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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice BREYERdelivered the opinion of the Court.
Texas offers automobile owners a choice between ordinary and specialty license plates. Those who want the State to issue a particular specialty plate may propose a plate design, comprising a slogan, a graphic, or (most commonly) both. If the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board approves the design, the State will make it available for display on vehicles registered in Texas.
In this case, the Texas Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans proposed a specialty license plate design featuring a Confederate battle flag. The Board rejected the proposal. We must decide whether that rejection violated the Constitution's free speech guarantees. See Amdts. 1, 14. We conclude that it did not.
I
A
Texas law requires all motor vehicles operating on the State's roads to display valid license plates. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 502.001(West Supp. 2014), 504.001 (2013), 504.943 (Supp. 2014). And Texas makes available several kinds of plates. Drivers may choose to display the State's general-issue license plates. See Texas Dept. of Motor Vehicles, Motor Vehicle Registration Manual 9.1 (Apr. 2015). Each of these plates contains the word "Texas," a license plate number, a silhouette of the State, a graphic of the Lone Star, and the slogan "The Lone Star State." Texas Dept. of Motor Vehicles, The Texas Classic FAQs (July 16, 2012), online at http://www.txdmv. gov/motorists/license-plates (all Internet materials as visited June 16, 2015, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). In the alternative, drivers may choose from an assortment of specialty license plates. § 504.008(b) (West 2013). Each of these plates contains the word "Texas," a license plate number, and one of a selection of designs prepared by the State. See ibid.; Specialty License Plates, http://www.txdmv.gov/motorists/license-plates/specialty-license-plates (displaying available Texas specialty plates); Create a Plate: Your Design, http://www.myplates.com/BackgroundOnly (same). Finally, Texas law provides for personalized plates (also known as vanity plates). 43 Tex. Admin. Code § 217.45(c)(7) (2015). Pursuant to the personalization program, a vehicle owner may request a particular alphanumeric pattern for use as a plate number, such as "BOB" or "TEXPL8."
Here we are concerned only with the second category of plates, namely specialty license plates, not with the personalization program. Texas offers vehicle owners a variety of specialty plates, generally for an annual fee. See § 217.45(b)(2). And Texas selects the designs for specialty plates through three distinct processes.
First, the state legislature may specifically call for the development of a specialty license plate. See Tex. Transp. Code §§ 504.602-504.663(West 2013 and Supp. 2014). The legislature has enacted statutes authorizing, for example, plates that say "Keep Texas Beautiful" and "Mothers Against Drunk Driving," plates that "honor" the Texas citrus industry, and plates that feature an image of the World Trade Center towers and the words "Fight Terrorism." See §§ 504.602, 504.608, 504.626, 504.647.
Second, the Board may approve a specialty plate design proposal that a state-designated private vendor has created at the request of an individual or organization. See §§ 504.6011(a), 504.851(a); 43 Tex. Admin. Code § 217.52(b). Among the plates created through the private-vendor process are plates promoting the "Keller Indians" and plates with the slogan "Get it Sold with RE/MAX."
Third, the Board "may create new specialty license plates on its own initiative or on receipt of an application from a" nonprofit entity seeking to sponsor a specialty plate. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 504.801(a), (b). A nonprofit must include in its application "a draft design of the specialty license plate." 43 Tex. Admin. Code § 217.45(i)(2)(C). And Texas law vests in the Board authority to approve or to disapprove an application. See § 217.45(i)(7). The relevant statute says that the Board "may refuse to create a new specialty license plate" for a number of reasons, for example "if the design might be offensive to any member of the public... or for any other reason established by rule." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 504.801(c). Specialty plates that the Board has sanctioned through this process include plates featuring the words "The Gator Nation," together with the Florida Gators logo, and plates featuring the logo of Rotary International and the words "SERVICE ABOVE SELF."
B
In 2009, the Sons of Confederate Veterans, Texas Division (a nonprofit entity), applied to sponsor a specialty license plate through this last-mentioned process. SCV's application included a draft plate design. See Appendix, infra. At the bottom of the proposed plate were the words "SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS." At the side was the organization's logo, a square Confederate battle flag framed by the words "Sons of Confederate Veterans 1896." A faint Confederate battle flag appeared in the background on the lower portion of the plate. Additionally, in the middle of the plate was the license plate number, and at the top was the State's name and silhouette. The Board's predecessor denied this application.
In 2010, SCV renewed its application before the Board. The Board invited public comment on its website and at an open meeting. After considering the responses, including a number of letters sent by elected officials who opposed the proposal, the Board voted unanimously against issuing the plate. The Board explained that it had found "it necessary to deny th[e] plate design application, specifically the confederate flag portion of the design, because public comments ha[d] shown that many members of the general public find the design offensive, and because such comments are reasonable." App. 64. The Board added "that a significant portion of the public associate the confederate flag with organizations advocating expressions of hate directed toward people or groups that is demeaning to those people or groups." Id.,at 65.
In 2012, SCV and two of its officers (collectively SCV) brought this lawsuit against the chairman and members of the Board (collectively Board). SCV argued that the Board's decision violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and it sought an injunction requiring the Board to approve the proposed plate design. The District Court entered judgment for the Board. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff,759 F.3d 388 (2014). It held that Texas's specialty license plate designs are private speech and that the Board, in refusing to approve SCV's design, engaged in constitutionally forbidden viewpoint discrimination. The dissenting judge argued that Texas's specialty license plate designs are government speech, the content of which the State is free to control.
We granted the Board's petition for certiorari, and we now reverse.
II
When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,555 U.S. 460, 467-468, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009). That freedom in part reflects the fact that it is the democratic electoral process that first and foremost provides a check on government speech. See Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth,529 U.S. 217, 235, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000). Thus, government statements (and government actions and programs that take the form of speech) do not normally trigger the First Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas. See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn.,544 U.S. 550, 559, 125 S.Ct. 2055, 161 L.Ed.2d 896 (2005). Instead, the Free Speech Clause helps produce informed opinions among members of the public, who are then able to influence the choices of a government that, through words and deeds, will reflect its electoral mandate. See Stromberg v. California,283 U.S. 359, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931)(observing that "our constitutional system" seeks to maintain "the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people").
Were the Free Speech Clause interpreted otherwise, government would not work. How could a city government create a successful recycling program if officials, when writing householders asking them to recycle cans and bottles, had to include in the letter a long plea from the local trash disposal enterprise demanding the contrary? How could a state government effectively develop programs designed to encourage and provide vaccinations, if officials also had to voice the perspective of those who oppose this type of immunization? "[I]t is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked th[e] freedom" to select the messages it wishes to convey. Summum, supra,at 468, 129 S.Ct. 1125.
We have therefore refused "[t]o hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals." Rust v. Sullivan,500 U.S. 173, 194, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991). We have pointed out that a contrary holding "would render numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect." Ibid.Cf. Keller v. State Bar of Cal.,496 U.S. 1, 12-13, 110 S.Ct. 2228, 110 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990)("If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed"). And we have made clear that "the government can speak for itself." Southworth, supra,at 229, 120 S.Ct. 1346.
That is not to say that a government's ability to express itself is without restriction. Constitutional and statutory provisions outside of the Free Speech Clause may limit government speech. Summum, supra,at 468, 129 S.Ct. 1125. And the Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the government's speech if, for example, the government seeks to compel private persons to convey the government's speech. But, as a general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing so, it represents its citizens and it carries out its duties on their behalf.
III
In our view, specialty license plates issued pursuant to Texas's statutory scheme convey government speech. Our reasoning rests primarily on our analysis in Summum,a recent case that presented a similar problem. We conclude here, as we did there, that our precedents regarding government speech (and not our precedents regarding forums for private speech) provide the appropriate framework through which to approach the case. See 555 U.S., at 464, 129 S.Ct. 1125.
A
In Summum,we considered a religious organization's request to erect in a 2.5-acre city park a monument setting forth the organization's religious tenets. See id.,at 464-465, 129 S.Ct. 1125. In the park were 15 other permanent displays. Id.,at 464, 129 S.Ct. 1125. At least 11 of these-including a wishing well, a September 11 monument, a historic granary, the city's first fire station, and a Ten Commandments monument-had been donated to the city by private entities. Id.,at 464-465, 129 S.Ct. 1125. The religious organization argued that the Free Speech Clause required the city to display the organization's proposed monument because, by accepting a broad range of permanent exhibitions at the park, the city had created a forum for private speech in the form of monuments. Brief for Respondent in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,O.T. 2008, No. 07-665, pp. 2-3, 30-36.
This Court rejected the organization's argument. We held that the city had not "provid[ed] a forum for private speech" with respect to monuments. Summum,555 U.S., at 470, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Rather, the city, even when "accepting a privately donated monument and placing it on city property," had "engage[d] in expressive conduct." Id.,at 476, 129 S.Ct. 1125. The speech at issue, this Court decided, was "best viewed as a form of government speech" and "therefore [was] not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause." Id.,at 464, 129 S.Ct. 1125.
We based our conclusion on several factors. First, history shows that "[g]overnments have long used monuments to speak to the public." Id.,at 470, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Thus, we observed that "[w]hen a government entity arranges for the construction of a monument, it does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some feeling in those who see the structure." Ibid.
Second, we noted that it "is not common for property owners to open up their property for the installation of permanent monuments that convey a message with which they do not wish to be associated."Id.,at 471, 129 S.Ct. 1125. As a result, "persons who observe donated monuments routinely-and reasonably-interpret them as conveying some message on the property owner's behalf." Ibid.And "observers" of such monuments, as a consequence, ordinarily "appreciate the identity of the speaker." Ibid.
Third, we found relevant the fact that the city maintained control over the selection of monuments. We thought it "fair to say that throughout our Nation's history, the general government practice with respect to donated monuments has been one of selective receptivity." Ibid.And we observed that the city government in Summum" 'effectively controlled' the messages sent by the monuments in the [p]ark by exercising 'final approval authority' over their selection." Id.,at 473, 129 S.Ct. 1125.
In light of these and a few other relevant considerations, the Court concluded that the expression at issue was government speech. See id.,at 470-472, 129 S.Ct. 1125. And, in reaching that conclusion, the Court rejected the premise that the involvement of private parties in designing the monuments was sufficient to prevent the government from controlling which monuments it placed in its own public park. See id.,at 470-471, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Cf. Rust, supra,at 192-196, 111 S.Ct. 1759(upholding a federal regulation limiting speech in a Government-funded program where the program was established and administered by private parties).
B
Our analysis in Summumleads us to the conclusion that here, too, government speech is at issue. First, the history of license plates shows that, insofar as license plates have conveyed more than state names and vehicle identification numbers, they long have communicated messages from the States. Cf. 555 U.S., at 470, 129 S.Ct. 1125("Governments have long used monuments to speak to the public"). In 1917, Arizona became the first State to display a graphic on its plates. J. Fox, License Plates of the United States 15 (1997) (Fox); J. Minard & T. Stentiford, A Moving History 56 (2004) (Minard). The State presented a depiction of the head of a Hereford steer. Fox 15; Minard 56. In the years since, New Hampshire plates have featured the profile of the "Old Man of the Mountain," Massachusetts plates have included a representation of the Commonwealth's famous codfish, and Wyoming plates have displayed a rider atop a bucking bronco. Minard 60, 61, 66.
In 1928, Idaho became the first State to include a slogan on its plates. The 1928 Idaho plate proclaimed "Idaho Potatoes" and featured an illustration of a brown potato, onto which the license plate number was superimposed in green. Id.,at 61. The brown potato did not catch on, but slogans on license plates did. Over the years, state plates have included the phrases "North to the Future" (Alaska), "Keep Florida Green" (Florida), "Hoosier Hospitality" (Indiana), "The Iodine Products State" (South Carolina), "Green Mountains" (Vermont), and "America's Dairyland" (Wisconsin). Fox 13, 29, 39, 91, 101, 109. States have used license plate slogans to urge action, to promote tourism, and to tout local industries.
Texas, too, has selected various messages to communicate through its license plate designs. By 1919, Texas had begun to display the Lone Star emblem on its plates. Texas Department of Transportation, The History of Texas License Plates 9, 11 (1999). In 1936, the State's general-issue plates featured the first slogan on Texas license plates: the word "Centennial." Id.,at 20. In 1968, Texas plates promoted a San Antonio event by including the phrase "Hemisfair 68." Id.,at 46. In 1977, Texas replaced the Lone Star with a small silhouette of the State. Id.,at 63. And in 1995, Texas plates celebrated "150 Years of Statehood." Id.,at 101. Additionally, the Texas Legislature has specifically authorized specialty plate designs stating, among other things, "Read to Succeed," "Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo," "Texans Conquer Cancer," and "Girl Scouts." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 504.607, 504.613, 504.620, 504.622. This kind of state speech has appeared on Texas plates for decades.
Second, Texas license plate designs "are often closely identified in the public mind with the [State]." Summum, supra,at 472, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Each Texas license plate is a government article serving the governmental purposes of vehicle registration and identification. The governmental nature of the plates is clear from their faces: The State places the name "TEXAS" in large letters at the top of every plate. Moreover, the State requires Texas vehicle owners to display license plates, and every Texas license plate is issued by the State. See § 504.943. Texas also owns the designs on its license plates, including the designs that Texas adopts on the basis of proposals made by private individuals and organizations. See § 504.002(3). And Texas dictates the manner in which drivers may dispose of unused plates. See § 504.901(c). See also § 504.008(g) (requiring that vehicle owners return unused specialty plates to the State).
Texas license plates are, essentially, government IDs. And issuers of ID "typically do not permit" the placement on their IDs of "message[s] with which they do not wish to be associated." Summum,555 U.S., at 471, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Consequently, "persons who observe" designs on IDs "routinely-and reasonably-interpret them as conveying some message on the [issuer's] behalf." Ibid.
Indeed, a person who displays a message on a Texas license plate likely intends to convey to the public that the State has endorsed that message. If not, the individual could simply display the message in question in larger letters on a bumper sticker right next to the plate. But the individual prefers a license plate design to the purely private speech expressed through bumper stickers. That may well be because Texas's license plate designs convey government agreement with the message displayed.
Third, Texas maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates. Texas law provides that the State "has sole control over the design, typeface, color, and alphanumeric pattern for all license plates." § 504.005. The Board must approve every specialty plate design proposal before the design can appear on a Texas plate. 43 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 217.45(i)(7)-(8), 217.52(b). And the Board and its predecessor have actively exercised this authority. Texas asserts, and SCV concedes, that the State has rejected at least a dozen proposed designs. Reply Brief 10; Tr. of Oral Arg. 49-51. Accordingly, like the city government in Summum,Texas "has 'effectively controlled' the messages [conveyed] by exercising 'final approval authority' over their selection." 555 U.S., at 473, 129 S.Ct. 1125(quoting Johanns,544 U.S., at 560-561, 125 S.Ct. 2055).
This final approval authority allows Texas to choose how to present itself and its constituency. Thus, Texas offers plates celebrating the many educational institutions attended by its citizens. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 504.615. But it need not issue plates deriding schooling. Texas offers plates that pay tribute to the Texas citrus industry. See § 504.626. But it need not issue plates praising Florida's oranges as far better. And Texas offers plates that say "Fight Terrorism." See § 504.647. But it need not issue plates promoting al Qaeda.
These considerations, taken together, convince us that the specialty plates here in question are similar enough to the monuments in Summumto call for the same result. That is not to say that every element of our discussion in Summumis relevant here. For instance, in Summumwe emphasized that monuments were "permanent" and we observed that "public parks can accommodate only a limited number of permanent monuments." 555 U.S., at 464, 470, 478, 129 S.Ct. 1125. We believed that the speech at issue was government speech rather than private speech in part because we found it "hard to imagine how a public park could be opened up for the installation of permanent monuments by every person or group wishing to engage in that form of expression." Id.,at 479, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Here, a State could theoretically offer a much larger number of license plate designs, and those designs need not be available for time immemorial.
But those characteristics of the speech at issue in Summumwere particularly important because the government speech at issue occurred in public parks, which are traditional public forums for "the delivery of speeches and the holding of marches and demonstrations" by private citizens. Id.,at 478, 129 S.Ct. 1125. By contrast, license plates are not traditional public forums for private speech.
And other features of the designs on Texas's specialty license plates indicate that the message conveyed by those designs is conveyed on behalf of the government. Texas, through its Board, selects each design featured on the State's specialty license plates. Texas presents these designs on government-mandated, government-controlled, and government-issued IDs that have traditionally been used as a medium for government speech. And it places the designs directly below the large letters identifying "TEXAS" as the issuer of the IDs. "The [designs] that are accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message, and they thus constitute government speech." Id., at 472, 129 S.Ct. 1125.
C
SCV believes that Texas's specialty license plate designs are not government speech, at least with respect to the designs (comprising slogans and graphics) that were initially proposed by private parties. According to SCV, the State does not engage in expressive activity through such slogans and graphics, but rather provides a forum for private speech by making license plates available to display the private parties' designs. We cannot agree.
We have previously used what we have called "forum analysis" to evaluate government restrictions on purely private speech that occurs on government property. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc.,473 U.S. 788, 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985). But forum analysis is misplaced here. Because the State is speaking on its own behalf, the First Amendment strictures that attend the various types of government-established forums do not apply.
The parties agree that Texas's specialty license plates are not a "traditional public forum," such as a street or a park, "which ha[s] immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, ha[s] been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.,460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)(internal quotation marks omitted). "The Court has rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic confines." Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,523 U.S. 666, 678, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998). And state-issued specialty license plates lie far beyond those confines.
It is equally clear that Texas's specialty plates are neither a " 'designated public forum,' " which exists where "government property that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened up for that purpose," Summum, supra,at 469, 129 S.Ct. 1125, nor a "limited public forum," which exists where a government has "reserv [ed a forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics," Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,515 U.S. 819, 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995). A government "does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse." Cornelius,473 U.S., at 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439. And in order "to ascertain whether [a government] intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum," this Court "has looked to the policy and practice of the government" and to "the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity." Ibid.
Texas's policies and the nature of its license plates indicate that the State did not intend its specialty license plates to serve as either a designated public forum or a limited public forum. First, the State exercises final authority over each specialty license plate design. This authority militates against a determination that Texas has created a public forum. See id.,at 803-804, 105 S.Ct. 3439(explaining that a school mail system was not a public forum because "[t]he practice was to require permission from the individual school principal before access to the system to communicate with teachers was granted"). Second, Texas takes ownership of each specialty plate design, making it particularly untenable that the State intended specialty plates to serve as a forum for public discourse. Finally, Texas license plates have traditionally been used for government speech, are primarily used as a form of government ID, and bear the State's name. These features of Texas license plates indicate that Texas explicitly associates itself with the speech on its plates.
For similar reasons, we conclude that Texas's specialty license plates are not a "nonpublic for[um]," which exists "[w]here the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations." International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,505 U.S. 672, 678-679, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 120 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992). With respect to specialty license plate designs, Texas is not simply managing government property, but instead is engaging in expressive conduct. As we have described, we reach this conclusion based on the historical context, observers' reasonable interpretation of the messages conveyed by Texas specialty plates, and the effective control that the State exerts over the design selection process. Texas's specialty license plate designs "are meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message." Summum,555 U.S., at 472, 129 S.Ct. 1125. They "constitute government speech." Ibid.
The fact that private parties take part in the design and propagation of a message does not extinguish the governmental nature of the message or transform the government's role into that of a mere forum-provider. In Summum,private entities "financed and donated monuments that the government accept[ed] and display[ed] to the public." Id.,at 470-471, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Here, similarly, private parties propose designs that Texas may accept and display on its license plates. In this case, as in Summum,the "government entity may exercise [its] freedom to express its views" even "when it receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled message." Id.,at 468, 129 S.Ct. 1125. And in this case, as in Summum,forum analysis is inapposite. See id.,at 480, 129 S.Ct. 1125.
Of course, Texas allows many more license plate designs than the city in Summumallowed monuments. But our holding in Summumwas not dependent on the precise number of monuments found within the park. Indeed, we indicated that the permanent displays in New York City's Central Park also constitute government speech. See id.,at 471-472, 129 S.Ct. 1125. And an amicusbrief had informed us that there were, at the time, 52 such displays. See Brief for City of New York in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,O.T. 2008, No. 07-665, p. 2. Further, there may well be many more messages that Texas wishes to convey through its license plates than there were messages that the city in Summumwished to convey through its monuments. Texas's desire to communicate numerous messages does not mean that the messages conveyed are not Texas's own.
Additionally, the fact that Texas vehicle owners pay annual fees in order to display specialty license plates does not imply that the plate designs are merely a forum for private speech. While some nonpublic forums provide governments the opportunity to profit from speech, see, e.g., Lehman v. Shaker Heights,418 U.S. 298, 299, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974)(plurality opinion), the existence of government profit alone is insufficient to trigger forum analysis. Thus, if the city in Summumhad established a rule that organizations wishing to donate monuments must also pay fees to assist in park maintenance, we do not believe that the result in that case would have been any different. Here, too, we think it sufficiently clear that Texas is speaking through its specialty license plate designs, such that the existence of annual fees does not convince us that the specialty plates are a nonpublic forum.
Finally, we note that this case does not resemble other cases in which we have identified a nonpublic forum. This case is not like Perry Ed. Assn.,where we found a school district's internal mail system to be a nonpublic forum for private speech. See 460 U.S., at 48-49, 103 S.Ct. 948. There, it was undisputed that a number of private organizations, including a teachers' union, had access to the mail system. See id.,at 39-40, 103 S.Ct. 948. It was therefore clear that private parties, and not only the government, used the system to communicate. Here, by contrast, each specialty license plate design is formally approved by and stamped with the imprimatur of Texas.
Nor is this case like Lehman,where we found the advertising space on city buses to be a nonpublic forum. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul,505 U.S. 377, 390, n. 6, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992)(identifying Lehmanas a case about a nonpublic forum). There, the messages were located in a context (advertising space) that is traditionally available for private speech. And the advertising space, in contrast to license plates, bore no indicia that the speech was owned or conveyed by the government.
Nor is this case like Cornelius,where we determined that a charitable fundraising program directed at federal employees constituted a nonpublic forum. See 473 U.S., at 804-806, 105 S.Ct. 3439. That forum lacked the kind of history present here. The fundraising drive had never been a medium for government speech. Instead, it was established "to bring order to [a] solicitation process" which had previously consisted of ad hoc solicitation by individual charitable organizations. Id.,at 792, 805, 105 S.Ct. 3439. The drive "was designed to minimize... disruption to the [federal] workplace," id.,at 805, 105 S.Ct. 3439, not to communicate messages from the government. Further, the charitable solicitations did not appear on a government ID under the government's name. In contrast to the instant case, there was no reason for employees to "interpret [the solicitation] as conveying some message on the [government's] behalf." Summum,555 U.S., at 471, 129 S.Ct. 1125.
IV
Our determination that Texas's specialty license plate designs are government speech does not mean that the designs do not also implicate the free speech rights of private persons. We have acknowledged that drivers who display a State's selected license plate designs convey the messages communicated through those designs. See Wooley v. Maynard,430 U.S. 705, 717, n. 15, 715, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977)(observing that a vehicle "is readily associated with its operator" and that drivers displaying license plates "use their private property as a'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message"). And we have recognized that the First Amendment stringently limits a State's authority to compel a private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. See id.,at 715, 97 S.Ct. 1428; Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,515 U.S. 557, 573, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). But here, compelled private speech is not at issue. And just as Texas cannot require SCV to convey "the State's ideological message," Wooley, supra,at 715, 97 S.Ct. 1428, SCV cannot force Texas to include a Confederate battle flag on its specialty license plates.
* * *
For the reasons stated, we hold that Texas's specialty license plate
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether, when a complaint raises both federal securities claims and pendent state claims, a Federal District Court may deny a motion to compel arbitration of the state-law claims despite the parties’ agreement to arbitrate their disputes. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Federal Courts of Appeals on this question. 467 U. S. 1240 (1984).
HH
In 1981, A. Lamar Byrd sold his dental practice and invested $160,000 in securities through Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., a securities broker-dealer. The value of the account declined by more than $100,000 between September 1981 and March 1982. Byrd filed a complaint against Dean Witter in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, alleging a violation of §§ 10(b), 15(c), and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §§78j(b), 78o(c), and 78t, and of various state-law provisions. Federal jurisdiction over the state-law claims was based on diversity of citizenship and the principle of pendent jurisdiction. In the complaint, Byrd alleged that an agent of Dean Witter had traded in his account without his prior consent, that the number of transactions executed on behalf of the account was excessive, that misrepresentations were made by an agent of Dean Witter as to the status of the account, and that the agent acted with Dean Witter’s knowledge, participation, and ratification.
When Byrd invested his funds with Dean Witter in 1981, he signed a Customer’s Agreement providing that “[a]ny controversy between you and the undersigned arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 11. Dean Witter accordingly filed a motion for an order severing the pendent state claims, compelling their arbitration, and staying arbitration of those claims pending resolution of the federal-court action. App. 12. It argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act or Act), 9 U. S. C. §§ 1-14, which provides that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” §2, required that the District Court compel arbitration of the state-law claims. The Act authorizes parties to an arbitration agreement to petition a federal district court for an order compelling arbitration of any issue referable to arbitration under the agreement. §§ 3, 4. Because Dean Witter assumed that the federal securities claim was not subject to the arbitration provision of the contract and could be resolved only in the federal forum, it did not seek to compel arbitration of that claim. The District Court denied in its entirety the motion to sever and compel arbitration of the pendent state claims, and on an interlocutory appeal the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 726 F. 2d 552 (1984).
I — I I — I
Confronted with the issue we address — whether to compel arbitration of pendent state-law claims when the federal court will in any event assert jurisdiction over a federal-law claim — the Federal Courts of Appeals have adopted two different approaches. Along with the Ninth Circuit in this case, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have relied on the “doctrine of intertwining.” When arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims arise out of the same transaction, and are sufficiently intertwined factually and legally, the district court, under this view, may in its discretion deny arbitration as to the arbitrable claims and try all the claims together in federal court. These courts acknowledge the strong federal policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements but offer two reasons why the district courts nevertheless should decline to compel arbitration in this situation. First, they assert that such a result is necessary to preserve what they consider to be the court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the federal securities claim; otherwise, they suggest, arbitration of an “intertwined” state claim might precede the federal proceeding and the factfinding done by the arbitrator might thereby bind the federal court through collateral estoppel. The second reason they cite is efficiency; by declining to compel arbitration, the court avoids bifurcated proceedings and perhaps redundant efforts to litigate the same factual questions twice.
In contrast, the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held that the Arbitration Act divests the district courts of any discretion regarding arbitration in cases containing both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, and instead requires that the courts compel arbitration of arbitrable claims, when asked to do so. These courts conclude that the Act, both through its plain meaning and the strong federal policy it reflects, requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate, and “not substitute [its] own views of economy and efficiency” for those of Congress. Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F. 2d 638, 646 (CA7 1981).
We agree with these latter courts that the Arbitration Act requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbi-trable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums. Accordingly, we reverse the decision not to compel arbitration.
HH t — I I — I
The Arbitration Act provides that written agreements to arbitrate controversies arising out of an existing contract “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2. By its terms, the Act leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed. §§ 3, 4. Thus, insofar as the language of the Act guides our disposition of this case, we would conclude that agreements to arbitrate must be enforced, absent a ground for revocation of the contractual agreement.
It is suggested, however, that the Act does not expressly address whether the same mandate — to enforce arbitration agreements — holds true where, as here, such a course would result in bifurcated proceedings if the arbitration agreement is enforced. Because the Act’s drafters did not explicitly consider the prospect of bifurcated proceedings, we are told, the clear language of the Act might be misleading. Thus, courts that have adopted the view of the Ninth Circuit in this case have argued that the Act’s goal of speedy and efficient decisionmaking is thwarted by bifurcated proceedings, and that, given the absence of clear direction on this point, the intent of Congress in passing the Act controls and compels a refusal to compel arbitration. They point out, in addition, that in the past the Court on occasion has identified a contrary federal interest sufficiently compelling to outweigh the mandate of the Arbitration Act, see n. 1, supra, and they conclude that the interest in speedy resolution of claims should do so in this case. See, e. g., Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F. 2d 318, 336 (CA5 1981); Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 585 (ED Cal. 1982).
We turn, then, to consider whether the legislative history of the Act provides guidance on this issue. The congressional history does not expressly direct resolution of the scenario we address. We conclude, however, on consideration of Congress’ intent in passing the statute, that a court must compel arbitration of otherwise arbitrable claims, when a motion to compel arbitration is made.
The legislative history of the Act establishes that the purpose behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate. We therefore reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims. The Act, after all, does not mandate the arbitration of all claims, but merely the enforcement — upon the motion of one of the parties — of privately negotiated arbitration agreements. The House Report accompanying the Act makes clear that its purpose was to place an arbitration agreement “upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs,” H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924), and to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate. This is not to say that Congress was blind to the potential benefit of the legislation for expedited resolution of disputes. Far from it, the House Report expressly observed:
“It is practically appropriate that the action should be taken at this time when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable.” Id., at 2.
Nonetheless, passage of the Act was motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered, and we must not overlook this principal objective when construing the statute, or allow the fortuitous impact of the Act on efficient dispute resolution to overshadow the underlying motivation. Indeed, this conclusion is compelled by the Court’s recent holding in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U. S. 1 (1983), in which we affirmed an order requiring enforcement of an arbitration agreement, even though the arbitration would result in bifurcated proceedings. That misfortune, we noted, “occurs because the relevant federal law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement,” id., at 20. See also id., at 24-25 (“The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration”).
We therefore are not persuaded by the argument that the conflict between two goals of the Arbitration Act — enforcement of private agreements and encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute resolution — must be resolved in favor of the latter in order to realize the intent of the drafters. The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is “piecemeal” litigation, at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another federal statute. See n. 1, supra. By compelling arbitration of state-law claims, a district court successfully protects the contractual rights of the parties and their rights under the Arbitration Act.
IV
It is also suggested, however, and some Courts of Appeals have held, that district courts should decide arbitrable pendent claims when a nonarbitrable federal claim is before them, because otherwise the findings in the arbitration proceeding might have collateral-estoppel effect in a subsequent federal proceeding. This preclusive effect is believed to pose a threat to the federal interest in resolution of securities claims, and to warrant a refusal to compel arbitration. Other courts have held that the claims should be separately resolved, but that this preclusive effect warrants a stay of arbitration proceedings pending resolution of the federal securities claim. In this case, Dean Witter also asked the District Court to stay the arbitration proceedings pending resolution of the federal claim, and we suspect it did so in response to such holdings.
We believe that the preclusive effect of arbitration proceedings is significantly less well settled than the lower court opinions might suggest, and that the consequence of this misconception has been the formulation of unnecessarily contorted procedures. We conclude that neither a stay of proceedings, nor joined proceedings, is necessary to protect the federal interest in the federal-court proceeding, and that the formulation of collateral-estoppel rules affords adequate protection to that interest.
Initially, it is far from certain that arbitration proceedings will have any preclusive effect on the litigation of nonarbitrable federal claims. . Just last Term, we held that neither the full-faith-and-credit provision of 28 U. S. C. § 1738, nor a judicially fashioned rule of preclusion, permits a federal court to accord res judicata or collateral-estoppel effect to an unappealed arbitration award in a case brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U. S. 284 (1984). The full-faith-and-credit statute requires that federal courts give the same preclusive effect to a State’s judicial proceedings as would the courts of the State rendering the judgment, and since arbitration is not a judicial proceeding, we held that the statute does not apply to arbitration awards. Id., at 287-288. The same analysis inevitably would apply to any unappealed state arbitration proceedings. We also declined, in McDonald, to fashion a federal common-law rule of preclusion, in part on the ground that arbitration cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and constitutional rights that §1988 is designed to safeguard. We therefore recognized that arbitration proceedings will not necessarily have a preclusive effect on subsequent federal-court proceedings.
Significantly, McDonald also establishes that courts may directly and effectively protect federal interests by determining the preclusive effect to be given to an arbitration proceeding. Since preclusion doctrine comfortably plays this role, it follows that neither a stay of the arbitration proceedings, nor a refusal to compel arbitration of state claims, is required in order to assure that a precedent arbitration does not impede a subsequent federal-court action. The Courts of Appeals that have assumed collateral-estoppel effect must be given to arbitration proceedings have therefore sought to accomplish indirectly that which they erroneously assumed they could not do directly.
The question of what preclusive effect, if any, the arbitration proceedings might have is not yet before us, however, and we do not decide it. The collateral-estoppel effect of an arbitration proceeding is at issue only after arbitration is completed, of course, and we therefore have no need to consider now whether the analysis in McDonald encompasses this case. Suffice it to say that in framing preclusion rules in this context, courts shall take into account the federal interests warranting protection. As a result, there is no reason to require that district courts decline to compel arbitration, or manipulate the ordering of the resulting bifurcated proceedings, simply to avoid an infringement of federal interests.
Finding unpersuasive the arguments advanced in support of the ruling below, we hold that the District Court erred in refusing to grant the motion of Dean Witter to compel arbitration of the pendent state claims. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it upheld the District Court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953), this Court held that a predispute agreement to arbitrate claims that arise under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 772(2), was not enforceable. The Court pointed to language in § 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77n, which declares “void” any “stipulation” waiving compliance with any “provision” of the Securities Act, and held that an agreement to arbitrate amounted to a stipulation waiving the right to seek a judicial remedy, and was therefore void. 346 U. S., at 434-435. Years later, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506 (1974), this Court questioned the applicability of Wilko to a claim arising under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or under Rule 10b-5, because the provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts differ, and because, unlike § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, § 10(b) of the 1934 Act does not expressly give rise to a private cause of action. 417 U. S., at 512-513. The Court did not, however, hold that Wilko would not apply in the context of a § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim, and Wilko has retained considerable vitality in the lower federal courts. Indeed, numerous District Courts and Courts of Appeals have held that the Wilko analysis applies to claims arising under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U. S. C. § 78j(b), and that agreements to arbitrate such claims are therefore unenforceable. See, e. g., DeLancie. v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F. 2d 1255, 1258-1259 (CA9 1981); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F. 2d 823, 827-829 (CA10 1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F. 2d 831, 833-835 (CA7 1977); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F. 2d 540, 543, and n. 3 (CA5 1976), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 824 (1977); see also Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 3 (citing cases); Brief for Securities Industry Association, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 10, n. 7 (same).
Dean Witter and amici representing the securities industry urge us to resolve the applicability of Wilko to claims under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. We decline to do so. In the District Court, Dean Witter did not seek to compel arbitration of the federal securities claims. Thus, the question whether Wilko applies to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims is not properly before us.
Respondent Byrd also argues that as a contract of adhesion this arbitration agreement is subject to close judicial scrutiny, and that it should not routinely be enforced. Byrd did not present this argument to the courts below, and we decline to address it in the first instance. We therefore express no view on the merits of the argument.
See Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F. 2d 1023 (CA11 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F. 2d 318, 334-337 (CA5 1981); see also Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578 (ED Cal. 1982).
See also Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F. 2d 59 (CA8 1984); Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F. 2d 314 (CA6 1983).
Bifurcated proceedings might be the result in several kinds of cases involving securities transactions. For example, since this Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan, see n. 1, swpra, claims arising under §12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 may not be resolved through arbitration, and when a court is confronted with a § 12(2) claim, pendent state claims, and a motion to compel arbitration, bifurcated proceedings might result. If Wilko applies to claims arising under other provisions of the Securities Acts, the same situation would arise. Also, when as here a federal securities claim and pendent state-law claims are filed and a party to the arbitration agreement asks only that the district court compel arbitration only of the pendent state claims, the prospect of a bifurcated proceeding arises.
Finally, federal courts have addressed the same issue when confronted with federal antitrust actions and pendent state claims. See, e. g., Lee v. Ply*Gem Industries, Inc., 193 U. S. App. D. C. 112, 121, 593 F. 2d 1266, 1274-1275, and n. 67 (holding that arbitrable claims should not become “subject to adjudication in court merely because they are related to non-arbitrable claims,” when the dispute arises out of a contract containing an agreement to arbitrate), cert. denied, 441 U. S. 967 (1979).
According to the Report:
“The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law. Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This j ealousy survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment, although they have frequently criticised the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results from it. This bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.” H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1924).
See also Cohn & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Act, 12 Va. L. Rev. 265, 283-284 (1926).
See also 65 Cong. Rec. 1931 (1924) (“It creates no new legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and in admiralty contracts”).
See, e. g., Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F. 2d, at 1026; Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F. 2d, at 336; Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp., at 582.
See, e. g., Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F. 2d, at 62-63; Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F. 2d 638, 644 (CA7 1981); see also Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F. 2d, at 318 (discussing Dickinson).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me, Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 896, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b), provides, among other things, that a corporation may recover for itself the profits realized by an owner of more than 10% of its shares from a purchase and sale of its stock within any six-month period, provided that the owner held more than 10% “both at the time of the purchase and sale.” In this case, the respondent, the owner of 13.2% of a corporation’s shares, disposed of its entire holdings in two sales, both of them within six months of purchase. The first sale reduced the respondent’s holdings to 9.96%, and the second disposed of the remainder. The question presented is whether the profits derived from the second sale are recoverable by the Corporation under § 16 (b). We hold that they are not.
I
On June 16, 1967, the respondent, Emerson Electric Co., acquired 13.2% of the outstanding common stock of Dodge Manufacturing Co., pursuant to a tender offer made in an unsuccessful attempt to take over Dodge. The purchase price for this stock was $63 per share. Shortly thereafter, the shareholders of Dodge approved a merger with the petitioner, Reliance Electric Co. Faced with the certain failure of any further attempt to take over Dodge, and with the prospect of being forced to exchange its Dodge shares for stock in the merged corporation in the near future, Emerson, following a plan outlined by its general counsel, decided to dispose of enough shares to bring its holdings below 10%, in order to immunize the disposal of the remainder of its shares from liability under § 16 (b). Pursuant to counsel’s recommendation, Emerson on August 28 sold 37,000 shares of Dodge common stock to a brokerage house at $68 per share. This sale reduced Emerson’s holdings in Dodge to 9.96% of the outstanding common stock. The remaining shares were then sold to Dodge at $69 per share on September 11.
After a demand on it by Reliance for the profits realized on both sales, Emerson filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment as to its liability under § 16 (b). Emerson first claimed that it was not liable at all, because it was not a 10% owner at the time of the purchase of the Dodge shares. The District Court disagreed, holding that a purchase of stock falls within § 16 (b) where the purchaser becomes a 10% owner by virtue of the purchase. The Court of Appeals affirmed this holding, and Emerson did not cross-petition for certiorari. Thus that question is not before us.
Emerson alternatively argued to the District Court that, assuming it was a 10% stockholder at the time of the purchase, it was liable only for the profits on the August 28 sale of 37,000 shares, because after that time it was no longer a 10% owner within the meaning of § 16 (b). After trial on the issue of liability alone, the District Court held Emerson liable for the entire amount of its profits. The court found that Emerson’s sales of Dodge stock were “effected pursuant to a single predetermined plan of disposition with the overall intent and purpose of avoiding Section 16 (b) liability,” and construed the term “time of . . . sale” to include “the entire period during which a series of related transactions take place pursuant to a plan by which a 10%' beneficial owner disposes of his stock holdings ” 306 F. Supp. 588, 592.
On an interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), the Court of Appeals upheld the finding that Emerson “split” its sale of Dodge stock simply in order to avoid most of its potential liability under § 16 (b), but it held this fact irrelevant under the statute so long as the two sales are “not legally tied to each other and [are] made at different times to different buyers . . . .” 434 F. 2d 918, 926. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s judgment as to Emerson’s liability for its profits on the September 11 sale, and remanded for a determination of the amount of Emerson’s liability on the August 28 sale. Reliance filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted in order to consider an unresolved question under an important federal statute. 401 U. S. 1008.
II
The history and purpose of § 16 (b) have been exhaustively reviewed by federal courts on several occasions since its enactment in 1934. See, e. g., Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F. 2d 231; Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840; Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F. 2d 304. Those courts have recognized that the only method Congress deemed effective to curb the evils of insider trading was a flat rule taking the profits out of a class of transactions in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great. As one court observed:
“In order to achieve its goals, Congress chose a relatively arbitrary rule capable of easy administration. The objective standard of Section 16 (b) imposes strict liability upon substantially all transactions occurring within the statutory time period, regardless of the intent of the insider or the existence of actual speculation. This approach maximized the ability of the rule to eradicate speculative abuses by reducing difficulties in proof. Such arbitrary and sweeping coverage was deemed necessary to insure the optimum prophylactic effect.” Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F. 2d 693, 696.
Thus Congress did not reach every transaction in which an investor actually relies on inside information. A person avoids liability if he does not meet the statutory definition of an “insider,” or if he sells more than six months after purchase. Liability cannot be imposed simply because the investor structured his transaction with the intent of avoiding liability under § 16 (b). The question is, rather, whether the method used to “avoid” liability is one permitted by the statute.
Among the “objective standards” contained in § 16 (b) is the requirement that a 10% owner be such “both at the time of the purchase and sale ... of thé security involved.” Read literally, this language clearly contemplates that a statutory insider might sell enough shares to bring his holdings below 10%, and later — but still within six months — sell additional shares free from liability under the statute. Indeed, commentators on the securities laws have recommended this exact procedure for a 10% owner who, like Emerson, wishes to dispose of his holdings within six months of their purchase.
Under the approach urged by Reliance, and adopted by the District Court, the apparent immunity of profits derived from Emerson’s second sale is lost where the two sales, though independent in every other respect, are “interrelated parts of a single plan.” 306 F. Supp., at 592. But a “plan” to sell that is conceived within six months of purchase clearly would not fall within § 16 (b) if the sale were made after the six months had expired, and we see no basis in the statute for a different result where the 10% requirement is involved rather than the six-month limitation.
The dissenting opinion, post, at 442, reasons that “the 10% rule is based upon a conclusive statutory presumption that ownership of this quantity of stock suffices to provide access to inside information,” and that it thus “follows that all sales by a more-than-10% owner within the six-month period carry the presumption of a taint, even if a prior transaction within the period has reduced the beneficial ownership to 10% or below.” While there may be logic in this position, it was clearly rejected as a basis for liability when Congress included the proviso that a 10% owner must be such both at the time of the purchase and of the sale. Although the legislative history affords no explanation of the purpose of the proviso, it may be that Congress regarded one with a long-term investment of more than 10% as more likely to have access to inside information than one who moves in and out of the 10% category. But whatever the rationale of the proviso, it cannot be disregarded simply on the ground that it may be inconsistent with our assessment of the “wholesome purpose” of the Act.
To be sure, where alternative constructions of the terms of § 16 (b) are possible, those terms are to be given the construction that best serves the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing speculation by corporate insiders. But a construction of the term “at the time of . . . sale” that treats two sales as one upon proof of a pre-existing intent by the seller is scarcely in harmony with the congressional design of predicating liability upon an “objective measure of proof.” Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., supra, at 235. Were we to adopt the approach urged by Reliance, we could be sure that investors would not in the future provide such convenient proof of their intent as Emerson did in this case. If a “two-step” sale of a 10% owner’s holdings within six months of purchase is thought to give rise to the kind of evil that Congress sought to correct through § 16 (b), those transactions can be more effectively deterred by an amendment to the statute that preserves its mechanical quality than by a judicial search for the will-o’-the-wisp of an investor’s “intent” in each litigated case.
III
The Securities and Exchange Commission, participating as amicus curiae, argues for an interpretation of the statute that both covers Emerson’s transaction and preserves the mechanical quality of the statute. Seizing upon a fragment of legislative history — a brief exchange between one of the principal authors of the bill and two members of the Senate Committee during hearings on the bill — the Commission suggests that the sole purpose of the requirement of 10%' ownership at the time of both purchase and sale was to exclude from the statute’s coverage those persons who became 10% shareholders “involuntarily,” as, for example, by legal succession or by a reduction in the total number of outstanding shares of the corporation. The effect of such an interpretation would be to bring within § 16 (b) all sales within six months by one who has gained the position of a 10%' owner through voluntary purchase, regardless of the amount of his holdings at the time of the sale. We cannot accept such a construction of the Act.
In the first place, we note that the SEC’s own rules undercut such an interpretation. Recognizing the interrelatedness of § 16 (a) and § 16 (b) of the Act, the Commission has used its power to grant exemptions under § 16 (b) to exclude from liability any transaction that does not fall within the reporting requirements of § 16 (a). A 10% owner is required by that section to report at the end of each month any changes in his holdings in the corporation during that month. The Commission has interpreted this provision to require a report only if the stockholder held more than 10% of the corporation’s shares at some time during the month. Thus, a 10% owner who, like Emerson, sells down to 9.96% one month and disposes of the remainder the following month, would presumably be exempt from the reporting requirement and hence from § 16 (b) under the SEC’s own rules, without regard to whether he acquired the stock “voluntarily.”
But the SEC’s argument would fail even if it were not contradicted by the Commission’s own previous construction of the Act. As we said in Blau v. Lehman, 368 U. S. 403, 411, one “may agree that . . . the Commission present [s] persuasive policy arguments that the Act should be broadened ... to prevent 'the unfair use of information’ more effectively than can be accomplished by leaving the Act so as to require forfeiture of profits only by those specifically designated by Congress to suffer those losses.” But we are not free to adopt a construction that not only strains, but flatly contradicts, the words of the statute.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 16 (b) provides:
“For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. . . . This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.” 15 U. S. C. §78p (b).
The term “such beneficial owner” refers to one who owns “more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 12 of this title.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16 (a), 15 U. S. C. §78p (a).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that an exchange of shares in one corporation for those of another pursuant to a merger agreement constitutes a “sale” within the meaning of § 16 (b). Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F. 2d 348, 354.
“[A] person who owns 15 percent and wants to sell down to 5 percent should sell 5-plus percent in one transaction and then, after he becomes a holder of slightly less than 10 percent, sell out the remainder.” 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1060 (2d ed. 1961).
“[T]he intention of the language was to exclude the second sale in a case where 10% is purchased, 5% sold within three months and the remaining 5% a month later. This latter construction of the Act is, it is believed, the only safe one to rely upon.” Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 Va. L Rev. 1, 20 (1934).
See, e. g., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840 (one who is a director at the time of sale need not also have been a director at the time of purchase). In interpreting the terms "purchase" and "sale," courts have properly asked whether the particular type of transaction involved is one that gives rise to speculative abuse. See, e. g., Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F. 2d 693 (granting of an option to purchase constitutes a "sale"). And in deciding whether an investor is an "officer" or "director" within the meaning of § 16 (b), courts have allowed proof that the investor performed the functions of an officer or director even though not formally denominated as such. Colby v. Klune, 178 F. 2d 872, 873; cf. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F. 2d 260, 262-263. The various tests employed in these cases are used to determine whether a transaction, objectively defined, falls within or without the terms of the statute. In no case is liability predicated upon "considerations of intent, lack of motive, or improper conduct" that are irrelevant in § 16 (b) suits. Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881, 887.
That exchange was as follows:
“Senator Carey. Suppose this stock passed to an estate, and the estate had to raise money?
“Mr. Corcoran. I do not think, in that case, sir, the statute would apply.
“Senator Kean. Why not?
“Senator Carey. The estate is the beneficiary.
“Mr. Corcoran. I do not believe it would. Certainly the intention was that it should not apply to that sort of a situation.” Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency pursuant to S. Res. 84, 56, and 97, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., pt. 15, p. 6558. It was sometime after this exchange that the bill was revised to add the exemptive provision.
SEC Rule 16a-10, 17 CFR § 240.16a-10.
Form 4, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6487 (Mar. 9, 1961).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Line Item Veto' Act (Act), 110 Stat. 1200, 2 U. S. C. § 691 et seq. (1994 ed., Supp. II), was enacted in April 1996 and became effective on January 1,1997. The following day, six Members of Congress who had voted against the Act brought suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia challenging its constitutionality. On April 10, 1997, the District Court entered an order holding that the Act is unconstitutional. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25. In obedience to the statutory direction to allow a direct, expedited appeal to this Court, see §§692(b)-(e), we promptly noted probable jurisdiction and expedited review, 520 U. S. 1194 (1997). We determined, however, that the Members of Congress did not have standing to sue because they had not “alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to have established Article III standing,” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 830 (1997); thus, “[i]n... light of [the] overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its proper constitutional sphere,” id., at 820, we remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Less than two months after our decision in that case, the President exercised his authority to cancel one provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-38, 111 Stat. 251, 515, and two provisions in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, 895-896, 990-993. Ap-pellees, claiming that they had been injured by two of those cancellations, filed these cases in the District Court. That Court again held the statute invalid, 985 F. Supp. 168, 177-182 (1998), and we again expedited our review, 522 U. S. 1144 (1998). We now hold that these appellees have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act and, reaching the merits, we agree that the cancellation procedures set forth in the Act violate the Presentment Clause, Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, of the Constitution.
I
We begin by reviewing the canceled items that are at issue in these cases.
Section J¡.722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 848, as amended, authorizes the Federal Government to transfer huge sums of money to the States to help finance medical care for the indigent. See 42 U. S. C. § 1396d(b). In 1991, Congress directed that those federal subsidies be reduced by the amount of certain taxes levied by the States on health care providers. In 1994, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) notified the State of New York that 15 of its taxes were covered by the 1991 Act, and that as of June 30, 1994, the statute therefore required New York to return $955 million to the United States. The notice advised the State that it could apply for a waiver on certain statutory grounds. New York did request a waiver for those tax programs, as well as for a number of others, but HHS has not formally acted on any of those waiver requests. New York has estimated that the amount at issue for the period from October 1992 through March 1997 is as high as $2.6 billion.
Because HHS had not taken any action on the waiver requests, New York turned to Congress for relief. On August 5, 1997, Congress enacted a law that resolved the issue in New York’s favor. Section 4722(e) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 identifies the disputed taxes and provides that they “are deemed to be permissible health care related taxes and in compliance with the requirements” of the relevant provisions of the 1991 statute.
On August 11,1997, the President sent identical notices to the Senate and to the House of Representatives canceling “one item of new direct spending,” specifying § 4722(c) as that item, and stating that he had determined that “this cancellation will reduce the Federal budget deficit.” He explained that § 4722(e) would have permitted New York “to continue relying upon impermissible provider taxes to finance its Medicaid program” and that “[t]his preferential treatment would have increased Medicaid costs, would have treated New York differently from all other States, and would have established a costly precedent for other States to request comparable treatment.”
Section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
A person who realizes a profit from the sale of securities is generally subject to a capital gains tax. Under existing law, however, an ordinary business corporation can acquire a corporation, including a food processing or refining company, in a merger or stoek-for-stock transaction in which no gain is recognized to the seller, see 26 U. S. C. §§ 354(a), 368(a); the seller’s tax payment, therefore, is deferred. If, however, the purchaser is a farmers’ cooperative, the parties cannot structure such a transaction because the stock of the cooperative may be held only by its members, see § 521(b)(2); thus, a seller dealing with a. farmers’ cooperative cannot obtain the benefits of tax deferral.
In §968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Congress amended § 1042 of the Internal Revenue Code to permit owners of certain food refiners and processors to defer the recognition of gain if they sell their stock to eligible farmers’ cooperatives. The purpose of the amendment, as repeatedly explained by its sponsors, was “to facilitate the transfer of refiners and processors to farmers’ cooperatives.” The amendment to § 1042 was one of the 79 “limited tax benefits” authorized by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and specifically identified in Title XVII of that Act as “subject to [the] line item veto.”
On the same date that he canceled the “item of new direct spending” involving New York’s health care programs, the President also canceled this limited tax benefit. In his explanation of that action, the President endorsed the objective of encouraging “value-added farming through the purchase by farmers’ cooperatives of refiners or processors of agricultural goods,” but concluded that the provision lacked safeguards and also “failed to target its benefits to small-and-medium-size cooperatives.”
hH
Appellees filed two separate actions against the President and other federal officials challenging these two cancellations. The plaintiffs in the first ease are the City of New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, and two unions representing health care employees. The plaintiffs in the second are a farmers’ cooperative consisting of about 30 potato growers in Idaho and an individual farmer who is a member and officer of the cooperative. The District Court consolidated the two cases and determined that at least one of the plaintiffs in each had standing under Article III of the Constitution.
Appellee New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (NYCHHC) is responsible for the operation of public health care facilities throughout the City of New York. If HHS ultimately denies the State’s waiver requests, New York law will automatically require NYCHHC to make retroactive tax payments to the State of about $4 million for each of the years at issue. 985 F. Supp., at 172. This contingent liability for NYCHHC, and comparable potential liabilities for the other appellee health care providers, were eliminated by § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and revived by the President’s cancellation of that provision. The District Court held that the cancellation of the statutory protection against these liabilities constituted sufficient injury to give these providers Article III standing.
Appellee Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. (Snake River) was formed in May 1997 to assist Idaho potato farmers in marketing their crops and stabilizing prices, in part through a strategy of acquiring potato processing facilities that will allow the members of the cooperative to retain revenues otherwise payable to third-party processors. At that time, Congress was considering the amendment to the capital gains tax that was expressly intended to aid farmers’ cooperatives in the purchase of processing facilities, and Snake River had concrete plans to take advantage of the amendment if passed. Indeed, appellee Mike Cranney, acting on behalf of Snake River, was engaged in negotiations with the owner of an Idaho potato processor that would have qualified for the tax benefit under the pending legislation, but these negotiations terminated when the President canceled § 968. Snake River is currently considering the possible purchase of other processing facilities in Idaho if the President’s cancellation is reversed. Based on these facts, the District Court concluded that the Snake River plaintiffs were injured by the President’s cancellation of § 968, as they “lost the benefit of being on equal footing with their competitors and will likely have to pay more to purchase processing facilities now that the sellers will not [be] able to take advantage of section 968’s tax breaks.” Id., at 177.
On the merits, the District Court held that the cancellations did not conform to the constitutionally mandated procedures for the enactment or repeal of laws in two respects. First, the laws that resulted after the cancellations “were different from those consented to by both Houses of Congress.” Id., at 178. Moreover, the President violated Article I “when he unilaterally canceled provisions of duly enacted statutes.” Id., at 179. As a separate basis for its decision, the District Court also held that the Act “imper-missibly disrupts the balance of powers among the three branches of government.” Ibid.
HH h — t
As in the prior challenge to the Line Item Veto Act, we initially confront jurisdictional questions. The appellees invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court under the section of the Act entitled “Expedited review.” That section, 2 U. S. C. § 692(a)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. II), expressly authorizes “[a]ny Member of Congress or any individual adversely affected” by the Act to bring an action for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief on the ground that any provision of the Act is unconstitutional. Although the Government did not question the applicability of that section in the District Court, it now argues that, with the exception of Mike Cran-ney, the appellees are not “individuals” within the meaning of § 692(a)(1). Because the argument poses a jurisdictional question (although not one of constitutional magnitude), it is not waived by the failure to raise it in the District Court. The fact that the argument did not previously occur to the able lawyers for the Government does, however, confirm our view that in the context of the entire section Congress undoubtedly intended the word “individual” to be construed as synonymous with the word “person.”
The special section authorizing expedited review evidences an unmistakable congressional interest in a prompt and authoritative judicial determination of the constitutionality of the Act. Subsection (a)(2) requires that copies of any complaint filed under subsection (a)(1) “shall be promptly delivered” to both Houses of Congress, and that each House shall have a right to intervene. Subsection (b) authorizes a direct appeal to this Court from any order of the District Court, and requires that the appeal be filed within 10 days. Subsection (c) imposes a duty on both the District Court and this Court “to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter brought under subsection (a).” There is no plausible reason why Congress would have intended to provide for such special treatment of actions filed by natural persons and to have precluded entirely jurisdiction over comparable cases brought by corporate persons. Acceptance of the Government’s new-found reading of § 692 “would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 574 (1982).
We are also unpersuaded by the Government’s argument that appellees’ challenge to the constitutionality of the Act is nonjusticiable. We agree, of course, that Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual “Cases” and “Controversies,” and that “the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.” Whit more v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990). Our disposition of the first challenge to the constitutionality of this Act demonstrates our recognition of the importance of respecting the constitutional limits on our jurisdiction, even when Congress has manifested an interest in obtaining our views as promptly as possible. But these eases differ from Raines, not only because the President’s exercise of his cancellation authority has removed any concern about the ripeness of the dispute, but more importantly because the parties have alleged a “personal stake” in having an actual injury redressed rather than an “institutional injury” that is “abstract and widely dispersed.” 521 U. S., at 829.
In both the New York and the Snake River cases, the Government argues that the appellees are not actually injured because the claims are too speculative and, in any event, the claims are advanced by the wrong parties. We find no merit in the suggestion that New York’s injury is merely speculative because HHS has not yet acted on the State’s waiver requests. The State now has a multibillion dollar contingent liability that had been eliminated by § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The District Court correctly concluded that the State, and the appellees, “suffered an immediate, concrete injury the moment that the President used the Line Item Veto to cancel section 4722(c) and deprived them of the benefits of that law.” 985 F. Supp., at 174. The self-evident significance of the contingent liability is confirmed by the fact that New York lobbied Congress for this relief, that Congress decided that it warranted statutory attention, and that the President selected for cancellation only this one provision in an Act that occupies 536 pages of the Statutes at Large. His action was comparable to the judgment of an appellate court setting aside a verdict for the defendant and remanding for a new trial of a multibillion dollar damages claim. Even if the outcome of the second trial is speculative, the reversal, like the President’s cancellation, causes a significant immediate injury by depriving the defendant of the benefit of a favorable final judgment. The revival of a substantial contingent liability immediately and directly affects the borrowing power, financial strength, and fiscal planning of the potential obligor.
We also reject the Government’s argument that New York’s claim is advanced by the wrong parties because the claim belongs to the State of New York, and not appellees. Under New York statutes that are already in place, it is clear that both the City of New York and the appellee health care providers will be assessed by the State for substantial portions of any recoupment payments that the State may have to make to the Federal Government. To the extent of such assessments, they have the same potential liability as the State does.
The Snake River farmers’ cooperative also suffered an immediate injury when the President canceled the limited tax benefit that Congress had enacted to facilitate the acquisition of processing plants. Three critical facts identify the specificity and the importance of that injury. First, Congress enacted § 968 for the specific purpose of providing a benefit to a defined category of potential purchasers of a defined category of assets. The members of that statutorily defined class received the equivalent of a statutory “bargaining chip” to use in carrying out the congressional plan to facilitate their purchase of such assets. Second, the President selected § 968 as one of only two tax benefits in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 that should be canceled. The cancellation rested on his determination that the use of those bargaining chips would have a significant impact on the federal budget deficit. Third, the Snake River cooperative was organized for the very purpose of acquiring processing facilities, it had concrete plans to utilize the benefits of § 968, and it was engaged in ongoing negotiations with the owner of a processing plant who had expressed an interest in structuring a tax-deferred sale when the President canceled § 968. Moreover, it is actively searching for other processing facilities for possible future purchase if the President’s cancellation is reversed; and there are ample processing facilities in the State that Snake River may be able to purchase. By depriving them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing under our precedents. See, e. g., Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 620 (1971); 3 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 18-14 (3d ed. 1994) (“The Court routinely recognizes probable economic injury resulting from [governmental actions] that alter competitive conditions as sufficient to satisfy the [Article III finjury-in-fact’ requirement].... It follows logically that any... petitioner who is likely to suffer economic injury as a result of [governmental action] that changes market conditions satisfies this part of the standing test”).
Appellees’ injury in this regard is at least as concrete as the injury suffered by the respondents in Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U. S. 352 (1980). In that case, we considered whether a rule that generally limited water deliveries from reclamation projects to 160 acres applied to the much larger tracts of the Imperial Irrigation District in southeastern California; application of that limitation would have given large landowners an incentive to sell excess lands at prices below the prevailing market price for irrigated land. The District Court had held that the 160-acre limitation did not apply, and farmers who had hoped to purchase the excess land sought to appeal. We acknowledged that the farmers had not presented “detailed information about [their] financial resources,” and noted that “the prospect of windfall profits could attract a large number of potential purchasers” besides the farmers. Id., at 367, n. 17. Nonetheless, “even though they could not with certainty establish that they would be able to purchase excess lands” if the judgment were reversed, id., at 367, we found standing because it was “likely that excess lands would become available at less than market prices,” id., at 368. The Snake Kiver appellees have alleged an injury that is as specific and immediate as that in Yellen. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72-78 (1978).
As with the New York case, the Government argues that the wrong parties are before the Court — that because the sellers of the processing facilities would have received the tax benefits, only they have standing to challenge the cancellation of § 968. This argument not only ignores the fact that the cooperatives were the intended beneficiaries of § 968, but also overlooks the self-evident proposition that more than one party may have standing to challenge a particular action or inaction. Once it is determined that a particular plaintiff is harmed by the defendant, and that the harm will likely be redressed by a favorable decision, that plaintiff has standing — regardless of whether there are others who would also have standing to sue. Thus, we are satisfied that both of these actions are Article III “Cases” that we have a duty to decide.
IV
The Line Item Veto Act gives the President the power to “cancel in whole” three types of provisions that have been signed into law: “(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit.” 2 U. S. C. § 691(a) (1994 ed., Supp. II), It is undisputed that the New York case involves an “item of new direct spending” and that the Snake River case involves a “limited tax benefit” as those terms are defined in the Act. It is also undisputed that each of those provisions had been signed into law pursuant to Article I, §7, of the Constitution before it was canceled.
The Act requires the President to adhere to precise procedures whenever he exercises his cancellation authority. In identifying items for cancellation he must consider the legislative history, the purposes, and other relevant information about the items. See 2 U. S. C. § 691(b) (1994 ed., Supp. II). He must determine, with respect to each cancellation, that it will “(i) reduee the Federal budget deficit; (ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm the national interest.” §691(a)(A). Moreover, he must transmit a special message to Congress notifying it of each cancellation within five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the enactment of the canceled provision. See § 691(a)(B). It is undisputed that the President meticulously followed these procedures in these eases.
A cancellation takes effect upon receipt by Congress of the special message from the President. See § 691b(a). If, however, a “disapproval bill” pertaining to a special message is enacted into law, the cancellations set forth in that message become “null and void.” Ibid. The Act sets forth a detailed expedited procedure for the consideration of a “disapproval bill,” see §691d, but no such bill was passed for either of the cancellations involved in these cases. A majority vote of both Houses is sufficient to enact a disapproval bill. The Act does not grant the President the authority to cancel a disapproval bill, see § 691(c), but he does, of course, retain his constitutional authority to veto such a bill.
The effect of a cancellation is plainly stated in §691e, which defines the principal terms used in the Act. With respect to both an item of new direct spending and a limited tax benefit, the cancellation prevents the item “from having legal force or effect.” §§691e(4)(B)-(C). Thus, under the plain text of the statute, the two actions of the President that are challenged in these cases prevented one section of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and one section of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 “from having legal force or effect.” The remaining provisions of those statutes, with the exception of the second canceled item in the latter, continue to have the same force and effect as they had when signed into law.
In both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each. “[R]epeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 954 (1983). There' is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes. Both Article I and Article II assign responsibilities to the President that directly relate to the lawmaking process, but neither addresses the issue presented by these cases. The President “shall from time to time give to the Congress Information on the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient_” Art. II, § 8. Thus, he may initiate and influence legislative proposals. Moreover, after a bill has passed both Houses of Congress, but “before it beeome[s] a Law,” it must be presented to the President. If he approves it, “he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.” Art. I, § 7, el. 2. His “return” of a bill, -which is usually described as a “veto,” is subject to being overridden by a two-thirds vote in each House.
There are important differences between the President’s “return” of a bill pursuant to Article I, §7, and the exercise of the President’s cancellation authority pursuant to the Line Item Yeto Act. The constitutional return takes place before the bill becomes law; the statutory cancellation occurs after the bill becomes law. The constitutional return is of the entire bill; the statutory cancellation is of only a part. Although the Constitution expressly authorizes the President to play a role in the process of enacting statutes, it is silent on the subject of unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes.
There are powerful reasons for construing constitutional silence on this profoundly important issue as equivalent to an express prohibition. The procedures governing the enactment of statutes set forth in the text of Article I were the product of the great debates and compromises that produced the Constitution itself. Familiar historical materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the power to enact statutes may only “be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.” Chadha, 462 U. S., at 951. Our first President understood the text of the Presentment Clause as requiring that he either “approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto.” What has emerged in these cases from the President’s exercise of his statutory cancellation powers, however, are truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress. They are not th.e product of the “finely wrought” procedure that the Framers designed.
At oral argument, the Government suggested that the cancellations at issue in these cases do not effect a “repeal” of the canceled items because under the special “lockbox” provisions of the Act, a canceled item “retain[s] real, legal budgetary effect” insofar as it prevents Congress and the President from spending the savings that result from the cancellation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. The text of the Act expressly provides, however, that a cancellation prevents a direct spending or tax benefit provision “from having legal force or effect.” 2 U. S. C. §§ 691e(4)(BMC). That a canceled item may have “real, legal budgetary effect” as a result of the lockbox procedure does not change the fact that by canceling the items at issue in these cases, the President made them entirely inoperative as to appellees. Section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act no longer provides a tax benefit, and § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 no longer relieves New York of its contingent liability. Such significant changes do not lose their character simply because the canceled provisions may have some continuing financial effect on the Government. The cancellation of one section of a statute may be the functional equivalent of a partial repeal even if a portion of the section is not canceled.
V
The Government advances two related arguments to support its position that despite the unambiguous provisions of the Act, cancellations do not amend or repeal properly enacted statutes in violation of the Presentment Clause. First, relying primarily on Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), the Government contends that the cancellations were merely exercises of discretionary authority granted to the President by the Balanced Budget Act and the Taxpayer Relief Act read in light of the previously enacted Line Item Veto Act. Second, the Government submits that the substance of the authority to cancel tax and spending items “is, in practical effect, no more and no less than the power to ‘decline to spend’ specified sums of money, or to ‘decline to implement’ specified tax measures.” Brief for Appellants 40. Neither argument is persuasive.
In Field v. Clark, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Tariff Act of 1890. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567. That statute contained a “free list” of almost BOO specific articles that were exempted from import duties “unless otherwise specially provided for in this act.” Id., at 602. Section 3 was a special provision that directed the President to suspend that exemption for sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides “whenever, and so often” as he should be satisfied that any country producing and exporting those products imposed duties on the agricultural products of the United States that he deemed to be “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable....” Id., at 612, quoted in Field, 143 U. S., at 680. The section then specified the duties to be imposed on those products during any such suspension. The Court provided this explanation for its conclusion that § 3 had not delegated legislative power to the President:
“Nothing involving the expediency or the just operation of such legislation was left to the determination of the President.... [W]hen he ascertained the fact that duties and exactions, reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, were imposed upon the agricultural or other products of the United States by a country producing and exporting sugar, molasses, coffee, tea or hides, it became his duty to issue a proclamation declaring the suspension, as to that country, which Congress had determined should occur. He had no discretion in the premises except in respect to the duration of the suspension so ordered. But that related only to the enforcement of the policy established by Congress. As the suspension was absolutely required when the President ascertained the existence of a particular fact, it cannot be said that in ascertaining that fact and in issuing his proclamation, in obedience to the legislative will, he exercised the function of making laws.... It was a part of the law itself as it left the hands of Congress that the provisions, full and complete in themselves, permitting the free introduction of sugars, molasses, coffee, tea and hides, from particular countries, should be suspended, in a given contingency, and that in ease of such suspensions certain duties should be imposed.” Id., at 693.
This passage identifies three critical differences between the power to suspend the exemption from import duties and the power to cancel portions of a duly enacted statute. First, the exercise of the suspension power was contingent upon a condition that did not exist when the Tariff Act was passed: the imposition of “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable” import duties by other countries. In contrast, the exercise of the cancellation power within five days after the enactment of the Balanced Budget and Tax Reform Acts necessarily was based on the same conditions that Congress evaluated when it passed those statutes. Second, under the Tariff Act, when the President determined that the contingency had arisen, he had a duty to suspend; in contrast, while it is true that the President was required by the Act to make three determinations before he canceled a provision, see 2 U. S. C. § 691(a)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. II), those determinations did not qualify his discretion to cancel or not to cancel. Finally, whenever the President suspended an exemption under the Tariff Act, he was executing the policy that Congress had embodied in the statute. In contrast, whenever the President cancels an item of new direct spending or a limited tax benefit he is rejecting the policy judgment made by Congress and relying on his own policy judgment. Thus, the conclusion in Field v. Clark that the suspensions mandated by the Tariff Act were not exercises of legislative power does not undermine our opinion that cancellations pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act are the functional equivalent of partial repeals of Acts of Congress that fail to satisfy Article I, §7.
The Government’s reliance upon other tariff and import statutes, discussed in Field, that contain provisions similar to the one challenged in Field is unavailing for the same reasons. Some of those statutes authorized the President to “suspen[d] and discontinu[e]” statutory duties upon his determination that discriminatory duties imposed by other nations had been abolished. See 143 U. S., at 686-687 (discussing Act of Jan. 7, 1824, ch. 4, §4, 4 Stat. 3, and Act of May 24, 1828, eh. Ill, 4 Stat. 308). A slightly different statute, Act of May 31, 1830, eh. 219, §2, 4 Stat. 425, provided that certain statutory provisions imposing duties on foreign ships “shall be repealed” upon the same no-discrimination determination by the President. See 143 U. S., at 687; see also id., at 686 (discussing similar tariff statute, Act of Mar. 3,1815, eh. 77, 3 Stat. 224, which provided that duties “are hereby repealed,” “[s]uch repeal to take effect... whenever the President” makes the required determination).
The cited statutes all relate to foreign trade, and this Court has recognized that in the foreign affairs arena, the President has “a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.” United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 320 (1936). “Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries.” Ibid. More important, when enacting the statutes discussed in Field, Congress itself made the decision to suspend or repeal the particular provisions at issue upon the occurrence of particular events subsequent to enactment, and it left only the determination of whether such events occurred up to the President. The Line Item Veto Act authorizes the President himself to effect the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons, without observing the procedures set out in Article I, § 7. The fact that Congress intended such a result is of no moment. Although Congress presumably anticipated that the President might cancel some of the items in the Balanced Budget Act and in the Taxpayer Relief Act, Congress cannot alter the procedures set out in Article I, § 7, without amending the Constitution.
Neither are we persuaded by the Government’s contention that the President’s authority to cancel new direct spending and tax benefit items is no greater than his traditional authority to decline to spend appropriated funds. The Government has reviewed in some detail the series of statutes in which Congress has given the Executive broad discretion over the expenditure of appropriated funds. For example, the First Congress appropriated “sum[s] not exceeding” specified amounts to be spent on various Government operations. See, e. g., Act of Sept. 29,1789, ch. 23,1 Stat. 95; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 104; Act of Feb. 11, 1791, eh. 6, 1 Stat. 190. In those statutes, as in later years, the President was given wide discretion with respect to both the amounts to be spent and how the money would be allocated among different functions. It is argued that the Line Item Veto Act merely confers comparable discretionary authority over the expenditure of appropriated funds. The critical difference "between this statute and all of its predecessors, however, is that unlike any of them, this Act gives the President the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes. None of the Act’s predecessors could even arguably have been construed to authorize such a change.
VI
Although they are implicit in what we have already written, the profound importance of these eases makes it appropriate to emphasize three points.
First, we express no opinion about the wisdom of the procedures authorized by the Line Item Veto Act. Many members of both major political parties who have served in the Legislative and the Executive Branches have long advocated the enactment of such procedures for the purpose of “ensur[ing] greater fiscal accountability in Washington.” H. R. Conf. Rep. 104-491, p. 15 (1996). The text of the Act was itself the product of much debate and deliberation in both Houses of Congress and that precise text was signed into law by the President. We do not lightly conclude that their action was unauthorized by the Constitution. We have, however, twice had full argument and briefing on the question and have concluded that our duty is clear.
Second, although appellees challenge the validity of the Act on alternative grounds, the only issue we address concerns the “finely wrought” procedure commanded by the Constitution. Chadha, 462 U. S., at 951. We have been favored with extensive
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | M | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam
and Decree.
Upon consideration of the Report filed June 7, 1965, by Senior Judge Marvin Jones, Special Master, and the exceptions thereto, it is now adjudged, ordered, and decreed as follows:
(1) All exceptions are overruled and the Report is in all things confirmed.
(2) The true boundary between the States of Louisiana and Mississippi in the area of the Mississippi River known as Deadman’s Bend on the several dates mentioned is determined to be as follows:
At all times the live thalweg has been the true boundary.
On October 3, 1952, the live thalweg was a gradually curving line running southward from the foot of Glass-cock Cutoff, and east of the future location of Louisiana State Well No. 1 by 230 feet, to the end of Deadman’s Bend at range 334.5 AHP. This line is described below by latitude and longitude and is drawn on Special Master Exhibit No. 1.
On April 10, 1964, the live thalweg was a gradually curving line running southward from the foot of Glass-cock Cutoff, and west of Louisiana State Well No. 1 by 850 feet, to the end of Deadman’s Bend at range 334.5 AHP. This line is described below by latitude and longitude and is drawn on Special Master Exhibit No. 1.
At all times between October 3, 1952, and April 10, 1964, the live thalweg has moved at a constant rate. The boundary location for any intervening period at any point in Deadman’s Bend (from the foot of Glasscock Cutoff to range 334.5 AHP) is to be determined mathematically by calculating the constant rate of change for that particular place in Deadman’s Bend, using the 1952 and 1964 thalwegs described heretofore and the appropriate time differentials.
At the latitude of Louisiana State Well No. 1 the location of the boundary was as follows from October 3, 1952, to April 10, 1964:
October 3, 1952 ................ 230 feet east of well
April 27, 1954 .................. 80 feet east of well
February 27, 1955.............. Directly above the well
April 10, 1956.................. 102 feet west of well
April 10, 1957.................. 195 feet west of well
April 10, 1958.................. 289 feet west of well
April 10, 1959.................. 382 feet west of well
April 10, 1960.................. 476 feet west of well
April 10, 1961.................. 569 feet west of well
April 10, 1962 .................. 663 feet west of well
April 10, 1963 .................. 756 feet west of well
April 10, 1964.................. 850 feet west of well
The Louisiana State Well No. 1 became located inside the boundary of Mississippi on February 28, 1955.
The description of the October 3, 1952, live thalweg by geodetic positions (North American Datum) is as follows:
Beginning at the foot of Glasscock Cutoff at a point on range 338.3 AHP, which is Lat. 31°19'07.0"— Long. 91°30'33.5".
Thence running southward through the following points:
Latitude Longitude
91°30'37.0" 31°18'57.5"
91°30'39.0" 31018'47.5"
91°30'40.0" 31°18'37.0"
91°30'39.5" 3V1&'27.W'
91°30'39.0" 31°18'17.0"
91°30'38.0" 31°18'07.0"
91°30'38.0" 31°17'57.5"
91°30'38.0" 31°17/47.0"
91°30'37.0" 31°17/37.0,/
91°30'36.5" 31° 17'27.0"
91°30'36.0" 31°17'17.0"
91°30'35.0" 31°17,07.0"
91°30'33.5" 31016'57.5"
91°30'32.5" 31°16'4:7.0"
91°30'34.0" 31°16'42.5"
91°30'37.0" 31°16'38.0"
91°30'43.0" srie^ob"
91°30'51.0" 31°16,22.5,/
91°31'00.0" 31016'17.0"
9io3i'io.o" 31°16'12.0"
91°31'21.0" 31°16,08.0"
91°31'32.0" 31°16'05.5"
91o31'42.0" 31016'03.5"
The description of the April 10, 1964, live thalweg by geodetic positions (North American Datum) is as follows:
Beginning at the foot of Glasscock Cutoff at a point on range 338.3 AHP, which is Lat. 31°19'07.0"— Long. 91°30'38.5".
Thence running southward through the following points:
Latitude Longitude
91°30'40.5" 31°18'57.5"
91°30'42.5" 3i°i8'48.o"
91°30'44.0" 31°18'38.0"
91°30'46.0" 31°18'28.0"
91°30'47.0" 3i°i8T8.5"
91°30'48.5" 31°18'08.5"
91°30'50.0" 31°17'59.0"
91°30'52.0" 31°17'49.0"
91°30'52.5" 31°17'39.0"
91°30'52.5" 31°17'29.5"
91°30'52.5" 31°17/20.0'/
91°30'52.0" 31°17'10.0"
91°30'52.0" 31°17'00.5"
91°30'52.5" 31°16'51.0"
91°30'53.0" 31°16'41.0"
91°30'55.0" 31°16'36.0"
9i°30'58.0" 31°16'32.0"
91°31'04.5" 31°16'24.0"
91°31'11.5" 31°16'16.0"
91°31'18.5" 3i°i6'09.0"
91°31'28.0" 31°16'03.0"
91°31'38.0" 31°15'59.0"
(3) As it appears that the Special Master has completed his work, he is hereby discharged with the thanks of the Court.
(4) The costs of this suit are to be equally divided between the two States.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | K | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 320.5(3)(b) of the New York Family Court Act authorizes pretrial detention of an accused juvenile delinquent based on a finding that there is a “serious risk” that the child “may before the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime.” Appellees brought suit on behalf of a class of all juveniles detained pursuant to that provision. The District Court struck down §320.5(3)(b) as permitting detention without due process of law and ordered the immediate release of all class members. United States ex tel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691 (SDNY 1981). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding the provision “unconstitutional as to all juveniles” because the statute is administered in such a way that “the detention period serves as punishment imposed without proof of guilt established according to the requisite constitutional standard.” Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F. 2d 365, 373-374 (1982). We noted probable jurisdiction, 460 U. S. 1079 (1983), and now reverse. We conclude that preventive detention under the FCA serves a legitimate state objective, and that the procedural protections afforded pretrial detainees by the New York statute satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Appellee Gregory Martin was arrested on December 13, 1977, and charged with first-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and criminal possession of a weapon based on an incident in which he, with two others, allegedly hit a youth on the head with a loaded gun and stole his jacket and sneakers. See Petitioners’ Exhibit lb. Martin had possession of the gun when he was arrested. He was 14 years old at the time and, therefore, came within the jurisdiction of New York’s Family Court. The incident occurred at 11:30 at night, and Martin lied to the police about where and with whom he lived. He was consequently detained overnight.
A petition of delinquency was filed, and Martin made his “initial appearance” in Family Court on December 14th, accompanied by his grandmother. The Family Court Judge, citing the possession of the loaded weapon, the false address given to the police, and the lateness of the hour, as evidencing a lack of supervision, ordered Martin detained under §320.5(3)(b) (at that time §739(a)(ii); see n. 2, supra). A probable-cause hearing was held five days later, on December 19th, and probable cause was found to exist for all the crimes charged. At the factfinding hearing held December 27-29, Martin was found guilty on the robbery and criminal possession charges. He was adjudicated a delinquent and placed on two years’ probation. He had been detained pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b), between the initial appearance and the completion of the factfinding hearing, for a total of 15 days.
Appellees Luis Rosario and Kenneth Morgan, both age 14, were also ordered detained pending their factfinding hearings. Rosario was charged with attempted first-degree robbery and second-degree assault for an incident in which he, with four others, allegedly tried to rob two men, putting a gun to the head of one of them and beating both about the head with sticks. See Petitioners’ Exhibit 2b. At the time of his initial appearance, on March 15, 1978, Rosario had another delinquency petition pending for knifing a student, and two prior petitions had been adjusted. Probable cause was found on March 21. On April 11, Rosario was released to his father, and the case was terminated without adjustment on September 25, 1978.
Kenneth Morgan was charged with attempted robbery and attempted grand larceny for an incident in which he and another boy allegedly tried to steal money from a 14-year-old girl and her brother by threatening to blow their heads off and grabbing them to search their pockets. See Petitioners’ Exhibit 3b. Morgan, like Rosario, was on release status on another petition (for robbery and criminal possession of stolen property) at the time of his initial appearance on March 27, 1978. He had been arrested four previous times, and his mother refused to come to court because he had been in trouble so often she did not want him home. A probable-cause hearing was set for March 30, but was continued until April 4, when it was combined with a factfinding hearing. Morgan was found guilty of harassment and petit larceny and was ordered placed with the Department of Social Services for 18 months. He was detained a total of eight days between his initial appearance and the factfinding hearing.
On December 21, 1977, while still in preventive detention pending his factfinding hearing, Gregory Martin instituted a habeas corpus class action on behalf of “those persons who are, or during the pendency of this action will be, preven-tively detained pursuant to” § 320.5(3)(b) of the FCA. Rosario and Morgan were subsequently added as additional named plaintiffs. These three class representatives sought a declaratory judgment that § 320.5(3)(b) violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In an unpublished opinion, the District Court certified the class. App. 20-32. The court also held that appellees were not required to exhaust their state remedies before resorting to federal habeas because the highest state court had already rejected an identical challenge to the juvenile preventive detention statute. See People ex rel. Waybum v. Schupf, 39 N. Y. 2d 682, 350 N. E. 2d 906 (1976). Exhaustion of state remedies, therefore, would be “an exercise in futility.” App. 26.
At trial, appellees offered in evidence the case histories of 34 members of the class, including the three named petitioners. Both parties presented some general statistics on the relation between pretrial detention and ultimate disposition. In addition, there was testimony concerning juvenile proceedings from a number of witnesses, including a legal aid attorney specializing in juvenile cases, a probation supervisor, a child psychologist, and a Family Court Judge. On the basis of this evidence, the District Court rejected the equal protection challenge as “insubstantial,” but agreed with appellees that pretrial detention under the FCA violates due process. The court ordered that “all class members in custody pursuant to Family Court Act Section [320.5(3)(b)] shall be released forthwith.” Id., at 93.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. After reviewing the trial record, the court opined that “the vast majority of juveniles detained under [§ 320.5(3)(b)] either have their petitions dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released after adjudication.” 689 F. 2d, at 369. The court concluded from that fact that § 320.5(3)(b) “is utilized principally, not for preventive purposes, but to impose punishment for unadjudi-cated criminal acts.” Id., at 372. The early release of so many of those detained contradicts any asserted need for pretrial confinement to protect the community. The court therefore concluded that § 320.5(3)(b) must be declared unconstitutional as to all juveniles. Individual litigation would be a practical impossibility because the periods of detention are so short that the litigation is mooted before the merits are determined.
There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable in juvenile proceedings. “The problem,” we have stressed, “is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.” In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 13-14 (1967). We have held that certain basic constitutional protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to juveniles. See id., at 31-57 (notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, right to confrontation and cross-examination); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy). But the Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles. See, e. g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528 (1971) (no right to jury trial). The State has “a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 766 (1982), which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial. We have tried, therefore, to strike a balance — to respect the “informality” and “flexibility” that characterize juvenile proceedings, In re Winship, supra, at 366, and yet to ensure that such proceedings comport with the “fundamental fairness” demanded by the Due Process Clause. Breed v. Jones, supra, at 531; McKeiver, supra, at 543 (plurality opinion).
The statutory provision at issue in these cases, § 320.5(3)(b), permits a brief pretrial detention based on a finding of a “serious risk” that an arrested juvenile may commit a crime before his return date. The question before us is whether preventive detention of juveniles pursuant to §320.5(3)(b) is compatible with the “fundamental fairness” required by due process. Two separate inquiries are necessary to answer this question. First, does preventive detention under the New York statute serve a legitimate state objective? See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 534, n. 15 (1979); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963). And, second, are the procedural safeguards contained in the FCA adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some juveniles charged with crimes? See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975).
A
Preventive detention under the FCA is purportedly designed to protect the child and society from the potential consequences of his criminal acts. People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N. Y. 2d, at 689-690, 350 N. E. 2d, at 910. When making any detention decision, the Family Court judge is specifically directed to consider the needs and best interests of the juvenile as well as the need for the protection of the community. FCA §301.1; In re Craig S., 57 App. Div. 2d 761, 394 N. Y. S. 2d 200 (1977). In Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 534, n. 15, we left open the question whether any governmental objective other than ensuring a detainee’s presence at trial may constitutionally justify pretrial detention. As an initial matter, therefore, we must decide whether, in the context of the juvenile system, the combined interest in protecting both the community and the juvenile himself from the consequences of future criminal conduct is sufficient to justify such detention.
The “legitimate and compelling state interest” in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U. S. 144, 155 (1960). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 22 (1968). We have stressed before that crime prevention is “a weighty social objective,” Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979), and this interest persists undiluted in the juvenile context. See In re Gault, supra, at 20, n. 26. The harm suffered by the victim of a crime is not dependent upon the age of the perpetrator. And the harm to society generally may even be greater in this context given the high rate of recidivism among juveniles. In re Gault, supra, at 22.
The juvenile’s countervailing interest in freedom from institutional restraints, even for the brief time involved here, is undoubtedly substantial as well. See In re Gault, supra, at 27. But that interest must be qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Services, 458 U. S. 502, 510-511 (1982); In re Gault, supra, at 17. Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae. See State v. Gleason, 404 A. 2d 573, 580 (Me. 1979); People ex rel. Waybum v. Schupf, supra, at 690, 350 N. E. 2d, at 910; Baker v. Smith, 477 S. W. 2d 149, 150-151 (Ky. App. 1971). In this respect, the juvenile’s liberty interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State’s “parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.” Santosky v. Kramer, supra, at 766.
The New York Court of Appeals, in upholding the statute at issue here, stressed at some length “the desirability of protecting the juvenile from his own folly.” People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, supra, at 688-689, 350 N. E. 2d, at 909. Society has a legitimate interest in protecting a juvenile from the consequences of his criminal activity — both from potential physical injury which may be suffered when a victim fights back or a policeman attempts to make an arrest and from the downward spiral of criminal activity into which peer pressure may lead the child. See L. O. W. v. District Court of Arapahoe, 623 P. 2d 1253, 1258-1259 (Colo. 1981); Morris v. D’Amario, 416 A. 2d 137, 140 (R. I. 1980). See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 115 (1982) (minority “is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage”); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 635 (1979) (juveniles “often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them”).
The substantiality and legitimacy of the state interests underlying this statute are confirmed by the widespread use and judicial acceptance of preventive detention for juveniles. Every State, as well as the United States in the District of Columbia, permits preventive detention of juveniles accused of crime. A number of model juvenile justice Acts also contain provisions permitting preventive detention. And the courts of eight States, including the New York Court of Appeals, have upheld their statutes with specific reference to protecting the juvenile and the community from harmful pretrial conduct, including pretrial crime. L. O. W. v. District Court of Arapahoe, supra, at 1258-1259; Morris v. D’Amario, supra, at 139-140; State v. Gleason, 404 A. 2d, at 583; Pauley v. Gross, 1 Kan. App. 2d 736, 738-740, 574 P. 2d 234, 237-238 (1977); People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N. Y. 2d, at 688-689, 350 N. E. 2d, at 909-910; Aubrey v. Gadbois, 50 Cal. App. 3d 470, 472, 123 Cal. Rptr. 365, 366 (1975); Baker v. Smith, 477 S. W. 2d, at 150-151; Commonwealth ex rel. Sprowal v. Hendrick, 438 Pa. 435, 438-439, 265 A. 2d 348, 349-350 (1970).
“The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the practice ‘offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).” Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 798 (1952). In light of the uniform legislative judgment that pretrial detention of juveniles properly promotes the interests both of society and the juvenile, we conclude that the practice serves a legitimate regulatory purpose compatible with the “fundamental fairness” demanded by the Due Process Clause in juvenile proceedings. Cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S., at 548 (plurality opinion).
Of course, the mere invocation of a legitimate purpose will not justify particular restrictions and conditions of confinement amounting to punishment. It is axiomatic that “[d]ue process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 535, n. 16. Even given, therefore, that pretrial detention may serve legitimate regulatory purposes, it is still necessary to determine whether the terms and conditions of confinement under § 320.5(3)(b) are in fact compatible with those purposes. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S., at 168-169. “A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 538. Absent a showing of an express intent to punish on the part of the State, that determination generally will turn on “whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].” Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, at 168-189. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 538; Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 613-614 (1960).
There is no indication in the statute itself that preventive detention is used or intended as a punishment. First of all, the detention is strictly limited in time. If a juvenile is detained at his initial appearance and has denied the charges against him, he is entitled to a probable-cause hearing to be held not more than three days after the conclusion of the initial appearance or four days after the filing of the petition, whichever is sooner. FCA § 325.1(2). If the Family Court judge finds probable cause, he must also determine whether continued detention is necessary pursuant to §320.5(3Xb). §325.3(3).
Detained juveniles are also entitled to an expedited factfinding hearing. If the juvenile is charged with one of a limited number of designated felonies, the factfinding hearing must be scheduled to commence not more than 14 days after the conclusion of the initial appearance. §340.1. If the juvenile is charged with a lesser offense, then the factfinding hearing must be held not more than three days after the initial appearance. In the latter case, since the times for the probable-cause hearing and the factfinding hearing coincide, the two hearings are merged.
Thus, the maximum possible detention under §320.5(3)(b) of a youth accused of a serious crime, assuming a 3-day extension of the factfinding hearing for good cause shown, is 17 days. The maximum detention for less serious crimes, again assuming a 3-day extension for good cause shown, is six days. These time frames seem suited to the limited purpose of providing the youth with a controlled environment and separating him from improper influences pending the speedy disposition of his case.
The conditions of confinement also appear to reflect the regulatory purposes relied upon by the State. When a juvenile is remanded after his initial appearance, he cannot, absent exceptional circumstances, be sent to a prison or lockup where he would be exposed to adult criminals. FCA § 304.1(2). Instead, the child is screened by an “assessment unit” of the Department of Juvenile Justice. Testimony of Mr. Kelly (Deputy Commissioner of Operations, New York City Department of Juvenile Justice), App. 286-287. The assessment unit places the child in either nonsecure or secure detention. Nonsecure detention involves an open facility in the community, a sort of “halfway house,” without locks, bars, or security officers where the child receives schooling and counseling and has access to recreational facilities. Id., at 285; Testimony of Mr. Benjamin, id., at 149-150.
Secure detention is more restrictive, but it is still consistent with the regulatory and parens patriae objectives relied upon by the State. Children are assigned to separate dorms based on age, size, and behavior. They wear street clothes provided by the institution and partake in educational and recreational programs and counseling sessions run by trained social workers. Misbehavior is punished by confinement to one’s room. See Testimony of Mr. Kelly, id., at 292-297. We cannot conclude from this record that the controlled environment briefly imposed by the State on juveniles in secure pretrial detention “is imposed for the purpose of punishment” rather than as “an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 538.
The Court of Appeals, of course, did conclude that the underlying purpose of §320.5(3)(b) is punitive rather than regulatory. But the court did not dispute that preventive detention might serve legitimate regulatory purposes or that the terms and conditions of pretrial confinement in New York are compatible with those purposes. Rather, the court invalidated a significant aspect of New York’s juvenile justice system based solely on some case histories and a statistical study which appeared to show that “the vast majority of juveniles detained under [§320.5(3)(b)] either have their petitions dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released after adjudication.” 689 F. 2d, at 369. The court assumed that dismissal of a petition or failure to confine a juvenile at the dispositional hearing belied the need to detain him prior to factfinding and that, therefore, the pretrial detention constituted punishment. Id., at B73. Since punishment imposed without a prior adjudication of guilt is per se illegitimate, the Court of Appeals concluded that no juveniles could be held pursuant to §320.5(3)(b).
There are some obvious flaws in the statistics and case histories relied upon by the lower court. But even assuming it to be the case that “by far the greater number of juveniles incarcerated under [§320.5(3)(b)] will never be confined as a consequence of a disposition imposed after an adjudication of delinquency,” 689 F. 2d, at 371-372, we find that to be an insufficient ground for upsetting the widely shared legislative judgment that preventive detention serves an important and legitimate function in the juvenile justice system. We are unpersuaded by the Court of Appeals’ rather cavalier equation of detentions that do not lead to continued confinement after an adjudication of guilt and “wrongful” or “punitive” pretrial detentions.
Pretrial detention need not be considered punitive merely because a juvenile is subsequently discharged subject to conditions or put on probation. In fact, such actions reinforce the original finding that close supervision of the juvenile is required. Lenient but supervised disposition is in keeping with the Act’s purpose to promote the welfare and development of the child. As the New York Court of Appeals noted:
“It should surprise no one that caution and concern for both the juvenile and society may indicate the more conservative decision to detain at the very outset, whereas the later development of very much more relevant information may prove that while a finding of delinquency was warranted, placement may not be indicated.” People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N. Y. 2d, at 690, 350 N. E. 2d, at 910.
