistically, appears from the complaint that its true gravamen is the ineffectiveness of the application for relief from service to bar the alien’s naturalization because he was not “residing” in the United States within the meaning of the Selective Training and Service Act at the time the application was filed. This construction was put upon the complaint by the Court of Appeals and has been adopted by the United States in its presentation here.
86 U. S. App. D. C. 48, 56, 179 F. 2d 796, 804.
Federal constitutional courts act only on cases and controversies and do not give advisory opinions. Rayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346; Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 113-14.
Cf. Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697, 702; United States v. Jefferson Electric Co., 291 U. S. 386, 400-401; Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., supra.
See note 1.
King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U. S. 225, 226; United States v. Corrick, 298 U. S. 435, 440.
We think the Attorney General’s refusal to suspend deportation for the reason of ineligibility for citizenship has administrative finality. Administrative remedies are exhausted. Compare Levers v. Anderson, 326 U. S. 219.
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 43; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33. Cf. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128; Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 122.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240; United States v. West Virginia, 295 U. S. 463, 475; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. 2d 321, 324, were cited.
8 U. S. C. § 903 has since been enacted, providing in part:
“If any person who claims a right or privilege as a national of the United States is denied such right or privilege by any Department or agency, or executive official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of the United States, such person, regardless of whether he is within the United States or abroad, may institute an action against the head of such Department or agency in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia or in the district court of the United States for the district in which such person claims a permanent residence for a judgment declaring him to be a national of the United States.”
Cf. Benzian v. Godwin, 168 F. 2d 952.
See note 2.
See § 16 (b), 54 Stat. 897, as amended, 59 Stat. 166, 60 Stat. 181, 342; Benzian v. Godwin, 168 F. 2d 952, 956.
See note 2.
The original version of the Act required every male alien residing in the United States to register, but subjected only aliens who had declared their intention to become citizens to liability for service. 54 Stat. 885. The Attorney General construed the words “male alien residing in the United States,” the earlier phrase defining those subject to registration, to include “every alien . . . who lives or has a place of residence or abode in the United States, temporary or otherwise, or for whatever purpose taken or established, . . . .” 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 504, 505.
“§ 611.12 When a nondeclarant alien is residing in the United States. Every male alien who is now in or hereafter enters the United States who has not declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, unless he is in one of the categories specifically excepted by the provisions of § 611.13, is 'a male person residing in the United States’ within the meaning of section 2 and section 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended.
“§ 611.13 When a nondeclarant alien is not redding in the United States, (a) A male alien who is now in or hereafter enters the United States who has not declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States is not ‘a male person residing in the United States’ within the meaning of section 2 or section 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended:
“(6) If he has entered or hereafter enters the United States in a manner prescribed by its laws and does not remain in the United States after May 16, 1942, or for more than 3 months following the date of his entry, whichever is the later.
“(b) When a male alien who has not declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States has entered or hereafter enters the United States in a manner prescribed by its laws and remains in the United States after May 16, 1942, or for more than 3 months following the date of his entry, whichever is the later, he is 'a male person residing in the United States’ within the meaning of section 2 and section 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, unless he has filed an Alien’s Application for Determination of Residence (Form 302) in the manner provided in § 611.21 and such application is either (1) pending or (2) has resulted in a determination that he is not ‘a male person residing in the United States’ within the meaning of section 2 or section 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, in either of which events he shall not be considered as ‘a male person residing in the United States’ within the meaning of section 2 or section 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, during the period when such application is pending or during the period covered by the Alien’s Certificate of Nonresidence (Form 303) issued to him as a result of the determination that he is not ‘a male person residing in the United States’ within the meaning of section 2 or section 3 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended. (54 Stat. 885; 50 U. S. C., Sup. 301-318, inclusive; E. O. No. 8545, 5 F. R. 3779)”
Apparently the regulations intended to give aliens time to enable them to file the Alien’s Application for Determination of Residence, see 7 Fed. Reg. 2084, § 611.21 (b) (1), or to leave the country before their status as “residents,” resulting in liability for military service, was fixed.
Neuberger v. United States, 13 F. 2d 541, 542. Cf. Stadtmuller v. Miller, 11 F. 2d 732, 738.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Scalia delivered
the opinion of the Court.
In United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164 (1974), this Court reaffirmed that a warrantless entry and search by law enforcement officers does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of “unreasonable searches and seizures” if the officers have obtained the consent of a third party who possesses common authority over the premises. The present case presents an issue we expressly reserved in Matlock, see id., at 177, n. 14: Whether a warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not do so.
I
Respondent Edward Rodriguez was arrested in his apartment by law. enforcement officers and charged with possession of illegal drugs. The police gained entry to the apartment with the consent and assistance of Gail Fischer, who had lived there with respondent for several months. The relevant facts leading to the arrest are as follows.
On July 26, 1985, police were summoned to the residence of Dorothy Jackson on South Wolcott in Chicago. They were met by Ms. Jackson’s daughter, Gail Fischer, who showed signs of a severe beating. She told the officers that she had been assaulted by respondent Edward Rodriguez earlier that day in an apartment on South California Avenue. Fischer stated that Rodriguez was then asleep in the apartment, and she consented to travel there with the police in order to unlock the door with her key so that the officers could enter and arrest him. During this conversation, Fischer several times referred to the apartment on South California as “our” apartment, and said that she had clothes and furniture there. It is unclear whether she indicated that she currently lived at the apartment, or only that she used to live there.
The police officers drove to the apartment on South California, accompanied by Fischer. They did not obtain an arrest warrant for Rodriguez, nor did they seek a search warrant for the apartment. At the apartment, Fischer unlocked the door with her key and gave the officers permission to enter. They moved through the door into the living room, where they observed in plain view drug paraphernalia and containers filled with white powder that they believed (correctly, as later analysis showed) to be cocaine. They proceeded to the bedroom, where they found Rodriguez asleep and discovered additional containers of white powder in two open attaché cases. The officers arrested Rodriguez and seized the drugs and related paraphernalia.
Rodriguez was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. He moved to suppress all evidence seized at the time of his arrest, claiming that Fischer had vacated the apartment several weeks earlier and had no authority to consent to the entry. The Cook County Circuit Court granted the motion, holding that at the time she consented to the entry Fischer did not have common authority over the apartment. The Court concluded that Fischer was not a “usual resident” but rather an “infrequent visitor” at the apartment on South California, based upon its findings that Fischer’s name was not on the lease, that she did not contribute to the rent, that she was not allowed to invite others to the apartment on her own, that she did not have access to the apartment when respondent was away, and that she had moved some of her possessions from the apartment. The Circuit Court also rejected the State’s contention that, even if Fischer did not possess common authority over the premises, there was no Fourth Amendment violation if the police reasonably believed at the time of their entry that Fischer possessed the authority to consent.
The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the Circuit Court in all respects. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the State’s petition for leave to appeal, 125 Ill. 2d 572, 537 N. E. 2d 816 (1989), and we granted certiorari. 493 U. S. 932 (1989).
II
The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrant-less entry of a person’s home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948). The prohibition does not apply, however, to situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the individual whose property is searched, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises, see United States v. Matlock, supra, at 171. The State of Illinois contends that that exception applies in the present case.
As we stated in Matlock, supra, at 171, n. 7, “[cjommon authority” rests “on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes . . . .” The burden of establishing that common authority rests upon the State. On the basis of this record, it is clear that burden was not sustained. The evidence showed that although Fischer, with her two small children, had lived with Rodriguez beginning in December 1984, she had moved out on July 1, 1985, almost a month before the search at issue here, and had gone to live with her mother. She took her and her children’s clothing with her, though leaving behind some furniture and household effects. During the period after July 1 she sometimes spent the night at Rodriguez’s apartment, but never invited her friends there, and never went there herself when he was not home. Her name was not on the lease nor did she contribute to the rent. She had a key to the apartment, which she said at trial she had taken without Rodriguez’s knowledge (though she testified at the preliminary hearing that Rodriguez had given her the key). On these facts the State has not established that, with respect to the South California apartment, Fischer had “joint access or control for most purposes.” To the contrary, the Appellate Court’s determination of no common authority over the apartment was obviously correct.
1 — l 1 — 1 1 — 1
A
The State contends that, even if Fischer did not in fact have authority to give consent, it suffices to validate the entry that the law enforcement officers reasonably believed she did. Before reaching the merits of that contention, we must consider a jurisdictional objection: that the decision below rests on an adequate and independent state ground. Respondent asserts that the Illinois Constitution provides greater protection than is afforded under the Fourth Amendment, and that the Appellate Court relied upon this when it determined that a reasonable belief by the police officers was insufficient.
When a state-court decision is clearly based on state law that is both adequate and independent, we will not review the decision. Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1041 (1983). But when “a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law,” we require that it contain a “‘plain statement’ that [it] rests upon adequate and independent state grounds,” id., at 1040, 1042; otherwise, “we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.” Id., at 1041. Here, the Appellate Court’s opinion contains no “plain statement” that its decision rests on state law. The opinion does not rely on (or even mention) any specific provision of the Illinois Constitution, nor even the Illinois Constitution generally. Even the Illinois cases cited by the opinion rely upon no constitutional provisions other than the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. We conclude that the Appellate Court of Illinois rested its decision on federal law.
B
On the merits of the issue, respondent asserts that permitting a reasonable belief of common authority to validate an entry would cause a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights to be “vicariously waived.” Brief for Respondent 32. We disagree.
We have been unyielding in our insistence that a defendant’s waiver of his trial rights cannot be given effect unless it is “knowing” and “intelligent.” Colorado v. Spring, 479 U. S. 564, 574-575 (1987); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). We would assuredly not permit, therefore, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to be introduced on the basis of a trial court’s mere “reasonable belief” — derived from statements by unauthorized persons — that the defendant has waived his objection. But one must make a distinction between, on the one hand, trial rights that derive from the violation of constitutional guarantees and, on the other hand, the nature of those constitutional guarantees themselves. As we said in Schneckloth:
“There is a vast difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. Nothing, either in the purposes behind requiring a ‘knowing’ and ‘intelligent’ waiver of trial rights, or in the practical application of such a requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 412 U. S., at 241.
What Rodriguez is assured by the trial right of the exclusionary rule, where it applies, is that no evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment will be introduced at his trial unless he consents. What he is assured by the Fourth Amendment itself, however, is not that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents; but that no such search will occur that is “unreasonable." U. S. Const., Arndt. 4. There are various elements, of course, that can make a search of a person’s house “reasonable” — one of which is the consent of the person or his cotenant.. The essence of respondent’s argument is that we should impose upon this element a requirement that we have not imposed upon other elements that regularly compel government officers to exercise judgment regarding the facts: namely, the requirement that their judgment be not only responsible but correct.
The fundamental objective that alone validates all un-consented government searches is, of course, the seizure of persons who have committed or are about to commit crimes, or of evidence related to crimes. But “reasonableness,” with respect to this necessary element, does not demand that the government be factually correct in its assessment that that is what a search will produce. Warrants need only be supported by “probable cause,” which demands no more than a proper “assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts . . . .” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 232 (1983). If a magistrate, based upon seemingly reliable but factually inaccurate information, issues a warrant for the search of a house in which the sought-after felon is not present, has never been present, and was never likely to have been present, the owner of that house suffers one of the inconveniences we all expose ourselves to as the cost of living in a safe society; he does not suffer a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Another element often, though not invariably, required in order to render an unconsented search “reasonable” is, of course, that the officer be authorized by a valid warrant. Here also we have not held that “reasonableness” precludes error with respect to those factual judgments that law enforcement officials are expected to make. In Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79 (1987), a warrant supported by probable cause with respect to one apartment was erroneously issued for an entire floor that was divided (though not clearly) into two apartments. We upheld the search of the apartment not properly covered by the warrant. We said:
“[T]he validity of the search of respondent’s apartment pursuant to a warrant authorizing the search of the entire third floor depends on whether the officers’ failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable. Here it unquestionably was. The objective facts available to the officers at the time suggested no distinction between [the suspect’s] apartment and the third-floor premises.” Id., at 88.
The ordinary requirement of a warrant is sometimes supplanted by other elements that render the unconsented search “reasonable.” Here also we have not held that the Fourth Amendment requires factual accuracy. A warrant is not needed, for example, where the search is incident to an arrest. In Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797 (1971), we upheld a search incident to an arrest, even though the arrest was made of the wrong person. We said:
“The upshot was that the officers in good faith believed Miller was Hill and arrested him. They were quite wrong as it turned out, and subjective good-faith belief would not in itself justify either the arrest or the subsequent search. But sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and on the record before us the officers’ mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time.” Id., at 803-804.
It would be superfluous to multiply these examples. It is apparent that in order to satisfy the “reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government — whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the police officer executing a warrant, or the police officer conducting a search or seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement — is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable. As we put it in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949):
“Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.”
We see no reason to depart from this general rule with respect to facts bearing upon the authority to consent to a search. Whether the basis for such authority exists is the sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement officials must be expected to apply their judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it reasonably. The Constitution is no more violated when officers enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has consented to their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is violated when they enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape. See Archibald v. Mosel, 677 F. 2d 5 (CA1 1982).
Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483 (1964), is in our view not to the contrary. There, in holding that police had improperly entered the defendant’s hotel room based on the consent of a hotel clerk, we stated that “the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded ... by unrealistic doctrines of ‘apparent authority.’” Id., at 488. It is ambiguous, of course, whether the word “unrealistic” is descriptive or limiting — that is, whether we were condemning as unrealistic all reliance upon apparent authority, or whether we were condemning only such reliance upon apparent authority as is unrealistic. Similarly ambiguous is the opinion’s earlier statement that “there [is no] substance to the claim that the search was reasonable because the police, relying upon the night clerk’s expressions of consent, had a reasonable basis for the belief that the clerk had authority to consent to the search.” Ibid. Was there no substance to it because it failed as a matter of law, or because the facts could not possibly support it? At one point the opinion does seem to speak clearly:
“It is important to bear in mind that it was the petitioner’s constitutional right which was at stake here, and not the night clerk’s nor the hotel’s. It was a right, therefore, which only the petitioner could waive by word or deed, either directly or through an agent.” Id., at 489.
But as we have discussed, what is at issue when a claim of apparent consent is raised is not whether the right to be free of searches has been waived, but whether the right to be free of unreasonable searches has been violated. Even if one does not think the Stoner opinion had this subtlety in mind, the supposed clarity of its foregoing statement is immediately compromised, as follows:
“It is true that the night clerk clearly and unambiguously consented to the search. But there is nothing in the record to indicate that the police had any basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been authorized by the petitioner to permit the police to search the petitioner’s room.” Ibid, (emphasis added).
The italicized language should have been deleted, of course, if the statement two sentences earlier meant that an appearance of authority could never validate a search. In the last analysis, one must admit that the rationale of Stoner was ambiguous — and perhaps deliberately so. It is at least a reasonable reading of the case, and perhaps a preferable one, that the police could not rely upon the obtained consent because they knew it came from a hotel clerk, knew that the room was rented and exclusively occupied by the defendant, and could not reasonably have believed that the former had general access to or control over the latter. Similarly ambiguous in its implications (the Court’s opinion does not even allude to, much less discuss the effects of, “reasonable belief”) is Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610 (1961). In sum, we were correct in Matlock, 415 U. S., at 177, n. 14, when we regarded the present issue as unresolved.
As Stoner demonstrates, what we hold today does not suggest that law enforcement officers may always accept a person’s invitation to enter premises. Even when the invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives there, the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry. As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of consent to enter must “be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ ” that the consenting party had authority over the premises? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21-22 (1968). If not, then war-rantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the search is valid.
* * *
In the present case, the Appellate Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the officers reasonably believed that Fischer had the authority to consent, because it ruled as a matter of law that a reasonable belief could not validate the entry. Since we find that ruling to be in error, we remand for consideration of that question. The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Justice MARSHALL’S dissent rests upon a rejection of the proposition that searches pursuant to valid third-party consent are “generally reasonable.” Post, at 196. Only a warrant or exigent circumstances, he contends, can produce “reasonableness”; consent validates the search only because the object of the search thereby “limit[s] his expectation of privacy,” post, at 198, so that the search becomes not really a search at all. We see no basis for making such an artificial distinction. To describe a consented search as a noninvasion of privacy and thus a nonsearch is strange in the extreme. And while it must be admitted that this ingenious device can explain why consented searches are lawful, it cannot explain why seemingly consented searches are “unreasonable,” which is all that the Constitution forbids. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 663-654 (1979) (“The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by government officials”). The only basis for contending that the constitutional standard could not possibly have been met here is the argument that reasonableness must be judged by the facts as they were, rather than by the facts as they were known. As we have discussed in text, that argument has long since been rejected.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Douglas,
announced by Mr. Justice Brennan.
This is the third time that the constitutional rights of appellant challenged in investigations by New Hampshire into subversion have been brought to us. The present case stems from an investigation by the Attorney General of the State under Rev. Stat. Ann. § 588:8-a (1965 Supp.), enacted in 1957, which provides in part:
“At any time when the attorney general has information which he deems reasonable or reliable relating to violations of the provisions of this chapter he shall make full and complete investigation thereof and shall report to the general court the results of this investigation, together with his recommendations, if any, for legislation. . . . [T]he attorney general is hereby authorized to make public such information received by him, testimony given before him, and matters handled by him as he deems fit to effectuate the purposes hereof.”
The “violations” cover a wide raiige of “subversive” activities designed to “overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional form of the government ... of the state of New Hampshire, or any political subdivision . . . by force, or violence.” § 588:1.
Appellant was willing to answer questions concerning his relationship with and knowledge of Communist activities since 1957, and in fact he did answer them. But he refused to answer a series of questions put him concerning earlier periods: His refusal, not being based on the Fifth Amendment, raised important questions under the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. He was committed to jail for a period of one year or until he purged himself of contempt. That judgment was affirmed by the New Hampshire Supreme Court. 106 N. H. 262, 209 A. 2d 712. The case is here on appeal. 382 U. S. 877.
The substantiality of appellant’s First Amendment claim can best be seen by considering what he was asked to do. Appellant had already testified that he had not been involved with the Communist Party since 1957 and that he had no knowledge of Communist activities during that period. The Attorney General further sought to have him disclose information relating to his political associations of an earlier day, the meetings he attended, and the views expressed and ideas advocated at any such gatherings. Indeed, the Attorney General here relied entirely upon a 1955 Report on Subversive Activities in New Hampshire to justify renewed investigation of appellant. The Report connects appellant with the Communist Party only until 1953, over 10 years prior to the investigation giving rise to the present contempt.
On the basis of our prior cases, appellant had every reason to anticipate that the details of his political associations to which he might testify would be reported in a pamphlet purporting to describe the nature of subversion in New Hampshire. (See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 72, 88-95, Brennan, J., dissenting.) Admittedly, “exposure — in the sense of disclosure — is an inescapable incident of an investigation into the presence of subversive persons within a State.” Uphaus v. Wyman, supra, at 81. But whatever justification may have supported such exposure in Uphaus is absent here; the staleness of both the basis for the investigation and its subject matter makes indefensible such exposure of one’s associational and political past — exposure which is objectionable and damaging in the extreme to one whose associations and political views do not command majority approval.
“The First Amendment may be invoked against infringement of the protected freedoms by law or by lawmaking.” Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 197. investigation is a part of lawmaking and the First Amendment, as well as the Fifth, stands as a barrier to state intrusion of privacy. No attack is made on the truthfulness of the questions answered by appellant stating that he does not serve in a subversive role and lacks knowledge of any current subversion. There is no showing of “overriding and compelling state interest” (Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U. S. 539, 546) that would warrant intrusion into the realm of political and associational privacy protected by the First Amendment. The information being sought was historical, not current. Lawmaking at the investigatory stage may properly probe historic events for any light that may be thrown on present conditions and problems. But the First Amendment prevents use of the power to investigate enforced by the contempt power to probe at will and without relation to existing need. Watkins v. United States, supra, at 197-200. The present record is devoid of any evidence that there is any Communist movement in New Hampshire. The 1955 Report deals primarily with “world-wide communism” and the Federal Government. There is no showing whatsoever of present danger of sedition against the State itself, the only area to which the authority of the State extends. There is thus absent that “nexus” between appellant and subversive activities in New Hampshire which the Court found to exist in Uphaus v. Wyman, supra, at 79. New Hampshire’s interest on this record is too remote and conjectural to override the guarantee of the First Amendment that a person can speak or not, as he chooses, free of all governmental compulsion. Reversed
DeGregory v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 717; DeGregory v. Attorney General, 368 U. S. 19. After remand of the latter case appellant purged himself of contempt by answering in the negative the question “Are you presently a member of the Communist Party?” Subsequently, new hearings were held and it is out of them that the present case arises.
Although the Act purports to extend its protection to the Federal Government as well, that field has been pre-empted. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497.
“I am not now a member of the Communist Party and have not been at any time since this authority under which I was subject has been on the statute books; that I have no knowledge of any communistic activities in New Hampshire during this period, or any violations of law during this period of six and one-half years. In fact, I have not even been aware of the existence of any Communist Party in the State of New Hampshire at any time that this authority has been on the statute books.”
“Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?
“When did you join the Communist Party?
“Were you a paid member of the Communist Party?
“Were you an officer of the Communist Party?
“Did you ever have access to or control of membership or financial records of the Communist Party in New Hampshire?
“Did you attend Communist Party meetings in New Hampshire?
“To what extent did Communist Party District I in Boston, Massachusetts, have control over the party’s activities in New Hampshire?
“Did you ever attend any Communist Party meetings in New Hampshire wherein any person advocated to . . . overthrow, destroy or alter the Government of the State of New Hampshire, by force or violence?
“Did you ever attend any Communist Party meetings in New Hampshire where any person advocated, abetted, advised or taught by any means the commission of an act to constitute a clear and present danger to the security of this state?
“Did you or any person known to you destroy any books, records or files, or secrete any funds in this state belonging to or owned by the Communist Party?
“Did you at any time participate or assist in the formation of or contribute to the support of the Communist Party in New Hampshire ?”
Prosecution for these activities was apparently barred by the six-year state statute of limitations, N. H. Rev. St-at. Ann. §603:1, long before the investigation in 1964.
See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U. S. 539, 543-544; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523-524; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 462-463. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 485-487; Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60, 64-65.
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra, n. 2.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Me. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether in a diversity action the federal court should follow state law or, alternatively, Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in determining when an action is commenced for the purpose of tolling the state statute of limitations.
I
According to the allegations of the complaint, petitioner, a carpenter, was injured on August 22, 1975, in Oklahoma City, Okla., while pounding a Sheffield nail into a cement wall. Respondent was the manufacturer of the nail. Petitioner claimed that the nail contained a defect which caused its head to shatter and strike him in the right eye, resulting in permanent injuries. The defect was allegedly caused by respondent’s negligence in manufacture and design.
Petitioner is a resident of Oklahoma, and respondent is a foreign corporation having its principal place of business in a State other than Oklahoma. Since there was diversity of citizenship, petitioner brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The complaint was filed on August 19, 1977. Although summons was issued that same day, service of process was not made on respondent’s authorized service agent until December 1, 1977. On January 5, 1978, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action was barred by the applicable Oklahoma statute of limitations. Although the complaint had been filed within the 2-year statute of limitations, Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 95 (1971), state law does not deem the action “commenced” for purposes of the statute of limitations until service of the summons on the defendant, Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 97 (1971). If the complaint is filed within the limitations period, however, the action is deemed to have commenced from that date of filing if the plaintiff serves the defendant within 60 days, even though that service may occur outside the limitations period. Ibid. In this case, service was not effectuated until long after this 60-day period had expired. Petitioner in his reply brief to the motion to dismiss admitted that his case would be foreclosed in state court, but he argued that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the manner in which an action is commenced in federal court for all purposes, including the tolling of the state statute of limitations.
The District Court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Oklahoma statute of limitations. 452 F. Supp. 243 (1978). The court concluded that Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 97 (1971) was “an integral part of the Oklahoma statute of limitations,” 452 F. Supp., at 245, and therefore under Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U. S. 530 (1949), state law applied. The court rejected the argument that Ragan had been implicitly overruled in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460 (1965).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 592 F. 2d 1133 (1979). That court concluded that Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 97 (1971), was in “direct conflict” with Rule 3. 592 P. 2d, at 1135. However; the Oklahoma statute was “indistinguishable” from the statute involved in Ragan, and the court felt itself “constrained” to follow Ragan. 592 F. 2d, at 1136.
We granted certiorari, 444 U. S. 823 (1979), because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeals. We now affirm.
II
The question whether state or federal law should apply on various issues arising in an action based on state law which has been brought in federal court under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction has troubled this Court for many years. In the landmark decision of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), we overturned the rule expressed in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction need not, in matters of “general jurisprudence,” apply the nonstatutory law of the State. The Court noted that “[diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the State,” Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, at 74. The doctrine of Swift v. Tyson had led to the undesirable results of discrimination in favor of non-citizens, prevention of uniformity in the administration of state law, and forum shopping. 304 U. S., at 74-75. In response, we established the rule that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any [diversity] case is the law of the State,” id., at 78.
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945), we addressed ourselves to “the narrow question whether, when no recovery could be had in a State court because the action is barred by the statute of limitations, a federal court in equity can take cognizance of the suit because there is diversity of citizenship between the parties,” id., at 107. The Court held that the Erie doctrine applied to suits in equity as well as to actions at law. In construing Erie we noted that “[i]n essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.” 326 U. S., at 109. We concluded that the state statute of limitations should be applied. “Plainly enough, a statute that would completely bar recovery in a suit if brought in a State court bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely formally or negligibly. As to consequences that so intimately affect recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a diversity case should follow State law.” Id., at 110.
The decision in York led logically to our holding in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., supra. In Ragan, the plaintiff had filed his complaint in federal court on September 4, 1945, pursuant to Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The accident from which the claim arose had occurred on October 1, 1943. Service was made on the defendant on December 28, 1945. The applicable statute of limitations supplied by Kansas law was two years. Kansas had an additional statute which provided: “An action shall be deemed commenced within the meaning of [the statute of limitations], as to each defendant, at the date of the summons which is served on him. . . . An attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof within the meaning of this article when the party faithfully, properly and diligently endeavors to procure a service; but such attempt must be followed by the first publication or service of the summons within sixty days.” Kan. Gen. Stat. § 60-308 (1935). The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Kansas statute of limitations barred the action since service had not been made within either the 2-year period or the 60-day period. It was conceded that had the case been brought in Kansas state court it would have been barred. Nonetheless, the District Court held that the statute had been tolled by the filing of the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed because “the requirement of service of summons within the statutory period was an integral part of that state’s statute of limitations.” Ragan, 337 U. S., at 532.
We affirmed, relying on Ene and York. “We cannot give [the cause of action] longer life in the federal court than it would have had in the state court without adding something to the cause of action. We may not do' that consistently with Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.” 337 U. S., at 533-534. We rejected the argument that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governed the manner in which an action was commenced in federal court for purposes of tolling the state statute of limitations. Instead, we held that the service of summons statute controlled because it was an integral part of the state statute of limitations, and under York that statute of limitations was part of the state-law cause of action.
Ragan was not our last pronouncement in this difficult area, however. In 1965 we decided Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460, holding that in a civil action where federal jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship, Rule 4 (d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than state law, governed the manner in which process was served. Massachusetts law required in-hand service on an executor or administrator of an estate, whereas Rule 4 permits service by leaving copies of the summons and complaint at the defendant’s home with some person “of suitable age and discretion.” The Court noted that in the absence of a conflicting state procedure, the Federal Rule would plainly control, 380 U. S., at 465. We stated that the “outcome-determination” test of Erie and York had to be read with reference to the “twin aims” of Erie: “discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.” 380 U. S., at 468. We determined that the choice between the state in-hand service rule and the Federal Rule “would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a forum,” for the plaintiff “was not presented with a situation where application of the state rule would wholly bar recovery; rather, adherence to the state rule would have resulted only in altering the way in which process was served.” Id., at 469 (footnote omitted). This factor served to distinguish that case from York and Ragan. See 380 U. S., at 469, n. 10.
The Court in Hanna, however, pointed out “a more fundamental flaw” in the defendant’s argument in that case. Id., at 469. The Court concluded that the Erie doctrine was simply not the appropriate test of the validity and applicability of one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
“The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule. It is true that there have been cases where this Court had held applicable a state rule in the face of an argument that the situation was governed by one of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each such ease was not that Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law.” 380 U. S., at 470.
The Court cited Ragan as one of the examples of this proposition, 380 U. S., at 470, n. 12. The Court explained that where the Federal Rule was clearly applicable, as in Hanna, the test was whether the Rule was within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2072, and if so, within a constitutional grant of power such as the Necessary and Proper Clause of Art. I. 380 U. S., at 470-472.
Ill
The present case is indistinguishable from Ragan. The statutes in both cases require service of process to toll the statute of limitations, and in fact the predecessor to the Oklahoma statute in this case was derived from the predecessor to the Kansas statute in Ragan. See Dr. Koch Vegetable Tea Co. v. Davis, 48 Okla. 14, 22, 145 P. 337, 340 (1914). Here, as in Ragan, the complaint was filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction within the 2-year statute of limitations, but service of process did not occur until after the 2-year period and the 60-day service period had run. In both cases the suit would concededly have been barred in the applicable state court, and in both instances the state service statute was held to be an integral part of the statute of limitations by the lower court more familiar than we with state law. Accordingly, as the Court of Appeals held below, the instant action is barred by the statute of limitations unless Ragan is no longer good law.
Petitioner argues that the analysis and holding of Ragan did not survive our decision in Hanna. Petitioner’s position is that Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 97 (1971), is in direct conflict with the Federal Rule. Under Hanna, petitioner contends, the appropriate question is whether Rule 3 is within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act and, if so, within the constitutional power of Congress. In petitioner’s view, the Federal Rule is to be applied unless it violates one of those two restrictions. This argument ignores both the force of stare decisis and the specific limitations that we carefully placed on the Hanna analysis.
We note at the outset that the doctrine of stare decisis weighs heavily against petitioner in this case. Petitioner seeks to have us overrule our decision in Ragan. Stare decisis does not mandate that earlier decisions be enshrined forever, of course, but it does counsel that we use caution in rejecting established law. In this case, the reasons petitioner asserts for overruling Ragan are the same factors which we concluded in Hanna did not undermine the validity of Ragan. A litigant who in effect asks us to reconsider not one but two prior decisions bears a heavy burden of supporting such a change in our jurisprudence. Petitioner here has not met that burden.
This Court in Hanna distinguished Ragan rather than overruled it, and for good reason. Application of the Hanna analysis is premised on a “direct collision” between the Federal Rule and the state law. 380 U. S., at 472. In Hanna itself the “clash” between Rule 4 (d) (1) and the state in-hand service requirement was “unavoidable.” 380 U. S., at 470. The first question must therefore be whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court. It is only if that question is answered affirmatively that the Hanna analysis applies.
As has already been noted, we recognized in Hanna that the present case is an instance where “the scope of the Federal Rule [is] not as broad as the losing party urge[s], and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which cover[s] the point in dispute, Erie command[s] the enforcement of state law.” Ibid. Rule 3 simply states that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” There is no indication that the Rule was intended to toll a state statute of limitations, much less that it purported to displace state tolling rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations. In our view, in diversity actions Rule 3 governs the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run, but does not affect state statutes of limitations. Cf. 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1057, pp. 190-191 (1969); id., § 1051, at 165-166.
In contrast to Rule 3, the Oklahoma statute is a statement of a substantive decision by that State that actual service on, and accordingly actual notice by, the defendant is an integral part of the several policies served by the statute of limitations. See C & C Tile Co. v. Independent School District No. 7 of Tulsa County, 503 P. 2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1972). The statute of limitations establishes a deadline after which the defendant may legitimately have peace of mind; it also recognizes that after a certain period of time it is unfair to require the defendant to attempt to piece together his defense to an old claim. A requirement of actual service promotes both of those functions of the statute. See generally ibid.; Seitz v. Jones, 370 P. 2d 300, 302 (Okla. 1961). See also Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 730-731 (1974). It is these policy aspects which make the service requirement an “integral” part of the statute of limitations both in this case and in Ragan. As such, the service rule must be considered part and parcel of the statute of limitations. Rule 3 does not replace such policy determinations found in state law. Rule 3 and Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 97 (1971), can exist side by side, therefore, each controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.
Since there is no direct conflict between the Federal Rule and the state law, the Hanna analysis does not apply. Instead, the policies behind Erie and Ragan control the issue whether, in the absence of a federal rule directly on point, state service requirements which are an integral part of the state statute of limitations should control in an action based on state law which is filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The reasons for the application of such a state service requirement in a diversity action in the absence of a conflicting federal rule are well explained in Erie and Ragan, see supra, at 744-746, and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to note that although in this case failure to apply the state service law might not create any problem of forum shopping, the result would be an “inequitable administration” of the law. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S., at 468. There is simply no reason why, in the absence of a controlling federal rule, an action based on state law which concededly would be barred in the state courts by the state statute of limitations should proceed through litigation to judgment in federal court solely because of the fortuity that there is diversity of citizenship between the litigants. The policies underlying diversity jurisdiction do not support such a distinction between state and federal plaintiffs, and Erie and its progeny do not permit it.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The Court of Appeals stated that summons was issued the following day, August 20. See 592 F. 2d 1133, 1134 (CA10 1979). However, the docket sheet in the District Court indicates that summons was issued August 19. See App. insert preceding p. A-l. Nothing turns on this difference.
The record does not indicate why this delay occurred. The face of the process record shows that the United States Marshal acknowledged receipt of the summons on December 1, 1977, and that service was effectuated that same day. Id., at A-5. At oral argument counsel for petitioner stated that the summons was found “in an unmarked folder in the filing cabinet” in counsel’s office some 90 days after the complaint had been filed. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3. See also id., at 6. Counsel conceded that the summons was not delivered to the Marshal until December 1. Id., at 3-4. It is unclear why the summons was placed in the filing cabinet. See id., at 17.
Under Oklahoma law, a suit for products liability, whether based on a negligence theory or a breach of implied warranty theory, is governed by the 2-year statute of limitations period of Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 95 (1971). See Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P. 2d 1306, 1308 (Okla. 1975); O’Neal v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 523 P. 2d 614, 615 (Okla. 1974); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P. 2d 1353, 1361 (Okla. 1974). The period begins to run from the date of injury. O’Neal v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., supra, at 615; Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., supra, at 1361.
Oklahoma Stat., Tit. 12, §97 (1971), provides in pertinent part: “An action shall be deemed commenced, within the meaning of this article [the statute of limitations], as to each defendant, at the date of the summons which is served on him, or on a codefendant, who is a joint contractor or otherwise united in interest with him. ... An attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof, within the meaning of this article, when the party faithfully, properly and diligently endeavors to procure a service; but such attempt must be followed by the first publication or service of the summons, . . . within sixty (60) days.”
Petitioner also argued in his reply brief to the motion to dismiss that respondent should have relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 — dismissal for failure to prosecute — rather than the state statute of limitations. Respondent in its response to the reply brief argued that a Rule 41 argument was implicit in its motion to dismiss. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed this issue.
Compare case below; Rose v. K. K. Masutoku Toy Factory Co., 597 F. 2d 215 (CA10 1979); Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F. 2d 1118, 1121-1123 (CA10), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 856 (1979); Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F. 2d 160, 163-166 (CA3 1976); Anderson v. Papillion, 445 F. 2d 841 (CA5 1971) (per curiam); Groninger v. Davison, 364 F. 2d 638 (CA8 1966); Sylvester v. Messler, 351 F. 2d 472 (CA6 1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 1011 (1966), all holding that state law controls, with Smith v. Peters, 482 F. 2d 799 (CA6 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 989 (1974), and Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F. 2d 598 (CA2 1968), holding that Rule 3 controls. See also Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F. 2d 566, 568 (CA2 1978) (reaffirming Sylvestri), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 940 (1979); Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 480 F. 2d 947 (CA8 1973) (distinguishing Ragan), cert. denied sub nom. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Prashar, 415 U. S. 994 (1974); Chappell v. Rouch, 448 F. 2d 446 (CA10 1971) (distinguishing Ragan). See generally Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 180 U. S. App. D. C. 306, 308-311, 554 F. 2d 1165, 1167-1170 (1977) (dicta).
The Court in Hanna noted that “this Court has never before been confronted with a case where the applicable Federal Rule is in direct collision with the law of the relevant State.” 380 U. S., at 472.
Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Hanna concluded that Ragan was no longer good law. 380 U. S., at 474-478. See also Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F. 2d 598 (CA2 1968).
This is not to suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a “direct collision” with state law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision with state law arises from that plain meaning, then the analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies.
“Rule 3 simply provides that an action is commenced by filing the complaint and has as its primary purpose the measuring of time periods that begin running from' the date -of commencement; the rule does not state that filing tolls the statute of limitations.” 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1057, p. 191 (1969) (footnote omitted).
The Note of the Advisory Committee on the Rules states:
“When a Federal or State statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense, a question may arise under this rule whether the mere filing of the complaint stops the running of the statute, or whether any further step is required, such as, service of the summons and complaint or their delivery to the marshal for service. The answer to this question may depend on whether it is competent for the Supreme Court, exercising the power to make rules of procedure without affecting substantive rights, to vary the operation of statutes of limitations. The requirement of Rule 4 (a) that the clerk shall forthwith issue the summons and deliver it to the marshal for service will reduce the chances of such a-question arising.” 28 IT. S. C. App., pp. 394-395.
This Note establishes that the Advisory Committee predicted the problem which arose in Ragan and arises again in the instant case. It does not indicate, however, that Rule 3 was intended to serve as a tolling provision for statute of limitations purposes; it only suggests that the Advisory Committee thought the Rule might have that effect.
The Court suggested in Ragan that in suits to enforce rights under a federal statute Rule 3 means that filing of the complaint tolls the applicable statute of limitations. 337 U. S., at 533, distinguishing Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F. 2d 136, 140-141 (CA2), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 825 (1947). See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 729 (1974). See also Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 308, n. 19, 554 F. 2d, at 1167, n. 19; 4 Wright & Miller, supra, § 1056, and authorities collected therein. We do not here address the role of Rule 3 as a tolling provision for a statute of limitations, whether set by federal law or borrowed from state law, if the cause of action is based on federal law.
The importance of actual service, with corresponding actual notice, to the statute of limitations scheme in Oklahoma is further demonstrated by the fact that under Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 97 (1971), the statute of limitations must be tolled as to each defendant through individual service, unless a codefendant who is served is “united in interest” with the unserved defendant. That requirement, like the service requirement itself, does nothing to promote the general policy behind all statutes of limitations of keeping stale claims out of court. Instead, the service requirement furthers a different but related policy decision: that each defendant has a legitimate right not to be surprised by notice of a lawsuit after the period of liability has run. If the defendant is “united in interest” with a codefendant who has been served, then presumably the defendant will receive actual notice of the lawsuit through the co defendant and will not have his peace of mind disturbed when he receives official service of process. Similarly, the defendant will know that he must begin gathering his evidence while that task is still deemed by the State to be feasible.
The substantive link of § 97 to the statute of limitations is made clear as well by another provision of Oklahoma law. Under Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 151 (1971), “[a] civil action is deemed commenced by filing in the office of the court clerk of the proper court a petition and by the clerk’s issuance of summons thereon.” This is the state-law corollary to Rule 3. However, § 97, not § 151, controls the commencement of the lawsuit for statute of limitations purposes. See Tyler v. Taylor, 578 P. 2d 1214 (Okla. App. 1977). Just as § 97 and § 151 can both apply in state court for their separate purposes, so too § 97 and Rule 3 may both apply in federal court in a diversity action.
Since we hold that Rule 3 does not apply, it is unnecessary for us to address the second question posed by the Hanna analysis: whether Rule 3, if it applied, would be outside the scope of the Rules Enabling Act or beyond the power of Congress under the Constitution.
There is no indication that when petitioner filed his suit in federal court he had any reason to believe that he would be unable to comply with the service requirements of Oklahoma law or that he chose to sue in federal court in an attempt to avoid those service requirements.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Goldberg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These consolidated appeals present as a key question the validity under § 1 of the Sherman Act of block booking of copyrighted feature motion pictures for television exhibition. We hold that the tying agreements here are illegal and in violation of the Act.
The United States brought separate civil antitrust actions in the Southern District of New York in 1957 against six major distributors of pre-1948 copyrighted motion picture feature films for television exhibition, alleging that each defendant had engaged in block booking in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The complaints asserted that the defendants had, in selling to television stations, conditioned the license or sale of one or more feature films upon the acceptance by the station of a package or block containing one or more unwanted or inferior films. No combination or conspiracy among the distributors was alleged; nor was any monopolization or attempt to monopolize under § 2 of the Sherman Act averred. The sole claim of illegality rested on the manner in which each defendant had marketed its product. The successful pressure applied to television station customers to accept inferior films along with desirable pictures was the gravamen of the complaint.
After a lengthy consolidated trial, the district judge filed exhaustive findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a carefully reasoned opinion, 189 F. Supp. 373, in which he found that the actions of the defendants constituted violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The conclusional finding of fact and law was that
“. . . the several defendants have each, from time to time and to the extent set forth in the specific findings of fact, licensed or offered to license one or more feature films to television stations on condition that the licensee also license one or more other such feature films, and have, from time to time and to the extent set forth in the specific findings of fact, refused, expressly or impliedly, to license feature films to television stations unless one or more other such feature films were accepted by the licensee.” 189 F. Supp., at 397-398.
The judge recognized that there was keen competition between the defendant distributors, and therefore rested his conclusion solely on the individual behavior of each in engaging in block booking. In reaching his decision he carefully considered the evidence relating to each of the 68 licensing agreements that the Government had contended involved block booking. He concluded that only 25 of the contracts were illegally entered into. Nine of these belonged to defendant C & C Super Corp., which had an admitted policy of insisting on block booking that it sought to justify on special grounds.
Of the others, defendant Loew’s, Incorporated, had in two negotiations that resulted in licensing agreements declined to furnish stations KWTV of Oklahoma City and WBRE of Wilkes-Barre with individual film prices and had refused their requests for permission to select among the films in the groups. Loew’s exacted from KWTV a contract for the entire Loew’s library of 723 films, involving payments of $314,725.20. The WBRE agreement was for a block of 100 films, payments to total $15,000.
Defendant Screen Gems, Inc., was also found to have block booked two contracts, both with WTOP of Washington, D. C., one calling for a package of 26 films and payments of $20,800 and the other for 52 films and payments of $40,000. The judge accepted the testimony of station officials that they had requested the right to select films and that their requests were refused.
Associated Artists Productions, Inc., negotiated four contracts that were found to be block booked. Station WTOP was to pay $118,800 for the license of 99 pictures, which were divided into three groups of 33 films, based on differences in quality. To get “Treasure of the Sierra Madre,” “Casablanca,” “Johnny Belinda,” “Sergeant York,” and “The Man Who Came to Dinner,” among others, WTOP also had to take such films as “Nancy Drew Troubleshooter,” “Tugboat Annie Sails Again,” “Kid Nightingale,” “Gorilla Man,” and “Tear Gas Squad.” A similar contract for 100 pictures, involving a license fee of $140,000, was entered into by WMAR of Baltimore. Triangle Publications, owner and operator of five stations, was refused the right to select among Associated’s packages, and ultimately purchased the entire library of 754 films for a price of $2,262,000 plus 10% of gross receipts. Station WJAR of Providence, which licensed a package of 58 features for a fee of $25,230, had asked first if certain films it considered undesirable could be dropped from the offered packages and was told that the packages could not be split.
Defendant National Telefilm Associates was found to have entered into five block booked contracts. Station WMAR wanted only 10 Selznick films, but was told that it could not have them unless it also bought 24 inferior films from the “TNT” package and 12 unwanted “Fabulous 40’s.” It bought all of these, for a total of $62,240. Station WBRE, before buying the “Fox 52” package in its entirety for $7,358.50, requested and was refused the right to eliminate undesirable features. Station WWLP of Springfield, Massachusetts, inquired about the possibility of splitting two of the packages, was told this was not possible, and then bought a total of 59 films in two packages for $8,850. A full package contract for National’s “Rocket 86” group of 86 films was entered into by KPIX of San Francisco, payments to total $232,200, after KPIX requested and was denied permission to eliminate undesirable films from the package. Station WJAR wanted to drop 10 or 12 British films from this defendant’s “Champagne 58” package, was told that none could be deleted, and then bought the block for $31,000.
The judge found that defendant United Artists Corporation had in three consummated negotiations conditioned the sale of films on the purchase of an entire package. The “Top 39” were licensed by WAAM of Baltimore for $40,000 only after receipt of a refusal to sell 13 of the 39 films in the package. Station WHTN of Huntington, West Virginia, purchased “Award 52” for $16,900 after United Artists refused to deal on any basis other than purchase of the entire 52 films. Thirty-nine films were purchased by WWLP for $5,850 after an initial inquiry about selection of titles was refused.
Since defendant C & C was found to have had an overall policy of block booking, the court did not analyze the particular circumstances of the nine negotiations which had resulted in the licensing of packages of films. C & C’s policies resulted in at least one station having to take a package in which “certain of the films were unplayable since they had a foreign language sound track.” 189 F. Supp., at 389.
The court entered separate final judgments against the defendants, wherein each was enjoined from
“(A) Conditioning or tying, or attempting to condition or tie, the purchase or license of the right to exhibit any feature film over any television station upon the purchase or license of any other film;
“(B) Conditioning the purchase or license of the right to exhibit any feature film over any television station upon the purchase or license for exhibition over any other television station of that feature film, or any other film ;
“(C) Entering into any agreement to sell or license the right to exhibit any feature film over any television station in which the differential between the price or fee for such feature film when sold or licensed alone and the price or fee for the same film when sold or licensed with one or more other film [sic] has the effect of conditioning the sale or license of such film upon the sale or license of one or more other films.”
All of the defendants except National Telefilm appeal from the decree. The appeals of defendants Loew’s, Screen Gems, Associated Artists, and United Artists raise identical issues and are consolidated as No. 43. The appeal of defendant C & C raises additional issues, and is therefore separately numbered as No. 44. The Government, although it won on the merits below, asserts in a cross-appeal (No. 42) that the scope and specificity of the decree entered by the District Court were inadequate to prevent the continued attainment of illegal objectives. It seeks to have the decree broadened in a number of ways. All of the defendants below oppose these modifications. The cases are here on direct appeal from the District Court under § 2 of the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 29. We noted probable jurisdiction, 368 U. S. 973, and consolidated the appeals. We shall consider No. 43 first, since appellants there raise the fundamental question whether their activities were in violation of the antitrust laws. We shall thereafter consider No. 44, the special arguments of appellant C & C, and finally No. 42, the Government’s request for broadening the decree.
I.
This case raises the recurring question of whether specific tying arrangements violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. This Court has recognized that “[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition,” Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293, 305-306. They are an object of antitrust concern for two reasons — they may force buyers into giving up the purchase of substitutes for the tied product, see Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, 605, and they may destroy the free access of competing suppliers of the tied product to the consuming market, see International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 396. A tie-in contract may have one or both of these undesirable effects when the seller, by virtue of his position in the market for the tying product, has economic leverage sufficient to induce his customers to take the tied product along with the tying item. The standard of illegality is that the seller must have "sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product . . . Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 6. Market dominance — some power to control price and to exclude competition — is by no means the only test of whether the seller has the requisite economic power. Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic power may be inferred from the tying product’s desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes.
The requisite economic power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131. This principle grew out of a long line of patent cases which had eventuated in the doctrine that a patentee who utilized tying arrangements would be denied all relief against infringements of his patent. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502; Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U. S. 27; Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U. S. 458; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436; Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U. S. 661. These cases reflect a hostility to use of the statutorily granted patent monopoly to extend the patentee’s economic control to unpatented products. The patentee is protected as to his invention, but may not use his patent rights to exact tribute for other' articles.
Since one of the objectives of the patent laws is to reward uniqueness, the principle of these cases was carried over into antitrust law on the theory that the existence of a valid patent on the tying product, without more, establishes a distinctiveness sufficient to conclude that any tying arrangement involving the patented product would have anticompetitive consequences. E. g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392. In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 156-159, the principle of the patent cases was applied to copyrighted feature films which had been block booked into movie theaters. The Court reasoned that
“The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration. In Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127, Chief Justice Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright monopoly granted by Congress, ‘The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benéfits derived by the public from the labors of authors.’ It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius. But the reward does not serve its public purpose if it is not related to the quality of the copyright. Where a high quality film greatly desired is licensed only if an inferior one is taken, the latter borrows quality from the former and strengthens its monopoly by drawing on the other. The practice tends to equalize rather than differentiate the reward for the individual copyrights. Even where all the films included in the package are of equal quality, the requirement that all be taken if one is desired increases the market for some. Each stands not on its own footing but in whole or in part on the appeal which another film may have. As the District Court said, the result is to add to the monopoly of the copyright in violation of the principle of the patent cases involving tying clauses.” 334 U. S., at 158.
Appellants attempt to distinguish the Paramount decision in its relation to the present facts: the block booked sale of copyrighted feature films to exhibitors in a new medium — television. Not challenging the District Court’s finding that they did engage in block booking, they contend that the uniqueness attributable to a copyrighted feature film, though relevant in the movie-theater context, is lost when the film is being sold for television use. Feature films, they point out, constitute less than 8% of television programming, and they assert that films are “reasonably interchangeable” with other types of programming material and with other feature films as well. Thus they argue that their behavior is not to be judged by the principle of the patent cases, as applied to copyrighted materials in Paramount Pictures, but by the general principles which govern the validity of tying arrangements of nonpatented products, e. g., Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 6, 11. They say that the Government’s proof did not establish their “sufficient economic power” in the sense contemplated for nonpatented products.
Appellants cannot escape the applicability of Paramount Pictures. A copyrighted feature film does not lose its legal or economic uniqueness because it is shown on a television rather than a movie screen.
The district judge found that each copyrighted film block booked by appellants for television use “was in itself a unique product”; that feature films “varied in theme, in artistic performance, in stars, in audience appeal, etc.,” and were not fungible; and that since each defendant by reason of its copyright had a “monopolistic” position as to each tying product, “sufficient economic power” to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied product was present, as demanded by the Northern Pacific decision. 189 F. Supp., at 381. We agree. These findings of the district judge, supported by the record, confirm the presumption of uniqueness resulting from the existence of the copyright itself.
Moreover, there can be no question in this case of the adverse effects on free competition resulting from appel¡ants’ illegal block booking contracts. Television stations forced by appellants to take unwanted films were denied access to films marketed by other distributors who, in turn, were foreclosed from selling to the stations. Nor can there be any question as to the substantiality of the commerce involved. The 25 contracts found to have been illegally block booked involved payments to appellants ranging from $60,800 in the case of Screen Gems to over $2,500,000 in the case of Associated Artists. A substantial portion of the licensing fees represented the cost of the inferior films which the stations were required to accept. These anti-competitive consequences are an apt illustration of the reasons underlying our recognition that the mere presence of competing substitutes for the tying product, here taking the form of other programming material as well as other feature films, is insufficient to destroy the legal, and indeed the economic, distinctiveness of the copyrighted product. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293, 307; Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, 611 and n. 30. By the same token, the distinctiveness of the copyrighted tied product is not inconsistent with the fact of competition, in the form of other programming material and other films, which is suppressed by the tying arrangements.
It is therefore clear that the tying arrangements here both by their “inherent nature” and by their “effect” injuriously restrained trade. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 179. Accommodation between the statutorily dispensed monopoly in the combination of contents in the patented or copyrighted product and the statutory principles of free competition demands that extension of the patent or copyright monopoly by the use of tying agreements be strictly confined. There may be rare circumstances in which the doctrine we have enunciated under § 1 of the Sherman Act prohibiting tying arrangements involving patented or copyrighted tying products is inapplicable. However, we find it difficult to conceive of such a case, and the present case is clearly not one.
The principles underlying our Paramount Pictures decision have general application to tying arrangements involving copyrighted products, and govern here. Applicability of Paramount Pictures brings with it a meeting of the test of Northern Pacific, since Paramount Pictures is but a particularized application of the general doctrine as reaffirmed in Northern Pacific. Enforced block booking of films is a vice in both the motion picture and television industries, and that the sin is more serious (in dollar amount) in one than the other does not expiate the guilt for either. Appellants’ block booked contracts are covered by the flat holding in Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S., at 159, that “a refusal to license one or more copyrights unless another copyright is accepted” is “illegal."
Appellants (other than C & C) make the additional argument that each of them was found to have entered into such a small number of illegal contracts as to make it improper to enter injunctive relief. Appellants urge that their over-all sales policies were to allow selective purchasing of films, and that in light of this, the fact that a few contracts were found to be illegal does not justify the entering of injunctive relief. We disagree. Illegality having been properly found, appellants cannot now complain that its incidence was too scattered to warrant injunctive relief. The trial judge, exercising sound judgment, has concluded that injunctive relief is necessary to prevent further violations. We think that finding wholly warranted. Moreover, the record shows that Loew’s only instituted its policy of 'making individual films available shortly after suit was brought, and there is evidence that United Artists was conscientious in publicizing its willingness to deal in individual films only after the commencement of suit was imminent. There is no reason to disturb the judge’s legal conclusions and decree merely because he did not find more illegal agreements when, as here, the illegal behavior of each defendant had substantial anticompetitive effects.
II.
Appellant C & C in its separate appeal raises certain arguments which amount to an attempted business justification for its admitted block booking policy. C & C purchased the telecasting rights in some 742 films known as the “RKO Library.” It did so with a bank loan for the total purchase price, and to get the bank loan it needed a guarantor, which it found in the International Latex Corporation. Latex, however, demanded and secured an agreement from C & C that films would not be sold without obtaining in return a commitment from television stations to show a minimum number of Latex spot advertisements in conjunction with the films. Thus, since stations could not feasibly telecast the minimum number of spots without buying a large number of films to spread them over, C & C by requiring the minimum number of advertisements effectively forced block booking on those stations which purchased its films. C & C contends the block booking was merely the by-product of two legitimate business motives — Latex’ desire for a saturation advertising campaign, and C & C’s wish to buy a large film library. However, the obvious answer to this contention is that the thrust of the antitrust laws cannot be avoided merely by claiming that the otherwise illegal conduct is compelled by contractual obligations. Were it otherwise, the antitrust laws could be nullified. Contractual obligations cannot thus supersede statutory imperatives. Hence, tying arrangements, once found to exist in a context of sufficient economic power, are illegal “without elaborate inquiry as to . . . the business excuse for their use,” Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5.
In Nos. 43 and 44, therefore, we agree with the merits of the District Court’s decision. It correctly found that the conditioning of the sale of one or more copyrighted feature films to television stations upon the purchase of one or more other films is illegal. The antitrust laws do not permit a compounding of the statutorily conferred monopoly.
III.
The trial judge’s ability to formulate a decree tailored to deal with the violations existent in each case is normally superior to that of any reviewing court, due to his familiarity with testimony and exhibits. Notwithstanding our belief that primary responsibility for the decree must rest with the trial judge if workable results are to obtain, it is our duty to examine the decree in light of the record to see that the relief it affords is adequate to prevent the recurrence of the illegality which brought on the given litigation. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U. S. 76, 89.
The United States contends that the relief afforded by the final judgments is inadequate and that to be adequate it must also: (1) require the defendants to price the films individually and offer them on a picture-by-picture basis; (2) prohibit noncost-justified differentials in price between a film when sold individually and when sold as part of a package; (3) proscribe “temporary” refusals by a distributor to deal on less than a block basis while he is negotiating with a competing television station for a package sale.
Some of the practices which the Government seeks to have enjoined with its requested modifications are acts which may be entirely proper when viewed alone. To ensure, however, that relief is effectual, otherwise permissible practices connected with the acts found to be illegal must sometimes be enjoined. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436, 461; United States v. Bausch & Bomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707, 724; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 409; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 401 ; United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U. S. 76, 88-89. When the Government has won the lawsuit, it is entitled to win the cause as well, International Salt Co. v. United States, supra, 332 U. S., at 401.
A. Initial Offer of Individual Films, Individually Priced.
Under the final judgments entered by the court, a distributor would be free to offer films in a package initially, without stating individual prices. If, however, he delayed at all in producing individual prices upon request, he would subject himself to a possible contempt sanction. The Government’s first request would prevent this “first bite” possibility, forcing the offer of the films on an individual basis at the outset (but, as we view it, not precluding a simultaneous package offer, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra, 334 U. S., at 159).
This is a necessary addition to the decrees, in view of the evidence appearing in the record. Television stations which asked for the individual prices of some of the better pictures “couldn’t get any sort of a firm kind of an answer,” according to one station official. He stated that they received a “certain form of equivocation, like the price for the better pictures that we wanted was so high that it wouldn’t be worth our while to discuss the matter, . . . the implication being that it wouldn’t happen.” A Screen Gems intracompany memorandum about a Baton Rouge station’s price request stated that “I told him that I would be happy to talk to him about it, figuring we could start the old round robin that worked so well in Houston & San Antonio.” Without the proposed amendment to the decree, distributors might surreptitiously violate it by allowing or directing their salesmen to be reluctant to produce the individual price list on request. This subtler form of sales pressure, though not accompanied by any observable delay over time, might well result in some television stations buying the block rather than trying to talk the seller into negotiating on an individual basis. Requiring the production of the individual list on first approach will obviate this danger.
B. Prohibition of Noncost-justified Price Differentials.
The final judgments as entered only prohibit a price differential between a film offered individually and as part of a package which “has the effect of conditioning the sale or license of such film upon the sale or license of one or more other films.” The Government contends that this provision appearing by itself is too vague and will lead to unnecessary litigation. Differentials unjustified by cost savings may already be prohibited under the decree as it now appears. Nevertheless, the addition of a specific provision to prevent such differentials will prevent uncertainty in the operation of the decree. To ensure that litigation over the scope and application of the decrees is not left until a contempt proceeding is brought, the second requested modification should be added. The Government, however, seeks to make distribution costs the only saving which can legitimately be the basis of a discount. We would not so limit the relevant cost justifications. To prevent definitional arguments, and to ensure that all proper bases of quantity discount may be used, the modification should be worded in terms of allowing all legitimate cost justifications.
C. Prohibition of “Temporary” Refusals to Deal.
The Government’s third request is, like the first, designed to prevent distributors from subjecting prospective purchasers to a “run-around” on the purchase of individual films. No doubt temporary refusal to sell in broken lots to one customer while negotiating to sell the entire block to another is a proper business practice, viewed in vacuo, but we think that if permitted here it may tend to force some stations into buying pre-set packages to forestall a competitor’s getting the entire group. In recognition of this the Government seeks a blanket prohibition against all temporary refusals to deal. We agree in the main, except that the modification proposed by the Government fails to give full recognition to that part of this Court’s holding in Paramount Pictures which said,
“We do not suggest that films may not be sold in blocks or groups, when there is no requirement, express or implied, for the purchase of more than one film. All we hold to be illegal is a refusal to license one or more copyrights unless another copyright is accepted.” 334 U. S., at 159.
We therefore grant the Government’s request, but modify it only to the limited degree necessary to permit a seller briefly to defer licensing or selling to a customer pending the expeditious conclusion of bona fide negotiations already being conducted with a competing station on a proposal wherein the distributor has simultaneously offered to license or sell films either individually or in a package.
The modifications we have specified will bring about a greater precision in the operation of the decrees. We have concluded that they will properly protect the interest of the Government in guarding against violations and the interest of the defendants in seeking in good faith to comply.
The judgments are vacated and the causes are remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . . . .” 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1.
National Telefilm has, however, filed a brief in opposition to the Government’s requests for modifications in the decree, discussed below.
See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S, 131; Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1.
Since the requisite economic power may be found on the basis of either uniqueness or consumer appeal, and since market dominance in the present context does not necessitate a demonstration of market power in the sense of § 2 of the Sherman Act, it should seldom be necessary in a tie-in sale case to embark upon a full-scale factual inquiry into the scope of the relevant market for the tying product and into the corollary problem of the seller’s percentage share in that market. This is even inore obviously true when the tying product is patented or copyrighted, in which ease, as appears in greater detail below, sufficiency of economic power is presumed. Appellants’ reliance on United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U. S. 377, is therefore misplaced.
Appellants’ framing of their argument in terms of each of them not having dominance in the market for television exhibition of feature films misconceives the applicable legal standard. As noted, supra, p. 45, “sufficient economic power” as contemplated by the Northern Pacific case is a term more inclusive in scope than “market dominance.”
To use the trial court’s apt example, forcing a television station which wants “Gone With The Wind” to take “Getting Gertie’s Garter” as well is taking undue advantage of the fact that to television as well as motion picture viewers there is but one “Gone With The Wind.”
The operative portion of the injunctions appears at p. 43, supra.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Clean Water Act forbids the "addition" of any pollutant from a "point source" to "navigable waters" without the appropriate permit from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Federal Water Pollution Control Act, §§ 301(a), 502(12)(A), as amended by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act) § 2, 86 Stat. 844, 886, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A). The question presented here is whether the Act "requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source," here, "groundwater." Pet. for Cert. i. Suppose, for example, that a sewage treatment plant discharges polluted water into the ground where it mixes with groundwater, which, in turn, flows into a navigable river, or perhaps the ocean. Must the plant's owner seek an EPA permit before emitting the pollutant? We conclude that the statutory provisions at issue require a permit if the addition of the pollutants through groundwater is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the point source into navigable waters.
I
A
Congress' purpose as reflected in the language of the Clean Water Act is to "'restore and maintain the... integrity of the Nation's waters,' " § 101(a), 86 Stat. 816. Prior to the Act, Federal and State Governments regulated water pollution in large part by setting water quality standards. See EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-203, 96 S.Ct. 2022, 48 L.Ed.2d 578 (1976). The Act restructures federal regulation by insisting that a person wishing to discharge any pollution into navigable waters first obtain EPA's permission to do so. See id., at 203-205, 96 S.Ct. 2022 ; Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 310-311, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 68 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981).
The Act's provisions use specific definitional language to achieve this result. First, the Act defines "pollutant" broadly, including in its definition, for example, any solid waste, incinerator residue, " 'heat,' " " 'discarded equipment,' " or sand (among many other things). § 502(6), 86 Stat. 886. Second, the Act defines a "point source" as " 'any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance... from which pollutants are or may be discharged,' " including, for example, any " 'container,' " " 'pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,' " or " 'well.' " § 502(14), id., at 887. Third, it defines the term "discharge of a pollutant" as " 'any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters [including navigable streams, rivers, the ocean, or coastal waters] from any point source.' " § 502(12), id., at 886.
The Act then sets forth a statutory provision that, using these terms, broadly states that (with certain exceptions) " 'the discharge of any pollutant by any person' " without an appropriate permit "'shall be unlawful.' " § 301, id., at 844. The question here, as we have said, is whether, or how, this statutory language applies to a pollutant that reaches navigable waters only after it leaves a "point source" and then travels through groundwater before reaching navigable waters. In such an instance, has there been a "discharge of a pollutant," that is, has there been "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source? "
B
The petitioner, the County of Maui, operates a wastewater reclamation facility on the island of Maui, Hawaii. The facility collects sewage from the surrounding area, partially treats it, and pumps the treated water through four wells hundreds of feet underground. This effluent, amounting to about 4 million gallons each day, then travels a further half mile or so, through groundwater, to the ocean.
In 2012, several environmental groups, the respondents here, brought this citizens' Clean Water Act lawsuit against Maui. See § 505(a), id., at 888. They claimed that Maui was "discharg[ing]" a "pollutant" to "navigable waters," namely, the Pacific Ocean, without the permit required by the Clean Water Act. The District Court, relying in part upon a detailed study of the discharges, found that a considerable amount of effluent from the wells ended up in the ocean (a navigable water). It wrote that, because the "path to the ocean is clearly ascertainable," the discharge from Maui's wells into the nearby groundwater was "functionally one into navigable water." 24 F.Supp.3d 980, 998 (Haw. 2014). And it granted summary judgment in favor of the environmental groups. See id., at 1005.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court, but it described the relevant statutory standard somewhat differently. The appeals court wrote that a permit is required when "the pollutants are fairly traceable from the point source to a navigable water such that the discharge is the functional equivalent of a discharge into the navigable water." 886 F.3d 737, 749 (2018) (emphasis added). The court left "for another day the task of determining when, if ever, the connection between a point source and a navigable water is too tenuous to support liability...." Ibid.
Maui petitioned for certiorari. In light of the differences in the standards adopted by the different Courts of Appeals, we granted the petition. Compare, e.g., 886 F.3d at 749 ("fairly traceable"), with Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L. P., 887 F.3d 637, 651 (C.A.4 2018) ("direct hydrological connection"), and Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Util. Co., 905 F.3d 925, 932-938 (C.A.6 2018) (discharges through groundwater are excluded from the Act's permitting requirements).
II
The linguistic question here concerns the statutory word "from." Is pollution that reaches navigable waters only through groundwater pollution that is "from" a point source, as the statute uses the word? The word "from" is broad in scope, but context often imposes limitations. "Finland," for example, is often not the right kind of answer to the question, "Where have you come from?" even if long ago you were born there.
The parties here disagree dramatically about the scope of the word "from" in the present context. The environmental groups, the respondents, basically adopt the Ninth Circuit's view-that the permitting requirement applies so long as the pollutant is "fairly traceable" to a point source even if it traveled long and far (through groundwater) before it reached navigable waters. They add that the release from the point source must be "a proximate cause of the addition of pollutants to navigable waters." Brief for Respondents 20.
Maui, on the other hand, argues that the statute creates a "bright-line test." Brief for Petitioner 27-28. A point source or series of point sources must be "the means of delivering pollutants to navigable waters." Id., at 28. They add that, if "at least one nonpoint source (e.g., unconfined rainwater runoff or groundwater)" lies "between the point source and the navigable water," then the permit requirement "does not apply." Id., at 54. A pollutant is "from" a point source only if a point source is the last "conveyance" that conducted the pollutant to navigable waters.
The Solicitor General, as amicus curiae, supports Maui, at least in respect to groundwater. Reiterating the position taken in a recent EPA "Interpretive Statement," see 84 Fed. Reg. 16810 (2019), he argues that, given the Act's structure and history, "a release of pollutants to groundwater is not subject to" the Act's permitting requirement "even if the pollutants subsequently migrate to jurisdictional surface waters," such as the ocean. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12 (capitalization omitted).
We agree that statutory context limits the reach of the statutory phrase "from any point source" to a range of circumstances narrower than that which the Ninth Circuit's interpretation suggests. At the same time, it is significantly broader than the total exclusion of all discharges through groundwater described by Maui and the Solicitor General.
III
Virtually all water, polluted or not, eventually makes its way to navigable water. This is just as true for groundwater. See generally 2 Van Nostrand's Scientific Encyclopedia 2600 (10th ed. 2008) (defining "Hydrology"). Given the power of modern science, the Ninth Circuit's limitation, "fairly traceable," may well allow EPA to assert permitting authority over the release of pollutants that reach navigable waters many years after their release (say, from a well or pipe or compost heap) and in highly diluted forms. See, e.g., Brief for Aquatic Scientists et al. as Amici Curiae 13-28.
The respondents suggest that the standard can be narrowed by adding a "proximate cause" requirement. That is, to fall within the permitting provision, the discharge from a point source must "proximately cause" the pollutants' eventual addition to navigable waters. But the term "proximate cause" derives from general tort law, and it takes on its specific content based primarily on "policy" considerations. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 701, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 180 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011) (plurality opinion). In the context of water pollution, we do not see how it significantly narrows the statute beyond the words "fairly traceable" themselves.
Our view is that Congress did not intend the point source-permitting requirement to provide EPA with such broad authority as the Ninth Circuit's narrow focus on traceability would allow. First, to interpret the word "from" in this literal way would require a permit in surprising, even bizarre, circumstances, such as for pollutants carried to navigable waters on a bird's feathers, or, to mention more mundane instances, the 100-year migration of pollutants through 250 miles of groundwater to a river.
Second, and perhaps most important, the structure of the statute indicates that, as to groundwater pollution and nonpoint source pollution, Congress intended to leave substantial responsibility and autonomy to the States. See, e.g., § 101(b), 86 Stat. 816 (stating Congress' purpose in this regard). Much water pollution does not come from a readily identifiable source. See 3 Van Nostrand's Scientific Encyclopedia, at 5801 (defining "Water Pollution"). Rainwater, for example, can carry pollutants (say, as might otherwise collect on a roadway); it can pollute groundwater, and pollution collected by unchanneled rainwater runoff is not ordinarily considered point source pollution. Over many decades, and with federal encouragement, the States have developed methods of regulating nonpoint source pollution through water quality standards, and otherwise. See, e.g., Nonpoint Source Program, Annual Report (California) 6 (2016-2017) (discussing state timberland management programs to address addition of sediment-pollutants to navigable waters); id., at 10-11 (discussing regulations of vineyards to control water pollution); id. at 17-19 (discussing livestock grazing management, including utilization ratios and time restrictions); Nonpoint Source Management Program, Annual Report (Maine) 8-10 (2018) (discussing installation of livestock fencing and planting of vegetation to reduce nonpoint source pollution); Oklahoma's Nonpoint Source Management Program, Annual Report 5, 14 (2017) (discussing program to encourage voluntary no-till farming to reduce sediment pollution).
The Act envisions EPA's role in managing nonpoint source pollution and groundwater pollution as limited to studying the issue, sharing information with and collecting information from the States, and issuing monetary grants. See §§ 105, 208, 86 Stat. 825, 839; see also Water Quality Act of 1987, § 316, 101 Stat. 52 (establishing Nonpoint Source Management Programs). Although the Act grants EPA specific authority to regulate certain point source pollution (it can also delegate some of this authority to the States acting under EPA supervision, see § 402(b), 86 Stat. 880), these permitting provisions refer to "point sources" and "navigable waters," and say nothing at all about nonpoint source regulation or groundwater regulation. We must doubt that Congress intended to give EPA the authority to apply the word "from" in a way that could interfere as seriously with States' traditional regulatory authority-authority the Act preserves and promotes-as the Ninth Circuit's "fairly traceable" test would.
Third, those who look to legislative history to help interpret a statute will find that this Act's history strongly supports our conclusion that the permitting provision does not extend so far. Fifty years ago, when Congress was considering the bills that became the Clean Water Act, William Ruckelshaus, the first EPA Administrator, asked Congress to grant EPA authority over "ground waters" to "assure that we have control over the water table... so we can... maintai[n] a control over all the sources of pollution, be they discharged directly into any stream or through the ground water table." Water Pollution Control Legislation-1971 (Proposed Amendments to Existing Legislation): Hearings before the House Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 230 (1971). Representative Les Aspin similarly pointed out that there were "conspicuou[s]" references to groundwater in all sections of the bill except the permitting section at issue here. Water Pollution Control Legislation-1971: Hearings before the House Committee on Public Works on H. R. 11896 and H. R. 11895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 727 (1972). The Senate Committee on Public Works "recognize[d] the essential link between ground and surface waters." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 73 (1971).
But Congress did not accept these requests for general EPA authority over groundwater. It rejected Representative Aspin's amendment that would have extended the permitting provision to groundwater. Instead, Congress provided a set of more specific groundwater-related measures such as those requiring States to maintain "affirmative controls over the injection or placement in wells" of "any pollutants that may affect ground water." Ibid. These specific state-related programs were, in the words of the Senate Public Works Committee, "designed to protect ground waters and eliminate the use of deep well disposal as an uncontrolled alternative to toxic and pollution control." Ibid. The upshot is that Congress was fully aware of the need to address groundwater pollution, but it satisfied that need through a variety of state-specific controls. Congress left general groundwater regulatory authority to the States; its failure to include groundwater in the general EPA permitting provision was deliberate.
Finally, longstanding regulatory practice undermines the Ninth Circuit's broad interpretation of the statute. EPA itself for many years has applied the permitting provision to pollution discharges from point sources that reached navigable waters only after traveling through groundwater. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 832 (C.A.7 1977) (permit for "deep waste-injection well" on the shore of navigable waters). But, in doing so, EPA followed a narrower interpretation than that of the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., 2 E. A. D. 715, 718 (EAB 1989) (Act's permitting requirement applies only to injection wells "that inject into ground water with a physically and temporally direct hydrologic connection to surface water"). EPA has opposed applying the Act's permitting requirements to discharges that reach groundwater only after lengthy periods. See McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Cheney, 763 F.Supp. 431, 437 (E.D. Cal. 1989) (United States argued that permitting provisions do not apply when it would take "literally dozens, and perhaps hundreds, of years for any pollutants" to reach navigable waters); Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Larson, 641 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1139 (D. Idaho 2009) (same in respect to instances where it would take "between 60 and 420 years" for pollutants to travel "one to four miles" through groundwater before reaching navigable waters). Indeed, in this very case (prior to its recent Interpretive Statement, see infra, at 1474 - 1475), EPA asked the Ninth Circuit to apply a more limited "direct hydrological connection" test. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in No. 15-17447 (CA9), pp. 13-20. The Ninth Circuit did not accept this suggestion.
We do not defer here to EPA's interpretation of the statute embodied in this practice. Indeed, EPA itself has changed its mind about the meaning of the statutory provision. See infra, at 1474 - 1475. But this history, by showing that a comparatively narrow view of the statute is administratively workable, offers some additional support for the view that Congress did not intend as broad a delegation of regulatory authority as the Ninth Circuit test would allow.
As we have said, the specific meaning of the word "from" necessarily draws its meaning from context. The apparent breadth of the Ninth Circuit's "fairly traceable" approach is inconsistent with the context we have just described.
IV
A
Maui and the Solicitor General argue that the statute's permitting requirement does not apply if a pollutant, having emerged from a "point source," must travel through any amount of groundwater before reaching navigable waters. That interpretation is too narrow, for it would risk serious interference with EPA's ability to regulate ordinary point source discharges.
Consider a pipe that spews pollution directly into coastal waters. There is an "addition of " a "pollutant to navigable waters from [a] point source." Hence, a permit is required. But Maui and the Government read the permitting requirement not to apply if there is any amount of groundwater between the end of the pipe and the edge of the navigable water. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 24-25. If that is the correct interpretation of the statute, then why could not the pipe's owner, seeking to avoid the permit requirement, simply move the pipe back, perhaps only a few yards, so that the pollution must travel through at least some groundwater before reaching the sea? Cf. Brief for State of Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae 9, n. 4. We do not see how Congress could have intended to create such a large and obvious loophole in one of the key regulatory innovations of the Clean Water Act. Cf. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 202-204, 96 S.Ct. 2022 (basic purpose of Clean Water Act is to regulate pollution at its source); The Emily, 9 Wheat. 381, 390, 6 L.Ed. 116 (1824) (rejecting an interpretation that would facilitate "evasion of the law").
B
Maui argues that the statute's language requires its reading. That language requires a permit for a "discharge." A "discharge" is "any addition" of a pollutant to navigable waters "from any point source." And a "point source" is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance " (such as a pipe, ditch, well, etc.). Reading "from" and "conveyance" together, Maui argues that the statutory meaning of "from any point source" is not about where the pollution originated, but about how it got there. Under what Maui calls the means-of-delivery test, a permit is required only if a point source itself ultimately delivers the pollutant to navigable waters. Under this view, if the pollutant must travel through groundwater to reach navigable waters, then it is the groundwater, not the pipe, that is the conveyance.
Congress sometimes adopts less common meanings of common words, but this esoteric definition of "from," as connoting a means, does not remotely fit in this context. The statute couples the word "from" with the word "to"-strong evidence that Congress was referring to a destination ("navigable waters") and an origin ("any point source"). Further underscoring that Congress intended this every day meaning is that the object of "from" is a "point source "-a source, again, connoting an origin. That Maui's proffered interpretation would also create a serious loophole in the permitting regime also indicates it is an unreasonable one.
C
The Solicitor General agrees that, as a general matter, the permitting requirement applies to at least some additions of pollutants to navigable waters that come indirectly from point sources. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 33-35. But the Solicitor General argues that the proper interpretation of the statute is the one reflected in EPA's recent Interpretive Statement. After receiving more than 50,000 comments from the public, and after the Ninth Circuit released its opinion in this case, EPA wrote that "the best, if not the only, reading" of the statutory provisions is that "all releases of pollutants to groundwater" are excluded from the scope of the permitting program, "even where pollutants are conveyed to jurisdictional surface waters via groundwater." 84 Fed. Reg. 16810, 16811.
Neither the Solicitor General nor any party has asked us to give what the Court has referred to as Chevron deference to EPA's interpretation of the statute. See Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Even so, we often pay particular attention to an agency's views in light of the agency's expertise in a given area, its knowledge gained through practical experience, and its familiarity with the interpretive demands of administrative need. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-235, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) ; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). But here, as we have explained, to follow EPA's reading would open a loophole allowing easy evasion of the statutory provision's basic purposes. Such an interpretation is neither persuasive nor reasonable.
EPA correctly points out that Congress did not require a permit for all discharges to groundwater; rather, Congress authorized study and funding related to groundwater pollution. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15-19. But there is quite a gap between "not all" and "none." The statutory text itself alludes to no exception for discharges through groundwater. These separate provisions for study and funding that EPA points to would be a "surprisingly indirect route" to convey "an important and easily expressed message"-that the permit requirement simply does not apply if the pollutants travel through groundwater. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 262, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). In truth, the most these provisions show is that Congress thought that the problem of groundwater pollution, as distinct from navigable water pollution, would primarily be addressed by the States or perhaps by other federal statutes.
EPA's new interpretation is also difficult to reconcile with the statute's reference to "any addition" of a pollutant to navigable waters. Cf. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 318, 101 S.Ct. 1784 ("Every point source discharge is prohibited unless covered by a permit" (footnote omitted)). It is difficult to reconcile EPA's interpretation with the statute's inclusion of "wells" in the definition of "point source," for wells most ordinarily would discharge pollutants through groundwater. And it is difficult to reconcile EPA's interpretation with the statutory provisions that allow EPA to delegate its permitting authority to a State only if the State (among other things) provides " 'adequate authority' " to " 'control the disposal of pollutants into wells.' " § 402(b), 86 Stat. 881. What need would there be for such a proviso if the federal permitting program the State replaces did not include such discharges (from wells through groundwater) in the first place?
In short, EPA's oblique argument about the statute's references to groundwater cannot overcome the statute's structure, its purposes, or the text of the provisions that actually govern.
D
Perhaps, as the two dissents suggest, the language could be narrowed to similar effect by reading the statute to refer only to the pollutant's immediate origin. See post, at 1479 - 1480 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); post, at 1486 - 1487 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But there is no linguistic basis here to so limit the statute in that way. Again, whether that is the correct reading turns on context. Justice THOMAS insists that in the case of a discharge through groundwater, the pollutants are added "from the groundwater." Post, at 1480. Indeed, but that does not mean they are not also "from the point source." Ibid. When John comes to the hotel, John might have come from the train station, from Baltimore, from Europe, from any two of those three places, or from all three. A sign that asks all persons who arrive from Baltimore to speak to the desk clerk includes those who took a taxi from the train station. There is nothing unnatural about such a construction. As the plurality correctly noted in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006), the statute here does not say "directly" from or "immediately" from. Id., at 743, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (opinion of Scalia, J.). Indeed, the expansive language of the provision-any addition from any point source-strongly suggests its scope is not so limited.
Justice ALITO appears to believe that there are only two possible ways to read "from": as referring either to the immediate source, or else to the original source. Post, at 1484 - 1485, 1486 - 1487. Because he agrees that the statute cannot reasonably be read always to reach the original source, he concludes the statute must refer only to the immediate origin. But as the foregoing example illustrates, context may indicate that "from" includes an intermediate stop-Baltimore, not Europe or the train station.
Justice THOMAS relies on the word "addition," but we fail to see how that word limits the statute to discharges directly to navigable waters. Ordinary language abounds in counter examples: A recipe might instruct to "add the drippings from the meat to the gravy"; that instruction does not become incomprehensible, or even peculiar, simply because the drippings will have first collected in a pan or on a cutting board. And while it would be an unusual phrasing (as statutory phrasings often are), we do not see how the recipe's meaning would transform if it instead said to "add the drippings to the gravy from the meat." To take another example: If Timmy is told to "add water to the bath from the well" he will know just what it means-even though he will have to use a bucket to complete the task.
And although Justice THOMAS resists the inevitable implications of his reading of the statute, post, at 1481 - 1482, that reading would create the same loopholes as those offered by the petitioner and the Government, and more. It would necessarily exclude a pipe that drains onto the beach next to navigable waters, even if the pollutants then flow to those waters. It also seems to exclude a pipe that hangs out over the water and adds pollutants to the air, through which the pollutants fall to navigable waters. The absurdity of such an interpretation is obvious enough.
We therefore reject this reading as well: Like Maui's and the Government's, it is inconsistent with the statutory text and simultaneously creates a massive loophole in the permitting scheme that Congress established.
E
For the reasons set forth in Part III and in this Part, we conclude that, in light of the statute's language, structure, and purposes, the interpretations offered by the parties, the Government, and the dissents are too extreme.
V
Over the years, courts and EPA have tried to find general language that will reflect a middle ground between these extremes. The statute's words reflect Congress' basic aim to provide federal regulation of identifiable sources of pollutants entering navigable waters without undermining the States' longstanding regulatory authority over land and groundwater. We hold that the statute requires a permit when there is a direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters or when there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge. We think this phrase best captures, in broad terms, those circumstances in which Congress intended to require a federal permit. That is, an addition falls within the statutory requirement that it be "from any point source" when a point source directly deposits pollutants into navigable waters, or when the discharge reaches the same result through roughly similar means.
Time and distance are obviously important. Where a pipe ends a few feet from navigable waters and the pipe emits pollutants that travel those few feet through groundwater (or over the beach), the permitting requirement clearly applies. If the pipe ends 50 miles from navigable waters and the pipe emits pollutants that travel with groundwater, mix with much other material, and end up in navigable waters only many years later, the permitting requirements likely do not apply.
The object in a given scenario will be to advance, in a manner consistent with the statute's language, the statutory purposes that Congress sought to achieve. As we have said (repeatedly), the word "from" seeks a "point source" origin, and context imposes natural limits as to when a point source can properly be considered the origin of pollution that travels through groundwater. That context includes the need, reflected in the statute, to preserve state regulation of groundwater and other nonpoint sources of pollution. Whether pollutants that arrive at navigable waters after traveling through groundwater are "from" a point source depends upon how similar to (or different from) the particular discharge is to a direct discharge.
The difficulty with this approach, we recognize, is that it does not, on its own, clearly explain how to deal with middle instances. But there are too many potentially relevant factors applicable to factually different cases for this Court now to use more specific language. Consider, for example, just some of the factors that may prove relevant (depending upon the circumstances of a particular case): (1) transit time, (2) distance traveled, (3) the nature of the material through which the pollutant travels, (4) the extent to which the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it travels, (5) the amount of pollutant entering the navigable waters relative to the amount of the pollutant that leaves the point source, (6) the manner by or area in which the pollutant enters the navigable waters, (7) the degree to which the pollution (at that point) has maintained its specific identity. Time and distance will be the most important factors in most cases, but not necessarily every case.
At the same time, courts can provide guidance through decisions in individual cases. The Circuits have tried to do so, often using general language somewhat similar to the language we have used. And the traditional common-law method, making decisions that provide examples that in turn lead to ever more refined principles, is sometimes useful, even in an era of statutes.
The underlying statutory objectives also provide guidance. Decisions should not create serious risks either of undermining state regulation of groundwater or of creating loopholes that undermine the statute's basic federal regulatory objectives.
EPA, too, can provide administrative guidance (within statutory boundaries) in numerous ways, including through, for example, grants of individual permits, promulgation of general permits, or the development of general rules. Indeed, over the years, EPA and the States have often considered the Act's application to discharges through groundwater.
Both Maui and the Government object that to subject discharges to navigable waters through groundwater to the statute's permitting requirements, as our interpretation will sometimes do, would vastly expand the scope of the statute, perhaps requiring permits for each of the 650,000 wells like petitioner's or for each of the over 20 million septic systems used in many Americans' homes. Brief for Petitioner 44-48; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24-25. Cf. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014).
But EPA has applied the permitting provision to some (but not to all) discharges through groundwater for over 30 years. See supra, at 1472 - 1473. In that time we have seen no evidence of unmanageable expansion. EPA and the States also have tools to mitigate those harms, should they arise, by (for example) developing general permits for recurring situations or by issuing permits based on best practices where appropriate. See, e.g., 40 CFR § 122.44(k) (2019). Judges, too, can mitigate any hardship or injustice when they apply the statute's penalty provision. That provision vests courts with broad discretion to set a penalty that takes account of many factors, including "any good-faith efforts to comply" with the Act, the "seriousness of the violation," the "economic impact of the penalty on the violator," and "such other matters as justice may require." See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). We expect that district judges will exercise their discretion mindful, as we are, of the complexities inherent to the context of indirect discharges through groundwater, so as to calibrate the Act's penalties when, for example, a party could reasonably have thought that a permit was not required.
In sum, we recognize that a more absolute position, such as the means-of-delivery test or that of the Government or that of the Ninth Circuit, may be easier to administer. But, as we have said, those positions have consequences that are inconsistent with major congressional objectives, as revealed by the statute's language, structure, and purposes. We consequently understand the permitting requirement, § 301, as applicable to a discharge (from a point source) of pollutants that reach navigable waters after traveling through groundwater if that discharge is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the point source into navigable waters.
VI
Because the Ninth Circuit applied a different standard, we vacate its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
During their examination of a damaged package, the employees of a private freight carrier observed a white powdery substance, originally concealed within eight layers of wrappings. They summoned a federal agent, who removed a trace of the powder, subjected it to a chemical test and determined that it was cocaine. The question presented is whether the Fourth Amendment required the agent to obtain a warrant before he did so.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Early in the morning of May 1, 1981, a supervisor at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport Federal Express office asked the office manager to look at a package that had been damaged and torn by a forklift. They then opened the package in order to examine its contents pursuant to a written company policy regarding insurance claims.
The container was an ordinary cardboard box wrapped in brown paper. Inside the box five or six pieces of crumpled newspaper covered a tube about 10 inches long; the tube was made of the silver tape used on basement ducts. The supervisor and office manager cut open the tube, and found a series of four zip-lock plastic bags, the outermost enclosing the other three and the innermost containing about six and a half ounces of white powder. When they observed the white powder in the innermost bag, they notified the Drug Enforcement Administration. Before the first DEA agent arrived, they replaced the plastic bags in the tube and put the tube and the newspapers back into the box.
When the first federal agent arrived, the box, still wrapped in brown paper, but with a hole punched in its side and the top open, was placed on a desk. The agent saw that one end of the tube had been slit open; he removed the four plastic bags from the tube and saw the white powder. He then opened each of the four bags and removed a trace of the white substance with a knife blade. A field test made on the spot identified the substance as cocaine.
In due course, other agents arrived, made a second field test, rewrapped the package, obtained a warrant to search the place to which it was addressed, executed the warrant, and arrested respondents. After they were indicted for the crime of possessing an illegal substance with intent to distribute, their motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the warrant was the product of an illegal search and seizure was denied; they were tried and convicted, and appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed. 683 F. 2d 296 (CA8 1982). It held that the validity of the search warrant depended on the validity of the agents’ warrantless test of the white powder, that the testing constituted a significant expansion of the earlier private search, and that a warrant was required.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, its decision conflicted with a decision of another Court of Appeals on comparable facts, United States v. Barry, 673 F. 2d 912 (CA6), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 927 (1982). For that reason, and because field tests play an important role in the enforcement of the narcotics laws, we granted certiorari, 460 U. S. 1021.
r*H
The first Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated... This text protects two types of expectations, one involving “searches,” the other “seizures.” A “search” occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A “seizure” of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property. This Court has also consistently construed this protection as proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable “to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.” Walter v. United States, 447 U. S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
When the wrapped parcel involved in this case was delivered to the private freight carrier, it was unquestionably an “effect” -within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Letters and other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects are presumptively unreasonable. Even when government agents may lawfully seize such a package to prevent loss or destruction of suspected contraband, the Fourth Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before examining the contents of such a package. Such a warrantless search could not be characterized as reasonable simply because, after the official invasion of privacy occurred, contraband is discovered. Conversely, in this case the fact that agents of the private carrier independently opened the package and made an examination that might have been impermissible for a government agent cannot render otherwise reasonable official conduct unreasonable. The reasonableness of an official invasion of the citizen’s privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as they existed at the time that invasion occurred.
The initial invasions of respondents’ package were occasioned by private action. Those invasions revealed that the package contained only one significant item, a suspicious looking tape tube. Cutting the end of the tube and extracting its contents revealed a suspicious looking plastic bag of white powder. Whether those invasions were accidental or deliberate, and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character.
The additional invasions of respondents’ privacy by the Government agent must be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private search. That standard was adopted by a majority of the Court in Walter v. United States, supra. In Walter a private party had opened a misdirected carton, found rolls of motion picture films that appeared to be contraband, and turned the carton over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Later, without obtaining a warrant, FBI agents obtained a projector and viewed the films. While there was no single opinion of the Court, a majority did agree on the appropriate analysis of a governmental search which follows on the heels of a private one. Two Justices took the position:
“If a properly authorized official search is limited by the particular terms of its authorization, at least the same kind of strict limitation must be applied to any official use of a private party’s invasion of another person’s privacy. Even though some circumstances — for example, if the results of the private search are in plain view when materials are turned over to the Government— may justify the Government’s reexamination of the materials, surely the Government may not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an independent search. In these cases, the private party had not actually viewed the films. Prior to the Government screening, one could only draw inferences about what was on the films. The projection of the films was a significant expansion of the search that had been conducted previously by a private party and therefore must be characterized as a separate search.” Id., at 657 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Stewart, J.) (footnote omitted).
Four additional Justices, while disagreeing with this characterization of the scope of the private search, were also of the view that the legality of the governmental search must be tested by the scope of the antecedent private search.
“ ‘Under these circumstances, since the L’Eggs employees so fully ascertained the nature of the films before contacting the authorities, we find that the FBI’s subsequent viewing of the movies on a projector did not “change the nature of the search” and was not an additional search subject to the warrant requirement.’” Id., at 663-664 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C. J., and Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.) (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 592 P. 2d 788, 793-794 (CA5 1979) (case below in Walter)
This standard follows from the analysis applicable when private parties reveal other kinds of private information to the authorities. It is well settled that when an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that information. Once frustration of the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the now nonprivate information: “This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in a third party will not be betrayed.” United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443 (1976). The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated. In such a case the authorities have not relied on what is in effect a private search, and therefore presumptively violate the Fourth Amendment if they act without a warrant.
In this case, the federal agents’ invasions of respondents’ privacy involved two steps: first, they removed the tube from the box, the plastic bags from the tube, and a trace of powder from the innermost bag; second, they made a chemical test of the powder. Although we ultimately conclude that both actions were reasonable for essentially the same reason, it is useful to discuss them separately.
II
When the first federal agent on the scene initially saw the package, he knew it contained nothing of significance except a tube containing plastic bags and, ultimately, white powder. It is not entirely clear that the powder was visible to him before he removed the tube from the box. Even if the white powder was not itself in “plain view” because it was still enclosed in so many containers and covered with papers, there was a virtual certainty that nothing else of significance was in the package and that a manual inspection of the tube and its contents would not tell him anything more than he already had been told. Respondents do not dispute that the Government could utilize the Federal Express employees’ testimony concerning the contents of the package. If that is the case, it hardly infringed respondents’ privacy for the agents to reexamine the contents of the open package by brushing aside a crumpled newspaper and picking up the tube. The advantage the Government gained thereby was merely avoiding the risk of a flaw in the employees’ recollection, rather than in further infringing respondents’ privacy. Protecting the risk of misdescription hardly enhances any legitimate privacy interest, and is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Respondents could have no privacy interest in the contents of the package, since it remained unsealed and since the Federal Express employees had just examined the package and had, of their own accord, invited the federal agent to their offices for the express purpose of viewing its contents. The agent’s viewing of what a private party had freely made available for his inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 487-490 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 475-476 (1921).
Similarly, the removal of the plastic bags from the tube and the agent’s visual inspection of their contents enabled the agent to learn nothing that had not previously been learned during the private search. It infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy and hence was not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
While the agents’ assertion of dominion and control over the package and its contents did constitute a “seizure,” that seizure was not unreasonable. The fact that, prior to the field test, respondents’ privacy interest in the contents of the package had been largely compromised is highly relevant to the reasonableness of the agents’ conduct in this respect. The agents had already learned a great deal about the contents of the package from the Federal Express employees, all of which was consistent with what they could see. The package itself, which had previously been opened, remained unsealed, and the Federal Express employees had invited the agents to examine its contents. Under these circumstances, the package could no longer support any expectation of privacy; it was just like a balloon “the distinctive character [of which] spoke volumes as to its contents — particularly to the trained eye of the officer,” Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 743 (1983) (plurality opinion); see also id,., at 746 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); or the hypothetical gun case in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 764-765, n. 13 (1979). Such containers may be seized, at least temporarily, without a warrant. Accordingly, since it was apparent that the tube and plastic bags contained contraband and little else, this warrantless seizure was reasonable, for it is well settled that it is constitutionally reasonable for law enforcement officials to seize “effects” that cannot support a justifiable expectation of privacy without a warrant, based on probable cause to believe they contain contraband.
r-H I — l I — I
The question remains whether the additional intrusion occasioned by the field test, which had not been conducted by the Federal Express employees and therefore exceeded the scope of the private search, was an unlawful “search” or “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The field test at issue could disclose only one fact previously unknown to the agent — whether or not a suspicious white powder was cocaine. It could tell him nothing more, not even whether the substance was sugar or talcum powder. We must first determine whether this can be considered a “search” subject to the Fourth Amendment — did it infringe an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable?
The concept of an interest in privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically different from the mere expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities. Indeed, this distinction underlies the rule that government may utilize information voluntarily disclosed to a governmental informant, despite the criminal’s reasonable expectation that his associates would not disclose confidential information to the authorities. See United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1971) (plurality opinion).
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy. This conclusion is not dependent on the result of any particular test. It is probably safe to assume that virtually all of the tests conducted under circumstances comparable to those disclosed by this record would result in a positive finding; in such cases, no legitimate interest has been compromised. But even if the results are negative — merely disclosing that the substance is something other than cocaine — such a result reveals nothing of special interest. Congress has decided — and there is no question about its power to do so — to treat the interest in “privately” possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably “private” fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.
This conclusion is dictated by United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983), in which the Court held that subjecting luggage to a “sniff test” by a trained narcotics detection dog was not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment:
“A ‘canine sniff’ by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer’s rummaging through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited.” Id., at 707.
Here, as in Place, the likelihood that official conduct of the kind disclosed by the récord will actually compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.
We have concluded, in Part II, supra, that the initial “seizure” of the package and its contents was reasonable. Nevertheless, as Place also holds, a seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests protected by the the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable seizures.” Here, the field test did affect respondents’ possessory interests protected by the Amendment, since by destroying a quantity of the powder it converted what had been only a temporary deprivation of pos-sessory interests into a permanent one. To assess the reasonableness of this conduct, “[w]e must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” 462 U. S., at 703.