Even when a case is terminated prior to factfinding, it does not follow that the decision to detain the juvenile pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b) amounted to a due process violation. A delinquency petition may be dismissed for any number of reasons collateral to its merits, such as the failure of a witness to testify. The Family Court judge cannot be expected to anticipate such developments at the initial hearing. He makes his decision based on the information available to him at that time, and the propriety of the decision must be judged in that light. Consequently, the final disposition of a case is “largely irrelevant” to the legality of a pretrial detention. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 145 (1979).
It may be, of course, that in some circumstances detention of a juvenile would not pass constitutional muster. But the validity of those detentions must be determined on a case-by-ease basis. Section 320.5(3)(b) is not invalid “on its face” by reason of the ambiguous statistics and case histories relied upon by the court below. We find no justification for the conclusion that, contrary to the express language of the statute and the judgment of the highest state court, §320.5(3)(b) is a punitive rather than a regulatory measure. Preventive detention under the FCA serves the legitimate state objective, held in common with every State in the country, of protecting both the juvenile and society from the hazards of pretrial crime.
B
Given the legitimacy of the State’s interest in preventive detention, and the nonpunitive nature of that detention, the remaining question is whether the procedures afforded juveniles detained prior to factfinding provide sufficient protection against erroneous and unnecessary deprivations of liberty. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 335. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S., at 114, we held that a judicial determination of probable cause is a prerequisite to any extended restraint on the liberty of an adult accused of crime. We did not, however, mandate a specific timetable. Nor did we require the “full panoply of adversary safeguards — counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process for witnesses.” Id., at 119. Instead, we recognized “the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by the States.” Id., at 123. Gerstein arose under the Fourth Amendment, but the same concern with “flexibility” and “informality,” while yet ensuring adequate predetention procedures, is present in this context. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 366; Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 554 (1966).
In many respects, the FCA provides far more predetention protection for juveniles than we found to be constitutionally required for a probable-cause determination for adults in Gerstein. The initial appearance is informal, but the accused juvenile is given full notice of the charges against him and a complete stenographic record is kept of the hearing. See 513 F. Supp., at 702. The juvenile appears accompanied by his parent or guardian. He is first informed of his rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to be represented by counsel chosen by him or by a law guardian assigned by the court. FCA §320.3. The initial appearance may be adjourned for no longer than 72 hours or until the next court day, whichever is sooner, to enable an appointed law guardian or other counsel to appear before the court. §320.2(3). When his counsel is present, the juvenile is informed of the charges against him and furnished with.a copy of the delinquency petition. §320.4(1). A representative from the presentment agency appears in support of the petition.
The nonhearsay allegations in the delinquency petition and supporting depositions must establish probable cause to believe the juvenile committed the offense. Although the Family Court judge is not required to make a finding of probable cause at the initial appearance, the youth may challenge the sufficiency of the petition on that ground. FCA § 315.1. Thus, the juvenile may oppose any recommended detention by arguing that there is not probable cause to believe he committed the offense or offenses with which he is charged. If the petition is not dismissed, the juvenile is given an opportunity to admit or deny the charges. §321.1.
At the conclusion of the initial appearance, the presentment agency makes a recommendation regarding detention. A probation officer reports on the juvenile’s record, including other prior and current Family Court and probation contacts, as well as relevant information concerning home life, school attendance, and any special medical or developmental problems. He concludes by offering his agency’s recommendation on detention. Opposing counsel, the juvenile’s parents, and the juvenile himself may all speak on his behalf and challenge any information or recommendation. If the judge does decide to detain the juvenile under §320.5(3)(b), he must state on the record the facts and reasons for the detention.
As noted, a detained juvenile is entitled to a formal, adversarial probable-cause hearing within three days of his initial appearance, with one 3-day extension possible for good cause shown. The burden at this hearing is on the presentment agency to call witnesses and offer evidence in support of the charges. §325.2. Testimony is under oath and subject to cross-examination. Ibid. The accused juvenile may call witnesses and offer evidence in his own behalf. If the court finds probable cause, the court must again decide whether continued detention is necessary under § 320.5(3)(b). Again, the facts and reasons for the detention must be stated on the record.
In sum, notice, a hearing, and a statement of facts and reasons are given prior to any detention under § 320.5(3)(b). A formal probable-cause hearing is then held within a short while thereafter, if the factfinding hearing is not itself scheduled within three days. These flexible procedures have been found constitutionally adequate under the Fourth Amendment, see Gerstein v. Pugh, and under the Due Process Clause, see Kent v. United States, supra, at 557. Appellees have failed to note any additional procedures that would significantly improve the accuracy of the determination without unduly impinging on the achievement of legitimate state purposes.
Appellees argue, however, that the risk of erroneous and unnecessary detentions is too high despite these procedures because the standard for detention is fatally vague. Detention under §320.5(3)(b) is based on a finding that there is a “serious risk” that the juvenile, if released, would commit a crime prior to his next court appearence. We have already seen that detention of juveniles on that ground serves legitimate regulatory purposes. But appellees claim, and the District Court agreed, that it is virtually impossible to predict future criminal conduct with any degree of accuracy. Moreover, they say, the statutory standard fails to channel the discretion of the Family Court judge by specifying the factors on which he should rely in making that prediction. The procedural protections noted above are thus, in their view, unavailing because the ultimate decision is intrinsically arbitrary and uncontrolled.
Our cases indicate, however, that from a legal point of view there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct. Such a judgment forms an important element in many decisions, and we have specifically rejected the contention, based on the same sort of sociological data relied upon by appellees and the District Court, “that it is impossible to predict future behavior and that the question is so vague as to be meaningless.” Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 279 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
We have also recognized that a prediction of future criminal conduct is “an experienced prediction based on a host of variables” which cannot be readily codified. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 16 (1979). Judge Qui-nones of the Family Court testified at trial that he and his colleagues make a determination under § 320.5(3)(b) based on numerous factors including the nature and seriousness of the charges; whether the charges are likely to be proved at trial; the juvenile’s prior record; the adequacy and effectiveness of his home supervision; his school situation, if known; the time of day of the alleged crime as evidence of its seriousness and a possible lack of parental control; and any special circumstances that might be brought to his attention by the probation officer, the child’s attorney, or any parents, relatives, or other responsible persons accompanying the child. Testimony of Judge Quinones, App. 254-267. The decision is based on as much information as can reasonably be obtained at the initial appearance. Ibid.
Given the right to a hearing, to counsel, and to a statement of reasons, there is no reason that the specific factors upon which the Family Court judge might rely must be specified in the statute. As the New York Court of Appeals concluded, People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N. Y. 2d, at 690, 350 N. E. 2d, at 910, “to a very real extent Family Court must exercise a substitute parental control for which there can be no particularized criteria.” There is also no reason, we should add, for a federal court to assume that a state court judge will not strive to apply state law as conscientiously as possible. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539, 549 (1981).
It is worth adding that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was mistaken in its conclusion that “[ijndividual litigation... is a practical impossibility because the periods of detention are so short that the litigation is mooted before the merits are determined.” 689 F. 2d, at 373. In fact, one of the juveniles in the very case histories upon which the court relied was released from pretrial detention on a writ of ha-beas corpus issued by the State Supreme Court. New York courts also have adopted a liberal view of the doctrine of “capable of repetition, yet evading review” precisely in order to ensure that pretrial detention orders are not unre viewable. In People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, supra, at 686, 350 N. E. 2d, at 908, the court declined to dismiss an appeal from the grant of a writ of habeas corpus despite the technical mootness of the case.
“Because the situation is likely to recur... and the substantial issue may otherwise never be reached (in view of the predictably recurring happenstance that, however expeditiously an appeal might be prosecuted, fact-finding and dispositional hearings normally will have been held and a disposition made before the appeal could reach us),... we decline to dismiss [the appeal] on the ground of mootness.”
The required statement of facts and reasons justifying the detention and the stenographic record of the initial appearance will provide a basis for
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 106(b) of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), 92 Stat. 1926, 29 U. S. C. § 816(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V), provides that the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) “shall” issue a final determination as to the misuse of CETA funds by a grant recipient within 120 days after receiving a complaint alleging such misuse. The question presented in this case is whether the Secretary loses the power to recover misused CETA funds after that 120-day period has expired.
I
Before its repeal in 1982, CETA provided for grants of federal funds to certain qualified entities known as “prime sponsors,” principally state and local governments, for programs “providing] job training and employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged, unemployed, or underemployed persons,” 29 U. S. C. §801 (1976 ed., Supp. V). The statute contains detailed requirements concerning the operation of a CETA program and the training, pay, and terms of employment of participants in a program, see § § 823-827. A prime sponsor must submit to the Secretary a plan detailing the operation of the proposed program and containing assurances that the program will comply with the statute and with the Secretary’s regulations, § 813.
CETA grants the Secretary broad authority to ensure that CETA funds are used in accordance with the statute and regulations. The Secretary may audit a grant recipient, and in connection with such an audit may inspect records, question employees, and enter any premises upon which the program is conducted. § 835(a)(2). Any interested person, such as a participating employee, may file a complaint with the Secretary alleging that a grant recipient is failing to comply with the applicable standards. § 816.
Section 106(b), 29 U. S. C. § 816(b), which is the provision at issue in this lawsuit, requires that whenever the Secretary has reason to believe, through a complaint, an audit, or otherwise, that any grant recipient is misusing CETA funds or violating any statutory or regulatory standards, the Secretary “shall investigate the matter.” The same section goes on to require that the Secretary “shall” determine “the truth of the allegation or belief involved, not later than 120 days after receiving the complaint.”
II
Respondent is a county in the State of Washington that received CETA funds from 1974 through 1977 pursuant to two separate grants. On September 19, 1978, the Labor Department’s Office of Special Investigations filed an audit report concerning respondent’s first grant. That Department’s Grant Officer issued a final determination on February 13, 1981, disallowing approximately $110,000 in costs incurred by respondent on the grounds that those costs related to employees who were not eligible to participate in a CETA program. On December 11, 1978, the Department’s Office of the Inspector General filed an audit report with respect to the second grant, again raising questions concerning ineligible participants. On April 22, 1981, the Grant Officer issued a final determination which he corrected on May 22, 1981, finally disallowing $373,000 in costs arising out of the second grant.
Respondent sought review of both final determinations before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Labor Department. The ALJ disallowed the smaller sums of $108,000 and $265,000, respectively, in the two cases. In both cases, respondent argued that the Secretary could not order respondent to repay these sums because the Grant Officer’s final determination had been issued considerably more than 120 days after submission of the initial audit report. While conceding that the Secretary did not lose jurisdiction to make a determination after 120 days had passed, respondent argued that it had suffered prejudice because of the lengthy delay. The ALJ rejected this claim in both cases, finding no specific instances of prejudice.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Pierce County v. United States, By and Through Dept. of Labor, 759 F. 2d 1398 (1985). That court had previously decided, in City of Edmonds v. United States Dept. of Labor, 749 F. 2d 1419 (1985), that Congress, in enacting § 106(b), had intended to prevent the Secretary from acting on a complaint unless the Secretary’s final determination was issued within 120 days from his receipt of the complaint. In the present case, the Court of Appeals decided that the statutory command to the Secretary to issue a final determination “not later than 120 days after receiving the complaint” also required the Secretary to make a determination within 120 days when the allegation or belief is a result of the Secretary’s own audit rather than a third-party complaint. This decision conflicts with decisions of the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 474 U. S. 944 (1985), and we now reverse.
Ill
As Judge Friendly noted in a case raising the identical issue, the proposition that Congress intended the Secretary to lose the authority to recover misspent funds 120 days after learning of the misuse “is not, to say the least, of the sort that commands instant assent.” St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, New York v. Brock, 769 F. 2d 37, 41 (CA2 1985) (footnote omitted), cert, pending, No. 85-949. We must therefore examine carefully the statutory language and legislative history to determine whether Congress did indeed desire this somewhat incongruous result.
A
The Ninth Circuit held that the plain meaning of the statutory command that the Secretary “shall” take action within 120 days was sufficient to demonstrate that Congress meant to bar further action after that period had expired. City of Edmonds, 749 F. 2d, at 1421. Noting that “[statutory language is generally construed according to the plain meaning of the words used by Congress ‘absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary/” ibid, (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980)), and finding no such contrary legislative intent, the Ninth Circuit held that the 120-day limit was jurisdictional.
The Secretary, however, notes that while § 106(b) speaks in mandatory language, it nowhere specifies the consequences of a failure to make a final determination within 120 days. The Secretary relies on a line of precedent in the Courts of Appeals to the effect that Government agencies do not lose jurisdiction for failure to comply with statutory time limits unless the statute “‘both expressly requires an agency or public official to act within a particular time period and specifies a consequence for failure to comply with the provision.’” St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, supra, at 41 (quoting Fort Worth National Corp. v. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp., 469 F. 2d 47, 58 (CA5 1972)). Having specified no consequences for the failure to make the determination required by § 106(b) within 120 days, the Secretary argues, the courts should not impute to Congress the desire to remedy such a failure by preventing the Secretary from protecting both the public fisc and the integrity of a Government program.
This Court has never expressly adopted the Circuit precedent upon which the Secretary relies. However, our decisions supply at least the underpinnings of those precedents. This Court has frequently articulated the “great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided.” United States v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co., 118 U. S. 120, 125 (1886). See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126 (1938); Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 515 (1893). We would be most reluctant to conclude that every failure of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action, especially when important public rights are at stake. When, as here, there are less drastic remedies available for failure to meet a statutory deadline, courts should not assume that Congress intended the agency to lose its power to act.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Fort Worth National line of precedent as being inconsistent with this Court’s decision in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807 (1980). In Mohasco, we held that an action filed by a private plaintiff after the expiration of the 300-day time period provided in § 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(e), was jurisdictionally barred. In so holding, we gave controlling weight to the literal meaning of the statutory provisions, which stated that “a charge under this section shall be filed” within the specified time limits. See 447 U. S., at 815-817. However, there are two clear differences between the present case and Mohasco. First, legislatures routinely create statutes of limitations for the. filing of complaints, and Congress’ intention to create a statute of limitations in § 706(e) was certainly unexceptional. Indeed, the plaintiff in Mohasco nowhere alleged that § 706(e) was not a statute of limitations, but rather contended that the word “filed” should be defined in a way that would render his action timely. 447 U. S., at 818. Section 106(b), by contrast, does not merely command the Secretary to file a complaint within a specified time, but requires him to resolve the entire dispute within that time. This is a more substantial task than filing a complaint, and the Secretary’s ability to complete it within 120 days is subject to factors beyond his control. There is less reason, therefore, to believe that Congress intended such drastic consequences to follow from the Secretary’s failure to meet the 120-day deadline. Second, Mohasco involved a private right of action, and the plaintiff’s failure to file a complaint prejudiced only that plaintiff. In the present case, by contrast, public rights are at stake, and the Secretary’s delay, under respondent’s theory, would prejudice the rights of the taxpaying public.
Respondent suggests that statutes setting deadlines for agency action should be interpreted to permit the agency to proceed after the deadline has expired only when agency inaction would prejudice a private citizen seeking some sort of redress. When, as in this case, agency inaction will injure only the Federal Treasury, courts should read a command like that of § 106(b) as a statute of limitations or jurisdictional bar. We disagree with this argument for two reasons. First, the protection of the public fisc is a matter that is of interest to every citizen, and we have no evidence that Congress wanted to permit the Secretary’s inaction to harm that interest any more than it would permit such inaction to injure an individual claimant. Second, the 120-day deadline clearly applies to investigations triggered by private complaints alleging that the individual complainant, perhaps a program participant or subcontractor, has been injured by a grant recipient’s failure to comply with CETA’s requirements. Indeed, the federal courts have uniformly held that the statutory complaint mechanism is the sole means of redress for a private party injured by a grant recipient’s violation of CETA. Thus, even under respondent’s theory, § 106(b) cannot be jurisdictional, because it would then permit the Secretary’s inaction to prejudice individual complainants seeking to enforce their rights under CETA. We hold, therefore, that the mere use of the word “shall” in § 106(b), standing alone, is not enough to remove the Secretary’s power to act after 120 days.
B
Looking to other sources of congressional intent, we have found nothing in the history of the 1978 amendments to CETA, which added the 120-day deadline, to suggest that Congress intended to impose a jurisdictional limitation on agency action. The only explicit discussion of the jurisdictional effect of the 120-day provision was a brief colloquy on the House floor between Representative Hawkins, one of the bill’s sponsors, and Representative Obey, who offered the amendment that added the 120-day deadline:
“Mr. HAWKINS. Mr. Chairman, we have seen the amendment. We accept the amendment.
“If the gentleman would further yield, do I understand . . . that if the determination is not made in a specified time it shall not affect the Secretary’s jurisdiction in the matter?
“Mr. OBEY. That is correct.
“Mr. HAWKINS. With that understanding we do accept the amendment.” 124 Cong. Rec. 25230-25231 (1978).
Such statements by individual legislators should not be given controlling effect, but when they are consistent with the statutory language and other legislative history, they provide evidence of Congress’ intent. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U. S. 555, 567 (1984). In this case, the legislative history fully supports Representative Hawkins’ interpretation of § 106(b).
One of the principal concerns underlying the 1978 amendments was the growing incidence of fraud and misuse of CETA funds by state and local governments. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1124, pp. 3, 5, 13 (1978) (noting “widespread concern that there has been substantial fraud and abuse in the CETA program and insufficient staff devoted to monitoring and supervising the program”); S. Rep. No. 95-891, pp. 42-44 (1978). A primary purpose of the amendments was to strengthen the Secretary’s hand in dealing with illegal practices. Thus the amendments contained numerous anti-fraud measures, including a provision for criminal sanctions, 18 U. S. C. § 665(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V), bonding requirements for grant recipients, 29 U. S. C. § 836, and authorization for the Secretary to terminate or suspend funding or to take other corrective measures, §816. In a separate bill, Congress created an Office of the Inspector General in the Labor Department. See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (now codified as amended at 5 U. S. C. App. §§ 1-12. The Conference Report for the 1978 CETA amendments made it clear that Congress expected the Secretary “to provide, within the new Office of Inspector General, for a unit whose sole responsibility will be that of monitoring the CETA program.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1765, p. 123 (1978).
Congress was particularly concerned about the ability of program participants such as contractors, subgrantees, and employees to voice grievances and receive a prompt resolution. See St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, New York v. Brock, 769 F. 2d, at 43 (citing House and Senate hearings on 1978 amendments). The Senate noted that “[i]n some cases grievances have been either ignored, or there has been interminable delay in their resolution.” S. Rep. No. 95-891, supra, at 42. In response to this problem, Congress required, in § 106(a), that each prime sponsor establish a grievance procedure that would provide for hearings and require a decision within 60 days after the filing of the grievance. After exhausting the prime sponsor’s grievance machinery, an interested party could, pursuant to § 106(b), file a complaint with the Secretary. The legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended the 120-day deadline of § 106(b) to assure program participants the opportunity for a prompt resolution of grievances. Senate Report No. 95-891, supra, at 16, for example, states: “A party who wishes to appeal to the Secretary either the formal or the informal decision of the prime sponsor has the right to a due process hearing and a determination on the merits of the case within 120 days.” Conspicuously absent is any reference to the possibility that the 120-day provision might convey rights upon the prime sponsor.
There is no indication in the legislative history that Congress was concerned that the Secretary was treating prime sponsors too harshly; to the contrary, the House and Senate Reports consistently voice Congress’ belief that the Secretary had not been aggressive enough in discovering and rectifying abuses. The 120-day provision was clearly intended to spur the Secretary to action, not to limit the scope of his authority. Congress intended that “the Secretary should have maximum authority to protect the integrity of the program.” S. Rep. No. 95-891, supra, at 21. It would be very odd if Congress had implemented that intent by cutting off the Secretary’s authority to correct abuses just 120 days after learning of them.
C
Respondent provides additional arguments, which we find unpersuasive, in support of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Respondent contends that even if the statute does not establish a jurisdictional bar to the Secretary’s recovery of funds, the Secretary’s own regulations do so. The Secretary’s regulations, however, merely provide a timetable for the resolution of complaints and audits. See n. 3, supra. While they arguably go beyond the statute in applying the 120-day limit to investigations triggered by audits as well as those triggered by complaints, they do not specify any consequences of a failure to meet that deadline in the event of either an audit or a complaint. Thus, even if it were possible for the Secretary to create a jurisdictional limitation not contained in the statute, the language of the regulations cannot support respondent’s contention that the 120-day provision is jurisdictional with respect to audits.
Respondent urges, if we do not find § 106(b) to affect the Secretary’s jurisdiction, that we treat it like a statute of limitations that can vary depending on the complexity of the dispute or the culpability of the grant recipient. There is simply no authority in the statute or legislative history for the courts to create such a remedy. The balancing of interests that respondent proposes is a task for Congress.
IV
We hold that CETA’s requirement that the Secretary “shall” take action within 120 days does not, standing alone, divest the Secretary of jurisdiction to act after that time. There is simply no indication in the statute or its legislative history that Congress intended to remove the Secretary’s enforcement powers if he fails to issue a final determination on a complaint or audit within 120 days. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Effective October 13, 1982, CETA was replaced by the Job Training Partnership Act, Pub. L. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1324 (now codified at 29 U. S. C. § 1501 et seq. (1982 ed., and Supp. II)).
Hereafter all citations to Title 29 of the United States Code will be to Supplement V of the 1976 edition, unless otherwise specified.
The Secretary has promulgated regulations implementing § 106(b). See 20 CFR §§ 676.86, 676.88 (1982). Those regulations provide that a Labor Department Grant Officer shall receive the complaint or audit report and conduct the investigation. §§ 676.86(c), (d), (e). The Grant Officer then makes an initial determination of the truth of the allegation or belief, § 676.88(a). The Grant Officer must provide the recipient with an opportunity to resolve informally the matters contained in the initial determination, § 676.88(d), and if such informal resolution fails, the Grant Officer issues a final determination, § 676.88(e).
The regulations provide that the Grant Officer’s final determination shall be the “final determination” required of the Secretary by § 106(b), even though that determination is subject to further review by an administrative law judge and the Secretary. § 676.86(a). Respondent does not contest the Secretary’s interpretation of § 106(b)’s “final determination” requirement. In the present case both the Grant Officer’s final determination and the Secretary’s final action took place after the 120-day deadline had expired.
Because § 106(b) states that the deadline for the Secretary’s final determination is “120 days after receiving the complaint,” the Secretary argued before the Ninth Circuit that the deadline applies only to investigations triggered by third-party complaints, and not those triggered by the Secretary’s own audit. This reading, in the Secretary’s view, also comports with the statutory purpose of protecting program participants and other interested parties who may be injured by a prime sponsor’s misuse of funds. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, in part because the Secretary’s own regulations establish a 120-day deadline for issuing determinations after an internal audit, see 20 CFR § 676.88(e) (1982). While the Secretary contends that those regulations simply constitute a self-imposed deadline, he does not challenge this aspect of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. We therefore assume without deciding that the 120-day deadline was intended to apply to audit investigations.
St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, New York v. Brock, 769 F. 2d 37 (CA2 1985), cert. pending, No. 85-949; Milwaukee County v. Donovan, 771 F. 2d 983 (CA7 1985), cert. pending, No. 85-1109; City of St. Louis v. United States Dept. of Labor, 787 F. 2d 342 (CA8 1986); but see Lehigh Valley Manpower Program v. Donovan, 718 F. 2d 99 (CA3 1983) (failure to comply with 120-day provision bars recovery of misspent funds).
See also National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 233 U. S. App. D. C. 44, 57, n. 23, 724 F. 2d 176, 189, n. 23 (1983) (requirement in 17 U. S. C. § 804(e) that tribunal “shall” render decision within one year does not make later decision void); Marshall v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 618 F. 2d 1220, 1224-1225 (CA7 1980) (failure to meet requirement in 29 U. S. C. § 660(e)(3) that Secretary of Labor “shall” make determination on employee’s complaint within 90 days does not bar subsequent enforcement action); Marshall v. Local Union 1374, Int’l Assn. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, 558 F. 2d 1354 (CA9 1977) (requirement of 29 U. S. C. § 482(b) that Secretary of Labor “shall” bring suit within 60 days of receiving complaint does not bar later suit).
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §§701-706, entitles any person “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action” to judicial review, § 702, unless the relevant statute precludes judicial review or “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law,” § 701(a)(2). Clearly the statutory command that the Secretary “shall” act within 120 days does not commit such action to the Secretary’s discretion. Moreover, nothing in CETA appears to bar an action to enforce the 120-day deadline. Cf. CETA Workers Organizing Comm. v. City of New York, 617 F. 2d 926, 934-936 (CA2 1980) (APA may not be used to circumvent § 106(b) complaint mechanism). Thus, it would appear that a complainant adversely affected by the Secretary’s failure to act on a complaint could bring an action in the district court. The court would have the authority to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” § 706(1). If respondent is correct in arguing that Congress, in enacting § 106(b), intended to protect grant recipients from lengthy delays in audits, grant recipients such as respondent would be within the zone of interests protected by § 106(b), and would therefore have standing to bring an action under the APA to the same extent as a complainant. Cf. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 153 (1970). On the other hand, were § 106(b) intended only to protect complainants, there would be no need to provide grant recipients with any remedy at all — much less the drastic remedy respondent seeks in this case — for the Secretary’s failure to meet the 120-day deadline.
See Uniformed Firefighters Assn., Local 94, IAFF, AFL-CIO v. City of New York, 676 F. 2d 20 (CA2 1982); Kolman v. Milwaukee Area Technical College, 548 F. Supp. 684 (ED Wis. 1982).
We need not, and do not, hold that a statutory deadline for agency action can never bar later action unless that consequence is stated explicitly in the statute. In this case, we need not go beyond the normal indicia of congressional intent to conclude that §. 106(b) permits the Secretary to recover misspent funds after the 120-day deadline has expired.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White delivered
the opinion of the Court.
Under § 8 (b) (4) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. 1158(b)(4)(B), a union commits an unfair labor practice when it induces employees to refuse to handle particular goods or products or coerces any person engaged in commerce, where “an object” of the inducement or coercion is to require any person to cease doing business with any other person. A proviso, added to § 8 (b) (4) (B) in 1959, declares that the section “shall [not] be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.” Although without the proviso the section on its face would seem to cover any coercion aimed at forcing a cessation of business, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) and the judiciary have construed the statute more narrowly, both before and after the proviso was added, to prohibit only secondary, rather than primary, strikes and picketing.
Among other things, it is not necessarily a violation of §8 (b)(4)(B) for a union to picket an employer for the purpose of preserving work traditionally performed by union members even though in order to comply with the union’s demand the employer would have to cease doing business with another employer. National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612 (1967) (National Woodwork). The question now before us is whether a union seeking the kind of work traditionally performed by its members at a construction site violates §8 (b)(4)(B) when it induces its members to engage in a work stoppage against an employer who does not have control over the assignment of the work ■sought by the union. More specifically, the issue is whether a union-instigated refusal of a subcontractor’s employees to handle or install factory-piped climate-control units, which were included in the general contractor’s job specifications and delivered to the construction site, was primary activity beyond the reach of § 8 (b) (4) (B) or whether it was secondary activity prohibited by the statute. As we shall see, this issue turns on whether the boycott was “addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees,” National Woodwork, supra, at 645, and is therefore primary conduct, or whether the boycott was “tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere,” 386 U. S., at 644, in which event the boycott would be prohibited secondary activity.
I
Austin Co., Inc. (Austin), was the general contractor and engineer on a construction project known as the Norwegian Home for the Aged. As the result of competitive bidding, Austin awarded a subcontract to Hudik-Ross Co., Inc. (Hudik), to perform the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning work for the Norwegian Home construction. Hudik employs a regular complement of about 10 to 20 steamfitters. For many years, these employees have been represented by respondent Enterprise Association (Enterprise), a plumbing and pipefitting union. Over the years Hudik and Enterprise have entered into successive collective-bargaining agreements, and such an agreement was in force at the time that the dispute involved in the present litigation arose. Austin had no agreement with Enterprise regarding the work to be done on the Norwegian Home project.
The subcontract between Austin and Hudik incorporated Austin’s job specifications. These specifications provided that Austin would purchase certain climate-control units manufactured by Slant/Fin Corp. (Slant/Fin) to be installed in the Norwegian Home. The specifications further provided that the internal piping in the climate-control units was to be cut, threaded, and installed at the Slant/Fin factory. At the time that Hudik entered into the subcontract with Austin, Hudik was aware that its employees would be called upon to install the Slant/Fin units but not to do the internal piping work for the units on the jobsite.
Traditionally, members of respondent union have performed the internal piping on heating and air-conditioning units on the jobsite. Also, Rule IX of the then-current collective-bargaining contract between Hudik and Enterprise provided that pipe threading and cutting were to be performed on the jobsite in accordance with Rule V, which in turn specified that the work would be performed by units of two employees. There had been similar or identical provisions in previous collective-bargaining contracts. There is no dispute that the work designated by Austin’s specifications to be performed at the Slant/Fin factory was the kind of cutting and threading work referred to in Rule IX.
When the Slant/Fin units arrived on the job, the union steamfitters refused to install them. The business agent of the union told Austin’s superintendent that the steamfitters “would not install the Slant/Fin units because the piping inside the units was steamfitters’ work.” Enterprise Assn. of Steam Pipefitters, 204 N. L. R. B. 760, 762 (1973). Hudik was informed that the factory-installed internal piping in the units was in violation of Rule IX of the union contract and “that such piping was Local 638’s work.” Ibid. When the union persisted in its refusal to install the units, thereby interfering with the completion of the Norwegian Home job, Austin filed a complaint with the Board, alleging that Enterprise had committed an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act by engaging in a strike and encouraging Hudik employees to refuse to install the Slant/Fin units in furtherance of an impermissible object. Specifically, Austin charged that the union’s action was taken to force Hudik to cease doing business with Austin and to force Hudik and Austin to cease dealing with the products of Slant/Fin. The union’s position before the Administrative Law Judge was that it was merely seeking to enforce its contract with Hudik and to preserve the jobsite cutting and threading work covered by Rule IX.
The Administrative Law Judge found that because Austin had specified factory-piped units, there was no internal threading and cutting work to be done on the jobsite of the kind covered by Rule IX and that no such work at the Norwegian Home project could be obtained through pressure on Hudik alone, even if Hudik was forced to abandon its contract, unless and until Austin changed its job specifications so as to provide the piping the union members had traditionally performed for Hudik as a subcontractor. The Administrative Law Judge thus concluded that the union had violated § 8 (b) (4) (B) because in seeking to enforce its contract and to obtain the work at the Norwegian Home jobsite, the union’s object was in reality to influence Austin by exerting pressure on Hudik, an employer who had no power to award the work to the union.
The Board agreed. Enterprise Assn., supra. It noted first that the steamfitters’ refusal to install the Slant/Fin units “was based on a valid work preservation clause in the agreement with Hudik, the subcontractor, and was for the purpose of preserving work they had traditionally performed.” 204 N. L. R. B. 760. This did not settle the legality of the work stoppage under §8 (b)(4)(B), however; for “Hudik was incapable of assigning its employees this work; such work was never Hudik’s to assign in the first place.... Respondent was exerting prohibited pressure on Hudik with an object of either forcing a change in Austin’s manner of doing business or forcing Hudik to terminate its subcontract with Austin. Since the pressure exerted by the Respondent on Hudik was undertaken for its effect on other employers, this pressure was secondary and prohibited by Section 8 (b) (4) (B).” Ibid, (as amended by order of Aug. 30, 1973).
A divided Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, set aside the Board’s order. 172 U. S. App. D. C.. 225, 521 F. 2d 885 (1975). We granted certiorari because of an apparent conflict between the Circuits. 424 U. S. 908 (1976).
II
In setting aside the Board’s order, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the Board on both legal and factual grounds. We deal first with the Court of Appeals’ proposition that “an employer who is struck by his own employees for the purpose of requiring him to do what he has lawfully contracted to do to benefit those employees can [njever be considered a neutral bystander in a dispute not his own.” 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 243, 521 F. 2d, at 903 (footnote omitted). Under this view, a strike or refusal to handle undertaken to enforce such a contract would not itself warrant an inference that the union sought to satisfy secondary, rather than primary, objectives, whatever the impact on the immediate employer or on other employers might be. Thus, where a union seeks to enforce a work-preservation agreement by a strike or work stoppage, the existence of the agreement would always provide an adequate defense to a § 8 (b) (4) unfair labor practice charge. This approach is untenable under the Act and our cases construing it.
Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U. S. 93 (1958) (Sand Door), involved a collective-bargaining contract containing a provision, then quite legal, that “ 'workmen shall not be required to handle non-union material.’ ” Id., at 95. The case arose when certain nonunion doors arrived at a construction site and the union notified the contractor that the doors would not be hung. The Board found that the union had committed an unfair labor practice by encouraging employees to strike or refuse to handle the disputed doors in order to force the contractor to cease doing business with the door manufacturer. The union stood squarely on the contract; and as the case arrived here the sole question was whether the collective-bargaining provision was a “defénse to a charge of an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (A) when, in the absence of such a provision, the union conduct would unquestionably be a violation.” Id., at 101.
The union argued that if the statute was aimed at protecting neutral employers from becoming involuntarily involved in the labor disputes of others, ''protection should not extend to an employer who has agreed to a hot cargo provision, for such an employer is not in fact involuntarily involved in the dispute,” especially “when the employer takes no steps at the time of the boycott to repudiate the contract and to order his employees to handle the goods.” In such circumstances, “[t]he union does no more than inform the employees of their contractual rights and urge them to take the only action effective to enforce them.” Id., at 105. These arguments were squarely rejected:
“Nevertheless, it seems most probable that the freedom of choice for the employer contemplated by § 8 (b) (4) (A) is a freedom of choice at the time the question whether to boycott or not arises in a concrete situation calling for the exercise of judgment on a particular matter of labor and business policy. Such a choice, free from the prohibited pressures — whether to refuse to deal with another or to maintain normal business relations on the ground that the labor dispute is no concern of his— must as a matter of federal policy be available to the secondary employer notwithstanding any private agreement entered into between the parties. See National Licorice Co. v. Labor Board, 309 U. S. 350, 364, This is so because by the employer’s intelligent exercise of such a choice under the impact of a concrete situation when judgment is most responsible, and not merely at the time a collective bargaining agreement is drawn up covering a multitude of subjects, often in a general and abstract manner, Congress may rightly be assumed to have hoped that the scope of industrial conflict and the economic effects of tire primary dispute might be effectively limited.” Id., at 105-106.
The Court went on to hold that inducements of employees that are prohibited by § 8 (b) (4) in the absence of a contractual provision countenancing them “are likewise prohibited when there is such a provision,” 357 U. S., at 106. This was true even though the making and voluntary observance of such contracts were not contrary to law at the time that Sand Door was decided; however lawful, these contracts could not be enforced “by the means specifically prohibited” by the section. Id., at 108. The Court held that the legality of the union’s conduct is to be viewed at the time of the boycott.
Sand Door’s holding that employer promises in a collective-bargaining contract provide no defense to a § 8 (b) (4) charge against a union has not been disturbed. In contemplating the 1959 amendments to the Landrum-Griffin Act, Congress viewed that part of Sand Door in which the Court suggested that contractual provisions having secondary objectives were not forbidden by law as creating a loophole in the Act. Section 8 (e) was enacted to close that loophole. See National Woodwork, 386 U. S., at 634. Section 8 (e), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (e) (1970 ed., Supp. Y), makes it an unfair labor practice, with provisos, for unions and employers to enter into collective-bargaining contracts whereby the employer ceases or agrees to cease doing business with any other person. Although on its face not limited to agreements having secondary objectives, the section was construed by the Board and this Court as only closing the loophole left by Sand Door and as having no broader reach than § 8 (b) (4) itself. Section 8 (e) does not prohibit agreements made for “primary” purposes, including the purpose of preserving for the contracting employees themselves work traditionally done by them. 386 U. S.; at 635.
By no stretch of the imagination, however, can it be thought, that in enacting § 8 (e) Congress intended to disagree with or ease Sand Door’s construction of § 8 (b)(4), under which a perfectly legal collective-bargaining contract may not be enforced by a strike or refusal to handle which in the absence of such a provision would be a violation of the statute. The intention of Congress as to this aspect of Sand Dpor could not be clearer, A proviso to § 8 (e) exempted from that section certain agreements in the construction industry that the section would otherwise have prohibited, but the Committee Report explained that the “proviso applies only to section 8 (e) and therefore leaves unaffected the law developed under section 8 (b)(4),” noting particularly that picketing to enforce agreements saved by the proviso “would be illegal under the Sand Door case.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1959), 1 NLRB Legislative History of the Labor-Management and Disclosure Act of 1959, p. 943 (1959) (hereafter 1 Leg. Hist.). Undoubtedly, Congress embraced the rule then followed by the Board and approved by this Court in Sand Door that a contract permitting or justifying the challenged union conduct is no defense to a § 8 (b) (4) charge. To hold, as the Court of Appeals did, that a work stoppage is necessarily primary and not an unfair labor practice when it aims at enforcing a legal promise in a collective-bargaining contract is inconsistent with the statute as construed in Sand Door, a construction that was accepted and that has never been abandoned by Congress.
Nor did we modify Sand Door in National Woodwork. The union in National Woodwork induced the employees of four contractors not to handle precut and prefitted doors that had arrived at the respective construction sites. In three instances, the precut doors had been specified by the architect or the owner; in the fourth, the decision to use precut doors was that of the immediate contractor-employer, Frouge Corp. In each case, there was a provision in the collective-bargaining contract that carpenters would not be required to handle precut or prefitted doors. The General Counsel of the Board filed charges in all four cases, asserting that the agreements were forbidden by § 8 (e) and that the refusal to handle in each case violated §8 (b)(4)(B). The trial examiner, whose findings were adopted by the Board, concluded that none of the agreements was invalid on its face but that in seeking to enforce the contract by refusing to handle in the three situations where the doors had been specified by the architect or owner, the union had violated §8 (b)(4)(B). In these situations, the legality of the contract no more immunized the work stoppage from the § 8 (b) (4) charge than would “the then-lawful ‘hot-cargo’ clause in the Sand Door case.” Metropolitan Dist. Council of Phila., 149 N. L. R. B. 646, 658 (1964). On the other hand, in the Frouge situation, where the choice lay with the contractor who “therefore was in a position to... settle the dispute with the District Council by granting its request to assign that work to the carpenters on the jobsite,” id., at 659 n. 21, the union was seeking only to regulate the relations between the general contractor and his own employees and to protect a legitimate economic interest of the employees by preserving their unit work. Neither the execution nor the enforcement of the Frouge agreement violated the Act. Only the Frouge decision was appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in part, concluding that the Frouge agreement was prohibited by § 8 (e).
In reversing the Court of Appeals’ § 8 (e) holding and agreeing that § 8 (b) (4) (B) had not been violated, we held that neither the Frouge contract nor its maintenance was illegal. Our rationale was not that the work-preservation provision was valid under § 8 (e) and that therefore it could be enforced by striking or picketing without violating § 8 (b) (4) (B). Expressly recognizing the continuing validity of the Sand Door decision that a valid contract does not immunize conduct otherwise violative of § 8 (b)(4), 386 U. S., at 634, we held that neither § 8 (b) (4) (B) nor § 8 (e) forbade primary activity by employees designed to preserve for themselves work traditionally done by them and that on this basis the union’s conduct violated neither section. To determine whether the Frouge employees’ refusal to handle was permissible primary activity or was forbidden secondary coercion, we inquired:
“[Whether] under all the surrounding circumstances, the Union’s objective was preservation of work for Frouge’s employees, or whether the agreements and boycott were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. Were the latter the case, Frouge, the boycotting employer, would be a neutral bystander, and the agreement or boycott would, within the intent of Congress, become secondary. There need not be an actual dispute with the boycotted employer, here the door manufacturer, for the activity to fall within this category, so long as the tactical object of the agreement and its maintenance is that employer, or benefits to other than the boycotting employees or other employees of the primary employer thus making the agreement or boycott secondary in its aim. The touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-á-vis his own employees.” 386 U. S., at 644-645 (footnotes omitted).
We went on to rule that there was substantial evidence to sustain the finding of the Board that both the agreement and the union activity at the Frouge jobsite related solely to the preservation of the traditional tasks of the jobsite carpenters. In consequence, we agreed that there was neither a § 8 (b) (4) (B) nor a § 8 (e) unfair labor practice.
There is thus no doubt that the collective-bargaining provision that pipes be cut by hand on the job and that the work be conducted by units of two is not itself a sufficient answer to a § 8 (b) (4) (B) charge. The substantial question before us is whether, with or without the collective-bargaining contract, the union’s conduct at the time it occurred was proscribed secondary activity within the meaning of the section. If it was, the collective-bargaining provision does not save it. If it was not, the reason is that § 8 (b) (4) (B) did not reach it, not that it was immunized by the contract. Thus, regardless of whether an agreement is valid under § 8 (e), it may not be enforced by means that would violate §8 (b)(4).
Ill
The Court of Appeals was also of the view that the Board’s “control" test, under which the union commits an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (B) when it coerces an employer in order to obtain work that the employer has no power to assign, is invalid as a matter of law because it fails to comply with the National Woodwork standard that the union’s conduct be judged in light of all the relevant circumstances. Again, we think the Court of Appeals was in error.
As we have seen, in National Woodwork the Board found unfair labor practices in three instances by inferring an improper secondary objective from the fact that the work sought by the union was not under the control of the immediate employer, but it found no unfair practice in the Frouge situation because Frouge did have the power to settle the dispute with the union. In sustaining the Board with respect to Frouge and in posing the issue whether under all the circumstances the boycott was tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere, we did not purport to announce a new legal standard and then ourselves to assess the facts in light of the modified construction of the statute. Such an assessment would 'have been a more proper task for the Board in the first instance; yet there was no remand for further proceedings in the light of a newly fashioned standard. The Board had sustained the trial examiner, who had examined the facts to determine whether the agreement and boycott had secondary objectives and concluded that they did not. This Court simply sustained the Board’s findings as supported by substantial evidence, without questioning either the legal standard employed by the Board or the Board’s resolution of the facts under that standard. Furthermore, the Court expressly recognized that as the case came to it, no question was raised about the results with respect to the three contractors other than Frouge. 386 U. S., at 616-617, n. 3.
Here, the Administrative Law Judge, cognizant of National Woodwork and the Board’s own precedents, examined the history both of the relevant jobsite work traditionally done by the steamfitters and of the contractual provision calling for jobsite cutting and threading of pipe, assessed the agreement and refusal to handle in light of the actual conditions in the New York market, and concluded that “ ‘under all the surrounding circumstances/ ” Hudik was “only a means or instrumentality for exerting pressure against Slant/Fin and Austin with whom the Union has its primary dispute.” It thus does not appear to us that either the Administrative Law Judge or the Board, in agreeing with him, articulated a different standard from that which this Court recognized as the proper test in National Woodwork.
Nor is it the case that the Board, in applying its control standard, failed to consider all of the relevant circumstances. Surely the fact that the Board distinguishes between two otherwise identical cases because in the one the employer has control of the work and in the other he has no power over it does not indicate that the Board has ignored any material circumstance. The contrary might more rationally be inferred. Of course, the Board may assign to the presence or absence of control much more weight than would the Court of Appeals, but this far from demonstrates a departure from the totality-of-the-circumstances test recognized in National Woodwork.
There is little or no basis in the statute, its legislative history, or our cases for the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the distinction the Board has drawn between those cases where the struck employer is in position to deliver the work to the union and those where the work is controlled by others is erroneous as a matter of law. The Board has taken this approach in applying § 8 (b) (4) at least since 1958, when it decided Clifton Deangulo, 121 N. L. R. B. 676. In that case, the facts of which were similar to this one, Limbach, a plumbing and heating contractor, was engaged to install certain comfort induction units. The union claimed that certain provisions in its collective-bargaining agreement with Limbach reserved to its members much of the work that had been performed at the factory on these units. Therefore, at the union’s behest, the employees refused to handle the units. Relying on its decision in the Sand Door case, Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 113 N. L. R. B. 1210 (1955), and ruling against the union, the Board rejected the union’s “main contentions... that the dispute was with Limbach, who was the primary employer; that the Union was seeking merely to exercise a valid contractual right to which Limbach had voluntarily agreed in advance, and that it was therefore engaged in privileged primary activity, not in proscribed secondary activity.” 121 N. L. R. B., at 684. The Board also observed that Limbach “had given to union members all work within the Union’s jurisdiction which it had been awarded on the project. It was powerless, of course, to give them additional work which it had not obtained and which, in fact, had been reserved by the very contractor through whom it had derived its own standing as an employer on the job.” Id., at 685-686.
Since that time, as its decision in National Woodwork exemplifies, the Board has continued to interpret and apply § 8 (b) (4) (B) to find an unfair labor practice, at least where the union employs a product boycott to claim work that the immediate employer is not in a position to award, and it has declined to find a violation where the employer has such power, even if awarding the work might cause him to terminate contractual relations with another employer. In the latter circumstances, the cease-doing-business consequences are merely incidental to primary activity, but not in the former where the union, if it is to obtain work, must intend to exert pressure on one or more other employers.
No legislative disagreement with the Board’s interpretation of § 8 (b) (4) was expressed in 1959 when Congress amended the section. On the contrary, in adding the primary-secondary proviso to the section, as the relevant reports clearly show, Congress intended merely to reflect the existing law. “This provision does not eliminate, restrict, or modify the limitations on picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute that are in existing law.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 38 (1959), 1 Leg. Hist. 942.
Furthermore, the Courts of Appeals regularly sustained the relevant Board interpretations of § 8 (b)(4), and we did not question the Board’s approach in National Woodwork, let alone overrule it sub dlentio. It is true that since our decision in that case some Courts of Appeals, like the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, have concluded that the Board’s interpretation of the statute is in error. The Board’s reading and application of the statute involved in this case, however, are long established, have remained undisturbed by Congress, and fall well within that category of situations in which the courts should defer to the agency’s understanding of the statute which it administers. See Bayside Enterprises v. NLRB, 429 U. S. 298, 303-304 (1977); NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U. S. 67, 76 (1973); NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U. S. 254, 260 (1968) ; Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965); Sand Door, 357 U. S., at 107.
IY
Wholly apart from its determination that the union’s conduct was justified as a measure to enforce its collective-bargaining contract and that the Board applied an incorrect standard for determining liability, the Court of Appeals held that since there was “no substantial evidence... in this record that the union’s purpose was also ‘to satisfy union objectives elsewhere,’ the Board’s decision holding the union guilty of a Section 8 (b) (4) (B) violation may not stand.” 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 244, 521 F. 2d, at 904. We disagree.
That there existed inducement and coercion within the meaning of § 8 (b) (4) is not disputed. The issue is whether “an object” of the inducement and the coercion was to cause the cease-doing-business consequences prohibited by § 8 (b) (4), the resolution of which in turn depends on whether the product boycott was “addressed to the labor relations of [Hudik]... vis-a-vis his own employees,” National Woodwork, 386 U. S., at 645, or whether the union’s conduct was “tactically calculated to satisfy [its] objectives elsewhere,” id., at 644.
There is ample support in the record for the Board’s resolution of this question. The union sought to enforce its contract with Hudik by a jobsite product boycott by which the steamfitters asserted their rights to the cutting and threading work on the Norwegian Home project. It is uncontrovertible that the work at this site could not be secured by pressure on Hudik alone and that the union’s work objectives could not be obtained without exerting pressure on Austin as well. That the union may also have been seeking to enforce its contract and to convince Hudik that it should bid on no more jobs where prepiped units were specified does not alter the fact that the union refused to install the Slant/Fin units and asserted that the piping work on the Norwegian Home job belonged to its members. It was not error for the Board to conclude that the union’s objectives were not confined to the employment relationship with Hudik but included the object of influencing Austin in a manner prohibited by § 8 (b) (4) (B).
The Court of Appeals was of the view that other inferences from the facts were possible. The court, for example, could “clearly see that it was possible for Hudik-Ross to settle the labor dispute which it had created. The record is void of any suggestion that Hudik-Ross attempted to negotiate a compromise with the union under which the union would have agreed to install the climate control units in exchange for extra pay or other special benefits.” 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 239, 521 F. 2d, at 899. How this observation impugns the Board’s finding with respect to the union’s object is not clear. The union simply refused to handle the Slant/ Fin units and asserted that under the contract the cutting and threading work belonged to them. The commonsense inference from these facts is that the product boycott was in part aimed at securing the cutting and threading work at the Norwegian Home job, which could only be obtained by exerting pressure on Austin.
The statutory standard under which the Court of Appeals was obliged to review this case was not whether the Court of Appeals would have arrived at the same result as the Board did, but whether the Board’s findings were “supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” 29 U. S. C. § 160 (e). See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105, 112 (1956); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 491 (1947); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938). It appears to us that in reweighing the facts and setting aside the Board’s order, the Court of Appeals improperly substituted its own views of the facts for those of the Board.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Section 8 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b), provides in relevant part:
“It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
“(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either ease an object thereof is—
“(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.”
The pre- and post-1959 developments are fully canvassed in National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612 (1967).
The facts here stated are taken from the findings made by the Administrative Law Judge and adopted by the Board. Enterprise Assn. of Steam Pipefitters, 204 N. L. R. B. 760 (1973).
Rule IX provided in relevant part:
“Radiator branches, convector branches and coil connections shall be cut and threaded by hand on the job in accordance with Rule V." App. 89.
Rule V provided:
“MEN TO WORK IN UNITS OF TWO
“All work to be performed within the jurisdiction of Enterprise Association must be performed by journeymen steamfitters or apprentices working in units of two, one of whom must be a steamfitter. A unit shall be composed of:
“A. Steamfitter with a steamfitter, or
“B. Steamfitter with an apprentice.” Id., at 87-88.
For a discussion of the decisions of the Courts of Appeals on the issues presented in this case see n. 15, infra.
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) was renumbered as § 8 (b) (4) (B) in 1959. As we shall see, no substantive changes made by the 1959 amendments had any effect on the rule established in Sand Door.
Part of the same contractual rule provided that “ ‘[n]o employee shall work on any job on which cabinet work, fixtures, millwork, sash, doors, trim or other detailed millwork is used unless the same is Union-made and bears the Union Label of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America.’ ” National Woodwork, 386 U. S., at 615 n. 2. The Board found that this sentence violated § 8 (e). This finding, consistent with prevailing law, was not challenged by the union. See, e.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, which invoked the diversity jurisdiction of the Federal District Court in a suit to recover damages under an insurance policy, was here before. 363 U. S. 207. The-initial question then as now is whether the 12-month-suit clause in the policy governs, in which event the claim is barred, or whether Florida’s statutes nullifying such clauses if they require suit to be filed in less than five years are applicable and valid, in which event the suit is timely. The policy was purchased by petitioner in Illinois while he was a citizen and resident-of that State. Respondent, a British company, is licensed to do business in Illinois, Florida, and several other States.
A few months after purchasing the policy, petitioner moved to Florida and became a citizen and resident of that State; and it was in Florida that the loss occurred two years later. When the case reached here, the majority view was that the underlying constitutional question— whether consistently with due process, Florida could apply its five-year statute to this Illinois contract — should not be reached until the Florida Supreme Court, through its certificate procedure, had construed that statute and resolved another local law question. On remand the Court of Appeals certified the two questions to the Florida Supreme Court, which answered both questions in petitioner’s favor. 133 So. 2d 735. Thereafter the Court of Appeals held that it was not compatible with due process for Florida to apply its five-year statute to this contract and that judgment should be entered for respondent. 319 F. 2d 505. We again granted-certiorari. 375 U. S. 929.
While there are Illinois cases indicating that parties may contract — as here — for a shorter period of limitations than is provided by the Illinois statute, we are referred to no Illinois decision extending that rule into other States whenever claims on Illinois contracts are sought to be enforced there. We see no difficulty whatever under either the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause. We deal with an ambulatory contract on which suit might be brought in any one of several States. Normally, as the Court held in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U. S. 493, 502, a State having jurisdiction over a claim deriving from an out-of-state employment contract need not substitute the conflicting statute of the other State (workmen’s compensation) for its own statute (workmen’s compensation) — where the employee was injured in the course of his employment while temporarily in the latter State. We followed the same route in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66, where we upheld a state statute allowing direct actions against liability insurance companies in the State of the forum, even though a clause in the contract, binding in the State where it was made, prohibited direct action against the insurer until final determination of the obligation of the insured.
The Court of Appeals relied in the main on Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143, and Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397. Those were cases where the activities in the State of the forum were thought to be too slight and too casual, as in the Delta & Pine Land Co. case (292 U. S., at 150), to make the application of local law consistent with due process, or wholly lacking, as in the Dick case. No deficiency of that order is present here. As Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, said when this case was here before:
“Insurance companies, like other contractors, do not confine their contractual activities and obligations within state boundaries. They sell to customers who are promised protection in States far away from the place where the contract is made. In this very case the policy was sold to Clay with knowledge that he could take his property anywhere in the world he saw fit without losing the protection of his insurance. In fact, his contract was described on its face as a ‘Personal Property Floater Policy (World Wide).’ The contract did not even attempt to provide that the law of Illinois would govern when suits were filed anywhere else in the country. Shortly after the contract was made, Clay moved to Florida and there he lived for several years. His insured property was there all that time. The company knew this fact. Particularly since the company was licensed to do business in Florida, it must have known it might be sued there . . . .” 363 U. S., at 221.
Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U. S. 586, involved a six-month-suit clause; but it is a highly specialized decision dealing with unique facts — a suit on an insurance policy issued by an Ohio fraternal society, incorporating its constitution and by-laws, and involving what the Court called the “indivisible unity” of the fraternal society. Id., at 606. In that case the additional time afforded by the statute of limitations of South Dakota, where the case was tried, was not allowed to be applied to the contract. We do not extend that rule nor apply it here, for Florida has ample contacts with the present transaction and the parties to satisfy any conceivable requirement of full faith and credit or of due process.
Reversed.
Fla. Stat. Ann. (1960) §§ 95.03, 95.11 (3).
Fla. Stat. Ann. (1957) §25.031; Fla. App. Rule 4.61. See Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735. For other instances of our use of that certificate procedure see Dresner v. Tallahassee, 375 U. S. 136, and Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U. S. 75, 249.
The meaning of an “all risks” clause.
See cases cited in 363 U. S., at 217, note 12.
“. . . [N]othing in any way relating to the policy sued on, or to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in Texas. All acts relating to the making of the policy were done in Mexico. All in relation to the making of the contracts of re-insurance were done there or in New York. And, likewise, all things in regard to'performance were to be done outside of Texas. Neither the Texas laws nor the Texas courts were invoked for any purpose, except by Dick in the bringing of this suit. The fact that Dick's permanent residence was in Texas is without significance. At all times here material, he was physically present and acting in Mexico.” 281 U. S., at 408.
A motion to strike a brief amicus filed by Florida is denied.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to determine whether Janus Capital Management LLC (JCM), a mutual fund investment adviser, can be held hable in a private action under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 for false statements included in its client mutual funds’ prospectuses. Rule 10b-5 prohibits “mak[ing] any untrue statement of a material fact” in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (2010). We conclude that JCM cannot be held liable because it did not make the statements in the prospectuses.
I
Janus Capital Group, Inc. (JCG), is a publicly traded company that created the Janus family of mutual funds. These mutual funds are organized in a Massachusetts business trust, the Janus Investment Fund. Janus Investment Fund retained JCG’s wholly owned subsidiary, JCM, to be its investment adviser and administrator. JCG and JCM are the petitioners here.
Although JCG created Janus Investment Fund, Janus Investment Fund is a separate legal entity owned entirely by mutual fund investors. Janus Investment Fund has no assets apart from those owned by the investors. JCM provides Janus Investment Fund with investment advisory services, which include “the management and administrative services necessary for the operation of [Janus] Fun[d],” App. 225a, but the two entities maintain legal independence. At all times relevant to this case, all of the officers of Janus Investment Fund were also officers of JCM, but only one member of Janus Investment Fund’s board of trustees was associated with JCM. This is more independence than is required: By statute, up to 60 percent of the board of a mutual fund may be composed of “interested persons.” See 54 Stat. 806, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-10(a); see also § 80a-2(a)(19) (2006 ed. and Supp. IV) (defining “interested person”).
As the securities laws require, Janus Investment Fund issued prospectuses describing the investment strategy and operations of its mutual funds to investors. See §§ 77b(a)(10), 77e(b)(2), 80a-8(b), 80a-2(a)(31), 80a-29(aHb) (2006 ed.). The prospectuses for several funds represented that the funds were not suitable for market timing and can be read to suggest that JCM would implement policies to curb the practice. For example, the Janus Mercury Fund prospectus dated February 25,2002, stated that the fund was “not intended for market timing or excessive trading” and represented that it “may reject any purchase request ... if it believes that any combination of trading activity is attributable to market timing or is otherwise excessive or potentially disruptive to the Fund.” App. 141a. Although market timing is legal, it harms other investors in the mutual fund.
In September 2003, the attorney general of the State of New York filed a complaint against JCG and JCM alleging that JCG entered into secret arrangements to permit market timing in several funds run by JCM. After the complaint’s allegations became public, investors withdrew significant amounts of money from the Janus Investment Fund mutual funds. Because Janus Investment Fund compensated JCM based on the total value of the funds and JCM’s management fees constituted a significant percentage of JCG’s income, Janus Investment Fund’s loss of value affected JCG’s value as well. JCG’s stock price fell nearly 25 percent, from $17.68 on September 2 to $18.50 on September 26.
Respondent First Derivative Traders (First Derivative) represents a class of plaintiffs who owned JCG stock as of September 8, 2003. Its complaint asserts claims against JCG and JCM for violations of Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §78j(b). First Derivative alleges that JCG and JCM “caused mutual fund prospectuses to be issued for Janus mutual funds and made them available to the investing public, which created the misleading impression that [JCG and JCM] would implement measures to curb market timing in the Janus [mutual funds].” App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a. “Had the truth been known, Janus [mutual funds] would have been less attractive to investors, and consequently, [JCG] would have realized lower revenues, so [JCG’s] stock would have traded at lower prices.” Id,, at 72a.
First Derivative contends that JCG and JCM “materially misled the investing public” and that class members relied “upon the integrity of the market price of [JCG] securities and market information relating to [JCG and JCM].” Id., at 109a. The complaint also alleges that JCG should be held liable for the acts of JCM as a “controlling person” under § 78t(a) (2006 ed., Supp. IV) (§ 20(a) of the Act).
The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litigation, 487 F. Supp. 2d 618, 620 (D Md. 2007). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that First Derivative had sufficiently alleged that “JCG and JCM, by participating in the writing and dissemination of the prospectuses, made the misleading statements contained in the documents.” In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litigation, 566 F. 3d 111, 121 (2009) (emphasis in original). With respect to the element of reliance, the court found that investors would infer that JCM “played a role in preparing or approving the content of the Janus fund prospectuses,” id., at 127, but that investors would not infer the same about JCG, which could be liable only as a “control person” of JCM under § 20(a). Id., at 128,129-130.
II
We granted certiorari to address whether JCM can be held liable in a private action under Rule 10b-5 for false statements included in Janus Investment Fund’s prospectuses. 561 U. S. 1024 (2010). Under Rule 10b-5, it is unlawful for “any person, directly or indirectly, . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact” in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 17 CFR § 240.10b-5(b). To be liable, therefore, JCM must have “made” the material misstatements in the prospectuses. We hold that it did not.
A
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 pursuant to authority granted under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b). Although neither Rule 10b-5 nor § 10(b) expressly creates a private right of action, this Court has held that “a private right of action is implied under § 10(b).” Superintendent of Ins. of N. Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13, n. 9 (1971). That holding “remains the law,” Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U. S. 148, 165 (2008), but “[concerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action caution against its expansion,” ibid. Thus, in analyzing whether JCM “made” the statements for purposes of Rule 10b-5, we are mindful that we must give “narrow dimensions ... to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.” Id., at 167.
1
One “makes” a statement by stating it. When “make” is paired with a noun expressing the action of a verb, the resulting phrase is “approximately equivalent in sense” to that verb. 6 Oxford English Dictionary 66 (def. 59) (1933) (hereinafter OED); accord, Webster’s New International Dictionary 1485 (def. 43) (2d ed. 1934) (“Make followed by a noun with the indefinite article is often nearly equivalent to the verb intransitive corresponding to that noun”). For instance, “to make a proclamation” is the approximate equivalent of “to proclaim,” and “to make a promise” approximates “to promise.” See 6 OED 66 (def. 59). The phrase at issue in Rule 10b-5, “[t]o make any . . . statement,” is thus the approximate equivalent of “to state.”
For purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it. Without control, a person or entity can merely suggest what to say, not “make” a statement in its own right. One who prepares or publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its maker. And in the ordinary case, attribution within a statement or implicit from surrounding circumstances is strong evidence that a statement was made by— and only by — the party to whom it is attributed. This rule might best be exemplified by the relationship between a speechwriter and a speaker. Even when a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is entirely within the control of the person who delivers it. And it is the speaker who takes credit — or blame — for what is ultimately said.
This rule follows from Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164 (1994), in which we held that Rule lOb-5's private right of action does not include suits against aiders and abettors. See id., at 180. Such suits — against entities that contribute “substantial assistance” to the making of a statement but do not actually make it — may be brought by the SEC, see 15 U. S. C. § 78t(e), but not by private parties. A broader reading of “make,” including persons or entities without ultimate control over the content of a statement, would substantially undermine Central Bank. If persons or entities without control over the content of a statement could be considered primary violators who “made” the statement, then aiders and abettors would be almost nonexistent.
This interpretation is further supported by our recent decision in Stoneridge. There, investors sued “entities who, acting both as customers and suppliers, agreed to arrangements that allowed the investors’ company to mislead its auditor and issue a misleading financial statement.” 552 U. S., at 152-153. We held that dismissal of the complaint was proper because the public could not have relied on the entities' undisclosed deceptive acts. Id., at 166-167. Significantly, in reaching that conclusion we emphasized that “nothing [the defendants] did made it necessary or inevitable for [the company] to record the transactions as it did.” Id., at 161. This emphasis suggests the rule we adopt today: that the maker of a statement is the entity with authority over the content of the statement and whether and how to communicate it. Without such authority, it is not “necessary or inevitable” that any falsehood will be contained in the statement.
Our holding also accords with the narrow scope that we must give the implied private right of action. Id., at 167. Although the existence of the private right is now settled, we will not expand liability beyond the person or entity that ultimately has authority over a false statement.
2
The Government contends that “make” should be defined as “create.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14-15 (citing Webster’s New International Dictionary 1485 (2d ed. 1958) (defining “make” as “[t]o cause to exist, appear, or occur”)). This definition, although perhaps appropriate when “make” is directed at an object unassociated with a verb (e. g., “to make a chair”), fails to capture its meaning when directed at an object expressing the action of a verb.
Adopting the Government’s definition of “make” would also lead to results inconsistent with our precedent. The Government’s definition would permit private plaintiffs to sue a person who “provides the false or misleading information that another person then puts into the statement.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13. But in Stoneridge, we rejected a private Rule 10b-5 suit against companies involved in deceptive transactions, even when information about those transactions was later incorporated into false public statements. 552 U. S., at 161. We see no reason to treat participating in the drafting of a false statement differently from engaging in deceptive transactions, when each is merely an undisclosed act preceding the decision of an independent entity to make a public statement.
For its part, First Derivative suggests that the “well-recognized and uniquely close relationship between a mutual fund and its investment adviser” should inform our decision. Brief for Respondent 21. It suggests that an investment adviser should generally be understood to be the “maker” of statements by its client mutual fund, like a playwright whose lines are delivered by an actor. We decline this invitation to disregard the corporate form. Although First Derivative and its amici persuasively argue that investment advisers exercise significant influence over their client funds, see Jones v. Harris Associates L. P., 559 U. S. 335, 338 (2010), it is undisputed that the corporate formalities were observed here. JCM and Janus Investment Fund remain legally separate entities, and Janus Investment Fund’s board of trustees was more independent than the statute requires. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-10 (2006 ed.). Any reapportionment of liability in the securities industry in light of the close relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds is properly the responsibility of Congress and not the courts. Moreover, just as with the Government’s theory, First Derivative’s rule would create the broad liability that we rejected in Stoneridge.
Congress also has established liability in § 20(a) for “[ejvery person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable” for violations of the securities laws. §78t(a) (2006 ed., Supp. IV). First Derivative’s theory of liability based on a relationship of influence resembles the liability imposed by Congress for control. To adopt First Derivative’s theory would read into Rule 10b-5 a theory of liability similar to — but broader in application than, see post, at 156— what Congress has already created expressly elsewhere. We decline to do so.
B
Under this rule, JCM did not “make” any of the statements in the Janus Investment Fund prospectuses; Janus Investment Fund did. Only Janus Investment Fund — not JCM— bears the statutory obligation to file the prospectuses with the SEC. §§77e(b)(2), 80a-8(b), 80a-29(a)-(b); see also 17 CFR .§ 230.497 (imposing requirements on “investment companies”). The SEC has recorded that Janus Investment Fund filed the prospectuses. See JIF Groupl Standalone Prospectuses (Feb. 25, 2002), online at http://www. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/277751/000027775102000049/ 0000277751-02-000049.txt (as visited June 10, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (recording the “Filer” of the Janus Mercury Fund prospectus as “Janus Investment Fund”). There is no allegation that JCM in fact filed the prospectuses and falsely attributed them to Janus Investment Fund. Nor did anything on the face of the prospectuses indicate that any statements therein came from JCM rather than Janus Investment Fund — a legally independent entity with its own board of trustees.
First Derivative suggests that both JCM and Janus Investment Fund might have “made” the misleading statements within the meaning of Rule 10b-5 because JCM was significantly involved in preparing the prospectuses. But this assistance, subject to the ultimate control of Janus Investment Fund, does not mean that JCM “made” any statements in the prospectuses. Although JCM, like a speechwriter, may have assisted Janus Investment Fund with crafting what Janus Investment Fund said in the prospectuses, JCM itself did not “make” those statements for purposes of Rule 10b-5.
* * *
The statements in the Janus Investment Fund prospectuses were made by Janus Investment Fund, not by JCM. Accordingly, First Derivative has not stated a claim against JCM under Rule 10b-5. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Market timing is a trading strategy that exploits timo delay in mutual funds’ daily valuation system. The price for buying or selling shares of a mutual fund is ordinarily determined by the next net asset value (NAV) calculation after the order is placed. The NAV calculation usually happens once a day, at the close of the major U. S. markets. Because of certain time delays, however, the values uood in these calculations do not always accurately reflect the true value of the underlying assets. For example, a fund may value its foreign securities based on the price at the close of the foreign market, which may have occurred several hours boforo the calculation. But events might have taken place after the close of the foreign market that could be expected to affect their price. If the event were expected to increase the price of the foreign securities, a market timing investor could buy shares of a mutual fund at the artificially low NAV and sell the next day when the NAV corrects itself upward. See Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 68 Fed. Reg. 70402 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003).
In 2004, JCG and JCM sottlod thoso allegations and agreed to reduce their fees by $125 million and pay $50 million in civil penalties and $50 million in disgorgement to the mutual fund investors.
The elements of a private action under Rule 10b-5 are “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or salo of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U. S. 148, 157 (2008).
Rule 10b-5 makes it “unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by tho ueo of any moans or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, . . . [t]o mako any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact nocoesary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . . .” 17 CFR §240.10b-5(b).
Although First Derivative argued below that JCG violated Rule 10b-5 by making the statements in the prospectuses, it now seeks to hold JCG liable solely as a control person of JCM under § 20(a). The only question we must answer, therefore, is whether JCM made the misstatements. Whether First Derivative has stated a claim against JCG as a control person depends on whether it has stated a claim against JCM.
Tho disoont eorroetly notes that Central Bank involved secondary, not primary, liability. Post, at 158 (opinion of Breyer, J.). But for Central Bank to have any moaning, there must be some distinction between thoac who aro primarily liable (and thue may be pursued in private suite) and those who aro secondarily liable (and thus may not be pursued in private suits).
We draw a clean line between the two — the maker is the person or entity with ultimate authority over a statement and others are not. In contrast, the dissent’s only limit on primary liability is not much of a limit at all. It would allow for primary liability whenever “[t]he specific rola tionships alleged... warrant [that] conclusion” — whatever that may mean. Post, at 158.
We agree that "no one in Stoneridge contended thal the equipment suppliers were, in fact, the makers of the cable company's misstatements.” Poots at 166. If Stonoridgo had addrcoood whether the equipment euppli-ero were “makers," today’s decision would be unnecessary. The point is that Stoneridge’s analysis suggests that they were not.
Because we do not find the meaning of “make” in Rule 10b-5 to be ambiguous, we need not consider the Government’s assertion that we should defer to the SEC's interpretation of the word elsewhere. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13 (citing Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae in Pacific Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, No. 09-1619 (CA2), p. 7); see Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 588 (2000). We note, howovor, that we have previously expressed skopticiom over the degree to which the SEC should receive deference regarding the private right of action. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 41, n. 27 (1977) (noting that the SEC’s presumed expertise “is of limited value” whan analyzing “whothor a cauoo of action should be implied by judicial interpretation in favor of a particular class of litigants”). This also is not the first time this Court has disagreed with the SEC’s broad view of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. See, e. g., Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 188-191 (1994); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646, 666, n. 27 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 207 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 746, n. 10 (1975).
Nor does First Derivative contend that any statements made by JCM to Janus Investment Fund were “public statements” for the purposes of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S. 224, 227-228 (1988). We do not address whether and in what eireumstanecD statements would qualify as “public.” Cf. post, at 159 160 (citing cases involving liability for statements mado to analysts); In re Aetna, Inc. Securities Litigation, 617 F. 3d 272, 275-277 (CA3 2010) (involving allegations that defendants “publicly toutfed]” falsities on analyst conference calls).
We do not address whether Congress created liability for entities that act through innocent intermediaries in 15 U. S. C. § 78t(b). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 61.
First Derivative suggests that “indirectly” in Rule 10b-5 may broaden the meaning of “make.” We disagree. The phrase “directly or indirectly” is set off by itself in Rule 10b-5 and modifies not just “to make,” but also “to employ” and “to engage.” We think the phrase merely clarifies that as long as a statement is made, it docs not matter whether the statement was communicated directly or indirectly to the recipient. A different understanding of “indirectly” would, like a broad definition of “make,” threaten to erase the line between primary violators and aiders and abettors established by Central Bank.
In this case, wo nood not dofino procisoly what it moans to communicate a “made” statement indirectly because none of the statements in the prospectuses were attributed, explicitly or implicitly, to JCM. Without attribution, there is no indication that Janus Investment Fund was quoting or otherwise repeating a statement originally “made” by JCM. Cf. Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 77 F. 3d 1215, 1220, and n. 4 (CA10 1996) (quoting a signed “ ‘Auditor’s Report’ ” included in a prospectus); Basic, supra, at 227, n. 4 (quoting a newo item reporting a statement by Basic’s presidont), More may bo required to find that a person or entity made a statement indirectly, but attribution is necessary.
That JCM provided access to Janus Investment Fund’s prospectuses on its Web site is also not a basis for liability. Merely hosting a document on a Web site docs not indicate that the hosting entity adopts the docu ■ ment as its own statement or exercises control over its content. Cf. United States v. Ware, 577 F. 3d 442, 448 (CA2 2009) (involving the issuance of false press releases through innocent companies). In doing so, we do not think JCM made any of the statements in Janus Investment Fund’s prospectuses for purposes of Rule 10b 5 liability, just as wo do not think that the SEC “makes” the statements in the many prospectuses available on its Web site.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1949 Mrs. Doris Walker was discharged from her job at Cutter Laboratories, a manufacturer of pharmaceutical and biological products, on the claimed grounds that she was an active member of the Communist Party and had falsified her application for employment there. Petitioner, Bio-Lab' Union of Local 225, United Office & Professional Workers of America, sought reinstatement for Mrs. Walker before an Arbitration Board pursuant to a valid collective-bargaining agreement which authorized discharge for “just cause” only. The Board determined that she had been discharged for union activity and, by a vote of 2 to 1, ordered her reinstatement. The Superior Court of San Francisco County confirmed the award and ordered it enforced. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court of California, however, reversed. 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P. 2d 905. Petitioners contend that the decision and opinion below violate constitutional principles embraced in the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. We granted certiorari, 350 U. S. 816.
Before Mrs. Walker applied for a job at the Cutter plant, she had graduated from law school, worked for three years as an attorney for the Office of Price Administration and in private practice, and had been discharged for union activity from jobs in three different canneries. All of these facts, she readily admitted to the Board, were concealed or misrepresented by her in the Cutter employment application in 1946. In addition, she admitted that she had falsely stated that she had been employed as a file clerk in 1939 by one John Trippe, attorney. She told the Board that no such person or employment had existed. The character references she listed had been warned by her of the omissions and falsifications in her application and at her request they did not disclose her true background to Cutter. These falsifications and omissions were not discovered until after she had been employed as a label clerk by the Cutter plant and the “probationary period” had expired.
The Arbitration Board found that Mrs. Walker had played an active role in union activities at the Cutter plant. In 1947 she became a shop chairman and a member of the executive board of the Local. The following year she was elected chief shop steward, and her activities were extended to all manufacturing departments of the Laboratory. She became president of the Local in the spring of 1949, and was holding that office at the time of her discharge. The Board also found that Mrs. Walker was a member of the Communist Party during the period of her employment. Cutter had investigated her in 1947 and 1949 and had discovered evidence of Communist Party membership and also that she had falsified her employment application. The Board’s finding of Communist Party membership was based on evidence uncovered in the Cutter investigations plus Mrs. Walker’s refusal to answer questions relating to membership and the Union’s offer to stipulate that the company could reasonably have concluded that she was a Communist.
The Board took the “view of the record” that Cutter honestly believed that Mrs. Walker had falsified her application and was a member of the Party. But it held that, “while an employer may have sufficient grounds for a discharge,” he “should not be entitled to carry mutually known grounds for discharge in his hip pocket indefinitely for future convenient use.” It found Cutter’s grounds to be “stale” and concluded that Mrs. Walker was unjustly discharged and that this action of Cutter “interfered with, restrained and coerced an employee because of participation as an officer and negotiator on behalf of the Union in a wage negotiation.”
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court of California contains broad statements to the effect that specific performance of the arbitration award would violate the public policy of the State. Petitioner’s constitutional arguments are based on the belief that these statements establish the ground on which the judgment below was based, and that therefore the decision below not only establishes a conclusive presumption of advocacy of violence from the mere fact of membership in the Communist Party, but renders unenforceable substantially all contracts entered into by members of the Party.
This Court, however, reviews judgments, not statements in opinions. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 125-126; Morrison v. Watson, 154 U. S. 111, 115. See also Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117, 118, 120. At times, the atmosphere in which an opinion is written may become so surcharged that unnecessarily broad statements are made. In such a case, it is our duty to look beyond the broad sweep of the language and determine for ourselves precisely the ground on which the judgment rests. This means no more than that we should not pass on federal questions discussed in the opinion where it appears that the judgment rests on adequate state grounds. Herb v. Pitcairn, supra; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471, 477.
It is significant that the Supreme Court of California did not limit itself to a discussion of the application of the California public policy. It also subjected the findings of the Arbitration Board to a scrutinizing review. Of course, the scope of review of such findings under the California Arbitration Act is a matter exclusively for the courts of that State, and is not our concern. Allen-Bradley Local v. Labor Board, 315 U. S. 740, 747.
First, the court determined that, since Mrs. Walker was a continuing member of the Communist Party, the doctrine of waiver could not be applied to this ground for discharge. The court noted that Mrs. Walker had remained a member of the Party “on an active and devoted basis even at the time of the board hearings.” 43 Cal. 2d, at 807, 278 P. 2d, at 916.
Second, it is clear that the individual parties might have agreed that the circumstance of Communist Party membership would constitute “just cause” under the contract, and no federal question would thereby be raised. It is implicit in the Arbitration Board’s opinion that this was a reasonable construction of the contract, but since it applied a doctrine of waiver, no explicit findings on this point were made. But, as we read the opinion of the Supreme Court of California, after concluding that waiver could not be applied to the facts of this case, it decided that the “just cause” provision of the contract permitted discharge on the ground of Communist Party membership, and that Mrs. Walker was discharged on that ground. The court stated, “The contract between Cutter Laboratories and the Bio-Lab Union cannot be construed, and will not be enforced, to protect activities by a Communist on behalf of her party whether in the guise of unionism or otherwise.” 43 Cal. 2d, at 809, 278 P. 2d, at 917. At another point, the court noted that “an entirely adequate ground [Party membership] for refusing to employ her (whether by original refusal to hire or by discharge) was a continuing one which was available to the employer at any time during its existence.” 43 Cal. 2d, at 807, 278 P. 2d, at 916. In this connection, it might also be noted that the court below discussed the history of the clause in the contract which prohibited discrimination “because of race, color, creed, national origin, religious belief, or Union affiliation.” At one time the word “political” as well as “religious belief” was included in the provision, but, by negotiation, it was deleted.
We believe that the Supreme Court of California construed the term “just cause” to embrace membership in the Communist Party, and refused to apply a doctrine of waiver. As such, the decision involves only California’s construction of a local contract under local law, and therefore no substantial federal question is presented. Moreover, even if the State Court’s opinion be considered ambiguous, we should choose the interpretation which does not face us with a constitutional question. See Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U. S. 541, 547, and cases cited. Cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. It follows that the writ must be
Dismissed.
Mr. Justice Reed would affirm the judgment below.
At the time of discharge a written notice was read to Mrs. Walker by a company official in the presence of another company official, an assistant shop steward of the union and a company stenographer. The notice read as follows:
“Mrs. Walker:
“As you are aware, the company has known for some time that when you applied for work with Cutter Laboratories on October 4, 1946, you made a number of false representations on your ‘Application for Employment.’
“As we know now, you falsified the statement of your education so as to conceal the fact that you had completed a law school course at the University of California’s School of Jurisprudence at Berkeley in May, 1942. You concealed the facts that you received the degree of Bachelor of Laws in May, 1942, and that you were admitted to the State Bar of California on December 8, 1942. You concealed that since that date you have at all times been admitted and entitled to practice as an attorney before all of the Courts of California.
“We know now that by falsification of the name of a previous employer, you concealed the fact that from June, 1942 to February, 1944 you were employed by the Federal Government’s Office of Price Administration, including employment as an Enforcement Attorney at a salary of about $3,200.00 a year.
"We know now that you deliberately concealed from us that from February 1944 to December, 1945 you were employed as an attorney by Gladstein, Grossman, Sawyer and Edises, a well-known firm of lawyers specializing in labor cases.
"You know that a few weeks ago the 'Labor Herald,’ the official CIO newspaper, stated that the National Labor Relations Board had sustained a cannery firm that had discharged you for refusing to answer whether or not you were a Communist.
“We have checked the records. We know now that you deliberately concealed that in 1946, just before you applied for work here, you were employed by a series of canneries and had been discharged by them.
“Ordinarily, an employee of the Company would be discharged immediately for falsifying material facts on an ‘Application for Employment.’ Because you were an officer of the Union we kept you on the pay roll rather than open ourselves to a charge of persecuting a union officer. We have given your case careful consideration because we know very well that no matter how strong the case against you there will be a claim of discrimination because of union activities.
“Because no employer wants to become involved in a dispute of that kind we have been patient and deliberate in our consideration of your misconduct.
“On October 1, 1948, when you testified under oath before a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, you refused to answer the question as to whether or not you were a member of the Communist Party.
“You refused to answer under oath the question as to whether or not you were or had been a member of the Federal Workers’ Branch No. 3 of the Communist Party.
“You refused to testify under oath whether or not you were or had been a member of the South Side Professional Club of the Communist Party.
“We are convinced now, that you were and still are a member of the Communist Party, that you were a member of the Federal Workers’ Branch No. 3 of the Communist Party, and that you were a member of the South Side Professional Club of the Communist Party.
“Our recent investigation of your past record has uncovered previously unknown conduct that goes far beyond a mere concealment of material facts. We have Just completed a thorough investigation and have a full report upon your past activities. We realize now the importance of the facts that you concealed from us. We realize the full implications of your falsification and misrepresentations. A follow-up and investigation of the ‘Labor Heralds’ recent revelations has uncovered a situation far more grave than we expected.
“We are convinced now that for a number of years, you have been and still are a member of the Communist Party. We are convinced beyond any question that for a number of years you have participated actively in the Communist Party’s activities.
“The nature of our company’s business requires more than the usual precaution against sabotage and subversion. Upon a disclosure that any employee is a member of the Communist Party, or has participated in other subversive or revolutionary activity, we conceive it to be the responsibility of management to take action.
“Confronted with such a situation, any inclination to be lenient or to grant a union official special consideration is out. In the face of your record there is no alternative open to us except to terminate your services at once. Accordingly, you are notified now that you are discharged for the causes mentioned. You will be paid the full amount due to you promptly.”
Since the Board was authorized to inquire into the reasons for her discharge and the questions were, as it ruled, relevant to the issue, it could draw such inferences as were warranted. In this respect the case is unlike Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551.
While the court also spoke of its public policy in reaching this conclusion, its reasoning outlined above amply supports its conclusion.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Clakk
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This injunction suit, filed in 1947 by water right claimants along the San Joaquin River below Friant Dam, California, and against local officials of the United States Bureau of Reclamation, a number of Irrigation and Utility Districts and, subsequently, against the United States as well, sought to prevent the storing and diverting of water at the dam, which is part of the Central Valley Reclamation Project. 50 Stat. 844, 850 (1937). See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725 (1950). The defense interposed was that the suit was against the United States and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the courts, it not having consented to be sued. In 1956 the District Court ordered the injunction issued unless the Government constructed a “physical solution” which would afford the landowners a supply of water simulating that of the past. Rank v. Krug, 142 F. Supp. 1. The Court of Appeals reversed as to the United States, finding that it had not consented to be sued. However, as to the officials, it affirmed on the ground that the United States had neither acquired nor taken the claimed water rights and that the officials were therefore acting beyond their statutory authority. California v. Rank, 293 F. 2d 340 and 307 F. 2d 96. No. 31 is the petition of the local Reclamation Bureau officials, and No. 115 is that of the Irrigation and Utility Districts. Both cases proceed from the same Court of Appeals opinion. The importance of the question to the operation of this vast federal reclamation project led us to grant certiorari. 369 U. S. 836 and 370 U. S. 936. We have concluded that the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the suit against the United States; that the suit against the petitioning local officials of the Reclamation Bureau is in fact against the United States and they must be dismissed therefrom; that the United States either owned or has acquired or taken the water rights involved in the suit and that any relief to which the respondents may be entitled by reason of such taking is by suit against the United States under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346. These conclusions lead to a reversal of the judgment insofar as suit was permitted against the United States through Bureau officials.
I. Aspects op the Central Valley Reclamation Project Involved.
The Project was authorized by the Congress and undertaken by the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior pursuant to the Act of August 26, 1937, 50 Stat. 844,850. It is generally described in sufficient detail for our purposes in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra, and Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275 (1958). See Graham, The Central Valley Project: Resource Development of a Natural Basin, 38 Cal. L. Rev. 588, 591 (1950), for a description and citation of federal authorizations.
The grand design of the Project was to conserve and put to maximum beneficial use the waters of the Central Valley of California, comprising a third of the State's territory, and the bowl of which starts in the northern part of the State and, averaging more than 100 miles in width, extends southward some 450 miles. The northern portion of the bowl is the Sacramento Valley, containing the Sacramento River, and the southern portion is the San Joaquin Valley, containing the San Joaquin River. The Sacramento River rises in the extreme north, runs southerly to the City of Sacramento and then on into San Francisco Bay and the Pacific Ocean. The San Joaquin River rises in the Sierra Nevada northeast of Fresno, runs westerly to Mendota and then northwesterly to the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta where it joins the Sacramento River. The Sacramento River, because of heavier rainfall in its watershed, has surplus water, but its valley has little available tillable soil, while the San Joaquin is in the contrary situation. An imaginative engineering feat has transported some of the Sacramento surplus to the San Joaquin scarcity and permitted the waters of the latter river to be diverted to new areas for irrigation and other needs. This transportation of Sacramento water is accomplished by pumping water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta into the Delta-Mendota Canal, a lift of some 200 feet. The water then flows by gravity through this canal along the west side of the San Joaquin Valley southerly to Mendota, some 117 miles, where it is discharged into the San Joaquin River. The waters of the San Joaquin River are impounded by a dam constructed at Friant, approximately 60 miles upstream from Men-dota. Friant Dam stores the water in Millerton Lake from which it is diverted by the Madera Canal on the north to Madera County and the Friant-Kern Canal on the south to the vicinity of Bakersfield for use in those areas for irrigation and other public purposes.
The river bed at Friant is at a level approximately 240 feet higher than at Mendota, 142 F. Supp. 173, which prevents the Sacramento water from being carried further upstream and replenishing the San Joaquin in the 60-mile area between Mendota and Friant Dam, thereby furnishing Sacramento River water for the entire length of the San Joaquin below Friant Dam. This 60-mile stretch of the San Joaquin — and more particularly that between Friant Dam and Gravelly Ford, 37 miles downstream — is the approximate area involved in this litigation. It has been the subject of cooperative studies by the state, local, and federal governments for many years. Indeed the initial planning of the Project recognized, as indicated by the engineering studies included in the plan, that the water flow on the San Joaquin between Friant Dam and Mendota would be severely diminished. See 18 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 31, 33-34 (1951). All of the parties recognized the existence of water rights in the area and the necessity to accommodate or extinguish them. Report No. 3, Calif. Water Project Authority, Definition of Rights to the Waters of the San Joaquin River Proposed for Diversion to Upper San Joaquin Valley, 1-2 (1936). The principal alternative, as shown by the reports of the United States Reclamation Bureau to the Congress and the subsequent appropriations of the Congress, was to purchase or pay for infringement of these rights. As early as 1939 the Government entered into negotiations ultimately culminating in the purchase of water rights or agreements for substitute diversions or periodic releases of water from Friant Dam into the San Joaquin River. Graham, The Central Valley Project: Resource Development of a Natural Basin, supra. As of 1952 the United States had entered into 215 contracts of this nature involving almost 12,000 acres, of which contracts some 100 require the United States to maintain a live stream of water in the river.
However, agreements could not be reached with some of the claimants along this reach of the river, and this suit resulted.
II. History of the Litigation.
The suit was filed in 1947 and has been both costly and protracted. It involves some 325,000 acres of land including a portion of the City of Fresno. See map in 142 F. Supp., at 40. Originally filed in the Superior Court of California, it sought to enjoin local officials of the United States Reclamation Bureau from storing or diverting water to the San Joaquin at Friant Dam or, in the alternative, to obtain a decree of a physical solution of water rights. The action was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The named plaintiffs claimed to represent a class of owners of riparian as well as other types of water rights. In addition to the local officials of the Reclamation Bureau two of the Irrigation Districts receiving diverted water from Millerton Lake were originally made defendants and later the other Irrigation and Utility District defendants were joined.
The complaint challenged the constitutional authority of the United States to operate the Project. A three-judge court was impaneled pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2282, and it decided this issue presented no substantial constitutional question. Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773 (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1950). This left undecided the question of whether the Secretary of the Interior and Bureau of Reclamation officials had statutory authority to acquire the water rights involved. The issue remained dormant until the Delta-Mendota Canal was completed in 1951, 142 F. Supp., at 45, and the Government began to reduce the flow of water through Friant Dam. By consent, temporary restraining orders were entered controlling the releases covering the years 1951, 1952, and part of 1953. In June of the latter year the United States withdrew its consent with the approval of the Court of Appeals, United States v. United States District Court, 206 F. 2d 303. The District Court then ordered the United States joined as a party on the basis of the McCarran amendment, Act of July 10, 1952, 66 Stat. 560, 43 U. S. C. § 666, infra, n. 5. Friant Dam has, however, been operated by the United States without judicial interference since June 30, 1953.
The District Court announced its opinion in the case on February 7, 1956, 142 F. Supp. 1, and the judgment was entered the next year. It declared the water rights of all of the claimants, the members of the class they claimed to represent and the intervenors, Tranquility Irrigation District and the City of Fresno, as against the United States, the Reclamation Bureau officers and the Districts. It did not grant relief as between individual claimants of water rights or adjudicate the priority of these rights among them. 142 F. Supp., at 36. The judgment declared that the claimants
“have been, now are, and will be entitled to the full natural flow of the San Joaquin River past Friant at all times . . . unless and until the physical solution hereinelsewhere described is erected and constructed [by the defendants] within a reasonable time, and thereafter operated as hereinelsewhere set forth.” Transcript of Record, Yol. Ill, p. 993.
The physical solution was a series of 10 small dams to be built at the expense of the United States along the stretch of river involved for the purpose of keeping the water at a level “equivalent” to the natural flow, 142 F. Supp., at 166, or to simulate it at a flow of 2,000 feet per second. 142 F. Supp., at 169.
In summary, the court held that the United States was a proper party under the McCarran amendment; that the claimants had vested rights to the full natural flow of the river superior to any rights of the United States or other defendants; that the operation of Friant Dam does not permit sufficient water to pass down the river to satisfy these rights; that Congress has not authorized the taking of these rights by physical seizure but only by eminent domain exercised through judicial proceedings; that as a consequence the impounding at Friant Dam constitutes an unauthorized and unlawful invasion of rights for which damages are not adequate recompense; that this requires all of the defendants, including the United States, to be enjoined from storing or diverting or otherwise impeding the full natural flow of the San Joaquin at Friant Dam unless within a reasonable time and at its own expense the United States, or the Districts, build the dams aforesaid and put them into operation; that the United States is subject to the California county of origin and watershed of origin statutes, Calif. Water Code § 10505, and §§ 11460-11463, and must first satisfy at the same charge as made for agricultural water service the full needs of the City of Fresno and Tranquility Irrigation District before diverting San Joaquin water to other areas; and finally that the United States is also subject to Calif. Water Code §§ 106 and 106.5 as to domestic-use water priority and the power of municipalities to acquire and hold water rights.
The Court of Appeals reversed as to the joinder of the United States, holding that it could not be made a party without its consent. It likewise found that the United States was authorized to acquire, either by physical seizure or otherwise, such of the rights of the claimants as it needed to operate the Project and that this power could not be restricted by state law. However, it found that no such authorized seizure had occurred because the Government had not sufficiently identified what rights it was seizing, and because of this equivocation of the federal officials, there was a trespass rather than a taking. It concluded, therefore, that the petitioner Reclamation Bureau officials had acted beyond their statutory authority and affirmed the injunctive features of the judgment. On rehearing, the injunction was modified to make it inapplicable to the petitioner Districts in No. 115 but the court refused to dismiss as to them.
III. The United States as a Party.
We go directly to the question of joinder of the United States as a party. We agree with the Court of Appeals on this issue and therefore do not consider the contention at length. It is sufficient to say that the provision of the McCarran amendment, 66 Stat. 560, 43 U. S. C. § 666, relied upon by respondents and providing that the United States may be joined in suits “for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source,” is not applicable here. Rather than a case involving a general adjudication of “all of the rights of various owners on a given stream,” S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951), it is a private suit to determine water rights solely between the respondents and the United States and the local Reclamation Bureau officials. In addition to the fact that all of the claimants to water rights along the river are not made parties, no relief is either asked or granted as between claimants, nor are priorities sought to be established as to the appropriative and prescriptive rights asserted. But because of the presence of local Reclamation Bureau officials and the nature of the relief granted against them, the failure of the action against the United States does not end the matter. We must yet deal with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the suit against these officials is not one against the United States.
IV. Relief Granted Against Federal Officers.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the United States was empowered to acquire the water rights of respondents by physical seizure. As early as 1937, by the Rivers and Harbors Act, 50 Stat. 844, 850, the Congress had provided that the Secretary of the Interior “may acquire by proceedings in eminent domain, or otherwise, all lands, rights-of-way, water rights, and other property necessary for said purposes . . . .” Likewise, in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra, this Court implicitly recognized that such rights were subject to seizure when we held that Gerlach and others were entitled to compensation therefor. The question was specifically settled in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, supra, where we said that such rights could be acquired by the payment of compensation “either through condemnation or, if already taken, through action of the owners in the courts.” 357 U. S., at 291. However, the Court of Appeals, in examining the extent of the taking here, concluded that rather than an authorized taking of water rights, the action of the Reclamation Bureau officials constituted an unauthorized trespass. The court observed that the San Joaquin “will not be dried up” below Friant because the Government has contracted with other water right owners to maintain “a live stream,” and as the flow of water varies from day to day the respondents do not now and never will know what part of their claimed water rights the Government has taken or will take.