Applying this test, we conclude that the destruction of the powder during the course of the field test was reasonable. The law enforcement interests justifying the procedure were substantial; the suspicious nature of the material made it virtually certain that the substance tested was in fact contraband. Conversely, because only a trace amount of material was involved, the loss of which appears to have gone unnoticed by respondents, and since the property had already been lawfully detained, the “seizure” could, at most, have only a de minimis impact on any protected property interest. Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 591-592 (1974) (plurality opinion) (examination of automobile’s tires and taking of paint scrapings was a de minimis invasion of constitutional interests). Under these circumstances, the safeguards of a warrant would only minimally advance Fourth Amendment interests. This warrantless “seizure” was reasonable.
In sum, the federal agents did not infringe any constitutionally protected privacy interest that had not already been frustrated as the result of private conduct. To the extent that a protected possessory interest was infringed, the infringement was de minimis and constitutionally reasonable. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
As the test is described in the evidence, it involved the use of three test tubes. When a substance containing cocaine is placed in one test tube after another, it will cause liquids to take on a certain sequence of colors. Such a test discloses whether or not the substance is cocaine, but there is no evidence that it would identify any other substances.
The Court of Appeals did not hold that the facts would not have justified the issuance of a warrant without reference to the test results; the court merely held that the facts recited in the warrant application, which relied almost entirely on the results of the field tests, would not support the issuance of the warrant if the field test was itself unlawful. “ ‘It is elementary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court may consider only information brought to the magistrate’s attention.’ ” Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 413, n. 3 (1969) (emphasis in original) (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 109, n. 1 (1964)). See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 238-239 (1983).
See also People v. Adler, 50 N. Y. 2d 730, 409 N. E. 2d 888, cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1014 (1980); cf. United States v. Andrews, 618 F. 2d 646 (CA10) (upholding warrantless field test without discussion), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 824 (1980).
See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U. S. 765, 771 (1983); United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 280-281 (1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 739-741 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 (1968).
See United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983); id., at 716 (Brennan, J., concurring in result); Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 747-748 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 13-14, n. 8 (1977); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 76 (1906). While the concept of a “seizure” of property is not much discussed in our cases, this definition follows from our oft-repeated definition of the “seizure” of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment— meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual’s freedom of movement. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 696 (1981); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U. S. 438, 440, n. (1980) (per curiam); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 551-554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.); Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 50 (1979); United Stales v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 726-727 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 16, 19, n. 16.
See 447 U. S., at 656 (opinion of Stevens, J.); id., at 660-661 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 455-456, n. 31 (1976); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 487-490 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921).
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 10 (1977); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249, 251 (1970); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 733 (1878); see also Walter, 447 U. S., at 654-655 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
See, e. g., United States v. Place, 462 U. S., at 701; United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 809-812 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 426 (1981) (plurality opinion); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 762 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S., at 13, and n. 8; United States v. Van Leeuwen, supra. There is, of course, a well-recognized exception for customs searches; but that exception is not involved in this case.
See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 567, n. 11 (1971); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 484 (1963); Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253, 261-262 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 103 (1959); Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 312 (1958); United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 595 (1948); Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 29 (1927).
A post-trial affidavit indicates that an agent of Federal Express may have opened the package because he was suspicious about its contents, and not because of damage from a forklift. However, the lower courts found no governmental involvement in the private search, a finding not challenged by respondents. The affidavit thus is of no relevance to the issue we decide.
See also 447 U. S., at 658-659 (footnotes omitted) (“The fact that the cartons were unexpectedly opened by a third party before the shipment was delivered to its intended consignee does not alter the consignor’s legitimate expectation of privacy. The private search merely frustrated that expectation in part. It did not simply strip the remaining unfrustrated portion of that expectation of all Fourth Amendment protection”).
In Walter, a majority of the Court found a violation of the Fourth Amendment. For present purposes, the disagreement between the majority and the dissenters in that case with respect to the comparison between the private search and the official search is less significant than the agreement on the standard to be applied in evaluating the relationship between the two searches.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 743-744 (1979); United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 749-753 (1971) (plurality opinion); Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 326-331 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 300-303 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 437-439 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747, 753-754 (1952). See also United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264, 272 (1980); United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 744, 750-751 (1979).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961).
Daniel Stegemoller, the Federal Express office manager, testified at the suppression hearing that the white substance was not visible without reentering the package at the time the first agent arrived. App. 42-43, 58. As Justice White points out, the Magistrate found that the “tube was in plain view in the box and the bags with the white powder were visible from the end of the tube.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a. The bags were, however, only visible if one picked up the tube and peered inside through a small aperture; even then, what was visible was only the translucent bag that contained the white powder. The powder itself was barely visible, and surely was not so plainly in view that the agents did “no more than fail to avert their eyes,” post, at 130. In any event, respondents filed objections to the Magistrate’s report with the District Court. The District Court declined to resolve respondents’ objections, ruling that fact immaterial and assuming for purposes of its decision “that the newspaper in the box covered the gray tube and that neither the gray tube nor the contraband could be seen when the box was turned over to the... DEA agents.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a-13a. At trial, the federal agent first on the scene testified that the powder was not visible until after he pulled the plastic bags out of the tube. App. 71-72. Respondents continue to argue this case on the assumption that the Magistrate’s report is incorrect. Brief for Respondents 2-3. As our discussion will make clear, we agree with the Distriet Court that it does not matter whether the loose pieces of newspaper covered the tube at the time the agent first saw the box.
See United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S., at 750-751; United States v. White, 401 U. S., at 749-753 (plurality opinion); Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S., at 326-331; On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S., at 753-754. For example, in Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427 (1963), the Court wrote: “Stripped to its essentials, petitioner’s argument amounts to saying that he has a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the agent’s memory, or to challenge the agent’s credibility without being beset by corroborating evidence.... For no other argument can justify excluding an accurate version of a conversation that the agent could testify to from memory. We think the risk that petitioner took in offering a bribe to Davis fairly included the risk that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court....” Id., at 439 (footnote omitted).
We reject Justice White’s suggestion that this case is indistinguishable from one in which the police simply learn from a private party that a container contains contraband, seize it from its owner, and conduct a war-rantless search which, as Justice White properly observes, would be unconstitutional. Here, the Federal Express employees who were lawfully in possession of the package invited the agent to examine its contents; the governmental conduct was made possible only because private parties had compromised the integrity of this container. Justice White would have this case turn on the fortuity of whether the Federal Express employees placed the tube back into the box. But in the context of their previous examination of the package, their communication of what they had learned to the agent, and their offer to have the agent inspect it, that act surely could not create any privacy interest with respect to the package that would not otherwise exist. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U. S., at 771-772. Thus the precise character of the white powder’s visibility to the naked eye is far less significant than the facts that the container could no longer support any expectation of privacy, and that it was virtually certain that it contained nothing but contraband. Contrary to Justice White’s suggestion, we do not “sanctio[n] warrantless searches of closed or covered containers or packages whenever probable cause exists as a result of a prior private search.” Post, at 129. A container which can support a reasonable expectation of privacy may not be searched, even on probable cause, without a warrant. See United States v. Ross, 456 U. S., at 809-812; Robbins v. California, 453 U. S., at 426-427 (plurality opinion); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S., at 764-765; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977).
Both the Magistrate and the District Court found that the agents took custody of the package from Federal Express after they arrived. Although respondents had entrusted possession of the items to Federal Express, the decision by governmental authorities to exert dominion and control over the package for their own purposes clearly constituted a “seizure,” though not necessarily an unreasonable one. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970). Indeed, this is one thing on which the entire Court appeared to agree in Walter v. United States, 447 U. S. 649 (1980).
See also United States v. Ross, 456 U. S., at 822-823; Robbins v. California, 453 U. S., at 428 (plurality opinion).
Respondents concede that the agents had probable cause to believe the package contained contraband. Therefore we need not decide whether the agents could have seized the package based on something less than probable cause. Some seizures can be justified by an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. See United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983).
See Place, 462 U. S., at 701-702; Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S., at 741-742 (plurality opinion); id., at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980); G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 354 (1977); Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam).
“Obviously, however, a ‘legitimate’ expectation of privacy by definition means more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered. A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as ‘legitimate.’ His presence, in the words of Jones [v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 267 (1960)], is ‘wrongful’; his expectation [of privacy] is not ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.” ’ Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). And it would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases. Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143-144, n. 12 (1978). See also United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983) (use of a beeper to track ear’s movements infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979) (use of a pen register to record phone numbers dialed infringed no reasonable expectation of privacy).
See Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1229 (1983). Our discussion, of course, is confined to possession of contraband. It is not necessarily the case that the purely “private” possession of an article that cannot be distributed in commerce is itself illegitimate. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969).
Respondents attempt to distinguish Place, arguing that it involved no physical invasion of Place’s effects, unlike the conduct at issue here. However, as the quotation makes clear, the reason this did not intrude upon any legitimate privacy interest was that the governmental conduct could reveal nothing about noncontraband items. That rationale is fully applicable here.
In Place, the Court held that while
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether it violates the Fourth Amendment for the United States Customs Service to require a urinalysis test from employees who seek transfer or promotion to certain positions.
I
A
The United States Customs Service, a bureau of the Department of the Treasury, is the federal agency responsible for processing persons, carriers, cargo, and mail into the United States, collecting revenue from imports, and enforcing customs and related laws. See United States Customs Service, Customs U. S. A., Fiscal Year 1985, p. 4. An important responsibility of the Service is the interdiction and seizure of contraband, including illegal drugs. Ibid. In 1987 alone, Customs agents seized drugs with a retail value of nearly $9 billion. See United States Customs Service, Customs U. S. A., Fiscal Year 1987, p. 40. In the routine discharge of their duties, many Customs employees have direct contact with those who traffic in drugs for profit. Drug import operations, often directed by sophisticated criminal syndicates, United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 561-562 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring), may be effected by violence or its threat. As a necessary response, many Customs operatives carry and use firearms in connection with their official duties. App. 109.
In December 1985, respondent, the Commissioner of Customs, established a Drug Screening Task Force to explore the possibility of implementing a drug-screening program within the Service. Id., at 11. After extensive research and consultation with experts in the field, the task force concluded that “drug screening through urinalysis is technologically reliable, valid and accurate.” Ibid. Citing this conclusion, the Commissioner announced his intention to require drug tests of employees who applied for, or occupied, certain positions within the Service. Id., at 10-11. The Commissioner stated his belief that “Customs is largely drug-free,” but noted also that “unfortunately no segment of society is immune from the threat of illegal drug use.” Id., at 10. Drug interdiction has become the agency’s primary enforcement mission, and the Commissioner stressed that “there is no room in the Customs Service for those who break the laws prohibiting the possession and use of illegal drugs.” Ibid.
In May 1986, the Commissioner announced implementation of the drug-testing program. Drug tests were made a condition of placement or employment for positions that meet one or more of three criteria. The first is direct involvement in drug interdiction or enforcement of related laws, an activity the Commissioner deemed fraught with obvious dangers to the mission of the agency and the lives of Customs agents. Id., at 17, 113. The second criterion is a requirement that the incumbent carry firearms, as the Commissioner concluded that “[pjublic safety demands that employees who carry deadly arms and are prepared to make instant life or death decisions be drug free.” Id., at 113. The third criterion is a requirement for the incumbent to handle “classified” material, which the Commissioner determined might fall into the hands of smugglers if accessible to employees who, by reason of their own illegal drug use, are susceptible to bribery or blackmail. Id., at 114.
After an employee qualifies for a position covered by the Customs testing program, the Service advises him by letter that his final selection is contingent upon successful completion of drug screening. An independent contractor contacts the employee to fix the time and place for collecting the sample. On reporting for the test, the employee must produce photographic identification and remove any outer garments, such as a coat or a jacket, and personal belongings. The employee may produce the sample behind a partition, or in the privacy of a bathroom stall if he so chooses. To ensure against adulteration of the specimen, or substitution of a sample from another person, a monitor of the same sex as the employee remains close at hand to listen for the normal sounds of urination. Dye is added to the toilet water to prevent the employee from using the water to adulterate the sample.
Upon receiving the specimen, the monitor inspects it to ensure its proper temperature and color, places a tamper-proof custody seal over the container, and affixes an identification label indicating the date and the individual’s specimen number. The employee signs a chain-of-custody form, which is initialed by the monitor, and the urine sample is placed in a plastic bag, sealed, and submitted to a laboratory.
The laboratory tests the sample for the presence of marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine. Two tests are used. An initial screening test uses the enzyme-multiplied-immunoassay technique (EMIT). Any specimen that is identified as positive on this initial test must then be confirmed using gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). Confirmed positive results are reported to a “Medical Review Officer,” “[a] licensed physician... who has knowledge of substance abuse disorders and has appropriate medical training to interpret and evaluate an individual’s positive test result together with his or her medical history and any other relevant biomedical information.” HHS Reg. § 1.2, 53 Fed. Reg. 11980 (1988); HHS Reg. §2.4(g), 53 Fed. Reg., at 11983. 'After verifying the positive result, the Medical Review Officer transmits it to the agency.
Customs employees.who test positive for drugs and who can offer no satisfactory explanation are subject to dismissal from the Service. Test results may not, however, be turned over to any other agency, including criminal prosecutors, without the employee’s written consent.
B
Petitioners, a union of federal employees and a union official, commenced this suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of current Customs Service employees who seek covered positions. Petitioners alleged that the Custom Service drug-testing program violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment. The District Court agreed. 649 F. Supp. 380 (1986). The court acknowledged “the legitimate governmental interest in a drug-free work place and work force,” but concluded that “the drug testing plan constitutes an overly intrusive policy of searches and seizures without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, in violation of legitimate expectations of privacy.” Id., at 387. The court enjoined the drug-testing program, and ordered the Customs Service not to require drug tests of any applicants for covered positions.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction. 816 F. 2d 170 (1987). The court agreed with petitioners that the drug-screening program, by requiring an employee to produce a urine sample for chemical testing, effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The court held further that the searches required by the Commissioner’s directive are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It first noted that “[t]he Service has attempted to minimize the intrusiveness of the search” by not requiring visual observation of the act of urination and by affording notice to the employee that he will be tested. Id., at 177. The court also considered it significant that the program limits discretion in determining which employees are to be tested, ibid., and noted that the tests are an aspect of the employment relationship, id., at 178.
The court further found that the Government has a strong interest in detecting drug use among employees who meet the criteria of the Customs program. It reasoned that drug use by covered employees casts substantial doubt on their ability to discharge their duties honestly and vigorously, undermining public confidence in the integrity of the Service and concomitantly impairing the Service’s efforts to enforce the drug laws. Ibid. Illicit drug users, the court found, are susceptible to bribery and blackmail, may be tempted to divert for their own use portions of any drug shipments they interdict, and may, if required to carry firearms, “endanger the safety of their fellow agents, as well as their own, when their performance is impaired by drug use.” Ibid. “Considering the nature and responsibilities of the jobs for which applicants are being considered at Customs and the limited scope of the search,” the court stated, “the exaction of consent as a condition of assignment to the new job is not unreasonable.” Id., at 179.
The dissenting judge concluded that the Customs program is not an effective method for achieving the Service’s goals. He argued principally that an employee “given a five day notification of a test date need only abstain from drug use to prevent being identified as a user.” Id., at 184. He noted also that persons already employed in sensitive positions are not subject to the test. Ibid. Because he did not believe the Customs program can achieve its purposes, the dissenting judge found it unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
We granted certiorari. 485 U. S. 903 (1988). We now affirm so much of the judgment of the Court of Appeals as upheld the testing of employees directly involved in drug interdiction or required to carry firearms. We vacate the judgment to the extent it upheld the testing of applicants for positions requiring the incumbent to handle classified materials, and remand for further proceedings. II
hH
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., ante, at 616-618, decided today, we held that federal regulations requiring employees of private railroads to produce urine samples for chemical testing implicate the Fourth Amendment, as those tests invade reasonable expectations of privacy. Our earlier cases have settled that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches conducted by the Government, even when the Government acts as an employer, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion); see id., at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), and, in view of our holding in Railway Labor Executives that urine tests are searches, it follows that the Customs Service’s drug-testing program must meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
While we have often emphasized, and reiterate today, that a search must be supported, as a general matter, by a warrant issued upon probable cause, see, e. g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 873 (1987); United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 717 (1984), our decision in Railway Labor Executives reaffirms the longstanding principle that neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance. Ante, at 618-624. See also New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 342, n. 8 (1985); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 556-661 (1976). As we note in Railway Labor Executives, our cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context. Ante, at 619-620.
It is clear that the Customs Service’s drug-testing program is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement. Test results may not be used in a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee’s consent. The purposes of the program are to deter drug use among those eligible for promotion to sensitive positions within the Service and to prevent the promotion of drug users to those positions. These substantial interests, no less than the Government’s concern for safe rail transportation at issue in Railway Labor Executives, present a special need that may justify departure from the ordinary warrant and probable-cause requirements.
A
Petitioners do not contend that a warrant is required by the balance of privacy and governmental interests in this context, nor could any such contention withstand scrutiny. We have recognized before that requiring the Government to procure a warrant for every work-related intrusion “would conflict with ‘the common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.’” O’Connor v. Ortega, supra, at 722, quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 143 (1983). See also 480 U. S., at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, at 340 (noting that “[t]he warrant requirement... is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools”). Even if Customs Service employees are more likely to be familiar with the procedures required to obtain a warrant than most other Government workers, requiring a warrant in this context would serve only to divert valuable agency resources from the Service’s primary mission. The Customs Service has been entrusted with pressing responsibilities, and its mission would be compromised if it were required to seek search warrants in connection with routine, yet sensitive, employment decisions.
Furthermore, a warrant would provide little or nothing in the way of additional protection of personal privacy. A warrant serves primarily to advise the citizen that an intrusion is authorized by law and limited in its permissible scope and to interpose a neutral magistrate between the citizen and the law enforcement officer “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). But in the present context, “the circumstances justifying toxicological testing and the permissible limits of such intrusions are defined narrowly and specifically..., and doubtless are well known to covered employees.” Ante, at 622. Under the Customs program, every employee who seeks a transfer to a covered position knows that he must take a drug test, and is likewise aware of the procedures the Service must follow in administering the test. A covered employee is simply not subject “to the discretion of the official in the field.” Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523, 532 (1967). The process becomes automatic when the employee elects to apply for, and thereafter pursue, a covered position. Because the Service does not make a discretionary determination to search based on a judgment that certain conditions are present, there are simply “no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 383 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
B
Even where it is reasonable to dispense with the warrant requirement in the particular circumstances, a search ordinarily must be based on probable cause. Ante, at 624. Our cases teach, however, that the probable-cause standard “ ‘is peculiarly related to criminal investigations.’” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U. S. 367, 371 (1987), quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, at 370, n. 5. In particular, the traditional probable-cause standard may be unhelpful in analyzing the reasonableness of routine administrative functions, Colorado v. Bertine, supra, at 371; see also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S., at 723, especially where the Government seeks to prevent the development of hazardous conditions or to detect violations that rarely generate articulable grounds for searching any particular place or person. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, supra, at 535-536 (noting that building code inspections, unlike searches conducted pursuant to a criminal investigation, are designed “to prevent even the unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety”); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S., at 557 (noting that requiring particularized suspicion before routine stops on major highways near the Mexican border “would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens”). Our precedents have settled that, in certain limited circumstances, the Government’s need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of individualized suspicion. E. g., ante, at 624. We think the Government’s need to conduct the suspicionless searches required by the Customs program outweighs the privacy interests of employees engaged directly in drug interdiction, and of those who otherwise are required to carry firearms.
The Customs Service is our Nation’s first line of defense against one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population. We have adverted before to “the veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U. S. 531, 538 (1985). See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 513 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Our cases also reflect the traffickers’ seemingly inexhaustible repertoire of deceptive practices and elaborate schemes for importing narcotics, e. g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, supra, at 538-539; United States v. Ramsey, 431 U. S. 606, 608-609 (1977). The record in this case confirms that, through the adroit selection of source locations, smuggling routes, and increasingly elaborate methods of concealment, drug traffickers have managed to bring into this country increasingly large quantities of illegal drugs. App. 111. The record also indicates, and it is well known, that drug smugglers do not hesitate to use violence to protect their lucrative trade and avoid apprehension. Id., at 109.
Many of the Service’s employees are often exposed to this criminal element and to the controlled substances it seeks to smuggle into the country. Ibid. Cf. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, supra, at 543. The physical safety of these employees may be threatened, and many may be tempted not only by bribes from the traffickers with whom they deal, but also by their own access to vast sources of valuable contraband seized and controlled by the Service. The Commissioner indicated below that “Customs [officers have been shot, stabbed, run over, dragged by automobiles, and assaulted with blunt objects while performing their duties.” App. at 109-110. At least nine officers have died in the line of duty since 1974. He also noted that Customs officers have been the targets of bribery by drug smugglers on numerous occasions, and several have been removed from the Service for accepting bribes and for other integrity violations. Id., at 114. See also United States Customs Service, Customs U. S. A., Fiscal Year 1987, p. 31 (reporting internal investigations that resulted in the arrest of 24 employees and 54 civilians); United States Customs Service, Customs U. S. A., Fiscal Year 1986, p. 32 (reporting that 334 criminal and serious integrity investigations were conducted during the fiscal year, resulting in the arrest of 37 employees and 17 civilians); United States Customs Service, Customs U. S. A., Fiscal Year 1985, p. 32 (reporting that 284 criminal and serious integrity investigations were conducted during the 1985 fiscal year, resulting in the arrest of 15 employees and 51 civilians).
It is readily apparent that the Government has a compelling interest in ensuring that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment. Indeed, the Government’s interest here is at least as important as its interest in searching travelers entering the country. We have long held that travelers seeking to enter the country may be stopped and required to submit to a routine search without probable cause, or even founded suspicion, “because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 154 (1925). See also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, supra, at 538; United States v. Ramsey, supra, at 617-619. This national interest in self-protection could be irreparably damaged if those charged with safeguarding it were, because of their own drug use, unsympathetic to their mission of interdicting narcotics. A drug user’s indifference to the Service’s basic mission or, even worse, his active complicity with the malefactors, can facilitate importation of sizable drug shipments or block apprehension of dangerous criminals. The public interest demands effective measures to bar drug users from positions directly involving the interdiction of illegal drugs.
The public interest likewise demands effective measures to prevent the promotion of drug users to positions that require the incumbent to carry a firearm, even if the incumbent is not engaged directly in the interdiction of drugs. Customs employees who may use deadly force plainly “discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.” Ante, at 628. We agree with the Government that the public should not bear the risk that employees who may suffer from impaired perception and judgment will be promoted to positions where they may need to employ deadly force. Indeed, ensuring against the creation of this dangerous risk will itself further Fourth Amendment values, as the use of deadly force may violate the Fourth Amendment in certain circumstances. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 7-12 (1985).
Against these valid public interests we must weigh the interference with individual liberty that results from requiring these classes of employees to undergo a urine test. The interference with individual privacy that results from the collection of a urine sample for subsequent chemical analysis could be substantial in some circumstances. Ante, at 626. We have recognized, however, that the “operational realities of the workplace” may render entirely reasonable certain work-related intrusions by supervisors and co-workers that might be viewed as unreasonable in other contexts. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S., at 717; id., at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). While these operational realities will rarely affect an employee’s expectations of privacy with respect to searches of his person, or of personal effects that the employee may bring to the workplace, id., at 716, 725, it is plain that certain forms of public employment may diminish privacy expectations even with respect to such personal searches. Employees of the United States Mint, for example, should expect to be subject to certain routine personal searches when they leave the workplace every day. Similarly, those who join our military or intelligence services may not only be required to give what in other contexts might be viewed as extraordinary assurances of trustworthiness and probity, but also may expect intrusive inquiries into their physical fitness for those special positions. Cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U. S. 507, 509, n. 3 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 758 (1974); Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 171 U. S. App. D. C. 73, 84, 518 F. 2d 466, 477 (1975).
We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in the line of duty likewise have a diminished expectation of privacy in respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test. Unlike most private citizens or government employees in general, employees involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness and probity. Much the same is true of employees who are required to carry firearms. Because successful performance of their duties depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity, these employees cannot reasonably expect to keep from the Service personal information that bears directly on their fitness. Cf. In re Caruso v. Ward, 72 N. Y. 2d 433, 441, 530 N. E. 2d 850, 854-855 (1988). While reasonable tests designed to elicit this information doubtless infringe some privacy expectations, we do not believe these expectations outweigh the Government’s compelling interests in safety and in the integrity of our borders.
Without disparaging the importance of the governmental interests that support the suspicionless searches of these employees, petitioners nevertheless contend that the Service’s drug-testing program is unreasonable in two particulars. First, petitioners argue that the program is unjustified because it is not based on a belief that testing will reveal any drug use by covered employees. In pressing this argument, petitioners point out that the Service’s testing scheme was not implemented in response to any perceived drug problem among Customs employees, and that the program actually has not led to the discovery of a significant number of drug users. Brief for Petitioners 37, 44; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, 20-21. Counsel for petitioners informed us at oral argument that no more than 5 employees out of 3,600 have tested positive for drugs. Id., at 11. Second, petitioners contend that the Service’s scheme is not a “sufficiently productive mechanism to justify [its] intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests,” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 658-659 (1979), because illegal drug users can avoid detection with ease by temporary abstinence or by surreptitious adulteration of their urine specimens. Brief for Petitioners 46-47. These contentions are unpersuasive.
Petitioners’ first contention evinces an unduly narrow view of the context in which the Service’s testing program was implemented. Petitioners do not dispute, nor can there be doubt, that drug abuse is one of the most serious problems confronting our society today. There is little reason to believe that American workplaces are immune from this pervasive social problem, as is amply illustrated by our decision in Railway Labor Executives. See also Masino v. United States, 589 P. 2d 1048, 1050 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (describing marijuana use by two Customs inspectors). Detecting drug impairment on the part of employees can be a difficult task, especially where, as here, it is not feasible to subject employees and their work product to the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office environments. Indeed, the almost unique mission of the Service gives the Government a compelling interest in ensuring that many of these covered employees do not use drugs even off duty, for such use creates risks of bribery and blackmail against which the Government is entitled to guard. In light of the extraordinary safety and national security hazards that would attend the promotion of drug users to positions that require the carrying of firearms or the interdiction of controlled substances, the Service’s policy of deterring drug users from seeking such promotions cannot be deemed unreasonable.
The mere circumstance that all but a few of the employees tested are entirely innocent of wrongdoing does not impugn the program’s validity. The same is likely to be true of householders who are required to submit to suspicionless housing code inspections, see Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and of motorists who are stopped at the checkpoints we approved in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976). The Service’s program is designed to prevent the promotion of drug users to sensitive positions as much as it is designed to detect those employees who use drugs. Where, as here, the possible harm against which the Government seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches calculated to advance the Government’s goal.
We think petitioners’ second argument — that the Service’s testing program is ineffective because employees may attempt to deceive the test by a brief abstention before the test date, or by adulterating their urine specimens — overstates the case. As the Court of Appeals noted, addicts may be unable to abstain even for a limited period of time, or may be unaware of the “fade-away effect” of certain drugs. 816 F. 2d, at 180. More importantly, the avoidance techniques suggested by petitioners are fraught with uncertainty and risks for those employees who venture to attempt them. A particular employee’s pattern of elimination for a given drug cannot be predicted with perfect accuracy, and, in any event, this information is not likely to be known or available to the employee. Petitioners’ own expert indicated below that the time it takes for particular drugs to become undetectable in urine can vary widely depending on the individual, and may extend for as long as 22 days. App. 66. See also ante, at 631 (noting Court of Appeals’ reliance on certain academic literature that indicates that the testing of urine can discover drug use “ ‘for... weeks after the ingestion of the drug’ ”). Thus, contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, no employee reasonably can expect to deceive the test by the simple expedient of abstaining after the test date is assigned. Nor can he expect attempts at adulteration to succeed, in view of the precautions taken by the sample collector to ensure the integrity of the sample. In all the circumstances, we are persuaded that the program bears a close and substantial relation to the Service’s goal of deterring drug users from seeking promotion to sensitive positions.
In sum, we believe the Government has demonstrated that its compelling interests in safeguarding our borders and the public safety outweigh the privacy expectations of employees who seek to be promoted to positions that directly involve the interdiction of illegal drugs or that require the incumbent to carry a firearm. We hold that the testing of these employees is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
C
We are unable, on the present record, to assess the reasonableness of the Government’s testing program insofar as it covers employees who are required “to handle classified material.” App. 17. We readily agree that the Government has a compelling interest in protecting truly sensitive information from those who, “under compulsion of circumstances or for other reasons,... might compromise [such] information.” Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U. S. 518, 528 (1988). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 267 (1967) (“We have recognized that, while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it does not withdraw from the Government the power to safeguard its vital interests.... The Government can deny access to its secrets to those who would use such information to harm the Nation”). We also agree that employees who seek promotions to positions where they would handle sensitive information can be required to submit to a urine test under the Service’s screening program, especially if the positions covered under this category require background investigations, medical examinations, or other intrusions that may be expected to diminish their expectations of privacy in respect of a urinalysis test. Cf. Department of Navy v. Egan, supra, at 528 (noting that the Executive Branch generally subjects those desiring a security clearance to “a background investigation that varies according to the degree of adverse effect the applicant could have on the national security”).
It is not clear, however, whether the category defined by the Service’s testing directive encompasses only those Customs employees likely to gain access to sensitive information. Employees who are tested under the Service’s scheme include those holding such diverse positions as “Accountant,” “Accounting Technician,” “Animal Caretaker,” “Attorney (All),” “Baggage Clerk,” “Co-op Student (All),” “Electric Equipment Repairer,” “Mail Clerk/Assistant,” and “Messenger.” App. 42-43. We assume these positions were selected for coverage under the Service’s testing program by reason of the incumbent’s access to “classified” information, as it is not clear that they would fall under either of the two categories we have already considered. Yet it is not evident that those occupying these positions are likely to gain access to sensitive information, and this apparent discrepancy raises in our minds the question whether the Service has defined this category of employees more broadly than is necessary to meet the purposes of the Commissioner’s directive.
We cannot resolve this ambiguity on the basis of the record before us, and we think it is appropriate to remand the case to the Court of Appeals for such proceedings as may be necessary to clarify the scope of this category of employees subject to testing. Upon remand the Court of Appeals should examine the criteria used by the Service in determining what materials are classified and in deciding whom to test under this rubric. In assessing the reasonableness of requiring tests of these employees, the court should also consider pertinent information bearing upon the employees’ privacy expectations, as well as the supervision to which these employees are already subject.
Ill
Where the Government requires its employees to produce urine samples to be analyzed for evidence of illegal drug use, the collection and subsequent chemical analysis of such samples are searches that must meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Because the testing program adopted by the Customs Service is not designed to serve the ordinary' needs of law enforcement, we have balanced the public interest in the Service’s testing program against the privacy concerns implicated by the tests, without reference to our usual presumption in favor of the procedures specified in the Warrant Clause, to assess whether the tests required by Customs are reasonable.
We hold that the suspicionless testing of employees who apply for promotion to positions directly involving the interdiction of illegal drugs, or to positions that require the incumbent to carry a firearm, is reasonable. The Government’s compelling interests in preventing the promotion of drug users to positions where they might endanger the integrity of our Nation’s borders or the life of the citizenry outweigh the privacy interests of those who seek promotion to these positions, who enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy by virtue of the special, and obvious, physical and ethical demands of those positions. We do not decide whether testing those who apply for promotion to positions where they would handle “classified” information is reasonable because we find the record inadequate for this purpose.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
After this case was decided by.the Court of Appeals, 816 F. 2d 170 (CA5 1987), the United States Department of Health and Human Services, in accordance with recently enacted legislation, Pub. L. 100-71, § 503, 101 Stat. 468-471, promulgated regulations (hereinafter HHS Regulations or HHS Reg.) governing certain federal employee drug-testing programs. 53 Fed. Reg. 11979 (1988). To the extent the HHS Regulations add to, or depart from, the procedures adopted as part of a federal drug-screening program covered by Pub. L. 100-71, the HHS Regulations control. Pub. L. 100-71, § 503(b)(2)(B), 101 Stat. 470. Both parties agree that the Customs Service’s drug-testing program must conform to the HHS Regulations. See Brief for Petitioners 6, n. 8; Brief for Respondent 4-5, and n. 4. We therefore consider the HHS Regulations to the extent they supplement or displace the Commissioner’s original directive. See California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 53 (1974); Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U. S.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue in this case is whether petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed within the time specified by Rule 37 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner was convicted on January 11, 1962, of violations of the postal laws. Four days later — on January 15 — he appeared for sentencing with the attorney who had been appointed to represent him at trial. Consecutive sentences aggregating 20 years were imposed, after which the defendant asked if he could appeal the case “as an insolvent.” The sentencing judge replied:
“Oh, yes, you always have a right to appeal; the Government provides for that.
“So that will be all. We are through with this case.
“Mr. Marshal, you may take charge of the defendant.”
Before he was taken out of the building, petitioner was given an opportunity to consult with his court-appointed attorney. According to the attorney’s later recollection, petitioner asked him at that time if he would be interested in representing him on an appeal. The attorney responded that his firm did not want him to undertake any further criminal matters, and that it would thus be best for petitioner to secure another attorney promptly so as not to forfeit his right to appeal. The attorney recalled that this conference lasted for about an hour and a half- — petitioner, that it lasted for only a few minutes. In any event, petitioner was then taken back to the medical center at which he had been quartered during the trial. Early the next morning, he was transferred to hospital facilities at Atlanta to commence his sentence. At neither place was he permitted to have visitors.
On January 29, 14 days after sentencing, the clerk of the court in which petitioner had been convicted received letters from petitioner asking for a new trial and for an appeal. The letters were dated January 23 by petitioner, and were mailed in a single envelope which bore a government frank but no postmark. No communications had been received in the interim from either petitioner or his court-appointed counsel.
The chief judge of the district then reappointed the same attorney for the purpose of presenting the motion for a new trial to the trial judge at a hearing which was set for that purpose. In due course the motion was denied on the merits, the time question having been argued but not decided. On the same day, petitioner’s reappointed attorney filed a notice of appeal and petitioner was granted leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Thereafter a new attorney was appointed to represent petitioner before the Court of Appeals and the case was set for hearing on the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal because the notice was not timely filed.
A divided Court of Appeals held, first, that petitioner’s motion for a new trial was not timely filed, and that the consideration of the motion on the merits by the trial judge was in error and thus could not serve to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. It then held that the time for filing the notice began on January 15 when petitioner was sentenced, and expired when on January 25 the clerk had not received the notice. 306 F. 2d 697. We granted certiorari, 374 U. S. 826, to consider whether the restrictive reading of the Rules by the court below was justified under the circumstances of this case. We have concluded that it was not, and accordingly remand the case for a disposition of petitioner’s appeal on the merits.
Rule 37 (a) provides that “[a]n appeal by a defendant may be taken within 10 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from . . .” and that an appeal is taken “by filing with the clerk of the district court a notice of appeal . . . .” The Court of Appeals has read this to mean that, irrespective of the reason for the delay, the notice of appeal must actually be in the hands of the clerk on or before the 10th day. Since the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the hearing of the appeal, the court thus felt powerless to do anything but to dismiss.
Overlooked, in our view, was the fact that the Rules are not, and were not intended to be, a rigid code to have an inflexible meaning irrespective of the circumstances. Rule 2 begins with the admonition that “[tjhese rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” That the Rules were not approached with sympathy for their purpose is apparent when the circumstances of this case are examined.
In the first place, in spite of the promise of the Rule, petitioner was forced to take his appeal without the assistance of counsel. He was whisked away from the place of trial (Jacksonville, Florida) on the day after he was sentenced, and, as he tells it without contradiction in the record, not permitted to have visitors, nor afforded the opportunity to secure another attorney. In addition to his normal physical problems, he was ill, and was thus confined in a hospital both in Jacksonville and in Atlanta.
It was not until January 23, as he tells it, again without contradiction in the record, that he felt well enough to write. Acting without advice as to the requirements of time, except that which he could acquire from other inmates, he then wrote two letters asking for a new trial and for the appeal which the trial judge promised that “the Government provides.” These letters were promptly mailed on January 23, for all the record shows, and by coincidence, no doubt, would thus in the normal course of events have been received by the clerk within the 10 days.
That they were not received within 10 days, however, is perhaps explained by the Government’s disclosure at oral argument that mail pickups at Atlanta at that time occurred only twice a week, on Tuesdays and Fridays. Thus, if petitioner deposited the letters with prison authorities after the hour of pickup on January 23, a Tuesday — and there is nothing in the record to show that anyone took the trouble to tell him about such mailing delays — his letters would not have been placed in the mail by prison authorities until Friday. They thus probably would not have been received by the clerk’s office until Monday the 29th, the day on which they were actually marked received by the clerk.
But whether or not this in fact occurred, there is no reason on the basis of what this record discloses to doubt that petitioner’s date at the top of the letter was an accurate one and that subsequent delays were not chargeable to him. Cf. Rosenbloom v. United States, 355 U. S. 80. There is no postmark on the envelope, nor any indication of the time at which the envelope came into the hands of prison officials. Other letters also mailed by petitioner from the prison took an equally long time to get to their destination. And although the Government had the opportunity, it introduced no evidence — and admitted on oral argument that it had none — to dispute the record facts that petitioner had done all that could reasonably be expected to get the letter to its destination within the required 10 days. Since petitioner did all he could under the circumstances, we decline to read the Rules so rigidly as to bar a determination of his appeal on the merits.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for a prompt disposition of the appeal on the merits.
It is so ordered.
Specifically, 18 U. S. C. §§ 371, 641, 2115.
As the result of an automobile accident in 1951, petitioner is a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair. In addition to complications which have resulted from his affliction, petitioner was at the time of sentencing suffering from the flu. He was kept in medical facilities, it appears, more because of his flu than his more permanent condition.
Rule 37 (a) (2) provides that if a motion for new trial is made within the 10 days during which an appeal must be taken, the appeal from the judgment of conviction may be taken within 10 days from the denial of the motion.
Rule 37 (a)(2) provides that “[w]hen a court after trial imposes sentence upon a defendant not represented, by counsel, the defendant shall be advised of his right to appeal and if he so requests, the clerk shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) Although counsel was physically present at sentencing, it is an open question whether petitioner was “represented” by counsel within the meaning and purpose of the Rule.
See note 2, supra.
January 23 was the eighth day after sentencing, and the parties are agreed that a letter mailed on the 23d in Atlanta would normally be received in Jacksonville by the 25th.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This murder case comes before us for the third time, to review a determination by the Supreme Court of South Carolina that instructions allowing the jury to apply unconstitutional presumptions were harmless error. We hold that the State Supreme Court employed a deficient standard of review, find that the errors were not harmless, and reverse.
I
A
Petitioner, Dale Robert Yates, and an accomplice, Henry Davis, robbed a country store in Greenville County, South Carolina. After shooting and wounding the proprietor, petitioner fled. Davis then killed a woman before he was shot to death by the proprietor. Petitioner was arrested soon after the robbery and charged with multiple felonies. Although he killed no one, the State prosecuted him for murder as an accomplice.
The trial record shows that for some time petitioner and Davis had planned to commit a robbery and selected T. P. Wood’s Store in Greenville as an easy target. After parking Davis’ car outside, they entered the store, petitioner armed with a handgun and Davis with a knife. They found no one inside except the proprietor, Willie Wood, who was standing behind the counter. Petitioner and Davis brandished their weapons, and petitioner ordered Wood to give them all the money in the cash register. When Wood hesitated, Davis repeated the demand. Wood gave Davis approximately $3,000 in cash. Davis handed the money to petitioner and ordered Wood to lie across the counter. Wood, who had a pistol beneath his jacket, refused and stepped back from the counter with his hands down at his side. Petitioner meanwhile was backing away from the counter toward the entrance to the store, with his gun pointed at Wood. Davis told him to shoot. Wood raised his hands as if to protect himself, whereupon petitioner fired twice. One bullet pierced Wood’s left hand and tore a flesh wound in his chest, but the other shot missed. Petitioner then screamed, “Let’s go,” and ran out with the money. App. 57. He jumped into Davis’ car on the passenger side and waited. When Davis failed to emerge, petitioner moved across the seat and drove off.
Inside the store, Wood, though wounded, ran around the counter pursued by Davis, who jumped on his back. As the two struggled, Wood’s mother, Helen Wood, emerged from an adjacent office. She screamed when she saw the scuffle and ran toward the two men to help her son. Wood testified that his mother “reached her left arm around and grabbed [Davis]. So, all three of us stumbled around the counter, out in the aisle.” Id., at 19. During the struggle, Mrs. Wood was stabbed once in the chest and died at the scene within minutes. Wood managed to remove the pistol from under his jacket and fire five shots at Davis, killing him instantly.
The police arrested petitioner a short while later and charged him as an accomplice to the murder of Mrs. Wood. Under South Carolina law, “where two persons combine to commit an unlawful act, and in execution of the criminal act, a homicide is committed by one of the actors as a probable or natural consequence of those acts [sic], all present participating in the unlawful act are as guilty as the one who committed the fatal act.” State v. Johnson, 291 S. C. 127, 129, 352 S. E. 2d 480, 482 (1987). Petitioner’s primary defense to the murder charge was that Mrs. Wood’s death was not the probable or natural consequence of the robbery he had planned with Davis. Petitioner testified that he had brought a weapon with him only to induce the store owner to empty the cash register, and that neither he nor Davis intended to kill anyone during the robbery. App. 37, 42-44, 49, 77-78.
The prosecution’s case for murder rested on petitioner’s agreement with Davis to commit an armed robbery. From this the State argued they had planned to kill any witnesses at the scene, and had thereby rendered homicide a probable or natural result of the robbery, in satisfaction of the requirement for accomplice liability. In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor asserted that petitioner and Davis had planned to rob without leaving “any witnesses in the store.” They entered the store “with the idea of stabbing the proprietor to death; a quiet killing, with [petitioner’s] pistol as a backup.” As a result of this agreement, the prosecutor concluded, “[i]t makes no difference who actually struck the fatal blow, the hand of one is the hand of all.” Id., at 89. The prosecutor also addressed the required element of malice. “Mr. Yates,” he argued, “is equally guilty. The malice required was in his heart,” making him guilty of murder even though he did not actually kill the victim. Id., at 83.
The trial judge charged the jury that murder under South Carolina law “is the unlawful killing of any human being with malice aforethought either express or implied.” Id., at 95. The judge continued:
“In order to convict one of murder, the State must not only prove the killing of the deceased by the Defendant, but that it was done with malice aforethought, and such proof must be beyond any reasonable doubt. Malice is defined in the law of homicide as a technical term, which imports wickedness and excludes any just cause or excuse for your action. It is something which springs from wickedness, from depravity, from a depraved spirit, from a heart devoid of social duty, and fatally bent on creating mischief. The words ‘express’ or ‘implied’ do not mean different kinds of malice, but they mean different ways in which the only kind of malice known to the law may be áhown.
“Malice may be expressed as where previous threats of vengeance have been made or is where someone lies in wait for someone else to come by so that they might attack them, or any other circumstances which show directly that an intent to kill was really and actually entertained.
“Malice may also be implied as where, although no expressed intention to kill was proved by direct evidence, it is indirectly and necessarily inferred from facts and circumstances which are, themselves, proved. Malice is implied or presumed by the law from the willful, deliberate, and intentional doing of an unlawful act without any just cause or excuse. In its general signification, malice means the doing of a wrongful act, intentionally, without justification or excuse.
“I tell you, however, that if the facts proven are sufficient to raise a presumption of malice, that presumption is rebuttable, that is, it is not conclusive on you, but it is rebuttable by the rest of the evidence. I tell you, also, that malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly weapon. I further tell you that when the circumstances surrounding the use of that deadly weapon have been put in evidence and testified to, the presumption is removed. And it ultimately remains the responsibility for you, ladies and gentlemen, under all the evidence to make a determination as to whether malice existed in the mind and heart of the killer at the time the fatal blow was struck.” Id., at 96-97.
The judge went on to instruct the jury on the theory of accomplice liability. The jury returned guilty verdicts on the murder charge and on all the other counts in the indictment. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction, and we denied certiorari. State v. Yates, 280 S. C. 29, 310 S. E. 2d 805 (1982), cert. denied, 462 U. S. 1124 (1983).
B
Petitioner thereafter sought a writ of habeas corpus from the State Supreme Court, asserting that the jury charge “that malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly weapon” was an unconstitutional burden-shifting instruction both under state precedent, State v. Elmore, 279 S. C. 417, 308 S. E. 2d 781 (1983), and under our decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979). While the state habeas petition was pending, we delivered another opinion on unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instructions, Francis v. Franklin, 471U. S. 307 (1985). Although petitioner brought this decision to the attention of the state court, it denied relief without opinion, and petitioner sought certiorari here. We granted the writ, vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Francis. Yates v. Aiken, 474 U. S. 896 (1985).
On remand, the State Supreme Court found the jury instruction unconstitutional, but denied relief on the ground that its decision in State v. Elmore, supra, was not to be applied retroactively. Petitioner again sought review here, and again we granted certiorari, Yates v. Aiken, 480 U. S. 945 (1987), out of concern that the State Supreme Court had not complied with the mandate to reconsider its earlier decision in light of Francis v. Franklin, supra. Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S. 211, 214 (1988). In an opinion by Justice Stevens, we unanimously held the state court had erred in failing to consider the retroactive application of Francis. We then addressed that question and held that Francis was merely an application of the principle settled by our prior decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, and should, for that reason, be applied retroactively in petitioner’s habeas proceeding. We accordingly reversed the judgment of the State Supreme Court and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with our opinion. Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S., at 218.
On the second remand, the Supreme Court of South Carolina stated that it was “[a]cquiescing in the conclusion that the trial judge’s charge on implied malice constituted an improper mandatory presumption.” State v. Yates, 301 S. C. 214, 216-217, 391 S. E. 2d 530, 531 (1989). On reviewing the record, the court found “two erroneous charges regarding implied malice. First, the trial judge charged the ‘willful, deliberate, and intentional doing of an unlawful act without any just cause or excuse’ [implied malice]. Second, he charged, ‘malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly weapon’....” Id., at 218, 391 S. E. 2d, at 532.
Despite this determination that two jury instructions were unconstitutional, the State Supreme Court again denied relief after a majority of three justices found the instructions to have been harmless error. The court described its enquiry as one to determine “whether it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the erroneous mandatory presumption regarding the element of malice.” Ibid. The court then stated that on “the facts of this case, as charged by the trial judge, the element of malice relied on by the State is that of the killer, Henry Davis.” Id., at 219, 391 S. E. 2d, at 532. Reviewing the facts, the court stated that “Davis lunged at Mrs. Wood with his knife [and] Mrs. Wood fell to the floor from knife wounds in her chest and died within moments.” Id., at 217, 391 S. E. 2d, at 531 (emphasis added). The court described the crime as “Henry Davis’ brutal multiple stabbing of Mrs. Wood,” and held “beyond a reasonable doubt [that] the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on either erroneous mandatory presumption in concluding that Davis acted with malice in killing Mrs. Wood.” Id., at 219, 391 S. E. 2d, at 532 (emphasis supplied). The state court gave no citation to the record for its description of Mrs. Wood’s death as resulting from a multiple stabbing and multiple wounds.
The remaining two justices on the State Supreme Court dissented. After first expressing doubt that this Court’s mandate authorized them to review for harmless error, id., at 222, 391 S. E. 2d, at 534, the dissenters disagreed that the erroneous jury instructions were harmless. They found that the trial judge “failed to articulate that the jury must find the killer acted with malicious intent.” Following this error, “the jury could have mistakenly inferred from the confusing instructions that the intent required in order to prove murder was that of Yates because he carried a gun. The unconstitutional instruction which allowed the jury to presume intent... would have eclipsed Yates’ defense of withdrawal, and prejudiced his right to a fair trial.” Id., at 222-223, 391 S. E. 2d, at 534-535.
Because the Supreme Court of South Carolina appeared to have applied the wrong standard for determining whether the challenged instructions were harmless error, and to have misread the record to which the standard was applied, we granted certiorari to review this case a third time. 498 U. S. 809 (1990).
II
A
This Court held in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S., at 513, 524, that a jury instruction stating that “ ‘the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts’ ” violated the requirement of the Due Process Clause that the prosecution prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). We applied this principle in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307 (1985), to instructions that the “‘acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of the person’s will’ and that a person ‘is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts.’” Id., at 316 (emphasis omitted). Although the jury had been told that these presumptions were rebuttable, we held them to be as pernicious in this context as conclusive presumptions because they shifted the burden of proof on intent to the de-. fendant. Id., at 316-318.
In charging the jurors on the issue of malice in this case, the trial judge instructed them on two mandatory presumptions, each of which the Supreme Court of South Carolina has since held to be unconstitutional under Sandstrom and Francis. The jury was told that “malice is implied or presumed” from the “willful, deliberate, and intentional doing of an unlawful act” and from the “use of a deadly weapon.” App. 96. With respect to the unlawful act presumption, the jury was told that the “presumption is rebuttable, that is, it is not conclusive on you, but it is rebuttable by the rest of the evidence.” Ibid. Following the description of the deadly weapon presumption, the jurors were told that it was their responsibility “under all the evidence to make a determination as to whether malice existed in the mind and heart of the killer.” Ibid.
We think a reasonable juror would have understood the unlawful act presumption to mean that upon introduction of evidence tending to rebut malice, the jury should consider all evidence bearing on the issue of malice, together with the presumption, which would still retain some probative significance. A reasonable juror would have understood the deadly weapon presumption to mean that its probative force should be considered along with all other evidence tending to prove or disprove malice. Although the presumptions were rebuttable in these ways, the mandate to apply them remained, as did their tendency to shift the burden of proof on malice from the prosecution to petitioner. Respondents do not challenge the conclusion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina that each presumption violated Sandstrom and Francis, and the constitutionality of neither one is in issue.
B
Having concluded that the instructions were constitutionally erroneous, the Supreme Court of South Carolina correctly treated them as subject to further review for harmless error, consistently with Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570, 582 (1986), in which we held that the taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction may be harmless, citing Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Chap man test is whether it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id., at 24; see ibid, (requirement that harmlessness of federal constitutional error be clear beyond reasonable doubt embodies standard requiring reversal if “ ‘there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction’ ”) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U. S. 85, 86-87 (1963)); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279, 296 (1991) (confession is harmless error if it “did not contribute to [the defendant’s] conviction”); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 681 (1986) (Chapman excuses errors that were “ ‘harmless’ in terms of their effect on the factfinding process at trial”).
To say that an error did not “contribute” to the ensuing verdict is not, of course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial later held to have been erroneous. When, for example, a trial court has instructed a jury to apply an unconstitutional presumption, a reviewing court can hardly infer that the jurors failed to consider it, a conclusion that would be factually untenable in most cases, and would run counter to a sound presumption of appellate practice, that jurors are reasonable and generally follow the instructions they are given. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 211 (1987) (“The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant”).
To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record. Thus, to say that an instruction to apply an unconstitutional presumption did not contribute to the verdict is to make a judgment about the significance of the presumption to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the presumption.
Before reaching such a judgment, a court must take two quite distinct steps. First, it must ask what evidence the jury actually considered in reaching its verdict. If, for example, the fact presumed is necessary to support the verdict, a reviewing court must ask what evidence the jury considered as tending to prove or disprove that fact. Did the jury look at only the predicate facts, or did it consider other evidence bearing on the fact subject to the presumption? In answering this question, a court does not conduct a subjective enquiry into the jurors’ minds. The answer must come, instead, from analysis of the instructions given to the jurors and from application of that customary presumption that jurors follow instructions and, specifically, that they consider relevant evidence on a point in issue when they are told that they may do so.
Once a court has made the first enquiry into the evidence considered by the jury, it must then weigh the probative force of that evidence as against the probative force of the presumption standing alone. To satisfy Chapman’s reasonable-doubt standard, it will not be enough that the jury considered evidence from which it could have come to the verdict without reliance on the presumption. Rather, the issue under Chapman is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the presumption. Since that enquiry cannot be a subjective one into the jurors’ minds, a court must approach it by asking whether the force of the evidence presumably considered by the jury in accordance with the instructions is so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that evidence would have been the same in the absence of the presumption. It is only when the effect of the presumption is comparatively minimal to this degree that it can be said, in Chapman’s words, that the presumption did not contribute to the verdict rendered.
Because application of the harmless-error test to an erroneous presumption thus requires an identification and evaluation of the evidence considered by the jury in addition to the presumption itself, we need to say a word about an assumption made in many opinions applying the Chapman rule, which state that the harmlessness of an error is to be judged after a review of the entire record. See, e. g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, at 681 (“[A]n otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 609, n. 7 (1983) (“Chapman mandates consideration of the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for constitutional errors that may be harmless”). That assumption is simply that the jury considered all the evidence bearing on the issue in question before it made the findings on which the verdict rested. If, on the contrary, that assumption were incorrect, an examination of the entire record would not permit any sound conclusion to be drawn about the significance of the error to the jury in reaching the verdict. This point must always be kept in mind when reviewing erroneous presumptions for harmless error, because the terms of some presumptions so narrow the jury’s focus as to leave it questionable that a reasonable juror would look to anything but the evidence establishing the predicate fact in order to infer the fact presumed. When applying a harmless-error analysis in presumption cases, therefore, it is crucial to ascertain from the trial court’s instructions that the jurors, as reasonable persons, would have considered the entire trial record, before looking to that record to assess the significance of the erroneous presumption.
C
The Supreme Court of South Carolina failed to apply the proper harmless-error standard to the rebuttable presumptions at issue in this case. As a threshold matter, the State Supreme Court did not undertake any explicit analysis to support its view of the scope of the record to be considered in applying Chapman. It is even more significant, however, that the state court did not apply the test that Chapman formulated. Instead, the court employed language taken out of context from Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570 (1986), and sought merely to determine whether it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury “would have found it unnecessary to rely” on the unconstitutional presumptions.
Enquiry about the necessity for reliance, however, does not satisfy all of Chapman’s concerns. It can tell us that the verdict could have been the same without the presumptions, when there was evidence sufficient to support the verdict independently of the presumptions’ effect. But the enquiry will not tell us whether the jury’s verdict did rest on that evidence as well as on the presumptions, or whether that evidence was of such compelling force as to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the presumptions must have made no difference in reaching the verdict obtained. Because the State Supreme Court’s standard of review apparently did not take these latter two issues into consideration, reversal is required.
Ill
Although our usual practice in cases like this is to reverse and remand for a new determination under the correct standard, we have the authority to make our own assessment of the harmlessness of a constitutional error in the first instance. See Rose v. Clark, supra, at 584. Because this case has already been remanded twice, once for harmless-error analysis, we think we would serve judicial economy best by proceeding now to determine whether the burden-shifting jury instructions were harmless.
We begin by turning to the State’s domestic law of accomplice murder and the elements it entails. The State Supreme Court decided that the trial judge “correctly and precisely” charged the jury on “the common law rule of murder,” which required proof of malice. State v. Yates, 280 S. C., at 38, 310 S. E. 2d, at 810. Petitioner was charged as an accomplice to the alleged murder of Mrs. Wood by Davis, and the state court determined that on “the facts of this case, as charged by the trial judge, the element of malice relied on by the State is that of the killer, Henry Davis.” 301 S. C., at 219, 391 S. E. 2d, at 532.
In light of the fact that the Supreme Court of South Carolina has approved the trial judge’s jury instructions, we will accept his charge on malice as the proper statement of South Carolina law on the subject. The trial judge told the jury that malice is the equivalent of an “intention to kill,” without legal justification or excuse. There is no question that either presumption on malice could have been employed by the jury in reaching its verdict. The evidence showed clearly that Davis used a deadly weapon, a knife, and intended to commit, and did commit, an unlawful act without legal justification, not only armed robbery, but the killing itself.
The first step in determining whether these instructions contributed to the jury’s verdict is to determine what evidence the jury considered on the issue of intent, independently of the presumptions themselves. The record reveals some evidence rebutting malice, including petitioner’s testimony that neither he nor Davis intended to kill anyone. This left the jury free to look beyond the unlawful act presumption and to consider all the evidence on malice. The jury can reasonably be expected to have done so. Likewise, under the deadly weapon presumption, as we have construed it, the jury was instructed to consider all the evidence, not just the presumption itself. Since we can thus infer with confidence that the jury considered all the evidence tending to prove or disprove Davis’ intent to kill, it is correct simply to follow the general rule of the post-Chapman cases that the whole record be reviewed in assessing the significance of the errors.
An examination of the entire record reveals that, as to Willie Wood, there was clear evidence of Davis’ intent to kill: Instead of leaving the store when he could have, Davis pursued Wood with a deadly weapon in his hand and attacked Wood by jumping on his back. This evidence was enhanced by the fact that Davis had at least two reasons to kill Wood. He could have thought it necessary to avoid being himself killed or injured by Wood, and he also could have thought it necessary to avoid being identified by Wood to the police.
As probative as this was of Davis’ intent to kill Wood, however, there was nothing in the instructions that allowed the jurors to consider this evidence in assessing Davis’ intent to kill Wood’s mother. Application of a theory of transferred intent would, of course, have allowed the jury to equate Davis’ malice in accosting Willie Wood with malice in the killing of Mrs. Wood. See 2 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 144 (14th ed. 1979) (“Under the common-law doctrine of transferred intent, a defendant, who intends to kill one person but instead kills a bystander, is deemed the author of whatever kind of homicide would have been committed had he killed the intended victim”); American Law Institute, Model Penal Code §2.03(2) (1985). But the jury was not charged on a theory of transferred intent, and we are therefore barred from treating evidence of intent to kill Wood as underlying the necessary finding of intent to' kill Wood’s mother.
The evidence of Davis’ intent to kill Mrs. Wood is far less clear. The prosecution argued that petitioner and Davis entered the store with the intention of killing any witnesses they found inside, and while this inference from the evidence was undoubtedly permissible, it was not compelled as a rational necessity. Petitioner testified that neither he nor Davis had planned to kill anyone, and the record shows that petitioner left the store not knowing whether he had, in fact, killed Willie Wood. Petitioner further testified that he heard a woman scream as he left the store, yet the evidence is clear that he made no effort to return and kill her. App. 57, 61. Hence, the jury could have taken petitioner’s behavior as confirming his claim that he and Davis had not originally planned to kill anyone whom they might find inside the store.
Nor do the specific circumstances of Mrs. Wood’s death reveal anything clear about Davis’ intent toward her. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, to be sure, viewed the record as showing that Davis directed his attention specifically to Mrs. Wood, and attacked her with a repetitiveness ruling out the possibility of inadvertence. The state court’s majority described Davis as having “lunged at Mrs. Wood with his knife” and inflicted “wounds” to her chest during a “brutal multiple stabbing.” 301 S. C., at 217-219, 391 S. E. 2d, at 531-532.
The state court’s description of the evidence as tending to prove Davis’ malice is not, however, supported by the record. The only eyewitness to the homicide, Willie Wood, testified that it was Mrs. Wood who ran into the store and “reached her left arm around and grabbed” Davis, after which “the three of [them] stumbled around the counter, out in the aisle.” There was no other testimony on how Mrs. Wood encountered Davis. The pathologist who performed an autopsy on Mrs. Wood testified that she died of a single wound to the chest and that “[t]here were no other wounds that I noted on the external surface of the body.” App. 32. There was no other testimony or physical evidence that Mrs. Wood suffered any wounds beyond the fatal one to her chest. The record thus does not support the state court’s assertion that Davis “lunged” at Mrs. Wood, or its description of Mrs. Wood’s “wounds” as resulting from a “multiple stabbing.” The prosecutor in his summation even conceded that “it appeared [Mrs. Wood] tried to grab Mr. Davis.” Id., at 88. The most that can be said with certainty is that Mrs. Wood joined the struggle between Davis and Wood and was stabbed during the course of it. She could have been killed inadvertently by Davis, and we cannot rule out that possibility beyond a reasonable doubt.
In sum, the evidentiary record simply is not clear on Davis’ intent to kill the victim. Without more, we could not infer beyond a reasonable doubt that the presumptions did not contribute to the jury’s finding of Davis’ intent to kill Mrs. Wood and to the ensuing verdict of petitioner’s guilt as Davis’ accomplice.
IV
The burden-shifting jury instructions found to have been erroneous in this case may not be excused as harmless error. The judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Blackmun joins all but Part III of this opinion.
Petitioner was indicted for murder, armed robbery, assault and battery with intent to kill, and conspiracy.
The State relied on a theory of accomplice liability because South Carolina does not have a felony-murder statute.
The pathologist who performed an autopsy on Mrs. Wood testified that the cause of her death was “a penetrating wound of the chest that was narrow and penetrated the full thickness of the chest by probe examination. There were -no other wounds that I noted on the external surface of the body.” App. 32.
Petitioner's second defense was that he had withdrawn from his agreement to commit the robbery when he shouted to Davis, “Let’s go,” and ran out of the store. Having allegedly withdrawn from the robbery scheme, petitioner contended that he was not liable for the subsequent homicide by his former accomplice.
In this case, petitioner challenges only his murder conviction. Brief for Petitioner 10, n. 5.
The presumption on the use of a deadly weapon in this case was qualified with the instruction that “when the circumstances surrounding the use of that deadly weapon have been put in evidence and testified to, the presumption is removed.” App. 96. This instruction confuses more than it clarifies. The jury could not presume malice under this rule without evidence that a deadly weapon was used. That evidence included a description of the melee in which the stabbing occurred. Yet the jury was told that once such evidence was introduced, the presumption vanished. As a reasonable juror would have understood the instruction, it was inherently contradictory. We think such a juror would have felt obliged to give the presumption some application and accordingly find its “bursting bubble” clause insufficient to correct the error of presuming malice from the use of a deadly weapon. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 322 (1985) (“Language that merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity”).
A mandatory presumption, even though rebuttable, is different from a permissive presumption, which “does not require... the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and... places no burden of any kind on the defendant.” Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 157 (1979). A permissive presumption merely allows an inference to be drawn and is constitutional so long as the inference would not be irrational. See Francis v. Franklin, supra, at 314-315.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment in Carella v. California, 491 U. S. 263, 267 (1989), Justice Scalia noted that the majority opinion in Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570 (1986), is not entirely consistent in its articulation of the harmless-error standard to be applied to rebuttable presumptions. In fact, the opinion in Rose does contain language that, when taken out of context, suggests standards that are both more restrictive and less restrictive than the standard for reviewing rebuttable presumptions that we apply today. Compare id., at 580-581 (“In many cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury”) (emphasis in original), with id., at 579 (rebuttable presumption is harmless error “[w]here a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”). The first statement, by its own terms, would not reflect the appropriate enquiry in every rebuttable presumption case; the second, in isolation, would not be correct, as our opinion today explains.
If the presumed fact is not itself necessary for the verdict, but only one of a variety of facts sufficient to prove a necessary element, the reviewing court should identify not only the evidence considered for the fact subject to the presumption, but also the evidence for alternative facts sufficient to prove the element.
For reviewing the effect of a conclusive presumption, a restrictive analysis has been proposed that would focus only on the predicate facts to be relied on under the presumption and would require a court to determine whether they “are so closely related to the ultimate fact to be presumed that no rational jury could find those facts without also finding that ultimate fact.” Carella v. California, 491 U. S., at 271 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). The error is harmless in this situation because it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury found the facts necessary to support the conviction. Ibid. Application of this narrow focus is urged, because the terms of a conclusive presumption tend to deter a jury from considering any evidence for the presumed fact beyond the predicate evidence; indeed, to do so would be a waste of the jury’s time and contrary to its instructions. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 526, n
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant was charged with murder in the first degree. He pleaded not guilty and gave notice of his intention to prove insanity. Upon trial in the Circuit Court of Multnomah County, Oregon, he was found guilty by a jury. In accordance with the jury’s decision not to recommend life imprisonment, appellant received a sentence of death. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed. 190 Ore. 598, 227 P. 2d 785. The case is here on appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2).
Oregon statutes required appellant to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt and made a “morbid propensity” no defense. The principal questions in this appeal are raised by appellant’s contentions that these statutes deprive him of his life and liberty without due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The facts of the crime were revealed by appellant’s confessions, as corroborated by other evidence. He killed a fifteen-year-old girl by striking her over the head several times with a steel bar and stabbing her twice with a hunting knife. Upon being arrested five days later for the theft of an automobile, he asked to talk with a homicide officer, voluntarily confessed the murder, and directed the police to the scene of the crime, where he pointed out the location of the body. On the same day, he signed a full confession and, at his own request, made another in his own handwriting. After his indictment, counsel were appointed to represent him. They have done so with diligence in carrying his case through three courts.
One of the Oregon statutes in question provides:
“When the commission of the act charged as a crime is proven, and the defense sought to be established is the insanity of the defendant, the same must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt . ...”
Appellant urges that this statute in effect requires a defendant pleading insanity to establish his innocence by disproving beyond a reasonable doubt elements of the crime necessary to a verdict of guilty, and that the statute is therefore violative of that due process of law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. To determine the merit of this challenge, the statute must be viewed in its relation to other relevant Oregon law and in its place in the trial of this case.
In conformity with the applicable state law, the trial judge instructed the jury that, although appellant was charged with murder in the first degree, they might determine that he had committed a lesser crime included in that charged. They were further instructed that his plea of not guilty put in issue every material and necessary element of the lesser degrees of homicide, as well as of the offense charged in the indictment. The jury could have returned any of five verdicts: (1) guilty of murder in the first degree, if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did the killing purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice; (2) guilty of murder in the second degree, if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did the killing purposely and maliciously, but without deliberation and premeditation; (3) guilty of manslaughter, if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did the killing without malice or deliberation, but upon a sudden heat of passion caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible; (4) not guilty, if, after a careful consideration of all the evidence, there remained in their minds a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the necessary elements of each degree of homicide; and (5) not guilty by reason of insanity, if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was insane at the time of the offense charged. A finding of insanity would have freed appellant from responsibility for any of the possible offenses. The verdict which the jury determined — guilty of first degree murder — required the agreement of all twelve jurors; a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity would have required the concurrence of only ten members of the panel.
It is apparent that the jury might have found appellant to have been mentally incapable of the premeditation and deliberation required to support a first degree murder verdict or of the intent necessary to find him guilty of either first or second degree murder, and yet not have found him to have been legally insane. Although a plea of insanity was made, the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged, including, in the case of first degree murder, premeditation, deliberation, malice and intent. The trial court repeatedly emphasized this requirement in its charge to the jury. Moreover, the judge directed the jury as follows:
“I instruct you that the evidence adduced during this trial to prove defendant’s insanity shall be considered and weighed by you, with all other evidence, whether or not you find defendant insane, in regard to the ability of the defendant to premeditate, form a purpose, to deliberate, act wilfully, and act maliciously; and if you find the defendant lacking in such ability, the defendant cannot have committed the crime of murder in the first degree.
“I instruct you that should you find the defendant’s mental condition to be so affected or diseased to the end that the defendant could formulate no plan, design, or intent to kill in cool blood, the defendant has not committed the crime of murder in the first degree.”
These and other instructions, and the charge as a whole, make it clear that the burden of proof of guilt, and of all the necessary elements of guilt, was placed squarely upon the State. As the jury was told, this burden did not shift, but rested upon the State throughout the trial, just as, according to the instructions, appellant was presumed to be innocent until the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty. The jurors were to consider separately the issue of legal sanity per se — an issue set apart from the crime charged, to be introduced by a special plea and decided by a special verdict. On this issue appellant had the burden of proof under the statute in question here.
By this statute, originally enacted in 1864, Oregon adopted the prevailing doctrine of the time — that, since most men are sane, a defendant must prove his insanity to avoid responsibility for his acts. That was the rule announced in 1843 in the leading English decision in M’Naghten’s Case:
“[T]he jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and ... to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing . . .
This remains the English view today. In most of the nineteenth-century American cases, also, the defendant was required to “clearly” prove insanity, and that was probably the rule followed in most states in 1895, when Davis v. United States was decided. In that case this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan, announced the rule for federal prosecutions to be that an accused is “entitled to an acquittal of the specific crime charged if upon all the evidence there is reasonable doubt whether he was capable in law of committing crime.” In reaching that conclusion, the Court observed:
“The views we have expressed are supported by many adjudications that are entitled to high respect. If such were not the fact, we might have felt obliged to accept the general doctrine announced in some of the above cases; for it is desirable that there be uniformity of rule in the administration of the criminal law in governments whose constitutions equally recognize the fundamental principles that are deemed essential for the protection of life and liberty.”
The decision obviously establishes no constitutional doctrine, but only the rule to be followed in federal courts. As such, the rule is not in question here.
Today, Oregon is the only state that requires the accused, on a plea of insanity, to establish that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Some twenty states, however, place the burden on the accused to establish his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence or some similar measure of persuasion. While there is an evident distinction between these two rules as to the quantum of proof required, we see no practical difference of such magnitude as to be significant in determining the constitutional question we face here. Oregon merely requires a heavier burden of proof. In each instance, in order to establish insanity as a complete defense to the charges preferred, the accused must prove that insanity. The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the practice “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).
Nor is this a case in which it is sought to enforce against the states a right which we have held to be secured to defendants in federal courts by the Bill of Rights. In Davis v. United States, supra, we adopted a rule of procedure for the federal courts which is contrary to that of Oregon. But “[i]ts procedure does not run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at the bar.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra, at 105. “The judicial judgment in applying the Due Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. . . . An important safeguard against such merely individual judgment is an alert deference to the judgment of the state court under review.” Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 417 (1945). We are therefore reluctant to interfere with Oregon’s determination of its policy with respect to the burden of proof on the issue of sanity since we cannot say that policy violates generally accepted concepts of basic standards of justice.
Nothing said in Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463 (1943), suggests a different conclusion. That decision struck down a specific presumption created by congressional enactment. This Court found that the fact thus required to be presumed had no rational connection with the fact which, when proven, set the presumption in operation, and that the statute resulted in a presumption of guilt based only upon proof of a fact neither criminal in itself nor an element of the crime charged. We have seen that, here, Oregon required the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged. Only on the issue of insanity as an absolute bar to the charge was the burden placed upon appellant. In all English-speaking courts, the accused is obliged to introduce proof if he would overcome the presumption of sanity.
It is contended that the instructions may have confused the jury as to the distinction between the State’s burden of proving premeditation and the other elements of the charge and appellant’s burden of proving insanity. We think the charge to the jury was as clear as instructions to juries ordinarily are or reasonably can be, and, with respect to the State’s burden of proof upon all the elements of the crime, the charge was particularly emphatic. Juries have for centuries made the basic decisions between guilt and innocence and between criminal responsibility and legal insanity upon the basis of the facts, as revealed by all the evidence, and the law, as explained by instructions detailing the legal distinctions, the placement and weight of the burden of proof, the effect of presumptions, the meaning of intent, etc. We think that to condemn the operation of this system here would be to condemn the system generally. We are not prepared to do so.
Much we have said applies also to appellant’s contention that due process is violated by the Oregon statute providing that a “morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts, existing in the mind of a person, who is not shown to have been incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of such acts, forms no defense to a prosecution therefor.” That statute amounts to no more than a legislative adoption of the “right and wrong” test of legal insanity in preference to the “irresistible impulse” test. Knowledge of right and wrong is the exclusive test of criminal responsibility in a majority of American jurisdictions. The science of psychiatry has made tremendous strides since that test was laid down in M’Naghten’s Case, but the progress of science has not reached a point where its learning would compel us to require the states to eliminate the right and wrong test from their criminal law. Moreover, choice of a test of legal sanity involves not only scientific knowledge but questions of basic policy as to the extent to which that knowledge should determine criminal responsibility. This whole problem has evoked wide disagreement among those who have studied it. In these circumstances it is clear that adoption of the irresistible impulse test is not “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”
Appellant also contends that the trial court’s refusal to require the district attorney to make one of appellant’s confessions available to his counsel before trial was contrary to due process. We think there is no substance in this argument. This conclusion is buttressed by the absence of any assignment of error on this ground in appellant’s motion for a new trial. Compare Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, 452 (1940). While it may be the better practice for the prosecution thus to exhibit a confession, failure to do so in this case in no way denied appellant a fair trial. The record shows that the confession was produced in court five days before appellant rested his case. There was ample time both for counsel and expert witnesses to study the confession. In addition the trial judge offered further time for that purpose but it was refused. There is no indication in the record that appellant was prejudiced by the inability of his counsel to acquire earlier access to the confession.
Affirmed.
Ore. Comp. Laws, 1940, §§ 26-929, 23-122.
Id., § 26-929.
Id., §§ 26-947, 26-948.
Six possible verdicts were listed in the instructions, guilty of murder in the first degree being divided into two verdicts: with, and without, recommendation of life imprisonment as the penalty. Since the jury in this case did not recommend that punishment, the death sentence was automatically invoked under Oregon law. Id., § 23-411.
The agreement of ten jurors would also have been sufficient for a verdict of not guilty, a verdict of guilty of second degree murder, or a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. R. 333-334.
Ore. Comp. Laws, 1940, §§ 23-401, 23-414, 26-933; cf. State v. Butchek, 121 Ore. 141, 253 P. 367, 254 P. 805 (1927).
R. 321, 323, 324, 330, 331, 332.
R. 330. Again:
"I instruct you that to constitute murder in the first degree, it is necessary that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and to your moral certainty, that the defendant’s design or plan to take life was formed and matured in cool blood and not hastily upon the occasion.
“I instruct you that in determining whether or not the defendant acted purposely and with premeditated and deliberated malice, it is your duty to take into consideration defendant’s mental condition and all factors relating thereto, and that even though you may not find him legally insane, if, in fact, his mentality was impaired, that evidence bears upon these factors, and it is your duty to consider this evidence along with all the other evidence in the case.” R. 332.
R. 321, 324.
Ore. Comp. Laws, 1940, § 26-846 (requiring notice of purpose to show insanity as defense); id., § 26-955 (providing for verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity and consequent commitment to asylum by judge). After defining legal insanity, the trial court instructed the jury:
“In this ease, evidence has been introduced relating to the mental capacity and condition of the defendant ... at the time [the girl] is alleged to have been killed, and if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed her in the manner alleged in the indictment, or within the lesser degrees included therein, then you are to consider the mental capacity of the defendant at the time the homicide is alleged to have been committed.” R. 327 (emphasis supplied).
Deady’s Gen. Laws of Ore., 1845-1864, Code of Crim. Proc., §204.
10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (H. L., 1843).
Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law (9th ed., Sturge, 1950), 6; cf. Sodeman v. The King, [1936] W. N. 190 (P. C.); see Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] A. C. 462, 475.
Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law (1933), 151-155. “Clear proof” was sometimes interpreted to mean proof beyond a reasonable doubt, e. g., State v. De Rancé, 34 La. Ann. 186 (1882), and sometimes to mean proof by a preponderance of the evidence, e. g., Hurst v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 383, 50 S. W. 719 (1899).
Seé Wharton, Criminal Evidence (9th ed. 1884), §§ 336-340.
160 U. S. 469, 484 (1895); see Hotema v. United States, 186 U. S. 413 (1902); Matheson v. United States, 227 U. S. 540 (1913).
Id., at 488.
Weihofen lists twelve states as requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence, four as requiring proof “to the satisfaction of the jury,” two which combine these formulae, one where by statute the defense must be “clearly proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury,” one where it has been held that the jury must “believe” the defendant insane, and one where the quantum of proof has not been stated by the court of last resort, but which appears to follow the preponderance rule. Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law (1933), 148-151,172-200. Twenty-two states, including Oregon, are mentioned as holding that the accused has the burden of proving insanity, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, in 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940 and Supp. 1951), § 2501.
Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law (1933), 161; 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), § 2501.
Ore. Comp. Laws, 1940, § 23-122.
State v. Garver, 190 Ore. 291, 225 P. 2d 771 (1950); State v. Wallace, 170 Ore. 60, 131 P. 2d 222 (1942); State v. Hassing, 60 Ore. 81, 118 P. 195 (1911).
Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law (1933), 15, 64-68, 109-147.
10 Cl. & Fin. 200 (H. L., 1843).
Compare Fisher v. United States, 328 U. S. 463, 475-476 (1946).
See Holloway v. United States, 80 U. S. App. D. C. 3, 148 F. 2d 665 (1945); Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law (1925); Hall, Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility, 45 Col. L. Rev. 677 (1945); Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 535, 724 (1917).
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Fortas
delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2) from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona affirming the dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P. 2d 760 (1965). The petition sought the release of Gerald Francis Gault, appellants’ 15-year-old son, who had been committed as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School by the Juvenile Court of Gila County, Arizona. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed dismissal of the writ against various arguments which included an attack upon the constitutionality of the Arizona Juvenile Code because of its alleged denial of procedural due process rights to juveniles charged with being “delinquents.” The court agreed that the constitutional guarantee of due process of law is applicable in such proceedings. It held that Arizona’s Juvenile Code is to be read as “impliedly” implementing the “due process concept.” It then proceeded to identify and describe “the particular elements which constitute due process in a juvenile hearing.” It concluded that the proceedings ending in commitment of Gerald Gault did not offend those requirements. We do not agree, and we reverse. We begin with a statement of the facts.
I.
On Monday, June 8, 1964, at about 10 a. m., Gerald Francis Gault and a friend, Ronald Lewis, were taken into custody by the Sheriff of Gila County. Gerald was then still subject to a six months’ probation order which had been entered on February 25, 1964, as a result of his having been in the company of another boy who had stolen a wallet from a lady’s purse. The police action on June 8 was taken as the result of a verbal complaint by a neighbor of the boys, Mrs. Cook, about a telephone call made to her in which the caller or callers made lewd or indecent remarks. It will suffice for purposes of this opinion to say that the remarks or questions put to her were of the irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety.
At the time Gerald was picked up, his mother and father were both at work. No notice that Gerald was being taken into custody was left at the home. No other steps were taken to advise them that their son had, in effect, been arrested. Gerald was taken to the Children’s Detention Home. When his mother arrived home at about 6 o’clock, Gerald was not there. Gerald’s older brother was sent to look for him at the trailer home of the Lewis family. He apparently learned then that Gerald was in custody. He so informed his mother. The two of them went to the Detention Home. The deputy probation officer, Flagg, who was also superintendent of the Detention Home, told Mrs. Gault “why Jerry was there” and said that a hearing would be held in Juvenile Court at 3 o’clock the following day, June 9.
Officer Flagg filed a petition with the court on the hearing day, June 9, 1964. It was not served on the Gaults. Indeed, none of them saw this petition until the habeas corpus hearing on August 17, 1964. The petition was entirely formal. It made no reference to any factual basis for the judicial action which it initiated. It recited only that “said minor is under the age of eighteen years, and is in need of the protection of this Honorable Court; [and that] said minor is a delinquent minor.” It prayed for a hearing and an order regarding “the care and custody of said minor.” Officer Flagg executed a formal affidavit in support of the petition.
On June 9, Gerald, his mother, his older brother, and Probation Officers Flagg and Henderson appeared before the Juvenile Judge in chambers. Gerald’s father was not there. He was at work out of the city. Mrs. Cook, the complainant, was not there. No one was sworn at this hearing. No transcript or recording was made. No memorandum or record of the substance of the proceedings was prepared. Our information about the proceedings and the subsequent hearing on June 15, derives entirely from the testimony of the Juvenile Court Judge, Mr. and Mrs. Gault and Officer Flagg at the habeas corpus proceeding conducted two months later. From this, it appears that at the June 9 hearing Gerald was questioned by the judge about the telephone call. There was conflict as to what he said. His mother recalled that Gerald said he only dialed Mrs. Cook’s number and handed the telephone to his friend, Ronald. Officer Flagg recalled that Gerald had admitted making the lewd remarks. Judge McGhee testified that Gerald “admitted making one of these [lewd] statements.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge said he would “think about it.” Gerald was taken back to the Detention Home. He was not sent to his own home with his parents. On June 11 or 12, after having been detained since June 8, Gerald was released and driven home. There is no explanation in the record as to why he was kept in the Detention Home or why he was released. At 5 p. m. on the day of Gerald’s release, Mrs. Gault received a note signed by Officer Flagg. It was on plain paper, not letterhead. Its entire text was as follows:
“Mrs. Gault:
“Judge McGHEE has set Monday June 15, 1964 at 11:00 A. M. as the date and time for further Hearings on Gerald’s delinquency
“/s/Flagg”
At the appointed time on Monday, June 15, Gerald, his father and mother, Ronald Lewis and his father, and Officers Flagg and Henderson were present before Judge McGhee. Witnesses at the habeas corpus proceeding differed in their recollections of Gerald’s testimony at the June 15 hearing. Mr. and Mrs. Gault recalled that Gerald again testified that he had only dialed the number and that the other boy had made the remarks. Officer Flagg agreed that at this hearing Gerald did not admit -making the lewd remarks. But Judge McGhee recalled that “there was some admission again of some of the lewd statements. He — he didn’t admit any of the more serious lewd statements.” Again, the complainant, Mrs. Cook, was not present. Mrs. Gault asked that Mrs. Cook be present “so she could see which boy that done the talking, the dirty talking over the phone.” The Juvenile Judge said “she didn’t have to be present at that hearing.” The judge did not speak to Mrs. Cook or communicate with her at any time. Probation Officer Flagg had talked to her once — over the telephone on June 9.
At this June 15 hearing a “referral report” made by the probation officers was filed with the court, although not disclosed to Gerald or his parents. This listed the charge as “Lewd Phone Calls.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge committed Gerald as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School “for the period of his minority [that is, until 21], unless sooner discharged by due process of law.” An order to that effect was entered. It recites that “after a full hearing and due deliberation the Court finds that said minor is a delinquent child, and that said minor is of the age of 15 years.”
No appeal is permitted by Arizona law in juvenile cases. On August 3, 1964, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court of Arizona and referred by it to the Superior Court for hearing.
At the habeas corpus hearing on August 17, Judge McGhee was vigorously cross-examined as to the basis for his actions. He testified that he had taken into account the fact that Gerald was on probation. He was asked “under what section of... the code you found the boy delinquent?”
His answer is set forth in the margin. In substance, he concluded that Gerald came within ARS § 8-201-6 (a), which specifies that a “delinquent child” includes one “who has violated a law of the state or an ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision thereof.” The law which Gerald was found to have violated is ARS § 13-377. This section of the Arizona Criminal Code provides that a person who “in the presence or hearing of any woman or child... uses vulgar, abusive or obscene language, is guilty of a misdemeanor....” The penalty specified in the Criminal Code, which would apply to an adult, is $5 to $50, or imprisonment for not more than two months. The judge also testified that he acted under ARS § 8-201-6 (d) which includes in the definition of a “delinquent child” one who, as the judge phrased it, is “habitually involved in immoral matters.”
Asked about the basis for his conclusion that Gerald was “habitually involved in immoral matters,” the judge testified, somewhat vaguely, that two years earlier, on July 2, 1962, a “referral” was made concerning Gerald, “where the boy had stolen a baseball glove from another boy and lied to the Police Department about it.” The judge said there was “no hearing,” and “no accusation” relating to this incident, “because of lack of material foundation.” But it seems to have remained in his mind as a relevant factor. The judge also testified that Gerald had admitted making other nuisance phone calls in the past which, as the judge recalled the boy’s testimony, were “silly calls, or funny calls, or something like that.”
The Superior Court dismissed the writ, and appellants sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court. That court stated that it considered appellants’ assignments of error as urging (1) that the Juvenile Code, ARS § 8-201 to § 8-239, is unconstitutional because it does not require that parents and children be apprised of the specific charges, does not require proper notice of a hearing, and does not provide for an appeal; and (2) that the proceedings and order relating to Gerald constituted a denial of due process of law because of the absence of adequate notice of the charge and the hearing; failure to notify appellants of certain constitutional rights including the rights to counsel and to confrontation, and the privilege against self-incrimination; the use of unsworn hearsay testimony; and the failure to make a record of the proceedings. Appellants further asserted that it was error for the Juvenile Court to remove Gerald from the custody of his parents without a showing and finding of their unsuitability, and alleged a miscellany of other errors under state law.
The Supreme Court handed down an elaborate and wide-ranging opinion affirming dismissal of the writ and stating the court’s conclusions as to the issues raised by appellants and other aspects of the juvenile process. In their jurisdictional statement and brief in this Court, appellants do not urge upon us all of the points passed upon by the Supreme Court of Arizona. They urge that we hold the Juvenile Code of Arizona invalid on its face or as applied in this case because, contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the juvenile is taken from the custody of his parents and committed to a state institution pursuant to proceedings in which the Juvenile Court has virtually unlimited discretion, and in which the following basic rights are denied:
1. Notice of the charges;
2. Right to counsel;
3. Right to confrontation and cross-examination;
4. Privilege against self-incrimination ;
5. Right to a transcript of the proceedings; and
6. Right to appellate review.
We shall not consider other issues which were passed upon by the Supreme Court of Arizona. We emphasize that we indicate no opinion as to whether the decision of that court with respect to such other issues does or does not conflict with requirements of the Federal Constitution.
II.
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that due process of law is requisite to the constitutional validity of proceedings in which a court reaches the conclusion that a juvenile has been at fault, has engaged in conduct prohibited by law, or has otherwise misbehaved with the consequence that he is committed to an institution in which his freedom is curtailed. This conclusion is in accord with the decisions of a number of courts under both federal and state constitutions.
This Court has not heretofore decided the precise question. In Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541 (1966), we considered the requirements for a valid waiver of the “exclusive” jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia so that a juvenile could be tried in the adult criminal court of the District. Although our decision turned upon the language of the statute, we emphasized the necessity that “the basic requirements of due process and fairness” be satisfied in such proceedings. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948), involved the admissibility, in a state criminal court of general jurisdiction, of a confession by a 15-year-old boy. The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to prohibit the use of the coerced confession. Mr. Justice Douglas said, “Neither naan nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law.” To the same effect is Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U. S. 49 (1962). Accordingly, while these cases relate only to restricted aspects of the subject, they unmistakably indicate that, whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.
We do not in this opinion consider -the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile “delinquents.” For example, we are not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or dis-positional process. See note 48, infra. We consider only the problems presented to us by this case. These relate to the proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a “delinquent” as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution. As to these proceedings, there appears to be little current dissent from the proposition that the Due Process Clause has a role to play. The problem is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.
From the inception of the juvenile court system, wide differences have been tolerated — indeed insisted upon— between the procedural rights accorded to adults and those of juveniles. In practically all jurisdictions, there are rights granted to adults which are withheld from juveniles. In addition to the specific problems involved in the present case, for example, it has been held that the juvenile is not entitled to bail, to indictment by grand jury, to a public trial or to trial by jury. It is frequent practice that rules governing the arrest and interrogation of adults by the police are not observed in the case of juveniles.
The history and theory underlying this development are well-known, but a recapitulation is necessary for purposes of this opinion. The Juvenile Court movement began in this country at the end of the last century. From the juvenile court statute adopted in Illinois in 1899, the system has spread to every State in the Union, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The con-stitutionaUty of Juvenile Court laws has been sustained in over 40 jurisdictions against a variety of attacks.
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals. They were profoundly convinced that society’s duty to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone. They believed that society’s role was not to ascertain whether the child was “guilty” or “innocent,” but “What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.” The child — essentially good, as they saw it — was to be made “to feel that he is the object of [the state’s] care and solicitude,” not that he was under arrest or on trial. The rules of criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable. The apparent rigidities, technicalities, and harshness which they observed in both substantive and procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be “treated” and “rehabilitated” and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be “clinical” rather than punitive.
These results were to be achieved, without coming to conceptual and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings were not adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens patriae. The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance. The phrase was taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was used to describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of the child. But there is no trace of the doctrine in the history of criminal jurisprudence. At common law, children under seven were considered incapable of possessing criminal intent. Beyond that age, they were subjected to arrest, trial, and in theory to punishment like adult offenders. In these old days, the state was not deemed to have authority to- accord them fewer procedural rights than adults.
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right “not to liberty but to custody.” He can be made to attorn to his parents, to go to school, etc. If his parents default in effectively performing their custodial functions — that is, if the child is “delinquent” — the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the child of any rights, because he has none. It merely provides the “custody” to which the child is entitled. On this basis, proceedings involving juveniles were described as “civil” not “criminal” and therefore not subject to the requirements which restrict the state when it seeks to deprive a person of his liberty.
Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable context. The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is — to say the least — debatable. And in practice, as we remarked in the Kent case, supra, the results have not been entirely satisfactory. Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. In 1937, Dean Pound wrote: “The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts....” The absence of substantive standards has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from established principles of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness. The Chairman of the Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court Judges has recently observed: “Unfortunately, loose procedures, high-handed methods and crowded court calendars, either singly or in combination, all too often, have resulted in depriving some juveniles of fundamental rights that have resulted in a denial of due process.”
Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said: “The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.” But in addition, the procedural rules which have been fashioned from the generality of due process are our best instruments for the distillation and evaluation of essential facts from the conflicting welter of data that life and our adversary methods present. It is these instruments of due process which enhance the possibility that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions and conflicting data. “Procedure is to law what ‘scientific method’ is to science.”
It is claimed that juveniles obtain benefits from the special procedures applicable to them which more than offset the disadvantages of denial of the substance of normal due process. As we shall discuss, the observance of due process standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process. But it is important, we think, that the claimed benefits of the juvenile process should be candidly appraised. Neither sentiment nor folklore should cause us to shut our eyes, for example, to such startling findings as that reported in an exceptionally reliable study of repeaters or recidivism conducted by the Stanford Research Institute for the President’s Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia. This Commission’s Report states:
“In fiscal 1966 approximately 66 percent of the 16- and 17-year-old juveniles referred to the court by the Youth Aid Division had been before the court previously. In 1965, 56 percent of those in the Receiving Home were repeaters. The SRI study revealed that 61 percent of the sample Juvenile Court referrals in 1965 had been previously referred at least once and that 42 percent had been referred at least twice before.” Id., at 773.
Certainly, these figures and the high crime rates among juveniles to which we have referred {supra, n. 26), could not lead us to conclude that the absence of constitutional protections reduces crime, or that the juvenile system, functioning free of constitutional inhibitions as it has largely done, is effective to reduce crime or rehabilitate offenders. We do not mean by this to denigrate the juvenile court process or to suggest that there are not aspects of the juvenile system relating to offenders which are valuable. But the features of the juvenile system which its proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication. For example, the commendable principles relating to the processing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults are in no way involved or affected by the procedural issues under discussion. Further, we are told that one of the important benefits of the special juvenile court procedures is that they avoid classifying the juvenile as a “criminal.” The juvenile offender is now classed as a “delinquent.” There is, of course, no reason why this should not continue. It is disconcerting, however, that this term has come to involve only slightly less stigma than the term “criminal” applied to adults. It is also emphasized that in practically all jurisdictions, statutes provide that an adjudication of the child as a delinquent shall not operate as a civil disability or disqualify him for civil service appointment. There is no reason why the application of due process requirements should interfere with such provisions.
Beyond this, it is frequently said that juveniles are protected by the process from disclosure of their devia-tional behavior. As the Supreme Court of Arizona phrased it in the present case, the summary procedures of Juvenile Courts are sometimes defended by a statement that it is the law’s policy “to hide youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past.” This claim of secrecy, however, is more rhetoric than reality. Disclosure of court records is discretionary with the judge in most jurisdictions. Statutory restrictions almost invariably apply only to the court records, and even as to those the evidence is that many courts routinely furnish information to the FBI and the military, and on request to government agencies and even to private employers. Of more importance are police records. In most States the police keep a complete file of juvenile “police contacts” and have complete discretion as to disclosure of juvenile records. Police departments receive requests for information from the FBI and other law-enforcement agencies, the Armed Forces, and social service agencies, and most of them generally comply. Private employers word their application forms to produce information concerning juvenile arrests and court proceedings, and in some jurisdictions information concerning juvenile police contacts is furnished private employers as well as government agencies.
In any event, there is no reason why, consistently with due process, a State cannot continue, if it deems it appropriate, to provide and to improve provision for the confidentiality of records of police contacts and court action relating to juveniles. It is interesting to note, however, that the Arizona Supreme Court used the confidentiality argument as a justification for the type of notice which is here attacked as inadequate for due process purposes. The parents were given merely general notice that their child was charged with “delinquency.” No facts were specified. The Arizona court held, however, as we shall discuss, that in addition to this general “notice,” the child and his parents fnust be advised “of the facts involved in the case” no later than the initial hearing by the judge. Obviously, this does not “bury” the word about the child’s transgressions. It merely defers the time of disclosure to a point when it is of limited use to the child or his parents in preparing his defense or explanation.
Further, it is urged that the juvenile benefits from informal proceedings in the court. The early conception of the Juvenile Court proceeding was one in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over his problems, by paternal advice and admonition, and in which, in extreme situations, benevolent and wise institutions of the State provided guidance and help “to save him from a downward career.” Then, as now, goodwill and compassion were admirably prevalent. But recent studies have, with surprising unanimity, entered sharp dissent as to the validity of this gentle conception. They suggest that the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness — -in short, the essentials of due process — may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned. For example, in a recent study, the sociologists Wheeler and Cottrell observe that when the procedural laxness of the “parens patriae” attitude is followed by stern disciplining, the contrast may have an adverse effect upon the child, who feels that he has been deceived or enticed. They conclude as follows: “Unless appropriate due process of law is followed, even the juvenile who has violated the law may not feel that he is being fairly treated and may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court personnel.” Of course, it is not suggested that juvenile court judges should fail appropriately to take account, in their demeanor and conduct, of the emotional and psychological attitude of the juveniles with whom they are confronted. While due process requirements will, in some instances, introduce a degree of order and regularity to Juvenile Court proceedings to determine delinquency, and in contested cases will introduce some elements of the adversary system, nothing will require that the conception of the kindly juvenile judge be replaced by its opposite, nor do we here rule upon the question whether ordinary due process requirements must be observed with respect to hearings to determine the disposition of the delinquent child.
Ultimately, however, we confront the reality of that portion of the Juvenile Court process with which we deal in this case. A boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence — and of limited practical meaning— that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a “receiving home” or an “industrial school” for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes “a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours....” Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and “delinquents” confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.
In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase “due process.” Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court. The traditional ideas of Juvenile Court procedure, indeed, contemplated that time would be available and care would be used to establish precisely what the juvenile did and why he did it — was it a prank of adolescence or a brutal act threatening serious consequences to himself or society unless corrected? Under traditional notions, one would assume that in a case like that of Gerald Gault, where the juvenile appears to have a home, a working mother and father, and an older brother, the Juvenile Judge would have made a careful inquiry and judgment as to the possibility that the boy could be disciplined and dealt with at home, despite his previous transgressions. Indeed, so far as appears in the record before us, except for some conversation with Gerald about his school work and his “wanting to go to... Grand Canyon with his father,” the points to which the judge directed his attention were little different from those that would be involved in determining any charge of violation of a penal statute. The essential difference between Gerald’s case and a normal criminal case is that safeguards available to adults were discarded in Gerald’s case. The summary procedure as well as the long commitment was possible because Gerald was 15 years of age instead of over 18.
If Gerald had been over 18, he would not have been subject to Juvenile Court proceedings. For the particular offense immediately involved, the maximum punishment would have been a fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment in jail for not more than two months. Instead, he was committed to custody for a maximum of six years. If he had been over 18 and had committed an offense to which such a sentence might apply, he would have been entitled to substantial rights under the Constitution of the United States as well as under Arizona’s laws and constitution. The United States Constitution would guarantee him rights and protections with respect to arrest, search and seizure, and pretrial interrogation. It would assure him of specific notice of the charges and adequate time to decide his course of action and to prepare his defense. He would be entitled to clear advice that he could be represented by counsel, and, at least if a felony were involved, the State would be required to provide counsel if his parents were unable to afford it. If the court acted on the basis of his confession, careful procedures would be required to assure its volun-tariness. If the case went to trial, confrontation and opportunity for cross-examination would be guaranteed. So wide a gulf between the State’s treatment of the adult and of the child requires a bridge sturdier than mere verbiage, and reasons more persuasive than cliché can provide. As Wheeler and Cottrell have put it, “The rhetoric of the juvenile court movement has developed without any necessarily close correspondence to the realities of court and institutional routines.”
In Kent v. United States, supra, we stated that the Juvenile Court Judge’s exercise of the power of the state as parens patriae was not unlimited. We said that “the admonition to function in a ‘parental’ relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.” With respect to the waiver by the Juvenile Court to the adult court of jurisdiction over an offense committed by a youth, we said that “there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony — without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons.” We announced with respect to such waiver proceedings that while “We do not mean... to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” We reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile court adjudication of “delinquency,” as a requirement which is part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution.
We now turn to the specific issues which are presented to us in the present case.
III.
Notice of Charges.
Appellants allege that the Arizona Juvenile Code is unconstitutional or alternatively that the proceedings before the Juvenile Court were constitutionally defective because of failure to provide adequate notice of the hearings. No notice was given to Gerald’s parents when he was taken into custody on Monday, June 8. On that night, when Mrs. Gault went to the Detention Home, she was orally informed that there would be a hearing the next afternoon and was told the reason why Gerald was in custody. The only written notice Gerald’s parents received at any time was a note on plain paper from Officer Flagg delivered on Thursday or Friday, June 11 or 12, to the effect that the judge had set Monday, June 15, “for further Hearings on Gerald’s delinquency.”
A “petition” was filed with the court on June 9 by Officer Flagg, reciting only that he was informed and believed that “said minor is a delinquent minor and that it is necessary that some order be made by the Honorable Court for said minor’s welfare.” The applicable Arizona statute provides for a petition to be filed in Juvenile Court, alleging in general terms that the child is “neglected, dependent or delinquent.” The statute explicitly states that such a general allegation is sufficient, “without alleging the facts.” There is no requirement that the petition be served and it was not served upon, given to, or shown to Gerald or his parents.
The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected appellants’ claim that due process was denied because of inadequate notice. It stated that “Mrs. Gault knew the exact nature of the charge against Gerald from the day he was taken to the detention home.” The court also pointed out that the Gaults appeared at the two hearings “without objection.” The court held that because “the policy of the juvenile law is to hide youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past,” advance notice of the specific charges or basis for taking the juvenile into custody and for the hearing is not necessary. It held that the appropriate rule is that “the infant and his parent or guardian will receive a petition only reciting a conclusion of delinquency. But no later than the initial hearing by the judge, they must be advised of the facts involved in the case. If the charges are denied, they must be given a reasonable period of time to prepare.”
We cannot agree with the court’s conclusion that adequate notice was given in this case. Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must “set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.” It is obvious, as we have discussed above, that no purpose of shielding the child from the public stigma of knowledge of his having been taken into custody and scheduled for hearing is served by the procedure approved by the court below. The “initial hearing” in the present case was a hearing on the merits. Notice at that time is not timely; and even if there were a conceivable purpose served by the deferral proposed by the court below, it would have to yield to the requirements that the child and his parents or guardian be notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing, and that
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted the petition for writ of certiorari in this case, 414 U. S. 1156 (1974), because it raises important questions concerning the administration of a state prison.
Respondent, on behalf of himself and other inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, Lincoln, Nebraska, filed a complaint under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 challenging several of the practices, rules, and regulations of the Complex. For present purposes, the pertinent allegations were that disciplinary proceedings did not comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; that the inmate legal assistance program did not meet constitutional standards, and that the regulations governing the inspection of mail to and from attorneys for inmates were unconstitutionally restrictive. Respondent requested damages and injunctive relief.
After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted partial relief. 342 F. Supp. 616 (Neb. 1972). Considering itself bound by prior Circuit authority, it rejected the procedural due process claim; but it went on to hold that the prison’s policy of inspecting all incoming and outgoing mail to and from attorneys violated prisoners’ rights of access to the courts and that the restrictions placed on inmate legal assistance were not constitutionally defective.
The Court of Appeals reversed, 483 F. 2d 1059 (CA8 1973), with respect to the due process claim, holding that the procedural requirements outlined by this Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), decided after the District Court’s opinion in this case, should be generally followed in prison disciplinary hearings but left the specific requirements, including the circumstances in which counsel might be required, to be determined by the District Court on remand. With respect to a remedy, the court further held that Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), forbade the actual restoration of good-time credits in this § 1983 suit but ordered expunged from prison records any determinations of misconduct arrived at in proceedings that failed to comport with due process as defined by the court. The court generally affirmed the judgment of the District Court with respect to correspondence with attorneys, but ordered further proceedings to determine whether the State was meeting its burden under Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483 (1969), to provide legal assistance to prison inmates, the court holding that the State’s duty extended to civil rights cases as well as to habeas corpus proceedings
I
We begin with the due process claim. An understanding of the issues involved requires a detailing of the prison disciplinary regime set down by Nebraska statutes and prison regulations.
Section 16 of the Nebraska Treatment and Corrections Act, as amended, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-185 (Cum. Supp. 1972), provides that the chief executive officer of each penal facility is responsible for the discipline of inmates in a particular institution. The statute provides for a range of possible disciplinary action. “Except in flagrant or serious cases, punishment for misconduct shall consist of deprivation of privileges. In cases of flagrant or serious misconduct, the chief executive officer may order that a person’s reduction of term as provided in section 83-1,107 [good-time credit] be forfeited or withheld and also that the person be confined in a disciplinary cell.” Each breach of discipline is to be entered in the person's file together with the disposition or punishment therefor.
As the statute makes clear, there are basically two kinds of punishment for flagrant or serious misconduct. The first is the forfeiture or withholding of good-time credits, which affects the term of confinement, while the second, confinement in a disciplinary cell, involves alteration of the conditions of confinement. If the misconduct is less than flagrant or serious, only deprivation of privileges results.
The only statutory provision establishing procedures for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions which pertains to good time, § 38 of the Nebraska Treatment and Corrections Act, as amended, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,107 (Cum. Supp. 1972), merely requires that an inmate be “consulted regarding the charges of misconduct” in connection with the forfeiture, withholding, or restoration of credit. But prison authorities have framed written regulations dealing with procedures and policies for controlling inmate misconduct. By regulation, misconduct is classified into two categories: major misconduct is a “serious violation” and must be formally reported to an Adjustment Committee, composed of the Associate Warden Custody, the Correctional Industries Superintendent, and the Reception Center Director. This Committee is directed to “review and evaluate all misconduct reports” and, among other things, to “conduct investigations, make findings, [and] impose disciplinary actions.” If only minor misconduct, “a less serious violation,” is involved, the problem may either be resolved informally by the inmate’s supervisor or it can be formally reported for action to the Adjustment Committee. Repeated minor misconduct must be reported. The Adjustment Committee has available a wide range of sanctions. “Disciplinary action taken and recommended may include but not necessarily be limited to the following: reprimand, restrictions of various kinds, extra duty, confinement in the Adjustment Center [the disciplinary cell], withholding of statutory good time and/or extra earned good time, or a combination of the elements listed herein.”
Additional procedures have been devised by the Complex governing the actions of the Adjustment Committee. Based on the testimony, the District Court found, 342 F. Supp., at 625-626, that the following procedures were in effect when an inmate is written up or charged with a prison violation:
“(a) The chief correction supervisor reviews the 'write-ups’ on the inmates by the officers of the Complex daily;
“(b) the convict is called to a conference with the chief correction supervisor and the charging party;
“(c) following the conference, a conduct report is sent to the Adjustment Committee;
“(d) there follows a hearing before the Adjustment Committee and the report is read to the inmate and discussed;
“(e) if the inmate denies charge he may ask questions of the party writing him up ;
“(f) the Adjustment'Committee can conduct additional investigations if it desires;
“ (g) punishment is imposed.”
II
This class action brought by respondent alleged that the rules, practices, and procedures at the Complex which might result in the taking of good time violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondent sought three types of relief: (1) restoration of good time; (2) submission of a plan by the prison authorities for a hearing procedure in connection with withholding and forfeiture of good time which complied with the requirements of due process; and (3) damages for the deprivation of civil rights resulting from the use of the allegedly unconstitutional procedures.
At the threshold is the issue whether under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), the validity of the procedures for depriving prisoners of good-time credits may be considered in a civil rights suit brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. In Preiser, state prisoners brought a § 1983 suit seeking an injunction to compel restoration of good-time credits. The Court held that because the state prisoners were challenging the very fact or duration of their confinement and were seeking a speedier release, their sole federal remedy was by writ of habeas corpus, 411 U. S., at 500, with the concomitant requirement of exhausting state remedies. But the Court was careful to point out that habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available remedy for damages claims, which, if not frivolous and of sufficient substance to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court, could be pressed under § 1983 along with suits challenging the conditions of confinement rather than the fact or length of custody. 411 U. S., at 494, 498-499.
The complaint in this case sought restoration of good-time credits, and the Court of Appeals correctly held this relief foreclosed under Preiser. But the complaint also sought damages; and Preiser expressly contemplated that claims properly brought under § 1983 could go forward while actual restoration of good-time credits is sought in state proceedings. 411 U. S., at 499 n. 14. Respondent’s damages claim was therefore properly before the District Court and required determination of the validity of the procedures employed for imposing sanctions, including loss of good time, for flagrant or serious misconduct. Such a declaratory judgment as a predicate to a damages award would not be barred by Preiser; and because under that case only an injunction restoring good time improperly taken is foreclosed, neither would it preclude a litigant with standing from obtaining by way of ancillary relief an otherwise proper injunction enjoining the prospective enforcement of invalid prison regulations.
We therefore conclude that it was proper for the Court of Appeals and the District Court to determine the validity of the procedures for revoking good-time credits and to fashion appropriate remedies for any constitutional violations ascertained, short of ordering the actual restoration of good time already canceled.
Ill
Petitioners assert that the procedure for disciplining prison inmates for serious misconduct is a matter of policy raising no constitutional issue. If the position implies that prisoners in state institutions are wholly without the protections of the Constitution and the Due Process Clause, it is plainly untenable. Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen, a “retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285 (1948). But though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country. Prisoners have been held to enjoy substantial religious freedom under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 (1964). They retain right of access to the courts. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U. S. 15 (1971), aff’g Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (ND Cal. 1970); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546 (1941). Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race. Lee v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333 (1968). Prisoners may also claim the protections of the Due Process Clause. They may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249 (1971); Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945).
Of course, as we have indicated, the fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause in no way implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed. Cf. CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974). Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S., at 488. In sum, there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.
. We also reject the assertion of the State that whatever may be true of the Due Process Clause in general or of other rights protected by that Clause against state infringement, the interest of prisoners in disciplinary procedures is not included in that “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is true that the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison. But here the State itself has not only provided a statutory right to good time but also specifies that it is to be forfeited only for serious misbehavior. Nebraska may have the authority to create, or not, a right to a shortened prison sentence through the accumulation of credits for good behavior, and it is true that the Due Process Clause does not require a hearing “in every conceivable case of government impairment of private interest.” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 894 (1961). But the State having created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner’s interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated. This is the thrust of recent cases in the prison disciplinary context. In Haines v. Kerner, supra, the state prisoner asserted a “denial of due process in the steps leading to [disciplinary] confinement.” 404 U. S., at 520. We reversed the dismissal of the § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, supra, the prisoner complained that he had been deprived of good-time credits without notice or hearing and without due process of law. We considered the claim a proper subject for a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
This analysis as to liberty parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property. The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests. Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The requirement for some kind of a hearing applies to the taking of private property, Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385 (1914), the revocation of licenses, In re Ruffalo, 390 U. S. 544 (1968), the operation of state dispute-settlement mechanisms, when one person seeks to take property from another, or to government-created jobs held, absent “cause” for termination, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 164 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); id., at 171 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ; id., at 206 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 652-654 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971).
We think a person's liberty is equally protected, even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the State. The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government, Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 123 (1889). Since prisoners in Nebraska can only lose good-time credits if they are guilty of serious misconduct, the determination of whether such behavior has occurred becomes critical, and the minimum requirements of procedural due process appropriate for the circumstances must be observed.
IV
As found by the District Court, the procedures employed are: (1) a preliminary conference with the Chief Corrections Supervisor and the charging party, where the prisoner is informed of the misconduct charge and engages in preliminary discussion on its merits; (2) the preparation of a conduct report and a hearing held before the Adjustment Committee, the disciplinary body of the prison, where the report is read to the inmate; and (3) the opportunity at the hearing to ask questions of the charging party. The State contends that the procedures already provided are adequate. The Court of Appeals held them insufficient and ordered that the due process requirements outlined in Morrissey and Scar-pelli be satisfied in serious disciplinary cases at the prison.
Morrissey held that due process imposed certain minimum procedural requirements which must be satisfied before parole could finally be revoked. These procedures were:
“(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence ; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.” 408 U. S., at 489.
The Court did not reach the question as to whether the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to appointed counsel, if he is indigent. Following the decision in Morrissey, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), the Court held the requirements of due process established for parole revocation were applicable to probation revocation proceedings. The Court added to the required minimum procedures of Morrissey the right to counsel, where a probationer makes a request, “based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present.” Id., at 790. In doubtful cases, the agency was to consider whether the probationer appeared to be capable of speaking effectively for himself, id., at 790-791, and a record was to be made of the grounds for refusing to appoint counsel.
We agree with neither petitioners nor the Court of Appeals: the Nebraska procedures are in some respects constitutionally deficient but the Morrissey-Scarpelli procedures need not in all respects be followed in disciplinary cases in state prisons.
We have often repeated that “[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S., at 895. “ [C] on-sideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” Ibid.; Morrissey, 408 U. S., at 481. Viewed in this light it is immediately apparent that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society, or for parolees or probationers under only limited restraints, to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison.
Revocation of parole may deprive the parolee of only conditional liberty, but it nevertheless “inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.” Id., at 482. Simply put, revocation proceedings determine whether the parolee will be free or in prison, a matter of obvious great moment to him. For the prison inmate, the deprivation of good time is not the same immediate disaster that the revocation of parole is for the parolee. The deprivation, very likely, does not then and there work any change in the conditions of his liberty. It can postpone the date of eligibility for parole and extend the maximum term to be served, but it is not certain to do so, for good time may be restored. Even if not restored, it cannot be said with certainty that the actual date of parole will be affected; and if parole occurs, the extension of the maximum term resulting from loss of good time may affect only the termination of parole, and it may not even do that. The deprivation of good time is unquestionably a matter of considerable importance. The State reserves it as a sanction for serious misconduct, and we should not unrealistically discount its significance. But it is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the revocation of parole or probation.
In striking the balance that the Due Process Clause demands, however, we think the major consideration militating against adopting the full range of procedures suggested by Morrissey for alleged parole violators is the very different stake the State has in the structure and content of the prison disciplinary hearing. That the revocation of parole be justified and based on an accurate assessment of the facts is a critical matter to the State as well as the parolee; but the procedures by which it is determined whether the conditions of parole have been breached do not themselves threaten other important state interests, parole officers, the police, or witnesses — at least no more so than in the case of the ordinary criminal trial. Prison disciplinary proceedings, on the other hand, take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so. Some are first offenders, but many are recidivists who have repeatedly employed illegal and often very violent means to attain their ends. They may have little regard for the safety of others or their property or for the rules designed to provide an orderly and reasonably safe prison life. Although there are very many varieties of prisons with different degrees of security, we must realize that in many of them the inmates are closely supervised and their activities controlled around the clock. Guards and inmates co-exist in direct and intimate contact. Tension between them is unremitting. Frustration, resentment, and despair are commonplace. Relationships among the inmates are varied and complex and perhaps subject to the unwritten code that exhorts inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner.
It is against this background that disciplinary proceedings must be structured by prison authorities; and it is against this background that we must make our constitutional judgments, realizing that we are dealing with the maximum security institution as well as those where security considerations are not paramount. The reality is that disciplinary hearings and the imposition of disagreeable sanctions necessarily involve confrontations between inmates and authority and between inmates who are being disciplined and those who would chargé or furnish evidence against them. Retaliation is much more than a theoretical possibility; and the basic and unavoidable task of providing reasonable personal safety for guards and inmates may be at stake, to say nothing of the impact of disciplinary confrontations and the resulting escalation of personal antagonisms on the important aims of the correctional process.
Indeed, it is pressed upon us that the proceedings to ascertain and sanction misconduct themselves play a major role in furthering the institutional goal of modifying the behavior and value systems of prison inmates sufficiently to permit them to live within the law when they are released. Inevitably there is a great range of personality and character among those who have transgressed the criminal law. Some are more amenable to suggestion and persuasion than others. Some may be incorrigible and would merely disrupt and exploit the disciplinary process for their own ends. With some, rehabilitation may be best achieved by simulating procedures of a free society to the maximum possible extent; but with others, it may be essential that discipline be swift and sure. In any event, it is argued, there would be great unwisdom in encasing the disciplinary procedures in an inflexible constitutional straitjacket that would necessarily call for adversary proceedings typical of the criminal trial, very likely raise the level of confrontation between staff and inmate, and make more difficult the utilization of the disciplinary process as a tool to advance the rehabilitative goals of the institution. This consideration, along with the necessity to maintain an acceptable level of personal security in the institution, must be taken into account as we now examine in more detail the Nebraska procedures that the Court of Appeals found wanting.
V
Two of the procedures that the Court held should be extended to parolees facing revocation proceedings are not, but must be, provided to prisoners in the Nebraska Complex if the minimum requirements of procedural due process are to be satisfied. These are advance written notice of the claimed violation and a written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken. As described by the Warden in his oral testimony, on the basis of which the District Court made its findings, the inmate is now given oral notice of the charges against him at least as soon as the conference with the Chief Corrections Supervisor and charging party. A written record is there compiled and the report read to the inmate at the hearing before the Adjustment Committee where the charges are discussed and pursued. There is no indication that the inmate is ever given a written statement by the Committee as to the evidence or informed in writing or otherwise as to the reasons for the disciplinary action taken.
Part of the function of notice is to give the charged party a chance to marshal the facts in his defense and to clarify what the charges are, in fact. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 33-34, and n. 54 (1967). Neither of these functions was performed by the notice described by the Warden. Although the charges are discussed orally with the inmate somewhat in advance of the hearing, the inmate is sometimes brought before the Adjustment Committee shortly after he is orally informed of the charges. Other times, after this initial discussion, further investigation takes place which may reshape the nature of the charges or the evidence relied upon. In those instances, under procedures in effect at the time of trial, it would appear that the inmate first receives notice of the actual charges at the time of the hearing before the Adjustment Committee. We hold that written notice of the charges must be given to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense. At least a brief period of time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the appearance before the Adjustment Committee.
We also hold that there must be a “written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons” for the disciplinary action. Morrissey, 408 IT. S., at 489. Although Nebraska does not seem to provide administrative review of the action taken by the Adjustment Committee, the actions taken at such proceedings may involve review by other bodies. They might furnish the basis of a decision by the Director of Corrections to transfer an inmate to another institution because he is considered “to be incorrigible by reason of frequent intentional breaches of discipline,” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-185 (4) (Cum. Supp. 1972), and are certainly likely to be considered by the state parole authorities in making parole decisions. Written records of proceedings will thus protect the inmate against collateral consequences based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the original proceeding. Further, as to the disciplinary action itself, the provision for a written record helps to insure that administrators, faced with possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts, where fundamental constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act fairly. Without written records, the inmate will be at a severe disadvantage in propounding his own cause to or defending himself from others. It may be that there will be occasions when personal or institutional safety is so implicated that the statement may properly exclude certain items of evidence, but in that event the statement should indicate the fact of the omission. Otherwise, we perceive no conceivable rehabilitative objective or prospect of prison disruption that can flow from the requirement of these statements.
We are also of the opinion that the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals. Ordinarily, the right to present evidence is basic to a fair hearing; but the unrestricted right to call witnesses from the prison population carries obvious potential for disruption and for interference with the swift punishment that in individual cases may be essential to carrying out the correctional program of the institution. We should not be too ready to exercise oversight and put aside the judgment of prison administrators. It may be that an individual threatened with serious sanctions would normally be entitled to present witnesses and relevant documentary evidence; but here we must balance the inmate’s interest in avoiding loss of good time against the needs of the prison, and some amount of flexibility and accommodation is required. Prison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses that may create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to limit access to other inmates to collect statements or to compile other documentary evidence. Although we do not prescribe it, it would be useful for the Committee to state its reason for refusing to call a witness, whether it be for irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the hazards presented in individual cases. Any less flexible rule appears untenable as a constitutional matter, at least on the record made in this case. The operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking. Many prison officials, on the spot and with the responsibility for the safety of inmates and staff, are reluctant to extend the unqualified right to call witnesses; and in our view, they must have the necessary discretion without being subject to unduly crippling constitutional impediments. There is this much play in the joints of the Due Process Clause, and we stop short of imposing a more demanding rule with respect to witnesses and documents.
Confrontation and cross-examination present greater hazards to institutional interests. If confrontation and cross-examination of those furnishing evidence against the inmate were to be allowed as a matter of course, as in criminal trials, there would be considerable potential for havoc inside the prison walls. Proceedings would inevitably be longer and tend to unmanageability. These procedures are essential in criminal trials where the accused, if found guilty, may be subjected to the most serious deprivations, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965), or where a person may lose his job in society, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474, 496-497 (1959). But they are not rights universally applicable to all hearings. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974). Rules of procedure may be shaped by consideration of the risks of error, In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ; Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, p. 171 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and should also be shaped by the consequences which will follow their adoption. Although some States do seem to allow cross-examination in disciplinary hearings, we are not apprised of the conditions under which the procedure may be curtailed; and it does not appear that confrontation and cross-examination are generally required in this context. We think that the Constitution should not be read to impose the procedure at the present time and that adequate bases for decision in prison disciplinary cases can be arrived at without cross-examination.
Perhaps as the problems of penal institutions change and correctional goals are reshaped, the balance of interests involved will require otherwise. But in the current environment, where prison disruption remains a serious concern to administrators, we cannot ignore the desire and effort of many States, including Nebraska, and the Federal Government to avoid situations that may trigger deep emotions and that may scuttle the disciplinary process as a rehabilitation vehicle. To some extent, the American adversary trial presumes contestants who are able to cope with the pressures and aftermath of the battle, and such may not generally be the case of those in the prisons of this country. At least, the Constitution, as we interpret it today, does not require the contrary assumption. Within the limits set forth in this opinion we are content for now to leave the continuing development of measures to review adverse actions affecting inmates to the sound discretion of corrections officials administering the scope of such inquiries.
We recognize that the problems of potential disruption may differ depending on whom the inmate proposes to cross-examine. If he proposes to examine an unknown fellow inmate, the danger may be the greatest, since the disclosure of the identity of the accuser, and the cross-examination which will follow, may pose a high risk of reprisal within the institution. Conversely, the inmate accuser, who might freely tell his story privately to prison officials, may refuse to testify or admit any knowledge of the situation in question. Although the dangers posed by cross-examination of known inmate accusers, or guards, may be less, the resentment which may persist after confrontation may still be substantial. Also, even where the accuser or adverse witness is known, the disclosure of third parties may pose a problem. There may be a class of cases where the facts are closely disputed, and the character of the parties minimizes the dangers involved. However, any constitutional rule tailored to meet these situations would undoubtedly produce great litigation and attendant costs in a much wider range of cases. Further, in the last analysis, even within the narrow range of cases where interest balancing may well dictate cross-examination, courts will be faced with the assessment of prison officials as to the dangers involved, and there would be a limited basis for upsetting such judgments. The better course at this time, in a period where prison practices are diverse and somewhat experimental, is to leave these matters to the sound discretion of the officials of state prisons.
As to the right to counsel, the problem as outlined in Scarpelli with respect to parole and probation revocation proceedings is even more pertinent here:
“The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will alter significantly the nature of the proceeding. If counsel is provided for the probationer or parolee, the State in turn will normally provide its own counsel; lawyers, by training and disposition, are advocates and bound by professional duty to present all available evidence and arguments in support of their clients' positions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence and views. The role of the hearing body itself, aptly described in Mor-rissey as being 'predictive and discretionary’ as well as factfinding, may become more akin to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned to the rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or parolee. In the greater self-consciousness of its quasi-judicial role, the hearing body may be less tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation. Certainly, the decisionmaking process will be prolonged, and the financial cost to the State— for appointed counsel, counsel for the State, a longer record, and the possibility of judicial review — -will not be insubstantial.” 411 U. S., at 787-788 (footnote omitted).
The insertion of counsel into the disciplinary process would inevitably give the proceedings a more adversary cast and tend to reduce their utility as a means to further correctional goals. There would also be delay and very practical problems in providing counsel in sufficient numbers at the time and place where hearings are to be held. At this stage of the development of these procedures we are not prepared to hold that inmates have a right to either retained or appointed counsel in disciplinary proceedings.
Where an illiterate inmate is involved, however, or where the complexity of the issue makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or if that is forbidden, to have adequate substitute aid in the form of help from the staff or from a sufficiently competent inmate designated by the staff. We need not pursue the matter further here, however, for there is no claim that respondent, McDonnell, is within the class of inmates entitled to advice or help from others in the course of a prison disciplinary hearing.
Finally, we decline to rule that the Adjustment Committee which
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the State of Texas, in the person of petitioner, the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, successfully rebutted respondent prisoner’s prima facie showing of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in the state grand jury selection process. In his brief, petitioner, in claiming effective rebuttal, asserts:
“This list [of the grand jurors that indicted respondent] indicates that 50 percent of the names appearing thereon were Spanish. The record indicates that 3 of the 5 jury commissioners, 5 of the grand jurors who returned the indictment, 7 of the petit jurors, the judge presiding at the trial, and the Sheriff who served notice on the grand jurors to appear had Spanish surnames.” Brief for Petitioner 6.
I
This Court on prior occasions has considered the workings of the Texas system of grand jury selection. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1945); Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940). Texas employs the “key man” system, which relies on jury commissioners to select prospective grand jurors from the community at large. The procedure begins with the state district judge’s appointment of from three to five persons to serve as jury commissioners. Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 19.01 (1966). The commissioners then “shall select not less than 15 nor more than 20 persons from the citizens of different portions of the county” to compose the list from which the actual grand jury will be drawn. Art. 19.06 (Supp. 1976-1977). When at least 12 of the persons on the list appear in court pursuant to summons, the district judge proceeds to “test their qualifications.” Art. 19.21. The qualifications themselves are set out in Art. 19.08: A grand juror must be a citizen of Texas and of the county, be a qualified voter in the county, be “of sound mind and good moral character,” be literate, have no prior felony conviction, and be under no pending indictment “or other legal accusation for theft or of any felony.” Interrogation under oath is the method specified for testing the prospective juror’s qualifications. Art. 19.22. The precise questions to be asked are set out in Art. 19.23, which, for the most part, tracks the language of Art. 19.08. After the court finds 12 jurors who meet the statutory qualifications, they are impaneled as the grand jury. Art. 19.26.
Respondent, Rodrigo Partida, was indicted in March 1972 by the grand jury of the 92d District Court of Hidalgo County for the crime of burglary of a private residence at night with intent to rape. Hidalgo is one of the border counties of southern Texas. After a trial before a petit jury, respondent was convicted and sentenced to eight years in the custody of the Texas Department of Corrections. He first raised his claim of discrimination in the grand jury selection process on a motion for new trial in the State District Court. In support of his motion, respondent testified about the general existence of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in that area of Texas and introduced statistics from the 1970 census and the Hidalgo County grand jury records. The census figures show that in 1970, the population of Hidalgo County was 181,535. United States Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, Characteristics of the Population, vol. 1, pt. 45, § 1, Table 119, p. 914. Persons of Spanish language or Spanish surname totaled 143,611. Ibid., and id., Table 129, p. 1092. On the assumption that all the persons of Spanish language or Spanish surname were Mexican-Americans, these figures show that 79.1% of the county’s population was Mexican-American.
Respondent’s data compiled from the Hidalgo County grand jury records from 1962 to 1972 showed that over that period, the average percentage of Spanish-surnamed grand jurors was 39%. In the 2½-year period during which the District Judge who impaneled the jury that indicted respondent was in charge, the average percentage was 45.5%. On the list from which the grand jury that indicted respondent was selected, 50% were Spanish surnamed. The last set of data that respondent introduced, again from the 1970 census, illustrated a number of ways in which Mexican-Americans tend to be underprivileged, including poverty-level incomes, less desirable jobs, substandard housing, and lower levels of education. The State offered no evidence at all either attacking respondent’s allegations of discrimination or demonstrating that his statistics were unreliable in any way.
The State District Court, nevertheless, denied the motion for a new trial.
On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. Partida v. State, 506 S. W. 2d 209 (1974). Reaching the merits of the claim of grand jury discrimination, the court held that respondent had failed to make out a prima facie case. In the court’s view, he should have shown how many of the females who served on the grand juries were Mexican-Americans married to men with Anglo-American surnames, how many Mexican-Americans were excused for reasons of age or health, or other legal reasons, and how many of those listed by the census would not have met the statutory qualifications of citizenship, literacy, sound mind, moral character, and lack of criminal record or accusation. Id., at 210—211. Quite beyond the uncertainties in the statistics, the court found it impossible to believe that discrimination could have been directed against a Mexican-American, in light of the many elective positions held by Mexican-Americans in the county and the substantial representation of Mexican-Americans on recent grand juries. Id., at 211. In essence, the court refused to presume that Mexican-Americans would discriminate against their own kind.
After exhausting his state remedies, respondent filed his petition for habeas corpus in the Federal District Court, alleging a denial of due process and equal protection, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, because of gross underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on the Hidalgo County grand juries. At a hearing at which the state transcript was introduced, petitioner presented the testimony of the state judge who selected the jury commissioners who had compiled the list from which respondent's grand jury was taken. The judge first reviewed the State’s grand jury selection process. In selecting the jury commissioners, the judge stated that he tried to appoint a greater number of Mexican-Americans than members of other ethnic groups. He testified that he instructed the commissioners about the qualifications of a grand juror and the exemptions provided by law. The record is silent, however, with regard to instructions dealing with the potential problem of discrimination directed against any identifiable group. The judge admitted that the actual results of the selection process had not produced grand jury lists that were “representative of the ethnic balance in the community.” App. 84. The jury commissioners themselves, who were the only ones in a position to explain the apparent substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans and to provide information on the actual operation of the selection process, were never called.
On the basis of the evidence before it, the court concluded that respondent had made out a “bare prima facie case” of invidious discrimination with his proof of “a long continued disproportion in the composition of the grand juries in Hidalgo County.” 384 F. Supp. 79, 90 (SD Tex. 1974) (emphasis in original). Based on an examination of the reliability of the statistics offered by respondent, however, despite the lack of evidence in the record justifying such an inquiry, the court stated that the prima facie case was weak. The court believed that the census statistics did not reflect the true situation accurately, because of recent changes in the Hidalgo County area and the court’s own impression of the demographic characteristics of the Mexican-American community. On the other hand, the court recognized that the Texas key-man system of grand jury selection was highly subjective, and was “archaic and inefficient,” id., at 91, and that this was a factor arguing for less tolerance in the percentage differences. On balance, the court’s doubts about the reliability of the statistics, coupled with its opinion that Mexican-Americans constituted a “governing majority” in the county, caused it to conclude that the prima facie case was rebutted. The “governing majority” theory distinguished respondent’s case from all preceding cases involving similar disparities. On the basis of those findings, the court dismissed the petition.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 524 F. 2d 481 (1975). It agreed with the District Court that respondent had succeeded in making out a prima facie case. It found, however, that the State had failed to rebut that showing. The “governing majority” theory contributed little to the State’s case in the absence of specific proof to explain the disparity. In light of the State’s abdication of its responsibility to introduce controverting evidence, the court held that respondent was entitled to prevail.
We granted certiorari to consider whether the existence of a “governing majority” in itself can rebut a prima facie case of discrimination in grand jury selection, and, if not, whether the State otherwise met its burden of proof. 426 U. S. 934 (1976).
III
A. This Court has long recognized that “it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws to try a defendant of a particular race or color under an indictment issued by a grand jury... from which all persons of his race or color have, solely because of that race or color, been excluded by the State....” Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 477. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 628 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U. S. 320, 330 (1970). See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493, 497 (1972) (plurality opinion); id., at 507 (dissenting opinion). While the earlier cases involved absolute exclusion of an identifiable group, later cases established the principle that substantial underrepresentation of the group constitutes a constitutional violation as well, if it results from purposeful discrimination. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970); Carter v. Jury Comm’n, supra; Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545, 552 (1967); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950). Recent cases have established the fact that an official act is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976) ; see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 264-265 (1977). Nevertheless, as the Court recognized in Arlington Heights, “[s]ometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.” Id., at 266. In Washington v. Davis, the application of these principles to the jury cases was considered:
“It is also clear from the cases dealing with racial discrimination in the selection of juries that the systematic exclusion of Negroes is itself such an 'unequal application of the law... as to show intentional discrimination.’... A prima facie case of discriminatory purpose may be proved as well by the absence of Negroes on a particular jury combined with the failure of the jury commissioners to be informed of eligible Negro jurors in a community,... or with racially non-neutral selection procedures.... With a prima facie case made out, ‘the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.’ Alexander [v. Louisiana, 405 U. S.,] at 632.” 426 U. S., at 241.
See Arlington Heights, supra, at 266 n. 13.
Thus, in order to show that an equal protection violation has occurred in the context of grand jury selection, the defendant must show that the procedure employed resulted in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs. The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 478-479. Next, the degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time. Id., at 480. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935). This method of proof, sometimes called the “rule of exclusion,” has been held to be available as a method of proving discrimination in jury selection against a delineated class. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 480. Finally, as noted above, a selection procedure that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral supports the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 241; Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 630. Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepresentation of his group, he has made out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the burden then shifts to the State to rebut that case.
B. In this case, it is no longer open to dispute that Mexican-Americans are a clearly identifiable class. See, e. g., Hernandez v. Texas, supra. Cf. White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 767 (1973). The statistics introduced by respondent from the 1970 census illustrate disadvantages to which the group has been subject. Additionally, as in Alexander v. Louisiana, the selection procedure is not racially neutral with respect to Mexican-Americans; Spanish surnames are just as easily identifiable as race was from the questionnaires in Alexander or the notations and card colors in Whitus v. Georgia, supra, and in Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953).
The disparity proved by the 1970 census statistics showed that the population of the county was 79.1% Mexican-American, but that, over an 11-year period, only 39% of the persons summoned for grand jury service were Mexican-American. This difference of 40% is greater than that found significant in Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970) (60% Negroes in the general population, 37% on the grand jury lists). Since the State presented no evidence showing why the 11-year period was not reliable, we take it as the relevant base for comparison. The mathematical disparities that have been accepted by this Court as adequate for a prima facie case have all been within the range presented here. For example, in Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967), the number of Negroes listed on the tax digest amounted to 27.1% of the taxpayers, but only 9.1% of those on the grand jury venire. The disparity was held to be sufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404 (1967) (24.4% of tax lists, 4.7% of grand jury lists); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24 (1967) (19.7% of tax lists, 5% of jury list). We agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the proof in this case was enough to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against the Mexican-Americans in the Hidalgo County grand jury selection.
Supporting this conclusion is the fact that the Texas system of selecting grand jurors is highly subjective. The facial constitutionality of the key-man system, of course, has been accepted by this Court. See, e. g., Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U. S. 320 (1970); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1945) ; Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940). Nevertheless, the Court has noted that the system is susceptible of abuse as applied. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 479. Additionally, as noted, persons with Spanish surnames are readily identifiable.
The showing made by respondent therefore shifted the burden of proof to the State to dispel the inference of intentional discrimination. Inexplicably, the State introduced practically no evidence. The testimony of the State District Judge dealt principally with the selection of the jury commissioners and the instructions given to them. The commissioners themselves were not called to testify. A case such as Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S., at 207 n. 4, 209, illustrates the potential usefulness of such testimony, when it sets out in detail the procedures followed by the commissioners. The opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is particularly revealing as to the lack of rebuttal evidence in the record:
“How many of those listed in the census figures with Mexican-American names were not citizens of the state, but were so-called ‘wet-backs’ from the south side of the Rio Grande; how many were migrant workers and not residents of Hidalgo County; how many were illiterate and could not read and write; how many were not of sound mind and good moral character; how many had been convicted of a felony or were under indictment or legal accusation for theft or a felony; none of these facts appear in the record.” 506 S. W. 2d, at 211 (emphasis added).
In fact, the census figures showed that only a small part of the population reported for Hidalgo County was not native born. See n. 6, supra. Without some testimony from the grand jury commissioners about the method by which they determined the other qualifications for grand jurors prior to the statutory time for testing qualifications, it is impossible to draw any inference about literacy, sound mind and moral character, and criminal record from the statistics about the population as a whole. See n. 8, supra. These are questions of disputed fact that present problems not amenable to resolution by an appellate court. We emphasize, however, that we are not saying that the statistical disparities proved here could never be explained in another case; we are simply saying that the State did not do so in this case. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S., at 361.
C. In light of our holding that respondent proved a prima facie case of discrimination that was not rebutted by any of the evidence presently in the record, we have only to consider whether the District Court’s “governing majority” theory filled the evidentiary gap. In our view, it did not dispel the presumption of purposeful discrimination in the circumstances of this case. Because of the many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of their group. Indeed, even the dissent of Mr. Justice Powell does not suggest that such a presumption would be appropriate. See post, at 514-516, n. 6, 516 n. 7. The problem is a complex one, about which widely differing views can be held, and, as such, it would be somewhat precipitate to take judicial notice of one view over another on the basis of a record as barren as this.
Furthermore, the relevance of a governing majority of elected officials to the grand jury selection process is questionable. The fact that certain elected officials are Mexican-American demonstrates nothing about the motivations and methods of the grand jury commissioners who select persons for grand jury lists. The only arguably relevant fact in this record on the issue is that three of the five jury commissioners in respondent’s case were Mexican-American. Knowing only this, we would be forced to rely on the reasoning that we have rejected—that human beings would not discriminate against their own kind—in order to find that the presumption of purposeful discrimination was rebutted. Without the benefit of this simple behavioral presumption, discriminatory intent can be rebutted only with evidence in the record about the way in which the commissioners operated and their reasons for doing so. It was the State’s burden to supply such evidence, once respondent established his prima facie case. The State’s failure in this regard leaves unchallenged respondent’s proof of purposeful discrimination.
Finally, even if a “governing majority” theory has general applicability in cases of this kind, the inadequacy of the record in this case does not permit such an approach. Among the evidentiary deficiencies are the lack of any indication of how long the Mexican-Americans have enjoyed “governing majority” status, the absence of information about the relative power inherent in the elective offices held by Mexican-Americans, and the uncertain relevance of the general political power to the specific issue in this case. Even for the most recent time period, when presumably the political power of Mexican-Americans was at its greatest, the discrepancy between the number of Mexican-Americans in the total population and the number on the grand jury lists was substantial. Thus, under the facts presented in this case, the “governing majority” theory is not developed fully enough to satisfy the State’s burden of rebuttal.
IV
Rather than relying on an approach to the jury discrimination question that is as faintly defined as the “governing majority” theory is on this record, we prefer to look at all the facts that bear on the issue, such as the statistical disparities, the method of selection, and any other relevant testimony as to the manner in which the selection process was implemented. Under this standard, the proof offered by respondent was sufficient to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination in grand jury selection. Since the State failed to rebut the presumption of purposeful discrimination by competent testimony, despite two opportunities to do so, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding of a denial of equal protection of the law in the grand jury selection process in respondent’s case.
It is so ordered.
The other principal state mode of juror selection is a random method similar to that used in the federal system. See 28 U. S. C. § 1864. See generally Sperlich & Jaspovice, Grand Juries, Grand Jurors and the Constitution, 1 Hastings Const. L. Q. 63, 68 (1974).
During the time period covered by this case, the statute was amended to omit the requirement that the commissioners be freeholders in the county. 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws, c. 131, § 1. That change has no bearing on the issues before us.
Prior to 1965, the law directed the commissioners to select “sixteen men.” The legislature amended the statute that year to substitute the words “twenty persons” for “sixteen men.” 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, c. 722, p. 317. In 1967, the law was amended again to provide the present range of from 15 to 20 persons. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, c. 515, § 1. These changes in the number of persons required to be on the list account for the jump from 16 to 20 in the grand jury list statistics set forth in n. 7, infra.
In the state courts and in the federal courts on habeas, the State argued that respondent’s challenge was not timely raised as a matter of state procedure, and therefore that he waived any complaint of this kind that he might have. Since the Texas courts considered the claim on its merits, however, we are free to do so here. See Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 129 (1964); cf. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536, 542 n. 5 (1976). Furthermore, petitioner abandoned the waiver point in his petition for certiorari.
For our purposes, the terms “Spanish-surnamed” and “Mexican-American” are used as synonyms for the census designation “Persons of Spanish Language or Spanish Surname.” Persons of Spanish language include both those whose mother tongue is Spanish and all other persons in families in which the head of the household or spouse reported Spanish as the mother tongue. Persons of Spanish surname, as the census uses that term, are determined by reference to a list of 8,000 Spanish surnames compiled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. For Texas, social and economic characteristics are presented for persons of Spanish language combined with all other persons of Spanish surname in the census reports. United States Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, Characteristics of the Population, vol. 1, pt. 45, § 2, App. B.
At oral argument, counsel for petitioner appears to have suggested that the presence of illegal aliens who have Spanish surnames might inflate the percentage of Mexican-Americans in the county’s population. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10-12. We cannot agree that the presence of noncitizens makes any practical difference. Table 119 of the census breaks down the 181,535 people who composed the total county population into three groups: native of native parentage, native of foreign parentage, and foreign born. The only persons as to whom the assumption of noncitizenship would be logically sustainable are the foreign born. Even for them, it is probable that some were naturalized citizens. Furthermore, only 22,845 persons were in the “foreign born” category. If those persons are excluded from the population of the county, the total becomes 158,690. Assuming that every foreign-born person was counted as a Spanish-surnamed person (an assumption that favors the State), the total number of Mexican-Americans is reduced from 143,611 to 120,766. Using these adjusted figures, Mexican-Americans constitute 76.1% of the county’s population, a figure only 3%, and thus negligibly, smaller than the one used throughout this litigation. For consistency, we shall continue to refer to the population figures for the entire county, particularly since the State has not shown why those figures are unreliable.
The statistics for grand jury composition can be organized as follows:
Year No. persons on grand jury list Av. No. Spanish surnamed per list Percentage Spanish surnamed
1962 16 6 37.5%
1963 16 5.75 35.9%
1964 16 4.75 29.7%
1965 16.2 5 30.9%
1966 20 7.5 37.5%
1967 20.25 7.25 35.8%
1968 20 6.6 33%
1969 20 10 50%
1970 20 8 40%
1971 20 9.4 47%
1972 20 10.5 52.5%
Of the 870 persons who were summoned to serve as grand jurors over the 11-year period, 339, or 39%, were Spanish surnamed. See table showing Hidalgo County grand jury panels from 1962 to 1972, App. 17-18.
At oral argument, counsel for petitioner suggested that the date regarding educational background explained the discrepancy between the percentage of Mexican-Americans in the total population and the percentage on the grand jury lists. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. For a variety of reasons, we cannot accept that suggestion. First, under the Texas method of selecting grand jurors, qualifications are not tested until the persons on the list appear in the District Court. Prior to that time, assuming an unbiased selection procedure, persons of all educational characteristics should appear on the list. If the jury commissioners actually exercised some means of winnowing those who lacked the ability to read and write, it was incumbent on the State to call the commissioners and to have them explain how this was done. In the absence of any evidence in the record to this effect, we shall not assume that the only people excluded from grand jury service were the illiterate.
Second, it is difficult to draw valid inferences from the raw census data, since the data are incomplete in some places and the definition of “literacy” would undoubtedly be the subject of some dispute in any event. The State’s failure to discuss the literacy problem at any point prior to oral argument compounds the difficulties. One gap in the data occurs with respect to the younger persons in the jury pool. The census reports for educational background cover only those who are 25 years of age and above. Yet the only age limitation on eligibility for grand jury service is qualification to vote. Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 19.08 (Supp. 1976-1977). During the period to which the census figures apply, a person became qualified to vote at age 21. Tex. Elec. Code, Art. 5.01 (1967). (In 1975, Art. 5.01 was amended to give the franchise to all persons 18 and over. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, c. 682, § 3.) It is not improbable that the educational characteristics of persons in the younger age group would prove to be favorable to Mexican-Americans.
Finally, even assuming that the statistics for persons age 25 and over are sufficiently representative to be useful, a significant discrepancy still exists between the number of Spanish-surnamed people and the level of representation on grand jury lists. Table 83 of the 1970 census shows that of a total of 80,049 persons in that age group, 13,205 have no schooling. (Data for McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. This SMSA is identical to Hidalgo County.) Table 97 shows that of the 55,949 Spanish-surnamed persons in the group, 12,817 have no schooling. This means that of the 24,100 persons of all other races and ethnic groups, 388 have no schooling. Translated into percentages, 22.9% of the Spanish-surnamed persons have no schooling, and 1.6% of the others have no schooling. This means that 43,132 of the Spanish-surnamed persons have some schooling and 23,712 of the others have some schooling. The Spanish-surnamed persons thus represent 65% of the 66,844 with some schooling, and the others 35%. The 65% figure still creates a significant disparity when compared to the 39% representation on grand juries shown over the 11-year period involved here.
The suggestion is made in the dissenting opinion of The Chief Justice, post, at 504-506, that reliance on eligible population figures and allowance for literacy would defeat respondent’s prima facie showing of discrimination. But the 65% to 39% disparity between Mexican-Americans over the age of 25 who have some schooling and Mexican-Americans represented on the grand jury venires takes both of The Chief Justice’s concerns into account. Statistical analysis, which is described in more detail in n. 17, infra, indicates that the discrepancy is significant. If one assumes that Mexican-Americans constitute only 65% of the jury pool, then a detailed calculation reveals that the likelihood that so substantial a discrepancy would occur by chance is less than 1 in 1050.
We prefer not to rely on the 65% to 39% disparity, however, since there are so many implicit assumptions in this analysis, and we consider it inappropriate for us, as an appellate tribunal, to undertake this kind of inquiry without a record below in which those assumptions were tested. We rest, instead, on the fact that the record does not show any way by which the educational characteristics are taken into account in the compilation of the grand jury lists, since the procedure established by the State provides that literacy is tested only after the group of 20 are summoned.
The court noted that the foreman of the grand jury that indicted respondent was Mexican-American, and that 10 of the 20 summoned to serve had Spanish surnames. Seven of the 12 members of the petit jury that convicted him were Mexican-American. In addition, the state judge who presided over the trial was Mexican-American, as were a number of other elected officials in the county.
The Federal District Judge observed, during the state judge’s testimony, that the selection process for grand jurors in Hidalgo County typically resulted in a progressive reduction of the number of Mexican-Americans involved at each stage. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 (1972). For example, said the court, if 60% of the jury commissioners were Mexican-American, the jury panel might be only 55%, and the actual grand jury only 43%. The court speculated that the reason for this might be cultural. App. 84-85.
The court suggested that the actual discrimination operating might be economic. The jury commissioners were from the higher socio-economic classes, and they tended to select prospective jurors from among their peers. Consequently, the number of Mexican-Americans was disproportionately low, since they were concentrated at the lower end of the economic scale. We find it unnecessary to decide whether a showing of simple economic discrimination would be enough to make out a prima facie case in the absence of other evidence, since that case is not before us. Cf. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217 (1946).
Cases in this Court holding unconstitutional discriminatory selection procedures in the grand jury context include Alexander v. Louisiana, supra; Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584 (1958); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85 (1955); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939) ; Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900); and Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110 (1883).
The idea behind the rule of exclusion is not at all complex. If a disparity is sufficiently large, then it is unlikely that it is due solely to chance or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, one must conclude that racial or other class-related factors entered into the selection process. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 n. 13 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 241 (1976); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S., at 587; Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S., at 131. Cf. n. 17, infra.
The dissenters argue that the subjectivity of the system
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner seeks a stay of execution on the theory that either Congress or the Legislature of the State of Texas might determine that actions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) should be given controlling weight in determining that a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is grounds for vacating the sentence imposed in this suit. Under settled principles, these possibilities are too remote to justify an order from this Court staying the sentence imposed by the Texas courts. And neither the President nor the Governor of the State of Texas has represented to us that there is any likelihood of congressional or state legislative action.
It is up to Congress whether to implement obligations undertaken under a treaty which (like this one) does not itself have the force and effect of domestic law sufficient to set aside the judgment or the ensuing sentence, and Congress has not progressed beyond the bare introduction of a bill in the four years since the IC J ruling and the four months since our ruling in Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491 (2008). This inaction is consistent with the President’s decision in 2005 to withdraw the United States’ accession to jurisdiction of the ICJ with regard to matters arising under the Convention.
The beginning premise for any stay, and indeed for the assumption that Congress or the legislature might seek to intervene in this suit, must be that petitioner’s confession was obtained unlawfully. This is highly unlikely as a matter of domestic or international law. Other arguments seeking to establish that a violation of the Convention constitutes grounds for showing the invalidity of the state-court judgment, for instance because counsel was inadequate, are also insubstantial, for the reasons noted in our previous opinion. Id., at 502, n. 1.
The Department of Justice of the United States is well aware of these proceedings and has not chosen to seek our intervention. Its silence is no surprise: The United States has not wavered in its position that petitioner was not prejudiced by his lack of consular access.
The application to recall and stay the mandate and for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, is denied. The application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, is denied. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent is a Negro convicted in a state court of violent crimes against a white security guard. The trial judge denied respondent’s motion that a question specifically directed to racial prejudice be asked during voir dire in addition to customary questions directed to general bias or prejudice. The narrow issue is whether, under our recent decision in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524 (1973), respondent was constitutionally entitled to require the asking of a question specifically directed to racial prejudice. The broader issue presented is whether Ham announced a requirement applicable whenever there may be a confrontation in a criminal trial between persons of different races or different ethnic origins. We answer both of these questions in the negative.
I
Respondent, James Ross, Jr., was tried in a Massachusetts court with two other Negroes for armed robbery, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery with intent to murder. The victim of the alleged crimes was a white man employed by Boston University as a uniformed security guard. The voir dire of prospective jurors was to be conducted by the court, which was required, by statute to inquire generally into prejudice. See n. 3, infra. Each defendant, represented by separate counsel, made a written motion that the prospective jurors also be questioned specifically about racial prejudice. Each defendant also moved that the veniremen be asked about affiliations with law enforcement agencies.
The trial judge consulted counsel for the defendants about their motions. After tentatively indicating that he “[felt] that no purpose would be accomplished by-asking such questions in this instance/’ the judge invited the views of counsel:
“The Court: ... I thought fr.om something Mr. Donnelly [counsel for a codefendant] said, he might have wanted on the record something which was peculiar to this case, or peculiar to the circumstances which we are operating under here which perhaps he didn’t want to say in open court.
“Is there anything peculiar about it, Mr. Donnelly?
“Mr. Donnelly: No, just the fact that the victim is white, and the defendants are black.
“The Court: This, unfortunately, is a problem with us, and all we can hope and pray for is that the jurors and all of them take their oaths seriously and understand the spirit of their oath and understand the spirit of what the Court says to them— this Judge anyway — and I am sure all Judges of this Court — would take the time to impress upon them before, during, and after the trial, and before their verdict, that their oath means just what it says, that they are to decide the case on the evidence, with no extraneous considerations.
“I believe that that is the best that can be done with respect to the problems which — as I said, I regard as extremely important . . . .” App. 29-30.
Further discussion persuaded the judge that a question about law enforcement affiliations should be asked because of the victim’s status as a security guard. But he adhered to his decision not to pose a question directed specifically to racial prejudice.
The voir dire of five panels of prospective jurors then commenced. The trial judge briefly familiarized each panel with the facts of the case, omitting any reference to racial matters. He then explained to the panel that the clerk would ask a general question about impartiality and a question about affiliations with law enforcement agencies. Consistently with his announced intention to “impress upon [the jurors] . . . that they are to decide the case on the evidence, with no extraneous considerations,” the judge preceded the questioning of the panel with an extended discussion of the obligations of jurors. After these remarks the clerk posed the questions indicated to the panel. Panelists answering a question affirmatively were questioned individually at the bench by the judge, in the presence of counsel. This procedure led to the excusing of 18 veniremen for cause on grounds of prejudice, including one panelist who admitted a racial bias.
The jury eventually impaneled convicted each defendant of all counts. On direct appeal Ross contended that his federal constitutional rights were violated by the denial of his request that prospective jurors be questioned specifically about racial prejudice. This contention was rejected by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Ross, 361 Mass. 665, 282 N. E. 2d 70 (1972), and Ross sought a writ of certiorari. While his petition was pending, we held in Ham that a trial court’s failure on request to question veniremen specifically about racial prejudice had denied Ham due process of law. We granted Ross’ petition for certiorari and remanded for reconsideration in light of Ham, 410 U. S. 901 (1973); the Supreme Judicial Court again affirmed Ross’ conviction. Commonwealth v. Ross, 363 Mass. 665, 296 N. E. 2d 810 (1973). The court reasoned that Ham turned on the need for questions about racial prejudice presented by its facts and did not announce “a new broad constitutional principle requiring that [such] questions ... be put to prospective jurors in all State criminal trials when the defendant is black. . . .” Id., at 671, 296 N. E. 2d, at 815. Ross again sought certiorari, but the writ was denied. 414 U. S. 1080 (1973).
In the present case Ross renewed his contention on collateral attack in federal habeas corpus. Relying on Ham, the District Court granted a writ of habeas corpus, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. 508 F. 2d 754 (1974). The Court of Appeals assumed that Ham turned on its facts. But it held that the facts of Ross’ case, involving “violence against a white” with “a status close to that of a police officer,” presented a need for specific questioning about racial prejudice similar to that in Ham. Id., at 756. We think the Court of Appeals read Ham too broadly.
II
The Constitution does not always entitle a defendant to have questions posed during voir dire specifically directed to matters that conceivably might prejudice veniremen against him. Ham, supra, at 527-528. Voir dire “is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.” Connors v. United States, 158 U. S. 408, 413 (1895); see Ham, supra, at 527-528; Aldridge v. United States, 283 U. S. 308, 310 (1931). This is so because the “determination of impartiality, in which demeanor plays such an important part, is particularly within the province of the trial judge.” Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 733 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). Thus, the State’s obligation to the defendant to impanel an impartial jury generally can be satisfied by less than an inquiry into a specific prejudice feared by the defendant. Ham, supra, at 527-528.
In Ham, however, we recognized that some cases may present circumstances in which an impermissible threat to the fair trial guaranteed by due process is posed by a trial court’s refusal to question prospective jurors specifically about racial prejudice during voir dire. Ham involved a Negro tried in South Carolina courts for possession of marihuana. He was well known in the locale of his trial as a civil rights activist, and his defense was that law enforcement officials had framed him on the narcotics charge to “get him” for those activities. Despite the circumstances, the trial judge denied Ham’s request that the court-conducted voir dire include questions specifically directed to racial prejudice. We reversed the judgment of conviction because “the essential fairness required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that under the facts shown by this record the [defendant] be permitted to have the jurors interrogated [during voir dire] on the issue of racial bias.” 409 U. S., at 527.
By its terms Ham did not announce a requirement of universal applicability. Rather, it reflected an assessment of whether under all of the circumstances presented there was a constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial prejudice, the jurors would not be as “indifferent as [they stand] unsworne.” Coke on Littleton 155b (19th ed. 1832). In this approach Ham was consistent with other determinations by this Court that a State had denied a defendant due process by failing to impanel an impartial jury. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961); Bideau v. Louisiana, supra; Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466 (1965); cf. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953).
The circumstances in Ham strongly suggested the need for voir dire to include specific questioning about racial prejudice. Ham’s defense was that he had been framed because of his civil rights activities. His prominence in the community as a civil rights.activist, if not already known to veniremen, inevitably would have been revealed to the members of the jury in the course of his presentation of that defense. Racial issues therefore were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial. Further, Ham’s reputation as a civil rights activist and the defense he interposed were likely to intensify any prejudice that individual members of the jury might harbor. In such circumstances we deemed a voir dire that included questioning specifically directed to racial prejudice, when sought by Ham, necessary to meet the constitutional requirement that an impartial jury be impaneled.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the need to question veniremen specifically about racial prejudice also rose to constitutional dimensions in this case. The mere fact that the victim of the crimes alleged was a white man and the defendants were Negroes was less likely to distort the trial than were the special factors involved in Ham. The victim’s status as a security officer; also relied upon by the Court of Appeals, was cited by respective defense counsel primarily as a separate source of prejudice, not as an aggravating racial factor, see n. 2, supra, and the trial judge dealt with it by his question about law-enforcement affiliations. The circumstances thus did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect Ross’ trial. This was made clear to the trial judge when Ross was unable to support his motion concerning voir dire by pointing to racial factors such as existed in Ham, or others of comparable significance. In these circumstances, the trial judge acted within the Constitution in determining that the demands of due process could be satisfied by his more generalized but thorough inquiry into the impartiality of the veniremen. Accordingly, the judgment is
Reversed.
Me. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The question proposed by Ross, who did not adopt as his own various other questions proposed by his codefendants, was: “5. Are there any of you who believe that a white person is more likely to be telling the truth than a black person?” App. 23.
“Mr. Donnelly: There is only one thing. The only reference I would make to the facts in this case — the victim[’]s being white, and that he was a security guard in uniform and acting as a policeman.
"Mr. Newman [counsel for Ross]: I think that factor might suggest the question — this was my series of questions — asking the jurors whether any of their relatives are policemen.
“The Couet: I am going to adopt Mr. Newman’s suggestion that we have a double problem here, not only the problem of skin color, but we also have the problem of someone who is a quasi policeman, so I am going to ask ... [a question] in the area of relations to police . . . .” Id., at 30-31.
The questions were, in substance, the following:
“If any of you are related to the defendants or to the victim, or if any of you have any interest in this case, or have formed an opinion or is sensible of any bias or prejudice, you should make it known to the court at this time.
“... Are you presently, or have you in the past worked for a police department or a district attorney’s office, or do you have any relative who is or was engaged in such work.” Id., at 71.
The first question was required by Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 234, §28 (1959).
He addressed one panel in part as follows:
“[The Court:] ... [U]nder your oath, you have an absolute duty to render a fair and impartial verdicts [sic] based upon the evidence that you hear in the courtroom, and no extraneous factors.
“The Clerk in asking you the first question is giving you an opportunity to inform the Court, if you believe that you cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence in this case; giving you an opportunity to inform the Court if you have serious doubt as to whether you can render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence in the case.
“Under this question, and under your oath, when this question is asked, if you believe that you cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence in this case, or if you have a doubt as to whether you can so render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence in the case, you have a duty to inform the Court when that question is asked by standing or raising your hand.” App. 72.
At least this venireman knew that the defendants were Negroes. See id., at 42. He was a member of the first panel questioned, and the record shows that immediately before the questioning of that panel the defendants were directed to stand and were “set at the bar to be tried.” Id., at 39. It appears that this formality was pursued only before the questioning of the first panel. Cf. id., at 49-50, 73-74, 84, 97. Nothing in the record lodged in this Court indicates whether the veniremen from other panels knew that the defendants weré Negroes, although presumably the defendants remained in the courtroom throughout the questioning.
A criminal defendant in a state court is guaranteed an "impartial jury” by the Sixth Amendment as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968). Principles of due process also guarantee a defendant an impartial jury. See, e. g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 722 (1961).
The questions proposed by Ham were:
“1. Would you fairly try this case on the basis of the evidence and disregarding the defendant’s race?
“2. You have no prejudice against negroes? Against black people? You would not be influenced by the use of the term ‘black’?” 409 II. S., at 525 n. 2,
In defending the judgment of the Court of Appeals Ross argues for a sweeping per se rule. At least where crimes of violence are involved, he would require defense motions for voir dire on racial prejudice to be granted in any case where the defendant was of a different race from the victim. He would require a similar result whenever any defendant sought voir dire on racial prejudice because of the race of his own or adverse witnesses. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-34. We note that such a per se rule could not, in principle, be limited to cases involving possible racial prejudice. It would apply with equal force whenever voir dire questioning about ethnic origins was sought, and its logic could encompass questions concerning other factors, such as religious affiliation or national origin. See Aldridge v. United States, 283 U. S. 308, 313 (1931). In our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption — as a per se rule — that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice of religion. See Connors v. United States, 158 U. S. 408, 415 (1895).
Although we hold that voir dire questioning directed to racial prejudice was not constitutionally required, the wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant. Under our supervisory power we would have required as much of a federal court faced with the circumstances here. See Aldridge v. United States, supra; cf. United States v. Walker, 491 F. 2d 236 (CA9), cert. denied, 416 U. S. 990 (1974); United States v. Booker, 480 F. 2d 1310 (CA7 1973). The States also are free to allow or require questions not demanded by the Constitution. In fact, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has suggested guidelines to Massachusetts trial courts for questioning about racial prejudice on voir dire. Commonwealth v. Lumley, - Mass. -, 327 N. E. 2d 683 (1975); Commonwealth v. Ross, 363 Mass. 665, 673, 296 N. E. 2d 810, 816 (1973).
The facts here resemble in many respects those in Aldridge, supra, where the Court overturned the conviction of a Negro for the murder of a white policeman because the federal trial judge had refused the defendant’s request that the venire be questioned about racial prejudice. Ham relied in part on Aldridge in finding that the inquiry into racial prejudice on voir dire sought in Ham had “constitutional stature.” 409 U. S., at 528. While Aldridge was one factor relevant to the constitutional decision in Ham, we did not rely directly on its precedential force. Rather, we noted that Aldridge “was not expressly grounded upon any constitutional requirement.” 409 U. S., at 526. In light of our holding today, the actual result in Aldridge should be recognized as an exercise of our supervisory power over federal courts. Cf. n. 9, supra.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam:
We hold that the proofs justified with reason the jury’s conclusion that employer negligence played a part in producing the petitioner’s injury. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500; Webb v. Illinois Central R. Co., 352 U. S. 512; Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U. S. 521. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded. Mr. Justice Frankfurter would dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. See his dissent in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, 524. Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Whittaker dissent for the reasons given in Mr. Justice Harlan’s opinion in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, 559.
Robert Lee Guthrie argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was David C. McCord. Luther Hudson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Preston Shirley.
Mr. Justice Burton dissents.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Among the limitations the Constitution sets on the power of a single State to tax the multistate income of a nondomicil-iary corporation are these: There must be “a ‘minimal connection’ between the interstate activities and the taxing State,” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U. S. 425, 436-437 (1980) (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 273 (1978)), and there must be a rational relation between the income attributed to the taxing State and the intrastate value of the corporate business. 445 U. S., at 437. Under our precedents, a State need not attempt to isolate the intrastate income-producing activities from the rest of the business; it may tax an apportioned sum of the corporation’s multistate business if the business is unitary. E. g., ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho Tax Comm’n, 458 U. S. 307, 317 (1982). A State may not tax a nondomiciliary corporation’s income, however, if it is “derive[d] from ‘unrelated business activity’ which constitutes a ‘discrete business enterprise.’” Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis., 447 U. S. 207, 224 (1980) (quoting Mobil Oil, supra, at 442, 439). This case presents the questions: (1) whether the unitary business principle remains an appropriate device for ascertaining whether a State has transgressed its constitutional limitations; and if so, (2) whether, under the unitary business principle, the State of New Jersey has the constitutional power to include in petitioner’s apportionable tax base certain income that, petitioner maintains, was not generated in the course of its unitary business.
I
Petitioner Allied-Signal, Inc., is the successor-in-interest to the Bendix Corporation (Bendix). The present dispute concerns Bendix’s corporate business tax liability to the State of New Jersey for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981. Although three items of income were contested earlier, the controversy in this Court involves only one item: the gain of $211.5 million realized by Bendix on the sale of its 20.6% stock interest in ASARCO Inc. (ASARCO). The case was submitted below on stipulated facts, and we begin with a summary.
During the times in question, Bendix was a Delaware corporation with its commercial domicile and corporate headquarters in Michigan. Bendix conducted business in all 50 States and 22 foreign countries. App. 154. Having started business in 1929 as a manufacturer of aviation and automotive parts, from 1970 through 1981, Bendix was organized in four major operating groups: automotive; aerospace/ electronics; industrial/energy; and forest products. Id., at 154-155. Each operating group was under separate management, but the chief executive of each group reported to the chairman and chief executive officer of Bendix. Id., at 155. In this period Bendix’s primary operations in New Jersey were the development and manufacture of aerospace products. App. 161.
ASARCO is a New Jersey corporation with its principal offices in New York. It is one of the world’s leading producers of nonferrous metals, treating ore taken from its own mines and ore it obtains from others. Id., at 163-164. From December 1977 through November 1978, Bendix acquired 20.6% of ASARCO’s stock by purchases on the open market. Id., at 165. In the first half of 1981, Bendix sold its stock back to ASARCO, generating a gain of $211.5 million. Id., at 172. The issue before us is whether New Jersey can tax an apportionable part of this income.
Our determination of the question whether the business can be called “unitary,” see infra, at 788-789, is all but controlled by the terms of a stipulation between the taxpayer and the State. They stipulated: “During the period that Bendix held its investment in ASARCO, Bendix and ASARCO were unrelated business enterprises each of whose activities had nothing to do with the other.” App. 169. Furthermore,
“[p]rior to and after its investment in Asarco, no business or activity of Bendix (in New Jersey or otherwise), either directly or indirectly (other than the investment itself), was involved in the nonferrous metal production business or any other business or activity (in New Jersey or otherwise) in which Asarco was involved. On its part, Asarco had no business or activity (in New Jersey or otherwise) which, directly or indirectly, was involved in any of the businesses or activities (in New Jersey or otherwise) in which Bendix was involved. None of Asarco’s activities, businesses or income (in New Jersey or otherwise) were related to or connected with Bendix’s activities, business or income (in New Jersey or otherwise).” Id., at 164-165.
The stipulation gives the following examples of the independence of the businesses:
“There were no common management, officers, or employees of Bendix and Asarco. There was no use by Bendix of Asarco’s corporate plant, offices or facilities and no use by Asarco of Bendix’s corporate plant, offices or facilities. There was no rent or lease of any property by Bendix from Asarco and no rent or lease of any property by Asarco from Bendix. Bendix and Asarco were each responsible for providing their own legal services, contracting services, tax services, finance services and insurance. Bendix and Asarco had separate personnel and hiring policies... and separate pension and employee benefit plans. Bendix did not lend monies to Asarco and Asarco did not lend monies to Bendix. There were no joint borrowings by Bendix and Asarco. Bendix did not guaranty any of Asarco’s debt and Asarco did not guaranty any of Bendix’s debt. Asarco had no representative on Bendix’s Board of Directors. Bendix did not pledge its Asarco stock. As far as can be determined there were no sales of product by Asarco itself to Bendix or by Bendix to Asarco. There were certain sales of product in the ordinary course of business by Asarco subsidiaries to Bendix but these sales were minute compared to Asarco’s total sales.... These open market sales were at arms length prices and did not come about due to the Bendix investment in Asarco. There were no transfers of employees between Bendix and Asarco.” Id., at 169-171.
While Bendix held its ASARCO stock, ASARCO agreed to recommend that two seats on the 14-member ASARCO Board of Directors be filled by Bendix representatives. The seats were filled by Bendix chief executive officer W. M. Agee and a Bendix outside director. Id., at 168. Nonetheless, “Bendix did not exert any control over Asarco.” Ibid.
After respondent assessed Bendix for taxes on an apportioned amount which included in the base the gain realized upon Bendix’s disposition of its ASARCO stock, Bendix sued for a refund in New Jersey Tax Court. The case was decided based upon the stipulated record we have described, and the Tax Court held that the assessment was proper. Bendix Corp. v. Taxation Div. Director, 10 N. J. Tax 46 (1988). The Appellate Division affirmed, Bendix Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 237 N. J. Super. 328, 568 A. 2d 59 (1989), and so, in turn, did the New Jersey Supreme Court, Bendix Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 125 N. J. 20, 592 A. 2d 536 (1991).
The New Jersey Supreme Court held it was constitutional to consider the gain realized from the sale of the ASARCO stock as earned in Bendix’s unitary business, drawing from our decision in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159, 166 (1983), the principle that “the context for determining whether a unitary business exists has, as an overriding consideration, the exchange or transfer of value, which may be evidenced by functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale.” 125 N. J., at 34, 592 A. 2d, at 543-544. The New Jersey Supreme Court went on to state: “The tests for determining a unitary business are not controlled, however, by the relationship between the taxpayer recipient and the affiliate generator of the income that becomes the subject of State tax.” Id., at 35, 592 A. 2d, at 544. Based upon Bendix documents setting out corporate strategy, the court found that the acquisition and sale of ASARCO “went well beyond... passive investments in business enterprises,” id., at 36, 592 A. 2d, at 544, and Bendix “essentially had a business function of corporate acquisitions and divestitures that was an integral operational activity.” Ibid. As support for its conclusion that the proceeds from the sale of the ASARCO stock were attributable to a unitary business, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied in part on the fact that Bendix intended to use those proceeds in what later proved to be an unsuccessful bid to acquire Martin Marietta, a company whose aerospace business, it was hoped, would complement Bendix’s aerospace/ electronics business. Id., at 36, 592 A. 2d, at 545.
We granted certiorari. 502 U. S. 977 (1991). At the initial oral argument in this case New Jersey advanced the proposition that all income earned by a nondomiciliary corporation could be apportioned by any State in which the corporation does business. To understand better the consequences of this theory we requested rebriefing and reargument. Our order asked the parties to address three questions:
“1. Should the Court overrule ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U. S. 307 (1982), and F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of New Mexico, 458 U. S. 354 (1982)?
“2. If ASARCO and Woolworth were overruled, should the decision apply retroactively?
“3. If ASARCO and Woolworth were overruled, what constitutional principles should govern state taxation of corporations doing business in several states?” 503 U. S. 928 (1992).
Because we give a negative answer to the first question, see infra, at 783-786, we need not address the second and third.
I — I
The principle that a State may not tax value earned outside its borders rests on the fundamental requirement of both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses that there be “some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.” Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 344-345 (1954). The reason the Commerce Clause includes this limit is self-evident: In a Union of 50 States, to permit each State to tax activities outside its borders would have drastic consequences for the national economy, as businesses could be subjected to severe multiple taxation. But the Due Process Clause also underlies our decisions in this area. Although our modern due process jurisprudence rejects a rigid, formalistic definition of minimum connection, we have not abandoned the requirement that, in the case of a tax on an activity, there must be a connection to the activity itself, rather than a connection only to the actor the State seeks to tax, see Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, ante, at 306-308. The constitutional question in a case such as Quill Corp. is whether the State has the authority to tax the corporation at all. The present inquiry, by contrast, focuses on the guidelines necessary to circumscribe the reach of the State’s legitimate power to tax; We are guided by the basic principle that the State’s power to tax an individual’s or corporation’s activities is justified by the “protection, opportunities and benefits” the State confers on those activities. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444 (1940).
Because of the complications and uncertainties in allocating the income of multistate businesses to the several States, we permit States to tax a corporation on an apportionable share of the multistate business carried on in part in the taxing State. That is the unitary business principle. It is not a novel construct, but one that we approved within a short time after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. We now give a brief summary of its development.
When States attempted to value railroad or telegraph companies for property tax purposes, they encountered the difficulty that what makes such a business valuable is the enterprise as a whole, rather than the track or wires that happen to be located within a State’s borders. The Court held that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, a State could base its tax assessments upon “the proportionate part of the value resulting from the combination of the means by which the business was carried on, a value existing to an appreciable extent throughout the entire domain of operation.” Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 220-221 (1897) (citing Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530 (1888)); Massachusetts v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 141 U. S. 40 (1891); Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 142 U. S. 217 (1891); Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 (1894); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 439 (1894); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1 (1896); Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891).
Adams Express recognized that the principles that permit a State to levy a tax on the capital stock of a railroad, telegraph, or sleeping car company by reference to its unitary business also allow proportional valuation of a unitary business in enterprises of other sorts. As the Court explained: “The physical unity existing in the former is lacking in the latter; but there is the same unity in the use of the entire property for the specific purpose, and there are the same elements of value arising from such use.” 165 U. S., at 221.
The unitary business principle was later permitted for state taxation of corporate income as well as property and capital. Thus, in Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 120-121 (1920), we explained:
“The profits of the corporation were largely earned by a series of transactions beginning with manufacture in Connecticut and ending with sale in other States. In this it was typical of a large part of the manufacturing business conducted in the State. The legislature in attempting to put upon this business its fair share, of the burden of taxation was faced with the impossibility of allocating specifically the profits earned by the processes conducted within its borders. It, therefore, adopted a method of apportionment which, for all that appears in this record, reached, and was meant to reach, only the profits earned within the State.”
As these cases make clear, the unitary business rule is a recognition of two imperatives: the States’ wide authority to devise formulae for an accurate assessment of a corporation’s intrastate value or income; and the necessary limit on the States’ authority to tax value or income that cannot in fairness be attributed to the taxpayer’s activities within the State. It is this second component, the necessity for a limiting principle, that underlies this case.
As we indicated in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U. S., at 442: “Where the business activities of the dividend payor have nothing to do with the activities of the recipient in the taxing State, due process considerations might well preclude apportionability, because there would be no underlying unitary business.” The constitutional question becomes whether the income “derive[s] from ‘unrelated business activity’ which constitutes a ‘discrete business enterprise.’ ” Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis., 447 U. S., at 224 (quoting Mobil Oil, supra, at 442, 439).
Although Mobil Oil and Exxon made clear that the unitary business principle limits the States’ taxing power, it was not until our decisions in ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho Tax Common, 458 U. S. 307 (1982), and F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of N. M., 458 U. S. 354 (1982), that we struck down a state attempt to include in the appor-tionable tax base income not derived from the unitary business. In those cases the States sought to tax unrelated business activity.
The principal question in ASARCO concerned Idaho’s attempt to include in the apportionable tax base of ASARCO certain dividends received from, among other companies, the Southern Peru Copper Corp. 458 U. S., at 309, 320. The analysis is of direct relevance for us because we have held that for constitutional purposes capital gains should be treated as no different from dividends. Id., at 330. The ASARCO in the 1982 case was the same company as the ASARCO here. It was one of four of Southern Peru’s shareholders, owning 51.5% of its stock. Under an agreement with the other shareholders, ASARCO was prevented from dominating Southern Peru’s board of directors. ASARCO had the right to appoint 6 of Southern Peru’s 13 directors, while 8 votes were required for the passage of any resolution. Southern Peru was in the business of producing unrefined copper (a nonferrous ore), some of which it sold to its shareholders. ASARCO purchased approximately 35% of Southern Peru’s output, at average representative trade prices quoted in a trade publication and over which neither Southern Peru nor ASARCO had any control. Id., at 320-322. We concluded that “ASARCO’s Idaho silver mining and Southern Peru’s autonomous business [were] insufficiently connected to permit the two companies to be classified as a unitary business.” Id., at 322.
On the same day we decided ASARCO, we decided Woolworth. In that case, the taxpayer company was domiciled in New York and operated a chain of retail variety stores in the United States. In the company’s apportionable state tax base, New Mexico sought to include earnings from four subsidiaries operating in foreign countries. The subsidiaries also engaged in chainstore retailing. 458 U. S., at 356-357. We observed that although the parent company had the potential to operate the subsidiaries as integrated divisions of a single unitary business, that potential was not significant if the subsidiaries in fact comprise discrete business operations. Id., at 362. Following the indicia of a unitary business defined in Mobil Oil, we inquired whether any of the three objective factors were present. The factors were: (1) functional integration; (2) centralization of management; and (3) economies of scale. 458 U. S., at 364. We found that “[ejxcept for the type of occasional oversight — with respect to capital structure, major debt, and dividends — that any parent gives to an investment in a subsidiary,” id., at 369, none of these factors was present. The subsidiaries were found not to be part of a unitary business. Ibid.
Our most recent case applying the unitary business principle was Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159 (1983). The taxpayer there was a vertically integrated corporation which manufactured custom-ordered paperboard packaging. Id., at 171. California sought to tax income it received from its wholly owned and mostly owned foreign subsidiaries, each of which was in the same business as the parent. Id., at 171-172. The foreign subsidiaries were given a fair degree of autonomy: They purchased only 1% of their materials from the parent, and personnel transfers from the parent to the subsidiaries were rare. Id., at 172. We recognized, however:
“[I]n certain respects, the relationship between appellant and its subsidiaries was decidedly close. For example, approximately half of the subsidiaries’ long-term debt was either held directly, or guaranteed, by appellant. Appellant also provided advice and consultation regarding manufacturing techniques, engineering, design, architecture, insurance, and cost accounting to a number of its subsidiaries, either by entering into technical service agreements with them or by informal arrangement. Finally, appellant occasionally assisted its subsidiaries in their procurement of equipment, either by selling them used equipment of its own or by employing its own purchasing department to act as an agent for the subsidiaries.” Id., at 173.
Based on these facts, we found that the taxpayer had not met its burden of showing by “‘“clear and cogent evidence” ’ ” that the State sought to tax extraterritorial values. Id., at 175, 164 (quoting Exxon Corp., supra, at 221, in turn quoting Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501, 507 (1942), in turn quoting Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297 U. S. 682, 688 (1936)).
In the course of our decision in Container Corp., we reaffirmed that the constitutional test focuses on functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale. 463 U. S., at 179 (citing Woolworth, supra, at 364; Mobil Oil, supra, at 438). We also reiterated that a unitary-business may exist without a flow of goods between the parent and subsidiary, if instead there is a flow of value between the entities. 463 U. S., at 178. The principal virtue of the unitary business principle of taxation is that it does a better job of accounting for “the many subtle and largely unquantifiable transfers of value that take place among the components of a single enterprise” than, for example, geographical or transactional accounting. Id., at 164-165 (citing Mobil Oil, 445 U. S., at 438-439).
Notwithstanding the Court’s long experience in applying the unitary business principle, New Jersey and several amici curiae argue that it is not an appropriate means for distinguishing between income generated within a State and income generated without. New Jersey has not persuaded us to depart from the doctrine of stare decisis by overruling our cases that announce and follow the unitary business standard. In deciding whether to depart from a prior decision, one relevant consideration is whether the decision is “unsound in principle.” Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 546 (1985). Another is whether it is “unworkable in practice.” Ibid. And, of course, reliance interests are of particular relevance because “[ajdherence to precedent promotes stability, predictability, and respect for judicial authority.” Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U. S. 197, 202 (1991) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265-266 (1986)). See also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, ante, at 316 (industry’s reliance justifies adherence to precedent); ante, at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (same). Against this background we address the arguments of New Jersey and its amici.
New Jersey contends that the unitary business principle must be abandoned in its entirety, arguing that a nondomicil-iary State should be permitted “to apportion all the income of a separate multistate corporate taxpayer.” Brief for Respondent on Reargument 27. According to New Jersey, the unitary business principle does not reflect economic reality, while its proposed theory does. We are not convinced.
New Jersey does not appear to dispute the basic proposition that a State may not tax value earned outside its borders. It contends instead that all income of a corporation doing any business in a State is, by virtue of common ownership, part of the corporation’s unitary business and appor-tionable. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-26 (Apr. 22, 1992). New Jersey’s sweeping theory cannot be reconciled with the concept that the Constitution places limits on a State’s power to tax value earned outside of its borders. To be sure, our cases give States wide latitude to fashion formulae designed to approximate the in-state portion of value produced by a corporation’s truly multistate activity. But that is far removed from New Jersey’s theory that any business in the State, no matter how small or unprofitable, subjects all of a corporation’s out-of-state income, no matter how discrete, to apportionment.
According to New Jersey, Brief for Respondent on Reargument 11, there is no logical distinction between short-term investment of working capital, which all concede is appor-tionable, see Reply Brief for Petitioner on Reargument 4-5, and n. 3; Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-8 (Apr. 22, 1992); Container Corp., supra, at 180, n. 19, and all other investments. The same point was advanced by the dissent in ASARCO, 458 U. S., at 337 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). New Jersey’s basic theory is that multistate corporations like Bendix regard all of their holdings as pools of assets, used for maximum long-term profitability, and that any distinction between operational and investment assets is artificial. We may assume, argu-endo, that the managers of Bendix cared most about the profits entry on a financial statement, but that state of mind sheds little light on the question whether in pursuing maximum profits they treated particular intangible assets as serving, on the one hand, an investment function, or, on the other, an operational function. See Container Corp,, supra, at 180, n. 19. That is the relevant unitary business inquiry, one which focuses on the objective characteristics of the asset’s use and its relation to the taxpayer and its activities within the taxing State. It is an inquiry to which our cases give content, and which is necessary if the limits of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are to have substance in a modern economy. In short, New Jersey’s suggestion is not in accord with the well-established and substantial case law interpreting the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.
Our precedents are workable in practice; indeed, New Jersey conceded as much. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38 (Apr. 22, 1992). If lower courts have reached divergent results in applying the unitary business principle to different factual circumstances, that is because, as we have said, any number of variations on the unitary business theme “are logically consistent with the underlying principles motivating the approach,” Container Corp., supra, at 167, and also because the constitutional test is quite fact sensitive.
Indeed, if anything would be unworkable in practice, it would be for us now to abandon our settled jurisprudence defining the limits of state power to tax under the unitary business principle. State legislatures have relied upon our precedents by enacting tax codes which allocate intangible nonbusiness income to the domiciliary State, see App. to Brief for Petitioner on Reargument 1a-7a (collecting statutes). Were we to adopt New Jersey’s theory, we would be required either to invalidate those statutes or authorize what would be certain double taxation. And, of course, we would defeat the reliance interest of those corporations that have structured their activities and paid their taxes based upon the well-established rules we here confirm. Difficult questions respecting the retroactive effect of our decision would also be presented. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U. S. 529 (1991). New Jersey’s proposal would disrupt settled expectations in an area of the law in which the demands of the national economy require stability.
Not willing to go quite so far as New Jersey, some amici curiae urge us to modify, rather than abandon, the unitary business principle. See, e. g., Brief for Multistate Tax Commission as Amicus Curiae; Brief for Multistate Tax Commission as Amicus Curiae on Reargument; Brief for Chevron Corporation as Amicus Curiae. They urge us to hold that the Constitution does not require a unitary business relation between the payor and the payee in order for a State to apportion the income the payee corporation receives from an investment in the payor. Rather, they urge us to adopt as the constitutional test the standard set forth in the business income definition in § 1(a) of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), 7A U. L. A. 331, 336 (1985). Under UDITPA, “business income,” which is apportioned, is defined as: “income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business and includes income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade or business operations.” UDITPA §1(a). “Non-business income,” which is allocated, is defined as “all income other than business income.” § 1(e).
In the abstract, these definitions may be quite compatible with the unitary business principle. See Container Corp., supra, at 167 (noting that most of the relevant provisions of the California statute under which we sustained the challenged tax there were derived from UDITPA). Furthermore, the unitary business principle is not so inflexible that as new methods of finance and new forms of business evolve it cannot be modified or supplemented where appropriate. It does not follow, though, that apportionment-of all income is permitted by the mere fact of corporate presence within the State; and New Jersey offers little more in support of the decision of the State Supreme Court.
We agree that the payee and the payor need not be engaged in the same unitary business as a prerequisite to apportionment in all cases. Container Corp. says as much. What is required instead is that the capital transaction serve an operational rather than an investment function. 463 U. S., at 180, n. 19. Hence, in ASARCO, although we rejected the dissent’s factual contention that the stock investments there constituted “interim uses of idle funds ‘accumulated for the future operation of [the taxpayer’s]... business [operation],’ ” we did not dispute the suggestion that had that been so the income would have been apportionable. 458 U. S., at 325, n. 21.
To be sure, the existence of a unitary relation between the payor and the payee is one means of meeting the constitutional requirement. Thus, in ASARCO and Woolworth we focused on the question whether there was such a relation. We did not purport, however, to establish a general requirement that there be a unitary relation between the payor and the payee to justify apportionment, nor do we do so today.
It remains the case that “[i]n order to exclude certain income from the apportionment formula, the company must prove that ‘the income was earned in the course of activities unrelated to [those carried out in the taxing] State.’” Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis., 447 U. S., at 223 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U. S., at 439). The existence of a unitary relation between payee and payor is one justification for apportionment, but not the only one. Hence, for example, a State may include within the apportionable income of a nondomiciliary corporation the interest earned on short-term deposits in a bank located in another State if that income forms part of the working capital of the corporation’s unitary business, notwithstanding the absence of a unitary relationship between the corporation and the bank. That circumstance, of course, is not at all presented here. See infra this page and 789.
Ill
Application of the foregoing principles to the present case yields a clear result: The stipulated factual record now before us presents an even weaker basis for inferring a unitary business than existed in either ASARCO or Woolworth, making this an a fortiori case. There is no serious contention that any of the three factors upon which we focused in Woolworth were present. Functional integration and economies of scale could not exist because, as the parties have stipulated, “Bendix and Asarco were unrelated business enterprises each of whose activities had nothing to do with the other.” App. 169. Moreover, because Bendix owned only 20.6% of ASARCO’s stock, it did not have the potential to operate ASARCO as an integrated division of a single unitary business, and of course, even potential control is not sufficient. Woolworth, 458 U. S., at 362. There was no centralization of management.
Furthermore, contrary to the view expressed below by the New Jersey Supreme Court, see 125 N. J., at 36-37, 592 A. 2d, at 544-545, the mere fact that an intangible asset was acquired pursuant to a long-term corporate strategy of acquisitions and dispositions does not convert an otherwise passive investment into an integral operational one. Indeed, in Container Corp. we noted the important distinction between a capital transaction that serves an investment function and one that serves an operational function. 463 U. S., at 180, n. 19 (citing Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U. S. 46, 50-53 (1955)). If that distinction is to retain its vitality, then, as we held in ASARCO, the fact that a transaction was undertaken for a business purpose does not change its character. 458 U. S., at 326. Idaho had argued that intangible income could be treated as earned in the course of a unitary business if the intangible property which produced that income is “ 'acquired, managed or disposed of for purposes relating or contributing to the taxpayer’s business.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Brief for Appellee 4). In rejecting the argument we observed:
“This definition of unitary business would destroy the concept. The business of a corporation requires that it earn money to continue operations and to provide a return on its invested capital. Consequently all of its operations, including any investment made, in some sense can be said to be 'for purposes related to or contributing to the [corporation’s]
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners were convicted of violating 18 U. S. C. § 241, which, in pertinent part, makes it unlawful for two or more persons to “conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . Specifically, the Government proved that petitioners engaged in a conspiracy to cast fictitious votes for candidates for federal, state, and local offices in a primary election in Logan County, West Virginia. At the trial, a question arose concerning the admissibility against all of the petitioners of certain out-of-court statements made by some of them. In considering the propriety of the District Court’s decision to admit this evidence, the Court of Appeals thought it necessary to resolve the question whether a conspiracy to cast false votes in a state or local election, as opposed to a conspiracy to cast false votes in a federal election, is unlawful under § 241. The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners’ convictions, concluding that § 241 encompasses “conspiracies, involving state action at least, to dilute the effect of ballots cast for the candidate of one’s choice in wholly state elections.” 481 F. 2d 685, 700-701 (CA4 1973). We granted certiorari to consider this question. 414 U. S. 1091 (1973). It now appears, however, that the out-of-court statements at issue were admissible under basic principles of the law of evidence and conspiracy, regardless of whether or not § 241 encompasses conspiracies to cast fraudulent votes in state and local elections. Accordingly we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals without passing on its interpretation of § 241.
I
The underlying facts are not in dispute. On May 12, 1970, a primary election was held in West Virginia for the purpose of nominating candidates for the United States Senate, United States House of Representatives, and various state and local offices. One of the nominations most actively contested in Logan County was the Democratic nomination for County Commissioner, an office vested with a wide variety of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Among the several candidates for the Democratic nomination for this office were the incumbent, Okey Hager, and his major opponent, Neal Scaggs.
Petitioners are state or county officials, including the Clerk of the Logan County Court, the Clerk of the County Circuit Court, the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff of the County, and a State Senator. The evidence at trial showed that by using the power of their office, the petitioners convinced three election officials in charge of the Mount Gay precinct in Logan County to cast false and fictitious votes on the voting machines and then to destroy poll slips so that the number of persons who had actually voted could not be determined except from the machine tally. While it is apparent from the record that the primary purpose behind the casting of false votes was to secure the nomination of Hager for the office of County Commissioner, it is equally clear that about 100 false votes were in fact cast not only for Hager, but also for Senator Robert Byrd and Representative Ken Hechler, who appeared on the ballot for renomination to their respective chambers of the United States Congress, as well as for other state and local candidates considered part of the Hager slate.
The conspiracy achieved its primary objective, the countywide vote totals showing Hager the winner by 21 votes, counting the Mount Gay precinct returns. About two weeks after the election, on May 27, 1970, the election results were certified. After that date, Scaggs filed an election contest challenging certain returns, including the Mount Gay County Commissioner votes. No challenge was made, however, to the Mount Gay votes for either of the federal offices, and they became final on May 27.
A hearing was held in the County Court on the election contest at which petitioners Earl Tomblin and John R. Browning gave sworn testimony. The prosecution in the § 241 trial sought to prove that Tomblin and Browning perjured themselves at the election contest hearing in a continuing effort to have the fraudulent votes for Hager counted and certified. For example, one of the key issues in the election contest was whether sufficient voters had in fact turned out in Mount Gay precinct to justify the unusually high reported returns. Tomblin testified under oath at the election contest that he had visited Mount Gay precinct on election day and had observed one Garrett Sullins there as Sullins went in to vote. The prosecution at the § 241 trial, however, offered testimony from Sullins himself that he was in the hospital and never went to the Mount Gay precinct on election day.
At trial, the other defendants objected to the introduction of Tomblin’s prior testimony on the ground that it was inadmissible against anyone but Tomblin. The District Court overruled the objection but instructed the jury that Tomblin’s testimony could be considered only as bearing upon his guilt or innocence, unless the jury should determine that at the time Tomblin gave this testimony, a conspiracy existed between him and the other defendants and that the testimony was made in furtherance of the conspiracy, in which case the jury could consider the testimony as bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the other defendants. A similar objection was made to the introduction of Browning’s election contest testimony and a similar cautionary instruction given when that objection was overruled.
In oral argument before the Court of Appeals, petitioners for the first time sought to link their objection to the introduction of this evidence to a particular interpretation of § 241. See 481 F. 2d, at 694. Specifically, petitioners argued that § 241 was limited to conspiracies to cast false votes in-federal elections and did not apply to local elections. Accordingly, they contended that the conspiracy in the present case, so far as federal jurisdiction was concerned, ended on May 27, 1970, the date on which the election returns were certified and the federal returns became final. Statements made after this date by one alleged conspirator, the argument continued, could not, as a matter of law, have been made in furtherance of the conspiracy charged under § 241 and therefore should not have been considered by the jury in determining the guilt or innocence of the other defendants.
The Government countered before the Court of Appeals that, whether the federal conspiracy had ended or not, the election contest testimony of Tomblin and Browning was admissible under the principles enunciated in Lutwak v. United States, 344 U. S. 604 (1953). The Court of Appeals, however, decided not to tarry over this point and instead, in its own words, chose “to meet directly the contention that federal jurisdiction over the alleged conspiracy ended with the certification in the federal election contests . . . .” See 481 F. 2d, at 698. We think it inadvisable, however, to reach out in this fashion to pass on important questions of statutory construction when simpler, and more settled, grounds are available for deciding the case at hand. In our view, the basic principles of evidence and conspiracy law set down in Lutwak are dispositive of petitioners’ evidentiary claims.
The doctrine that declarations of one conspirator may be used against another conspirator, if the declaration was made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy charged, is a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule which would otherwise bar the introduction of such out-of-court declarations. See Lutwak v. United States, supra, at 617. See also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440 (1949). The hearsay-conspiracy exception applies only to declarations made while the conspiracy charged was still in progress, a limitation that this Court has “scrupulously observed.” See Krulewitch v. United States, supra, at 443-444. See also Lutwak v. United States, supra, at 617-618; Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211, 217 (1946); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 490 (1963).
But, as the Court emphasized in Lutwak, the requirement that out-of-court declarations by a conspirator be shown to have been made while the conspiracy charged was still in progress and in furtherance thereof arises only because the declaration would otherwise be hearsay. The ongoing conspiracy requirement is therefore inapplicable to evidence, such as that of acts of alleged conspirators, which would not otherwise be hearsay. Thus the Court concluded in Lutwak that acts of one alleged conspirator could be admitted into evidence against the other conspirators, if relevant to prove the existence of the conspiracy, “even though they might have occurred after the conspiracy ended.” 344 U. S., at 618. See also United States v. Chase, 372 F. 2d 453 (CA4 1967); Note, Developments in the Law — Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 988 (1959).
The obvious question that arises in the present case, then, is whether the out-of-court statements of Tomblin and Browning were hearsay. We think it plain they were not. Out-of-court statements constitute hearsay only when offered in evidence 'to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The election contest testimony of Tomblin and Browning, however, was not admitted into evidence in the § 241 trial to prove the truth of anything asserted therein. Quite the contrary, the point of the prosecutor’s introducing those statements was simply to prove that the statements were made so as to establish a foundation for later showing, through other admissible evidence, that they were false. The rationale of the hearsay rule is inapplicable as well. The primary justification for the exclusion of hearsay is the lack of any opportunity for the adversary to cross-examine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is introduced into evidence. Here, since the prosecution was not contending that anything Tomblin or Browning said at the election contest was true, the other defendants had no interest in cross-examining them so as to put their credibility in issue. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965); Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 (1968); Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968).
Since these prior statements were not hearsay, the jury did not have to make a preliminary finding that the conspiracy charged under § 241 was still in progress before it could consider them as evidence against the other defendants. The prior testimony was accordingly admissible simply if relevant in some way to prove the conspiracy charged. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U. S., at 617.