“A casual day by day taking under these circumstances constitutes day to day trespass upon the water right. . . . The cloud cast prospectively on the water right by the assertion of a power to take creates a present injury above what has been suffered by the interference itself — a present loss in property value which cannot be compensated until it can be measured.” 293 F. 2d, at 358.
The court, therefore, permitted the suit against the petitioning Reclamation Bureau officers as one in trespass, which led it to affirm, with modification, the injunctive relief granted by the District Court.
Rather than a trespass, we conclude that there was, under respondents’ allegations, a partial taking of respondents’ claimed rights. We believe that the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the principle of Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949), and other cases in the field of sovereign immunity. The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if “the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,” Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 738 (1947), or if the effect of the judgment would be “to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.” Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., supra, at 704; Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 502 (1921). The decree here enjoins the federal officials from “impounding, or diverting, or storing for diversion, or otherwise impeding or obstructing the full natural flow of the San Joaquin River . . . .” Transcript of Record, Vol. III, p. 1021. As the Court of Appeals found, the Project “could not operate without impairing, to some degree, the full natural flow of the river.” Experience of over a decade along the stretch of the San Joaquin involved here indicates clearly that the impairment was most substantial — almost three-fourths of the natural flow of the river. To require the full natural flow of the river to go through the dam would force the abandonment of this portion of a project which has not" only been fully authorized by the Congress but paid for through its continuing appropriations. Moreover, it would prevent the fulfillment of the contracts made by the United States with the Water and Utility Districts, which are petitioning in No. 115. The Government would, indeed, be “stopped in its tracks ....” Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., supra, at 704.
The physical solution has no less direct effect. The Secretary of the Interior, the President and the Congress have authorized the Project as now constructed and operated. Its plans do not include the 10 additional dams required by the physical solution to be built at government expense. The judgment, therefore, would not only “interfere with the public administration” but also “expend itself on the public treasury . . . .” Land v. Dollar, supra, at 738. Moreover, the decree would require the United States — contrary to.the mandate of the Congress— to dispose of valuable irrigation water and deprive it of the full use and control of its reclamation facilities. It is therefore readily apparent that the relief granted operates against the United States.
Nor do we believe that the action of the Reclamation Bureau officials falls within either of the recognized exceptions to the above general rule as reaffirmed only last Term. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., supra; Santa Fe Pac. R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197, 199 (1922); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 152-153 (1900). Those exceptions are (1) action by officers beyond their statutory powers and (2) even though within the scope of their authority, the powers themselves or the manner in which they are exercised are constitutionally void. Malone v. Bowdoin, supra, at 647. In either of such cases the officer’s action “can be made the basis of a suit for specific relief against the officer as an individual.. ..” Ibid. But the fact that the Court of Appeals characterized the action of the officers as a “trespass” does not at all establish that it was either unconstitutional or unauthorized. As this Court said in Larson, supra, at 693:
“The mere allegation that the officer, acting officially, wrongfully holds property to which the plaintiff has title does not meet [the] requirement [that it must also appear that the action to be restrained or directed is not action of the sovereign]. True, it establishes a wrong to the plaintiff. But it does not establish that the officer, in committing that wrong, is not exercising the powers delegated to him by the sovereign.”
And, the Court added:
“the action of an officer of the sovereign (be it holding, taking or otherwise legally affecting the plaintiff’s property) can be regarded as so ‘illegal’ as to permit a suit for specific relief against the officer as an individual only if it is not within the officer’s statutory powers or, if within those powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in the particular case, are constitutionally void.” Id., at 701-702.
Since the Government, through its officers here, had the power, under authorization of Congress, to seize the property of the respondents, as held by the Court of Appeals and recognized by several cases in this Court, and this power of seizure was constitutionally permissible, as we held in Ivanhoe, supra, there can be no question that this case comes under the rule of Larson and Malone, supra. The power to seize which was granted here had no limitation placed upon it by the Congress, nor did the Court of Appeals bottom its conclusion on a finding of any limitation. Haying plenary power to seize the whole of respondents’ rights in carrying out the congressional mandate, the federal officers a fortiori had authority to seize less. It follows that if any part of respondents’ claimed water rights were invaded it amounted to an interference therewith and a taking thereof — not a trespass.
We find no substance to the contention that respondents were without knowledge of the interference or partial taking. Nor can we accept the view that the absence of specificity as to the amount of water to be taken prevents the assessment of damages in this case. From the very beginning it was recognized that the operation of Friant Dam and its facilities would entail a taking of water rights below the dam. Indeed, it was obvious from the expressed purpose of the construction of the dam — to store and divert to other areas the waters of the San Joaquin — and the intention of the Government to purchase water rights along the river. Pursuant to this announced intention the Government did in fact enter into numerous contracts for water rights, as we have previously noted. While it is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the Government did not announce that it was taking water rights to a specified number of “gallons” or, for that matter, “inches” of water, see 293 F. 2d 340, 357-358, we do not think this quantitative uncertainty precludes ascertainment of the value of the taking. On this point we conclude that the Court of Appeals was in error. We find no uncertainty in the taking.
It is likely that an element of uncertainty may have been drawn by the Court of Appeals from the Secretary of the Interior’s statement in a letter that the operation of Friant Dam “is an administrative one, voluntarily assumed and voluntarily to be executed.” 293 F. 2d 340, 356, n. 8. This alone might present a picture of a spillway being opened and closed at the whim of the Secretary. We view this statement, however, as merely notice to the court that the Secretary intended to operate the water works fairly, but solely on his own, without court interference. Neither he nor the United States was a party. Even if the statement did introduce an element of uncertainty as to what exactly the Secretary might do, injunc-tive relief was not proper. Despite this caveat, damages were clearly ascertainable (see Collier v. Merced Irrigation District, 213 Cal. 554, 571-572, 2 P. 2d 790, 797 (1931)), based partially on the Secretary’s prior unequivocal statement regarding his plans as to the minimum flow of water to be released into the river below the dam. Parenthetically, we note that petitioners, in their brief, at p. 12, inform us that “Friant Dam has since been operated in accordance with the Secretary’s stated plan, subject to adjustments required by weather and other conditions.”
Damages in this instance are to be measured by the difference in market value of the respondents’ land before and after the interference or partial taking. As the Supreme Court of California said in Collier v. Merced Irrigation District, supra, at 571-572.
“. . . [T]he riparian right is a part and parcel of the land in a legal sense, yet it is a usufructuary and intangible right inhering therein and neither a partial nor a complete taking produces a disfigurement of the physical property. The only way to measure the injury done by an invasion of this right is to ascertain the depreciation in market value of the physical property. . . . There was a distinct conflict in the evidence as to whether the lands of appellant had a greater or a less market value after the taking by respondent, but there is no question of law arising on the evidence.”
The right claimed here is to the continued flow of water in the San Joaquin and to its use as it flows along the landowner’s property. A seizure of water rights need not necessarily be a physical invasion of land. It may occur upstream, as here. Interference with or partial taking of water rights in the manner it was accomplished here might be analogized to interference or partial taking of air space over land, such as in our recent case of Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U. S. 84, 89-90 (1962). See United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 261-263, 267 (1946); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327, 329 (1922). See also 1 Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States (3d ed. 1911), § 15; 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed. 1950), § 6.3. Therefore, when the Government acted here “with the purpose and effect of subordinating” the respondents’ water rights to the Project’s uses “whenever it saw fit,” “with the result of depriving the owner of its profitable use [there was] the imposition of such a servitude [as] would constitute an appropriation of property for which compensation should be made.” Peabody v. United States, 231 U. S. 530, 538 (1913); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, supra, at 329.
In an appropriate proceeding there would be a determination of not only the extent of such a servitude but the value thereof based upon the difference between the value of respondents’ property before and after the taking. Rather than a stoppage of the government project, this is the avenue of redress open to respondents. Since we have set aside the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the District Court, it is appropriate that we make clear that we do not in any way pass upon or indicate any view regarding the validity of respondents’ water right claims.
V. The Irrigation and Utility Districts.
Similar disposition must be made of No. 115. There the petitioners are 14 Irrigation and Utility Districts which have contracts with thp Government for the use of water from Millerton Lake. The Court of Appeals, as we have noted, dissolved the injunction previously granted against them by the District Court. No other relief having been sought against the Districts, it appears that they should have been dismissed from the action. In any event, in view of our disposition of No. 31, dismissal of these petitioners is now in order.
The judgment as to the dismissal of the United States is affirmed; it is reversed as to the failure to dismiss the Reclamation officials and the Irrigation and Utility Districts, and the cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions that it vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case with instructions that the same be dismissed.
It is so ordered.
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
A procedure authorized by California law whereby existing rights to the use of water are protected and excess waters are put to beneficial use.
See the Feasibility Report of Secretary Ickes to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, dated November 26, 1935, and approved by the President on December 2, 1935, reprinted in 90 F. Supp. 823-827 and in 1 Engle, Central Valley Project Documents, H. R. Doc. No. 416, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 562-567 (1956).
The trial, which lasted more than 200 days, required 30,000 pages of record and produced hundreds of orders. Opinions below are State v. Rank, 293 F. 2d 340 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1961); Rank v. (Krug) United States, 142 F. Supp. 1 (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1956). Related cases involving intermediate orders of the District Court are Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773 (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1950); United States v. United States District Court, 206 F. 2d 303 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1953); California v. United States District Court, 213 F. 2d 818 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1954); Rank v. United States, 16 F. R. D. 310 (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1954); City of Fresno v. Edmonston, 131 F. Supp. 421 (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1955).
The last two sections of the judgment are dealt with in cause No. 51, City of Fresno v. California, decided today, post, p. 627.
43 U. S. C. § 666:
“(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States in any such suit.
“(b) Summons or other process in any such suit shall be served upon the Attorney General or his designated representative.
“(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the joinder of the United States in any suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of the United States involving the right of States to the use of the water of any interstate stream.” July 10, 1952, c. 651, Title II, § 208, 66 Stat. 560.
See note 2, supra.
On March 30, 1953, in response to a request from the district judge that the Secretary clarify his position, a letter was written by the Secretary to the Attorney General expressing his “administrative intent with respect to the operation of the Central Valley project insofar as it relates to the Friant-to-Gravelly Ford reach of the San Joaquin River.” The letter specified that:
“. . . the Department will release from Friant Reservoir into the bed of the river a sufficient quantity of water (1) to meet all valid legal requirements for the reasonable and beneficial use of water, both surface and underground, by reasonable methods of diversion and reasonable methods of use in that area, and (2) to provide, in addition thereto, a continuous live stream flowing at a rate of not less than five cubic feet per second at specified control points throughout the Friant-to-Gravelly Ford area, the last one to be at a point approximately one-half mile below the head of the Gravelly Ford Canal.” Transcript of Record, Vol. VII, p. 388, n. 8.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In August 1982, respondent Hardwick (hereafter respondent) was charged with violating the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by committing that act with another adult male in the bedroom of respondent’s home. After a preliminary hearing, the District Attorney decided not to present the matter to the grand jury unless further evidence developed.
Respondent then brought suit in the Federal District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. He asserted that he was a practicing homosexual, that the Georgia sodomy statute, as administered by the defendants, placed him in imminent danger of arrest, and that the statute for several reasons violates the Federal Constitution. The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, relying on Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney for the City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (ED Va. 1975), which this Court summarily affirmed, 425 U. S. 901 (1976).
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 760 F. 2d 1202 (1985). The court first held that, because Doe was distinguishable and in any event had been undermined by later decisions, our summary affirmance in that case did not require affirmance of the District Court. Relying on our decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the court went on to hold that the Georgia statute violated respondent’s fundamental rights because his homosexual activity is a private and intimate association that is beyond the reach of state regulation by reason of the Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was remanded for trial, at which, to prevail, the State would have to prove that the statute is supported by a compelling interest and is the most narrowly drawn means of achieving that end.
Because other Courts of Appeals have arrived at judgments contrary to that of the Eleventh Circuit in this case, we granted the Attorney General’s petition for certiorari questioning the holding that the sodomy statute violates the fundamental rights of homosexuals. We agree with petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred, and hence reverse its judgment.
This case does not require a judgment on whether laws against sodomy between consenting adults in general, or between homosexuals in particular, are wise or desirable. It raises no question about the right or propriety of state legislative decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize homosexual sodomy, or of state-court decisions invalidating those laws on state constitutional grounds. The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time. The case also calls for some judgment about the limits of the Court’s role in carrying out its constitutional mandate.
We first register our disagreement with the Court of Appeals and with respondent that the Court’s prior cases have construed the Constitution to confer a right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy and for all intents and purposes have decided this case. The reach of this line of cases was sketched in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 685 (1977). Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), were described as dealing with child rearing and education; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944), with family relationships; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942), with procreation; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967), with marriage; Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, and Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra, with contraception; and Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), with abortion. The latter three cases were interpreted as construing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to confer a fundamental individual right to decide whether or not to beget or bear a child. Carey v. Population Services International, supra, at 688-689.
Accepting the decisions in these cases and the above description of them, we think it evident that none of the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case. No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated, either by the Court of Appeals or by respondent. Moreover, any claim that these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable. Indeed, the Court’s opinion in Carey twice asserted that the privacy right, which the Griswold line of cases found to be one of the protections provided by the Due Process Clause, did not reach so far. 431 U. S., at 688, n. 5, 694, n. 17.
Precedent aside, however, respondent would have us announce, as the Court of Appeals did, a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do. It is true that despite the language of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which appears to focus only on the processes by which life, liberty, or property is taken, the cases are legion in which those Clauses have been interpreted to have substantive content, subsuming rights that to a great extent are immune from federal or state regulation or proscription. Among such cases are those recognizing rights that have little or no textual support in the constitutional language. Meyer, Prince, and Pierce fall in this category, as do the privacy cases from Griswold to Carey.
Striving to assure itself and the public that announcing rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution’s text involves much more than the imposition of the Justices’ own choice of values on the States and the Federal Government, the Court has sought to identify the nature of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 326 (1937), it was said that this category includes those fundamental liberties that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.” A different description of fundamental liberties appeared in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.), where they are characterized as those liberties that are “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.” Id., at 503 (Powell, J.). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 506.
It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy. Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots. See generally Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 521, 525 (1986). Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when t-hey ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults. See Survey, U. Miami L. Rev., supra, at 524, n. 9. Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” is, at best, facetious.
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. That this is so was painfully demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive and the Court in the 1930’s, which resulted in the repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that the Court had placed on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority. The claimed right pressed on us today falls far short of overcoming this resistance.
Respondent, however, asserts that the result should be different where the homosexual conduct occurs in the privacy of the home. He relies on Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), where the Court held that the First Amendment prevents conviction for possessing and reading obscene material in the privacy of one’s home: “If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.” Id., at 565.
Stanley did protect conduct that would not have been protected outside the home, and it partially prevented the enforcement of state obscenity laws; but the decision was firmly grounded in the First Amendment. The right pressed upon us here has no similar support in the text of the Constitution, and it does not qualify for recognition under the prevailing principles for construing the Fourteenth Amendment. Its limits are also difficult to discern. Plainly enough, otherwise illegal conduct is not always immunized whenever it occurs in the home. Victimless crimes, such as the possession and use of illegal drugs, do not escape the law where they are committed at home. Stanley itself recognized that its holding offered no protection for the possession in the home of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods. Id., at 568, n. 11. And if respondent’s submission is limited to the voluntary sexual conduct between consenting adults, it would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though they are committed in the home. We are unwilling to start down that road.
Even if the conduct at issue here is not a fundamental right, respondent asserts that there must be a rational basis for the law and that there is none in this case other than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. This is said to be an inadequate rationale to support the law. The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. Even respondent makes no such claim, but insists that majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on this basis.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Georgia Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. . . .
“(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. ...”
John and Mary Doe were also plaintiffs in the action. They alleged that they wished to engage in sexual activity proscribed by § 16-6-2 in the privacy of their home, App. 3, and that they had been “chilled and deterred” from engaging in such activity by both the existence of the statute and Hardwick’s arrest. Id., at 5. The District Court held, however, that because they had neither sustained, nor were in immediate danger of sustaining, any direct injury from the enforcement of the statute, they did not have proper standing to maintain the action. Id., at 18. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment dismissing the Does’ claim for lack of standing, 760 F. 2d 1202, 1206-1207 (CA11 1985), and the Does do not challenge that holding in this Court.
The only claim properly before the Court, therefore, is Hardwick’s challenge to the Georgia statute as applied to consensual homosexual sodomy. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as applied to other acts of sodomy.
See Baker v. Wade, 769 F. 2d 289, rehearing denied, 774 F. 2d 1286 (CA5 1985) (en banc); Dronenburg v. Zech, 239 U. S. App. D. C. 229, 741 F. 2d 1388, rehearing denied, 241 U. S. App. D. C. 262, 746 F. 2d 1579 (1984).
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the District Court was not obligated to follow our summary affirmance in Doe. We need not resolve this dispute, for we prefer to give plenary consideration to the merits of this case rather than rely on our earlier action in Doe. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 14 (1976); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 309, n. 1 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974). Cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 344 (1975).
Criminal sodomy laws in effect in 1791:
Connecticut: 1 Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut, 1808, Title LXVI, ch. 1, §2 (rev. 1672).
Delaware: 1 Laws of the State of Delaware, 1797, ch. 22, § 5 (passed 1719).
Georgia had no criminal sodomy statute until 1816, but sodomy was a crime at common law, and the General Assembly adopted the common law of England as the law of Georgia in 1784. The First Laws of the State of Georgia, pt. 1, p. 290 (1981).
Maryland had no criminal sodomy statute in 1791. Maryland’s Declaration of Rights, passed in 1776, however, stated that “the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England,” and sodomy was a crime at common law. 4 W. Swindler, Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions 372 (1975).
Massachusetts: Acts and Laws passed by the General Court of Massachusetts, ch. 14, Act of Mar, 3, 1785.
New Hampshire passed its first sodomy statute in 1718. Acts and Laws of New Hampshire 1680-1726, p. 141 (1978).
Sodomy was a crime at common law in New Jersey at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. The State enacted its first criminal sodomy law five years later. Acts of the Twentieth General Assembly, Mar. 18, 1796, ch. DC, § 7.
New York: Laws of New York, ch. 21 (passed 1787).
At the time of ratification of the Bill of Rights, North Carolina had adopted the English statute of Henry VIII outlawing sodomy. See Collection of the Statutes of the Parliament of England in Force in the State of North-Carolina, ch. 17, p. 314 (Martin ed. 1792).
Pennsylvania: Laws of the Fourteenth General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, ch. CLIV, § 2 (passed 1790).
Rhode Island passed its first sodomy law in 1662. The Earliest Acts and Laws of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 1647-1719, p. 142 (1977).
South Carolina: Public Laws of the State of South Carolina, p. 49 (1790).
At the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights, Virginia had no specific statute outlawing sodomy, but had adopted the English common law. 9 Hening’s Laws of Virginia, ch. 5, § 6, p. 127 (1821) (passed 1776).
Criminal sodomy statutes in effect in 1868:
Alabama: Ala. Rev. Code § 3604 (1867).
Arizona (Terr.): Howell Code, ch. 10, § 48 (1865).
Arkansas: Ark. Stat., ch. 51, Art. IV, §5 (1858).
California: 1 Cal. Gen. Laws, ¶ 1450, § 48 (1865).
Colorado (Terr.): Colo. Rev. Stat., ch. 22, §§45, 46 (1868).
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat., Tit. 122, ch. 7, §124 (1866).
Delaware: Del. Rev. Stat., ch. 131, §7 (1893).
Florida: Fla. Rev. Stat., div. 5, §2614 (passed 1868) (1892).
Georgia: Ga. Code §§4286, 4287, 4290 (1867).
Kingdom of Hawaii: Haw. Penal Code, ch. 13, § 11 (1869).
Illinois: Ill. Rev. Stat., div. 5, §§49, 50 (1845).
Kansas (Terr.): Kan. Stat., eh. 53, §7 (1855).
Kentucky: 1 Ky. Rev. Stat., eh. 28, Art. IV, § 11 (1860).
Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat., Crimes and Offences, §5 (1856).
Maine: Me. Rev. Stat., Tit. XII, ch. 160, §4 (1840).
Maryland: 1 Md. Code, Art. 30, § 201 (1860).
Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Stat., ch. 165, §18 (1860).
Michigan: Mich. Rev. Stat., Tit. 30, ch. 158, §16 (1846).
Minnesota: Minn. Stat., ch. 96, §13 (1859).
Mississippi: Miss. Rev. Code, ch. 64, § LII, Art. 238 (1857).
Missouri: 1 Mo. Rev. Stat., ch. 50, Art. VIII, §7 (1856).
Montana (Terr.): Mont. Acts, Resolutions, Memorials, Criminal Practice Acts, ch. IV, §44 (1866).
Nebraska (Terr.): Neb. Rev. Stat., Crim. Code, ch. 4, §47 (1866).
Nevada (Terr.): Nev. Comp. Laws, 1861-1900, Crimes and Punishments, §45.
New Hampshire: N. H. Laws, Act. of June 19, 1812, § 5 (1815).
New Jersey: N. J. Rev. Stat., Tit. 8, ch. 1, §9 (1847).
New York: 3 N. Y. Rev. Stat., pt. 4, ch. 1, Tit. 5, §20 (5th ed. 1859).
North Carolina: N. C. Rev. Code, ch. 34, § 6 (1855).
Oregon: Laws of Ore., Crimes — Against Morality, etc., ch. 7, §655 (1874).
Pennsylvania: Act of Mar. 31,1860, § 32, Pub. L. 392, in 1 Digest of Statute Law of Pa. 1700-1903, p. 1011 (Purdon 1905).
Rhode Island: R. I. Gen. Stat., ch. 232, § 12 (1872).
South Carolina: Act of 1712, in 2 Stat. at Large of S. C. 1682-1716, p. 493 (1837).
Tennessee: Tenn. Code, ch. 8, Art. 1, § 4843 (1858).
Texas: Tex. Rev. Stat., Tit. 10, ch. 5, Art. 342 (1887) (passed 1860).
Vermont: Acts and Laws of the State of Vt. (1779).
Virginia: Va. Code, ch. 149, § 12 (1868).
West Virginia: W. Va. Code, eh. 149, § 12 (1868).
Wisconsin (Terr.): Wis. Stat. § 14, p. 367 (1839).
In 1961, Illinois adopted the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, which decriminalized adult, consensual, private, sexual conduct. Criminal Code of 1961, §§ 11-2, 11-3, 1961 Ill. Laws, pp. 1985, 2006 (codified as amended at Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶¶11-2, 11-3 (1983) (repealed 1984)). See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Respondent does not defend the judgment below based on the Ninth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Eighth Amendment.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | E | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
CHIEF Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We decide here whether employees of the State of Alabama may recover money damages by reason of the State’s failure to comply with the provisions of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 330, 42 U. S. C. §§ 12111-12117. We hold that such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The ADA prohibits certain employers, including the States, from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” §§ 12112(a), 12111(2), (5), (7). To this end, the Act requires employers to “mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the [employer’s] business.” § 12112(b)(5)(A).
“ ‘[Reasonable accommodation’ may include—
“(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.” § 12111(9).
The Act also prohibits employers from “utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration . . . that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability.” § 12112(b)(3)(A).
The Act defines “disability” to include “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” §12102(2). A disabled individual is otherwise “qualified” if he or she, “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” § 12111(8).
Respondent Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, was employed as the Director of Nursing, OB/Gyn/Neonatal Services, for the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital. See App. 31,38. In 1994, Garrett was diagnosed with breast cancer and subsequently underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and chemotherapy. See id., at 38. Garrett’s treatments required her to take substantial leave from work. Upon returning to work in July 1995, Garrett’s supervisor informed Garrett that she would have to give up her Director position. See id., at 39. Garrett then applied for and received a transfer to another, lower paying position as a nurse manager. See ibid.
Respondent Milton Ash worked as a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services (Department). See id., at 8. Upon commencing this employment, Ash informed the Department that he suffered from chronic asthma and that his doctor recommended he avoid carbon monoxide and cigarette smoke, and Ash requested that the Department modify his duties to minimize his exposure to these substances. See ibid. Ash was later diagnosed with sleep apnea and requested, again pursuant to his doctor’s recommendation, that he be reassigned to daytime shifts to accommodate his condition. See id., at 9. Ultimately, the Department granted none of the requested relief. See id., at 8-9. Shortly after Ash filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, he noticed that his performance evaluations were lower than those he had received on previous occasions. See id., at 9.
Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits in the District Court, both seeking money damages under the ADA. Petitioners moved for summary judgment, claiming that the ADA exceeds Congress’ authority to abrogate the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 989 F. Supp. 1409, 1410 (ND Ala. 1998). In a single opinion disposing of both cases, the District Court agreed with petitioners’ position and granted their motions for summary judgment. See id., at 1410,1412. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals reversed, 193 F. 3d 1214 (1999), adhering to its intervening decision in Kimel v. State Bd. of Regents, 139 F. 3d 1426, 1433 (CA11 1998), aff'd, 528 U. S. 62 (2000), that the ADA validly abrogates the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.
We granted certiorari, 529 U. S. 1065 (2000), to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether an individual may sue a State for money damages in federal court under the ADA.
I
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, our cases have extended the Amendment’s applicability to suits by citizens against their own States. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 72-73 (2000); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 669-670 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 54 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 15 (1890). The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court. See Kimel, supra, at 73.
We have recognized, however, that Congress may abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and “act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.” 528 U. S., at 73. The first of these requirements is not in dispute here. See 42 U. S. C. § 12202 (“A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter”). The question, then, is whether Congress acted within its constitutional authority by subjecting the States to suits in federal court for money damages under the ADA.
Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I. See Kimel, supra, at 79 (“Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967] rests solely on Congress’ Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today’s cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers”); Seminole Tribe, supra, at 72-73 (“The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction”); College Savings Bank, supra, at 672; Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 636 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 730-733 (1999). In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), however, we held that “the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 456 (citation omitted). As a result, we concluded, Congress may subject nonconsenting States to suit in federal court when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise of its § 5 power. See ibid. Our cases have adhered to this proposition. See, e. g., Kimel, supra, at 80. Accordingly, the ADA can apply to the States only to the extent that the statute is appropriate § 5 legislation.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part:
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the substantive guarantees contained in § 1 by enacting “appropriate legislation.” See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 536 (1997). Congress is not limited to mere legislative repetition of this Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. “Rather, Congress’ power 'to enforce’ the Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.” Kimel, supra, at 81; City of Boerne, supra, at 536.
City of Boerne also confirmed, however, the long-settled principle that it is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees. 521 U. S., at 519-524. Accordingly, § 5 legislation reaching beyond the scope of §l’s actual guarantees must exhibit “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” Id., at 520..
II
The first step in applying these now familiar principles is to identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue. Here, that inquiry requires us to examine the limitations § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment places upon States’ treatment of the disabled. As we did last Term in Kimel, see 528 U. S., at 83, we look to our prior decisions under the Equal Protection Clause dealing with this issue.
In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432 (1985), we considered an equal protection challenge to a city ordinance requiring a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. The specific question before us was whether the Court of Appeals had erred by holding that mental retardation qualified as a “quasi-suspect” classification under our equal protection jurisprudence. Id., at 435. We answered that question in the affirmative, concluding instead that such legislation incurs only the minimum “rational-basis” review applicable to general social and economic legislation. Id., at 446. In a statement that today seems quite prescient, we explained that
“if the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do so.” Id., at 445-446.
Under rational-basis review, where a group possesses “distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement,” a State’s decision to act on the basis of those differences does not give rise to a constitutional violation. Id., at 441. “Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 320 (1993) (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U. S. 1 (1992); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam)). Moreover, the State need not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather, the burden is upon the challenging party to negative “ 'any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.’ ” Heller, supra, at 320 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S. 307, 313 (1993)).
Justice Breyer suggests that Cleburne stands for the broad proposition that state decisionmaking reflecting “negative attitudes” or “fear” necessarily runs afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. See post, at 382 (dissenting opinion) (quoting Cleburne, 473 U. S., at 448). Although such biases may often accompany irrational (and therefore unconstitutional) discrimination, their presence alone does not a constitutional violation make. As we noted in Cleburne: “[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently . . . .” Id., at 448 (emphases added). This language, read in context, simply states the unremarkable and widely acknowledged tenet of this Court’s equal protection jurisprudence that state action subject to rational-basis scrutiny does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment when it “rationally furthers the purpose identified by the State.” Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam).
Thus, the result of Cleburne is that States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational. They could quite hardheadedly— and perhaps hardheartedly — hold to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled. If special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause.
Ill
Once we have determined the metes and bounds of the constitutional right in question, we examine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against the disabled. Just as §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to actions committed “under color of state law,” Congress’ § 5 authority is appropriately exercised only in response to state transgressions. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U. S., at 640 (“It is this conduct then — unremedied patent infringement by the States — that must give rise to the Fourteenth Amendment violation that Congress sought to redress in the Patent Remedy Act”); Kimel, 528 U. S., at 89 (“Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation”). The legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled.
Respondents contend that the inquiry as to unconstitutional discrimination should extend not only to States themselves, but to units of local governments, such as cities and counties. All of these, they say, are “state actors” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brief for Respondents 8. This is quite true, but the Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity to units of local government. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530 (1890). These entities are subject to private claims for damages under the ADA without Congress’ ever having to rely on §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to render them so. It would make no sense to consider constitutional violations on their part, as well as by the States themselves, when only the States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh Amendment.
Congress made a general finding in the ADA that “historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” 42 U. S. C. § 12101(a)(2). The record assembled by Congress includes many instances to support such a finding. But the great majority of these incidents do not deal with the activities of States.
Respondents in their brief cite half a dozen examples from the record that did involve States. A department head at the University of North Carolina refused to hire an applicant for the position of health administrator because he was blind; similarly, a student at a state university in South Dakota was denied an opportunity to practice teach because the dean at that time was convinced that blind people could not teach in public schools. A microfilmer at the Kansas Department of Transportation was fired because he had epilepsy; deaf workers at the University of Oklahoma were paid a lower salary than those who could hear. The Indiana State Personnel Office informed a woman with a concealed disability that she should not disclose it if she wished to obtain employment.
Several of these incidents undoubtedly evidence an unwillingness on the part of state officials to make the sort of accommodations for 'the disabled required by the ADA. Whether they were irrational under our decision in Cleburne is more debatable, particularly when the incident is described out of context. But even if it were to be determined that each incident upon fuller examination showed unconstitutional action on the part of the State, these incidents taken together fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which §5 legislation must be based. See Kimel, supra, at 89-91; City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at 530-531. Congress, in enacting the ADA, found that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities.” 42 U. S. C. § 12101(a)(1). In 1990, the States alone employed more than 4.5 million people. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 338 (119th ed. 1999) (Table 534). It is telling, we think, that given these large numbers, Congress assembled only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in employment against the disabled.
Justice Breyer maintains that Congress applied Title I of the ADA to the States in response to a host of incidents representing unconstitutional state discrimination in employment against persons with disabilities. A close review of the relevant materials, however, undercuts that conclusion. Justice Breyer’s Appendix C consists not of legislative findings, but of unexamined, anecdotal accounts of “adverse, disparate treatment by state officials.” Post, at 379. Of course, as we have already explained, “adverse, disparate treatment” often does not amount to a constitutional violation where rational-basis scrutiny applies. These accounts, moreover, were submitted not directly to Congress but to the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, which made no findings on the subject of state discrimination in employment. See the Task Force’s Report entitled From ADA to Empowerment (Oct. 12, 1990). And, had Congress truly understood this information as reflecting a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the States, one would expect some mention of that conclusion in the Act’s legislative findings. There is none. See 42 U. S. C. § 12101. Although Justice Breyer would infer from Congress’ general conclusions regarding societal discrimination against the disabled that the States had likewise participated in such action, post, at 378, the House and Senate committee reports on the ADA flatly contradict this assertion. After describing the evidence presented to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and its subcommittee (including the Task Force Report upon which the dissent relies), the Committee’s Report reached, among others, the following conclusion: “Discrimination still persists in such critical areas as employment in the private sector, public accommodations, public services, transportation, and telecommunications.” S. Rep. No. 101-116, p. 6 (1989) (emphasis added). The House Committee on Education and Labor, addressing the ADA’s employment provisions, reached the same conclusion: “[A]fter extensive review and analysis over a number of Congressional sessions, . . . there exists a compelling need to establish a clear and comprehensive Federal prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability in the areas of employment in the private sector, public accommodations, public services, transportation, and telecommunications.” H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, p. 28 (1990) (emphasis added). Thus, not only is the inference Justice Breyer draws unwarranted, but there is also strong evidence that Congress’ failure to mention States in its legislative findings addressing discrimination in employment reflects that body’s judgment that no pattern of unconstitutional state action had been documented.
Even were it possible to squeeze out of these examples a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States, the rights and remedies created by the ADA against the States would raise the same sort of concerns as to congruence and-proportionality as were found in City of Boerne, supra. For example, whereas it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities, the ADA requires employers to “mak[e] existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” 42 U. S. C. §§ 12112(5)(B), 12111(9). The ADA does except employers from the “reasonable aecommodatio[n]” requirement where the employer “can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.” § 12112(b)(5)(A). However, even with this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternative responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an “undue burden” upon the employer. The Act also makes it the employer’s duty to prove, that it would suffer such a burden, instead of requiring (as the Constitution does) that the complaining party negate reasonable bases for the employer’s decision. See ibid.
The ADA also forbids “utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration” that disparately impact the disabled, without regard to whether such conduct has a rational basis. § 12112(b)(3)(A). Although disparate impact may be relevant evidence of racial discrimination, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976), such evidence alone is insufficient even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny. See, e. g., ibid. (“[Oju'r cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact”).
The ADA’s constitutional shortcomings are apparent when the Act is compared to Congress’ efforts in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to respond to a serious pattern of constitutional violations. In' South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966), we considered whether the Voting Rights Act was “appropriate” legislation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s protection against racial discrimination in voting. Concluding that it was a valid exercise of Congress’ enforcement power under §2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, we noted that “[bjefore enacting the measure, Congress explored with great care the problem of racial discrimination in voting.” Id., at 308.
In that Act, Congress documented a marked pattern of unconstitutional action by the States. State officials, Congress found, routinely applied voting tests in order to exclude African-American citizens from registering to vote. See id., at 312. Congress also determined that litigation had proved ineffective and that there persisted an otherwise inexplicable 50-percentage-point gap in the registration of white and African-American voters in some States. See id., at 313. Congress’ response was to promulgate in the Voting Rights Act a detailed but limited remedial scheme designed to guarantee meaningful enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment in those areas of the Nation where abundant evidence of States’ systematic denial of those rights was identified.
The contrast between this kind of evidence, and the evidence that Congress considered in the present case, is stark. Congressional enactment of the ADA represents its judgment that there should be a “comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U. S. C. § 12101(b)(1). Congress is the final authority as to desirable public policy, but in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation. Those requirements are not met here, and to uphold the Act’s application to the States would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in Cleburne. Section 5 does not so broadly enlarge congressional authority. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
Respondents’ complaints in the United States District Court alleged violations of both Title I and Title II of the ADA, and petitioners’ “Question Presented” can be read to apply to both sections. See Brief for Petitioners i; Brief for United States I. Though the briefs of the parties discuss both sections in their constitutional arguments, no party has briefed the question whether Title II of the ADA, dealing with the “services, programs, or activities of a public entity,” 42 U. S. C. §12132, is available for claims of employment discrimination when Title I of the ADA expressly deals with that subject. See, e. g., Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Courts of Appeals are divided on this issue, compare Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F. 3d 1169 (CA9 1999), with Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F. 3d .816 (CA11 1998). We are not disposed to decide the constitutional issue whether Title II, which has somewhat different remedial provisions from Title I, is appropriate legislation under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when the parties have not favored us with briefing on the statutory question. To the extent the Court granted certiorari on the question whether respondents may sue their state employers for damages under Title II of the ADA, see this Court’s Rule 24.1(a), that portion of the writ is dismissed as imprevidently granted. See The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 180, 184 (1959).
Garrett raised other claims, but those are not presently before the Court.
It is clear that Congress intended to invoke § 5 as one of its bases for enacting the ADA. See 42 U. S. C. § 12101(b)(4).
Applying the basic principles of rationality review, Cleburne struck down the city ordinance in question. 478 U. S., at 447-450. The Court’s reasoning was that the city’s purported justifications for the ordinance made no sense in light of how the city treated other groups similarly situated in relevant respects. Although the group home for the mentally retarded was required to obtain a special use permit, apartment houses, other multiple-family dwellings, retirement homes, nursing homes, sanitariums, hospitals, boarding houses, fraternity and sorority houses, and dormitories were not subject to the ordinance. See ibid.
It is worth noting that by the time that Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, every State in the Union had enacted such measures. At least one Member of Congress remarked that “this is probably one of the few times where the States are so far out in front of the Federal Government, it’s not funny.” Hearing on Discrimination Against Cancer Victims and the Handicapped before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1987). A number of these provisions, however, did not go as far as the ADA did in requiring accommodation.
The record does show that some States, adopting the tenets of the eugenics movement of the early part of this century, required extreme measures such as sterilization of persons suffering from hereditary mental disease. These laws were upheld against constitutional attack 70 years ago in Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927). But there is no indication that any State had persisted in requiring such harsh measures as of 1990 when the ADA was adopted.
Only a small fraction of the anecdotes Justice Breyer identifies in his Appendix C relate to state discrimination against the disabled in employment. At most, somewhere around 50 of these allegations describe conduct that could conceivably amount to constitutional violations by the States, and most of them are so general and brief that no firm conclusion can be drawn. The overwhelming majority of these accounts pertain to alleged discrimination by the States in the provision of public services and public accommodations, which areas are addressed in Titles II and III of the ADA.
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is virtually identical to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). In addition, state laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment and other aspects of life provide independent avenues of redress. See n. 5, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
April 6, 1953, an order was entered disbarring Isserman from the practice of law in this Court pursuant to Rule 2, par. 5, of this Court’s Rules then in effect. See In re Isserman, 345 U. S. 286. The order of disbarment is now before us on a petition for rehearing. Rule 8 of our present Rules provides that “no order of disbarment will be entered except with the concurrence of a majority of the justices participating.” The petition for rehearing is granted. A majority of the Justices participating do not find ground for disbarment of Isserman. Accordingly, the former order of disbarment is set aside and the rule against Isserman to show cause is discharged.
Mr. Justice Burton, with whom Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Minton join, dissents for the reasons stated in the opinion announced by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, April 6, 1953, in In re Isserman, 345 U. S. 286.
Mr. Justice Reed also calls attention to his dissent in Sacher v. Association of the Bar, 347 U. S. 388, 390.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Clark did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | F | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In federal court, petitioners asserted state law claims under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (1994 ed.), against respondent university, an arm of the State of Minnesota. Those claims were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, and petitioners refiled them in state court past the period of limitations. The supplemental jurisdiction statute purports to toll the period of limitations for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after they are dismissed. § 1367(d). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that provision unconstitutional when applied to claims against noncon-senting state defendants, such as respondent university, and dismissed petitioners’ claims. We affirm the judgment on the alternative ground that the tolling provision does not apply to claims filed in federal court against nonconsenting States.
I
In August 1995, petitioners Lance Raygor and James Goodchild filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The charges alleged that their employer, the University of Minnesota, discriminated against them on the basis of age in December 1994 by attempting to compel them to accept early retirement at the age of 52. After petitioners refused to retire, the university allegedly reclassified petitioners’ jobs so as to reduce their salaries. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-45; Brief for Petitioners 3.
The EEOC cross-filed petitioners’ charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR) and later issued a right-to-sue letter on June 6,1996, advising that petitioners could file a lawsuit within 90 days under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Brief for United States 5. The MDHR likewise issued right-to-sue letters on July 17,1996, advising petitioners that they could file suit within 45 days under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat., ch. 363 (1991). 620 N. W. 2d 680, 681 (Minn. 2001); App. to Pet. for Cert. A-46 to A-47.
On or about August 29, 1996, each petitioner filed a separate complaint against respondent Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota (hereinafter respondent), in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. 620 N. W. 2d, at 681; App. to Pet. for Cert. A-41. Each complaint alleged a federal cause of action under the ADEA and a state cause of action under the MHRA. The suits were subsequently consolidated. 604 N. W. 2d 128, 130 (Minn. App. 2000). Respondent filed answers to these complaints in September 1996, setting forth eight affirmative defenses, including that the suits were “ ‘barred in whole or in part by Defendant’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.’” Brief for Petitioners 4. The District Court entered a scheduling plan that the parties agreed upon. According to the plan, discovery would finish by May 30,1997, and dispositive motions would be filed by July 15,1997. Ibid. The parties then engaged in discovery as well as mediation. Ibid.
In early July 1997, respondent filed its motion to dismiss petitioners’ claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Brief for Petitioners 5, n. 5. The motion argued that the federal and state law claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Brief for Respondent Regents of the University of Minnesota 5. Petitioners’ response acknowledged respondent’s “ ‘potential Eleventh Amendment immunity from state discrimination claims in Federal Court,’” but urged the District Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims if the federal claims were upheld. Brief for Petitioners 5-6. On July 11, 1997, the District Court granted respondent’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion and dismissed all of petitioners’ claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-39. Petitioners appealed, but the appeal was stayed pending this Court’s decision in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62 (2000). 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Kimel held that the “ADEA does not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.” 528 U. S., at 92. Given that result, petitioners moved to withdraw their appeal, and it was dismissed in January 2000. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682; Brief for Petitioners 6-7.
In the meantime, approximately three weeks after the Federal District Court had dismissed their state law claims, petitioners refiled their state law claims in Hennepin County District Court. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Respondent’s answer asserted that “ ‘plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable statute of limitations.’” Brief for Petitioners 7. The state court initially stayed the lawsuit because of the pending federal appeal, but lifted the stay in December 1998 for the purpose of allowing respondent to move for dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Respondent moved for summary judgment in February 1999, arguing that petitioners’ state claims were barred by the applicable 45 day statute of limitations. See Minn. Stat. §§363.06, subd. 3, 363.14, subd. 1(a)(1) (2000). Respondent also argued that the tolling provision of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367, did not apply to toll the limitations period on the state law claims while they were pending in federal court because the Federal District Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over petitioners’ ADE A claims. Petitioners argued that the tolling provision of the supplemental jurisdiction statute applied because their state law claims had been dismissed without prejudice. App. to Brief for Petitioners B-3, B-4. The State District Court treated respondent’s motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss and granted it, holding that § 1367(d) did “not apply ... because the federal district court never had ‘original jurisdiction’ over the controversy” since “both the state and federal claims were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id., at B-5, B-6.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. The court first decided that the Federal District Court had original jurisdiction over the case before respondent’s Eleventh Amendment defense was “successfully asserted.” 604 N. W. 2d, at 132 (citing Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381 (1998)). The court then held that § 1367(d) applied to toll the statute of limitations for petitioners’ state law claims because that provision “allows tolling of any claim dismissed by a federal district court, whether dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds or at the discretion of the federal district court under [§1367](c).” 604 N. W. 2d, at 132-133.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. The court noted that respondent was an arm of the State, and found that the federal tolling provision facially applied to petitioners’ state law claims. 620 N. W. 2d, at 684, 687. The court concluded, however, “that application of section 1367(d) to toll the statute of limitations applicable to state law claims against an unconsenting state defendant first filed in federal court but then dismissed and brought in state court is an impermissible denigration of [respondent’s] Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id., at 687. The court thus concluded that § 1367(d) could not constitutionally apply to toll the statute of limitations for petitioners’ state law claims, and it dismissed those claims. We granted certiorari, 532 U. S. 1065 (2001), on the question whether 28 U. S. C. § 1367(d) is unconstitutional as applied to a state defendant.
H-I l — l
In Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), this Court held that federal courts deciding claims within their federal-question subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, may decide state law claims not within their subject matter jurisdiction if the federal and state law claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” and comprise “but one constitutional 'case.’ ” Mine Workers, supra, at 725. Jurisdiction over state law claims in such instances was known as “pendent jurisdiction.” This Court later made clear that, absent authorization from Congress, a district court could not exercise pendent jurisdiction over claims involving parties who were not already parties to a claim independently within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545 (1989).
In the wake of Finley, the Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that “Congress expressly authorize federal courts to hear any claim arising out of the same ‘transaction or occurrence’ as a claim within federal jurisdiction, including claims, within federal question jurisdiction, that require the joinder of additional parties.” Report of Federal Courts Study Committee 47 (Apr. 2, 1990). Soon thereafter, Congress enacted the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367, as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. Subsection (a) of § 1367 states that
“[ejxcept as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.”
Subsection (b) places limits on supplemental jurisdiction when the district court’s original jurisdiction is based only on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Subsection (c) allows district courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in certain situations, such as when a “claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law.” § 1367(c)(1) (1994 ed.).
Petitioners originally sought to have their state law claims heard in federal court as supplemental claims falling under § 1367(a). App. to Brief for Petitioners B-3. Prior to the enactment of § 1367, however, this Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars the adjudication of pendent state law claims against nonconsenting state defendants in federal court. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 120 (1984). In that context, the Eleventh Amendment was found to be an “explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction.” Id., at 118. Consequently, an express grant of jurisdiction over such claims would be an abrogation of the sovereign immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. Before Congress could attempt to do that, it must make its intention to abrogate “‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S. 223, 228 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985)).
The most that can be said about subsection (a), however, is that it is a general grant of jurisdiction, no more specific to claims against nonconsenting States than the one at issue in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775 (1991). There, we considered whether 28 U. S. C. § 1362 contained a clear statement of an intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. That grant of jurisdiction provides that
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” (Emphasis added.)
Such a. facially broad grant of jurisdiction over “all civil actions” could be read to include claims by Indian tribes against nonconsenting States, but we held that such language was insufficient to constitute a clear statement of an intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Blatchford, supra, at 786. Likewise, we cannot read § 1367(a) to authorize district courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims against nonconsenting States, even though nothing in the statute expressly excludes such claims. Thus, consistent with Blatch- ford, we hold that § 1367(a)’s grant of jurisdiction does not extend to claims against nonconsenting state defendants.
Even so, there remains the question whether § 1367(d) tolls the statute of limitations for claims against nonconsenting States that are asserted under § 1367(a) but subsequently dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Subsection (d) of § 1367 provides that
“[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”
On its face, subsection (d) purports to apply to dismissals of “any claim asserted under subsection (a).” Ibid, (emphasis added). Thus, it could be broadly read to apply to any claim technically “asserted” under subsection (a) as long as it was later dismissed, regardless of the reason for dismissal. But reading subsection (d) to apply when state law claims against nonconsenting States are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds raises serious doubts about the constitutionality of the provision given principles of state sovereign immunity. If subsection (d) applied in such circumstances, it would toll the state statute of limitations for 30 days in addition to however long the claim had been pending in federal court. This would require a State to defend against a claim in state court that had never been filed in state court until some indeterminate time after the original limitations period had elapsed.
When the sovereign at issue is the United States, we have recognized that a limitations period may be “a central condition” of the sovereign’s waiver of immunity. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834, 843 (1986); see also Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983) (“When waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity”)- In suits against the United States, however, there is a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling under federal law applies to waivers of the United States’ immunity. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990). From this, the dissent argues that any broadening of a State’s waiver of immunity through tolling under § 1367(d) presumptively does not violate the State’s sovereign immunity. Post, at 552-553, and n. 11 (opinion of Stevens, J.). But this Court has never held that waivers of a State’s immunity presumptively include all federal tolling rules, nor is it obvious that such a presumption would be “a realistic assessment of legislative intent.” Irwin, supra, at 95.
Moreover, with respect to suits against a state sovereign in its own courts, we have explained that a State “may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued,” Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1858), and that “[o]nly the sovereign’s own consent could qualify the absolute character of [its] immunity” from suit in its own courts, Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 414 (1979). Thus, although we have not directly addressed whether federal tolling of a state statute of limitations constitutes an abrogation of state sovereign immunity with respect to claims against state defendants, we can say that the notion at least raises a serious constitutional doubt.
Consequently, we have good reason to rely on a clear statement principle of statutory construction. When “Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero, supra, at 242). This principle applies when Congress “intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States” or when it legislates in “ ‘traditionally sensitive areas’ ” that “ ‘affec[t] the federal balance.’ ” Will, supra, at 65 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971)). In such cases, the clear statement principle reflects “an acknowledgment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461, 464 (1991).
Here, allowing federal law to extend the time period in which a state sovereign is amenable to suit in its own courts at least affects the federal balance in an area that has been a historic power of the States, whether or not it constitutes an abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Thus, applying the clear statement principle helps “ ‘assur[e] that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.’” Will, supra, at 65 (quoting Bass, supra, at 349). This is obviously important when the underlying issue raises a serious constitutional doubt or problem. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 787 (2000) (relying in part on clear statement principle to decide the False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§3729-3733 (1994 ed.), did not authorize “an action in federal court by a qui tam relator against a State” and avoiding whether such a suit would violate the Eleventh Amendment, an issue raising a serious constitutional doubt); Gregory, supra, at 464 (relying on clear statement principle to determine that state judges were excluded from the ADEA in order to “avoid a potential constitutional problem” given the constraints on the Court’s “ability to consider the limits that the state-federal balance places on Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause”).
The question then is whether § 1367(d) states a clear intent to toll the limitations period for claims against nonconsenting States that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Here the lack of clarity is apparent in two respects. With respect to the claims the tolling provision covers, one could read § 1367(d) to cover any claim “asserted” under subsection (a), but we have previously found similarly general language insufficient to satisfy clear statement requirements. For example, we have held that a statute providing civil remedies for violations committed by “ ‘any recipient of Federal assistance’” was “not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment” even when it was undisputed that a state defendant was a recipient of federal aid. Atascadero, 473 U. S., at 245-246 (quoting 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(2) (1982 ed.) (emphasis in original)). Instead, we held that “[w]hen Congress chooses to subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically.” 473 U. S., at 246. Likewise, § 1367(d) reflects no specific or unequivocal intent to toll the statute of limitations for claims asserted against nonconsenting States, especially considering that such claims do not fall within the proper scope of § 1367(a) as explained above.
With respect to the dismissals the tolling provision covers, one could read § 1367(d) in isolation to authorize tolling regardless of the reason for dismissal, but § 1367(d) occurs in the context of a statute that specifically contemplates only a few grounds for dismissal. The requirements of § 1367(a) make clear that a claim will be subject to dismissal if it fails to “form part of the same case or controversy” as a claim within the district court’s original jurisdiction. Likewise, § 1367(b) entails that certain claims will be subject to dismissal if exercising jurisdiction over them would be “inconsistent” with 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Finally, § 1367(c) (1994 ed.) lists four specific situations in which a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a particular claim. Given that particular context, it is unclear if the tolling provision was meant to apply to dismissals for reasons unmentioned by the statute, such as dismissals on Eleventh Amendment grounds. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme”). In sum, although § 1367(d) may not clearly exclude tolling for claims against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, we are looking for a clear statement of what the rule includes, not a clear statement of what it excludes. See Gregory, supra, at 467. Section 1367(d) fails this test. As such, we will not read § 1367(d) to apply to dismissals of claims against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
In anticipation of this result, petitioners argue that the tolling provision should be interpreted to apply to their claims because Congress enacted it to prevent due process violations caused by state claim preclusion and anti-claim-splitting laws. Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief for Petitioners 5-12. In other words, petitioners contend that Congress enacted the tolling provision to enforce the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against perceived state violations. We have previously addressed the argument that if a statute were passed pursuant to Congress’ §5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, federalism concerns “might carry less weight.” Gregory, 501 U. S., at 468. We concluded, however, that “the Fourteenth Amendment does not override all principles of federalism,” id., at 469, and held that insofar as statutory intent was ambiguous, we would “not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental functions regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to... § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 470. That same rule applies here. As already demonstrated, it is far from clear whether Congress intended tolling to apply when claims against non-consenting States were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Thus, it is not relevant whether Congress acted pursuant to § 5.
Petitioners also argue that our construction of the statute does not resolve their case because respondent consented to suit in federal court. Reply Brief for Petitioners 2-4. We have stated that “[a] sovereign’s immunity may be waived” and have “held that a State may consent to suit against it in federal court.” Pennhurst, 465 U. S., at 99 (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883)). Petitioners claim that respondent consented to suit by not moving to dismiss petitioners’ state law claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds until July 1997, some 10 months after the federal lawsuits were filed in August 1996. Yet respondent raised its Eleventh Amendment defense at the earliest possible opportunity by including that defense in its answers that were filed in September 1996. Given that, we cannot say that respondent “unequivocally expressed” a consent to be sued in federal court. Pennhurst, supra, at 99 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974)). The fact that respondent filed its motion in July 1997 is as consistent with adherence to the pretrial schedule as it is with anything else.
Indeed, such circumstances are readily distinguishable from the limited situations where this Court has found a State consented to suit, such as when a State voluntarily invoked federal court jurisdiction or otherwise “ma[de] a ‘clear declaration’ that it intends to submit itself to our jurisdiction.” College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 676 (1999). And even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that consent could be inferred “from the failure to raise the objection at the outset of the proceedings,” Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S., at 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring) — a standard this Court has not adopted — consent would still not be found here since respondent raised the issue in its answer. Thus, we find no merit to petitioners’ argument that respondent was a consenting state defendant during the federal court proceedings. We express no view on the application or constitutionality of § 1367(d) when a State consents to suit or when a defendant is not a State.
l — l t — 1 I — (
We hold that respondent never consented to suit in federal court on petitioners’ state law claims and that § 1367(d) does not toll the period of limitations for state law claims asserted against nonconsenting state defendants that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Therefore, § 1367(d) did not operate to toll the period of limitations for petitioners’ claims, and we affirm the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court dismissing those claims.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The sole question presented by this case is whether the Federal District Court in which it was brought had jurisdiction over the cause, or whether that court was deprived of jurisdiction by 28 U. S. C. § 1359. That section provides:
“A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.”
The facts were these. Respondent Caribbean Mills, Inc. (Caribbean) is a Haitian corporation. In May 1959 it entered into a contract with an individual named Kelly and the Panama and Venezuela Finance Company (Panama), a Panamanian corporation. The agreement provided that Caribbean would purchase from Panama 125 shares of corporate stock, in return for payment of $85,000 down and an additional $165,000 in 12 annual installments.
No installment payments ever were made, despite requests for payment by Panama. In 1964, Panama assigned its entire interest in the 1959 contract to petitioner Kramer, an attorney in Wichita Falls, Texas. The stated consideration was $1. By a separate agreement dated the same day, Kramer promised to pay back to Panama 95% of any net recovery on the assigned cause of action, “solely as a Bonus.”
Kramer soon thereafter brought suit against Caribbean for $165,000 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging diversity of citizenship between himself and Caribbean. The District Court denied Caribbean’s motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury returned a $165,000 verdict in favor of Kramer.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the assignment was “improperly or collusively made” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1359, and that in consequence the District Court lacked jurisdiction. We granted certiorari, 393 U. S. 819 (1968). For reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I.
The issue before us is whether Kramer was “improperly or collusively made” a party “to invoke the jurisdiction” of the District Court, within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1359. We look first to the legislative background.
Section 1359 has existed in its present form only since the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code. Prior to that time, the use of devices to create diversity was regulated by two federal statutes. The first, known as the “assignee clause,” provided that, with certain exceptions not here relevant:
“No district court shall have cognizance of any suit ... to recover upon any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee, . . . unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court ... if no assignment had been made.”
The second pre-1948 statute, 28 U. S. C. § 80 (1940 ed.), stated that a district court should dismiss an action whenever:
“it shall appear to the satisfaction of the . . . court . . . that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of [the] court, or that the parties to said suit have been improperly or collu-sively made or joined ... for the purpose of creating [federal jurisdiction].”
As part of the 1948 revision, § 80 was amended to produce the present § 1359. The assignee clause was simultaneously repealed. The Reviser’s Note describes the amended assignee clause as a “ ‘jumble of legislative jargon,’ ” and states that “[t]he revised section changes this clause by confining its application to cases wherein the assignment is improperly or collusively made .... Furthermore, . . . the original purpose of [the assignee] clause is better served by substantially following section 80.” That purpose was said to be “to prevent the manufacture of Federal jurisdiction by the device of assignment.” Ibid.
II.
Only a small number of cases decided under § 1359 have involved diversity jurisdiction based on assignments, and this Court has not considered the matter since the 1948 revision. Because the approach of the former assignee clause was to forbid the grounding of jurisdiction upon any assignment, regardless of its circumstances or purpose, decisions under that clause are of little assistance. However, decisions of this Court under the other predecessor statute, 28 U. S. C. § 80 (1940 ed.), seem squarely in point. These decisions, together with the evident purpose of § 1359, lead us to conclude that the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the assignment in question was “improperly or collusively made.”
The most compelling precedent is Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U. S. 138 (1885). There Maine holders of bonds issued by a Maine village desired to test the bonds’ validity in the federal courts. In an effort to accomplish this, they cut the coupons from their bonds and transferred them to a citizen of Massachusetts, who gave in return a non-negotiable two-year note for $500 and a promise to pay back 50% of the net amount recovered above $500. The jurisdictional question was certified to this Court, which held that there was no federal jurisdiction because the plaintiff had been “improperly or collusively” made a party within the meaning of the predecessor statute to 28 U. S. C. § 80 (1940 ed.). The Court pointed out that the plaintiff could easily have been released from his non-negotiable note, and found that apart from the hoped-for creation of federal jurisdiction the only real consequence of the transfer was to enable the Massachusetts plaintiff to “retain one-half of what he collects for the use of his name and his trouble in collecting.” 114 U. S., at 146. The Court concluded that “the transfer of the coupons was ‘a mere contrivance, a pretence, the result of a collusive arrangement to create’ ” federal jurisdiction. Ibid.
We find the case before us indistinguishable from Farmington and other decisions of like tenor. When the assignment to Kramer is considered together with his total lack of previous connection with the matter and his simultaneous reassignment of a 95% interest back to Panama, there can be little doubt that the assignment was for purposes of collection, with Kramer to retain 5% of the net proceeds “for the use of his name and his trouble in collecting.” If the suit had been unsuccessful, Kramer would have been out only $1, plus costs. Moreover, Kramer candidly admits that the “assignment was in substantial part motivated by a desire by [Panama’s] counsel to make diversity jurisdiction available . . . .”
The conclusion that this assignment was “improperly or collusively made” within the meaning of § 1359 is supported not only by precedent but also by consideration of the statute’s purpose. If federal jurisdiction could be created by assignments of this kind, which are easy to arrange and involve few disadvantages for the assignor, then a vast quantity of ordinary contract and tort litigation could be channeled into the federal courts at the will of one of the parties. Such “manufacture of Federal jurisdiction” was the very thing which Congress intended to prevent when it enacted § 1359 and its predecessors.
III.
Kramer nevertheless argues that the assignment to him was not “improperly or collusively made” within the meaning of § 1359, for two main reasons. First, he suggests that the undisputed legality of the assignment under Texas law necessarily rendered it valid for purposes of federal jurisdiction. We cannot accept this contention. The existence of federal jurisdiction is a matter of federal, not state, law. See, e. g., Missouri P. R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556, 582 (1896). Under the predecessor section, 28 U. S. C. § 80 (1940 ed.), this Court several times held that an assignment could be “improperly or collusively made” even though binding under state law, and nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1359 suggests that a different result should be reached under that statute. Moreover, to accept this argument would render § 1359 largely incapable of accomplishing its purpose; this very case demonstrates the ease with which a party may “manufacture” federal jurisdiction by an assignment which meets the requirements of state law.
Second, Kramer urges that this case is significantly distinguishable from earlier decisions because it involves diversity jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (a)(2), arising from the alienage of one of the parties, rather than the more common diversity jurisdiction based upon the parties’ residence in different States. We can perceive no substance in this argument: by its terms, § 1359 applies equally to both types of diversity jurisdiction, and there is no indication that Congress intended them to be treated differently.
IV.
In short, we find that this assignment falls not only within the scope of § 1359 but within its very core. It follows that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear this action, and that petitioner must seek his remedy in the state courts. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
That is, Kramer would receive 5%, and Panama 95%, of the net proceeds remaining after payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses of litigation.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (a) (2) grants district courts original jurisdiction of civil actions in which the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000 and is between “citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof . . . .” The District Court would have had no jurisdiction of a suit brought by Panama against Caribbean, since both were alien corporations.
28 U. S. C. § 41 (1) (1940 ed.). The clause first appeared as § 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 79.
This statute was first enacted in 1875. See 18 Stat. 470.
The quotation is from a Comment, Chaos of Jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts, 35 Ill. L. Rev. 566, 569 (1941); it refers primarily to the obscure wording of certain exceptions contained in the clause. See id., at 569-571.
See cases cited in 3A J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 17.05 [3.-1], nn. 7-9 (2d ed. 1968).
There were exceptions for particular types of assignments, none of which is relevant here.
See, e. g., Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U. S. 209 (1881); Little v. Giles, 118 U. S. 596 (1886).
Hence, we have no occasion to re-examine the cases in which this Court has held that where the transfer of a claim is absolute, with the transferor retaining no interest in the subject matter, then the transfer is not “improperly or collusively made,” regardless of the transferor’s motive. See, e. g., Cross v. Allen, 141 U. S. 528 (1891) ; South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 (1904); Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U. S. 518 (1928); cf. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619 (1914).
Nor is it necessary to consider whether, in cases in which suit is required to be brought by an administrator or guardian, a motive to create diversity jurisdiction renders the appointment of an out-of-state representative “improper” or “collusive.” See, e. g., McSparran v. Weist, 402 F. 2d 867 (1968); Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 324 F. 2d 235 (1963); County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F. 2d 470 (1961); cf. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U. S. 183 (1931). Cases involving representatives vary in several respects from those in which jurisdiction is based on assignments: (1) in the former situation, some representative must be appointed before suit can be brought, while in the latter the assignor normally is himself capable of suing in state court; (2) under state law, different kinds of guardians and administrators may possess discrete sorts of powers; and (3) all such representatives owe their appointment to the decree of a state court, rather than solely to an action of the parties. It is not necessary to decide whether these distinctions amount to a difference for purposes of § 1359.
Brief for Petitioner 16.
See, e. g., Little v. Giles, 118 U. S. 596, 602 (1886); Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U. S. 327, 336 (1895); cf. Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 198, 215-216 (1849).
Petitioner asks that we make our ruling prospective only, asserting that he reasonably believed he had a right to invoke federal jurisdiction, and that the four-year Texas statute of limitations governing contract actions, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., Art. 5527 (1948), may bar him from recovering in the state courts as to some of the installments allegedly due him. However, another Texas statute, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., Art. 5539a (1948), provides:
"When ... a judgment . . . shall be set aside or annulled in a direct proceeding, because of a want of jurisdiction of the Trial Court . . . and within sixty (60) days after such dismissal . . . becomes final, such action shall be commenced in a Court of Proper Jurisdiction, the period between the date of first filing and that of commencement in the second Court shall not be counted as a part of the period of limitation unless the opposite party shall . . . show the first filing to have been in intentional disregard of jurisdiction.”
This statute has been held to apply when the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds was by a federal court. See, e. g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 186 S. W. 2d 306 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1944). Petitioner alleges that the first contract installment accrued on July 1, 1962. Hence, Art. 5539a appears to assure him a full state-court remedy, and thus obviates the need for further discussion of prospectivity.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the Department of State produced 25 documents containing information about Haitian nationals who had attempted to immigrate illegally to the United States and were involuntarily returned to Haiti. Names of individual Haitians had been deleted from 17 of the documents. The question presented is whether these deletions were authorized by FOIA Exemption 6, which provides that FOIA disclosure requirements do not apply to “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6).
I
Haiti is a densely populated nation located about 500 nautical miles southeast of Florida on the western third of the Caribbean Island of Hispaniola. Prior to 1981, its history of severe economic depression and dictatorial government motivated large numbers of its citizens to emigrate to Florida without obtaining the permission of either the Haitian Government or the Government of the United States. A small number of those undocumented aliens were eligible for asylum as political refugees, but almost all of them were subject to deportation if identified and apprehended.
In response to this burgeoning “illegal migration by sea of large numbers of undocumented aliens” from Haiti and other countries, President Reagan ordered the Coast Guard and the Secretary of State to intercept vessels carrying undocumented aliens and, except for passengers who qualified for refugee status, to return them to their point of origin. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4865, 3 CFR 50 (1981 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 12324, 3 CFR 180 (1981 Comp.). The President also directed the Secretary of State to enter into “cooperative arrangements with appropriate foreign governments for the purpose of preventing illegal migration to the United States by sea.” Ibid. Following this directive, the Secretary of State obtained an assurance from the Haitian Government that interdicted Haitians would “not be subject to prosecution for illegal departure.” See Agreement on Migrants — Interdiction, Sept. 23, 1981, United States-Haiti, 33 U. S. T. 3559, 3560, T. I. A. S. No. 10241. In order to monitor compliance with that assurance, State Department personnel conducted confidential interviews with a “representative sample” of unsuccessful emigrants about six months after their involuntary return. All but one or two of the emigrants reported that they had not been harassed or prosecuted since their return to Haiti.
Respondents in this case are a Florida lawyer who represents undocumented Haitian nationals seeking political asylum in the United States and three of his clients. In immigration proceedings, respondents are attempting to prove that Haitians who immigrated illegally will face a well-founded fear of persecution if they return to their homeland and therefore are refugees entitled to asylum in this country. Relying in part on the evidence in the reports of the interviews with former passengers on vessels interdicted by the Coast Guard, the Government has taken the position in those proceedings that respondents’ fear of persecution is not well founded.
In order to test the accuracy of the Government’s assertion that undocumented Haitian nationals have not been persecuted upon their return to Haiti, respondents made a series of FOIA requests to three Government agencies for copies of reports of the interviews by State Department personnel with persons who had been involuntarily returned to Haiti. Insofar as relevant to the question before us, the net result of these requests was the production by the State Department of 25 documents, containing approximately 96 pages, which describe a number of interviews with specific returnees and summarize the information that had been obtained during successive periods. Thus, for example, a summary prepared in March 1985 reported that since the followup program had begun 3V2 years earlier, United States embassy officials in Haiti had interviewed 812 returnees, 22.83 percent of the total migrant interdictee population. During that time, the report continued, “only two interdictees have mentioned a threat or mistreatment by the authorities. In one case the claim was unverifiable as there were no witnesses present, in the second case higher authorities intervened to prevent mistreatment by a rural policeman.” In 17 of the documents, the information related to individual interviews, but the names and other identifying information had been redacted before the documents were delivered to respondents. The only issue for us to decide is whether that redaction was lawful.
The District Court found that any invasion of privacy from the “mere act of disclosure of names and addresses would be de minimis and little more than' speculation” and was clearly outweighed by the public interest in the “safe relocation of returned Haitians.” Ray v. United States Department of Justice, 725 F. Supp. 502, 505 (SD Fla. 1989). It therefore ordered the Department to produce the redacted information.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Ray v. United States Department of Justice, 908 F. 2d 1549 (CA11 1990). For two reasons, however, it disagreed with the District Court’s “de minimis” characterization of the privacy interest at stake. First, it noted that respondents wanted the redacted information in order to enable them to contact the interviewees directly and to question them about their treatment by the Haitian Government. Id., at 1554. Second, the Court recognized that “the returnees were promised confidentiality before they talked with U. S. government officials.” Ibid. Thus, the Court of Appeals began its balancing process “by acknowledging that there are significant privacy interests at stake.” Ibid. It nevertheless concluded that those interests were outweighed by the public interest in learning whether the Government is “adequately monitoring Haiti’s compliance with its obligation not to persecute returnees” and “is honest to the public” when its officials express the opinion that Haiti is adhering to that obligation. Id., at 1555. The court recognized that the redacted information would not, in and of itself, tell respondents anything about Haiti’s treatment of the returnees or this Government’s honesty, but it concluded that the indirect benefit of giving respondents the means to locate the Haitian returnees and to cross-examine them provided a public value that required disclosure. Id., at 1555-1556.
We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ construction of Exemption 6, 499 U. S. 904 (1991), and now reverse.
II
It is appropriate to preface our evaluation of the narrow question that we must decide with an identification of certain matters that have been resolved in earlier stages of the litigation.
After the District Court’s initial decision, the State Department filed additional affidavits in support of a claim that the redacted information was protected from disclosure by Exemption 1, the exemption for classified documents, and also by Exemption 7(C), the exemption for law enforcement records which, if released, “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The District Court ruled that the Government had waived those claims by not raising them until after its Exemption 6 claim had been denied, 725 F. Supp., at 505, and the Court of Appeals held that that ruling was not an abuse of discretion, 908 F. 2d, at 1557. We denied the Government’s certiorari petition insofar as it sought review of that question, but mention it here because the Government’s burden in establishing the requisite invasion of privacy to support an Exemption 6 claim is heavier than the standard applicable to Exemption 7(C). See Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749, 756 (1989). To prevail in this case under Exemption 6, the Government must establish that the invasion of the interviewees’ privacy would be “clearly unwarranted.”
In attempting to meet its burden, the Government relies, in part, on the fact that the interviews with the Haitian returnees were conducted pursuant to assurances of confidentiality. In this Court, respondents have suggested that the texts of some of the reported interviews do not expressly mention such assurances. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals, however, questioned the fact that promises of confidentiality had actually been made; on the contrary, after finding that such assurances had been made, both courts concluded as a matter of law that they did not outweigh the public interest in disclosure. Insofar as the promises of confidentiality are relevant, we of course accept the factual predicate for the Court of Appeals decision.
That court’s conclusion rested, in part, on what it described as the public interest in learning “whether our government is honest to the public about Haiti’s treatment of returnees.” 908 F. 2d, at 1555. The Court of Appeals did not, however, suggest that there was any evidence in the State Department records that was inconsistent with any public statement made by Government officials, or that there was any other factual basis for questioning the honesty of its officials. Thus, as with the assurances of confidentiality, we have no occasion to question the Government’s version of the relevant facts.
We note, finally, that respondents have never questioned the Government’s position that the documents at issue consist of “personnel and medical files and similar files” within the meaning of Exemption 6. Because the 17 reports from which identifying information was deleted unquestionably apply to the particular individuals who had been returned and interviewed, they are “similar files” within the meaning of the exemption. See Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U. S. 595, 602 (1982). The only question, therefore, is whether the disclosure of the unredacted interview reports “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of that person’s privacy.”
III
The Freedom of Information Act was enacted to facilitate public access to Government documents. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U. S. 146, 151 (1989). The statute was designed “‘to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.’” Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 361 (1976). Consistently with this purpose, as well as the plain language of the Act, the strong presumption in favor of disclosure places the burden on the agency to justify the withholding of any requested documents. Ibid.; Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U. S., at 755. That burden remains with the agency when it seeks to justify the redaction of identifying information in a particular document as well as when it seeks to withhold an entire document. See 5 U.S. C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
The redaction procedure is, however, expressly authorized by FOIA. Congress thus recognized that the policy of informing the public about the operation of its Government can be adequately served in some cases without unnecessarily compromising individual interests in privacy. Accordingly, in the leading case interpreting Exemption 6, we held that the statute required disclosure of summaries of Air Force Academy disciplinary proceedings “with personal references or other identifying information deleted.” Rose, 425 U. S., at 380. The question in this case is whether petitioner has discharged its burden of demonstrating that the disclosure of the contents of the interviews with the Haitian returnees adequately served the statutory purpose and that the release of the information identifying the particular interviewees would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of their privacy.
As we held in Rose, the text of the exemption requires the Court to balance “the individual’s right of privacy” against the basic policy of opening “agency action to the light of public scrutiny,” id., at 372. The District Court and the Court of Appeals properly began their analysis by considering the significance of the privacy interest at stake. We are persuaded, however, that several factors, when considered together, make the privacy interest more substantial than the Court of Appeals recognized.
First, the Court of Appeals appeared to assume that respondents sought only the names and addresses of the interviewees. But respondents sought — and the District Court ordered that the Government disclose — the unredacted interview summaries. As the Government points out, many of these summaries contain personal details about particular interviewees. Thus, if the summaries are released without the names redacted, highly personal information regarding marital and employment status, children, living conditions, and attempts to enter the United States would be linked publicly with particular, named individuals. Although disclosure of such personal information constitutes only a de minimis invasion of privacy when the identities of the interviewees are unknown, the invasion of privacy becomes significant when the personal information is linked to particular interviewees. Cf. id., at 380-381.
In addition, disclosure of the unredacted interview summaries would publicly identify the interviewees as people who cooperated with a State Department investigation of the Haitian Government’s compliance with its promise to the United States Government not to prosecute the returnees. The Court of Appeals failed to acknowledge the significance of this fact. As the State Department explains, disclosure of the interviewees’ identities could subject them or their families to “embarrassment in their social and community relationships.” App. 43. More importantly, this group of interviewees occupies a special status: They left their homeland in violation of Haitian law and are protected from prosecution by their government’s assurance to the State Department. Although the Department’s monitoring program indicates that that assurance has been fulfilled, it nevertheless remains true that the State Department considered the danger of mistreatment sufficiently real to necessitate that monitoring program. How significant the danger of mistreatment may now be is, of course, impossible to measure, but the privacy interest in protecting these individuals from any retaliatory action that might result from a renewed interest in their aborted attempts to emigrate must be given great weight. Indeed, the very purpose of respondents’ FOIA request is to attempt to prove that such a danger is present today.
We are also persuaded that the Court of Appeals gave insufficient weight to the fact that the interviews had been conducted pursuant to an assurance of confidentiality. We agree that such a promise does not necessarily prohibit disclosure, but it has a special significance in this case. Not only is it apparent that an interviewee who had been given such an assurance might have been willing to discuss private matters that he or she would not otherwise expose to the public — and therefore would regard a subsequent interview by a third party armed with that information as a special affront to his or her privacy — but, as discussed above, it is also true that the risk of mistreatment gives this group of interviewees an additional interest in assuring that their anonymity is maintained.
Finally, we cannot overlook the fact that respondents plan to make direct contact with the individual Haitian returnees identified in the reports. As the Court of Appeals properly recognized, the intent to interview the returnees magnifies the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of their identities.
IV
Although the interest in protecting the privacy of the redacted information is substantial, we must still consider the importance of the public interest in its disclosure. For unless the invasion of privacy is “clearly unwarranted,” the public interest in disclosure must prevail. As we have repeatedly recognized, FOIA’s “basic policy of ‘full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language,’... focuses on the citizens’ right to be informed about ‘what their government is up to.’ Official information that sheds light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose.” Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U. S., at 773 (quoting Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S., at 360-361) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Court of Appeals properly recognized that the public interest in knowing whether the State Department has adequately monitored Haiti’s compliance with its promise not to prosecute returnees is cognizable under FOIA. We are persuaded, however, that this public interest has been adequately served by disclosure of the redacted interview summaries and that disclosure of the unredacted documents would therefore constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the interviewees’ privacy.
The unredacted portions of the documents that have already been released to respondents inform the reader about the State Department’s performance of its duty to monitor Haitian compliance with the promise not to prosecute the returnees. The documents reveal how many returnees were interviewed, when the interviews took place, the contents of individual interviews, and details about the status of the interviewees. The addition of the redacted identifying information would not shed any additional light on the Government’s conduct of its obligation.
The asserted public interest on which respondents rely stems not from the disclosure of the redacted information itself, but rather from the hope that respondents, or others, may be able to use that information to obtain additional information outside the Government files. The Government argues that such “derivative use” of requested documents is entirely beyond the purpose of the statute and that we should adopt a categorical rule entirely excluding the interest in such use from the process of balancing the public interest in disclosure against the interest in privacy. There is no need to adopt such a rigid rule to decide this case, however, because there is nothing in the record to suggest that a second series of interviews with the already-interviewed returnees would produce any relevant information that is not set forth in the documents that have already been produced. Mere speculation about hypothetical public benefits cannot outweigh a demonstrably significant invasion of privacy. Accordingly, we need not address the question whether a “derivative use” theory would ever justify release of information about private individuals.
We are also unmoved by respondents’ asserted interest in ascertaining the veracity of the interview reports. There is not a scintilla of evidence, either in the documents themselves or elsewhere in the record, that tends to impugn the integrity of the reports. We generally accord Government records and official conduct a presumption of legitimacy. If a totally unsupported suggestion that the interest in finding out whether Government agents have been telling the truth justified disclosure of private materials, Government agencies would have no defense against requests for production of private information. What sort of evidence of official misconduct might be sufficient to identify a genuine public interest in disclosure is a matter that we need not address in this case. On the record before us, we are satisfied that the proposed invasion of the serious privacy interest of the Haitian returnees is “clearly unwarranted.”
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Article 1.2 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U. N. T. S. 268, to which the United States acceded in 1968,19 U. S. T. 6223, 6261, T. I. A. S. No. 6577, defines a “refugee” as a person absent from his or her country due to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” The Protocol obligates the United States to comply with the substantive requirements of Articles 2 through 34 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,1951,189 U. N. T. S. 150. 19 U. S. T., at 6225. Article 33.1 of the Convention, 19 U. S. T., at 6267, states: “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” See generally INS v. Stevic, 467 U. S. 407, 416-418 (1984). Article 34, 19 U. S. T., at 6267, provides that “Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. ...” See generally INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 436-441 (1987).
Respondents also sought disclosure of an alleged list of 600 Haitians who had been returned to Haiti and had not been mistreated after their arrival. The District Court found, however, that the “record fails to disclose that any documents have been improperly withheld o[r] that they, indeed, exist,” Ray v. United States Department of Justice, 725 F. Supp. 502, 504 (SD Fla. 1989), and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this finding, Ray v. United States Department of Justice, 908 F. 2d 1549, 1559-1560 (1990). We have no reason to question this finding and, therefore, we are concerned only with the 25 documents containing summaries of interviews with illegal Haitian immigrants who were involuntarily returned to Haiti.
Plaintiffs’ Notice of Filing Defendant State Department’s Edited Documents 12.
The May 1985 report, the last report in the record, states that as of that date, embassy officials had interviewed 1,052 of the returnees, 23.28 percent of the total migrant returnee population. Id., at 96. The report concluded that the interviews provide “further evidence” that Haiti “is keeping its commitment under the 1981 Migrant Interdiction Agreement not to prosecute or harass returned migrants for their illegal departure,” but noted that “the embassy will continue its follow-up program with the goal of reaching a 25-percent interview rate of returned migrants.” Ibid.
For example, one memorandum relates the following:
“-is an unemployed 21-year-old living with his mother and five younger siblings in a one-room shack in Delmas. His older brother, who is employed and living in Port-au-Prince, had paid the $100 fare for_ to travel on the S/V Sainte Marie, interdicted enroute to Miami on 6/13/83.
“-explained that he had wanted to live in Miami, although he has no family there. He never went to school and has no marketable skills. -says that he is thinking of another attempt to reach the States. He cannot find a job here and said that he would like to travel. The twelve days spent on board the S/V Sainte Marie were difficult, he admitted, but he is willing to take another chance. _emphatically said that he had had no problems from Haitian officials since his return. He has been assisted twice by the Red Cross with food and money grants totalling $60.” Attachment 2 to Declaration of John Eaves, Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Mandatory Review of the Classification and Declassification Center of the Department of State 6.
The relevant portions of Exemptions 1, 6, and 7 read as follows:
“(b) [The FOIA disclosure] section does not apply to matters that are—
“(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
“(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
“(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy . . .5 U. S. C. § 552.
Thus, the Court of Appeals explained:
“We are also mindful, as the government points out, that the returnees were promised confidentiality before they talked with U. S. government officials. That, of course, is a factor that adds weight to the privacy interests at stake here, but it is not a factor that compels us to prohibit disclosure in this case.” 908 F. 2d, at 1554; see also 725 F. Supp., at 505 (“The promise of confidentiality by the State Dept, is only one factor to be considered and, in this case, is not determinative of the outcome”).
See n. 6, supra.
As we noted in Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749, 755, n. 7 (1989):
“Congress employed ... language [similar to that contained in Exemption 6] earlier in the statute to authorize an agency to delete identifying details that might otherwise offend an individual’s privacy:
‘“To the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes an opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction.’ § 552(a)(2).”
In addition, Congress mandated that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt. ...” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b).
See S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1965) (“The authority to delete identifying details after written justification is necessary in order to be able to balance the public’s right to know with the private citizen’s right to be secure in his personal affairs which have no bearing or effect on the general public. For example, it may be pertinent to know that unseasonably harsh weather has caused an increase in public relief costs; but it is not necessary that the identity of any person so affected be made public”); H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1966) (“The public has a need to know, for example, the details of an agency opinion or statement of policy on an income tax matter, but there is no need to identify the individuals involved in a tax matter if the identification has no bearing or effect on the general public”). These examples guided our analysis in Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm., supra, in which we held that criminal identification records, or “rap sheets,” were law enforcement records which, if released, “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” and therefore were exempt from disclosure under Exemption 7. We explained that:
“Both public relief and income tax assessments — like law enforcement— are proper subjects of public concern. But just as the identity of the individuals given public relief or involved in tax matters is irrelevant to the public’s understanding of the Government’s operation, so too is the identity of individuals who are the subjects of rap sheets irrelevant to the public’s understanding of the system of law enforcement. For rap sheets reveal only the dry, chronological, personal history of individuals who have had brushes with the law, and tell us nothing about matters of substantive law enforcement policy that are properly the subject of public concern.” Id., at 766, n. 18.
See n. 5, supra.
We emphasize, however, that we are not implying that disclosure of a list of names and other identifying information is inherently and always a significant threat to the privacy of the individuals on the list. Instead, we agree with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that whether disclosure of a list of names is a “ ‘significant or a de minimis threat depends upon the characteristic(s) revealed by virtue of being on the particular list, and the consequences likely to ensue.'” National Assn. of Retired Federal Employees v. Horner, 279 U. S. App. D. C. 27, 31, 879 F. 2d 873, 877 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U. S. 1078 (1990). As discussed infra, disclosure of the interviewees’ names would be a significant invasion of their privacy because it would subject them to possible embarrassment and retaliatory action.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | E | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
Since the inception of cable television, cable companies have sought the means to run a wire into the home of each subscriber. They have found it convenient, and often essential, to lease space for their cables on telephone and electric utility poles. Utilities, in turn, have found it convenient to charge monopoly rents.
Congress first addressed these transactions in 1978, by enacting the Pole Attachments Act, 92 Stat. 35, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 224 (1994 ed.), which requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to “regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments to provide that such rates, terms, and conditions are just and reasonable.” § 224(b). (The Act is set forth in full in the Appendix, infra.) The cases now before us present two questions regarding the scope of the Act. First, does the Act reach attachments that provide both cable television and high-speed (broadband) Internet service? Second, does it reach attachments by wireless telecommunications providers? Both questions require us to interpret what constitutes a “pole attachment” under the Act.
In the original Act a “pole attachment” was defined as “any attachment by a cable television system to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by a utility,” § 224(a)(4). The Telecommunications Act of 1996, §703, 110 Stat. 150, expanded the definition to include, as an additional regulated category, “any attachment by a . . . provider of telecommunications service.” § 224(a)(4) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
Cable companies had begun providing high-speed Internet service, as well as traditional cable television, over their wires even before 1996. The FCC had interpreted the Act to cover pole attachments for these commingled services, and its interpretation had been approved by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Texas Util. Elec. Co. v. FCC, 997 F. 2d 925, 927, 929 (1993). Finding nothing in the 1996 amendments to change its view on this question, the FCC continued to assert jurisdiction over pole attachments for these particular commingled services. In re Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Amendment of the Commission’s Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, 13 FCC Rcd. 6777 (1998). In the same order the FCC concluded further that the amended Act covers attachments by wireless telecommunications providers. “[T]he use of the word 'any’ precludes a position that Congress intended to distinguish between wire and wireless attachments.” Id., at 6798.
Certain pole-owning utilities challenged the FCC’s order in various Courts of Appeals. See 47 U. S. C. § 402(a) (1994 ed.); 28 U. S. C. § 2842 (1994 ed.). The challenges were consolidated in the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, see § 2112(a), which reversed the FCC on both points. 208 F. 3d 1263 (2000). On the question of commingled services, the court held that the two specific rate formulas in 47 U. S. C. §§ 224(d)(3) and (e)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. V) narrow the general definition of pole attachments. The first formula applies to “any pole attachment used by a cable television system solely to provide cable service,” § 224(d)(3), and the second applies to “pole attachments used by telecommunications carriers to provide telecommunications services,” § 224(e)(1). The majority concluded that attachments for commingled services are neither, and that “no other rates are authorized.” 208 F. 3d, at 1276, n. 29. Because it found that neither rate formula covers commingled services, it ruled those attachments must be excluded from the Act’s coverage.
On the wireless question, the majority relied on the statutory definition of “utility”: “any person ... who owns or controls poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part, for any wire communications.” § 224(a)(1). The majority concluded that the definition of “utility” informed the definition of “pole attachment,” restricting it to attachments used, at least in part, for wire communications. Attachments for wireless communications, it held, are excluded by negative implication. Id., at 1274.
Judge Carnes dissented on these two issues. In his view, §§ 224(a)(4) and (b) “unambiguously giv[e] the FCC regulatory authority over wireless telecommunications service and Internet service.” Id., at 1281 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). We granted certiorari. 531 U. S. 1125 (2001).
II
We turn first to the question whether the Act applies to attachments that provide high-speed Internet access at the same time as cable television, the commingled services at issue here. As we have noted, the Act requires the FCC to “regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments,” § 224(b) (1994 ed.), and defines these to include “any attachment by a cable television system,” § 224(a)(4) (1994 ed., Supp. V). These provisions resolve the question.
No one disputes that a cable attached by a cable television company, which provides only cable television service, is an attachment “by a cable television system.” If one day its cable provides high-speed Internet access, in addition to cable television service, the cable does not cease, at that instant, to be an attachment “by a cable television system.” The addition of a service does not change the character of the attaching entity—the entity the attachment is “by.” And this is what matters under the statute.
This is our own, best reading of the statute, which we find unambiguous. If the statute were thought ambiguous, however, the FCC’s reading must be accepted nonetheless, provided it is a reasonable interpretation. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-844 (1984). Respondents’ burden, then, is not merely to refute the proposition that “any attachment” means “any attachment”; they must prove also the FCC’s interpretation is unreasonable. This they cannot do.
Some respondents now advance an interpretation of the statute not presented to the Court of Appeals, or, so far as our review discloses, to the FCC. They contend it is wrong to concentrate on whose attachment is at issue; the question, they say, is what does the attachment do? Under this approach, an attachment is only an attachment by a cable television system to the extent it is used to provide cable television. To the extent it does other things, it falls outside the ambit of the Act, and respondents may charge whatever rates they choose. To make this argument, respondents rely on a statutory definition of “cable system” (which the FCC treats as synonymous with “cable television system,” see 47 CFR § 76.5(a) (2000)). The definition begins as follows: “[T]he term ‘cable system’ means a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission paths and associated signal generation, reception, and control equipment that is designed to provide cable service which includes video programming and which is provided to multiple subscribers within a community.” 47 U. S. C. § 522(7) (1994 ed., Supp. V). The first part of the definition would appear to cover commingled services, but the definition goes on to exclude “a facility of a common carrier ... except that such facility shall be considered a cable system ... to the extent such facility is used in the transmission of video programming directly to subscribers, unless the extent of such use is solely to provide interactive on-demand services.” Ibid.
Respondents assert that “most major cable companies are now common carriers [since they also provide] residential and/or commercial telephone service.” Brief for Respondents American Electric Power Service Corp. et al. 20. If so, they contend, then for purposes of § 224(a)(4), a facility that provides commingled cable television and Internet service is a “cable television system” only “to the extent that” it provides cable television.
Even if a cable company is a common carrier because it provides telephone service, of course, the attachment might still fall under the second half of the “pole attachments” definition: “any attachment by a... provider of telecommunications service.” §224(a)(4). This argument, and the related assertion that “most major cable companies are now common carriers,” need not be considered by us in the first instance, when neither the FCC nor the Court of Appeals has had the opportunity to pass upon the points. There is a factual premise here, as well as an application of the statute to the facts, that the FCC and the Court of Appeals ought to have the opportunity to address in the first instance. This does not leave the cases in doubt, however. Even if a “cable television system” is best thought of as a certain “facility” rather than a certain type of entity, respondents still must confront the problem that the statute regulates attachments “by” (rather than “of”) these facilities. The word “by” still limits pole attachments by who is doing the attaching, not by what is attached. So even if a cable television system is only a cable television system “to the extent” it provides cable television, an “attachment ... by a cable television system” is still (entirely) an attachment “by” a cable television system whether or not it does other things as well.
The Court of Appeals based its ruling on a different theory. The statute sets two different formulas for just and reasonable rates — one for pole attachments “used by a cable television system solely to provide cable service,” § 224(d)(3), and one for those “used by telecommunications carriers to provide telecommunications services,” § 224(e)(1). In a footnote, the Court of Appeals concluded without analysis that “subsections (d) and (e) narrow (b)(l)’s general mandate to set just and reasonable rates.” 208 F. 3d, at 1276, n. 29. In its view, Congress would not have provided two specific rate formulas, and yet left a residual category for which the FCC would derive its own view of just and reasonable rates. “The straightforward language of subsections (d) and (e) directs the FCC to establish two specific just and reasonable rates ...; no other rates are authorized.” Ibid.
This conclusion has no foundation in the plain language of §§ 224(a)(4) and (b). Congress did indeed prescribe two formulas for “just and reasonable” rates in two specific categories; but nothing about the text of §§ 224(d) and (e) (1994 ed. and Supp. V), and nothing about the structure of the Act, suggest that these are the exclusive rates allowed. It is true that specific statutory language should control more general language when there is a conflict between the two. Here, however, there is no conflict. The specific controls but only within its self-described scope.
The sum of the transactions addressed by the rate formulas — § 224(d)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (attachments “used by a cable television system solely to provide cable service”) and § 224(e)(1) (attachments “used by telecommunications carriers to provide telecommunications services”) — is less than the theoretical coverage of the Act as a whole. Section 224(a)(4) reaches “any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service.” The first two subsections are simply subsets of — but not limitations upon — the third.
Likewise, nothing about the 1996 amendments suggests an intent to decrease the jurisdiction of the FCC. To the contrary, the amendments’ new provisions extend the Act to cover telecommunications. As we have noted, commingled services were covered under the statute as first enacted, in the views of the FCC and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Texas Util. Elec. Co. v. FCC, 997 F. 2d 925 (1998). Before 1996, it is true, the grant of authority in §§ 224(a)(4) and (b) was coextensive with the application of the single rate formula in § 224(d). The 1996 amendments limited § 224(d) to attachments used by a cable television system “solely to provide cable service,” but — despite Texas Util. Elec. Co. — did not so limit “pole attachment” in § 224(a)(4). At this point, coextensiveness ended. Cable television systems that also provide Internet service are still covered by §§ 224(a)(4) and (b) — just as they were before 1996 — whether or not they are now excluded from the specific rate formula of § 224(d); if they are, this would simply mean that the FCC must prescribe just and reasonable rates for them without necessary reliance upon a specific statutory formula devised by Congress.
The Court of Appeals held that §§ 224(d) and (e) implicitly limit the reach of §§ 224(a)(4) and (b); as a result, it was compelled to reach the question of the correct categorization of Internet services — that is, whether these services are “cable service,” § 224(d)(3), or “telecommunications services,” § 224(e)(1). It held that they are neither. By contrast, we hold that §§ 224(d) and (e) work no limitation on §§ 224(a)(4) and (b); for this reason, and because we granted certiorari only to determine the scope of the latter provisions, we need not decide the scope of the former.
The FCC had to go a step further, because once it decided that it had jurisdiction over attachments providing commingled services, it then had to set a just and reasonable rate. Again, no rate challenge is before us, but we note that the FCC proceeded in a sensible fashion. It first decided that Internet services are not telecommunications services:
“Several commentators suggested that cable operators providing Internet service should be required to pay the Section 224(e) telecommunications rate. We disagree. . . . Under [our] precedent, a cable television system providing Internet service over a commingled facility is not a telecommunications carrier subject to the revised rate mandated by Section 224(e) by virtue of providing Internet service.” 13 FCC Rcd., at 6794-6795 (footnotes omitted).