As we read the record, there can be no doubt that the evidence of perjury by petitioners Tomblin and Browning in the election contest was relevant to make out the Government’s case under § 241, even assuming, arguendo, that the petitioners’ conspiracy ended, for purposes of federal jurisdiction, on May 27, 1970, with the certification of the federal election returns. For even if federal jurisdiction rested only on that aspect of the conspiracy involving the federal candidates, the proof at trial need not have been so limited. The prosecution was entitled to prove the underlying purpose and motive of the conspirators in order to convince the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that petitioners had in fact unlawfully conspired to cast false votes in the election. See Lutwak v. United States, supra, at 617. As it was never suggested that either Senator Byrd or Representative Hechler needed or sought the assistance of an unlawful conspiracy in order to win his respective nomination, a key issue in this prosecution, accepting for the sake of argument petitioners' view of § 241, was whether and why petitioners conspired to have false votes cast for these federal candidates. The fact that two of the petitioners perjured themselves at an election contest in which the Mount Logan votes for Hager were at stake helped prove the underlying motive of the conspiracy, by demonstrating that the false votes for federal officers were not an end in themselves, but rather part of a conspiracy to obtain Hager’s nomination through unlawful means. The jury could have inferred that the petitioners were motivated in casting false federal ballots by the need to conceal the fraudulent votes for Hager, since the casting of large numbers of false ballots for County Commissioner would likely have aroused suspicion in the absence of the casting of a similar number of false votes for the other offices at issue in the election.
Even if the federal conspiracy ended on May 27, then, the Tomblin and Browning election contest testimony was relevant to prove the offense charged. Accordingly, in order to rule on petitioners’ challenge to the admissibility of this evidence, there was no need for the Court of Appeals, and there is no need for us, to decide whether petitioners’ conspiracy ended on May 27 for purposes of federal jurisdiction or whether § 241 applies to conspiracies to cast fraudulent votes in local elections.
II
Petitioners argue, however, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to show that they had engaged in a conspiracy to cast false votes for the federal officers and that their convictions under § 241 can stand only if we hold that section applicable to a conspiracy to cast false votes in a local election. Our examination of the record leads us to conclude otherwise.
Two principles form the backdrop for our analysis of the record. It is established that since the gravamen of the offense under § 241 is conspiracy, the prosecution must show that the offender acted with a specific intent to interfere with the federal rights in question. See United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 753-754 (1966); Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945). Moreover, we scrutinize the record for evidence of such intent with special care in a conspiracy case for, as we have indicated in a related context, “charges of conspiracy are not to be made out by piling inference upon inference, thus fashioning ... a dragnet to draw in all substantive crimes.” Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 703, 711 (1943). See also Ingram v. United States, 360 U. S. 672, 680 (1959).
Even with these caveats in mind, we find the record amply bears out the verdict that each of the petitioners engaged in the conspiracy with the intent of having false votes cast for the federal officers. The Government’s chief witness was Cecil Elswick, an unindicted coconspir-ator who served as the Republican election officer at the Mount Gay precinct and who actually cast most of the fraudulent votes. Elswick testified that he was first approached by petitioner Red Hager, the son of Okey Hager, who told Elswick to go along with them to win the Mount Gay precinct or else he, Red Hager, would cause Elswick trouble. When asked on direct examination for whom he was told to win the precinct, Elswick testified: “For the Okey Hager slate and Senator Byrd and Ken Hechler.” App. 40. When Elswick expressed an interest in going along, Red Hager arranged for a meeting between Elswick and Tomblin at which Tomblin confirmed an offer of a part-time deputy sheriff job for Elswick as a reward for his help in the election fraud. Elswick later met with petitioner W. Bernard Smith in Tomblin’s office, and Smith then instructed him on how to proceed to win the election. The night before the election, Elswick met with all five of the petitioners. At this meeting cash payments for the false votes were discussed and petitioners Smith and Hager emphasized the need for( putting “all the votes” on the machine. Later that evening, Elswick accompanied Tomblin to visit Garrett Sullins, a candidate for justice of the peace listed on the Hager slate. Tomblin told Sullins not to worry about his election because they had him “slated,” so long as Sullins’ wife, another Mount Gay precinct election official, would go along with the illegal voting.
Elswick then testified as to how he actually put the fraudulent votes on the machines. When a voter came into the precinct and asked for help in using the machines to vote the Neal Scaggs slate, Elswick and Mrs. Sullins would join the voter in the voting machine and, aligning their bodies so as to conceal what they were doing, would put votes on the machine for the entire Hager slate. In addition, Elswick simply went into the voting machine on his own and cast many fictitious ballots. Through a comparison between the reported returns and the number of persons who actually voted, false votes were shown to have been cast for every office — federal, state, and local. See n. 3, supra.
We think this evidence amply supported the jury’s conclusion that each of the petitioners knowingly participated in a conspiracy which contemplated the casting of false votes for all offices at issue in the election. The evidence at trial tended to show a single conspiracy, the primary objective of which was to have false votes cast for Hager but which also encompassed the casting of false votes for candidates for all other offices, including Senator Byrd and Representative Hechler. True, there was little discussion among the conspirators of the federal votes per se, just as there was little discussion of the Hager votes in and of themselves, but the jury could believe this was only a reflection of the conspirators’ underlying assumption that false votes would have to be cast for entire slates of candidates in order to have their fraud go undetected.
In our view, petitioners err in seeking to attach significance to the fact that the primary motive behind their conspiracy was to affect the result in the local rather than the federal election. A single conspiracy may have several purposes, but if one of them — whether primary or secondary — be the violation of a federal law, the conspiracy is unlawful under federal law. See Ingram v. United States, 360 U. S., at 679-680. It has long been settled that § 241 embraces a conspiracy to stuff the ballot box at an election for federal officers, and thereby to dilute the value of votes of qualified voters; see United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385 (1944). See also United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383 (1915). This applies to primary as well as general elections. See United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941).
That petitioners may have had no purpose to change the outcome of the federal election is irrelevant. The specific intent required under § 241 is not the intent to change the outcome of a federal election, but rather the intent to have false votes cast and thereby to injure the right of all voters in a federal election to express their choice of a candidate and to have their expressions of choice given full value and effect, without being diluted or distorted by the casting of fraudulent ballots. See United States v. Saylor, supra, at 386. As one court has stated:
“The deposit of forged ballots in the ballot boxes, no matter how small or great their number, dilutes the influence of honest votes in an election, and whether in greater or less degree is immaterial. The right to an honest [ count] is a right possessed by each voting elector, and to the extent that the importance of his vote is nullified, wholly or in part, he has been injured in the free exercise of a right or privilege secured to him by the laws and Constitution of the United States.” Prichard v. United States, 181 F. 2d 326, 331 (CA6), aff’d due to absence of quorum, 339 U. S. 974 (1950).
Every voter in a federal primary election, whether he votes for a candidate with little chance of winning or for one with little chance of losing, has a right under the Constitution to have his vote fairly counted, without its being distorted by fraudulently cast votes. And, whatever their motive, those who conspire to cast false votes in an election for federal office conspire to injure that right within the meaning of § 241.
While the District Court’s jury instructions did not specifically focus upon the conspiracy to cast false votes for candidates for federal offices, no objection was made at trial or before the Court of Appeals with respect to this aspect of the instructions. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U. S. 189, 200 (1943); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 147 n. 2 (1970). And, even assuming, arguendo, that § 241 is limited to conspiracies to cast false votes for candidates for federal offices, we could find no plain error here. The prosecution’s case, as indicated earlier, showed a single conspiracy to cast entire slates of false votes. The defense consisted in large part of a challenge to the credibility of the Government’s witnesses, primarily the three unindicted coconspirators. The case therefore ultimately hinged on whether the jury would believe or disbelieve their testimony. Given the record, we think it inconceivable that, even if charged by more specific instructions, the jury could have found a conspiracy to cast false votes for local offices without finding a conspiracy to cast false votes for the federal offices as well.
This case is therefore an inappropriate vehicle for us to decide whether a conspiracy to cast false votes for candidates for state or local office, as opposed to candidates for federal office, is unlawful under § 241, and we intimate no views on that question.
Affirmed.
The County Commissioner sits on the County Court which is the central governmental body in the county. See State ex rel. Dingess v. Scaggs, — W. Va. —, —, 195 S. E. 2d 724, 726 (1973). See also W. Va. Code Ann., §7-1-3 et seq. (1969).
The participation of the election officials was secured by threats of indictment or arrest, or promises of county jobs and money.
Of the 541 persons listed as eligible to vote at the Mount Gay precinct, the Government proved that 222 did not vote and that 13 more were either dead, in the hospital, or in prison. This left a maximum of 306 who could have voted. Observers at the precinct throughout election day estimated that about 275 persons had actually voted. Nevertheless 348 votes were recorded as cast for candidates for the nominees for United States Senator, 328 for Congressman, 358 for State Senator, 458 for House of- Delegates, 375 for County Commissioner (long term), 365 for County Commissioner (short term), 371 for Justice of the Peace, and 371 for Constable.
The election contest, at which candidate Hager was one of the two presiding judges, was concluded on August 25, 1970. Although the court was required by statute to rule on the contest by September 17, 1970, see W. Va. Code Ann., § 3-7-7, it failed to enter a final order within the statutory period. Scaggs appealed to an intermediate appellate court, which granted an appeal. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, however, ruled that the intermediate appellate court lacked jurisdiction since no decision had been rendered by the County Court within the statutory time allowed. See State ex rel. Hager v. Oakley, 154 W. Va. 528, 177 S. E. 2d 585 (1970).
Other gounds for exclusion argued before the District Court and in the briefs before the Court of Appeals have not been pursued here. These include a contention that introduction of the prior testimony had the effect of putting Tomblin and Browning on the witness stand in violation of their constitutional right to stand mute, a suggestion that since the testimony was given in a judicial hearing there might be Miranda problems, and the argument that the prior testimony of Tomblin and Browning was inadmissible impeachment evidence since both had exercised their constitutional right not to testify. See 481 F. 2d 685, 694.
The Court of Appeals recognized that it need not ordinarily consider grounds of objection not presented to the trial court. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552, 556 (1941). This rule is not without its exceptions, however, particularly in criminal cases where appellate courts can notice errors seriously affecting the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U. S. 157, 160 (1936). See also Hormel v. Helvering, supra, at 557. In view of the fact that petitioners did challenge the admissibility of the Tomblin and Browning testimony at trial, we think it was proper for the Court of Appeals to consider all grounds related to that underlying objection.
The rationale for both the hearsay-conspiracy exception and its limitations is the notion that conspirators are partners in crime. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 253 (1940); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211, 216 (1946). As such, the law deems them agents of one another. And just as the declarations of an agent bind the principal only when the agent acts within the scope of his authority, so the declaration of a conspirator must be made in furtherance of the conspiracy charged in order to be admissible against his partner. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 442-443 (1949); Fiswick v. United States, supra, at 217; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 490 (1963). See generally 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1077-1079 (Chadbourne rev. 1972).
See 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1361 (3d ed. 1940); C. McCormick, Law of Evidence 460 (1954).
Of course, evidence is not hearsay when it is used only to prove that a prior statement was made and not to prove the truth of the statement. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 88 (1970) (opinion of Stewart, J.). See also Creaghe v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 323 F. 2d 981 (CA10 1963); General Tire of Miami Beach, Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F. 2d 58 (CA5 1964); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Combs, 273 F. 2d 295 (CA5 1960); Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F. 2d 874 (CA1 1966).
Thus, in his opening argument the prosecutor said: 'T believe the evidence will show, frankly, that that election contest was full of perjurious testimony, full of lies. Some of it, the evidence will show, was solicited and caused by these defendants.” App. 22. The same point was made in closing argument. Tr. 1851-1852.
See 5 J. Wigmore, supra, n. 7, at § 1362. See also Colorificio Italiano Max Meyer, S. P. A. v. S/S Hellenic Wave, 419 F. 2d 223 (CA5 1969); Rossville Salvage Corp. v. S. E. Graham Co., 319 F. 2d 391 (CA3 1963); Superior Engraving Co. v. NLRB, 183 F. 2d 783 (CA7 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 930 (1951).
Technically, of ccurse, the proffered evidence was hearsay in that the Government sought to prove the prior testimony of Tomblin and Browning by reading a transcript of the election contest hearing into evidence at the § 241 trial, rather than by calling as a witness a person who himself heard the Tomblin and Browning testimony. A well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule, however, permits the introduction of certified court transcripts to prove the testimony given at a prior proceeding. See generally 5 J. Wigmore, supra, n. 7, at § 1681. Nor is there any right-of-confrontation problem here, since petitioners did not suggest below that the transcript read at the § 241 trial did not accurately reflect the testimony actually given at the election contest hearing.
In briefing this case, all parties appear to have assumed that this sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim was properly before this Court. It seems clear, however, that this issue was presented neither to the Court of Appeals nor to us in the petition for a writ of certiorari. As indicated earlier, the § 241 question arose below only with respect to the admissibility of the prior testimony of Browning and Tomblin, and not in connection with any claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict under the statute. We nevertheless consider the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim here. We recognize that petitioners did raise before both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, and in the petition for a writ of certiorari a claim that the indictment was unconstitutionally vague, and the gist of their argument on this point was that the Government had charged a conspiracy to cast false votes for both federal and local candidates in order to survive a motion to dismiss the indictment, but had turned around at trial and proved only a conspiracy to cast false votes for the local candidates. This argument therefore raised the substance of petitioners’ present contention that the evidence was insufficient to show a conspiracy to cast false votes for federal candidates. Moreover, as we have had occasion to note, a claim that a conviction is based on a record lacking any evidence relevant to crucial elements of the offense is a claim with serious constitutional overtones. See, e. g., Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 (1960); Johnson v. Florida, 391 U. S. 596 (1968). See also Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 44 (1966). Accordingly, even though the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue was not raised below with any particularity, we think the interests of justice require its consideration here. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 107 (1945) (opinion of Douglas, J.). Cf. Lawn v. United States, 355 U. S. 339, 362 n. 16 (1958).
We also find no merit in petitioners’ contention that the indictment was unconstitutionally vague. The indictment states that on May 12, 1970, a primary election was held in Logan County, West Virginia, for the purpose of nominating candidates for the offices of United States Senator, Representative to Congress, and various state and county public offices. It then charges each of the defendants with conspiring to injure and oppress the qualified voters of Mount Gay precinct in the free exercise and enjoyment of their “right to vote for candidates for the aforesaid offices and to have such vote cast, counted, recorded, and certified at their full value and given full effect The indictment further specifies that it was a part of the conspiracy “to cause fraudulent and fictitious votes to be east in said precinct ....’’ Pet. for Cert. 3b. We think it plain that the indictment gave petitioners adequate notice of the specific charges against them. We also note, and petitioners themselves concede, that the form of the indictment was similar to those used in other § 241 prosecutions. See United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385 (1944); United States v. Kantor, 78 F. 2d 710 (CA2 1935); Walker v. United States, 93 F. 2d 383 (CA8 1937); Ledford v. United States, 155 F. 2d 574 (CA6), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 733 (1946).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Paul Gibbs was awarded compensatory and punitive damages in this action against petitioner United Mine Workers of America (UMW) for alleged violations of § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 158, as amended, and of the common law of Tennessee. The case grew out of the rivalry between the United Mine Workers and the Southern Labor Union over representation of workers in the southern Appalachian coal fields. Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company, not a party here, laid off 100 miners of the UMW’s Local 5881 when it closed one of its mines in southern Tennessee during the spring of 1960. Late that summer, Grundy Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Consolidated, hired respondent as mine superintendent to attempt to open a new mine on Consolidated’s property at nearby Gray’s Creek through use of members of the Southern Labor Union. As part of the arrangement, Grundy also gave respondent a contract to haul the mine’s coal to the nearest railroad loading point.
On August 15 and 16, 1960, armed members of Local 5881 forcibly prevented the opening of the mine, threatening respondent and beating an organizer for the rival union. The members of the local believed Consolidated
had promised them the jobs at the new mine; they insisted that if anyone would do the work, they would. At this time, no representative of the UMW, their international union, was present. George Gilbert, the UMW’s field representative for the area including Local 5881, was away at Middlesboro, Kentucky, attending an Executive Board meeting when the members of the local discovered Grundy’s plan; he did not return to the area until late in the day of August 16. There was uncontradicted testimony that he first learned of the violence while at the meeting, and returned with explicit instructions from his international union superiors to establish a limited picket line, to prevent any further violence, and to see to it that the strike did not spread to neighboring mines. There was no further violence at the mine site; a picket line was maintained there for nine months; and no further attempts were made to open the mine during that period.
Respondent lost his job as superintendent, and never entered into performance of his haulage contract. He testified that he soon began to lose other trucking contracts and mine leases he held in nearby areas. Claiming these effects to be the result of a concerted union plan against him, he sought recovery not against Local 5881 or its members, but only against petitioner, the international union. The suit was brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, and jurisdiction was premised on allegations of secondary boycotts under § 303. The state law claim, for which jurisdiction was based upon the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, asserted “an unlawful conspiracy and an unlawful boycott aimed at him and [Grundy] to maliciously, wantonly and willfully interfere with his contract of employment and with his contract of haulage.” The trial judge refused to submit to the jury the claims of pressure intended to cause mining firms other than Grundy to cease doing business with Gibbs; he found those claims unsupported by the evidence. The jury’s verdict was that the UMW had violated both § 303 and state law. Gibbs was awarded $60,000 as damages under the employment contract and $14,500 under the haulage contract; he was also awarded $100,000 punitive damages. On motion, the trial court set aside the award of damages with respect to the haulage contract on the ground that damage was unproved. It also held that union pressure on Grundy to discharge respondent as supervisor would constitute only a primary dispute with Grundy, as respondent’s employer, and hence was not cognizable as a claim under § 303. Interference with the employment relationship was cognizable as a state claim, however, and a remitted award was sustained on the state law claim. 220 F. Supp. 871. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 343 F. 2d 609. We granted certiorari. 382 U. S. 809. We reverse.
I.
A threshold question is whether the District Court properly entertained jurisdiction of the claim based on Tennessee law. There was no need to decide a like question in Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252, since the pertinent state claim there was based on peaceful secondary activities and we held that state law based on such activities had been pre-empted by § 303. But here respondent’s claim is based in part on proofs of violence and intimidation. “[W]e have allowed the States to grant compensation for the consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order. United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634; United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656.... State jurisdiction has prevailed in these situations because the compelling state interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction.” San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 247.
The fact that state remedies were not entirely preempted does not, however, answer the question whether the state claim was properly adjudicated in the District Court absent diversity jurisdiction. The Court held in Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238, that state law claims are appropriate for federal court determination if they form a separate but parallel ground for relief also sought in a substantial claim based on federal law. The Court distinguished permissible from nonpermissible exercises of federal judicial power over state law claims by contrasting “a case where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question, and a case where two separate and distinct causes of action are alleged, one only of which is federal in character. In the former, where the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal court, even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the non-federal ground; in the latter it may not do so upon the non-federal cause of action 289 U. S., at 246. The question is into which category the present action- fell.
Hum was decided in 1933, before the unification of law and equity by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At the time, the meaning of “cause of action” was a subject of serious dispute; the phrase might “mean one thing for one purpose and something different for another.” United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 67-68. The Court in Hum identified what it meant by the term by citation of Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316, a case in which “cause of action” had been used to identify the operative scope of the doctrine of res judicata. In that case the Court had noted that “ The whole tendency of our decisions is to require a plaintiff to try his whole cause of action and his whole case at one time.’ ” 274 U. S., at 320. It stated its holding in the following language, quoted in part in the Hum opinion:
“Upon principle, it is perfectly plain that the respondent [a seaman suing for an injury sustained while working aboard ship] suffered but one actionable wrong and was entitled to but one recovery, whether his injury was due to one or the other of several distinct acts of alleged negligence or to a combination of some or all of them. In either view, there would be but a single wrongful invasion of a single primary right of the plaintiff, namely, the right of bodily safety, whether the acts constituting such invasion were one or many, simple or complex.
“A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show. The number and variety of the facts alleged do not establish more than one cause of action so long as their result, whether they be considered severally or in combination, is the violation of but one right by a single legal wrong. The mere multiplication of grounds of negligence alleged as causing the same injury does not result in multiplying the causes of action. ‘The facts are merely the means, and not the end. They do not constitute the cause of action, but they show its existence by making the wrong appear.’ ” Id,., at 321.
Had the Court found a jurisdictional bar to reaching the state claim in Hum, we assume that the doctrine of res judicata would not have been applicable in any subsequent state suit. But the citation of Baltimore S. S. Co. shows that the Court found that the weighty policies of judicial economy and fairness to parties reflected in res judicata doctrine were in themselves strong counsel for the adoption of a rule which would permit federal courts to dispose of the state as well as the federal claims.
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the unified form of action, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 2, much of the controversy over “cause of action” abated. The phrase remained as the keystone of the Hum test, however, and, as commentators have noted, has been the source of considerable confusion. Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged. Yet because the Hum question involves issues of jurisdiction as well as convenience, there has been some tendency to limit its application to cases in which the state and federal claims are, as in Hum, “little more than the equivalent of different epithets to characterize the same group of circumstances.” 289 U. S., at 246.
This limited approach is unnecessarily grudging. Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim “arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority...,” U. S. Const., Art. Ill, § 2, and the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional “case.” The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103. The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.
That power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist. It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right. Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound to apply state law to them, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64. Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well. Similarly, if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state claims may be dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to state tribunals. There may, on the other hand, be situations in which the state claim is so closely tied to questions of federal policy that the argument for exercise of pendent jurisdiction is particularly strong. In the present case, for example, the allowable scope of the state claim implicates the federal doctrine of pre-emption; while this interrelationship does not create statutory federal question jurisdiction, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, its existence is relevant to the exercise of discretion. Finally, there may be reasons independent of jurisdictional considerations, such as the likelihood of jury confusion in treating divergent legal theories of relief, that would justify separating state and federal claims for trial, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 42 (b). If so, jurisdiction should ordinarily be refused.
The question of power will ordinarily be resolved on the pleadings. But the issue whether pendent jurisdiction has been properly assumed is one which remains open throughout the litigation. Pretrial procedures or even the trial itself may reveal a substantial hegemony of state law claims, or likelihood of jury confusion, which could not have been anticipated at the pleading stage. Although it will of course be appropriate to take account in this circumstance of the already completed course of the litigation, dismissal of the state claim might even then be merited. For example, it may appear that the plaintiff was well aware of the nature of his proofs and the relative importance of his claims; recognition of a federal court’s wide latitude to decide ancillary questions of state law does not imply that it must tolerate a litigant’s effort to impose upon it what is in effect only a state law ease. Once it appears that a state claim constitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage, the state claim may fairly be dismissed.
We are not prepared to say that in the present case the District Court exceeded its discretion in proceeding to judgment on the state claim. We may assume for purposes of decision that the District Court was correct in its holding that the claim of pressure on Grundy to terminate the employment contract was outside the purview of § 303. Even so, the § 303 claims based on secondary pressures on Grundy relative to the haulage contract and on other coal operators generally were substantial. Although § 303 limited recovery to compensatory damages based on secondary pressures, Teamsters Union v. Morton, supra, and state law allowed both compensatory and punitive damages, and allowed such damages as to both secondary and primary activity, the state and federal claims arose from the same nucleus of operative fact and reflected alternative remedies. Indeed, the verdict sheet sent in to the jury authorized only one award of damages, so that recovery could not be given separately on the federal and state claims.
It is true that the § 303 claims ultimately failed and that the only recovery allowed respondent was on the state claim. We cannot confidently say, however, that the federal issues were so remote or played such a minor role at the trial that in effect the state claim only was tried. Although the District Court dismissed as unproved the § 303 claims that petitioner’s secondary activ--ities included attempts to induce coal operators other than Grundy to cease doing business with respondent, the court submitted the § 303 claims relating to Grundy to the jury. The jury returned verdicts against petitioner on those § 303 claims, and it was only on petitioner’s motion for a directed verdict and a judgment. n. o. v. that the verdicts on those claims were set aside. The District Judge considered the claim as to the haulage contract proved as to liability, and held it failed only for lack of proof of damages. Although there was some risk of confusing the jury in joining the state and federal claims — especially since, as will be developed, differing standards of proof of UMW involvement applied— the possibility of confusion could be lessened by employing a special verdict form, as the District Court did. Moreover, the question whether the permissible scope of the state claim was limited by the doctrine of preemption afforded a special reason for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction; the federal courts are particularly appropriate bodies for the application of pre-emption principles. We thus conclude that although it may be that the District Court might, in its sound discretion, have dismissed the state claim, the circumstances show no error in refusing to do so.
1 — I H-f
This Court has consistently recognized the right of States to deal with violence and threats of violence appearing in labor disputes, sustaining a variety of remedial measures against the contention that state law was pre-empted by the passage of federal labor legislation. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740; United Construction Workers v. Laburnum, Construction Corp., 347 U. S. 656; United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 351 U. S. 266; Youngdahl v. Bainfair, Inc., 355 U. S. 131; United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634: Petitioner concedes the principle, but argues that the permissible scope of state remedies in this area is strictly confined to the direct consequences of such conduct, and does not include consequences resulting from associated peaceful picketing or other union activity. We agree.
Our opinions on this subject, frequently announced over weighty arguments in dissent that state remedies were being given too broad scope, have approved only remedies carefully limited to the protection of the compelling state interest in the maintenance of domestic peace. Thus, in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Carmon, 359 U. S. 236, we read our prior decisions as only allowing “the States to grant compensation for the consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order,” id., at 247, and noted that in Laburnum,
“damages were restricted to the 'damages directly and proximately caused by wrongful conduct chargeable to the defendants...’ as defined by the traditional law of torts.... Thus there is nothing in the measure of damages to indicate that state power was exerted to compensate for anything more than the direct consequences of the violent conduct.” Id., 248, n. 6, at 249.
In Russell, we specifically observed that the jury had been charged that to award damages it must find a proximate relation between the violence and threats of force and violence complained of, on the one hand, and the loss of wages allegedly suffered, on the other. 356 U. S., at 638, n. 3. In the two Wisconsin Board cases it was noted that the State’s administrative-injunctive relief was limited to prohibition against continuation of the unlawful picketing, not all picketing.. 315 U. S., at 748; 351 U. S., at 269-270, n. 3. And in Youngdahl, the Court held that a state court injunction which would have prohibited all picketing must be modified to permit peaceful picketing of the premises. We said, “[t] hough the state court was within its discretionary power in enjoining future acts of violence, intimidation and threats of violence by the strikers and the union, yet it is equally clear that such court entered the pre-empted domain of the National Labor Relations Board insofar as it enjoined peaceful picketing....” 355 U. S., at 139.
It is true that in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, the Court approved sweeping state injunctive relief barring any future picketing in a labor dispute, whether peaceful or not. That case, however, was decided only on a constitutional claim of freedom of speech. We did not consider the impact of federal labor policy on state regulatory power. Moreover, as we recognized in Youngdahl, supra, at 139, the case was decided in the context of a strike marked by extreme and repeated acts of violence — “a pattern of violence... which would inevitably reappear in the event picketing were later resumed.” The Court in Meadowmoor had stated the question presented as “whether a state can choose to authorize its courts to enjoin acts of picketing in themselves peaceful when they are enmeshed with contemporaneously violent conduct which is concededly outlawed,” 312 U. S., at 292, and had reasoned that
“acts which in isolation are peaceful may be part of a coercive thrust when entangled with acts of violence. The picketing in this case was set in a background of violence. In such a setting it could justifiably be concluded that the momentum of fear generated by past violence would survive even though future picketing might be wholly peaceful.” Id., at 294.
Such special facts, if they appeared in an action for damages after picketing marred by violence had occurred, might support the conclusion that all damages resulting from the picketing were proximately caused by its violent component or by the fear which that violence engendered. Where the consequences of peaceful and violent conduct are separable, however, it is clear that recovery may be had only for the latter.
In the present case, petitioner concedes that violence which would justify application of state tort law within these narrow bounds occurred during the first two days of the strike. It is a separate issue, however, whether the pleadings, the arguments of counsel to the jury, or the instructions to the jury adequately defined the compass within which damages could be awarded under state law. The tort claimed was, in essence, a “conspiracy” to interfere with Gibbs’ contractual relations. The tort of “conspiracy” is poorly defined, and highly susceptible to judicial expansion; its relatively brief history is colored by use as a weapon against the developing labor movement. Indeed, a reading of the record in this case gives the impression that the notion of “conspiracy” was employed here to expand the application of state law substantially beyond the limits to be observed in showing direct union involvement in violence.
Thus, respondent’s complaint alleged “an unlawful conspiracy and an unlawful boycott... to maliciously, wantonly and willfully interfere with his contract of employment and with his contract of haulage.” No limitation to interference by violence appears. Similarly, counsel in arguing to the jury asserted, not that the conspiracy in which the union had allegedly participated and from which its liability could be inferred was a conspiracy of violence but that it was a conspiracy to impose the UMW and the UMW’s standard contract on the coal fields of Tennessee. Under the state law, it would not have been relevant that the union had not actually authorized, participated in or ratified the particular violence involved or even the general use of violence. It would only be necessary to show a conspiracy in which the union had a part, and to show also that those who engaged in the violence were members of the conspiracy and their acts were related to the conspiracy’s purpose.
The instructions to the jury also appear not to have kept the conspiracy concept within any proper bounds. The charge instructed the jury separately on the § 303 and conspiracy claims, characterizing each as predicated on an assertion that there had been “unlawful” picketing action, and distinguishing one from the other on the basis that in the conspiracy claim “the lawfulness of the means rather than the lawfulness of the object or the purpose of the picketing... is controlling.” But in charging the conspiracy claim, the court stressed that the “unlawfulness” of the picketing, rather than violence as such, would be controlling. Thus, in characterizing respondent’s claim of a conspiracy intentionally to interfere with his contractual relations with Grundy, the trial judge said respondent asserted the interference to be “wrongful in that it was accomplished by unlawful means, including violence and threats of violence.” Turning to the question of the international union’s responsibility, he said this depended on a showing that it “was a party to a conspiracy pursuant to which the interference was committed.” He defined conspiracy as
“an agreement between two or more... to do an unlawful thing, or to do a lawful thing by unlawful means.... It is not essential to the existence of a conspiracy that the agreement between the conspirators be formally made between the parties at any one time, if, for example, two persons agreed to pursue an unlawful purpose or pursue a lawful purpose by unlawful means, then later a third person with knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy assents to it either impliedly or expressly and participates in it, then all three are conspirators in the same conspiracy.... [A] 11 that is required is that each party to the conspiracy know of the existence of the conspiracy and that each agrees to assist in some manner in the furtherance of the unlawful purpose... or any unlawful means of accomplishing an unlawful purpose.”
The trial judge then charged, in accordance with the Tennessee common law on conspiracy, that the union, if a member of a conspiracy, would be liable for all acts “done in concert... with the common purpose, and to effect a common design,” whether or not it had authorized, participated in, or ratified the particular acts. The jury was told it might award “only such damages as... he has sustained as a proximate and direct result of the action of the defendant,” and that “[n]o award of damages can be made... on the basis of losses sustained... as a result of lawful activity upon the part of the defendant or its agents.” Such instructions do not focus the jury’s attention upon violence or threats of violence as the essential predicate of any recovery it might award.
III.
Even assuming the conspiracy concept could be and was kept within limits proper to the application of state tort law under the pre-emption doctrine, reversal is nevertheless required here for failure to meet the special proof requirements imposed by § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
“No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.”
Petitioner vigorously contends that § 6 applied to the state claims in this case; that, on this record, it cannot be charged with having participated in or authorized the violence of August 15-16; and that its acts once it learned of the violence fell short of what would be necessary to show either ratification of the violence or any intent to build its picketing campaign upon the fears the violence engendered. We agree.
We held in Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 403, that
“whether § 6 should be called a rule of evidence or one that changes the substantive law of agency... its purpose and effect was to relieve organizations... and members of those organizations from liability for damages or imputation of guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by some individual officers or members of the organization, without clear proof that the organization or member charged with responsibility for the offense actually participated, gave prior authorization, or ratified such acts after actual knowledge of their perpetration.”
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act, which expressly provides that for the purposes of that statute, including § 303, the responsibility of a union for the acts of its members and officers is to be measured by reference to ordinary doctrines of agency, rather than the more stringent standards of § 6. Yet although the legislative history indicates that Congress was well aware of the Carpenters decision, it did not repeal § 6 outright, but left it applicable to cases not arising under the new Act. This selectivity is not surprising, for on state claims, though not on § 303 claims, punitive damages may be recovered. The driving force behind § 6 and the opposition to § 303, even in its limited form, was the fear that unions might be destroyed if they could be held liable for damage done by acts beyond their practical control. Plainly, § 6 applies to federal court adjudications of state tort claims arising out of labor disputes, whether or not they are associated with claims under § 303 to which the section does not apply.
Although the statute does not define “clear proof,” its history and rationale suggest that Congress meant at least to signify a meaning like that commonly accorded such similar phrases as “clear, unequivocal, and convincing proof.” Under this standard, the plaintiff in a civil case is not required to satisfy the criminal standard of reasonable doubt on the issue of participation, authorization or ratification; neither may he prevail by meeting the ordinary civil burden of persuasion. He is required to persuade by a substantial margin, to come forward with “more than a bare preponderance of the evidence to prevail.” Schneiderman v. United State's, 320 U. S. 118, 125. In our view, that burden was not met.
At the outset, it is clear that the requisite showing was not made as to possible union authorization of or participation in the violence of August 15 and 16. Although it is undoubtedly true that the officers and members of Local 5881 were present in force at the mine site on those days, neither the Local nor they are parties to this suit. Mr. Gilbert, the UMW representative, had left the area for a business meeting before the series of events culminating in the violence, and immediately upon his return, the violence subsided. The Sixth Circuit conceded that “[t]he proofs were sketchy as to defendant’s responsibility for the [first two days’ violence].” This view accurately reflects the state of the record. Petitioner was not even aware of Grundy’s plan to open the Gray’s Creek mine until after the violence had occurred.
The remaining issue is whether there was clear proof that the union ratified the violence which had occurred. Preliminarily, we note that it would be inconsistent with the fabric of national labor policy to infer ratification from the mere fact that petitioner involved itself in the dispute after the violence had occurred, or from the fact that it carried on some normal union functions, such as provision of strike relief. A union would ordinarily undertake these tasks during the course of a lawful strike. National labor policy requires that national unions be encouraged to exercise a restraining influence on explosive strike situations; and when they seek to do so, they should not for these activities be made to risk liability for such harm as may already have been done. The fact that ripples of the earlier violence may still be felt should not be permitted, and under § 6 is not permitted, to impose such liability. Because the dispute which sparked the violence will often continue, the union will feel a responsibility to take up the dispute.as well as to curb its excesses. There can be no rigid requirement that a union affirmatively disavow such unlawful acts as may previously have occurred. Cf. ILGWU v. Labor Board, 237 F. 2d 545. What is required is proof, either that the union approved the violence which occurred, or that it participated actively or by knowing tolerance in further acts which were in themselves actionable under state law or intentionally drew upon the previous violence for their force.
The record here is persuasive that the petitioner did what it could to stop or curtail the violence. There was repeated and uncontradicted testimony that when news of the violence reached the meeting that Gilbert was attending, he was given firm instructions to return to the scene, to assume control of the strike, to suppress violence, to limit the size of the picket line, and to assure that no other area mines were affected. He succeeded. Although the day after his return two Consolidated officers were harassed by a large and unruly mob in a nearby town, this incident was unrelated to respondent, and was not repeated. There was no further violence at the mine site, and the number of pickets was reduced to a very few. Other mines in the immediate area, including two worked on lease by Gibbs, continued to operate, although strenuous effort was required to accomplish this; one union official testified, “I thought I was going to get whipped two or three times [by members of the Local who opposed this policy].”
To be sure, there was testimony that Gilbert and, through him, the international union were not pleased with respondent’s role in the abortive venture to open the Gray’s Creek mines with members of the Southern Labor Union. A company officer testified that when the mines finally opened respondent was not hired, because “Had I hired Mr. Paul Gibbs none of these mines would be open today.” Respondent testified that Gilbert had told him, shortly after assuming control of the strike, “I want you to keep your damn hands off of that Gray’s Creek area over there, and tell that Southern Labor Union that we don’t intend for you to work that mine.” To another, Gilbert is alleged to have said, “Hell, we can’t let that go on... Paul was trying to bring this other union in there, and [Gilbert said] he ain’t going to get by with it.” A third witness reported remarks of a similar tenor. Respondent testified that fear for his own safety caused him not to visit his mine leases after the events of August 15 and 16. His foreman testified to minor acts of violence at the mine site, never connected to any person or persons.
The relevant question, however, is whether Gilbert or other UMW representatives were clearly shown to have endorsed violence or threats of violence as a means of settling the dispute. The Sixth Circuit’s answer was that they had. Its view of the record gave it
“the impression that the threat of violence remained throughout the succeeding days and months. The night and day picketing that followed its spectacular beginning was but a guaranty and warning that like treatment would be accorded further attempts to open the Gray’s Creek area. The aura of violence remained to enhance the effectiveness of the picketing. Certainly there is a threat of violence when the man who has just knocked me down my front steps continues to stand guard at my front door.” 343 F. 2d, at 616.
An “impression” is too ephemeral a product to be the result of “clear proof.” As we have said, the mere fact of continued picketing at the mine site is not properly relied upon to show ratification. But even accepting the passage as a holding that “clear proof” of UMW involvement is present, we do not so read the record.
If there was a remaining threat of violence here, it was a threat which arose from the context of the dispute, and not from the manner in which the international union was shown to have handled it. This dispute began when unemployed miners in the Appalachian hills discovered that jobs they believed had been promised to them were being given to others behind their backs. In considering the vicarious liability of the international union, accommodation must be made for that fact. The record here clearly bears the construction that the international union exerted pressure to assure that respondent would lose his present jobs and obtain no more. But the record fails to rebut petitioner’s contention that it had been unwilling to see its ends accomplished through violence, and indeed had sought to control the excesses which had occurred. Since the record establishes only peaceful activities in this regard on the part of petitioner, respondent was limited to his § 303 remedy. Teamsters Union v. Morton, supra. Although our result would undoubtedly be firmer if the petitioner had assured respondent that, having assumed control of the strike, it would prevent further violence, in the circumstances of this case the crucial fact of petitioner’s participation in or ratification of the violence that occurred was not proved to the degree of certainty required by § 6. Reversed.
The Chief Justice took no part in the decision of this case.
Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 provides:
“(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 158 (b) (4) of this title.
“(b) Whoever shall be injured in
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case presents two questions: whether due process prohibits Arizona’s use of an insanity test stated solely in terms of the capacity to tell whether an act charged as a crime was right or wrong; and whether Arizona violates due process in restricting consideration of defense evidence of mental illness and incapacity to its bearing on a claim of insanity, thus eliminating its significance directly on the issue of the mental element of the crime charged (known in legal shorthand as the mens rea, or guilty mind). We hold that there is no violation of due process in either instance.
I
In the early hours of June 21, 2000, Officer Jeffrey Moritz of the Flagstaff Police responded in uniform to complaints that a pickup truck with loud music blaring was circling a residential block. When he located the truck, the officer turned on the emergency lights and siren of his marked patrol car, which prompted petitioner Eric Clark, the truck’s driver (then 17), to pull over. Officer Moritz got out of the patrol car and told Clark to stay where he was. Less than a minute later, Clark shot the officer, who died soon after but not before calling the police dispatcher for help. Clark ran away on foot but was arrested later that day with gunpowder residue on his hands; the gun that killed the officer was found nearby, stuffed into a knit cap.
Clark was charged with first-degree murder under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1105(A)(3) (West Supp. 2005) for intentionally or knowingly killing a law enforcement officer in the line of duty. In March 2001, Clark was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to a state hospital for treatment, but two years later the same trial court found his competence restored and ordered him to be tried. Clark waived his right to a jury, and the case was heard by the court.
At trial, Clark did not contest the shooting and death, but relied on his undisputed paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the incident in denying that he had the specific intent to shoot a law enforcement officer or knowledge that he was doing so, as required by the statute. Accordingly, the prosecutor offered circumstantial evidence that Clark knew Officer Moritz was a law enforcement officer. The evidence showed that the officer was in uniform at the time, that he caught up with Clark in a marked police car with emergency lights and siren going, and that Clark acknowledged the symbols of police authority and stopped. The testimony for the prosecution indicated that Clark had intentionally lured an officer to the scene to kill him, having told some people a few weeks before the incident that he wanted to shoot police officers. At the close of the State’s evidence, the trial court denied Clark’s motion for judgment of acquittal for failure to prove intent to kill a law enforcement officer or knowledge that Officer Moritz was a law enforcement officer.
In presenting the defense case, Clark claimed mental illness, which he sought to introduce for two purposes. First, he raised the affirmative defense of insanity, putting the burden on himself to prove by clear and convincing evidence, § 13-502(C) (West 2001), that “at the time of the commission of the criminal act [he] was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that [he] did not know the criminal act was wrong,” §13-502(A). Second, he aimed to rebut the prosecution’s evidence of the requisite mens rea, that he had acted intentionally or knowingly to kill a law enforcement officer. See, e. g., Record in No. CR 2000-538 (Ariz. Super. Ct.), Doc. 374 (hereinafter Record).
The trial court ruled that Clark could not rely on evidence bearing on insanity to dispute the mens rea. The court cited State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P. 2d 1046, cert. denied, 520 U. S. 1234 (1997), which “refused to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent,” 187 Ariz., at 541, 931 P. 2d, at 1051, and held that “Arizona does not allow evidence of a defendant’s mental disorder short of insanity... to negate the mens rea element of a crime,” ibid
As to his insanity, then, Clark presented testimony from classmates, school officials, and his family describing his increasingly bizarre behavior over the year before the shooting. Witnesses testified, for example, that paranoid delusions led Clark to rig a fishing line with beads and wind chimes at home to alert him to intrusion by invaders, and to keep a bird in his automobile to warn of airborne poison. There was lay and expert testimony that Clark thought Flagstaff was populated with “aliens” (some impersonating government agents), the “aliens” were trying to kill him, and bullets were the only way to stop them. A psychiatrist testified that Clark was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions about “aliens” when he killed Officer Moritz, and he concluded that Clark was incapable of luring the officer or understanding right from wrong and that he was thus insane at the time of the killing. In rebuttal, a psychiatrist for the State gave his opinion that Clark’s paranoid schizophrenia did not keep him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct, as shown by his actions before and after the shooting (such as circling the residential block with music blaring as if to lure the police to intervene, evading the police after the shooting, and hiding the gun).
At the close of the defense case consisting of this evidence bearing on mental illness, the trial court denied Clark’s renewed motion for a directed verdict grounded on failure of the prosecution to show that Clark knew the victim was a police officer. The judge then issued a special verdict of first-degree murder, expressly finding that Clark shot and caused the death of Officer Moritz beyond a reasonable doubt and that Clark had not shown that he was insane at the time. The judge noted that though Clark was indisputably afflicted with paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the shooting, the mental illness “did not... distort his perception of reality so severely that he did not know his actions were wrong.” App. 334. For this conclusion, the judge expressly relied on “the facts of the crime, the evaluations of the experts, [Clark’s] actions and behavior both before and after the shooting, and the observations of those that knew [Clark].” Id., at 333. The sentence was life imprisonment without the possibility of release for 25 years.
Clark moved to vacate the judgment and sentence, arguing, among other things, that Arizona’s insanity test and its Mott rule each violate due process. As to the insanity standard, Clark claimed (as he had argued earlier) that the Arizona Legislature had impermissibly narrowed its standard in 1993 when it eliminated the first part of the two-part insanity test announced in M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). The court denied the motion.
The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed Clark’s conviction, treating the conclusion on sanity as supported by enough evidence to withstand review for abuse of discretion, and holding the State’s insanity scheme consistent with due process. App. 336. As to the latter, the Court of Appeals reasoned that there is no constitutional requirement to recognize an insanity defense at all, the bounds of which are left to the State’s discretion. Beyond that, the appellate court followed Mott, reading it as barring the trial court’s consideration of evidence of Clark’s mental illness and capacity directly on the element of mens rea. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied further review.
We granted certiorari to decide whether due process prohibits Arizona from thus narrowing its insanity test or from excluding evidence of mental illness and incapacity due to mental illness to rebut evidence of the requisite criminal intent. 546 U. S. 1060 (2005). We now affirm.
II
Clark first says that Arizona’s definition of insanity, being only a fragment of the Victorian standard from which it derives, violates due process. The landmark English rule in M’Naghten’s Case, supra, states that
“the jurors ought to be told... that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” Id., at 210, 8 Eng. Rep., at 722.
The first part asks about cognitive capacity: whether a mental defect leaves a defendant unable to understand what he is doing. The second part presents an ostensibly alternative basis for recognizing a defense of insanity understood as a lack of moral capacity: whether a mental disease or defect leaves a defendant unable to understand that his action is wrong.
When the Arizona Legislature first codified an insanity rule, it adopted the full M’Naghten statement (subject to modifications in details that do not matter here):
“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct the person was suffering from such a mental disease or defect as not to know the nature and quality of the act or, if such person did know, that such person did not know that what he was doing was wrong.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-502 (West 1978).
In 1993, the legislature dropped the cognitive incapacity part, leaving only moral incapacity as the nub of the stated definition. See 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 256, §§ 2—3. Under current Arizona law, a defendant will not be adjudged insane unless he demonstrates that “at the time of the commission of the criminal act [he] was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that [he] did not know the criminal act was wrong,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-502(A) (West 2001).
A
Clark challenges the 1993 amendment excising the express reference to the cognitive incapacity element. He insists that the side-by-side M’Naghten test represents the minimum that a government must provide in recognizing an alternative to criminal responsibility on grounds of mental illness or defect, and he argues that elimination of the M’Naghten reference to nature and quality “ ‘offends [a] principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,’” Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 202 (1977) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 523 (1958)); see also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 798 (1952).
The claim entails no light burden, see Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U. S. 37, 43 (1996) (plurality opinion), and Clark does not carry it. History shows no deference to M’Naghten that could elevate its formula to the level of fundamental principle, so as to limit the traditional recognition of a State’s capacity to define crimes and defenses, see Patterson, supra, at 210; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71, 96 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Even a cursory examination of the traditional Anglo-American approaches to insanity reveals significant differences among them, with four traditional strains variously combined to yield a diversity of American standards. The main variants are the cognitive incapacity, the moral incapacity, the volitional incapacity, and the product-of-mental-illness tests. The first two emanate from the alternatives stated in the M’Naghten rule. The volitional incapacity or irresistible-impulse test, which surfaced over two centuries ago (first in England, then in this country), asks whether a person was so lacking in volition due to a mental defect or illness that he could not have controlled his actions. And the product-of-mental-illness test was used as early as 1870, and simply asks whether a person’s action was a product of a mental disease or defect. Seventeen States and the Federal Government have adopted a recognizable version of the M’Naghten test with both its cognitive incapacity and moral incapacity components. One State has adopted only M’Naghten’s cognitive incapacity test, and 10 (including Arizona) have adopted the moral incapacity test alone. Fourteen jurisdictions, inspired by the Model Penal Code, have in place an amalgam of the volitional incapacity test and some variant of the moral incapacity test, satisfaction of either (generally by showing a defendant’s substantial lack of capacity) being enough to excuse. Three States combine a full M’Naghten test with a volitional incapacity formula. And New Hampshire alone stands by the product-of-mental-illness test. The alternatives are multiplied further by variations in the prescribed insanity verdict: a significant number of these jurisdictions supplement the traditional “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict with an alternative of “guilty but mentally ill.” Finally, four States have no affirmative insanity defense, though one provides for a “guilty and mentally ill” verdict. These four, like a number of others that recognize an affirmative insanity defense, allow consideration of evidence of mental illness directly on the element of mens rea defining the offense.
With this varied background, it is clear that no particular formulation has evolved into a baseline for due process, and that the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal offenses, is substantially open to state choice. Indeed, the legitimacy of such choice is the more obvious when one considers the interplay of legal concepts of mental illness or deficiency required for an insanity defense, with the medical concepts of mental abnormality that influence the expert opinion testimony by psychologists and psychiatrists commonly introduced to support or contest insanity claims. For medical definitions devised to justify treatment, like legal ones devised to excuse from conventional criminal responsibility, are subject to flux and disagreement. See infra, at 774-775; cf. Leland, 343 U. S., at 800-801 (no due process violation for adopting the M’Naghten standard rather than the irresistible-impulse test because scientific knowledge does not require otherwise and choice of test is a matter of policy). There being such fodder for reasonable debate about what the cognate legal and medical tests should be, due process imposes no single canonical formulation of legal insanity.
B
Nor does Arizona’s abbreviation of the M’Naghten statement raise a proper claim that some constitutional minimum has been shortchanged. Clark’s argument of course assumes that Arizona’s former statement of the M’Naghten rule, with its express alternative of cognitive incapacity, was constitutionally adequate (as we agree). That being so, the abbreviated rule is no less so, for cognitive incapacity is relevant under that statement, just as it was under the more extended formulation, and evidence going to cognitive incapacity has the same significance under the short form as it had under the long.
Though Clark is correct that the application of the moral incapacity test (telling right from wrong) does not necessarily require evaluation of a defendant’s cognitive capacity to appreciate the nature and quality of the acts charged against him, see Brief for Petitioner 46-47, his argument fails to recognize that cognitive incapacity is itself enough to demonstrate moral incapacity. Cognitive incapacity, in other words, is a sufficient condition for establishing a defense of insanity, albeit not a necessary one. As a defendant can therefore make out moral incapacity by demonstrating cognitive incapacity, evidence bearing on whether the defendant knew the nature and quality of his actions is both relevant and admissible. In practical terms, if a defendant did not know what he was doing when he acted, he could not have known that he was performing the wrongful act charged as a crime. Indeed, when the two-part rule was still in effect, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that a jury instruction on insanity containing the moral incapacity part but not a full recitation of the cognitive incapacity part was fine, as the cognitive incapacity part might be “‘treated as adding nothing to the requirement that the accused know his act was wrong.’” State v. Chavez, 143 Ariz. 238, 239, 693 P. 2d 893, 894 (1984) (quoting A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 50 (1967)).
The Court of Appeals of Arizona acknowledged as much in this case, too, see App. 350 (“It is difficult to imagine that a defendant who did not appreciate the ‘nature and quality’ of the act he committed would reasonably be able to perceive that the act was ‘wrong’ ”), and thus aligned itself with the long-accepted understanding that the cognitively incapacitated are a subset of the morally incapacitated within the meaning of the standard M’Naghten rule, see, e. g., Goldstein, supra, at 51 (“In those situations where the accused does not know the nature and quality of his act, in the broad sense, he will not know that it was wrong, no matter what construction ‘wrong’ is given”); 1 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.2(b)(3), p. 536 (2d ed. 2003) (“Many courts feel that knowledge of ‘the nature and quality of the act’ is the mere equivalent of the ability to know that the act was wrong” (citing cases)); id., § 7.2(b)(4), at 537 (“If the defendant does not know the nature and quality of his act, then quite obviously he does not know that his act is ‘wrong,’ and this is true without regard to the interpretation given to the word ‘wrong’”); cf. 1 R. Gerber, Criminal Law of Arizona 502-7, n. 1 (2d ed. 1993).
Clark, indeed, adopted this very analysis himself in the trial court: “[I]f [Clark] did not know he was shooting at a police officer, or believed he had to shoot or be shot, even though his belief was not based in reality, this would establish that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.” Record, Doc. 374, at 1. The trial court apparently agreed, for the judge admitted Clark’s evidence of cognitive incapacity for consideration under the State’s moral incapacity formulation. And Clark can point to no evidence bearing on insanity that was excluded. His psychiatric expert and a number of lay witnesses testified to his delusions, and this evidence tended to support a description of Clark as lacking the capacity to understand that the police officer was a human being. There is no doubt that the trial judge considered the evidence as going to an issue of cognitive capacity, for in finding insanity not proven he said that Clark’s mental illness “did not... distort his perception of reality so severely that he did not know his actions were wrong,” App. 334.
We are satisfied that neither in theory nor in practice did Arizona’s 1993 abridgment of the insanity formulation deprive Clark of due process.
Ill
Clark’s second claim of a due process violation challenges the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Arizona in State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P. 2d 1046, cert. denied, 520 U. S. 1234 (1997). This case ruled on the admissibility of testimony from a psychologist offered to show that the defendant suffered from battered women’s syndrome and therefore lacked the capacity to form the mens rea of the crime charged against her. The opinion variously referred to the testimony in issue as “psychological testimony,” 187 Ariz., at 541, 931 P. 2d, at 1051, and “expert testimony,” ibid., and implicitly equated it with “expert psychiatric evidence,” id., at 540, 931 P. 2d, at 1050 (internal quotation marks omitted), and “psychiatric testimony,” id., at 541, 931 P. 2d, at 1051. The state court held that testimony of a professional psychologist or psychiatrist about a defendant’s mental incapacity owing to mental disease or defect was admissible, and could be considered, only for its bearing on an insanity defense; such evidence could not be considered on the element of mens rea, that is, what the State must show about a defendant’s mental state (such as intent or understanding) when he performed the act charged against him. See id., at 541, 544, 931 P. 2d, at 1051, 1054.
A
Understanding Clark’s claim requires attention to the categories of evidence with a potential bearing on mens rea. First, there is “observation evidence” in the everyday sense, testimony from those who observed what Clark did and heard what he said; this category would also include testimony that an expert witness might give about Clark’s tendency to think in a certain way and his behavioral characteristics. This evidence may support a professional diagnosis of mental disease and in any event is the kind of evidence that can be relevant to show what in fact was on Clark’s mind when he fired the gun. Observation evidence in the record covers Clark’s behavior at home and with friends, his expressions of belief around the time of the killing that “aliens” were inhabiting the bodies of local people (including government agents), his driving around the neighborhood before the police arrived, and so on. Contrary to the dissent’s characterization, see post, at 782 (opinion of Kennedy, J.), observation evidence can be presented by either lay or expert witnesses.
Second, there is “mental-disease evidence” in the form of opinion testimony that Clark suffered from a mental disease with features described by the witness. As was true here, this evidence characteristically but not always comes from professional psychologists or psychiatrists who testify as expert witnesses and base their opinions in part on examination of a defendant, usually conducted after the events in question. The thrust of this evidence was that, based on factual reports, professional observations, and tests, Clark was psychotic at the time in question, with a condition that fell within the category of schizophrenia.
Third, there is evidence we will refer to as “capacity evidence” about a defendant’s capacity for cognition and moral judgment (and ultimately also his capacity to form mens rea). This, too, is opinion evidence. Here, as it usually does, this testimony came from the same experts and concentrated on those specific details of the mental condition that make the difference between sanity and insanity under the Arizona definition. In their respective testimony on these details the experts disagreed: the defense expert gave his opinion that the symptoms or effects of the disease in Clark’s case included inability to appreciate the nature of his action and to tell that it was wrong, whereas the State’s psychiatrist was of the view that Clark was a schizophrenic who was still sufficiently able to appreciate the reality of shooting the officer and to know that it was wrong to do that.
A caveat about these categories is in order. They attempt to identify different kinds of testimony offered in this case in terms of explicit and implicit distinctions made in Mott. What we can say about these categories goes to their cores, however, not their margins. Exact limits have thus not been worked out in any Arizona law that has come to our attention, and in this case, neither the courts in their rulings nor counsel in objections invoked or required precision in applying the Mott rule’s evidentiary treatment, as we explain below. Necessarily, then, our own decision can address only core issues, leaving for other cases any due process claims that may be raised about the treatment of evidence whose categorization is subject to dispute.
B
It is clear that Mott itself imposed no restriction on considering evidence of the first sort, the observation evidence. We read the Mott restriction to apply, rather, to evidence addressing the two issues in testimony that characteristically comes only from psychologists or psychiatrists qualified to give opinions as exp'ert witnesses: mental-disease evidence (whether at the time of the crime a defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect, such as schizophrenia) and capacity evidence (whether the disease or defect left him incapable of performing or experiencing a mental process defined as necessary for sanity such as appreciating the nature and quality of his act and knowing that it was wrong).
Mott was careful to distinguish this kind of opinion evidence from observation evidence generally and even from observation evidence that an expert witness might offer, such as descriptions of a defendant’s tendency to think in a certain way or his behavioral characteristics; the Arizona court made it clear that this sort of testimony was perfectly admissible to rebut the prosecution’s evidence of mens rea, 187 Ariz., at 544, 931 P. 2d, at 1054. Thus, only opinion testimony going to mental defect or disease, and its effect on the cognitive or moral capacities on which sanity depends under the Arizona rule, is restricted.
In this case, the trial court seems to have applied the Mott restriction to all evidence offered by Clark for the purpose of showing what he called his inability to form the required mens rea, see, e.g., Record, Doc. 406, at 7-10 (that is, an intent to kill a police officer on duty, or an understanding that he was engaging in the act of killing such an officer, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1105(A)(3) (West Supp. 2005)). Thus, the trial court’s restriction may have covered not only mental-disease and capacity evidence as just defined, but also observation evidence offered by lay (and expert) witnesses who described Clark’s unusual behavior. Clark’s objection to the application of the Mott rule does not, however, turn on the distinction between lay and expert witnesses or the kinds of testimony they were competent to present.
C
There is some, albeit limited, disagreement between the dissent and ourselves about the scope of the claim of error properly before us. To start with matters of agreement, all Members of the Court agree that Clark’s general attack on the Mott rule covers its application in confining consideration of capacity evidence to the insanity defense.
In practical terms, our agreement on issues presented extends to a second point. Justice Kennedy understands that Clark raised an objection to confining mental-disease evidence to the insanity issue. As he sees it, Clark in effect claimed that in dealing with the issue of mens rea the trial judge should have considered expert testimony on what may characteristically go through the mind of a schizophrenic, when the judge considered what in fact was in Clark’s mind at the time of the shooting. See post, at 783 (dissenting opinion) (“[T]he opinion that Clark had paranoid schizophrenia—an opinion shared by experts for both the prosecution and defense—bears on efforts to determine, as a factual matter, whether he knew he was killing a police officer”). He thus understands that defense counsel claimed a right to rebut the State’s mens rea demonstration with testimony about how schizophrenics may hallucinate voices and other sounds, about their characteristic failure to distinguish the content of their imagination from what most people perceive as exterior reality, and so on. It is important to be clear that this supposed objection was not about dealing with testimony based on observation of Clark showing that he had auditory hallucinations when he was driving around, or failed in fact to appreciate objective reality when he shot; this objection went to use of testimony about schizophrenics, not about Clark in particular. While we might dispute how clearly Clark raised this objection, we have no doubt that the objection falls within a general challenge to the Mott rule; we understand that Mott is meant to confine to the insanity defense any consideration of characteristic behavior associated with mental disease, see 187 Ariz., at 544, 931 P. 2d, at 1054 (contrasting State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 628 P. 2d 580 (1981), and State v. Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349, 681 P. 2d 1368 (1984)). We will therefore assume for argument that Clark raised this claim, as we consider the due process challenge to the Mott rule.
The point on which we disagree with the dissent, however, is this: did Clark apprise the Arizona courts that he believed the trial judge had erroneously limited the consideration of observation evidence, whether from lay witnesses like Clark’s mother or (possibly) the expert witnesses who observed him? This sort of evidence was not covered by the Mott restriction, and confining it to the insanity issue would have been an erroneous application of Mott as a matter of Arizona law. For the following reasons we think no such objection was made in a way the Arizona courts could have understood it, and that no such issue is before us now. We think the only issue properly before us is the challenge to Mott on due process grounds, comprising objections to limits on the use of mental-disease and capacity evidence.
It is clear that the trial judge intended to apply Mott:
“[R]ecognizing that much of the evidence that [the defense is] going to be submitting, in fact all of it, as far as I know... that has to do with the insanity could also arguably be made along the lines of the Mott issues as to form and intent and his capacity for the intent. I’m going to let you go ahead and get all that stuff in because it goes to the insanity issue and because we’re not in front of a jury. At the end, I’ll let you make an offer of proof as to the intent, the Mott issues, but I still think the supreme court decision is the law of the land in this state.” App. 9.
At no point did the trial judge specify any particular evidence that he refused to consider on the mens rea issue. Nor did defense counsel specify any observation or other particular evidence that he claimed was admissible but wrongly excluded on the issue of mens rea, so as to produce a clearer ruling on what evidence was being restricted on the authority of Mott and what was not. He made no “offer of proof” in the trial court; and although his brief in the Arizona Court of Appeals stated at one point that it was not inconsistent with Mott to consider nonexpert evidence indicating mental illness on the issue of mens rea, and argued that the trial judge had failed to do so, Appellant’s Opening Brief in No. 1CA-CR-03-0851 etc., pp. 48-49 (hereinafter Appellant’s Opening Brief), he was no more specific than that, see, e. g., id., at 52 (“The Court’s ruling in Mott and the trial court’s refusal to consider whether as a result of suffering from paranoid schizophrenia [Clark] could not formulate the mens rea necessary for first degree murder violated his right to due process”). Similarly, we read the Arizona Court of Appeals to have done nothing more than rely on Mott to reject the claim that due process forbids restricting evidence bearing on “[ajbility to [florm [m]ens [r]ea,” App. 351 (emphasis in original), (i. e., mental-disease and capacity evidence) to the insanity determination. See id., at 351-353.
This failure in the state courts to raise any clear claim about observation evidence, see Appellant’s Opening Brief 46-52, is reflected in the material addressed to us, see Brief for Petitioner 13-32. In this Court both the question presented and the following statement of his position were couched in similarly worded general terms:
“I. ERIC WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE OF HIS SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS IN DETERMINING FACTUALLY WHETHER THE PROSECUTION PROVED THE MENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.” Id., at 13.
But as his counsel made certain beyond doubt in his reply brief,
“Eric’s Point I is and always has been an attack on the rule of State v. Mott, which both courts below held applicable and binding. Mott announced a categorical ‘rejection of the use of psychological testimony to challenge the mens rea element of a crime,’ and upheld this rule against federal due process challenge.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 2 (citations omitted).
This explanation is supported by other statements in Clark’s briefs in both the State Court of Appeals and this Court, replete with the consistently maintained claim that it was error to limit evidence of mental illness and incapacity to its bearing on the insanity defense, excluding it from consideration on the element of mens rea. See, e. g., Appellant’s Opening Brief 46,47,51; Brief for Petitioner 11,13,16,20-23.
In sum, the trial court’s ruling, with its uncertain edges, may have restricted observation evidence admissible on mens rea to the insanity defense alone, but we cannot be sure. But because a due process challenge to such a restriction of observation evidence was, by our measure, neither pressed nor passed upon in the Arizona Court of Appeals, we do not consider it. See, e. g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U. S. 730, 747, n. 22 (1987); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 217-224 (1983). What we do know, and now consider, is Clark’s claim that Mott denied due process because it “preclude [dj Eric from contending that...factual inferences” of the “mental states which were necessary elements of the crime charged” “should not be drawn because the behavior was explainable, instead, as a manifestation of his chronic paranoid schizophrenia.” Brief for Petitioner 13 (emphasis in original). We consider the claim, as Clark otherwise puts it, that “Arizona’s prohibition of ‘diminished capacity’ evidence by criminal defendants violates” due process, ibid.
D
Clark’s argument that the Mott rule violates the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process turns on the application of the presumption of innocence in criminal cases, the presumption of sanity, and the principle that a criminal defendant is entitled to present relevant and favorable evidence on an element of the offense charged against him.
1
The first presumption is that a defendant is innocent unless and until the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense charged, see Patterson, 432 U. S., at 210-211; In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 361-364 (1970), including the mental element or mens rea. Before the last century, the mens rea required to be proven for particular offenses was often described in general terms like “malice,” see, e. g., In re Eckart, 166 U. S. 481 (1897); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *21 (“[A]n unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no crime at all”), but the modern tendency has been toward more specific descriptions, as shown in the Arizona statute defining the murder charged against Clark: the State had to prove that in acting to kill the victim, Clark intended to kill a law enforcement officer on duty or knew that the victim was such an officer on duty. See generally Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 635. As applied to mens rea (and every other element), the force of the presumption of innocence is measured
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question we have here is whether respondent William I. Connelly, hereafter referred to as the taxpayer, is entitled to the $1,500 exclusion from gross income provided by § 22 (b) (13) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code. The taxpayer claimed this additional allowance for the taxable years 1943 and 1944. The Commissioner disallowed the sum deducted. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner, 8 T. C. 848, and the Court of Appeals reversed, one judge dissenting. 84 U. S. App. D. C. 260, 172 F. 2d 877. We granted certiorari. 337 U. S. 924.
On February 19, 1943, taxpayer was a civil service employee in the legal division of the Coast Guard. On that date he was enrolled as a lieutenant commander within one of the six classifications which constituted the temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve. His enrollment was under authority of the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve Act which provided for the enrolling of “persons (including Government employees without pay other than the compensation of their civilian positions).” 55 Stat. 12, as amended, 56 Stat. 1021, 14 U. S. C. § 307. On April 24, 1944, he was reenrolled as a commander and his class was described as “Coast Guard Civil Service Employees.”
After enrollment taxpayer performed duties identical with those which he had previously performed. At the time he was enrolled, his civil service rating was P-5. Later this rating was raised to P-6 and his rank was increased at the same time to that of commander. He received the same pay after enrollment that he had received as a civil service employee. He received overtime pay as a civil service employee, deductions were made from his pay for civil service retirement, and he was subject to civil service regulations as to annual and sick leave. If he had been injured or killed, he would have received benefits as a civil employee of the United States. He was still subject to the Selective Training and Service Act. In the case of sickness or disease contracted while on active duty, taxpayer was entitled to the same hospital and medical care as members of the regular Coast Guard, but dental care was not included. While on active duty he was required to wear the uniform of and he received the courtesies due his rank. He was subject to the laws, regulations and orders of the Coast Guard and to disciplinary action.
It is apparent that taxpayer had a dual status. He had a limited military status with the rank of lieutenant commander and later that of commander. He had also the status of a civil service employee, carefully so limited and with all the privileges incident to such status. He was given just enough military status to enable him effectively to carry out his duties. All considerations of an economic character pertaining to his employment by the Government were related to his civil service status.
In Mitchell v. Cohen, 333 U. S. 411, we held that one employed in a department of the Federal Government as a civil service employee who was enrolled temporarily in the Volunteer Port Security Force of the Coast Guard Reserve and who worked part-time as a reservist without pay was not an “ex-serviceman” within the meaning of the Veterans’ Preference Act. Looking to the legislative history of that statute, we found that the over-shadowing purpose of the Act was to favor those who had a real record of military service.
The Court of Appeals found in this case that by the application of “long-established criteria — oath of office, military duty, and subjection to military discipline” taxpayer had acquired a military status and was thus entitled to the exclusion. We agree that he had a military status for some purposes. But the question for tax purposes is whether he received his pay in that status. To come within § 22 (b)(13)(A), he must have received his compensation “for active service as a commissioned officer.” We understand this to mean that if taxpayer received his pay as a commissioned officer, he would be entitled to the exclusion. It seems equally plain that if he received his pay as a civil service employee and served without military pay and allowances, he is not entitled to the claimed exclusion. As in the Cohen case, the emphasis of the statute is on a military and not on a civilian status.
And it is clear that taxpayer received his compensation in a civilian status. As noted, § 307 of the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve Act provided for the enrolling of “persons (including Government employees without pay other than the compensation of their civilian positions).” The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries referred to the amendment by which the parenthetical phrase was added to the statute as being “advisable to clarify this authority [enrollment of temporary members without the pay of their military rank] and resolve any doubt of its applicability to Government employees by specifically providing for temporary membership in the Coast Guard Reserve of Government employees without military pay but with continuance in their civilian positions and the receipt of the compensation thereof.”
From the date of the enactment of the enrollment statute there seems to have been no deviation from the view that the taxpayer was to be paid as a civil service employee and not as a commissioned officer. His pay came from congressional appropriations allocated to civilian positions. His pay was at the civil service scale for his grade, with overtime pay and appropriate deductions for civil service retirement. His continuing civilian status is underlined by his receipt of a civil service promotion, from which his military promotion resulted. Indeed, the taxpayer’s certificate of disenrollment described the duty performed as “Chief of Admiralty and Maritime Section having civil service status, receiving civilian but no military pay, and holding rank of Commander as a Temporary Member of the Coast Guard Reserve.”
The Court of Appeals ignored the status in which taxpayer was compensated and gave effect to his military status which was provided only to facilitate the performance of his duties in wartime. Taxpayer’s rank was for the purpose of getting the job done, and not for the purpose of receiving compensation.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
As amended by Revenue Act of 1945, § 141 (a), 59 Stat. 571:
“(13) Additional allowance for military and naval personnel.—
“ (A) In the case of compensation received ... for active service as a commissioned officer ... in the military or naval forces of the United States ... so much of such compensation as does not exceed $1,500.”
These classifications and the organization of the Coast Guard Reserve are detailed in Mitchell v. Cohen, 333 U. S. 411, 412-14.
See Judge Edgerton, dissenting in part, below:
“. . .1 would be unable, in view of the rule that tax exemptions are strictly construed, to say that the compensation of a man who did not receive a commissioned officer’s pay but served ‘without pay other than the compensation of [his] civilian positions’ was ‘received ... for active service as a commissioned officer.’ ” 84 U. S. App. D. C. at 263, 172 F. 2d at 880.
H. R. Rep. No. 2525, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1942). The Committee added that the amendment “would obviate any possible impairment of the right of such employees to continue to receive the compensation of their civilian positions for the entire period of their performance of active Coast Guard duty as such temporary members. There will be little, if any, change in the nature of their duties after enrollment.”
Office Memorandum No. 13-43 issued by the Commandant of the Coast Guard on July 24,1943, states:
“6. The attention of heads of offices and chiefs of divisions is invited to the fact that one of the principal reasons for the induction of civil service employees into the military establishment as temporary members of the Reserve was to obtain a homogeneous organization on a military basis and to eliminate differences in procedure and practices applicable to military personnel and civil service personnel engaged on exactly the same duty . . . ."
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of Michigan has enacted legislation authorizing a system for union representation of local governmental employees. A union and a local government employer are specifically permitted to agree to an “agency shop” arrangement, whereby every employee represented by a union— even though not a union member — must pay to the union, as a condition of employment, a service fee equal in amount to union dues. The issue before us is whether this arrangement violates the constitutional rights of government employees who object to public-sector unions as such or to various union activities financed by the compulsory service fees.
I
After a secret ballot election, the Detroit Federation of Teachers (Union) was certified in 1967 pursuant to Michigan law as the exclusive representative of teachers employed by the Detroit Board of Education (Board), The Union and the Board thereafter concluded a collective-bargaining agreement effective from July 1, 1969, to July 1, 1971. Among the agreement’s provisions was an “agency shop” clause, requiring every teacher who had not become a Union member within 60 days of hire (or within 60 days of January 26, 1970, the effective date of the clause) to pay the Union a service charge equal to the regular dues required of Union members. A teacher who failed to meet this obligation was subject to discharge. Nothing in the agreement, however, required any teacher to join the Union, espouse the cause of unionism, or participate in any other way in Union affairs.
On November 7, 1969 — more than two months before the agency-shop clause was to become effective — Christine Warczak and a number of other named teachers filed a class action in a state court, naming as defendants the Board, the Union, and several Union officials. Their complaint, as amended, alleged that they were unwilling or had refused to pay dues and that they opposed collective bargaining in the public sector. The amended complaint further alleged that the Union “carries on various social activities for the benefit of its members which are not available to nonmembers as a matter of right,” and that the Union is engaged
“in a number and variety of activities and programs which are economic, political, professional, scientific and religious in nature of which Plaintiffs do not approve, and in which they will have no voice, and which are not and will not be collective bargaining activities, i. e., the negotiation and administration of contracts with Defendant Board, and that a substantial part of the sums required to be paid under said Agency Shop Clause are used and will continue to be used for the support of such activities and programs, and not solely for the purpose of defraying the cost of Defendant Federation of its activities as bargaining agent for teachers employed by Defendant Board.”
The complaint prayed that the agency-shop clause be declared invalid under state law and also under the United States Constitution as a deprivation of, inter alia, the plaintiffs’ freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and for such further relief as might be deemed appropriate.
Upon the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Warczak v. Board of Education, 73 LRRM 2237 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County). The plaintiffs appealed, and while their appeal was pending the Michigan Supreme Court ruled in Smigel v. Southgate Community School Dist., 388 Mich. 531, 202 N. W. 2d 305, that state law prohibited an agency shop in the public sector. Accordingly, the judgment in the Warczak case was vacated and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Smigel decision.
Meanwhile, D. Louis Abood and other named teachers had filed a separate action in the same state trial court. The allegations in the complaint were virtually identical to those in Warczak, and similar relief was requested. This second action was held in abeyance pending disposition of the Warczak appeal, and when that case was remanded the two cases were consolidated in the trial court for consideration of the defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment.
On November 5, 1973, that motion was granted. The trial court noted that following the Smigel decision, the Michigan Legislature had in 1973 amended its Public Employment Relations Act so as expressly to authorize an agency shop. 1973 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 25, codified as Mich. Comp. Laws §423.210 (l)(c). This amendment was applied retraactively by the trial court to validate the agency-shop clause predating 1973 as a matter of state law, and the court ruled further that such a clause does not violate the Federal Constitution.
The plaintiffs’ appeals were consolidated by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which ruled that the trial court had erred in giving retroactive application to the 1973 legislative amendment. The appellate court proceeded, however, to consider the constitutionality of the agency-shop clause, and upheld its facial validity on the authority of this Court’s decision in Railway Employes’ Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, which upheld the constitutionality under the First Amendment of a union-shop clause, authorized by the Railway Labor Act, requiring financial support of the exclusive bargaining representative by every member of the bargaining unit. Id., at 238. Noting, however, that Michigan law also permits union expenditures for legislative lobbying and in support of political candidates, the state appellate court identified an issue explicitly not considered in Hanson — the constitutionality of using compulsory service charges to further “political purposes” unrelated to collective bargaining. Although recognizing that such expenditures “could violate plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights,” the court read this Court’s more recent decisions to require that an employee who seeks to vindicate such rights must “make known to the union those causes and candidates to which he objects.” Since the complaints had failed to allege that any such notification had been given, the court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to restitution of any portion of the service charges. The trial court’s error on the retroactivity question, however, led the appellate court to reverse and remand the case. 60 Mich. App. 92, 230 N. W. 2d 322. After the Supreme Court of Michigan denied review, the plaintiffs appealed to this Court, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), and we noted probable jurisdiction, 425 U. S. 949.
II
A
Consideration of the question whether an agency-shop provision in a collective-bargaining agreement covering governmental employees is, as such, constitutionally valid must begin with two cases in this Court that on their face go far toward resolving the issue. The cases are Railway Employes’ Dept. v. Hanson, supra, and Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740.
In the Hanson case a group of railroad employees brought an action in a Nebraska court to enjoin enforcement of a union-shop agreement. The challenged clause was authorized, and indeed shielded from any attempt by a State to prohibit it, by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 152 Eleventh. The trial court granted the relief requested. The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the injunction on the ground that employees who disagreed with the objectives promoted by union expenditures were deprived of the freedom of association protected by the First Amendment. This Court agreed that “justiciable questions under the First and Fifth Amendments were presented,” 351 U. S., at 231, but reversed the judgment of the Nebraska Supreme Court on the merits. Acknowledging that “[m]uch might be said pro and con” about the union shop as a policy matter, the Court noted that it is Congress that is charged with identifying “[t]he ingredients of industrial peace and stabilized labor-management relations....’’ Id., at 233-234. Congress determined that it would promote peaceful labor relations to permit a union and an employer to conclude an agreement requiring employees who obtain the benefit of union representation to share its cost, and that legislative judgment was surely an allowable one. Id., at 235.
The record in Hanson contained no evidence that union dues were used to force ideological conformity or otherwise to impair the free expression of employees, and the Court noted that “[i]f ‘assessments’ are in fact imposed for purposes not germane to ■ collective bargaining, a different problem would be presented.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). But the Court squarely held that “the requirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work... does not violate... the First... Amendmen[t].” Id., at 238.
The Court faced a similar question several years later in the Street case, which also involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a union shop authorized by the Railway Labor Act. In Street, however, the record contained findings that the union treasury to which all employees were required to contribute had been used “to finance the campaigns of candidates for federal and state offices whom [the plaintiffs] opposed, and to promote the propagation of political and economic doctrines, concepts and ideologies with which [they] disagreed.” 367 U. S., at 744.
’ The Court recognized, id., at 749, that these findings presented constitutional “questions of the utmost gravity” not decided in Hanson, and therefore considered whether the Act could fairly be construed to avoid these constitutional issues. 367 U. S., at 749-750. The Court concluded that the Act could be so construed, since only expenditures related to the union’s functions in negotiating and administering the collective-bargaining agreement and adjusting grievances and disputes fell within “the reasons... accepted by Congress why authority to make union-shop agreements was justified,” id., at 768. The Court ruled, therefore, that the use of compulsory union dues for political purposes violated the Act itself. Nonetheless, it found that an injunction against enforcement of the union-shop agreement as such was impermissible under Hanson, and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia so that a more limited remedy could be devised.
The holding in Hanson, as elaborated in Street, reflects familiar doctrines in the federal labor laws. The principle of exclusive union representation, which underlies the National Labor Relations Act as well as the Railway Labor Act, is a central element in the congressional structuring of industrial relations. E. g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U. S. 50, 62-63; NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175, 180; Medo Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 678, 684-685; Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 545-549. The designation of a single representative avoids the confusion that would result from attempting to enforce two or more agreements specifying different terms and conditions of employment. It prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within the work force and eliminating the advantages to the employee of collectivization. It also frees the employer from the possibility of facing conflicting demands from different unions, and permits the employer and a single union to reach agreements and settlements that are not subject to attack from rival labor organizations. See generally Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., supra, at 67-70; S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1935).
The designation of a union as exclusive representative carries with it great responsibilities. The tasks of negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining agreement' and representing the interests of employees in settling disputes and processing grievances are continuing and difficult ones. They often entail expenditure of much time and money. See Street, 367 U. S., at 760. The services of lawyers, expert negotiators, economists, and a research staff, as well as general administrative personnel, may be required. Moreover, in carrying out these duties, the union is obliged “fairly and equitably to represent all employees..., union and nonunion,” within the relevant unit. Id., at 761. A union-shop arrangement has been thought to distribute fairly the cost of these activities among those who benefit, and it counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise have to become “free riders” — to refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation that necessarily accrue to all employees. Ibid.; see Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U. S. 407, 415-416; NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U. S. 734, 740-741.
To compel employees financially to support their collective-bargaining representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests. An employee may very well have ideological objections to a wide variety of activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive representative. His moral or religious views about the desirability of abortion may not square with the union’s policy in negotiating a medical benefits plan. One individual might disagree with a union policy of negotiating limits on the right to strike, believing that to be the road to serfdom for the working class, while another might have economic or political objections to unionism itself. An employee might object to the union’s wage policy because it violates guidelines designed to limit inflation, or might object to the union’s seeking a clause in the collective-bargaining agreement proscribing racial discrimination. The examples could be multiplied. To be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining agent might well be thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an employee’s freedom to associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit. But the judgment clearly made in Hanson and Street is that such interference as exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress. “The furtherance of the common cause leaves some leeway for the leadership of the group. As long as they act to promote the cause which justified bringing the group together, the individual cannot withdraw his financial support merely because he disagrees with the group’s strategy. If that were allowed, we would be reversing the Hanson case, sub silentio.” Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S., at 778 (Douglas, J., concurring).
B
The National Labor Relations Act leaves regulation of the labor relations of state and local governments to the States. See 29 U. S. C. § 152 (2). Michigan has chosen to establish for local government units a regulatory scheme which, although not identical in every respect to the NLRA or the Railway Labor Act, is broadly modeled after federal law. E. g., Rockwell v. Crestwood School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 393 Mich. 616, 635-636, 227 N. W. 2d 736, 744-745, appeal dismissed sub nom. Crestwood Ed. Assn. v. Board of Ed. of Crestwood, 427 U. S. 901; Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 53, 214 N. W. 2d 803, 807-808; Michigan Employment Relations Comm’n v. Reeths-Puffer School Dist., 391 Mich. 253, 260, and n. 11, 215 N. W. 2d 672, 675, and n. 11. Under Michigan law employees of local government units enjoy rights parallel to those protected under federal legislation: the rights to self-organization and to bargain collectively, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 423.209, 423.215 (1970); see 29 U. S. C. § 157; 45 U. S. C. § 152 Fourth; and the right to secret-ballot representation elections, Mich. Comp. Laws §423.212 (1970); see 29 U. S. C. § 159 (e)(1); 45 U. S. C. § 152 Ninth.
Several aspects of Michigan law that mirror provisions of the Railway Labor Act are of particular importance here. A union that obtains the support of a majority of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit is designated the exclusive representative of those employees. Mich. Comp. Laws § 423.211 (1970). A union so designated is under a duty of fair representation to all employees in the unit, whether or not union members. E. g., Lowe v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 705, 389 Mich. 123, 145-152, 205 N. W. 2d 167, 177-180; Wayne County Community College Federation of Teachers Local 2000 v. Poe, 1976 Mich. Emp. Rel. Comm’n 347, 350-353; Local 836, AFSCME v. Solomon, 1976 Mich. Emp. Rel. Comm’n 84, 89. And in carrying out all of its various responsibilities, a recognized union may seek to have an agency-shop clause included in a collective-bargaining agreement. Mich. Comp. Laws §423.210 (1)(c) (1970). Indeed, the 1973 amendment to the Michigan law was specifically designed to authorize agency shops in order that “employees in the bargaining unit... share fairly in the financial support of their exclusive bargaining representative....” §423.210 (2).
The governmental interests advanced by the agency-shop provision in the Michigan statute are much the same as those promoted by similar provisions in federal labor law. The confusion and conflict that could arise if rival teachers’ unions, holding quite different views as to the proper class hours, class sizes, holidays, tenure provisions, and grievance procedures, each sought to obtain the employer’s agreement, are no different in kind from the evils that the exclusivity rule in the Railway Labor Act was designed to avoid. See Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U. S. 167, 178 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). The desirability of labor peace is no less important in the public sector, nor is the risk of “free riders” any smaller.
Our province is not to judge the wisdom of Michigan’s decision to authorize the agency shop in public employment. Rather, it is to adjudicate the constitutionality of that decision. The same important government” interests recognized in the Hanson and Street cases presumptively support the impingement upon associations! freedom created by the agency shop here at issue. Thus, insofar as the service charge is used to finance expenditures by the Union for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment, those two decisions of this Court appear to require validation of the agency-shop agreement before us.
While recognizing the apparent precedential weight of the Hanson and Street cases, the appellants advance two reasons why those decisions should not control decision of the present case. First, the appellants note that it is government employment that is involved here, thus directly implicating constitutional guarantees, in contrast to the private employment that was the subject of the Hanson and Street decisions. Second, the appellants say that in the public sector collective bargaining itself is inherently “political,” and that to require them to give financial support to it is to require the “ideological conformity” that the Court expressly found absent in the Hanson case. 351 U. S., at 238. We find neither argument persuasive.
Because it is employment by the State that is here involved, the appellants suggest that this case is governed by a long line of decisions holding that public employment cannot be conditioned upon the surrender of First Amendment rights. But, while the actions of public employers surely constitute “state action,” the union shop, as authorized by the Railway Labor Act, also was found to result from governmental action in Hanson. The plaintiffs’ claims in Hanson failed, not because there was no governmental action, but because there was no First Amendment violation. The appellants’ reliance on the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine is therefore misplaced.
The appellants’ second argument is that in any event collective bargaining in the public sector is inherently “political” and thus requires a different result under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This contention rests upon the important and often-noted differences in the nature of collective bargaining in the public and private sectors. A public employer, unlike his private counterpart, is not guided by the profit motive and constrained by the normal operation of the market. Municipal services are typically not priced, and where they are they tend to be regarded as in some sense “essential” and therefore are often price-inelastic. Although a public employer, like a private one, will wish to keep costs down, he lacks an important discipline against agreeing to increases in labor costs that in a market system would require price increases. A public-sector union is correspondingly less concerned that high prices due to costly wage demands will decrease output and hence employment.
The government officials making decisions as the public “employer” are less likely to act as a cohesive unit than are managers in private industry, in part because different levels of public authority — department managers, budgetary officials, and legislative bodies — are involved, and in part because each official may respond to a distinctive political constituency. And the ease of negotiating a final agreement with the union may be severely limited by statutory restrictions, by the need for the approval of a higher executive authority or a legislative body, or by the commitment of budgetary decisions of critical importance to others.
Finally, decisionmaking by a public employer is above all a political process. The officials who represent the public employer are ultimately responsible to the electorate, which for this purpose can be viewed as comprising three overlapping classes of voters — taxpayers, users of particular government services, and government employees. Through exercise of their political influence as part of the electorate, the employees have the opportunity to affect the decisions of government representatives who sit on the other side of the bargaining table. Whether these representatives accede to a union’s demands will depend upon a blend of political ingredients, including community sentiment about unionism generally and the involved union in particular, the degree of taxpayer resistance, and the views of voters as to the importance of the service involved and the relation between the demands and the quality of service. It is surely arguable, however, that permitting public employees to unionize and a union to bargain as their exclusive representative gives the employees more influence in the decisionmaking process than is possessed by employees similarly organized in the private sector.
The distinctive nature of public-sector bargaining has led to widespread discussion about the extent to which the law governing labor relations in the private sector provides an appropriate model. To take but one example, there has been considerable debate about the desirability of prohibiting public employee unions from striking, a step that the State of Michigan itself has taken, Mich. Comp. Laws § 423.202 (1970). But although Michigan has not adopted the federal model of labor relations in every respect, it has determined that labor stability will be served by a system of exclusive representation and the permissive use of an agency shop in public employment. As already stated, there can be no' principled basis for according that decision less weight in the constitutional balance than was given in Hanson to the congressional judgment reflected in the Railway Labor Act. The only remaining constitutional inquiry evoked by the appellants' argument, therefore, is whether a public employee has a weightier First Amendment interest than a private employee in not being compelled to contribute to the costs of exclusive union representation. We think he does not.
Public employees are not basically different from private employees; on the whole, they have the same sort of skills, the same needs, and seek the same advantages. “The uniqueness of public employment is not in the employees nor in the work performed; the uniqueness is in the special character of the employer.” Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 669, 670 (1975) (emphasis added). The very real differences between exclusive-agent collective bargaining in the public and private sectors are not such as to work any greater infringement upon the First Amendment interests of public employees. A public employee who believes that a union representing him is urging a course that is unwise as a matter of public policy is not barred from expressing his viewpoint. Besides voting in accordance with his convictions, every public employee is largely free to express his views, in public or private, orally or in writing. With some exceptions not pertinent here, public employees are free to participate in the full range of political activities open to other citizens. Indeed, just this Term we have held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of a public school teacher to oppose, at a public school board meeting, a position advanced by the teachers' union. Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U. S. 167. In so ruling we recognized that the principle of exclusivity cannot constitutionally be used to muzzle a public employee who, like any other citizen, might wish to express his view about governmental decisions concerning labor relations, id., at 174.
There can be no quarrel with the truism that because public employee unions attempt to influence governmental policy-making, their activities — and the views of members who disagree with them — may be properly termed political. But that characterization does not raise the ideas and beliefs of public employees onto a higher plane than the ideas and beliefs of private employees. It is no doubt true that a central purpose of the First Amendment “ 'was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.’ ” Post, at 259, quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14, and Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 218. But our cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters — to take a nonexhaustive list of labels — is not entitled to full First Amendment protection. Union members in both the public and private sectors may find that a variety of union activities conflict with their beliefs. Compare, e. g., supra, at 222, with post, at 256-257. Nothing in the First Amendment or our cases discussing its meaning makes the question whether the adjective “political” can properly be attached to those beliefs the critical constitutional inquiry.
The differences between public- and private-sector collective bargaining simply do not translate into differences in First Amendment rights. Even those commentators most acutely aware of the distinctive nature of public-sector bargaining and most seriously concerned with its policy implications agree that “[t]he union security issue in the public sector... is fundamentally the same issue... as in the private sector.... No special dimension results from the fact that a union represents public rather than private employees.” H. Wellington & R. Winter, Jr., The Unions and the Cities 95-96 (1971). We conclude that the Michigan Court of Appeals was correct in viewing this Court’s decisions in Hanson and Street as controlling in the present case insofar as the service charges are applied to collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance-adjustment purposes.
C
Because the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that state law “sanctions the use of nonunion members’ fees for purposes other than collective bargaining,” 60 Mich. App., at 99, 230 N. W. 2d, at 326, and because the complaints allege that such expenditures were made, this case presents constitutional issues not decided in Hanson or Street. Indeed Street embraced an interpretation of the Railway Labor Act not without its difficulties, see 367 U. S., at 784-786 (Black, J., dissenting); id., at 799-803 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), precisely to avoid facing the constitutional issues presented by the use of union-shop dues for political and ideological purposes unrelated to collective bargaining, id., at 749-750. Since the state court’s construction of the Michigan statute is authoritative, however, we must confront those issues in this case.
Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. E. g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 355-357 (plurality opinion); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 487; Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51, 56-57; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 460-461. Equally clear is the proposition that a government may not require an individual to relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment as a condition of public employment. E. g., Elrod v. Burns, supra, at 357-360, and cases cited; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589. The appellants argue that they fall within the protection of these cases because they have been prohibited, not from actively associating, but rather from refusing to associate. They specifically argue that they may constitutionally prevent the Union’s spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative. We have concluded that this argument is a meritorious one.
One of the principles underlying the Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, was that contributing to an organization for the purpose of spreading a political message is protected by the First Amendment. Because “[m]aking a contribution... enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals,” id., at 22, the Court reasoned that limitations upon the freedom to contribute “implicate fundamental First Amendment interests,” id., at 23.
The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of their constitutional rights. For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State. See Elrod v. Burns, supra, at 356-357; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303-304. And the freedom of belief is no incidental or secondary aspect-of the First Amendment’s protections:
“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642.
These principles prohibit a State from compelling any individual to affirm his belief in God, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, or to associate with a political party, Elrod v. Burns, supra; see 427 U. S., at 363-364, n. 17, as a condition of retaining public employment. They are no less applicable to the case at bar, and they thus prohibit the appellees from requiring any of the appellants to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose as a condition of holding a job as a public school teacher.
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative. Rather, the Constitution requires only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment.
There will, of course, be difficult problems in drawing lines between collective-bargaining activities, for which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining, for which such compulsion is prohibited. The Court held in Street, as a matter of statutory construction, that a similar line must be drawn under the Railway Labor Act, but in the public sector the line may be somewhat hazier. The process of establishing a written collective-bargaining agreement prescribing the terms and conditions of public employment may require not merely concord at the bargaining table, but subsequent approval by other public authorities; related budgetary and appropriations decisions might be seen as an integral part of the bargaining process. We have no occasion in this case, however, to try to define such a dividing line. The case comes to us after a judgment on the pleadings, and there is no evidentiary record of any kind. The allegations in the complaints are general ones, see supra, at 212-213, and the parties have neither briefed nor argued the question of what specific Union activities in the present context properly fall under the definition of collective bargaining. The lack of factual concreteness and adversary presentation to aid us in approaching the difficult line-drawing questions highlights the importance of avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional questions.. All that we decide is that the general allegations in the complaints, if proved, establish a cause of action under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Ill
In determining what remedy will be appropriate if the appellants prove their allegations, the objective must be to devise a way of preventing compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by employees who object thereto without restricting the Union’s ability to require every employee to contribute to the cost of collective-bargaining activities. This task is simplified by the guidance to be had from prior decisions. In Street, the plaintiffs had proved at trial that expenditures were being made for political purposes of various kinds, and the Court found those expenditures illegal under the Railway-Labor Act. See supra, at 219-220. Moreover, in that case each plaintiff had “made known to the union representing his craft or class his dissent from the use of his money for political causes which he opposes.” 367 U. S., at 750; see id., at 771. The Court found that “[i]n that circumstance, the respective unions were without power to use payments thereafter tendered by them for such political causes.” Ibid. Since, however, Hanson had established that the union-shop agreement was not unlawful as such, the Court held that to enjoin its enforcement would “[sweep] too broadly.” 367 U. S., at 771. The Court also found that an injunction prohibiting the union from expending dues for political purposes would be inappropriate, not only because of the basic policy reflected in the Norris-La Guardia Act against enjoining labor unions, but also because those union members who do wish part of their dues to be used for political purposes have a right to associate to that end “without being silenced by the dissenters.” Id., at 772-773.
After noting that “dissent is not to be presumed” and that only employees who have affirmatively made known to the union their opposition to political uses of their funds are entitled to relief, the Court sketched two possible remedies: First, “an injunction against expenditure for political causes opposed by each complaining employee of a sum, from those moneys to be spent by the union for political purposes, which is so much of the moneys exacted from him as is the proportion of the union’s total expenditures made for such political activities to the union’s total budget”; and second, restitution of a fraction of union dues paid equal to' the fraction of total union expenditures that were made for political purposes opposed by the employee. Id., at 774-775.
The Court again considered the remedial question in Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U. S. 113. In that case employees who had refused to pay union-shop dues obtained injunctive relief in state court against
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The factual background and the question presented in this case are the same as in Jackson v. Taylor, ante, p. 569, decided today. The case reaches us from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 234 F. 2d 615, which had reversed the District Court. We granted certiorari, 352 U. S. 940.
There are additional reasons to those in Jackson v. Taylor advanced for reversal in this case. Fowler contends that the 20-year sentence is arbitrarily severe, even though within the statutory maximum, citing United States v. Voorhees, 4 U. S. C. M. A. 509, 16 C. M. R. 83 (1954). But as we said in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 (1953), this Court exerts “no supervisory power over the courts which enforce [military law]; the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that task to Congress.” Id., at 140. If there is injustice in the sentence imposed it is for the Executive to correct, for since the board of review has authority to act, we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the exercise of its discretion. That power is placed by the Congress in the hands of those entrusted with the administration of military justice, or if clemency is in order, the Executive. It may be that the board’s judgment was harsh or that the military’s highest court should have intervened as it did in the Voorhees case, but we have no jurisdiction in that regard. As long ago as 1902 this Court recognized that it was a “salutary rule that the sentences of courts martial, when affirmed by the military tribunal of last resort, cannot be revised by the civil courts save only when void because of an absolute want of power, and not merely voidable because of the defective exercise of power possessed.” Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365, 401.
We note that petitioner’s reliance on Voorhees’ case is misplaced when he cites it as apposite to the problem here presented. While the Court of Military Appeals held there that the board should have ordered a rehearing, the rehearing was to include a reconsideration of the finding of guilt as well as the sentence. Though, as Judge Lati-mer indicates in his opinion, the board of review had the power to approve the sentence, dismissal from the service, such approval was found by that court to be an abuse of the discretion placed in the board under the particular circumstances of the case. We, of course, do not sit to pass on the exercise of discretion by the military authorities. Judge Latimer further indicated the Court of Military Appeals’ recognition of the power of the board of review to affirm such parts, or amount of a sentence, as it finds correct in fact and law. The case, then, instead of supporting petitioner’s position, indicates authority for the power of the board to modify the sentence. See United States v. Bigger, 2 U. S. C. M. A. 297, 8 C. M. R. 97 (1953).
The argument that the adjustment of the sentence by the board deprives the petitioner of two appeals likewise is without merit. He contends that if the resentencing were done by a court-martial he would have a review of that resentencing by the convening authority as well as the board of review. But Congress did not intend any such result. The accused has already had his day before the court-martial and the convening authority. It is not for us to say that the procedure established by Congress is unwise. There are no constitutional questions before us. We have determined that the board of review had jurisdiction to modify the sentence. Our inquiry cannot be extended beyond that question.
For these reasons, and those stated in Jackson v. Taylor, ante, p. 569, the judgment is
Affirmed.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Brennan dissent for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in No. 619, Jackson v. Taylor, ante, p. 581.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision in these cases is whether Congress has prohibited the Tennessee Valley Authority from competing in the sale of electricity with respondent, the Kentucky Utilities Company, in two small villages in Claiborne County, Tennessee, and in a narrow corridor between the two villages and the Tennessee-Kentucky state boundary 16 miles away. By § 15d of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as added by the 1959 amendments to that Act, Congress barred the TVA from expanding its sales outside “the area for which the Corporation [TVA] or its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July , 1957/’1 and our problem is therefore the narrow one of deciding whether these villages and the narrow corridor are part of an “area” for which TYA was the primary source of power on the crucial date. The difficulty lies in determining the location and extent of the “area” to which the statute refers. In June 1957, TVA supplied 62% of the power used in all of Claiborne County, and therefore if the entire county is an “area” within the meaning of the statute, TVA would have been the “primary” source of power, and its expansion into the two villages would be permissible. On the other hand, in the villages themselves, TVA supplied only 6% of the power in June 1957, while respondent supplied 94%; thus if the two villages either alone or with the corridor constitute an “area,” TVA would not have been the primary source of power, and it would be barred by § 15d from expanding into that area.
The question of statutory interpretation now before us arose in this way. TVA is the major supplier of electric power in Tennessee and in many adjoining areas- of Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Virginia, and Kentucky. Respondent, whose service area is centered in Kentucky, has long served customers in Tazewell and New Tazewell, the two villages within 16 miles of the Kentucky border in Claiborne County, Tennessee. The power lines of TVA distributors also crisscross Claiborne County, and TVA has therefore been- able to serve a small number of customers in the two villages, even though respondent was the predominant source of power. Because Kentucky Utilities’ retail rates for electricity in the two villages were approximately 2y2 times higher for typical consumers than the rates for TVA power, the value of residential and commercial properties served by TVA was substantially and uniformly higher than the value of similar properties served by respondent. This rate disparity created a seething discontent among residential and industrial consumers in the villages. Pointing out that they lived in the very heart of the TVA watershed and in immediate proximity to TVA’s large Norris Lake, these citizens contended that it was wholly unjust and inequitable to deny them the benefits and advantages of cheap TVA power. After complaints, planning, and consultations over a period of more than three years, the local governments engaged a contractor to build the facilities necessary to establish a municipal system linked to TVA’s cheap power. Kentucky Utilities’ customers immediately began to discontinue their service and become customers of the municipal system.
Kentucky Utilities then filed this suit against TVA, the mayors of the twb Tazewells, and the Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, a TVA distributor, charging them with conspiracy to destroy its Tazewell business and asking the court to enjoin TVA from supplying power to the new municipal system in alleged violation of § 15d. The District Court upheld the determination of the TVA Board of Directors that the two Tazewells were within TVA’s primary service “area” and dismissed the case, 237 F. Supp. 502 (1964), but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the two villages plus the corridor constituted an “area” and that TVA accordingly was barred from extending its service in the Tazewells. 375 F. 2d 403 (1966). We granted certiorari, 386 U. S. 980 (1967), to resolve this important question in the administration of the TVA Act. We reverse and agree with the District Court that the TVA Board properly determined the relevant service “area” to extend beyond the two Taze-wells and to include the entire county. TVA, as the primary power source within this area, could therefore properly make its low-cost power available to consumers in this entire county area including the two villages.
I.
Before discussing the merits, we shall briefly consider petitioners’ contention that the Kentucky Utilities Company lacks standing to challenge the legality of TVA’s activities. We agree with both the courts below that this contention is without merit. This Court has, it is true, repeatedly held that the economic injury which results from lawful competition cannot, in and of itself, ■confer standing on the injured business to question the legality of any aspect of its competitor’s operations. Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166 (1882); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464 (1938); Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U. S. 118 (1939); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 (1940). But competitive injury provided no basis for standing in the above cases simply because the statutory and constitutional requirements that the plaintiff sought to enforce were in no way concerned with protecting against competitive injury. In contrast, it has been the rule, at least since the Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258 (1924), that when the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest, the injured competitor has standing to require compliance with that provision. See Alton R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 15, 19 (1942); Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77, 83 (1958).
Petitioners concede, as of course they must, that one of the primary purposes of the area limitations in § 15d of the Act was to protect private utilities from TYA competition. This is evident from the provision itself and is amply supported by its legislative history. The provision grew out of TVA’s efforts to find some way to meet the cost of new facilities without dependence upon annual appropriations from Congress. In 1955 TVA began to seek authority to issue bonds to finance these expenditures. Although TVA spokesmen assured Congress that the objective was not territorial expansion but only improvement of facilities in TVA’s existing service area, many members of Congress were apprehensive and thought that if congressional budgetary control was to be weakened, some substitute to prevent territorial expansion should be found. A series of bills to give TVA borrowing power failed to pass. Several bills were then introduced combining the grant of borrowing power with various provisions to prohibit territorial expansion, and one of these bills was eventually-enacted as the TYA amendments of 1959. Although discussions of the territorial limitation mentioned a number of policy reasons for the restriction, it is clear and undisputed that protection of private utilities from TVA competition was almost universally regarded as the primary objective of the limitation. Since respondent is thus in the class which § 15d is designed to protect, it has standing under familiar judicial principles to bring this suit, see Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309 (1944); cf. United States v. ICC, 337 U. S. 426, 433-434 (1949), and no explicit statutory provision is necessary to confer standing.
II.
Basic to our consideration of the merits of these cases is an appraisal of the significance of the TVA Board’s determination that all of Claiborne County, including the two Tazewells, constituted a single “area” in which TYA is the primary source of power. Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals gave no weight whatever to this determination and urge that the finding should instead have been treated like an administrative interpretation by an agency or executive officer, to be set aside only if it is not properly related to the purposes of the statute. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is not altogether clear in dealing with this question, however, and respondent has not attempted to argue here that the Court of Appeals could have decided the matter entirely on its own, without any consideration of the TVA Board’s finding. Rather, respondent appears to agree with petitioners that the determination of the TVA Board is entitled to acceptance unless it lies outside the range of permissible choices contemplated by the statute, and we think this is the proper rule. The initial determination as to the extent of the “area” under § 15d must be made by the TVA Board in every case, since TVA is required under the Act to make power available to public bodies and cooperatives within the permissible area. In making this determination as to the most appropriate boundaries for its service area, the TYA Board will normally evaluate the economic and engineering aspects of providing its service to the customers in question, especially in relation to the particular topography of the affected region. Given the innate and inevitable vagueness of the “area” concept and the complexity of the factors relevant to decision in this matter, we think it is more efficient, and thus more in line with the overall purposes of the Act, for the courts to take the TVA’s “area” determinations as their starting points and to set these determinations aside only when they lack reasonable support in relation to the statutory purpose of controlling, but not altogether prohibiting, territorial expansion. Cf. SEC v. New England Electric, 384 U. S. 176, 185 (1966); Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 109-110 (1904).
III.
Tested by this standard, we think the determination of the TVA Board with respect to Claiborne County should have been upheld by the court below. Neither the language of § 15d, its legislative history, nor any of the economic and technical circumstances of this particular locality suggest that the TVA Board’s determination here exceeded the outer boundaries of choice contemplated in the Act.
Certainly nothing in the language of § 15d (a) itself forecloses the TVA’s present decision. The second paragraph of that section reads:
“Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Corporation or its distributors from, supplying electric power to any customer within any area in which the Corporation or its distributors had generally established electric service on July 1, 1957, and to which electric service was not being supplied from any other source on the effective date of this Act.”
In light of this provision, respondent argues that even within its “area,” TVA may not extend its services to new customers previously served by a private company. Literally, of course, this language does not establish such a rule. It simply states that when a customer is served by a private utility in this area of generally established service, an area perhaps broader than the “area” of primary service which is controlling under the first paragraph of § 15d (a), the Act may prevent TVA from supplying the customer; other parts of the subsection must be looked to for the actual prohibition. This literal reading, moreover, is the only' appropriate one in light of other provisions of the statute. The first paragraph of § 15d (a) authorizes TVA to provide power not only within its “area” but also within an additional region “extending not more than five miles around the periphery of such area.” This is followed by a proviso denying TVA the right to serve within this additional region any “municipality receiving electric service from another source on or after July 1, 1957.” Since the Act makes the existence of a private supplier an explicit bar to TVA expansion only within the additional region, we cannot read the statute as also making the existence of a private supplier, in and of itself, an automatic bar to expansion in the primary service “area.”
The parties have also called our attention to numerous incidents in the legislative history suggesting that Congress may have regarded the very villages involved in this case as either inside or outside of TVA’s service area. Petitioners note that maps placed before the congressional committees showed the Tazewells as within TVA’s primary service area. Respondent counters that one map submitted to the House Public Works Committee showed the Tazewells as within respondent’s service area. In addition, respondent notes that a “gentlemen’s agreement” between TVA and neighboring private utilities had placed the Tazewells within respondent’s area, and respondent refers to a number of statements indicating that various sponsors of the territorial limitations intended to enact the “gentlemen’s agreement” into law.
We do not find any of this information particularly helpful in resolving the question before us. The maps on which petitioners rely were large-scale representations of TYA’s entire multistate system, and they were submitted to various committees for general reference. Even if all these maps had placed the Tazewells in the same area, it would be artificial in the extreme to assume that Congress actually entertained any specific intention with respect to these small villages in one tiny portion of the county, the State and the map. With respect to the “gentlemen’s agreement,” it is undeniable that many members of Congress did hope to freeze completely the existing situation by enactment of the territorial limitation. Others, the majority of the Senate Public Works Committee in particular, undoubtedly sought to include language that would authorize adjustments and permit a certain amount of elasticity in the availability of TYA service. We think it is sufficient to note, without tracing all the changes in the wording of the territorial limitation, that the language of the Act in its final form is a compromise and that the views of those who sought the most restrictive wording cannot control interpretation of the compromise version.
Finally, we think that apart from the structure of the Act and its legislative history, the facts of the situation in Claiborne County, in Tennessee, and in Kentucky support rather than undercut the TVA Board’s determination. The parties place great stress on the question whether respondent’s service area should be characterized as a “peninsula” attached to its main region of service or as a mere “island” surrounded by TVA territory and therefore more properly subject to TVA intrusion. But we can attribute no controlling significance to such characterizations. The most isolated area of private service will necessarily be connected to the private company’s main area by at least one power fine such as the one present here, and the company may even, as here, serve scattered customers along the line — if indeed the region contains any customers to serve. At the same time a broad area served almost entirely by a private company and contiguous with its main service area may be crisscrossed by the lines of TVA distributors and TVA may even have scattered customers along these lines; the fact that the private company was thus surrounded by TVA might not under this statute justify TVA expansion into the “peninsula” or “island,” whatever it may be, served by private power. In the present cases respondent did serve a substantial number of customers in the corridor between the Tazewells and its main service area in Kentucky, but if a “peninsula,” it was at best a very narrow and tiny one in relation to the possible patterns of power distribution. TVA, on the other hand, served most of the rural areas in Claiborne County and had a substantial minority of the customers in the Tazewells themselves. Under these circumstances, the TVA Board could properly have concluded that the pattern of electric power distribution would be more sensible and efficient if TVA competed in the entire Tazewell municipal area as well as serving the relatively unprofitable rural customers, many of whom were rather close to respondent’s transmission line into the Tazewells. In addition, the Board could have considered the existence of its significant, though not primary, service in the Tazewells themselves as a compelling reason for including these villages in its “area,” since the factors supporting inclusion were in any event significant and since the great disparity of rates in the villages had resulted in significant economic dislocations.
Under all these circumstances we cannot say that the conclusion of the TYA Board in the present cases is incompatible with the “area” concept formulated in the Act. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm that of the District Court.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, § 15d (a), 73 Stat. 280, as amended, 73 Stat. 338, 16 U. S. C. §831n-4 (a). The full text of the relevant portion of § 15d (a) is as follows:
“Unless otherwise specifically authorized by Act of Congress the Corporation shall make no contracts for the sale or delivery of power which would have the effect of making the Corporation or its distributors, directly or indirectly, a source of power supply outside the area for which the Corporation or its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957, and such additional area extending not more than five miles around the periphery of such area as may be necessary to care for the growth of the Corporation and its distributors within said area: Provided, however, That such additional area shall not in any event increase by more than 2% per centum (or two thousand square miles, whichever is the lesser) the area for which the Corporation and its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957: And provided further, That no part of such additional area may be in a State not now served by the Corporation or its distributors or in a municipality receiving electric service from another source on or after July 1, 1957, and no more than five hundred square miles of such additional area may be in any one State now served by the Corporation or its distributors.
“Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Corporation or its distributors from supplying electric power to any customer within any area in which the Corporation or its distributors had generally established electric service on July 1, 1957, and to which electric service was not being supplied from any other source on the effective date of this Act.”
For the owner of an electrically heated home, TVA power might cost $30.50 for a winter month as against $75.53 for the identical amount of power supplied by respondent.
S. 2373, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H. R. 4266, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
S. 1855, S. 1869, S. 1986, S. 2145, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 931, H. R. 3460, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
One of the Senators active in framing the territorial limitation expressed concern over TVA’s powerful bargaining position with respect to its purchase of coal. See S. Rep. No. 470, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 54 (1959) (supplemental views of Senator Randolph).
See, e. g., id., at 9 (majority report); id., at 54-55 (supplemental views of Senator Randolph); 105 Cong. Rec. 13053 (July 9, 1959) (remarks of Senator Cooper); id., at 13054 (remarks of Senator Holland); id., at 13055 (remarks of Senator Kerr); id., at 13060-13061 (remarks of Senator Randolph); id., at 13061 (remarks of Senator Byrd); hearings on H. R. 3460 before House Committee on Public Works, March 10-11, 1959, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 110, 115 (testimony of Representative Vinson); id., at 122 (testimony of Representative Boykin).
Petitioners’ reliance on Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 96 U. S. App. D. C. 273, 225 F. 2d 924, cert. denied, 350 U. S. 884 (1955), is thus misplaced. The Court in McKay ruled that an explicit statutory provision was necessary to confer standing because of the “long established rule” that an injured competitor cannot sue to enforce statutory requirements not designed to protect competitors. In the case of statutes concerned with protecting competitive interests, the “long established rule” is of course precisely the opposite.
The Court of Appeals stated at one point:
“But, TVA argues, the 1959 Act must be read as committing to its Board of Directors authority to determine 'the area’ in which it was the primary source of power on that date. We find no words in the Act which directly or impliedly delegated to TVA’s Board such authority.” 375 F. 2d, at 412.
Later in its opinion, however, the court suggests that this statement was not intended to deny any role to the Board’s determination:
“We hold that the resolution of the TVA Board did not foreclose the testing of its validity by the District Judge or by this Court on this appeal.” 375 F. 2d, at 415.
See § 12 of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 48 Stat. 65, 16 U. S. C. § 831k.
It should be noted that the agency determination upon which the Court places so much weight was reached at a “special meeting” of the Board of Directors on August 26, 1964, more than eight months after respondent filed its complaint, and only three weeks before trial. One of the staff memoranda upon which the determination was based refers specifically to this litigation. One might have supposed that a determination which was made post litem, motam warranted at least cautious treatment.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Michigan State Bar brought this action in January 1959 to enjoin the members of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen from engaging in activities undertaken for the stated purpose of assisting their fellow workers, their widows and families, to protect themselves from excessive fees at the hands of incompetent attorneys in suits for damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. The complaint charged, as factors relevant to the cause of action, that the Union recommended selected attorneys to its members and their families, that it secured a commitment from those attorneys that the maximum fee charged would not exceed 25% of the recovery, and that it recommended Chicago lawyers to represent Michigan claimants. The State Bar’s complaint appears to be a plea for court protection of unlimited legal fees. The Union’s answers admitted that it had engaged in the practice of protecting members against large fees and incompetent counsel; that since 1930 it had recommended, with respect to FELA claims, that injured member employees, and their families, consult attorneys designated by the Union as “Legal Counsel”; that prior to March 1959, it had informed the injured members and their families that the legal counsel would not charge in excess of 25% of any recovery; and that Union representatives were reimbursed for transporting injured employees, or their families, to the legal counsel offices.
The only evidence introduced in this case was the testimony of one employee of the Association of American Railroads in 1961 that from 1953 through 1960 a large number of Michigan FELA claimants were represented by the Union’s designated Chicago legal counsel. Based on this evidence and the Union’s admissions set out above, the state trial court in 1962 issued an order enjoining the Union’s activities on the ground that they violated the state statute making it a misdemeanor to “solicit” damage suits against railroads. The Union appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, but before the case was argued on appeal, this Court handed down its decision in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U. S. 1 (1964), involving a similar injunction secured by the Virginia State Bar against the Union. We held in that case that the First Amendment guarantees of free speech, petition, and assembly give railroad workers the right to cooperate in helping and advising one another in asserting their rights under the FELA. While not deciding every question that possibly could be raised, our opinion left no doubt that workers have a right under the First Amendment to act collectively to secure good, honest lawyers to assert their claims against railroads.
Acknowledging our decision in Trainmen, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the instant case to the state trial court with permission for amendment of the complaint “to seek, if it be so advised, relief not inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s said opinion.” 374 Mich. 152, 155, 132 N. W. 2d 78, 79. After remand, the State Bar made a motion for further proceedings. That motion was heard on February 5, 1965, at which time the Bar declined to amend its complaint. For reasons not explained in the record, the case lingered in the trial court until May 24, 1968. On that date, after a motion for judgment by the State Bar and arguments on the motion, the trial court adopted verbatim the injunction entered in the Virginia state courts after our remand in Trainmen.
In affirming the trial court decree, the material part of which is set out below, the Michigan Supreme Court gave our holding in Trainmen the narrowest possible reading, focusing only on the specific literal language of the injunctive provisions challenged in that case rather than the broad range of union activities held to be protected by the First Amendment. Similarly, the Michigan court erroneously restricted our holding in United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U. S. 217 (1967), to “the operative portion” of the Illinois decree prohibiting any financial connection between the attorney and the Union. The Michigan Supreme Court failed to follow our decisions in Trainmen, United Mine Workers, and NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963), upholding the First Amendment principle that groups can unite to assert their legal rights as effectively and economically as practicable. When applied, as it must be, to the Union’s activities reflected in the record of this case, the First Amendment forbids the restraints imposed by the injunction here under review for the following among other reasons.
First. The decree approved by the Michigan Supreme Court enjoins the Union from “giving or furnishing legal advice to its members or their families.” Given its broadest meaning, this provision would bar the Union’s members, officers, agents, or attorneys from giving any kind of advice or counsel to an injured worker or his family concerning his FELA claim. In Trainmen we upheld the commonsense proposition that such activity is protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, the plain meaning of this particular injunctive provision would emphatically deny the right of the Union to employ counsel to represent its members, a right explicitly upheld in United Mine Workers and NAACP v. Button.
We cannot accept the restricted interpretation of this provision urged by the State Bar, and accepted by our Brother Harlan, that it only prohibits the Union or its members themselves from “practicing law.” The record is devoid of any evidence or allegation of such conduct on the part of the Union or its members. A decree must relate specifically and exclusively to the pleadings and proof. If not so related, the provision, because of its vagueness, will jeopardize the exercise of protected freedoms. This injunction, like a criminal statute, prohibits conduct under fear of punishment. Therefore, we look at the injunction as we look at a statute, and if upon its face it abridges rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, it should be struck down. Our statement in NAACP v. Button concerning the statute there in question is equally applicable to the injunction now before us: “[W]e cannot assume that, in its subsequent enforcement, ambiguities will be resolved in favor of adequate protection of First Amendment rights.” 371 U. S., at 438.
Second. The decree also enjoins the Union from furnishing to any attorney, the names of injured members or information relating to their injuries. The investigation of accidents by Union staff for purposes of gathering evidence to assist the injured worker or his family in asserting FELA claims was part of the Union practice upheld in Trainmen. 377 U. S., at 4 n. 8. It would seem at least a little strange now to hold that the Union cannot communicate that information to the injured member’s attorney.
Third. A provision of the decree enjoins the members of the Union from.“accepting or receiving compensation of any kind, directly or indirectly, for the solicitation of legal employment for any lawyer, whether by way of salary, commission or otherwise.” The Union conceded that prior to 1959, Union representatives were reimbursed for their actual time spent and out-of-pocket expenses incurred in bringing injured members or their families to the offices of the legal counsel. Since the members of a union have a First Amendment right to help and advise each other in securing effective legal representation, there can be no doubt that transportation of injured members to an attorney’s office is within the scope of that protected activity. To the extent that the injunction prohibits this practice, it is invalid under Trainmen, United Mine Workers, and NAACP v. Button.
Fourth. Our Brothers Harlan and White apparently accept the State Bar contention that the provision prohibiting compensation to Union representatives for solicitation refers to compensation paid by the attorney rather than the Union. And so interpreted, it supplements the two provisions which prohibit the Union from sharing in legal fees received by the recommended counsel. There is no basis for this restraint. Such activity is not even suggested in the complaint. There is not a line of evidence concerning such practice in the record in this case. If there is any such suggestion, it is in records in other cases involving other parties in other courts, records upon which we believe our Brother Harlan erroneously seeks to rely. In fact, the explanation for the appearance of the provisions in this decree appears to be the Michigan court’s verbatim adoption of a Virginia injunction issued in a different case on different pleadings relating to different facts. Decrees between litigants should not rest on any such unsupportable basis as this.
Our Brother Harlan appears to concede that the State Bar has neither alleged nor proved that the Union has engaged in the past, is presently engaging, or plans to engage, in the sharing of legal fees. Nonetheless, he suggests that the injunction against such conduct is justified in order to remove any “temptation” for the Union to participate in such activities. We cannot accept this novel concept of equity jurisdiction that would open the courts to claims for injunctions against “temptation,” and would deem potential “temptation” to be a sufficient basis for the issuance of an injunction. Indeed, it would appear that jurisdiction over “temptation” has heretofore been reserved to the churches.
An injunction can issue only after the plaintiff has established that the conduct sought to be enjoined is illegal and that the defendant, if not enjoined, will engage in such conduct. In Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 262 (1917), this Court struck the portions of a decree enjoining a union from picketing and physical violence because there was no evidence that either of these forms of interference was threatened. Likewise in the present case, with respect to the prohibition against sharing legal fees, the State Bar simply has made no showing that such conduct was threatened. Indeed, it has made no showing at all. Therefore, that provision of the decree, to use an often quoted slogan, would appear to be not only unjustified, but also '‘arbitrary and capricious.”
Fifth. Finally, the challenged decree bars the Union from controlling, directly or indirectly, the fees charged by any lawyer. The complaint alleged that the Union sought to protect its members from excessive legal fees by securing an agreement from the counsel it recommends that the fee will not exceed 25% of the recovery, and that the percentage will include all expenses incidental to investigation and litigation. The Union in its answer admitted that prior to 1959 it secured such agreements for the protection of its members.
United Mine Workers upheld the right of workers to act collectively to obtain affordable and effective legal representation. One of the abuses sought to be remedied by the Mine Workers’ plan was the situation pursuant to which members “were required to pay forty or fifty per cent of the amounts recovered in damage suits, for attorney fees.” 389 U. S., at 219. The Mine Workers dealt with the problem by employing an attorney on a salary basis, thereby providing free legal representation for its members in asserting their claims before the state workmen’s compensation board. The Union in the instant case sought to protect its members against the same abuse by limiting the fee charged by recommended attorneys. It is hard to believe that a court of justice would deny a cooperative union of workers the right to protect its injured members, and their widows and children, from the injustice of excessive fees at the hands of inadequate counsel. Indeed, the Michigan court was foreclosed from so doing by our decision in United Mine Workers.
In the context of this case we deal with a cooperative union of workers seeking to assist its members in effectively asserting claims under the FELA. But the principle here involved cannot be limited to the facts of this case. At issue is the basic right to group legal action, a right first asserted in this Court by an association of Negroes seeking the protection of freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The common thread running through our decisions in NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United Mine Workers is that collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment. However, that right would be a hollow promise if courts could deny associations of workers or others the means of enabling their members to meet the costs of legal representation. That was the holding in United Mine Workers, Trainmen, and NAACP v. Button. The injunction in the present case cannot stand in the face of these prior decisions.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the decision of this case.
On January 1, 1969, after the decree was entered in the court below, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen merged into a newly created union, the United Transportation Union. The successor union is the petitioner in this case.
35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-60.
Section 750.410, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948), in relevant part provides:
“Any person ... or organization of any kind, either incorporated or unincorporated . . . who shall directly or indirectly . . . solicit any person injured as the result of an accident ... for the purpose of representing such person in making claim for damages . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”
The decree entered by the Michigan trial court permanently restrained and enjoined the Union:
“from giving or furnishing legal advice to its members or their families; from informing any lawyer or lawyers that an accident has been suffered by a member or non-member of the said Brotherhood and furnishing the name and address of-such injured or deceased person for the purpose of obtaining legal employment for any lawyer; from stating or suggesting that a recommended lawyer will defray expenses of any kind or make advances for any purpose to such injured persons or their families pending settlement of their claim; from controlling, directly or indirectly, the fees charged or to be charged by any lawyer; from accepting or receiving compensation of any kind, directly or indirectly, for the solicitation of legal employment for any lawyer, whether by way of salary, commission or otherwise; from sharing in any manner in the legal fees of any lawyer or countenancing the splitting of or sharing in such fees with any layman or lay agency; and from sharing in any recovery for personal injury or death by gift, assignment or otherwise.”
383 Mich. 201, 174 N. W. 2d 811.
The decree overturned in United Mine Workers also enjoined the union from: “Giving legal counsel and advice.” 389 U. S., at 218 n. 1. It was conceded in that case that the provision was directed at the Union’s employment of an attorney.
Our Brother HarlaN suggests that the injured member should be free to direct the collected information to whatever lawyer he chooses, rather than for the Union to give it to the Union’s recommended legal counsel. However, the injunction prohibits the Union from furnishing the information to “any lawyer,” apparently including both recommended and nonrecommended counsel alike. The injunction would prohibit the injured member’s attorney, regardless of whether or not he was recommended by the Union, from communicating with the Union’s representative who investigated the accident, is familiar with the facts, and, other than the injured member himself, is probably the person most qualified to answer the attorney’s questions and assist in preparation of the claim. To satisfy the Michigan court’s notion that direct communication between the Union and the member's attorney is somehow unlawful, it seems our Brother HarlaN would restrict the Union’s efforts, which we expressly approved in Trainmen, of assisting the injured member in preparing his case for trial, to a written accident report filed with the injured member.
Mr. Justice Brandéis dissented on the ground that this principle should have been applied to strike the other provisions of the injunction as well. 245 U. S., at 263 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The injunction also bars the Union “from stating or suggesting that & recommended lawyer will defray expenses of any kind or make advances for any purpose to such injured persons or their families pending settlement of their claim.” The only allegation in the complaint possibly relating to this injunctive provision is that the Union representatives informed the injured members that the 25% fee included all expenses. This provision of the injunction, therefore, is invalid for the same reasons that the provision limiting fees is invalid.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Samuels registered under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, and thereafter claimed exemption from military service under § 5 (d) of the Act. That exemption includes not only regular or duly ordained ministers of religion but also “students who are preparing for the ministry in theological or divinity schools recognized as such for more than one year prior” to the Act. He was classified I-A and inducted into the Army. Thereafter he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, seeking release from military custody on the ground that he was entitled to an exemption under § 5 (d) of the Act and that his classification as I-A was unlawful. There was a return and a hearing, and the District Court ordered the writ dismissed. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals, in reliance on United States v. Cain, 149 F. 2d 338, reversed and remanded the cause to the District Court with directions to “discharge” Samuels “from military custody, without prejudice to further lawful proceedings under the Selective Service Act.” 151 F. 2d 801, 802.
The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted in order to resolve the conflict between the decision below and United States v. Hearn, 153 F. 2d 186, in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
First. A question of mootness lies at the threshold of the case presented here. We are advised that after remand of the cause the District Court ordered the release of Samuels and that he was thereupon unconditionally released from military custody. Samuels contends that the case is moot since he'is no longer in custody of the military or of any one else but is free to come and go as he pleases.
Under our decisions the case would be moot if the writ of habeas corpus had been denied below and, pending disposition of the petition here, Samuels had received a discharge from the army. Zimmerman v. Walker, 319 U. S. 744. And see Weber v. Squier, 315 U. S. 810; Tornello v. Hudspeth, 318 U. S. 792. That situation, like the case of a prisoner who, pending an appeal from denial of a writ of habeas corpus, is granted bail, Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U. S. 245; Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564, 572-574, would present no existing controversy. Habeas corpus is the means of making a judicial “inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty.” R. S. § 752, 28 U. S. C. § 452. As stated in McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131, 137, “There is no warrant in either the statute or the writ for its use to invoke judicial determination of questions which could not affect the lawfulness of the custody and detention.” If the custody or restraint of liberty is terminated without use of the writ, the case is finished. Different considerations are brought into play if custody is ended through the writ itself.
Our rules recognize the beneficent function of the writ, Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 26-27; People v. Jennings, 246 N. Y. 258, 158 N. E. 613, by providing that a prisoner to whom the writ has been granted may, pending appeal, be enlarged on a recognizance. Rule 45. The fact that he has been so enlarged does not render the appeal of the custodian moot. Carr v. Zaja, 283 U. S. 52, 53. In such a case the release is obtained through the assertion of judicial power. It is the propriety of the exercise of that power which is in issue in the appellate court, whether the prisoner is discharged or remanded to custody. Though the writ has been granted and the prisoner released, the appellate court by what it does is not rendering an opinion and issuing an order which cannot affect the litigants in the case before it. Cf. St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U. S. 41, 42, and cases cited. Affirmance makes the prisoner’s release final and unconditional. Reversal undoes what the habeas corpus court did and makes lawful a resumption of the custody. Knewel v. Egan, 268 U. S. 442, 448; Haddox v. Richardson, 168 F. 635; James v. Amrine, 157 Kan. 397, 140 P. 2d 362; State v. Langum, 135 Minn. 320, 160 N. W. 858.
Second. On the merits the case involves primarily the use by the Selective Service System in New York City of advisory panels on theological classifications. Under the Act the President is authorized to establish “civilian local boards, civilian appeal boards, and such other agencies, including agencies of appeal, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.” Section 10 (a) (2), 57 Stat. 597, 598, 50 U. S. C. App. Supp. III, § 310 (a) (2). With exceptions not material here, the President is authorized to delegate to the Director of Selective Service any authority vested in him under the Act. Section 10 (b), 57 Stat. 597, 598, 50 U. S. C. App. Supp. III, §310 (b). And the Director may redelegate that authority. Id. The administration of the system in each State is delegated under the regulations to a state director. Sections 603.11, 603.12, 6 Fed. Reg. 6827. In New York City, however, a city director has been appointed who performs within that area the functions of the state director. Section 603.12-1, 8 Fed. Reg. 3514. The city director supervises the local boards and boards of appeal in New York City. He may require a local board to reopen and consider anew the classification of a registrant. Section 626.2 (b), 9 Fed. Reg. 11619, § 626.2-1, 10 Fed. Reg. 9210. He may appeal to a board of appeal any determination of a local board. Section 627.1, 8 Fed. Reg. 16720,10 Fed. Reg. 9210. He may require a board of appeal to reconsider its decision, § 627.61, 8 Fed. Reg. 6017, or appeal from it to the President. Section 628.1,7 Fed. Reg. 10521.
It appears that the city director, in aid of these functions, established theological panels. It was thought desirable to give the selective service personnel the benefit of the advice of those familiar with the educational practices of various religious groups so that Selective Service might exercise a more informed judgment in evaluating claims to classifications in IV-D. Accordingly, theological panels were constituted, one of which consisted of prominent laymen and rabbis of the Jewish faith who gave advisory opinions on those who sought a IV-D classification on the grounds that they were either rabbis or students preparing for the ministry in the Jewish religion. The members of the panel were volunteers, as permitted by the regulations. Section 602.2, 6 Fed. Reg. 6826. And pursuant to the regulations each took the oath of office. Section 602.4 (a), 6 Fed. Reg. 6826.
Samuels registered under the Act in February, 1942. In May and July, 1942, he filed with his local board questionnaires stating that he had had two years of high school education; that he was a student at the Mesifta Theological Seminary preparing for the rabbinate; that since 1940 his regular occupation was that of a clerk; that for the past two years he had been employed by a textile company; and that the job for which he was best fitted was that of a spiritual leader and a teacher of Hebrew or rabbinical duties. The local board was advised by the seminary that Samuels had attended there since he was six years old, that he had finished the eight-year elementary course and the four-year pre-rabbinical course, that he had been admitted to the rabbinical division in 1937, that he left the school in 1939 to seek employment, that he returned to the evening school in September, 1941, and that he was transferred to the day session in July, 1942, which, as later appeared, was a few days before the school closed for the summer.
In August, 1942, the local board classified him IV-D. Section 622.44 (a), 6 Fed. Reg. 6607, 6610. In May, 1944, he was given a physical examination and found acceptable for military service. Thereafter the city director requested that he appear before the theological panel in respect to his claim to a IV-D classification. He appeared before the panel in June, 1944, stating, inter alia, that he expected to graduate from the seminary in 1945, that ill health caused him to leave the school in 1939, that between 1940 and 1942 he worked as a clerk, and that he returned to the seminary as a full-time student at about the time he filed his selective service questionnaire.
The panel reported that the seminary which Samuels attended was not preparing men exclusively for the rabbinate, that orthodox tradition encouraged advanced study of the subjects in which students for the ministry were trained, and that students ultimately intending to enter business or a profession or some non-rabbinic activity in the field of religion may be enrolled in the same classes as those preparing for the rabbinate. The panel stated that it therefore seemed essential to determine in each case what the registrant had in mind in pursuing his course of study; that to make that determination the character of the seminary, the sincerity of the registrant’s declared purpose, his demeanor, and the impression as to his candor and honesty should be considered. It concluded that Samuels was not “preparing in good faith for a career of service in the practicing rabbinate.” Its recommendation and the transcript of the hearing before it were sent to the city director who forwarded them to the local board with a request that Samuels’ classification be reopened and with the statement that “while the Local Board should give careful consideration to the recommendation of the advisory panel, the responsibility of determining the registrant’s classification must rest with the Local Board itself, or the appropriate agency of appeal.”
The local board reclassified Samuels I-A in August, 1944. He submitted additional evidence and requested a hearing. One was had in September, 1944 and another in October, 1944. There is no showing that the recommendation of the panel or the transcript of the hearing before it was kept from Samuels. They were not marked confidential in the file. The local board, indeed, allowed Samuels to correct alleged inaccuracies in the transcript. The local board ordered him continued in I-A and, on appeal, the board of appeal also classified him as I-A. A few days later Samuels filed additional information with the local board and requested that his classification be reopened. Another hearing was held, Samuels being present. He advised the board that he had appeared of his own volition before a committee representing the Union of Orthodox Rabbis (but not connected with the selective service system) and that the committee concluded he was a student preparing in good faith for the ministry. What facts that committee may have acted upon do not appear. In any event, the local board denied Samuels’ request to reopen the classification by a divided vote; and shortly thereafter he was inducted into the army.
Congress made the decisions of the local boards and of the boards of appeal “final,” except as appeals from them may be authorized, § 10 (a) (2), withholding from the courts the customary power of review of administrative action. See Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114.
It is elementary that habeas corpus may not be used as a writ of error. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131; Woolsey v. Best, 299 U. S. 1. The function of habeas corpus is exhausted when it is ascertained that the agency under whose order the petitioner is being held had jurisdiction to act. If the writ is to issue, mere error in the proceeding which resulted in the detention is not sufficient. Tisi v. Tod, supra. Deprivation of petitioner of basic and fundamental procedural safeguards, an assertion of power to act beyond the authority granted the agency, and action without evidence to support its order, are familiar examples of the showing which is necessary. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 149. But it is not enough to show that the decision was wrong, Tisi v. Tod, supra, or that incompetent evidence was admitted and considered. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103. If it cannot be said that there were procedural irregularities of such a nature or magnitude as to render the hearing unfair, Bridges v. Wixon, supra, p. 156, or that there was no evidence to support the order, Vajtauer v. Commissioner, supra, the inquiry is at an end.
We do not think that the use of the theological panel per se infected the whole administrative proceeding and rendered it so unfair as to be nugatory. The task of the local boards in evaluating claims to exemption is almost certain to raise perplexing problems, especially in large centers where the status and activities of registrants are not so well known in the community. The local boards will frequently have to make inquiries on their own. And when it comes to exemptions claimed under § 5 (d), the variety of religious faiths and the differing educational practices of the churches or of sects within one faith may create difficult questions for the boards.
We agree with the court in United States v. Hearn, supra, p. 188, that advice from well-informed members of the faith in question may “both help and speed just classification.” Congress wrote into the Act a comparable procedure for the handling of claims for exemtion by conscientious objectors. Where such claims are denied by the local board and appealed, they are referred to the Department of Justice for a hearing and an advisory report. Section 5 (g). But the fact that there is no specific statutory provision for the creation of theological panels does not make their use improper. Wise administration may call for the expert advice which they alone can offer. And we see no difference in principle if they are formally constituted and regularly used in lieu of inquiry to members of the particular faith as individual cases arise. The administrative function entrusted to the Selective Service is an enormous one. The Act contemplates an administrative organization highly decentralized so as to operate effectively at the local level. More than the director, local boards, and boards of appeal were authorized. For § 10 (a) (2), as we have noted, authorized the creation of “other agencies” as well. A theological advisory panel, serving solely in an advisory capacity, would seem to be included in that category. The information received by the board from the panel, like information from any other source, must be put in writing in the file so that the registrant may examine it, explain or correct it, or deny it. There is, moreover, no confidential information which can be kept from the registrant under the regulations. With those safeguards a truly expert panel might serve a most useful function without the administrative process being corrupted by any unfair procedure.
Distinct questions would be raised if a registrant of one faith were referred to a theological panel on which his faith was not represented. See United States v. Balogh, 157 F. 2d 939. But it has not been shown that such a condition obtained here.
The court in United States v. Cain, supra, p. 341, held that though the propriety of the use of a theological panel be assumed, it must be limited by two conditions: the names of the members of the panel must be disclosed to the registrant so that he may be in a position to challenge it; the advice or answers which it gives must be limited to ecclesiastical questions.
In the statement which the panel filed in this case the names are not disclosed. But we, do not think that fact rendered the administrative proceedings invalid per se. This is not a case of a registrant being passed upon by a secret group. He appeared before them, saw them face to face, and indeed recognized one of them. There is no showing that Samuels tried to ascertain who the panel members were, either at the time or subsequently, and was denied the information. Though we assume that the regulations require the file to disclose the names and affiliations of the panel members, the mere absence of a formal disclosure is not, without more, so grave an omission as to undermine the whole administrative proceeding.
The question is not whether the allegations of the petition are sufficient to justify the grant of the writ or the issuance of a rule to show cause, so that the facts can be ascertained in accord with the procedure outlined in Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275. In this case there was a return to the writ, a full hearing was had, and all evidence offered was received. Samuels had the burden of showing that he was unlawfully detained. Walker v. Johnston, supra. Not every procedural error, but only those so flagrant as to result in an unfair hearing render the proceedings vulnerable in a collateral attack. Tisi v. Tod, supra, p. 133; Bridges v. Wixon, supra, pp. 152-156. On the case Samuels has made out, the most that has been shown is that the use of the theological panel might result in a hearing so unfair as to deprive the administrative proceedings of vitality. Samuels has failed to show that in his case it had that effect. He has therefore failed to sustain the burden of proof which was on him.
Secrecy and anonymity are not congenial to our traditions of procedure, nor in keeping with the regulations under this Act. But as we have said, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is limited. We are not sitting in review of action of federal agencies over which we have the power of supervision. Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332. The function of habeas corpus is not to correct a practice but only to ascertain whether the procedure complained of has resulted in an unlawful detention. It is the impact of the procedure on the person seeking the writ that is crucial. Whatever potentialities of abuse a particular procedure may have, the case is at an end if the challenged proceeding cannot be said to have been so corrupted as to have made it unfair. Samuels points to possibilities of abuse. But he fails to establish prejudice in his case.
If, as was held in United States v. Cain, supra, the panel must be restricted to answering ecclesiastical questions, Samuels should prevail. For the panel in question not only gave the board information concerning the seminary which Samuels-attended but also rendered an advisory opinion on the bona fides of his claim. The argument for restricting the panel to ecclesiastical questions is based on the thought that it is only on such subjects that the board needs specialized information, while if the board relies on a general advisory opinion of the panel, it is devolving its administrative responsibility. See United States v. Cain, supra, pp. 341-342.
It is plain that the local boards and the boards of appeal may not abdicate their duty by delegating to others the responsibility for making classifications. That is their statutory function. Section 10 (a) (2). But no such case is made out in this record. The city director submitted the panel’s report with the admonition that it was advisory only and that it was the board’s responsibility to make the classification. The recommendation of the panel was followed. But Samuels was subsequently given not only one but two hearings before the local board and a hearing before the board of appeal. There is no indication that either board relied solely on the panel’s report or considered itself bound by it. In fact both boards received additional evidence submitted by Samuels and considered it. The record does not bear out the suggestion that either board was a rubber stamp for the panel.
Nor do we think that the range of inquiry and recommendation of the panel was too broad. If a panel is truly expert in the field, its expertness is not necessarily limited to knowledge of the theological schools, the course of training, and the educational practices and traditions. Its acquaintance with the ministry of that faith and with the norms of the profession may well give it special insight into the claims of those seeking exemption. To draw the line at questions technically ecclesiastical is to make a distinction which may be wholly arbitrary in terms of the panel’s expertness. A panel might act on irrelevancies; it might usurp the functions of a board. We discover nothing of the kind here. The fact that the board follows the advice of the panel does not necessarily mean that it functions in a subservient way. The fact is that the local board and the board of appeal gave Samuels further hearings and received and considered all evidence submitted. We find no procedural error of such magnitude as to warrant an uprooting of the entire administrative proceeding in this collateral attack upon it.
Nor can we say there was no evidence to support the final classification made by the board of appeal. Samuels’ statement that he was best fitted to be a Hebrew school teacher and spiritual leader, the two-year interruption in his education, his return to the day session of the seminary in the month when his selective service questionnaire was returned, and the fact that the seminary in question was apparently not preparing men exclusively for the rabbinate make questionable his claim that he was preparing in good faith for the rabbinate. A registrant might seek a theological school as a refuge for the duration of the war. Congress did not create the exemption in § 5 (d) for him. There was some evidence that this was Samuels’ plan; and that evidence, coupled with his demeanor and attitude, might have seemed more persuasive to the boards than it does in the cold record. Our inquiry is ended when we are unable to say that the board flouted the command of Congress in denying Samuels the exemption.
Reversed.
54 Stat. 885, 55 Stat. 211, 621, 845, 56 Stat. 386, 50 U. S. C. App., 50 U. S. C. App. Supp. I, and 50 U. S. C. App. Supp. II, § 301 et seq.
Our citations of the Act and the regulations throughout the opinion refer to the provisions applicable at the times relevant here.
In that case Mr. Justice Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, said, “It would be intolerable that a custodian adjudged to be at fault, placed by the judgment of the court in the position of a wrongdoer, should automatically, by a mere notice of appeal, prolong the term of imprisonment, and frustrate the operation of the historic writ of liberty.” 246 N. Y. p. 260, 158 N. E. 613.
It appears from the briefs in that case that after the writ had issued in the lower court the petitioner had been discharged, pending appeal, on a recognizance.
The regulations provide that in classifying a registrant, “Oral information should not be considered unless it is summarized in writing and the summary placed in the registrant’s file. Under no circumstances should the local board rely upon information received by a member personally unless such information is reduced to writing and placed in the registrant’s file.” Section 623.2, 9 Fed. Reg. 437, 10 Fed. Reg. 8541.
See § 605.32 (a), 9 Fed. Reg. 9190.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case the United States challenges the treatment given to its claim for unpaid taxes against an insolvent corporation in reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. §§ 501-676. Under the reorganization plan approved by the District Court, the debtor, Hancock Trucking, Inc., will sell its chief asset, its Interstate Commerce Commission operating rights, to Hennis Freight Lines, Inc., for $935,000. The sale contract provides for a $300,000 down payment, with the balance to be paid in 78 monthly installments. Under the reorganization plan, the down payment will be used to satisfy certain wage and state and local tax claims in full, to satisfy 20% of the claims of the unsecured creditors, and to satisfy about 10% of the United States’ tax claim of $375,386.55. The remainder of the United States’ claim will be paid out of the monthly installments. The plan, an atypical one for a corporate reorganization, does not contemplate the continued existence of the debtor as a going concern, but amounts in substance to a liquidation.
The United States objects to that aspect of the plan that provides for partial or complete payment of the claims of unsecured creditors and state and local government units before full payment of the federal tax claims. This, the Government urges, violates the command of § 3466 of the Revised Statutes, 31 U. S. C. § 191, that “[w]henever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent . . . the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied.” Respondent urges that § 3466 does not apply to Chapter X proceedings, but that the United States is entitled only to “payment” of its tax claim, as provided by § 199 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 599.
The Court of Appeals accepted respondent’s theory, and affirmed the order of the District Court approving the plan. 407 F. 2d 635 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1969). We granted certiorari, 396 U. S. 874 (1969), and we reverse.
Since the earliest days of the Republic, § 3466 and its predecessors have given the Government priority over all other claimants in collecting debts due it from insolvent debtors. The present statute has existed almost unchanged since 1797, and its historical roots reach back to the similar priority of the Crown in England, an aspect of the royal prerogative, founded upon a policy of protecting the public revenues. The same policy underlies the federal statute, United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 6 Pet. 29, 35 (1832), and it is established that the terms of § 3466 are to be liberally construed to achieve this broad purpose. Beaston v. Farmers’ Bank, 12 Pet. 102, 134 (1838); Bramwell v. United States Fidelity Co., 269 U. S. 483, 487 (1926).
Section 3466 applies literally to the situation here. The debtor is concededly insolvent, and it is established that a tax debt is a “debt due to the United States” within the meaning of the statute. Price v. United States, 269 U. S. 492, 499 (1926). No provision of Chapter X explicitly excepts corporate debtors in reorganization from the application of § 3466, and so the only remaining question is whether the legislative scheme established in Chapter X, either by logical inconsistency or other manifestation, of congressional intent, implies such an exception.
In approaching a claim of an implied exception to § 3466, we start with the principle, noted above, that the statute must be given a liberal construction consonant with the public policy underlying it. Applying that principle to an earlier claim that a statutory scheme implicitly excluded § 3466, this Court held that “[o]nly the plainest inconsistency would warrant our finding an implied exception to the operation of so clear a command as that of § 3466.” United States v. Emory, 314 U. S. 423, 433 (1941).
Here the Court of Appeals discerned an intent not to apply § 3466 to Chapter X proceedings from § 199 of the Bankruptcy Act, which forbids the approval of any reorganization plan which does not provide for the “payment” of taxes or customs due to the United States, unless the Secretary of the Treasury accepts “a lesser amount.” The Court of Appeals further supported its inference of exclusionary intent from §§ 216 (7) and 221 of the Act, 11 U. S. C. §§ 616 (7) and 621. Section 216 (7) provides that where a class of creditors dissents from a reorganization plan, the District Court shall provide “adequate protection for the realization by them of the value of their claims against the property” in any of four ways, the last and most general of which is by “such method as will, under and consistent with the circumstances of the particular case, equitably and fairly provide such protection.” Section 221 merely sums up the applicable tests for a valid reorganization plan by providing that “[t]he judge shall confirm a plan if satisfied that” § 199 has been complied with and that “the plan is fair and equitable, and feasible.”
The Court of Appeals reasoned from these provisions to the implied exclusion of the operation of § 3466 as follows:
“Within Chapter X, §§199, 216 and 221 are inter-related statutes and part of a studied statutory plan. Section 199 outlines the nature of the government’s tax claim 'priority,’ and the two other sections establish an equitable standard to govern the method of payment. If, as the government would have us hold, § 3466 creates an absolute right to first payment in addition to full payment, there would be little need for §§ 199, 216 (7) and 221. These sections apply specifically to Chapter X proceedings and should control over the more general and conflicting direction of § 3466.” 407 F. 2d, at 638.
In our view these provisions are not logically inconsistent with the terms of § 3466, nor would they be rendered redundant if the older statute applied, nor does their language or legislative history reveal a purpose incongruous with its application.
In the first place, § 216 (7) has nothing to do with the priorities of different classes of claimants under Chapter X. That section merely provides that where an affected class of creditors (and here the United States itself constitutes the whole of such a class) dissents from a plan, their claims are to be dealt with in one of the four ways specified, one of which is that those claims must be disposed of “equitably and fairly.”
This Court has long held that these words, along with the words “fair and equitable” in § 221, in no way authorize a District Court to ignore or erode priorities otherwise granted by law, and it follows that this language cannot be taken to exclude by implication an explicit statutory priority, such as that granted the United States by § 3466. In short, the words “fair and equitable” in Chapter X are terms of art, and no plan can be “fair and equitable” which compromises the rights of senior creditors in order to protect junior creditors. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U. S. 106, 115-116 (1939); Consolidated Rock Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510, 527-529 (1941).
We turn then to the argument upon which respondent chiefly relies for his claim that § 3466 does not reach to Chapter X proceedings — the alleged inconsistency between application of the “first satisfied” requirement and the terms and purposes of § 199. As already noted, § 199 provides that the United States shall have “payment” of its tax claims in Chapter X proceedings unless the Secretary of the Treasury accepts “a lesser amount.” Respondent argues and the Court of Appeals held that this establishes by negative implication that Congress did not mean the United States to be able to insist upon the more onerous remedy of payment first in time.
As a matter of logic, we see no inconsistency between a requirement of payment and a requirement of first satisfaction. Congress surely could have provided that the United States receive payment out of a limited fund at the expense of other claimants, and quite consistently provided that when the wherewithal to make such payment became available in installments over time the United States should also have the right to claim the first of those installments and each succeeding one until its debt was satisfied. Separate provisions to this effect in the same statute could certainly be read in harmony with each other, and there is no reason why § 3466 should not be read to supplement the requirement of payment contained in § 199 in the same fashion.
Nor is § 199 redundant if § 3466 applies in Chapter X proceedings on the ground that a requirement of first satisfaction necessarily implies a requirement of payment. Section 3466 applies only to insolvent debtors. Yet Chapter X proceedings are not open merely to corporations that are insolvent, in that their liabilities exceed their assets, but also to those that are solvent in the bankruptcy or asset-liability sense and yet are unable to meet their obligations as they mature. Bankruptcy Act § 130 (1), 11 U. S. C. § 530 (1). Thus § 199 does not merely give the Government rights already granted by implication in § 3466, but extends the Government’s priority, for tax claims at least, to solvent corporations in Chapter X reorganization.
Thus, on the face of the statute, no inconsistency arises from applying both § 3466 and § 199 to Chapter X proceedings, much less the “plain inconsistency” required if respondent is to prevail under the test of United States v. Emory, supra. That in itself strongly suggests that § 3466 should apply here, and our examination of the background and legislative history of § 199 and of Chapter X generally does not reveal a contrary intent on the part of Congress.
Before the reorganization legislation of the 1930’s, the principal method of reorganizing corporations that were unable to meet their debts was the equity receivership. This judge-made device was designed to preserve the debtor business as a going concern by cancelling claims against it, in return for which cancellation the claimants received debt or equity interests in a new corporation, which then acquired the assets of the old corporation in a judicial sale. See T. Finletter, The Law of Bankruptcy Reorganization 1-17 (1939). By 1926, it was established that § 3466 applied to give the United States an absolute priority for payment of debts due it from insolvent corporations in equity receivership. Price v. United States, 269 U. S., at 502-503; and see Blair, The Priority of the United States in Equity Receiverships, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1925).
In 1933, Congress enacted § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 47 Stat. 1474, providing a statutory procedure for the reorganization of railroads. Section 77, as well as later corporate reorganization statutes discussed below, was designed to follow the general format of the equity receivership. As one of the early commentators on the federal statutes has noted, “[t]he principles of the equity receivership underlie nearly every substantive provision of the [reorganization acts].” Finletter, supra, at 3. These statutes were not, of course, mere codifications of the law governing equity receiverships. They were designed in part to correct abuses and inefficiencies that had existed under the prior regime. Duparquet Co. v. Evans, 297 U. S. 216, 218-219 (1936). However, the problems of the equity receivership that led to the legislative intervention did not include the Government’s priority under § 3466, a relatively uncontroversial aspect of the receivership procedure.
Nothing in § 77 casts any doubt on the continued priority of the United States under § 3466. Indeed the only provision in the new statute affecting the claims of the United States was § 77(e), which provided in pertinent part:
“If the United States of America is directly a creditor or stockholder, the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to accept or reject a plan in respect of the interests or claims of the United States.” 47 Stat. 1478.
The purpose of this provision was to overcome the effect of two prior rulings of the Attorney General that the Secretary of the Treasury lacked authority to compromise claims of indebtedness owed to the Government by the railroads, 33 Op. Atty. Gen. 423 (1923), 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 108 (1924).
In 1934, Congress enacted § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 Stat. 911, which provided a reorganization scheme for corporations generally, closely modeled on the railroad reorganization scheme of § 77; § 77B (e) (1) granted the Secretary of the Treasury power to compromise federal claims, in language almost identical with that of § 77 (e). 48 Stat. 918. There is no language in the statute, and nothing in its history, to suggest any intention to alter the established priority of the United States under § 3466.
In 1935, the Secretary of the Treasury called the attention of Congress to the fact that the courts were construing § 77B (e)(1) to include the United States among the general creditors in reorganization proceedings, so that plans disapproved by the Secretary for failure to satisfy a federal claim could nevertheless be confirmed if the necessary majority of general creditors approved. S. Rep. No. 953, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). The Secretary proposed an amendment, which, after some weakening in the House, see S. Rep. No. 1386, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), was adopted. 49 Stat. 966 (1935). In its relevant provisions, the amendment was identical with present § 199, and the 1938 revisions which culminated in the replacement of § 77B by present Chapter X did not affect it.
Thus § 199 is derived from an enactment designed to grant the Government the power to compromise its claims against debtors, and an amendment designed to ensure priority for federal claims over the claims of general creditors. Nothing in this background lends any support to respondent’s claim that the draftsmen of Chapter X meant to provide an exception to the operation of § 3466 for reorganization proceedings under the new statute. Indeed the established practice of applying § 3466 to equity receiverships, the acknowledged predecessor of the Chapter X proceeding, combined with the failure to indicate in any way an intent to alter that practice in the new statutes, supports the conclusion that Congress affirmatively meant § 3466 to' apply to statutory reorganization.
As we noted at the outset, § 3466 must apply according to its terms except where expressly superseded, or where excluded by a later enactment “plainly inconsistent” with it. Here the statute literally applies, and no plain inconsistency with the scheme of Chapter X appears. The terms of § 3466 are clearly not satisfied by the reorganization plan here in question, which provides payment in part to general creditors and other nonpre-ferred claimants before satisfaction of the federal tax claim. Therefore the judgment upholding the plan must be reversed, and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
See, e. g., Act of July 31, 1789, § 21, 1 Stat. 42; Act of August 4,1790, § 45,1 Stat. 169.
See Act of March 3, 1797, § 5, 1 Stat. 515, as amended by Act of March 2, 1799, § 65, 1 Stat. 676.
See 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, §74 (1541); 13 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (1570).
Section 199 provides:
“If the United States is a secured or unsecured creditor or stockholder of a debtor, the claims or stock thereof shall be deemed to be affected by a plan under this chapter, and the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to accept or reject a plan in respect of the claims or stock of the United States. If, in any proceeding under this chapter, the United States is a secured or unsecured creditor on claims for taxes or customs duties (whether or not the United States has any other interest in, or claim against the debtor, as secured or unsecured creditor or stockholder), no plan which does not provide for the payment thereof shall be confirmed by the judge except upon the acceptance of a lesser amount by the Secretary of the Treasury certified to the court: Provided, That if the Secretary of the Treasury shall fail to accept or reject a plan for more than ninety days after receipt of written notice so to do from the court to which the plan has been proposed, accompanied by a certified copy of the plan, his consent shall be conclusively presumed.” 11 U. S. C. § 599.
The Government argues in the alternative that even if § 3466 does not apply to claims against debtors in Chapter X, the plan here is defective even under the § 199 requirement of “payment” alone, since the deferment of payment of the Government’s tax claim while the cash flow from the installment contract is used to satisfy the claims of lower ranking creditors means that the Government is receiving a “lesser amount,” which § 199 in its terms contrasts with “payment,” than what it would receive if it had first claim on all cash as it came in. The argument is premised on the fact that the Government cannot collect post-petition interest on its claim. City of New York v. Saper, 336 U. S. 328 (1949); United States v. Edens, 189 F. 2d 876 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1951), aff’d per curiam, 342 U. S. 912 (1952). Because of our determination that § 3466 applies here and requires payment first in time, we need not reach this contention.
In the normal Chapter X reorganization no provision need be made for priority in time of different claims. Claimants receive debt or equity interests in a going concern in the usual situation, and the priority of one claimant over another means only that if there is insufficient going-concern value to satisfy both claims, the claimant with priority must receive value equivalent to his full claim if the other claimant is to receive anything. Here a second sense of priority is involved: when cash becomes available to pay off outstanding claims only over a period of time, the claimant with “priority” in this second sense receives his cash first in time; the nonpriority claimant may receive full payment, but receives it later. In its literal language — “first satisfied” — § 3466 provides this kind of priority, and respondent has not argued that it should not be so construed if it applies here.
It seems to § 3466 meant insolvent in the bankruptcy sense, and this Court clearly so held in United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U. S. 253, 260-261 (1923).
See Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Criticisms and Suggestions Relating to H. R. 14359 and S. 5551, Amending the Bankruptcy Act 19-20, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print. 1933).
The Secretary had proposed that he be given a veto over plans that failed to provide for “payment” of any federal claim. See S. Rep. No. 953, supra. The House imposed the “payment” requirement only upon tax and customs claims, possibly intending to leave the Government in the position of a general creditor with respect to other claims, see S. Rep. No. 1386, supra, and this was the form in which the amendment was adopted. Section 199 preserves this apparent distinction between tax and other claims, see text at n. 4, supra. However the courts, relying on the strong presumption against implied exceptions to § 3466, have not treated the Government as a general creditor in its nontax claims, but rather have held that it has priority under § 3466. United States v. Anderson, 334 F. 2d 111 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1964); In re Cherry Valley Homes, Inc., 255 F. 2d 706 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1958); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Flynn, 175 F. 2d 761 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1949).
If, as appears from the present case, § 3466, if applicable, may, in some instances, give the Government .greater protection than § 199, it would be anomalous to deny that protection to Government tax claims while granting it to nontax claims, since Congress clearly intended that tax claims should have greater protection.
The leading authorities agree that § 3466 applies to Chapter X proceedings. Finletter, supra, at 388-393; 6A Collier on Bankruptcy 269 n. 11 (14th ed. 1969).
This case does not raise the question, never decided by this Court, whether § 3466 grants the Government priority over the prior specific liens of secured creditors. See United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361, 365-366 (1953).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Officials of the Bureau of Land Management stand accused of harassment and intimidation aimed at extracting an easement across private property. The questions here are whether the landowner has either a private action for damages of the sort recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), or a claim against the officials in their individual capacities under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV). We hold that neither action is available.
I
A
Plaintiff-respondent Frank Robbins owns and operates the High Island Ranch, a commercial guest resort in Hot Springs County, Wyoming, stretching across some 40 miles of territory. The ranch is a patchwork of mostly contiguous land parcels intermingled with tracts belonging to other private owners, the State of Wyoming, and the National Government. Its natural resources include wildlife and mineral deposits, and its mountainous western portion, called the upper Rock Creek area, is a place of great natural beauty. In response to persistent requests by environmentalists and outdoor enthusiasts, the Bureau tried to induce the ranch’s previous owner, George Nelson, to grant an easement for publie use over South Fork Owl Creek Road, which runs through the ranch and serves as a main route to the upper Rock Creek area. For a while, Nelson refused from fear that the public would disrupt his guests’ activities, but shortly after agreeing to sell the property to Robbins, in March 1994, Nelson signed a nonexclusive deed of easement giving the United States the right to use and maintain the road along a stretch of his property. In return, the Bureau agreed to rent Nelson a right-of-way to maintain a different section of the road as it runs across federal property and connects otherwise isolated parts of Robbins’s holdings.
In May 1994, Nelson conveyed the ranch to Robbins, who continued to graze cattle and run guest cattle drives in reliance on grazing permits and a Special Recreation Use Permit (SRUP) issued by the Bureau. But Robbins knew nothing about Nelson’s grant of the easement across South Fork Owl Creek Road, which the Bureau had failed to record, and upon recording his warranty deed in Hot Springs County, Robbins took title to the ranch free of the easement, by operation of Wyoming law. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. -§34-1-120 (2005).
When the Bureau’s employee Joseph Vessels discovered, in June 1994, that the Bureau’s inaction had cost it the easement, he telephoned Robbins and demanded an easement to replace Nelson’s. Robbins refused but indicated he would consider granting one in return for something. In a later meeting, Vessels allegedly told Robbins that “‘the Federal Government does not negotiate,’” and talks broke down. Brief for Respondent 5. Robbins says that over the next several years the defendant-petitioners (hereinafter defendants), who are current and former employees of the Bureau, carried on a campaign of harassment and intimidation aimed at forcing him to regrant the lost easement.
B
Robbins concedes that any single one of the offensive and sometimes illegal actions by the Bureau’s officials might have been brushed aside as a small imposition, but says that in the aggregate the campaign against him amounted to coercion to extract the easement and should be redressed collectively. The substance of Robbins’s claim, and the degree to which existing remedies available to him were adequate, can be understood and assessed only by getting down to the details, which add up to a long recitation.
In the summer of 1994, after the fruitless telephone conversation in June, Vessels wrote to Robbins for permission to survey his land in the area of the desired easement. Robbins said no, that it would be a waste of time for the Bureau to do a survey without first reaching agreement with him. Vessels went ahead with a survey anyway, trespassed on Robbins’s land, and later boasted about it to Robbins. Not surprisingly, given the lack of damage to his property, Robbins did not file a trespass complaint in response.
Mutual animosity grew, however, and one Bureau employee, Edward Parodi, was told by his superiors to “look closer” and “investigate harder” for possible trespasses and other permit violations by Robbins. App. 128-129. Parodi also heard colleagues make certain disparaging remarks about Robbins, such as referring to him as “the rich SOB from Alabama [who] got [the Ranch].” Id., at 121. Parodi became convinced that the Bureau had mistreated Robbins and described its conduct as “the volcanic point” in his decision to retire. Id., at 133.
Vessels and his supervisor, defendant Charles Wilkie, continued to demand the easement, under threat to cancel the reciprocal maintenance right-of-way that Nelson had negotiated. When Robbins would not budge, the Bureau canceled the right-of-way, citing Robbins’s refusal to grant the desired easement and failure even to pay the rental fee. Robbins did not appeal the cancellation to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) or seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 702.
In August 1995, Robbins brought his cattle to a water source on property belonging to his neighbor, LaVonne Pennoyer. An altercation ensued, and Pennoyer struck Robbins with her truck while he was riding a horse. PlaintiffAppellee’s Supp. App. in No. 04-8016 (CA10), pp. 676-681 (hereinafter CA10 App.); 9 Record, PI. Exh. 2, pp. 164-166; 10 id., PI. Exh. 35a, at 102-108. Defendant Gene Leone fielded a call from Pennoyer regarding the incident, encouraged her to contact the sheriff, and himself placed calls to the sheriff suggesting that Robbins be charged with trespass. After the incident, Parodi claims that Leone told him: “ ‘I think I finally got a way to get [Robbins’s] permits and get him out of business.’” App. 125,126.
In October 1995, the Bureau claimed various permit violations and changed the High Island Ranch’s 5-year SRUP to a SRUP subject to annual renewal. According to Robbins, losing the 5-year SRUP disrupted his guest ranching business, owing to the resulting uncertainty about permission to conduct cattle drives. Robbins declined to seek administrative review, however, in part because Bureau officials told him that the process would be lengthy and that his permit would be suspended until the IBLA reached a decision.
Beginning in 1996, defendants brought administrative charges against Robbins for trespass and other land-use violations. Robbins claimed some charges were false, and others unfairly selective enforcement, and he took all of them to be an effort to retaliate for refusing the Bureau’s continuing demands for the easement. He contested a number of these charges, but not all of them, administratively.
In the spring of 1997, the South Fork Owl Greek Road, the only way to reach the portions of the ranch in the Rock Creek area, became impassable. When the Bureau refused to repair the section of road across federal land, Robbins took matters into his own hands and fixed the public road himself, even though the Bureau had refused permission. The Bureau fined Robbins for trespass, but offered to settle the charge and entertain an application to renew the old maintenance right-of-way. Instead, Robbins appealed to the IBLA, which found that Robbins had admitted the unauthorized repairs when he sent the Bureau a bill for reimbursement. The Board upheld the fine, In re Robbins, 146 I. B. L. A. 213 (1998), and rejected Robbins’s claim that the Bureau was trying to “ ‘blackmail’ ” him into providing the easement; it said that “[t]he record effectively shows... intransigence was the tactic of Robbins, not [the] BLM.” Id., at 219. Robbins did not seek judicial review of the IBLA’s decision.
In July 1997, defendant Teryl Shryack and a colleague entered Robbins’s property, claiming the terms of a fence easement as authority. Robbins accused Shryack of unlawful entry, tore up the written instrument, and ordered her off his property. Later that month, after a meeting about trespass issues with Bureau officials, Michael Miller, a Bureau law enforcement officer, questioned Robbins without advance notice and without counsel about the incident with Shryack. The upshot was a charge with two counts of knowingly and forcibly impeding and interfering with a federal employee, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 111 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), a crime with a penalty of up to one year in prison. A jury acquitted Robbins in December, after deliberating less than 30 minutes. United States v. Robbins, 179 F. 3d 1268, 1269 (CA10 1999). According to a news story, the jurors “were appalled at the actions of the government” and one said that “Robbins could not have been railroaded any worse... if he worked for the Union Pacific.” CA10 App. 852. Robbins then moved for attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment, § 617, 111 Stat. 2519, note following 18 U. S. C. §3006A, arguing that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith. The trial judge denied the motion, and Robbins appealed too late. See 179 F. 3d, at 1269-1270.
In 1998, Robbins brought the lawsuit now before us, though there was further vexation to come. In June 1999, the Bureau denied Robbins’s application to renew his annual SRUP, based on an accumulation of land-use penalties levied against him. Robbins appealed, the IBLA affirmed, In re Robbins, 154 I. B. L. A. 93 (2000), and Robbins did not seek judicial review. Then, in August, the Bureau revoked the grazing permit for High Island Ranch, claiming that Robbins had violated its terms when he kept Bureau officials from passing over his property to reach public lands. Robbins appealed to the IBLA, which stayed the revocation pending resolution of the appeal. Order in Robbins v. Bureau of Land Management, IBLA 2000-12 (Nov. 10, 1999), CA10 App. 1020.
The stay held for several years, despite periodic friction. Without a SRUP, Robbins was forced to redirect his guest cattle drives away from federal land and through a mountain pass with unmarked property boundaries. In August 2000, Vessels and defendants Darrell Barnes and Miller tried to catch Robbins trespassing in driving cattle over a corner of land administered by the Bureau. From a nearby hilltop, they videotaped ranch guests during the drive, even while the guests sought privacy to relieve themselves. That afternoon, Robbins alleges, Barnes and Miller broke into his guest lodge, left trash inside, and departed without closing the lodge gates.
The next summer, defendant David Wallace spoke with Preston Smith, an employee of the Bureau of Indian Affairs who manages lands along the High Island Ranch’s southern border, and pressured him to impound Robbins’s cattle. Smith told Robbins, but did nothing more.
Finally, in January 2003, tension actually cooled to the point that Robbins and the Bureau entered into a settlement agreement that, among other things, established a procedure for informal resolution of future grazing disputes and stayed 16 pending administrative appeals with a view to their ultimate dismissal, provided that Robbins did not violate certain Bureau regulations for a 2-year period. The settlement came apart, however, in January 2004, when the Bureau began formal trespass proceedings against Robbins and unilaterally voided the settlement agreement. Robbins tried to enforce the agreement in federal court, but a District Court denied relief in a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals in February 2006. Robbins v. Bureau of Land Management, 438 F. 3d 1074 (CA10).
C
In this lawsuit (brought, as we said, in 1998), Robbins asks for compensatory and punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Although he originally included the United States as a defendant, he voluntarily dismissed the Government, and pressed forward with a RICO claim charging defendants with repeatedly trying to extort an easement from him, as well as a similarly grounded Bivens claim that defendants violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity and failure to state a claim, which the District Court granted, holding that Robbins inadequately pleaded damages under RICO and that the APA and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. § 1846, were effective alternative remedies that precluded Bivens relief. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed on both grounds, 300 F. 3d 1208, 1211 (2002), although it specified that Bivens relief was available only for those “constitutional violations committed by individual federal employees unrelated to final agency action,” 300 F. 3d, at 1212.
On remand, defendants again moved to dismiss on qualified immunity. As to the RICO claim, the District Court denied the motion; as to Bivens, it dismissed what Robbins called the Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution and those under the Fifth Amendment for due process violations, but it declined to dismiss the Fifth Amendment claim of retaliation for the exercise of Robbins’s right to exclude the Government from his property and to refuse any grant of a property interest without compensation. After limited discovery, defendants again moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity. The District Court adhered to its earlier denial.
This time, the Court of Appeals affirmed, after dealing with collateral order jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity, 433 F. 3d 755, 761 (2006) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 530 (1985)). It held that Robbins had a clearly established right to be free from retaliation for exercising his Fifth Amendment right to exclude the Government from his private property, 433 F. 3d, at 765-767, and it explained that Robbins could go forward with the RICO claim because Government employees who “engag[e] in lawful actions with an intent to extort a right-of-way from [a landowner] rather than with an intent to merely carry out their regulatory duties” commit extortion under Wyoming law and within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1951, 433 F. 3d, at 768. The Court of Appeals rejected the defense based on a claim of the Government’s legal entitlement to demand the disputed easement: “if an official obtains property that he has lawful authority to obtain, but does so in a wrongful manner, his conduct constitutes extortion under the Hobbs Act.” Id., at 769. Finally, the Court of Appeals said again that “Robbins’[s] allegations involving individual action unrelated to final agency action are permitted under Bivens.” Id., at 772. The appeals court declined defendants’ request “to determine which allegations remain and which are precluded,” however, because defendants had not asked the District Court to sort them out. Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. 1075 (2006), and now reverse.
II
The first question is whether to devise a new Bivens damages action for retaliating against the exercise of ownership rights, in addition to the discrete administrative and judicial remedies available to a landowner like Robbins in dealing with the Government’s employees. Bivens, 403 U. S. 388, held that the victim of a Fourth Amendment violation by federal officers had a claim for damages, and in the years following we have recognized two more nonstatutory damages remedies, the first for employment discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause, Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), and the second for an Eighth Amendment violation by prison officials, Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980). But we have also held that any freestanding damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation has to represent a judgment about the best way to implement a constitutional guarantee; it is not an automatic entitlement no matter what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest, and in most instances we have found a Bivens remedy unjustified. We have accordingly held against applying the Bivens model to claims of First Amendment violations by federal employers, Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367 (1983), harm to military personnel through activity incident to service, United States v. Stanley, 483 U. S. 669 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296 (1983), and wrongful denials of Social Security disability benefits, Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U. S. 412 (1988). We have seen no case for extending Bivens to claims against federal agencies, FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471 (1994), or against private prisons, Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61 (2001).
Whatever the ultimate conclusion, however, our consideration of a Bivens request follows a familiar sequence, and on the assumption that a constitutionally recognized interest is adversely affected by the actions of federal employees, the decision whether to recognize a Bivens remedy may require two steps. In the first place, there is the question whether any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages. Bush, supra, at 378. But even in the absence of an alternative, a Bivens remedy is a subject of judgment: “the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.” Bush, supra, at 378.
A
In this factually plentiful case, assessing the significance of any alternative remedies at step one has to begin by categorizing the difficulties Robbins experienced in dealing with the Bureau. We think they can be separated into four main groups: torts or tort-like injuries inflicted on him, charges brought against him, unfavorable agency actions, and offensive behavior by Bureau employees falling outside those three categories.
Tortious harm inflicted on him includes Vessels’s unauthorized survey of the terrain of the desired easement and the illegal entry into the lodge, and in each instance, Robbins had a civil remedy in damages for trespass. Understandably, he brought no such action after learning about the survey, which was doubtless annoying but not physically damaging. For the incident at the lodge, he chose not to pursue a tort remedy, though there is no question that one was available to him if he could prove his allegations. Cf. Correctional Services Corp., supra, at 72-73 (considering availability of state tort remedies in refusing to recognize a Bivens remedy).
The charges brought against Robbins include a series of administrative claims for trespass and other land-use violations, a fine for the unauthorized road repair in 1997, and the two criminal charges that same year. Robbins had the opportunity to contest all of the administrative charges; he did fight some (but not all) of the various land-use and trespass citations, and he challenged the road repair fine as far as the IBLA, though he did not take advantage of judicial review when he lost in that tribunal. **8 He exercised his right to jury trial on the criminal complaints, and although the rapid acquittal tended to support his charge of baseless action by the prosecution (egged on by Bureau employees), the federal judge who presided at the trial did not think the Government’s case thin enough to justify awarding attorney’s fees, and Robbins’s appeal from that decision was late. See Robbins, 179 F. 3d, at 1269-1270. The trial judge’s denial of fees may reflect facts that dissuaded Robbins from bringing a state-law action for malicious prosecution, though it is also possible that a remedy would have been unavailable against federal officials, see Blake v. Rupe, 651 P. 2d 1096, 1107 (Wyo. 1982) (“Malicious prosecution is not an action available against a law enforcement official”). ****6 For each charge, in any event, Robbins had some procedure to defend and make good on his position. He took advantage of some opportunities, and let others pass; although he had mixed success, he had the means to be heard.
The more conventional agency action included the 1995 cancellation of the right-of-way in Robbins’s favor (originally given in return for the unrecorded easement for the Government’s benefit); the 1995 decision to reduce the SRUP from five years to one; the termination of the SRUP in 1999; and the revocation of the grazing permit that same year. Each time, the Bureau claimed that Robbins was at fault, and for each claim, administrative review was available, subject to ultimate judicial review under the APA. Robbins took no appeal from the 1995 decisions, stopped after losing an IBLA appeal of the SRUP denial, and obtained a stay from the IBLA of the Bureau’s revocation of the grazing permit.
Three events elude classification. The 1995 incident in which Robbins’s horse was struck primarily involved Robbins and his neighbor, not the Bureau, and the sheriff never brought criminal charges. The videotaping of ranch guests during the 2000 drive, while no doubt thoroughly irritating and bad for business, may not have been unlawful, depending, among other things, upon the location on public or private land of the people photographed. C£ Restatement (Second) of Torts §652B (1976) (defining tort of intrusion upon seclusion). Even if a tort was committed, it is unclear whether Robbins, rather than his guests, would be the proper plaintiff, or whether the tort should be chargeable against the Government (as distinct from employees) under the FTCA, cf. Carlson, 446 U. S., at 19-20 (holding that FTCA and Bivens remedies were “parallel, complementary causes of action” and that the availability of the former did not preempt the latter). The significance of Wallace’s 2001 attempt to pressure Smith into impounding Robbins’s cattle is likewise up in the air. The legitimacy of any impoundment that might have occurred would presumably have depended on where particular cattle were on the patchwork of private and public lands, and in any event, Smith never impounded any.
In sum, Robbins has an administrative, and ultimately a judicial, process for vindicating virtually all of his complaints. He suffered no charges of wrongdoing on his own part without an opportunity to defend himself (and, in the ease of the criminal charges, to recoup the consequent expense, though a judge found his claim wanting). And final agency action, as in canceling permits, for example, was open to administrative and judicial review, as the Court of Appeals realized, 433 F. 3d, at 772.
This state of the law gives Robbins no intuitively meritorious case for recognizing a new constitutional cause of action, but neither does it plainly answer no to the question whether he should have it. Like the combination of public and private land ownership around the ranch, the forums of defense and redress open to Robbins are a patchwork, an assemblage of state and federal, administrative and judicial benches applying regulations, statutes, and common law rules. It would be hard to infer that Congress expected the Judiciary to stay its Bivens hand, but equally hard to extract any clear lesson that Bivens ought to spawn a new claim. Compare Bush, 462 U. S., at 388 (refusing to create a Bivens remedy when faced with “an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations”); and Schweiker, 487 U. S., at 426 (“Congress chose specific forms and levels of protection for the rights of persons affected”), with Bivens, 403 U. S., at 397 (finding “no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured [in this way] may not recover money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress”).
B
This, then, is a case for Bivens step two, for weighing reasons for and against the creation of a new cause of action, the way common law judges have always done. See Bush, supra, at 378. Here, the competing arguments boil down to one on a side: from Robbins, the inadequacy of discrete, incident-by-incident remedies; and from the Government and its employees, the difficulty of defining limits to legitimate zeal on the public’s behalf in situations where hard bargaining is to be expected in the back-and-forth between public and private interests that the Government’s employees engage in every day.
1
As we said, when the incidents are examined one by one, Robbins’s situation does not call for creating a constitutional cause of action for want of other means of vindication, so he is unlike the plaintiffs in cases recognizing freestanding claims: Davis had no other remedy, Bivens himself was not thought to have an effective one, and in Carlson the plaintiff had none against Government officials. Davis, 442 U. S., at 245 (“For Davis, as for Bivens, ‘it is damages or nothing’ ” (quoting Bivens, supra, at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment))); Carlson, supra, at 23 (“[W]e cannot hold that Congress relegated respondent exclusively to the FTCA remedy” against the Government).
But Robbins’s argument for a remedy that looks at the course of dealing as a whole, not simply as so many individual incidents, has the force of the metaphor Robbins invokes, “death by a thousand cuts.” Brief for Respondent 40. It is one thing to be threatened with the loss of grazing rights,. or to be prosecuted, or to have one’s lodge broken into, but something else to be subjected to this in combination over a period of six years, by a series of public officials bent on making life difficult. Agency appeals, lawsuits, and criminal defense take money, and endless battling depletes the spirit along with the purse. The whole here is greater than the sum of its parts.
2
On the other side of the ledger there is a difficulty in defining a workable cause of action. Robbins describes the wrong here as retaliation for standing on his right as a property owner to keep the Government out (by refusing a free replacement for the right-of-way it had lost), and the mention of retaliation brings with it a tailwind of support from our longstanding recognition that the Government may not retaliate for exercising First Amendment speech rights, see Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378 (1987), or certain others of constitutional rank, see, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70 (1973) (Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury).
But on closer look, the claim against the Bureau’s employees fails to fit the prior retaliation cases. Those cases turn on an allegation of impermissible purpose and motivation; an employee who spoke out on matters of public concern and then was fired, for example, would need to “prove that the conduct at issue was constitutionally protected, and that it was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination.” Board of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 U. S. 668, 675 (1996). In its defense, the Government may respond that the firing had nothing to do with the protected speech, or that “it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Ibid. In short, the outcome turns on “what for” questions: what was the Government’s purpose in firing him and would he have been fired anyway? Questions like these have definite answers, and we have established methods for identifying the presence of an illicit reason (in competition with others), not only in retaliation cases but on claims of discrimination based on race or other characteristics. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973).
But a Bivens case by Robbins could not be resolved merely by answering a “what for” question or two. All agree that the Bureau’s employees intended to convince Robbins to grant an easement. But unlike punishing someone for speaking out against the Government, trying to induce someone to grant an easement for public use is a perfectly legitimate purpose: as a landowner, the Government may have, and in this instance does have, a valid interest in getting access to neighboring lands. The “what for” question thus has a ready answer in terms of lawful conduct.
Robbins’s challenge, therefore, is not to the object the Government seeks to achieve, and for the most part his argument is not that the means the Government used were necessarily illegitimate; rather, he says that defendants simply demanded too much and went too far. But as soon as Robbins’s claim is framed this way, the line-drawing difficulties it creates are immediately apparent. A “too much” kind of liability standard (if standard at all) can never be as reliable a guide to conduct and to any subsequent liability as a “what for” standard, and that reason counts against recognizing freestanding liability in a case like this.
The impossibility of fitting Robbins’s claim into the simple “what for” framework is demonstrated, repeatedly, by recalling the various actions he complains about. Most of them, such as strictly enforcing rules against trespass or conditions on grazing permits, are legitimate tactics designed to improve the Government’s negotiating position. Just as a private landowner, when frustrated at a neighbor’s stubbornness in refusing an easement, may press charges of trespass every time a cow wanders across the property line or call the authorities to report every land-use violation, the Government too may stand firm on its rights and use its power to protect public property interests. Though Robbins protests that the Government was trying to extract the easement for free instead of negotiating, that line is slippery even in this case; the Government was not offering to buy the easement, but it did have valuable things to offer in exchange, like continued. permission for Robbins to use Government land on favorable terms (at least to the degree that the terms of a permit were subject to discretion).
It is true that the Government is no ordinary landowner, with its immense economic power, its role as trustee for the public, its right to cater to particular segments of the public (like the recreational users who would take advantage of the right-of-way to get to remote tracts), and its wide discretion to bring enforcement actions. But in many ways, the Government deals with its neighbors as one owner among the rest (albeit a powerful one). Each may seek benefits from the others, and each may refuse to deal with the others by insisting on valuable consideration for anything in return. And as a potential contracting party, each neighbor is entitled to drive a hard bargain, as even Robbins acknowledges, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-32. That, after all, is what Robbins did by flatly refusing to regrant the easement without further recompense, and that is what the defendant employees did on behalf of the Government. So long as they had authority to withhold or withdraw permission to use Government land and to enforce the trespass and land-use rules (as the IBLA confirmed that they did have at least most of the time), they were within their rights to make it plain that Robbins’s willingness to give the easement would determine how complaisant they would be about his trespasses on public land, when they had discretion to enforce the law to the letter.
Robbins does make a few allegations, like the unauthorized survey and the unlawful entry into the lodge, that charge defendants with illegal action plainly going beyond hard bargaining. If those were the only coercive acts charged, Robbins could avoid the “too much” problem by fairly describing the Government behavior alleged as illegality in attempting to obtain a property interest for nothing, but that is not a fair summary of the body of allegations before us, according to which defendants’ improper exercise of the Government’s “regulatory powers” is essential to the claim. Brief for Respondent 21. (Of course, even in that simpler case, the tort or torts by Government employees would be so clearly actionable under the general law that it would furnish only the weakest argument for recognizing a generally available constitutional tort.) Rather, the bulk of Robbins’s charges go to actions that, on their own, fall within the Government’s enforcement power.
It would not answer the concerns just expressed to change conceptual gears and consider the more abstract concept of liability for retaliatory or undue pressure on a property owner for standing firm on property rights; looking at the claim that way would not eliminate the problem of degree, and it would raise a further reason to balk at recognizing a Bivens claim. For at this high level of generality, a Bivens action to redress retaliation against those who resist Government impositions on their property rights would invite claims in every sphere of legitimate governmental action affecting property interests, from negotiating tax claim settlements to enforcing Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations. Exercising any governmental authority affecting the value or enjoyment of property interests would fall within the Bivens regime, and across this enormous swath of potential litigation would hover the difficulty of devising a “too much” standard that could guide an employee’s conduct and a judicial factfinder’s conclusion.
The point here is not to deny that Government employees sometimes overreach, for of course they do, and they may have done so here if all the allegations are true. The point is the reasonable fear that a general Bivens cure would be worse than the disease.
C
In sum, defendants were acting in the name of the Bureau, which had the authority to grant (and had given) Robbins some use of public lands under its control and wanted a right-of-way in return. Defendants bargained hard by capitalizing on their discretionary authority and Robbins’s violations of various permit terms, though truculence was apparent on both sides. One of the defendants, at least, clearly crossed the line into impermissible conduct in breaking into Robbins’s lodge, although it is not clear from the record that any other action by defendants was more serious than garden-variety trespass, and the Government has successfully defended every decision to eliminate Robbins’s permission to use public lands in the ways he had previously enjoyed. Robbins had ready at hand a wide variety of administrative and judicial remedies to redress his injuries. The proposal, nonetheless, to create a new Bivens remedy to redress such injuries collectively on a theory of retaliation for exercising his property right to exclude, or on a general theory of unjustifiably burdening his rights as a property owner, raises a serious difficulty of devising a workable cause of action. A judicial standard to identify illegitimate pressure going beyond legitimately hard bargaining would be endlessly knotty to work out, and a general provision for tortlike liability when Government employees are unduly zealous in pressing a governmental interest affecting property would invite an onslaught of Bivens actions.
We think accordingly that
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
When a criminal conviction is invalidated by a reviewing court and no retrial will occur, is the State obliged to refund fees, court costs, and restitution exacted from the defendant upon, and as a consequence of, the conviction? Our answer is yes. Absent conviction of a crime, one is presumed innocent. Under the Colorado law before us in these cases, however, the State retains conviction-related assessments unless and until the prevailing defendant institutes a discrete civil proceeding and proves her innocence by clear and convincing evidence. This scheme, we hold, offends the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process.
I
A
Two cases are before us for review. Petitioner Shannon Nelson, in 2006, was convicted by a Colorado jury of five counts-two felonies and three misdemeanors-arising from the alleged sexual and physical abuse of her four children. 362 P.3d 1070, 1071 (Colo.2015) ; App. 25-26. The trial court imposed a prison sentence of 20 years to life and ordered Nelson to pay court costs, fees, and restitution totaling $8,192.50. 362 P.3d, at 1071. On appeal, Nelson's conviction was reversed for trial error. Ibid. On retrial, a new jury acquitted Nelson of all charges. Ibid.
Petitioner Louis Alonzo Madden, in 2005, was convicted by a Colorado jury of attempting to patronize a prostituted child and attempted third-degree sexual assault by force. See 364 P.3d 866, 867 (Colo.2015). The trial court imposed an indeterminate prison sentence and ordered Madden to pay costs, fees, and restitution totaling $4,413.00. Ibid. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed one of Madden's convictions on direct review, and a postconviction court vacated the other. Ibid. The State elected not to appeal or retry the case. Ibid.
Between Nelson's conviction and acquittal, the Colorado Department of Corrections withheld $702.10 from her inmate account, $287.50 of which went to costs and fees and $414.60 to restitution. See 362 P.3d, at 1071, and n. 1. Following Madden's conviction, Madden paid Colorado $1,977.75, $1,220 of which went to costs and fees and $757.75 to restitution. See 364 P.3d, at 867. The sole legal basis for these assessments was the fact of Nelson's and Madden's convictions. Absent those convictions, Colorado would have no legal right to exact and retain petitioners' funds.
Their convictions invalidated, both petitioners moved for return of the amounts Colorado had taken from them. In Nelson's case, the trial court denied the motion outright. 362 P.3d, at 1071. In Madden's case, the postconviction court allowed the refund of costs and fees, but not restitution. 364 P.3d, at 867-868.
The same Colorado Court of Appeals panel heard both cases and concluded that Nelson and Madden were entitled to seek refunds of all they had paid, including amounts allocated to restitution. See People v. Nelson, 369 P.3d 625, 628-629 (2013) ; People v. Madden, --- P.3d ----, ----, 2013 WL 1760869, *1 (Apr. 25, 2013). Costs, fees, and restitution, the court held, must be "tied to a valid conviction," 369 P.3d, at 627-628, absent which a court must "retur[n] the defendant to the status quo ante," - -- P.3d at ----, 2013 WL 1760869, at *2.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed in both cases. A court must have statutory authority to issue a refund, that court stated. 362 P.3d, at 1077, 364 P.3d, at 868. Colorado's Compensation for Certain Exonerated Persons statute (Exoneration Act or Act), Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 13-65-101, 13-65-102, 13-65-103 (2016), passed in 2013, "provides the proper procedure for seeking a refund," the court ruled. 362 P.3d, at 1075, 1077. As no other statute addresses refunds, the court concluded that the Exoneration Act is the "exclusive process for exonerated defendants seeking a refund of costs, fees, and restitution." Id., at 1078. Because neither Nelson nor Madden had filed a claim under the Act, the court further determined, their trial courts lacked authority to order a refund. Id., at 1075, 1078 ; 364 P.3d, at 867. There was no due process problem, the court continued, because the Act "provides sufficient process for defendants to seek refunds of costs, fees, and restitution that they paid in connection with their conviction." 362 P.3d, at 1078.
Justice Hood dissented in both cases. Because neither petitioner has been validly convicted, he explained, each must be presumed innocent. Id., at 1079 (Nelson ); 364 P.3d, at 870 (adopting his reasoning from Nelson in Madden ). Due process therefore requires some mechanism "for the return of a defendant's money," Justice Hood maintained, 362 P.3d, at 1080 ; as the Exoneration Act required petitioners to prove their innocence, the Act, he concluded, did not supply the remedy due process demands, id., at 1081. We granted certiorari. 579 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 30, 195 L.Ed.2d 902 (2016).
B
The Exoneration Act provides a civil claim for relief "to compensate an innocent person who was wrongly convicted." 362 P.3d, at 1075. Recovery under the Act is available only to a defendant who has served all or part of a term of incarceration pursuant to a felony conviction, and whose conviction has been overturned for reasons other than insufficiency of evidence or legal error unrelated to actual innocence. See § 13-65-102. To succeed on an Exoneration Act claim, a petitioner must show, by clear and convincing evidence, her actual innocence of the offense of conviction. §§ 13-65-101(1), 13-65-102(1). A successful petitioner may recoup, in addition to compensation for time served, "any fine, penalty, court costs, or restitution... paid... as a result of his or her wrongful conviction." Id., at 1075 (quoting § 13-65-103(2)(e)(V) ).
Under Colorado's legislation, as just recounted, a defendant must prove her innocence by clear and convincing evidence to obtain the refund of costs, fees, and restitution paid pursuant to an invalid conviction. That scheme, we hold, does not comport with due process. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado.
II
The familiar procedural due process inspection instructed by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), governs these cases. Colorado argues that we should instead apply the standard from Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), and inquire whether Nelson and Madden were exposed to a procedure offensive to a fundamental principle of justice. Medina "provide[s] the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules" that "are part of the criminal process." Id., at 443, 112 S.Ct. 2572. Such rules concern, for example, the allocation of burdens of proof and the type of evidence qualifying as admissible. These cases, in contrast, concern the continuing deprivation of property after a conviction has been reversed or vacated, with no prospect of reprosecution. See Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. ----, ----, n. 4, 134 S.Ct. 1090, 1110 n. 4, 188 L.Ed.2d 46 (2014) (ROBERTS, C.J., dissenting) (explaining the different offices of Mathews and Medina ). Because no further criminal process is implicated, Mathews "provides the relevant inquiry." 571 U.S., at ---- n. 4, 134 S.Ct., at 1110 n. 4.
III
Under the Mathews balancing test, a court evaluates (A) the private interest affected; (B) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used; and (C) the governmental interest at stake. 424 U.S., at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. All three considerations weigh decisively against Colorado's scheme.
A
Nelson and Madden have an obvious interest in regaining the money they paid to Colorado. Colorado urges, however, that the funds belong to the State because Nelson's and Madden's convictions were in place when the funds were taken. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-31. But once those convictions were erased, the presumption of their innocence was restored. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 585, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) (After a "conviction has been reversed, unless and until [the defendant] should be retried, he must be presumed innocent of that charge."). "[A]xiomatic and elementary,"
the presumption of innocence "lies at the foundation of our criminal law." Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895). Colorado may not retain funds taken from Nelson and Madden solely because of their now-invalidated convictions, see supra, at 1253 - 1254, and n. 3, for Colorado may not presume a person, adjudged guilty of no crime, nonetheless guilty enough for monetary exactions.
That petitioners prevailed on subsequent review rather than in the first instance, moreover, should be inconsequential. Suppose a trial judge grants a motion to set aside a guilty verdict for want of sufficient evidence. In that event, the defendant pays no costs, fees, or restitution. Now suppose the trial court enters judgment on a guilty verdict, ordering cost, fee, and restitution payments by reason of the conviction, but the appeals court upsets the conviction for evidentiary insufficiency. By what right does the State retain the amount paid out by the defendant? "[I]t should make no difference that the reviewing court, rather than the trial court, determined the evidence to be insufficient." Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). The vulnerability of the State's argument that it can keep the amounts exacted so long as it prevailed in the court of first instance is more apparent still if we assume a case in which the sole penalty is a fine. On Colorado's reasoning, an appeal would leave the defendant emptyhanded; regardless of the outcome of an appeal, the State would have no refund obligation. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 44.
B
Is there a risk of erroneous deprivation of defendants' interest in return of their funds if, as Colorado urges, the Exoneration Act is the exclusive remedy? Indeed yes, for the Act conditions refund on defendants' proof of innocence by clear and convincing evidence. § 13-65-101(1)(a). But to get their money back, defendants should not be saddled with any proof burden. Instead, as explained supra, at 1255 - 1256, they are entitled to be presumed innocent.
Furthermore, as Justice Hood noted in dissent, the Act provides no remedy at all for any assessments tied to invalid misdemeanor convictions ( Nelson had three). 362 P.3d, at 1081, n. 1 ; see § 13-65-102(1)(a). And when amounts a defendant seeks to recoup are not large, as is true in Nelson's and Madden's cases, see supra, at 1253, the cost of mounting a claim under the Exoneration Act and retaining a lawyer to pursue it would be prohibitive.
Colorado argued on brief that if the Exoneration Act provides sufficient process to compensate a defendant for the loss of her liberty, the Act should also suffice "when a defendant seeks compensation for the less significant deprivation of monetary assessments paid pursuant to a conviction that is later overturned." Brief for Respondent 40. The comparison is inapt. Nelson and Madden seek restoration of funds they paid to the State, not compensation for temporary deprivation of those funds. Petitioners seek only their money back, not interest on those funds for the period the funds were in the State's custody. Just as the restoration of liberty on reversal of a conviction is not compensation, neither is the return of money taken by the State on account of the conviction.
Colorado also suggests that "numerous pre- and post-deprivation procedures"-including the need for probable cause to support criminal charges, the jury-trial right, and the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt-adequately minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation of property. Id., at 31; see id., at 31-35. But Colorado misperceives the risk at issue. The risk here involved is not the risk of wrongful or invalid conviction any criminal defendant may face. It is, instead, the risk faced by a defendant whose conviction has already been overturned that she will not recover funds taken from her solely on the basis of a conviction no longer valid. None of the above-stated procedures addresses that risk, and, as just explained, the Exoneration Act is not an adequate remedy for the property deprivation Nelson and Madden experienced.