After deciding Internet services are not telecommunications services, the FCC then found that it did not need to decide whether they are cable services:
“Regardless of whether such commingled services constitute ‘solely cable services’ under Section 224(d)(3), we believe that the subsection (d) rate should apply. If the provision of such services over a cable television system is a ‘cable service’ under Section 224(d)(3), then the rate encompassed by that section would clearly apply. Even if the provision of Internet service over a cable television system is deemed to be neither ‘cable service’ nor ‘telecommunications service’ under the existing definitions, the Commission is still obligated under Section 224(b)(1) to ensure that the ‘rates, terms and conditions [for pole attachments] are just and reasonable,’... [a]nd we would, in our discretion, apply the subsection (d) rate as a ‘just and reasonable rate.’” Id., at 6795-6796 (footnote omitted).
Respondents are frustrated by the FCC’s refusal to categorize Internet services, and doubly frustrated by the FCC’s contingent decision that even if commingled services are not “cable service,” those services nevertheless warrant the § 224(d) rate. On the first point, though, decisionmakers sometimes dodge hard questions when easier ones are dis-positive; and we cannot fault the FCC for taking this approach. The second point, in essence, is a challenge to the rate the FCC has chosen, a question not now before us,'
We note that the FCC, subsequent to the order under review, has reiterated that it has not yet categorized Internet service. See, e. g., Pet. for Cert, in No. 00-843, p. 15, n. 4. It has also suggested a willingness to reconsider its conclusion that Internet services are not telecommunications. See, e. g., In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 15 FCC Rcd. 19287, 19294 (2000). Of course, the FCC has power to reconsider prior decisions. The order under review in this litigation, however, is both logical and unequivocal.
If the FCC should reverse its decision that Internet services are not telecommunications, only its choice of rate, and not its assertion of jurisdiction, would be implicated by the reversal. In this suit, though, we address only whether pole attachments that carry commingled services are subject to FCC regulation at all. The question is answered by §§ 224(a)(4) and (b), and the answer is yes.
Even if the FCC decides, in the end, that Internet service is not “cable service,” the result obtained by its interpretation of §§ 224(a)(4) and (b) is sensible. Congress may well have chosen to define a “just and reasonable” rate for pure cable television service, yet declined to produce a prospective formula for commingled cable service. The latter might be expected to evolve in directions Congress knew it could not anticipate. As it was in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), the subject matter here is technical, complex, and dynamic; and as a general rule, agencies have authority to fill gaps where the statutes are silent, id., at 843-844. It might have been thought prudent to provide set formulas for telecommunications service and “solely cable service,” and to leave unmodified the FCC’s customary discretion in calculating a “just and reasonable” rate for commingled services.
This result is more sensible than the one for which respondents contend. On their view, if a cable company attempts to innovate at all and provide anything other than pure television, it loses the protection of the Pole Attachments Act and subjects itself to monopoly pricing. The resulting contradiction of longstanding interpretation — on which cable companies have relied since before the 1996 amendments to the Act — would defeat Congress’ general instruction to the FCC to “encourage the deployment” of broadband Internet capability and, if necessary, “to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment.” Pub. L. 104-104, Tit. VII, §§ 706(a), (b), and (c)(1), 110 Stat. 153, note following 47 U. S. C. § 157 (1994 ed., Supp. V). This congressional policy underscores the reasonableness of the FCC’s interpretation: Cable attachments providing commingled services come within the ambit of the Act.
t-H
The second question presented is whether and to what extent the equipment of wireless telecommunications providers is susceptible of FCC regulation under the Act. The Eleventh Circuit held that “the act does not provide the FCC with authority to regulate wireless carriers.” 208 F. 3d, at 1275. All parties now agree this holding was overstated. “[T]o the extent a wireless carrier seeks to attach a wireline facility to a utility pole... the wireline attachment is subject to Section 224.” Brief for Respondents American Electric Power Service Corp. et al. 31; see also Brief for Respondents Atlantic City Electric Co. et al. 40; Brief for Repondent TXU Electric Co. 18; Brief for Respondent Florida Power & Light Co. 10-11. We agree, and we so hold.
The dispute that remains becomes a narrow one. Are some attachments by wireless telecommunications providers — those, presumably, which are composed of distinctively wireless equipment — excluded from the coverage of the Act? Again, the dispositive text requires the FCC to “regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments,” § 224(b) (1994 ed.), and defines these to include “any attachment by a . . . provider of telecommunications service,” § 224(a)(4) (1994 ed., Supp. V). “Telecommunications service,” in turn, is defined as the offering of telecommunications to the public for a fee, “regardless of the facilities used,” § 153(46). A provider of wireless telecommunications service is a “provider of telecommunications service,” so its attachment is a “pole attachment.”
Once more, respondents seek refuge in other parts of the statute. A “utility” is defined as an entity “who owns or controls poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part, for any wire communications.” § 224(a)(1). The definition, though, concerns only whose poles are covered, not which attachments are covered. Likewise, the rate formula is based upon the poles’ “usable space,” which is defined as “the space above the minimum grade level which can be used for the attachment of wires, cables, and associated equipment,” § 224(d)(2) (1994 ed.). This definition, too, does not purport to limit which pole attachments are covered.
In short, nothing in § 224(a)(1) or § 224(d)(2) limits § 224(a)(4) or § 224(b). Even if they did, moreover, respondents still would need to confront the provision for “assoei-ated equipment.” As noted above, respondents themselves concede that attachments of wires by wireless providers of telecommunications service are covered by the Act. See supra, at 339-340. It follows, in our view, that “associated equipment” which is indistinguishable from the “associated equipment” of wire-based telecommunications providers would also be covered. Respondents must demand a distinction between prototypical wire-based “associated equipment” and the wireless “associated equipment” to which they object. The distinction, they contend, is required by the economic rationale of the Act. The very reason for the Act is that — as to wires — utility poles constitute a bottleneck facility, for which utilities could otherwise charge monopoly rents. Poles, they say, are not a bottleneck facility for the siting of at least some, distinctively wireless equipment, like antennas. These can be located anywhere sufficiently high.
The economic analysis may be correct as far as it goes. Yet the proposed distinction — between prototypical wire-based “associated equipment” and the wireless “associated equipment” which allegedly falls outside of the rationale of the Act — finds no support in the text, and, based on our present understanding of the record before us, appears quite difficult to draw. Congress may have decided that the difficulties of drawing such a distinction would burden the orderly administration of the Act. In any event, the FCC was not unreasonable in declining to draw this distinction; and if the text were ambiguous, we would defer to its judgment on this technical question.
<!
Respondents insist that “any attachment” cannot mean “any attachment.” Surely, they say, the Act cannot cover billboards, or clotheslines, or anything else that a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service should fancy attaching to a pole. Since the literal reading is absurd, they contend, there must be a limiting principle.
The FCC did not purport either to enunciate or to disclaim a specific limiting principle, presumably because, in its view, the attachments at issue here did not test the margins of the Act. The term “any attachment by a cable television system” covers at least those attachments which do in fact provide cable television service, and “any attachment by a ... provider of telecommunications service” covers at least those which in fact provide telecommunications. Attachments of other sorts may be examined by the agency in the first instance.
The attachments at issue in this suit — ones which provide commingled cable and Internet service and ones which provide wireless telecommunications — fall within the heartland of the Act. The agency’s decision, therefore, to assert jurisdiction over these attachments is reasonable and entitled to our deference. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
47 U. S. C. § 224. Pole attachments
(a) Definitions
As used in this section:
(1) The term “utility” means any person who is a local exchange carrier or an electric, gas, water, steam, or other public utility, and who owns or controls poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part, for any wire communications. Such term does not include any railroad, any person who is cooperatively organized, or any person owned by the Federal Government or any State.
(2) The term “Federal Government” means the Government of the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof.
(3) The term “State” means any State, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof.
(4) The term “pole attachment” means any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by a utility.
(5) For purposes of this section, the term “telecommunications carrier” (as defined in section 153 of this title) does not include any incumbent local exchange carrier as defined in section 251(h) of this title.
(b) Authority of Commission to regulate rates, terms, and conditions; enforcement powers; promulgation of regulations
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, the Commission shall regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments to provide that such rates, terms, and conditions are just and reasonable, and shall adopt procedures necessary and appropriate to hear and resolve complaints concerning such rates, terms, and conditions. For purposes of enforcing any determinations resulting from complaint procedures established pursuant to this subsection, the Commission shall take such action as it deems appropriate and necessary, including issuing cease and desist orders, as authorized by section 312(b) of this title.
(2) The Commission shall prescribe by rule regulations to carry out the provisions of this section.
(c) State regulatory authority over rates, terms, and conditions; preemption; certification; circumstances constituting State regulation
(1) Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to, or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to rates, terms, and conditions, or access to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way as provided in subsection (f) of this section, for pole attachments in any case where such matters are regulated by a State.
(2) Each State which regulates the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments shall certify to the Commission that—
(A) it regulates such rates, terms, and conditions; and
(B) in so regulating such rates, terms, and conditions, the State has the authority to consider and does consider the interests of the subscribers of the services offered via such attachments, as well as the interests of the consumers of the utility services.
(3) For purposes of this subsection, a State shall not be considered to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments—
(A) unless the State has issued and made effective rules and regulations implementing the State’s regulatory authority over pole attachments; and
(B) with respect to any individual matter, unless the State takes final action on a complaint regarding such matter—
(i) within 180 days after the complaint is filed with the State, or
(ii) within the applicable period prescribed for such final action in such rules and regulations of the State, if the prescribed period does not extend beyond 360 days after the filing of such complaint.
(d) Determination of just and reasonable rates; “usable space” defined
(1) For purposes of subsection (b) of this section, a rate is just and reasonable if it assures a utility the recovery of not less than the additional costs of providing pole attachments, nor more than an amount determined by multiplying the percentage of the total usable space, or the percentage of the total duct or conduit capacity, which is occupied by the pole attachment by the sum of the operating expenses and actual capital costs of the utility attributable to the entire pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way.
(2) As used in this subsection, the term “usable space” means the space above the minimum grade level which can be used for the attachment of wires, cables, and associated equipment.
(3) This subsection shall apply to the rate for any pole attachment used by a cable television system solely to provide cable service. Until the effective date of the regulations required under subsection (e) of this section, this subsection shall also apply to the rate for any pole attachment used by a cable system or any telecommunications carrier (to the extent such carrier is not a party to a pole attachment agreement) to provide any telecommunications service.
(e) Regulations governing charges; apportionment of costs of providing space
(1) The Commission shall, no later than 2 years after February 8, 1996, prescribe regulations in accordance with this subsection to govern the charges for pole attachments used by telecommunications carriers to provide telecommunications services, when the parties fail to resolve a dispute over such charges. Such regulations shall ensure that a utility charges just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates for pole attachments.
(2) A utility shall apportion the cost of providing space on a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way other than the usable space among entities so that such apportionment equals two-thirds of the costs of providing space other than the usable space that would be allocated to such entity under an equal apportionment of such costs among all attaching entities.
(3) A utility shall apportion the cost of providing usable space among all entities according to the percentage of usable space required for each entity.
(4) The regulations required under paragraph (1) shall become effective 5 years after February 8,1996. Any increase in the rates for pole attachments that result from the adoption of the regulations required by this subsection shall be phased in equal annual increments over a period of 5 years beginning on the effective date of such regulations.
(f) Nondiscriminatory access
(1) A utility shall provide a cable television system or any telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access to any pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by it.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a utility providing electric service may deny a cable television system or any telecommunications carrier access to its poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way, on a non-discriminatory basis where there is insufficient capacity and for reasons of safety, reliability and generally applicable engineering purposes.
(g) Imputation to costs of pole attachment rate
A utility that engages in the provision of telecommunications services or cable services shall impute to its costs of providing such services (and charge any affiliate, subsidiary, or associate company engaged in the provision of such services) an equal amount to the pole attachment rate for which such company would be liable under this section.
(h) Modification or alteration of pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way
Whenever the owner of a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way intends to modify or alter such pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way, the owner shall provide written notification of such action to any entity that has obtained an attachment to such conduit or right-of-way so that such entity may have a reasonable opportunity to add to or modify its existing attachment. Any entity that adds to or modifies its existing attachment after receiving such notification shall bear a proportionate share of the costs incurred by the owner in making such pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way accessible.
(i) Costs of rearranging or replacing attachment
An entity that obtains an attachment to a pole, conduit, or right-of-way shall not be required to bear any of the costs of rearranging or replacing its attachment, if such rearrangement or replacement is required as a result of an additional attachment or the modification of an existing attachment sought by any other entity (including the owner of such pole, duet, conduit, or right-of-way).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The patents at issue in this case disclose a computer-implemented scheme for mitigating "settlement risk" ( i.e., the risk that only one party to a financial transaction will pay what it owes) by using a third-party intermediary. The question presented is whether these claims are patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, or are instead drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea. We hold that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. We therefore affirm the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
I
A
Petitioner Alice Corporation is the assignee of several patents that disclose schemes to manage certain forms of financial risk.1 According to the specification largely shared by the patents, the invention "enabl[es] the management of risk relating to specified, yet unknown, future events." App. 248. The specification further explains that the "invention relates to methods and apparatus, including electrical computers and data processing systems applied to financial matters and risk management." Id., at 243.
The claims at issue relate to a computerized scheme for mitigating "settlement risk"- i.e., the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its obligation. In particular, the claims are designed to facilitate the exchange of financial obligations between two parties by using a computer system as a third-party intermediary. Id., at 383-384.2 The intermediary creates "shadow" credit and debit records ( i.e., account ledgers) that mirror the balances in the parties' real-world accounts at "exchange institutions" ( e.g., banks). The intermediary updates the shadow records in real time as transactions are entered, allowing "only those transactions for which the parties' updated shadow records indicate sufficient resources to satisfy their mutual obligations." 717 F.3d 1269, 1285 (C.A.Fed.2013) (Lourie, J., concurring). At the end of the day, the intermediary instructs the relevant financial institutions to carry out the "permitted" transactions in accordance with the updated shadow records, ibid., thus mitigating the risk that only one party will perform the agreed-upon exchange.
In sum, the patents in suit claim (1) the foregoing method for exchanging obligations (the method claims), (2) a computer system configured to carry out the method for exchanging obligations (the system claims), and (3) a computer-readable medium containing program code for performing the method of exchanging obligations (the media claims). All of the claims are implemented using a computer; the system and media claims expressly recite a computer, and the parties have stipulated that the method claims require a computer as well.
B
Respondents CLS Bank International and CLS Services Ltd. (together, CLS Bank) operate a global network that facilitates currency transactions. In 2007, CLS Bank filed suit against petitioner, seeking a declaratory judgment that the claims at issue are invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. Petitioner counterclaimed, alleging infringement. Following this Court's decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010), the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the asserted claims are eligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The District Court held that all of the claims are patent ineligible because they are directed to the abstract idea of "employing a neutral intermediary to facilitate simultaneous exchange of obligations in order to minimize risk." 768 F.Supp.2d 221, 252 (D.C.2011).
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that it was not "manifestly evident" that petitioner's claims are directed to an abstract idea. 685 F.3d 1341, 1352, 1356 (2012). The Federal Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacated the panel opinion, and affirmed the judgment of the District Court in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. 717 F.3d, at 1273. Seven of the ten participating judges agreed that petitioner's method and media claims are patent ineligible. See id., at 1274 (Lourie, J., concurring); id., at 1312-1313 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). With respect to petitioner's system claims, the en banc Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment by an equally divided vote. Id., at 1273.
Writing for a five-member plurality, Judge Lourie concluded that all of the claims at issue are patent ineligible. In the plurality's view, under this Court's decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012), a court must first "identif[y] the abstract idea represented in the claim," and then determine "whether the balance of the claim adds'significantly more.' " 717 F.3d, at 1286. The plurality concluded that petitioner's claims "draw on the abstract idea of reducing settlement risk by effecting trades through a third-party intermediary," and that the use of a computer to maintain, adjust, and reconcile shadow accounts added nothing of substance to that abstract idea. Ibid.
Chief Judge Rader concurred in part and dissented in part. In a part of the opinion joined only by Judge Moore, Chief Judge Rader agreed with the plurality that petitioner's method and media claims are drawn to an abstract idea. Id., at 1312-1313. In a part of the opinion joined by Judges Linn, Moore, and O'Malley, Chief Judge Rader would have held that the system claims are patent eligible because they involve computer "hardware" that is "specifically programmed to solve a complex problem." Id., at 1307. Judge Moore wrote a separate opinion dissenting in part, arguing that the system claims are patent eligible. Id., at 1313-1314. Judge Newman filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that all of petitioner's claims are patent eligible. Id., at 1327. Judges Linn and O'Malley filed a separate dissenting opinion reaching that same conclusion. Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 571 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 734, 187 L.Ed.2d 590 (2013), and now affirm.
II
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the subject matter eligible for patent protection. It provides:
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
"We have long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2116, 186 L.Ed.2d 124 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). We have interpreted § 101 and its predecessors in light of this exception for more than 150 years. Bilski,supra, at 601-602, 130 S.Ct. 3218; see also O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112-120, 14 L.Ed. 601 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 174-175, 14 L.Ed. 367 (1853).
We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as one of pre-emption. See, e.g., Bilski, supra, at 611-612, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (upholding the patent "would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea"). Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are "'"the basic tools of scientific and technological work."'" Myriad, supra, at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 2116. "[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it," thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1923; see U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress "shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"). We have "repeatedly emphasized this... concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of" these building blocks of human ingenuity. Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1301 (citing Morse, supra, at 113).
At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1293-1294. At some level, "all inventions... embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1293. Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981). "[A]pplication[s]" of such concepts " 'to a new and useful end,' " we have said, remain eligible for patent protection. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 93 S.Ct. 253, 34 L.Ed.2d 273 (1972).
Accordingly, in applying the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that claim the " 'buildin[g] block[s]' " of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something more, Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1303, thereby "transform[ing]" them into a patent-eligible invention, id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294. The former "would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying" ideas, id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294, and are therefore ineligible for patent protection. The latter pose no comparable risk of pre-emption, and therefore remain eligible for the monopoly granted under our patent laws.
III
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012), we set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1296-1297. If so, we then ask, "[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?" Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1297. To answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and "as an ordered combination" to determine whether the additional elements "transform the nature of the claim" into a patent-eligible application. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1298, 1297. We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an " 'inventive concept' "- i.e., an element or combination of elements that is "sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294.3
A
We must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. We conclude that they are: These claims are drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement.
The "abstract ideas" category embodies "the longstanding rule that '[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.' " Benson, supra, at 67, 93 S.Ct. 253 (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498, 507, 22 L.Ed. 410 (1874)); see also Le Roy,supra, at 175 ("A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right"). In Benson, for example, this Court rejected as ineligible patent claims involving an algorithm for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form, holding that the claimed patent was "in practical effect... a patent on the algorithm itself." 409 U.S., at 71-72, 93 S.Ct. 253. And in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-595, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978), we held that a mathematical formula for computing "alarm limits" in a catalytic conversion process was also a patent-ineligible abstract idea.
We most recently addressed the category of abstract ideas in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010). The claims at issue in Bilski described a method for hedging against the financial risk of price fluctuations. Claim 1 recited a series of steps for hedging risk, including: (1) initiating a series of financial transactions between providers and consumers of a commodity; (2) identifying market participants that have a counterrisk for the same commodity; and (3) initiating a series of transactions between those market participants and the commodity provider to balance the risk position of the first series of consumer transactions. Id., at 599, 130 S.Ct. 3218. Claim 4 "pu[t] the concept articulated in claim 1 into a simple mathematical formula." Ibid. The remaining claims were drawn to examples of hedging in commodities and energy markets.
"[A]ll members of the Court agree[d]" that the patent at issue in Bilski claimed an "abstract idea." Id., at 609, 130 S.Ct. 3218; see also id., at 619, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Specifically, the claims described "the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk." Id., at 611, 130 S.Ct. 3218. The Court explained that " '[h]edging is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introductory finance class.' " Ibid. "The concept of hedging" as recited by the claims in suit was therefore a patent-ineligible "abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook." Ibid.
It follows from our prior cases, and Bilski in particular, that the claims at issue here are directed to an abstract idea. Petitioner's claims involve a method of exchanging financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk. The intermediary creates and updates "shadow" records to reflect the value of each party's actual accounts held at "exchange institutions," thereby permitting only those transactions for which the parties have sufficient resources. At the end of each day, the intermediary issues irrevocable instructions to the exchange institutions to carry out the permitted transactions.
On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk. Like the risk hedging in Bilski, the concept of intermediated settlement is " 'a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.' " Ibid.; see, e.g., Emery, Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States, in 7 Studies in History, Economics and Public Law 283, 346-356 (1896) (discussing the use of a "clearing-house" as an intermediary to reduce settlement risk). The use of a third-party intermediary (or "clearing house") is also a building block of the modern economy. See, e.g., Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 Geo. L.J. 387, 406-412 (2013); J. Hull, Risk Management and Financial Institutions 103-104 (3d ed. 2012). Thus, intermediated settlement, like hedging, is an "abstract idea" beyond the scope of § 101.
Petitioner acknowledges that its claims describe intermediated settlement, see Brief for Petitioner 4, but rejects the conclusion that its claims recite an "abstract idea." Drawing on the presence of mathematical formulas in some of our abstract-ideas precedents, petitioner contends that the abstract-ideas category is confined to "preexisting, fundamental truth[s]" that " 'exis[t] in principle apart from any human action.' " Id., at 23, 26 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1297).
Bilski belies petitioner's assertion. The concept of risk hedging we identified as an abstract idea in that case cannot be described as a "preexisting, fundamental truth." The patent in Bilski simply involved a "series of steps instructing how to hedge risk." 561 U.S., at 599, 130 S.Ct. 3218. Although hedging is a longstanding commercial practice, id., at 599, 130 S.Ct. 3218, it is a method of organizing human activity, not a "truth" about the natural world " 'that has always existed,' " Brief for Petitioner 22 (quoting Flook,supra, at 593, n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 2522). One of the claims in Bilski reduced hedging to a mathematical formula, but the Court did not assign any special significance to that fact, much less the sort of talismanic significance petitioner claims. Instead, the Court grounded its conclusion that all of the claims at issue were abstract ideas in the understanding that risk hedging was a " 'fundamental economic practice.' " 561 U.S., at 611, 130 S.Ct. 3218.
In any event, we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the "abstract ideas" category in this case. It is enough to recognize that there is no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement at issue here. Both are squarely within the realm of "abstract ideas" as we have used that term.
B
Because the claims at issue are directed to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, we turn to the second step in Mayo's framework. We conclude that the method claims, which merely require generic computer implementation, fail to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
1
At Mayo step two, we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an " 'inventive concept' " sufficient to "transform" the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. 566 U.S., at ----, ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294, 1298. A claim that recites an abstract idea must include "additional features" to ensure "that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1297.Mayo made clear that transformation into a patent-eligible application requires "more than simply stat[ing] the [abstract idea] while adding the words 'apply it.' " Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294.
Mayo itself is instructive. The patents at issue in Mayo claimed a method for measuring metabolites in the bloodstream in order to calibrate the appropriate dosage of thiopurine drugs in the treatment of autoimmune diseases. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294-1296. The respondent in that case contended that the claimed method was a patent-eligible application of natural laws that describe the relationship between the concentration of certain metabolites and the likelihood that the drug dosage will be harmful or ineffective. But methods for determining metabolite levels were already "well known in the art," and the process at issue amounted to "nothing significantly more than an instruction to doctors to apply the applicable laws when treating their patients." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1298. "Simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality," was not " enough " to supply an " 'inventive concept.' " Id., at ----, ----, ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1300, 1297, 1294.
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis at Mayo step two. In Benson, for example, we considered a patent that claimed an algorithm implemented on "a general-purpose digital computer." 409 U.S., at 64, 93 S.Ct. 253. Because the algorithm was an abstract idea, see supra, at 2355, the claim had to supply a " 'new and useful' " application of the idea in order to be patent eligible. 409 U.S., at 67, 93 S.Ct. 253. But the computer implementation did not supply the necessary inventive concept; the process could be "carried out in existing computers long in use." Ibid. We accordingly "held that simply implementing a mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely a computer, [i]s not a patentable application of that principle."
Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1301 (citing Benson,supra, at 64, 93 S.Ct. 253).
Flook is to the same effect. There, we examined a computerized method for using a mathematical formula to adjust alarm limits for certain operating conditions ( e.g., temperature and pressure) that could signal inefficiency or danger in a catalytic conversion process. 437 U.S., at 585-586, 98 S.Ct. 2522. Once again, the formula itself was an abstract idea, see supra, at 2355, and the computer implementation was purely conventional. 437 U.S., at 594, 98 S.Ct. 2522 (noting that the "use of computers for 'automatic monitoring-alarming' " was "well known"). In holding that the process was patent ineligible, we rejected the argument that "implement[ing] a principle in some specific fashion" will "automatically fal[l] within the patentable subject matter of § 101." Id., at 593, 98 S.Ct. 2522. Thus, " Flook stands for the proposition that the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of [the idea] to a particular technological environment." Bilski, 561 U.S., at 610-611, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155, by contrast, we held that a computer-implemented process for curing rubber was patent eligible, but not because it involved a computer. The claim employed a "well-known" mathematical equation, but it used that equation in a process designed to solve a technological problem in "conventional industry practice." Id., at 177, 178, 101 S.Ct. 1048. The invention in Diehr used a "thermocouple" to record constant temperature measurements inside the rubber mold-something "the industry ha[d] not been able to obtain." Id., at 178, and n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1048. The temperature measurements were then fed into a computer, which repeatedly recalculated the remaining cure time by using the mathematical equation. Id., at 178-179, 101 S.Ct. 1048. These additional steps, we recently explained, "transformed the process into an inventive application of the formula." Mayo,supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1299. In other words, the claims in Diehr were patent eligible because they improved an existing technological process, not because they were implemented on a computer.
These cases demonstrate that the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea "while adding the words 'apply it' " is not enough for patent eligibility. Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294. Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea " 'to a particular technological environment.' " Bilski, supra, at 610-611, 130 S.Ct. 3218. Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it with a computer" simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent's recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to "implemen [t]" an abstract idea "on... a computer," Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1301, that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion accords with the pre-emption concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers, see 717 F.3d, at 1286 (Lourie, J., concurring), wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of "additional featur[e]" that provides any "practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself." Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1297.
The fact that a computer "necessarily exist[s] in the physical, rather than purely conceptual, realm," Brief for Petitioner 39, is beside the point. There is no dispute that a computer is a tangible system (in § 101 terms, a "machine"), or that many computer-implemented claims are formally addressed to patent-eligible subject matter. But if that were the end of the § 101 inquiry, an applicant could claim any principle of the physical or social sciences by reciting a computer system configured to implement the relevant concept. Such a result would make the determination of patent eligibility "depend simply on the draftsman's art," Flook, supra, at 593, 98 S.Ct. 2522, thereby eviscerating the rule that " '[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable,' " Myriad, 569 U.S., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 2116.
2
The representative method claim in this case recites the following steps: (1) "creating" shadow records for each counterparty to a transaction; (2) "obtaining" start-of-day balances based on the parties' real-world accounts at exchange institutions; (3) "adjusting" the shadow records as transactions are entered, allowing only those transactions for which the parties have sufficient resources; and (4) issuing irrevocable end-of-day instructions to the exchange institutions to carry out the permitted transactions. See n. 2, supra. Petitioner principally contends that the claims are patent eligible because these steps "require a substantial and meaningful role for the computer." Brief for Petitioner 48. As stipulated, the claimed method requires the use of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions; in other words, "[t]he computer is itself the intermediary." Ibid. (emphasis deleted).
In light of the foregoing, see supra, at 2357 - 2359, the relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is "[p]urely conventional." Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1298 (internal quotation marks omitted). Using a computer to create and maintain "shadow" accounts amounts to electronic recordkeeping-one of the most basic functions of a computer. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S., at 65, 93 S.Ct. 253 (noting that a computer "operates... upon both new and previously stored data"). The same is true with respect to the use of a computer to obtain data, adjust account balances, and issue automated instructions; all of these computer functions are "well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]" previously known to the industry. Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions.
Considered "as an ordered combination," the computer components of petitioner's method "ad[d] nothing... that is not already present when the steps are considered separately." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1298. Viewed as a whole, petitioner's method claims simply recite the concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer. See 717 F.3d, at 1286 (Lourie, J., concurring) (noting that the representative method claim "lacks any express language to define the computer's participation"). The method claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. See ibid. ("There is no specific or limiting recitation of... improved computer technology..."); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28-30. Nor do they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S., at 177-178, 101 S.Ct. 1048. Instead, the claims at issue amount to "nothing significantly more" than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer. Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1298. Under our precedents, that is not " enough " to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1297.
C
Petitioner's claims to a computer system and a computer-readable medium fail for substantially the same reasons. Petitioner conceded below that its media claims rise or fall with its method claims. En Banc Response Brief for Defendant-Appellant in No. 11-1301 (CA Fed.) p. 50, n. 3. As to its system claims, petitioner emphasizes that those claims recite "specific hardware" configured to perform "specific computerized functions." Brief for Petitioner 53. But what petitioner characterizes as specific hardware-a "data processing system" with a "communications controller" and "data storage unit," for example, see App. 954, 958, 1257-is purely functional and generic. Nearly every computer will include a "communications controller" and "data storage unit" capable of performing the basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the method claims. See 717 F.3d, at 1290 (Lourie, J., concurring). As a result, none of the hardware recited by the system claims "offers a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking 'the use of the [method] to a particular technological environment,' that is, implementation via computers." Id., at 1291 (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S., at 610-611, 130 S.Ct. 3218).
Put another way, the system claims are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has long "warn[ed]... against" interpreting § 101 "in ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the draftsman's art.' " Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S., at 593, 98 S.Ct. 2522); see id., at 590, 98 S.Ct. 2522 ("The concept of patentable subject matter under § 101 is not 'like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction...' "). Holding that the system claims are patent eligible would have exactly that result.
Because petitioner's system and media claims add nothing of substance to the underlying abstract idea, we hold that they too are patent ineligible under § 101.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice GINSBURG and Justice BREYER join, concurring.
I adhere to the view that any "claim that merely describes a method of doing business does not qualify as a 'process' under § 101." Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 614, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 972 (C.A.Fed.2008) (Dyk, J., concurring) ("There is no suggestion in any of th[e] early [English] consideration of process patents that processes for organizing human activity were or ever had been patentable"). As in Bilski, however, I further believe that the method claims at issue are drawn to an abstract idea. Cf.
561 U.S., at 619, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (opinion of Stevens, J.). I therefore join the opinion of the Court.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.
The patents at issue are United States Patent Nos. 5,970,479 (the '479 patent), 6,912,510, 7,149,720, and 7,725,375.
The parties agree that claim 33 of the '479 patent is representative of the method claims. Claim 33 recites:
"A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, the method comprising the steps of:
"(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution from the exchange institutions;
"(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record;
"(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the supervisory institution adjusting each respective party's shadow credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological order, and
"(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing on[e] of the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits being
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether consumers who pay a higher price for goods purchased for personal use as a result of antitrust violations sustain an injury in their “business or property” within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 15.
I
Petitioner brought a class action on behalf of herself and all persons in the United States who purchased hearing aids manufactured by five corporations, respondents here. Her complaint alleges that respondents have committed a variety of antitrust violations, including vertical and horizontal price fixing. Because of these violations, the complaint alleges, petitioner and the class of persons she seeks to represent have been forced to pay illegally fixed higher prices for the hearing aids and related services they purchased from respondents’ retail dealers. Treble damages and injunctive relief are sought under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 15 and 26.
Respondents moved for dismissal of the complaint or summary judgment in the District Court. Among other things, respondents argued that Reiter, as a retail purchaser of hearing aids for personal use, lacked standing to sue for treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act because she had not been injured in her “business or property” within the meaning of the Act.
The District Court held that under § 4 a retail purchaser is injured in “property” if the purchaser can show that antitrust violations caused an increase in the price paid for the article purchased. The District Court relied on Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906), and the legislative history of the Clayton Act set forth in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477, 486 n. 10 (1977), indicating that Congress intended to give a § 4 remedy to consumers. 435 F. Supp. 933, 935-938 (Minn. 1977).
The District Court determined, however, that the respondents had raised a “controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” id., at 938, and accordingly certified the question for interlocutory review under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b). It then stayed further proceedings in the case and declined to express any opinion on the merits of the other issues raised by respondents’ motions or on the certifiability of the class.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that retail purchasers of consumer goods and services who allege no injury of a commercial or business nature are not injured in their “business or property” within the meaning of § 4. 579 F. 2d 1077 (CA8 1978). Noting the absence of any holdings on this precise issue by this Court or other courts of appeals, the court reasoned that the phrase “business or property” was intended to limit standing to those engaged in commercial ventures. It relied on the legislative history and this Court’s statement in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251, 264 (1972), that “business or property” referred to “commercial interests or enterprises.” A contrary holding, the Court of Appeals observed, would add a substantial volume of litigation to the already strained dockets of the federal courts and could be used to exact unfair settlements from retail businesses. Small and medium-sized retailers would be especially hard hit by “gigantic consumer class actions,” and granting standing to retail consumers might actually have an anticompeti-tive impact as a consequence. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals thought “it sensible as a matter of policy and compelled as a matter of law that consumers alleging no injury of a commercial or competitive nature are not injured in their property under section 4 of the Clayton Act.” 579 F. 2d, at 1087.
We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 1065 (1979). We reverse.
II
As is true in every case involving the construction of a statute, our starting point must be the language employed by Congress. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, provides:
“Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States . . . without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 15 U. S. C. § 15 (emphasis added).
On its face, § 4 contains little in the way of restrictive language. In Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308 (1978), we remarked:
“ ‘The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.’ Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236; cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 138-139. And the legislative history of the Sherman Act demonstrates that Congress used the phrase 'any person’ intending it to have its naturally broad and inclusive meaning. There was no mention in the floor debates of any more restrictive definition.” Id., at 312.
Similarly here, the word “property” has a naturally broad and inclusive meaning. In its dictionary definitions and in common usage “property” comprehends anything of material value owned or possessed. See, e. g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1818 (1961). Money, of course, is a form of property.
Respondents protest that, if the reference to “property” in § 4 means “money,” the term “business” then becomes superfluous, for every injury in one’s business necessarily involves a pecuniary injury. They argue that if Congress wished to permit one who lost only money to bring suit under § 4, it would not have used the restrictive phrase “business or property” ; rather, it would have employed more generic language akin to that of § 16, for example, which provides for injunctive relief against.any “threatened loss or damage.” 15 U. S. C. § 26. Congress plainly intended to exclude some category of injury in choosing the phrase “business or property” for § 4. Only a “commercial interest” gloss, they argue, both gives the phrase the restrictive significance intended for it and at the same time gives independent significance to the word “business” and the word “property.” The argument of respondents is straightforward: the phrase “business or property” means “business activity or property related to one’s business.” Brief for Respondents 11 n. 7.
That strained construction would have us ignore the disjunctive “or” and rob the term “property” of its independent and ordinary significance; moreover, it would convert the noun “business” into an adjective. In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used. United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955). Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise; here it does not. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 739-740 (1978). Congress’ use of the word “or” makes plain that “business” was not intended to modify “property,” nor was “property” intended to modify “business.”
When a commercial enterprise suffers a loss of money it suffers an injury in both its “business” and its “property.” But neither term is rendered redundant by recognizing that a consumer not engaged in a “business” enterprise, but rather acquiring goods or services for personal use, is injured in “property” when the price of those goods or services is artificially inflated by reason of the anticompetitive conduct complained of. The phrase “business or property” also retains restrictive significance. It would, for example, exclude personal injuries suffered. E. g., Hamman v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 420, 432 (Mont. 1967). Congress must have intended to exclude some class of injuries by the phrase “business or property.” But it taxes the ordinary meaning of common terms to argue, as respondents do, that a consumer’s monetary injury arising directly out of a retail purchase is not comprehended by the natural and usual meaning of the phrase “business or property.” We simply give the word “property” the independent significance to which it is entitled in this context. A consumer whose money has been diminished by reason of an antitrust violation has been injured “in his . . . property” within the meaning of § 4.
Indeed, this Court indicated as much in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1960). There the city alleged that the anticompetitive conduct of the defendants had caused the city to pay more for water pipes purchased for use in the city’s water system. The defendants answered that the pecuniary injury resulting from the alleged overcharges did not injure the city in its “business or property” within the meaning of § 4. This Court, without relying on the fact that the city was engaged in a business enterprise, stated:
“The city was . . . injured in its property, at least, if not in its business of furnishing water, by being led to pay more than the worth of the pipe. A person whose property is diminished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in his property.” 203 U. S., at 396.
The holding of Chattanooga Foundry could well have been grounded on the undisputed fact that the city was engaged in the commercial enterprise of supplying water for a charge and, therefore, engaged in a business. It was not uncommon for both municipalities and private companies to own and operate competing waterworks at the turn of the century. In operating a municipal public utility, the city was in a real sense engaged in the “business of furnishing water” when it purchased the pipe to carry water from the city’s reservoirs to its customers. Ibid.
Yet, the Court’s holding in Chattanooga Foundry was deliberately grounded on the premise that the city had been injured in its “property” — independent of any injury it had sustained in its “business of furnishing water”' — because the defendants’ antitrust violation caused it to pay a higher price for the pipe than it otherwise would have paid. Ibid. Chattanooga Foundry therefore establishes that monetary injury, standing alone, may be injury in one’s “property” within the meaning of § 4. Thus, the fact that petitioner Reiter was deprived of only money, albeit a modest amount, is no reason to conclude that she did not sustain a “property” injury.
Nor does her status as a “consumer” change the nature of the injury she suffered or the intrinsic meaning of “property” in § 4. That consumers of retail goods and services have standing to sue under § 4 is implicit in our decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 780, 782 (1975). There we held that a bar association was subject to a treble-damages suit brought under § 4 by persons who sought legal services in connection with the purchase of a residence. Furthermore, we have often referred to “consumers” as parties entitled to seek damages under § 4 without intimating that consumers of goods and services purchased for personal rather than commercial use were in any way foreclosed by the statutory language from asserting an injury in their “property.” E. g., Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S., at 313-315; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S., at 486 n. 10; Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481, 494 (1968); Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236 (1948).
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251 (1972), is not to the contrary. There we held that injury to a state’s total economy, for which the state sought redress in its parens patriae capacity, was not cognizable under § 4. It is true we noted that the words “business or property” refer to “commercial interests or enterprises,” and reasoned that Hawaii could not recover on its claim for damage done to its “general economy” because such injury did not harm Hawaii’s “commercial interests.” 405 U. S., at 264.
However, the language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute. Use of the phrase “commercial interests or enterprises,” read in context, in no sense suggests that only injuries to a business entity are within the ambit of § 4. Respondents ignore the Court’s careful use of the disjunctive and the naturally broad meaning of the term “interests” in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., supra. The phrase “commercial interests” was used there as a generic reference to the interests of the State of Hawaii as a party to a commercial transaction. This is apparent from Hawaii’s explicit reaffirmance of the rule of Chattanooga Foundry and statement that, where injury to a state “occurs in its capacity as a consumer in the marketplace” through a “payment of money wrongfully induced,” treble damages are recoverable by a state under the Clayton Act. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., supra, at 263 n. 14. A central premise of our holding in Hawaii was concern over duplicative recoveries. We noted that a “large and ultimately indeterminable part of the injury to the 'general economy’ ” for which the State sued was “no more than a reflection of injuries to the 'business or property’ of consumers” for which, on a proper showing, they could recover in their own right. 405 U. S., at 263-264.
Consumers in the United States purchase at retail more than $1.2 trillion in goods and services annually. 1978 Economic Report of the President 257 (Table B-l). It is in the sound commercial interests of the retail purchasers of goods and services to obtain the lowest price possible within the framework of our competitive private enterprise system. The essence of the antitrust laws is to ensure fair price competition in an open market. Here, where petitioner alleges a wrongful deprivation of her money because the price of the hearing aid she bought was artificially inflated by reason of respondents’ anticompetitive conduct, she has alleged an injury in her “property” under § 4.
Nothing in the legislative history of § 4 conflicts with our holding today. Many courts and commentators have observed that the respective legislative histories of § 4 of the Clayton Act and § 7 of the Sherman Act, its predecessor, shed no light on Congress’ original understanding of the terms “business or property.” Nowhere in the legislative record is specific reference made to the intended scope of those terms. Respondents engage in speculation in arguing that the substitution of the terms “business or property” for the broader language originally proposed by Senator Sherman was clearly intended to exclude pecuniary injuries suffered by those who purchase goods and services at retail for personal use. None of the subsequent floor debates reflect any such intent. On the contrary, they suggest that Congress designed the Sherman Act as a “consumer welfare prescription.” R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 66 (1978). Certainly the leading proponents of the legislation perceived the treble-damages remedy of what is now § 4 as a means of protecting consumers from overcharges resulting from price fixing. E. g., 21 Cong. Rec. 2457, 2460, 2558 (1890). Because Congress in 1890 rejected a proposal to allow a group of consumers to bring a collective action as a class, some legislators questioned whether individual consumers would be willing to bring actions for relatively small amounts. See, e. g., id., at 1767-1768, 2569, 2612, 3147-3148, 3150. At no time, however, was the right of a consumer to bring an action for damages questioned.
In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., supra, after examining the legislative history of § 4, we described the Sherman Act as “conceived of primarily as a remedy for ‘[t]he people of the United States as individuals/ especially consumers,” and the treble-damages provision of the Clayton Act as “conceived primarily as ‘open[ing] the door of justice to every man . . . and giv[ing] the injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered.’ ” 429 U. S., at 486 n. 10. Thus, to the extent that the legislative history is relevant, it supports our holding that a consumer deprived of money by reason of allegedly anticompetitive conduct is injured in “property” within the meaning of § 4.
Respondents also argue that allowing class actions to be brought by retail consumers like the petitioner here will add a significant burden to the already crowded dockets of the federal courts. That may well be true but cannot be a controlling consideration here. We must take the statute as we find it. Congress created the treble-damages remedy of § 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust violations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations. Indeed, nearly 20 times as many private antitrust actions are currently pending in the federal courts as actions filed by the Department of Justice. Administrative Office of the United States Courts Ann. Rep. 101, Table 28 (1978). To be sure, these private suits impose a heavy litigation burden on the federal courts; it is the clear responsibility of Congress to provide the judicial resources necessary to execute its mandates.
Finally, respondents argue that the cost of defending consumer class actions will have a potentially ruinous effect on small businesses in particular and will ultimately be paid by consumers in any event. These are not unimportant considerations, but they are policy considerations more properly addressed to Congress than to this Court. However accurate respondents’ arguments may prove to be — and they are not without substance — they cannot govern our reading of the plain language in § 4.
District courts must be especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance settlements; they have broad power and discretion vested in them by Ted. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 with respect to matters involving the certification and management of potentially cumbersome or frivolous class actions. See generally Durham & Dibble, Certification: A Practical Device for Early Screening of Spurious Antitrust Litigation, 1978 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 299. Recognition of the plain meaning of the statutory language “business or property” need not result in administrative chaos, class-action harassment, or “windfall” settlements if the district courts exercise sound discretion and use the tools available.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Me. Justice Brennan took- no part in the decision of this case.
Specifically, Reiter alleges that respondents violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2, and § 3 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 14. She claims respondents restricted the territories, customers, and brands of hearing aids offered by their retail dealers, used the customer lists of their retail dealers for their own purposes, prohibited unauthorized retailers from dealing in or repairing their hearing aids, and conspired among themselves and with their retail dealers to fix the retail prices of the hearing aids.
Differing views on this issue have been expressed by various courts. See, e. g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 579 F. 2d 1077 (CA8 1978) (case below); Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Industries, 552 F. 2d 90, 98-99, and n. 23 (CA3), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 823 (1977); Cleary v. Chalk, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 415, 419 n. 17, 488 F. 2d 1315, 1319 n. 17 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U. S. 938 (1974); Theophil v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 446 F. Supp. 131 (EDNY 1978); Gutierrez v. E. & J. Gallo Winery Co., 425 F. Supp. 1221 (ND Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1725 (CA9).
The Court of Appeals expressly noted that Reiter’s claim for injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act was riot before it on interlocutory appeal. 579 F. 2d, at 1087 n. 19. The court therefore expressed no view as to Reiter’s standing to raise this claim. It also expressly refused to decide whether Reiter’s claim for treble damages under § 4 was barred by the direct-purchaser rule of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977). 579 F. 2d, at 1079 n. 3. Accordingly, these issues are not before us.
See, e. g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251, 261 (1972); Weinberg v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 880, 882-883 (ND Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1547 (CA9); M. Forkosch, Antitrust and the Consumer 2-3 (1956); Comment, Closing the Door on Consumer Antitrust Standing, 54 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 237, 242-243, 249-252 (1979). See also 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ¶ 106, pp. 14r-16 (1978).
As originally introduced, the bill that ultimately became the Sherman Act authorized "any person or corporation injured or damnified by [an unlawful] arrangement, contract, agreement, trust, or combination” to sue for damages thereby sustained. S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., §2 (1889).
Of course, the treble-damages remedy of § 4 took on new practical significance for consumers with the advent of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.
Although in no sense a controlling consideration, we note that our holding is consistent with the assumption on which Congress enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 1394, 15 U. S. C. § 15c et seq. The 'text and legislative history of this statute make clear that in 1976 Congress believed that consumers have a cause of action under § 4, which the statute authorizes the states to assert in a parens patriae capacity. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 15c (a)(1), 15c (a)(1) (B)(ii), 15c (b)(2); H. R. Rep. No. 94^499, pp. 6, 9 (1975). See also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S., at 734 n. 14.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens join.
Petitioners in these cases were found guilty of criminal contempt by a jury, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §401(3), for their violation of the District Court’s injunction prohibiting infringement of respondent’s trademark. They received sentences ranging from six months to five years. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, petitioners urged that the District Court erred in appointing respondent’s attorneys, rather than a disinterested attorney, to prosecute the contempt. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 780 F. 2d 179 (1985), and we granted certiorari, 477 U. S. 903 (1986). We now reverse, exercising our supervisory power, and hold that counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed to undertake contempt prosecutions for alleged violations of that order.
H-(
The injunction that petitioners violated in these cases is a result of the settlement of a lawsuit brought in December 1978, in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, by Louis Vuitton, S. A., a French leather goods manufacturer, against Sol Klayminc, his wife Sylvia, his son Barry (the Klaymincs), and their family-owned businesses, Karen Bags, Inc., Jade Handbag Co., Inc., and Jak Handbag, Inc. Vuitton alleged in its suit that the Klaymincs were manufacturing imitation Vuitton goods for sale and distribution. Vuitton’s trademark was found valid in Vuitton et Fils S. A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F. 2d 769 (CA9 1981), and Vuitton and the Klaymincs then entered into a settlement agreement in July 1982. Under this agreement, the Klay-mincs agreed to pay Vuitton $100,000 in damages, and consented to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting them from, inter alia, “manufacturing, producing, distributing, circulating, selling, offering for sale, advertising, promoting or displaying any product bearing any simulation, reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation” of Vuitton’s registered trademark. App. to Pet. for Cert. 195-A to 196-A.
In early 1983, Vuitton and other companies concerned with possible trademark infringement were contacted by a Florida investigation firm with a proposal to conduct an undercover “sting” operation. The firm was retained, and Melvin Weinberg and Gunner Askeland, two former Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, set out to pose as persons who were interested in purchasing counterfeit goods. Weinberg expressed this interest to petitioner Nathan Helfand, who then discussed with Klayminc and his wife the possibility that Weinberg and Askeland might invest in a Haitian factory devoted to the manufacture of counterfeit Vuitton and Gucci goods. Klayminc signed documents that described the nature of the factory operation and that provided an estimate of the cost of the counterfeited goods. In addition, Klayminc delivered some sample counterfeit Vuitton bags to Helfand for Weinberg and Askeland’s inspection.
Four days after Helfand met with Klayminc, on March 31, 1983, Vuitton attorney J. Joseph Bainton requested that the District Court appoint him and his colleague Robert P. Dev-lin as special counsel to prosecute a criminal contempt action for violation of the injunction against infringing Vuitton’s trademark. App. 18. Bainton’s affidavit in support of this request recounted the developments with Helfand and Klay-minc and pointed out that he and Devlin previously had been appointed by the court to prosecute Sol Klayminc for contempt of an earlier preliminary injunction in the Vuitton lawsuit. Bainton also indicated that the next step of the “sting” was to be a meeting among Sol and Barry Klayminc, Weinberg, and Askeland, at which Sol was to deliver 25 counterfeit Vuitton handbags. Bainton sought permission to conduct and videotape this meeting, and to continue to engage in undercover investigative activity.
The court responded to Bainton on the day of this request. It found probable cause to believe that petitioners were engaged in conduct contumacious of the court’s injunctive order, and appointed Bainton and Devlin to represent the United States in the investigation and prosecution of such activity, as proposed in Bainton’s affidavit. Id., at 27. A week after Bainton’s appointment, on April 6, the court suggested that Bainton inform the United States Attorney’s Office of his appointment and the impending investigation. Bainton did so, offering to make available any tape recordings or other evidence, but the Chief of the Criminal Division of that Office expressed no interest beyond wishing Bainton good luck.
Over the course of the next month, more than 100 audio and video tapes were made of meetings and telephone conversations between petitioners and investigators. On the basis of this evidence, Bainton requested, and the District Court signed, an order on April 26 directing petitioners to show cause why they and other parties should not be cited for contempt for either violating or aiding and abetting the violation of the court’s July 1982 permanent injunction. App. to Pet. for Cert. 205-A. Petitioners’ pretrial motions opposing the order to show cause and the appointment of Bainton and Devlin as special prosecutors were denied, United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 734 (SDNY 1984), and two of the defendants subsequently entered guilty pleas. Sol Klayminc ultimately was convicted, following a jury trial, of criminal contempt under 18 U. S. C. §401(3), and the other petitioners were convicted of aiding and abetting that contempt. The trial court denied their post-trial motions. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1052 (SDNY 1985).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit petitioners argued, inter alia, that the appointment of Bain-ton and Devlin as special prosecutors violated their right to be prosecuted only by an impartial prosecutor. The court rejected their contention, 780 F. 2d 179 (1985), citing its decision in Musidor, B. V. v. Great American Screen, 658 F. 2d 60 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 944 (1982). It suggested that an interested attorney will often be the only source of information about contempts occurring outside the court’s presence, 780 F. 2d, at 183, and stated that the supervision of contempt prosecutions by the judge is generally sufficient to prevent the “danger that the special prosecutor will use the threat of prosecution as a bargaining chip in civil negotiations....” Id., at 184. Furthermore, the court stated that the authority to prosecute encompasses the authority to engage in necessary investigative activity such as the “sting” conducted in this case. Id., at 184-185. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed petitioners’ contempt convictions.
a
¡>
Petitioners first contend that the District Court lacked authority to appoint any private attorney to prosecute the contempt action against them, and that, as a result, only the United States Attorney’s Office could have permissibly brought such a prosecution. We disagree. While it is true that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) does not provide authorization for the appointment of a private attorney, it is long settled that courts possess inherent authority to initiate contempt proceedings for disobedience to their orders, authority which necessarily encompasses the ability to appoint a private attorney to prosecute the contempt.
By its terms, Rule 42(b) speaks only to the procedure for providing notice of criminal contempt. The court is required to “state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such.” This notice must be given by the judge in open court, “or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest.” The Rule’s reference to the appointment of a private attorney to submit a show cause order assumes a preexisting practice of private prosecution of contempts, but does not itself purport to serve as authorization for that practice. Rule 42(b) simply requires that, when a private prosecutor is appointed, sufficient notice must be provided that the contempt proceeding is criminal in nature.
The Rule’s assumption that private attorneys may be used to prosecute contempt actions reflects the longstanding acknowledgment that the initiation of contempt proceedings to punish disobedience to court orders is a part of the judicial function. As this Court declared in Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M., & O. R. Co., 266 U. S. 42 (1924):
“That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is essential to the administration of justice. The courts of the United States, when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction over any subject, at once became possessed of the power.” Id., at 65-66.
The ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other Branches. “If a party can make himself a judge of the validity of orders which have been issued, and by his own act of disobedience set them aside, then are the courts impotent, and what the Constitution now fittingly calls The judicial power of the United States’ would be a mere mockery.” Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 450 (1911). As a result, “there could be no more important duty than to render such a decree as would serve to vindicate the jurisdiction and authority of courts to enforce orders and to punish acts of disobedience.” Ibid. Courts cannot be at the mercy of another Branch in deciding whether such proceedings should be initiated. The ability to appoint a private attorney to prosecute a contempt action satisfies the need for an independent means of self-protection, without which courts would be “mere boards of arbitration whose judgments and decrees would be only advisory.” Ibid.
B
Petitioners contend that the ability of courts to initiate contempt prosecutions is limited to the summary punishment of in-court contempts that interfere with the judicial process. They argue that out-of-court contempts, which require prosecution by a party other than the court, are essentially conventional crimes, prosecution of which may be initiated only by the Executive Branch.
The underlying concern that gave rise to the contempt power was not, however, merely the disruption of court proceedings. Rather, it was disobedience to the orders of the Judiciary, regardless of whether such disobedience interfered with the conduct of trial. See Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 333 (1904) (contempt power “has been uniformly held to be necessary to the protection of the court from insults and oppressions while in the ordinary course of its duties, and to enable it to enforce its judgments and orders necessary to the due administration of law and the protection of the rights of suitors”) (emphasis added); Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510 (1874) (existence of contempt power “essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice”) (emphasis added); Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227 (1821) (courts by their creation vested with power “to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates”) (emphasis added).
The distinction between in-court and out-of-court con-tempts has been drawn not to define when a court has or has not the authority to initiate prosecution for contempt, but for the purpose of prescribing what procedures must attend the exercise of that authority. As we said in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, 204 (1968), “[bjefore the 19th century was out, a distinction had been carefully drawn between contempts occurring within the view of the court, for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence were dispensed with, and all other contempts where more normal adversary procedures were required.” Thus, for instance, this Court has found that defendants in criminal contempt proceedings must be presumed innocent, proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and accorded the right to refuse to testify against themselves, Gompers, supra, at 444; must be advised of charges, have a reasonable opportunity to respond to them, and be permitted the assistance of counsel and the right to call witnesses, Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 537 (1925); must be given a public trial before an unbiased judge, In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948); and must be afforded a jury trial for serious contempts, Bloom, supra. Congress also has regulated the manner in which courts exercise their power to prosecute contempts, narrowing the class of con-tempts subject to summary punishment, Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487. Furthermore, Rule 42 itself distinguishes between contempt committed in the presence of the court, which may be summarily punished, and all other contempts, which may be punished only upon notice and hearing.
The manner in which the court’s prosecution of contempt is exercised therefore may be regulated by Congress, Michaelson, 266 U. S., at 65-66, and by this Court through constitutional review, Bloom, supra, at 201-208, or supervisory power, Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U. S. 373, 384 (1966). However, while the exercise of the contempt power is subject to reasonable regulation, “the attributes which inhere in that power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative.” Michaelson, supra, at 66. Thus, while the prosecution of in-court and out-of-court contempts must proceed in a different manner, they both proceed at the instigation of the court.
The fact that we have come to regard criminal contempt as “a crime in the ordinary sense,” Bloom, supra, at 201, does not mean that any prosecution of contempt must now be considered an execution of the criminal law in which only the Executive Branch may engage. Our insistence on the criminal character of contempt prosecutions has been intended to rebut earlier characterizations of such actions as undeserving of the protections normally provided in criminal proceedings. See, e. g., In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 596 (1895) (no jury trial in criminal contempt actions because a court in such a case is “only securing to suitors the rights which it has adjudged them entitled to”). That criminal procedure protections are now required in such prosecutions should not obscure the fact that these proceedings are not intended to punish conduct proscribed as harmful by the general criminal laws. Rather, they are designed to serve the limited purpose of vindicating the authority of the court. In punishing contempt, the Judiciary is sanctioning conduct that violates specific duties imposed by the court itself, arising directly from the parties’ participation in judicial proceedings.
Petitioners’ assertion that the District Court lacked authority to appoint a private attorney to prosecute the contempt action in these cases is thus without merit. While contempt proceedings are sufficiently criminal in nature to warrant the imposition of many procedural protections, their fundamental purpose is to preserve respect for the judicial system itself. As a result, courts have long had, and must continue to have, the authority to appoint private attorneys to initiate such proceedings when the need arises.
C
While a court has the authority to initiate a prosecution for criminal contempt, its exercise of that authority must be restrained by the principle that “only ‘[t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed’ should be used in contempt cases.” United States v. Wilson, 421 U. S. 309, 319 (1975) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat., at 231). We have suggested, for instance, that, when confronted with a witness who refuses to testify, a trial judge should first consider the feasibility of prompting testimony through the imposition of civil contempt, utilizing criminal sanctions only if the civil remedy is deemed inadequate. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U. S. 364, 371, n. 9 (1966).
This principle of restraint in contempt counsels caution in the exercise of the power to appoint a private prosecutor. We repeat that the rationale for the appointment authority is necessity. If the Judiciary were completely dependent on the Executive Branch to redress direct affronts to its authority, it would be powerless to protect itself if that Branch declined prosecution. The logic of this rationale is that a court ordinarily should first request the appropriate prosecuting authority to prosecute contempt actions, and should appoint a private prosecutor only if that request is denied. Such a procedure ensures that the court will exercise its inherent power of self-protection only as a last resort.
In practice, courts can reasonably expect that the public prosecutor will accept the responsibility for prosecution. Indeed, the United States Attorney’s Manual §9-39.318 (1984) expressly provides: “In the great majority of cases the dedication of the executive branch to the preservation of respect for judicial authority makes the acceptance by the U. S. Attorney of the court’s request to prosecute a mere formality....” Referral will thus enhance the prospect that investí-gative activity will be conducted by trained prosecutors pursuant to Justice Department guidelines.
In this case, the District Court did not first refer the case to the United States Attorney’s Office before the appointment of Bainton and Devlin as special prosecutors. We need not address the ramifications of that failure, however. Even if a referral had been made, we hold, in the exercise of our supervisory power, that the court erred in appointing as prosecutors counsel for an interested party in the underlying civil litigation.
Ill
A
In Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935), this Court declared:
“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer.”
This distinctive role of the prosecutor is expressed in Ethical Consideration (EC) 7-13 of Canon 7 of the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1982): “The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”
Because of this unique responsibility, federal prosecutors are prohibited from representing the Government in any matter in which they, their family, or their business associates have any interest. 18 U. S. C. § 208(a). Furthermore, the Justice Department has applied to its attorneys the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 28 CFR 45.735-1(b) (1986), which contains numerous provisions relating to conflicts of interest. The concern that representation of other clients may compromise the prosecutor’s pursuit of the Government’s interest rests on recognition that a prosecutor would owe an ethical duty to those other clients. “Indeed, it is the highest claim on the most noble advocate which causes the problem — fidelity, unquestioned, continuing fidelity to the client.” Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. United States, 411 F. 2d. 312, 319 (CA5 1969).
Private attorneys appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt action represent the United States, not the party that is the beneficiary of the court order allegedly violated. As we said in Gompers, criminal contempt proceedings arising out of civil litigation “are between the public and the defendant, and are not a part of the original cause.” 221 U. S., at 445. The prosecutor is appointed solely to pursue the public interest in vindication of the court’s authority. A private attorney appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt therefore certainly should be as disinterested as a public prosecutor who undertakes such a prosecution.
If a Justice Department attorney pursued a contempt prosecution for violation of an injunction benefiting any client of that attorney involved in the underlying civil litigation, that attorney would be open to a charge of committing a felony under § 208(a). Furthermore, such conduct would violate the ABA ethical provisions, since the attorney could not discharge the obligation of undivided loyalty to both clients where both have a direct interest. The Government’s interest is in dispassionate assessment of the propriety of criminal charges for affronts to the Judiciary. The private party’s interest is in obtaining the benefits of the court’s order. While these concerns sometimes may be congruent, sometimes they may not. A prosecutor may be tempted to bring a tenuously supported prosecution if such a course promises financial or legal rewards for the private client. Conversely, a prosecutor may be tempted to abandon a meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing benefits to the private client is conditioned on a recommendation against criminal charges.
Regardless of whether the appointment of private counsel in this case resulted in any prosecutorial impropriety (an issue on which we express no opinion), that appointment illustrates the potential for private interest to influence the discharge of public duty. Vuitton’s California litigation had culminated in a permanent injunction and consent decree in favor of Vuitton against petitioner Young relating to various trademark infringement activities. This decree contained a liquidated damages provision of $750,000 for violation of the injunction. The prospect of such a damages award had the potential to influence whether Young was selected as a target of investigation, whether he might be offered a plea bargain, or whether he might be offered immunity in return for his testimony. In addition, Bainton was the defendant in a defamation action filed by Klayminc arising out of Bainton’s involvement in the litigation resulting in the injunction whose violation was at issue in this case. This created the possibility that the investigation of Klayminc might be shaped in part by a desire to obtain information useful in the defense of the defamation suit. Furthermore, Vuitton had various civil claims pending against some of the petitioners. These claims theoretically could have created temptation to use the criminal investigation to gather information of use in those suits, and could have served as bargaining leverage in obtaining pleas in the criminal prosecution. In short, as will generally be the case, the appointment of counsel for an interested party to bring the contempt prosecution in this case at a minimum created opportunities for conflicts to arise, and created at least the appearance of impropriety.
As should be apparent, the fact that the judge makes the initial decision that a contempt prosecution should proceed is not sufficient to quell concern that prosecution by an interested party may be influenced by improper motives. A prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in matters such as the determination of which persons should be targets of investigation, what methods of investigation should be used, what information will be sought as evidence, which persons should be charged with what offenses, which persons should be utilized as witnesses, whether to enter into plea bargains and the terms on which they will be established, and whether any individuals should be granted immunity. These decisions, critical to the conduct of a prosecution, are all made outside the supervision of the court.
The requirement of a disinterested prosecutor is consistent with our recognition that prosecutors may not necessarily be held to as stringent a standard of disinterest as judges. “In an adversary system, [prosecutors] are necessarily permitted to be zealous in their enforcement of the law,” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U. S. 238, 248 (1980). We have thus declined to find a conflict of interest in situations where the potential for conflict on the part of a judge might have been intolerable. See id., at 250-252 (fact that sums collected as civil penalties returned to agency to defray administrative costs presented too remote a potential for conflict in agency enforcement efforts). Ordinarily we can only speculate whether other interests are likely to influence an enforcement officer, and it is this speculation that is informed by appreciation of the prosecutor’s role. In a case where a prosecutor represents an interested party, however, the ethics of the legal profession require that an interest other than the Government’s be taken into account. Given this inherent conflict in roles, there is no need to speculate whether the prosecutor will be subject to extraneous influence.
As we said in Bloom, “In modern times, procedures in criminal contempt cases have come to mirror those used in ordinary criminal cases.” 391 U. S., at 207. The requirement of a disinterested prosecutor is consistent with that trend, since “[a] scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision.”
The use of this Court’s supervisory authority has played a prominent role in ensuring that contempt proceedings are conducted in a manner consistent with basic notions of fairness. See, e. g., Cheff, 384 U. S., at 380 (requiring jury trial for imposition of contempt sentences greater than six months); Yates v. United States, 356 U. S. 363, 366-367 (1958) (reducing contempt sentence in light of miscalculation of number of offenses committed); Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 13, 17-18 (1954) (contempt conviction reversed in case in which judge involved in personal conflict with con-temner). The exercise of supervisory authority is especially appropriate in the determination of the procedures to be employed by courts to enforce their orders, a subject that directly concerns the functioning of the Judiciary. We rely today on that authority to hold that counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed as prosecutor in a contempt action alleging a violation of that order.
B
The next question we must confront is whether the Government should have the opportunity to demonstrate that it was harmless error for the court to appoint counsel for an interested party as contempt prosecutor. See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). We have held that some errors “are so fundamental and pervasive that they require reversal without regard to the facts or circumstances of the particular case.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 681 (1986). We find that the appointment of an interested prosecutor is such an error.
An error is fundamental if it undermines confidence in the integrity of the criminal proceeding. Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570, 577-578 (1986); Van Arsdall, supra, at 681-682; Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 263-264 (1986). The appointment of an interested prosecutor raises such doubts. Prosecution by someone with conflicting loyalties “calls into question the objectivity of those charged with bringing a defendant to judgment.” Vasquez, supra, at 263. It is a fundamental premise of our society that the state wield its formidable criminal enforcement powers in a rigorously disinterested fashion, for liberty itself may be at stake in such matters. We have always been sensitive to the possibility that important actors in the criminal justice system may be influenced by factors that threaten to compromise the performance of their duty. We have held, for instance, that it cannot be harmless error for racial discrimination to infect the selection of the grand jury, Vasquez, supra; for a petit jury to be exposed to publicity unfavorable to the defendant, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 351-352 (1966); or for adjudication to be performed by a judical officer faced with a conflict of interest, Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927).
It is true that we have indicated that the standards of neutrality for prosecutors are not necessarily as stringent as those applicable to judicial or quasi-judicial officers. See Jerrico, 446 U. S., at 248-250. This difference in treatment is relevant to whether a conflict is found, however, not to its gravity once identified. We may require a stronger showing for a prosecutor than a judge in order to conclude that a conflict of interest exists. Once we have drawn that conclusion, however, we have deemed the prosecutor subject to influences that undermine confidence that a prosecution can be conducted in disinterested fashion. If this is the case, we cannot have confidence in a proceeding in which this officer plays the critical role of preparing and presenting the case for the defendant’s guilt.
Furthermore, appointment of an interested prosecutor creates an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general. The narrow focus of harmless-error analysis is not sensitive to this underlying concern. If a prosecutor uses the expansive prosecutorial powers to gather information for private purposes, the prosecution function has been seriously abused even if, in the process, sufficient evidence is obtained to convict a defendant. Prosecutors “have available a terrible array of coercive methods to obtain information,” such as “police investigation and interrogation, warrants, informers and agents whose activities are immunized, authorized wiretapping, civil investigatory demands, [and] enhanced subpoena power.” C. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 460 (1986). The misuse of those methods “would unfairly harass citizens, give unfair advantage to [the prosecutor’s personal interests], and impair public willingness to accept the legitimate use of those powers.” Ibid. Notwithstanding this concern, the determination whether an error was harmful focuses only on “‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’” Chapman, supra, at 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U. S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). A concern for actual prejudice in such circumstances misses the point, for what is at stake is the public perception of the integrity of our criminal justice system. “[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice,” Offutt, supra, at 14, and a prosecutor with conflicting loyalties presents the appearance of precisely the opposite. Society’s interest in disinterested prosecution therefore would not be adequately protected by harmless-error analysis, for such analysis would not be sensitive to the fundamental nature of the error committed.
Appointment of an interested prosecutor is also an error whose effects are pervasive. Such an appointment calls into question, and therefore requires scrutiny of, the conduct of an entire prosecution, rather than simply a discrete prosecu-torial decision. Determining the effect of this appointment thus would be extremely difficult. A prosecution contains a myriad of occasions for the exercise of discretion, each of which goes to shape the record in a case, but few of which are part of the record. As we said in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475, 490-491 (1978), in rejecting application of the harmless-error rule to a defense attorney’s conflict in representing three codefendants:
“In the normal case where a harmless-error rule is applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope is readily identifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court can undertake with some confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations of the jury. But in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil — it bears repeating — is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial negotiations and in the sentencing process. It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney’s failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney’s representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney’s options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation.” (Citations omitted.)
Cf. Vasquez, 474 U. S., at 264 (“Once having found discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, we simply cannot know that the need to indict would have been assessed in the same way by a grand jury properly constituted”).
The case before us involves the citizen’s primary adversary in a criminal proceeding, who is armed with expansive powers and wide-ranging discretion. Public confidence in the disinterested conduct of that official is essential. Harmless-error analysis is not equal to the task of assuring that confidence. It is best suited for the review of discrete exercises of judgment by lower courts, where information is available that makes it possible to gauge the effect of a decision on the trial as a whole. In this case, however, we establish a categorical rule against the appointment of an interested prosecutor, adherence to which requires no subtle calculations of judgment. Given the fundamental and pervasive effects of such an appointment, we therefore hold that harmless-error analysis is inappropriate in reviewing the appointment of an interested prosecutor in a case such as this. Cf. United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U. S. 418, 432 (1983) (prosecutorial use of grand jury to elicit evidence for use in civil case “improper per se”).
IV
Between the private life of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation stands the prosecutor. That state official has the power to employ the full machinery of the state in scrutinizing any given individual. Even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced immersion in criminal investigation and adjudication is a wrenching disruption of everyday life. For this reason, we must have assurance that those who would wield this power will be guided solely by their •sense of public responsibility for the attainment of justice. A prosecutor of a contempt action who represents the private beneficiary of the court order allegedly violated cannot provide such assurance, for such an attorney is required by the very standards of the profession to serve two masters. The appointment of counsel for Vuitton to conduct the contempt prosecution in these cases therefore was improper. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Petitioners’ sentences were as follows: Sol Klayminc, 5 years; Gerald Young, 2Vü years; Barry Klayminc, 9 months; George Cariste, 9 months; Nathan Helfand, 6 months. App. 162-164.
That provision states: “A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as... (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.”
That ease held that it was proper for the District Court to appoint as special prosecutor the counsel for plaintiffs in a civil action who were the beneficiaries of the injunction allegedly violated.
The Rule provides in relevant part:
“(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and.place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to decide whether two California jury instructions used in the penalty phase of petitioner’s capital murder trial and in other California capital cases before each was modified in 1983 and 1985, respectively, are consistent with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. We hold that they are.
Petitioner Richard Boyde was found guilty by a jury in the robbery, kidnaping, and murder of Dickie Gibson, the night clerk at a 7-Eleven Store in Riverside, California. The State introduced evidence at trial that about 2:30 a.m. on January 15, 1981, Boyde entered the store and robbed the clerk at gunpoint of $33 from the cash register. Petitioner then forced Gibson into a waiting car, which was driven by petitioner’s nephew, and the three men drove to a nearby orange grove. There, Boyde brought Gibson into the grove and ordered him to kneel down with his hands behind his head. As Gibson begged for his life, Boyde shot him once in the back of the head and again in the forehead, killing him. The jury returned a special verdict that Boyde personally committed the homicide with “express malice aforethought and premeditation and deliberation.”
At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury was instructed, inter alia, in accordance with instructions 8.84.1 and 8.84.2, "1 California Jury Instructions, Criminal (4th ed. 1979) (CALJIC), both of which have since been amended. The former lists 11 factors that the jury “shall consider, take into account and be guided by” in determining whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment. The eleventh is a “catch-all,” factor (k), which reads: “Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.” The court’s concluding instruction, pursuant to CALJIC 8.84.2, again told the jury to consider all applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances and followed with this direction: “If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole.” (Emphasis added.) After hearing six days of testimony concerning the appropriate penalty, the jury returned a verdict imposing the sentence of death, and the trial court denied Boyde’s motion to reduce the sentence.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California affirmed. 46 Cal. 3d 212, 758 P. 2d 25 (1988). It rejected petitioner’s contention that the jury instructions violated the Eighth Amendment because the so-called “unadorned version” of factor (k) did not allow the jury to consider mitigating evidence of his background and character. The court noted that all of the defense evidence- at the penalty phase related to Boyde?S background and character, that the jury was- instructed' to-consider “‘all of the evidence which has; been, received during' any part of the trial of this case,,”’ and' that the prosecutor “never suggested that the background and’, character' evidence could not be considered.” Id., at 251, 758;P. 2d, at47. Therefore, the court found it “inconceivable the jury would have believed that, though it was permitted to hear defendant’s background and character evidence and his attorney’s lengthy argument concerning that evidence, it could not consider that evidence.” Ibid.
With regard to the “shall impose” language of CALJIC 8.84.2, the court agreed with petitioner that the instruction could not permissibly require a juror to vote for the death penalty “ ‘unless, upon completion of the “weighing” process, he decides that death is the appropriate penalty under all the circumstances.’” 46 Cal. 3d, at 253, 758 P. 2d, at48 (quoting People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 541, 726 P. 2d 516, 532 (1985)). It concluded, however, that in this case “[t]he jury was adequately informed as to its discretion in determining whether death was the appropriate penalty.” 46 Cal. 3d, at 253, 758 P. 2d, at 48. Three justices dissented from the court’s affirmance of the death sentence. The dissenters argued that the mandatory feature of instruction 8.84.2 misled the jury into believing that it was required to impose the death penalty if the aggravating factors “outweighed” the mitigating factors, even though an individual juror might not have thought death was the appropriate penalty in this case. Id., at 257-266, 758 P. 2d, at 51-57. We granted certiorari, 490 U. S. 1097 (1989), and now affirm.
Petitioner reiterates in this Court his argument that the mandatory nature of former CALJIC 8.84.2 resulted in a sentencing proceeding that violated the Eighth Amendment, because the instruction prevented the jury from making an “individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty.” See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 319 (1989). Specifically, Boyde contends that the “shall impose” language of the jury instruction precluded the jury from evaluating the “absolute weight” of the aggravating circumstances and determining whether they justified the death penalty. He further asserts that the jury was prevented from deciding whether, in light of all the aggravating and mitigating evidence, death was the appropriate penalty. In response, the State argues that the sentencing proceeding was consistent with the Eighth Amendment, because a reasonable juror would interpret the instruction as allowing for the exercise of discretion and moral judgment about the appropriate penalty in the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
We need not discuss petitioner’s claim at length, because we conclude that it is foreclosed by our decision earlier this Term in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 299. In Blystone, we rejected a challenge to an instruction with similar mandatory language, holding that “[t]he requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence.” Ante, at 307. Although Blystone, unlike Boyde, did not present any mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of his capital trial, the legal principle we expounded in Blystone clearly requires rejection of Boyde’s claim as well, because the mandatory language of CALJIC 8.84.2 is not alleged to have interfered with the consideration of mitigating evidence. Petitioner suggests that the jury must have freedom to decline to impose the death penalty even if the jury decides that the aggravating circumstances “outweigh” the mitigating circumstances. But there is no such constitutional requirement of unfettered sentencing discretion in the jury, and States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence “in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.” Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164, 181 (1988) (plurality opinion). Petitioner’s claim that the “shall impose” language of CALJIC 8.84.2 unconstitutionally prevents “individualized assessment” by the jury is thus without merit.
The second issue in this case is whether petitioner’s capital sentencing proceedings violated the Eighth Amendment because the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with former CALJIC 8.84.1, including the “unadorned” factor (k). The Eighth Amendment requires that the jury be able to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence offered by petitioner. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982); Penry, supra. In assessing the effect of a challenged jury instruction, we follow the familiar rule stated in Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141 (1973):
“In determining the effect of this instruction on the validity of respondent’s conviction, we accept at the outset the well-established proposition that a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. Boyd v. United States, 271 U. S. 104, 107 (1926).” Id., at 146-147.
Petitioner contends that none of the 11 statutory factors in CALJIC 8.84.1 allowed the jury to consider non-crime-related factors, such as his background and character, which might provide a basis for a sentence less than death. Nine of the factors, he argues, focused only on the immediate circumstances of the crime itself. Two others, factors (b) and (c), which center on the presence or absence of prior violent criminal activity and prior felony convictions, were in petitioner’s view simply vehicles for the consideration of aggravating evidence not directly related to the crime. Finally, petitioner claims that the “catchall” factor (k) did not allow the jury to consider and give effect to non-crime-related mitigating evidence, because its language — “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime” — limited the jury to other evidence that was related to the crime.
The legal standard for reviewing jury instructions claimed to restrict impermissibly a jury’s consideration of relevant evidence is less than clear from our cases. In Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307 (1985), we said that “[t]he question . , . is'. . . what a reasonable juror could have understood the charge as meaning.” Id., at 315-316 (emphasis added). See also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 516-517 (1979). But our subsequent decisions, while sometimes purporting to apply the Francis standard, have not adhered strictly to that formulation. In California v. Brown, 479 U. S. 538, 541-542 (1987), we made reference both to what a reasonable juror “could” have done and what he “would” have done. And two Terms ago in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367 (1988), we alluded to at least three different inquiries for evaluating such a challenge: whether reasonable jurors “could have” drawn an impermissible interpretation from the trial court’s instructions, id., at 375-376 (emphasis added); whether there is a “substantial possibility that the jury may have rested its verdict on the ‘improper’ ground,” id., at 377 (emphasis added); and how reasonable jurors “would have” applied and understood the instructions. Id., at 389 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Other opinions in the area likewise have produced a variety of tests and standards. See, e. g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S., at 326 (“[A] reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence”) (emphasis added); Franklin v. Lynaugh, supra, at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[N]either of the Special Issues as they would have been understood by reasonable jurors gave the jury the opportunity to consider petitioner’s mitigating evidence”) (emphasis added); see also Andres v. United States, 333 U. S. 740, 752 (1948) (“That reasonable men might derive a meaning from the instructions given other than the proper meaning ... is probable”) (emphasis added).
Although there may not be great differences among these various phrasings, it is important to settle upon a single formulation for this Court and other courts to employ in deciding this kind of federal question. Our cases, understandably, do not provide a single standard for determining whether various claimed errors in instructing a jury require reversal of a conviction. In some instances, to be sure, we have held that “when a case is submitted to the jury on alternative theories the unconstitutionality of any of the theories requires that the conviction be set aside. See, e. g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931).” Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 31-32 (1969); see also Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U. S. 564, 571 (1970). In those cases, a jury is clearly instructed by the court that it may convict a defendant on an impermissible legal theory, as well as on a proper theory or theories. Although it is possible that the guilty verdict may have had a proper basis, “it is equally likely that the verdict . . . rested on an unconstitutional ground,” Bachellar, supra, at 571, and we have declined to choose between two such likely possibilities.
In this case we are presented with a single jury instruction. The instruction is not concededly erroneous, nor found so by a court, as was the case in Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931). The claim is that the instruction is ambiguous and therefore subject to an erroneous interpretation. We think the proper inquiry in such a case is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Although a defendant need not establish that the jury was more likely than not to have been impermissibly inhibited by the instruction, a capital sentencing proceeding is not inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment if there is only a possibility of such an inhibition. This “reasonable likelihood” standard, we think, better accommodates the concerns of finality and accuracy than does a standard which makes the inquiry dependent on how a single hypothetical “reasonable” juror could or might have interpreted the instruction. There is, of course, a strong policy in favor of accurate determination of the appropriate sentence in a capital case, but there is an equally strong policy against retrials years after the first trial where the claimed error amounts to no more than speculation. Jurors do not sit in solitary isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shades of meaning in the same way that lawyers might. Differences among them in interpretation of instructions may be thrashed out in the deliberative process, with commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting.
Applying this standard to factor (k) of CALJIC 8.84.1 standing alone, we think there is not a reasonable likelihood that Boyde’s jurors interpreted the trial court’s instructions to prevent consideration of mitigating evidence of background and character. The jury was instructed, according to factor (k), that “you shall consider . . . [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime,” and the term “extenuate” was defined by the court to mean “to lessen the seriousness of a crime as by giving an excuse.” App. 34. Petitioner contends that this instruction did not permit the jury to give effect to evidence — presented by psychologists, family, and friends — of his impoverished and deprived childhood, his inadequacies as a school student, and his strength of character in the face of these obstacles. But as we explained last Term in Penry v. Lynaugh: “ ‘evidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.’” 492 U. S., at 319 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U. S., at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (emphasis added). Petitioner had an opportunity through factor (k) to argue that his background and character “extenuated” or “excused” the seriousness of the crime, and we see no reason to believe that reasonable jurors would resist the view, “long held by society,” that in an appropriate case such evidence would counsel imposition of a sentence less than death. The instruction did not, as petitioner seems to suggest, limit the jury’s consideration to “any other circumstance of the crime which extenuates the gravity of the crime.” The jury was directed to consider any other circumstance that might excuse the crime, which certainly includes a defendant’s background and character.
Even were the language of the instruction less clear than we think, the context of the proceedings would have led reasonable jurors to believe that evidence of petitioner’s background and character could be considered in mitigation. Other factors listed in CALJIC 8.84.1 allow for consideration of mitigating evidence not associated with the crime itself, such as the absence of prior criminal activity by a defendant, the absence of prior felony convictions, and youth. When factor (k) is viewed together with those instructions, it seems even more improbable that jurors would arrive at an interpretation that precludes consideration of all non-crime-related evidence.
All of the defense evidence presented at the penalty phase— four days of testimony consuming over 400 pages of trial transcript — related to petitioner’s background and character, and we think it unlikely that reasonable jurors would believe the court’s instructions transformed all of this “favorable testimony into a virtual charade.” California v. Brown, supra, at 542. The jury was instructed that it “shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case,” App. 33 (emphasis added), and in our view reasonable jurors surely would not have felt constrained by the factor (k) instruction to ignore all of the evidence presented by petitioner during the sentencing phase. Presentation of mitigating evidence alone, of course, does not guarantee that a jury will feel entitled to consider that evidence. But the introduction without objection of volumes of mitigating evidence certainly is relevant to deciding how a jury would understand an instruction which is at worst ambiguous. This case is unlike those instances where we have found broad descriptions of the evidence to be considered insufficient to cure statutes or instructions which clearly directed the sentencer to disregard evidence. • See, e. g., Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U. S. 393, 398-399 (1987) (“[I]t could not be clearer that the advisory jury was instructed not to consider, and the sentencing judge refused to consider, evidence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances . . .”); Lockett, 438 U. S., at 608 (plurality opinion) (Even under Ohio’s “liberal” construction of the death penalty statute, “only the three factors specified in the statute can be considered in mitigation of the defendant’s sentence”).
Petitioner also asserts that arguments by the prosecutor immediately before the jury’s sentencing deliberations reinforced an impermissible interpretation of factor (k) and made it likely that jurors would arrive at such an understanding. But arguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the court. The former are usually billed in advance to the jury as matters of argument, not evidence, see Tr. 3933, and are likely viewed as the statements of advocates; the latter, we have often recognized, are viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U. S. 288, 302-304, and n. 20 (1981); Quercia v. United States, 289 U. S. 466, 470 (1933); Starr v. United States, 153 U. S. 614, 626 (1894). Arguments of counsel which misstate the law are subject to objection and to correction by the court. E. g., Greer v. Miller, 483 U. S. 756, 765-766, and n. 8 (1987). This is not to say that prosecutorial misrepresentations may never have a decisive effect on the jury, but only that they are not to be judged as having the same force as an instruction from the court. And the arguments of counsel, like the instructions of the court, must be judged in the context in which they are made. Greer, supra, at 766; Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 168, 179 (1986); United States v. Young, 470 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1985); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637, 647 (1974) (“[A] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations”).
We find no objectionable prosecutorial argument in this case. Petitioner maintains that the prosecutor encouraged an intolerably narrow view of factor (k) when he argued to the jury that the mitigating evidence did not “suggest that [petitioner’s] crime is less serious or that the gravity of the crime is any less,” App. 24, and that “[n]othing I have heard lessens the seriousness of this crime.” Id., at 29. But we agree with the Supreme Court of California, which was without dissent on this point, that “[although the prosecutor argued that in his view the evidence did not sufficiently mitigate Boyde’s conduct, he never suggested that the background and character evidence could not be considered.” 46 Cal. 3d, at 251, 758 P. 2d, at 47. His principal tack was not to contend that background and character were irrelevant, but to urge the jury that despite petitioner’s past difficulties, he must accept responsibility for his actions. See App. 28-30. Indeed, the prosecutor explicitly assumed that petitioner’s character evidence was a proper factor in the weighing process, but argued that it was minimal in relation to the aggravating circumstances:
“The Defendant can dance. The Defendant . . . may have some artistic talent. The Defendant may, in fact, have been good with children. During the course of twenty-four years, even on a basis of just random luck, you are going to have to have picked up something or done something ... we can all approve of, but if you consider that on the weight that goes against it, . . . it is not even close.” Tr. 4820-4821 (emphasis added).
■Defense counsel also stressed a broad reading of factor (k) in his argument to the jury: “[I]t is almost a catchall phrase. Any other circumstance, and it means just that, any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse.” App. 31.
In sum, we conclude there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jurors in petitioner’s case understood the challenged instructions to preclude consideration of relevant mitigating evidence offered by petitioner. We thus hold that the giving of the jury instructions at issue in this case, former CAL JIC 8.84.1 and 8.84.2, did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is
Affirmed.
The complete instruction provides:
“In determining which penalty is to be imposed on [each] defendant, you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case, [except as you may be hereafter instructed]. You shall consider, take into account and be guided by the following factors, if applicable:
“(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstanced found to be true.
“(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or violence.
“(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
“(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
“(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
“(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or' extenuation for his conduct.
“(g) Whether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.
“(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the affects of intoxication.
“(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
“(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor.
“(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.”
In People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P. 2d 813 (1983), the Supreme Court of California stated that in order to avoid potential misunderstanding over the meaning of factor (k) in the future, trial courts “should inform the jury that it may consider as a mitigating factor ‘any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime’ and any other ‘aspect of [the] defendant’s character or record . . . that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.’” Id., at 878, n. 10, 671 P. 2d, at 826, n. 10 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)). CALJIC 8.84.1 has since been formally amended and the present factor (k) instruction directs the jury to consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime [and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record [that the defendant offers] as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial ...].” 1 California Jury Instructions, Criminal 8.85(k) (5th ed. 1988).
In People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 726 P. 2d 516 (1986), the Supreme Court of California acknowledged that the “shall impose” language of instruction 8.84.2 “lefft] room for some confusion as to the jury’s role.” Id., at 544, n. 17, 726 P. 2d, at 534, n. 17. The court believed that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required that the jury have the discretion to decide whether, under all of the relevant circumstances, a defendant deserves the punishment of death or life without parole, id., at 540, 726 P. 2d, at 531, and stated that each ease in which the mandatory language was used “must be examined on its own merits to determine whether, in context, the sentencer may have been misled to defendant’s prejudice about the scope of its sentencing discretion under the 1978 law.” Id., at 544, n. 17, 726 P. 2d, at 534, n. 17. The court noted that a proposed instruction, which has since been adopted almost verbatim, see 1 CALJIC 8.88 (5th ed. 1988), would conform to its opinion: “ ‘The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical weighing of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. In weighing the various circumstances you simply determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating evidence [circumstances] is so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole.’” 40 Cal. 3d, at 545, n. 19, 726 P. 2d, at 535, n. 19.
In other contexts, we have held that a defendant cannot establish a constitutional violation simply by demonstrating that an alleged trial-related error could or might have affected the jury. To establish that ineffective assistance of counsel violates the Sixth Amendment, for example, a defendant must show a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (1984). Deportation of potential defense witnesses does not violate due process unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact.” United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858, 874 (1982). And failure of the prosecution to disclose allegedly exculpatory evidence to the defense violates due process “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (1985). To receive a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must demonstrate that the evidence would more likely than not lead to a different outcome. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U. S. 94, 107, n. 12 (1988).
The dissent focuses on the terms “gravity” and “seriousness” and argues that background and character evidence has no effect on the seriousness of the crime. But the jury was instructed to consider any circumstance which “extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime” or “lessens the seriousness of a crime as by giving an excuse.” The instruction directs the jury to consider “any other circumstance” which might provide such an excuse, and we think jurors would naturally consider background and character as a possible excuse.
At oral argument (though not in his brief), counsel for petitioner also argued that testimony that Boyde won a prize for his dance choreography while in prison showed that he could lead a useful life behind bars, and that the jury must be able to consider that evidence as a mitigating circumstance under our decision in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1 (1986). Factor (k), he argued, did not allow for such consideration. In Skipper, we held that a capital defendant must be permitted to introduce in mitigation evidence of postcrime good prison behavior to show that he would not pose a danger to the prison community if sentenced to life imprisonment rather than death. The testimony that petitioner had won a dance contest while in prison, however, was introduced not to demonstrate that he was a “model prisoner” like Skipper and therefore unlikely to present a risk of future dangerousness, but to show that he had artistic ability. Tr. 4607-4608. Moreover, although the record is not clear on this point, petitioner apparently won the dance prize during a prison term served prim• to the Gibson murder, and the evidence thus did not pertain to prison behavior after the crime for which he was sentenced to death, as was the case in Skipper. The testimony about dancing ability was presented as part of petitioner’s overall strategy to portray himself as less culpable than other defendants due to his disadvantaged background and his character strengths in the face of those difficulties. As with other evidence of good character, therefore, the jury had the opportunity to conclude through factor (k) that petitioner’s dancing ability extenuated the gravity of the crime because it showed that Boyde’s criminal conduct was an aberration from otherwise good character.
We find no merit to the contention of petitioner and amicus that arguments of prosecutors in other California cases bear on the validity of the factor (k) instruction in this case. Petitioner’s jury obviously was not influenced by comments made in other California capital trials. Nor do we think the fact that prosecutors in other cases may have pressed a construction of factor (k) that would cause the sentencing proceedings to violate the Eighth Amendment means that reasonable jurors are likely to have arrived at an such an interpretation. Prosecutors are interested advocates, and the arguments that one or more prosecutors may have made in urging a particular construction of factor (k) in other cases is not a weighty factor in deciding whether the jury in petitioner’s case would have felt precluded from considering mitigating evidence.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Louisiana has an insurance code which comprehensively regulates the business of insurance in all its phases. This case brings to us challenges to the constitutionality of certain provisions of that code allowing injured persons to bring direct actions against liability insurance companies that have issued policies contracting to pay liabilities imposed on persons who inflict injury. Cf. Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, decided today, ante, p. 48. This is such a direct action brought by the appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Watson, in a Louisiana state court claiming damages against the appellee, Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., on account of alleged personal injuries suffered by Mrs. Watson. The complaint charged that the injuries occurred in Louisiana when Mrs. Watson bought and used in that State “Toni Home Permanent” a hair-waving product alleged to have contained a highly dangerous latent ingredient put there by its manufacturer. The manufacturer is the Toni Company of Illinois, a subsidiary of the Gillette Safety Razor Company which has its headquarters in Massachusetts.
The particular problem presented with reference to enforcing the Louisiana statute in this case arises because the insurance policy sued on was negotiated and issued in Massachusetts and delivered in Massachusetts and Illinois. This Massachusetts-negotiated contract contains a clause, recognized as binding and enforceable under Massachusetts and Illinois law, which prohibits direct actions against the insurance company until after final determination of the Toni Company's obligation to pay personal injury damages either by judgment or agreement. Contrary to this contractual “no action” clause, the challenged statutory provisions permit injured persons to sue an insurance company before such final determination. As to injuries occurring in Louisiana, one provision of the State’s direct action statute makes it applicable, even though, as here, an insurance contract is made in another state and contains a clause forbidding such direct actions. Another Louisiana statutory provision, with which Employers long ago complied, compels foreign insurance companies to consent to such direct suits in order to get a certificate to do business in the State. The basic issue raised by the attack on both these provisions is whether the Federal Constitution forbids Louisiana to apply its own law and compels it to apply the law of Massachusetts or Illinois.
After the case was removed to the United States District Court because of diversity Employers moved to dismiss, contending that the two Louisiana statutory provisions contravened the Equal Protection, Contract, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses of the Federal Constitution. With emphasis on the due process contention, the District Court dismissed the case, holding both statutory provisions unconstitutional as to policies written and delivered outside the State of Louisiana. 107 F. Supp. 494. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court and affirmed the dismissal. 202 F. 2d 407. Provisions of Louisiana’s statutes having been held invalid as repugnant to the Federal Constitution, the case is properly here on appeal.
The denial of equal protection and impairment of contract contentions are wholly void of merit. The State’s direct action provisions fall with equal force upon all liability insurance companies, foreign and domestic. Employers points to no other provisions of the Louisiana law or to facts of any nature which give the slightest support to any charge of discriminatory application of the direct action statute. And since the direct action provisions became effective before this insurance contract was made, there is a similar lack of substantiality in the suggestion that Louisiana has violated Art. I, § 10, of the United States Constitution which forbids states to impair the obligation of contracts. Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 252 U. S. 499, 503.
Had the policy sued on been issued in Louisiana there would be no arguable due process question. See Merchants Mutual Auto. Liability Ins. Co. v. Smart, 267 U. S. 126, 129-130. But because the policy was bought, issued and delivered outside of Louisiana, Employers invokes the due process principle that a state is without power to exercise “extraterritorial jurisdiction,” that is, to regulate and control activities wholly beyond its boundaries. Such a principle was recognized and applied in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, a case strongly relied on by Employers. There Texas was denied power to alter the terms of an insurance contract made in Mexico between persons then in that country, covering a vessel only while in Mexican waters, and containing a provision that the contract was to be governed, by the laws of Mexico. Thus, the subject matter of the contract related in no manner to anything that had been done or was to be done in Texas. For this reason, Texas was denied power to alter the obligations of the Mexican contract. But this Court carefully pointed out that its decision might have been different had activities relating to the contract taken place in Texas upon which the State could properly lay hold as a basis for regulation. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra, at 408 n. 5. The extraterritorial due process doctrine was again applied in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143. That case denied the power of Mississippi to alter terms of an insurance contract made in Tennessee. Mississippi activities in connection with the policy were found to be so “slight” and so “casual” that Mississippi could not apply its own law in such way as to enlarge the obligations of the Tennessee contract. Again, however, the Court carefully noted that there might be future cases in which the terms of out-of-state contracts would be so repugnant to the vital interests of the forum state as to justify nonenforcement. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., supra, at 150. See also Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, and cases there cited.
Some contracts made locally, affecting nothing but local affairs, may well justify a denial to other states of power to alter those contracts. But, as this case illustrates, a vast part of the business affairs of this Nation does not present such simple local situations. Although this insurance contract was issued in Massachusetts, it was to protect Gillette and its Illinois subsidiary against damages on account of personal injuries that might be suffered by users of Toni Home Permanents anywhere in the United States, its territories, or in Canada. As a consequence of the modern practice of conducting widespread business activities throughout the entire United States, this Court has in a series of cases held that more states than one may seize hold of local activities which are part of multistate transactions and may regulate to protect interests of its own people, even though other phases of the same transactions might justify regulatory legislation in other states. See, e. g., Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53; Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Commission, 294 U. S. 532.
Louisiana’s direct action statute is not a mere inter-meddling in affairs beyond her boundaries which are no concern of hers. Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care for them. Serious injuries may require treatment in Louisiana homes or hospitals by Louisiana doctors. The injured may be destitute. They may be compelled to call upon friends, relatives, or the public for help. Louisiana has manifested its natural interest in the injured by providing remedies for recovery of damages. It has a similar interest in policies of insurance which are designed to assure ultimate payment of such damages. Moreover, Louisiana courts in most instances provide the most convenient forum for trial of these cases. But modern transportation and business methods have made it more difficult to serve process on wrongdoers who live or do business in other states. In this case efforts to serve the Gillette Company were answered by a motion to dismiss on the ground that Gillette had no Louisiana agent on whom process could be served. If this motion is granted, Mrs. Watson, but for the direct action law, could not get her case tried without going to Massachusetts or Illinois although she lives in Louisiana and her claim is for injuries from a product bought and used there. What has been said is enough to show Louisiana’s legitimate interest in safeguarding the rights of persons injured there. In view of that interest, the direct action provisions here challenged do not violate due process.
What we have said above goes far toward answering the Full Faith and Credit Clause contention. That clause does not automatically compel a state to subordinate its own contract laws to the laws of another state in which a contract happens to have been formally executed. Where, as here, a contract affects the people of several states, each may have interests that leave it free to enforce its own contract policies. Alaska Packers Assn. v. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 544-550. See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 506-507. We have already pointed to the vital interests of Louisiana in liability insurance that covers injuries to people in that State. Of course Massachusetts also has some interest in the policy sued on in this case. The insurance contract was formally executed in that State and Gillette has an office there. But plainly these interests cannot outweigh the interest of Louisiana in taking care of those injured in Louisiana. Since this is true, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel Louisiana to subordinate its direct action provisions to Massachusetts contract rules. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Commission, 306 U. S. 493, 503. But cf. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178; Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609.
What we have already said disposes of the contention that Louisiana’s law compelling foreign insurance companies to consent to direct actions is unconstitutional. That contention is that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state to compel a foreign corporation to surrender constitutional rights as a condition of being permitted to do business in the state. See Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529. That principle is inapplicable to this case because, as we have just decided, Louisiana has a constitutional right to subject foreign liability insurance companies to the direct action provisions of its laws whether they consent or not.
Reversed.
Title 22, La. Rev. Stat., 1950.
The insurance policy was issued to “The Toni Company, a Division of the Gillette Safety Razor Company . . . .” Gillette is a Delaware Corporation with headquarters in Boston where the contract was negotiated with the Boston office of Employers. The Toni Company manufactures the hair-waving product in Chicago, Illinois.
“12. Action Against Company. No action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the terms of this policy, nor until the amount of the insured’s obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company.
“Any person or organization or the legal representative thereof who has secured such judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this policy to the extent of the insurance afforded by this policy. Nothing contained in this policy shall give any person or organization any right to join the company as a co-defendant in any action against the insured to determine the insured’s liability.
“Bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or of the insured’s estate shall not relieve the company of any of its obligations hereunder.”
“The injured person or his or her heirs, at their option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy in the parish where the accident or injury occurred or in the parish where the insured has his domicile, and said action may be brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured and the insurer, jointly and in solido. This right of direct action shall exist whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana. ... It is the intent of this section that any action brought hereunder shall be subject to all of the lawful conditions of the policy or contract and the defenses which could be urged by the insurer to a direct action brought by the insured, provided the terms and conditions of such policy or contract are not in violation of the laws of this state.” La. Rev. Stat., 1950, §22:655, as amended by Act 541 of the Louisiana Legislature of 1950. As to the scope of this provision according to Louisiana courts, see Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, La. App., 169 So. 132.
“No certificate of authority to do business in Louisiana shall be issued to a foreign or alien liability insurer until such insurer shall consent to being sued by the injured person or his or her heirs in a direct action as provided in Section 655 of this title, whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not, and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided that the accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana. The said foreign or alien insurer shall deliver to the Secretary of State as a condition precedent to the issuance of such authority, an instrument evidencing such consent.” La. Rev. Stat., 1950, §22:983, as amended by Act 542 of the Louisiana Legislature of 1950.
The District Court relied in part on its prior opinions in Mayo v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 106 F. Supp. 579; Bayard v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343; Bish v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp., 102 F. Supp. 343.
28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2). In addition to noting probable jurisdiction'of this cause, we granted certiorari. 347 U. S. 958. Since the case is properly here on appeal, the certiorari is dismissed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Whittaker
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The ultimate question presented by these cases is whether certain lands, purchased and owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation and lying adjacent to a natural power site on the Niagara River near the town of Lewiston, New York, may be taken for the storage reservoir of a hydroelectric power project, upon the payment of just compensation, by the Power Authority of the State of New York under a license issued to it by the Federal Power Commission as directed by Congress in Public Law 85-159, approved August 21, 1957, 71 Stat. 401.
The Niagara River, an international boundary stream and a navigable waterway of the United States, flows from Lake Erie to Lake Ontario, a distance of 36 miles. Its mean flow is about 200,000 cubic feet per second. The river drops about 165 feet at Niagara Falls and an additional 140 feet in the rapids immediately above and below the falls. The “head” created by these great falls, combined with the large and steady flow of the river, makes the Lewiston power site, located below the rapids, an extremely favorable one for hydroelectric development.
For the purpose of avoiding “continuing waste of a great natural resource and to make it possible for the United States of America and Canada to develop, for the benefit of their respective peoples, equal shares of the waters of the Niagara River available for power purposes/’ the United States and Canada entered into the Treaty of February 27, 1950, providing for a flow of 100,000 cubic feet per second over Niagara Falls during certain specified daytime and evening hours of the tourist season (April 1 to October 31) and of 50,000 cubic feet per second at other times, and authorizing the equal division by the United States and Canada of all excess waters for power purposes.
In consenting to the 1950 Treaty, the Senate imposed the condition that “no project for redevelopment of the United States’ share of such waters shall be undertaken until it be specifically authorized by Act of Congress.” 1 U. S. T. 694, 699. To that end, a study was made and reported to Congress in 1951 by the United States Army Corps of Engineers respecting the most feasible plans for utilizing all of the waters available to the United States under the 1950 Treaty, and detailed plans embodying other studies were prepared and submitted to Congress prior to June 7, 1956, by the Bureau of Power of the Federal Power Commission, the Power Authority of New York, and the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation. To enable utilization of all of the United States’ share of the Niagara waters by avoiding waste of the nighttime and week-end flow that would not be needed at those times for the generation of power, all of the studies and plans provided for a pumping-generating plant to lift those waters at those times into a reservoir, and for a storage reservoir to contain them until released for use — through the pumping-generating plant, when its motors (operating in reverse) would serve as generators — during the daytime hours when the demand for power would be highest and the diversion of waters from the river would be most restricted by the treaty. Estimates of dependable capacity of the several recommended projects varied from 1,240,000 to 1,723,000 kilowatts, and estimates of the needed reservoir capacity varied from 22,000 acre-feet covering 850 acres to 41,000 acre-feet covering 1,700 acres. The variations in these estimates were largely due to differing assumptions as to the length of the daily period of peak demand.
Although there was “no controversy as to the most desirable engineering plan of development,” there was serious disagreement in Congress over whether the project should be publicly or privately developed and over marketing preferences and other matters of policy. That disagreement continued through eight sessions of Committee Hearings, during which more than 30 proposed bills were considered, in the Eighty-first to Eighty-fifth Congresses and delayed congressional authorization of the project for seven years.
On June 7, 1956, a rock slide destroyed the Schoellkopf plant. This created a critical shortage of electric power in the Niagara community. It also required expansion of the plans for the Niagara project if the 20,000 cubic feet per second of water that had been reserved for the Schoellkopf plant was to be utilized. Accordingly, the Power Authority of New York prepared and submitted to Congress a major revision of the project plans. Those revised plans, designed to utilize all of the Niagara waters available to the United States under the 1950 Treaty, provided for an installed capacity of 2,190,000 kilowatts, of which 1,800,000 kilowatts would be dependable power for 17 hours per day, necessitating a storage reservoir of 60,000 acre-feet capacity covering about 2,800 acres.
Confronted with the destruction of the Schoellkopf plant and the consequent critical need for electric power in the Niagara community, Congress speedily composed its differences in the manner and terms prescribed in Public Law 85-159, approved August 21, 1957. 71 Stat. 401. By § 1(a) of that Act, Congress “expressly authorized and directed” the Federal Power Commission “to issue a license to the Power Authority of the State of New York for the construction and operation of a power project with capacity to utilize all of the United States share of the water of the Niagara River permitted to be used by international agreement.” By § 1 (b) of the Act, the Federal Power Commission was directed to “include among the licensing conditions, in addition to those deemed necessary and required under the terms of the Federal Power Act,” seven conditions which are of only collateral importance here. The concluding section of the Act, § 2, provides: “The license issued under the terms of this Act shall be granted in conformance with Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Power Commission, but in the event of any conflict, the provisions of this Act shall govern in respect of the project herein authorized.”
Thereafter, the Power Authority of the State of New York, a municipal corporation created'under the laws of that State to develop the St. Lawrence and Niagara power projects, applied to the Federal Power Commission' for the project license which Congress had thus directed the Commission to issue to it. Its application embraced the project plans that it had submitted to the Eighty-fifth Congress shortly before its approval of Public Law 85-159. The project was scheduled to be completed in 1963 at an estimated cost of $720,000,000.
Hearings were scheduled by the Commission, of which due notice was given to all interested parties, including the Tuscarora Indian Nation, inasmuch as the application contemplated the taking of some of its lands for the reservoir. The Tuscarora Indian Nation intervened and objected to the taking of any of its lands upon the ground "that the applicant lacks authority to acquire them.” At the hearings, it was shown that the Tuscarora lands needed for the reservoir — then thought to be about 1,000 acres— are part of a separate tract of 4,329 acres purchased in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation, with the assistance of Henry Dearborn, then Secretary of War, from the Holland Land Company on November 21, 1804, with the proceeds derived from the contemporaneous sale of their lands in North Carolina — from which they had removed in about the year 1775 to reside with the Oneidas in central New York.
After concluding the hearings, the Commission, on January 30, 1958, issued its order granting the license. It found that a reservoir having a usable storage capacity of 60,000 acre-feet “is required to properly utilize the water resources involved.” Although the Commission found that the Indian lands “are almost entirely undeveloped except for agricultural use,” it did not pass upon the Tuscaroras’ objection to the taking of their lands because it then assumed that “other lands are available for reservoir use if the Applicant is unable to acquire the Indian lands.” But the Commission did direct the licensee to revise its exhibit covering the reservoir, to more definitely show the area and acreage involved, and to resubmit it to the Commission for approval within a stated time.
In its application for rehearing, the Tuscarora Indian Nation contended, among other things, that the portion of its lands sought to be taken for the reservoir was part of a “reservation,” as defined in § 3 (2), and as used in § 4 (e), of the Federal Power Act, and therefore could not lawfully be taken for reservoir purposes in the absence of a finding by the Commission “that the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired.” By its order of March 21, 1958, denying that application for rehearing, the Commission found that “[t]he best location of the reservoir would require approximately 1,000 acres of land owned by Intervener,” and it held that the Indian lands involved “are not part of a'reservation’ referred to in Section 4 (e) as defined in Section 3 (2) of the [Federal Power] Act and the finding suggested by Intervener is not required.” On May 5, 1958, the Commission issued its order approving the licensee’s revised exhibit which precisely delineated the location, area, and acreage to be embraced by the reservoir — which included 1,383 acres of the Tuscaroras’ lands.
On May 16, 1958, the Tuscarora Indian Nation filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit challenging the license issued by the Commission on January 30, 1958, insofar as it would authorize the taking of Tuscarora lands. By its opinion and interim judgment of November 14, 1958, the Court of Appeals held that the Tuscarora lands sought to be taken for the reservoir constitute a part of a “reservation” within the meaning of §§ 3 (2) and 4 (e) of the Federal Power Act, and that the Commission may not include those lands in the license in the absence of a § 4 (e) finding that their taking “will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired,” and the court remanded the case to the Commission that it might “explore the possibility of making that finding.” 105 U. S. App. D. C. 146, 265 F. 2d 338.
Upon remand, the Commission held extensive hearings, exploring not only the matter of the making of the finding held necessary by the Court of Appeals but also the possibility of locating the reservoir on other lands. In its order of February 2, 1959, the Commission found that the use of other lands for the reservoir would result in great delay, severe community disruption, and unreasonable expense; that a reservoir with usable storage capacity of 60,000 acre-feet is required to utilize all of the United States’ share of the water of the Niagara River, as required by Public Law 85-159; that removal of the reservoir from the Tuscarora lands by reducing the area of the reservoir would reduce the usable storage capacity from 60,000 acre-feet to 30,000 acre-feet and result in a loss of about 300,000 kilowatts of dependable capacity. But it concluded that, although other lands contiguous to their- reservation might be acquired by the Tuscaroras, the taking of the 1,383 acres of Tuscarora lands for the reservoir “would interfere and would be inconsistent with the purpose for which the reservation was created or acquired.” That order was transmitted to the Court of Appeals which, on March 24, 1959, after considering various motions of the parties, entered its final judgment approving the license except insofar as it would authorize the taking of Tuscarora lands for the reservoir, and remanded the case to the Commission with instructions to amend the license “to exclude specifically the power of the said Power Authority to condemn the said lands of the Tuscarora Indians for reservoir purposes.” 105 U. S. App. D. C., at 152, 265 F. 2d, at 344.
Because of conflict between the views of the court below and those of the Second Circuit, and of the general importance of the questions involved, we granted certio-rari. 360 U. S. 915.
The parties have urged upon us a number of contentions, but we think these cases turn upon the answers to two questions, namely, (1) whether the Tuscarora lands covered by the Commission’s license are part of a “reservation” as defined and used in the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. § 791a et seq., and, if not, (2) whether those lands may be condemned by the licensee, under the eminent domain powers conferred by § 21 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. § 814. We now turn to a consideration of those questions in the order stated.
I.
A Commission finding that “the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired" is required by § 4 (e) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. § 797 (e), only if the lands involved are within a “reservation” in the sense of that term as defined and used in that Act. That by generally accepted standards and common understanding these Tuscarora lands may be part of a “reservation” is not at all decisive of whether they are such within the meaning of the Federal Power Act. Congress was free and competent artificially to define the term “reservations” for the purposes it prescribed in that Act. And we are bound to give effect to its definition of that term, for it would be idle for Congress to define the sense in which it used it “if we were free in despite of it to choose a meaning for ourselves.” Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87, 96. By § 3 (2) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. § 796 (2), Congress has provided:
“Sec. 3. The words defined in this section shall have the following meanings for purposes of this Act, to wit:
“(2)'reservations’ means national forests, tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations, military reservations, and other lands and interests in lands owned by the United States, and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and disposal under the public land laws; also lands and interests in lands acquired and held for any public purpose; but shall not include national monuments or national parks.” (Emphasis added.)
The plain words of this definition seem rather clearly to show that Congress intended the term “reservations,” wherever used in the Act, to embrace only “lands and interests in lands owned by the United States.”
Turning to the definition’s legislative history, we find that it, too, strongly indicates that such was the congressional intention. In the original draft bill of the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, as proposed by the Administration and passed by the House in the Sixty-fifth and Sixty-sixth Congresses, the term was defined as follows:
“ 'Reservations' means lands and interest in lands owned by the United States and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and disposal under the public-land laws, and lands and interest in lands acquired and held for any public purpose.”
It is difficult to perceive how congressional intention could be more clearly and definitely expressed. However, after the bill reached the Senate it inserted the words "national monuments, national parks, national forests, tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations, military reservations, and other” (emphasis added) at the beginning of the definition. When the bill was returned to the House it was explained that the Senate’s “amendment recasts the House definition of'reservations.' ” The bill as enacted contained the definition as thus recast. It remains in that form, except for the deletion of the words "national monuments, national parks,” which was occasioned by the Act of March 3, 1921 (41 Stat. 1353), negating Commission authority to license any project works within “national monuments or national parks,” and those words were finally deleted from the definition by amendment in 1935. 49 Stat. 838. It seems entirely clear that no change in substance was intended or effected by the Senate's amendment, and that its “recasting” only specified, as illustrative, some of the “reservations” on “lands and interests in lands owned by the United States.”
Further evidence that Congress intended to limit “reservations,” for the “purposes of this Act” (§3), to those located on “lands owned by the United States” or in which it owns an interest is furnished by its use of the term in the context of § 4 (e) of the Act. By that section Congress, after authorizing the Commission to license projects in streams or other bodies of water over which it has jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3), authorized the Commission to license projects “upon any part of the public lands and reservations of the United States.” Congress must be deemed to have known, as this Court held in Federal Power Comm’n v. Oregon, 349 U. S. 435, 443, that the licensing power, “in relation to public lands and reservations of the United States springs from the Property Clause” of the Constitution — namely, the “... Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States....” Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. In thus acting under the Property Clause of the Constitution, Congress must have intended to deal only with “the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” Ibid.
Moreover, the Federal Power Act’s plan of compensating for lands taken or used for licensed projects is explicable only if the term “reservations” is confined, as Congress evidently intended, to those located on “lands owned by the United States” or in which it owns a proprietary interest. By § 21, 16 U. S. C. § 814, licensees are authorized to acquire “the lands or property of others necessary to the” licensed project “by the exercise of the right of eminent domain” in the federal or state courts, and, of course, upon the payment of just compensation. But, despite its general and all-inclusive terms, § 21 does not apply to nor authorize condemnation of lands or interests in lands owned by the United States, because § 10 (e) of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 803 (e), expressly provides that “the licensee shall pay to the United States reasonable annual charges... for recompensating it for the use, occupancy, and enjoyment of its lands or other property” (emphasis added) devoted to the licensed project. It therefore appears to be unmistakably clear that by the language of the first proviso of that section saying, in pertinent part; “That when licenses are issued involving the use of Government dams or other structures owned by the United States or tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations (these italicized words being lifted straight from the § 3 (2) definition of ‘reservations’) the Commission shall... fix a reasonable annual charge for the use thereof...,” Congress intended to treat and treated only with structures, lands and interests in lands owned by the United States, for, as stated, the section expressly requires the “reasonable annual charges” to be paid to the United States for the use, occupancy, and enjoyment of “its lands or other property.” (Emphasis added.)
This analysis of the plain words and legislative history of the Act’s definition of “reservations” and of the plan and provisions of the Act leaves us with no doubt that Congress, “for purposes of this Act” (§ 3 (2)), intended to and did confine “reservations,” including “tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations” (§ 3 (2)), to those located on lands “owned by the United States” (§3 (2)), or in which it owns a proprietary interest.
The Court of Appeals did not find to the contrary. Indeed, it found that the Act’s definition of “reservations” includes only those located on lands in which the United States “has an interest.” But it thought that the national paternal relationship to the Indians and the Government’s concern to protect them against improper alienation of their lands gave the United States the requisite “interest” in the lands here involved, and that the result “must be the same as if the phrase ‘owned by the United States, [etc.]’ were not construed as a limitation upon the term ‘tribal lands [etc.].’” 105 U. S. App. D. C., at 150, 265 F. 2d, at 342. We do not agree. The national “interest” in Indian welfare and protection “is not to be expressed in terms of property....” Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413, 437. The national “paternal interest” in the welfare and protection of Indians is not the “interests in lands owned by the United States” required, as an element of “reservations,” by § 3 (2) of the Federal Power Act. (Emphasis added.)
Inasmuch as the lands involved are owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation and no “interest” in them is “owned by the United States,” we hold that they are not within a “reservation” as that term is defined and used in the Federal Power Act, and that a Commission finding under § 4 (e) of that Act “that the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired” is not necessary to the issuance of a license embracing the Tuscarora lands needed for the project.
II.
We pass now to the question whether the portion of the Tuscarora lands here involved may be condemned by the licensee under the provisions and eminent domain powers of § 21 of the Federal Power Act. Petitioners contend that § 21 is a broad general statute authorizing condemnation of “the lands or property of others necessary to the construction, maintenance, or operation of any” licensed project, and that lands owned by Indians in fee simple, not being excluded, may be taken by the licensee under the federal eminent domain powers delegated to it by that section. Parrying this contention, the Tuscarora Indian Nation argues that § 21, being only a general Act of Congress, does not apply to Indians or their lands.
The Tuscarora Indian Nation heavily relies upon Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94. It is true that in that case the Court, dealing with the question whether a native-born American Indian was made a citizen of the United States by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, said: “Under the Constitution of the United States, as originally established... General Acts of Congress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them.” 112 U. S., at 99-100. However that may have been, it is now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests. In Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 418, the funds of a restricted Creek Indian were held and invested for him by the Superintendent, and a question arose as to whether income from the investment was subject to federal income taxes. In an earlier case, Blackbird v. Commissioner, 38 F. 2d 976, the Tenth Circuit had held such income to be exempt from federal income taxation. But in this case the Board of Tax Appeals sustained the tax, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, and the Superintendent brought the case here. This Court observed that in the Blackbird case the Tenth Circuit had said that to hold a general act of Congress to be applicable to restricted Indians “would be contrary to the almost unbroken policy of Congress in dealing with its Indian wards and their affairs. Whenever they and their interests have been the subject affected by legislation they have been named and their interests specifically dealt with.” That is precisely the argument now made here by the Tuscarora Indian Nation. But this Court, in affirming the judgment, said:
“This does not harmonize with what we said in Choteau v. Burnet (1931), 283 U. S. 691, 693, 696:
“ 'The language of [the Internal Revenue Act of 1918] subjects the income of “every individual” to tax. Section 213 (a) includes income “from any source whatever.” The intent of Congress was to levy the tax with respect to all residents of the United States and upon all sorts of income. The Act does not expressly exempt the sort of income here involved, nor a person having petitioner’s status respecting such income, and we are not referred to any other statute which does.... The intent to exclude must be definitely expressed, where, as here, the language of the Act laying the tax is broad enough to include the subject matter.’
“The court below properly declined to follow its quoted pronouncement in Blackbird’s case. The terms of the 1928 Revenue Act are very broad, and nothing there indicates that Indians are to be excepted. See Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161; Heiner v. Colonial Trust Co., 275 U. S. 232; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84; Pitman v. Commissioner, 64 F. (2d) 740. The purpose is sufficiently clear.” 295 U. S., at 419-420.
In Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598, this Court, in holding that the estate of a restricted Oklahoma Indian was subject to state inheritance and estate taxes under general state statutes, said:
“The language of the statutes does not except either Indians or any other persons from their scope. [319 U. S., at 600.] If Congress intends to prevent the State of Oklahoma from levying a general nondiscriminatory estate tax applying alike to all its citizens, it should say so in plain words. Such a conclusion cannot rest on dubious inferences.” 319 U. S., at 607.
See, e. g., Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corporation, 276 U. S. 575, 581-582; United States v. Ransom, 263 U. S. 691; Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U. S. 556, 563-564; Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 673.
The Federal Power Act constitutes a complete and comprehensive plan for the development and improvement of navigation and for the development, transmission and utilization of electric power in any of the streams or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under its commerce powers, and upon the public lands and reservations of the United States under its property powers. See § 4 (e). It neither overlooks nor excludes Indians or lands owned or occupied by them. Instead, as has been shown, the Act specifically defines and treats with lands occupied by Indians — “tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations.” See §§ 3 (2) and 10 (e). The Act gives every indication that, within its comprehensive plan, Congress intended to include lands owned or occupied by any person or persons, including Indians. The Court of Appeals recognized that this is so. 105 U. S. App. D. C., at 151, 265 F. 2d, at 343. Section 21 of the Act, by broad general terms, authorizes the licensee to condemn “the lands or property of others necessary to the construction, maintenance, or operation of any” licensed project. That section does not exclude lands or property owned by Indians, and, upon the authority of the cases cited, we must hold that it applies to these lands owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation.
The Tuscarora Indian Nation insists that even if its lands are embraced by the terms of § 21 of the Federal Power Act, they still may not be taken for public use “without the express consent of Congress referring specifically to those lands,” because of the provisions of 25 U. S. C. § 177. That section, in pertinent part, provides:
“No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution....”
The obvious purpose of that statute is to prevent unfair, improvident or improper disposition by Indians of lands owned or possessed by them to other parties, except the United States, without the consent of Congress, and to enable the Government, acting as parens patriae for the Indians, to vacate any disposition of their lands made without its consent. See, e. g., United States v. Hellard, 322 U. S. 363; United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 441-442; Henkel v. United States, 237 U. S. 43, 51; United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, 46-48. But there is no such requirement with respect to conveyances to or condemnations by the United States or its licensees; “nor is it conceivable that it is necessary, for the Indians are subject only to the same rule of law as are others in the State....” United States v. Oklahoma Gas Co., 318 U. S. 206, 211.
As to the Tuscaroras’ contention that § 177 prohibits the taking of any of their lands for the reservoir “without the express and specific consent of Congress,” one thing is certain. It is certain that if § 177 is applicable to alienations effected by condemnation proceedings under § 21 of the Federal Power Act, the mere “expressed consent” of Congress would be vain and idle. For § 177 at the very least contemplates the assent of the Indian nation or tribe. And inasmuch as the Tuscarora Indian Nation withholds such consent and refuses to convey to the licensee any of its lands, it follows that the mere consent of Congress, however express and specific, would avail nothing. Therefore, if § 177 is applicable to alienations effected by condemnation under § 21 of the Federal Power Act, the result would be that the Tuscarora lands, however imperative for the project, could not be taken at all.
But § 177 is not applicable to the sovereign United States nor, hence, to its licensees to whom Congress has delegated federal eminent domain powers under § 21 of the Federal Power Act. The law is now well settled that:
“A general statute imposing restrictions does not impose them upon the Government itself without a clear expression or implication to that effect.” United States v. Wittek, 337 U. S. 346, 358-359.
In United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S. 258, 272-273, the Court said:
“There is an old and well-known rule that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.”
See, e. g., Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States, 352 U. S. 220, 224-225; United States v. Wyoming, 331 U. S. 440, 449; United States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S. 190; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 159 U. S. 548, 553-555; Lewis v. United States, 92 U. S. 618, 622; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251, 263; Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 239.
This Court has several times applied, in combination, the rules (1) that general Acts of Congress apply to Indians as well as to all others in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary, and (2) that general statutes imposing restrictions do not apply to the Government itself without a clear expression to that effect. It did so in Henkel v. United States, 237 U. S. 43 (sustaining the right of the United States to take Indian lands for reservoir purposes under the general Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat. 388), in Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U. S. 394 (sustaining the power of the Government to convey a strip of land through a tract owned by an Indian tribe to one Chandler for the use of the State of Michigan in constructing a canal, even though the conveyance was in derogation of a treaty with the Indian tribe), and in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641. There, this Court sustained the right of a licensee of the Government to take so much of the undescribed fee lands of an Indian tribe as was necessary for the licensed project, though in derogation of the terms of a treaty between the United States and the Indian tribe, saying: See also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 565; Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U. S. 114, 117-118; Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 517; Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367.
“It would be very strange if the national government, in the execution of its rightful authority, could exercise the power of eminent domain in the several States, and could not exercise the same power in a Territory occupied by an Indian nation or tribe, the members of which were wards of the United States, and directly subject to its political control. The lands in the Cherokee territory, like the lands held by private owners everywhere within the geographical limits of the United States, are held subject to the authority of the general government to take them for such objects as are germane to the execution of the powers granted to it; provided only, that they are not taken without just compensation being made to the owner.” 135 U. S., at 656-657.
In the light of these authorities we must hold that Congress, by the broad general terms of § 21 of the Federal Power Act, has authorized the Federal Power Commission’s licensees to take lands owned by Indians, as well as those of all other citizens, when needed for a licensed project, upon the payment of just compensation; that the lands in question are not subject to any treaty between the United States and the Tuscaroras (see notes 10 and 18); and that 25 U. S. C. § 177 does not apply to-the United States itself nor prohibit it, or its licensees under the Federal Power Act, from taking such lands in the manner provided by § 21, upon the payment of just compensation.
All members of this Court — no one more than any other — adhere to the concept that agreements are made to be performed — no less by the Government than by others — but the federal eminent domain powers conferred by Congress upon the Commission’s licensee, by § 21 of the Federal Power Act, to take such of the lands of the Tuscaroras as are needed for the Niagara project do not breach the faith of the United States, or any treaty or other contractual agreement of the United States with the Tuscarora Indian Nation in respect to these lands for the conclusive reason that there is none.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Brennan concurs in the result.
1 U..S. T. 694.
The excess flow of water available for power purposes under the 1950 Treaty was estimated to fluctuate between 44,000 and
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 543, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 301 et seq., grants the Commission pervasive control over motor carriers. Common carriers and contract carriers by motor vehicle, subject to that part of the Act, must have a certificate of public convenience and necessity or a permit issued by the Commission. §§ 206 (a), 209 (a). The Commission has powers of investigation to determine if a motor carrier has complied with the Act; and it has authority to issue an order compelling compliance. § 204 (c). These requirements for a certificate or permit are not, however, applicable to “motor vehicles used in carrying property consisting of ordinary livestock, fish (including shell fish), or agricultural (including horticultural) commodities (not including manufactured products thereof), if such motor vehicles are not used in carrying any other property, or passengers, for compensation.” §203 (b)(6).
The controversy in these cases centers around this “agricultural” exemption. After an investigation instituted on its own motion, the Commission issued an order that specified commodities are not “agricultural” within the meaning of § 203 (b)(6).
The hearing to determine the meaning and application of the term “agricultural . . . commodities (not including manufactured products thereof)” as used in § 203 (b)(6) was held before an examiner. It was a public hearing at which various governmental officials and agencies and various producers, shippers, and carriers appeared and presented evidence. The Commission’s decision was in the form of a report and order. 52 M. C. C. 511. The report, which concerns various groups of commodities, covers 71 pages of the printed record. The findings list those commodities that the Commission finds are exempted under § 203 (b) (6) and those that are not. The order of the Commission incorporates the “findings” and states that the proceeding “be, and it is hereby-discontinued.”
Frozen Food Express, the plaintiff, is a motor carrier transporting numerous commodities which the Commission ruled were nonexempt under § 203 (b)(6) but which the carrier claims are “agricultural commodities.” Plaintiff, who was not a party to the administrative proceeding, instituted suit before a three-judge District Court (28 U. S. C. § 2325) to enjoin the order of the Commission and have it set aside, naming the United States and the Commission as defendants. 28 U. S. C. § 1336; 49 Stat. 550, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 305 (g); 60 Stat. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009. The complaint alleged that plaintiff is a common carrier by motor vehicle, holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity which authorizes it to transport certain commodities between designated points and places; that plaintiff is transporting, in addition to those commodities, commodities which are exempt under § 203 (b) (6) and for which plaintiff has sought no authority from the Commission; that the Commission in its order has held the latter commodities nonexempt and accordingly has deprived it of the right granted by the statute; that the order of the Commission classifying certain commodities as nonexempt is unlawful; and that the Commission threatens to enjoin transportation of the commodities' which plaintiff claims are exempt. The Secretary of Agriculture intervened, supporting plaintiff’s position on some of the commodities. Other interveners are trucking associations and railroads which support the Commission. The United States as a defendant supports the Commission on some of its findings and opposes it on others.
The District Court, being of the view that .the case was controlled by United States v. Los Angeles R. Co., 273 U. S. 299, dismissed the action, saying that the “order” of the Commission was not subject to judicial review. 128 F. Supp. 374. The cases are here by appeal. 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253, 2101 (b).
We disagree with the District Court. We do not think United States v. Los Angeles R. Co., supra, is controlling here. In that case the “order” held nonreviewable was a valuation of a carrier’s property made by the Commission. The Court held that the “order” was no more than a report of an investigation which might never be the basis of a proceeding before the Commission or a court. Mr. Justice Brandéis, speaking for the Court, said:
“The so-called order here complained of is one which does not command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing, any thing; which does not grant or withhold any authority, privilege or license; which does not extend or abridge any power or facility; which does not subject the carrier to any liability, civil or criminal; which does not change the carrier’s existing or future status or condition; which does not determine any right or obligation. This so-called order is merely the formal record of conclusions reached after a study of data collected in the course of extensive research conducted by the Commission, through its employees. It is the exercise solely of the function of investigation. . . .” 273 U. S. 309-310.
The situation here is quite different. The determination by the Commission that a commodity is not an exempt agricultural product has an immediate and practical impact on carriers who are transporting the commodities, and on shippers as well. The “order” of the Commission warns every carrier, who does not have authority from the Commission to transport those commodities, that it does so at the risk of incurring criminal penalties. §222 (a). Where unauthorized operations occur, the Commission may proceed administratively and issue a cease and desist order. § 204 (c). Such orders of the Commission are enforceable by the courts. § 222 (b). And wilful violation of a cease and desist order is ground for revocation of a certificate or permit. § 212. The determination made by the Commission is not therefore abstract, theoretical, or academic. Cf. El Dorado Oil Works v. United States, 328 U. S. 12, 18-19. The “order” of the Commission which classifies commodities as exempt or nonexempt is, indeed, the basis for carriers in ordering and arranging their affairs. Cf. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 132. Carriers who are without the appropriate certificate or permit, because they believe they carry exempt commodities, run civil and criminal risks. A carrier authorized to carry specified commodities and dependent on exempt articles for its return load may lose its right to operate at all, if it does not respect the Commission’s “order.” Carriers and shippers alike are told that they are or are not free to bargain for rates, that they must or must not pay the filed charges. The “order” of the Commission is in substance a “declaratory” one, see 60 Stat. 240, 5 U. S. C. § 1004 (d), which touches vital interests of carriers and shippers alike and sets the standard for shaping the manner in which an important segment of the trucking business will be done. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407. The consequences we have summarized are not conjectural. The Commission itself places this interpretation on its action and argues, contrary to its position in the Los Angeles Case, supra, for finality of the order. We conclude that the issues raised in the complaint are justiciable and that the District Court should adjudicate the merits.
„ 7
„ 7 Reversed.
Exempted carriers are also not subject to the provisions concerning rates and charges, §§ 217, 218, nor to the requirements concerning bodily injury and property damage insurance. § 215.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises important questions concerning the power of states to bar interstate motor carriers from use of state roads as punishment for repeated violations of state highway regulations. The respondent Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. is such a carrier transporting goods to and from many points in Illinois and seven other states. This extensive interstate business is done under a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission under authority of the Federal Motor Carrier Act. Hayes also does an intrastate carrier business in Illinois under a certificate issued by state authorities. Illinois has a statute which limits the weight of freight that can be carried in commercial trucks over Illinois highways; the same statute also provides for a balanced distribution of freight loads in relation to the truck's axles. Repeated violations of these provisions by trucks of a carrier are made punishable by total suspension of the carrier’s right to use Illinois state highways for periods of ninety days and one year. This action was brought in a state court to restrain Illinois officials from prosecuting Hayes as a repeated violator. The State Supreme Court held that the punishment of suspension provided by the state statute could not be imposed on the interstate operations of the respondent Hayes. Such a state suspension- of interstate transportation, it was decided, would conflict with the Federal Motor Carrier Act which is the supreme law of the iand. We granted the State’s petition for certiorari. 347 U. S. 1009.
Congress in the Motor Carrier Act adopted a comprehensive plan for regulating the carriage of goods by motor truck in interstate commerce. The federal plan of control was so all-embracing that former power of states over interstate motor carriers was greatly reduced. No power at all was left in states to determine what carriers could or could not operate in interstate commerce. Exclusive power of the Federal Government to make this determination is shown by § 306 of 49 U. S. C. which describes the conditions under which the Interstate Commerce Commission can issue certificates of convenience and necessity. And § 312 of the same title provides that all certificates, permits or licenses issued by the Commission “shall remain in effect until suspended or terminated as herein provided.” But in order to provide stability for operating rights of carriers, Congress placed within very narrow limits the Commission’s power to suspend or revoke an outstanding certificate. No certificate is to be revoked, suspended or changed until after a hearing and a finding that a carrier has willfully failed to comply with the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act or with regulations properly promulgated under it. Under these circumstances, it would be odd if a state could take action amounting to a suspension or revocation of an interstate carrier’s commission-granted right to operate. Cf. Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538. It cannot be doubted that suspension of this common carrier’s right to use Illinois highways is the equivalent of a partial suspension of its federally granted certificate. The highways of Illinois are not only used by Hayes to transport interstate goods to and from that State but are also used as connecting links to points in other states which the Commission has authorized Hayes to serve. Consequently if the ninety-day or the one-year suspension should become effective, the carriage of interstate goods into Illinois and other states would be seriously disrupted.
That Illinois seeks to punish Hayes for violations of its road regulations does not justify this disruption of federally authorized activities. A state’s regulation of weight and distribution of loads carried in interstate trucks does not itself conflict with the Federal Act. The reason for this as pointed out in Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598, is that the Federal Act has a provision designed to leave states free to regulate the sizes and weights of motor vehicles. But it would stretch this statutory provision too much to say that it also allowed states to revoke or suspend the right of interstate motor carriers for violation of state highway regulations.
It is urged that without power to impose punishment by suspension states will be without appropriate remedies to enforce their laws against recalcitrant motor carriers. We are not persuaded, however, that the conventional forms of punishment are inadequate to protect states from overweighted or improperly loaded motor trucks. Moreover, a Commission regulation requires motor carriers to abide by valid state highway regulations. And as previously pointed out, the Commission can revoke in whole or in part certificates of motor carriers which willfully refuse to comply with any lawful regulation of the Commission. If, therefore, motor carriers persistently and repeatedly violate the laws of a state, we know of no reason why the Commission may not protect the state’s interest, either on the Commission’s own initiative or on complaint of the state.
We agree with the Supreme Court of Illinois that the right of this carrier to use Illinois highways for interstate transportation of goods cannot be suspended by Illinois.
Affirmed.
Indiana, Missouri, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee.
49 Stat. 543. Now Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 919, 49 U. S. C. § 301 et seq.
Ill. Rev. Stat., 1953, c. 9514, § 228.
Ill. Rev. Stat., 1953, c. 95½, § 229b. This section provides for a 90-day suspension upon a finding of 10 or more violations. If thereafter the same carrier is found to have been guilty of 10 or more later violations the suspension is for one year.
2 Ill. 2d 58, 117 N. E. 2d 106. But the State Supreme Court held that Hayes’ intrastate operations could be suspended. Hayes appealed to this Court. We dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 347 U. S. 994.
Smith Bros., Revocation of Certificate, 33 M. C. C. 465, 472. See United States v. Seatrain Lines, 329 U. S. 424.
49 CFR, 1954 Cum. Supp., § 192.3. “Every motor vehicle shall be driven in accordance with the laws, ordinances, and regulations of the jurisdiction in which it is being operated, unless such laws, ordinances and regulations are at variance with specific regulations of this Commission which impose a greater affirmative obligation or restraint.”
49 Stat. 555, 49 U. S. C. § 312.
49 Stat. 555, 49 U. S. C. § 312. For eases in which the Commission has considered violations of state law in passing on the fitness and ability of applicants to operate as carriers in interstate commerce see Southwest Freight Lines, Inc., Extension — Glass Products, 54 M. C. C. 205, 219; Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., Extension — Alternate Routes, 54 M. C. C. 643, 659.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Todd Mitchell’s sentence for aggravated battery was enhanced because he intentionally selected his victim on account of the victim’s race. The question presented in this case is whether this penalty enhancement is prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold that it is not.
On the evening of October 7,1989, a group of young black men and boys, including Mitchell, gathered at an apartment complex in Kenosha, Wisconsin. Several members of the group discussed a scene from the motion picture “Mississippi Burning,” in which a white man beat a young black boy who was praying. The group moved outside and Mitchell asked them: “‘Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white people?’” Brief for Petitioner 4. Shortly thereafter, a young white boy approached the group on the opposite side of the street where they were standing. As the boy walked by, Mitchell said: “‘You all want to fuck somebody up? There goes a white boy; go get him.’ ” Id., at 4-5. Mitchell counted to three and pointed in the boy’s direction. The group ran toward the boy, beat him severely, and stole his tennis shoes. The boy was rendered unconscious and remained in a coma for four days.
After a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County, Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery. Wis. Stat. §§939.05 and 940.19(lm) (1989-1990). That offense ordinarily carries a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. §§ 940.19(lm) and 939.50(3)(e). But because the jury found that Mitchell had intentionally selected his victim because of the boy’s race, the maximum sentence for Mitchell’s offense was increased to seven years under § 939.645. That provision enhances the maximum penalty for an offense whenever the defendant “[intentionally selects the person against whom the crime ... is committed ... because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person . . . .” § 939.645(l)(b). The Circuit Court sentenced Mitchell to four years’ imprisonment for the aggravated battery.
Mitchell unsuccessfully sought posteonviction relief in the Circuit Court. Then he appealed his conviction and sentence, challenging the constitutionality of Wisconsin’s penalty-enhancement provision on First Amendment grounds. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Mitchell’s challenge, 163 Wis. 2d 652, 473 N. W. 2d 1 (1991), but the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court held that the statute “violates the First Amendment directly by punishing what the legislature has deemed to be offensive thought.” 169 Wis. 2d 153, 163, 485 N. W. 2d 807, 811 (1992). It rejected the State’s contention “that the statute punishes only the ‘conduct’ of intentional selection of a victim.” Id., at 164, 485 N. W. 2d, at 812. According to the court, “[t]he statute punishes the ‘because of’ aspect of the defendant’s selection, the reason the defendant selected the victim, the motive behind the selection.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). And under R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377 (1992), “the Wisconsin legislature cannot criminalize bigoted thought with which it disagrees.” 169 Wis. 2d, at 171, 485 N. W. 2d, at. 815.
The Supreme Court also held that the penalty-enhancement statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. It reasoned that, in order to prove that a defendant intentionally selected his victim because of the victim’s protected status, the State would often have to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior speech, such as racial epithets he may have uttered before the commission of the offense. This evidentiary use of protected speech, the court thought, would have a “chilling effect” on those who feared the possibility of prosecution for offenses subject to penalty enhancement. See id., at 174, 485 N. W. 2d, at 816. Finally, the court distinguished antidiscrimination laws, which have long been held constitutional, on the ground that the Wisconsin statute punishes the “subjective mental process” of selecting a victim because of his protected status, whereas antidiscrimination laws prohibit “objective acts of discrimination.” Id., at 176, 485 N. W. 2d, at 817.
We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question presented and the existence of a conflict of authority among state high courts on the constitutionality of statutes similar to Wisconsin's penalty-enhancement provision, 506 U. S. 1033 (1992). We reverse.
Mitchell argues that we are bound by the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s conclusion that the statute punishes bigoted thought and not conduct. There is no doubt that we are bound by a state court’s construction of a state statute. B. A. V., supra, at 381; New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949). In Terminiello, for example, the Illinois courts had defined the term “ ‘breach of the peace,’” in a city ordinance prohibiting disorderly conduct, to include “ ‘stirs the public to anger ... or creates a disturbance.’ ” Id., at 4. We held this construction to be binding on us. But here the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not, strictly speaking, construe the Wisconsin statute in the sense of defining the meaning of a particular statutory word or phrase. Rather, it merely characterized the “practical effect” of the statute for First Amendment purposes. See 169 Wis. 2d, at 166-167, 485 N. W. 2d, at 813 (“Merely because the statute refers in a literal sense to the intentional ‘conduct' of selecting, does not mean the court must turn a blind eye to the intent and practical effect of the law — punishment of motive or thought”). This assessment does not bind us. Once any ambiguities as to the meaning of the statute are resolved, we may form our own judgment as to its operative effect.
The State argues that the statute does not punish bigoted thought, as the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said, but instead punishes only conduct. While this argument is literally correct, it does not dispose of Mitchell's First Amendment challenge. To be sure, our cases reject the “view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376 (1968); accord, R. A. V., supra, at 385-386; Spence v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 555 (1965). Thus, a physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 628 (1984) (“[V]iolenee or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact. . . are entitled to no constitutional protection”); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 916 (1982) (“The First Amendment does not protect violence”).
But the fact remains that under the Wisconsin statute the same criminal conduct may be more heavily punished if the victim is selected because of his race or other protected status than if no such motive obtained. Thus, although the statute punishes criminal conduct, it enhances the maximum penalty for conduct motivated by a discriminatory point of view more severely than the same conduct engaged in for some other reason or for no reason at all. Because the only reason for the enhancement is the defendant's discriminatory motive for selecting his victim, Mitchell argues (and the Wisconsin Supreme Court held) that the statute violates the First Amendment by punishing offenders’ bigoted beliefs.
Traditionally, sentencing judges have considered a wide variety of factors in addition to evidence bearing on guilt in determining what sentence to impose on a convicted defendant. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 820-821 (1991); United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 446 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 246 (1949). The defendant’s motive for committing the offense is one important factor. See 1 W. LeFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.6(b), p. 324 (1986) (“Motives are most relevant when the trial judge sets the defendant’s sentence, and it is not uncommon for a defendant to receive a minimum sentence because he was acting with good motives, or a rather high sentence because of his bad motives”); cf. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U. S. 137, 156 (1987) (“Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished”). Thus, in many States the commission of a murder, or other capital offense, for pecuniary gain is a separate aggravating circumstance under the capital sentencing statute. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F)(5) (1989); Fla. Stat. § 921.1415(f) (Supp. 1992); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(f) (Supp. 1992); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (1992); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-102(h)(vi) (Supp. 1992).
But it is equally true that a defendant’s abstract beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, may not be taken into consideration by a sentencing judge. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U. S. 159 (1992). In Dawson, the State introduced evidence at a capital sentencing hearing that the defendant was a member of a white supremacist prison gang. Because “the evidence proved nothing more than [the defendant’s] abstract beliefs,” we held that its admission violated the defendant’s First Amendment rights. Id., at 167. In so holding, however, we emphasized that “the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one’s beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment.” Id., at 165. Thus, in Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion), we allowed the sentencing judge to take into account the defendant’s racial animus towards his victim. The evidence in that case showed that the defendant’s membership in the Black Liberation Army and desire to provoke a “race war” were related to the murder of a white man for which he was convicted. See id., at 942-944. Because “the elements of racial hatred in [the] murder” were relevant to several aggravating factors, we held that the trial judge permissibly took this evidence into account in sentencing the defendant to death. Id., at 949, and n. 7.
Mitchell suggests that Dawson and Barclay are inapposite because they did not involve application of a penalty-enhancement provision. But in Barclay we held that it was permissible for the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s racial animus in determining whether he should be sentenced to death, surely the most severe “enhancement” of all. And the fact that the Wisconsin Legislature has decided, as a general matter, that bias-motivated offenses warrant greater maximum penalties across the board does not alter the result here. For the primary responsibility for fixing criminal penalties lies with the legislature. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 274 (1980); Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386, 393 (1958).
Mitchell argues that the Wisconsin penalty-enhancement statute is invalid because it punishes the defendant’s discriminatory motive, or reason, for acting. But motive plays the same role under the Wisconsin statute as it does under federal and state antidiscrimination laws, which we have previously upheld against constitutional challenge. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S., at 628; Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 78 (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 176 (1976). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(l) (emphasis added). In Hishon, we rejected the argument that Title VII infringed employers’ First Amendment rights. And more recently, in R. A. V. v. St Paul, 505 U. S., at 389-390, we cited Title VII (as well as 18 U. S. C. § 242 and 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1982) as an example of a permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct.
Nothing in our decision last Term in R. A. V. compels a different result here. That case involved a First Amendment challenge to a municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of “ ‘fighting words’ that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ ” 505 U. S., at 391 (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code §292.02 (1990)). Because the ordinance only proscribed a class of “fighting words” deemed particularly offensive by the city — i. e., those “that contain ... messages of ‘bias-motivated’ hatred,” 505 U. S., at 392— we held that it violated the rule against content-based discrimination. See id., at 392-394. But whereas the ordinance struck down in R. A. V. was explicitly directed at expression (i. e., “speech” or “messages”), id., at 392, the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment.
Moreover, the Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm. For example, according to the State and its amici, bias-motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest. See, e. g., Brief for Petitioner 24-27; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13-15; Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae 18-22; Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae 17-19; Brief for the Anti-Defamation League et al. as Amici Curiae 9-10; Brief for Congressman Charles E. Sehumer et al. as Amici Curiae 8-9. The State’s desire to redress these perceived harms provides an adequate explanation for its penalty-enhancement provision over and above mere disagreement with offenders’ beliefs or biases. As Blackstone said long ago, “it is but reasonable that among crimes of different natures those should be most severely punished, which are the most destructive of the public safety and happiness.” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *16.
Finally, there remains to be considered Mitchell’s argument that the Wisconsin statute is unconstitutionally over-broad because of its “chilling effect” on free speech. Mitchell argues (and the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed) that the statute is “overbroad” because evidence of the defendant’s prior speech or associations may be used to prove that the defendant intentionally selected his victim on account of the victim’s protected status. Consequently, the argument goes, the statute impermissibly chills free expression with respect to such matters by those concerned about the possibility of enhanced sentences if they should in the future commit a criminal offense covered by the statute. We find no merit in this contention.
The sort of chill envisioned here is far more attenuated and unlikely than that contemplated in traditional “over-breadth” cases. We must conjure up a vision of a Wisconsin citizen suppressing his unpopular bigoted opinions for fear that if he later commits an offense covered by the statute, these opinions will be offered at trial to establish that he selected his victim on account of the victim’s protected status, thus qualifying him for penalty enhancement. To stay within the realm of rationality, we must surely put to one side minor misdemeanor offenses covered by the statute, such as negligent operation of a motor vehicle (Wis. Stat. § 941.01 (1989-1990)); for it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a situation where such offenses would be racially motivated. We are left, then, with the prospect of a citizen suppressing his bigoted beliefs for fear that evidence of such beliefs will be introduced against him at trial if he commits a more serious offense against person or property. This is simply too speculative a hypothesis to support Mitchell’s overbreadth claim.
The First Amendment, moreover, does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent. ■ Evidence of a defendant’s previous declarations or statements is commonly admitted in criminal trials subject to evidentiary rules dealing with relevancy, reliability, and the like. Nearly half a century ago, in Haupt v. United States, 330 U. S. 631 (1947), we rejected a contention similar to that advanced by Mitchell here. Haupt was tried for the offense of treason, which, as defined by the Constitution (Art. III, §3), may depend very much on proof of motive. To prove that the acts in question were committed out of “adherence to the enemy” rather than “parental solicitude,” id., at 641, the Government introduced evidence of conversations that had taken place long prior to the indictment, some of which consisted of statements showing Haupt’s sympathy with Germany and Hitler and hostility towards the United States. We rejected Haupt’s argument that this evidence was improperly admitted. While “[s]ueh testimony is to be scrutinized with care to be certain the statements are not expressions of mere lawful and permissible difference of opinion with our own government or quite proper appreciation of the land of birth,” we held that “these statements . . . clearly were admissible on the question of intent and adherence to the enemy.” Id., at 642. See also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 251-252 (1989) (plurality opinion) (allowing evidentiary use of defendant’s speech in evaluating Title VII discrimination claim); Street v. New York, 894 U. S. 576, 594 (1969).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Mitchell’s First Amendment rights were not violated by the application of the Wisconsin penalty-enhancement provision in sentencing him. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
At the time of Mitchell’s trial, the Wisconsin penalty-enhancement statute provided:
“(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crime are increased as provided in sub. (2):
“(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
“(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is committed or selects the property which is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime under par. (a) because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property.
“(2)(a) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a misdemeanor other than a Class A misdemeanor, the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum period of imprisonment is one year in the county jail.
“(b) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a Class A misdemeanor, the penalty increase under this section changes the status of the crime to a felony and the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum period of imprisonment is 2 years.
“(c) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is a felony, the maximum fine prescribed by law for the crime may be increased by not more than $5,000 and the maximum period of imprisonment prescribed by law for the crime may be increased by not more than 5 years.
“(3) This section provides for the enhancement of the penalties applicable for the underlying crime. The court shall direct that the trier of fact find a special verdict as to all of the issues specified in sub. (1).
“(4) This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry is required for a conviction for that crime.” Wis. Stat. §939.645 (1989-1990).
The statute was amended in 1992, but the amendments are not at issue in this case.
Mitchell also challenged the statute on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and vagueness grounds. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that Mitchell waived his equal protection claim and rejected his vagueness challenge outright. 163 Wis. 2d 652, 473 N. W. 2d 1 (1991). The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to address both claims. 169 Wis. 2d 153, 158, n. 2, 485 N. W. 2d 807, 809, n. 2 (1992). Mitchell renews his Fourteenth Amendment claims in this Court. But since they were not developed below and plainly fall outside of the question on which we granted certiorari, we do not reach them either.
Two justices dissented. They concluded that the statute punished discriminatory acts, and not beliefs, and therefore would have upheld it. See 169 Wis. 2d, at 181, 485 N. W. 2d, at 819 (Abrahamson, J.); id., at 187-195, 485 N. W. 2d, at 821-825 (Bablitch, J.).
Several States have enacted penalty-enhancement provisions similar to the Wisconsin statute at issue in this case. See, e. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. §422.7 (West 1988 and Supp. 1993); Fla. Stat. §776.085 (1991); Mont. Code Ann. §46-6-222 (1992); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §1455 (Supp. 1992). Proposed federal legislation to the same effect passed the House of Representatives in 1992, H. R. 4797, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), but failed to pass the Senate, S. 2622, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The state high courts are divided over the constitutionality of penalty-enhancement statutes and analogous statutes covering bias-motivated offenses. Compare, e. g., State v. Plowman, 314 Ore. 157, 838 P. 2d 568 (1992) (upholding Oregon statute), with State v. Wyant, 64 Ohio St. 3d 566, 597 N. E. 2d 450 (1992) (striking down Ohio statute); 169 Wis. 2d 153, 485 N. W. 2d 807 (1992) (case below) (striking down Wisconsin statute). According to amici, bias-motivated violence is on the rise throughout the United States. See, e. g., Brief for the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium et al. as Amici Curiae 5-11; Brief for the Anti-Defamation League et al. as Amici Curiae 4-7; Brief for the City of Atlanta et al. as Amici Curiae 3-12. In 1990, Congress enacted the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. 101-275, § 1(b)(1), 104 Stat. 140, codified at 28 U. S. C. §534 (note) (1988 ed., Supp. Ill), directing the Attorney General to compile data “about crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.” Pursuant to the Act, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported in January 1993, that 4,658 bias-motivated offenses were committed in 1991, including 1,614 incidents of intimidation, 1,301 incidents of vandalism, 796 simple assaults, 773 aggravated assaults, and 12 murders. See Brief for the Crown Heights Coalition et al. as Amici Curiae 1A-7A.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal, like Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante, p. 264, also decided today, involves a broad constitutional challenge to numerous important provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 445, 30 U. S. C. § 1201 et seg. (1976 ed., Supp. III) (Surface Mining Act or Act). Many of the specific provisions attacked in this case, however, differ from the “steep-slope” provisions that were the primary focus of the challenge in Virginia Surface Mining. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana ruled that the provisions of the Act challenged here are unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their enforcement. 501 F. Supp. 452 (1980). We noted probable jurisdiction sub nom. Andrus v. Indiana, 449 U. S. 816 (1980), and we now reverse.
I
A
The basic structure of the Surface Mining Act is described in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante, at 268-272, and it will therefore suffice here to briefly describe the specific provisions drawn into question in this case. Several of the challenged sections of the Act are known collectively as the “prime farmland” provisions. These sections establish special requirements for surface mining operations conducted on land that both qualifies as prime farmland under a definition promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and has historically been used as cropland within the meaning of the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) implementing the Surface Mining Act. § 701 (20), 30 U. S. C. § 1291 (20) (1976 ed., Supp. III). A permit for surface coal mining on such lands may be granted only if the mine operator can demonstrate its “technological capability to restore such mined area, within a reasonable time, to equivalent or higher levels of yield as nonmined prime farmland in the surrounding area under equivalent levels of management....” § 510 (d)(1), 30 IT. S. C. § 1260 (d)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The operator must also show that it can “meet the soil reconstruction standards” for prime farmland set forth in § 515 (b)(7), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (b)(7) (1976 ed., Supp. III). That section specifies that the distinct soil layers on prime farmland must be separately removed, segregated, stockpiled, and then properly replaced and regraded. Furthermore, § 519 (c)(2), 30 U. S. C. § 1269 (c)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), provides that upon its completion of mining activities on prime farmland, a mine operator can have its performance bond released only on a showing that soil productivity “has returned to equivalent levels of yield as nonmined land of the same soil type in the surrounding area under equivalent management practices....”
Also challenged here are some of the Act’s more general provisions that are applicable throughout the country. These include §515 (b)(3), which requires restoration of mined land to its approximate original contour, and the directive in § 515 (b)(5), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (b)(5) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), that surface mine operators remove topsoil separately during mining activities and preserve it for use during reclamation if it is not to be replaced immediately on the backfill area of the mining cut. Section 508, 30 U. S. C. § 1258 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), requires applicants for surface coal mining permits to submit proposed reclamation plans specifying the intended postmining use of the land and the method by which that use will be achieved. In addition, §§ 522 (a), (c), (d), 30 U. S. C. §§ 1272 (a), (c), (d) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), require States wishing to assume permanent regulatory authority over surface coal mining to establish an administrative procedure for determining whether particular lands are unsuitable for some or all kinds of surface mining. Section 522 (e), 30 U. S. C. § 1272 (e) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), proscribes mining activity within 100 feet of roadways and cemeteries or within 300 feet of public buildings, schools, churches, public parks, or occupied dwellings. Finally, the Act’s procedures for collecting proposed civil penalties contained in § 518 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1268 (c) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), are also drawn into question here.
B
These suits were filed in August 1978, one by the State of Indiana and several of its officials, and the other by the Indiana Coal Association, several coal mine operators, and others. The complaints alleged that the Act contravenes the Commerce Clause, the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The District Court held a 1-day hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the court ultimately decided the case on the merits without taking further evidence. On June.10, 1980, the District Court issued an order and opinion sustaining each of plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges and permanently enjoining the Secretary from enforcing the challenged sections of the Act. 501 F. Supp. 452 (SD Ind. 1980).
II
The District Court gave two rationales for its decision on the Commerce Clause issue. The court first held that the six “prime farmland” provisions are beyond congressional power to regulate interstate commerce because they are “directed at facets of surface coal mining which have no substantial and adverse effect on interstate commerce.” Id., at 460. The court reached this conclusion by examining statistics in the Report of the Interagency Task Force on the Issue of a Moratorium or a Ban on Mining in Prime Agricultural Lands (1977) (Interagency Report). These statistics compared the prime farmland acreage being disturbed annually by surface mining to the total prime farmland acreage in the United States. The Interagency Report stated that approximately 21,800 acres of prime farmland were being disturbed annually and that this acreage amounted to 0.006% of the total prime farmland acreage in the Nation. 501 F. Supp., at 459. This statistic and others derived from it, together with similar comparisons for Indiana, persuaded the court that surface coal mining on prime farmland has “an infinitesimal effect or trivial impact on interstate commerce.” Id., at 458.
With respect to the other 15 substantive provisions which apply to surface mining generally, the District Court reasoned that the only possible adverse effects on interstate commerce justifying congressional action are air and water pollution and determined that these effects are adequately addressed by other provisions of the Act. The court therefore concluded that these 15 provisions as well as the 6 prime farmland provisions “are not directed at the alleviation of water or air pollution, to the extent that there are [any] such effects, and are not means reasonably and plainly adapted to [the legitimate end of] removing any substantial and adverse effect on interstate commerce.” Id., at 461. We find both of the District Court’s rationales untenable.
It is established beyond peradventure that “legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality....” Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 15 (1976). See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 83-84 (1978). A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate corn-merce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante, at 276; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 303-304 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258, 262 (1964). We are not convinced that the District Court had reliable grounds to reach either conclusion in this case.
In our view, Congress was entitled to find that the protection of prime farmland is a federal interest that may be addressed through Commerce Clause legislation. The Inter-agency Report provides no basis for the District Court’s contrary view. That report dealt only with the question whether a complete moratorium or ban on surface coal mining on prime farmland was advisable as a matter of policy. The report neither purported to examine the full impact of surface mining on interstate commerce in agricultural commodities, nor concluded that the impact is too negligible to warrant federal regulation. More important, the court below incorrectly assumed that the relevant inquiry under the rational-basis test is the volume of commerce actually affected by the regulated activity. This Court held in NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 606 (1939), that “[t]he power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and extends to all such commerce be it great or small.” The pertinent inquiry therefore is not how much commerce is involved but whether Congress could rationally conclude that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante, at 276-277; Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 154-156 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, supra, at 303-304; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-129 (1942). Cf. Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U. S. 643, 648 (1944); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 123 (1941).
Against this background, we have little difficulty in concluding that the congressional finding in this case satisfies the rational-basis test. The Senate considered information from the Interagency Report about the prime farmland acreage that might be affected by surface coal mining. See 123 Cong. Rec. 15713 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Percy). In addition, Senator Percy called the Senate’s attention to testimony presented at the Senate Committee hearings about the losses in agricultural productivity attributable to surface mining. Id., at 15713-15717. See also id., at 15720-15721 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), 15721 (remarks of Sen. Stevenson). Similar evidence was presented during the contemporaneous hearings before the House Committee, and the Committee Report referred to this testimony in explaining the origins of the “prime farmland” provisions. The Report stated:
“The Committee heard testimony from citizens and local officials of Illinois and Indiana requesting that special attention be given in the bill to the protection of prime agricultural lands. Working with officials of the Soil Conservation Service, the Committee added a number of provisions to H. R. 2 designed to insure the proper reconstruction of soil strata within those areas classified as prime agricultural lands.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, p. 184 (1977).
In our judgment, the evidence summarized in the Reports mandates the conclusion that Congress had a rational basis for finding that surface coal mining on prime farmland affects interstate commerce in agricultural products. As we explained in Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 521 (1922):
“Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and decide the fact of danger and meet it. This court will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon it are clearly non-existent.”
The court below improperly substituted its judgment for the congressional determination.
We also conclude that the court below erred in holding that the prime farmland and 15 other substantive provisions challenged by appellees are not reasonably related to the legitimate goal of protecting interstate commerce from adverse effects attributable to surface coal mining. The court incorrectly assumed that the Act’s goals are limited to preventing air and water pollution. As we noted in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante, at 277-280, Congress was also concerned about preserving the productive capacity of mined lands and protecting the public from health and safety hazards that may result from surface coal mining. All the provisions invalidated by the court below are reasonably calculated to further these legitimate goals.
For example, the approximate-original-contour requirement in § 515 (b) (5) is designed to avoid the environmental and other harm that may result from unreclaimed or improperly restored mining cuts. As the Senate Committee Report explained:
“If surface mining and reclamation are not done carefully, significant environmental damage can result. In addition, unreclaimed or improperly reclaimed surface coal mines pose a continuing threat to the environment, and at times are a danger to public health and safety, public or private property.” S. Rep. No. 95-128, p. 50 (1977).
See also id., at 83; H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, supra, at 79-80, 93. The same is true of § 508’s requirement that applicants for surface mining permits under the permanent program must inform the regulatory authority of the intended postmining use for the land and the manner in which such use will be achieved. This requirement was among the remedial actions specifically recommended to the House Committee by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps recommended “[a]dvanced submission of mining and reclamation plans to a responsible government agency having authority to grant or deny approval to engage in mining, based upon the information in the plans and the requirements of the regulations.” House Hearings, pt. 2, at 86. These requirements obviously enable the regulatory authority to ascertain, before mining begins, whether the prospective mine operator has given adequate consideration to the postmining fate of the land, and whether the operator possesses the technological capability to restore the land in the manner proposed.
Similarly, the relevance of the topsoil-replacement requirement in § 515 (b)(5) to the congressional goal of preserving the productive capacity of mined land should be self-evident. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, supra, at 106-109. Again, this measure was included among the Corps of Engineers’ recommendations to the House Committee. The Corps spokesman advised the Committee to require “[segregation and preservation of topsoils during, or preceding, mining operations... [in order] to provide soil conditions conducive to rapid re-vegetation after mining... House Hearings, pt. 2, at 86. Section 522 (e)’s prohibition against mining near churches, schools, parks, public buildings, and occupied dwellings is plainly directed toward ensuring that surface coal mining does not endanger life and property in coal mining communities.
Congress adopted the Surface Mining Act in order to ensure that production of coal for interstate commerce would not be at the expense of agriculture, the environment, or public health and safety, injury to any of which interests would have deleterious effects on interstate commerce. See 30 U. S. C. § 1202 (f) (1976 ed., Supp. III); S. Rep. No. 95-128, supra, at 49-53; H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, supra, at 57-60. Moreover, as noted in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante, at 281-282, the Act reflects the congressional goal of protecting mine operators in States adhering to high performance and reclamation standards from disadvantageous competition with operators in States with less rigorous regulatory programs. See 30 U. S. C. § 1201 (g) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The statutory provisions invalidated by the District Court advance these legitimate goals, and we conclude that Congress acted reasonably in adopting the regulatory scheme contained in the Act.
III
The District Court also held that the 21 substantive statutory provisions discussed above violate the Tenth Amendment because they constitute “displacement or regulation of the management structure and operation of the traditional governmental function of the States in the area of land use control and planning....” 501 F. Supp., at 468. The District Court ruled that the real purpose and effect of the Act is land-use regulation, which, in the court’s view, is a traditional state governmental function. The court below, like the District Court in Virginia Surface Mining, relied for its Tenth Amendment analysis on this Court’s decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976).
For the reasons stated in our opinion in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante, at 286-293, we hold that the District Court erred in concluding that the challenged provisions of the Act contravene the Tenth Amendment. Like the provisions' challenged in Virginia Surface Mining, the sections of the Act under attack in this case regulate only the activities of surface mine operators who are private individuals and businesses, and the District Court’s conclusion that the Act directly regulates the States as States is untenable. This Court’s decision in National League of Cities simply is not applicable to this case.
IV
The District Court next held that the prime farmland and approximate-original-contour provisions of the Act violate the equal protection and substantive due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. The court noted that the Act makes no allowance for variances from the prime farmland requirements, and that variances from the approximate-original-contour provisions are available only for steep-slope and mountaintop operations. The court reasoned that the absence of a variance procedure from these statutory requirements impermissibly discriminates against coal mine operators and States in the Midwest, where there are significant ■coal reserves located under prime farmland and few or no steep-slope or mountaintop mining operations. Relying on this Court’s decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88 (1976), the court ruled that this discriminatory treatment could not withstand equal protection scrutiny because it is not justified by “an overriding national interest.” 501 F. Supp., at 469. The court further held that both the prime farmland and approximate-original-contour provisions “constitute a deprivation of substantive due process” because they are “irrational, arbitrary and capricious requirements in situations where they are not reasonably necessary to achieve a particular postmining use....” Ibid.
Although its decision was couched in terms of the arbitrariness of the challenged provisions, we fear that the court below did no more than substitute its policy judgment for that of Congress. Social and economic legislation like the Surface Mining Act that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must be upheld against equal protection attack when the legislative means are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221 (1981); U. S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166 (1980). Moreover, such legislation carries with it a presumption of rationality that can only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S., at 83; Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S., at 15. As the Court explained in Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979), social and economic legislation is valid unless “the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [a court] can only conclude that the legislature’s actions were irrational.” This is a heavy burden, and appellees have not carried it.
Neither the court below nor appellees have identified any instance in which the prime farmland or approximate-original-contour provisions have been applied to a mining operation so as to produce an irrational or arbitrary result. More important, even were appellees correct that the challenged provisions impose a greater burden on mine operators in the Midwest, that is no basis for finding the provisions unconstitutional. A claim of arbitrariness cannot rest solely on a statute’s lack of uniform geographic impact. Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338 U. S. 604, 616—619 (1950); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 14 (1939). As the Court explained in Central Roig Refining Co., supra, at 616:
“Nor does the Commerce Clause impose requirements of geographic uniformity.... Congress may devise... a national policy with due regard for the varying and fluctuating interests of different regions.”
The characteristics of surface coal mining obviously will vary according to the different geographical conditions present in affected States. Congress has determined that the measures appropriate for steep-slope mines are not necessarily desirable in flatter terrain and prime farmland areas. In allowing variances from the approximate-original-contour requirement applicable to steep-slope mines, Congress may have been influenced by the relative shortage of level land in the steep-slope areas of the country which does not exist in the flatter terrain areas of the Midwest. Similarly, Congress presumably concluded that allowing variances from the prime farmland provisions would undermine the effort to preserve the productivity of such lands. In our view, Congress acted rationally in drawing these distinctions, and the fact that a particular State has more of one kind of mining operation than another does not establish impermissible discrimination under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Furthermore, by invalidating the challenged provisions of the Act under the rubric of “substantive due process,” the District Court essentially acted as a superlegislature, passing on the wisdom of congressional policy determinations. In so doing, the court exceeded its proper role. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 730 (1963).
y
As did its counterpart in Virginia Surface Mining, the District Court here ruled that some of the Act’s provisions take private property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.,The court found fault with three of the prime farmland provisions. One is the provision requiring an operator seeking a permit for mining on such land to show that he has the capacity to restore the land, within a reasonable time after the completion of mining, to at least the productivity levels of “non-mined prime farmland in the surrounding area under equivalent levels of management....” § 510 (d)(1), 30 U. S. C. § 1260 (d)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The second provision conditions the release of a mine operator’s performance bond on the completion of this restoration. §519 (c)(2), 30 U. S. C. § 1269 (c)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The third provision directs mine operators to include information about the premining productivity of the land in the reclamation plans they file as part of “prime farmland” permit applications. §508 (a) (2), 30 U. S. C. § 1258 (a)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The District Court concluded that these three provisions effect ail unconstitutional taking of private property because, in the court’s view,
“it is technologically impossible to reclaim prime farmland in a postmining period so that equal or higher levels of yield under high levels of management practice can be achieved.” 501 F. Supp., at 470.
The court also ruled that the requirement in § 522 of a procedure for designating areas unsuitable for mining operations, as well as § 522 (e)’s proscription of mining on certain lands and near particular structures, takes private property without just compensation.
In this case as in Virginia Surface Mining, appellees’ takings claims do not focus on any particular properties to which the challenged provisions have been applied. Similarly, the District Court’s ruling did not pertain to the taking of a particular piece of property or the denial of a mining permit for specific prime farmland operations proposed by appel-lees. Thus, this case resembles Virginia Surface Mining in that the only issue properly before the District Court was whether “mere enactment” of the Surface Mining Act effected an unconstitutional taking of private property. For the reasons discussed more fully in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante, at 294-297, we conclude that this question must be answered in the negative.
Like the steep-slope provisions reviewed in Virginia Surface Mining, the prime farmland provisions do not prohibit surface mining; they merely regulate the conditions under which the activity may be conducted. The prime farmland provisions say nothing about alternative uses to which prime farmland may be put since they come into play only when an operator seeks to conduct mining operations on the land. We therefore conclude that these provisions do not, on their face, deprive a property owner of economically beneficial use of his property.
VI
The court below joined the Virginia Surface Mining District Court in holding that the Act’s civil penalty provisions deprive coal mine operators of their right to due process. However, like their counterparts in Virginia Surface Mining, appellees have made no showing that they were ever assessed civil penalties under the Act, much less that the statutory prepayment requirement was ever applied to them or caused them any injury. As in Virginia Surface Mining, we hold that appellees’ challenge to these provisions is premature.
VII
Our review of the questions presented by this case leads us to the same conclusion that we reached in Virginia Surface Mining. The Surface Mining Act is not vulnerable to appel-lees’ pre-enforcement constitutional challenge. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to that court with instructions to dissolve the injunction entered against the Secretary, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
[For concurring statement of The Chief Justice, see ante, p. 305.]
[For opinion of Justice Rehnquist concurring in the judgment, see ante, p. 307.]
Section 701 (20), 91 Stat. 517, 30 U. S. C. § 1291 (20) (1976 ed., Supp. III), provides that
“the term ‘prime farmland’ shall have the same meaning as that previously prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture on the basis of such factors as moisture availability, temperature regime, chemical balance, permeability, surface layer composition, susceptibility to flooding, and erosion characteristics, and which historically have been used for intensive agricultural purposes, and as published in the Federal Register.”
The Secretary of Agriculture’s definition is found at 7 CFR pt. 657 (1980), and is incorporated into the Secretary of the Interior’s regulations implementing the Act by 30 CFR § 701.5 (1980). The Secretary published regulations defining “prime farmland” for purposes of the Act’s interim phase. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia remanded the regulations to the Secretary for reconsideration on grounds not pertinent here. See In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301, 1312 (1978), rev’d in part on other grounds, 201 U. S. App. D. C. 360, 627 F. 2d 1346 (1980). The Secretary has published proposed new regulations defining “prime farmland” for purposes of the interim program. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33625 (1979).
Under § 509 of the Act, 30 U. S. C. § 1259 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), no mining permits may be issued until the operator has filed a performance bond with the appropriate regulatory authority.
Section 515 (b) (3) describes the “approximate original contour” requirement applicable generally to surface mining operations. Appellees in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante, p. 264, challenged the approximate-original-contour provision in § 515 (d) of the Act, which is applicable only to surface mining operations on steep slopes.
The progress of the States in submitting proposed permanent regulatory programs under § 503 of the Act and the Secretary’s response to those submissions is described in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante, at 272, n. 7. The proposed program submitted by Indiana was approved in part and disapproved in part. See 45 Fed. Reg. 78482 (1980).
On July 2, 1980, Justice Stevens stayed the District Court’s judgment pending final disposition of this appeal.
The six are:
(1) § 507 (b) (16), 30 U. S. C. § 1257(b) (16) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), which requires a “soil survey” of suspected prime farmlands “to confirm the exact location of such prime farmlands, if any”;
(2) § 508 (a)(2)(C), 30 IT. S. C. § 1258 (a) (2) (C) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), which directs a mine operator to include in its reclamation plan information about “the productivity of land prior to mining, including appropriate classification as prime farm lands, as well as the average yield of food, fiber, forage, or wood products from such lands obtained under high levels of management”;
(3) § 510 (d) (1), 30 U. S. C. § 1260 (d) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), which allows permits to be issued for mining on prime farmland only when the regulatory authority is satisfied that the operator “has the technological capability to restore such mined area, within a reasonable time, to equivalent or higher levels of yield as non-mined prime farmland in the surrounding area under equivalent levels of management and can meet the soil reconstruction standards in Section 515 (b) (7)....”;
(4) § 515 (b) (7), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (b) (7) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), which requires the separate removal and replacement of the A, B, and C soil horizons of prime farmland;
(5) §515 (b)(20), insofar as it authorizes regulatory authorities to approve “long-term, intensive, agricultural postmining land use”; and
(6) § 519 (c) (2), 30 TJ. S. C. § 1269 (c) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), which provides that performance bonds for mining on prime farmland may not be released “until soil productivity for prime farm lands has returned to equivalent levels of yield as nonmined land of the same soil type in the surrounding area under equivalent management practices....”
The Interagency Report was submitted to the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in April 1977, one month after the Committee completed hearings on the proposed surface mining legislation. See 501 F. Supp. 452, 459 (SD Ind. 1980).
The court noted that it would take 166 years for surface mining to disturb 1% of the total prime farmland in the country. The court also noted that in 1977 the Government’s Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service paid farmers not to grow crops on 5,900,000 acres, which is 200 times the prime farmland acreage disturbed annually by surface mining. With respect to Indiana, the court pointed out that only 40,000 acres of prime farmland are projected to be disturbed by surface mining in Indiana in the next 20 years, and that this figure amounts to 0.003% of the total prime farmland in Indiana. Id., at 459-460. In addition, the court noted that in 1977, the Government paid Indiana farmers not to farm 369,153 acres, nearly 1,000% more land than would be affected by surface mining in Indiana in the next 20 years. Id., at 460.
These provisions are:
(1) §515 (b)(3), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (b)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), requiring restoration of surface mined land to its approximate original contour;
(2) §515 (b)(5), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (b)(5) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), requiring separate removal, segregation, and ultimate replacement of topsoil on mined land;
(3) §§522 (a), (c), (d), (e)(4), (e)(5), 30 U. S. C. §§ 1272 (a), (c), (d), (e)(4), (e)(5) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), requiring permanent regulatory programs to establish procedures for designating particular lands as unsuitable for surface mining, and restricting surface mining within a specified radius of certain facilities;
(4) §§ 508 (a)(2), (3), (4), (8), (10), 30 U. S. C. §§ 1258 (a)(2), (3), (4), (8), (10) (1976 ed, Supp. Ill), requiring that reclamation plans be submitted as part of permit applications under the permanent regulatory program, including descriptions of the premining use of the affected land, the proposed postmining use, and the methods by which the proposed use will be achieved;
(5) §§ 510 (b) (1), (2), 30 U. S. C. §§ 1260 (b) (1), (2) (1976 ed, Supp. Ill), the general provisions governing approval or disapproval of permit applications under the permanent regulatory program (invalidated to the extent that they entail regulatory authority review of proposed postmining land uses); and
(6) §§515 (b) (19), (20), 30 IT. S. C. §§ 1265 (b) (19), (20) (1976 ed, Supp. HI), requiring maintenance of revegetation of mined lands for a 5- or 10-year period after completion of mining (invalidated to the extent that they may incorporate a requirement of compliance with a postmining land-use plan approved by the regulatory authority).
As explained in the Report of the House Committee, Congress followed the recommendation of the Interagency Report, and rejected a Carter administration proposal for a 5-year moratorium on surface mining on prime farmlands. The Committee explained that Soil Conservation Service officials testified that mined prime farmland could be restored to its original productivity levels through compliance with the prime farmland provisions now contained in the Act. H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, pp. 184-185 (1977).
In any event, the District Court’s “finding” that only an insignificant amount of interstate commerce is affected by surface mining on prime farmland is questionable. The court, noted that the 21,800 acres of prime farmland disturbed annually by surface mining would have produced about 0.04% of the Nation’s total corn production in the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The District Court for the Central District of California determined in 1973 that hiring practices of the County of Los Angeles respecting the County Fire Department violated 42 U. S. C. § 1981. The District Court in an unreported opinion and order permanently enjoined all future discrimination and entered a remedial hiring order. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further consideration. 566 F. 2d 1334 (1977). We granted certiorari to consider questions presented as to whether the use of arbitrary employment criteria, racially exclusionary in operation, but not purposefully discriminatory, violates 42 U. S. C. § 1981 and, if so, whether the imposition of minimum hiring quotas for fully qualified minority applicants is an appropriate remedy in this employment discrimination case. 437 IT. S. 903 (1978). We now find that the controversy has become moot during the pend-ency of this litigation. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and direct that court to modify its remand so as to direct the District Court to dismiss the action.
I
In 1969, persons seeking employment with the Los Angeles County Fire Department were required to take a written civil service examination and a physical-agility test. Applicants were ranked according to their performance on the two tests and selected for job interviews on the basis of their scores. Those who passed their oral interviews were then placed on a hiring-eligibility list. Because blacks and Hispanics did poorly on the written examination, this method of screening job applicants proved to have a disparate impact on minority hiring.
The County of Los Angeles has not used the written civil service examination as a ranking device since 1969. The county desisted, prior to the commencement of this litigation, because it felt that the test had a disparate adverse impact on minority hiring, because it feared that this impact might violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and because it wished, in any event, to increase minority representation in the Fire Department. See App. to Brief for Respondents 1-4.
In 1971, the county replaced the 1969 procedure with a new method of screening job applicants. A new written test was designed expressly to eliminate cultural bias. The test was to be given and graded on a pass-fail basis for the sole purpose of screening out illiterates. Five hundred of the passing applicants were to be selected at random for oral interviews and physical-agility tests. Passing applicants were to be ranked solely on the basis of the results of the physical-agility test and the oral interview. See 566 F. 2d, at 1346 (Wallace J., dissenting).
An examination was conducted, pursuant to this plan, in January 1972. Ninety-seven percent of the applicants passed the written test. There was no disparate adverse impact on minorities and this use of the written examination has not been challenged in this litigation.
After administration of the written test, but before the random selection could be made, an action was filed in state court against the county charging that the random-selection process violated provisions of the county charter and civil service regulations. The county was enjoined from using the random-selection method pending trial on the merits. See ibid.
For a time the hiring process came to a halt. The eligibility list drawn from the 1969 examination had been exhausted. The county was unable to devise a nonrandom method of screening job applicants and the county lacked the resources to interview all of the applicants who had passed the 1972 examination.
As a consequence of this unintended hiring freeze, vacancies in the County Fire Department increased and the manpower needs of the Department became critical. Finally, to break the logjam, the County Department of Personnel proposed to interview those applicants who had received the top 544 scores on the 1972 written test. Of this number, 492 were white, 10 black, and 33 Mexican-American. The applicants were not to be ranked on the basis of the test results, however, and the interviews were not intended to eliminate the remaining applicants from consideration. The purpose was solely to expedite the hiring of sufficient firefighters to meet the immediate urgent requirements of the Fire Department. See ibid. But when minority representatives objected to the plan, it was abandoned, uneffectuated, prior to the commencement of this litigation.
In January 1973, respondents, representing present and future black and Mexican-American applicants to the Fire Department, brought a class action against the County of Los Angeles, the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles, and the Civil Service Commission of the County of Los Angeles (petitioners). Respondents charged that petitioners’ 1969 hiring procedures violated 42 U. S. C. § 1981. Respondents also charged that petitioners’ plan to interview those applicants who had received the top 544 scores on the 1972 written test violated 42 U. S. C. § 1981.
The District Court found that petitioners had acted without discriminatory intent. Nonetheless, the District Court held that because the 1969 and 1972 written examinations had not been validated as predictive of job performance, petitioners’ employment practices had violated 42 U. S. C. § 1981. The court permanently enjoined all future discrimination and mandated good-faith affirmative-action efforts. The court also entered a remedial hiring order whereby at least 20% of all new firefighter recruits were required to be black and another 20% were required to be Mexican-American until the percentage of blacks and Mexican-Amerieans in the Los Angeles County Fire Department was commensurate with their percentage in Los Angeles County.'
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court with respect to the 1969 examination: The Court of Appeals held that respondents did not have standing to seek relief on account of the 1969 civil service examination because the plaintiff class, as certified by the District Court, consisted only of present and future job applicants and did not include any persons who had in any way been affected by the 1969 test.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, the District Court’s holding with respect to the 1972 proposal to use ah unvalidated civil service examination.
II
The only question remaining in this case, then, concerns petitioners’ 1972 plan to interview the top 544 scorers on the 1972 written examination in order to fill temporary emergency manpower needs. We find that this controversy became moot during the pendency of this litigation.
“Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496 (1969). We recognize that, as a general rule, “voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i. e., does not make the case moot.” United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632 (1953). But jurisdiction, properly acquired, may abate if the case becomes moot because
(1) it can be said with assurance that “there is no reasonable expectation . . .” that the alleged violation will recur, see id., at 633; see also SEC v. Medical Committee For Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403 (1972), and
(2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. See, e. g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974); Indiana Employment Security Div. v. Burney, 409 U. S. 540 (1973).
When both conditions are satisfied it may be said that the case is moot because neither party has a legally cognizable interest in the final determination of the underlying questions of fact and law.
The burden of demonstrating mootness “is a heavy one.” See United States v. W. T. Grant Co., supra, at 632-633. Nevertheless, that burden is fully met on this record.
The first condition is met because there can be no reasonable expectation that petitioners will use an unvalidated civil service examination for the purposes contemplated in 1972. Petitioners have not used an unvalidated written examination to rank job applicants since 1969. Petitioners considered employing such a procedure in 1972 only because of a temporary emergency shortage of firefighters and only because petitioners then had no alternative means of screening job applicants. Those conditions were unique, are no longer present, and are unlikely to recur because, since the commencement of this litigation, petitioners have succeeded in instituting an efficient and nonrandom method of screening job applicants and increasing minority representation in the Fire Department. The new procedures are as follows:
To fill each group of vacancies petitioners interview 500 applicants who passed their written examination, including the highest scoring 300 whites, 100 blacks, and 100 Mexican-Americans. The number interviewed is several times the number of actual vacancies. The interviewers rate each of these applicants on his or her merits without regard to race or national origin. Thereafter applicants are hired solely on the basis of the score given by the interviewer, again without regard to race or national origin. Those hired are not hired from separate lists, no quotas are used, and the same rating standards are applied to all applicants. The interviewers are not authorized to give extra points because of an applicant’s race or national origin, but are directed only to be alert for talented minority applicants. This procedure has resulted every year since 1972 in a minority hiring level which consistently, though by varying amounts, exceeded 50%.
There has been no suggestion by any of the parties, nor is there any reason to believe, that petitioners would significantly alter their present hiring practices if the injunction were dissolved. See also Brief for N. A. A. C. P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 7. A fortiori, there is no reason to believe that petitioners would replace their present hiring procedures with procedures that they regarded as unsatisfactory even before the commencement of this litigation. Under these circumstances we believe that this aspect of the case has “lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if '[the Court is] to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.” Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969).
The second condition of mootness is met because petitioners’ compliance during the five years since 1973 with the District Court’s decree and their hiring of over 50% of new recruits from minorities has completely cured any discriminatory effects of the 1972 proposal. Indeed, it is extremely doubtful, from this record, that the 1972 proposal had any discriminatory effects to redress. The plan, it must be remembered, was never carried out. As a consequence, there has been no finding that any minority job applicant was excluded from employment as a result of the proposal. Cf. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976). Nor has there been a finding that any prospective minority job applicant was deterred from applying for employment with the Fire Department as a result of the proposed application of the examination. Cf. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 365-367 (1977). Nor has there been a finding that the 1972 proposal reflected a racial animus that might have tainted other employment practices. Cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U. S. 189 (1973). On the contrary the District Court expressly found:
“Neither Defendants nor their officials engaged in employment practices with a willful or conscious purpose of excluding blacks and Mexican-Americans from employment at the Los Angeles County Fire Department. To the contrary, several of Defendants’ officials engaged in efforts designed to increase the minority representation in the Los Angeles County Fire Department.” App. 41.
All of these circumstances, taken together, persuade us that, whatever might have been the case at the time of trial, the controversy has become moot during the pendency of this litigation. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court for entry of an appropriate order directing the District Court to dismiss the action as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39 (1960).
So ordered.
Revised Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, provides:
“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”
Despite the fact that the Mexican-American population of Los Angeles County was approximately double the size of the black population, the District Court ordered identical accelerated hiring for both groups due to its finding that the Fire Department’s 5'7"' height requirement for job applicants was a valid requirement for employment and that this height requirement had the effect of eliminating 41% of the otherwise eligible Mexican-American applicants from consideration. See 566 F. 2d 1334, 1337 (1977). The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court in this respect and ordered a relative increase in the Mexican-American hiring quota. In light of our disposition on grounds of mootness we do not consider this issue.
Respondents contend that their failure to include past applicants in the class was a “mere oversight” which should not be used to vitiate the District Court’s decree. But respondents did not cross petition for modification of the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the District Court with respect to the 1969 test. The issue of oversight, as a consequence, is not properly before us. See FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548, 560 n. 11 (1976). We intimate no view whether respondents may seek, despite the oversight, to bring a new lawsuit with new and proper parties. See Gibson v. Supercargoes & Checkers, 543 F. 2d 1259, 1264 (CA9 1976).
The parties stipulated that approximately 100 vacancies occur in the ranks of firemen each year, and testimony at trial established that 187 applicants were placed on an eligibility list following the 1969 test. Based on this evidence the Court of Appeals concluded that the 1969 list had been exhausted before plaintiffs applied for employment as firefighters in October 1971. See 566 F. 2d, at 1338.
Moreover, there appears to be no possibility that persons hired pursuant to the District Court’s order will be terminated in consequence of our vacation of the Court of Appeals’ judgment as moot. Cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974).
Of necessity our decision “vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court’s opinion of precedential effect . . . .” O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 577-578, n. 12 (1975). See also A. L. Mechling Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U. S. 324, 329-330 (1961).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought by petitioner against respondent county and its treasurer for a declaratory judgment that petitioner was not required to pay certain state and county “personal property” taxes and for an injunction against the levy of such taxes on that property. The controlling facts are not in dispute. Petitioner is a Nebraska corporation organized primarily to provide housing for rent or sale. On January 18, 1951, petitioner entered into a contract with the Secretary of the Air Force to lease 63 acres of land and to build a housing project on Offutt Air Force Base in respondent county in accordance with specifications submitted to the Department of the Air Force and to be approved by the Federal Housing Commissioner.
The lease was for 75 years at a rental price of $100 per year. It provided that the “buildings and improvements erected by the Lessee, constituting the aforesaid housing project, shall be and become, as completed, real estate and part of the leased land, and public buildings of the United States, leased to Lessee . . .” and further provided that “upon the expiration of this lease, or earlier termination, all improvements made upon the leased premises shall remain the property of the Government without compensation . . . .” Petitioner was to lease all the units of the project to such military and civilian personnel at the Base as were designated by the Commanding Officer, on terms specified in the contract and at a maximum rent approved by the Federal Housing Administration and the Air Force. The Government was to provide fire and police protection to the project on a reimbursable basis. Petitioner had the right to permit public utilities to extend water, gas, sewer, telephone, and electric power lines onto the leased land in order to provide those services. Petitioner agreed to insure the buildings at its own expense, to permit Government inspection of the premises, and to comply with regulations prescribed by the Commanding Officer for military requirements for safety and security purposes, consistent with the use of the leased land for housing. Petitioner could not assign the lease without the written approval of the Secretary of the Air Force.
The preferred stock of petitioner was held by the Commissioner of the Federal Housing Administration which, acting under Title VIII of the National Housing Act (the Wherry Military Housing Act), 63 Stat. 570, insured a mortgage on the project after receiving a certificate from the Department of the Air Force that a housing project was necessary to provide adequate housing for civilian or military personnel. After the signing of the contract and the insurance of the mortgage, construction proceeded forthwith. Petitioner filed no county tax return, although the Attorney General of Nebraska had ruled that its interest in the project, including all of the “personal property” used therein, was taxable as “personal property.” On June 23, 1952, the county assessor of Sarpy County filed a schedule on behalf of petitioner, listing a taxable total of $825,685, itemized as “Furniture & Fixtures— Tools & Equipment”; “Household Appliances”; and “Improvements on Leased Land.” Petitioner never paid' the resulting county and state taxes, and after the county treasurer threatened to issue the usual distress warrant to collect the taxes, petitioner brought this suit.