C
Colorado has no interest in withholding from Nelson and Madden money to which the State currently has zero claim of right. "Equitable [c]onsiderations," Colorado suggests, may bear on whether a State may withhold funds from criminal defendants after their convictions are overturned. Brief for Respondent 20-22. Colorado, however, has identified no such consideration relevant to petitioners' cases, nor has the State indicated any way in which the Exoneration Act embodies "equitable considerations."
IV
Colorado's scheme fails due process measurement because defendants' interest in regaining their funds is high, the risk of erroneous deprivation of those funds under the Exoneration Act is unacceptable, and the State has shown no countervailing interests in retaining the amounts in question. To comport with due process, a State may not impose anything more than minimal procedures on the refund of exactions dependent upon a conviction subsequently invalidated.
* * *
The judgments of the Colorado Supreme Court are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Justice ALITO, concurring in the judgment.
I agree that the judgments of the Colorado Supreme Court must be reversed, but I reach that conclusion by a different route.
I
The proper framework for analyzing these cases is provided by Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992). Medina applies when we are called upon to "asses[s] the validity of state procedural rules which... are part of the criminal process," id., at 443, 112 S.Ct. 2572 and that is precisely the situation here. These cases concern Colorado's rules for determining whether a defendant can obtain a refund of money that he or she was required to pay pursuant to a judgment of conviction that is later reversed. In holding that these payments must be refunded, the Court relies on a feature of the criminal law, the presumption of innocence. And since the Court demands that refunds occur either automatically or at least without imposing anything more than "minimal" procedures, see ante, at 1257, it appears that they must generally occur as part of the criminal case. For these reasons, the refund obligation is surely "part of the criminal process" and thus falls squarely within the scope of Medina. The only authority cited by the Court in support of its contrary conclusion is a footnote in a dissent. See ante, at 1255 (citing Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. ----, ----, n. 4, 134 S.Ct. 1090, 1110 n. 4, 188 L.Ed.2d 46 (2014) (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.)). Under Medina, a state rule of criminal procedure not governed by a specific rule set out in the Bill of Rights violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if it offends a fundamental and deeply rooted principle of justice. 505 U.S., at 445, 112 S.Ct. 2572. And "[h]istorical practice is probative of whether a procedural rule can be characterized as fundamental." Id., at 446, 112 S.Ct. 2572. Indeed, petitioners invite us to measure the Colorado scheme against traditional practice, reminding us that our " 'first due process cases' " recognized that " 'traditional practice provides a touchstone for constitutional analysis,' " Brief for Petitioners 26 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994) ). Petitioners then go on to argue at some length that "[t]he traditional rule has always been that when a judgment is reversed, a person who paid money pursuant to that judgment is entitled to receive the money back." Brief for Petitioners 26; see id., at 26-30. See also Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 4-14 (discussing traditional practice).
The Court, by contrast, turns its back on historical practice, preferring to balance the competing interests according to its own lights. The Court applies the balancing test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), a modern invention "first conceived"
to decide what procedures the government must observe before depriving persons of novel forms of property such as welfare or Social Security disability benefits. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002). Because these interests had not previously been regarded as "property," the Court could not draw on historical practice for guidance. Mathews has subsequently been used more widely in civil cases, but we should pause before applying its balancing test in matters of state criminal procedure. "[T]he States have considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process is grounded in centuries of common-law tradition." Medina, supra, at 445-446, 112 S.Ct. 2572. Applying the Mathews balancing test to established rules of criminal practice and procedure may result in "undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and the careful balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and order." Medina, supra, at 443, 112 S.Ct. 2572. Where long practice has struck a particular balance between the competing interests of the State and those charged with crimes, we should not lightly disturb that determination. For these reasons, Medina's historical inquiry, not Mathews, provides the proper framework for use in these cases.
II
Under Medina, the Colorado scheme at issue violates due process. American law has long recognized that when an individual is obligated by a civil judgment to pay money to the opposing party and that judgment is later reversed, the money should generally be repaid. See, e.g., Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219, 11 S.Ct. 523, 35 L.Ed. 151 (1891) ("The right of restitution of what one has lost by the enforcement of a judgment subsequently reversed has been recognized in the law of England from a very early period..."); Bank of United States v. Bank of Washington, 6 Pet. 8, 17, 8 L.Ed. 299 (1832) ("On the reversal of an erroneous judgment, the law raises an obligation in the party to the record, who has received the benefit of the erroneous judgment, to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost"). This was "a remedy well known at common law," memorialized as "a part of the judgment of reversal which directed 'that the defendant be restored to all things which he has lost on occasion of the judgment aforesaid.' " 2 Ruling Case Law § 248, p. 297 (W. McKinney and B. Rich eds. 1914); Duncan v. Kirkpatrick, 13 Serg. & Rawle 292, 294 (Pa.1825).
As both parties acknowledge, this practice carried over to criminal cases. When a conviction was reversed, defendants could recover fines and monetary penalties assessed as part of the conviction. Brief for Respondent 20-21, and n. 7; Reply Brief 7-8, 11; see, e.g., Annot., Right To Recover Back Fine or Penalty Paid in Criminal Proceeding, 26 A.L.R. 1523, 1532, § VI(a) (1923) ("When a judgment imposing a fine, which is paid, is vacated or reversed on appeal, the court may order restitution of the amount paid... "); 25 C.J. § 39, p. 1165 (W. Mack, W. Hale, & D. Kiser eds. 1921) ("Where a fine illegally imposed has been paid, on reversal of the judgment a writ of restitution may issue against the parties who received the fine").
The rule regarding recovery, however, "even though general in its application, [was] not without exceptions." Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 309, 55 S.Ct. 713, 79 L.Ed. 1451 (1935) (Cardozo, J.). The remedy was "equitable in origin and function," and return of the money was " 'not of mere right,' " but "'rest[ed] in the exercise of a sound discretion.' " Id., at 309, 310, 55 S.Ct. 713 (quoting Gould v. McFall, 118 Pa. 455, 456, 12 A. 336 (1888) ). This was true in both civil and criminal cases. See, e.g., 25 C. J., at 1165 (noting that "restitution [of fines paid on a conviction later reversed] is not necessarily a matter of right"); Annot., 26 A.L.R., at 1532, § VI(a) (Restitution for fines upon reversal of a conviction "is not a matter of strict legal right, but rather one for the exercise of the court's discretion"). The central question courts have asked is whether "the possessor will give offense to equity and good conscience if permitted to retain [the successful appellant's money]." Atlantic Coast Line, supra, at 309, 55 S.Ct. 713.
This history supports the Court's rejection of the Colorado Exoneration Act's procedures. The Act places a heavy burden of proof on defendants, provides no opportunity for a refund for defendants (like Nelson) whose misdemeanor convictions are reversed, and excludes defendants whose convictions are reversed for reasons unrelated to innocence. Brief for Respondent 8, 35, n. 18. These stringent requirements all but guarantee that most defendants whose convictions are reversed have no realistic opportunity to prove they are deserving of refunds. Colorado has abandoned historical procedures that were more generous to successful appellants and incorporated a court's case-specific equitable judgment. Instead, Colorado has adopted a system that is harsh, inflexible, and prevents most defendants whose convictions are reversed from demonstrating entitlement to a refund. Indeed, the Colorado General Assembly made financial projections based on the assumption that only one person every five years would qualify for a financial award under the Exoneration Act. Colorado Legislative Council Staff Fiscal Note, State and Local Revised Fiscal Impact, HB 13-1230, p. 2 (Apr. 22, 2013), online at http://leg.colorado.gov (as last visited Apr. 17, 2017). Accordingly, the Exoneration Act does not satisfy due process requirements. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (A state rule of criminal procedure may violate due process where "a rule significantly more favorable to the defendant has had a long and consistent application").
III
Although long-established practice supports the Court's judgment, the Court rests its decision on different grounds. In its Mathews analysis, the Court reasons that the reversal of petitioners' convictions restored the presumption of their innocence and that "Colorado may not presume a person, adjudged guilty of no crime, nonetheless guilty enough for monetary exactions." Ante, at 1256. The implication of this brief statement is that under Mathews, reversal restores the defendant to the status quo ante, see ante, at 1253. But the Court does not confront the obvious implications of this reasoning.
For example, if the status quo ante must be restored, why shouldn't the defendant be compensated for all the adverse economic consequences of the wrongful conviction? After all, in most cases, the fines and payments that a convicted defendant must pay to the court are minor in comparison to the losses that result from conviction and imprisonment, such as attorney's fees, lost income, and damage to reputation. The Court cannot convincingly explain why Mathews'amorphous balancing test stops short of requiring a full return to the status quo ante when a conviction is reversed. But Medina does.
The American legal system has long treated compensation for the economic consequences of a reversed conviction very differently from the refund of fines and other payments made by a defendant pursuant to a criminal judgment. Statutes providing compensation for time wrongfully spent in prison are a 20th-century innovation: By 1970, only the Federal Government and four States had passed such laws. King, Compensation of Persons Erroneously Confined by the State, 118 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1091, 1109 (1970) ; United States v. Keegan, 71 F.Supp. 623, 626 (S.D.N.Y.1947) ("[T]here seems to have been no legislation by our Government on this subject" until 1938). Many other jurisdictions have done so since, but under most such laws, compensation is not automatic. Instead, the defendant bears the burden of proving actual innocence (and, sometimes, more). King, supra, at 1110 ("The burden of proving innocence in the compensation proceeding has from the start been placed upon the claimant"); see also Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Burden of Proof in Wrongful Conviction Claims Under State Compensation Statutes, 44 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 123, 145 (2010) (Most U.S. compensation statutes "require that claimants prove their innocence either by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence" (footnote omitted)). In construing the federal statute, courts have held that a compensation proceeding "is not... a criminal trial" and that the burden of proof can be placed on the petitioner. United States v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276, 279 (C.A.6 1952). As noted, Colorado and many other States have similar statutes designed narrowly to compensate those few persons who can demonstrate that they are truly innocent. The Court apparently acknowledges that these statutes pose no constitutional difficulty. That is the correct conclusion, but it is best justified by reference to history and tradition.
IV
The Court's disregard of historical practice is particularly damaging when it comes to the question of restitution. The Court flatly declares that the State is "obliged to refund... restitution" in just the same way as fees and court costs. Ante, at 1252. This conclusion is not supported by historical practice, and it overlooks important differences between restitution, which is paid to the victims of an offense, and fines and other payments that are kept by the State.
Although restitution may be included in a criminal judgment, it has many attributes of a civil judgment in favor of the victim. This is clear under Colorado law. Although the obligation to pay restitution is included in the defendant's sentence, restitution results in a final civil judgment against the defendant in favor of the State and the victim. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-1.3-603(4)(a)(I) (2016). Entitlement to restitution need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt or in accordance with standard rules of evidence or criminal procedure. People v. Pagan, 165 P.3d 724, 729 (Colo.App.2006) ; Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 18-1.3-603(2) - (3). And the judgment may be enforced either by the State or the victim. §§ 16-18.5-106(2), §§ 16-18.5-107(1)-(4).
The Court ignores the distinctive attributes of restitution, but they merit attention. Because a restitution order is much like a civil judgment, the reversal of the defendant's criminal conviction does not necessarily undermine the basis for restitution. Suppose that a victim successfully sues a criminal defendant civilly and introduces the defendant's criminal conviction on the underlying conduct as (potentially preclusive) evidence establishing an essential element of a civil claim. See, e.g., 2 K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 298, 473 - 477 (7th ed.2013) (discussing the admissibility, and potential preclusive effect, of a criminal conviction in subsequent civil litigation). And suppose that the defendant's criminal conviction is later reversed for a trial error that did not (and could not) infect the later civil proceeding: for example, the admission of evidence barred by the exclusionary rule or a Confrontation Clause violation. It would be unprecedented to suggest that due process requires unwinding the civil judgment simply because it rests in part on a criminal conviction that has since been reversed. And a very similar scenario could unfold with respect to a Colorado restitution judgment. The only salient difference would be that, in the Colorado case, the civil judgment would have been obtained as part of the criminal proceeding itself. It is not clear (and the Court certainly does not explain) why that formal distinction should make a substantive difference.
It is especially startling to insist that a State must provide a refund after enforcing a restitution judgment on the victims' behalf in reliance on a final judgment that is then vacated on collateral review. Faced with this fact pattern, the Ninth Circuit declined to require reimbursement, reasoning that the Government was a mere "escrow agent" executing a then-valid final judgment in favor of a third party. United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1230 (2004).
The Court regrettably mentions none of this. Its treatment of restitution is not grounded in any historical analysis, and-save for a brief footnote, ante, at 1253, n. 3-the Court does not account for the distinctive civil status of restitution under Colorado law (or the laws of the many other affected jurisdictions that provide this remedy to crime victims).
Nor does the Court consider how restitution's unique characteristics might affect the balance that it strikes under Mathews. Ante, at 1257. The Court summarily rejects the proposition that " 'equitable considerations' " might militate against a blanket rule requiring the refund of money paid as restitution, see ibid., but why is this so? What if the evidence amply establishes that the defendant injured the victims to whom restitution was paid but the defendant's conviction is reversed on a ground that would be inapplicable in a civil suit? In that situation, is it true, as the Court proclaims, that the State would have "no interest" in withholding a refund? Would the Court reach that conclusion if state law mandated a refund from the recipients of the restitution? And if the States and the Federal Government are always required to foot the bill themselves, would that risk discourage them from seeking restitution-or at least from providing funds to victims until the conclusion of appellate review?
It was unnecessary for the Court to issue a sweeping pronouncement on restitution. But if the Court had to address this subject to dispose of these cases, it should have acknowledged that-at least in some circumstances-refunds of restitution payments made under later reversed judgments are not constitutionally required.
* * *
For these reasons, I concur only in the judgment.
Of the $287.50 for costs and fees, $125 went to the victim compensation fund and $162.50 to the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund (VAST fund). See 362 P.3d 1070, 1071, n. 1 (Colo.2015).
Of the $1,220 for costs and fees, $125 went to the victim compensation fund and $1,095 to the VAST fund ($1,000 of which was for the special advocate surcharge). See App. 79; 364 P.3d 866, 869 (Colo.2015).
See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 24-4.1-119(1)(a) (2005) (levying victim-compensation-fund fees for "each criminal action resulting in a conviction or in a deferred judgment and sentence"); § 24-4.2-104(1)(a)(1)(I) (2005) (same, for VAST fund fees); § 24-4.2-104(1)(a)(1)(II) (same, for special advocate surcharge); § 18-1.3-603(1) (2005) (with one exception, "[e]very order of conviction... shall include consideration of restitution"). See also 362 P.3d, at 1073 ("[T]he State pays the cost of criminal cases when a defendant is acquitted." (citing Colo.Rev.Stat. § 16-18-101(1) (2015) )). Under Colorado law, a restitution order tied to a criminal conviction is rendered as a separate civil judgment. See § 18-1.3-603(4)(a) (2005). If the conviction is reversed, any restitution order dependent on that conviction is simultaneously vacated. See People v. Scearce, 87 P.3d 228, 234-235 (Colo.App.2003).
While these cases were pending in this Court, Colorado passed new legislation to provide "[r]eimbursement of amounts paid following a vacated conviction." See Colo. House Bill 17-1071 (quoting language for Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-1.3-603, the new provision
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue in this case is the constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of a state statute that generally bars picketing of residences or dwellings, but exempts from its prohibition “the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute.”
I
On September 6, 1977, several of the appellees, all of whom are members of a civil rights organization entitled the Committee Against Racism, participated in a peaceful demonstration on the public sidewalk in front of the home of Michael Bilandic, then Mayor of Chicago, protesting his alleged failure to support the busing of schoolchildren to achieve racial integration. They were arrested and charged with unlawful residential picketing in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 21.1-2 (1977), which provides:
“It is unlawful to picket before or about the residence or dwelling of any person, except when the residence or dwelling is used as a place of business. However, this Article does not apply to a person peacefully picketing his own residence or dwelling and does not prohibit the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute or the place of holding a meeting or assembly on premises commonly used to discuss subjects of general public interest.”
Appellees pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to periods of supervision ranging from six months to a year.
In April 1978, appellees commenced this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Illinois residential picketing statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and an injunction prohibiting defendants — various state, county, and city officials — -from enforcing the statute. Appellees did not attempt to attack collaterally their earlier state-court convictions, but requested only prospective relief. Alleging that they wished to renew their picketing in residential neighborhoods but were inhibited from doing so by the threat of criminal prosecution under the residential picketing statute, appellees challenged the Act under the First and Fourteenth Amendments as an overbroad, vague, and, in light of the exception for labor picketing, impermissible content-based restriction on protected expression. The District Court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, denied all relief. Brown v. Scott, 462 F. Supp. 518 (1978).
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. Brown v. Scott, 602 F. 2d 791 (1979). Discerning “no principled basis” for distinguishing the Illinois statute from a similar picketing prohibition invalidated in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972), the court concluded that the Act’s differential treatment of labor and nonlabor picketing could not be justified either by the important state interest in protecting the peace and privacy of the home or by the special character of a residence that is also used as a “place of employment.” Accordingly, the court held that the statute, both on its face and as applied to appellees, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We noted probable jurisdiction. 444 U. S. 1011 (1980). We affirm.
II
As the Court of Appeals observed, this is not the first instance in which this Court has had occasion to consider the constitutionality of an enactment selectively proscribing peaceful picketing on the basis of the placard’s message. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, supra, arose out of a challenge to a Chicago ordinance that prohibited picketing in front of any school other than one “involved in a labor dispute.” We held that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it impermissibly distinguished between labor picketing and all other peaceful picketing without any showing that the latter was “clearly more disruptive” than the former. 408 U. S., at 100. Like the Court of Appeals, we find the Illinois residential picketing statute at issue in the present case constitutionally indistinguishable from the ordinance invalidated in Mosley.
There can be no doubt that in prohibiting peaceful picketing on the public streets and sidewalks in residential neighborhoods, the Illinois statute regulates expressive conduct that falls within the First Amendment’s preserve. See, e. g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 112 (1969); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 152 (1969). “Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.). “‘[SJtreets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places are so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights that access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely.’” Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 515 (1976) (quoting Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U. S. 308, 315 (1968)).
Nor can it be seriously disputed that in exempting from its general prohibition only the “peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute,” the Illinois statute discriminates between lawful and unlawful conduct based upon the content of the demonstrator’s communication. On its face, the Act accords preferential treatment to the expression of views on one particular subject; information about labor disputes may be freely disseminated, but discussion of all other issues is restricted. The permissibility of residential picketing under the Illinois statute is thus dependent solely on the nature of the message being conveyed.
In these critical respects, then, the Illinois statute is identical to the ordinance in Mosley, and it suffers from the same constitutional infirmities. When government regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 98-99, 101; see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376-377 (1968); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 30-31 (1968); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 342-343 (1972); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 34, n. 75 (1973). As we explained in Mosley: “Chicago may not vindicate its interest in preventing disruption by the wholesale exclusion of picketing on all but one preferred subject. Given what Chicago tolerates from labor picketing, the excesses of some nonlabor picketing may not be controlled by a broad ordinance prohibiting both peaceful and violent picketing. Such excesses 'can be controlled by narrowly drawn statutes/ Saia v. New York, 334 U. S., at 562, focusing on the abuses and dealing evenhandedly with picketing regardless of subject matter.” 408 U. S., at 101-102. Yet here, under the guise of preserving residential privacy, Illinois has flatly prohibited all nonlabor picketing even though it permits labor picketing that is equally likely to intrude on the tranquility of the home.
Moreover, it is the content of the speech that determines whether it is within or without the statute’s blunt prohibition. What we said in Mosley has equal force in the present case:
“The central problem with Chicago’s ordinance is that it describes permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter. Peaceful picketing on the subject of a school’s labor-management dispute is permitted, but all other peaceful picketing is prohibited. The operative distinction is the message on a picket sign. . . . Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would completely undercut the 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [376 U. S. 254], 270.
“Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is an ‘equality of status in the field of ideas,’ and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.” Id., at 95-96 (citations and footnote omitted)
III
Appellant nonetheless contends that this case is distinguishable from Mosley. He argues that the state interests here are especially compelling and particularly well served by a statute that accords differential treatment to labor and non-labor picketing. We explore in turn each of these interests, and the manner in which they are said to be furthered by this statute.
A
Appellant explains that whereas the Chicago ordinance sought to prevent disruption of the schools, concededly a “substantial” and “legitimate” governmental concern, see id., at 99, 100, the Illinois statute was enacted to ensure privacy in the home, a right which ■ appellant views as paramount in our constitutional scheme. For this reason, he contends that the same content-based distinctions held invalid in the Mosley context may be upheld in the present case.
We find it unnecessary, however, to consider whether the State’s interest in residential privacy outranks its interest in quiet schools in the hierarchy of societal values. For even the most legitimate goal may not be advanced in a constitutionally impermissible manner. And though we might agree that certain state interests may be so compelling that where no adequate alternatives exist a content-based distinction— if narrowly drawn — would be a permissible way of furthering those objectives, cf. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919), this is not such a case.
First, the generalized classification which the statute draws suggests that Illinois itself has determined that residential privacy is not a transcendent objective: While broadly permitting all peaceful labor picketing notwithstanding the disturbances it would undoubtedly engender, the statute makes no attempt to distinguish among various sorts of nonlabor picketing on the basis of the harms they would inflict on the privacy interest) The apparent overinclusiveness and under-inclusiveness of the statute’s restriction would seem largely to undermine appellant’s claim that the prohibition of all non-labor picketing can be justified by reference to the State’s interest in maintaining domestic tranquility.
More fundamentally, the exclusion for labor picketing cannot be upheld as a means of protecting residential privacy for the simple reason that nothing in the content-based labor-nonlabor distinction has any bearing whatsoever on privacy. Appellant can point to nothing inherent in the nature of peaceful labor picketing that would make it any less disruptive of residential privacy than peaceful picketing on issues of broader social concern. Standing alone, then, the State’s asserted interest in promoting the privacy of the home is not sufficient to save the statute.
B
The second important objective advanced by appellant in support of the statute is the State’s interest in providing special protection for labor protests. He maintains that federal and state law has long exhibited an unusual concern for such activities, and he contends that this solicitude may be furthered by a narrowly drawn exemption for labor picketing.
The central difficulty with this argument is that it forthrightly presupposes that labor picketing is more deserving of First Amendment protection than are public protests over other issues, particularly the important economic, social, and political subjects about which these appellees wish to demonstrate. We reject that proposition. Cf. T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 444-449' (1970) (suggesting that nonlabor picketing is more akin to pine expression than labor picketing and thus should be subject to fewer restrictions). Public-issue picketing, “an exercise of . . . basic constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form,” Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235 (1963), has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values: “The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.” Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369 (1931). See generally A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948). While the State’s motivation in protecting the First Amendment rights of employees involved in labor disputes is commendable, that factor, without more, cannot justify the labor picketing exemption.
C
Appellant’s final contention is that the statute can be justified by some combination of the preceding objectives. This argument is fashioned on two different levels. In its elemental formulation, it posits simply that a distinction between labor and nonlabor picketing is uniquely suited to furthering the legislative judgment that residential privacy should be preserved to the greatest extent possible without also compromising the special protection owing to labor picketing. In short, the statute is viewed as a reasonable attempt to accommodate the competing rights of the homeowner to enjoy his privacy and the employee to demonstrate over labor disputes. But this attempt to justify the statute hinges on the validity of both of these goals, and we have already concluded that the latter — the desire to favor one form of speech over all others — is illegitimate.
The second and more complex formulation of appellant’s position characterizes the statute as a carefully drafted attempt to prohibit that picketing which would impinge on residential privacy while permitting that picketing which would not. In essence, appellant asserts that the exception for labor picketing does not contravene the State’s interest in preserving residential tranquility because of the unique character of a residence that is a “place of employment.” By “inviting” a worker into his home and converting that dwelling into a place of employment, the argument goes, the resident has diluted his entitlement to total privacy. In other words, he has “waived” his right to be free from picketing with respect to disputes arising out of the employment relationship, thereby justifying the statute’s narrow labor exception at those locations.
The flaw in this argument is that it proves too little. Numerous types of peaceful picketing other than labor picketing would have but a negligible impact on privacy interests, and numerous other actions of a homeowner might constitute “nonresidential” uses of his property and would thus serve to vitiate the right to residential privacy. For example, the resident who prominently decorates his windows and front yard with posters promoting the qualifications of one candidate for political office might be said to “invite” a counter-demonstration from supporters of an opposing candidate. Similarly, a county chairman who uses his home to meet with his district captains and to discuss some controversial issue might well expect that those who are deeply concerned about the decision the chairman will ultimately reach would want to make their views known by demonstrating outside his home during the meeting. And, with particular regard to the facts of the instant case, it borders on the frivolous to suggest that a resident who invites a repairman into his home to fix his television set has “waived” his right to privacy with respect to a dispute between the repairman and the local union, but that the official who has voluntarily chosen to enter the public arena has not likewise “waived” his right to privacy with respect to a challenge to his views on significant issues of social and economic policy.
IV
We therefore conclude that appellant has not successfully distinguished Mosley. We are not to be understood to imply, however, that residential picketing is beyond the reach of uniform and nondiscriminatory regulation. For the right to communicate is not limitless. E. g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 554-555 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, 563-564 (1965). Even peaceful picketing may be prohibited when it interferes with the operation of vital governmental facilities, see, e. g., ibid, (picketing or parading prohibited near courthouses); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 (1966) (demonstrations prohibited on jailhouse grounds), or when it is directed toward an illegal purpose, see, e. g., Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U. S. 284 (1957) (prohibition of picketing directed toward achieving “union shop” in violation of state law).
Moreover, we have often declared that “[a] state or municipality may protect individual privacy by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content.” Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 209 (1975) (emphasis supplied). See, e. g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395 (1953); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S., at 554; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972). In sum, “no mandate in our Constitution leaves States and governmental units powerless to pass laws to protect the public from the kind of boisterous and threatening conduct that disturbs the tranquility of spots selected by the people either for homes, wherein they can escape the hurly-burly of the outside business and political world, or for public and other buildings that require peace and quiet to carry out their functions, such as courts, libraries, schools, and hospitals.” Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 118 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
Preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value. Our decisions reflect no lack of solicitude for the right of an individual “to be let alone” in the privacy of the home, “sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick.” Id., at 125 (Black, J., concurring). See generally Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728 (1970); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980). The State’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society. “ ‘The crucial question, however, is whether [the Illinois’ statute] advances that objective in a manner consistent with the command of the Equal Protection Clause.’ Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. [71], 76 [(1971)].” Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 99’. And because the statute discriminates among pickets based on the subject matter of their expression, the answer must be “No.”
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed
A violation of § 21.1-2 is a “Class B” misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $500 and imprisonment for not more than six months. See Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, §§ 21.1-3, 1005-8-3, 1005-9-1 (1977).
At least four other States have enacted antiresidential picketing laws similar in form to this statute. See Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2966 to 41-2968 (1977); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-120 (1979); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 379A-1 (1976); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 580A (1976). Connecticut’s law has been construed to permit all picketing in a residential area except for labor picketing that is not conducted at the situs of a labor dispute. State v. Anonymous, 6 Conn. Cir. 372, 274 A. 2d 897 (App. Div. 1970); DeGregory v. Giesing, 427 F. Supp. 910 (Conn. 1977) (three-judge court). The Maryland statute was declared unconstitutional by the Maryland Court of Appeals in State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305, 372 A. 2d 1076 (1977). See also People Acting Through Community Effort v. Doorley, 468 F. 2d 1143 (CA1 1972) (invalidating municipal ordinance virtually identical to the Illinois residential picketing statute); but see Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 182 N. W. 2d 530 (1971) (upholding validity of similar ordinance).
Because the Court of Appeals concluded that the labor dispute exception was not severable from the remainder of the statute, it invalidated the enactment in its entirety. Cf. State v. Schuller, supra, at 318-321, 372 A. 2d, at 1083-1084. The court therefore found it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality under the First Amendment of a statute that prohibited all residential picketing. Brown v. Scott, 602 F. 2d 791, 795, n. 6 (1979). Because we find the present statute defective on equal protection principles, we likewise do not consider whether a statute barring all residential picketing regardless of its subject matter would violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Chicago Municipal Code, ch. 193-1 (i) (1968), provided:
“A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly:
“(i) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school building while the school is in session and one-half hour before the school is in session and one-half hour after the school session has been concluded, provided that this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute. . . (Emphasis supplied.)
The Illinois residential picketing statute apparently has not been construed by the state courts. Throughout this litigation, however, all parties and the courts below have interpreted the statutory exception for “peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute” as embodying the additional requirement that the subject of the picketing be related to the ongoing labor dispute. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 TJ. S. 92 (1972), was premised upon an identical construction. See id., at 94, n. 2 (statutory exemption for “the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute” applies only to labor picketing of a school involved in such a dispute).
The District Court read the labor exception in this statute as creating two separate classifications: one between “places of employment” and all other “residences,” and a second between “places of employment involved in a labor dispute” and “places of employment not involved in a labor dispute.” The court held that the first classification was a permissible content-neutral regulation of the location of picketing. And although recognizing that the second distinction may well be based on the subject matter of the demonstration, see n. 4, supra, the court held that appellees lacked standing to challenge it because they were not seeking to picket “a place of employment,” and thus would not have benefitted from a determination that the second classification was unconstitutional. Brown v. Scott, 462 F. Supp. 518, 534-535 (1978).
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the District Court, refused to adopt the lower court’s interpretation of the statute. Rather, it read the “place of employment” exception to divide “residences and dwellings” into but two categories — those at which picketing is lawful (i. e., all places of employment involved in labor disputes) and those at which it is unlawful (*. e., all other residences and dwellings). Brown v. Scott, 602 F. 2d, at 793-794. We accept the construction of the Court of Appeals. Appellees sought to picket at a residence and were denied permission to do so. They clearly have standing to attack the statutory classification on which that denial was premised. Indeed, appellant does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the statute, Tr. of Oral Arg. 13, and he concedes that this restriction is content-based, id., at 21.
It is, of course, no answer to assert that the Illinois statute does not discriminate on the basis of the speaker’s viewpoint, but only on the basis of the subject matter of his message. “The First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, post, at 537.
Mosley was neither the Court’s first nor its last pronouncement that the First and Fourteenth Amendments forbid discrimination in the regulation of expression on the basis of the content of that expression. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring):
“Standing, patrolling, or marching back and forth on streets is conduct, not speech, and as conduct can be regulated or prohibited. But by specifically permitting picketing for the publication of labor union views, Louisiana is attempting to pick and choose among the views it is willing to have discussed on its streets. It thus is trying to prescribe by law what matters of public interest people whom it allows to assemble on its streets may and may not discuss. This seems to me to be censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. And to deny this appellant and his group use of the streets because of their views against racial discrimination, while allowing other groups to use the streets to voice opinions on other subjects, also amounts, I think, to an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 209, 215 (1975); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 520 (1976); Madison Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U. S. 167, 175-176 (1976); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 784-785 (1978); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, post, at 536-538.
The importance which the State attaches to the interest in maintaining residential privacy is reflected in the Illinois Legislature’s finding accompanying the residential picketing statute:
“The Legislature finds and declares that men in a free society have the right to quiet enjoyment of their homes; that the stability of community and family life cannot be maintained unless the right to privacy and a sense of security and peace in the home are respected and encouraged; that residential picketing, however just the cause inspiring it, disrupts home, family and communal life; that residential picketing is inappropriate in our society, where the jealously guarded rights of free speech and assembly have always been associated with respect for the rights of others. For these reasons the Legislature finds and declares this Article to be necessary.” IE. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, §21.1-1 (1977).
Cf. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 29 (quoted in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 67, n. 27 (1976) (opinion of Stevens, J.)): “If some groups are exempted from a prohibition on parades and pickets, the rationale for regulation is fatally impeached.” See also Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 100; Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 638-639 (1980).
See generally 29 U. S. C. § 141 et seq,; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); AFL v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941). Appellant does not go so far as to suggest that the National Labor Relations Act preempts the State from enacting a law prohibiting the picketing of residences involved in labor disputes. Such an argument has dubious merit. See Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132, 136, and n. 2 (1976).
See Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, § 2a (1977), which provides:
“No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of this State ... in any case involving or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, enjoining or restraining any person or persons, either singly or in concert, . . . from peaceably and without threats or intimidation being upon any public street, or thoroughfare or highway for the purpose of obtaining or communicating information, or to peaceably and without threats or intimidation persuade any person or persons to work or to abstain from working, or to employ or to peaceably and without threats or intimidation cease to employ any party to a labor dispute, or to recommend, advise, or persuade others so to do.”
We note that the statute’s labor dispute exemption is overbroad in this respect, for it not only protects the rights of the employee to picket the residence of his employer, but it also permits third parties to picket both the employer and his employee, even when there is no dispute between those individuals. As appellant’s counsel explained at oral argument: “[T]he labor dispute could exist even if the employee wasn’t part of the dispute. For example, if you have a condominium that employs non-union janitors and the non-union janitor is perfectly happy to be there, conceivably union janitors could engage in picketing, very much like a traditional labor law cane.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 14.
An alternative justification for the statute — one not pressed by appellant — is that it is intended to protect privacy in the home, but only insofar as that objective can be accomplished without prohibiting those forms of speech that are peculiarly appropriate to residential neighborhoods and cannot effectively be exercised elsewhere. Since labor picketing arising out of disputes occurring in residential neighborhoods can only be carried out in those neighborhoods, the argument would continue, it is permitted under the statute while other forms of picketing, for which suitable alternative forums will generally exist, are barred.
Even assuming that a content-based distinction might in some cases be permissible on these grounds, but see Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 163 (1939) (“one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place”), this is not such a case because the Illinois statute is seriously underinclusive in this respect. It singles out for special protection only one of the many sorts of picketing which must be carried out in residential neighborhoods or not at all. Protests arising out of landlord-tenant relationships, zoning disputes, and historic preservation issues are just some of the many demonstrations that bear a direct relation to residential neighborhoods. See generally Comment, Picketers at the Doorstep, 9 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 95, 101-102, 106 (1974). Indeed, appellees themselves assert that they want to engage in residential picketing because it is the only effective means they have of communicating their concern about the issue of busing to the desired neighborhood audience. Yet the Illinois statute bars all of these groups from picketing in residential areas while those wishing to picket at the site of a labor dispute are permitted to do so.
See supra, at 461-462.
See n. 12, supra.
Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974).
Mr. Justice Goldberg’s opinion for the Court in the first Cox case stated: “The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time. The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy.” 379 U. S., at 554.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U. S. 349, we held that the shareholders of BancoKentucky Company, a bank-stock-holding company, were liable under 12 U. S. C. § § 63, 64, for an assessment on shares of an insolvent national bank held in the portfolio of the holding company. That suit was brought in a Kentucky District Court against Banco stockholders residing in that District. These suits in equity were brought in Federal District Courts in Ohio and Pennsylvania to enforce assessments against Ohio and Pennsylvania stockholders of Banco. In No. 656 the District Court in Ohio overruled a motion to dismiss made on the ground, among others, that the bill showed on its face that the action was barred by an Ohio statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 156 F. 2d 47. In No. 593 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court in Pennsylvania which had held the action there barred by the Pennsylvania statute of limitations. 156 F. 2d 972. We granted certiorari to consider both cases. 329 U. S. 707.
There is no federal statute of limitations fixing the period within which suits must be brought to enforce the statutory double liability of shareholders of insolvent national banks. For this reason we look to Ohio and Pennsylvania law to determine the period in which these suits may be brought. McDonald v. Thompson, 184 U. S. 71; McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154, 158; Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U. S. 96, 97. Even though these suits are in equity, the states' statutes of limitations apply. For it is only the scope of the relief sought and the multitude of parties sued which give equity concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the legal obligation here asserted. And equity will withhold its relief in such a case where the applicable statute of limitations would bar the concurrent legal remedy. Russell v. Todd, 309 U. S. 280, 289 and cases cited. See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99; Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395-396.
But even though the period in which suit must be brought is governed by state limitations statutes, we have previously decided that the question of when the applicable state statute of limitations begins to run depends upon when, under federal law, the Comptroller of the Currency, or his authorized agent, is empowered by federal law to bring suit. And the Comptroller’s agent, the Receiver here, could not bring these actions until the date for payment fixed by the Comptroller. Rawlings v. Ray, supra, 98, 99; Fisher v. Whiton, 317 U. S. 217, 220, 221. The date for payment fixed by the Comptroller in this instance was April 1, 1931. These actions were instituted more than five but less than six years after the payments became due under the Comptroller’s assessment order.
With regard to No. 656, the Ohio proceeding, the Ohio statute of limitations provides that suit “upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty, shall be brought within six years after the cause thereof accrued.” Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938) § 11222. This statute describes the liability sued on here, and if applicable does not bar this suit. But the scope of this general provision is narrowed by another known as the “borrowing statute” which reads:
“If the laws of any state or country where the cause of action arose limits the time for the commencement of the action to a less number of years than do the statutes of this state in like causes of action then said cause of action shall be barred in this state at the expiration of said lesser number of years.” Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938) § 11234.
If the cause of action arose in Kentucky, the “borrowing statute” applies Kentucky’s statute of limitations, and this suit is barred. For Kentucky’s law requires that an “action upon a liability created by statute . . . shall be commenced within five years after the cause of action accrued.” Ky. Rev. Stat. (Baldwin, 1943) § 413.120.
The Receiver contends that the Ohio borrowing statute’s language “the laws of any state or country where the cause.of action arose” has reference to “a system of jurisprudence other than Ohio’s,” and does not refer “necessarily to territorial limits” within which events occurred giving rise to an enforceable obligation. The place where the events giving rise to a cause of action occur is said to be “important only insofar as the laws of that place are controlling.” Under this argument, the cause of action here could not have “arisen” in any state since the statutory obligation of shareholders was not imposed or controlled by state law. Hence, the argument runs, the Ohio law did not contemplate borrowing any state statute of limitations in a case where liability is governed by federal law. And no federal statute of limitations could be borrowed in this case for none existed. Therefore, it is argued, only Ohio’s general six-year statute of limitations applies.
The consequence of accepting this contention would be that the Ohio borrowing statute would have no effect at all as to suits brought in Ohio state courts to enforce actions authorized by federal law. For, of course, Ohio courts could never borrow a non-existent federal statute of limitations. And if there were a federal statute of limitations governing a federally created right, that statute would control of its own force. Herget v. Central National Bank & Trust Co., 324 U. S. 4. We have been cited to no decision by any Ohio court which would lead us to believe that its borrowing statute should be given such a sterilizing interpretation. Cf. Townsend v. Eichelberger, 51 Ohio St. 213, 216, 38 N. E. 207, 208.
We find it unnecessary to our decision to discuss the contentions made here concerning differences between a “cause of action” and a “liability.” The Ohio Supreme Court has itself said that a “cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a right of action, the existence of which affords a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf.” Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Larwill, 83 Ohio St. 108, 115-116, 93 N. E. 619, 621. We have been referred to nothing in Ohio statutes or decisions which indicates that it used “cause of action” in any different sense in its borrowing statute. The purpose of the state’s borrowing statute, as those of other states, was apparently to require its courts to bar suits against an Ohio resident if the right to sue him had already expired in another state where the combination of circumstances giving rise to the right to sue had taken place. Moreover, limitations on federally created rights to sue have similarly been considered to be governed by the limitations law of the state where the crucial combination of events transpired. Seaboard Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 24 F. Supp. 1018, 104 F. 2d 659; Bluefields S. S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 F. 1, 19-20. See Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610; Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 397.
Our appraisal of the Ohio borrowing statute, the opinions of the courts of that state, and the circumstances leading to this suit, persuade us that the cause of action “arose” in Kentucky within the meaning of the Ohio borrowing statute. The bank was authorized to do its banking business in Louisville and did business in no other place. See 12 U. S. C. § 81. Nor was this bank’s business any the less local because its shares were held in the portfolio of a Delaware corporation. Many provisions of federal law make national banks, in important aspects, peculiarly local institutions. See 12 U. S. C. §§ 30, 33, 34 (a), 36, 51, 62, 72. For jurisdictional purposes, a national bank is a “citizen” of the state in which it is established or located, 28 U. S. C. § 41 (16), and in that district alone can it be sued. 12 U. S. C. § 94. True, when insolvency occurs, there is a shift in bank management, but the bank’s activities are still necessarily rooted in its local habitat. In this case the Receiver’s office was located in Louisville, the home of the bank; payment of assessments, like other obligations due the bank, could have been made there, and, in fact, shareholders were notified by the Receiver to pay at his office in Louisville. Liquidation of a local bank, like its daily operations, must from necessity and in the interest of good business be carried on, in the main, in the community where the bank did business with its depositors and other customers. Practically everything that preceded the final fixing of liability of shareholders derived from Kentucky transactions. We have been referred to no Ohio decisions, and have been unable to find any, which contradict our conclusion that events which culminated in this suit justify our holding that this “cause of action” “arose” in Kentucky within the meaning of the Ohio statute. See Hunter v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 73 Ohio St. 110, 76 N. E. 563; Atropa Corp. v. Kirchwehm, 138 Ohio St. 30, 33 N. E. 2d 655; Payne v. Kirchwehm, 141 Ohio St. 384, 48 N. E. 2d 224; Bowers v. Holabird, 51 Ohio App. 413, 1 N. E. 2d 326; National Bondholders Corp. v. Stoddard, 22 Ohio O. 145, 8 Ohio Supp. 19. See also Hilliard v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 73 F. 2d 473, 475-476; Note, 15 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 337 (1941); Note, 21 Ohio O. 107 (1941). Therefore the judgment in No. 656 is affirmed.
In No. 593, the Pennsylvania action, the same considerations are controlling. The general statute of limitations of that state which would be applicable to this action had it arisen in Pennsylvania, like Ohio’s general statute, provides a six-year period in which this suit could be brought. 12 Pa. Stat. § 31 (Purdon, 1931). But Pennsylvania also has a “borrowing statute” which provides : “When a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state or country in which it arose, such bar shall be a complete defense to an action thereon brought in any of the courts of this commonwealth.” 12 Pa. Stat. § 39 (Purdon, 1931). Our review of Pennsylvania decisions construing this statute persuades us that the borrowing statute is applicable to this case, that under that statute this cause of action “arose” in Kentucky, and that the five-year statute of Kentucky bars this action. See Mister v. Burkholder, 56 Pa. Super. 517; Fletcher’s Estate, 45 Pa. D. & C. 673, 674; Bell v. Brady, 346 Pa. 666, 31 A. 2d 547; Shaffer’s Estate, 228 Pa. 36, 40, 76 A. 716, 717. Cf. Rosenzweig v. Heller, 302 Pa. 279, 153 A. 346. See also Notes, 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 878 (1940), 4 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 215 (1938). The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals in No. 593 is therefore reversed.
So ordered.
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
For convenience, the motion was made by only four defendants who are respondents here. The case was continued as to the others pending final disposition of the question concerning the statute of limitations, the only ground of the motion to dismiss upon which the District Court passed.
See 25 Ohio Jurisprudence 435-440 (1932).
See Note, 75 A. L. R. 203 (1931); Note, 35 Col. L. Rev. 762 (1935).
Whether notice by the Receiver to pay at a particular place could alter the conclusive situation as to where a cause of action might be considered to “arise” under other circumstances is a question we need not decide.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
A private citizen seeks to attach an asset belonging to Iran’s Ministry of Defense in order to help satisfy a judgment for money damages. The question raised is whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (Act), 28 U. S. C. § 1602 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. Ill), forbids that attachment.
The judgment for money damages consists of a default judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran (for about $300 million) that the private citizen, Dariush Elahi, obtained in a federal-court lawsuit claiming that the Republic had murdered his brother. Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103 (DC 2000). The asset is an arbitration award (against a third party), which Iran’s Ministry of Defense obtained in Switzerland. Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., 385 F. 3d 1206, 1211 (CA9 2004). The Ministry asked the Federal District Court for the Southern District of California to confirm the award. Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (2002). The court did so. And Elahi then intervened, seeking to impose a lien upon the award. The Ministry opposed the attachment on the ground that the Act grants it immunity from such a claim.
The Federal District Court rejected the Ministry’s immunity defense on the ground that, by suing to enforce the award, the Ministry had waived any such immunity. On appeal the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the District Court about waiver. But it then found against the Ministry on a different ground — a ground that the parties had not argued. The Act says that under certain conditions the property of an “agency or instrumentality ” of a foreign government is “not... immune from attachment ” if the agency is “engaged in commercial activity in the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1610(b) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals found that the Ministry engages in commercial activity and that the other conditions were satisfied. 385 F. 3d, at 1219-1222 (applying § 1610(b)(2)). And it held that this section of the Act barred the Ministry’s assertion of immunity. Ibid.
The Ministry filed a petition for certiorari asking us to review that decision. The Solicitor General agrees with the Ministry that we should grant the writ but limited to the Ministry’s Question 1, namely, whether “the property of a foreign state stricto sensu, situated in the United States,” is “immune from attachment ... as provided in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.” Pet. for Cert, i (citing §§ 1603(a), 1610(a)). The Solicitor General also asks us to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for consideration of whether the Ministry is simply a “foreign state” (what the Ministry calls “a foreign state stricto sensu”) or whether the Ministry is an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state (as the Ninth Circuit held). Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15-17. We grant the writ limited to Question 1.
The Act, as it applies to the “property in the United States of a foreign state,” § 1610(a) (emphasis added), does not contain the “engaged in commercial activity” exception that the Ninth Circuit described. That exception applies only where the property at issue is property of an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state. Compare § 1610(b) (“property ... of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity”) with § 1610(a) (“property ... of a foreign state . . . used for a commercial activity” (emphasis added)). The difference is critical. Moreover, in the Solicitor General’s view a defense ministry (unlike, say, a government-owned commercial enterprise) generally is not an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state but an inseparable part of the state itself. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8-11; see also Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F. 3d 148, 153 (CADC 1994) (“holding] that armed forces are as a rule so closely bound up with the structure of the state that they must in all cases be considered as the ‘foreign state’ itself, rather than a separate ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the state”).
We shall not now determine whether the Solicitor General is correct about the status of the Ministry, for the Ninth Circuit did not address the question nor did the parties argue the matter before the Circuit. Neither can we fault the Ministry for that failure. As we said, swpra, at 451, the District Court based its denial of immunity upon waiver. The parties’ Ninth Circuit briefs focused on matters not relevant here (such as the waiver question), with one exception. The exception consists of a footnote in Elahi’s brief mentioning the Act’s “agency and instrumentality” provision. That footnote, however, does not ask for affirmance on that basis; nor did it provide the Ministry with clear notice that a reply was necessary. Answering Brief for Appellee in No. .03-55015 (CA9), p. 45, n. 27 (stating that “[iff [the Ministry] is considered ‘an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,’ rather than the foreign state itself, Mr. Elahi’s attachment still is valid” (emphasis added)).
The Ninth Circuit said that it was free to affirm on “any ground supported by the record.” 385 F. 3d, at 1219, n. 15. But the court did not explain what in the record might demonstrate that the Ministry is an “agency or instrumentality” of the state rather than an integral part of the state itself. The court noted that “Elahi appears to concede” that the Ministry is an “agency and instrumentality,” id., at 1218, n. 13, but any relevant concession would have to have come from the Ministry, not from Elahi, whose position the concession favors. Thus, in implicitly concluding that the Ministry was an “agency or instrumentality” of the Republic of Iran within the meaning of § 1610(b), the Ninth Circuit either mistakenly relied on a concession by respondent that could not possibly bind petitioner, or else erroneously presumed that there was no relevant distinction between a foreign state and its agencies or instrumentalities for purposes of that subsection. See §§ 1603(a), (b). Either way, the Ninth Circuit committed error that was essential to its judgment in favor of respondent.
Because the Ninth Circuit did not consider, and the Ministry had no reasonable opportunity to argue, the critical legal point we have mentioned, we vacate the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927 (1995), we held that the Fourth Amendment incorporates the common-law requirement that police officers entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry. At the same time, we recognized that the “flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests,” id., at 934, and left “to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” id., at 936.
In this case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that police officers are never required to knock and announce their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony drug investigation. In so doing, it reaffirmed a pre-Wilson holding and concluded that Wilson did not preclude this per se rule. We disagree with the court’s conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permits a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for this entire category of criminal activity. But because the evidence presented to support the officers’ actions in this case establishes that the decision not to knock and announce was a reasonable one under the circumstances, we affirm the judgment of the Wisconsin court.
I
On December 31, 1991, police officers in Madison, Wisconsin, obtained a warrant to search Steiney Richards’ motel room for drugs and related paraphernalia. The search warrant was the culmination of an investigation that had uncovered substantial evidence that Richards was one of several individuals dealing drugs out of hotel rooms in Madison. The police requested a warrant that would have given advance authorization for a “no-knock” entry into the motel room, but the Magistrate explicitly deleted those portions of the warrant. App. 7, 9.
The officers arrived at the motel room at 3:40 a.m. Officer Pharo, dressed as a maintenance man, led the team. With him were several plainclothes officers and at least one man in uniform. Officer Pharo knocked on Richards’ door and, responding to the query from inside the room, stated that he was a maintenance man. With the chain still on the door, Richards cracked it open. Although there is some dispute as to what occurred next, Richards acknowledges that when he opened the door he saw the man in uniform standing behind Officer Pharo. Brief for Petitioner 6. He quickly slammed the door closed and, after waiting two or three seconds, the officers began kicking and ramming the door to gain entry to the locked room. At trial, the officers testified that they identified themselves as police while they were kicking the door in. App. 40. When they finally did break into the room, the officers caught Richards trying to escape through the window. They also found cash and cocaine hidden in plastic bags above the bathroom ceiling tiles.
Richards sought to have the evidence from his motel room suppressed on the ground that the officers had failed to knock and announce their presence prior to forcing entry into the room. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the officers could gather from Richards’ strange behavior when they first sought entry that he knew they were police officers and that he might try to destroy evidence or to escape. Id., at 54. The judge emphasized that the easily disposable nature of the drugs the police were searching for further justified their decision to identify themselves as they crossed the threshold instead of announcing their presence before seeking entry. Id., at 55. Richards appealed the decision to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and that court affirmed. 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 N. W. 2d 218 (1996).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not delve into the events underlying Richards’ arrest in any detail, but accepted the following facts: “[0]n December 31, 1991, police executed a search warrant for the motel room of the defendant seeking evidence of the felonious crime of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance in violation of Wis. Stat. § 161.41(lm) (1991-92). They did not knock and announce prior to their entry. Drugs were seized.” Id., at 849, 549 N. W. 2d, at 220.
Assuming these facts, the court proceeded to consider whether our decision in Wilson required the court to abandon its decision in State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 511 N. W. 2d 591 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U. S. 1102 (1995), which held that “when the police have a search warrant, supported by probable cause, to search a residence for evidence of delivery of drugs or evidence of possession with intent to deliver drugs, they necessarily have reasonable cause to believe exigent circumstances exist” to justify a no-knock entry. 201 Wis. 2d, at 852, 549 N. W. 2d, at 221. The court concluded that nothing in Wilson’s acknowledgment that the knock- and-announce rule was an element of the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” requirement would prohibit application of a per se exception to that rule in a category of cases. 201 Wis. 2d, at 854-855, 549 N. W. 2d, at 220.
In reaching this conclusion, the Wisconsin court found it reasonable — after considering criminal conduct surveys, newspaper articles, and other judicial opinions — to assume that all felony drug crimes will involve “an extremely high risk of serious if not deadly injury to the police as well as the potential for the disposal of drugs by the occupants prior to entry by the police.” Id., at 847-848, 549 N. W. 2d, at 219. Notwithstanding its acknowledgment that in “some cases, police officers will undoubtedly decide that their safety, the safety of others, and the effective execution of the warrant dictate that they knock and announce,” id., at 863, 549 N. W. 2d, at 225, the court concluded that exigent circumstances justifying a no-knock entry are always present in felony drug cases. Further, the court reasoned that the violation of privacy that occurs when officers who have a search warrant forcibly enter a residence without first announcing their presence is minimal, given that the residents would ultimately be without authority to refuse the police entry. The principal intrusion on individual privacy interests in such a situation, the court concluded, comes from the issuance of the search warrant, not the manner in which it is executed. Id., at 864-865, 549 N. W. 2d, at 226. Accordingly, the court determined that police in Wisconsin do not need specific information about dangerousness, or the possible destruction of drugs in a particular case, in order to dispense with the knock-and-announce requirement in felony drug cases.
Justice Abrahamson concurred in the judgment because, in her view, the facts found by the trial judge justified a no-knock entry. Id,., at 866-868, 549 N. W. 2d, at 227. Specifically, she noted that Richards’ actions in slamming the door when he saw the uniformed man standing behind Officer Pharo indicated that he already knew that the people knocking on his door were police officers. Under these circumstances, any further announcement of their presence would have been a useless gesture. Id., at 868-869, n. 3, 549 N. W. 2d, at 228, n. 3. While agreeing with the outcome, Justice Abrahamson took issue with her colleagues’ affirmation of the blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement in drug felony cases. She observed that the constitutional reasonableness of a search has generally been a matter left to the court, rather than to the officers who conducted the search, and she objected to the creation of a blanket rule that insulated searches in a particular category of crime from the neutral oversight of a reviewing judge. Id., at 868-875, 549 N. W. 2d, at 228-230.
II
We recognized in Wilson that the knock-and-announce requirement could give way “under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence,” or “where police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given.” 514 U. S., at 936. It is indisputable that felony drug investigations may frequently involve both of these circumstances. The question we must resolve is whether this fact justifies dispensing with case-by-case evaluation of the manner in which a search was executed.
The Wisconsin court explained its blanket exception as necessitated by the special circumstances of today’s drug culture, 201 Wis. 2d, at 863-866, 549 N. W. 2d, at 226-227, and the State asserted at oral argument that the blanket exception was reasonable in “felony drug cases because of the convergence in a violent and dangerous form of commerce of weapons and the destruction of drugs.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. But creating exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule based on the “culture” surrounding a general category of criminal behavior presents at least two serious concerns.
First, the exception contains considerable overgeneralization. For example, while drug investigation frequently does pose special risks to officer safety and the preservation of evidence, not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree. For example, a search could be conducted at a time when the only individuals present in a residence have no connection with the drug activity and thus will be unlikely to threaten officers or destroy evidence. Or the police could know that the drugs being searched for were of a type or in a location that made them impossible to destroy quickly. In those situations, the asserted governmental interests in preserving evidence and maintaining safety may not outweigh the individual privacy interests intruded upon by a no-knock entry. Wisconsin’s blanket rule imper-missibly insulates these cases from judicial review.
A second difficulty with permitting a criminal-category exception to the knock-and-announce requirement is that the reasons for creating an exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to others. Armed bank robbers, for example, are, by definition, likely to have weapons, and the fruits of their crime may be destroyed without too much difficulty. If a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a considerable — albeit hypothetical — risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement would be meaningless.
Thus, the fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular case. Instead, in each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement.
In order to justify a “no-knock” entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. This standard — as opposed to a probable-cause requirement — strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no-knock entries. Cf. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U. S. 325, 337 (1990) (allowing a protective sweep of a house during an arrest where the officers have “a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 30 (1968) (requiring a reasonable and articulable suspicion of danger to justify a patdown search). This showing is not high, but the police should be required to make it whenever the reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged.
III
Although we reject the Wisconsin court’s blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement, we conclude that the officers’ no-knock entry into Richards’ motel room did not violate the Fourth Amendment. We agree with the trial court, and with Justice Abrahamson, that the circumstances in this case show that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Richards might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so.
The judge who heard testimony at Richards’ suppression hearing concluded that it was reasonable for the officers executing the warrant to believe that Richards knew, after opening the door to his motel room the first time, that the men seeking entry to his room were the police. App. 54. Once the officers reasonably believed that Richards knew who they were, the court concluded, it was reasonable for them to force entry immediately given the disposable nature of the drugs. Id., at 55.
In arguing that the officers’ entry was unreasonable, Richards places great emphasis on the fact that the Magistrate who signed the search warrant for his motel room deleted the portions of the proposed warrant that would have given the officers permission to execute a no-knock entry. But this fact does not alter the reasonableness of the officers’ decision, which must be evaluated as of the time they entered the motel room. At the time the officers obtained the warrant, they did not have evidence sufficient, in the judgment of the Magistrate, to justify a no-knock warrant. Of course, the Magistrate could not have anticipated in every particular the circumstances that would confront the officers when they arrived at Richards’ motel room. These actual circumstances — petitioner’s apparent recognition of the officers combined with the easily disposable nature of the drugs— justified the officers’ ultimate decision to enter without first announcing their presence and authority.
Accordingly, although we reject the blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations, the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Several other state courts — in eases that predate our decision in Wilson — have adopted similar rules, concluding that simple probable cause to search a home for narcotics always allows the police to forgo the knock- and-announce requirement. See, e. g., People v. Lujan, 484 P. 2d 1238, 1241 (Colo. 1971) (en banc); Henson v. State, 236 Md. 519, 523-524, 204 A. 2d 516, 519-520 (1964); State v. Loucks, 209 N. W. 2d 772, 777-778 (N. D. 1973). Cf. People v. De Lago, 16 N. Y. 2d 289, 292, 213 N. E. 2d 659, 661 (1965) (similar rule for searches related to gambling operations), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 963 (1966).
This Court has encountered before the links between drugs and violence, see, e. g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 702 (1981), and the likelihood that drug dealers will attempt to dispose of drugs before police seize them, see, e. g., Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 28, n. 3 (1963).
Although our decision in Wilson did not address this issue directly, it is instructive that in that case — which involved a felony drug investigation — we remanded to the state court for further factual development to determine whether the no-knock entry was reasonable under the circumstances of the case. Two amicus briefs in Wilson suggested that we adopt just the sort of per se rule the Wisconsin court propounded here. Brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 10-11, Brief for Wayne County, Michigan, as Amicus Curiae 39-46, in Wilson v. Arkansas, O. T. 1994, No. 5707. Although the respondent did not argue for a categorical rule, the petitioner, in her reply brief, did address the arguments put forward by the dmicus briefs, Reply Brief for Petitioner in Wilson v. Arkansas, O. T. 1994, No. 5707, p. 11, and amici supporting the petitioner also presented arguments against a categorical rule. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae in Wilson v. Arkansas, O. T. 1994, No. 5707, p. 29, n. 44. Thus, while the prospect of a categorical rule was one to which we were alerted in Wilson, we did not choose to adopt such a rule at that time.
It is always somewhat dangerous to ground exceptions to constitutional protections in the social norms of a given historical moment. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness “is to preserve that degree of respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of their property that existed when the provision was adopted — even if a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusion ‘reasonable.’” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U. S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J,, concurring).
The State asserts that the intrusion on individual interests effectuated by a no-knock entry is minimal because the execution of the warrant itself constitutes the primary intrusion on individual privacy and that the individual privacy interest cannot outweigh the generalized governmental interest in effective and safe law enforcement. Brief for Respondent 21-24. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16 (“occupants’ privacy interest is necessarily limited to the brief interval between the officers’ announcement and their entry”). While it is true that a no-knoek entry is less intrusive than, for example, a warrantless search, the individual interests implicated by an unannounced, forcible entry should not be unduly minimized. As we observed in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927, 930-932 (1995), the common law recognized that individuals should be provided the opportunity to comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of property occasioned by a forcible entry. These interests are not inconsequential.
Additionally, when police enter a residence without announcing their presence, the residents are not given any opportunity to prepare themselves for such an entry. The State pointed out at oral argument that, in Wisconsin, most search warrants are executed during the late night and early morning hours. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. The brief interlude between announcement and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that an individual has to pull on clothes or get out of bed.
We note that the attorneys general of 26 States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Territory of Guam filed an amicus brief taking the position that the officers’ decision was reasonable under the specific facts of this ease, but rejecting Wisconsin’s per se rule. See Brief for Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae.
A number of States give magistrate judges the authority to issue “no-knoek” warrants if the officers demonstrate ahead of time a reasonable suspicion that entry without prior announcement will be appropriate in a particular context. See, e. g., 725 Ill. Comp. Stat., eh. 725, § 5/108-8 (1992); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-411 (1995); Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, §1228 (Supp. 1997); S. D. Codified Laws §23A-35-9 (1988); Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (1995). But see State v. Arce, 83 Ore. App. 185, 730 P. 2d 1260 (1986) (magistrate has no authority to abrogate knock-and-announce requirement); State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1994) (same).
The practice of allowing magistrates to issue no-knock warrants seems entirely reasonable when sufficient cause to do so can be demonstrated ahead of time. But, as the facts of this case demonstrate, a magistrate’s decision not to authorize a no-knoek entry should not be interpreted to remove the officers’ authority to exercise independent judgment concerning the wisdom of a no-knock entry at the time the warrant is being executed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1976, Congress authorized the noneonsensual referral to magistrates for a hearing and recommended findings “of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.” 28 U. S. C. § 636(b)(1)(B). We granted certiorari to decide whether that authorization includes cases alleging a specific episode of unconstitutional conduct by prison administrators or encompasses only challenges to ongoing prison conditions. 498 U. S. 1011 (1990).
In this case, petitioner brought suit against various prison officials alleging that, in violation of his constitutional rights, they used excessive force when they transferred him from one cell to another on July 13, 1982. App. 11-24. Petitioner waived a jury trial and initially consented to have a magistrate try the entire case pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 636(c)(1). See App. 7-8, 28-29. On the first day of trial, however, petitioner sought to withdraw his consent. Petitioner was permitted to withdraw his consent, but the Magistrate ruled that he was nonetheless authorized to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to submit proposed findings of fact and a recommended disposition to the District Court. See id., at 30-31.
After a hearing, the Magistrate recommended detailed findings and a judgment for defendants. Id., at 33-49. The District Court accepted the Magistrate’s recommendation and overruled petitioner’s objection to the Magistrate’s role. Id., at 54-55. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s determination that the Magistrate was authorized by § 636(b)(1)(B) to hold the hearing and to recommend findings. 906 F. 2d 835 (CA2 1990).
Petitioner contends that § 636(b)(1)(B) permits nonconsen-sual referrals to a magistrate only when a prisoner challenges ongoing prison conditions. Suits alleging that administrators acted unconstitutionally in an isolated incident, petitioner suggests, are not properly classified as “petitions challenging conditions of confinement.” § 636(b)(1)(B).
Petitioner advances two reasonable arguments for his construction of the statute. First, he maintains that the ordinary meaning of the words “conditions of confinement” includes continuous conditions and excludes isolated incidents. Second, he suggests that because a prisoner is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial in a damages action arising out of a specific episode of misconduct, it seems unlikely that Congress would authorize a nonconsensual reference to a magistrate in such a case. In our judgment, however, these arguments, although not without force, are overcome by other considerations.
We do not quarrel with petitioner’s claim that the most natural reading of the phrase “challenging conditions of confinement,” when viewed in isolation,' would not include suits seeking relief from isolated episodes of unconstitutional conduct. However, statutory language must always be read in its proper context. “In ascertaining the plain meaning of [a] statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281, 291 (1988). See also Crandon v. United States, 494 U. S. 152, 158 (1990) (“In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy”).
The text of the statute does not define the term “conditions of confinement” or contain any language suggesting that prisoner petitions should be divided into subcategories. On the contrary, when the relevant section is read in its entirety, it suggests that Congress intended to authorize the nonconsen-sual reference of all prisoner petitions to a magistrate. In pertinent part, the statute provides:
“(b)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary—
“(B) a judge may . . . designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, ... of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.” § 636(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
This description suggests Congress intended to include in their entirety the two primary categories of suits brought by prisoners — applications for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§2254 and 2255 and actions for monetary or in-junctive relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
Petitioner attempts to bolster his plain meaning argument with the suggestion that this Court has interpreted the words “conditions of confinement” to include the limitation that he suggests. We certainly presume that in 1976, when Congress selected this language, our elected representatives were familiar with our recently announced opinions concerning prisoner petitions. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696-697 (1979). However, the possibility that Congress was influenced in its choice of language by our opinions cuts against, rather than in favor of, the statutory reading advanced by petitioner.
All but one of the cases that petitioner claims support his reading were decided well after the enactment of § 636(b) (1)(B). The sole case identified by petitioner that predates the statute’s enactment did not even use the phrase “conditions of confinement” much less expound a narrow definition of it. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974).
Just three years before the statute was drafted, however, our opinion in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), had described two broad categories of prisoner petitions: (1) those challenging the fact or duration of confinement itself; and (2) those challenging the conditions of confinement. The statu-t.ory language from ,§ 636(b)(1)(B) that we emphasized above describes these same two categories. Significantly, our description in Preiser of the latter category unambiguously embraced the kind of single episode cases that petitioner’s construction would exclude. We wrote:
“The respondents place a great deal of reliance on our recent decisions upholding the right of state prisoners to bring federal civil rights actions to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 (1964); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639 (1968); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249 (1971); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972). But none of the state prisoners in those cases was challenging the fact or duration of his physical confinement itself, and none was seeking immediate release or a speedier release from that confinement — the heart of habeas corpus. In Cooper, the prisoner alleged that, solely because of his religious beliefs, he had been denied permission to purchase certain religious publications and had been denied other privileges enjoyed by his fellow prisoners. In Houghton, the prisoner’s contention was that prison authorities had violated the Constitution by confiscating legal materials which he had acquired for pursuing his appeal, but which, in violation of prison rules, had been found in the possession of another prisoner. In Wilwording, the prisoners’ complaints related solely to their living conditions and disciplinary measures while confined in maximum security. And in Haines, the prisoner claimed that prison officials had acted unconstitutionally by placing him in solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure, and he sought damages for claimed physical injuries sustained while so segregated. It is clear, then, that in all those cases, the prisoners’ claims related solely to the States’ alleged unconstitutional treatment of them while in confinement. None sought, as did the respondents here, to challenge the very fact or duration of the confinement itself. Those cases, therefore, merely establish that a §1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody. ” Id., at 498-499.
The denial of religious publications in Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 (1964), the confiscation of legal materials in Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639 (1968), and, most definitely, the placement of the prisoner in solitary confinement in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972), were all challenges to specific instances of unconstitutional conduct, and the Preiser Court described them as challenges to “conditions of confinement.”
Petitioner also claims that his narrow reading is supported by the fact that, in other legislation, Congress used the term “conditions of confinement” to mean ongoing situations. However, the fact that Congress may have used the term “conditions of confinement” in a different sense in legislation having a different purpose cannot control our interpretation of the language in this Act that so clearly parallels our Preiser opinion.
The broader reading we adopt also comports with the policy behind the Act. The central purpose of the 1976 amendment to the Magistrate’s Act was to authorize greater use of magistrates to assist federal judges “in handling an ever-increasing caseload.” S. Rep. No. 94-625, p. 2 (1976). The adoption of the definition of “conditions of confinement” that we had used in Preiser is consistent with this purpose because it will allow referral of a broader category of cases. Our reading also furthers the policy of the Act because its simplicity avoids the litigation that otherwise would inevitably arise in trying to identify the precise contours of petitioner’s suggested exception for single episode cases.
Petitioner’s definition would generate additional work for the district courts because the distinction between cases challenging ongoing conditions and those challenging specific acts of alleged misconduct will often be difficult to identify. The complaint filed by petitioner in this case illustrates the point. On the one hand, he alleged that the defendants injured him by making improper use of a chemical agent “commonly referred to by correctional sadists as ‘Big Red,’” App. 14, but on the other hand, he also complained of the absence of prison regulations governing the use of tear gas, and sought in-junctive relief as well as damages. Thus, this complaint, like many other prisoner petitions, could fairly be characterized as challenging both ongoing practices and a specific act of alleged misconduct.
We are not persuaded to alter our reading of the statute by petitioner’s argument based on the constitutional right to a jury trial. First, petitioner’s statutory reading would not eliminate the potential constitutional difficulty that he identifies. Petitioner concedes that, in some actions that would be considered “petitions challenging conditions of confinement” under his definition, the prisoner would nonetheless have a constitutional right to a jury trial that would render noncon-sensual referral constitutionally suspect. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 3. Second, and, more important, the statute properly interpreted is not constitutionally infirm. No constitutional question arises in cases like this one, in which the plaintiff has waived the right to a jury trial. And, in cases in which the jury right exists and is not waived, the lower courts, guided by the principle of constitutional avoidance, have consistently held that the statute does not authorize reference to a magistrate. See, e. g., Hall v. Sharpe, 812 F. 2d 644, 647-649 (CA11 1987); Archie v. Christian, 808 F. 2d 1132, 1136-1137 (CA5 1987) (en banc); Wimmer v. Cook, 774 F. 2d 68, 73-74 (CA4 1985).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 636(b)(1)(B) provides in relevant part:
“(b)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary—
“(B) a judge may . . . designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court,... of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement. ”
Title 28 U. S. C. § 636(e)(1) provides in relevant part:
“Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary—
“(1) Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate or a part-time United States magistrate who serves as a full-time judicial officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves."
See 18 U. S. C. § 4013(a)(4) (authorizing Attorney General to enter into contracts “to establish acceptable conditions of confinement” in state facilities housing federal detainees); 42 U. S. C. §§1997a(a), 1997c(a)(1) (authorizing Attorney General to initiate, or intervene in, injunctive actions challenging “egregious or flagrant conditions” in state prisons); 42 U. S. C. §§ 37C9a(b), 3769b(a)(1) (requiring state governments to develop a “plan for . . . improving conditions of confinement” as a precondition to receiving federal funds to “reliev[e] overcrowding [and] substandard conditions”).
“27. There is no standard reporting form for any chemical weapon other than mace used at [the Connecticut Correctional Institute at Somers, Connecticut (CCI-Somers)].” App. 15.
“30. There were no written directives governing the use of chemical weapons other than mace at the time this incident occurred.” Id., at 16.
“32. Written policy and procedure of the Department of Corrections and the Institution did not provide for the use of the tear gas duster." Id., at 17.
“42. At the time of the incident, neither the Administrative Directives nor the CCI-Somers Operational Directives contained a use of force doctrine. Neither addressed the use of the tear gas duster or other chemical weapons, except mace.” Id., at 18.
The complaint included a prayer for an injunction asking that defendants “immediately formulate and adopt rigid Directives restricting the use of Tear Gas and the weapon known as the Tear Gas Duster to riot situations involving multiple inmates or to situations where there exist barriers obstructing the use of mace[;] immediately formulate and adopt rigid Directives requiring the immediate post-incident treatment of inmates sprayed with tear gas including adequate medical treatment and shower facilities.” 7d.,at23.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Thomas
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and II-D, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-B and II-C, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Souter join.
This case presents the question whether Military Rule of Evidence 707, which makes polygraph evidence inadmissible in court-martial proceedings, unconstitutionally abridges the right of accused members of the military to present a defense. We hold that it does not.
I
In March 1992, respondent Edward Scheffer, an airman stationed at March Air Force Base in California, volunteered to work as an informant on drug investigations for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI). His OSI supervisors advised him that, from time to time during the course of his undercover work, they would ask him to submit to drug testing and polygraph examinations. In early April, one of the OSI agents supervising respondent requested that he submit to a urine test. Shortly after providing the urine sample, but before the results of the test were known, respondent agreed to take a polygraph test administered by an OSI examiner. In the opinion of the examiner, the test “indicated no deception” when respondent denied using drugs since joining the Air Force.
On April 30, respondent unaccountably failed to appear for work and could not be found on the base. He was absent without leave until May 13, when an Iowa state patrolman arrested him following a routine traffic stop and held him for return to the base. OSI agents later learned that respondent’s urinalysis revealed the presence of methamphetamine.
Respondent was tried by general court-martial on charges of using methamphetamine, failing to go to his appointed place of duty, wrongfully absenting himself from the base for 13 days, and, with respect to an unrelated matter, uttering 17 insufficient funds checks. He testified at trial on his own behalf, relying upon an “innocent ingestion” theory and denying that he had knowingly used drugs while working for OSI. On cross-examination, the prosecution attempted to impeach respondent with inconsistencies between his trial testimony and earlier statements he had made to OSI.
Respondent sought to introduce the polygraph evidence in support of his testimony that he did not knowingly use drugs. The military judge’ denied the motion, relying on Military Rule of Evidence 707, which provides, in relevant part:
“(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence.”
The military judge determined that Rule 707 was constitutional because “the President may, through the Rules of Evidence, determine that credibility is not an area in which a fact finder needs help, and the polygraph is not a process that has sufficient scientific acceptability to be relevant.” App. 28. He further reasoned that the factfinder might give undue weight to the polygraph examiner’s testimony, and that collateral arguments about such evidence could consume “an inordinate amount of time and expense.” Ibid.
Respondent was convicted on all counts and was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 80 months, total forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in all material respects, explaining that Rule 707 “does not arbitrarily limit the accused’s ability to present reliable evidence.” 41 M. J. 683, 691 (1995) (en banc).
By a 3-to-2 vote, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed. 44 M. J. 442 (1996). Without pointing to any particular language in the Sixth Amendment, the Court of Appeals held that “[a] per se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered by an accused to rebut an attack on his credibility . . . violates his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.” Id., at 445. Judge Crawford, dissenting, stressed that a defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not absolute, that relevant evidence can be excluded for valid reasons, and that Rule 707 was supported by a number of valid justifications. Id., at 449-451. We granted cer-tiorari, 520 U. S. 1227 (1997), and we now reverse.
II
A defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 410 (1988); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 55 (1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 295 (1973). A defendant’s interest in presenting such evidence may thus “ ‘bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.’ ” Rock, supra, at 55 (quoting Chambers, supra, at 295); accord, Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U. S. 145, 149 (1991). As a result, state and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials. Such rules do not abridge an accused’s right to present a defense so long as they are not “arbitrary” or “disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Rock, supra, at 56; accord, Lucas, supra, at 151. Moreover, we have found the exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused. See Rock, supra, at 58; Chambers, supra, at 302; Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 22-23 (1967).
Rule 707 serves several legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. These interests include ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced at trial, preserving the court members’ role in determining credibility, and avoiding litigation that is collateral to the primary purpose of the trial. The Rule is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate in promoting these ends. Nor does it implicate a sufficiently weighty interest of the defendant to raise a constitutional concern under our precedents.
A
State and Federal Governments unquestionably have a legitimate interest in ensuring that reliable evidence is presented to the trier of fact in a criminal trial. Indeed, the exclusion of unreliable evidence is a principal objective of many evidentiary rules. See, e. g., Fed. Rules Evid. 702, 802, 901; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 589 (1993).
The contentions of respondent and the dissent notwithstanding, there is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable. To this day, the scientific community remains extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph techniques. 1 D. Faigman, D. Kaye, M. Saks, & J. Sanders, Modern Scientific Evidence 565, n. †, § 14-2.0 to §14-7.0 (1997); see also 1 P. Giannelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence § 8-2(C), pp. 225-227 (2d ed. 1993) (hereinafter Giannelli & Imwinkelried); 1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 206, p. 909 (4th ed. 1992) (hereinafter McCormick). Some studies have concluded that polygraph tests overall are accurate and reliable. See, e.g., S. Abrams, The Complete Polygraph Handbook 190-191 (1989) (reporting the overall accuracy rate from laboratory studies involving the common “control question technique” polygraph to be “in the range of 87 percent”). Others have found that polygraph tests assess truthfulness significantly less accurately — that scientific field studies suggest the accuracy rate of the “control question technique” polygraph is “little better than could be obtained by the toss of a coin,” that is, 50 percent. See lacono & Lykken, The Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph Techniques: The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in 1 Modern Scientific Evidence, supra, § 14-5.3, at 629 (hereinafter lacono & Lykken).
This lack of scientific consensus is reflected in the disagreement among state and federal courts concerning both the admissibility and the reliability of polygraph evidence. Although some Federal Courts of Appeals have abandoned the per se rule excluding polygraph evidence, leaving its admission or exclusion to the discretion of district courts under Daubert, see, e. g., United States v. Posado, 57 F. 3d 428, 434 (CA5 1995); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F. 3d 225, 228 (CA9 1997), at least one Federal Circuit has recently reaffirmed its per se ban, see United States v. Sanchez, 118 F. 3d 192, 197 (CA4 1997), and another recently noted that it has “not decided whether polygraphy has reached a sufficient state of reliability to be admissible.” United States v. Messina, 131 F. 3d 36, 42 (CA2 1997). Most States maintain per se rules excluding polygraph evidence. See, e. g., State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 92-95, 698 A. 2d 739, 758-759 (1997); People v. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d 191, 202-204, 632 N. E. 2d 1026, 1032 (1994); In re Odell, 672 A. 2d 457, 459 (RI 1996) (per curiam); Perkins v. State, 902 S. W. 2d 88, 94-95 (Ct. App. Tex. 1995). New Mexico is unique in making polygraph evidence generally admissible without the prior stipulation of the parties and without significant restriction. See N. M. Rule Evid. § 11-707. Whatever their approach, state and federal courts continue to express doubt about whether such evidence is reliable. See, e.g., United States v. Messina, supra, at 42; United States v. Posado, supra, at 434; State v. Porter, supra, at 126-127, 698 A. 2d, at 774; Perkins v. State, supra, at 94; People v. Gard, supra, at 202-204, 632 N. E. 2d, at 1032; In re Odell, supra, at 459.
The approach taken by the President in adopting Rule 707 — excluding polygraph evidence in all military trials — is a rational and proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence. Although the degree of reliability of polygraph evidence may depend upon a variety of identifiable factors, there is simply no way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph examiner’s conclusion is accurate, because certain doubts and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph exams. Individual jurisdictions therefore may reasonably reach differing conclusions as to whether polygraph evidence should be admitted. We cannot say, then, that presented with such widespread uncertainty, the President acted arbitrarily or disproportionately in promulgating a per se rule excluding all polygraph evidence.
B
It is equally clear that Rule 707 serves a second legitimate governmental interest: Preserving the court members’ core function of making credibility determinations in criminal trials. A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that “the jury is the lie detector.” United States v. Barnard, 490 F. 2d 907, 912 (CA9 1973) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 416 U. S. 959 (1974). Determining the weight and credibility of witness testimony, therefore, has long been held to be the “part of every case [that] belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fittéd for it by their natural intelligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76, 88 (1891).
By its very nature, polygraph evidence may diminish the jury’s role in making credibility determinations. The common form of polygraph test measures a variety of physiological responses to a set of questions asked by the examiner, who then interprets these physiological correlates of anxiety and offers an opinion to the jury about whether the witness — often, as in this case, the accused — was deceptive in answering questions about the very matters at issue in the trial. See 1 McCormick §206. Unlike other expert witnesses who testify about factual matters outside the jurors’ knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth. Jurisdictions, in promulgating rules of evidence, may legitimately be concerned about the risk that juries will give excessive weight to the opinions of a polygrapher, clothed as they are in scientific expertise and at times offering, as in respondent’s case, a conclusion about the ultimate issue in the trial. Such jurisdictions may legitimately determine that the aura of infallibility attending polygraph evidence can lead jurors to abandon them duty to assess credibility and guilt. Those jurisdictions may also take into account the fact that a judge cannot determine, when ruling on a motion to admit polygraph evidence, whether a particular polygraph expert is likely to influence the jury unduly. For these reasons, the President is within his constitutional prerogative to promulgate a per se rule that simply excludes all such evidence.
C
A third legitimate interest served by Rule 707 is avoiding litigation over issues other than the guilt or innocence of the accused. Such collateral litigation prolongs criminal trials and threatens to distract the jury from its central function of determining guilt or innocence. Allowing proffers of polygraph evidence would inevitably entail assessments of such issues as whether the test and control questions were appropriate, whether a particular polygraph examiner was qualified and had properly interpreted the physiological responses, and whether other factors such as countermeasures employed by the examinee had distorted the exam results. Such assessments would be required in each and every case. It thus offends no constitutional principle for the President to conclude that a per se rule excluding all polygraph evidence is appropriate. Because litigation over the admissibility of polygraph evidence is by its very nature collateral, a per se rule prohibiting its admission is not an arbitrary or disproportionate means of avoiding it.
D
The three of our precedents upon which the Court of Appeals principally relied, Rock v. Arkansas, Washington v. Texas, and Chambers v. Mississippi, do not support a right to introduce polygraph evidence, even in very narrow circumstances. The exclusions of evidence that we declared unconstitutional in those eases significantly undermined fundamental elements of the defendant’s defense. Such is not the ease here.
In Rock, the defendant, accused of a killing to which she was the only eyewitness, was allegedly able to remember the facts of the killing only after having her memory hypnotically refreshed. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S., at 46. Because Arkansas excluded all hypnotically refreshed testimony, the defendant was unable to testify about certain relevant facts, including whether the killing had been accidental. See id., at 47-49. In holding that the exclusion of this evidence violated the defendant’s “right to present a defense,” we noted that the rule deprived the jury of the testimony of the only witness who was at the scene and had firsthand knowledge of the facts. See id., at 57. Moreover, the rule infringed upon the defendant’s interest in testifying in her own defense — an interest that we deemed particularly significant, as it is the defendant who is the target of any criminal prosecution. See id., at 52. For this reason, we stated that a defendant ought to be allowed “to present his own version of events in his own words.” Ibid.
In Washington, the statutes involved prevented co-defendants or coparticipants in a crime from testifying for one another and thus precluded the defendant from introducing his accomplice’s testimony that the accomplice had in fact committed the crime. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S., at 16-17. In reversing Washington’s conviction, we held that the Sixth Amendment was violated because “the State arbitrarily denied [the defendant] the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed.” Id., at 23.
In Chambers, we found a due process violation in the combined application of Mississippi’s common-law “voucher rule,” which prevented a party from impeaching his own witness, and its hearsay rule that excluded the testimony of three persons to whom that witness had confessed. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S., at 302. Chambers specifically confined its holding to the “facts and circumstances” presented in that case; we thus stressed that the ruling did not “signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures.” Id., at 302-303. Chambers therefore does not stand for the proposition that the defendant is denied a fair opportunity to defend himself whenever a state or federal rule excludes favorable evidence.
Rock, Washington, and Chambers do not require that Rule 707 be invalidated, because, unlike the evidentiary rules at issue in those cases, Rule 707 does not implicate any significant interest of the accused. Here, the court members heard all the relevant details of the charged offense from the perspective of the accused, and the Rule did not preclude him from introducing any factual evidence. Rather, respondent was barred merely from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility. Moreover, in contrast to the rule at issue in Rock, Rule 707 did not prohibit respondent from testifying on his own behalf; he freely exercised his choice to convey his version of the facts to the court-martial members. We therefore cannot conclude that respondent’s defense was significantly impaired by the exclusion of polygraph evidence. Rule 707 is thus constitutional under our precedents.
•I'
For the foregoing reasons, Military Rule of Evidence 707 does not unconstitutionally abridge the right to present a defense. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
The OSI examiner asked three relevant questions: (1) “Since you’ve been in the [Air Force], have you used any illegal drugs?”; (2) “Have you lied about any of the drug information you’ve given OSI?”; and (3) “Besides your parents, have you told anyone you’re assisting OSI?” Respondent answered “no” to each question. App. 12.
Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice authorizes the President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, see U. S. Const., Art. II, §2, to promulgate rules of evidence for military courts: “Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof,... may he prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.” 10 U. S. C. § 836(a).
In this Court, respondent cites the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause as the specific constitutional provision supporting his claim. He also briefly contends that the “combined effect” of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments confers upon him the right to a “‘meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,’” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 683, 690 (1986) (citations omitted), and that this light in turn encompasses a constitutional right to present polygraph evidence to holster his credibility.
The words “defendant” and “jury” are used throughout in reference to general principles of law and in discussing nonmilitary precedents. In reference to this ease or to the military specifically, the terms “court,” “court members,” or “court-martial” are used throughout, as is the military term “accused,” rather than the civilian term “defendant.”
These interests, among others, were recognized hy the drafters of Rule 707, who justified the Rule on the following grounds: the risk that court members would be misled by polygraph evidence; the risk that the traditional responsibility of court members to ascertain the facts and adjudge guilt or innocence would be usurped; the danger that confusion of the issues “‘could result in the court-martial degenerating into a trial of the polygraph machine;’ ” the likely waste of time on collateral issues; and the fact that the ‘“reliability of polygraph evidence has not been sufficiently established.’” See 41 M. J. 683, 686 (USAR Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence, App. 22, p. A22-46 (1994 ed.)).
The United States notes that in 1983 Congress’ Office of Technology Assessment evaluated all available studies on the reliability of polygraphs and concluded that “'[ojverall, the cumulative research evidence suggests that when used in criminal investigations, the polygraph test detects deception better than chance, but with error rates that could be considered significant.’ ” Brief for United States 21 (quoting U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation — A Technical Memorandum 5 (OTA-TM-H-15, Nov. 1983)). Respondent, however, contends current research shows polygraph testing is reliable more than 90 percent of the time. Brief for Respondent 22, and n. 19 (citing J. Matte, Forensic Psychophysiology Using the Polygraph 121-129 (1996)). Even if the basic debate about the reliability of polygraph technology itself were resolved, however, there would still be controversy over the efficacy of countermeasures, or deliberately adopted strategies that a polygraph examinee can employ to provoke physiological responses that will obscure accurate readings and thus “fool” the polygraph machine and the examiner. See, e.g., lacono & Lykken §14-3.0.
Until quite recently, federal and state courts were uniform in categorically ruling polygraph evidence inadmissible under the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (CADO 1923), which held that scientific evidence must gain the general acceptance of the relevant expert community to be admissible. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993), we held that Frye had been superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence and that expert testimony could be admitted if the district court deemed it both relevant and reliable.
Prior to Daubert, neither federal nor state courts found any Sixth Amendment obstacle to the categorical rule. See, e. g., Bashor v. Risley, 730 F. 2d 1228, 1238 (CA9), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 838 (1984); People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 419-420, 821 P. 2d 610, 663 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 851 (1992). Nothing in Daubert foreclosed, as a constitutional matter, per se exclusionary rules for certain types of expert or scientific evidence. It would be an odd inversion of our hierarchy of laws if altering or interpreting a rule of evidence worked a corresponding change in the meaning of the Constitution.
Respondent argues that because the Government — and in particular the Department of Defense — routinely uses polygraph testing, the Government must consider polygraphs reliable. Governmental use of polygraph tests, however, is primarily in the field of personnel screening, and to a lesser extent as a tool in criminal and intelligence investigations, but not as evidence at trials. See Brief for United States 34, n. 17; Barland, The Polygraph Test in the USA and Elsewhere, in The Polygraph Test 76 (A. Gale ed. 1988). Such limited, out of court uses of polygraph techniques obviously differ in character from, and carry less severe consequences than, the use of polygraphs as evidence in a criminal trial. They do not establish the reliability of polygraphs as trial evidence, and they do not invalidate reliability as a valid concern supporting Rule 707’s categorical ban.
The examiner interprets various physiological responses of the exami-nee, including blood pressure, perspiration, and respiration, while asking a series of questions, commonly in three categories: direct accusatory questions concerning the matter under investigation, irrelevant or neutral questions, and more general “control” questions concerning wrongdoing by the subject in general. The examiner forms an opinion of the subject’s truthfulness by comparing the physiological reactions to each set of questions. See generally Giannelli & Imwinkelried 219-222; Honts & Quick, The Polygraph in 1995: Progress in Science and the Law, 71 N. L. L. Rev. 987, 990-992 (1995).
Although some of this litigation could take place outside the presence of the jury, at the very least a foundation must be laid for the jury to assess the qualifications and skill of the polygrapher and the validity of the exam, and significant cross-examination could occur on these issues.
Although the Court of Appeals stated that it had "merely remove[d] the obstacle of the per se rule against admissibility” of polygraph evidence in cases where the accused wishes to proffer an exculpatory polygraph to rebut an attack on his credibility, 44 M. J. 442, 446 (1996), and respondent thus implicitly argues that the Constitution would require collateral litigation only in such cases, we cannot see a principled justification whereby a right derived from the Constitution could be so narrowly contained.
In addition, we noted that the State of Texas could advance no legitimate interests in support of the evidentiary rules at issue, and those rules burdened only the defense and not the prosecution. See 388 U. S., at 22-23. Rule 707 suffers from neither of these defects.
The dissent suggests, post, at 331, that polygraph results constitute “factual evidence.” The raw results of a polygraph exam — the subject’s pulse, respiration, and perspiration rates — may be factual data, but these are not introduced at trial, and even if they were, they would not be “facts” about the alleged crime at hand. Rather, the evidence introduced is the expert opinion testimony of the polygrapher about whether the subject was truthful or deceptive in answering questions about the alleged crime. A per se rule excluding polygraph results therefore does not prevent an accused — just as it did not prevent respondent here — from introducing factual evidence or testimony about the crime itself, such as alibi witness testimony, see ibid. For the same reasons, an expert poly-grapher’s interpretation of polygraph results is not evidence of “‘the accused’s whole conduct,’ ” see post, at 336, to which Dean Wigmore referred. It is not evidence of the “‘accused’s ... conduct’” at all, much less “conduct” concerning the actual crime at issue. It is merely the opinion of a witness with no knowledge about any of the facts surrounding the alleged crime, concerning whether the defendant spoke truthfully or deceptively on another occasion.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Pro se petitioner Maria L. Gaydos seeks leave to proceed informa pauperis and requests this Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering (1) the Clerk of the District Court for the District of New Jersey to file her Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit challenging this Court’s orders in 10 previous cases in which Gaydos was denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis under this Court’s Rule 39.8; (2) the disqualification of William T. Walsh, Clerk of the District Court, and William K. Suter, Clerk of this Court; and (3) the issuance of summons under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. In the alternative, she asks this Court to exercise its original jurisdiction over her FOIA suit because her complaint concerns this Court’s orders.
We deny petitioner’s requests. Petitioner is allowed until December 23, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. For the reasons discussed below, we direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or for extraordinary writs in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless she first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1.
Petitioner has a history of frivolous, repetitive filings. She has been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis 10 times, and she has filed at least 8 other petitions. This most recent petition is nearly incomprehensible, and alludes to, among other things, fraud by the staff of this Court and impending impeachment proceedings against Clerks Walsh and Suter in the House of Representatives. We also note that the relief she purports to seek has already been granted: The District Court docketed petitioner’s FOIA complaint as Case No. 96-CV-42435 on September 9, 1996, and promptly dismissed it “in its entirety” the following week.
We enter the order barring future in forma pauperis filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992). Because petitioner has limited her abuse of our processes to nonerimi-nal cases, we limit our sanction accordingly.
It is so ordered.
Rule 39.8 provides: “If satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ... is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have set aside cease-and-desist orders of the Federal Trade Commission prohibiting respondent insurance companies from carrying on certain advertising practices found by the Commission to be false, misleading, and deceptive, in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45. These orders seek to proscribe activities within the boundaries of States that have their own statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive insurance practices as well as within States that do not. The courts below concluded that in view of the existence of these statutes, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011— 1015, prohibits the Federal Trade Commission from regulating such practices within the States having these statutes. We granted certiorari to review this interpretation of an important federal statute. 355 U. S. 867.
Respondents, the National Casualty Company in No. 435 and the American Hospital and Life Insurance Company in No. 436, engage in the sale of health and accident insurance. National is licensed to sell policies in all States, as well as the District of Columbia and Hawaii, while American is licensed in fourteen States. Solicitation of business for National is carried on by independent agents who operate on commission. The company’s advertising material is prepared by it and shipped in bulk to these agents, who distribute the material locally and assume the expense of such dissemination. Only an insubstantial amount of any advertising goes directly by mail from the company to the public, and there is no use of radio, television, or other means of mass communication by the company. American does not materially differ from National in method of operation.
The pertinent portions of the McCarran-Ferguson Act are set forth in the margin. An examination of that statute and its legislative history establishes that the Act withdrew from the Federal Trade Commission the authority to regulate respondents’ advertising practices in those States which are regulating those practices under their own laws.
Petitioner asserts that for constitutional reasons the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be construed to authorize federal regulation in these cases. It is urged that because Congress understood that in accordance with due process there are territorial limitations on the power of the States to regulate an interstate business, it did not intend to foreclose federal regulation of interstate insurance as a supplement to state action. However, petitioner concedes that this constitutional infirmity on the power of the States does not operate to hinder state regulation of the advertising practices of the respondents in the instant cases. Whatever may have been the intent of Congress with regard to interstate insurance practices which the States cannot for constitutional reasons regulate effectively, that intent is irrelevant in the cases before us. Respondents’ advertising programs require distribution by their local agents, and there is no question but that the States possess ample means to regulate this adver-) tising within their respective boundaries. Cf., e. g., Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440, 445, n. 6, 461.
Petitioner also argues in a different vein that even if the McCarran-Ferguson Act bars federal regulation where state regulation has been effectively applied, the exercise of Commission authority in these cases should be upheld because the States have not “regulated” within the meaning of the Section 2 (b) proviso. This argument is not persuasive in the instant cases. Each State in question has enacted prohibitory legislation which proscribes unfair insurance advertising and authorizes enforcement through a scheme of administrative supervision. Petitioner does not argue that the statutory provisions here under review were mere pretense. Rather, it urges that a general prohibition designed to guarantee certain standards of conduct is too “inchoate” to be “regulation” until that prohibition has been crystallized into “administrative elaboration of these standards and application in individual cases.” However, assuming there is some difference in the McCarran-Ferguson Act between “legislation” and “regulation,” nothing in the language of that Act or its legislative history supports the distinctions drawn by petitioner. So far as we can determine from the records and arguments in these cases, the proviso in Section 2 (b) has been satisfied.
The judgments of the Courts of Appeals are
Affirmed.
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reported at 243 F. 2d 719. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reported at 245 F. 2d 883.
“That the Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
“Sec. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
“(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the Clayton Act, and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act . . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law. . . .” 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 61 Stat. 448, 70 Stat. 908.
The crucial proviso in Section 2 (b) was the subject of extended debate. See, especially, the remarks of Senator McCarran, 91 Cong. Rec. 1443, and Senator Ferguson, 91 Cong. Rec. 1481. A substantial amount of material appears during the formulating period of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., and the remarks of Senators Ferguson, Murdock, and Radcliffe, 91 Cong. Rec. 482-483, and of Representatives Hancock and Gwynne, 91 Cong. Rec. 1087, 1089-1090.
Cf., e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, and 91 Cong. Rec. 1442.
See also Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313; Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53.
At the time the complaints were filed thirty-six States had enacted the “Model Unfair Trade Practices Bill for Insurance.” Eight others had statutes essentially the same in effect as the “Model Bill.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires our further consideration of the family partnership problem. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that the entire income from-a partnership allegedly entered into by respondent and his four sons must be taxed to respondent, and the Tax Court sustained that determination. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 168 F. 2d 979. We granted certiorari, 335 U. S. 883, to consider the Commissioner’s claim that thq. principles of Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946), and Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U. S. 293 (1946), have been departed from in this and other courts of appeals decisions.