The District Court of Sarpy County held that, since title to the buildings and improvements was in the United States, Nebraska and Sarpy County could not tax them. The Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed, holding that Congress had given Nebraska the right to tax petitioner’s interest in the property and that for tax purposes, under Neb. Rev. Stat., Reissue 1950, § 77-1209, petitioner was in fact and as a matter of law the owner of the property sought to be taxed. 160 Neb. 320, 70 N. W. 2d 382. Petitioner’s attack on the Nebraska judgment raises serious questions of state-federal relations with respect to taxation of private housing developments on Government-owned land, and therefore we granted certiorari. 350 U. S. 893.
This is another in a long series of cases in this Court dealing with the power of the States to tax property in private hands against a claim of exempt status deriving from an immunity of the Federal Government from state taxation. Offutt Air Force Base falls within the scope of Article I, § 8, cl. 17 of the United States Constitution, providing that the Congress shall have power
“To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District [of Columbia] . . . and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings . . . .”
The course of construction of this provision cannot be said to have run smooth. The power of "exclusive Legislation” has been held to prohibit a state tax on private property located on a military base acquired pursuant to Art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647. On the other hand, the State may acquire the right to tax private interests within such a location by permission of Congress, see, e. g., the Buck Act, 54 Stat. 1059 (permitting state sales, use, and income taxes), and we have also held that the State may tax when the United States divests itself of proprietary interest over the area on which the tax is sought to be levied. S. R. A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U. S 558; see also Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375.
The line of least resistance in analysis of our immediate problem is to ascertain whether Congress has given consent to the type of state taxation here asserted. The applicable congressional statutes are the Military Leasing Act of 1947 and the Wherry Military Housing Act of 1949 (adding Title VIII to the National Housing Act). The Military Leasing Act provides:
“That whenever the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy shall deem it to be advantageous to the Government he is authorized to lease such real or personal property under the control of his Department as is not surplus to the needs of the Department within the meaning of the Act of October 3, 1944 (58 Stat. 765), and is not for the time required for public use, to such lessee or lessees and upon such terms and conditions as in his judgment will promote the national defense or will be in the public interest. Each such lease shall be for a period not exceeding five years unless the Secretary of the Department concerned shall determine that a longer period will promote the national defense or will be in the public interest. . . . Each such lease shall contain a provision permitting the Secretary of the Department concerned to revoke the lease at any time, unless the Secretary shall determine that the omission of such provision from the lease will promote the national defense or will be in the public interest. In any event each such lease shall be revocable by the Secretary of the Department concerned during a national emergency declared by the President. . . . The authority herein granted shall not apply to oil, mineral, or phosphate lands. . . .
“Sec. 6. The lessee’s interest, made or created pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall be made subject to State or local taxation. Any lease of property authorized under the provisions of this Act shall contain a provision that if and to the extent that such property is made taxable by State and local governments by Act of Congress, in such event the terms of such lease shall be renegotiated.” 61 Stat. 77T-776.
Two years later, the Wherry Act provided:
“Whenever the Secretary of the Army, Navy, or Air Force determines that it is desirable to lease real property within the meaning of the Act of August 5, 1947 (61 Stat. 774), to effectuate the purposes of this title, the Secretary concerned is authorized to lease such property under the authority of said Act upon such terms and conditions as in his opinion will best serve the national interest without regard to the limitations imposed by said Act in respect to the term or duration of the lease, and the power vested in the Secretary of the Department concerned to revoke any lease made pursuant to said Act in the event of a national emergency declared by the President shall not apply. . . ,” 63 Stat. 570, 576.
These two Acts interlock and must be read together. The reasonable relationship between them has been thus delineated by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:
“In our view this provision of the National Housing Act [the 1949 Act] merely permits leasing for military housing purposes, already covered by the general authorization of the 1947 Act, to be accomplished without regard to specified restrictions of the 1947 Act, when the elimination of these restrictions would serve the purposes of the Housing Act. Other provisions of the 1947 Act, including the language of Section 6 subjecting the lessee’s interest to local taxation, apply to leases made under the authority of both Acts.
“We have not overlooked the argument for a narrower view of the scope of the 1947 Act based upon legislative history indicating that the primary purpose of that Act was to provide for the leasing of stand-by defense plants. But the language of the Act extends the leasing authority to all non-surplus property under the control of the Defense Department except oil, mineral, or phosphate lands (an exception which would be unnecessary if the Act applied only to defense plants). An additional indication that the 1947 Act encompasses the leasing of property generally is found in Section 2 which repeals the prior authority for the leasing of War Department property generally, 27 Stat. 321. The Senate Report expresses the reporting committee’s understanding that this prior leasing statute was being 'entirely superseded’. Sen. Rep. No. 626,1947, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. [p. 3].” Fort Dix Apartments Corp. v. Borough of Wrightstown, 225 F. 2d 473, 475-476.
We agree with this. To be sure, the 1947 Act does not refer specifically to property in an area subject to the power of “exclusive Legislation” by Congress. It does, however, govern the leasing of Government property generally and its permission to tax extends generally to all lessees’ interests created by virtue of the Act. The legislative history indicates a concern about loss of revenue to the States and a desire to prevent unfairness toward competitors of the private interests that might otherwise escape taxation. While the latter consideration is not necessarily applicable where military housing is involved, the former is equally relevant to leases for military housing as for any other purpose.
We do not say that this is the only admissible construction of these Acts. We could regard Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 as of such overriding and comprehensive scope that consent by Congress to state taxation of obviously valuable private interests located in an area subject to the power of “exclusive Legislation” is to be found only in explicit and unambiguous legislative enactment. We have not heretofore so regarded it, see S. R. A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U. S. 558; Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375, nor are we constrained by reason to treat this exercise by Congress of the “exclusive Legislation” power and the manner of construing it any differently from any other exercise by Congress of that power. This is one of those cases in which Congress has seen fit not to express itself unequivocally. It has preferred to use general language and thereby requires the judiciary to apply this general language to a specific problem. To that end we must resort to whatever aids to interpretation the legislation in its entirety and its history provide. Charged as we are with this function, we have concluded that the more persuasive construction of the statute, however flickering and feeble the light afforded for extracting its meaning, is that the States were to be permitted to tax private interests, like those of this petitioner, in housing projects located on areas subject to the federal power of “exclusive Legislation.” We do not hold that Congress has relinquished this power over these areas. We hold only that Congress, in the exercise of this power, has permitted such state taxation as is involved in the present case.
Petitioner also argues that the state tax, measured by the full value of the buildings and improvements, is not on the “lessee’s interest” but is on the full value of property owned by the Government. Labeling the Government as the “owner” does not foreclose us from ascertaining the nature of the real interests created and so does not solve the problem. See Millinery Center Building Corp. v. Commissioner, 350 U. S. 456. The lease is for 75 years; the buildings and improvements have an estimated useful life of 35 years. The enjoyment of the entire worth of the buildings and improvements will therefore be petitioner’s.
Petitioner argues, however, that the Government has a substantial interest in the buildings and improvements, since the Government prescribed the maximum rents and determined the occupants, had voting interests' in petitioner, provided services, and took the financial risks by insuring the project. Petitioner compares its own position to that of a “managing agent.” This characterization is an attempt by use of a phrase to make these facts fit an abstract legal category. This contention would certainly surprise a Congress which was interested in having private enterprise and not the Government conduct these housing projects. The Government may have “title,” but only a paper title, and, while it retained the controls described in the lease as a regulatory mechanism to prevent the ordinary operation of unbridled economic forces, this does not mean that the value of the buildings and improvements should thereby be partially allocated to it. If an ordinary private housing venture were being assessed for tax purposes, the value would not be allocated between an owner and the mortgage company which does his financing or between the owner and the State, which may fix rents and provide services. In the circumstances of this case, then, the full value of the buildings and improvements is attributable to the lessee’s interest.
Petitioner further argues that the tax on the appliances and furniture is invalid because petitioner owns those items, never bought them from the Government, and that therefore its interest was not “made or created pursuant to the provisions of this Act [the Military Leasing Act of 1947].” Here again using a label, that of “owner,” as descriptive of petitioner does not answer the question. It appears from the record that petitioner was required to supply the appliances for the housing project. Petitioner and its tenants will have full use of them for the lease period and they or their replacements must be left on the property at the end of the lease. Petitioner’s interest in the appliances, just like its interest in the buildings, is determined by its agreement with the Government and, keeping in mind the purpose of § 6, we interpret that section as treating these items alike.
For these reasons the judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska must be
Affirmed.
The record before us is unclear whether the estimated useful life of all the appliances and furniture is less than the lease period. To the extent that the estimated useful life of any of these items extends beyond the term of the lease, the value attributable to such period must be excluded from the tax, since it represents the Government’s ownership interest. In the present state of the record, however, petitioner’s remedy, if any, is in the Nebraska courts, not here.
The record does not indicate clearly the relationship of the parties with respect to the furniture — valued at $205 in the total 1952 valuation of the taxable property at $825,685. This is a minor matter and we leave petitioner to seek redress in the Nebraska courts should the interests of the Government and petitioner in the furniture be significant!y different from their interests in the appliances or buildings.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioners, Oklahoma liquor retailers, brought this action under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1, to enjoin an alleged state-wide market division by all Oklahoma liquor wholesalers. The trial judge, sitting without a jury, found that there had in fact been a division of markets — both by territories and by brands. The court nevertheless entered judgment for the wholesalers because, among other reasons, it found that the interstate commerce prerequisite of the Sherman Act was not satisfied. The Court of Appeals affirmed upon the sole ground that “the proof was entirely insufficient to show that the activities complained of were in or adversely affected interstate commerce.” 377 F. 2d 901, 903.
There are no liquor distilleries in Oklahoma. Liquor is shipped in from other States to the warehouses of the wholesalers, where it is inventoried and held until purchased by retailers. The District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the liquor “came to rest” in the wholesalers’ warehouses and that interstate commerce ceased at that point. Hence, they concluded that the wholesalers’ division of the Oklahoma market did not take place “in interstate commerce.” But whatever the validity of that conclusion, it does not end the matter. For it is well established that an activity which does not itself occur in interstate commerce comes within the scope of the Sherman Act if it substantially affects interstate commerce. United States v. Employing Plasterers Association, 347 U. S. 186; Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219.
Recognizing this, the District Court went on to find that the wholesalers’ market division had no effect on interstate commerce, and the Court of Appeals agreed. The Court of Appeals held that proof of a state-wide wholesalers’ market division in the distribution of goods retailed in substantial volume within the State but produced entirely out of the State was not by itself sufficient proof of an effect on interstate commerce. We disagree. Horizontal territorial divisions almost invariably reduce competition among the participants. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211; United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U. S. 350. When competition is reduced, prices increase and unit sales decrease. The wholesalers’ territorial division here almost surely resulted in fewer sales to retailers — hence fewer purchases from out-of-state distillers — than would have occurred had free competition prevailed among the wholesalers. In addition the wholesalers’ division of brands meant fewer wholesale outlets available to any one out-of-state distiller. Thus the state-wide wholesalers’ market division inevitably affected interstate commerce.
The petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Me. Justice Harlan concurs in the result.
Between $44 and $45 million in wholesale purchases in 1964.
The Court of Appeals stressed the fact that unit sales to the wholesalers increased (885,976 cases to 891,176 cases) from 1963 to 1964 while the market division was in effect. But if there had been free competition among the wholesalers — all other things being equal — presumably sales to them would have increased even more.
The increase in liquor sales noted by the Court of Appeals was 0.6%; during the same period total personal income in Oklahoma increased from $4,880 million to $5,220 million, an increase of 7.0%. Table 1, Survey of Current Business, p. 30, Office of Business Economics, Department of Commerce (August 1967). Adjusting for concurrent price inflation (see Table 8.1, Survey of Current Business, p. 42 (July 1967)), the increase in real personal income was approximately 5.7%.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
, Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
' Petitioners are 4,100 United States citizens or residents of Japanese descent seeking to recover funds vested under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1 et seq. The District Court dismissed their suit against the Attorney General as barred by limitations, and the Court of Appeals.affirmed by a divided vote. 123 U. S. App. D: C. 12, 356 F. 2d 351. We granted certiorari because of the importance and unusual character of the questions involved, affecting the proper application of this wartime statute. 385 U. S. 917.
Both as the case was treated by the lower courts and as it was largely argued here, the limitations issue has been thought' to turn on whether the Government is estopped from asserting the 60-day time bar provided for actions of this kind by § 34 (f) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. We conclude, however, that “estoppel” is not the controlling issue, but that for reasons discussed in this opinion the period of limitations was tolled, requiring reversal of the judgment below.
I.
Upon the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, the United States, on December 7, 1941, acting under the Trading with the Enemy Act, seized the American assets of businesses owned by Japanesé nationals, among such property being the assets of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd. . The assets of the bank were liquidated, and in 1943 were vested in the Alien Property Custodian; see Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Sparling, 93 Cal. App. 2d 768, 770-771, 209 P. 2d 968, 969-970. Petitioners were among the approximately 7,500 depositors of the bank holding “yen certificates,” who submitted timely claims, many being filed as early as 1946, under -§ 34 of the Act seeking recovery of their deposits.
Section 34 of the Act was enacted in 1946 as a legislative' response to this Court’s decision in Markham v. Cabell, 326 U. S. 404, which allowed nonenemy creditors of former owners of vested property to bring suit under a World War I statute, and recover directly' out of vested assets. The Alien Property Custodian feared that allowance of such suits might lead.to inequitable results, in that creditors who brought suit immediately might exhaust the assets at the expense of other, equally valid, claims. The Custodian urged, and the Congress agreed, that an approach on the lines of the.Bankruptcy Act was a fairer method of distributing such assets. See H. R. Rep. No. 2398, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 10, 14 (1946); S. Rep, No. 1839, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 4, 8 (1946). As in bankruptcy law, the new Act required the filing of a debt claim with the Custodian within a specified period, § 34(b).
Approximately 7,500 yen certificate holders3 including petitioners, immediately complied with this provision and submitted photostatic copies of their respective certificates. In the course of processing the claims pursuant to § 34 (f) a question arose as to the redemption value of the certificates both for depositors of the Yokohama Specie Bank and for those of another bank, the Sumi-tomo Bank, holding similar certificates. An administrative determination was sought in a proceeding brought in the name of one of the Yokohama Bank depositors, Kunio Abe, Claim No. 55507. Abe, acting for all yen certificate holders, took the view that since these deposits had been made in American dollars, and the certificates were allegedly redeemable in dollars at any time upon demand at American branches of the bank, they should be treated as dollar debts at the amount of their value when seized in 1941, at a rate of about 4.3 yen to the dollar. The Attorney General, however, characterized the debts as yen debts, and following the rule of Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey, 272 U. S. 517, and Zimmermann v. Sutherland, 274 U. S. 253, held that the proper measure of recovery would be at the postwar conversion rate of 361.55 yen to the dollar, or less than 2% of the prewar rate. It is noteworthy that throughout this period the Yokohama Bank’s successor in Japan, the Bank of Tokyo, Ltd., was willing to redeem these certificates at the postwar rate. Petitioners, at any time, could therefore have received from the Japanese bank the amount the Government asserted would eventually be obtained from the vested assets.
At the conclusion of the administrative process, in 1958-1959, the Chief of the Claims Section wrote to each of the depositors who had filed a claim, including petitioners, advising that “The Director of this Office decided on-November 13, 1957, In the Matter of Kunio Abe, et al., Claim No. 55507, Docket No. 55 D 72, which decision the Attorney General has declined to review, that yen certificates of deposit issued by the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd. ... are obligations payable in yen in Japan .. .,” and therefore that the postwar rate of 361.55 yen to the dollar would be used in redeeming certificates from the vested assets. Claimants were told to -submit their originál certificates within 45 days. However, the letter continued, “Payment of your claim . . . will not be made immediately.” The letter informed the claimant that a full schedule of claimants would be made, § 34 (f), and that after its issuance aggrieved certificate holders might file suit in the United States District' Court for the District of Columbia for judicial review. “Under the circumstances,” the letter continued, “you may wish to utilize the funds in Japan, rather than await settlement by this Office. If this is done, the Notice of Claim filed with this Office should be canceled by signing and mailing the enclosed Notice of Cancellation of Claim card.”
Petitioners characterize this letter as “confusing” and “insulting.” We. think the opprobrium which is sought to be fastened on the letter is undeserved and consider it more accurate and fairer to say. that although its instructions were complex, the letter was written in a manner designed reasonably to apprise, a layman of the choices before him. However, on the particular facts of this case and given the empirical evidence available, it is quite understandable that of the 7,500 initial claimants, only 1,817 responded affirmatively by sending in their certificates, and less than 1,600 canceled their claims and sought immediate recovery in Japan. The remainder, a majority of all who had claims, petitioners in this case, did nothing.
The reasons for their inaction are quite apparent, and, it can reasonably be argued, should have been so to the Government: the letter indicated that despite as long as 12 years of waiting after the original submission of their claims, supported by copies of their certificates, they could expect to receive less than 2% of their basic deposits measured in prewar dollar terms, and that even this amount would not be forthcoming immediately, but only after issuance of a schedule (an additional interval, it turned out, of three years) plus possible judicial review.- Claimants would clearly be better off getting repayment immediately from the Japanese bank itself. This recourse, suggested by the letter itself, was at the same time understandably advantageous to the Government as well: American citizens or residents would obtain relief, but from a foreign source, thus freeing more of the vested assets for distribution to remaining claimants. It is thus understandable that the Government did nothing to ascertain why a majority of the. 7,600 claimants had responded in no way to its letter.
■ In affidavits submitted to the District Court, and not contradicted on the motion to dismiss the complaint, various other reasons were asserted for the failure of these petitioners to respond. Petitioner Jiro Kai asserted:
“I did receive a letter from the Office of Alien Property offering me about 30⅜ for my claim. I think I recall being asked to send in my original certificate by registered mail to receive this amount. For me to have done this would have cost more than I was being offered.[] I had heard from others that many more persons had claims similar to mine and I understood that they were all being processed together. I saw in the Japanese newspaper that a court suit was or would be filed seeking to obtain for the yen claimants the proper amount for their claims. I believed, therefore, I would be protected.”
Other affidavits gave similar reasons. These are summarized best in an affidavit of Mr. Katsuma Mukaeda, president of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce of Southern, California:
“Many of the Yokohama Specie Bank yen deposit certificate holders were old people who could not read English and could not understand the communications they received from the Office of Alien Property; many of them had to rely upon other persons who themselves were not able to understand the letters; most of the claimants had never talked to a lawyer about their cases and there was a general feeling in the community that all of the claims were -going to be treated alike, both the Sumitomo Bank claimants and the Yokohama Specie Bank claimants; there was knowledge in the community that a law suit had been filed in Washington and it was understood and believed that the outcome of that law suit would determine how much money the claimants received and that it- would apply to all claimants not just some; most of the claimants had had experience with or had heard about the Japanese Evacuation Claims program (50 U. S. C. Appx. 1981-1987)[] and many of them knew generally that under that program, deadlines had been extended and even that the law itself had been changed to include persons who originally were not eligible, to be eligible for repayment of some of their losses due-to the Japanese- evacuation program, and that persons who previously had been denied payment, later were paid; . . . since the original certificates of deposit were the claimants’ only direct evidence of their claim, many of the claimants were reluctant to part with this evidence, especially at a time when the Government was recognizing their claims at less than 2% of their face value, to say nothing of accumulated interest over the years; moreover, many of them, felt that to send in their certificates at that time would be taken as agreeing to accept this very small sum in full settlement and they did not want to do that; there were others whose claims were so small that to send in the originals at the figure the ■ Government was offering would net them no return or a very small amount; as individuals, even those claimants who did not have very small claims could not afford to hire an individual lawyer in Washington or to file their- own suit but had to rely on what was being done generally and many of them believed that in the end their Government would not try to keep their money but would return it.”
The claims of these 4,100 claimants were dismissed when they did not respond within the 45-day administrative limit, pursuant to 8 CFR § 502:25 (g), 21 Fed. .Reg. 1582. Petitioners were notified that their claims were disallowed as abandoned, and told that further proceedings were governed by § 34 (f), the provision requiring a final schedule of claimants and providing for judicial review. In May 1961 a final schedule was prepared and sent to all claimants, including petitioners. Petitioners’ claims were not included in the schedule, but they were informed that “Pursuant to Section 34 (f) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, any claimant considering himself aggrieved by this Final Schedule may, within sixty (60) days from the date of the mailing of the Schedule, file in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia a complaint for review of this Schedule . . . .”
Such á suit was brought to challenge the proper rate of exchange. It was brought by Mr. Kunio Abe, the same person who had challenged the administrative ruling and whose case was cited by the Government in its letters to petitioners as dispositive of their cases. Abe v. Kennedy, C. A. No. 2529-61, D. D. C., was held in abeyance in the District Court pending a determination of the identical issue raised in relation to yen certificates issued by the Sumitomo Bank. The District Court upheld the Attorney General’s determination, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, Aratani v. Kennedy, 115 U. S. App. D. C. 97, 317 F. 2d 161, 323 F. 2d 427., After this Court granted certiorari in Aratani, 375 U. S. 877, the Attorney General entered into a compromise settlement with the plaintiffs in Aratani and Abe, in the latter case approximately at the prewar rate without interest. Petitioners here were not included in the class represented by Abe, for his complaint was framed to represent only the class of those claimants listed in the schedule rather than all outstanding claimants. Petitioners therefore filed this suit upon final disposition of the Abe litigation, and long before the dismissal of certiorari in Aratani, asking for similar treatment. The Attorney General denied their claims because petitioners were not included in the class represented in the Abe suit, and because they had not filed their suit within 60 days after mailing, of the schedule as required by § 34 (f).
II.
Quite apart from any- question of governmental estop-pel respecting assertion of the statute of limitations, a contention that is sought to be predicated on the foregoing train of events and circumstances, we consider that the limitations period was in any event tolled during the pendency of the Abe litigation, and that petitioners’ right to bring their suit was not foreclosed. An analysis of the statutory scheme as devised by Congress persuades us,' in the context of this factual setting, that this is the result most consistent with the legislative purpose of this Act.
The statutory system embodied in § 34 was intended to provide a method for the fair and equitable distribution of vested enemy assets to American residents. The basic model for the statute was the Federal Bankruptcy Act, a concept revealed in the legislative record by expressions of the Custodian and of those members of Congress principally responsible for the legislation. The 60-day limitation on suits was designed to further this end — to aid claimants by expediting a final distribution — and not primarily as a shield for the Government.
The Bankruptcy Act, the pattern for this legislation, ■presents a compelling analogy, pointing the way to the decision which we make in this case. Section 57n, 11 U. S. C. § 93 (n), requires notification of claims within six months after the first date set for the first meeting of creditors. Those who fail to file timely claims do not, however, lose all their rights; rather after all duly allowed and properly filed claims have been paid in full, “claims not filed within the time hereinabove prescribed may nevertheless be filed within such time as the court may fix or for cause shown extend and, if duly proved, shall be allowed against any surplus remaining in such case.”
It is true that this equitable principle of the Bankruptcy Act was specifically authorized by a 1938 amendment which was “designed to remedy the inequity of returning property to the bankrupt as long as there are creditors, however tardy, whose claims have not been satisfied even in part.” 3 Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 57.33, at 398. But it is noteworthy that bankruptcy courts in the exercise of their general equity power had already reached this result long before the principle was enacted into law. As one nisi prius bankruptcy court stated in In re Lenox, 2 F. 2d 92, in 1924, “This [the statute of limitations] is a provision for the benefit of creditors, not for the benefit of the bankrupt. ... In the present case, the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act have been complied with, and those who complied with all its provisions have been paid in full. But the fact remains that the petitioner'who had reduced his claim to judgment, the existence and validity of which the bankrupt recognized in his schedules and does not now deny, has received nothing. A fund remains in the hands of the trustee.” Id., at 93. The equitable solution, the court held, was to allow the claim, even though untimely. In Williams v. Rice, 30 F. 2d 814, an estate, presumably without assets, was reopened when new assets were discovered. The question was again whether creditors who had not filed timely claims, should - be allowed to prove their claims. Noting that the time limitation- “is intended primarily to require creditors to prove their claims promptly, in order that the estate may be closed without undue delay/’ id,, at 815, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that in the absence of negligent failure to file, claimants in such a case could file after the time limitation. See also In re Pierson, 174 F. 160, where the court allowed the reopening of the estate and the filing of claims past the statutory period when new assets were discovered. But see In re Silk, 55 F. 2d 917, reaching the opposite result.
Another, though less precise, analogy in the bankruptcy area can be drawn from Nassau Works v. Brightwood Co., 265 U. S. 269. The issue there was whether a creditor whose claim was not proved within the statutory period established for creditors in bankruptcy. could nevertheless participate in a composition in bankruptcy. Mr. Justice Brandéis, writing for a unanimous Court, analyzed the statute in terms of its purpose and the various interests involved. From the viewpoint of the other creditors, he found, “neither the amount which a creditor receives, nor the time when he receives it, can be affected by the amount of others’ claims, or by the time of proof, or by their failure to prove. . . . Nor can the time of proof of claims, as distinguished from their allowance, be of legitimate interest to the bankrupt. ... No reason is suggested why Congress should have wished to bar creditors from participation in the benefits of a composition merely because their claims were not proved within a year of the adjudication. Failure to prove within the year does not harm the bankrupt. Why should he gain thereby? And why should the creditor be penalized by a total loss of his claim?” 265 U. S., at 272-273.
These factors can be applied to the present case with equal force. What purpose does the strict 60-day limitation serve, except as a method of expediting the distribution of vested assets to creditors? But no other creditors are here objecting, for none exist: they have all compromised their claims and yet a surplus remains in the account. The Government itself has.no real interest in this fund, for it neither comes out of the common weal nor will any surplus ihure to the Treasury. The Attorney General is a mere stakeholder, a custodian in the true sense of the word. The only persons who might eventually benefit from the surplus are those general beneficiaries of the War Claims Fund into which any surplus is deposited. But the 60-day rule can hardly be deemed a device for augmenting this general fund at the expense of recognized creditors, especially in the face of repeated and uncontested expressions of congressional intent to facilitate and expand the rights of American creditors having an interest in these assets.
III.
The foregoing considerations are especially persuasive here when the reason for petitioners’ delay in bringing suit is recalled. It was generally known in the Japanese community that a class suit, the Abe case, had been filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The complaint in that suit outlined the history of the controversy over the proper rate of exchange and it specifically noted that this question was “[t]he sole issue on this Complaint for review . .. .” An examination of the complaint, on file at the District Court but presumably not readily available to petitioners who lived on the West Coast, reveals that the plaintiffs included in the class action were defined as those listed on the final schedule rather than all those who filed valid claims. But from a practical standpoint, this definition, which legally excluded these petitioners, made no differentiation between the total group of certificate holders in any material respect.. The legal issue raised in the complaint dealt only with the exchange rate; the administrative record filed with the District Court was that of the Abe claim which did apply — at the administrative level — to petitioners; the named plaintiff was also Kunio Abe whose case was cited by the Government as dispositive of petitioners’ claims; no action was in any event taken on the complaint which was held in suspense pending, determination of the same legal issue in the Aratani casé and then dismissed upon settlement with the Abe suit claimants. Since petitionérs filed their claim immediately upon settlement of the Abe case, there can be no claim that the course of action they took in any way interfered with the speed or manner in which this litigation was conducted.
. The only arguable difference it might have made had petitioners filed their action immediately upon publication of the schedule is that the Government’s willingness to settle the case might have been dampened because the larger number of plaintiffs would have made settlement more costly to the total fund. Upon examination, however, even this possibility should be discounted when it is recalled that these are not in any real sense government funds, but rather vested assets of an enemy debtor which will be distributed to another class of war victims if petitioners’ claims are barred. The Government has no interest in the fund except to enforce the primary congressional mandate that bona fide creditors recover their due. Since the amount in the fund adequately covers a full settlement with all these claimants at the Abe rate, exhausting the surplus should not have played a part in the Government’s decision to settle with the Abe claimants.
For these reasons we think the statutory purpose is best served by invoking the equitable doctrine of tolling to preserve petitioners’ action in which they seek payment on the same basis as that accorded the claimants in Abe.
IV.
In light of these circumstances we find the Attorney General’s arguments unpersuasive. He argues primarily that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply in this case to prevent assertion of the statute of limitations. We do not reach the estoppel- issue, because we hold that the statutory scheme itself requires tolling the limitation period during the pendency of the Abe litigation. In this respect, the Government contends that because this suit is, at least formally, one against the sovereign, see Banco Mexicano v. Deutsche Bank, 263 U. S. 591, the statute of limitations may not be tolled without' express congressional consent. It is well settled, of course, that the Government is ordinarily immune from suit, and that it may define the conditions under which it will permit such actions. E. g., Kendall v. United States, 107 U. S. 123; United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584. It is also true that in many cases this Court has read procedural rules embodied in statutes waiving immunity strictly, with an eye to effectuating á restrictive legislative purpose when Congress relinquishes sovereign immunity. E. g., Kendall v. United States, supra; United States v. Sherwood, supra; Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270; compare Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, post, p. 503.
This case is, however, wholly different from those cases on which the Government primarily relies, where the public treasury was directly affected. Here Congress established a method for returning seized enemy assets to United States creditors, assets that were never contemplated as finding their way permanently into the public fisc. As the House and Senate-Reports on this statute declare, “The Custodian has emphasized to the committee that he is anxious to satisfy the. proper claims of creditors and the committee concur in the view that there exists a strong moral obligation to satisfy them inasmuch as, but for the vesting of their debtors’ property, they would presumably have been able to pursue ordinary remedies against the debtors.” H. R. Rep. No. 2398, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1946); S. Rep. No. 1839, 79th Cong., 2d Sees., 3-4 (1946). We consider it much more consistent with the overall congressional purpose to apply a traditional equitable tolling principle, aptly suited to the particular facts of this case and nowhere eschewed by Congress, to preserve petitioners’ cause of action. Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424; cf. Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 320 U. S. 356, 360.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the dismissal of this action is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the decision of this case.
This suit was originally filed against Robert F. Kennedy, then Attorney General. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach was substituted as statutory defendant in the District Court, and Ramsey Clark, the present Attorney General, succeeded him as respondent here by operation of law. Sup. Ct. Rule 48 (3).
The certificates expressed their value in terms of yen, and bore the following statement, in both Japanese and English:
“This is to certify that the sum of yen -.has been submitted to our Head Office, Yokohama, to be placed in Fixed Deposit there in your name at — percent, per annum for — months, maturing -, subject to the conditions on the back hereof.
■ “Both principal and interest are payable, when due, at our aforesaid Head' Office, Yokohama, upon surrender of this Certificate, properly endorsed and/or sealed.”
Section 9 (a.) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U. S. C. App. §9 (a).
Section 34 (a) limits allowable debt claims only to “those of citizens of the United States or of the Philippine Islands; those of corporations organized under the laws of the United States or any State, Territory, or possession thereof, or the District of Columbia , or the Philippine Islands; those of other natural persons who are and have been since the beginning of the war residents of the United States and who have not during the war been interned or paroled pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act; and those acquired by the Custodian.”
The Attorney General assumed the duties of the Custodian in 1946 by Executive Order No. 9788, 11 Fed. Reg. 11981.
Counsel for petitioners have supplied us with the following information as to the range in amounts of the claims involved in this litigation: “Of the 1,120 Honda claimants who have . . . retained [our associated California counsel] ... to the present date, the highest is for 120,000 yen — about $30,000 at the Abe ratio [or about' $332 at the. Government’s original rate] — and the- lowest claim is for 50 yen, or about $12 [about 14⅜⅝ at the lower rate]. Among all 4,100 petitioners the largest debt claimant of which we are aware chose other counsel, and his claim was for 246,000 yen (about $60,000) [about $680 at the lower rate] ....
“The average claim among the 1,120 retainer claimants in Honda is for about $2,000 [at the Abe rate], and the mean considerably lower; the average among all 4,100 petitioners is necessarily more modest still, because it includes the 2,980 claimants who have not even sought representation by counsel in this suit, presumably because of the very small amounts of their claims . . . .”
This legislation, enacted in 1948,- authorizes the Attorney General to make awards in amounts not to exceed $100,000 “on any claim by a person of Japanese ancestry against the United Statés arising on or after December 7, 1941, . that is ... a reasonable and natural consequence of the evacuation or exclusion of such person by the appropriate military commander from a military area in Arizona, California, Oregon,, or Washington; or from the Territory of Alaska, or the Territory of Hawaii, under authority of Executive Order . . . 70 Stat. 513, 50 U. S. C. App. §1981.
The regulation provides: “A claim shall be deemed abandoned when after request to do so the claimant has not furnished relevant information in support of his claim, or where by virtue of his failure to respond to inquiries regarding the claim it appears that he does not wish to pursue it further.” Neither in his motion to dismiss the complaint in the District Court, nor on review in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, has the Attorney General advanced the argument that failure to comply with this administrative regulation is by itself an independent reason for dismissing this suit. It suffices to say here that such an argument would be open to attack on lines similar to those we hold require tolling the statute of limitations.
The claimants in Aratani recovered considerably less than those in Abe because the amounts of their claims exceeded the vested assets of the Sumitomo Bank. 228 F. Supp. 706, 708.
The District Court approved the settlements in both Aratani and Abe on March 18,4964, 228 F. Supp. 706, and entered its final, order on May 18, 1964. The present suit was filed May 19, 1964. The writ of certiorari in Aratani was dismissed on March -9, 1965, 380 U. S. 938, upon stipulation of counsel that the case had been settled.
'At the committee hearings on this section, the following dialogue occurred between the Chairman, Congressman Celler of New York, and the Custodian, Mr. Markham:
“Mr. Markham. . ’. . We propose that the law be changed so that the man could file his claim, but he would be paid on a ratable basis, if there is not enough money for everybody, and that we should have a marshaling of assets and a marshaling of debts, so that everybody would be treated alike and would not depend upon the time when they brought the' suit or the order in which the suits were brought.
“Mr. Celler. But you want to be sure that you don’t get into a situation where one creditor can fritter away all the assets of an enterprise, and you want to apply them under the principle now applied in the Bankruptcy Act, give each creditor an equitable share in the assets?
“Mr. Markham. That is the way I want it to be done. That is what I want to- do.” Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5089, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 17 (1946). See also, id., at 7, 11-13, 113-114.
Congressman Celler used the same reference when he introduced the bill to the House: “The.bill before us provides that the Alien Property Custodian takes the property and sells it and divides the proceeds equitably among all creditors as pari passu, in bankruptcy.” 92 Cong. Rec. 10217 (1946). And see H. R. Rep. No. 2398, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., TO, 14 (1946); S. Rep. No. 1839, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 4, 8 (1946). . r
Under the War Claims Act of 1948, undistributed assets of enemy property are transferred to a War Claims Fund for distribution to United States citizens who suffered losses Caused by enemy military operations during World War II. 62 St-at. 1246-1247, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 39, 2012. That Act also declares that no vested property be returned to the former German or Japanese owners as had been the case with some assets after World War I. § 39 (a). See H. R. Rep. No. 976, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1947); ' II. R. Rep. No. 2439, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); S. Rep. No. 1742, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
See 'references cited in n. 11, supra. There is nothing in the legislative history of the 1946 Act indicating that Congress had the interests of those who were in effect “remainder beneficiaries” in mind when imposing the procedures of § 34. • It is further noteworthy that in 1953 the Congress refused to enact legislation, supported by the Government, that would have had the effect of wiping out entirely debt claims payable in foreign currency, the Yokohama Bank certificates being the largest group of such debts. See S. Rep. No. .616, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); 99 Cong. Rec. 7408-7409 (1953)>
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Breyer
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice joins, and in which Justice Alito joins except as to Parts II-B-1 and II-B-2.
We here consider the constitutionality of a Vermont campaign finance statute that limits both (1) the amounts that candidates for state office may spend on their campaigns (expenditure limitations) and (2) the amounts that individuals, organizations, and political parties may contribute to those campaigns (contribution limitations). Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2801 et seq. (2002). We hold that both sets of limitations are inconsistent with the First Amendment. Well-established precedent makes clear that the expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 54-58 (1976) (per curiam). The contribution limits are unconstitutional because in their specific details (involving low maximum levels and other restrictions) they fail to satisfy the First Amendment’s requirement of careful tailoring. Id., at 25-30. That is to say, they impose burdens upon First Amendment interests that (when viewed in light of the statute’s legitimate objectives) are disproportionately severe.
I
A
Prior to 1997, Vermont’s campaign finance law imposed no limit upon the amount a candidate for state office could spend. It did, however, impose limits upon the amounts that individuals, corporations, and political committees could contribute to the campaign of such a candidate. Individuals and corporations could contribute no more than $1,000 to any candidate for state office. § 2805(a) (1996). Political committees, excluding political parties, could contribute no more than $3,000. § 2805(b). The statute imposed no limit on the amount that political parties could contribute to candidates.
In 1997, Vermont enacted a more stringent campaign finance law, Pub. Act No. 64, codified at Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2801 et seq. (2002) (hereinafter Act or Act 64), the statute at issue here. Act 64, which took effect immediately after the 1998 elections, imposes mandatory expenditure limits on the total amount a candidate for state office can spend during a “two-year general election cycle,” i. e., the primary plus the general election, in approximately the following amounts: governor, $300,000; lieutenant governor, $100,000; other statewide offices, $45,000; state senator, $4,000 (plus an additional $2,500 for each additional seat in the district); state representative (two-member district), $3,000; and state representative (single member district), $2,000. § 2805a(a). These limits are adjusted for inflation in odd-numbered years based on the Consumer Price Index. §2805a(e). Incumbents seeking reelection to statewide office may spend no more than 85% of the above amounts, and incumbents seeking reelection to the State Senate or House may spend no more than 90% of the above amounts. §2805a(c). The Act defines “[e]xpenditure” broadly to mean the
“payment, disbursement, distribution, advance, deposit, loan or gift of money or anything of value, paid or promised to be paid, for the purpose of influencing an election, advocating a position on a public question, or supporting or opposing one or more candidates.” § 2801(3).
With certain minor exceptions, expenditures over $50 made on a candidate’s behalf by others count against the candidate’s expenditure limit if those expenditures are “intentionally facilitated by, solicited by or approved by” the candidate’s campaign. §§ 2809(b), (c). These provisions apply so as to count against a campaign’s expenditure limit any spending by political parties or committees that is coordinated with the campaign and benefits the candidate. And any party expenditure that “primarily benefits six or fewer candidates who are associated with the political party” is “presumed” to be coordinated with the campaign and therefore to count against the campaign’s expenditure limit. §§ 2809(b), (d).
Act 64 also imposes strict contribution limits. The amount any single individual can contribute to the campaign of a candidate for state office during a “two-year general election cycle” is limited as follows: governor, lieutenant governor, and other statewide offices, $400; state senator, $300; and state representative, $200. § 2805(a). Unlike its expenditure limits, Act 64’s contribution limits are not indexed for inflation.
A political committee is subject to these same limits. Ibid. So is a political party, ibid., defined broadly to include “any subsidiary, branch or local unit” of a party, as well as any “national or regional affiliates” of a party (taken separately or together). § 2801(5). Thus, for example, the statute treats the local, state, and national affiliates of the Democratic Party as if they were a single entity and limits their total contribution to a single candidate’s campaign for governor (during the primary and the general election together) to $400.
The Act also imposes a limit of $2,000 upon the amount any individual can give to a political party during a 2-year general election cycle. § 2805(a).
The Act defines “contribution” broadly in approximately the same way it defines “expenditure.” §2801(2). Any expenditure made on a candidate’s behalf counts as a contribution to the candidate if it is “intentionally facilitated by, solicited by or approved by” the candidate. §§ 2809(a), (c). And a party expenditure that “primarily benefits six or fewer candidates who are associated with the” party is “presumed” to count against the party’s contribution limits. §§ 2809(a), (d).
There are a few exceptions. A candidate’s own contributions to the campaign and those of the candidate’s family fall outside the contribution limits. § 2805(f). Volunteer services do not count as contributions. § 2801(2). Nor does the cost of a meet-the-candidate function, provided that the total cost for the function amounts to $100 or less. § 2809(d).
In addition to these expenditure and contribution limits, the Act sets forth disclosure and reporting requirements and creates a voluntary public financing system for gubernatorial elections. §§2803, 2811, 2821-2823, 2831, 2832, 2851-2856. None of these is at issue here. The Act also limits the amount of contributions a candidate, political committee, or political party can receive from out-of-state sources. § 2805(c). The lower courts held these out-of-state contribution limits unconstitutional, and the parties do not challenge that holding.
B
The petitioners are individuals who have run for state office in Vermont, citizens who vote in Vermont elections and contribute to Vermont campaigns, and political parties and committees that participate in Vermont politics. Soon after Act 64 became law, they brought this lawsuit in Federal District Court against the respondents, state officials charged with enforcement of the Act. Several other private groups and individual citizens intervened in the District Court proceedings in support of the Act and are joined here as respondents as well.
The District Court agreed with the petitioners that the Act’s expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. See Buckley, 424 U. S. 1. The court also held unconstitutional the Act’s limits on the contributions of political parties to candidates. At the same time, the court found the Act’s other contribution limits constitutional. Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 470 (Vt. 2000).
Both sides appealed. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that all of the Act’s contribution limits are constitutional.. It also held that the Act’s expenditure limits may be constitutional. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F. 3d 91 (2004). It found those limits supported by two compelling interests, namely, an interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption and an interest in limiting the amount of time state officials must spend raising campaign funds. The Circuit then remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to determine whether the Act’s expenditure limits were narrowly tailored to those interests.
The petitioners and respondents all sought certiorari. They asked us to consider the constitutionality of Act 64’s expenditure limits, its contribution limits, and a related definitional provision. We agreed to do so. 545 U. S. 1165 (2005).
II
We turn first to the Act’s expenditure limits. Do those limits violate the First Amendment’s free speech guarantees?
A
In Buckley v. Valeo, supra, the Court considered the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 3, as amended, 2 U. S. C. §431 et seq., a statute that, much like the Act before us, imposed both expenditure and contribution limitations on campaigns for public office. The Court, while upholding FECA’s contribution limitations as constitutional, held that the statute’s expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment.
Buckley stated that both kinds of limitations “implicate fundamental First Amendment interests.” 424 U. S., at 23. It noted that the Government had sought to justify the statute’s infringement on those interests in terms of the need to prevent “corruption and the appearance of corruption.” Id., at 25; see also id., at 55. In the Court’s view, this rationale provided sufficient justification for the statute’s contribution limitations, but it did not provide sufficient justification for the expenditure limitations.
The Court explained that the basic reason for this difference between the two kinds of limitations is that expenditure limitations “impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than” do contribution limitations. Id., at 23. Contribution limitations, though a “marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication,” nevertheless leave the contributor “fre[e] to discuss candidates and issues.” Id., at 20-21. Expenditure limitations, by contrast, impose “[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign.” Id., at 19. They thereby necessarily “reducfe] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” Ibid. Indeed, the freedom “to engage in unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.” Id., at 19, n. 18.
The Court concluded that “[n]o governmental interest that has been suggested is sufficient to justify the restriction on the quantity of political expression imposed by” the statute’s expenditure limitations. Id., at 55. It decided that the Government’s primary justification for expenditure limitations, preventing corruption and its appearance, was adequately addressed by the Act’s contribution limitations and disclosure requirements. Ibid. The Court also considered other governmental interests advanced in support of expenditure limitations. It rejected each. Id., at 56-57. Consequently, it held that the expenditure limitations were “constitutionally invalid.” Id., at 58.
Over the last 30 years, in considering the constitutionality of a host of different campaign finance statutes, this Court has repeatedly adhered to Buckley’s constraints, including those on expenditure limits. See McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 134 (2003); Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 441 (2001) (Colorado II); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 386 (2000) (Shrink); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 610 (1996) (Colorado I) (plurality opinion); Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 259-260 (1986); Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 491 (1985); California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182, 194-195 (1981) (plurality opinion).
B
1
The respondents recognize that, in respect to expenditure limits, Buckley appears to be a controlling—and unfavorable—precedent. They seek to overcome that precedent in two ways. First, they ask us in effect to overrule Buckley. Post-Buckley experience, they believe, has shown that contribution limits (and disclosure requirements) alone cannot effectively deter corruption or its appearance; hence experience has undermined an assumption underlying that case. Indeed, the respondents have devoted several pages of their briefs to attacking Buckley’s holding on expenditure limits. See Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Vermont Public Interest Research Group et al. 6-39 (hereinafter VPIRG Brief) (arguing that “sound reasons exist to revisit the applicable standard of review” for expenditure limits); Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner William H. Sorrell et al. 28-31 (hereinafter Sorrell Brief) (arguing that “the Court should revisit Buckley and consider alternative constitutional approaches to spending limits”).
Second, in the alternative, they ask us to limit the scope of Buckley significantly by distinguishing Buckley from the present case. They advance as a ground for distinction a justification for expenditure limitations that, they say, Buckley did not consider, namely, that such limits help to protect candidates from spending too much time raising money rather than devoting that time to campaigning among ordinary voters. We find neither argument persuasive.
2
The Court has often recognized the “fundamental importance” of stare decisis, the basic legal principle that commands judicial respect for a court’s earlier decisions and the rules of law they embody. See Harris v. United States, 536 U. S. 545, 556-557 (2002) (plurality opinion) (citing numerous cases). The Court has pointed out that stare decisis “ 'promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’ ” United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856 (1996) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991)). Stare decisis thereby avoids the instability and unfairness that accompany disruption of settled legal expectations. For this reason, the rule of law demands that adhering to our prior case law be the norm. Departure from precedent is exceptional, and requires “special justification.” Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984). This is especially true where, as here, the principle has become settled through iteration and reiteration over a long period of time.
We can find here no such special justification that would require us to overrule Buckley. Subsequent case law has not made Buckley a legal anomaly or otherwise undermined its basic legal principles. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000). We cannot find in the respondents’ claims any demonstration that, circumstances have changed so radically as to undermine Buckley’s critical factual assumptions. The respondents have not shown, for example, any dramatic increase in corruption or its appearance in Vermont; nor have they shown that expenditure limits are the only way to attack that problem. Cf. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U. S. 93. At the same time, Buckley has promoted considerable reliance. Congress and state legislatures have used Buckley when drafting campaign finance laws. And, as we have said, this Court has followed Buckley, upholding and applying its reasoning in later cases. Overruling Buckley now would dramatically undermine this reliance on our settled precedent.
For all these reasons, we find this a case that fits the stare decisis norm. And we do not perceive the strong justification that would be necessary to warrant overruling so well established a precedent. We consequently decline the respondents’ invitation to reconsider Buckley.
3
The respondents also ask us to distinguish these cases from Buckley. But we can find no significant basis for that distinction. Act 64’s expenditure limits are not substantially different from those at issue in Buckley. In both instances the limits consist of a dollar cap imposed upon a candidate’s expenditures. Nor is Vermont’s primary justification for imposing its expenditure limits significantly different from Congress’ rationale for the Buckley limits: preventing corruption and its appearance.
The sole basis on which the respondents seek to distinguish Buckley concerns a further supporting justification. They argue that expenditure limits are necessary in order to reduce the amount of time candidates must spend raising money. VPIRG Brief 16-20; Sorrell Brief 22-25. Increased campaign costs, together with the fear of a better-funded opponent, mean that, without expenditure limits, a candidate must spend too much time raising money instead of meeting the voters and engaging in public debate. Buckley, the respondents add, did not fully consider this justification. Had it done so, they say, the Court would have upheld, not struck down, FECA’s expenditure limits.
In our view, it is highly unlikely that fuller consideration of this time protection rationale would have changed Buckley’s result. The Buckley Court was aware of the connection between expenditure limits and a reduction in fundraising time. In a section of the opinion dealing with FECA’s public financing provisions, it wrote that Congress was trying to “free candidates from the rigors of fundraising.” 424 U. S., at 91; see also id,., at 96 (“[LJimits on contributions necessarily increase the burden of fundraising,” and “public financing” was designed in part to relieve Presidential candidates “from the rigors of soliciting private contributions”); id., at 258-259 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). The Court of Appeals’ opinion and the briefs filed in this Court pointed out that a natural consequence of higher campaign expenditures was that “candidates were compelled to allow to fund raising increasing and extreme amounts of money and energy.” Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821, 838 (CADC 1975); see also Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae in Buckley v. Valeo, O. T. 1975, Nos. 75-436 and 75-437, p. 36 (“Fund raising consumes candidate time that otherwise would be devoted to campaigning”). And, in any event, the connection between high campaign expenditures and increased fundraising demands seems perfectly obvious.
Under these circumstances, the respondents’ argument amounts to no more than an invitation so to limit Buckley’s holding as effectively to overrule it. For the reasons set forth above, we decline that invitation as well. And, given Buckley’s continued authority, we must conclude that Act 64’s expenditure limits violate the First Amendment.
Ill
We turn now to a more complex question, namely, the constitutionality of Act 64’s contribution limits. The parties, while accepting Buckley’s approach, dispute whether, despite Buckley’s general approval of statutes that limit campaign contributions, Act 64’s contribution limits are so severe that in the circumstances its particular limits violate the First Amendment.
A
As with the Act’s expenditure limits, we begin with Buckley. In that case, the Court upheld the $1,000 contribution limit before it. Buckley recognized that contribution limits, like expenditure limits, “implicate fundamental First Amendment interests,” namely, the freedoms of “political expression” and “political association.” 424 U. S., at 15, 23. But, unlike expenditure limits (which “necessarily reduc[e] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached,” id., at 19), contribution limits “involv[e] little direct restraint on” the contributor’s speech, id., at 21. They do restrict “one aspect of the contributor’s freedom of political association,” namely, the contributor’s ability to support a favored candidate, but they nonetheless “per-mi[t] the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution,” and they do “not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.” Id., at 21, 24.
Consequently, the Court wrote, contribution limitations are permissible as long as the Government demonstrates that the limits are “closely drawn” to match a “sufficiently important interest.” Id., at 25. It found that the interest advanced in the case, “preventing] corruption” and its “appearance,” was “sufficiently important” to justify the statute’s contribution limits. Id., at 25-26.
The Court also found that the contribution limits before it were “closely drawn.” It recognized that, in determining whether a particular contribution limit was “closely drawn,” the amount, or level, of that limit could make a difference. Indeed, it wrote that “contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.” Id., at 21. But the Court added that such “distinctions in degree become significant only when they can be said to amount to differences in kind.” Id., at 30. Pointing out that it had “ ‘no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000,’ ” ibid., the Court found “no indication” that the $1,000 contribution limitations imposed by the Act would have “any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns,” id., at 21. It therefore found the limitations constitutional.
Since Buckley, the Court has consistently upheld contribution limits in other statutes. Shrink, 528 U. S. 377 ($1,075 limit on contributions to candidates for Missouri state auditor); California Medical Assn., 453 U. S. 182 ($5,000 limit on contributions to multicandidate political committees). The Court has recognized, however, that contribution limits might sometimes work more harm to protected First Amendment interests than their anticorruption objectives could justify. See Shrink, supra, at 395-397; Buckley, supra, at 21. And individual Members of the Court have expressed concern lest too low a limit magnify the “reputation-related or media-related advantages of incumbency and thereby insulat[e] legislators from effective electoral challenge.” Shrink, supra, at 403-404 (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring). In the cases before us, the petitioners challenge Act 64’s contribution limits on that basis.
B
Following Buckley, we must determine whether Act 64’s contribution limits prevent candidates from “amassing the resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy,” 424 U. S., at 21; whether they magnify the advantages of incumbency to the point where they put challengers to a significant disadvantage; in a word, whether they are too low and too strict to survive First Amendment scrutiny. In answering these questions, we recognize, as Buckley stated, that we have “ ‘no scalpel to probe’ ” each possible contribution level. Id., at 30. We cannot determine with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction necessary to carry out the statute’s legitimate objectives. In practice, the legislature is better equipped to make such empirical judgments, as legislators have “particular expertise” in matters related to the costs and nature of running for office. McConnell, 540 U. S., at 137. Thus ordinarily we have deferred to the legislature’s determination of such matters.
Nonetheless, as Buckley acknowledged, we must recognize the existence of some lower bound. At some point the constitutional risks to the democratic electoral process become too great. After all, the interests underlying contribution limits, preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, “directly implicate the integrity of our electoral process.” McConnell, supra, at 136 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet that rationale does not simply mean “the lower the limit, the better.” That is because contribution limits that are too low can also harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability. Were we to ignore that fact, a statute that seeks to regulate campaign contributions could itself prove an obstacle to the very electoral fairness it seeks to promote. Thus, we see no alternative to the exercise of independent judicial judgment as a statute reaches those outer limits. And, where there is strong indication in a particular ease, i. e., danger signs, that such risks exist (both present in kind and likely serious in degree), courts, including appellate courts, must review the record independently and carefully with an eye toward assessing the statute’s “tailoring,” that is, toward assessing the proportionality of the restrictions. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984) (“[A]n appellate court has an obligation to ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression’ ” (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 284-286 (1964))).
We find those danger signs present here. As compared with the contribution limits upheld by the Court in the past, and with those in force in other States, Act 64’s limits are sufficiently low as to generate suspicion that they are not closely drawn. The Act sets its limits per election cycle, which includes both a primary and a general election. Thus, in a gubernatorial race with both primary and final election contests, the Act’s contribution limit amounts to $200 per election per candidate (with significantly lower limits for contributions to candidates for State Senate and House of Representatives, see supra, at 238). These limits apply both to contributions from individuals and to contributions from political parties, whether made in cash or in expenditures coordinated (or presumed to be coordinated) with the candidate. See supra, at 238-239.
These limits are well below the limits this Court upheld in Buckley. Indeed, in terms of real dollars (i. e., adjusting for inflation), the Act’s $200 per election limit on individual contributions to a campaign for governor is slightly more than one-twentieth of the limit on contributions to campaigns for federal office before the Court in Buckley. Adjusted to reflect its value in 1976 (the year Buckley was decided), Vermont’s contribution limit on campaigns for statewide office (including governor) amounts to $113.91 per 2-year election cycle, or roughly $57 per election, as compared to the $1,000 per election limit on individual contributions at issue in Buckley. (The adjusted value of Act 64’s limit on contributions from political parties to candidates for statewide office, again $200 per candidate per election, is just over one one-hundredth of the comparable limit before the Court in Buckley, $5,000 per election.) Yet Vermont’s gubernatorial district—the entire State—is no smaller than the House districts to which Buckley’s limits applied. In 1976, the average congressional district contained a population of about 465,000. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 459 (1976) (Statistical Abstract) (describing results of 1970 census). Indeed, Vermont’s population is 621,000—about one-third larger. Statistical Abstract 21 (2006) (describing Vermont’s population in 2004).
Moreover, considered as a whole, Vermont’s contribution limits are the lowest in the Nation. Act 64 limits contributions to candidates for statewide office (including governor) to $200 per candidate per election. We have found no State that imposes a lower per election limit. Indeed, we have found only seven States that impose limits on contributions to candidates for statewide office at or below $500 per election, more than twice Act 64’s limit. Cf. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §16-905 (West Cum. Supp. 2005) ($760 per election cycle, or $380 per election, adjusted for inflation); Colo. Const., Art. XXVIII, § 3 ($500 per election, adjusted for inflation); Fla. Stat. § 106.08(l)(a) (2003) ($500 per election); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21-A, §1015(1) (West Supp. 2005) ($500 for governor, $250 for other statewide office, per election); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 55, §7A (West Cum. Supp. 2006) ($500 per year, or $250 per election); Mont. Code Ann. §13-37-216(l)(a) (2005) ($500 for governor, $250 for other statewide office, per election); S. D. Codified Laws §12-25-1.1 (2004) ($1,000 per year, or $500 per election). We are aware of no State that imposes a limit on contributions from political parties to candidates for statewide office lower than Act 64’s $200 per candidate per election limit. Cf. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21-A, § 1015(1) (next lowest: $500 for contribution from party to candidate for governor, $250 for contribution from party to candidate for other statewide office, both per election). Similarly, we have found only three States that have limits on contributions to candidates for state legislature below Act 64’s $150 and $100 per election limits. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-905 ($296 per election cycle, or $148 per election); Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216(l)(a) ($130 per election); S. D. Codified Laws § 12-25-1.1 ($250 per year, or $125 per election). And we are aware of no State that has a lower limit on contributions from political parties to state legislative candidates. Cf. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21-A, § 1015(1) (next lowest: $250 per election).
Finally, Vermont’s limit is well below the lowest limit this Court has previously upheld, the limit of $1,075 per election (adjusted for inflation every two years, see Mo. Rev. Stat. §130.032.2 (Cum. Supp. 1998)) for candidates for Missouri state auditor. Shrink, 528 U. S. 377. The comparable Vermont limit of roughly $200 per election, not adjusted for inflation, is less than one-sixth of Missouri’s current inflation-adjusted limit ($1,275).
We recognize that Vermont’s population is much smaller than Missouri’s. Indeed, Vermont is about one-ninth of the size of Missouri. Statistical Abstract 21 (2006). Thus, per citizen, Vermont’s limit is slightly more generous. As of 2006, the ratio of the contribution limit to the size of the constituency in Vermont is.00064, while Missouri’s ratio is.00044, 31% lower. Cf. App. 55 (doing same calculation in 2000).
But this does not necessarily mean that Vermont’s limits are less objectionable than the limit upheld in Shrink. A campaign for state auditor is likely to be less costly than a campaign for governor; campaign costs do not automatically increase or decrease in precise proportion to the size of an electoral district. See App. 66 (1998 winning candidate for Vermont state auditor spent about $60,000; winning candidate for governor spent about $340,000); Opensecrets.org, The Big Picture, 2004 Cycle: Hot Races, available at http://www.opensecrets.org/ bigpicture/hotraces.asp?cycle=2004 (as visited June 22, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (U. S. Senate campaigns identified as competitive spend less per voter than U. S. House campaigns identified as competitive). Moreover, Vermont’s limits, unlike Missouri’s limits, apply in the same amounts to contributions made by political parties. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 130.032.4 (2000) (enacting limits on contributions from political parties to candidates 10 times higher than limits on contributions from individuals). And, as we have said, Missouri’s (current) $1,275 per election limit, unlike Vermont’s $200 per election limit, is indexed for inflation. See swpra, at 251; see also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 130.032.2 (2000).
The factors we have mentioned offset any neutralizing force of population differences. At the very least, they make it difficult to treat Shrink’s (then) $1,075 limit as providing affirmative support for the lawfulness of Vermont’s far lower levels. Cf. 528 U. S., at 404 (Breyer, J., concurring) (The Shrink “limit... is low enough to raise... a [significant constitutional] question”). And even were that not so, Vermont’s failure to index for inflation means that Vermont’s levels would soon be far lower than Missouri’s regardless of the method of comparison.
In sum, Act 64’s contribution limits are substantially lower than both the limits we have previously upheld and comparable limits in other States. These are danger signs that Act 64’s contribution limits may fall outside tolerable First Amendment limits. We consequently must examine the record independently and carefully to determine whether Act 64’s contribution limits are “closely drawn” to match the State’s interests.
C
Our examination of the record convinces us that, from a constitutional perspective, Act 64’s contribution limits are too restrictive. We reach this conclusion based not merely on the low dollar amounts of the limits themselves, but also on the statute’s effect on political parties and on volunteer activity in Vermont elections. Taken together, Act 64’s substantial restrictions on the ability of candidates to raise the funds necessary to run a competitive election, on the ability of political parties to help their candidates get elected, and on the ability of individual citizens to volunteer their time to campaigns show that the Act is not closely drawn to meet its objectives. In particular, five factors together lead us to this decision.
First, the record suggests, though it does not conclusively prove, that Act 64’s contribution limits will significantly restrict the amount of funding available for challengers to run competitive campaigns. For one thing, the petitioners’ expert, Clark Bensen, conducted a race-by-raee analysis of the 1998 legislative elections (the last to take place before Act 64 took effect) and concluded that Act 64’s contribution limits would have reduced the funds available in 1998 to Republican challengers in competitive races in amounts ranging from 18% to 53% of their total campaign income. See 3 Tr. 52-57 (estimating loss of 47% of funds for candidate Tully, 50% for Harvey, 53% for Welch, 19% for Bahre, 29% for Delaney, 36% for LaRocque, 18% for Smith, and 31% for Brown).
For another thing, the petitioners’ expert witnesses produced evidence and analysis showing that Vermont political parties (particularly the Republican Party) “target” their contributions to candidates in competitive races, that those contributions represent a significant amount of total candidate funding in such races, and that the contribution limits will cut the parties’ contributions to competitive races dramatically. See 1 id., at 189-190; 3 id., at 50-51; 8 id., at 139; 10 id., at 150; see also, e. g., Gierzynski & Breaux, The Role of Parties in Legislative Campaign Financing, 15 Am. Rev. Politics 171 (1994); Thompson, Cassie, & Jewell, A Sacred Cow or Just a Lot of Bull? Party and PAC Money in State Legislative Elections, 47 Pol. Research Q. 223 (1994). Their statistics showed that the party contributions
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner is a career officer in the Air Force who has come to believe that this country’s participation in the Vietnamese conflict is unjust and immoral. Having decided that he would do nothing to further the Nation’s military effort in Southeast Asia, Captain Noyd refused to obey an order, issued December 5, 1967, requiring him to teach one of the junior officers at the Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, to fly a military airplane.
In response, Major General Charles Bond, Jr., the Commander of the Twelfth Air Force, convened a general court-martial at the Cannon Base. On March 8, 1968, the court-martial found Noyd guilty of wilfully disobeying a lawful order; on the following day petitioner was sentenced to one year’s confinement at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and dismissal from the Air Force. As soon as the court-martial announced its sentence, Captain Noyd was ordered confined to his quarters. The court-martial’s judgment was then forwarded to General Bond for the review required by 10 U. S. C. § 864, and on May 10, 1968, the General approved the sentence, ordering that: “Pending completion of appellate review, the accused will be confined in the United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.”
At this point, petitioner’s attorneys undertook two courses of action. On the one hand, they appealed the merits of petitioner’s conviction to the Air Force Board of Review, which is the appellate military tribunal Congress has established to oversee the administration of criminal justice in petitioner’s branch of the Armed Forces. On the other hand, they sought habeas corpus relief from the civilian courts, arguing that the Uniform Code of Military Justice required that petitioner be released from confinement pending the outcome of his military appeal.
At the present time, petitioner’s appeal from his conviction is still pending in the higher reaches of the military court system. While the Air Force Board of Review has now affirmed the judgment of the court-martial, the Court of Military Appeals, the highest military tribunal, has agreed to review Captain Noyd’s case. Petitioner does not suggest that we may properly interfere with the orderly process of military review by considering the merits of his conviction at this juncture. Rather, we are now only asked to vindicate his asserted right to remain free from confinement while the validity of his conviction is still being litigated in the appellate military courts.
I.
Captain Noyd’s effort to invoke the assistance of the civilian courts was precipitated by General Bond’s order transferring petitioner to the disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth. Shortly after the order was issued, and before it was carried out, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, arguing that both his confinement at the Cannon Air Force Base and his proposed transfer to Fort Leavenworth were in violation of two provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. First, petitioner contended that his confinement constituted an attempt to “execute” his sentence in violation of Article 71 (c) of the Code, which provides:
“No sentence which includes, unsuspended, a dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one year or more, may be executed until affirmed by a board of review and, in cases reviewed by it, the Court of Military Appeals.” 10 U. S. C. § 871 (c). (Emphasis supplied.)
Second, petitioner argued that Article 13 of the Code only authorized confinement of a convicted serviceman pending his appeal after the military has found that restraint is necessary to prevent the serviceman’s flight from the jurisdiction. Since no such finding has been made in this case, petitioner argued that the civilian court should require his complete release.
The Government, in addition to opposing Captain Noyd’s claims on the merits, argued that petitioner should be required to exhaust his military remedies before seeking habeas corpus relief from the civilian courts. The District Court, however, refused to apply the exhaustion principle in the present case, finding that the military court system did not provide petitioner with an adequate remedy by which he could test the validity of his confinement, pending appeal, in an expedited manner. Turning to the merits, the District Judge granted petitioner part of the relief he requested. While the court refused to review the legality of Noyd’s confinement at the Cannon Air Force Base, the court did find that petitioner’s incarceration at Fort Leavenworth would constitute an “execution” of his sentence in violation of Article 71 (c), and so declared General Bond’s order invalid.
Both sides appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which reversed the District Court’s grant of partial relief. Relying on this Court’s decision in Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128 (1950), a unanimous panel held that the District Court could not properly grant petitioner any form of relief until he had first challenged the validity of his confinement before the appellate tribunals within the military system. The court emphasized that “the Court of Military Appeals has recently held that it possesses the power to issue a habeas corpus writ” if a serviceman could demonstrate that he was illegally restrained pending appeal, and it could perceive no justification for petitioner’s failure to seek the military court’s assistance. 402 F. 2d 441, 442-443. We granted certiorari to consider the propriety of the application of the rule of Gusik v. Schilder in the circumstances of this case. 393 U. S. 1048 (1969).
II.
Shortly after the Court of Appeals announced its decision, petitioner recognized that since his sentence was scheduled to expire on December 26, 1968, he might well be released from custody before this Court would have an opportunity to pass upon his claims for relief pending his appeal to the military courts. In order to avoid the possibility of mootness, petitioner promptly requested the Court of Appeals to stay its mandate and order his release pending this Court’s decision on his petition for certiorari. On December 6, the Court of Appeals agreed to stay its mandate, thereby keeping the District Court’s order in effect, but refused to require the military to release Captain Noyd from custody at the Cannon Air Force Base.
Petitioner then applied to Mr. Justice White, Circuit Justice for the Tenth Circuit, for temporary release from all confinement pending this Court’s action on his cer-tiorari petition. When the Circuit Justice denied this application on December 18, 1968, a second motion of the same tenor was made to Mr. Justice Douglas on the following day. Noting that the Court was then in recess and would not meet again until January 10, 1969, Mr. Justice Douglas ordered that “petitioner ... be placed in a non-incarcerated status” until the full Court could have an opportunity to pass on the issues raised in a considered manner. Pursuant to Mr. Justice Douglas’ order, petitioner was released from confinement on Christmas Eve, two days before his sentence was scheduled to expire.
Despite Mr. Justice Douglas’ order of release, the Government now suggests that this case has become moot. It claims that under the applicable military law, a judicial order that petitioner be placed in a “non-incarcerated status” was insufficient to toll petitioner’s sentence, which continued to run until it expired of its own force on December 26. The Government bases this claim upon its reading of Article 57 (b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice:
“Any period of confinement included in a sentence of a court-martial begins to run from the date the sentence is adjudged by the court-martial, but periods during which the sentence to confinement is suspended shall be excluded in computing the service of the term of confinement.” 10 U. S. C. § 857 (b).
Citing interpretive military regulations, the Government understands the statute to establish the general rule that “[t]he date the sentence of a court-martial is adjudged will mark the beginning of a sentence to confinement whether or not the accused had then been placed in confinement.” Apprehension and Confinement: Military Sentences to Confinement, AR 633-30; AFR 125-30. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner does not disagree with the Government’s understanding of the general rule, but relies on that part of the statute which expressly provides that a sentence may be tolled if it is “suspended” and the serviceman is placed on probation. Petitioner argues that since Mr. Justice Douglas’ order, and this Court’s confirmance of it, had the obvious purpose to preserve the status quo pending the full Court’s consideration of the merits of his certiorari petition, the order should be understood to have “suspended” petitioner’s sentence within the meaning of the statutory exception to the general rule. In response, the Government emphasizes that Mr. Justice Douglas’ order did not expressly “suspend” petitioner’s sentence and so contends that the statutory exception is not applicable in this instance.
We find it unnecessary to decide this question. For even if Mr. Justice Douglas’ order did not satisfy the statutory exception, we hold that it was sufficient to interrupt the running of petitioner’s sentence. Like the Court of Military Appeals, we do not believe that Congress intended that the general rule stated in Article 57 (b) be inexorably applied in all situations which do not fall within the “suspension of sentence” exception:
“Congress did not mention all contingencies which would prevent an accused from being credited with time served. Common sense suggests that if an accused escaped from confinement, his period of service would be interrupted and he would be required to make up the time at the end of the period.” United States v. Bryant, 12 U. S. C. M. A. 133, 137, 30 C. M. R. 133, 137 (1961).
We think it equally clear that Article 57 (b) was not intended to give a litigious serviceman a bonus when he obtains temporary release from confinement the military was seeking to impose. Rather, the statute serves to protect a convicted serviceman whom the military wishes to release from confinement before his term has run. If a serviceman’s commanding officer simply releases him from confinement without “suspending” his sentence, the Code does not demand that the serviceman be given a hearing before he is reincarcerated. In contrast, the Code demands that once a sentence is “suspended,” it may not be reinstated unless the accused is given a hearing, at which he is represented by counsel, in order to determine whether he has violated the conditions of his probation. 10 U. S. C. § 872 (a). Article 57 (b), then, represents Congress’ decision that even though a man is temporarily set at liberty, he should be given sentence credit unless he is sure that his freedom will not be curtailed at a later date without a plenary hearing. Obviously, the statute’s purpose will not be served in the present case, where Captain Noyd’s liberty will only be limited once again after a full argument before the judiciary.
In recognition of this fact, the Manual for Courts-Martial has, since its promulgation in 1951, required that a serviceman not be given credit for the time during which he has obtained release from confinement in cases like the present one. The Manual, which has the force of law unless it is “contrary to or inconsistent with” the Uniform Code Congress has enacted, 10 U. S. C. § 836 (a), provides:
“A sentence to confinement ... is continuous until the term expires, with certain exceptions. These exceptions include the following:
“Periods during which the person undergoing such a sentence is absent without authority ... or is erroneously released from confinement through misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the prisoner, or is erroneously released from confinement upon his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under a court order which is later reversed by a competent tribunal . . . .” § 97 (c), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1951). (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the Manual requires that a serviceman receive no sentence credit for the period he has avoided confinement if the judicial decision granting him freedom is reversed on appeal. It follows a fortiori that the principles established in the Manual require that Captain Noyd be denied sentence credit as well. For in the present litigation, petitioner has not convinced any court that he may properly be relieved from all confinement. Petitioner obtained his release from Mr. Justice Douglas simply by showing that his chances of success on the merits were sufficiently great to warrant the grant of interlocutory relief. Surely, he is not entitled to more favorable sentencing treatment than the serviceman who has at least convinced one court that his claim to release is legally sound but whose arguments have not been upheld on appeal.
We hold that the principles of the Manual for Courts-Martial operated to interrupt the running of Captain Noyd’s sentence at the time of his release on December 24, 1968, and hence that the case before us is not moot.
III.
We now turn to consider whether petitioner could properly seek his release in civilian courts without making any effort to invoke the assistance of the courts within the military system. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128 (1950), established the general rule that habeas corpus petitions from military prisoners should not be entertained by federal civilian courts until all available remedies within the military court system have been invoked in vain. Mr. Justice Douglas, for a unanimous Court, explained some of the important reasons which require civilian courts to respect the integrity of the military court system that Congress has established:
“An analogy is a petition for habeas corpus in the federal court challenging the jurisdiction of a state court. If the state procedure provides a remedy, which though available has not been exhausted, the federal courts will not interfere. . . . The policy underlying that rule is as pertinent to the collateral attack of military judgments as it is to collateral attack of judgments rendered in state courts. If an available procedure has not been employed to rectify the alleged error which the federal court is asked to correct, any interference by the federal court may be wholly needless. The procedure established to police the errors of the tribunal whose judgment is challenged may be adequate for the occasion. If it is, any friction between the federal court and the military or state tribunal is saved. ... Such a principle of judicial administration is in no sense a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. It is merely a deferment of resort to the writ until other corrective procedures are shown to be futile.” Id., at 131-132.
It is true, of course, that the principles of federalism which enlighten the law of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners are not relevant to the problem before us. Nevertheless other considerations require a substantial degree of civilian deference to military tribunals. In reviewing military decisions, we must accommodate the demands of individual rights and the social order in a context which is far removed from those which we encounter in the ordinary run of civilian litigation, whether state or federal. In doing so, we must interpret a legal tradition which is radically different from that which is common in civil courts.
It is for these reasons that Congress, in the exercise of its power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” has never given this Court appellate jurisdiction to supervise the administration of criminal justice in the military. When after the Second World War, Congress became convinced of the need to assure direct civilian review over military justice, it deliberately chose to confide this power to a specialized Court of Military Appeals, so that disinterested civilian judges could gain over time a fully developed understanding of the distinctive problems and legal traditions of the Armed Forces.
Almost one year before petitioner sought habeas corpus relief from the Federal District Court sitting in New Mexico, the Court of Military Appeals had held that it would, in appropriate cases, grant the relief petitioner now demands from us. Levy v. Resor, 17 U. S. C. M. A. 135, 37 C. M. R. 399 (1967). Petitioner, however, has made no effort to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Military Appeals. Nevertheless, he would have civilian courts intervene precipitately into military life without the guidance of the court to which Congress has confided primary responsibility for the supervision of military justice in this country and abroad.
Petitioner emphasizes that in the present case we are not called upon to review prematurely the merits of the court-martial proceeding itself. Instead, we are merely asked to determine the legality of petitioner’s confinement while he is exercising his right of appeal to the higher military courts. It is said that there is less justification for deference to military tribunals in ancillary matters of this sort. We cannot agree. All of the reasons supporting this Court’s decision in Gusik v. Schilder, supra, are applicable here. If the military courts do vindicate petitioner’s claim, there will be no need for civilian judicial intervention. Needless friction will result if civilian courts throughout the land are obliged to review comparable decisions of military commanders in the first instance. Moreover, if we were to reach the merits of petitioner’s claim for relief pending his military appeal, we would be obliged to interpret extremely technical provisions of the Uniform Code which have no analogs in civilian jurisprudence, and which have not even been fully explored by the Court of Military Appeals itself. There seems little reason to blaze a trail on unfamiliar ground when the highest military court stands ready to consider petitioner’s arguments.
Petitioner contends, however, that the Court of Military Appeals cannot be expected to protect his rights in a fully effective way. His principal argument is based on the simple fact that the Court of Military Appeals sits exclusively in Washington, D. C. Thus, before a serviceman may invoke its habeas corpus jurisdiction, he must somehow obtain a lawyer willing and able to conduct a lawsuit in the Nation’s Capital. It is said that this practical difficulty makes it clear that the Court of Military Appeals cannot provide petitioner with adequate relief.
This argument seems to us far too sweeping to be acceptable. Individuals convicted of crime in the civil judicial system are often obliged to appeal to state courts which are far distant from the place at which they are incarcerated. Nevertheless, this fact alone has never been considered sufficient to permit a federal district court to consider a petition for habeas corpus without demanding that the prisoner exhaust all of the presently available remedies offered by the State’s appellate courts. Similarly, the fact that Captain Noyd is confined far from Washington, D. C., is not enough, standing alone, to permit him to circumvent the military court system.
Noyd argues, however, that the great distance of the Court of Military Appeals is of special significance in cases like the present one, where speed is essential if relief is to be at all effective. But petitioner concedes that the Court of Military Appeals has thus far acted speedily when confronted with an application for an emergency writ, and there is no reason to believe that the court would not have responded rapidly if Captain Noyd had sought its assistance. Nor has petitioner ever suggested that it was impossible for him to obtain a lawyer who was willing to present an appropriate application before the Court of Military Appeals with the requisite dispatch.
Instead, petitioner simply argues that other servicemen in other situations could conceivably have great difficulty in obtaining a lawyer who was able to move quickly before the military court sitting in Washington. Moreover, it is said that the Court of Military Appeals would be inundated with applications for emergency writs if all servicemen in petitioner’s position were required to seek relief within the military system. It will be time enough, however, to consider these problems when, and if, they arise. It may be that situations like the present one are unusual, or that the Court of Military Appeals will be able to announce clear rules as to the proper treatment of convicted prisoners pending appeal, or that Congress will act to facilitate the hearing of applications for emergency writs within the military system. Since petitioner has at no time attempted to show that prompt and effective relief was unavailable from the Court of Military Appeals in his case, we hold that petitioner’s failure to exhaust this remedy before seeking the assistance of the civilian courts is not excused.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. In light of the substantial questions raised by petitioner, however, we think it plain that petitioner in no sense acted in bad faith when he failed to exhaust his military remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of the District Court. Consequently, we consider it appropriate for us to continue Mr. Justice Douglas’ order in effect until our mandate issues, in order to give petitioner an opportunity to present his arguments to the Court of Military Appeals. See 28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a); cf. Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 254 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter). While it is true that Captain Noyd has only two days yet to serve on his sentence, he should not be required to surrender his freedom for even this short time unless it is found that the law so requires.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result.
Before this incident took place, Captain Noyd sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the civilian federal courts in an effort to require the Air Force either to assign him to duties consistent with his beliefs or to dismiss him. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied relief because petitioner had not yet been court-martialed for refusing to obey orders and so had not fully exhausted his remedies within the military system. Noyd v. McNamara, 267 F. Supp. 701 (1967). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, 378 F. 2d 538, and this Court denied certiorari, 389 U. S. 1022 (1967). The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Circuits have, however, subsequently decided that the exhaustion doctrine did not necessarily require a serviceman to await the military’s decision to convene a court-martial before seeking relief in the civilian courts. Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F. 2d 705 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1968); In re Kelly, 401 F. 2d 211 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1968). Cf. Brown v. McNamara, 387 F. 2d 150 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1967). We have not found it necessary to resolve this conflict among the circuits in order to decide the narrow issue in this case.
This provision of the Code reads:
“Art. 13. Punishment prohibited before trial.
“Subject to section 857 of this title [Article 57 of the Code], no person, while being held for trial or the result of trial, may be subjected to punishment or penalty other than arrest or confinement upon the charges pending against him, nor shall the arrest or confinement imposed upon him be any more rigorous than the circumstances require to insure his presence, but he may be subjected to minor punishment during that period for infractions of discipline.” 10 U. S. C. § 813.
After the District Court held that petitioner could not be lawfully transferred to Fort Leavenworth, the military significantly increased the degree of restraint that was imposed upon Captain Noyd at the Cannon Air Force Base. Petitioner was permitted to see his family only twice each week and was forbidden to leave his quarters except for narrowly limited purposes. See Letter Regarding Arrest in Quarters, from Col. George R. Doerr, Appendix 32-34.
While petitioner’s one-year sentence began to run on March 9, 1968, when it was announced by the court-martial, the Air Force awarded him sentence credits for good behavior, thereby permitting him to obtain his release from custody after a period of some nine and one-half months.
When this Court granted certiorari on January 20, 1969, we also ordered that the “[s]tay heretofore granted by Mr. Justice Douglas shall remain in effect pending issuance of judgment of this Court or until further order of this Court.” 393 U. S. 1048.
Constitution, of the United States, Art. I, § 8, el. 14.
The Government does not renew the arguments it has on occasion advanced before the Court of Military Appeals, see Brief in Support of Motion to Strike and Dismiss Petition, United States v. Frischholz, Docket No. 14,270 (1965), to the effect that the Court of Military Appeals lacks the power to grant emergency writs. In its decision in the Frischholz case, 16 U. S. C. M. A. 150, 36 C. M. R. 306 (1966), the Court of Military Appeals properly rejected the Government’s argument, holding that the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. §1651 (a), permitted it to issue all “writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [its] . . . jurisdiction.” Since the All Writs Act applies by its terms to any “courts established by Act of Congress,” and since the Revisers of 1948 expressly noted that “[t]he revised section extends the power to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction, to all courts established by Act of Congress, thus making explicit the right to exercise powers implied from the creation of such courts,” we do not believe that there can be any doubt as to the power of the Court of Military Appeals to issue an emergency writ of habeas corpus in cases, like the present one, which may ultimately be reviewed by that court. A different question would, of course, arise in a case which the Court of Military Appeals is not authorized to review under the governing statutes. Cf. United States v. Bevilacqua, 18 U. S. C. M. A. 10, 39 C. M. R. 10 (1968).
Petitioner contends that our decisions in Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955); Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1 (1957); and McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U. S. 281 (1960), justify his position that exhaustion of military remedies is not required in this case. The cited cases held that the Constitution barred the assertion of court-martial jurisdiction over various classes of civilians connected with the military, and it is true that this Court there vindicated complainants' claims without requiring exhaustion of military remedies. We did so, however, because we did not believe that the expertise of military courts extended to the consideration of constitutional claims of the type presented. Moreover, it appeared especially unfair to require exhaustion of military remedies when the complainants raised substantial arguments denying the right of the military to try them at all. Neither of these factors is present in the case before us.
In Levy v. Resor, supra, a petition for emergency relief was filed on June 20, 1967. The Court of Military Appeals promptly ordered oral argument and filed a full opinion on July 7, 1967. Both the petitioner and the Government indicate that a subsequent habeas corpus application filed by Captain Levy was ruled on by the Court of Military Appeals within five days after its submission.
Consequently, we need not decide how long a serviceman must wait for a decision on his application by the Court of Military Appeals before he may petition for a writ of habeas corpus from the appropriate civilian court.
The Government suggests that petitioner should also be required to exhaust a second remedy allegedly afforded him within the military system. It is said that Captain Noyd should have requested the Air Force Board of Review to release him pending the exhaustion of his rights of appeal. The Government, however, cites no decision of a Board of Review which asserts the power to grant emergency interlocutory relief prior to the Board's consideration of a case on the merits; nor are we referred to any statute which unequivocally grants this authority. In the absence of any attempt by the Boards of Review to assert such a power, we do not believe that petitioner may properly be required to exhaust a remedy which may not exist. Cf. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Weld County, 247 U. S. 282 (1918) ; Township of, Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620 (1946).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether 35 U. S. C. § 271(e)(1) (1982 ed., Supp II) renders activities that would otherwise constitute patent infringement noninfringing if they are undertaken for the purpose of developing and submitting to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) information necessary to obtain marketing approval for a medical device under § 515 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 90 Stat. 552, 21 U. S. C. § 360e.
I
In 1983, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1338(a), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Eli Lilly & Co. filed an action against respondent Medtronic, Inc., in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to enjoin respondent’s testing and marketing of an implantable cardiac defibrillator, a medical device used in the treatment of heart patients. Petitioner claimed that respondent’s actions infringed its exclusive rights under United States Patent No. Re 27,757 and United States Patent No. 3,942,536. Respondent sought to defend against the suit on the ground that its activities were “reasonably related to the development and submission of information under” the FDCA, and thus exempt from a finding of infringement under 35 U. S. C. § 271(e)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. II). The District Court rejected this argument, concluding that the exemption does not apply to the development and submission of information relating to medical devices. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for petitioner on infringement of the first patent, and the court directed a verdict for petitioner on infringement of the second patent. The court entered judgment for petitioner and issued a permanent injunction against infringement of both patents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that by virtue of § 271(e)(1) respondent’s activities could not constitute infringement if they had been undertaken to develop information reasonably related to the development and submission of information necessary to obtain regulatory approval under the FDCA. It remanded for the District Court to determine whether in fact that condition had been met. 872 F. 2d 402 (1989). We granted certiorari. 493 U. S. 889 (1989).
II
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (1984 Act), 98 Stat. 1585, which amended the FDCA and the patent laws in several important respects. The issue in this case concerns the proper interpretation of a portion of § 202 of the 1984 Act, codified at 35 U. S. C. § 271(e)(1). That paragraph, as originally enacted, provided:
“It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913)) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.” 35 U. S. C. § 271(e)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. II).
The parties dispute whether this provision exempts from infringement the use of patented inventions to develop and submit information for marketing approval of medical devices under the FDCA.
A
The phrase “patented invention” in § 271(e)(1) is defined to include all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone. See 35 U. S. C. § 100(a) (“When used in this title unless the context otherwise indicates . . . [t]he term ‘invention’ means invention or discovery”). The core of the present controversy is that petitioner interprets the statutory phrase, “a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs,” to refer only to those individual provisions of federal law that regulate drugs, whereas respondent interprets it to refer to the entirety of any Act (including, of course, the FDCA) at least some of whose provisions regulate drugs. If petitioner is correct, only such provisions of the FDCA as § 505, 52 Stat. 1052, as amended, 21 U. S. C. § 355, governing premarket approval of new drugs, are covered by § 271 (e)(1), and respondent’s submission of information under 21 U. S. C. § 360e, governing premarket approval of medical devices, would not be a noninfringing use.
On the basis of the words alone, respondent’s interpretation seems preferable. The phrase “a Federal law” can be used to refer to an isolated statutory section—one might say, for example, that the judicial review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706, is “a Federal law.” The phrase is also used, however, to refer to an entire Act. The Constitution, for example, provides that “Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). And the United States Code provides that “[w]henever a bill. . . becomes a law or takes effect, it shall forthwith be received by the Archivist of the United States from the President.” 1 U. S. C. § 106a (emphasis added). This latter usage, which is probably the more common one, seems also the more natural in the present context. If § 271(e)(1) referred to “a Federal law which pertains to the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs” it might be more reasonable to think that an individual provision was referred to. But the phrase “a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs” more naturally summons up the image of an entire statutory scheme of regulation. The portion of § 271(e)(1) that immediately precedes the words “a Federal law” likewise seems more compatible with reference to an entire Act. It refers to “the development and submission of information under a Federal law” (emphasis added). It would be more common, if a single section rather than an entire scheme were referred to, to speak of “the development and submission of information pursuant to a Federal law,” or perhaps “in compliance with a Federal law.” Taking the action “under a Federal law” suggests taking it in furtherance of or compliance with a comprehensive scheme of regulation. Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, the fact that § 202 of the 1984 Act (which established § 271(e)(1)) used the word “law” in its broader sense is strongly suggested by the fact that the immediately preceding—and, as we shall see, closely related—section of the 1984 Act, when it meant to refer to a particular provision of law rather than an entire Act, referred to “the first permitted commercial marketing or use of the product under the provision of law.” § 201, 98 Stat. 1598, 35 U. S. C. § 156(a)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
The centrally important distinction in this legislation (from the standpoint of the commercial interests affected) is not between applications for drug approval and applications for device approval, but between patents relating to drugs and patents relating to devices. If only the former patents were meant to be included, there were available such infinitely more clear and simple ways of expressing that intent that it is hard to believe the convoluted manner petitioner suggests was employed would have been selected. The provision might have read, for example, “It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented drug invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information required, as a condition of manufacture, use, or sale, by Federal law.” Petitioner contends that the terms “patented drug,” or “drug invention” (or, presumably, “patented drug invention”) would have been “potentially unclear” as to whether they covered only patents for drug products, or patents for drug composition and drug use as well. Brief for Petitioner 22. If that had been the concern, however, surely it would have been clearer and more natural to expand the phrase constituting the object of the sentence to “patented invention for drug product, drug composition, or drug use” than to bring in such a limitation indirectly by merely limiting the laws under which the information is submitted to drug regulation laws.
On the other side of the ledger, however, one must admit that while the provision more naturally means what respondent suggests, it is somewhat difficult to understand why anyone would want it to mean that. Why should the touchstone of noninfringement be whether the use is related to the development and submission of information under a provision that happens to be included within an Act that, in any of its provisions, not necessarily the one at issue, regulates drugs? The first response is that this was a shorthand reference to the pertinent provisions Congress was aware of, all of which happened to be included in Acts that regulated drugs. But since it is conceded that all those pertinent provisions were contained within only two Acts (the FDCA and the Public Health Service Act (PHS Act), 58 Stat. 682, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.), that is not much of a time-saving shorthand. The only rejoinder can be that Congress anticipated future regulatory-submission requirements that it would want to be covered, which might not be included in the FDCA or the PHS Act but would surely (or probably) be included in another law that regulates drugs. That is not terribly convincing. On the other hand, this same awkwardness, in miniature, also inheres in petitioner’s interpretation, unless one gives “under a Federal law” a meaning it simply will not bear. That is to say, if one interprets the phrase to refer to only a single section or even subsection of federal law, it is hard to understand why the fact that that section or subsection happens to regulate drugs should bring within § 271(e)(1) other products that it also regulates; and it does not seem within the range of permissible meaning to interpret “a Federal law” to mean only isolated portions of a single section or subsection. The answer to this, presumably, is that Congress would not expect two products to be dealt with in the same section or subsection—but that also is not terribly convincing.
As far as the text is concerned, therefore, we conclude that we have before us a provision that somewhat more naturally reads as the Court of Appeals determined, but that is not plainly comprehensible on anyone’s view. Both parties seek to enlist legislative history in support of their interpretation, but that sheds no clear light. We think the Court of Appeals’ interpretation is confirmed, however, by the structure of the 1984 Act taken as a whole.
B
Under federal law, a patent “grant[s] to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, . . . the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States.” 35 U. S. C. § 154. Except as otherwise provided, “whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” § 271(a). The parties agree that the 1984 Act was designed to respond to two unintended distortions of the 17-year patent term produced by the requirement that certain products must receive premarket regulatory approval. First, the holder of a patent relating to such products would as a practical matter not be able to reap any financial rewards during the early years of the term. When an inventor makes a potentially useful discovery, he ordinarily protects it by applying for a patent at once. Thus, if the discovery relates to a product that cannot be marketed without substantial testing and regulatory approval, the “clock” on his patent term will be running even though he is not yet able to derive any profit from the invention.
The second distortion occurred at the other end of the patent term. In 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided that the manufacture, use, or sale of a patented invention during the term of the patent constituted an act of infringement, see § 271(a), even if it was for the sole purpose of conducting tests and developing information necessary to apply for regulatory approval. See Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F. 2d 858, cert. denied, 469 U. S. 856 (1984). Since that activity could not be commenced by those who planned to compete with the patentee until expiration of the entire patent term, the patentee’s de facto monopoly would continue for an often substantial period until regulatory approval was obtained. In other words, the combined effect of the patent law and the premarket regulatory approval requirement was to create an effective extension of the patent term.
The 1984 Act sought to eliminate this distortion from both ends of the patent period. Section 201 of the Act established a patent-term extension for patents relating to certain products that were subject to lengthy regulatory delays and could not be marketed prior to regulatory approval. The eligible products were described as follows:
“(1) The term ‘product’ means:
“(A) A human drug product.
“(B) Any medical device, food additive, or color additive subject to regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
“(2) The term ‘human drug product’ means the active ingredient of a new drug, antibiotic drug, or human biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act) including any salt or ester of the active ingredient, as a single entity or in combination with another active ingredient.” 35 U. S. C. § 156(f).
Section 201 provides that patents relating to these products can be extended up to five years if, inter alia, the product was “subject to a regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or use,” and “the permission for the commercial marketing or use of the product after such regulatory review period [was] the first permitted commercial marketing or use of the product under the provision of law under which such regulatory review period occurred.” 35 U. S. C. § 156(a).
The distortion at the other end of the patent period was addressed by § 202 of the Act. That added to the provision prohibiting patent infringement, 35 U. S. C. § 271, the paragraph at issue here, establishing that “[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.” § 271(e)(1). This allows competitors, prior to the expiration of a patent, to engage in otherwise infringing activities necessary to obtain regulatory approval.
Under respondent’s interpretation, there may be some relatively rare situations in which a patentee will obtain the advantage of the § 201 extension but not suffer the disadvantage of the § 202 noninfringement provision, and others in which he will suffer the disadvantage without the benefit. Under petitioner’s interpretation, however, that sort of disequilibrium becomes the general rule for patents relating to all products (other than drugs) named in § 201 and subject to premarket approval under the FDCA. Not only medical devices, but also food additives and color additives, since they are specifically named in § 201, see 35 U. S. C. § 156(f), receive the patent-term extension; but since the specific provisions requiring regulatory approval for them, though included in the FDCA, are not provisions requiring regulatory approval for drugs, they are (on petitioner’s view) not subject to the noninfringement provision of § 271(e)(1). It seems most implausible to us that Congress, being demonstrably aware of the dual distorting effects of regulatory approval requirements in this entire area—dual distorting effects that were roughly offsetting, the disadvantage at the beginning of the term producing a more or less corresponding advantage at the end of the term—should choose to address both those distortions only for drug products; and for other products named in § 201 should enact provisions which not only leave in place an anticompetitive restriction at the end of the monopoly term but simultaneously expand the monopoly term itself, thereby not only failing to eliminate but positively aggravating distortion of the 17-year patent protection. It would take strong evidence to persuade us that this is what Congress wrought, and there is no such evidence here.
Apart from the reason of the matter, there are textual indications that §§ 201 and 202 are meant generally to be complementary. That explains, for example, § 202's exception for “a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913).” 35 U. S. C. § 271(e)(1). Although new animal drugs and veterinary biological products are subject to premarket regulatory licensing and approval under the FDCA, see 21 U. S. C. § 360b (new animal drugs), and the Act of March 4, 1913, see 21 U. S. C. §§ 151, 154 (veterinary biological products)—each “a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs”—neither product was included in the patent-term extension provision of § 201. They therefore were excepted from § 202 as well. Interpreting § 271(e)(1) as the Court of Appeals did here appears to create a perfect “product” fit between the two sections. All of the products eligible for a patent term extension under § 201 are subject to § 202, since all of them— medical devices, food additives, color additives, new drugs, antibiotic drugs, and human biological products—are subject to premarket approval under various provisions of the FDCA, see 21 U. S. C. § 360e (medical devices); § 348 (food additives); § 376 (color additives); § 355 (new drugs); § 357 (antibiotic drugs), or under the PHS Act, see 42 U. S. C. § 262 (human biological products). And the products subject to premarket approval under the FDCA and the Act of March 4, 1913, that are not made eligible for a patent term extension under § 201—new animal drugs and veterinary biological products—are excluded from § 202 as well.
III
According to petitioner, “[t]he argument for a broad construction of Section 271(e)(1) is refuted by the companion Sections (e)(2) and (e)(4).” Brief for Petitioner 17. The latter provide:
“(2) It shall be an act of infringement to submit an application under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or described in section 505(b)(2) of such Act for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent, if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such Act to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent.
“(4) For an act of infringement described in paragraph (2)-
“(A) the court shall order the effective date of any approval of the drug involved in the infringement to be a date which is not earlier than the date of the expiration of the patent which has been infringed,
“(B) injunctive relief may be granted against an infringer to prevent the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of an approved drug, and
“(C) damages or other monetary relief may be awarded against an infringer only if there has been commercial manufacture, use, or sale of an approved drug.
“The remedies prescribed by subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) are the only remedies which may be granted by a court for an act of infringement described in paragraph (2), except that a court may award attorney fees under section 285.” 35 U. S. C. §§ 271(e)(2), (4).
Petitioner points out that the protections afforded by these provisions are conferred exclusively on the holders of drug patents. They would, petitioner contends, have been conferred upon the holders of other patents if Congress had intended the infringement exemption of § 271(e)(1) to apply to them as well.
That is not so. The function of the paragraphs in question is to define a new (and somewhat artificial) act of infringement for a very limited and technical purpose that relates only to certain drug applications. As an additional means of eliminating the de facto extension at the end of the patent term in the case of drugs, and to enable new drugs to be marketed more cheaply and quickly, § 101 of the 1984 Act amended § 505 of the FDCA, 21 U. S. C. § 355, to authorize abbreviated new drug applications (ANDA’s), which would substantially shorten the time and effort needed to obtain marketing approval. An ANDA may be filed for a generic drug that is the same as a so-called “pioneer drug” previously approved, see § 355(j)(2)(A), or that differs from the pioneer drug in specified ways, see § 355(j)(2)(C). The ANDA applicant can substitute bioequivalence data for the extensive animal and human studies of safety and effectiveness that must accompany a full new drug application. Compare § 355(j)(2) (A)(iv) with § 355(b)(1). In addition, § 103 of the 1984 Act amended § 505(b) of the FDCA, § 355(b), to permit submission of a so-called paper new drug application (paper NDA), an application that relies on published literature to satisfy the requirement of animal and human studies demonstrating safety and effectiveness. See § 355(b)(2). Like ANDA’s, paper NDA’s permit an applicant seeking approval of a generic drug to avoid the costly and time-consuming studies required for a pioneer drug.
These abbreviated drug-application provisions incorporated an important new mechanism designed to guard against infringement of patents relating to pioneer drugs. Pioneer drug applicants are required to file with the FDA the number and expiration date of any patent which claims the drug that is the subject of the application, or a method of using such drug. See § 355(b)(1). ANDA’s and paper NDA’s are required to contain one of four certifications with respect to each patent named in the pioneer drug application: (1) “that such patent information has not been filed,” (2) “that such patent has expired,” (3) “the date on which such patent will expire,” or (4) “that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted.” §§ 355(b)(2)(A), 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
This certification is significant, in that it determines the date on which approval of an ANDA or paper NDA can be made effective, and hence the date on which commercial marketing may commence. If the applicant makes either the first or second certification, approval can be made effective immediately. See §§ 355(c)(3)(A), 355(j)(4)(B)(i). If the applicant makes the third certification, approval of the application can be made effective as of the date the patent expires. See §§ 355(c)(3)(B), 355(j)(4)(B)(ii). If the applicant makes the fourth certification, however, the effective date must depend on the outcome of further events triggered by the Act. An applicant who makes the fourth certification is required to give notice to the holder of the patent alleged to be invalid or not infringed, stating that an application has been filed seeking approval to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of the drug before the expiration of the patent, and setting forth a detailed statement of the factual and legal basis for the applicant’s opinion that the patent is not valid or will not be infringed. See §§ 355(b)(3)(B), 355(j)(2)(B)(ii). Approval of an ANDA or paper NDA containing the fourth certification may become effective immediately only if the patent owner has not initiated a lawsuit for infringement within 45 days of receiving notice of the certification. If the owner brings such a suit, then approval may not be made effective until the court rules that the patent is not infringed or until the expiration of (in general) 30 months, whichever first occurs. See §§ 355(c)(3)(C), 355(j)(4)(B)(iii).
This scheme will not work, of course, if the holder of the patent pertaining to the pioneer drug is disabled from establishing in court that there has been an act of infringement. And that was precisely the disability that the new 35 U. S. C. § 271(e)(1) imposed with regard to use of his patented invention only for the purpose of obtaining premarketing approval. Thus, an act of infringement had to be created for these ANDA and paper NDA proceedings. That is what is achieved by § 271 (e)(2)—the creation of a highly artificial act of infringement that consists of submitting an ANDA or a paper NDA containing the fourth type of certification that is in error as to whether commercial manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug (none of which, of course, has actually occurred) violates the relevant patent. Not only is the defined act of infringement artificial, so are the specified consequences, as set forth in subsection (e)(4). Monetary damages are permitted only if there has been “commercial manufacture, use, or sale.” § 271(e)(4)(C). Quite obviously, the purpose of subsections (e)(2) and (e)(4) is to enable the judicial adjudication upon which the ANDA and paper NDA schemes depend. It is wholly to be expected, therefore, that these provisions would apply only to applications under the sections establishing those schemes—which (entirely incidentally, for present purposes) happen to be sections that relate only to drugs and not to other products.
* * *
No interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform § 271(e)(1) into an elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship. To construe it as the Court of Appeals decided, one must posit a good deal of legislative imprecision; but to construe it as petitioner would, one must posit that and an implausible substantive intent as well.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Unless otherwise specified, references to sections of the United States Code are to those sections as they existed upon the effective date of the 1984 Act.
Petitioner’s principal argument is that the legislative history of § 202 mentions only drugs—which is quite different, of course, from its saying (as it does not) that only drugs are included. “It is not the law that a statute can have no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history . . . .” Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U. S. 106, 115 (1988). As respondent notes, even the legislative history of § 201—whose text explicitly includes devices—contains only scant references to devices.
Petitioner suggests that it was “the 1984 Roche decision which prompted enactment of [§ 202],” Brief for Petitioner 20, n. 13, which should therefore be regarded as quite independent of the simultaneously enacted patent-term extension of § 201. Undoubtedly the decision in Roche prompted the proposal of § 202; but whether that alone accounted for its enactment is quite a different question. It seems probable that Congress—for the reasons we discuss in text—would have regarded § 201 and § 202 as related parts of a single legislative package, as we do.
We cannot readily imagine such situations (and petitioner has not described any), except where there is good enough reason for the difference. Petitioner states that disequilibrium of this sort will often occur because the § 271(e)(1) noninfringement provision applies “whether the patent term is extended or not,” and even with respect to “patents which cannot qualify for a term extension.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 11. But if the patent term is not extended only because the patentee does not apply, he surely has no cause for complaint. And the major reason relevant patents will not qualify for the term extension is that they pertain to “follow-on” drug products rather than “pioneer” drug products, see §§ 156(a)(5)(A), 156 (f)(2); Fisons pic v. Quigg, 876 F. 2d 99 (CA Fed. 1989). For these, however, the abbreviated regulatory approval procedures established by Title I of the 1984 Act, 98 Stat. 1585, see 21 U. S. C. §§ 355(b)(2), (j), eliminate substantial regulatory delay at the outset of the patent term and thus eliminate the justification for the § 156 extension.
Petitioner argues that there was good reason for Congress to establish an infringement exemption with respect to drugs but not devices, since testing of the latter does much greater economic harm to the paten-tee. Devices, petitioner contends, are much more expensive than drugs ($17,000 apiece for respondent’s allegedly infringing defibrillators); and many have only a small number of potential customers, who will purchase only a single device each, so that depleting the market through testing may do substantial harm. Brief for Petitioner 30-31. These concerns, however, apply with respect to certain drugs as well. According to one source, a year’s dosage of Cyclosporine (used to suppress rejection of new organs) costs from $5,000 to $7,000; of AZT (used to treat AIDS) $8,000; of Monoclate (used to speed blood clotting in hemophiliacs) $25,000; and of Growth Hormone (used to treat dwarfism) $8,000 to $30,000. A. Pollack, The Troubling Cost of Drugs That Offer Hope, N. Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1988, p. A1, col. 3. Another new drug, Tissue Plasminogen Activator, used in the treatment of heart attacks to dissolve blood clots, costs $2,200 per dose and is prescribed for only a single dose. Ibid. Moreover, even if the factors petitioner mentions could explain the omission from § 271(e)(1) of medical devices, they could not explain the omission of food additives and color additives.
It is true that § 202, if interpreted to apply to all products regulated by the FDCA and other drug-regulating statutes, has a product coverage that includes other products, in addition to new animal drugs and veterinary biological products, not numbered among the specifically named products in § 201—for example, food, infant formulas, cosmetics, pesticides, and vitamins. But for the § 202 exemption to be applicable, the patent use must be “reasonably related to the development and submission of information under” the relevant law. New animal drugs and veterinary biological products appear to be the only additional products covered by drug-regulating statutes for which the requirement of premarket approval—and hence the need for “development and submission of information”—existed. With respect to food, infant formulas, cosmetics, and pesticides, for example, the FDCA merely established generally applicable standards that had to be met. See, e. g., 21 U. S. C. § 341 (food); § 350a (infant formula); § 361 (cosmetics); § 346a (pesticides); cf. § 350 (vitamins).
It must be acknowledged that the seemingly complete product correlation between § 201 and § 202 was destroyed in 1986, when, without adding “new infant formula” to the defined products eligible for the patent-term extension under § 156, Congress established a premarket approval requirement for that product, and thus automatically rendered it eligible for the § 271(e)(1) exemption from patent infringement. See Pub. L. 99-570, § 4014(a)(7), 100 Stat. 3207-116, codified at 21 U. S. C. § 350a(d). That subsequent enactment does not change our view of what the statute means. That isolated indication of lack of correlation between § 156 and § 271(e)(1) is in any event contradicted by the 1988 amendment that added most new animal drugs and veterinary biological products to § 156 and simultaneously deleted from § 271(e)(1) the infringement exception for those products. See Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act, 102 Stat. 3971, 3984-3989.
Although petitioner has not challenged § 271(e)(1) on constitutional grounds, it argues that we should adopt its construction because of the “serious constitutional question under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . [that would arise] if the statute is interpreted to authorize the infringing use of medical devices.” Brief for Petitioner 31. We do not see how this consideration makes any difference. Even if the competitive injury caused by the noninfringement provision is de minimis with respect to most drugs, surely it is substantial with respect to some of them—so the “serious constitutional question” (if it is that) is not avoided by petitioner’s construction either.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The question in this case is whether the State of Missouri violated that guarantee when it prosecuted the petitioner a second time for armed robbery in the circumstances here presented.
Sometime in the early hours of the morning of January 10, 1960, six men were engaged in a poker game in the basement of the home of John Gladson at Lee’s Summit, Missouri. Suddenly three or four masked men, armed with a shotgun and pistols, broke into the basement and robbed each of the poker players of money and various articles of personal property. The robbers — and it has never been clear whether there were three or four of them — then fled in a car belonging to one of the victims of the robbery. Shortly thereafter the stolen car was discovered in a field, and later that morning three men were arrested by a state trooper while they were walking on a highway not far from where the abandoned car had been found. The petitioner was arrested by another officer some distance away.
The four were subsequently charged with seven separate offenses — the armed robbery of each of the six poker players and the theft of the car. In May 1960 the petitioner went to trial on the charge of robbing Donald Knight, one of the participants in the poker game. At the trial the State called Knight and three of his fellow poker players as prosecution witnesses. Each of them described the circumstances of the holdup and itemized his own individual losses. The proof that an armed robbery had occurred and that personal property had been taken from Knight as well as from each of the others was unassailable. The testimony of the four victims in this regard was consistent both internally and with that of the others. But the State’s evidence that the petitioner had been one of the robbers was weak. Two of the witnesses thought that there had been only three robbers altogether, and could not identify the petitioner as one of them. Another of the victims, who was the petitioner’s uncle by marriage, said that at the “patrol station” he had positively identified each of the other three men accused of the holdup, but could say only that the petitioner’s voice “sounded very much like” that of one of the robbers. The fourth participant in the poker game did identify the petitioner, but only by his “size and height, and his actions.”
The cross-examination of these witnesses was brief, and it was aimed primarily at exposing the weakness of their identification testimony. Defense counsel made no attempt to question their testimony regarding the holdup itself or their claims as to their losses. Knight testified without contradiction that the robbers had stolen from him his watch, $250 in cash, and about $500 in checks. His billfold, which had been found by the police in the possession of one of the three other men accused of the robbery, was admitted in evidence. The defense offered no testimony and waived final argument.
The trial judge instructed the jury that if it found that the petitioner was one of the participants in the armed robbery, the theft of “any money” from Knight would sustain a conviction. He also instructed the jury that if the petitioner was one of the robbers, he was guilty under the law even if he had not personally robbed Knight. The jury — though not instructed to elaborate upon its verdict — found the petitioner “not guilty due to insufficient evidence.”
Six weeks later the petitioner was brought to trial again, this time for the robbery of another participant in the poker game, a man named Roberts. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, based on his previous acquittal. The motion was overruled, and the second trial began. The witnesses were for the most part the same, though this time their testimony was substantially stronger on the issue of the petitioner's identity. For example, two witnesses who at the first trial had been wholly unable to identify the petitioner as one of the robbers, now testified that his features, size, and mannerisms matched those of one of their assailants. Another witness who before had identified the petitioner only by his size and actions now also remembered him by the unusual sound of his voice. The State further refined its case at the second trial by declining to call one of the participants in the poker game whose identification testimony at the first trial had been conspicuously negative. The case went to the jury on instructions virtually identical to those given at the first trial. This time the jury found the petitioner guilty, and he was sentenced to a 35-year term in the state penitentiary.
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction, holding that the “plea of former jeopardy must be denied.” State v. Ashe, 350 S. W. 2d 768, 771. A collateral attack upon the conviction in the state courts five years later was also unsuccessful. State v. Ashe, 403 S. W. 2d 589. The petitioner then brought the present habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, claiming that the second prosecution had violated his right not to be twice put in jeopardy. Considering itself bound by this court’s decision in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464, the District Court denied the writ, although apparently finding merit in the petitioner’s claim. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, also upon the authority of Hoag v. New Jersey, supra. We granted certiorari to consider the important constitutional question this case presents. 393 U. S. 1115.
As the District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly noted, the operative facts here are virtually identical to those of Hoag v. New Jersey, supra. In that case the defendant was tried for the armed robbery of three men who, along with others, had been held up in a tavern. The proof of the robbery was clear, but the evidence identifying the defendant as one of the robbers was weak, and the defendant interposed an alibi defense. The jury brought in a verdict of not guilty. The defendant was then brought to trial again, on an indictment charging the robbery of a fourth victim of the tavern holdup. This time the jury found him guilty. After appeals in the state courts proved unsuccessful, Hoag brought his case here.
Viewing the question presented solely in terms of Fourteenth Amendment due process — whether the course that New Jersey had pursued had “led to fundamental unfairness,” 356 U. S., at 467 — this Court declined to reverse the judgment of conviction, because “in the circumstances shown by this record, we cannot say that petitioner’s later prosecution and conviction violated due process.” 356 U. S., at 466. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether “collateral estoppel” — the principle that bars relitigation between the same parties of issues actually determined at a previous trial — is a due process requirement in a state criminal trial, since it accepted New Jersey’s determination that the petitioner’s previous acquittal did not in any event give rise to such an estoppel. 356 U. S., at 471. And in the view the Court took of the issues presented, it did not, of course, even approach consideration of whether collateral estop-pel is an ingredient of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.
The doctrine of Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, puts the issues in the present case in a perspective quite different from that in which the issues were perceived in Hoag v. New Jersey, supra. The question is no longer whether collateral estoppel is a requirement of due process, but whether it is a part of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against double jeopardy. And if collateral estoppel is embodied in that guarantee, then its applicability in a particular case is no longer a matter to be left for state court determination within the broad bounds of “fundamental fairness,” but a matter of constitutional fact we must decide through an examination of the entire record. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 285; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 271; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 51; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 229; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 590.
“Collateral estoppel” is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Although first developed in civil litigation, collateral estoppel has been an established rule of federal criminal law at least since this Court's decision more than 50 years ago in United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85. As Mr. Justice Holmes put the matter in that case, “It cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than those that protect from a liability in debt.” 242 U. S., at 87. As a rule of federal law, therefore, “[i]t is much too late to suggest that this principle is not fully applicable to a former judgment in a criminal case, either because of lack of ‘mutuality’ or because the judgment may reflect only a belief that the Government had not met the higher burden of proof exacted in such cases for the Government’s evidence as a whole although not necessarily as to every link in the chain.” United States v. Kramer, 289 F. 2d 909, 913.
The federal decisions have made clear that the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality. Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires a court to “examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon air issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.” The inquiry “must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.” Sealfon v. United States. 332 U. S. 575, 579. Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal.
Straightforward application of the federal rule to the present case can lead to but one conclusion. For the record is utterly devoid of any indication that the first jury could rationally have found that an armed robbery had not occurred, or that Knight had not been a victim of that robbery. The single rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury was whether the petitioner had been one of the robbers. And the jury by its verdict found that he had not. The federal rule of law, therefore, would make a second prosecution for the robbery of Roberts wholly impermissible.
The ultimate question to be determined, then, in the light of Benton v. Maryland, supra, is whether this established rule of federal law is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. We do not hesitate to hold that it is. For whatever else that constitutional guarantee may embrace, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 717, it surely protects a man who has been acquitted from having to “run the gantlet” a second time. Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 190.
The question is not whether Missouri could validly charge the petitioner with six separate offenses for the robbery of the six poker players. It is not whether he could have received a total of six punishments if he had been convicted in a single trial of robbing the six victims. It is simply whether, after a jury determined by its verdict that the petitioner was not one of the robbers, the State could constitutionally hale him before a new jury to litigate that issue again.
After the first jury had acquitted the petitioner of robbing Knight, Missouri could certainly not have brought him to trial again upon that charge. Once a jury had determined upon conflicting testimony that there was at least a reasonable doubt that the petitioner was one of the robbers, the State could not present the same or different identification evidence in a second prosecution for the robbery of Knight in the hope that a different jury might find that evidence more convincing. The situation is constitutionally no different here, even though the second trial related to another victim of the same robbery. For the name of the victim, in the circumstances of this case, had no bearing whatever upon the issue of whether the petitioner was one of the robbers.
In this case the State in its brief has frankly conceded that following the petitioner’s acquittal, it treated the first trial as no more than a dry run for the second prosecution: “No doubt the prosecutor felt the state had a provable case on the first charge and, when he lost, he did what every good attorney would do — he refined his presentation in light of the turn of events at the first trial.” But this is precisely what the constitutional guarantee forbids.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
There can be no doubt of the “retroactivity” of the Court’s decision in Benton v. Maryland. In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, decided the same day as Benton, the Court unanimously accorded fully “retroactive” effect to the Benton doctrine.
“The Court instructs the jury that if you believe and find from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at the County of Jackson and State of Missouri, on the 10th day of January, 1960, the defendant herein, BOB FRED ASHE, alias BOBBY FRED ASHE, either alone or knowingly acting in concert with others, did then and there with force and arms in and upon one Don Knight, unlawfully and feloniously make an assault and took and carried away any money from his person or in his presence and against his will, by force and violence to his person, or by putting him in fear of some, immediate injury to his person, with felonious intent to convert the same to his own use, without any honest claim to said money on the part of the defendant and with intent to permanently deprive the said Don Knight of his ownership and without the consent of the said Don Knight, if such be your finding, then you will find the defendant guilty of Robbery, First Degree, and so find in your verdict.”
“The Court instructs the jury that all persons are equally guilty who act together with a common intent in the commission of a crime, and a crime so committed by two or more persons jointly is the act of all and of each one so acting.
“The Court instructs the jury that when two or more persons knowingly act together in the commission of an unlawful act or purpose, then whatever either does in furtherance of such unlawful act or purpose is in law the act and deed of each of such persons.”
“However persuasive the dissenting opinions in the Hoag case may be, it is the duty of this Court to follow the law as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States until it expresses a contrary view. Certainly the factual circumstances of this case provide an excellent opportunity for reexamination of the questions presented. An examination of the transcript of both trials shows that in both the single issue in real contest, as distinguished from the issues that may be said to have been in technical dispute, was the question of whether petitioner was or was not present at the time the money was taken from the poker table and the other property taken from persons of the respective poker players.” Ashe v. Swenson, 289 F. Supp. 871, 873.
“It usually is difficult for a lower federal court to forecast with assurance a Supreme Court decision as to the continuing validity of a holding of a decade ago by a Court then divided as closely as possible. This is particularly so when the decision is in the rapidly developing and sensitive area of the criminal law and the Fourteenth Amendment Bill of Rights relationship. We feel, however, that our task is not to forecast but to follow those dictates, despite their closeness of decision, which at this moment in time are on the books and for us to read. . . .” Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F. 2d 40, 46.
The particular “circumstance” most relied upon by the Court was “the unexpected failure of four of the State’s witnesses at the earlier trial to identify petitioner, after two of these witnesses had previously identified him in the course of the police investigation. Indeed, after the second of the two witnesses failed to identify petitioner, the State pleaded surprise and attempted to impeach his testimony. We cannot say that, after such an unexpected turn of events, the State’s decision to try petitioner for the Yager robbery was so arbitrary or lacking in justification that it amounted to a denial of those concepts constituting ‘the very essence of a scheme of ordered justice, which is due process.’ ” 356 U. S., at 469-470.
In the case now before us, by contrast, there is no claim of any “unexpected turn of events” at the first trial, unless the jury verdict of acquittal be so characterized.
See also Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 436, 442-443; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 333-334; Sealfon v. United States, 332 U. S. 575; United States v. De Angelo, 138 F. 2d 466; United States v Curzio, 170 F. 2d 354; Yawn v. United States, 244 F. 2d 235; United States v. Cowart, 118 F. Supp. 903.
Mayors & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 38-39. See Yawn v. United States, supra; United States v. De Angelo, supra.
“If a later court, is permitted to state that the jury may have disbelieved substantial and uncontradicted evidence of the prosecution on a point the defendant did not contest, the possible multiplicity of prosecutions is staggering. ... In fact, such a restrictive definition of ‘determined’ amounts simply to a rejection of collateral estoppel, since it is impossible to imagine a statutory offense in which the government has to prove only one element or issue to sustain a conviction.” Mayers & Yarbrough, supra, at 38. See generally Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 Iowa L. Rev. 317. See also Comment., Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L. J. 262; Hunvald, Criminal Law in Missouri, 25 Mo. L. Rev. 369, 369-375; Comment, Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel in Crimes Arising From the Same Transaction, 24 Mo. L. Rev. 513; McLaren, The Doctrine of Res Judicata as Applied to the Trial of Criminal Cases, 10 Wash. L. Rev. 19S.
It is true, as this Court said in Hoag v. New Jersey, supra, that we have never squarely held collateral estoppel to be a constitutional requirement. Until perhaps a century ago, few situations arose ealling for its application. For at common law, and under early federal criminal statutes, offense categories were relatively few and distinct. A single course of criminal conduct was likely to yield but a single offense. See Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 Yale L. J. 339, 342. In more recent times, with the advent of specificity in draftsmanship and the extraordinary proliferation of overlapping and related statutory offenses, it became possible for prosecutors to spin out a startlingly numerous series of offenses from a single alleged criminal transaction. See Note, Double Jeopardy and the Multiple-Count. Indictment, 57 Yale L. J. 132, 133. As the. number of statutory offenses multiplied, the potential for unfair and abusive reprosecutions became far more pronounced. Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L. J. 262, 279-2S0; Note, Double Jeopardy and the Concept of Identity of Offenses, 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 79, 82. The federal courts soon recognized the need to prevent such abuses through the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and it became a safeguard firmly embedded in federal law. See n. 7, supra. Whether its basis was a constitutional one was a question of no more than academic concern until this Court’s decision in Benton v. Maryland, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question in this case is whether the United States is accountable in money damages for alleged breaches of trust in connection with its management of forest resources on allotted lands of the Quinault Indian Reservation.
HH
U>
In the 1850’s, the United States undertook a policy of removing Indian tribes from large areas of the Pacific Northwest in order to facilitate the settlement of non-Indians. Pursuant to this policy, the first Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs of the Washington Territory began negotiations in 1855 with various tribes living on the west coast of the Territory. The negotiations culminated in a treaty between the United States and the Quinault and Quileute Tribes, 12 Stat. 971 (Treaty of Olympia). In the Treaty the Indians ceded to the United States a vast tract of land on the Olympic Peninsula in the State of Washington, and the United States agreed to set aside a reservation for the Indians.
In 1861 a reservation of about 10,000 acres was provisionally chosen for the tribes. This tract proved undesirable because of its limited size and heavy forestation. The Quinault Agency superintendent subsequently recommended that since the coastal tribes drew their subsistence almost entirely from the water, they should be collected on a reservation suitable for their fishing needs. Acting on this suggestion, President Grant issued an Executive Order on November 4, 1873, designating about 200,000 acres along the Washington coast as an Indian reservation. The vast bulk of this land consisted of rain forest covered with huge, coniferous trees.
In 1905 the Federal Government began to allot the Qui-nault Reservation in trust to individual Indians under the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 331 et seq. ° See also the Quinault Allotment Act of Mar. 4, 1911, ch. 246, 36 Stat. 1345. The Government initially determined that the forested areas of the Reservation were not to be allotted because they were not suitable for agriculture or grazing. In 1924, however, this Court concluded that the character of lands to be set apart for the Indians was not restricted by the General Allotment Act. United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446, 449. Thereafter, the forested lands of the Reservation were allotted. By 1935 the entire Reservation had been divided into 2,340 trust allotments, most of which were 80 acres of heavily timbered land. About a third of the Reservation has since gone out of trust, but the bulk of the land has remained in trust status.
The forest resources on the allotted lands have long been managed by the Department of the Interior, which exercises “comprehensive” control over the harvesting of Indian timber. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U. S. 136, 145 (1980). The Secretary of the Interior has broad statutory authority over the sale of timber on reservations. See 25 U. S. C. §§406, 407. Sales of timber “shall be based upon a consideration of the needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs,” § 406(a), and the proceeds from such sales are to be used for the benefit of the Indians or transferred to the Indian owner, §§ 406(a), 407. Congress has directed the Secretary to adhere to principles of sustained-yield forestry on all Indian forest lands under his supervision. 25 U. S. C. § 466. Under these statutes, the Secretary has promulgated detailed regulations governing the management of Indian timber. 25 CFR pt. 163 (1983). The Secretary is authorized to deduct an administrative fee for his services from the timber revenues paid to Indian allot-tees. 25 U. S. C. §§406(a), 413.
B
The respondents are 1,465 individuals owning interests in allotments on the Quinault Reservation, an unincorporated association of Quinault Reservation allottees, and the Qui-nault Tribe, which now holds some portions of the allotted lands. In 1971 respondents filed four actions that were consolidated in the Court of Claims. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U. S. C. §§ 1491 and 1505. Respondents sought to recover damages from the United States based on allegations of pervasive waste and mismanagement of timberlands on the Quinault Reservation. More specifically, respondents claimed that the Government (1) failed to obtain a fair market value for timber sold; (2) failed to manage timber on a sustained-yield basis; (3) failed to obtain any payment at all for some merchantable timber; (4) failed to develop a proper system of roads and easements for timber operations and exacted improper charges from allottees for maintenance of roads; (5) failed to pay any interest on certain funds from timber sales held by the Government and paid insufficient interest on other funds; and (6) exacted excessive administrative fees from allottees. Respondents assert that the alleged misconduct constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty owed them by the United States as trustee under various statutes.
Six years after the suits were filed, the United States moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the Court of Claims had no authority over claims based on a breach of trust. The court denied the motion, holding that the General Allotment Act created a fiduciary duty on the United States’ part to manage the timber resources properly and thereby provided the necessary authority for recovery of damages against the United States. Mitchell v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 95, 591 F. 2d 1300 (1979) (en banc).
In United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980), this Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Claims, stating that the General Allotment Act “created only a limited trust relationship between the United States and the allottee that does not impose any duty upon the Government to manage timber resources.” Id., at 542. We concluded that “[a]ny right of the respondents to recover money damages for Government mismanagement of timber resources must be found in some source other than [the General Allotment] Act.” Id., at 546. Since the Court of Claims had not considered respondents’ assertion that other statutes render the United States answerable in money damages for the alleged mismanagement in this case, we remanded the case for consideration of these alternative grounds for liability. See id., at 546, n. 7.
On remand, the Court of Claims once again held the United States subject to suit for money damages on most of respondents’ claims. 229 Ct. Cl. 1, 664 P. 2d 265 (1981) (en banc). The court ruled that the timber management statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§406, 407, and 466, various federal statutes governing roadbuilding and rights of way, §§318 and 323-325, statutes governing Indian funds and Government fees, §§162a and 413, and regulations promulgated under these statutes imposed fiduciary duties upon the United States in its management of forested allotted lands. The court concluded that the statutes and regulations implicitly required compensation for damages sustained as a result of the Government’s breach of its duties. Thus, the court held that respondents could proceed on their claims.
Because the decision of the Court of Claims raises issues of substantial importance concerning the liability of the United States, we granted the Government’s petition for certiorari. 457 U. S. 1104 (1982). We affirm.
» — l t — I
Respondents have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §1491, and its counterpart for claims brought by Indian tribes, 28 U. S. C. § 1505, known as the Indian Tucker Act. The Tucker Act states in pertinent part:
“The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”
It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. The terminology employed in some of our prior decisions has unfortunately generated some confusion as to whether the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity. The time has come to resolve this confusion. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that by giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction over specified types of claims against the United States, the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to those claims.
A
Before 1855 no general statute gave the consent of the United States to suit on claims for money damages; the only recourse available to private claimants was to petition Congress for relief. In order to relieve the pressure caused by
the volume of private bills and to avoid the delays and inequities of the private bill procedure, Congress created the Court of Claims. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612. The 1855 Act empowered that court to hear claims and report its findings to Congress and to submit a draft of a private bill in each case which received a favorable decision. §7, 10 Stat. 613. The limited powers initially conferred upon the court failed to relieve Congress from “the laborious necessity of examining the merits of private bills.” Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 553 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.). Thus, in his State of the Union Message of 1861, President Lincoln recommended that the court be authorized to render final judgments. He declared that it is “as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between private individuals.” Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., App. 2 (1861). Congress adopted President Lincoln’s recommendation and made the court’s judgments final. Act of Mar. 3, 1863,12 Stat. 765.
In 1886 Representative John Randolph Tucker introduced a bill to revise in several respects the jurisdiction and procedures of the Court of Claims and to replace most provisions of the 1855 and 1863 Acts. H. R. 6974, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). The House Judiciary Committee reported that the bill was a “comprehensive measure by which claims against the United States may be heard and determined.” H. R. Rep. No. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1886). The measure was designed to “give the people of the United States what every civilized nation of the world has already done — the right to go into the courts to seek redress against the Government for their grievances.” 18 Cong. Rec. 2680 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Bayne). See id., at 622 (remarks of Rep. Tucker); id., at 2679 (colloquy between Reps. Tucker and Townshend); id., at 2680 (remarks of Rep. Holman). The eventual enactment thus “provide[d] for the bringing of suits against the Government of the United States.” Act of Mar. 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505.
The Indian Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1505, has a similar history. An early amendment to the original enactment creating the Court of Claims had excluded claims by Indian tribes. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, § 9, 12 Stat. 767. As a result, Congress eventually confronted a “vast and growing burden” resulting from the large number of tribes seeking special jurisdictional Acts. H. R. Rep. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1945). Congress responded by conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear any tribal claim “of a character which would be cognizable in the Court of Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe.” Id., at 13. As the House sponsor of the Act stated, an important goal of the Act was to ensure that it would “never again be necessary to pass special Indian jurisdictional acts in order to permit the Indians to secure a court adjudication on any misappropriations of Indian funds or of any other Indian property by Federal officials that might occur in the future.” 92 Cong. Rec. 5313 (1946) (statement of Rep. Jackson). Indians were to be given “their fair day in court so that they can call the various Government agencies to account on the obligations that the Federal government assumed.” Id., at 5312. The House Report stressed the same point: “If we fail to meet these obligations by denying access to the courts when trust funds have been improperly dissipated or other fiduciary duties have been violated, we compromise the national honor of the United States.” H. R. Rep. No. 1466, supra, at 5.
For decades this Court consistently interpreted the Tucker Act as having provided the consent of the United States to be sued eo nomine for the classes of claims described in the Act. See, e. g., Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163, 166-167 (1894); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 17 (1896); Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, 227-228 (1901); Reid v. United States, 211 U. S. 529, 538 (1909); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 590 (1941); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 25, n. 10 (1953); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 273 (1957). In at least two recent decisions this Court explicitly stated that the Tucker Act effects a waiver of sovereign immunity. Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan, 456 U. S. 728, 734 (1982); Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 466 (1980) (per curiam). These decisions confirm the unambiguous thrust of the history of the Act.
The existence of a waiver is readily apparent in claims founded upon “any express or implied contract with the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1491. The Court of Claims’ jurisdiction over contract claims against the Government has long been recognized, and Government liability in contract is viewed as perhaps “the widest and most unequivocal waiver of federal immunity from suit.” Developments in the Law— Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 827, 876 (1957). See also 14 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3656, p. 202 (1976). The source of consent for such suits unmistakably lies in the Tucker Act. Otherwise, it is doubtful that any consent would exist, for no contracting officer or other official is empowered to consent to suit against the United States. The same is true for claims founded upon executive regulations. Indeed, the Act makes absolutely no distinction between claims founded upon contracts and claims founded upon other specified sources of law.
In United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 398, 400 (1976), and in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 538, this Court employed language suggesting that the Tucker Act does not effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. Such language was not necessary to the decision in either case. See infra, at 217-218. Without in any way questioning the result in either case, we conclude that this isolated language should be disregarded. If a claim falls within the terms of the Tucker Act, the United States has presumptively consented to suit.
B
It nonetheless remains true that the Tucker Act “ ‘does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages.’” United States v. Mitchell, supra, at 538, quoting United States v. Testan, supra, at 398. A substantive right must be found in some other source of law, such as “the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department.” 28 U. S. C. § 1491. Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act. The claim must be one for money damages against the United States, see United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 2-3 (1969), and the claimant must demonstrate that the source of substantive law he relies upon “‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.’” United States v. Testan, supra, at 400, quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 607, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1009 (1967).
For example, in United States v. Testan, supra, two Government attorneys contended that they were entitled to a higher salary grade under the Classification Act, and to an award of backpay under the Back Pay Act for the period during which they were classified at a lower grade. This Court concluded that neither the Classification Act nor the Back Pay Act could fairly be interpreted as requiring compensation for wrongful classifications. See 424 U. S., at 398-407. Particularly in light of the “established rule that one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has been duly appointed to it,” id., at 402, the Classification Act does not support a claim for money damages. While the Back Pay Act does provide a basis for money damages as a remedy “in carefully limited circumstances” such as wrongful reductions in grade, id., at 404, it does not apply to wrongful classifications. Id., at 405.
Similarly, in United States v. Mitchell, supra, this Court concluded that the General Allotment Act does not confer a right to recover money damages against the United States. While § 5 of the Act provided that the United States would hold land “in trust” for Indian allottees, 25 U. S. C. § 348, we held that the Act creates only a limited trust relationship. 445 U. S., at 542. The trust language of the Act does not impose any fiduciary management duties or render the United States answerable for breach thereof, but only prevents improvident alienation of the allotted lands and assures their immunity from state taxation. Id., at 544.
Thus, for claims against the United States “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department,” 28 U. S. C. § 1491, a court must inquire whether the source of substantive law can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages sustained. In undertaking this inquiry, a court need not find a separate waiver of sovereign immunity in the substantive provision, just as a court need not find consent to suit in “any express or implied contract with the United States.” Ibid. The Tucker Act itself provides the necessary consent.
Of course, in determining the general scope of the Tucker Act, this Court has not lightly inferred the United States’ consent to suit. See United States v. King, supra, at 4-5 (Court of Claims lacks general authority to issue declaratory judgment); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S., at 276 (nontolling of limitations beyond statutory provisions). For example, although the Tucker Act refers to claims founded upon any implied contract with the United States, we have held that the Act does not reach claims based on contracts implied in law, as opposed to those implied in fact. Merritt v. United States, 267 U. S. 338, 341 (1925).
In this case, however, there is simply no question that the Tucker Act provides the United States’ consent to suit for claims founded upon statutes or regulations that create substantive rights to money damages. If a claim falls within this category, the existence of a waiver of sovereign immunity is clear. The question in this case is thus analytically distinct: whether the statutes or regulations at issue can be interpreted as requiring compensation. Because the Tucker Act supplies a waiver of immunity for claims of this nature, the separate statutes and regulations need not provide a second waiver of sovereign immunity, nor need they be construed in the manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity. See United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 28, 32 (1915). “‘The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced.’” United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 383 (1949), quoting Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 147, 153 N. E. 28, 29-30 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
Ill
Respondents have based their money claims against the United States on various Acts of Congress and executive department regulations. We begin by describing these sources of substantive law. We then examine whether they can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties they impose.
A
The Secretary of the Interior’s pervasive role in the sales of timber from Indian lands began with the Act of June 25, 1910, §§7, 8, 36 Stat. 857, as amended, 25 U. S. C. §§406, 407. Prior to that time, Indians had no right to sell timber on reservation land, and there existed “‘no general law under which authority for the sale of timber on Indian lands, whether allotted or unallotted, can be granted.’” H. R. Rep. No. 1135, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1910) (quoting letter of the Secretary of the Interior). Congress recognized that this situation was undesirable “‘because in many instances the timber is the only valuable part of the allotment or is the only source from which funds can be obtained for the support of the Indian or the improvement of his allotment.’” Ibid. The 1910 Act empowered the Secretary to sell timber on unallotted lands and apply the proceeds of the sales for the benefit of the Indians, § 7, and authorized the Secretary to consent to sales by allottees, with the proceeds to be paid to the allottees or disposed of for their benefit, § 8. Congress thus sought to provide for harvesting timber “in such a manner as to conserve the interests of the people on the reservations, namely, the Indians.” 45 Cong. Rec. 6087 (1910) (remarks of Rep. Saunders).
From the outset, the Interior Department recognized its obligation to supervise the cutting of Indian timber. In 1911, the Department’s Office of Indian Affairs promulgated detailed regulations covering its responsibilities in “managing the Indian forests so as to obtain the greatest revenue for the Indians consistent with a proper protection and improvement of the forests.” U. S. Office of Indian Affairs, Regulations and Instructions for Officers in Charge of Forests on Indian Reservations 4 (1911). The regulations addressed virtually every aspect of forest management, including the size of sales, contract procedures, advertisements and methods of billing, deposits and bonding requirements, administrative fee deductions, procedures for sales by minors, allowable heights of stumps, tree marking and scaling rules, base and top diameters of trees for cutting, and the percentage of trees to be left as a seed source. Id., at 8-28. The regulations applied to allotted as well as tribal lands, and the Secretary’s approval of timber sales on allotted lands was explicitly conditioned upon compliance with the regulations. Id., at 9.
Over time, deficiencies in the Interior Department’s performance of its responsibilities became apparent. Accordingly, as part of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, Congress imposed even stricter duties upon the Government with respect to Indian timber management. In § 6 of the Act, now codified as 25 U. S. C. § 466, Congress expressly directed that the Interior Department manage Indian forest resources “on the principle of sustained-yield management.” Representative Howard, cosponsor of the Act and Chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs, explained that the purpose of the provision was “to assure a proper and permanent management of the Indian forest” under modern sustained-yield methods so as to “assure that the Indian forests will be permanently productive and will yield continuous revenues to the tribes.” 78 Cong. Rec. 11730 (1934). See United States v. Anderson, 625 F. 2d 910, 915 (CA9 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 920 (1981). Referring to the relationship between the Indians and the Government as a “sacred trust,” Representative Howard stated that “[t]he failure of their governmental guardian to conserve the Indians’ land and assets and the consequent loss of income or earning power, has been the principal cause of the present plight of the average Indian.” 78 Cong. Rec., at 11726.
Regulations promulgated under the Act required the preservation of Indian forest lands in a perpetually productive state, forbade the clear-cutting of large contiguous areas, called for the development of long-term working plans for all major reservations, required adequate provision for new growth when mature timber was removed, and required the regulation of run-off and the minimization of erosion. The regulatory scheme was designed to assure that the Indians receive “ 'the benefit of whatever profit [the forest] is capable of yielding.’” White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S., at 149 (quoting 25 CFR § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)).
In 1964 Congress amended the timber provisions of the 1910 Act, again emphasizing the Secretary of the Interior’s management duties. Act of Apr. 30, 1964, 78 Stat. 186. As to sales of timber on allotted lands, the Secretary was directed to consider “the needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs.” 25 U. S. C. § 406(a). In performing this duty, the Secretary was specifically required to take into account
“(1) the state of growth of the timber and the need for maintaining the productive capacity of the land for the benefit of the owner and his heirs, (2) the highest and best use of the land, including the advisability and practicality of devoting it to other uses for the benefit of the owner and his heirs, and (3) the present and future financial needs of the owner and his heirs.” Ibid.
See also 25 U. S. C. §407 (timber sales on unallotted trust lands).
The timber management statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§406, 407, 466, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 25 CFR pt. 163 (1983), establish the “comprehensive” responsibilities of the Federal Government in managing the harvesting of Indian timber. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S., at 145. The Department of the Interior — through the Bureau of Indian Affairs — “exercises literally daily supervision over the harvesting and management of tribal timber.” Id., at 147. Virtually every stage of the process is under federal control.
The Department exercises comparable control over grants of rights-of-way on Indian lands held in trust. The Secretary is empowered to grant rights-of-way for all purposes across trust land, 25 U. S. C. § 323, provided that he obtains the consent of the tribal or individual Indian landowner, §324, and that the Indian owners are paid appropriate compensation, § 325. Regulations detail the scope of federal supervision. 25 CFR pt. 169 (1983). For example, an applicant for a right-of-way must deposit with the Secretary an amount not less than the fair market value of the rights granted, plus an amount to cover potential damages associated with activity on the right-of-way. The Secretary must determine the adequacy of the compensation, and the amounts deposited must be held in a special account for distribution to Indian landowners. See 25 CFR §§169.12, 169.14 (1983).
B
In United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 542, this Court recognized that the General Allotment Act creates a trust relationship between the United States and Indian allottees but concluded that the trust relationship was limited. We held that the Act could not be read “as establishing that the United States has a fiduciary responsibility for management of allotted forest lands.” Id., at 546. In contrast to the bare trust created by the General Allotment Act, the statutes and regulations now before us clearly give the Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the Indians. They thereby establish a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the United States’ fiduciary responsibilities.
The language of these statutory and regulatory provisions directly supports the existence of a fiduciary relationship! For example, §8 of the 1910 Act, as amended, expressly mandates that sales of timber from Indian trust lands be based upon the Secretary’s consideration of “the needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs” and that proceeds from such sales be paid to owners “or disposed of for their benefit.” 25 U. S. C. § 406(a). Similarly, even in its earliest regulations, the Government recognized its duties in “managing the Indian forests so as to obtain the greatest revenue for the Indians consistent with a proper protection and improvement of the forests.” U. S. Office of Indian Affairs, Regulations and Instructions for Officers in Charge of Forests on Indian Reservations 4 (1911). Thus, the Government has “expressed a firm desire that the Tribe should retain the benefits derived from the harvesting and sale of reservation timber.” White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S., at 149.
Moreover, a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Government assumes such elaborate control over forests and property belonging to Indians. All of the necessary elements of a common-law trust are present: a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a trust corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds). “[W]here the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or properties (unless Congress has provided otherwise) even though nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute (or other fundamental document) about a trust fund, or a trust or fiduciary connection.” Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl. 171, 183, 624 F. 2d 981, 987 (1980).
Our construction of these statutes and regulations is reinforced by the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people. This Court has previously emphasized “the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people.” Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296 (1942). This principle has long dominated the Government’s dealings with Indians. United States v. Mason, 412 U. S. 391, 398 (1973); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 (1939); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 117-118 (1938); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 442 (1926); McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458, 469 (1907); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 382-384 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831).
Because the statutes and regulations at issue in this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the Government in the management and operation of Indian lands and resources, they can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for damages sustained. Given the existence of a trust relationship, it naturally follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties. It is well established that a trustee is accountable in damages for breaches of trust. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§205-212 (1959); G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees §862 (2d ed. 1965); 3 A. Scott, Law of Trusts § 205 (3d ed. 1967). This Court and several other federal courts have consistently recognized that the existence of a trust relationship between the United States and an Indian or Indian tribe includes as a fundamental incident the right of an injured beneficiary to sue the trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust.
The recognition of a damages remedy also furthers the purposes of the statutes and regulations, which clearly require that the Secretary manage Indian resources so as to generate proceeds for the Indians. It would be anomalous to conclude that these enactments create a right to the value of certain resources when the Secretary lives up to his duties, but no right to the value of the resources if the Secretary’s duties are not performed. “Absent a retrospective damages remedy, there would be little to deter federal officials from violating their trust duties, at least until the allottees managed to obtain a judicial decree against future breaches of trust.” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 550 (White, J., dissenting). Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1945).
The Government contends that violations of duties imposed by the various statutes may be cured by actions for declaratory, injunctive, or mandamus relief against the Secretary, although it concedes that sovereign immunity might have barred such suits before 1976. Brief for United States 40. In this context, however, prospective equitable remedies are totally inadequate. To begin with, the Indian allottees are in no position to monitor federal management of their lands on a consistent basis. Many are poorly educated, most are absentee owners, and many do not even know the exact physical location of their allotments. Indeed, it was the very recognition of the inability of the Indians to oversee their interests that led to federal management in the first place. A trusteeship would mean little if the beneficiaries were required to supervise the day-to-day management of their estate by their trustee or else be precluded from recovery for mismanagement.
In addition, by the time Government mismanagement becomes apparent, the damage to Indian resources may be so severe that a prospective remedy may be next to worthless. For example, if timber on an allotment has been destroyed through Government mismanagement, it will take many years for nature to restore the timber. As this Court has observed:
“Once logged off, the land is of little value. The land no longer serves the purpose for which it was by treaty set aside to [the allottee’s] ancestors, and for which it was allotted to him. It can no longer be adequate to his needs
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
In this action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-60, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, by a divided court, affirmed a judgment in favor of the respondent railroad entered on a jury verdict in the District Court for the Northern District of Florida. 265 F. 2d 75. We granted certiorari, 361 U. S. 861, to consider the issues presented in the light of our decisions in Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 356 U. S. 326, and Baker v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 359 U. S. 227. The latter is an intervening decision.
The railroad employed the petitioner as a laborer in a section gang with a regular work-week from Monday through Friday. The petitioner was injured on a Saturday, ordinarily the gang’s day off, when the gang, supervised by their foreman, using the work tools supplied by the railroad, and following standard railroad methods for doing the work, were replacing ties under a siding track which ran off the railroad’s main line tracks to the plant of the M. & M. Turpentine Company. That company had an agreement with the railroad calling for the railroad to make periodic inspections of the track and for the repairs disclosed to be necessary by such inspections to be made by and at the expense of the Turpentine Company -“to the satisfaction of the [railroad’s] Chief Engineer.” When an inspection revealed the need for the work in question, the Turpentine Company engaged the petitioner’s foreman to recruit his crew to do the work on their day off under his direction. The foreman offered the crew railroad overtime rates of pay for doing the work, but there is a sharp conflict in the evidence whether he told the crew that they would not be working for the railroad but for someone else. The foreman paid the wages with funds supplied to him by the Turpentine Company.
The petitioner contends that the proofs require a holding as a matter of law that the Turpentine Company, in the maintenance of the siding, was the “agent” of the respondent railroad within the meaning of § 1 of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. § 51, as we construed that term in Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., supra. We find no merit in this contention. Indeed, we do not think that the proofs presented a jury question whether the Turpentine Company was the railroad’s “agent” within the meaning of the Act. This was not a situation, as in Sinkler, in which the railroad engaged an independent contractor to perform operational activities required to carry out the franchise. This was a siding privately owned by the Turpentine Company and established to service it alone. In maintaining it, we do not see how it can be said under the proofs that the Turpén-tine Company was “engaged in furthering the operational activities of respondent.” Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., supra, at 331. Even the use of the siding by local farmers in harvest time to load respondent’s cars with watermelons, a fact heavily relied upon by the petitioner, was, according to uncontradicted testimony, not at the instance of the railroad but because the President of the Turpentine Company “leased this track — I guess that is what you would call it — anyhow, he let those farmers load watermelons out there on that track and he always repaired it every year before watermelon time.”
However, we agree with the petitioner’s alternative contention that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the j,ury as requested by the petitioner, and in giving the instructions he did, as to the factors to be considered by the jury in determining whether the petitioner was an “employee” of the railroad during the performance of the work within the meaning of the Act. The instructions given in effect limited inquiry to the question whether the petitioner was aware that the railroad considered him not to be working for it but for some third party. But neither the railroad’s communication of its concept of petitioner’s status to petitioner, nor his acquiescence therein, if shown, is determinative of the issue. Cf. Cimorelli v. New York Central R. Co., 148 F. 2d 575, 578. The parties’ characterization is but one factor to be considered among others, see Restatement, Agency 2d, § 220 (2) (i), and the issue is one for determination by the jury on the basis of all the relevant factors. Baker v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., supra. Reversed
“The accident here involved occurred upon a spur track which was partly owned by the M. & M. Turpentine Co. The fact that the M. & M. Turpentine Co. had contracted with the defendant railroad to maintain all or a portion of this spur track does not relieve the defendant railroad of its liability to the plaintiff if the plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment with the defendant railroad on the spur track as a direct consequence, in whole or in part, of the defendant railroad’s negligence.”
Mr. Justice Frankfurter would dismiss this writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. As the Court’s opinion demonstrates, the case solely presents the appropriateness of instructions given by a trial court and the refusal of requested instructions in the light of the unique circumstances of a particular situation. As such it falls outside the considerations which, according to Rule 19 of this Court, govern the granting of a petition for certiorari. See Ferguson v. Moor e-McCormack Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 524 (dissenting).
The requested instructions were the following:
“One of the issues to be decided in this case is whether or not the plaintiff, Raymond P. Ward, was employed by the defendant railroad at the time he was injured. This issue must be determined from all of the circumstances of the case. The primary factor to be considered is whether or not the railroad had the power to direct, control, and supervise the plaintiff in the performance of his work at the time he was injured. Other relevant factors to be considered are: who selected and engaged the plaintiff to perform the work; who furnished the tools with which the work was performed; who paid the plaintiff his wages for the performance of the work; the amount of scale of such wages; and who had the power to fire or dismiss the plaintiff from the work.
“If you find that the railroad, through its foreman, I. H. Keen, had the power to direct, control and supervise the plaintiff in the performance of the work he was doing at the time he was injured, then you should find that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant railroad at the time he was injured.
“The fact that the money used to pay the plaintiff Ward for the work he was doing at the time he was injured came originally from some third person with whom the railroad or the owner of the spur track had made an arrangement, does not remove the defendant railroad from its employer-employee relationship with the plaintiff Ward and does not relieve the defendant railroad of liability for injuries suffered by the plaintiff during the course of his railroad employment as a result of the defendant railroad’s negligence.
The pertinent portion of the court’s charge was as follows:
“That the Railroad Company was liable unless the defendant’s foreman made it clear to him before he started to work that morning that they were not working for the Railroad, but working on a private track to make some extra money. I think I put it just about that simply, didn’t I, to make some extra money. I told. you that if the foreman failed to make that disclosure to him, ordered him to go out there and go to work, and put him to work on that private track, the Railroad Company would be liable. I don’t see how I can say it any plainer. Do you have a word that you think I could use to make it any plainer?
“Mr. Rutledge: Your Honor, to. make it clear he was working for some third person and not working for the Railroad.
“The Court: Yes sir, that is the word I believe he suggested— that he was working for some third person. The foreman had to make it clear to him that he was working for some third person and not the Railroad. I thought I said it, but I guess I didn’t spell it out as much as he wanted, but I want to make that clear to you. If you find from this evidence he was so advised before he went out there to work, and he went out on his own volition and joined the others to make some extra money, then he was not an employee of the Railroad Company and they would not be liable.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
' An Arkansas statute compels every teacher, .as a condition of employment in a state-supported school or college, to file annually an affidavit listing without limitation every organization to which he has belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five years. At issue in these two cases is the validity of that statute under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. No. 14 is an appeal from the judgment of a three-judge Federal District Court upholding the statute's validity, 174 F. Supp. 351. No. 83 is here on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which also held the statute constitutionally valid. 231 Ark. 641, 331 S. W. 2d 701.
The statute in question is Act 10 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the Arkansas General Assembly of 1958. The provisions of the Act are summarized in the opinion of the District Court as follows:
“Act 10 provides in substance that no person shall be employed or elected to employment as a superintendent, principal or teacher in any public school in Arkansas, or as an instructor, professor or teacher in any public institution of higher learning in that State until such person shall have submitted to the appropriate hiring authority an affidavit listing all organizations to which he at the time belongs and to which he has belonged during the past five years, and also listing all organizations to which he at the time is paying regular dues or is making regular contributions, or to which within the past five years he has paid such dues or made such contributions. The Act further provides, among other things, that any contract entered into with any person who has not filed the prescribed affidavit shall be void; that no public moneys shall be paid to such person as compensation for his servicés; and that any such funds so paid may be recovered back either from the person receiving such funds or from the board of trustees or other governing body making the payment. The filing of a false affidavit is denounced as perjury, punishable by a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, and, in addition, the person filing the false affidavit is to lose his teaching license.” 174 F. Supp. 353-354.
These provisions must be considered against the existing system of teacher employment required by Arkansas law. Teachers there are hired on a year-to-year basis. They are not covered by a civil service system, and they have no job security beyond the end of each school year. The closest approach to tenure is a statutory provision for the automatic renewal of a teacher’s contract if he is not notified within ten days after the end of a school year that the contract has not been renewed. Ark. 1947 Stat. Ann. § 80-1304 (b) (1960); Wabbaseka School District No. 7 v. Johnson, 225 Ark. 982, 286 S. W. 2d 841.
The plaintiffs in the Federal District Court (appellants here) were B. T. Shelton, a teacher employed in the Little Rock Public School System, suing for himself and others similarly situated, together with the Arkansas Teachers Association and its Executive Secretary, suing for the benefit of members of the Association. Shelton had been employed in the Little Rock Special School District for twenty-five years. In the spring of 1959 he was notified that, before he could be employed for the 1959-1960 school year, he must file the affidavit required by Act 10, listing all his organizational connections over the previous five years. He declined to file the affidavit, and his contract for the ensuing school year was not renewed. At the trial the evidence showed that he was not a member of the Communist Party or of any organization advocating the overthrow of the Government by force, and that he was a member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The court upheld Act 10, finding the information it required was “relevant,” and relying on several decisions of this Court, particularly Garner v. Beard of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U. S. 716; Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485; Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U. S. 399; and Lerner v. Casey, 357 U. S. 468.
The plaintiffs in the state court proceedings (petitioners here) were Max Carr, an associate professor at the University of Arkansas, and Ernest T. Gephardt, a teacher at Central High School in Little Rock, each suing for himself and others similarly situated. Each refused to execute and file the affidavit required by Act 10. Carr executed an affirmation in which he listed his membership in professional organizations, denied ever having been a member of any subversive organization, and offered to answer any questions which the University authorities might constitutionally ask touching upon his qualifications as a teacher. Gephardt filed an affidavit stating that he had never belonged to a subversive organization, disclosing his membership in the Arkansas Education Association and the American Legion, and also offering to answer any questions which the school authorities might constitutionally ask touching upon his qualifications as a teacher. Both were advised that their failure to comply with the requirements of Act 10 would make impossible their re-employment as teachers for the following school year. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the constitutionality of Act 10, on its face and as applied to the petitioners. 231 Ark. 641, 331 S. W. 2d 701.
I.
It is urged here, as it was unsuccessfully urged throughout the proceedings in both the federal and state courts, that Act 10 deprives teachers in Arkansas of their rights to personal, associational, and academic liberty, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action. In considering this contention, we deal with two basic postulates.
First. There can be no doubt of the right of a State to investigate the competence and fitness of those whom it hires to teach in its schools, as this Court before now has had occasion to recognize. “A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern.” Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485, 493. There is “no requirement in the Federal Constitution that a teacher’s classroom conduct be the sole basis for determining his fitness. Fitness for teaching, depends on a broad range of factors.” Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U. S. 399, 406.
This controversy is thus not of a pattern with such cases as N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, and Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516. In those cases the Court held that there was no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State’s effort to compel disclosure of the membership lists involved. Here, by contrast, there can be no question of the relevance of a State’s inquiry into the fitness and competence of its teachers.
Second. It is not disputed that to compel a teacher to disclose his every associational tie is to impair that teacher’s right of free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364; Bates v. Little Rock, supra, at 522-523. Such interference with personal freedom is conspicuously accented when the- teacher serves at the absolute will of those to whom the disclosure must be made — those who any year can terminate the teacher’s employment without bringing charges, without notice, without a hearing, without affording an opportunity to explain.
The statute does not provide that the information it requires be kept confidential. Each school board is left free to deal with the information as it wishes. The record contains evidence to indicate that fear of public disclosure is neither theoretical nor groundless. Even if there were no disclosure to the general public, the pressure upon a teacher to avoid any ties which might displease those who control his professional destiny would be constant and heavy. Public exposure, bringing with it the possibility of public pressures upon school boards to discharge teachers who belong to unpopular or minority organizations, would simply operate to widen and aggravate the impairment of constitutional liberty.
The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools. “By limiting the power of the States to interfere with freedom of speech and freedom of inquiry and freedom of association, the Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons, no matter what their calling. But, in view of the nature of the teacher’s relation to the effective exercise of the rights which are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of freedom of thought, and of action upon thought, in the case of teachers brings the safeguards of those amendments vividly into operation. Such unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers . . . has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice ; it makes for caution and timidity in their associations by potential teachers.” Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 195 (concurring opinion). “Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate . . . .” Sweesy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250.
HH
HH
The question to be decided here is not whether the State of Arkansas can ask certain of its teachers about all their organizational relationships. It is not whether the State can. ask all of its teachers about certain of their associational ties. It is not whether teachers can be asked how many organizations they belong to, or how much time they spend in organizational activity. The question is whether the State can ask every one of its teachers to disclose every single organization with which he has been associated over a five-year period. The scope of the inquiry required by Act 10 is completely unlimited. The statute requires a teacher to reveal the church to which he belongs, or to which he has given financial support. It requires him to disclose his political party, and every political organization to which he may have contributed over a five-year period. It requires him to list, without number, every conceivable kind of associational tie— social, professional, political, avocational, or religious. Many such relationships could have no possible bearing upon the teacher’s occupational competence or fitness.
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
In Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, the Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting all distribution of literature at any time or place in Griffin, Georgia, without a license, pointing out that so broad an interference was unnecessary to accomplish legitimate municipal aims. In Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, the Court dealt with ordinances of four different municipalities which either banned or imposed prior restraints upon the distribution of handbills. In holding the ordinances invalid, the Court noted that where legislative abridgment of “fundamental personal rights and liberties” is asserted, “the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences' or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.” 308 U. S., at 161. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, the Court said that “[cjonduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society,” but pointed out that in each case “the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.” 310 U. S., at 304. Illustrations of the same constitutional principle are to be found in many other decisions of the Court, among them, Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141; Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558; and Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290.
As recently as last Term we held invalid an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of handbills because the breadth of its application went far beyond what was necessary to achieve a legitimate governmental purpose. Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60. In that case the Court noted that it had been “urged that this ordinance is aimed at providing a way to identify those responsible for fraud, false advertising and libel. Yet the ordinance is in no manner so limited .... Therefore we do not pass on the validity of an ordinance limited to prevent these or any other supposed evils. This ordinance simply bars all handbills under all circumstances anywhere that do not have the names and addresses printed on them in the place the ordinance requires.” 362 U. S., at 64.
The unlimited and indiscriminate sweep of the statute now before us brings it within the ban of our prior cases. The statute’s comprehensive interference with associational freedom goes far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State’s legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers. The judgments in both cases must be reversed.
It is so ordered.
The statute is in seven sections. Section 1 provides: “It is hereby declared that the purpose of this act is to provide assistance in the administration and financing of the public schools of Arkansas, and institutions of higher learning supported wholly or in part by public funds, and it is hereby determined that it will be beneficial to the public schools and institutions of higher learning and the State of Arkansas, if certain affidavits of membership are required as hereinafter provided.”
Section 2 provides: “No superintendent, principal, or teacher shall be employed or elected in any elementary or secondary school by the district operating such school, and no instructor, professor, or other teacher shall be employed or elected in any institution of higher learning, or other educational institution supported wholly or in part by public funds, by the trustees or governing authority thereof, until, as a condition precedent to such employment, such superintendent, principal, teacher, instructor or professor shall have filed with such board of trustees or governing authority an affidavit as to the names and addresses of all incorporated and/or unincorporated associations and organizations that such superintendent, principal, teacher, instructor or professor is or within the past five years has been a member of, or to which organization or association such superintendent, principal, teacher, instructor, professor, or other teacher is presently paying, or within the past five years has paid regular dues, or to which the same is making or within the past five years has made regular contributions.”
Section 3 sets out the form of affidavit to be used.
Section 4 provides: “Any contract entered into by any board of any school district, board of trustees of any institution of higher learning, or other educational institution supported wholly or’ in part by public funds, or by any governing authority thereof, with any superintendent, principal, teacher, instructor, professor, or other instructional personnel, who shall not have filed the affidavit required in Section 2 hereof prior to the employment or election of such person and prior to the making of such contracts, shall be null and void and no funds shall be paid under said contract to such superintendent, principal, teacher, instructor, professor, or other instructional personnel; any funds so paid under said contract to such superintendent, principal, teacher, instructor, professor, or other instructional personnel, may be recovered from the person receiving the same and/or from the board of trustees or other governing authority by suit filed in the circuit court of the county in which such contract was made, and any judgment entered by such court in such cause of action shall be a personal judgment against the defendant therein and upon the official bonds made by such defendants, if any such bonds be in existence.”
Section 5 provides that a teacher filing a false affidavit shall be guilty of perjury, punishable by a fine, and shall forfeit his license to teach in any school or other institution of learning supported wholly or in part by public funds.
Section 6 is a separability provision.
Section 7 is an emergency clause, reading in part as follows:
“It is hereby determined that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the school segregation cases require solution of a great variety of local public school problems of considerable complexity immediately and which involve the health, safety and general welfare of the people of the State of Arkansas, and that the purpose of this act is to assist in the solution of these problems and to provide for the more efficient administration of public education.”
In the same proceeding the court held constitutionally invalid an Arkansas statute making it unlawful for any member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to be employed by the State of Arkansas or any of its subdivisions. 174 F. Supp. 351.
The affirmation recited that Carr was “conscientiously opposed to taking an oath or swearing in any form . . . .”
The actual holdings in Adler and Beilan, involving the validity of teachers’ discharges, are not relevant to the present- case.
The declared purpose of Act 10 is “to provide assistance in the administration and financing of the public schools . . . .” The declared justification for the emergency clause is “to assist in the solution” of problems raised by '“the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the school segregation cases.” See note 1. But neither the breadth and generality of the declared purpose.nor the possible irrelevance of the emergency provision detracts from the existence of an actual relevant state interest in the inquiry.
The record contains an opinion of the State Attorney General that “it is an administrative determination, to be made by the respective Boards, as to the disclosure of information contained in the affidavits.” The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held only that “the affidavits need not be opened to public inspection . . . .” 231 Ark. 641, 646, 331 S. W. 2d 701, 704. (Emphasis added.)
In the state court proceedings a witness who was a member of the Capital Citizens Council testified that his group intended to gain access to some of the Act 10 affidavits with a view to eliminating from the school system persons who supported organizations unpopular with the group. Among such organizations he named the American Civil Liberties Union, the Urban League, the American Association of University Professors, and the Women’s Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools.
In other areas, involving different constitutional issues, more administrative leeway has been thought allowable in the interest of increased efficiency in accomplishing a clearly constitutional central purpose. See Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192; Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 241 (dissenting opinion); Queenside Hills Co. v. Saxl, 328 U. S. 80, 83. But cf. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349.
See Freund, Competing Freedoms in American Constitutional Law, 13 U. of Chicago Conference Series 26, 32-33; Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6, 23-24; Comment, Legislative Inquiry into Political Activity: First Amendment Immunity From Committee Interrogation, 65 Yale L. J. 1159.1173-1175.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The major issue in this case involves the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, petitioner herein, to grant or refuse to grant individual producers special relief from applicable area and nationwide rates set by the Commission for the sale of natural gas. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside what it considered to have been the decision of the Commission that under the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq., it did not have authority to grant exceptional relief which would allow producers to pass through to interstate customers increased royalty costs based upon the intrastate price of natural gas. A secondary issue involves a question of abandonment under § 7 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (b), and an application of our decision last Term in California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U. S. 519 (1978), rev’g Southland Royalty Co. v. FPC, 543 F. 2d 1134 (CA5 1976).
I
Respondent United Gas Pipe Line Co. (United) purchases for resale in the interstate market natural gas produced by respondents Pennzoil Oil Producing Co. and Shell Oil Co. (Producers) from the Gibson field in southern Louisiana. Producers’ prices are subject to Commission regulation and may not exceed the just and reasonable rates established by the Commission in its relevant area and nationwide rate proceedings. Under their lease agreements with the owner of the Gibson field, Producers pay royalties pegged to the “market value” or “market price” of the gas. After commencement of state-court litigation involving the lessor’s contention that these references are to the unregulated price of natural gas in the intrastate market, rather than to the applicable interstate rates set by the Commission, the lessor and Producers reached a settlement agreement whereby royalty payments would be pegged to the higher of 78(4 per 1,000 cubic feet of gas (increasing 1.5(4 per year beginning in 1976) or 150% of the highest applicable interstate rate. In the alternative, Producers would abandon delivery to United of the royalty portion of the gas and deliver it instead as payment in kind to the lessor. However, this settlement would be binding only if the Commission allowed Producers to charge United a rate higher than applicable area and nationwide rates by the amount of the resulting increase in royalty costs, or in the alternative, permitted the desired abandonment.
The Commission referred Producers’ subsequent petition for special relief, supported by intervenor United, to an Administrative Law Judge who, after a hearing, denied the petition. Under his view of applicable cases, special relief from the relevant ceiling rates, while not absolutely prohibited, would be available only if Producers demonstrated “that' [their] overall costs incurred in the operation of the particular well or group of wells are higher than the applicable Commission-established area or nationwide ceiling rates, or, even more stringently, that [their] out-of-pocket expenses will exceed revenues.” App. 171. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that neither Producer had satisfied its burden of proof in this respect. Nor had it made a case for abandonment of the royalty portion of the gas.
The Commission affirmed but took a somewhat different approach. Acknowledging for the purposes of this case that it had no jurisdiction over royalty rates, the Commission nevertheless noted its authority to regulate the prices charged by Producers for gas sold in interstate commerce and asserted that it would be “inconsistent” with and “contrary” to its mandate to permit royalty costs to be passed on to Producers’ customers if royalties were calculated on any basis other than the just and reasonable rate for the gas involved. Relying in part on our decision in FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U. S. 380 (1974), the Commission concluded that it was “not free” to allow royalty costs based on the value of the gas in an unregulated market. 55 F. P. C. 400, 404-405 (1976). In an opinion and order denying rehearing, the Commission said that it “does not have the power to base a part of the regulated price on the unregulated market value of intrastate gas.” Price relief was thus denied without accepting or rejecting the findings of the Administrative Law Judge with respect to the relationship between the Producers’ costs and revenues. The Commission also denied the alternative request for abandonment of the royalty portion of the gas.
The Court of Appeals rejected the Commission’s determination that it was without authority to allow producers of natural gas to increase their rates above applicable area and nationwide rates in order “to reflect the increased cost of 'market value’ or 'market price’ royalty obligations.” Pennzoil Producing Co. v. FPC, 553 F. 2d 485, 487 (CA5 1977). Asserting that the Commission “has taken a cost plus profit .approach to gas rate regulation,” the Court of Appeals believed that in seeking to pass through their increased royalty expense, Producers “do not seek to increase their profits but merely to maintain those margins already determined by the Commission to be just and reasonable.” Id., at 488. The Commission had “authority to consider the reasonableness of any costs incurred,” but doing so “necessarily requires consideration of market price,” and the Commission had failed to explain why royalty costs in an unregulated market are different from any other cost of production. Ibid. The court concluded that these considerations and our decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U. S. 283 (1974), entitled the Producers to a “determination of the merits” of their request for special relief for the applicable area and nationwide rates. 553 F. 2d, at 488.
Based on its opinion and judgment in Southland Royalty Co. v. FPC, 543 F. 2d 1134 (CA5 1976), the Court of Appeals also disagreed with the Commission on the abandonment issue.
II
If the Commission’s opinion is to be read as holding that granting an individual producer a rate increase at variance with the established area or national rate in order to accommodate an increase in royalty costs is forbidden by the Act under any circumstance, the Court of Appeals was surely correct in disagreeing with the Commission. In Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747 (1968), the Commission urged that “nothing in the Constitution or in the Natural Gas Act require[s] the Commission to provide exceptions to the area rates,” at least so long as the Commission permitted abandonment when costs exceed revenues, but it nevertheless pointed out that it had established a procedure whereby individual producers may seek relief from the applicable area rate. Brief for the FPC, O. T. 1967, Nos. 90 et al., p. 64. Similarly, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, supra, the Commission, responding to the possibility of certain producers facing higher royalty payments than the fixed percentage of total costs used by the Commission in setting the area rates, stated — in agreement with the Court of Appeals — that “the issue is hypothetical at this stage and that if it becomes a reality producers may seek special relief from the Commission” Brief for Respondent FPC, O. T. 1973, Nos. 73-437 et al., p. 62. This Court proceeded on a similar assumption, saying that “in any event an affected producer is entitled to seek individualized relief.” 417 U. S., at 328.
None of the foregoing is consistent with the proposition that the Commission is totally without power to give special relief to individual producers whose escalating royalty costs place them in an untenable position. In view of the scope of the discretion vested in the Commission to establish just and reasonable rates consistent with the public interest, we could not hold that the Act forbids special relief from area rates to accommodate increased royalty costs regardless of the circumstances.
Nor do we understand the Commission in this Court to deny its jurisdiction to extend such relief in proper situations. Indeed, in its brief before this Court the Commission states that “with the approval of the courts, [it] has established the policy that it will not authorize departures from area rates unless a producer can show that its costs exceed its revenues at the area rate. See, e. g., Op. No. 699, 51 F. P. C. 2212, 2279, aff’d, Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 520 F. 2d 1061 (C. A. 5), certiorari denied, 426 U. S. 941.” Brief for Petitioner 34. The Commission does not suggest that this policy is generally inapplicable to eases seeking relief because of escalating royalty costs.
Nevertheless, the Commission’s initial opinion and its opinion denying rehearing indicated that it is “not free” and that “it does not have the power” to give individualized relief where escalating royalty costs are a function of, or are otherwise based upon, an unregulated market price for the product the sale of which in the interstate market is regulated by the Commission. Erroneously, we think, the Commission sought support for these conclusions in Texaco, 417 U. S., at 399, where we reminded the Commission that “[i]n subjecting producers to regulation because of anticompetitive conditions in the industry, Congress could not have assumed that ‘just and reasonable’ rates could conclusively be determined by reference to market price.” We did not, however, hold, as suggested by the Commission, that it “has no authority to permit rate increases based on royalty costs tied to the unregulated market for natural gas.” Brief for Petitioner 13; see also id., at 16, 19, 21. Our concern in Texaco was that rates of small producers might be totally exempted from the Act, and we did not indicate that producer or pipeline rates would be per se unjust and unreasonable because related to the unregulated price of natural gas. Texaco did not purport to circumscribe so severely the Commission’s discretion to decide what formulas and methods it will employ to ensure just and reasonable rates. Indeed, the decision underscored the wide discretion vested in the Commission. 387-393. See 417 TI. S., at
Ill
We are also convinced, however, that the Court of Appeals trenched upon the ratemaking authority vested in the Commission when it strongly suggested that the Commission is required to grant the relief Producers request in this case so long as the increase in royalty costs is not imprudent and the relief, when granted, will merely sustain rather than increase Producers’ profits.
Sections 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 717c and 7Í7d, mandate the Commission to set just and reasonable rates for the sale of interstate natural gas. In sustaining the Commission’s authority to establish maximum rates on an areawide basis, we noted that “courts are without authority to set aside any rate adopted by the Commission which is within a 'zone of reasonableness,’ ” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, supra, at 797. Moreover, in arriving at just and reasonable rates “no single method need be followed.” Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U. S. 294, 309 (1963). Specifically, the Commission is not required to adhere “rigidly to a cost-based determination of rates, much less to one that base[s] each producer’s rates on his own costs.” Mobil Oil, 417 U. S., at 308. While recognizing that under an areawide approach, “ 'high cost operators may be more seriously affected . . . than others,’ ” Permian Basin, supra, at 769, quoting Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 518 (1944), we refused to invalidate as inadequate the Commission’s proposal to provide special relief when a producer’s “ 'out of pocket expenses in connection with the operation of a particular well’ exceed [s] its revenue from the well under the applicable area price,” 390 U. S., at 770-771.
The Court of Appeals proceeded from the proposition that “[a] cost-based methodology was approved” in Permian Basin, to the implicit conclusion that the Commission is required to allow producers to maintain whatever profit margins they enjoyed under area or national rates, and that therefore it must grant special relief from these rates for all reasonable cost increases, emphasizing that a cost is not unreasonable simply because it is based on an unregulated market price. It must be noted, however, that the methodology employed by the Commission in arriving at the area rates approved in Permian Basin was not a purely cost-plus approach. To the contrary, the Court recognized “deviation [s] from cost-based pricing” which it “found not to be unreasonable and to be consistent with the Commission’s responsibility to consider not merely the interests of the producers . . . but also ‘the relevant public interests’ . . . .” Mobil Oil, supra, at 308-309, quoting Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 792. Furthermore, the notion that the Commission is required to maintain, or even allowed to maintain to the exclusion of other considerations, the profit margin of any particular producer is incompatible not only with the specific area approach to natural gas regulation approved in Permian Basin and Mobil Oil but also with a basic precept of rate regulation. “The fixing of prices, like other applications of the police power, may reduce the value of the property which is being regulated. But the fact that the value is reduced does not mean that the regulation is invalid.” FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 601 (1944). The Commission is not required by the Act to grant special relief from area or nationwide rates simply because the costs of an individual producer increase and his profits decline.
Given the wide discretion of the Commission to refuse exceptional relief, we are somewhat unsure of the meaning of the Court of Appeals’ statement that respondents in this case “were entitled to a determination of the merits of their requests.” 553 F. 2d, at 488. We think that the Court of Appeals read too much into our statement in Mobil Oil that a producer with rising royalty costs “is entitled to seek individualized relief.” 417 U. S., at 328. We did not there suggest that the Commission must be prepared to grant such relief in order to forestall declining profits. Indeed, we rejected the claim that the Commission must “provide automatic adjustments in area rates to compensate for anticipated higher royalty costs.” Ibid. Moreover, in Texaco, decided the same day as Mobil, we faced the issue whether the Commission had acted arbitrarily in failing to provide relief from the bind that pipelines and large producers might be put in if direct regulation of small producers were eliminated, a bind similar to that in which respondent Producers may find themselves if their royalty costs increase. We concluded in Texaco:
“ [Requiring pipelines and the large producers to assume the risk in bargaining for reasonable prices from small producers is within the Commission’s discretion in working out the balance of the interests . . . involved.” 417 U. S., at 392.
Likewise, the Commission is under no obligation automatically to relieve the bind on producers facing increased royalty costs based on unregulated prices. “All that is protected against, in a constitutional sense, is that the rates fixed by the Commission be higher than a confiscatory level.” Id., at 391-392. The Commission would not exceed its statutory authority if, in its view of the public interest, it determines to reject requests for special relief presenting no colorable claim that the applicable area or nationwide rate is confiscatory or, what may amount to the same thing, outside the “zone of reasonableness,” Permian Basin, supra, at 797; FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 585 (1942).
IY
Although we hold that the Court of Appeals too narrowly confined the Commission’s functions and judgment on remand, we agree that the case should be returned to the Commission. As we have said, despite the indications to the contrary in its opinions below and despite its failure to address the Administrative Law Judge’s findings with respect to Producers’ proof as to their costs and revenues, the Commission does not seem to take the position here that it is totally without power to grant individual relief from area rates in recognition of increased royalty costs and that the relationship between the individual producer’s costs and revenues in such a proceeding is totally irrelevant. Expressing its adherence to the policy approved in Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F. 2d 1061 (CA5 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 941 (1976), the Commission points to the findings of the Administrative Law Judge that Producers in this case failed to make any showing that their costs exceed revenues. See Brief for Petitioner 34-35. At the same time, however, the Commission disaffirms any suggestion that its order be sustained on a ground that it did not itself rely upon. Id., at 34. The agency’s reluctance is understandable, see Texaco, 417 U. S., at 395-397; Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168-169 (1962); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947). The upshot is that, given this state of the record, a remand to the Commission is the proper course in order that the Commission in the first instance may clearly enunciate whether and to what extent individual relief from area rates will be granted due to the increased royalty costs that are or may be involved in this case, and, if relief is to be denied, that it may make an adequate explanation of its judgment. Cf. Burlington Truck Lines, supra, at 167-168. If, as the Commission perhaps now suggests, the policy set forth in Shell Oil is the policy to be followed in cases such as this, the Commission should proceed to complete its task of reviewing and sustaining or rejecting the findings of the Administrative Law Judge.
V
With respect to the issue of abandonment, it is apparent that to the extent that the Court of Appeals relied upon its judgment in the Southland case, it was in error since that judgment was reversed here. It also appears to us, however, that the question of individual rate relief and that of abandonment are not unrelated. If the Commission were to take the position that relief from area rates to accommodate royalty-costs tied to intrastate rates is unavailable regardless of the relationship between costs and revenues, it may be that the issue of abandonment would appear in a different light. Cf. Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 770-771. In any event, it is the better part of wisdom to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and to remand the case to that court with directions to return the entire case to the Commission for further appropriate proceedings.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
At the time of the Commission’s decision in this case, the applicable rates were those prescribed by Opinion No. 598, Area Rate Proceeding (,Southern Louisiana Area), 46 F. P. C. 86, enf’d sub nom. Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F. 2d 880 (CA5 1973), aff’d sub nom. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U. S. 283 (1974); Opinion No. 699-H, Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Oas, 52 F. P. C. 1604 (1974), aff’d sub nom. Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F. 2d 1061 (CA5 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 941 (1976).
The Commission takes the position that construction of such clauses is a question of federal law, and that the “market” referred to is that for interstate gas. See Brief for Petitioner 35-37, and n. 22. Compare Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P. 2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U. S. 876 (1977), petition for rehearing pending, No. 76-1694; and Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 434 F. Supp. 349 (WD Tex. 1977), with Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 149 U. S. App. D. C. 310, 319-320, 463 F. 2d 256, 265-266 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 976 (1972).
Under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351, all wellhead natural gas, including that dedicated to the intrastate market, that is sold after December 1, 1978, will be subject to the Act’s price ceilings. However, there will remain for some time a differential between the rate prescribed for gas previously unregulated and that prescribed for gas dedicated to the interstate market.
In separate agreements, United consented to make the additional payments or to release the royalty gas, pursuant to Commission approval.
The Commission framed the issue before it as “whether [the Commission] can legally grant any form of rate relief above either an area or nationwide just and reasonable rate solely because the producer selling the gas in interstate commerce may be obligated to make a royalty payment based not upon the regulated price the producer receives for the gas, but rather on the 'market value’ of the gas.” 55 F. P. C. 400, 404 (1976).
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 149 U. S. App. D. C. 310, 463 F. 2d 256 (1971), oert. denied, 406 U. S. 976 (1972).
The Commission said:
“In the instant proceeding, the impetus of the settlement is the market value of the royalties • and no consideration has been given to regulated rates. As such, we cannot permit any incremental royalty costs resulting from this settlement, or resulting from any judgment by a state court regarding royalty payments, to be passed on to the pipeline if these incremental royalty costs are based on any other factors than the regulated just and reasonable rate. On this point, we note the Supreme Court’s warning in FPC v. Texaco . . . that the Commission is not free to equate just and reasonable rates with the prices for gas in the marketplace. Accordingly, we believe that we are not free to allow royalty costs, which are based on market values, to be passed on to the pipelines as just and reasonable rates. A contrary result would not '. . . afford customers a complete, permanent, and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges.’ ” 55 F. P. C., at 405.
55 F. P. C. 901 (1976). The Commission also explained:
“In arriving at the national rates costs of production were used and royalties were computed at 16 percent of total costs. ... It is for these reasons that the Commission is not free to allow royalty costs, which are based on market values, to be passed on to the pipelines as just and reasonable rates.” Id., at 902.
In separately denying the petition for rehearing filed by another litigant, the Commission observed that in setting area rates, an allowance for royalty costs “would depend on the royalties generally being paid in the area,” but this did not mean that an “individual producer’s rates should be increased because it must pay a higher royalty, particularly one based on market value.” 55 F. P. C. 1377, 1379 (1976).
The increasing rates provided for in the tentative settlement between United and Producers in this case, while formally pegged to the higher of the regulated rate or a specific price, are based upon unregulated market prices in that, as the Commission noted, 55 F. P. C., at 405, “the impetus of the settlement is the [unregulated] market value of the royalties.”
See Mobil Oil, 417 U. S., at 316; Permian Basin Area Bate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 769-770 (1968).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner is the publisher of Time, a weekly news magazine. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed a $100,000 libel judgment against petitioner which was based on an item appearing in Time that purported to describe the result of domestic relations litigation between respondent and her husband. We granted certio-rari, 421 U. S. 909 (1975), to review petitioner’s claim that the judgment violates its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
I
Respondent, Mary Alice Firestone, married Russell Firestone, the scion of one of America’s wealthier industrial families, in 1961. In 1964, they separated, and respondent filed a complaint for separate maintenance in the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County, Fla. Her husband counterclaimed for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. After a lengthy trial the Circuit Court issued a judgment granting the divorce requested by respondent’s husband. In relevant part the court’s final judgment read:
“This cause came on for final hearing before the court upon the plaintiff wife’s second amended complaint for separate maintenance (alimony unconnected with the causes of divorce), the defendant husband’s answer and counterclaim for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery, and the wife’s answer thereto setting up certain affirmative defenses. . . .
“According to certain testimony in behalf of the defendant, extramarital escapades of the plaintiff were bizarre and of an amatory nature which would have made Dr. Freud’s hair curl. Other testimony, in plaintiff’s behalf, would indicate that defendant was guilty of bounding from one bedpartner to another with the erotic zest of a satyr. The court is inclined to discount much of this testimony as unreliable. Nevertheless, it is the conclusion and finding of the court that neither party is domesticated, within the meaning of that term as used by the Supreme Court of Florida ....
“In the present case, it is abundantly clear from the evidence of marital discord that neither of the parties has shown the least susceptibility to domestication, and that the marriage should be dissolved.
“The premises considered, it is thereupon
“ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
“1. That the equities in this cause are with the defendant; that defendant’s counterclaim for divorce be and the same is hereby granted, and the bonds of matrimony which have heretofore existed between the parties are hereby forever dissolved.
“4. That the defendant shall pay unto the plaintiff the sum of $3,000 per month as alimony beginning January 1, 1968, and a like sum on the first day of each and every month thereafter until the death or remarriage of the plaintiff.” App. 523-525, 528.
Time’s editorial staff, headquartered in New York; was alerted by a wire service report and an account in a New York newspaper to the fact that a judgment had been rendered in the Firestone divorce proceeding. The staff subsequently received further information regarding the Florida decision from Time’s Miami bureau chief and from a “stringer” working on a special assignment basis in the Palm Beach area. On the basis of these four sources, Time’s staff composed the following item, which appeared in the magazine’s “Milestones” section the following week:
“Divorced. By Russell A. Firestone Jr., 41, heir to the tire fortune: Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime Palm Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery; after six years of marriage, one son; in West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough testimony of extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, ‘to make Dr. Freud’s hair curl.’ ”
Within a few weeks of the publication of this article respondent demanded in writing a retraction from petitioner, alleging that a portion of the article was “false, malicious and defamatory.” Petitioner declined to issue the requested retraction.
Respondent then filed this libel action against petitioner in the Florida Circuit Court. Based on a jury verdict for respondent, that court entered judgment against petitioner for $100,000, and after review in both the Florida District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida the judgment was ultimately affirmed. 305 So. 2d 172 (1974). Petitioner advances several contentions as to why the judgment is contrary to decisions of this Court holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution limit the authority of state courts to impose liability for damages based on defamation.
II
Petitioner initially contends that it cannot be liable for publishing any falsehood defaming respondent unless it is established that the publication was made “with actual malice,” as that term is defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964). Petitioner advances two arguments in support of this contention: that respondent is a “public figure” within this Court’s decisions extending New York Times to defamation suits brought by such individuals, see, e. g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967); and that the Time item constituted a report of a judicial proceeding, a class of subject matter which petitioner claims deserves the protection of the “actual malice” standard even if the story is proved to be defamatorily false or inaccurate. We reject both arguments.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 345 (1974), we have recently further defined the meaning of “public figure” for the purposes of the First and Fourteenth Amendments:
“For the most part those who' attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”
Respondent did not assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society, and she did not thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in it. •
Petitioner contends that because the Firestone divorce was characterized by the Florida Supreme Court as a “cause célebre,” it must have been a public controversy and respondent must be considered a public figure. But in so doing petitioner seeks to equate “public controversy” with all controversies of interest to the public. Were we to accept this reasoning, we would reinstate the doctrine advanced in the plurality opinion in Rosen-bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971), which concluded that the New York Times privilege should be extended to falsehoods defamatory of private persons whenever the statements concern matters -of general or public interest. In Qertz, however, the - Court repudiated this position, stating that “extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge [a] legitimate state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable.” 418 U. S., at 346.
Dissolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of “public controversy” referred to in Gertz, even though the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be of interest to some portion of the reading public. Nor did respondent freely choose to publicize issues as to the propriety of her married life. She was compelled to go to court by the State in order to obtain legal release from the bonds of matrimony. We have said that in such an instance “[r]esort to the judicial process ... is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests in court.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 376-377 (1971). Her actions, both in instituting the litigation and in its conduct, were quite different from those of General Walker in Curtis Publishing Co., supra. She assumed no “special prominence in the resolution of public questions.” Gertz, supra, at 351. We hold respondent was not a “public figure” for the purpose of determining the constitutional protection afforded petitioner’s report of the factual and legal basis for her divorce.
For similar reasons we likewise reject petitioner’s claim for automatic extension of the New York Times privilege to all reports of judicial proceedings. It is argued that information concerning proceedings in our Nation’s courts may have such importance to all citizens as to justify extending special First Amendment protection to the press when reporting on such events. We have recently accepted a significantly more confined version of this argument by holding that the Constitution precludes States from imposing civil liability based upon the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection. Cox Broadcasting Corp, v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975).
Petitioner would have us extend the reasoning of Cox Broadcasting to safeguard even inaccurate and false statements, at least where “actual malice” has not been established. But its argument proves too much. It-may be that all reports of judicial proceedings contain some informational value implicating the First Amendment, but recognizing this is little different from labeling all judicial proceedings matters of “public or general interest,” as that phrase was used by the plurality in Rosenbloom. Whatever their general validity, use of such subject-matter classifications to determine the extent of constitutional protection afforded defamatory falsehoods may too often result in an improper balance between the competing interests in this area. It was our recognition and rejection of this weakness in the Rosenbloom test which led us in Oertz to eschew a subject-matter test for one focusing upon the character of the defamation plaintiff. See 418 U. S., at 344-346. By confining inquiry to whether a plaintiff is a public officer or a public figure who might be assumed to “have voluntarily exposed [himself] to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood,” we sought a more appropriate accommodation between the public’s interest in an uninhibited press and its equally compelling need for judicial redress of libelous utterances. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942).
Presumptively erecting the New York Times barrier against all plaintiffs seeking to recover for injuries from defamatory falsehoods published in what are alleged to be reports of judicial proceedings would effect substantial depreciation of the individual’s interest in protection from such harm, without any convincing assurance that such a sacrifice is required under the First Amendment. And in some instances such an undiscriminating approach might achieve results directly at odds with the constitutional balance intended. Indeed, the article upon which the Gertz libel action was based purported to be a report on the murder trial of a Chicago police officer. See 418 U. S., at 325-326. Our decision in that case should make it clear that no such blanket privilege for reports of judicial proceedings is to be found in the Constitution.
It may be argued that there is still room for application of the New York Times protections to more narrowly focused reports of what actually transpires in the courtroom. But even so narrowed, the suggested privilege is simply too broad. Imposing upon the law of private defamation the rather drastic limitations worked by New York Times cannot be justified by generalized references to the public interest in reports of judicial proceedings. The details of many, if not most, courtroom battles would add almost nothing toward advancing the uninhibited debate on public issues thought to provide principal support for the decision in New York Times. See 376 U. S., at 270; cf. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 86 (1966). And while participants in some litigation may be legitimate "public figures," either generally or for the limited purpose of that litigation, the majority will more likely resemble respondent, drawn into a public forum largely against their will in order to attempt to obtain the only redress available to them or to defend themselves against actions brought by the State or by others. There appears little reason why these individuals should substantially forfeit that degree of protection which the law of defamation would otherwise afford them simply by virtue of their being drawn into a courtroom. The public interest in accurate reports of judicial proceedings is substantially protected by Cox Broadcasting Co., supra. As to inaccurate and defamatory reports of facts, matters deserving no First Amendment protection, see 418 U. S., at 340, we think Gertz provides an adequate safeguard for the constitutionally protected interests of the press and affords it a tolerable margin for error by requiring some type of fault.
i:ii
Petitioner has urged throughout this litigation that it could not be held liable for publication of the "Milestones" item because its report of respondent's divorce was factually correct. In its view the Time article faithfully reproduced the precise meaning of the divorce judgment. But this issue was submitted to the jury under an instruction intended to implement Florida's limited privilege. for accurate reports of judicial proceedings. App. 509; see 305 So. 2d, at 177. By returning a verdict for respondent the jury necessarily found that the identity of meaning which petitioner claims does not exist even for laymen. The Supreme Court of Florida upheld this finding on appeal, rejecting petitioner’s contention that its report was accurate as a matter of law. Because demonstration that an article was true would seem to preclude finding the publisher at fault, see Cox Broadcasting Co., 420 U. S., at 498-500 (Powell, J., concurring), we have examined the predicate for petitioner’s contention. We believe the Florida courts properly could have found the “Milestones” item to be false.