Respondent taxpayer is a rancher. From 1915 until October 1939, he had operated a cattle business in partnership with R. S. Coon. Coon, who had numerous business interests in the Southwest and had largely financed the partnership, was 79 years old in 1939 and desired to dissolve the partnership because of ill health. To that end, the bulk of the partnership herd was sold until, in October of that year, only about 1,500 head remained. These cattle were all registered Herefords, the brood or foundation herd. Culbertson wished to keep these cattle and approached Coon with an. ffer of $65 a head. Coon agreed to sell at that price, Dut only upon condition that Culbertson would sell an undivided one-half interest in the herd to his four sons at the same price. His reasons for imposing this condition were his intense interest in maintaining the Hereford strain which he and Culbertson had developed, his conviction that Culbertson was too old to carry on the work alone, and his personal interest in the Culbertson boys. Culbertson’s sons were enthusiastic about the proposition, so respondent thereupon bought the remaining cattle from the Coon and Culbertson partnership for $99,440. Two days later. Culbertson sold an undivided one-half interest to the four boys, and the following day they gave their father a note for $49,720 at 4 per cent interest due one year from date. Several months later a new note for $57,674 was executed by the boys to replace the earlier note. The increase in amount covered the purchase by Culbertson and his sons of other properties formerly owned by Coon and Culbertson. This note was paid by the boys in the following manner:
Credit for overcharge................. $5,930
Gifts from respondent................ 21,744
One-half of a loan procured by Culbertson & Sons partnership...........:.. 30,000
The loan was repaid from the proceeds from operation of the ranch.
The partnership agreement between taxpayer ánd his sons was oral. The local paper announced ,the dissolution of the Coon and Culbertson partnership and the continuation of the business by respondent and his boys under the name of Culbertson &.Sons. A bank.account was opened in this name, upon which taxpayer, his four sons and a bookkeeper could check. At the time of formation of the new partnérship, Culbertson’s oldest son was 24 years old, married, and living on the ranch, of which he had for two years been foreman under the Coon and Culbertson partnership. He was a college graduate and received $100 a month plus board and lodging for himself and his wife both before and after formation-of Culbertson & Sons and until entering the Army. The second son was 22 years old, was married and finished college in 1940, the first year'during which the new part-, nership operated. He went directly into the Army following graduation and rendered no services to the partnership. The two younger sons, who were 18 and Í6 years old respectively in 1940, went to school during the winter and worked on the ranch during the summer.
The tax years here involved are 1940 and 1941. A partnership return was filed for both years indicating a division of income approximating the capital attributed to each partner. It is the disallowance of this division of the income from the ranch that brings this case into the courts.
First. The Tax Court read our decisions in Commissioner v. Tower, supra, and Lusthaus v. Commissioner, supra, as setting out two essential tests of partnership for income-tax purposes: that each partner contribute to the partnership either vital services or capital originating with him. Its decision was based upon a finding that none of respondent’s sons had satisfied those requirements during the tax years in question. Sanction for the use of these “tests” of partnership is sought in this paragraph from our opinion in the Tower case:
“There can be no question that a wife and a husband may, under certain circumstances, become partners for tax, as for other, purposes. If she either invests capital originating with hér or substantially contributes to the control and management of the business, or otherwise performs vital additional services, or does all of these things she may be a partner as contemplated by 26 U. S. C. §§ 181, 182. The Tax Court has recognized that under such circumstances the income belongs to the wife. A wife may become a general or a limited partner with her husband. But when she does not share in the management and control of the business, contributes no vital additional service,, and where the husband purports in some way to have given her a partnership interest, the Tax Court may properly take these circumstances into consideration in determining whether the partnership is real within the meaning of the federal revenue laws.” 327 U. S. at 290.
It is the Commissioner’s contention that the Tax Court’s decision can and should be reinstated upon the mere reaffirmation of the quoted paragraph.
The Court of Appeals; on the other hand, was of the opinion that a family partnership entered into without thought of tax avoidance should be given recognition tax-wise whether or not it ¿was intended that some of the partners contribute either capital or services during the tax year and whether or not they actually made such-contributions, since, it was formed “with the full expectation and purpose that the boys would, in the future, contribute their , time and services to the partnership.” We must consider, therefore, whether an intention to contribute capital or services sometime in the future is sufficient to satisfy ordinary concepts of partnership, as required by the Tower case. The sections of the Internal Revenue Code involved are §§ 181 and 182, which set out the method of taxing partnership income, and §§11 and 22 (a), which relate to the taxation of individual incomes.
In the Tower case we held that, despite the claimed partnership, the evidence fully justified the Tax Court’s holding that the husband, through his ownership of the capital and his management of the business, actually created the right to receive and enjoy the benefit of the income and was thus taxable upon that entire income under §§ 11 and 22 (a). In such case, other members of the partnership cannot be considered “Individuals carrying on business in partnership” and thus “liable for income tax ... in their individual capacity” within the meaning of § 181. If it is conceded that some of the partners contributed neither capital nor services to the partnership during the tax years in question, as the Court of Appeals was apparently willing to do in the present case, it can hardly be contended that they are in any way responsible for the production of income during those years. - The partnership sections of the Code are, of course, geared to the sections relating to taxation of individual income, since no tax is imposed upon partnership income as such. To hold that “Individuals carrying on business in partnership” includes persons who contribute nothing during the tax period would viola té the first principle of income taxation: that income must be taxed to him who earns it. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940); National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U. S. 422 (1949).
Furthermore, our decision in Commissioner v. Tower, supra, clearly indicates the importance of participation in the business by the partners during the tax year. We there said that a partnership is created “when persons join together their money, goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying oñ a trade, profession, or business and when there is community of interest in the' profits and-losses.” Id. at 286. This is, after all, but the application of an often iterated definition of income — the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined — to a particular form of business organization. A partnership is, in other words, an organization for the production of income to which each partner contributes one or both of the ingredients of income — capital or services. Ward v. Thompson, 22 How. 330, 334 (1859). The intent to provide money, goods, labor, or skill sometime in the future- cannot meet the demands of §§11 and 22 (a) of the Code that he who- presently earns the income through his own labor and skill and the utilization of his own capital, be taxed therefor. The vagaries of human experience preclude reliance upon even good faith intent as to future conduct as a basis for the present taxation of income.
Second. We turn next to a consideration of the Tax Court’s approach to the family partnership problem. It treated as essential to membership in a family partnership for tax purposes the contribution of either “vital services” or “original capital.” Use of these “tests” of partnership indicates, at best, an error in emphasis. It ignores what we said is the ultimate question for decision, namely ^“whether the partnership is real within the meaning of the federal revenue laws” and makes decisive what we described as “circumstances [to be taken] into consideration” in making that determination.
The Tower case thus provides no support for such an approach. We there said that the question whether the family partnership is real for income-tax purposes depends upon
“whether the partners really and truly intended to join together for the purpose of carrying on business and sharing in the profits or losses or both. And their intention in this respect is a question of fact, to be determined from testimony disclosed by their ‘agreement, considered as a whole, and by their conduct in execution of its provisions.’ Drennen v. London Assurance Co., 113 U. S. 51, 56; Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 268. We see no reason why this general rule should not apply in tax cases where the Government challenges the existence of a partnership for tax purposes.” 327 U. S. at 287.
The question is not whether the services or capital contributed by a partner are of sufficient importance to meet some objective standard supposedly established by the Tower, case, but whether, considering all the facts — the agreement, the conduct of the parties in execution of its provisions, their statements, the testimony of disinterested persons, the relationship of the parties, their respective abilities and capital contributions, the actual control of income and the purposes for which it is used, and any other facts throwing light on their true intent — the parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise. There is nothing new or particularly difficult about such a test. Triers of fact are constantly called upon to determine the intent with which a person acted. The Tax Court, for example, must make such a determination in every estate tax case in which it is contended that a transfer was made in contemplation of death, for “The question, necessarily, is as to the state of mind of the donor.” United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 117 (1931). See Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 326 U. S. 630 (1946). Whether the parties really intended to carry on business as partners is not, we' think, any more difficult of determination or the manifestations of such intent any less perceptible than is ordinarily true of inquiries into the subjective.
But the Tax Court did not view the question as one concerning the-bona fide intent of the parties to join together as partners. Not once in its opinion is there even an oblique reference to any lack of intent on the part of respondent and his sons to combine their capital and services “for the purpose of .arrying on the business.” Instead, the court, focusing entirely upon concepts of “vital services” and “original capital,” simply decided that the alleged partners had not satisfied those tests when the facts were compared with those in the Tower case. The court’s opinion is replete with such statements as “we discern nothing constituting what we think is a requisite contribution to a real partnership,” “we find no son adding ‘vital additional service’ which would take the place of capital contributed because of formation of a partnership,” and “the sons made no capital contribution, within the sense of the Tower case.” 6 CCH TCM 698, 699.
• Unquestionably a court’s determination that the services cpntribiited by a partner are not “vital” and that he has not participated in “managemént and control of the business” or contributed “original capital” has the effect of placing a heavy burden on the taxpayer to show the bona fide intent of the parties to join together as partners. But such a determination is not conclusive, and that is the vice in the “tests” adopted by the Tax Court. It assumes that there is no room for an honest difference of opinion as to whether the services or capital furnished by the alleged partner are of sufficient importance to justify his inclusion in the partnership. If, upon a consideration of all the facts, it is found that the partners joined together in good faith to conduct a business, having agreed that the services or capital to. be contributed presently by each is of such value to the partnership that the contributor should participate in the distribution of profits, that is sufficient. The Tower case did not purport to authorize the Tax Court to substitute its judgment for that of the parties; it simply furnished some guides to the determination of their true intent. Even though it was admitted in the Tower case that the wife contributed no original capital, management of the business, or other vital services, this Court did not say as a matter of law that there was no valid partnership. We said, instead, that “There was, thus, more than ample evidence to support the Tax Court’s finding that no genuine union for partnership business purposes was ever intended and that the husband earned the income.” 327 U. S. at 292. (Italics added.)
Third. The Tax Court’s isolation op “original capital” as an essential of membership in- a family partnership also indicates an erroneous reading of the Tower opinion. We did not say that the donee of an intra-family gift could never become a partner through investment of the capital in the family partnership, any more than we said that all family trusts are invalid for tax purposes in Helvering v. Clifford, supra. The facts may indicate, on the contrary, that the amount thus contributed and the income therefrom should be considered the property of the donee for tax, as well as general law, purposes/' In the Tower and Lusthaus cases this Court, applying the principles of Lucas v. Earl, supra; Helvering v. Clifford, supra; and Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, found that the purported gift, whether or not technically complete, had made no substantial change in the economic relation of members of the family to' the income. In'each case the husband continued to manage and control the business as before, and income from the property given to the wife and invested by her in the. partnership continued to be used in the. business or expended for family purposes. . We characterized the results of the transactions entered into between Jiusband and wife as “a mere paper reallocation of income among the family members,” noting that “The actualities of their relation to the income did not change.” 327 U. S. at 292. This, we thought, provided' ample grounds for the finding that no true partnership was intended; that the husband was still the true earner of the income
But application of the Clifford-Horst principle does not follow automatically upon a gift to a member of one’s family, followed by its investment in the family partnership. If it did, it would be necessary to define “family” and to set precise limits of membership therein. We have not done so for the obvious reason thát existence' of the family relationship does not create a status which itself determines tax questions, but is simply a warning that things may not be what they seem. It is frequently stated that transactions between members of a family will be carefully scrutinized. But, more particularly, the family relationship often makes it possible for one to shift tax incidence by surface changes of ownership without disturbing in the least his dominion and control over the subject of the gift or the purposes for which the income from the property is used. He is able, in other words, to retain “the substance of full enjoyment of all the rights which previously he had in the property.” Helvering v. Clifford, supra, at 336.
The fact that transfers to members of the family group may be mere camouflage does not, however, mean that they invariably are. The Tower case recognized that one’s participation in control and management of, the business is a circumstance indicating an intent to be a bona fide partner despite the fact that the capital contributed originated elsewhere in the family. If the donee of property who then invests it in the family partnership exercises dominion and control over that property — and through that control influences the conduct of the partnership and the disposition of its' income— he may well be a true partner. Whether he is free to, and does, enjoy the fruits of the partnership is strongly indicative of the reality of his participation in the enterprise. In the Tower and Lusthaus cases we distinguished between active participation in the affairs of "the business by a donee of a share in the partnership on the one hand, attd his passive acquiescence to the will of the donor on the other. This distinction is of obvious importance to a determination of the true intent of the parties. It is meaningless if “original capital” is an essential test of membership in a ■family partnership.
The cause must therefore be remanded to the Tax Court for a decision as to which,' if any, of respondent’s sons were partners with him in the operation of the ranch during 1940 and 1941. As to which of them, in other words, was there a bona fide intent that they be partners in the conduct of the cattle business, either because of services to be performed during those years, or because' of contributions of capital of which they were the true owners, as we have defined that term in the Clifford, Horst, and Tower cases? No question as to the allocation of income between capital and services is presented in this case, and we intimate no opinion on that subject.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is revt.sed with directions to remand the cause' to the Tax Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Rutledge think that the Tax Court properly applied the principles of the Tower and LiCsthaus decisions. (327 U. S. 280, id., 293) in this case. However, they consider it of paramount importance in this case to have a court interpretation of the applicable taxing statute, for guidance in its application. Accordingly, they acquiesce in the Court’s opinion and judgment.
Gladys Culbertson, the wife of W. 0. Culbertson, Sr., is joined as a party because of her community of interest in the property án4 income of her husband under Texas law.
A daughter was also made a member of the partnership some time after its formation upon the gift by respondent of one-quarter of his one-half interest in the partnership. Respondent did not contend before the Tax Court that she was a partner for tax purposes.
168 F. 2d 979 at 982. The court further said: “Neither statute, common sensé, nor impelling precedent requires the holding, that a partner must contribute capital or render services to the partnership prior to the time that he is taken into it. These tests are equally effective whether the capital and the services are presently contributed and'rendered or are later to be contributed or to be rendered.” Id. at 983. See Note, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 595.
26 U. S. C. §§181, 182.
26 U. S. C. §§11, 22 (a).
Of course one who has been a bona fide partner does not lose that status when he is called into military or government service, and the Commissioner has not so contended. On the other hand, one hardly becomes a partner1"in the conventional sense merely because he might have, done so had- ne not been called.
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207 (1920); Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, 519 (1921). See Treas. Reg.. 101, Art. 22 (a)-1. See 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, 159 et seq.
The reductio ad absurdum of -the theory that children may be-partners With their parents before they are capable of being entrusted with the disposition of partnership funds or of contributing súbstantial services occurred in Tinkoff v. Commissioner, 120 F. 2d 564, where a taxpayer made his son a partner in his accounting firm the. day the son was born.
While the Tax Court went on to consider other factors, it is clear from its opinion that a contribution of either “vital services” or “original capital” was considered essential to membership in the partnership. After finding that none of respondent’s sons had, in the court’s opinion, contributed either, the court continued: “In addition to the above inquiry as to the presence of those elements deemed by the Tower case essential to partnerships recognizable for Federal tax purposes, . . . .” 6 CCH TCM 692, 699. Again, the court commented:
“Though the petitioner urges that many cattle businesses are composed of fathers and sons, and that the nature of the industry so requires, we think the sarnie is probably equally true of other industries where men wish to take children, into business with them. Nevertheless, we think that fact does not override the many decisions to the general effect that partners must contribute capital originating with them, or vital services.” Id. at 700.
See Mannheimer and Mook, A Taxwise Evaluation of Family Partnerships, 32 Iowa L. Rev. 436,447-48.
This is not, as we understand it, contrary to the approach taken by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in its most recent statement of policy. I. T. 3845,1947 Cum. Bull. 66, states at p. 67 :•
“Where persons who are closely related by blood or marriage enter into an agreement purporting to create a so-called family partnership or other arrangement with respect to the operation of a business or income-producing venture, under which agreement all of the parties are accorded substantially the same treatment and consideration with respect to their designated interests and prescribed responsibilities in the business as if they were strangers dealing at arm’s length; where the actions of the parties as legally responsible persons evidence an intent to carry on a business in a partnership relation; and where the terms of such agreement are substantially followed in the operation of’'the business or venture, as well as in the dealings of the partners or. members with each other, it is the policy of the Bureau to disregard the close family relationship existing between the parties and to recognize, for Federal income tax purposes, the division of profits as prescribed by such agreement. However, where the instrument purporting to create the family partnership expressly .provides that the wife or child or other member of the family shall not be required, to participate in the management of the business, or is merely silent on that point, the- extent and nature of the services of such individual in the actual conduct of the business will be given appropriate evidentiary weight as to the question of intent to carry on the business as partners.”
Nearly three-quarters of a century ago, Bowen, L. J., made the classic statement that “the state of a man’s mind is as much a fact. as the state of his digestion.” Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 L. R. Ch. Div. 459, 483. State of mind has always been determinative 'of the question whether a partnership has been formed as between' the parties. See, e. g., Drennen v. London Assurance Co., 113 U. S. 51, 56 (1885); Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611, 621 (1892); Barker v. Kraft, 259 Mich. 70, 242 N. W. 841 (1932); Zuback v. Bakmaz, 346 Pa. 279, 29 A. 2d 473 (1943); Kennedy v. Mullins, 155 Va. 166, 154 S. E. 568 (1930).
In the Tower case the taxpayer argued that he had a right to reduce his taxes by any legal means, to which this Court agreed. We said, however, that existence of a tax avoidance motive gives some indication that there was no bona fide intent to carry on business as a partnership. If Tower had set ud objective requirements of membership in, a family partnership, such as “vital services” and “original .caffital,” the motives behind adoption of the partnership form would have been irrelevant.
Although “management and control of the business” was one of the circumstances emphasized by the Tower case, along with “vital services” and “original capital,” the- Tax Court did not consider it an alternative “test” of partnership. See discussion, infra, at part Third, and note 17.
Except, of course, when Congress defines “family” and attaches tax consequences thereto. See, e. g. 26 U. S. C. §503 (a) (2).
It is not enough to say in this case, as we did in the Clifford case, that “If is hard to imagine that respondent felt himself the poorer after this [partnership agreement]- had been executed or, if he did, that it had any rational foundation in fact.” 309 U. S. at 336. Culbertson’s interest in his partnership with Coon was worth about $50,000 immediately prior to dissolution of the partnership. In order to sustain the Tax Court, we would have to conclude that he felt himself worth approximately twice that much upon his purchase of Coon’s interest, even though he had agreed to sell that interest to his sons at the same price.
As noted above (note 13), participation in control and management of the business, although given equal prominence with contributions of “vital services” and “original capital” as circumstances indicating an intent to enter into a partnership relation, .was discarded by the Tax Court as a “test” of partnership. This indicates a basic and erroneous assumption that one can never make a gift to a member of one’s family without retaining the essentials of ownership, if the gift is then invested in a family partnership.- We included participation in management and control of the business as a circumstance indicative of intent to carry on business' as a partner to cover the situation in which active dominion and control of the subject of the gift had actually passed to the donee. It is a circumstance of prime importance.'
There is testimony in the record as to the participation by respondent’s sons in the management of the ranch. ■ Since such evidence did not fall within either of th$ “tests” adopted by the Tax Court, it failed to consider this testimony. Without intimating any opinion as to its probative value, we think that it is clearly relevant evidence of the intent to carry on business as partners.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are two of eleven defendants who were convicted in the Southern District of New York in 1949 of conspiring to teach and advocate the violent overthrow of the Government in violation of the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670, 671, 18 U. S. C. §§ 371, 2385. Their convictions, each carrying a $10,000 fine and five years’ imprisonment, were affirmed by this Court on June 4, 1951, in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494. After their convictions, petitioners had been enlarged on bail, and following the affirmance, the United States Attorney served counsel for the petitioners on June 28, 1951, with copies of a proposed order on mandate requiring petitioners to surrender to the United States Marshal on July 2 for the execution of their sentences, and with a notice that such order would be presented to the District Court for signature on the indicated day of surrender. Petitioners were thereupon informed by their counsel that their presence in court would be required on July 2. Both, however, disappeared from their homes, failed to appear in court when the surrender order was signed on July 2, and remained fugitives for more than four and a half years. Ultimately both voluntarily surrendered to the United States Marshal in New York, Green on February 27, 1956, and Winston on March 5, 1956.
Shortly thereafter, the United States instituted criminal contempt proceedings against the petitioners in the District Court for willful disobedience of the surrender order in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 401 (see p. 168, infra). Pursuant to Rule 42 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, these proceedings were tried to the court without a jury. Following a hearing, the court found petitioners guilty of the contempts charged and sentenced each to three years’ imprisonment to commence after service of the five-year sentences imposed in the conspiracy case. See 140 F. Supp. 117 (opinion as to Green). The Court of Appeals affirmed, 241 F. 2d 631, and we granted certiorari because the case presented important issues relating to the scope of the power of federal district courts to convict and sentence for criminal contempts. 353 U. S. 972.
The petitioners urge four grounds for reversal, namely: (1) the criminal contempt power of federal courts does not extend to surrender orders; (2) even if such power exists, the evidence was insufficient to support the judgments of contempt; (3) a prison sentence for criminal contempt cannot, as a matter of law, exceed one year; and (4) in any event the three-year sentences imposed were so excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion on the part of the District Court. For the reasons given hereafter we think that none of these contentions can be sustained, and that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be upheld.
I.
The contempt judgments rest on 18 U. S. C. § 401, which in pertinent part provides that a federal court:
“... shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as—
“(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful... order....”
Since the order here issued was beyond dispute “lawful,” § 401 plainly empowered the District Court to punish petitioners for disobeying it unless, as petitioners claim, this order is outside the scope of subdivision (3). This claim rests on the argument that the statute, viewed in its historical context, does not embrace an order requiring the surrender of a bailed defendant.
An evaluation of this argument requires an analysis of the course of development of federal statutes relating to criminal contempts. The first statute bearing on the contempt powers of.federal courts was enacted as § 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 83. It stated that federal courts “shall have power to... punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same....” The generality of this language suggests that § 17 was intended to do no more than expressly attribute to the federal judiciary those powers to punish for contempt possessed by English courts at common law. Indeed, this Court has itself stated that under § 17 the definition of contempts and the procedure for their trial were “left to be determined according to such established rules and principles of the common law as were applicable to our situation.” Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267, 275-276. At English common law disobedience of a writ under the King’s seal was early treated as a contempt, 4 Blackstone Commentaries 284, 285; Beale, Contempt of Court, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 161, 164-167; Fox, The Summary Process to Punish Contempt, 25 L. Q. Rev. 238, 249, and over the centuries English courts came to use the King’s seal as a matter of course as a means of making effective their own process. Beale, at 167. It follows that under the Judiciary Act of 1789 the contempt powers of the federal courts comprehended the power to punish violations of their own orders.
So much the petitioners recognize. They point out, however, that, at early English law, courts dealt with absconding defendants not by way of contempt, but under the ancient doctrine of outlawry, a practice whereby the defendant was summoned by proclamation to five successive county courts and, for failure to appear, was declared forfeited of all his goods and chattels. 4 Blackstone Commentaries 283, 319. In view of this distinct method at English common law of punishing refusal to respond to this summons, which was the equivalent of the present surrender order, petitioners argue that § 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, incorporating English practice, did not reach to a surrender order, and that the unique status of such an order subsisted under all statutory successors to § 17, including § 401 (3) of the existing contempt statute.
We find these arguments unconvincing. The reasons for the early English practice of proceeding against absconding defendants by way of outlawry rather than by contempt are obscure. It may have been that outlawry was resorted to because absconding was regarded so seriously as to require the drastic penalties of outlawry rather than fine or imprisonment. But whatever the reasons may have been, the fact that English courts adhered to the practice of dealing with such cases by outlawry should not obscure the general principle that they had power to treat willful disobedience of their orders as contempts of court. It is significant that, so far as we know, the severe remedy of outlawry, which fell into early disuse in the state courts, was never known to the federal law. See United States v. Hall, 198 F. 2d 726, 727-728. Its unavailability to federal courts, and the absence of any other sanctions for the disobedience of surrender orders, are in themselves factors which point away from the conclusion that the kind of power traditionally used to assure respect for a court’s process should be found wanting in this one instance.
The subsequent development of the federal contempt power lends no support to the petitioners’ position, for the significance of the Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 487, 488, lies quite in the opposite direction. Sentiment for passage of that Act arose out of the impeachment proceedings instituted against Judge James H. Peck because of his conviction and punishment for criminal contempt of a lawyer who had published an article critical of a decision of the judge then on appeal. Although it is true that the Act marks the first congressional step to curtail the contempt powers of the federal courts, the important thing to note is that the area of curtailment related not to punishment for disobedience of court orders but to punishment for conduct of the kind that had provoked Judge Peck’s controversial action. As to such conduct, the 1831 Act confined the summary power of punishment to “... mis-behaviour of any person... in the presence of the... courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice....” The cases in this Court which have curbed the exercise of the contempt power by federal courts have concerned this clause, as found in statutory successors to the Act of 1831 including subdivision (1) of present 18 U. S. C. § 401, or a further clause in the Act and its successors dealing with misbehavior of court “officers,” now found in subdivision (2) of § 401.
In contrast to the judicial restrictions imposed on the contempt power exercisable under the clauses now found in subdivisions (1) and (2) of § 401, we find no case suggesting that subdivision (3) of § 401, before us here, is open to any but its obvious meaning. This clause also finds its statutory source in the Act of 1831, which first made explicit the authority of federal courts to punish for conduct of the kind involved in this case by providing that the contempt power should extend to “... disobedience or resistance... to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command...” of a federal court. Particularly in the absence of any showing that the old practice of outlawry was ever brought to the attention of Congress, there is no warrant for engrafting upon this unambiguous clause a dubious exception to the English contempt power stemming from this practice. Although the 1831 Act no doubt incorporated many of the concepts of the English common law, its legislative history indicates that Congress sought to define independently the contempt powers of federal courts rather than to have the Act simply reflect all the oddities of early English practice. The House Committee which reported the bill had been directed “to inquire into the expediency of defining by statute all offences which may be punished as con-tempts of...” federal courts. 7 Cong. Deb., 21st Cong., 2d Sess. (Gale’s & Seaton’s Reg.), pp. 560-561. (Italics added.) See Frankfurter and Landis, Power to Regulate Contempts, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1024-1028.
Entirely apart from the historical argument, there are no reasons of policy suggesting a need for limitation of the contempt power in this situation. As the present cases evidence, the issuance of a bench warrant and the forfeiture of bail following flight have generally proved inadequate to dissuade defendants from defying court orders. See Willopghby, Principles of Judicial Administration (1929), 561-566. At the time these contempts were committed bail-jumping itself was not a criminal offense, and considerations in past decisions limiting the scope of the contempt power where the conduct deemed to constitute a contempt was also punishable as a substantive crime are not here.relevant. Cf. Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 382. There is small justification for permitting a defendant the assurance that his only risk in disobeying a surrender order is the forfeiture of a known sum of money, particularly when such forfeiture may result in injury only to a bail surety.
It may be true, as petitioners state, that this case and those of the other absconding Dennis defendants, United States v. Thompson, 214 F. 2d 545; United States v. Hall, 198 F. 2d 726, provide the first instances where a federal court has exercised the contempt power for disobedience of a surrender order. But the power to punish for willful disobedience of a court order, once found to exist, cannot be said to have atrophied by disuse in this particular instance. Indeed, when Congress in 1954 made bail-jumping a crime in 18 U. S. C. § 3146, it expressly preserved the contempt power in this very situation. We find support in neither history nor policy to carve out so singular an exception from the clear meaning of § 401 (3).
II.
Petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to support their contempt convictions, in that it failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt their knowledge of the existence of the surrender order. The Court of Appeals did not address itself to this contention, considering the issue foreclosed by its prior decisions in the Thompson and Hall cases, supra, where the evidence as to those other two Dennis defendants who were convicted of similar criminal contempts was identical with that involved here, except as to the circumstances of their ultimate apprehension.
In this Court, petitioners interpret the District Court’s opinion to rest the contempt convictions on alternative theories: (a) that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the issuance of the July 2 surrender order, or (b) that they at least had notice of its prospective issuance and hence were chargeable with knowledge that it was in fact issued. But we find no such dual aspect to the District Court’s decision, which rested solely on findings that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Green “knowingly disobeyed” the surrender order and Winston absented himself “with knowledge” of the order. Since we are satisfied that the record supports these findings, we need not consider whether mere notice of the prospective issuance of the order, cf. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 206-207, would be sufficient to sustain these convictions on the theory that petitioners were chargeable as a matter of law with notice that it was later issued.
The evidence for the Government, there being none offered by the defense, related to three time intervals: (1) the period up to June 28,1951; (2) the four-day interval between June 28, when the proposed surrender order was served on counsel with the notice of settlement, and July 2, when the surrender order was signed; and (3) the period ending with the surrender of the petitioners— February 27, 1956, in the case of Green, and March 5, 1956, in the case of Winston.
1. The judgments of conviction upon the conspiracy indictment under the Smith Act were entered, and the petitioners were sentenced, on October 21, 1949. On November 2, 1949, the Court of Appeals admitted the petitioners to bail, pending appeal upon separate recognizances, signed by each petitioner on November 3, by which each undertook, among other things, to
“surrender himself in execution of the judgment and sentence appealed from upon such day as the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York may direct, if the judgment and sentence appealed from shall be affirmed... (Italics added.)
Following the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the conspiracy convictions on August 1, 1950, 183 F. 2d 201, Mr. Justice Jackson, as Circuit Justice, continued petitioners’ bail on September 25, 1950, pending review of the convictions by this Court. 184 F. 2d 280. This Court, as noted above, affirmed the conspiracy convictions on June 4, 1951, and on June 22, 1951, Mr. Justice Jackson denied a stay of the Court’s mandate.
2. On Thursday, June 28, 1951, one of the counsel in the Dennis case accepted service on behalf of all the defendants, including petitioners, of a proposed order on mandate requiring the defendants to “personally surrender to the United States Marshal for the Southern District of New York... on the 2nd day of July, 1951, at 11:05” a. m., together with a notice stating that the proposed order would be presented to the District Court “for settlement and signature” at 10 a. m. on that day. It appears from the testimony of this same counsel and another Dennis counsel that on the following day, Friday, June 29, an unsuccessful request was made to the United States Attorney and the District Court to postpone the defendants’ surrender until after the July 4 holiday; that on the same day these lawyers told the petitioners and the other Dennis defendants that they must be in court on Monday, July 2; and that petitioners assured counsel of their appearance on that day. On July 2 all of the Dennis defendants surrendered, except the two petitioners, and Hall and Thompson. The surrender order was signed, bench warrants were issued for the arrest of these four, and the proceedings were adjourned to the following day, July 3.
3. On July 3 the names of the petitioners were called again in open court, and after interrogating counsel as to their disappearance (see note 6, supra), the court declared their bail forfeited. The petitioners remained in hiding until their eventual surrender, some four and a half years later. Prior to their respective surrenders in February and March, 1956, Green and Winston issued press releases announcing their intention to surrender and “enter prison.” When he turned up on the steps of the courthouse, Green also responded to certain questions put by reporters and stated, among other things, that he intended “to go to the United States Marshal’s office,” this being a requirement found only in the surrender order itself. Winston made a similar statement in his press release.
In summary, one day after counsel was served on June 28 with the proposed order calling for petitioners’ surrender on July 2, together with the notice stating that the order would also be presented for the court’s signature on that day, petitioners were unequivocally notified by counsel that their presence in court was required on July 2. From these undisputed facts, coupled with petitioners’ disappearance, it was certainly permissible for the District Court to infer that petitioners knew of the proposed surrender order, of the failure of counsel’s efforts on June 29 to postpone the surrender date, and of the court’s intention to sign the order on July 2. We need not decide whether these facts alone would sustain the finding that petitioners knew of the issuance of the surrender order on July 2 as planned, for unquestionably as background they furnished significant support for the District Court’s ultimate finding that petitioners’ statements to the press at the time of their eventual surrender in 1956 (see note 7, supra) indicated their knowledge of the issuance of the order, a finding strengthened by the fact that the recognizance admitting the petitioners to bail obligated petitioners to surrender for service of sentence only when so directed by the District Court.
No doubt some of this evidence lent itself to conflicting inferences, but those favorable to the petitioners were, in our view, not of such strength as to compel the trier of the facts to reject alternative unfavorable inferences. Our duty as an appellate court is to assess the evidence as a whole under the rigorous standards governing criminal trials, rather than to test by those standards each item of evidence relied on by the District Court. 9 Wig-more, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), § 2497; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th ed. 1955), § 16. So viewing the entire record, we think the District Court was justified in finding that the evidence established, beyond a reasonable doubt, petitioners’ knowing violations of the surrender order.
III.
We deal here with petitioners’ claim that the District Court was without power to sentence them to imprisonment for more than one year.
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 confirmed the power of federal courts “... to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts...” certain con-tempts. The Act of 1831 simply referred to the power to “inflict summary punishments,” and present § 401 contains substantially the above language of the Act of 1789. Petitioners contend that despite the provision for “discretion,” the power to punish under § 401 is limited to one year by certain sections of the Clayton Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 730, 738-740. In any event, we are urged to read such a limitation into § 401 in order to avoid constitutional difficulties which, it is said, would otherwise confront us.
We turn first to the argument based on the Clayton Act. Sections 21 and 22 of that Act provided that certain rights not traditionally accorded persons charged with contempt, notably the right to trial by jury, should be granted in certain classes of criminal contempts, and that persons tried under these procedures were not subject to a fine of more than $1,000 or imprisonment for longer than six months. Section 24 of the Act made these provisions inapplicable to other categories of contempts, including the contempt for which the petitioners here have been convicted, and provided that such excluded categories of contempts were to be punished “in conformity to the usages at law and in equity now prevailing.” (Italics added.) In the recodification of 1948 the foregoing provisions of the Clayton Act were substantially re-enacted in § 402 of the present contempt statute, and the above-quoted clause now reads: “in conformity to the prevailing usages at law.”
Petitioners’ argument is that the purpose and effect of the “usages... now prevailing” language of § 24 of the Clayton Act was to freeze into federal contempt law the sentencing practices of federal courts, which up to that time appear never to have imposed a contempt sentence of more than one year. These practices, suggest petitioners, reflect the unarticulated belief of federal courts that criminal contempts are not infamous crimes and hence not subject to punishment by imprisonment for over one year; this belief is said to derive from the constitutional considerations to which we shortly turn. In view of this suggested effect of § 24, petitioners would have us read the “discretion” vested in federal courts by § 401 as referring exclusively to the choice between sentencing to fine or imprisonment, or in any event as subject to the unexpressed limitation of one year’s imprisonment.
Particularly in the context of the rest of the Clayton Act of 1914 we cannot read the “usages... now prevailing” clause of § 24 as incorporating into the statute the sentencing practices up to that date. In § 22 the statute specifically restricts to six months the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for commission of any of the contempts described in § 21. Had Congress also intended to restrict the term of imprisonment for con-tempts excluded from the operation of the Act by § 24, it is difficult to understand why it did not make explicit its intention, as it did in § 22, rather than so subtly express its purpose by proceeding in the devious manner attributed to it by the petitioners. Further, there is no evidence that the past sentencing practices of the courts were ever brought to the attention of Congress. That the federal courts themselves have not considered their sentencing power to be restricted by § 24 of the Clayton Act or by § 402 of the present contempt statute is indicated by the fact that in at least nine cases subsequent to 1914, contempt convictions carrying sentences of more than one year have been affirmed by four different Courts of Appeals and on one occasion by this Court.
Such of the legislative history as is germane here argues against the petitioners and strengthens our conclusions that the “usages... now prevailing” clause of § 24 of the Clayton Act did no more than emphasize that con-tempts other than those specified in § 21 were to be tried under familiar contempt procedures, that is, among other things, by the court rather than a jury. The House Report accompanying the bill which was substantially enacted as §§ 21, 22 and 24 of the Clayton Act referred to the provisions later forming these sections as dealing “... entirely with questions of Federal procedure relating to injunctions and contempts committed without the presence of the court.” H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 21. There is no evidence of a broader purpose to enact so substantial a rule of substantive law encompassing all criminal contempts.
We are nevertheless urged to read into § 401 a one-year limitation on the sentencing power in order to avoid constitutional issues which the petitioner^ deem present in the absence of such a restriction. But in view of what we have shown, the section’s provision that a federal court may punish “at its discretion” the enumerated classes of contempts cannot reasonably be read to allow a court merely the choice between fines and imprisonment. We think the Court of Appeals correctly said: “The phrase 'at its discretion,’ does not mean that the court must choose between fine and imprisonment; the word ‘or/ itself provides as much and the words, if so construed, would have been redundant. The term of imprisonment is to be as much in the court’s discretion as the fine.” 241 F. 2d, at 634.
We therefore turn to petitioners’ constitutional arguments. The claim is that proceedings for criminal con-tempts, if contempts are subject to prison terms of more than one year, must be based on grand jury indictments under the clause of the Fifth Amendment providing: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury....” (Italics added.) Since an “infamous crime” within the meaning of the Amendment is one punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary, Mackin v. United States, 117 U. S. 348, and since imprisonment in a penitentiary can be imposed only if a crime is subject to imprisonment exceeding one year, 18 U. S. C. § 4083, petitioners assert that criminal contempts if subject to such punishment are infamous crimes under the Amendment.
But this assertion cannot be considered in isolation from the general status of contempts under the Constitution, whether subject to “infamous” punishment or not. The statements of this Court in a long and unbroken line of decisions involving contempts ranging from misbehavior in court to disobedience of court orders establish beyond peradventure that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right. Although appearing to recognize this, petitioners nevertheless point out that punishment for criminal con-tempts cannot in any practical sense be distinguished from punishment for substantive crimes, see Gompers v. United, States, 233 U. S. 604, 610, and that contempt proceedings have traditionally been surrounded with many of the protections available in a criminal trial. But this Court has never suggested that such protections included the right to grand jury indictment. Cf. Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267, 278; Gompers v. United States, supra, at 612. And of course the summary procedures followed by English courts prior to adoption of the Constitution in dealing with many contempts of court did not embrace the use of either grand or petit jury. See 4 Blackstone Commentaries 283-287. It would indeed be anomalous to conclüde that contempts subject to sentences of imprisonment for over one year are “infamous crimes” under the Fifth Amendment although they are neither “crimes” nor “criminal prosecutions” for the purpose of jury trial within the meaning of Art. Ill, § 2, and the Sixth Amendment.
We are told however that the decisions of this Court denying the right to jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings are based upon an “historical error” reflecting a misunderstanding as to the scope of the power of English courts at the early common law to try summarily for contempts, and that this error should not here be extended to a denial of the right to grand jury. But the more recent historical research into English contempt practices predating the adoption of our Constitution reveals no such clear error and indicates if anything that the precise nature of those practices is shrouded in much obscurity. And whatever the breadth of the historical error said by contemporary scholarship to have been committed by English courts of the late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries in their interpretation of English precedents involving the trials of contempts of court, it at lpast seems clear that English practice by the early Eighteenth Century comprehended the use of summary powers of conviction by courts to punish for a variety of contempts committed within and outside court. Such indeed is the statement of English law of this period found in Blackstone, supra, p. 184, who explicitly recognized use of a summary power by English courts to deal with disobedience of court process. It is noteworthy that the Judiciary Act of 1789, first attempting a definition of the contempt power, was enacted by a Congress with a Judiciary Committee including members of the recent Constitutional Convention, who no doubt shared the prevailing views in the American Colonies of English law as expressed in Blackstone. See Ex parte Burr, 4 Fed. Cas. 791, 797 (No. 2,186). Against this historical background, this Court has never deviated from the view that the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury for “crimes” and “criminal prosecutions” was not intended to reach to criminal contempts. And indeed beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has consistently preserved the summary nature of the contempt power in the Act of 1831 and its statutory successors, departing from this traditional notion only in specific instances where it has provided for jury trial for certain categories of contempt.
We do not write upon a clean slate. The principle that criminal contempts of court are not required to be tried by a jury under Article III or the Sixth Amendment is firmly rooted in our traditions. Indeed, the petitioners themselves have not contended that they were entitled to a jury trial. By the same token it is clear that criminal contempts, although subject, as we have held, to sentences of imprisonment exceeding one year, need not be prosecuted by indictment under the Fifth Amendment. In various respects, such as the absence of a statutory limitation of the amount of a fine or the length of a prison sentence which may be imposed for their commission, criminal contempts have always differed from the usual statutory crime under federal law. As to trial by jury and indictment by grand jury, they possess a unique character under the Constitution.
IV.
Petitioners contend that the three-year sentences imposed upon them constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the District Court.
We take this occasion to reiterate our view that in the areas where Congress has not seen fit to impose limitations on the sentencing power for contempts the district courts have a special duty to exercise such an extraordinary power with the utmost sense of responsibility and circumspection. The “discretion” to punish vested in the District Courts by § 401 is not an unbridled discretion. Appellate courts have here a special responsibility for determining that the power is not abused, to be exercised if necessary by revising themselves the sentences imposed. This Court has in past cases taken pains to emphasize its concern with the use to which the sentencing power has occasionally been put, both by remanding for reconsideration of contempt sentences in light of factors it deemed important, see Yates v. United States, 355 U. S. 66; Nilva v. United States, 352 U. S. 385, and by itself modifying such sentences. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258. The answer to those who see in the contempt power a potential instrument of oppression lies in assurance of its careful use and supervision, not in imposition of artificial limitations on the power.
It is in this light that we have considered the claim that the sentences here were so excessive as to amount to an abuse of discretion. We are led to reject the claim under the facts of this case for three reasons. First, the contempt here was by any standards a most egregious one. Petitioners had been accorded a fair trial on the conspiracy charges against them and had been granted bail pending review of their convictions by the Court of Appeals and this Court. Nevertheless they absconded, and over four and a half years of hiding culminated not in a belated recognition of the authority of the court, but in petitioners’ reassertion of justification for disobeying the surrender order. Second, comparing these sentences with those imposed on the other fugitives in the Dennis case, the sentences here are shorter by a year than that upheld in the Thompson case, and no longer than that inflicted in the Hall case. It is true that Hall and Thompson were apprehended, but the record shows that the District Court took into account the fact that the surrender of these petitioners was voluntary; there is the further factor that the period during which petitioners remained fugitives was longer than that in either the Hall or Thompson case. Third, the sentences were well within the maximum five-year imprisonment for bail-jumping provided now by 18 U. S. C. § 3146, a statute in which Congress saw fit expressly to preserve the contempt power. without enacting any limitation on contempt sentences.
In these circumstances we cannot say that the sentences imposed were beyond the bounds of the reasonable exercise of the District Court's discretion., ~,
,, Affirmed.
This Rule provides that criminal contempts other than those committed in the actual presence of the court and seen or heard by the court shall be prosecuted on notice. Notice may be given, as in the present case, by an order to show cause. The Rule states that a defendant is entitled to trial by jury if an Act of Congress so provides. See note 19, infra.
The debates conducted in 1830-1831 by leading counsel of that period during the impeachment proceedings against Judge James H. Peck, see p. 171, infra, contained discussions of the Act of 1789, and the limitations to be imposed upon it, which were cast largely in terms of the English common law preceding its enactment. See Stansbury, Report of the Trial of James H. Peck (1833).
During the debates in 1830-1831 referred to in note 2, supra, several of the managers who argued that Judge Peck had exceeded the historical boundaries of the contempt power by the conduct which had provoked the impeachment proceedings (see p. 171, infra) appear to have assumed that courts were historically justified in employing the contempt power to deal with disobedience to court process. See Stansbury, supra, note 2, at 313, 395-396, 436, 444.
See, e. g., In re Michael, 326 U. S. 224, Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33, and Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, all concerning the predecessor statutes to present § 401 (1), which relates to misbehavior in court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, and Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399, arising under §401 (2), which deals with misbehavior of court officers in their official transactions.
This order can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as imposing on the Dennis defendants from the time that the order became effective on July 2 a continuing obligation to surrender promptly upon becoming aware of its effectiveness. The printed record before us indicates that the proposed order given counsel on June 28 read precisely in the form quoted in the text above, but the original copy of the order reveals that the time for surrender was first written as “10:30” a. m., and at some later time prior to the time the order was signed was changed to read
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., certain federal employees may obtain administrative and judicial review of specified adverse employment actions. The question before us is whether the CSRA provides the exclusive avenue to judicial review when a qualifying employee challenges an adverse employment action by arguing that a federal statute is unconstitutional. We hold that it does.
I
The CSRA “established a comprehensive system for reviewing personnel action taken against federal employees.” United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 455 (1988). As relevant here, Subchapter II of Chapter 75 governs review of major adverse actions taken against employees “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.” 5 U. S. C. §§ 7503(a), 7513(a). Employees entitled to review are those in the “competitive service” and “excepted service” who meet certain requirements regarding probationary periods and years of service. § 7511(a)(1). The reviewable agency actions are removal, suspension for more than 14 days, reduction in grade or pay, or furlough for 30 days or less. §7512.
When an employing agency proposes a covered action against a covered employee, the CSRA gives the employee the right to notice, representation by counsel, an opportunity to respond, and a written, reasoned decision from the agency. § 7513(b). If the agency takes final adverse action against the employee, the CSRA gives the employee the right to a hearing and to be represented by an attorney or other representative before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). §§ 7513(d), 7701(a)(1)-(2). The MSPB is authorized to order relief to prevailing employees, including reinstatement, backpay, and attorney’s fees. §§ 1204(a)(2), 7701(g).
An employee who is dissatisfied with the MSPB’s decision is entitled to judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. That court “shall review the record and hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, findings, or conclusions” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” “obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed,” or “unsupported by substantial evidence.” §§ 7703(a)(1), (c). The Federal Circuit has “exclusive jurisdiction” over appeals from a final decision of the MSPB. 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(9); see also 5 U. S. C. § 7703(b)(1) (judicial review of an MSPB decision “shall be” in the Federal Circuit).
II
Petitioners are former federal competitive service employees who failed to comply with the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 453. That Act requires male citizens and permanent-resident aliens of the United States between the ages of 18 and 26 to register for the Selective Service. Another federal statute, 5 U. S. C. § 3328 (hereinafter Section 3328), bars from employment by an executive agency anyone who has knowingly and willfully failed to register. Pursuant to Section 3328, petitioners were discharged (or allegedly constructively discharged) by respondents, their employing agencies.
Among petitioners, only Michael Elgin appealed his removal to the MSPB. Elgin argued that Section 3328 is an unconstitutional bill of attainder and unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of sex when combined with the registration requirement of the Military Selective Service Act. The MSPB referred Elgin’s appeal to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for an initial decision. The ALJ dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that an employee is not entitled to MSPB review of agency action that is based on an absolute statutory bar to employment. App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a-101a. The ALJ also held that Elgin’s constitutional claims could not “confer jurisdiction” on the MSPB because it “lacks authority to determine the constitutionality of a statute.” Id., at 101a.
Elgin neither petitioned for review by the full MSPB nor appealed to the Federal Circuit. Instead, he joined the other petitioners in filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, raising the same constitutional challenges to Section 3328 and the Military Selective Service Act. App. 4, 26-28, 29. Petitioners sought equitable relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the challenged statutes are unconstitutional, an injunction prohibiting enforcement of Section 3328, reinstatement to their former positions, backpay, benefits, and attorney’s fees. Id., at 29-30.
The District Court rejected respondents’ argument that it lacked jurisdiction and denied petitioners’ constitutional claims on the merits. See Elgin v. United States, 697 F. Supp. 2d 187 (Mass. 2010). The District Court held that the CSRA did not preclude it from hearing petitioners’ claims, because the MSPB had no authority to determine the constitutionality of a federal statute. Id., at 193. Hence, the District Court concluded that it retained jurisdiction under the general grant of federal-question jurisdiction in 28 U. S. C. § 1331. 697 F. Supp. 2d, at 194.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See 641 F. 3d 6 (2011). The Court of Appeals held that challenges to a removal are not exempted from the CSRA review scheme simply because the employee argues that the statute authorizing the removal is unconstitutional. Id., at 11-12. According to the Court of Appeals, the CSRA provides a forum—the Federal Circuit— that may adjudicate the constitutionality of a federal statute, and petitioners “were obliged to use it.” Id., at 12-13.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the CSRA precludes district court jurisdiction over petitioners’ claims even though they are constitutional claims for equitable relief. See 565 U. S. 962 (2011). We conclude that it does, and we therefore affirm.
Ill
We begin with the appropriate standard for determining whether a statutory scheme of administrative and judicial review provides the exclusive means of review for constitutional claims. Petitioners argue that even if they may obtain judicial review of their constitutional claims before the Federal Circuit, they are not precluded from pursuing their claims in federal district court. According to petitioners, the general grant of federal-question jurisdiction in 28 U. S. C. § 1331, which gives district courts authority over constitutional claims, remains undisturbed unless Congress explicitly directs otherwise. In support of this argument, petitioners rely on Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 603 (1988), which held that “where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims[,] its intent to do so must be clear.” The Webster Court noted that this “heightened showing” was required “to avoid the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.” Ibid, (quoting Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 681, n. 12 (1986)). Petitioners contend that the CSRA does not meet this standard because it does not expressly bar suits in district court.
Petitioners’ argument overlooks a necessary predicate to the application of Webster’s heightened standard: a statute that purports to “deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.” 486 U. S., at 603. Webster’s standard does not apply where Congress simply channels judicial review of a constitutional claim to a particular court. We held as much in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U. S. 200 (1994). In that case, we considered whether a statutory scheme of administrative review followed by judicial review in a federal appellate court precluded district court jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s statutory and constitutional claims. Id., at 206. We noted that the plaintiffs claims could be “meaningfully addressed in the Court of Appeals” and that the case therefore did “not present the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if an agency statute were construed to preclude all judicial review of a constitutional claim.” Id., at 215, and n. 20 (quoting Bowen, supra, at 681, n. 12). Accordingly, we did not require Webster’s “heightened showing,” but instead asked only whether Congress’ intent to preclude district court jurisdiction was “ ‘fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.’ ” 510 U. S., at 207 (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 351 (1984)).
Like the statute in Thunder Basin, the CSRA does not foreclose all judicial review of petitioners’ constitutional claims, but merely directs that judicial review shall occur in the Federal Circuit. Moreover, as we explain below, the Federal Circuit is fully capable of providing meaningful review of petitioners’ claims. See infra, at 16-21. Accordingly, the appropriate inquiry is whether it is “fairly discernible” from the CSRA that Congress intended covered employees appealing covered agency actions to proceed exclusively through the statutory review scheme, even in cases in which the employees raise constitutional challenges to federal statutes.
IV
To determine whether it is “fairly discernible” that Congress precluded district court jurisdiction over petitioners’ claims, we examine the CSRA’s text, structure, and purpose. See Thunder Basin, supra, at 207; Fausto, 484 U. S., at 443.
A
This is not the first time we have addressed the impact of the CSRA’s text and structure on the availability of judicial review of a federal employee’s challenge to an employment decision. In Fausto, we considered whether a so-called “nonpreference excepted service employe[e]” could challenge his suspension in the United States Claims Court, even though the CSRA did not then afford him a right to review in the MSPB or the Federal Circuit. Id., at 440-441, 448. Citing “[t]he comprehensive nature of the CSRA, the attention that it gives throughout to the rights of nonprefer-enee excepted service employees, and the fact that it does not include them in provisions for administrative and judicial review contained in Chapter 75,” the Court concluded that “the absence of provision for these employees to obtain judicial review” was a “considered congressional judgment.” Id., at 448. The Court thus found it “fairly discernible” that Congress intended to preclude all judicial review of Fausto’s statutory claims. Id., at 452 (citing Block, supra, at 349).
Just as the CSRA’s “elaborate” framework, 484 U. S., at 443, demonstrates Congress’ intent to entirely foreclose judicial review to employees to whom the CSRA denies statutory review, it similarly indicates that extrastatutory review is not available to those employees to whom the CSRA grants administrative and judicial review. Indeed, in Fausto we expressly assumed that “competitive service employees, who are given review rights by Chapter 75, cannot expand these rights by resort to” judicial review outside of the CSRA scheme. See id., at 450, n. 3. As Fausto explained, the CSRA “prescribes in great detail the protections and remedies applicable to” adverse personnel actions against federal employees. Id., at 443. For example, Sub-chapter II of Chapter 75, the portion of the CSRA relevant to petitioners, specifically enumerates the major adverse actions and employee classifications to which the CSRA’s procedural protections and review provisions apply. 5 U. S. C. §§ 7511, 7512. The subchapter then sets out the procedures due an employee prior to final agency action. § 7513. And, Chapter 77 of the CSRA exhaustively details the system of review before the MSPB and the Federal Circuit. §§ 7701, 7703; see also Fausto, supra, at 449 (emphasizing that the CSRA’s structure evinces “the primacy” of review by the MSPB and the Federal Circuit). Given the painstaking detail with which the CSRA sets out the method for covered employees to obtain review of adverse employment actions, it is fairly discernible that Congress intended to deny such employees an additional avenue of review in district court.
Petitioners do not dispute that they are employees who suffered adverse actions covered by the foregoing provisions of the CSRA. Nor do they contest that the CSRA’s text and structure support implied preclusion of district court jurisdiction, at least as a general matter. Petitioners even acknowledge that the MSPB routinely adjudicates some constitutional claims, such as claims that an agency took adverse employment action in violation of an employee’s First or Fourth Amendment rights, and that these claims must be brought within the CSRA scheme. See Brief for Petitioners 33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-11, 15, 21; see also, e. g., Smith v. Department of Transp., 106 MSPR 59, 78-79 (2007) (applying Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563 (1968), to an employee’s claim that he was suspended in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights); Garrison v. Department of Justice, 67 MSPR 154 (1995) (considering whether an order directing an employee to submit to a drug test was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). Nevertheless, petitioners seek to carve out an exception to CSRA exclusivity for facial or as-applied constitutional challenges to federal statutes.
The text and structure of the CSRA, however, provide no support for such an exception. The availability of administrative and judicial review under the CSRA generally turns on the type of civil service employee and adverse employment action at issue. See, e.g., 5 U. S. C. §§ 7511(a)(1) (defining “employee”), 7512 (defining “[ajctions covered”), 7513(d) (providing that “[ajn employee against whom an action is taken under this section is entitled to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board”), 7703(a)(1) (providing that “[a]ny employee... adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board may obtain judicial review of the order or decision” in the Federal Circuit). Nothing in the CSRA’s text suggests that its exclusive review scheme is inapplicable simply because a covered employee challenges a covered action on the ground that the statute authorizing that action is unconstitutional. As the Government correctly notes, “[t]he plain language of [the CSRA’s] provisions applies to an employee who challenges his removal on the ground that the statute requiring it is unconstitutional no less than it applies to an employee who challenges his removal on any other ground.” Brief for Respondents 33-34.
In only one situation does the CSRA expressly exempt a covered employee’s appeal of a covered action from Federal Circuit review based on the type of claim at issue. When a covered employee “alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination” prohibited by enumerated federal employment laws, 5 U. S. C. § 7702(a)(1)(B), the CSRA allows the employee to obtain judicial review of an unfavorable MSPB decision by filing a civil action as provided by the applicable employment law. See § 7703(b)(2). Each of the cross-referenced employment laws authorizes an action in federal district court. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f); 29 U. S. C. § 633a(c); § 216(b). Title 5 U. S. C. § 7703(b)(2) demonstrates that Congress knew how to provide alternative forums for judicial review based on the nature of an employee’s claim. That Congress declined to include an exemption from Federal Circuit review for challenges to a statute’s constitutionality indicates that Congress intended no such exception.
B
The purpose of the CSRA also supports our conclusion that the statutory review scheme is exclusive, even for employees who bring constitutional challenges to federal statutes. As we have previously explained, the CSRA’s “integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review” for aggrieved federal employees was designed to replace an “‘outdated patchwork of statutes and rules’” that afforded employees the right to challenge employing agency actions in district courts across the country. Fausto, 484 U. S., at 444-445. Such widespread judicial review, which included appeals in all of the Federal Courts of Appeals, produced “wide variations in the kinds of decisions... issued on the same or similar matters” and a double layer of judicial review that was “wasteful and irrational.” Id., at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The CSRA’s objective of creating an integrated scheme of review would be seriously undermined if, as petitioners would have it, a covered employee could challenge a covered employment action first in a district court, and then again in one of the courts of appeals, simply by alleging that the statutory authorization for such action is unconstitutional. Such suits would reintroduce the very potential for inconsistent decisionmaking and duplicative judicial review that the CSRA was designed to avoid. Moreover, petitioners’ position would create the possibility of parallel litigation regarding the same agency action before the MSPB and a district court. An employee could challenge the constitutionality of the statute authorizing an agency’s action in district court, but the MSPB would remain the exclusive forum for other types of challenges to the agency’s decision. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-7, 9, 15-16.
Petitioners counter that doctrines regarding claim splitting and preclusion would bar parallel suits before the MSPB and the district court. But such doctrines would not invariably eliminate the possibility of simultaneous proceedings, for a tribunal generally has discretion to decide whether to dismiss a suit when a similar suit is pending elsewhere. See 18 C. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4406 (2d ed. 2002 and Supp. 2011). In any event, petitioners point to nothing in the CSRA to support the odd notion that Congress intended to allow employees to pursue constitutional claims in district court at the cost of forgoing other, potentially meritorious claims before the MSPB.
Finally, we note that a jurisdictional rule based on the nature of an employee’s constitutional claim would deprive the aggrieved employee, the MSPB, and the district court of clear guidance about the proper forum for the employee’s claims at the outset of the case. For example, petitioners contend that facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to statutes may be brought in district court, while other constitutional challenges must be heard by the MSPB. See supra, at 12; n. 5, infra. But, as we explain below, that line is hazy at best and incoherent at worst. See ibid. The dissent’s approach fares no better. The dissent carves out for district court adjudication only facial constitutional challenges to statutes, but we have previously stated that “the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some automatic effect or that it must always control the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a constitutional challenge.” Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 331 (2010). By contrast, a jurisdictional rule based on the type of employee and adverse agency action at issue does not involve such amorphous distinctions. Accordingly, we conclude that the better interpretation of the CSRA is that its exclusivity does not turn on the constitutional nature of an employee’s claim, but rather on the type of the employee and the challenged employment action.
y
Petitioners raise three additional factors in arguing that their claims are not the type that Congress intended to be reviewed within the CSRA scheme. Specifically, petitioners invoke our “presum[ption] that Congress does not intend to limit [district court] jurisdiction if ‘a finding of preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial review’; if the suit is ‘wholly collateral to a statute’s review provisions’; and if the claims are ‘outside the agency’s expertise.’” Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 489 (2010) (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U. S., at 212-213). Contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, none of those characteristics are present here.
A
First, petitioners argue that the CSRA review scheme provides no meaningful review of their claims because the MSPB lacks authority to declare a federal statute unconstitutional. Petitioners are correct that the MSPB has repeatedly refused to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation. See, e. g., Malone v. Department of Justice, 13 M. S. P. B. 81, 83 (1983) (“[I]t is well settled that administrative agencies are without authority to determine the constitutionality of statutes”). This Court has also stated that “adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.” Thunder Basin, 510 U. S., at 215 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
We need not, and do not, decide whether the MSPB’s view of its power is correct, or whether the oft-stated principle that agencies cannot declare a statute unconstitutional is truly a matter of jurisdiction. See ibid. (describing this rule as “not mandatory”). In Thunder Basin, we held that Congress’ intent to preclude district court jurisdiction was fairly discernible in the statutory scheme “[e]ven if” the administrative body could not decide the constitutionality of a federal law. Ibid. That issue, we reasoned, could be “meaningfully addressed in the Court of Appeals” that Congress had authorized to conduct judicial review. Ibid. Likewise, the CSRA provides review in the Federal Circuit, an Article III court fully competent to adjudicate petitioners’ claims that Section 3328 and the Military Selective Service Act’s registration requirement are unconstitutional.
Petitioners insist, however, that the Federal Circuit cannot decide their constitutional claims either. Emphasizing the Federal Circuit’s holdings that its jurisdiction over employee appeals is coextensive with the MSPB’s jurisdiction, petitioners argue that the Federal Circuit likewise lacks jurisdiction to decide their challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute. Petitioners are incorrect.
As we have explained, the CSRA makes MSPB jurisdiction over an appeal dependent only on the nature of the employee and the employment action at issue. See supra, at 5-6, 12-13; see also 5 CFR § 1201.3(a) (stating that “[t]he Board has jurisdiction over appeals from agency actions” and enumerating covered actions); Todd v. MSPB, 55 F. 3d 1574, 1576 (CA Fed. 1995) (explaining that the employee “has the burden of establishing that she and the action she seeks to appeal [are] within the [MSPB’s] jurisdiction”). Accordingly, as the cases cited by petitioners demonstrate, the Federal Circuit has questioned its jurisdiction when an employee appeals from a type of adverse action over which the MSPB lacked jurisdiction. But the Federal Circuit has never held, in an appeal from agency action within the MSPB’s jurisdiction, that its authority to decide particular legal questions is derivative of the MSPB’s authority. To the contrary, in Briggs v. MSPB, 331 F. 3d 1307, 1312-1313 (2003), the Federal Circuit concluded that it could determine the constitutionality of a statute upon which an employee’s removal was based, notwithstanding the MSPB’s professed lack of authority to decide the question.
Petitioners next contend that even if the Federal Circuit could consider their claims in the first instance, resolution of the claims requires a factual record that neither the MSPB (because it lacks authority to decide the legal question) nor the Federal Circuit (because it is an appellate court) can create. To the contrary, we think the CSRA review scheme fully accommodates an employee’s potential need to establish facts relevant to his constitutional challenge to a federal statute. Even without factfinding capabilities, the Federal Circuit may take judicial notice of facts relevant to the constitutional question. See, e. g., Rothe Development Corp. v. Department of Defense, 545 F. 3d 1023, 1045-1046 (CA Fed. 2008) (judicially noticing facts relevant to equal protection challenge). And, if resolution of a constitutional claim requires the development of facts beyond those that the Federal Circuit may judicially notice, the CSRA empowers the MSPB to take evidence and find facts for Federal Circuit review. See 5 U. S. C. §§ 1204(b)(1)-(2) (providing that the MSPB may administer oaths, examine witnesses, take depositions, issue interrogatories, subpoena testimony and documents, and otherwise receive evidence when a covered employee appeals a covered adverse employment action). Unlike petitioners, we see nothing extraordinary in a statutory scheme that vests reviewable factfinding authority in a non-Article III entity that has jurisdiction over an action but cannot finally decide the legal question to which the facts pertain. Congress has authorized magistrate judges, for example, to conduct evidentiary hearings and make findings of fact relevant to dispositive pretrial motions, although they are powerless to issue a final ruling on such motions. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A)-(B); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U. S. 667, 673 (1980).
Petitioners nonetheless insist that the MSPB will never reach the factfinding stage in an appeal challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute, pointing to the ALJ’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction in petitioner Elgin’s case. Again, petitioners are incorrect. When a covered employee appeals a covered adverse action, the CSRA grants the MSPB jurisdiction over the appeal. See supra, at 18. If the employee attacks the adverse action on the ground that a statute is unconstitutional, the MSPB may determine that it lacks authority to decide that particular issue; but absent another infirmity in the adverse action, the MSPB will affirm the employing agency’s decision rather than dismiss the appeal. See, e. g., Briggs, supra, at 1311. The Federal Circuit can then review the MSPB decision, including any factual record developed by the MSPB in the course of its decision on the merits.
Contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, Elgin’s case does not illustrate that the MSPB will invariably dismiss an appeal challenging the' constitutionality of a federal statute before reaching the factfinding stage. The ALJ dismissed Elgin’s case on the threshold jurisdictional ground that he was not an “employee” with a right to appeal to the MSPB because his employment was absolutely barred by statute. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a-101a. The Government conceded before the First Circuit that this jurisdictional argument was incorrect, see Brief for Respondents 10, and the Court of Appeals agreed, see 641 F. 3d, at 10-11. The parties do not raise that issue here, and we do not address it. What matters for present purposes is that the particular circumstances of Elgin’s case do not demonstrate that the MSPB will dismiss an appeal that is otherwise within its jurisdiction merely because it lacks the authority to decide a particular claim.
In sum, the CSRA grants the MSPB and the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal because they are covered employees challenging a covered adverse employment action. Within the CSRA review scheme, the Federal Circuit has authority to consider and decide petitioners’ constitutional claims. To the extent such challenges require factual development, the CSRA equips the MSPB with tools to create the necessary record. Thus, petitioners’ constitutional claims can receive meaningful review within the CSRA scheme.
B
Petitioners next contend that the CSRA does not preclude district court jurisdiction over their claims because they are “wholly collateral” to the CSRA scheme. According to petitioners, their bill-of-attainder and sex discrimination claims “have nothing to do with the types of day-to-day personnel actions adjudicated by the MSPB,” Brief for Petitioners 29, and petitioners “are not seeking the CSRA’s ‘protections and remedies/ ” Reply Brief 3. We disagree.
As evidenced by their district court complaint, petitioners’ constitutional claims are the vehicle by which they seek to reverse the removal decisions, to return to federal employment, and to receive the compensation they would have earned but for the adverse employment action. See App. 29-30. A challenge to removal is precisely the type of personnel action regularly adjudicated by the MSPB and the Federal Circuit within the CSRA scheme. Likewise, reinstatement, backpay, and attorney’s fees are precisely the kinds of relief that the CSRA empowers the MSPB and the Federal Circuit to provide. See supra, at 6; see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 614 (1984) (holding that plaintiffs’ claims were not wholly collateral to a statutory scheme of administrative and judicial review of Medicare payment decisions, where plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory challenge to an agency’s procedure for reaching payment decisions was “at bottom” an attempt to reverse the agency’s decision to deny payment). Far from a suit wholly collateral to the CSRA scheme, the case before us is a challenge to CSRA-covered employment action brought by CSRA-covered employees requesting relief that the CSRA routinely affords.
C
Relatedly, petitioners argue that their constitutional claims are not the sort that Congress intended to channel through the MSPB because they are outside the MSPB’s expertise. But petitioners overlook the many threshold questions that may accompany a constitutional claim and to which the MSPB can apply its expertise. Of particular relevance here, preliminary questions unique to the employment context may obviate the need to address the constitutional challenge. For example, petitioner Henry Tucker asserts that his resignation amounted to a constructive discharge. That issue falls squarely within the MSPB’s expertise, and its resolution against Tucker would avoid the need to reach his constitutional claims. In addition, the challenged statute may be one that the MSPB regularly construes, and its statutory interpretation could alleviate constitutional concerns. Or, an employee’s appeal may involve other statutory or constitutional claims that the MSPB routinely considers, in addition to a constitutional challenge to a federal statute. The MSPB’s resolution of those claims in the employee’s favor might fully dispose of the case.. Thus, because the MSPB’s expertise can otherwise be “brought to bear” on employee appeals that challenge the constitutionality of a statute, we see no reason to conclude that Congress intended to exempt such claims from exclusive review before the MSPB and the Federal Circuit. See Thunder Basin, 510 U. S., at 214-215 (concluding that, where administrative Commission’s expertise “could be brought to bear” on appeal, Commission’s exclusive review of alleged statutory violation was appropriate despite its lack of expertise in interpreting a particular statute (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that it is fairly discernible that the CSR.A review scheme was intended to preclude district court jurisdiction over petitioners’ claims. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
The CSRA divides civil service employees into three main categories. Fausto, 484 U. S., at 441, n. 1. “Senior Executive Service” employees occupy high-level positions in the Executive Branch but are not required to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 5 U. S. C. §3131(2). “[C]ompetitive service” employees—the relevant category for purposes of this case—are all other Executive Branch employees whose nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate are not required and who are not specifically excepted from the competitive service by statute. § 2102(a)(1). The competitive service also includes employees in other branches of the Federal Government and in the District of Columbia government who are specifically included by statute. §§ 2102(a)(2)—(3). Finally, “excepted service” employees are employees who are not in the Senior Executive Service or in the competitive service. § 2103.
See § 7701(b)(1) (authorizing referral of MSPB appeals to an ALJ); 5 CFR §§ 1201.111-1201.114 (2011) (detailing procedures for an initial decision by an ALJ and review by the MSPB).
Certain veterans and their close relatives are considered “preference eligible” civil service employees. Fausto, 484 U. S., at 441, n. 1.
Although Fausto interpreted the CSRA to entirely foreclose judicial review, the Court had no need to apply a heightened standard like that applied in Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592 (1988), because Fausto did not press any constitutional claims.
According to petitioners, the MSPB can decide claims that an agency violated an employee’s First or Fourth Amendment rights (and those claims consequently must be brought within the CSRA scheme), supra, at 12, because such claims allege only that an agency “acted in an unconstitutional manner” and do not challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute either facially or as applied. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 10, 21. That distinction is dubious at best. Agencies are created by and act pursuant to statutes. Thus, unless an action is beyond the scope of the agency’s statutory authority, an employee’s claim that the agency “acted in an unconstitutional manner” will generally be a claim that the statute authorizing the agency action was unconstitutionally applied to him. See, e. g., Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 565 (1968) (holding that the statute authorizing a government employee’s termination was unconstitutional as applied under the First and Fourteenth Amendments where the employee was fired because of his speech). In any event, the curious line that petitioners draw only highlights the weakness of their position, for it certainly is not “fairly discernible” from the CSRA’s text, structure, or purpose that the statutory review scheme is exclusive for so-called “unconstitutional manner” claims but not for facial or as-applied constitutional challenges to statutes. See supra, at 11-14.
The dissent misreads Thunder Basin. The dissent contends that the “heart of the preclusion analysis” in Thunder Basin involved statutory claims reviewable by the administrative body and that the “only constitutional issue” was decided by this Court “ ‘not on preclusion grounds but on the merits.’” Post, at 32 (opinion of Alito, J.) (quoting 510 U. S., at 219 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). To be sure, the Thunder Basin Court did decide the merits of the petitioner’s “second constitutional challenge,” namely whether the Court’s finding of preclusion was
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Douglas,
announced by Mr. Justice Black.
Petitioner passed the New York bar éxaminatións in 1936 but has not yet been admitted to practice. The present case is the latest in a long series of proceedings whereby he seeks admission.
Under New York law the Appellate Division of-the' State Supreme Court of each of the four Judicial Departments has power to admit applicants to the Bar. Once the State Board of Bar' Examiners certifies that an applicant has passed the examination (or that an examinátion has been dispensed with), the Appellate Division shall admit him to practice “if it shall be satisfied that' such person possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law.” Judiciary Law § 90 (i)(a).
The Appellate Division is required by Rule 1 of the New York Rules of Civil Practice to appoint a committee of not less than three practicing lawyers “for the purpose of investigating the character and fitness” óf applicants. •“Unless otherwise ordered by the Appellate Division, no person shall be admitted to practice”'without a favorable .certificate from the Committee. Ibid. Provision is made for submission by the applicant to the Committee of “all the information and data required by the committee and the Appellate Division justices.” Ibid. If an applicant has once applied for -admission and failed to obtain a certificate of good character and fitness, he must obtain and .submit “the written consent” of the Appellate Division to a renewal of his application. Ibid.
The papers of an applicant for admission to the Bar .are required by Rule 1 (g) of the Rules of Civil Practice to be kept on file in the Office of the Clerk of the Appellate Division.
The. Court of Appeals pursuant to its rule-making authority (Judiciary Law § 53(1)) has promulgated Rules for the Admission of Attorneys and Counsellors-at-Law which provide, inter alia, that every applicant must produce before the Committee “evidence that he possesses the good moral character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law”. (Rule VIII-1), and that justices of the Appellate Division shall adopt “such additional rules for ascertaining the moral and general fitness of applicants as to such justices may seem proper.” Rule VIII-4.
The Appellate Division to which petitioner has made application has not promulgated any “additional rules” under Rule VIII-4. Its Character and Fitness Committee consists of 10 members; and that Committee, we are advised, has not published or provided any rules of procedure.
The statute provides that “all papers, records and documents” of applicants “shall be sealed and be deemed private and confidential,” except that “upon good cause being shown, the justices of the appellate division . . . are empowered, in their discretion, by written order, to permit to be divulged all or any part of such papers, records and documents.” Judiciary Law §90(10). And for that purpose they may make such rules “as they may deem necessary.” Ibid.
But New York does not appear to have any procedure whereby an applicant for admission to the Bar is served with an order, to show cause by the Appellate Division before he is denied admission nor any other procedure that gives him a hearing prior to the court’s adverse action.
The present case started with a petition by Willner to the Appellate Division seeking leave to file a de novo application which alleged the following:
Willner had been certified by the State Board of Bar Examiners as having passed the bar'examinations in 1936, and the Committee in 1938, after several hearings, filed with the Appellate Division its determination that it was not satisfied'and could not “certify that the applicant possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law.” In 1943 Willner applied to the Appellate Division for an order directing the Committee to review its 1938 determination. This motion was denied without opinion. Willner in 1948 again petitioned the Appellate Division for a reexamination of his application, and for permission to file a new application. The Appellate Division permitted him to file a new application. Upon the filing of that application, the Committee conducted two hearings in 1948 and, by a report in 1950, refused to certify him for the second time. In 1951 Willner again made application to the Appellate Division for an order directing, inter alia, the Corn-mittee to furnish him with statements of its reasons for its refusal to certify him or that a referee be appointed to hear and report on the question of his character and fitness. This application was denied without opinion. In 1954 Willner filed a fourth application with the Appellate Division requesting leave to file an application for admission. This was denied without opinion. The Court of Appeals refused leave to appeal, and this Court denied certiorari. 348 U. S. 955. In 1960 Willner filed a fifth application with the Appellate Division, which application was denied without opinion.
The present petition further alleged that Willner has been a member in'good standing of the New York Society of Certified Public Accountants and of the American Institute of Accountants since 1951 and that he has been admitted to practice before the Tax Court and the Treasury Department since 1928. Petitioner alleged that in connection with his hearings before the Committee on his 1937 application he was shown a letter containing various adverse statements about him from a New York attorney; that a member of the Committee promised him a personal confrontation with that attorney; but that the promise was never kept. Petitioner also alleged that he had been involved in litigation with another lawyer who had as his purpose “to destroy me”; that the secretary of the Committee was taking orders from that lawyer and that two members of the Committee were' “in cahoots” with that lawyer.
The Appellate Division denied the petition without opinion and denied leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Willner thereupon sought leave to appeal to the Court, of Appeals and in an affidavit in support of his motion stated, “I was never afforded the opportunity of confronting my accusers, of having the accusers sworn and cross examining them, and the opportunity of refuting the accusations and accusers.”
The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and the Clerk of that Court obtained from the Clerk of the Appellate Division the file in the case. Willner, in his brief before the-Court of Appeals, argued he had been denied his constitutional rights in that he had been denied confrontation of his accusers and.that, in, spite of the repeated attempts, he could not be sure of the Committee’s reasons for refusing to certify him for admission. The Court of Appeals, after oral argument, affirmed the order without opinion. 11. N. Y. 2d 866, 182 N. E. 2d 288. Thereafter, at Willner’s request, the Court of Appeals amended its remittitur to recite that
“Upon the appeal herein there was presented and necessarily passed upon a question under the Constitution of the United States, viz: Appellant contended that he was denied due process of law in. violation of his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that appellant was not denied due process ixi violation of such constitutional rights.”
We granted certiorari, 370 U. S. 934.
The issue presented is justiciable. “A claim of a present right to admission to the bar of á state and a denial of that right is a controversy.” In re ,Summers, 325 U. S, 561, 568. Moreover, the requirements of procedural due process must be met before a-State can.exclude a person from practicing law. “A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law of from any other occupation in a manner of for reasons that contravéne the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 238-239. As the Court said in Ex parte Garland, 4, Wall. 333, 379, the right is not “a matter of grace and favor.”
We are not here concerned with grounds which justify denial of a license to practice law, but only with what procedural due process requires if the license is to be withheld. This is the problem which Chief Justice Taft adverted to in Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117, involving an application of a certified public, accountant to practice before the Board of Tax Appeals. Chief Justice Taft writing for the Court said:
“We think that the petitioner having shown by . his application that, being a citizen of the United States and a certified public accountant under the laws of a State, he was within the class of those entitled to be admitted to practice under- the Board’s rules, he should not have been rejected upon charges of his unfitness without giving him an opportunity by notice’ for hearing and answer. The rules adopted by the Board provide that 'the Board may in its discretion deny admission, suspend or disbar any person.’ But this must be construed to mean the exercise of a discretion to be exercised after fair investigation, with such a notice, hearing and opportunity to answer for the applicant as would constitute due process.” Id., p. 123.
We have emphasized in recent years that procedural due process often requires confrontation and cross-examination of those whose word deprives a person of his livelihood. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474, 492, 496-497, and cases cited. That view has been taken by several state courts when it comes to procedural due process and the admission to practice law. Coleman v. Watts, 81 So. 2d 650; Application of Burke, 87 Ariz. 336, 351 P. 2d 169; In re Crum, 103 Ore. 296, 204 P. 948; Moity v. Louisiana State Bar Assn., 239 La. 1081, 121 So. 2d 87. Cf. Brooks v. Laws, 208 F. 2d 18, 33 (concurring opinion). We think the need for confrontation is a necessary conclusion from the requirements of procedural due process in a situation such as this. Cf. Greene v. McElroy, supra; Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886.
This result, is sought to be avoided in several ways. First, it is. said that the Committee’s action is merely advisory, that it is an investigator not a trier of facts, since under § 90 of the Judiciary Law it is the Appellate Division that ultimately must be convinced of an applicant’s good character. The answer is that “[ujnless otherwise ordered by the Appellate Division” (New York Rules of Civil Practice, Rule 1 (d)), á favorable certificate from the Committee is requisite to admission by the Appellate Division; and where, as here, the Appellate Division has held no hearings of its own to determine an applicant’s character, the role of the Committee is more than that of a mere investigator.
Second, it is said that petitioner has.sought relief too late. But the Court of Appeals did' not reject his peti-' tio'n on that ground. Instead, it stated that it “necessarily” ruled on the constitutional issue “presented.” We can only conclude that the Court of Appeals would have found it “unnecessary” to pass, upon any constitutional question if under state law some other ground had .existed for denying petitioner relief. See Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U. S. 179, 182; Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U. S. 528, 535-536.
Third, it is said that the record,shows that petitioner was not rejected on the basis of ex parte statements but on the basis of his. own statements to the Committee. If the Court of Appeals reached this' conclusion, the only constitutional question which was presented and which it could have “necessarily” passed on was whether petitioner was denied due process by not being informed of aiid allowed, to rebut the bases for either the Committee’s or the Appellate Division’s failure to find his good character. It does not appear from the record that either the Committee or the Appellate Division, at any stage in. these proceedings, ever apprised petitioner of its reasons for failing to be convinced of his good character. Petitioner was clearly, entitled to notice of and a hearing on the grounds for his rejection either before the Committee or before the Appellate Division. Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra; cf. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273. There seems no question but that petitioner was apprised of the matters the Committee was considering.
“But a ‘full hearing’ — a fair and open hearing— requires more than that. . . . Those ' who are brought into .contest with . . . Government .in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its final command.” Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 18-19.
Petitioner had no opportunity to ascertain and contest the bases of the Committee’s reports to the Appellate Division, and the Appellate Division gave him no separate hearing. Yet, “[t]he requirements of fairness are hot exhausted in the taking or consideration of evidence but extend to the concluding parts of the procedure as well as to the beginning and intermediate steps.” Id., at 20. Cf. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U. S. 407, 414.
If the Court of Appeals based its decision on the ground that denying petitioner the right of confrontation did not violate due process, we also hold that it erred for the reasons earlier stated. But because respondent has asserted that the ex parte statements involved in this case played no part in any of the decisions below, we have searched the record to assess this contention. It shows that the Committee • had several complaints against petitioner. The various intra-Committee memoranda and reports to the Appellate Division contained in this record .support the conclusion that the Committee did in fact rely on these complaints, at least to some extent, in reaching its determinations. And there is no- indication in the record that any of the Appellate Division’s orders were based solely on petitioner’s own statements. Thus, despite respondent’s assurances that the Committee never bases its final action on ex parte statements, we cannot say that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that' this constitutional question was “necessarily” decided.
We hold that petitioner was denied procedural due process when he was denied admission to the Bar by the Appellate Division without a hearing on the charges filed against him before either the Committee or the Appellate Division.
Reversed.
In New Jersey the Committee on Character and Fitness is directed by Rule 1:20-6 (a) of the Supreme Court Rules to take the •following steps in case of an adverse report:
“If the committee believes that an applicant is not of fit character or has not served a satisfactory clerkship, it shall promptly notify the applicant of • its intention to' file an .adverse report as to his moral character or clerkship and of the time, not less than 5 days, within which the applicant may file with the committee a written request fór a hearing. If the applicant does not request a hearing within the time fixed by the committee, it shall promptly notify'him of its action and file its report with the court for appropriate action by it. If the applicant requests a hearing within the time fixed by the committee, it shall promptly notify him of the time and' place of the hearing. The hearing shall be conducted in private and in a formal manner. A complete stenographic record shall be kept and to this end an official court reporter of the county, assigned by the supervising court reporter for that purpose, shall serve the committee and prepare, without additional compensation, such transcripts as may be ordered by it. A transcript may be ordered by the applicant at his own expense. The committee shall submit a report of its findings and conclusions to the court, with a copy to the applicant, for appropriate action by it. An applicant aggrieved by the determination of the committee may, on notice to the committee, petition the court for relief.”
Rule 1:20-6 (b) goes on to provide:
“The Board of Bar Examiners, subject to the approval of the court, shall prescribe the procedures to be followed by the committees on character and fitness in the performance of their duties under paragraph (a) of this rule.”
Cf. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, where only “the opportunity to work at one isolated and specific military installation” was involved. Id., at 896.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a companion case to Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, ante, p. 233. Like the petitioner in that case, petitioner Brent Ray Brewer claims that the former Texas capital sentencing statute impermissibly prevented his sentencing jury from giving meaningful consideration to constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.
In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989) (Penry I), we held that jury instructions that merely articulated the Texas “special issues,” without directing the jury “to consider fully Penry’s mitigating evidence as it bears on his personal culpability,” did not provide his sentencing jury with an adequate opportunity to decide whether that evidence might provide a legitimate basis for imposing a sentence other than death. Id., at 323. We characterized the evidence of Penry’s mental retardation and history of childhood abuse as a “two-edged sword,” because “it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future.” Id., at 324.
As an overview of the cases both preceding and following Penry I demonstrates, we have long recognized that a sentencing jury must be able to give a “‘reasoned moral response’” to a defendant’s mitigating evidence — particularly that evidence which tends to diminish his culpability — when deciding whether to sentence him to death. Id., at 323; see also Abdul-Kabir, ante, at 246-256,260-263. This principle first originated in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), in which we held that sentencing juries in capital cases “must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor,” id., at 112 (emphasis added). In more recent years, we have repeatedly emphasized that a Penry violation exists whenever a statute, or a judicial gloss on a statute, prevents a jury from giving meaningful effect to mitigating evidence that may justify the imposition of a life sentence rather than a death sentence. See Abdul-Kabir, ante, at 260-263. We do so again here, and hold that the Texas state court’s decision to deny relief to Brewer under Penry I was both "contrary to” and “involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, ás determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).
I
In 1991, Brewer was convicted of murder committed during the course of a robbery. At sentencing, he introduced several different types of mitigating evidence, including
“that he had a bout with depression three months before the murder; that he was briefly hospitalized for that depression; that his co-defendant, a woman with whom he was apparently obsessed, dominated and manipulated him; that he had been abused by his father; that he had witnessed his father abuse his mother; and that he had abused drugs.” Brewer v. Dretke, 442 F. 3d 273, 275 (CA5 2006) (per curiam,) (footnotes omitted).
As a result of a strategic decision on his counsel’s part, Brewer neither secured nor presented any expert psychological or psychiatric testimony.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, Brewer submitted several additional instructions designed to give effect to the mitigating evidence he did present. App. 81-87. The trial judge rejected all of his proposed instructions and instead instructed the jury to answer only two special issues:
“‘Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of the defendant, BRENT RAY BREWER, that caused the death of the deceased, Robert Doyle Laminack, was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased would result?
“‘Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability that the defendant, BRENT RAY BREWER, would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society?’ ” 442 F. 3d, at 277.
In closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized that Brewer’s violent response to his father’s extensive physical abuse of both Brewer and his mother supported an affirmative answer to the “future dangerousness” special issue. In contrast, he deemphasized any mitigating effect that such evidence should have on the jury’s determination of Brewer’s fate:
“And, you know, folks, you can take a puppy, and you can beat that puppy and you can make him mean, but if that dog bites, he is going to bite the rest of his life, for whatever reason.
“Whatever got him to this point, he is what he is today. And that will never change. That will never change. “All that’s happened to this time or all those years cannot change the violence and the cold, cold-bloodedness that he’s exhibited right here. Not one tear. Not one tear, because life means nothing to him. Zero.
“You go back, you look at the evidence and you decide, not because of a poor family and not because of the survivors, because of the evidence that you see that he has shown.” App. 118.
The prosecutor stressed that the jurors lacked the power to exercise moral judgment in determining Brewer’s sentence, admonishing them that “[y]ou don’t have the power to say whether [Brewer] lives or dies. You answer the questions according to the evidence, mu[ch] like you did at the guilt or innocence [sic]. That’s all.” Id., at 114. Ultimately, the jury answered both special issues in the affirmative, and Brewer was sentenced to death.
Brewer’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Brewer v. State, No. 71,307 (Tex. Crim. App., June 22,1994) (en banc), App. 122-171. He then filed an application for state postconviction relief, which the CCA denied on January 31, 2001, over the dissent of three judges. Ex parte Brewer, 50 S. W. 3d 492 (2001) {per curiam order).
Brewer subsequently filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. After requesting supplemental briefing concerning Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U. S. 274 (2004), the District Court granted conditional relief. Brewer v. Dretke, No. Civ.A.2:01-CV-0112-J (Aug. 2,2004), App. 185-213. On March 1, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court and rendered its own judgment denying the petition. 442 F. 3d, at 282. We granted certiorari. 549 U. S. 974 (2006).
II
Like the petitioner in Abdul-Kabir, Brewer contends that the same constitutional error that infected Penry’s sentencing hearing occurred in his trial. We agree. As did Penry’s, Brewer’s mitigating evidence served as a “two-edged sword” because it tended to confirm the State’s evidence of future dangerousness as well as lessen his culpability for the crime. Penry 1, 492 U. S., at 324. It may well be true that Brewer’s mitigating evidence was less compelling than Penry’s, but, contrary to the view of the CCA, that difference does not provide an acceptable justification for refusing to apply the reasoning in Penry I to this case. There is surely a reasonable likelihood that the jurors accepted the prosecutor’s argument at the close of the sentencing hearing that all they needed to decide was whether Brewer had acted deliberately and would likely be dangerous in the future, necessarily disregarding any independent concern that, given Brewer’s troubled background, he may not be deserving of a death sentence.
Also unpersuasive in distinguishing the instant case from others to which Penry I applies is the Fifth Circuit’s explanation regarding the lack of expert evidence in Brewer’s case (as compared to that presented by the petitioner in AbdulKabir) and its distinction between mental illness and mental retardation. In its opinion reversing the District Court’s conditional grant of habeas relief, the Court of Appeals noted that, under its precedents, “[t]he only instances in which mental illness has given rise to Penry I violations involve those where the illness in question is chronic and/or immutable [as in the case of mental retardation].” 442 F. 3d, at 280. The court also emphasized the lack of expert psychiatric evidence in this case, contrasting the record below with that in Abdul-Kabir, and concluded that Brewer “came nowhere near to producing evidence sufficient for us to grant relief.” 442 F. 3d, at 281. Nowhere in our Penry line of cases have we suggested that the question whether mitigating evidence could have been adequately considered by the jury is a matter purely of quantity, degree, or immutability. Rather, we have focused on whether such evidence has mitigating relevance to the special issues and the extent to which it may diminish a defendant’s moral culpability for the crime. The transient quality of such mitigating evidence may make it more likely to fall in part within the ambit of the special issues; however, as we explained in Penry I, such evidence may still have “relevance to the defendant’s moral culpability beyond the scope of the special verdict questions.” 492 U. S., at 322 (citing and quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164, 185 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment)).
Ill
Under the narrowest possible reading of our opinion in Penry I, the Texas special issues do not provide for adequate consideration of a defendant’s mitigating evidence when that evidence functions as a “two-edged sword.” As the District Court explained in its opinion granting habeas corpus relief in this case:
“The mitigating evidence presented may have served as a basis for mercy even if a jury decided that the murder was committed deliberately and that Petitioner posed a continuing threat. Without an instruction, much less a special issue on mitigation, this evidence was out of the jury’s reach. Given the nature of the mitigating evidence before the jury and the lack of any instruction on mitigation, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied its instructions in a way that prevented the consideration of the mitigating evidence. Reviewing the evidence in light of the special issues, a jury would be very hard pressed to see the evidence presented as anything but aggravating. Failure to submit an instruction on mitigation evidence was an unreasonable application of federal law and Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, habeas relief on this issue is conditionally granted.” No. Civ.A.2:01-CV-Q112-J, at 9, App. 196.
In reversing the District Court’s grant of habeas relief, and rejecting that court’s conclusion that Brewer’s mitigating evidence was effectively “out of the jury’s reach,” the Court of Appeals miseharacterized the law as demanding only that such evidence be given “sufficient mitigating effect,” and improperly equated “sufficient effect” with “full effect.” This is not consistent with the reasoning of our opinion issued after Penry’s resentencing (and before the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in this case). See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U. S. 782 (2001) (Penry II). Like the “‘constitutional relevance’ ” standard that we rejected in Tennard, a “sufficient effect” standard has “no foundation in the decisions of this Court.” 542 U. S., at 284.
For reasons not supported by our prior precedents, but instead dictated by what until quite recently has been the Fifth Circuit’s difficult Penry jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals concluded that Brewer’s evidence of mental illness and substance abuse could not constitute a Penry violation. It further concluded that “evidence of a troubled childhood may, as a result of its temporary character, fall sufficiently within the ambit of” the special issues. 442 F. 3d, at 280. For the reasons explained above, as well as in our opinion in Abdul-Kabir, these conclusions fail to heed the warnings that have repeatedly issued from this Court regarding the extent to which the jury must be allowed not only to consider such evidence, or to have such evidence before it, but to respond to it in a reasoned, moral manner and to weigh such evidence in its calculus of deciding whether a defendant is truly deserving of death. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
[For dissenting opinion of The Chief Justice, see ante, p. 265; for dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia, see ante, p. 280.]
On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) summarized the same evidence as follows:
“1) Appellant was not mentally retarded, but was involuntarily committed on January 1,1990, for ‘major depression, single episode, without psychotic features, polysubstance abuse.’ The examining physician based his opinion on a suicide note appellant wrote to his mother. On January 25, appellant signed a request for voluntary admission to Big Springs State Hospital for fourteen days.
“2) Appellant came from an abused background where he was ignored by both his father and step-father. He did not have a relationship or live with his real father until after he was fifteen-years old. Appellant’s father hit him on several occasions, once with the butt of a pistol and once with a flashlight. Appellant’s father frequently beat his mother. Appellant’s father had once told him, ‘If you ever draw your hand back, you’d better kill me because I’ll kill you.’
“3) Appellant had smoked marijuana when he was a teenager.” Brewer v. State, No. 71,307 (June 22, 1994), p. 15, App. 140 (footnotes omitted).
The CCA’s opinion on direct appeal provides the only meaningful explanation by a Texas state court as to why Brewer’s Penry I claim was denied. See n. 5, infra. When Brewer raised the same claim in his state postconviction proceedings, the trial court set forth, and the CCA adopted, a one-sentence ruling embracing the holding previously made on direct appeal: “The ... special issues ... were an adequate vehicle for the jury’s consideration of the mitigating evidence . . . .” App. 176; Ex parte Brewer, 50 S. W. 3d 492, 493 (2001) (per curiam).
Judge Price filed a dissent to the order dismissing Brewer’s postconviction application for relief, joined by Judges Johnson and Holcomb. Id., at 493-495. In the dissenters’ view, Brewer had alleged a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on his counsel’s failure to procure a mental health expert who could have examined him in preparation for trial. Id., at 493.
For example, the prosecution introduced the testimony of a police officer who had been called to quell a family dispute as evidence of Brewer’s violent character. App. 6-15. The prosecution also introduced testimony from a doctor who treated Brewer’s father after Brewer struck him with a broom handle in response to his father’s attack on his mother. Id., at 23-25.
The CCA’s opinion purporting to distinguish Penry I simply stated: “We conclude the second punishment issue provided an adequate vehicle for the jurors to give effect to appellant’s mitigating evidence. We have held a stay in a mental hospital does not evidence a ‘long term mental illness which would affect appellant’s ability to conform to the requirements of society.’ Joiner [v. State, 825 S. W. 2d 701, 707 (1992) (en banc)]. As in Joiner, the evidence shows no more than appellant’s threat to commit suicide and a stay at a hospital on one occasion. Id. Further, appellant’s evidence of drug abuse and an abusive homelife was given effect within the scope of the punishment issues. Ex parte Ellis, 810 S. W. 2d 208, 211-212 (Tex. Cr. App. 1991) (drug addiction); Goss v. State, 826 S. W. 2d 162, 166 (Tex. Cr. App. 1992) (abusive household).” No. 71,307, at 15, App. 141.
In neither its opinion in this case nor in Joiner did the CCA explain why Brewer’s evidence was not the same kind of “two-edged sword” as Penry’s, other than to suggest that it was less persuasive. 492 U. S., at 324.
“It’s not a matter of life and death. It’s whether it was deliberate. Was this act deliberate? Will he continue to commit violent acts? That’s all you answer. And every one of you people told me you would base that not upon the result, but upon what the evidence dictates you must do.” App. 115 (paragraph break omitted).
The Court of Appeals explained: “For the mitigating evidence to be within the effective reach of the jury in answering the special issues, the special interrogatories must be capable of giving relevant evidence constitutionally sufficient mitigating effect. Whether that sufficiency requires that the evidence be given ‘full/ or merely ‘some/ mitigating effect has been the subject of considerable discussion in this court, but ultimately the distinction is only one of semantics, because regardless of what label is put on the word ‘effect/ it is indisputable that the effect must be constitutionally ‘sufficient.’ Even if the requirement is called ‘full,’ it means nothing more than ‘sufficient.’” Brewer v. Dretke, 442 F. 3d 273, 278-279 (CA5 2006) (per curiam) (footnote omitted).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court. Two Terms ago in Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663, where federal savings bonds purchased with community funds were registered in a co-ownership form and the registered co-owners were husband and wife, the survivor was held entitled to the proceeds of the bonds without liability to account in any amount to the beneficiaries of the deceased co-owner, despite conflicting state law purporting to forbid a married couple to make survivorship arrangements with respect to community property and requiring süch property to pass as part of the estate of the deceased in accordance with his will or the state intestacy laws. The success of the management of the national debt was deemed to depend upon the successful sale of the savings bonds, one of the inducements to purchasers being sur-vivorship provisions which afforded “a convenient method of avoiding complicated probate proceedings.” 369 U. S., at 669. State law interfered with a legitimate exercise of federal power and was required to give way under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
The Court nevertheless recognized that the federal law was not to be used as a shield for fraud or to prevent relief “where the circumstances manifest fraud or a breach of trust tantamount thereto on the part of a husband while acting in his capacity as manager of the general community property.” 369 U. S., at 670. The scope and application of the exception to the regulatory imperative — “the doctrine of fraud applicable under federal law in such a case,” 369 U. S., at 670-671 — were left to decision in other cases.
This is one of those cases. Petitioner is the brother of Angel Yiatchos who died in 1958 and who in 1950-1951 purchased with community funds belonging to himself and his wife United States Savings Bonds in the face amount of $15,075. The deceased was the registered owner of the bonds and they were made payable on his death to his brother, the petitioner. The deceased left a will made in 1954, naming his wife as executrix and bequeathing all cash and bonds owned by him at the time of his death to his brother, four sisters and a nephew. Petitioner brought suit in the appropriate court in the State of Washington to establish his ownership of the bonds, relying upon the federal regulations providing for registration of the savings bonds in the beneficiary form and providing that in the case of the death of the registered owner “the beneficiary will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner, and payment or reissue will be made as though the bond were registered in his name alone.” 31 CFR § 315.66. The trial court, on stipulated facts, sustained the claims of the wife and the other beneficiaries under the will who insisted that since the bonds were purchased with community funds and were community property at the death of the deceased they must be divided into two equal parts, one-half to go to the wife and the other half to be distributed in accordance with the will. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed, holding that the deceased’s “purchase with community funds of bonds payable to him alone or, after his death, payable exclusively to his brother was in fraud of the rights of the respondent wife” and “a void endeavor to divest the wife of any interest in her own property.” The deceased having been under a fiduciary duty to manage the community funds for the benefit of the community, “[a] breach of this duty [was] a constructive fraud.” Petitioner’s claim to any part of the bonds as beneficiary named therein was rejected since “[respondent widow had a vested one-half interest in the bond proceeds” and since “[t]he descent of decedent’s interest is controlled by RCW 11.04.050 and, therefore, must be distributed according to the terms of the will.” In re Yiatchos’ Estate, 60 Wash. 2d 179, 182, 373 P. 2d 125, 127. We granted certiorari to consider an asserted conflict with Free v. Bland, supra, which was decided while this case was on appeal in the Washington Supreme Court and which that court considered in rendering its own judgment.
Under the federal regulations petitioner is entitled to the bonds unless his deceased brother committed fraud or breach of trust tantamount to fraud. Since the construction and application of a federal regulation having the force of law, California Comm’n v. United States, 355 U. S. 534, 542-545; Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S. 481, 484, are involved, whether or not there is fraud which will bar the named beneficiary in a particular case must be determined as a matter of federal law, Free v. Bland, supra; Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363. But in applying the federal standard we shall be guided by state law insofar as the property interests of the widow created by state law are concerned. It would seem obvious that the bonds may not be used as a device to deprive the widow of property rights which she enjoys under Washington law and which would not be transferable by her husband but for the survivorship provisions of the federal bonds.
Proceeding on these premises, we note that under Washington law spouses may agree to change the status of community property either by an agreement to become effective on the death of either spouse, Rev. Code Wash. § 26.16.120; In re Yiatchos’ Estate, 60 Wash. 2d 179, 182, 373 P. 2d 125, 127, or by gift during lifetime; Hanley v. Most, 9 Wash. 2d 429, 458, 115 P. 2d 933, 944. Thus the widow in this case could have consented to a gift of community property to her husband’s brother or to the inclusion of the bonds in that portion of the estate which belonged to her husband and which he could dispose of at the time of his death. If she gave such consent, or if she ratified the purchase and registration of the bonds, the conduct of the husband was not, for federal purposes, fraud or breach of trust sufficient to avoid the command of the regulations, and petitioner would be entitled to all of the bonds.
So far petitioner apparently agrees, but he denies the need for further inquiry, claiming all of the bonds because the record is silent about the knowledge or consent of the wife, she having made no claim of fraud and produced no facts negativing her consent or knowledge. But we think the course suggested by the United States in its amicus curiae brief is preferable. The factual record was made by the stipulation of the parties prior to decision of Free v. Bland, supra. Before precluding the widow because of her own conduct, she should have an opportunity upon remand to prove the actual facts concerning her knowledge or participation in the purchase and registration of the bonds.
Petitioner, however, also objects to a remand because further inquiry into consent or acquiescence rests upon the erroneous assumption that the wife could object to the husband’s transfer of the bonds after his death. Since the present value of the bonds, or even their face value, is less than one-half the community property, the deceased, says petitioner, was not attempting to give away property belonging to his wife but was only making use of a simple device provided by federal law to dispose of what he could give by will under the Washington law. The validity of this contention turns on a question of state law about which we are not entirely clear and which may be resolved upon remand. According to the court below, the widow had a “vested one-half interest” in the bonds, which may mean that under Washington law the wife before and after death has a half interest in each item of the community estate, including the particular bonds involved in this case, and cannot be forced to take cash or something else of equal value upon a division of the community property between herself and those entitled to take her husband’s half. Under such circumstances, since we cannot say that this property right, if it exists, is insubstantial, to allow all of the bonds to pass to the designated beneficiary would effect an involuntary and impermissible conversion of the widow’s assets.
On the other hand, Rev. Code Wash. § 26.16.030 provides that “The husband shall have the management and control of community personal property, with a like power of disposition as he has of his separate personal property, except he shall not devise by will more than one-half thereof.” If under Washington law, the widow, after her husband’s death, has no interest in specific assets owned by the community and her half of the community estate may be satisfied from property or money other than the bonds, petitioner is entitled to all of the bonds for then there is no fraud or breach of trust in derogation of the widow’s property rights under state law. Upon dissolution of the community one-half of the community property belonged to Angel Yiatchos, who was free, as of the time of dissolution, to dispose of this half as he pleased. He might have left it to his brother by will. Instead he elected to effect the same result by utilizing federal savings bonds with their convenient feature of permitting ownership spanning two lives. On the assumption, then, that the wife is entitled to half of the estate, but not half of each particular item of property, the bonds have not been used as an instrument of fraud ; and the survivorship provisions of the federal regulations must control, preempting, if necessary, inconsistent state law which interferes with the legitimate exercise of the Federal Government’s power to borrow money. Free v. Bland, supra.
Petitioner is therefore entitled to all of the bonds if the widow consented to making him the beneficiary or if under Washington law the surviving spouse does not have a one-half interest in each community asset. But even if the wife is not barred by her own consent or by the nature of her interest from claiming a half interest in the bonds, petitioner is entitled to the other half, the half which belonged to the deceased and could be disposed of by him to the beneficiaries of his choice. The Washington court deemed the transaction void ab initio and required the deceased’s half to pass by his will rather than by virtue of the bonds and the force of the regulation. But the petitioner was entitled to the proceeds only on the death of the husband, and then only if the bonds had not matured or been cashed. During the husband’s life he was the registered owner of the bonds, and was therefore entitled at any time to convert them into cash upon presentation and surrender “as though no beneficiary had been named in the registration.” 31 CFR § 315.65. Aside from possible consequences of the wife’s consent or ratification, as long as Angel Yiatchos was alive the bonds were community property, and could be used by him— the manager of the community and the registered owner of the bonds — for community purposes just as the assets used to purchase them could have been so used. Thus, the holding of the court below, which requires that the bonds be disposed of by will or by state intestacy provisions, is nothing more than a state prohibition against utilizing savings bonds to transmit property at death, and is, for reasons stated above, forbidden by Free v. Bland, supra.
We add but one caveat to our holding that petitioner is entitled to at least one-half the bonds. The bonds, it would appear, are less than one-half the gross estate, but the record does not compare the value of the bonds with one-half the net estate after payment of debts. It is our understanding that the deceased’s interest in the community property is chargeable with his separate debts and with one-half the community debts. Ryan v. Ferguson, 3 Wash. 356, 28 P. 910. It would not contravene federal law as expressed in the applicable regulations to require the bonds to bear the same share of the debts that they would have borne if they had been passed to petitioner as a specific legacy under the will rather than by the survivorship provisions of the bonds.
The judgment of the Washington court is reversed insofar as it relates to one-half of the bonds, subject to the above remarks concerning the portion of the debts which may be allocable thereto. As to the other half the judgment is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On July 23, 1954, an information was filed -in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania charging appellee with a violation of 18 U. S. C. § 214 (originally § 1 of the Act of December 11, 1926, 44 Stat. 918). That statute provides:
“Whoever pays or offers or promises any money or thing of value, to any person, firm, or corporation in consideration of the use or promise to use any influence to procure any appointive office or place under the United States for any person, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”
The information alleged that appellee had offered S. Walter Stauffer, a member of Congress from Pennsylvania, to contribute $1,000 a year to the Republican Party in consideration of Stauffer’s use of influence to procure for appellee the postmastership of York, Pennsylvania. The District Court granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the United States. 168 F. Supp. 382. The Government appealed directly to this Court, 18 U. S. C. § 3731, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 358 U.. S. 806, to determine whether the allegations of the information constituted a violation of 18 U. S. C. § 214.
We turn first to the language of the statute. There are alternative constructions of its language. One sensible reading is to say that even though the Republican Party was to be the ultimate recipient of the money, this was a promise to Stauffer of money (which it plainly was) in consideration of his use of influence. Since Stauffer is a “person,” the statute covers the alleged offense. It may be urged that although a promise was made to
Stauffer it was not a promise of money to him. Since the word “to” immediately follows the words “money or thing of value” and not the word “promises,” it is possible to read the statute as requiring that the recipient of the money or thing of value be the “person, firm, or corporation”, which the statute describes. But either construction of the statute covers the classic three-party case: e. g., A tells X he will give $1,000 to Y if X will use influence to get him a job. . Under the first construction this is a promise of $1,000 to X in consideration of the use of influence. Under the second construction this is a promise ,to give money to Y in consideration of a promise to use influence; a standard third-party beneficiary situation. The only difficulty with this second construction in the context of this ease is the necessity of finding that the Republican Party is a “person, firm, or corporation,” as those .words are used in the statute. The Republican Party is not a legal entity. It is an amorphous group of individuals that acts and only can 'act through persons. Its funds are received and managed by persons. Certainly the word “person” in the statute is broad enough to include the Republican Party, and since the content and manifest purpose of the statute confirm, as we shall see, such a construction, it would unjustifiably contract the law to withdraw gifts to the Republican Party from its scope. Thus, no matter how the statute is read, one thing is clear — its terms cover this case. Shirey’s endeavor to purchase himself a postmastership as alleged has been interdicted by the Congress. Awkwardness is not ambiguity, nor do defined multiple meanings, each of which is satisfied by the allegations of the information, constitute a want of definiteness.
Not only does the compulsion of language within the statutory , framework seem clear, but the purpose and history of the enactment powerfully reaffirm the meaning yielded by its language. The bill was first introduced in Congress with a Committee Report which stated:
“This bill seeks to punish the purchase and sale of public offices. Certain Members of Congress have brought to the attention of the House both by speeches on the floor and statements before the Judiciary Committee a grave situation, disclosing corruption in connection with postal appointments in Mississippi and South Carolina. It is believed that this bill will prevent corrupt practices in connection with patronage appointments in thé future.” H. R. Rep. No. 1366, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
The information in this case deals, with the very kind of situation that gave rise to the pro vision, under scrutiny. In the years preceding the enactment of this legislation members of Congress referred to contributions to party treasuries and to campaign funds, as well as direct payments to those in charge of patronage, as among the corrupt methods of obtaining postmasterships. See, e. g., 65 Cong. Rec. 1*408-1413. These revelations on the floor of the Congress, as disclosed by the authoritative history of enactment, indicate the aim of Congress to proscribe payments to political. parties in return for influence. Indeed this form of payment was a major concern of Congress. Certainly we. cannot infer that Congress expressed this concern in self-defeating terms.
Statutes, including penal enactments, are not inert exercises in literary composition. They are instruments of government, and in construing them “the general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.” United States v. Whitridge, 197 U. S. 135, 143. This is so because the purpose of an enactment is embedded in its words even though it is not always pedantically expressed in words. See United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396, 399. Statutory meaning, it is to be remembered, is more to be felt than demonstrated, see United States v. Johnson, 221 U. S. 488, 496, or, as Judge Learned Hand has put it, the art of interpretation is “the art of proliferating a purpose.” Brooklyn Nat. Corp. v. Comm’r, 157 F. 2d 450, 451. In ascertaining this purpose it is important to remember that no matter how elastic is the use to which the term scientific may be put, it cannot be used to describe the legislative process. That is a crude but practical process of the adaptation by the ordinary citizen of means to an end, except when it concerns technical problems beyond the ken of the average man.
Applying these generalities to the immediate occasion, it is clear that the terms, the history, and the manifest purpose of 18 U. S. C. § 214 coalesce in a construction of that statute which validates the information against Shirey. The evil which Congress sought to check and the mischief wrought by what it proscribed are the same when the transaction is triangular as when only two parties are involved. It is incredible to suppose that Congress meant to prohibit Shirey from giving $1,000 to Stauffer, to be passed on by the latter to the Party fund, but that Shirey was outside the congressional prohibition for securing the same influence by a promise to deposit $1,000 directly in the Party’s fund. That is not the kind of finessing by which this Court has heretofore allowed penal legislation to be construed. See, e. g., United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383, and United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385.
The judgment is
Reversed.
The information charges as follows:
“On or about the 5th day of December 1953, in the City of York, Middle District of Pennsylvania, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, GEORGE DONALD SHIREY, in violation of the Act of Congress, June 25, 1948, c 645, Sec. 1, 62 Stat. 694,18 U. S. C. Sec. •214, did KNOWINGLY, WILFULLY and UNLAWFULLY offer or promise to S. WALTER STAUFFER, a Member of Congress of the 19th Congressional District of Pennsylvania, to donate $1,000 a year to the Republican Party to be used as they see fit, in consideration of the use or the promise to use any influence 'to procure for him the appointive office, under thé United States, of Postmaster of York, Pennsylvania,”..
Whether the word “person” in a particular statute includes a' particular body, a corporation, or association is essentially a matter of construction of that statute, aided, where possible, by general statutory definitions. If the purpose of a statute is such as to dictate the inclusion of a particular body within its scope then the statute is. generally so interpreted: Since 18 U. S. C. § 214 was aimed at prohibiting the purchase of influence, it is difficult to conclude that Congress would prohibit payments to firms and corporations and not proscribe payments to political organizations, since the influence of political parties in securing jobs and their involvement in the patronage process is greater than that of private companies. We must be blind not to know that among the abuses which led to the legislation were gifts to political parties and campaign treasuries, etc. Although these mostly took the form of payments to local chairmen, etc., there is no reason to assume that Congress meant to proscribe the payment to the officer of the Party but if a check were made out to the Party itself, a check which could be cashed and used by the officers of the Party, it was not outlawed.
In Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, the Court decided that § 7 of the Sherman Act allowing "any person” to bring a treble damage action, allowed the State of Georgia to bring such an action. This was in the face of an earlier case holding that the same act did not allow the United States to' sue. In reconciling the cases the Court pointed out that the scope of the word “person” depended on its “legislative environment,” and pointed to the differences in considerations which led to the exclusion of the United States and the inclusion of Georgia.
In Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, a statute taxed “persons” selling liquor. Person was defined to include “partnership, association, company or corporation, as well as a natural person.” The Court decided this allowed a State to be taxed, saying that the meaning of the word person “depends upon the connection in which the word is found.”
In Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, the Court said that the word “person” in a Texas statute of limitations included the United States, and thus the United States could claim the benefit of the statute. The Court said that “the word ‘person’ in the statute would include them as a body politic and corporate.”
Under these principles the statutory context here clearly calls for including the Republican Party within the term “person.”
The bill was introduced by Congressman Stevenson. 67 Cong. Rec. 6419. Two years before, in describing the “corruption in connection with postal appointments in . . . South Carolina” to which the Committee Report refers, Congressman Stevenson said, in response to the' question “Where did this money finally find its home?”:
“I do not know: As I said here once before, I doubt if much of it gets to thé Republican executive committee, but I do not care where it goes. Either it goes into his pocket and the pockets of his machine or it goés into the coffers of the Republican Party. If it does, it is the most blatant defiance of the civil service law that any party has ever had the hardihood to put over, and it is as disgraceful as the Teapot Dome proposition any day.” 65 Cong. Rec. 1410.
When the bill which became § 1 of the Act of December 11, 1926 (now 18 U. S. C. § 214), was introduced in the House, it was coupled with a bill requiring the filing of an affidavit by certain officers of the United States. (This bill, with changes from its original wording, is now 5 U. S. C. § 21a.) Mr. Graham, introducing both bills, said: “They are correlative. T promised the committee and the gentlemen who are proponents of the bill that I would try to get unanimous consent to consider both bills together.” 67 Cong. Réc. 10840.
The text of this “correlative” bill was as follows:
. “Be it enacted, etc., That each individual hereafter appointed as an officer of the United States by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or by the President alone, or by a court of law, or by the head of a department, shall, within 30 days after the effective date of his appointment, file with the Comptroller General of the United States an affidavit under oath stating that neither , he nor anyone acting in his behalf has given, transferred, or paid any consideration for or in the expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.
“Sec. 3. When used in this Act the term ‘consideration’ includes a payment, distribution, gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money, or anything of value, or a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make such a payment, distribution, gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit.” Ibid.
This Act has been since amended, but the portions here relevant— the last phrases - of § 1 — remain unchanged. ' This is the affidavit Shirey would have-to file were he appointed Postmaster of York. It is blear, that he could not truthfujly file such' an affidavit if the allegations of the information are true.' The fact that the sponsor of both bills expressly declared them to be correlative is persuasive evidence that an act which would make the oath impossible to take fe a violation, of § 214.
This Court reviews judgments, not arguments assailing them or seeking' to sustain them. See Williams v. United States, 168 U. S. 382, 389. The judgment which the Government brought here for review under the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 is that “The information does not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the United. States.” The correctness of this judgment depends on the construction of 18 U. S. C. §214 and more particularly whether that section supports the allegations of the information. Arguments invoked by the Government do not determine the meaning of a statute nor do they define the scope of our inquiry into its meaning. If §214 brings the allegations of this information within its scope, an offense is charged and the course of the Government’s reasoning is beside the point.
It is claimed that because § 2 of the Act of December 11, 1926, 44 Stat. 918, which deals with the user of influence, is restricted in scope to the-“payee” of the money or thing'of value, a similar restriction must be read into § 1. There is not one shred of evidence in the legislative history or in the statutes themselves to indicate that the two sections are in any way to be read “in pari materia.” In fact, normal principles of statutory construction tell us that the use of the word “payee” in § 2, and its absence.in § 1, is convincing evidence that the provisions are different in scope and not congruent. A look at the other statutes in the bribery and graft section of 18 U. S. C. shows that the wording of other Acts directed to the receipt and offer of bribes, ete., is not identical in the statute directed to offer and that directed to receipt. Whether this would mean a difference in ultimate construction is not now our concern.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether respondent, a college professor, timely complained under the civil rights laws that he had been denied academic tenure because of his national origin.
I
Columbus Ricks is a black Liberian. In 1970, Ricks joined the faculty at Delaware State College, a state institution attended predominantly by blacks. In February 1973, the Faculty Committee on Promotions and Tenure (the tenure committee) recommended that Ricks not receive a tenured position in the education department. The tenure committee, however, agreed to reconsider its decision the following year. Upon reconsideration, in February 1974, the committee adhered to its earlier recommendation. The following month, the Faculty Senate voted to support the tenure committee’s negative recommendation. On March 13, 1974, the College Board of Trustees formally voted to deny tenure to Ricks.
Dissatisfied with the decision, Ricks immediately filed a grievance with the Board’s Educational Policy Committee (the grievance committee), which in May 1974 held a hearing and took the matter under submission. During the pendency of the grievance, the College administration continued to plan for Ricks’ eventual termination. Like many colleges and universities, Delaware State has a policy of not discharging immediately a junior faculty member who does not receive tenure. Rather, such a person is offered a “terminal” contract to teach one additional year. When that contract expires, the employment relationship ends. Adhering to this policy, the Trustees on June 26, 1974, told Ricks that he would be offered a 1-year “terminal” contract that would expire June 30, 1975. Ricks signed the contract without ob-jeetion or reservation on September 4, 1974. Shortly thereafter, on September 12, 1974, the Board of Trustees notified Ricks that it had denied his grievance.
Ricks attempted to file an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on April 4, 1975. Under Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, however, state fair employment practices agencies have primary jurisdiction over employment discrimination complaints. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (c). The EEOC therefore referred Ricks’ charge to the appropriate Delaware agency. On April 28, 1975, the state agency waived its jurisdiction, and the EEOC accepted Ricks’ complaint for filing. More than two years later, the EEOC issued a “right to sue” letter.
Ricks filed this lawsuit in the District Court on September 9, 1977. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the College had discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin in violation of Title VII and 42 U. S. C. § 1981. The District Court sustained the College’s motion to dismiss both claims as untimely. It concluded that the only unlawful employment practice alleged was the College’s decision to deny Ricks tenure, and that the limitations periods for both claims had commenced to run by June 26, 1974, when the President of the Board of Trustees officially notified Ricks that he would be offered a 1-year “terminal” contract. See n. 2, supra. The Title YII claim was not timely because Ricks had not filed his charge with the EEOC within 180 days after that date. Similarly, the § 1981 claim was not timely because the lawsuit had not been filed in the District Court within the applicable 3-year statute of limitations.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 605 F. 2d 710 (1979). It agreed with the District Court that Ricks’ essential allegation was that he. had been denied tenure illegally. Id., at 711. According to the Court of Appeals, however, the Title YII filing requirement, and the statute of limitations for the § 1981 claim, did not commence to run until Ricks’ “terminal” contract expired on June 30, .1975. The court reasoned:
“ ‘ [A] terminated employee who is still working should not be required to consult a lawyer or file charges of discrimination against his employer as long as he is still working, even though he has been told of the employer’s present intention to terminate him in the future.’ ” Id., at 712, quoting Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F. 2d 187, 192 (CA3 1977), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 821 (1978).
See Egelston v. State University College at Geneseo, 535 F. 2d 752 (CA2 1976); cf. Noble v. University of Rochester, 535 F. 2d 756 (CA2 1976).
The Court of Appeals believed that the initial decision to terminate an employee sometimes might be reversed. The aggrieved employee therefore should not be expected to resort to litigation until termination actually has occurred. Prior resort to judicial or administrative remedies would be “likely to have the negative side effect of reducing that employee’s effectiveness during the balance of his or her term. Working relationships will be injured, if not sundered, and the litigation process will divert attention from the proper fulfillment of job responsibilities.” 605 F. 2d, at 712. Finally, the Court of Appeals thought that a rule focusing on the last day of employment would provide a “bright line guide both for the courts and for the victims of discrimination.” Id., at 712-713. It therefore reversed and remanded the case to the District Court for trial on the merits of Ricks’ discrimination claims. We granted certiorari. 444 U. S. 1070 (1980).
For the reasons that follow, we think that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the filing limitations periods did not commence to run until June 30, 1975. We agree instead with the District Court that both the Title YII and § 1981 claims were untimely. Accordingly, we reverse.
II
Title VII requires aggrieved persons to file a complaint with the EEOC “within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e). Similarly, § 1981 plaintiffs in Delaware must file suit within three years of the unfavorable employment decision. See n. 5, supra. The limitations periods, while guaranteeing the protection of the civil rights laws to those who promptly assert their rights, also protect employers from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are long past. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 463-464 (1975); see United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 558 (1977).
Determining the timeliness of Ricks’ EEOC complaint, and this ensuing lawsuit, requires us to identify precisely the “unlawful employment practice” of which he complains. Ricks now insists that discrimination motivated the College not only in denying him tenure, but also in terminating his employment on June 30, 1975. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25, 26, 31-32. In effect, he is claiming a “continuing violation” of the civil rights laws with the result that the limitations periods did not commence to run until his 1-year “terminal” contract expired. This argument cannot be squared with the allegations of the complaint. Mere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, supra, at 558. If Ricks intended to complain of a discriminatory discharge, he should have identified the alleged discriminatory acts that continued until, or occurred at the time of, the actual termination of his employment. But the complaint alleges no such facts.
Indeed, the contrary is true. It appears that termination of employment at Delaware State is a delayed, but inevitable, consequence of the denial of tenure. In order for the limitations periods to commence with the date of discharge, Ricks would have had to allege and prove that the manner in which his employment was terminated differed discriminatorily from the manner in which the College terminated other professors who also had been denied tenure. But no suggestion has been made that Ricks was treated differently from other unsuccessful tenure aspirants. Rather, in accord with the College’s practice, Ricks was offered a 1-year “terminal” contract, with explicit notice that his employment would end upon its expiration.
In sum, the only alleged discrimination occurred — and the filing limitations periods therefore commenced — at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks. That is so even though one of the effects of the denial of tenure — the eventual loss of a teaching position — did not occur until later. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly held, in a similar tenure case, that “[t]he proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.” Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F. 2d 202, 209 (1979) (emphasis added); see United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S., at 558. It is simply insufficient for Ricks to allege that his termination “gives present effect to the past illegal act and therefore perpetuates the consequences of forbidden discrimination.” Id., at 557. The emphasis is not upon the effects of earlier employment decisions; rather, it “is [upon] whether any present violation exists.” Id., at 558 (emphasis in original).
III
We conclude for the foregoing reasons that the limitations periods commenced to run when the tenure decision was made and Ricks was notified. The remaining inquiry is the identification of this date.
A
Three dates have been advanced and argued by the parties. As indicated above, Ricks contended for June 30, 1975, the final date of his “terminal” contract, relying on a continuing-violation theory. This contention fails, as we have shown, because of the absence of any allegations of facts to support it. The Court of Appeals agreed with Ricks that the relevant date was June 30, 1975, but it did so on a different theory. It found that the only alleged discriminatory act was the denial of tenure, 605 F. 2d, at 711, but nevertheless adopted the “final date of employment” rule primarily for policy reasons. Supra, at 255-256. Although this view has the virtue of simplicity, the discussion in Part II of this opinion demonstrates its fallacy as a rule of general application. Congress has decided that time limitations periods commence with the date of the “alleged unlawful employment practice.” See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e). Where, as here, the only challenged employment practice occurs before the termination date, the limitations periods necessarily commence to run before that date. It should not be forgotten that time-limitations provisions themselves promote important interests; “the period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S., at 463-464. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 820, 825 (1980).
B
The EEOC, in its amicus brief, contends in the alternative for a different date. It was not until September 12, 1974, that the Board notifiéd Ricks that his grievance had been denied. The EEOC therefore asserts that, for purposes of computing limitations periods, this was the date of the unfavorable tenure decision. Two possible lines of reasoning underlie this argument. First, it could be contended that the Trustees’ initial decision was only an expression of intent that did not become final until the grievance was denied. In support of this argument, the EEOC notes that the June 26 letter explicitly held out to Ricks the possibility that he would receive tenure if the Board sustained his grievance. See n. 2, supra. Second, even if the Board’s first decision expressed its official position, it could be argued that the pendency of the grievance should toll the running of the limitations periods.
We do not find either argument to be persuasive. As to the former, we think that the Board of Trustees had made clear well before September 12 that it had formally rejected Ricks’ tenure bid. The June 26 letter itself characterized that as the Board’s "official position.” Ibid. It is apparent, of course, that the Board in the June 26 letter indicated a willingness to change its prior decision if Ricks’ grievance were found to be meritorious. But entertaining a grievance complaining of the tenure decision does not suggest that the earlier decision was in any respect tentative. The grievance procedure, by its nature, is a remedy for a prior decision, not an opportunity to influence that decision before it is made.
As to the latter argument, we already have held that the pendency of a grievance, or some other method of collateral review of an employment decision, does not toll the running of the limitations periods. Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U. S. 229 (1976). The existence of careful procedures to assure fairness in the tenure decision should not obscure the principle that limitations periods normally commence when the employer’s decision is made. Of. id., at 234-235.
C
The District Court rejected both the June 30, 1975, date and the September 12, 1974, date, and concluded that the limitations periods had commenced to run by June 26, 1974, when the President of the Board notified Ricks that he would be offered a "terminal” contract for the 1974-1975 school year. We cannot say that this decision was erroneous. By June 26, the tenure committee had twice recommended that Ricks not receive tenure; the Faculty Senate had voted to support the tenure committee’s recommendation; and the Board of Trustees formally had voted to deny Ricks tenure. In light of this unbroken array of negative decisions, the District Court was justified in concluding that the College had established its official position — and made that position apparent to Ricks — ho later than June 26, 1974.
We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court so that it may reinstate the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint.
Reversed and remanded.
According to the Court of Appeals, the grievance committee almost immediately recommended to the Board that Ricks’ grievance be denied. 605 F. 2d 710, 711 (CA3 1979). Nothing in the record, however, reveals the date on which the grievance committee rendered its decision.
The June 26 letter stated:
June 26, 1974
Dr. Columbus Ricks
Delaware State College
Dover, Delaware
Dear Dr. Ricks:
On March 13, 1974, the Board of Trustees of Delaware State College officially endorsed the recommendations of the Faculty Senate at its March 11, 1974 meeting, at which time the Faculty Senate recommended that the Board not grant you tenure.
As we are both aware, the Educational Policy Committee of the Board of Trustees has heard your grievance and it is now in the process of coming to a decision. The Chairman of the Educational Policy Committee has indicated to me that a decision may not be forthcoming until sometime in July. In order to comply with the 1971 Trustee Policy Manual and AAUP requirements with regard to the amount of time needed in proper notification of non-reappointment for non-tenured faculty members, the Board has no choice but to follow actions according to its official position prior to the grievance process, and thus, notify you of its intent not to renew your contract at the end of the 1974-75 school year.
Please understand that we have no way of knowing what the outcome of the grievance process may be, and that this action is being taken at this time in order to be consistent with the present formal position of the Board and AAUP time requirements in matters of this kind. Should the Educational Policy Committee decide to recommend that you be granted tenure, and should the Board of Trustees concur with their recommendation, then of course, it will supersede any previous action taken by the Board.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Walton H. Simpson, President
Board of Trustees of Delaware State College
In addition to the College itself, other defendants (petitioners in this Court) are Trustees Walton H. Simpson, William H. Davis, William G. Dix, Edward W. Hagemeyer, James C. Hardcastle, Delma Lafferty, James H. Williams, William S. Young, Burt C. Pratt, Luna I. Mishoe, and Pierre S. duPont IV (ex officio); the academic dean, M. Milford Caldwell (now deceased); the education department chairman, George W. McLaughlin; and tenure committee members Romeo C. Henderson, Harriet R. Williams, Arthur E. Bragg, Ora Bunch, Ehsan Helmy, Vera Powell, John R. Price, Herbert Thompson, W. Richard Wynder, Ulysses Washington, and Jane Laskaris.
Section 1981 provides:
“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”
The statute of limitations in § 1981 cases is that applicable to similar claims under state law. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 462 (1975). The parties in this case agree that the applicable limitations period under Delaware law is three years.
Because the claims were not timely filed, we do not decide whether a claim of national origin discrimination is cognizable under § 1981.
Under certain circumstances, the filing period is extended to 300 days. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e); see Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807 (1980).
Sixteen paragraphs in the complaint describe in detail the sequence of events surrounding the tenure denial. Only one paragraph even mentions Ricks’ eventual departure from Delaware State, and nothing in that paragraph alleges any fact suggesting discrimination in the termination of Ricks’ employment.
The complaint does allege that a variety of unusual incidents occurred during the 1974-1975 school year, including one in which the education department chairman, George W. McLaughlin, physically attacked Ricks. This incident allegedly resulted in McLaughlin’s conviction for assault. Counsel for Ricks conceded at oral argument that incidents such as this were not independent acts of discrimination, Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30, but at most evidence that could be used at a trial.
Complaints that employment termination resulted from discrimination can present widely varying circumstances. In this case the only alleged discriminatory act is the denial of tenure sought by a college professor, with the termination of employment not occurring until a later date. The application of the general principles discussed herein necessarily must be made on a case-by-case basis.
Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae 19-22; 605 F. 2d, at 712-713.
The Court of Appeals also thought it was significant that a final-date-of-employment rule would permit the teacher to conclude his affairs at a school without the acrimony engendered by the filing of an administrative complaint or lawsuit. Id., at 712. It is true that “the filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter efforts at conciliation.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S., at 461. But this is the “natural effec[t] of the choice Congress has made,” ibid., in explicitly requiring that the limitations period commence with the date of the “alleged unlawful employment practice,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (c).
It is conceivable that the Court of Appeals’ "final day of employment” rule might discourage colleges even from offering a “grace period,” such as Delaware State’s practice of 1-year “terminal” contracts, during which the junior faculty member not offered tenure may seek a teaching position elsewhere.
If September 12 were the critical date, the § 1981 claim would be timely. Counting from September 12, the Title VII claim also would be timely if Ricks is entitled to 300 days, rather than 180 days, in which to file with the EEOC. In its brief before this Court, the EEOC as amicus curiae noted that Delaware is a State with its own fair employment practices agency. According to the EEOC, therefore, Ricks was entitled to 300 days to file his complaint. See n. 7, supra. Because we hold that the time-limitations periods commenced to run no later than June 26, 1974, we need not decide whether Ricks was entitled to 300 days to file under Title VII. Counting from the June 26 date, Ricks’ filing with the EEOC was not timely even with the benefit of the 300-day period.
See also B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 235 (1979 Supp.), and cases cited therein.
We do not suggest that aspirants for academic tenure should ignore available opportunities to request reconsideration. Mere requests to reconsider, however, cannot extend the limitations periods applicable to the civil rights laws.
We recognize, of course, that the limitations periods should not commence to run so soon that it becomes difficult for a layman to invoke the protection of the civil rights statutes. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 761 (1979); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522, 526-527 (1972). But, for the reasons we have stated, there can be no claim here that Ricks was not abundantly forewarned. In NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U. S. 672, 677 (1980), we noted that university boards of trustees customarily rely on the professional expertise of the tenured faculty, particularly with respect to decisions about hiring, tenure, termination, and promotion. Thus, the action of the Board of Trustees on March 13, 1974, affirming the faculty recommendation, was entirely predictable. The Board’s letter of June 26, 1974, simply repeated to Ricks the Board’s official position and acknowledged the pendency of the grievance through which Ricks hoped to persuade the Board to change that position.
We need not decide whether the District Court correctly focused on the June 26 date, rather than the date the Board communicated to Ricks its unfavorable tenure decision made at the March 13, 1974, meeting. As we have stated, see n. 13, supra, both the Title VII and § 1981 complaints were not timely filed even counting from the June 26 date.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Michael Crawford stabbed a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife, Sylvia. At his trial, the State played for the jury Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement to the police describing the stabbing, even though he had no opportunity for cross-examination. The Washington Supreme Court upheld petitioner’s conviction after determining that Sylvia’s statement was reliable. The question presented is whether this procedure complied with the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
I
On August 5,1999, Kenneth Lee was stabbed at his apartment. Police arrested petitioner later that night. After giving petitioner and his wife Miranda warnings, detectives interrogated each of them twice. Petitioner eventually confessed that he and Sylvia had gone in search of Lee because he was upset over an earlier incident in which Lee had tried to rape her. The two had found Lee at his apartment, and a fight ensued in which Lee was stabbed in the torso and petitioner’s hand was cut.
Petitioner gave the following account of the fight:
“Q. Okay. Did you ever see anything in [Lee’s] hands?
“A. I think so, but I’m not positive.
“Q. Okay, when you think so, what do you mean by that?
“A. I could a swore I seen him goin’ for somethin’ before, right before everything happened. He was like reaching fiddlin’ around down here and stuff... and I just... I don’t know, I think, this is just a possibility, but I think, I think that he pulled somethin’ out and I grabbed for it and that’s how I got cut... but I’m not positive. I, I, my mind goes blank when things like this happen. I mean, I just, I remember things wrong, I remember things that just doesn’t, don’t make sense to me later.” App. 155 (punctuation added).
Sylvia generally corroborated petitioner’s story about the events leading up to the fight, but her account of the fight itself was arguably different — particularly with respect to whether Lee had drawn a weapon before petitioner assaulted him:
“Q. Did Kenny do anything to fight back from this assault?
“A. (pausing) I know he reached into his pocket... or somethin’... I don’t know what.
“Q. After he was stabbed?
“A. He saw Michael coming up. He lifted his hand... his chest open, he might [have] went to go strike his hand out or something and then (inaudible).
“Q. Okay, you, you gotta speak up.
“A. Okay, he lifted his hand over his head maybe to strike Michael’s hand down or something and then he put his hands in his... put his right hand in his right pocket... took a step back... Michael proceeded to stab him... then his hands were like... how do you explain this... open arms... with his hands open and he fell down... and we ran (describing subject holding hands open, palms toward assailant).
“Q. Okay, when he’s standing there with his open hands, you’re talking about Kenny, correct?
“A. Yeah, after, after the fact, yes.
“Q. Did you see anything in his hands at that point?
“A. (pausing) um um (no).” Id., at 137 (punctuation added).
The State charged petitioner with assault and attempted murder. At trial, he claimed self-defense. Sylvia did not testify because of the state marital privilege, which generally bars a spouse from testifying without the other spouse’s consent. See Wash. Rev. Code §5.60.060(1) (1994). In Washington, this privilege does not extend to a spouse’s out-of-court statements admissible under a hearsay exception, see State v. Burden, 120 Wash. 2d 371, 377, 841 P. 2d 758, 761 (1992), so the State sought to introduce Sylvia’s tape-recorded statements to the police as evidence that the stabbing was not in self-defense. Noting that Sylvia had admitted she led petitioner to Lee’s apartment and thus had facilitated the assault, the State invoked the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, Wash. Rule Evid. 804(b)(3) (2003).
Petitioner countered that, state law notwithstanding, admitting the evidence would violate his federal constitutional right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him.” Arndt. 6. According to our description of that right in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), it does not bar admission of an unavailable witness’s statement against a criminal defendant if the statement bears “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’” Id., at 66. To meet that test, evidence must either fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Ibid. The trial court here admitted the statement on the latter ground, offering several reasons why it was trustworthy: Sylvia was not shifting blame but rather corroborating her husband’s story that he acted in self-defense or “justified reprisal”; she had direct knowledge as an eyewitness; she was describing recent events; and she was being questioned by a “neutral” law enforcement officer. App. 76-77. The prosecution played the tape for the jury and relied on it in closing, arguing that it was “damning evidence” that “completely refutes [petitioner’s] claim of self-defense.” Tr. 468 (Oct. 21, 1999). The jury convicted petitioner of assault.
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed. It applied a nine-factor test to determine whether Sylvia’s statement bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, and noted several reasons why it did not: The statement contradicted one she had previously given; it was made in response to specific questions; and at one point she admitted she had shut her eyes during the stabbing. The court considered and rejected the State’s argument that Sylvia’s statement was reliable because it coincided with petitioner’s to such a degree that the two “interlocked.” The court determined that, although the two statements agreed about the events leading up to the stabbing, they differed on the issue crucial to petitioner’s self-defense claim: “[Petitioner’s] version asserts that Lee may have had something in his hand when he stabbed him; but Sylvia’s version has Lee grabbing for something only after he has been stabbed.” App. 32.
The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, unanimously concluding that, although Sylvia’s statement did not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it bore guarantees of trustworthiness: “‘[Wjhen a codefendant’s confession is virtually identical [to, i. e., interlocks with,] that of a defendant, it may be deemed reliable.’ ” 147 Wash. 2d 424, 437, 54 P. 3d 656, 663 (2002) (quoting State v. Rice, 120 Wash. 2d 549, 570, 844 P. 2d 416, 427 (1993)). The court explained:
“Although the Court of Appeals concluded that the statements were contradictory, upon closer inspection they appear to overlap....
“[B]oth of the Crawfords’ statements indicate that Lee was possibly grabbing for a weapon, but they are equally unsure when this event may have taken place. They are also equally unsure how Michael received the cut on his hand, leading the court to question when, if ever, Lee possessed a weapon. In this respect they overlap....
“[N.jeither Michael nor Sylvia clearly stated that Lee had a weapon in hand from which Michael was simply defending himself. And it is this omission by both that interlocks the statements and makes Sylvia’s statement reliable.” 147 Wash. 2d, at 438-439, 54 P. 3d, at 664 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We granted certiorari to determine whether the State’s use of Sylvia’s statement violated the Confrontation Clause. 539 U. S. 914 (2003).
II
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” We have held that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 406 (1965). As noted above, Roberts says that an unavailable witness’s out-of-court statement may be admitted so long as it has adequate indicia of reliability — i. e., falls within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” 448 U. S., at 66. Petitioner argues that this test strays from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause and urges us to reconsider it.
A
The Constitution’s text does not alone resolve this case. One could plausibly read “witnesses against” a defendant to mean those who actually testify at trial, cf. Woodsides v. State, 3 Miss. 655, 664-665 (1837), those whose statements are offered at trial, see 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1397, p. 104 (2d ed. 1923) (hereinafter Wigmore), or something in-between, see infra, at 52-53. We must therefore turn to the historical background of the Clause to understand its meaning.
The right to confront one’s accusers is a concept that dates back to Roman times. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U. S. 1012, 1015 (1988); Herrmann & Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 Va. J. Int’l L. 481 (1994). The founding generation’s immediate source of the concept, however, was the common law. English common law has long differed from continental civil law in regard to the manner in which witnesses give testimony in criminal trials. The common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing, while the civil law condones examination in private by judicial officers. See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 373-374 (1768).
Nonetheless, England at times adopted elements of the civil-law practice. Justices of the peace or other officials examined suspects and witnesses before trial. These examinations were sometimes read in court in lieu of live testimony, a practice that “occasioned frequent demands by the prisoner to have his ‘accusers,’ i. e. the witnesses against him, brought before him face to face.” 1 J. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 326 (1883). In some cases, these demands were refused. See 9 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 216-217, 228 (3d ed. 1944); e. g., Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 15-16, 24 (1603); Throckmorton’s Case, 1 How. St. Tr. 869, 875-876 (1554); cf. Lilburn’s Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315, 1318-1322, 1329 (Star Chamber 1637).
Pretrial examinations became routine under two statutes passed during the reign of Queen Mary in the 16th century, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554), and 2 & 3 id., c. 10 (1555). These Marian bail and committal statutes required justices of the peace to examine suspects and witnesses in felony cases and to certify the results to the court. It is doubtful that the original purpose of the examinations was to produce evidence admissible at trial. See J. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance 21-34 (1974). Whatever the original purpose, however, they came to be used as evidence in some cases, see 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 284 (1736), resulting in an adoption of continental procedure. See 4 Holdsworth, supra, at 528-530.
The most notorious instances of civil-law examination occurred in the great political trials of the 16th and 17th centuries. One such was the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason. Lord Cobham, Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, had implicated him in an examination before the Privy Council and in a letter. At Raleigh’s trial, these were read to the jury. Raleigh argued that Cobham had lied to save himself: “Cobham is absolutely in the King’s mercy; to excuse me cannot avail him; by accusing me he may hope for favour.” 1 D. Jardine, Criminal Trials 435 (1832). Suspecting that Cobham would recant, Raleigh demanded that the judges call him to appear, arguing that “[t]he Proof of the Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face....” 2 How. St. Tr., at 15-16. The judges refused, id., at 24, and, despite Raleigh’s protestations that he was being tried “by the Spanish Inquisition,” id., at 15, the jury convicted, and Raleigh was sentenced to death.
One of Raleigh’s trial judges later lamented that “/the justice of England has never been so degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh.’” 1 Jardine, supra, at 520. Through a series of statutory and judicial reforms, English law developed a right of confrontation that limited these abuses. For example, treason statutes required witnesses to confront the accused “face to face” at his arraignment. E.g., 13 Car. 2, c. 1, §5 (1661); see 1 Hale, supra, at 306. Courts, meanwhile, developed relatively strict rules of unavailability, admitting examinations only if the witness was demonstrably unable to testify in person. See Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 770-771 (H. L. 1666); 2 Hale, supra, at 284; 1 Stephen, supra, at 358. Several authorities also stated that a suspect’s confession could be admitted only against himself, and not against others he implicated. See 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 46, § 3, pp. 603-604 (T. Leach 6th ed. 1787); 1 Hale, supra, at 585, n. (k); 1 G. Gilbert, Evidence 216 (C. Lofft ed. 1791); cf. Tong’s Case, Kel. J. 17, 18, 84 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1062 (1662) (treason). But see King v. Westbeer, 1 Leach 12, 168 Eng. Rep. 108, 109 (1739).
One recurring question was whether the admissibility of an unavailable witness’s pretrial examination depended on whether the defendant had had an opportunity to cross-examine him. In 1696, the Court of King’s Bench answered this question in the affirmative, in the widely reported misdemeanor libel case of King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584. The court ruled that, even though a witness was dead, his examination was not admissible where “the defendant not being present when [it was] taken before the mayor... had lost the benefit of a cross-examination.” Id., at 165, 87 Eng. Rep., at 585. The question was also debated at length during the infamous proceedings against Sir John Fenwick on a bill of attainder. Fenwick’s counsel objected to admitting the examination of a witness who had been spirited away, on the ground that Fenwick had had no opportunity to cross-examine. See Fenwick’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 591-592 (H. C. 1696) (Powys) (“[T]hat which they would offer is something that Mr. Goodman hath sworn when he was examined... ; sir J. F. not being present or privy, and no opportunity given to cross-examine the person; and I conceive that cannot be offered as evidence...”); id., at 592 (Shower) (“[N]o deposition of a person can be read, though beyond sea, unless in cases where the party it is to be read against was privy to the examination, and might have cross-examined him.... [Q]ur constitution is, that the person shall see his accuser”). The examination was nonetheless admitted on a closely divided vote after several of those present opined that the common-law rules of procedure did not apply to parliamentary attainder proceedings — one speaker even admitting that the evidence would normally be inadmissible. See id., at 603-604 (Williamson); id., at 604-605 (Chancellor of the Exchequer); id., at 607; 3 Wigmore §1364, at 22-23, n. 54. Fenwick was condemned, but the proceedings “must have burned into the general consciousness the vital importance of the rule securing the right of cross-examination.” Id., § 1364, at 22; cf. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U. S. 513, 526-530 (2000).
Paine had settled the rule requiring a prior opportunity for cross-examination as a matter of common law, but some doubts remained over whether the Marian statutes 'prescribed an exception to it in felony cases. The statutes did not identify the circumstances under which examinations were admissible, see 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554); 2 & 3 id., c. 10 (1555), and some inferred that no prior opportunity for cross-examination was required. See Westbeer, supra, at 12, 168 Eng. Rep., at 109; compare Fenwick’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr., at 596 (Sloane), with id., at 602 (Musgrave). Many who expressed this view acknowledged that it meant the statutes were in derogation of the common law. See King v. Eriswell, 3 T. R. 707, 710, 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 817 (K. B. 1790) (Grose, J.) (dicta); id., at 722-723, 100 Eng. Rep., at 823-824 (Kenyon, C. J.) (same); compare 1 Gilbert, Evidence, at 215 (admissible only “by Force ‘of the Statute’”), with id., at 65. Nevertheless, by 1791 (the year the Sixth Amendment was ratified), courts were applying the cross-examination rule even to examinations by justices of the peace in felony cases. See King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562-563, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 383-384 (1791); King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502-504, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789); cf. King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 459-461, 168 Eng. Rep. 330, 331-332 (1787); 3 Wigmore § 1364, at 23. Early 19th-century treatises confirm that requirement. See 1 T. Starkie, Evidence 95 (1826); 2 id., at 484-492; T. Peake, Evidence 63-64 (3d ed. 1808). When Parliament amended the statutes in 1848 to make the requirement explicit, see 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, § 17, the change merely “introduced in terms” what was already afforded the defendant “by the equitable construction of the law.” Queen v. Beeston, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 527, 529 (Ct. Crim. App. 1854) (Jervis, C. J.).
B
Controversial examination practices were also used in the Colonies. Early in the 18th century, for example, the Virginia Council protested against the Governor for having “privately issued several commissions to examine witnesses against particular men ex parte,” complaining that “the person accused is not admitted to be confronted with, or defend himself against his defamers.” A Memorial Concerning the Maladministrations of His Excellency Francis Nicholson, reprinted in 9 English Historical Documents 253, 257 (D. Douglas ed. 1955). A decade before the Revolution, England gave jurisdiction over Stamp Act offenses to the admiralty courts, which followed civil-law rather than common-law procedures and thus routinely took testimony by deposition or private judicial examination. See 5 Geo. 3, c. 12, §57 (1765); Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. Pub. L. 381, 396-397 (1959). Colonial representatives protested that the Act subverted their rights “by extending the jurisdiction of the courts of admiralty beyond its ancient limits.” Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress §8th (Oct. 19, 1765), reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties 270, 271 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. 1959). John Adams, defending a merchant in a high-profile admiralty case, argued: “Examinations of witnesses upon Interrogatories, are only by the Civil Law. Interrogatories are unknown at common Law, and Englishmen and common Lawyers have an aversion to them if not an Abhorrence of them.” Draft of Argument in Sewall v. Hancock (Oct. 1768-Mar. 1769), in 2 Legal Papers of John Adams 194, 207 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965).
Many declarations of rights adopted around the time of the Revolution guaranteed a right of confrontation. See Virginia Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776); Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights § IX (1776); Delaware Declaration of Rights §14 (1776); Maryland Declaration of Rights §XIX (1776); North Carolina Declaration of Rights § VII (1776); Vermont Declaration of Rights Ch. I, § X (1777); Massachusetts Declaration of Rights § XII (1780); New Hampshire Bill of Rights §XV (1783), all reprinted in 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History.235, 265, 278, 282, 287, 323, 342, 377 (1971). The proposed Federal Constitution, however, did not. At the Massachusetts ratifying convention, Abraham Holmes objected to this omission precisely on the ground that it would lead to civil-law practices: “The mode of trial is altogether indetermined;... whether [the defendant] is to be allowed to confront the witnesses, and have the advantage of cross-examination, we are not yet told----[W]e shall find Congress possessed of powers enabling them to institute judicatories little less inauspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain,... the Inquisition.” 2 Debates on the Federal Constitution 110-111 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1863). Similarly, a prominent Antifederalist writing under the pseudonym Federal Farmer criticized the use of “written evidence” while objecting to the omission of a vicinage right: “Nothing can be more essential than the cross examining [of] witnesses, and generally before the triers of the facts in question.... [W]ritten evidence... [is] almost useless; it must be frequently taken ex parte, and but very seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth.” R. Lee, Letter IV by the Federal Farmer (Oct. 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra, at 469, 473. The First Congress responded by including the Confrontation Clause in the proposal that became the Sixth Amendment.
Early state decisions shed light upon the original understanding of the common-law right. State v. Webb, 2 N. C. 103 (Super. L. & Eq. 1794) (per curiam), decided a mere three years after the adoption of the Sixth Amendment, held that depositions could be read against an accused only if they were taken in his presence. Rejecting a broader reading of the English authorities, the court held: “[I]t is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine.” Id., at 104.
Similarly, in State v. Campbell, 30 S. C. L. 124 (App. L. 1844), South Carolina’s highest law court excluded a deposition taken by a coroner in the absence of the accused. It held: “[I]f we are to decide the question by the established rules of the common law, there could not be a dissenting voice. For, notwithstanding the death of the witness, and whatever the respectability of the court taking the depositions, the solemnity of the occasion and the weight of the testimony, such depositions are ex parte, and, therefore, utterly incompetent.” Id., at 125. The court said that one of the “indispensable conditions” implicitly guaranteed by the State Constitution was that “prosecutions be carried on to the conviction of the accused, by witnesses confronted by him, and subjected to his personal examination.” Ibid.
Many other decisions are to the same effect. Some early cases went so far as to hold that prior testimony was inadmissible in criminal cases even if the accused had a previous opportunity to cross-examine. See Finn v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. 701, 708 (1827); State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. 229 (Super. L. & Eq. 1807) (per curiam). Most, courts rejected that view, but only after reaffirming that admissibility depended on a prior opportunity for cross-examination. See United States v. Macomb, 26 F. Cas. 1132, 1133 (No. 15,702) (CC Ill. 1851); State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 435-436 (1858); Kendrick v. State, 29 Tenn. 479, 485-488 (1850); Bostick v. State, 22 Tenn. 344, 345-346 (1842); Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. 434, 437 (1837); State v. Hill, 20 S. C. L. 607, 608-610 (App. 1835); Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. 58, 59 (Err. & App. 1821). Nineteenth-century treatises confirm the rule. See 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 1093, p. 689 (2d ed. 1872); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations *318.
Ill
This history supports two inferences about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.
A
First, the principal evil at which*the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. It was these practices that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like Raleigh’s; that the Marian statutes invited; that English law’s assertion of a right to confrontation was meant to prohibit; and that the founding-era rhetoric decried. The Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with this focus in mind.
Accordingly, we once again reject the view that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court testimony, and that its application to out-of-court statements introduced at trial depends upon “the law of Evidence for the time being.” 3 Wigmore § 1397, at 101; accord, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result). Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices. Raleigh was, after all, perfectly free to confront those who read Cobham’s confession in court.
This focus also suggests that not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns. An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted. On the other hand, ex parte examinations might sometimes be admissible under modern hearsay rules, but the Framers certainly would not have condoned them.
The text of the Confrontation Clause reflects this focus. It applies to “witnesses” against the accused — in other words, those who “bear testimony.” 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828). “Testimony,” in turn, is typically “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Ibid. An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, like the history underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement.
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements exist: “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent — that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used proseeuto-rially,” Brief for Petitioner 23; “extrajudicial statements... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,” White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,” Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 3. These formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it. Regardless of the precise articulation, some statements qualify under any definition — for example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing.
Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard. Police interrogations bear a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in England. The statements are not sworn testimony, but the absence of oath was not dispositive. Cobham’s examination was unsworn, see 1 Jardine, Criminal Trials, at 430, yet Raleigh’s trial has long been thought a paradigmatic confrontation violation, see, e. g., Campbell, 30 S. C. L., at 130. Under the Marian statutes, witnesses were typically put on oath, but suspects were not. See 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, at 52. Yet Hawkins and others went out of their way to caution that such un-sworn confessions were not admissible against anyone but the confessor. See supra, at 45.
That interrogators are police officers rather than magistrates does not change the picture either. Justices of the peace conducting examinations under the Marian statutes were not magistrates as we understand that office today, but had an essentially investigative and prosecutorial function. See 1 Stephen, Criminal Law of England, at 221; Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance, at 34-45. England did not have a professional police force until the 19th century, see 1 Stephen, supra, at 194-200, so it is not surprising that other government officers performed the investigative functions now associated primarily with the police. The involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers are police or justices of the peace.
In sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, and interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within that class.
B
The historical record also supports a second proposition: that the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts. Rather, the “right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” Amdt. 6, is most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 243 (1895); cf. Houser, 26 Mo., at 433-435. As the English authorities above reveal, the common law in 1791 conditioned admissibility of an absent witness’s examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine. The Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those limitations. The numerous early state decisions applying the same test confirm that these principles were received as part of the common law in this country.
We do not read the historical sources to say that a prior opportunity to cross-examine was merely a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition for admissibility of testimonial statements. They suggest that this requirement was dis-positive, and not merely one of several ways to establish reliability. This is not to deny, as The Chief Justice notes, that “[t]here were always exceptions to the general rule of exclusion” of hearsay evidence. Post, at 73. Several had become well established by 1791. See 3 Wigmore § 1397, at 101; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13, n. 5. But there is scant evidence that exceptions were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the accused in a criminal case. Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial — for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. We do not infer from these that the Framers thought exceptions would apply even to prior testimony. Cf. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U. S. 116, 134 (1999) (plurality opinion) (“[Accomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule”).
IV
Our case law has been largely consistent with these two principles. Our leading early decision, for example, involved a deceased witness’s prior trial testimony. Mattox v. United States,
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Goldberg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether respondent’s attempted corporate rehabilitation under the Bankruptcy Act, materially affecting the rights of widespread public investor creditors, may be conducted under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 905, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 701 et seq. (1958 ed.), or whether dismissal or, in effect, transfer to proceedings under Chapter X of that Act, 52 Stat. 883, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 501 et seq. (1958 ed.), is required upon motion by the Securities and Exchange Commission dr any other party in interest, pursuant to § 328 of the Bankruptcy Act, 66 Stat. 432, 11 U. S. C. § 728 (1958 ed.).
I.
Respondent, American Trailer Rentals Company, was organized in 1958 to engage in the automobile-trailer rental business. The business was financed largely through the sale of trailers to investors and their simul-. taneous lease-back. From 1959 to 1961 hundreds of small investors, scattered.throughout the. entire western part of the United States,, purchased and leased back a total of 5,866 trailers, paying an aggregate price of $3,587,439 (approximately $600 per trailer). Under the usual form of lease-back agreement, the trailer owners were to receive a set 2% of their investment per month for 10 years.
The trailers sold to investors and then leased back are of the general utility type that are attached to the rear bumper of automobiles. They were placed by respondent at gasoline stations, the operators of which acted as respondent’s rental agents, without the investors ever having seen them. Respondent had about 700 such service station operators in December 1961, although the number had declined to about 500 by the time the petition for an arrangement was filed a year later.
Respondent’s further offering of these sale and leaseback arrangements to the public was halted in' 1961, when the SEC advised respondent that these sale and leaseback arrangements were investment contracts and therefore securities, which could not be sold to the public unless and until a registration statement was filed and became effective under the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq. (1958 ed.). Respondent ‘then filed a registration statement with the SEC pertaining to these sale and lease-back arrangements. This registration statement, however, never became effective, and proceedings were instituted by the SEC to stop distribution of respondent's proposed prospectus on the •grounds that it contained false and misleading statements. See Securities Act of 1933, § 8 (d), 48 Stat. 79, 15 U. S. C. § 77h (d) (1958 ed.). In June. 1963, respondent consented to the entry of an order stopping distribution of this prospectus. See SEC, Securities Act Release No. 4615 (1963).
After this attempt to register the sale and lease-back agreements had failed, respondent’s executive vice president and other persons organized a corporation named Capitol Leasing Corporation, which offered respondent’s investor creditors an exchange of its stock for their trailers on the basis of one share of its stock for each $2 the investor creditors had paid for the' trailers. After Capitol had acquired approximately 300 of the 5,866 trailers outstanding in exchange for its stock, the SEC suspended the exemption from registration for small offerings, upon which Capitol had relied in making this offer, on the grounds that there was reasonable cause to believe that the material used in making this offer again contained false and misleading statements.
Following this event, respondent filed a petition and a proposed plan of arrangement under Chapter XI of the. Bankruptcy Act. The petition, annexed schedules, and other documents show that respondent had never operated at a profit. For the three years ended September 30, 1961, it had an aggregate income from “gross rentals" of $395,610. In the same period, it made rental payments to investor-trailer owners of $613,021; made payments to gasoline station operators of $118,400; and incurred additional “operating expenses” of $668,698.
The $613,021 paid to trailer owners included payments' to investors whose trailers had not yet been obtained and put into the system. In order to make the necessary payments to trailer owners and station operators respondent had not only borrowed money from its officers, directors, and stockholders but also had used funds obtained for purchase of new trailers. Virtually all the trailers were purchased from an affiliate in which respondent’s officers and directors had interests. Many of these trailers proved defective in design or otherwise unsuitable for rental. About a year prior to the filing of respond-' ent’s Chapter XI proceeding, this manufacturing affiliate became' bankrupt, owing respondent approximately $200,000 for trailers that were never manufactured and. an additional amount of approximately, $150,000 for trailers that were manufactured but never delivered. These latter trailers had been mortgaged by the affiliate to a third party who took possession upon the affiliate’s bankruptcy. In addition, in June 1961, some 100 trailers, as to which respondent, although obligated by the leaseback arrangements to do so, did not have insurance coverage, were unbeatable and considered lost. Finally, certain funds received from investors for the purchase of trailers had been, at an earlier period, misappropriated by a member or members of respondent’s management. Respondent’s executive vice president, who estimated this misappropriation loss to be at least $141,000, attributed it “almost completely” to a deceased member of the original management group, but did not feel “qualified to make [the] judgment” that the two remaining members of that group, including one who owned over 15% of respondent’s common stock, could be held liable.
At the time of filing its Chapter XI petition, respondent stated its total assets as $685,608, of which $500,000 represented the stated estimated “value” of its trailer-rental system, an intangible asset. It stated in its petition that its trailer-rental system (which then consisted of arrangements with some 500 service station operator agents) “was built by [respondent] at an estimated cost of $500,000,” despite the fact that respondent’s balance sheet in 1961 showed the cost of establishing a system of 700 stations as only $33,750, and that in 1961 respondent had estimated that the cost of establishing an additional 800 rental stations would be only $56,000. The total liabilities were stated at $1,367,890, of which $710,597 was owed to trailer owners under their leasing agreements; $200,677 was owed to the investors who had paid for trailers that had never been manufactured; $71,805 was owed to trade and other general creditors; and $285,277 was owed-to respondent’s officers and directors.
Under the proposed plan of arrangement submitted by respondent the investor-trailer owners were to exchange their entire interests (their rights in the trailers as well as the amounts owed them under the rental agreements) for stock of-Capitol on the basis of one share of stock for each $2 of “remaining capital investment in the trailers,” which sum was to be determined by deducting from the original purchase price of the trailers the amount, if any, which the owners had received as rental payments. Respondent’s officers and directors, as well as trade and other general creditors, were to receive one share of stock for each $3.50 of their claims. Respondent, itself, in exchange for transferring to Capitol its trailer-rental system, was to receive 107,000 shares which it would then distribute to its stockholders. Finally, obligations to two banks, totaling $55,558, although clearly unsecured, were to be paid 'in full, presumably because the officers and directors of respondent would otherwise, have been Hable as guarantors of these obHgations.
If this plan were approved and all of the investor-trailer owners participated, a total of approximately 866,000 shares of Capitol’s stock would be issued to them, but approximately 81,500 shares would be issued directly to the officers and directors of respondent, 22,400 to. trade and other general creditors, and 107,000 to respondent itself to be distributed to its stockholders. More than 60% of respondent’s stock was held by eight men, seven of whom are officers and directors and the eighth one of the original-promoters of the venture.
The SEC then filed a motion, under § 328 of the Bankruptcy Act, to dismiss the Chapter XI proceeding or, in effect, transfer it to Chapter X on the ground that it should have been brought under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act and thus Chapter XI is not available. A referee in bankruptcy to whom, as a special master, the motion was referred, recommended that it be denied on the grounds that the Commission had.not made “a sufficient showing to warrant the granting of the Section 328 motion.” At his hearing on this matter, the District Judge recognized that, in light of the fact that the investor-trailer owners were widely scattered and the nature of their' individual holdings was small, the proposed plan’s issuance of approximately 15% of Capitol’s stock to respondents officers and directors would mean that they, rather than the investor-trailer owners, would have effective control over Capitol, and expressed his “disapproval” of such a result. He also expressed disapproval of preferential treatment of the banks in order to avoid the obligations of the officer and director guarantors. The District Court, however, “accepted and adopted” the referee’s findings and denied the motion without a written opinion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, “since the granting of the motion rests in the discretion of the [district] court, while we think this is a border-line case, it does not appear that the S. E. C. has shown that adequate relief is not obtainable in Chapter XI proceedings or that there has been an abuse of that discretion warranting reversal.” 325 F. 2d 47, 52. We granted certiorari, 376 U. S. 948.
II.
The background and operative procedures of Chapter X and Chapter XI and the interrelationship between them have been reviewed by this Court in SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434, and General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U. S. 462. This background was detailed in United States Realty, supra, as follows:
Before passage, in 1934, of § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 Stat. 912, bankruptcy procedures offered no facilities for corporate rehabilitation, which, therefore, was left to equity receiverships, with their attendant paraphernalia of creditors’ and security holders’ committees, and of rival plans of reorganization,. Lack of judicial control of the conditions attending formulation of the plans, inadequate protection of widely scattered security holders, frequent adoption of plans which favored management at the expense of other interests and which afforded the corporation only temporary respite from financial collapse, so often characteristic of equity receivership reorganizations, led to the enactment of § 77B. See S. Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 90; H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2. As does the present Chapter X, § 77B permitted the adjustment of all interests in the debtor, secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and stockholders.
The day preceding the enactment of §.77B, Congress had created the Securities and Exchange Commission as a special agency charged with the function of protecting the investing public, 48 Stat. 885, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78d (1958 ed.). At the urging of, and based on extensive studies by the SEC, § 77B was, in 1938, revised and enacted in changed form as Chapter X. 52 Stat. 883-905. The aims of Chapter X as thus revised were to afford greater protection to creditors and stockholders by providing greater judicial control over the entire proceedings and impartial and expert administrative assistance in corporate reorganizations through appointment of a disinterested trustee and the active participation of the SEC. The trustee in a Chapter X proceeding is required to make a thorough examination and study of the debtor’s financial problems and management, Bankruptcy Act, §§ 167 (3), (5), and then transmit his independent report to the creditors, stockholders, the SEC, and others. Following this, the trustee gives notice to all creditors and stockholders to submit to him proposals for a plan of reorganization. §§167 (5), (6). The trustee then formulates a plan of reorganization which he presents to the court. If the court finds the plan worthy of consideration, it may refer it to the SEC for its opinion and must so refer it where the debtor’s liabilities exceed $3,000,000. § 172. When the proposed plan, after approval by the court, is finally submitted to the debtor’s creditors and stockholders, it is accompanied by the advisory report of the SEC, as well as the opinion of the judge who approved the plan. § 175. As to each class of creditors and stockholders whose rights are affected by the plan, the plan must receive the approval of the holders of two-thirds in amount of each class of creditors’ claims and, if the debtor has not been found to be insolvent, the holders of a majority of each class of stock. § 179. The plan becomes effective upon final confirmation by the court, based on a finding, inter alia, that “the plan is fair and equitable.” §221.
As part of the, same Act in which Chapter X was enacted Congress álso, in 1938, enacted Chapter XI. 52 Stat. 905-916. Chapter XI is a statutory variation of the common-law composition of creditors and, unlike the broader scope of Chapter X, is limited to an adjustment of unsecured debts. It was sponsored by the National Association of Credit Men and other groups of creditors’ representatives whose experience had been in representing trade creditors in small and middle-sized commercial failures. See Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 6439 (reintroduced as H. R. 8046 and enacted in 1938), 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 31, 35; 13 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 17 (1938). The contrast between the provisions of Chapter X, carefully designed to protect the creditor and stockholder interests involved, and the summary provisions of Chapter XI is quite marked. The formulation of the plan of arrangement, and indeed the entire Chapter XI proceeding, for all practical purposes is.in the hands of the debtor, subject only to the requisite consent of a majority in number and amount of unsecured creditors, § 362, and the ultimate finding by the court that the plan is, inter alia, “for the best interests of the creditors,” § 366. “The process of formulating an arrangement and the solicitation of consent of creditors, sacrifices to speed and economy every safeguard, in the interest of thoroughness and distinterestedness, provided in Chapter X.” United States Realty, supra, at 450-451. The debtor generally remains in possession and operates the business under court supervision, § 342. A trustee is only provided in the very limited situation where á trustee in bankruptcy has previously been appointed, § 332. There is no requirement for a receiver, but the Court “may” appoint one if it finds it to be “necessary,” § 332. The plan of arrangement is proposed by, and only by, the debtor, §§ 306 (1), 323, 357, and creditors have only the choice of accepting or rejecting it. Acceptances may be solicited by the debtor even before filing of the Chapter XI petition and, in fact, must be solicited before court review of the plan, § 336 (4). There are no provisions for an independent study by the court or a trustee, or for advice by them being given to creditors in advance of the acceptance of the arrangement. In short, Chapter XI provides a summary procedure whereby judicial confirmation is obtained on a plan that has been formulated and accepted with only a bare minimum of independent control or supervision. This, of course, is consistent with the basic purpose of Chapter XI: to provide a quick and economical means of facilitating simple compositions among general creditors who have been deemed by Congress to need only the minimal disinterested protection provided by that Chapter.
In enacting these two distinct methods of corporate rehabilitations, Congress has made it quite clear that Chapters X and XI are not alternate routes, the choice of which is in the hands of the debtor. Rather, they are legally, mutually exclusive paths to attempted financial rehabilitation. A Chapter X petition may not be filed unless “adequate relief” is not obtainable under Chapter XI, § 146 (2). Likewise, a Chapter XI petition is to be dismissed, or in effect transferred, if the proceedings “should have been brought” under Chapter X_, § 328.
III.
The SEC here contends that, as an absolute rule, all proceedings for the financial rehabilitation of a corporate debtor which would alter the rights of public investor creditors must be in Chapter X. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that there is no such absolute rule and that the determination of whether proceedings, on the facts of a particular case, should be in Chapter X or in Chapter XI rests in the discretion of the District Court, which discretion should not be reversed unless it is found to have been clearly abused. Both parties rely on United States Realty, supra, and General Stores Corp., supra, for their respective contentions.
United States Realty- involved a corporation with publicly owned debentures, publicly owned mortgage certificates, and publicly owned stock, which proposed a plan of arrangement that would have left the debentures’and stock unaffected but would have both extended the time for payment of the publicly held mortgage certificates and reduced their interest rate. The SEC there argued that Chapter X is the exclusive avenue for financial rehabilitation of large corporations with many stockholders. While rejecting this argument as an absolute matter, the Court recognized that “in general... the two chapters were specifically devised to afford different procedures, the one [Chapter X] adapted to the reorganization of corporations with complicated debt structures and many stockholders, the other [Chapter XI] to composition of debts of small individual business and corporations with few stockholders....” 310 U. S., at 447. The Court then held that, as the proposed plan of arrangement adversely affected the rights of many, widely scattered public creditors, to wit, the holders of mortgage certificates, the formulation of a plan with the judicial control, statutory SEC participation, and employment of disinterested trustees, assured by Chapter X, would better serve “the public and private interests concerned including those of the debtor,” id., at 455, than would the formulation of a Chapter XI plan under the almost complete control of the debtor. In reaching this result, the Court explored at great length the safeguards of Chapter X and their protection of public investors:
“The basic assumption of Chapter X and other acts administered by the Commission is that the investing public dissociated from control or active participation in the management, needs impartial and expert administrative assistance in the ascertainment of facts, in theidetection of fraud, and in the understanding of complex financial problems.” Id., at 448-449, n. 6.
Applying these principles, the Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the District Court’s refusal to dismiss a Chapter XI proceeding which the SEC had challenged on the grounds that it should have been brought under Chapter X.
It should be noted that, prior to United States Realty, a bill had been introduced in Congress to draw a numerical line that would close Chapter XI to any corporation which had any class of its securities owned by 100 or more creditors or stockholders. See Hearing before Special Subcommittee on Bankruptcy and Reorganization of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 9864, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. In reporting out. the bill, the Subcommittee stated: •
“Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the bill, which are eliminated by the last of your committee’s amendments, provided for amendments to chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act which were designed to prevent corporations which are publicly indebted or owned from filing a petition for an arrangement under, chapter XI, rather than a petition for reorganization under chapter X, the chapter specially designed for the reorganization of such corporations,.and to establish a numerical test of such 'public’ indebtedness or ownership.
“Your committee believes that, while the amendments proposed by sections 4,.5, 6, and 7 are desirable, the element of emergency requiring their immediate passage has been eliminated by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange Commission v. U. S. Realty and Improvement Company. That decision was rendered on May 27, 1940, after the introduction of the bill. Since immediate action on these proposals does not appear to be necessary, the last of your committee’s amendments provides for the striking.out of sections 4, 5, 6, and 7. The committee’s conclusion is supported by all of the'witnesses who testified at the. hearings before the committee’s Subcommittee' on Bankruptcy and Reorganization and also by the report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the bill.” H. R. Rep. No. 2372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 2.
In General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, supra, a corporation with over 2,000,000 shares of common stock, held by-over 7,000 shareholders, but with no publicly held debt of any kind, petitioned under Chapter XI for an arrangement of its unsecured debt, consisting of obligations to trade creditors and one private investor. The District Court had held, with the Court of Appeals affirming, that Chapter XI was unavailable as the debtor needed more extensive reorganization than merely a simple arrangement with unsecured creditors. This Court affirmed. In so doing, the Court again rejected the SEC’s argument that, as an absolute matter, Chapter XI is not available where the debtor is publicly owned.
The Court stated:
“It may well be that in most cases where the debtor’s securities are publicly held c. X will afford the more appropriate remedy. But that is not necessarily so. A large company with publicly held securities may have as much need for.a simple composition of unsecured debts as a smaller company. And there is no reason we can see. why c. XI may not serve that end. The essential difference is not between the small company and the large company but between the needs to be served.” 350 U. S., at 466.
The Court pointéd out that the “needs to be served” included such factors as requirements of fairness to public debt holders, need for a trustee’s evaluation of an accounting from management or determination that new management is necessary, and the need to readjust a complicated debt structure requiring more than a simple composition of unsecured debt. Id., at 466-467.
IV.
' We agree with the parties that the principles of United States Realty and General Stores apply to and govern the result in this case. We reaffirm the holdings of these cases that there is no absolute rule that Chapter X must be utilized in every case in which the corporate debtor is publicly owned. As this Court has recognized, Congress has drawn no such hard-and-fast line between the two Chapters. The SEC, purporting to bow to these holdings, urges in this case, however, a variation of its absolute-rule argument that, while not requiring Chapter X in all cases in which the debtor is publicly owned, would require the use of Chapter X in 100% of the cases involving the rights of public investor creditors.
It argues, in support of this variation of its absolute rule, that to hold otherwise would deprive the investor creditors of Chapter X’s protection of the “fair and equitable” requirement of a plan. As noted above, whereas Chapter X contains the proviso that a plan must be “fair and equitable,” Chapter XI only requires that it be “for the best interests of' the creditors.” The words “fair arid equitable” are “words of art” which mean that senior interests are entitled to full priority over junior ones and, in particular, “that in any plan of corporate reorganization unsecured creditors are entitled to priority over stockholders to the full extent of their debts and that any scaling down of the claims, of creditors without some fair compensating advantage to them which is prior to the rights of stockholders is inadmissible.” United States Realty, supra, at 452. The SEC’s argument, however, is premised on the assertion, for which we can firid no support.in either the language or legislative history of Chapters X and XI, that Congress has deemed it necessary in all cases involving public investor creditors that they have the protection of the “fair and equitable” doctrine. In fact, the requirement that a plan be “fair and equitable” was part of Chapter XI, as well as Chapter X, until 1952, when Congress deleted it from Chapter XI and replaced it with the requirement that the plan be “for the best interests of the creditors.” Congress clearly deemed this latter requirement to be sufficient protection in a proceeding properly in Chapter XI in light of the general philosophy of Chapter XI to expedite “simple” compositions. See S. Rep. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 10, 11-12; H. R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 19, 20-21. There is no indication that in so doing, Congress intended in' any way to change the law on the interrelationship between Chapters X and XI. In fact, the history is just the opposite. In the same Act that deleted the “fair and equitable” requirement from Chapter XI, Congress expressly codified, in § 328, the rule of United States Realty providing for dismissal, or, in effect transfer, of a Chapter XI proceeding if it “should have been brought” in Chapter X. Nothing in this even suggests transfer as an absolute rule to give Chapter X’s “fair and equitable” protection to all cases involving public investors, which presumably if Congress had so intended, it would have so stated. Moreover, as noted above, supra, pp. 608-609, a House subcommittee previously approved the United States Realty holding of a general, but not absolute, rule, and had not reported out a bill that would have drawn an absolute line.
The SEC further argues that Chapter X is required in all cases involving public investor creditors, because its right to intervene in a Chapter XI proceeding is limited solely to moving under § 328 for a transfer to Chapter X. We reject this argument. The District Court, in this case, quite properly recognized that th¿ SEC was not so limited in a Chapter XI proceeding, and we hold that, under the statutory scheme, while not charged with express statutory rights and responsibilities as in Chapter X, the SEC is entitled to intervene and be heard in a Chapr ter XI proceeding. We therefore reject the SEC’s variation of its absolute-rule argument, advanced in this case, that would require the use of Chapter X in all cases in which the rights of public investor creditors are involved. The short answer is that, as with the SEC’s original absolute-rule argument, Congress has drawn no such absolute line of demarcation between Chapters X and XI.
This does not mean, however, that we disagree with the holding of United States Realty that, although there is no absolute rule requiring that Chapter X be utilized in every case in which the debtor is publicly owned, or even where publicly held debt is adjusted, as a general rule Chapter X is the appropriate proceeding for adjustment of publicly held debt. See SEC v. Canandaigua Enterprises Corp., 339 F. 2d 14 (C. A. 2d Cir.). Not only do we not disagree with this holding, but we expressly reaffirm it. Public investors are, as here, generally widely scattered and are far less likely than trade creditors to be aware of the financial condition and cause of the collapse of the debtor. They are less commonly organized in groups or committees capable of protecting their interests. They do not have the same interest as do trade creditors in continuing the business relations with the debtor. Where debt is publicly held, the SEC is likely, as here, to have become familiar with the debtor’s finances, indicating the desirability of its performing its full Chapter X functions. It seems clear that in enacting Chapter X Congress had the protection of public investors, and not trade creditors, primarily in mind. As noted above, Chapter X is one of many Acts in which the; SEC has the statutory right and responsibility to protect public investors. Finally, again it is clear that Congress was thinking of Chapter XI as primarily concerned with adjustment of the rights of trade creditors when it deemed the “fair and equitable” doctrine to be unnecessary to “simple” compositions in Chapter XI.
General Stores indicates the narrow limits within which there are exceptions to this general rule that the rights of public investor creditors are to be adjusted only under Chapter X. “Simple” compositions are still to be effected under Chapter XI.. Such a situation, even where public debt is directly affected may exist, for example, where the public investors are few in number and familiar with the operations of the debtor, or where, although the public investors are greater in number, the adjustment of their debt is relatively minor, consisting, for example, of a short extension of time for payment.
On the other hand, General Stores also makes it clear that even though there may be no public debt materially and directly affected, Chapter X is still, the appropriate proceeding where the débtor has widespread public stockholders and the protections of the public and private interests involved afforded by Chapter X are required because, for example,, there is evidence of management misdeeds for which an accounting might be made, there is a need for new management, or the financial condition of the debtor requires more than a simple composition of its unsecured debts.
Applying.the above principles, it is obvious that Chapter X is the appropriate proceeding for the attempted rehabilitation of respondent in this case. Here public debts are being adjusted. The investors are many and widespread, not few. in number intimately connected with the debtor, and the adjustment is quite major and certainly not minor. These facts alone would require Chapter X proceedings under the above-stated principles. In addition there is here, as we have previously pointed out, substantial evidence of misappropriation of assets, and not only is there a need for a complete corporate reorganization, but it is obvious that the proposed plan of arrangement is just that. The trailer owners are exchanging their entire interests, including a sale of their trailers, in exchange for stock in a new corporation, in which other creditors of respondent, including respondent’s officers and directors, as well as respondent itself will have substantial interests. Indeed, this is the same complete reorganization, except that the plan here gives the public investor creditors even less than was previously offered, see noté 5, supra, that the SEC previously stopped as a public offering on the grounds that the offering material contained false and misleading information. The Court of Appeals itself recognized, 325 F. 2d, at 53, “that if the stock involved here were nut part of an arrangement, the disclosures made with regard to it’ | in soliciting the trailer owners’ consents to the plan] would be clearly inadequate. No authority has been found which would indicate- that recipients of stock issued in connection with an arrangement are not entitled to as much information as are those persons acquiring stock under ordinary conditions.” We agree.
Indeed, the facts of this case aptly demonstrate the need for Chapter X protection as a general rule on the above-stated principles. There is clearly a need for a stúdy by a disinterested trustee to make a thorough examination of respondent’s.financial problems and management and submit á full report to the public-investor creditors. Respondent has never operated profitably, has always been in precarious financial condition, and apparently was hopelessly insolvent, in both the bankruptcy and equity sense, when the arrangement was proposed. At an earlier period, its management apparently misappropriated substantial corporate funds. Most of the trailers were purchased from an affiliated company; a large number of them, although paid for, were either not manufactured or, if manufactured, were not delivered. The affiliated company is bankrupt. Only approximately two-thirds of the $3,587,439 contributed by the public investors for the purchase of trailers was used for that purpose; the balance apparently having been drained off in high commissions taken by the management on the sale of the trailers to the public. Portions of these commissions on new trailer sales were, in turn, used by the management to pay prior purchasers of trailers the rentals which they had been promised.' When respondent filed its petition for an arrangement, its stated liabilities of $1,367,890 were approximately double its stated assets of $685,608;- with even most of the latter ($500,000) representing the alleged “estimated” value of the trailer-rental system, i. e., the debtor’s arrangements with the service station operators. The District Court itself recognized that “there may be in this situation need for new management, and there certainly is some question... as to whether or not the. management that, is-presently... operating it, would continue tó do so for the best interests of the investors.” It did not find, however, that Chapter X was necessary since this need for new management had “not been clearly established yet.” One of the purposes of Chapter X is to give the independent trustee the opportunity to conduct a searching inquiry so as to “clearly establish” whether or not new management is necessary, when there is, as here, a substantial basis for such a belief. See General Stores, supra, at 466. Finally, it is clear that there is need for an independent investigation of possible causes of action against the past and present management of respondent, and it is as true now as when Chapter X was énacted, that “a debtor in possession cannot be expected to investigate itself.” Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 176 (my Brother Douglas then testifying as Chairman of the SEC).
Respondent, however, contends that Chapter X is not here appropriate as the time and expense involved in such a proceeding would be too great. This is, however, just another way of stating the natural preference of a debtor’s management for the “speed and economy” of Chapter XI, to the “thoroughness and disinterestedness” of Chapter X. In this area, as with other statutes designed, to protect the investing public, Congress has made the determination that the disinterested protection of the public investor outweighs the self-interest “needs” of corporate management for so-called “speed and. economy.” In fact, experience in this area has confirmed the view of Congress that the thoroughness and disinterestedness assured by Chapter X not only result in greater protection for the investing public, but often in greater ultimate savings for all interests, public and private, than do the so-called “speed and economy” of Chapter XI. See Twenty-Eighth Annual Report of the SEC 98 (1963); Twenty-Ninth Annual Report of the SEC 90-91 (1964); Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 352, 357-360 (1955). Moreover, the requirements of Chapter X are themselves sufficiently flexible so that the District Court can act to keep expenses within proper bounds and insure
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are “sit-in” cases that came here from the highest courts of South Carolina and Arkansas, respectively. Each of those courts affirmed convictions based upon state' trespass statutes against petitioners, who are Negroes, for participating in “sit-in” démonstrations in the luncheon facilities of retail stores in their respective States^ We granted certiorari in each of the cases, 377 U. S. 988, 989, and consolidated them for argument. The petitioners asserted both in the state courts and here the denial of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; in addition, they claim here that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, passed subsequent to their convictions and the affirmances thereof in the state courts, abated these actions.
1. The Facts.
In No. 2, Hamm v. Rock Hill, the petitioner, and a companion who is now deceased, entered McCrory’s variety store at Rock Hill, South Carolina. After making purchases in other parts of the store, they proceeded to the lunch counter and sought service. It was refused. The manager asked the petitioner and his associate to leave and when they refused he called the police. They were prosecuted and convicted under § 16-388 of the S. C. Code of Laws, making it an offense for anyone to enter a place of business after having been warned not to do so or to refuse to leave immediately after having entered therein. Petitioner’s companion died subsequently. The conviction of petitioner was affirmed by both the Court of General Sessions and the Supreme' Court of South Carolina, 24Í S. C. 420, 128 S. E. 2d 907 (1962).
Lupper v. Arkansas, No. 5, involves a group of Negroes who entered the department store of Gus Blass Company in Little Rock. The group went to the mezzanine tearoom of the store at the busy luncheon hour, seated themselves and requested service which was refused. Within a few minutes the group, including petitioners, was advised that Blass reserved the right to refuse service to anyone and was not prepared to serve them at that time. Upon being requested to leave, the petitioners refused. The police officers who were summoned located petitioners on the first floor of the store and arrested them. The officers’ testimony that petitioners admitted the whole affair was denied. The prosecutions in the Little Rock Municipal Court resulted in convictions -of petitioners based upon § 41-1433, Ark. Stat. Ann. (1964 Repl. Yol.), which prohibits a person from remaining on the premises of a business establishment after having been requested to leave by the owner or manager thereof. On appeal to the Pulaski Circuit Court, a trial de novo resulted in verdicts of guilty and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, 236 Ark. 596, 367 S. W. 2d 750 (1963), sub nom. Briggs v. State.
We hold that the convictions must be vacated and the prosecutions dismissed. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination in places of public accommodation and removes peaceful attempts to be served on an equal basis from the category of punishable activities. Although the conduct, in the present cases occurréd prior to enactment of the Act, the still-pending convictions are abated by its passage.
2. Application of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the Facts Here.
We treat these cases as involving' places of public accommodation covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under that statute, a place of public- accommodation is defined to include one which serves or offers to serve interstate travelers. Applying the rules of §§ 201 (b) (2), (c) we find that each of them offers to serve interstate travelers. In Hamm it is not denied that the lunch counter was in a McCrory’s 5-and-10-cent store, a large variety store at Rock Hill belonging to a national chain, which offers to • sell thousands of items to the public; that it invites all members of the public into its premises to do business and offers to serve all persons, except at its lunch counter which is restricted to white persons only. There is no contention here that it does not come within the Act. Likewise in Lupper the lunch counter area, called a tearoom, is located within and operated by the Gus Blass Company’s department store at Little Rock. It is a large department store dealing extensively in interstate commerce. It appears from the record that it also offered to serve all persons coming into its store but limited its lunch counter service to white persons. On argument it was frankly admitted that the lunch counter operation “probably would” come under the Act. Finally, neither respondent asks for a remand to determine the facts as to coverage of the respective lunch counters. In the light of such a record and the legislative history indicating that Congress intended to cover retail store lunch counters, See 110 Cong. Rec. 1519-1520, we hold that the Act covers both the McCrory and the Blass lunch counter operations.
3. The Provisions of the Act.
Under the Civil Rights Act, petitioners’ conduct could not be the subject of trespass prosecutions, federal or state, if it had occürred after the enactment of the statuté.
Title II includes several sections, some of which are relevant here, that create federal statutory rights. The first is § 201 (a) declaring that “[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoymént of the goods, services, fácilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation,” which, as we have found includes the establishments here involved. Next, § 203 provides:
“No person shall (a) withhold, deny, or attempt to. withhold or deny, or deprive or attempt to deprive, any person of any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (b) intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate,, threaten, or coerce any person with the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (c) punish or attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202.” (Emphasis supplied.)
On its face, this language prohibits prosecution of any person for seeking service in a covered establishment, because of his race or color. It has been argued, however, that victims of discrimination must make use of the exclusive statutory mechanisms for the redress of grievances, and not resort to extralegal means. Although we agree that the law generally condemns self-help, the language of § 203 (c) supports a conclusion that nonforcible attempts to gain admittance to or remain in establishments covered by the Act, are immunized from prosecution, for the statute speaks of exercising or attempting to exercise a “right or privilege” secured by its earlier provisions. The availability of the Act as a defense against punishment is not limited solely to those who pursue the statutory remedies. The legislative history specifically notes that the Act would be a defense to criminal trespáss, breach of the peace and similar prosecutions. Senator Humphrey, floor manager of the bill in the Senate, said in explaining the bill:
“This plainly means that a defendant in a criminal trespass, breach of the peace, or other similar case can assert the rights created by 201 and 202 and that State courts must entertain defenses grounded upon these provisions. . . .” 110 Cong. Rec. 9767.
In effect the Act prohibits the application of state laws in a way that would deprive any person of the rights granted under the Act. The Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, requires this result where “there is a.clear collision” between state and federal law, Kesler v. Department of Safety, 369 U. S. 153, 172 (1962), or a conflict between. federal law and the application of an otherwise valid state enactment, Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538 (1945). There can be no question that this was the intended result here in light of §203 (c). The present convictions and the command of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are clearly in direct conflict. The only remaining question is the effect, of the Act on judgments rendered, but not finalized, before its passage.
4. Effect of the Act upon the Prosecutions.
Last Term, in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U. S. 226, we noted the existence of a body of federal and state law to the effect that convictions on direct review at the time the conduct in question is rendered no longer unlawful by statute, must abate. We consider first the effect the Civil Rights Act would have on petitioners’ convictions if they had been federal convictions, and then,the import of the fact that these are state and not federal convictions. We think it is clear that the convictions, if federal, would abate.
The doctrine found its earliest expression in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (1801):
“But if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied. If the law be constitutional ... I know of no. court which' can contest its obligation. It is true that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, , affect the rights of parties, but in great national concerns . . . [the law] ought always to receive a construction conforming to its manifest import .... In such a case the court must* decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation of law, the judgment must be set aside."
Although the decision in that case arguably rested on the premise that appeals in admiralty were trials de novo, and that prize litigation applied the law of the time of trial, see Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch 281, 283 (1809); Maryland v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 3 How. 534, 552 (1845); United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 95 (1871); United States v. Reisinger, 128 U. S. 398, 401 (1888); United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 217, 222-223 (1934); Massey v. United States, 291 U. S. 608 (1934), the later cases applied the rule in quite different contexts, see United States v. Tynen, supra; United States v. Reisinger, supra. The reason for the rule was stated by Chief Justice Hughes, in United States v. Chambers: “Prosecution for crimes is but an application or enforcement of the law, and if the prosecution continues the law must continue to vivify it.” 291 U. S. 217, at 226. Although Chambers specifically left open the question of the effect of its rule on cases where final judgment was rendered prior to ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, and petition for certiorari sought thereafter, such an extension of the rule was taken for granted in the per curiam decision in Massey v. United States, supra, handed down shortly after Chambers.
It is apparent that the rule exemplified by Chambers does not depend on the imputation of a specific intention to Congress in any particular statute. None of the cases cited drew on any reference to the problem in the legislative history or the language of the statute. Rather, the principle takes the more general form of imputing to Congress an intention to avoid inflicting punishment at a time when it can no longer further any legislative purpose, and would be unnecessarily vindictive. This general principle, expressed in the rule, is to be read wherever applicable as part of the background against which Congress acts. Thus, we deem it irrelevant that Congress made no allusion to the problem in enacting the Civil Rights Aclt.
Nor do we believe that the provisions of the federal saving statute, 61 Stat. 635, 1 U. S. C. § 109 (1958 ed.), would nullify abatement of a federal conviction. In Chambers, a case where the cause for punishment was removed by a repeal of the constitutional basis for the punitive statute, the Court was quite certain as to this. See 291 Ü. S., at 224 and n. 2, involving.the identical statute. The federal saving statute was originally enacted in 1871, 16 Stat. 432. It was meant to obviate mere technical abatement, such as that illustrated by the application of the rule in Tynen decided in 1871. There a substitution of a new statute with a greater schedule of penalties was held to abate the previous prosecution. In contrast, the Civil Rights Act works no such technical abatement. It substitutes a right for a crime. So drastic a change is well beyond the narrow language of amendment and repeal. It is clear, therefore, that if the convictions were under a federal statute they would be' abated.
We believe the fact that the convictions were under state statutes is in these cases a distinction without a difference. We cannot believe the Congress, in enacting-such a far-reaching and comprehensive scheme, intended the Act to operate less effectively than the run-of-the-mill repealer. Since the provisions of the Act would abate all federal prosecutions it follows that the same rule must prevail under the Supremacy Clause which requires that a contrary state practice or state statute must give way. Here the Act intervened before either of the judgments under attack was finalized. Just as in federal cases abatement must follow in these state prosecutions. Rather than a retroactive intrusion into state criminal law this is but the application of a long-standing federal rule,.namely, that since the Civil Rights Act substitutes a right for a crime any state statute, or its application, to the contrary must by virtue of the Supremacy Clause give way under the normal abatement rule covering pending convictions arising out of a pre-enactment activity. The great purpose of the civil rights legislation was to obliter- . ate the effect of a distressing chapter of our history. This demands no less than the application of a normal rule, of statutory construction to strike down pending convictions inconsistent with the purposes of the Act.
Far from finding a bar to the application of the rule where a state statute is. involved, we find that our construction of the effect of the Civil Rights Act is more than statutory. It is required by the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See Kesler v. Department of Safety, 369 U. S. 153, 172 (1962); Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538 (1945). Future state prosecutions under the Act being unconstitutional and there being no saving clause in the Act itself, convictions for pre-enactment violations would be equally unconstitutional and abatement necessarily follows.
Nor do we find persuasive reasons for. imputing to the Congress an intent to insulate such prosecutions. As we have said, Congress, as well as the two Presidents who recommended the legislation, clearly intended to eradicate an unhappy chapter in our history. The peaceful conduct for which petitioners were prosecuted was on.behalf of a principle since embodied in the law of the land. The convictions were based on the theory that the rights of a property owner had been violated. However, the supposed right to discriminate on the basis of race, at least in covered establishments, was nullified by the statute. Under such circumstances the actionable nature of the acts in question must be viewed in the light of the statute .and its legislative purpose.
We find yet another reason for applying the Chambers rule of construction. In our view Congress clearly had the power to extend immunity to pending prosecutions. Some might say that to permit these convictions to stand would have no effect on interstate commerce which we have held justified the adoption of the Act. But even if this be true, the principle of abatement is so firmly imbedded in our jurisprudence as to be a necessary and proper part of every statute working a repealer of criminal legislation. Where Congress sets out to regulate a situation within its power, the Constitution 'affords it a wide choice of remedies. This being true, the only question remaining is whether Congress exercised its power in the Act' to abate the prosecutions here. If we held that it did not we would then have to pass on the constitutional question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment, without the benefit of the Civil Rights Act, operates of its own force to bar criminal trespass convictions, where, as here, they are used to enforce a pattern of racial discrimination. As we have noted, some of the Justices joining this opinion believe that the Fourteenth Amendment does so operate; others are of the contrary opinion. Since this point is not free from, doubt, and since as we have found ■ Congress has ample power to extend the statute to pending convictions we avoid that question by favoring an interpretation of the statute which renders a constitutional decision unnecessary.
In short, now that Congress has exercised its constitutional power in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and declared that the public policy of our country is to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations as therein defined, there is no public interest to be served in the further prosecution of the petitioners. And in accordance with the long-established rule of our cases they must be abated and the judgment in each is therefore vacated and the charges are ordered dismissed.
It is so ordered.
Section 201:
“(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect commerce . . .
“(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally ’ engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment . . .
“(c) The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning of this title if ... it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers . . . .”
In Lupper the State’s brief says, “a remand of these cases would not reap any . . . benefits.” At 13.
Some of us believe that the substantive rights granted by the Act here, i: e., freedom from discrimination in places of public accommodation are also included in the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, see concurring opinions in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U. S. 226; others take the position that the Amendment creates no such substantive rights, see dissenting opinion in Bell v. Maryland, supra. No such question, is involved here, and we do not pass upon it in any manner. We deal only with the statutory rights created in the Act.
In Bell v. Maryland, supra, we dealt with the problem arising when a state enactment intervened prior to the finalizing of. státe criminal trespass convictions. Because we were dealing with the effect of a state statute on a state conviction prior to the Act’s passage we felt that the state courts should be allowed to pass on the question. Here, we have an intervening federal statute and in attempting to judge its effect on a state conviction we are faced with a federal not a state question. Because of this distinction we do not feel that remand is esquired or desirable.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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