For petitioner’s report to have been accurate, the divorce granted Russell Firestone must have been based on a finding by the divorce court that his wife had committed extreme cruelty toward him and that she had been guilty of adultery. This is indisputably what petitioner reported in its “Milestones” item, but it is equally indisputable that these were not the facts. Russell Firestone alleged in his counterclaim that respondent had been guilty of adultery, but the divorce court never made any such finding. Its judgment provided that Russell Firestone’s “counterclaim for divorce be and the same is hereby granted,” but did not specify that the basis for the judgment was either of the two grounds alleged in the counterclaim. The Supreme Court of Florida on appeal concluded that the ground actually relied upon by the divorce court was “lack of domestication of the parties,” a ground not theretofore recognized by Florida law. The Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed the judgment dissolving the bonds of matrimony because the record contained sufficient evidence to establish the ground of extreme cruelty. Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223, 225 (1972).
Petitioner may well argue that the meaning of the trial court’s decree was unclear, but this does not license it to choose from among several conceivable interpretations the one most damaging to respondent. Having chosen to follow this tack, petitioner must be able to establish not merely that the item reported was a conceivable or plausible interpretation of the decree, but that the item was factually correct. We believe there is ample support for the jury’s conclusion, affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida, that this was not the case. There was, therefore, sufficient basis for imposing liability upon petitioner if the constitutional limitations we announced in Gertz have been satisfied. These are a prohibition against imposing liability without fault, 418 U. S., at 347, and the requirement that compensatory awards “be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury.” Id., at 350.
As to the latter requirement little difficulty appears. Petitioner has argued that because respondent withdrew her claim for damages to reputation on the eve of trial, there could be no recovery consistent with Gertz. Petitioner’s theory seems to be that the only compensable injury in a defamation action is that which may be done to one’s reputation, and that claims not predicated upon such injury are by definition not actions for defamation. But Florida has obviously decided to permit recovery for other injuries without regard to measuring the effect the falsehood may have had upon a plaintiff’s reputation. This does not transform the action into something other than an action for defamation as that term is meant in Gertz. In that opinion we made it clear that States could base awards on elements other than injury to reputation, specifically listing “personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering” as examples of injuries which might be compensated consistently with the Constitution upon a showing of fault. Because respondent has decided to forgo recovery for injury to her reputation, she is not prevented from obtaining compensation for such other damages that a defamatory falsehood may have caused her.
The trial court charged, consistently with Gertz, that the jury should award respondent compensatory damages in “an amount of money that will fairly and adequately compensate her for such damages,” and further cautioned that “ [i] t is only damages which are a direct and natural result of the alleged libel which may be recovered.” App. 509. There was competent evidence introduced to permit the jury to assess the amount of injury. Several witnesses testified to the extent of respondent’s anxiety and concern over Time’s inaccurately reporting that she had been found guilty of adultery, and she herself took the stand to elaborate on her fears that her young son would be adversely affected by this falsehood when he grew older. The jury decided these injuries should be compensated by an award of $100,000. We have no warrant for re-examining this determination. Cf. Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S. 436 (1894).
IV
Gertz established, however, that not only must there be evidence to support an award of compensatory damages, there must also be evidence of some fault on the part of a defendant charged with publishing defamatory material. No question of fault was submitted to the jury in this case, because under Florida law the only findings required for determination of liability were whether the article was defamatory, whether it was true, and whether the defamation, if any, caused respondent harm.
The failure to submit the question of fault to the jury does not of itself establish noncompliance with the constitutional requirements established in Gertz, however. Nothing in the Constitution requires that assessment , of fault in a civil case tried in a state court be made by a jury, nor is there any prohibition against such a finding being made in the first instance by an appellate, rather than a trial, court. The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not impose upon the States any limitations as to how, within their own. judicial systems, factfinding tasks shall be allocated. If we were satisfied that one of the Florida courts which considered this case had supportably ascertained petitioner was at fault, we would be required to affirm the judgment below.
But the only alternative source of such a finding, given that the issue was not submitted to the jury, is the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida. That opinion appears to proceed generally on the assumption that a showing of fault was not required, but then in the penultimate paragraph it recites:
“Furthermore, this erroneous reporting is clear and convincing evidence of the negligence in certain segments of the news media in gathering the news. Gertz v. Welch, Inc., supra. Pursuant to Florida law in effect at the time of the divorce judgment (Section 61.08, Florida Statutes), a wife found guilty of adultery could not be awarded alimony. Since petitioner had been awarded alimony, she had not been found guilty of adultery nor had the divorce been granted on the ground of adultery. A careful examination of the final decree prior to publication would have clearly demonstrated that the divorce had been granted on the grounds of extreme cruelty, and thus the wife would have been saved the humiliation of being accused of adultery in a nationwide magazine. This is a flagrant example of ‘journalistic negligence.’ ” 305 So. 2d, at 178.
It may be argued that this is sufficient indication the court found petitioner at fault within the meaning of Gertz. Nothing in that decision or in the First or Fourteenth Amendment requires that in a libel action an appellate court treat in detail by written opinion all contentions of the parties, and if the jury or trial judge had found fault in fact, we would be quite willing to read the quoted passage as affirming that conclusion. But without some finding of fault by the judge or jury in the Circuit Court, we would have to attribute to the Supreme Court of Florida from the quoted language not merely an intention to affirm the finding of the lower court, but an intention to find such a fact in the first instance.
Even where a question of fact may have constitutional significance, we normally accord findings of state courts deference in reviewing constitutional claims here. See, e. g., Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 602-603 (1944); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U. S. 55, 60-61 (1951) (opinion of Reed, J.). But that deference is predicated on our belief that at some point in the state proceedings some factfinder has made a conscious determination of the existence or nonexistence of the critical fact. Here the record before us affords no basis for such a conclusion.
It may well be that petitioner’s account in its “Milestones” section was the product of some fault on its part, and that the libel judgment against it was, therefore, entirely consistent with Gertz. But in the absence of a finding in some element of the state-court system that there was fault, we are not inclined to canvass the record to make such a determination in the first instance. Cf. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S., at 87-88. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Under Florida law the demand for retraction was a prerequisite for filing a libel action, and permits defendants to limit their potential liability to actual damages by complying with the demand. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§770.01-770.02 (1963).
The “actual malice” test requires that a plaintiff prove that the defamatory statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” 376 U. S., at 280.
Nor do we think the fact that respondent may have held a few press conferences during the divorce proceedings in an attempt to satisfy inquiring reporters converts her into a “public figure.” Such - interviews should have had no effect upon the merits of the legal dispute between respondent and her husband or the outcome of that trial, and we do not think it can be assumed that any such purpose was intended. Moreover, there is no indication that she sought to use the press conferences as a vehicle by which to thrust herself to the forefront of some unrelated controversy in order to influence its resolution. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 345 (1974).
Petitioner is incorrect in arguing that a rational interpretation of an ambiguous document is constitutionally protected under our decision in Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U. S. 279 (1971). There we were applying the New York Times standard to test whether the defendant had acted in reckless disregard of the truth. Id., at 292. But as we have concluded that the publication in this case need not be tested against the "actual malice” standard, Pape is of no assistance to petitioner.
In fact, it appears that none of petitioner’s employees actually saw the decree prior to publication of the “Milestones” article. But we do not think this can affect.the extent of constitutional protection afforded the statement. Moreover, petitioner has maintained throughout that it would have published an identical statement if its editorial staff had had an opportunity to peruse the judgment prior to their publication deadline, and has consistently contended that its article was true when compared to the words of that judgment.
These included respondent’s minister, her attorney in the divorce proceedings, plus several friends and neighbors, one of whom was a physician who testified to having to administer a sedative to respondent in an attempt to reduce discomfort wrought by her worrying about the article.
After reiterating its conclusion that the article was false, the Florida court noted that falsely accusing a woman of adultery is libelous per se and normally actionable without proof of damages. The court then recognized that our opinion in Gertz necessarily displaced this presumption of damages but ruled that the trial court’s instruction was consistent with Gertz and that there was evidence to support the jury’s verdict — conclusions with which we have agreed. The court went on to reject a claim of privilege under state law, pointing out that the privilege shielded only “fair and accurate” reports and the jury had resolved these issues against petitioner. The court appears to have concluded its analysis of petitioner’s legal claims with this statement, which immediately precedes the paragraph set out in the text:
“Careful examination and consideration of the record discloses that the judgment of the trial court is correct and should have been affirmed on appeal to the District Court.” 305 So. 2d, at 177-178.
There is nothing in the court’s opinion which appears to make any reference to the relevance of some concept of fault in determining petitioner’s liability.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Murphy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In March of 1947, the Committee on Education and Labor was, as it is now, a standing committee of the House of Representatives. During the first session of the 80th Congress it held frequent hearings on proposed amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. On March 1, 1947, petitioner appeared as a witness before the committee, under oath, and in the course of the proceedings was asked a series of questions directed to his political affiliations and associations. In his answers he unequivocally denied that he was a Communist or that he endorsed, supported or participated in Communist programs. As a result of these answers he was indicted for perjury under § 22-2501 of the District of Columbia Code, and after a trial by jury was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, 84 U. S. App. D. C. 132, 171 F. 2d 1004, and we granted certiorari to review its validity. 336 U. S. 934.
No question is raised as to the relevancy or propriety of the questions asked. Petitioner’s main contention is that the committee was not a “competent tribunal” within the meaning of the statute, in that a quorum of the committee was not present at the time of the incident on which the indictment was based. As to this, the record reveals the following: the Committee on Education and Labor consists of twenty-five members, of whom thirteen constitute a quorum. At the commencement of the afternoon session on Saturday, March 1, 1947, shortly after two o’clock, a roll call showed that fourteen members were present. Petitioner’s testimony started some time after four o’clock. The responses said to constitute offenses were given just prior to five p. m.
Evidence was adduced at the trial from which a jury might have concluded that at the time of the allegedly perjurious answers less than a quorum — as few as six— of the committee were in attendance. Counsel for the petitioner contended vigorously at the trial, on appeal and in this Court that unless a quorum were found to be actually present when the crucial questions were asked, the statutory requirement of a competent tribunal was not met and that absent such a finding a verdict of acquittal should follow.
The trial court agreed that the presence of a quorum was an indispensable part of the offense charged, and instructed the jury that to find the defendant guilty they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt “That the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen members of the said Committee,” and that “at least that number must have been actually and physically present .... If such a Committee so met, that is, if 13 members did meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of March 1, 1947, and thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of them left temporarily or otherwise and no question was raised as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not remain there would not affect, for the purposes of this case, the existence of that Committee as a competent tribunal provided that before the oath was administered and before the testimony of the defendant was given there were present as many as 13 members of that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon session. . . .”
This charge is objected to insofar as it allows the jury to find a quorum present simply by finding that thirteen or more members were in attendance when the committee was convened, without reference to subsequent facts.
The Constitution of the United States provides that “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,” Art. I, § 5, Cl. 2, and we find that the subject of competency, both of the House as a whole and of its committees, has been a matter of careful consideration. Rule XI (2) (f) of the House of Representatives reads in part, “The rules of the House are hereby made the rules of its standing committees so far as applicable . . . .” Rule XV of the House provides for a call of the House if a quorum is not present, and it has been held under this rule that such a call, or a motion to adjourn, is the only business that may be transacted in the absence of a quorum. IV Hind’s Precedents § 2950; id. § 2988. See id. § § 2934, 2939; VI Cannon’s Precedents § 653; id. § 680. It appears to us plain that even the most highly privileged business must be suspended in the absence of a quorum in the House itself.
A similar situation obtains in the committees. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812, 831, provides, referring to the standing committees, in § 133 (d), “No measure or recommendation shall be reported from any such committee unless a majority of the committee were actually present.” The rule embodied in this subsection was effective as long ago as 1918 to keep off the floor of the House a bill from a committee attended by less than a quorum, even though no objection was raised in the committee meeting itself. It appeared that the situation in the committee was much like the one with which we are concerned, with members coming and going during the meeting. No point of no quorum was raised at the committee meeting. When the Chairman proposed in the House to bring up the bill considered in the meeting, the Speaker ruled, on objection being made from the floor, that in spite of the point’s not having been raised in committee, the bill could not be reported. The absence of a quorum of the committee, though at the time unobjected to, had made effective action impossible. VIII Cannon’s Precedents § 2212. Witnesses in committee hearings cannot be required to be familiar with the complications of parliamentary practice. Even if they are, the power to raise a point of no quorum appears to be limited to members of the committee. We have no doubt that if a member of the committee had raised a point of no quorum and a count had revealed the presence of less than a majority, proceedings would have been suspended until the deficiency should be supplied. In a criminal case affecting the rights of one not a member, the occasion of trial is an appropriate one for petitioner to raise the question.
Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business is of course none of our concern, and by the same token the considerations which may lead Congress as a matter of legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct of its committees do not control the issue before us. The question is neither what rules Congress may establish for its own governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity may protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather what rules the House has established and whether they have been followed. It of course has the power to define what tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the conditions that establish its competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the charge that was given it the jury was allowed to assume that the conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in fact was not established and in face of a possible finding that the facts contradicted the assumption.
We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which defined it. As a consequence of this conviction, petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from two to six years. An essential part of a procedure which can be said fairly to inflict such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the crime charged in the instant indictment is the presence of a competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed the jury. The House insists that to be such a tribunal a committee must consist of a quorum, and we agree with the trial court’s charge that, to convict, the jury had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there were “actually and physically present” a majority of the committee.
Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by a finding that there was a majority present two or three hours before the defendant offered his testimony, in the face of evidence indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law that a quorum need not be present when the offense is committed. This not only seems to us contrary to the rules and practice of the Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is that he be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of the crime charged against him. A tribunal that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is unthinkable that such a body can be the instrument of criminal conviction. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming so much of the instructions to the jury as allowed them to find a quorum present without reference to the facts at the time of the alleged perjurious testimony, and its judgment is reversed.
Reversed.
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812, § 121; Rule X, House of Representatives; H. R. Res. No. 111, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., adopted Feb. 26, 1947 (93 Cong. Rec. 1457).
“§ 22-2501 .... Perjury — Subornation of perjury. Every person who, having taken an oath or affirmation before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which the law authorized such oath or affirmation to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, wilfully and contrary to such oath or affirmation states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, shall be guilty of perjury; and any person convicted of perjury or subornation of perjury shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than two nor more than ten years. . . .” 31 Stat. 1329.
There is some difference between procedure in the full House and in its committees. In the former, business is transacted on the assumption that a quorum is present at all times, unless a roll call or a division indicate the contrary. In committee meetings, however, the presence of a quorum must be affirmatively shown before the committee is deemed to be legally met. VIII Cannon’s Precedents § 2222.
In Meyers v. United States, 84 U. S. App. D. C. 101, 171 F. 2d 800, the appellant made contentions similar to those of petitioner. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held the same view expressed here. “On October 6, 1947, however, only two senators were present at the hearing. Since they were a minority of the subcommittee, they could not legally function except to adjourn. For that reason, the testimony of Lamarre given on that day cannot be considered as perjury nor can appellant be convicted of suborning it.” 84 U. S. App. D. C. at 112, 171 F. 2d at 811. The conviction was affirmed on the ground that all the perjurious statements alleged in the indictment were made on October 4, when a quorum was present. 84 U. S. App. D. C. at 113, 171 F. 2d at 812.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Article I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” In Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood, 541 U. S. 440 (2004), we granted certiorari to determine whether this Clause gives Congress the authority to abrogate States’ immunity from private suits. See id., at 443. Without reaching that question, we upheld the application of the Bankruptcy Code to proceedings initiated by a debtor against a state agency to determine the dischargeability of a student loan debt. See id., at 451. In this case we consider whether a proceeding initiated by a bankruptcy trustee to set aside preferential transfers by the debtor to state agencies is barred by sovereign immunity. Relying in part on our reasoning in Hood, we reject the sovereign immunity defense advanced by the state agencies.
I
Petitioners are Virginia institutions of higher education that are considered “arm[s] of the State” entitled to sovereign immunity. See, e. g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 756 (1999) (observing that only arms of the State can assert the State’s immunity). Wallace’s Bookstores, Inc., did business with petitioners before it filed a petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. III), in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Respondent, Bernard Katz, is the court-appointed liquidating supervisor of the bankrupt estate. He has commenced proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to §§ 547(b) and 550(a) to avoid and recover alleged preferential transfers to each of the petitioners made by the debtor when it was insolvent. Petitioners’ motions to dismiss those proceedings on the basis of sovereign immunity were denied by the Bankruptcy Court.
The denial was affirmed by the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, judgt. order reported at 106 Fed. Appx. 841 (2004), on the authority of the Sixth Circuit’s prior determination that Congress has abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings. See Hood v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation, 319 F. 3d 755 (2003). We granted certiorari, 544 U. S. 960 (2005), to consider the question left open by our opinion in Hood: whether Congress’ attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity in 11 U. S. C. § 106(a) is valid. As we shall explain, however, we are persuaded that the enactment of that provision was not necessary to authorize the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction over these preference avoidance proceedings.
Bankruptcy jurisdiction, at its core, is in rem. See Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U. S. 565, 574 (1947) (“The whole process of proof, allowance, and distribution is, shortly speaking, an adjudication of interests claimed in a res”). As we noted in Hood, it does not implicate States’ sovereignty to nearly the same degree as other kinds of jurisdiction. See 541 U. S., at 450-451 (citing admiralty and bankruptcy cases). That was as true in the 18th century as it is today. Then, as now, the jurisdiction of courts adjudicating rights in the bankrupt estate included the power to issue compulsory orders to facilitate the administration and distribution of the res.
It is appropriate to presume that the Framers of the Constitution were familiar with the contemporary legal context when they adopted the Bankruptcy Clause — a provision which, as we explain in Part IV, infra, reflects the States’ acquiescénce in a grant of congressional power to subordinate to the pressing goal of harmonizing bankruptcy law sovereign immunity defenses that might have been asserted in bankruptcy proceedings. The history of the Bankruptcy Clause, the reasons it was inserted in the Constitution, and the legislation both proposed and enacted under its auspices immediately following ratification of the Constitution demonstrate that it was intended not just as a grant of legislative authority to Congress, but also to authorize limited subordination of state sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy arena. Foremost on the minds of those who adopted the Clause were the intractable problems, not to mention the injustice, created by one State’s imprisoning of debtors who had been discharged (from prison and of their debts) in and by another State. As discussed below, to remedy this problem, the very first Congresses considered, and the Sixth Congress enacted, bankruptcy legislation authorizing federal courts to, among other things, issue writs of habeas corpus directed at state officials ordering the release of debtors from state prisons.
We acknowledge that statements in both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996), reflected an assumption that the holding in that case would apply to the Bankruptcy Clause. See also Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U. S. 96, 105 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Careful study and reflection have convinced us, however, that that assumption was erroneous. For the reasons stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821), we are not bound to follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now at issue was not fully debated. See id., at 399-400 (“It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision”).
II
Critical features of every bankruptcy proceeding are the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s property, the equitable distribution of that property among the debtor’s creditors, and the ultimate discharge that gives the debtor a “fresh start” by releasing him, her, or it from further liability for old debts. See, e. g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 244 (1934). “Under our longstanding precedent, States, whether or not they choose to participate in the proceeding, are bound by a bankruptcy court’s discharge order no less than other creditors.” Hood, 541 U. S., at 448. Petitioners here, like the state agencies that were parties in Hood, have conceded as much. See id., at 449 (noting concession that “States are generally bound by a bankruptcy court’s discharge order”); Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9.
The history of discharges in bankruptcy proceedings demonstrates that the state agencies’ concessions, and Hood’s holding, are correct. The term “discharge” historically had a dual meaning; it referred to both release of debts and release of the debtor\from prison. Indeed, the earliest English statutes governing bankruptcy and insolvency authorized discharges of persons, not debts. One statute enacted in 1649 was entitled “An Act for discharging Poor Prisoners unable to satisfie their Creditors.” 2 Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660, pp. 240-241 (C. Firth & R. Rait eds. 1911). The stated purpose of the Act was to “Discharge... the person of [the] Debtor” “of and from his or her Imprisonment.” Ibid. Not until 1705 did the English Parliament extend the discharge (and then only for traders and merchants) to include release of debts. See 4 Ann., ch. 17, §7,11 Statutes at Large 165 (D. Pickering ed. 1764) (providing that upon compliance with the statute, “all and every person and persons so becoming bankrupt... shall be discharged from all debts by him, her, or them due and owing at the time that he, she, or they did become bankrupt”); see also McCoid, Discharge: The Most Important Development in Bankruptcy History, 70 Am. Bankr. L. J. 163, 167 (1996).
Well into the 18th century, imprisonment for debt was still ubiquitous in England and the American Colonies. Bankruptcy and insolvency laws remained as much concerned with ensuring full satisfaction of creditors (and, relatedly, preventing debtors’ flight to parts unknown) as with securing new beginnings for debtors. Illustrative of bankruptcy laws’ harsh treatment of debtors during this period was that debtors often fared worse than common criminals in prison; unfortunate insolvents, unlike criminals, were forced to provide their own food, fuel, and clothing while behind bars. See B. Mann, Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence 78-108 (2002).
Common as imprisonment itself was, the American Colonies, and later the several States, had wildly divergent schemes for discharging debtors and their debts. Id., at 79 (“The only consistency among debt laws in the eighteenth century was that every colony, and later every state, permitted imprisonment for debt — most on mesne process, and all on execution of a judgment”). At least four jurisdictions offered relief through private Acts of their legislatures. See Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. v. Gibbons, 455 U. S. 457, 472 (1982). Those Acts released debtors from prison upon surrender of their property, and many coupled the release from prison with a discharge of debts. Other jurisdictions enacted general laws providing for release from prison and, in a few places, discharge of debt. Others still granted release from prison, but only in exchange for indentured servitude. Some jurisdictions provided no relief at all for the debtor. See generally P. Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in America: Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt, and Bankruptcy, 1607-1900 (1999).
The difficulties posed by this patchwork of insolvency and bankruptcy laws were peculiar to the American experience. In England, where there was only one sovereign, a single discharge could protect the debtor from his jailer and his creditors. As two cases — one litigated before the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and one litigated after it— demonstrate, however, the uncoordinated actions of multiple sovereigns, each laying claim to the debtor’s body and effects according to different rules, rendered impossible so neat a solution on this side of the Atlantic.
In the first case, James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188 (C. P. Phila. Cty. 1786), Jared Ingersoll, an attorney who a year later would become a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, represented a Pennsylvania creditor seeking recovery from a debtor who had been released from prison in New Jersey. Shortly after his release, the debtor traveled to Pennsylvania, where he was arrested for nonpayment of the Pennsylvania debt. In seeking release from the Pennsylvania prison, he argued that his debt had been discharged by the New Jersey court. Ingersoll responded that the order granting relief under New Jersey’s insolvency laws “only discharged the person of the debtor from arrest within the State of New Jersey.” Id., at 190. The court agreed: Whatever effect the order might have had in New Jersey, the court said, it “goes no further than to discharge [the debtor] from his imprisonment in the Gaol of Essex County in the State of New Jersey; which, if the fullest obedience were paid to it, could not authorize a subsequent discharge from imprisonment in another Gaol, in another State.” Id., at 192. The court further observed that “[insolvent laws subsist in every State in the Union, and are probably all different from each other.... Even the Bankrupt Laws of England, while we were the subjects of that country, were never supposed to extend here, so as to exempt the persons of the Bankrupts from being arrested.” Id., at 191.
In the second case, Millar v. Hall, 1 Dall. 229 (Pa. 1788), which was decided the year after the Philadelphia Convention, Ingersoll found himself arguing against the principle announced in James. His client, a debtor named Hall, had been “discharged under an insolvent law of the state of Maryland, which is in the nature of a general bankrupt[cy] law.” 1 Dall., at 231. Prior to his discharge, Hall had incurred a debt to a Pennsylvanian named Millar. Hall neglected to mention that debt in his schedule of creditors presented to the Maryland court, or to personally notify Millar of the looming discharge. Following the Maryland court’s order, Hall traveled to Pennsylvania and was promptly arrested for the unpaid debt to Millar.
Responding to Millar’s counsel’s argument that the holding of James controlled, Ingersoll urged adoption of a rule that “the discharge of the Defendant in one state ought to be sufficient to discharge [a debtor] in every state.” 1 Dall., at 231. Absent such a rule, Ingersoll continued, “perpetual imprisonment must be the lot of every man who fails; and all hope of retrieving his losses by honest and industrious pursuits, will be cut off from the unfortunate bankrupt.” Ibid. The court accepted this argument. Allowing a creditor to execute “upon [a debtor’s] person out of the state in which he has been discharged,” the court explained, “would be giving a superiority to some creditors, and affording them a double satisfaction — to wit, a proportionable dividend of his property there, and the imprisonment of his person here.” Id., at 232. Indeed, the debtor having already been obliged to surrender all of his effects, “to permit the taking [of] his person here, would be to attempt to compel him to perform an impossibility, that is, to pay a debt after he has been deprived of every means of payment, — an attempt which would, at least, amount to perpetual imprisonment, unless the benevolence of his friends should interfere to discharge [his] account.” Ibid.
These two cases illustrate the backdrop against which the Bankruptcy Clause was adopted. In both James and Millar, the debtors argued that the earlier discharge should be given preclusive effect pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Articles of Confederation. See James, 1 Dall., at 190; Millar, 1 Dall., at 231. That possibility was the subject of discussion at the Constitutional Convention when a proposal to encompass legislative Acts, and insolvency laws in particular, within the coverage of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution was committed to the Committee of Detail together with a proposal “‘[t]o establish uniform laws lipón the subject of bankruptcies, and respecting the damages arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange.’” See Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 Am. J. Legal Hist. 215, 216-217, 219 (1957); see also Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 Term. L. Rev. 487, 527-528 (1996). A few days after this proposal was taken under advisement, the Committee of Detail reported that it had recommended adding the power “ ‘[t]o establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies’” to the Naturalization Clause of what later became Article I. Id., at 527.
The Convention adopted the Committee’s recommendation with very little debate two days later. Roger Sherman of Connecticut alone voted against it, apparently because he was concerned that it would authorize Congress to impose upon American citizens the ultimate penalty for debt then in effect in England: death. See J. Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 571 (Ohio Univ. Press ed. 1966). The absence of extensive debate over the text of the Bankruptcy Clause or its insertion indicates that there was general agreement on the importance of authorizing a uniform federal response to the problems presented in cases like James and Millar.
Ill
Bankruptcy jurisdiction, as understood today and at the time of the framing, is principally in rem jurisdiction. See Hood, 541 U. S., at 447; Local Loan Co., 292 U. S., at 241; Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318, 320-321 (1931); Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 192 (1902); New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 U. S. 656, 661-662 (1876). In bankruptcy, “the court’s jurisdiction is premised on the debtor and his estate, and not on the creditors.” Hood, 541 U. S., at 447. As such, its exercise does not, in the usual case, interfere with state sovereignty even when States’ interests are affected. See id., at 448.
The text of Article I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution, however, provides that Congress shall have the power to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” Although the interest in avoiding unjust imprisonment for debt and making federal discharges in bankruptcy enforceable in every State was a primary motivation for the adoption of that provision, its coverage encompasses the entire “subject of Bankruptcies.” The power granted to Congress by that Clause is a unitary concept rather than an amalgam of discrete segments.
The Framers would have understood that laws “on the subject of Bankruptcies” included laws providing, in certain limited respects, for more than simple adjudications of rights in the res. The first bankruptcy statute, for example, gave bankruptcy commissioners appointed by the district court the power, inter alia, to imprison recalcitrant third parties in possession of the estate’s assets. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 14,2 Stat. 25 (repealed 1803). More generally, courts adjudicating disputes concerning bankrupts’ estates historically have had the power to issue ancillary orders enforcing their in rem adjudications. See, e. g., 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 486 (1766) (noting that the assignees of the bankrupt’s property — the 18th-century counterparts to today’s bankruptcy trustees — could “pursue any legal method of recovering [the debtor’s] property so vested in them,” and could pursue methods in equity with the consent of the creditors); Plank, 63 Tenn. L. Rev., at 523 (discussing state insolvency and bankruptcy laws in the 18th century empowering courts to recover preferential transfers); see also Ex parte Christy, 3 How. 292, 312, 314 (1844) (opinion for the Court by Story, J.) (describing bankruptcy jurisdiction under the 1841 Act in broad terms); Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 502, 513-514 (1938) (defining “bankruptcy” as the “ ‘subject of the relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending to his and their relief ’ ” (emphasis added)).
Our decision in Hood illustrates the point. As the dissenters in that case pointed out, it was at least arguable that the particular procedure that the debtor pursued to establish dischargeability of her student loan could have been characterized as a suit against the State rather than a purely in rem proceeding. See 541 U. S., at 455-456 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But because the proceeding was merely ancillary to the Bankruptcy Court’s exercise of its in rem jurisdiction, we held that it did not implicate state sovereign immunity. The point is also illustrated by Congress’ early grant to federal courts of the power to issue in personam writs of habeas corpus directing States to release debtors from state prisons, discussed in Part IV, infra. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484, 494-495 (1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody”).
The interplay between in rem adjudications and orders ancillary thereto is evident in the ease before us. Respondent first seeks a determination under 11 U. S. C. §547 that the various transfers made by the debtor to petitioners qualify as voidable preferences. The § 547 determination, standing alone, operates as a mere declaration of avoidance. That declaration may be all that the trustee wants; for example, if the State has a claim against the bankrupt estate, the avoidance determination operates to bar that claim until the preference is turned over. See § 502(d). In some cases, though, the trustee, in order to marshal the entirety of the debtor’s estate, will need to recover the subject of the transfer pursuánt to § 550(a). A court order mandating turnover of the property, although ancillary to and in furtherance of the court’s in rem jurisdiction, might itself involve in perso-nam process.
As we explain in Part IV, infra, it is not necessary to decide whether actions to recover preferential transfers pursuant to § 550(a) are themselves properly characterized as in rem. Whatever the appropriate appellation, those who crafted the Bankruptcy Clause would have understood it to give Congress the power to authorize courts to avoid preferential transfers and to recover the transferred property. Petitioners do not dispute that that authority has been a core aspect of the administration of bankrupt estates since at least the 18th century. See, e. g., Rust v. Cooper, 2 Cowp. 629, 633-634, 98 Eng. Rep. 1277, 1280 (K. B. 1777); Alderson v. Temple, 1 Black. W. 660, 661-663, 96 Eng. Rep. 384, 385 (K. B. 1768); see also McCoid, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 Va. L. Rev. 249, 251-253 (1981) (discussing-English precedents, dating back to Sir Edward Coke’s discussion in The Case of Bankrupts, 2 Co. Rep. 25a, 76 Eng. Rep. 441 (K. B. 1584), addressing bankruptcy commissioners’ power to avoid preferences); In re Dehon, Inc., 327 B. R. 38,62-65 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass. 2005) (collecting historical materials). And it, like the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus releasing debtors from state prisons, see Part IV, infra, operates free and clear of the State’s claim of sovereign immunity.
IV
Insofar as orders ancillary to the bankruptcy courts in rem jurisdiction, like orders directing turnover of preferential transfers, implicate States’ sovereign immunity from suit, the States agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert that immunity. So much is evidenced not only by the history of the Bankruptcy Clause, which shows that the Framers’ primary goal was to prevent competing sovereigns’ interference with the debtor’s discharge, see Part II, supra, but also by legislation considered and enacted in the immediate wake of the Constitution’s ratification.
Congress considered proposed legislation establishing uniform federal bankruptcy laws in the first and each succeeding Congress until 1800, when the first Bankruptcy Act was passed. See C. Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History 10 (1935) (“[I]n the very first session of the 1st Congress, during which only the most necessary subjects of legislation were considered, bankruptcy was one of those subjects; and as early as June 1, 1789, a Committee of the House was named to prepare a bankruptcy bill”). The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was in many respects a copy of the English bankruptcy statute then in force. It was, like the English law, chiefly a measure designed to benefit creditors. Like the English statute, its principal provisions permitted bankruptcy commissioners, on appointment by a federal district court, to arrest the debtor, see § 4, 2 Stat. 22; to “cause the doors of the dwelling-house of [the] bankrupt to be broken,” § 4, id., at 22-23; to seize and collect the debtor’s assets, § 5, id., at 23; to examine the debtor and any individuals who might have possession of the debtor’s property, §§ 14,18,19, id., at 25-27; and to issue a “certificate of discharge” once the estate had been distributed, §36, id., at 31.
The American legislation differed slightly from the English, however. That difference reflects both the uniqueness of a system involving multiple sovereigns and the concerns that lay at the core of the Bankruptcy Clause itself. The English statute gave a judge sitting on a court where the debtor had obtained his discharge the power to order a sheriff, “Bailiff or Officer, Gaoler or Keeper of any Prison” to release the “Bankrupt out of Custody” if he were arrested subsequent to the discharge. 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30, ¶ 13 (1732). The American version of this provision was worded differently; it specifically granted federal courts the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus effective to release debtors from state prisons. See § 38, 2 Stat. 32; see also In re Comstock, 6 F. Cas. 237, 239 (No. 3,073) (Vt. 1842) (observing that Bankruptcy Act of 1800, then repealed, would have granted a federal court the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to release a debtor from state prison if he had been arrested following his bankruptcy discharge).
This grant of habeas power is remarkable not least because it would be another 67 years, after Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment, before the writ would be made generally available to state prisoners. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 247 (1886). Moreover, the provision of the 1800 Act granting that power was considered and adopted during a period when state sovereign immunity could hardly have been more prominent among the Nation’s concerns. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, the case that had so “shock[ed]” the country in its lack of regard for state sovereign immunity, Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934), was decided in 1793. The ensuing five years that culminated in adoption of the Eleventh Amendment were rife with discussion of States’ sovereignty and their amenability to suit. Yet there appears to be no record of any objection to the bankruptcy legislation or its grant of habeas power to federal courts based on an infringement of sovereign immunity. See Haines 184-185.
This history strongly supports the view that the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I, the source of Congress’ authority to effect this intrusion upon state sovereignty, simply did not contravene the norms this Court has understood the Eleventh Amendment to exemplify. Cf. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms... ”). Petitioners, ignoring this history, contend that nothing in the words of the Bankruptcy Clause evinces an intent on the part of the Framers to alter the “background principle” of state sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U. S., at 72. Specifically, they deny that the word “uniform” in the Clause implies anything about pre-existing immunities or Congress’ power to interfere with those immunities. See Brief for Petitioners 32-42. Whatever the merits of petitioners’ argument, it misses the point; text aside, the Framers, in adopting the Bankruptcy Clause, plainly intended to give Congress the power to redress the rampant injustice resulting from States’ refusal to respect one another’s discharge orders. As demonstrated by the First Congress’ immediate consideration and the Sixth Congress’ enactment of a provision granting federal courts the authority to release debtors from state prisons, the power to enact bankruptcy legislation was understood to carry with it the power to subordinate state sovereignty, albeit within a limited sphere.
The ineluctable conclusion, then, is that States agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert any sovereign immunity defense they might have had in proceedings brought pursuant to “Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.” See Blatchford, 501 U. S., at 779 (observing that a State is not “subject to suit in federal court unless it has consented to suit, either expressly or in the ‘plan of the convention’”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S., at 713 (same). The scope of this consent was limited; the jurisdiction exercised in bankruptcy proceedings was chiefly in rem — a narrow jurisdiction that does not implicate state sovereignty to nearly the same degree as other kinds of jurisdiction. But while the principal focus of the bankruptcy proceedings is and was always the res, some exercises of bankruptcy courts’ powers — issuance of writs of habeas corpus included — unquestionably involved more than mere adjudication of rights in a res. In ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause, the States acquiesced in a subordination of whatever sovereign immunity they might otherwise have asserted in proceedings necessary to effectuate the in rem jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.
Y
Neither our decision in Hood, which held that States could not assert sovereign immunity as a defense in adversary proceedings brought to adjudicate the dischargeability of student loans, nor the cases upon which it relied, see 541 U. S., at 448-449 (discussing New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U. S. 329 (1933); Gardner, 329 U. S. 565; and Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U. S. 225 (1931)), rested on any statement Congress had made on the subject of state sovereign immunity. Nor does our decision today. The relevant question is not whether Congress has “abrogated” States’ immunity in proceedings to recover preferential transfers. See 11 U. S. C. § 106(a). The question, rather, is whether Congress’ determination that States should be amenable to such proceedings is within the scope of its power to enact “Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.” We think it beyond peradventure that it is.
Congress may, at its option, either treat States in the same way as other creditors insofar as concerns “Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies” or exempt them from operation of such laws. Its power to do so arises from the Bankruptcy Clause itself; the relevant “abrogation” is the one effected in the plan of the Convention, not by statute.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
A preferential transfer is defined as “any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property— '
“(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
“(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made;
“(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
“(4) made—
“(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; ór
“(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
“(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if—
“(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
“(B) the transfer had not been made; and
“(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title.” 11 U. S. C. § 547(b).
Respondent also instituted adversary proceedings against some of the petitioners to collect accounts receivable. He has, however, filed a letter with this Court indicating his intent not to pursue those claims further.
Section 106(a), as amended in 1994, provides in part as follows:
“Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit... with respect to the following:
“(1) Sections 105,106,107,108, 303,346,362,363,364, 365,366,502, 503, 505, 506, 510, 522, 523, 524, 525, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 722, 724, 726, 728, 744, 749, 764, 901, 922, 926, 928, 929, 944, 1107, 1141, 1142, 1143,1146,1201, 1203, 1205,1206, 1227, 1231, 1301, 1303, 1305, and 1327 of this title.
“(2) The court may hear and determine any issue arising with respect to the application of such sections to governmental units.
“(3) The court may issue against a governmental unit an order, process, or judgment under such sections of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, including an order or judgment awarding a money recovery, but not including an award of punitive damages....”
The term “governmental unit” is defined to include a “State,” a “municipality,” and a “department, agency, or instrumentality of... a State.” §101(27).
The above-quoted version of § 106(a) is the product of revisions made in the wake of some of our precedents. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2549, contained a provision indicating only that “governmental unit[s],” defined to include States, were deemed to have “waived sovereign immunity” with respect to certain proceedings in bankruptcy and to be bound by a court’s determinations under certain provisions of the Act “notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity.” Id., at 2555-2556. This Court’s decisions in Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept, of Income Maintenance, 492 U. S. 96 (1989), and United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30 (1992), which held that Congress had failed to make sufficiently clear in the predecessor to § 106(a) its intent either to “abrogate” state sovereign immunity or to waive the Federal Government’s immunity, see 492 U. S., at 101; 503 U. S., at 39, prompted Congress in 1994 to enact the text of § 106(a) now in force. See generally Gibson, Congressional Response to Hoffman and Nordic Village: Amended Section 106 and Sovereign Immunity, 69 Am. Bankr. L. J. 311 (1995).
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 699 (1979), we endorsed the presumption “that Congress was thoroughly familiar” with contemporary law when it enacted Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is equally proper to presume that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention were fully aware of the potential for injustice, discussed in Part II, infra, presented by the nonuniform state laws authorizing imprisonment as a remedy for the nonpayment of an insolvent’s
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue here is whether the Kentucky Court of Appeals properly enjoined implementation of the decision of a joint employer-employee committee purporting to settle certain grievances in accordance with the terms of a collective bargaining contract. The decision of the committee determined the relative seniority rights of the employees of two companies, Dealers Transport Company of Memphis, Tennessee, and E & L Transport Company of Detroit, Michigan. We are of the opinion that the Kentucky court erred and we reverse its judgment.
Part of the business of each of these companies was the transportation of new automobiles from the assembly plant of the Ford Motor Company in Louisville, Kentucky. In the face of declining business resulting from several factors, the two companies were informed by Ford that there was room for only one of them in the Louisville operation. After considering the matter for some time, the two companies made these arrangements: E & L would sell to Dealers its “secondary” authority out of Louisville, the purchase price to be a nominal sum roughly equal to the cost of effecting the transfer of authority; E & L would also sell to Dealers its authority to serve certain points in Mississippi and Louisiana; and Dealers would sell to E & L its initial authority out of Lorain, Ohio, along with certain equipment and terminal facilities. The purpose of these arrangements was to concentrate the transportation activities of E & L in the more northerly area and those of Dealers in the southern zone. The transfers were subject to the approval of regulatory agencies.
The employees of both Dealers and E & L were represented by the same union, General Drivers, Warehouse-men and Helpers, Local Union No. 89. Its president, Paul Priddy, as the result of inquiry from E & L by his assistant, understood that the transaction between the companies involved no trades, sales, or exchanges of properties but only a withdrawal by E & L at the direction of the Ford Motor Company. He consequently advised the E & L employees that their situation was precarious. When layoffs at E & L began three E & L employees filed grievances claiming that the seniority lists of Dealers and E & L should be “sandwiched” and the E & L employees be taken on at Dealers with the seniority they had enjoyed at E & L. The grievances were placed before the local joint committee, Priddy or his assistant meanwhile advising Dealers employees that they had “nothing to worry about” since E & L employees had no contract right to transfer under these circumstances.
The collective bargaining contract involved covered a multi-employer, multi-local union unit negotiated ,on behalf of the employers by Automobile Transporters Labor Division and on behalf of the unions by National Truck-away and Driveaway Conference. Almost identical contracts were executed by each company in the unit and by the appropriate local union. According to Art. 4, § 1 of the contract “seniority rights for employees shall prevail” and “any controversy over the employees’ standing on such lists shall be submitted to the joint grievance procedure. . . .” Section 5 of the same article, of central significance here, was as follows:
“In the event that the Employer absorbs the business of another private, contract or common carrier, or is a party to a merger of lines, the seniority of the employees absorbed or affected thereby shall be determined by mutual agreement between the Employer and the Unions involved. Any controversy with respect to such matter shall be submitted to the joint grievance procedure.”
Article 7 called for grievances to be first taken up between the employer and the local union and, if not settled, to be submitted to the local joint committee where the union and the employer were to have equal votes. Failing settlement by majority vote of the members of the local committee, the matter could be taken to the Automobile Transporters Joint Conference Committee upon which the employers and the unions in the overall bargaining unit had an equal number of representatives. Decisions of the Joint Conference Committee were to be “final and conclusive and binding upon the employer and the union, and the employees involved.” However, if the Joint Conference Committee was unable to reach a decision the matter was to be submitted to arbitration as provided in the contract.
Article 7 also provided that:
(d) “It is agreed that all matters pertaining to the interpretation of any provision of this Agreement, whether requested by the Employer or the Union, must be submitted to the full Committee of the Automobile Transporters Joint Conference Committee, which Committee, after listening to testimony on both sides, shall make a decision.”
Other provisions of the contract stated that it was “the intention of the parties to resolve all questions of interpretation by mutual agreement” and that the employer agreed “to be bound by all of the terms and provisions of this Agreement, and also agrees to be bound by the interpretations and enforcement of the Agreement.”
The grievances of the E & L employees were submitted directly to the local joint committee and endorsed “Deadlocked to Detroit for interpretation” over the signatures of the local union president and the Dealers representative on the committee. Later, however, the local union, having been more fully advised as to the nature of the transaction between the two companies, decided to recommend to the Joint Conference Committee that the seniority lists of the two companies be dovetailed and the E & L employees be employed at Dealers with seniority rights based upon those which they had enjoyed at E & L. The three shop stewards who represented the Dealers employees before the Joint Conference Committee meeting in Detroit were so advised by the union immediately prior to the opening of the hearing. After hearing from the company, the union and the stewards representing Dealers employees, the Joint Conference Committee thereupon determined that “in accordance with Article 4 and particularly sub-sections 4 and 5” of the agreement the employees of E & L and of Dealers should “be sandwiched in on master seniority boards using the presently constituted seniority lists and the dates contained therein . . . .”
Since E & L was an older company and most of its employees had more seniority than the Dealers employees, the decision entailed the layoff of a large number of Dealers employees to provide openings for the E & L drivers.
Respondent Moore, on behalf of himself and other Dealers employees, then brought this class action in a Kentucky state court praying for an injunction against the union and the company to prevent the decision of the Joint Conference Committee from being carried out. Damages were asked in an alternative count and certain E & L employees were added as defendants by amendment to the complaint. The complaint alleged that Dealers employees had relied upon the union to represent them, that the president of Local 89, Paul Priddy, assured Dealers employees that they had nothing to worry about and that precedent in the industry provided that when a new business is taken over, its employees do not displace the original employees of the acquiring company; it further alleged that Priddy had deliberately “deadlocked” the local joint committee and that the Dealers employees learned for the first time before the Joint Conference Committee in Detroit, that Priddy favored dovetailing the seniority lists. Priddy’s actions, the complaint went on, “in deceiving these plaintiffs as to his position left them without representation before the Joint Conference Committee.” The decision, according to the complaint, was “contrived, planned and brought about by Paul Priddy” who “has deceived and failed completely to represent said employees” and whose “false and deceitful action” and “connivance . . . with the employees of E & L” threatened the jobs of Dealers employees. The International union is said to have “conspired with and assisted the defendant, Local No. 89, and its president, Paul Priddy, in bringing about this result . . . .” The decision of the Joint Conference Committee was charged to be arbitrary and capricious, contrary to the existing practice in the industry and violative of the collective bargaining contract.
After hearing, the trial court denied a temporary and permanent injunction. The Court of Appeals of the Commonwealth of Kentucky reversed and granted a permanent injunction, two judges dissenting. 356 S. W. 2d 241. In the view of that court, Art. 4, § 5 could have no application to the circumstances of this case since it came into play only if the absorbing company agreed to hire the employees of the absorbed company. The clause was said to deal with seniority, not with initial employment. Therefore, it was said, the decision of the Joint Conference Committee was not binding because the question of employing E & L drivers was not “arbitrable” at all under this section. The Court of Appeals, however, went on to hold that even if it were otherwise, the decision could not stand since the situation involved antagonistic interests of two sets of employees represented by the same union advocate. The result was inadequate representation of the Dealers employees in a context where Dealers itself was essentially neutral. Against such a backdrop, the erroneous decision of the board became “arbitrary and violative of natural justice.” Kentucky cases were cited and relied upon. We granted both the petition filed by the E & L employees in No. 17 and the petition in No. 18, filed by the local union. 371 U. S. 966, 967.
I.
Since issues concerning the jurisdiction of the courts and the governing law are involved, it is well at the outset to elaborate upon the statement of the Kentucky court that this is an action to enforce a collective bargaining contract, an accurate observation as far as we are concerned.
First, Moore challenges the power of the parties and of the Joint Conference Committee to dovetail seniority lists of the two companies because there was no absorption here within the meaning of § 5 of Art. 4 and because, as the court below held, that section granted no authority to deal with jobs as well as seniority. His position is that neither the parties nor the committee has any power beyond that delegated to them by the precise terms of § 5. Since in his view the Joint Committee exceeded its power in making the decision it did, the settlement is said to be a nullity and his impending discharge a breach of contract.
Second, Moore claims the decision of the Committee was obtained by dishonest union conduct in breach of its duty of fair representation and that a decision so obtained cannot be relied upon as a valid excuse for his discharge under the contract. The undoubted broad authority of the union as exclusive bargaining agent in the negotiation and administration of a collective bargaining contract is accompanied by a responsibility of equal scope, the responsibility and duty of fair representation. Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U. S. 892, reversing 223 F. 2d 739; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210; Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192. “By its selection as bargaining representative, it has become the agent of all the employees, charged with the responsibility of representing their interests fairly and impartially.” Wallace Corp. v. Labor Board, 323 U. S. 248, 255. The exclusive agent’s obligation “to represent all members of an appropriate unit requires [it] to make an honest effort to serve the interests of all of those members, without hostility to any . . .’’and its powers are “subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.” Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330, 337-338.
In the complaint which Moore filed here, the union is said to have deceived the Dealers employees concerning their job and seniority rights, deceitfully connived with the E & L drivers and with the International union to deprive Moore and others of their employment rights and prevented the latter from having a fair hearing before the Joint Committee by espousing the cause of the rival group of drivers after having indicated that the interests of the men at Dealers would be protected by the union. These allegations are sufficient to charge a breach of duty by the union in the process of settling the grievances at issue under the collective bargaining agreement.
Both the local and international unions are charged with dishonesty, and one-half of the votes on the Joint Committee were cast by representatives of unions affiliated with the international. No fraud is charged against the employer; but except for the improper action of the union, which is said to have dominated and brought about the decision, it is alleged that Dealers would have agreed to retain its own employees. The fair inference from the complaint is that the employer considered the dispute a matter for the union to decide. Moreover, the award had not been implemented at the time of the filing of the complaint, which put Dealers on notice that the union was charged with dishonesty and a breach of duty in procuring the decision of the Joint Committee. In these circumstances, the allegations of the complaint, if proved, would effectively undermine the decision of the Joint Committee as a valid basis for Moore’s discharge.
For these reasons this action is one arising under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and is a case controlled by federal law, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, even though brought in the state court. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95; Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195. Although there are differing views on whether a violation of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act, it is not necessary for us to resolve that difference here. Even if it is, or arguably may be, an unfair labor practice, the complaint here alleged that Moore’s discharge would violate the contract and was therefore within the cognizance of federal and state courts, Smith v. Evening News Assn., supra, subject, of course, to the applicable federal law.
We now come to the merits of this case.
II.
If we assume with Moore and the courts below that the Joint Conference Committee’s power was circumscribed by § 5 and that its interpretation of the section is open to court review, Moore’s cause is not measurably advanced. For in our opinion the section reasonably meant what the Joint Committee said or assumed it meant. There was an absorption here within the meaning' of the section and that section did deal with jobs as well as with seniority.
Prior to this transaction both E & L and Dealers were transporting new cars out of Louisville for the Ford Motor Company. Afterwards, only one company enjoyed this business, and clearly this was no unilateral withdrawal by E & L. There was an agreement between the companies, preceded by long negotiation. E & L’s authority to engage in the transportation of new cars out of Louisville was sold to Dealers. The business which E & L had done in that city was henceforth to be done by Dealers. While there was no sale of tangible assets at that location, the Joint Conference Committee reasonably concluded that there was an absorption by Dealers of the E & L business within the meaning of § 5 of the contract.
It was also permissible to conclude that § 5 dealt with employment as well as seniority. Mergers, sales of assets and absorptions are commonplace events. It is not unusual for collective bargaining agreements to deal with them, especially in the transportation industry where the same unions may represent the employees of both parties to the transaction. Following any of such events, the business of the one company will probably include the former business of the other; and the recurring question is whether it is the employees of the absorbed company or those of the acquiring company who are to have first call upon the available work at the latter concern. Jobs, as well as seniority, are at stake; and it was to solve just such problems that § 5 was designed. Its interpretation should be commensurate with its purposes.
Seniority has become of overriding importance, and one of its major functions is to determine who gets or who keeps an available job. Here § 5 provided for resolving the seniority of not only those employees who are “absorbed,” but all who were “affected” by the absorption. Certainly the transaction “affected” the E & L employees; and the seniority of these drivers, which the parties or the Joint Conference Committee could determine, was clearly seniority at Dealers, the company which had absorbed the E & L business. The parties very probably, therefore, intended the seniority granted an E & L employee at Dealers to carry the job with it, just as seniority usually would. If it did not and if Dealers unilaterally could determine whether to hire any E & L employee, it might decide to hire none, excluding E & L employees from any of the work which they had formerly done. Or if it did hire E & L employees to fill any additional jobs resulting from the absorption of the E & L business, it might select E & L employees for jobs without regard to length of service at E & L or it might insist on an agreement from the union to grant only such seniority as might suit the company. Section 5 would be effectively emasculated.
The power of the Joint Conference Committee over seniority gave it power over jobs. It was entitled under § 5 to integrate the seniority lists upon some rational basis, and its decision to integrate lists upon the basis of length of service at either company was neither unique nor arbitrary. On the contrary, it is a familiar and frequently equitable solution to the inevitably conflicting interests, which arise in the wake of a merger or an absorption such as occurred here. The Joint Conference Committee’s decision to dovetail seniority lists was a decision which § 5 empowered the committee to make.
Neither do we find adequate support in this record for the complaint’s attack upon the integrity of the union and of the procedures which led to the decision. Although the union at first advised the Dealers drivers that they had nothing to worry about but later supported the E & L employees before the Joint Conference Committee, there is no substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct. Priddy’s early assurances to Dealers employees were not well founded, it is true; but Priddy was acting upon information then available to him, information received from the company which led him to think there was no trade or exchange involved, no “absorption” which might bring § 5 into play. Other sections of the contract, he thought, would protect the jobs of Moore and his fellow drivers. Consistent with this view, he also advised E & L employees that the situation appeared unfavorable for them. However, when he learned of the pending acquisition by Dealers of E & L operating authority in Louisville and of the involvement of other locations in the transaction, he considered the matter to be one for the Joint Committee. Ultimately he took the view that an absorption was involved, that § 5 did apply and that dovetailing seniority lists was the most equitable solution for all concerned. We find in this evidence insufficient proof of dishonesty or intentional misleading on the part of the union. And we do not understand the court below to have found otherwise.
The Kentucky court, however, made much of the antagonistic interests of the E & L and Dealers drivers, both groups being represented by the same union, whose president supported one group and opposed the other at the hearing before the Joint Conference Committee. But we are not ready to find a breach of the collective bargaining agent’s duty of fair representation in taking a good faith position contrary to that of some individuals whom it represents nor in supporting the position of one group of employees against that of another. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330, the Court found no breach of duty by the union in agreeing to an amendment of an existing collective bargaining contract, granting enhanced seniority to a particular group of employees and resulting in layoffs which otherwise would not have occurred. “Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed' a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.” Id., at 338. Just as a union must be free to sift out wholly frivolous grievances which would only clog the grievance process, so it must be free to take a position on the not so frivolous disputes. Nor should it be neutralized when the issue is chiefly between two sets of employees. Conflict between employees represented by the same union is a recurring fact. To remove or gag the union in these cases would surely weaken the collective bargaining and grievance processes.
As far as this record shows, the union took its position honestly, in good faith and without hostility or arbitrary discrimination. After Dealers absorbed the Louisville business of E & L, there were fewer jobs at Dealers than there were Dealers and E & L drivers. One group or the other was going to suffer. If any E & L drivers were to be hired at Dealers either they or the Dealers drivers would not have the seniority which they had previously enjoyed. Inevitably the absorption would hurt someone. By choosing to integrate seniority lists based upon length of service at either company, the union acted upon wholly relevant considerations, not upon capricious or arbitrary factors. The evidence shows no breach by the union of its duty of fair representation.
There is a remaining contention. Even though the union acted in good faith and was entitled to take the position it did, were the Dealers employees, if the union was going to oppose them, deprived of a fair hearing by having inadequate representation at the hearing? Dealers employees had notice of the hearing; they were obviously aware that they were locked in a struggle for jobs and seniority with the E & L drivers, and three stewards representing them went to the hearing at union expense and were given every opportunity to state their position. Thus the issue is in reality a narrow one. There was no substantial dispute about the facts concerning the nature of the transaction between the two companies. It was for the Joint Conference Committee initially to decide whether there was an “absorption” within the meaning of § 5 and, if so, whether seniority lists were to be integrated and the older employees of E & L given jobs at Dealers. The Dealers employees made no request to continue the hearing until they could secure further representation and have not yet suggested what they could have added to the hearing by way of facts or theory if they had been differently represented. The trial court found it “idle speculation to assume that the result would have been different had the matter been differently presented.” We agree.
Moore has not, therefore, proved his case. Neither the parties nor the Joint Committee exceeded their power under the contract and there was no fraud or breach of duty by the exclusive bargaining agent. The decision of the committee, reached after proceedings adequate under the agreement, is final and binding upon the parties, just as the contract says it is. Drivers Union v. Riss & Co., 372 U. S. 517.
The decision below is reversed and the cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas.
I agree for the reasons stated by my Brother Goldberg that this litigation was properly brought in the state court but on the merits I believe that no cause of action has been made out for the reasons stated by the Court.
The International union was also named as a party but service was quashed and the action dismissed as against it.
The denial of a temporary injunction by the trial court was set aside and temporary injunction ordered by the Court of Appeals. Thereafter the trial court dismissed the complaint, but the Court of Appeals reversed and made the temporary injunction permanent.
In its brief filed here Dealers does not support the decision of the Joint Committee. It suggests, rather, that the matter be finally settled by arbitration under the terms of the contract.
Section 301 (a) of the L. M. R. A. is as follows:
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 29 U. S. C. §185 (a).
Compare, for example, Labor Board v. Local 294, International Bro. of Teamsters, 317 F. 2d 746 (C. A. 2d Cir.), with Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N. L. R. B. 181 (1962); enforcement denied, Labor Board v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F. 2d 172 (C. A. 2d Cir.). See also Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Yillanova L. Rev. 151, 172-175.
The union contended in the state courts that the jurisdiction of the state courts had been preempted by the federal statutes. The Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled otherwise and the union appears to have abandoned the view here, since it says, relying upon Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330, that individual employees “may undoubtedly maintain suits against their representative when the latter hostilely discriminates against them.”
We note that in Syres v. Oil Workers International Union. 350 U. S. 892, individual employees sued the exclusive agent and the company to enjoin and declare void a collective bargaining agreement alleged to violate the duty of fair representation. Dismissal in the trial court was affirmed in the Court of Appeals. This Court reversed and ordered further proceedings in the trial court in the face of contentions made both in this Court and the lower courts that the employees should have brought their proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board. Cf. Cosmark v. Struthers Wells Corp., 54 L. R. R. M. 2333 (Pa. Oct. 17, 1963).
The E & L employees, petitioners in No. 17, urge that even if the federal courts may entertain suits such as this, the state courts may not. Since in our view the complaint here charged a breach of contract, we find no merit in this position. It is clear that suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization may be brought in either state or federal courts. Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502.
We need not consider the problem posed if § 5 had been omitted from the contract or if the parties had acted to amend the provision. The fact is that they purported to proceed under the section. They deadlocked at the local level and it was pursuant to § 5 that the matter was taken to the Joint Conference Committee which, under Art. 7, was to make a decision “after listening to testimony on both sides.” The committee expressly recited that its decision was in accordance with § 5 of the contract. Even in the absence of § 5, however, it would be necessary to deal with the alleged breach of the union’s duty of fair representation.
We also put aside the union’s contention that Art. 7, § (d)— providing that all matters of interpretation of the agreement be submitted to the Joint Conference Committee — makes it inescapably clear that the committee had the power to decide that the transfer of operating authority was an absorption within the scope of § 5. But it is by no means clear that this provision in Art. 7 was intended to apply to interpretations of § 5, for the latter section by its own terms appears to limit the authority of the committee to disputes over seniority in the event of an absorption. Reconciliation of these two provisions, going to the power of the committee under the contract, itself presented an issue ultimately for the court, not the committee, to decide. Our view of the scope and applicability of § 5, infra, renders an accommodation of these two sections unnecessary.
See cases cited in footnote 10, infra.
See for example, Kent v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 204 F. 2d 263 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1953); Keller v. Teamsters Local 249, 43 CCH Labor Cases ¶ 17,119 (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1961); Pratt v. Wilson Trucking Co., 214 Ga. 385, 104 S. E. 2d 915 (1958); Walker v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 142 N. J. Eq. 588, 61 A. 2d 453 (1948); In re Western Union Telegraph Co. and American Communications Association (Decisions of War Labor Board 1944) 14 L. R. R. M. 1623. Cf. Colbert v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 206 F. 2d 9 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1953); Labor Board v. Wheland Co., 271 F. 2d 122 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1959); Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F. 2d 182 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1962); Fagan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 173 F. Supp. 465 (D. C. M. D. Pa. 1959). "Integration of seniority lists should ordinarily be accomplished on the basis of each employee’s length of service with his original employer Kahn, Seniority Problems in Business Mergers, 8 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 361, 378.
The Dealers employees rely upon a rider to the Dealers contract protecting the seniority of the employees at a terminal when another terminal of that company is closed down. The court below did not believe the rider dispositive, and we agree.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful" for certain individuals to possess firearms. The provision lists nine categories of individuals subject to the prohibition, including felons and aliens who are "illegally or unlawfully in the United States." Ibid. A separate provision, § 924(a)(2), adds that anyone who "knowingly violates" the first provision shall be fined or imprisoned for up to 10 years. (Emphasis added.)
The question here concerns the scope of the word "knowingly." Does it mean that the Government must prove that a defendant knew both that he engaged in the relevant conduct (that he possessed a firearm) and also that he fell within the relevant status (that he was a felon, an alien unlawfully in this country, or the like)? We hold that the word "knowingly" applies both to the defendant's conduct and to the defendant's status. To convict a defendant, the Government therefore must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it.
I
Petitioner Hamid Rehaif entered the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa to attend university. After he received poor grades, the university dismissed him and told him that his " 'immigration status' " would be terminated unless he transferred to a different university or left the country. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. Rehaif did neither.
Rehaif subsequently visited a firing range, where he shot two firearms. The Government learned about his target practice and prosecuted him for possessing firearms as an alien unlawfully in the United States, in violation of § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2). At the close of Rehaif's trial, the judge instructed the jury (over Rehaif's objection) that the "United States is not required to prove" that Rehaif "knew that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States." App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a (internal quotation marks omitted). The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Rehaif was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.
Rehaif appealed. He argued that the judge erred in instructing the jury that it did not need to find that he knew he was in the country unlawfully. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, concluded that the jury instruction was correct, and it affirmed Rehaif's conviction. See 888 F.3d 1138, 1148 (2018). The Court of Appeals believed that the criminal law generally does not require a defendant to know his own status, and further observed that no court of appeals had required the Government to establish a defendant's knowledge of his status in the analogous context of felon-in-possession prosecutions. Id., at 1145-1146.
We granted certiorari to consider whether, in prosecutions under § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove that a defendant knows of his status as a person barred from possessing a firearm. We now reverse.
II
Whether a criminal statute requires the Government to prove that the defendant acted knowingly is a question of congressional intent. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994). In determining Congress' intent, we start from a longstanding presumption, traceable to the common law, that Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding "each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct." United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994) ; see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256-258, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). We normally characterize this interpretive maxim as a presumption in favor of "scienter," by which we mean a presumption that criminal statutes require the degree of knowledge sufficient to "mak[e] a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission." Black's Law Dictionary 1547 (10th ed. 2014).
We apply the presumption in favor of scienter even when Congress does not specify any scienter in the statutory text. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 606, 114 S.Ct. 1793. But the presumption applies with equal or greater force when Congress includes a general scienter provision in the statute itself. See ALI, Model Penal Code § 2.02(4), p. 22 (1985) (when a statute "prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears").
A
Here we can find no convincing reason to depart from the ordinary presumption in favor of scienter. The statutory text supports the presumption. The text of § 924(a)(2) says that "[w]hoever knowingly violates" certain subsections of § 922, including § 922(g), "shall be" subject to penalties of up to 10 years' imprisonment. The text of § 922(g) in turn provides that it "shall be unlawful for any person..., being an alien... illegally or unlawfully in the United States," to "possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition."
The term "knowingly" in § 924(a)(2) modifies the verb "violates" and its direct object, which in this case is § 922(g). The proper interpretation of the statute thus turns on what it means for a defendant to know that he has "violate[d]" § 922(g). With some here-irrelevant omissions, § 922(g) makes possession of a firearm or ammunition unlawful when the following elements are satisfied: (1) a status element (in this case, "being an alien... illegally or unlawfully in the United States"); (2) a possession element (to "possess"); (3) a jurisdictional element ("in or affecting commerce"); and (4) a firearm element (a "firearm or ammunition").
No one here claims that the word "knowingly" modifies the statute's jurisdictional element. Jurisdictional elements do not describe the "evil Congress seeks to prevent," but instead simply ensure that the Federal Government has the constitutional authority to regulate the defendant's conduct (normally, as here, through its Commerce Clause power). Luna Torres v. Lynch, 578 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct. 1619, 1630-1631, 194 L.Ed.2d 737 (2016). Because jurisdictional elements normally have nothing to do with the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct, such elements are not subject to the presumption in favor of scienter. See id., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1631.
Jurisdictional element aside, however, the text of § 922(g) simply lists the elements that make a defendant's behavior criminal. As "a matter of ordinary English grammar," we normally read the statutory term " 'knowingly' as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime." Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 650, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009) ; see also id., at 652, 129 S.Ct. 1886 (we "ordinarily read a phrase in a criminal statute that introduces the elements of a crime with the word 'knowingly' as applying that word to each element"). This is notably not a case where the modifier "knowingly" introduces a long statutory phrase, such that questions may reasonably arise about how far into the statute the modifier extends. See id., at 659, 129 S.Ct. 1886 (ALITO, J., concurring in part). And everyone agrees that the word "knowingly" applies to § 922(g)'s possession element, which is situated after the status element. We see no basis to interpret "knowingly" as applying to the second § 922(g) element but not the first. See United States v. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d 1136, 1143 (CA10 2012) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). To the contrary, we think that by specifying that a defendant may be convicted only if he "knowingly violates" § 922(g), Congress intended to require the Government to establish that the defendant knew he violated the material elements of § 922(g).
B
Beyond the text, our reading of § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2) is consistent with a basic principle that underlies the criminal law, namely, the importance of showing what Blackstone called "a vicious will." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 21 (1769). As this Court has explained, the understanding that an injury is criminal only if inflicted knowingly "is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250, 72 S.Ct. 240. Scienter requirements advance this basic principle of criminal law by helping to "separate those who understand the wrongful nature of their act from those who do not." X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72-73, n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 464.
The cases in which we have emphasized scienter's importance in separating wrongful from innocent acts are legion. See, e.g., id., at 70, 115 S.Ct. 464 ; Staples, 511 U.S. at 610, 114 S.Ct. 1793 ; Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) ; United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406, n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980) ; United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) ;
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250-251, 72 S.Ct. 240. We have interpreted statutes to include a scienter requirement even where the statutory text is silent on the question. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793. And we have interpreted statutes to include a scienter requirement even where "the most grammatical reading of the statute" does not support one. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 70, 115 S.Ct. 464.
Applying the word "knowingly" to the defendant's status in § 922(g) helps advance the purpose of scienter, for it helps to separate wrongful from innocent acts. Assuming compliance with ordinary licensing requirements, the possession of a gun can be entirely innocent. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 611, 114 S.Ct. 1793. It is therefore the defendant's status, and not his conduct alone, that makes the difference. Without knowledge of that status, the defendant may well lack the intent needed to make his behavior wrongful. His behavior may instead be an innocent mistake to which criminal sanctions normally do not attach. Cf. O. Holmes, The Common Law 3 (1881) ("even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked").
We have sometimes declined to read a scienter requirement into criminal statutes. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254, 42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922). But we have typically declined to apply the presumption in favor of scienter in cases involving statutory provisions that form part of a "regulatory" or "public welfare" program and carry only minor penalties. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 606, 114 S.Ct. 1793 ; Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255-259, 72 S.Ct. 240. The firearms provisions before us are not part of a regulatory or public welfare program, and they carry a potential penalty of 10 years in prison that we have previously described as "harsh." X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72, 115 S.Ct. 464. Hence, this exception to the presumption in favor of scienter does not apply.
III
The Government's arguments to the contrary do not convince us that Congress sought to depart from the normal presumption in favor of scienter.
The Government argues that Congress does not normally require defendants to know their own status. But the Government supports this claim primarily by referring to statutes that differ significantly from the provisions at issue here. One of these statutes prohibits "an officer, employee, contractor, or consultant of the United States" from misappropriating classified information. 18 U.S.C. § 1924(a). Another statute applies to anyone "at least eighteen years of age" who solicits a minor to help avoid detection for certain federal crimes. 21 U.S.C. § 861(a)(2). A third applies to a "parent [or] legal guardian" who allows his child to be used for child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b).
We need not decide whether we agree or disagree with the Government's interpretation of these statutes. In the provisions at issue here, the defendant's status is the "crucial element" separating innocent from wrongful conduct. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 73, 115 S.Ct. 464. But in the statutes cited by the Government, the conduct prohibited-misappropriating classified information, seeking to evade detection for certain federal crimes, and facilitating child pornography-would be wrongful irrespective of the defendant's status. This difference assures us that the presumption in favor of scienter applies here even assuming the Government is right that these other statutes do not require knowledge of status.
Nor do we believe that Congress would have expected defendants under § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2) to know their own statuses. If the provisions before us were construed to require no knowledge of status, they might well apply to an alien who was brought into the United States unlawfully as a small child and was therefore unaware of his unlawful status. Or these provisions might apply to a person who was convicted of a prior crime but sentenced only to probation, who does not know that the crime is "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added); see also Games-Perez, 667 F.3d at 1138 (defendant held strictly liable regarding his status as a felon even though the trial judge had told him repeatedly-but incorrectly-that he would "leave this courtroom not convicted of a felony"). As we have said, we normally presume that Congress did not intend to impose criminal liability on persons who, due to lack of knowledge, did not have a wrongful mental state. And we doubt that the obligation to prove a defendant's knowledge of his status will be as burdensome as the Government suggests. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 615, n. 11, 114 S.Ct. 1793 ("knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence").
The Government also argues that whether an alien is "illegally or unlawfully in the United States" is a question of law, not fact, and thus appeals to the well-known maxim that "ignorance of the law" (or a "mistake of law") is no excuse. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991).
This maxim, however, normally applies where a defendant has the requisite mental state in respect to the elements of the crime but claims to be "unaware of the existence of a statute proscribing his conduct." 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1(a), p. 575 (1986). In contrast, the maxim does not normally apply where a defendant "has a mistaken impression concerning the legal effect of some collateral matter and that mistake results in his misunderstanding the full significance of his conduct," thereby negating an element of the offense. Ibid. ; see also Model Penal Code § 2.04, at 27 (a mistake of law is a defense if the mistake negates the "knowledge... required to establish a material element of the offense"). Much of the confusion surrounding the ignorance-of-the-law maxim stems from "the failure to distinguish [these] two quite different situations." LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1(d), at 585.
We applied this distinction in Liparota, where we considered a statute that imposed criminal liability on "whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses" food stamps "in any manner not authorized by the statute or the regulations." 471 U.S. at 420, 105 S.Ct. 2084 (quotation altered). We held that the statute required scienter not only in respect to the defendant's use of food stamps, but also in respect to whether the food stamps were used in a "manner not authorized by the statute or regulations." Id., at 425, n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 2084. We therefore required the Government to prove that the defendant knew that his use of food stamps was unlawful-even though that was a question of law. See ibid.
This case is similar. The defendant's status as an alien "illegally or unlawfully in the United States" refers to a legal matter, but this legal matter is what the commentators refer to as a "collateral" question of law. A defendant who does not know that he is an alien "illegally or unlawfully in the United States" does not have the guilty state of mind that the statute's language and purposes require.
The Government finally turns for support to the statutory and legislative history. Congress first enacted a criminal statute prohibiting particular categories of persons from possessing firearms in 1938. See Federal Firearms Act, 52 Stat. 1250.
In 1968, Congress added new categories of persons subject to the prohibition. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 82 Stat. 197. Then, in 1986, Congress passed the statute at issue here, the Firearms Owners' Protection Act, 100 Stat. 449, note following 18 U.S.C. § 921, which reorganized the prohibition on firearm possession and added the language providing that only those who violate the prohibition "knowingly" may be held criminally liable.
The Government says that, prior to 1986, the courts had reached a consensus that the law did not require the Government to prove scienter regarding a defendant's status. And the Government relies on the interpretive canon providing that when particular statutory language has received a settled judicial construction, and Congress subsequently reenacts that "same language," courts should presume that Congress intended to ratify the judicial consensus. Helsinn Healthcare S. A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 586 U.S. ----, ----, 139 S.Ct. 628, 633, 202 L.Ed.2d 551 (2019).
Prior to 1986, however, there was no definitive judicial consensus that knowledge of status was not needed. This Court had not considered the matter. As the Government says, most lower courts had concluded that the statute did not require knowledge of status. See, e.g., United States v. Pruner, 606 F.2d 871, 874 (CA9 1979). But the Sixth Circuit had held to the contrary, specifically citing the risk that a defendant "may not be aware of the fact" that barred him from possessing a firearm. United States v. Renner, 496 F.2d 922, 926 (1974). And the Fourth Circuit had found that knowledge of a defendant's status was not needed because the statute "[b]y its terms" did not require knowledge of status. United States v. Williams, 588 F.2d 92 (1978) (per curiam ).
This last-mentioned circumstance is important. Any pre-1986 consensus involved the statute as it read prior to 1986-without any explicit scienter provision. But Congress in 1986 added a provision clarifying that a defendant could be convicted only if he violated the prohibition on firearm possession "knowingly." This addition, which would serve no apparent purpose under the Government's view, makes it all but impossible to draw any inference that Congress intended to ratify a pre-existing consensus when, in 1986, it amended the statute.
The Government points to the House Report on the legislation, which says that the 1986 statute would require the Government to prove "that the defendant's conduct was knowing." H. R. Rep. No. 99-495, p. 10 (1986) (emphasis added). Although this statement speaks of "conduct" rather than "status," context suggests that the Report may have meant the former to include the latter. In any event, other statements suggest that the word "knowingly" was intended to apply to both conduct and status. The Senate Report, for example, says that the proposed amendments sought to exclude "individuals who lack all criminal intent and knowledge," without distinguishing between conduct and status. S. Rep. No. 97-476, p. 15 (1982). And one Senate sponsor of the bill pointed out that the absence of a scienter requirement in the prior statutes had resulted in "severe penalties for unintentional missteps." 132 Cong. Rec. 9590 (1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
Thus, assuming without deciding that statutory or legislative history could overcome the longstanding presumption in favor of scienter, that history here is at best inconclusive.
* * *
The Government asks us to hold that any error in the jury instructions in this case was harmless. But the lower courts did not address that question. We therefore leave the question for those courts to decide on remand. See Thacker v. TVA, 587 U.S. ----, ----, 139 S.Ct. 1435, 1443, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2019) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005) ).
We conclude that in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. We express no view, however, about what precisely the Government must prove to establish a defendant's knowledge of status in respect to other § 922(g) provisions not at issue here. See post, at 2207 - 2208 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (discussing other statuses listed in § 922(g) not at issue here). We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)
"Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a)(6), (d), (g), (h), (i), (j), or (o) of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both."
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
"It shall be unlawful for any person-
"(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
"(2) who is a fugitive from justice;
"(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...;
"(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution;
"(5) who, being an alien-(A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or (B)... has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26) ));
"(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions;
"(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced his citizenship;
"(8) who is subject to a court order that-(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; or
"(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
Justice ALITO, with whom Justice THOMAS joins, dissenting.
The Court casually overturns the long-established interpretation of an important criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), an interpretation that has been adopted by every single Court of Appeals to address the question. That interpretation has been used in thousands of cases for more than 30 years. According to the majority, every one of those cases was flawed. So today's decision is no minor matter. And § 922(g) is no minor provision. It probably does more to combat gun violence than any other federal law. It prohibits the possession of firearms by, among others, convicted felons, mentally ill persons found by a court to present a danger to the community, stalkers, harassers, perpetrators of domestic violence, and illegal aliens.
Today's decision will make it significantly harder to convict persons falling into some of these categories, and the decision will create a mountain of problems with respect to the thousands of prisoners currently serving terms for § 922(g) convictions. Applications for relief by federal prisoners sentenced under § 922(g) will swamp the lower courts. A great many convictions will be subject to challenge, threatening the release or retrial of dangerous individuals whose cases fall outside the bounds of harmless-error review. See ante, at 2199.
If today's decision were compelled by the text of § 922(g) or by some other clear indication of congressional intent, what the majority has done would be understandable. We must enforce the laws enacted by Congress even if we think that doing so will bring about unfortunate results. But that is not the situation in this case. There is no sound basis for today's decision. Indeed, there was no good reason for us to take this case in the first place. No conflict existed in the decisions of the lower courts, and there is no evidence that the established interpretation of § 922(g) had worked any serious injustice.
The push for us to grant review was based on the superficially appealing but ultimately fallacious argument that the text of § 922(g) dictates the interpretation that the majority now reaches. See Pet. for Cert. 8. Ironically, today's decision, while casting aside the established interpretation of § 922(g), does not claim that the text of that provision is itself dispositive. Instead, what the majority relies on, in the end, is its own guess about congressional intent. And the intent that the majority attributes to Congress is one that Congress almost certainly did not harbor.
I
The majority provides a bowdlerized version of the facts of this case and thus obscures the triviality of this petitioner's claim. The majority wants readers to have in mind an entirely imaginary case, a heartless prosecution of "an alien who was brought into the United States unlawfully as a small child and was therefore unaware of his unlawful status." Ante, at 2198. Such a defendant would indeed warrant sympathy, but that is not petitioner, and no one has called to our attention any real case like the one the majority conjures up.
Here is what really happened. Petitioner, a citizen of the United Arab Emirates, entered this country on a visa that allowed him to stay here lawfully only so long as he remained a full-time student. 888 F.3d 1138, 1140 (CA11 2018). He enrolled at the Florida Institute of Technology, but he withdrew from or failed all of his classes and was dismissed. Brief for Petitioner 4-5. After he was conditionally readmitted, he failed all but one of his courses. His enrollment was then terminated, and he did not appeal. The school sent him e-mails informing him that he was no longer enrolled and that, unless he was admitted elsewhere, his status as a lawful alien would be terminated. 888 F.3d at 1140-1141. Petitioner's response was to move to a hotel and frequent a firing range. Each evening he checked into the hotel and always demanded a room on the eighth floor facing the airport. Each morning he checked out and paid his bill with cash, spending a total of more than $ 11,000. This went on for 53 days. Brief for United States 4. A hotel employee told the FBI that petitioner claimed to have weapons in his room. Arrested and charged under § 922(g) for possession of a firearm by an illegal alien, petitioner claimed at trial that the Government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually knew that his lawful status had been terminated. Following what was then the universal and long-established interpretation of § 922(g), the District Court rejected this argument, and a jury found him guilty. 888 F.3d at 1141. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Id., at 1140. Out of the more than 8,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari that we expected to receive this Term, we chose to grant this one to see if petitioner had been deprived of the right to have a jury decide whether, in his heart of hearts, he really knew that he could not lawfully remain in the United States on a student visa when he most certainly was no longer a student.
II
A
Petitioner claims that the texts of § 922(g) and a companion provision, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), dictate a decision in his favor, and I therefore begin with the text of those two provisions. Section 924(a)(2) provides in relevant part as follows:
"Whoever knowingly violates subsection... (g) of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both." (Emphasis added.)
Section 922(g), in turn, makes it unlawful for nine categories of persons to engage in certain interstate-commerce-related conduct involving firearms. These categories consist of: (1) convicted felons; (2) fugitives from justice; (3) users of illegal drugs or addicts; (4) persons found to have very serious mental problems; (5) illegal aliens; (6) individuals who were dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces; (7) persons who renounced U.S. citizenship; (8) stalkers, harassers, and abusers subject to restraining orders; and (9) persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Persons falling into these categories are forbidden, as relevant here, to "possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm."
Petitioner argues that, when § 924(a)(2) and § 922(g) are put together, they unambiguously show that a defendant must actually know that he falls into one of the nine enumerated categories. But this purportedly textual argument requires some moves that cannot be justified on the basis of the statutory text. Petitioner's argument tries to hide those moves in the manner of a sleight-of-hand artist at a carnival.
Petitioner begins by extracting the term "knowingly" from § 924(a)(2). He then transplants it into the beginning of § 922(g), ignores the extraordinarily awkward prose that this surgery produces, and proclaims that because "knowingly" appears at the beginning of the enumeration of the elements of the § 922(g) offense, we must assume that it modifies the first of those elements, i.e., being a convicted felon, illegal alien, etc. To conclude otherwise, he contends, is to commit the sin of having the term "knowingly" leap over that element and then land conveniently in front of the second. Pet. for Cert. 8.
But petitioner's reading is guilty of the very sort of leaping that it condemns-and then some. It has "knowingly" performed a jump of Olympian proportions, taking off from § 924(a)(2), sailing backward over more than 9,000 words in the U.S. Code, and then landing-conveniently-at the beginning of the enumeration of the elements of the § 922(g) offense. Of course, there is no logical reason why this jump has to land at that particular point in § 922(g). That is petitioner's first sleight of hand. But there is another.
What petitioner and those who have pressed this leaping argument want § 922(g) to say is essentially this: Whoever knowingly is an illegal alien and possesses a firearm shall be fined and/or imprisoned if his possession of the gun was in or affecting interstate commerce. If we had before us a provision that reads like that, there would be a strong textual argument that a defendant's status as an illegal alien must actually be known to him. That is essentially what we held in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 652, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009). But when the term "knowingly" is excised from § 924(a)(2) and inserted at the beginning of § 922(g), what we get is something quite different:
Whoever knowingly... It is unlawful for any person... who, being an alien-is illegally or unlawfully in the United States... to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition....
Congress did not-and certainly would not-enact a statute that reads like that. To convert this garbled conglomeration into intelligible prose, editing is obviously needed, and the editing process would compel the editor to make decisions with substantive implications that could hardly go unnoticed. Here is a way of amalgamating § 924(a)(1) and § 922(g) that minimizes the changes in the language of the two provisions:
Whoever knowingly...
It is unlawful for any person... who,
being an alien-is illegally or unlawfully in the United States... and possesses in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition... [commits a crime punishable by....]
The most natural reading of this version is that the defendant must know only that he is an alien, not that his presence in the country is illegal or unlawful. And under this version, it is not even clear that the alien's possession of the firearm or ammunition must
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a loyalty oath case. The question for decision is whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments are violated by Indiana’s requirement, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-3812 (1969), that “[n]o existing or newly-organized political party or organization shall be permitted on or to have the names of its candidates printed on the ballot used at any election until it has filed an affidavit, by its officers, under oath, that it does not advocate the overthrow of local, state or national government by force or violence .
Appellants are the Communist Party of Indiana, a new political party in Indiana, certain of its officers and potential voters, and its candidates for President and Vice President in the 1972 election. Appellees are the Indiana State Election Board and its members. When appellants applied to the Election Board in August 1972 for a place on Indiana’s National Ballot for the 1972 general election without submitting the required oath, the Board, on the advice of the Attorney General of Indiana, rejected the application. Appellants thereupon filed this action in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of § 29-3812, and an injunction requiring that the Election Board place the Party on the ballot. A three-judge court was convened and that court, on September 28, 1972, in an unreported opinion, declared the provision of § 29-3812 that is challenged on this appeal constitutional and issued an order requiring the Election Board to place the Communist Party and its nominees on the National Ballot only “[i]n the event that the Communist Party of Indiana shall submit an affidavit in keeping with this memorandum and order. . . .” The Communist Party submitted an affidavit that, in addition to the statutory language, added the following:
“The term advocate as used herein has the meaning given it by the Supreme Court of the United States in Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 at 320, 'the advocacy and teaching of concrete action for the forcible overthrow of the government, and not of principles divorced from action.’ ”
The Election Board rejected the affidavit and appellants, on October 3, returned to the District Court, seeking an order directing the Board to accept it. On the same day, the Election Board filed a motion requesting reconsideration of the order of September 28. The District Court, on October 4, denied both motions by order entered that day. Appellants on October 10 filed a notice of appeal to this Court to enable them to seek emergency relief. That effort was abandoned, and appellants then sought leave of the District Court to withdraw the notice of appeal in order that the District Court might act on a motion of appellants, also filed October 10, that the District Court amend its September 28 order to include a determination that § 29-3812 was constitutional “only insofar as it proscribes advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action, as distinguished from advocacy of abstract doctrine.” On October 31, the District Court entered an order granting leave to withdraw the notice of appeal of October 10 but denying the motion to amend the September 28 memorandum.
Appellants refiled their notice of appeal on November 29. Appellees moved to dismiss the appeal as juris-dictionally untimely, arguing that the 60-day period for appeal, 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (b), expired on November 27. We postponed consideration of the question of our jurisdiction to the merits. 410 U. S. 981 (1973). We hold that the appeal was timely. Appellees’ motion for reconsideration of October 3 suspended the finality of the judgment of September 28 until the District Court’s denial of the motion on October 4 restored it. Time for appeal thus began to run from October 4 and the notice of appeal filed November 29 was timely. As to the merits, we hold that the loyalty oath requirement of § 29-3812 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court.
Loyalty oath cases are not strangers to this Court, see Note, Loyalty Oaths, 77 Yale L. J. 739 (1968), but the constitutional questions presented in earlier cases arising from their use to limit access to the ballot have not had plenary consideration. The District Court decided this case under the pressure of a ballot-printing deadline, and its memorandum opinion states no reasons and cites no authorities to support the court’s holding that “that portion of the statute providing ‘that it does not advocate the overthrow of local, state or national government by force or violence,’ is constitutional and hence enforceable by Indiana.”
Appellees do not deny that § 29-3812 exacts a broad oath embracing advocacy of abstract doctrine as well as advocacy of action. Yet this Court has held in many contexts that the First and Fourteenth Amendments render invalid statutes regulating advocacy that are hot limited to- advocacy of action. And, as we have so often emphasized, “[precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963).
We most recently summarized the constitutional principles that have evolved in this area in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969). We expressly overruled the earlier holding of Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927), that “without more, ‘advocating’ violent means to effect political and economic change involves such danger to the security of the State that the State may outlaw it.” 395 U. S., at 447. For, we said:
“[L]ater decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. As we said in Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, 297-298 (1961), ‘the mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.’ . . . A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from governmental control. Cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957) . . . .” Id., at 447-448.
This principle that “the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action” has been applied not only to statutes that directly forbid or proscribe advocacy, see Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957); but also to regulatory schemes that determine eligibility for public employment, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278 (1961); see also United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); tax exemptions, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958); and moral fitness justifying disbarment, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 (1957).
Appellees argue that the principle should nevertheless not obtain in cases of state regulation of access to the ballot. We perceive no reason to make an exception, and appellees suggest none. Indeed, all of the reasons for application of the principle in the other contexts are equally applicable here. “To be sure, administration of the electoral process is a matter that the Constitution largely entrusts to the States. But, in exercising their powers of supervision over elections and in setting qualifications for voters, the States may not infringe upon basic constitutional protections.” Kusper v. Pontikes, ante, at 57 (footnote omitted). At stake are appellants' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas. “The right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom.” Ibid.; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 30 (1968). At stake as well are appellants' interests as party members in casting an effective ballot. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 142-144 (1972).
Thus, burdening access to the ballot, rights of association in the political party of one's choice, interests in casting an effective vote and in running for office, not because the Party urges others “to do something, now or in the future . . . [but] . . . merely to believe in something,” Yates v. United States, supra, at 325, is to infringe interests certainly as substantial as those in public employment, tax exemption, or the practice of law. For “the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights . . . Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 562 (1964). “Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 17 (1964).
Appellees argue: “It is fraudulent for a group seeking by violent revolution to overthrow our democratic form of government to disguise itself as a political party and use the very forms of the democracy it seeks to subvert in order to gain support and carry on its nefarious ends.” Brief for Appellees 7. Again, they argue “that the affidavit required under the statute refers to the official actions of the party itself, thus reducing to a minimum any possibility of ‘innocent involvement’ in activities which might be considered advocacy.” Id., at 10. As we understand appellees, this is an argument that, at least for purposes of determining whether to grant a place on the ballot, any group that advocates violent overthrow as abstract doctrine must be regarded as necessarily advocating unlawful action. We reject that proposition. Its acceptance would only return the law to the “thoroughly discredited” regime of Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927), unanimously overruled by the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S., at 447, 449.
Reversed.
Section 29-3812 reads in pertinent part as follows:
“No political party or organization shall be recognized and given a place on or have the names of its candidates printed on the ballot used at any election which advocates the overthrow, by force or violence, of the local, state or national government, or which advocates, or carries on, a program of sedition or of treason, and which is affiliated or cooperates with or has any relation with any foreign government, or any political party or group of individuals of any foreign government. Any political party or organization which is in existence at the time of the passage of this act . . . or which shall have had a ticket on the ballot one or more times prior to any election, and which does not advocate any of the doctrines the advocacy of which is prohibited by this act, shall insert a plank in its platform that it does not advocate any of the doctrines prohibited by this act. No existing or newly-organized political party or organization shall be permitted on or to have the names of its candidates printed on the ballot used at any election until it has filed an affidavit, by its officers, under oath, that it does not advocate the overthrow of local, state or national government by force or violence, and that it is not affiliated with and does not cooperate with nor has any relation with any foreign government, or any political party, organization or group of individuals of any foreign government. The affidavit herein provided for shall be filed with the state election board or the county election board having charge of the printing of the ballot on which such ticket is to appear.”
The District Court’s decision of September 28 also decided attacks upon the loyalty oath provision of § 29-3812 made in actions brought by two other new political parties, the American Independent Party and the Indiana Peace and Freedom Party. All three actions challenged, in addition to the “advocacy” provision, the provision of § 29-3812 requiring a party also to file an affidavit that “it is not affiliated with and does not cooperate with nor has any relation with any foreign government, or any political party, organization or group of individuals of any foreign government.” The September 28 memorandum of the three-judge court declared this provision of § 29-3812 unconstitutional. The American Independent Party and the Indiana Peace and Freedom Party then filed affidavits accepted by the Election Board and were placed on the National Ballot for the 1972 elections. On November 11, the Election Board appealed that portion of the order to this Court. We summarily affirmed. Whitcomb v. Communist Party, 410 U. S. 976 (1973).
Section 29-3801, Ind. Stat. Ann. (1969), provides for ballot listing of any party that files petitions containing signatures of one-half of one percent “of the total vote of all parties east in the state for secretary of state at the last preceding general election.” The sufficiency of the Communist Party petitions in this respect was challenged by appellees in the District Court but was not discussed in the court’s September 28 memorandum although the issuance of the injunction presupposed a decision adverse to appellees. The motion for reconsideration requested the court to reconsider that result.
Appellees also argue that the notice of appeal of November 29 was ineffective because the earlier notice of October 10 divested the District Court of jurisdiction and that that jurisdiction could not have been revested by the granting of leave to withdraw the October 10 notice. But since the October 10 notice was clearly timely, that argument is reduced to an attack on the untimeliness under Supreme Court Rule 13 (1) of the filing of the jurisdictional statement on January 26, 1973. Timely docketing of the jurisdictional statement is not, however, a jurisdictional requisite. Johnson v. Florida, 391 U. S. 596, 598 (1968).
Appellees’ brief also invokes § 3 of the Communist Control Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 776, 50 U. S. C. § 842, providing that “[t]he Communist Party of the United States . . . [is] not entitled to any of the rights, privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any political subdivision thereof . . . .” We have difficulty understanding appel-lees’ argument that this statute is applicable to the Communist Party of Indiana or in any way relevant to the issues in this case. The statute was not relied upon by either the Election Board, or the District Court when it denied declaratory relief. In any event, insofar as the argument is that this statute bars the Communist Party of Indiana from maintaining this action, it is rejected. See Communist Party, U. S. A. v. Catherwood, 367 U. S. 389 (1961).
Appellants also contend that the requirement is constitutionally precluded as an oath different from that prescribed for a President by Art. II, § 1, and for any other state or federal officer by Art. VI, cl. 3. See Cole v. Richardson, 405 U. S. 676 (1972). In view of our result we need not address those contentions.
The only question presented in the jurisdictional statement is whether § 29-3812 is facially valid. Thus, we do not reach the question whether the Election Board’s apparent failure to require the Republican and Democratic Parties, the two major parties in Indiana, to comply with the statute rises to the level of a denial of equal protection of the law as applied, or was within the Board’s “proseeutorial discretion.” We note, however, that the only relevant testimony in the District Court, given by the Board’s clerk, is entirely silent as to the reasons behind the omission.
E. g., Usker v. Kelley, 401 U. S. 928 (1971), summarily aff’g 315 F. Supp. 777 (1970); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U. S. 56 (1951), presenting a constitutional challenge to a Maryland statute imposing a loyalty requirement on candidates for municipal office rested on “the narrowing construction tendered by the Attorney General [of Maryland] during oral argument so as to avoid the constitutional issue that was argued.” Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U. S. 54; 58 (1967). And Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583 (1972), was dismissed as insufficiently concrete and mature to permit adjudication, on the authority of Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549 (1947).
Cf. Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, 298 (1961), a prosecution under the Smith Act, 18 U. S. C. § 2385, where we held that the constitutional limitations require that criminal advocacy by the Communist Party be proved by “some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future which is both sufficiently strong and sufficiently pervasive- to lend color to the otherwise ambiguous theoretical material regarding Communist Party teaching, and to justify the inference that such a call to violence may fairly be imputed to the Party as a whole, and not merely to some narrow segment of it.” See also Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The opinion of the Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), makes clear that it is the responsibility of the jury — not the court — to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury. What is more, a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was “objectively unreasonable.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because rational people can sometimes disagree, the inevitable consequence of this settled law is that judges will sometimes encounter convictions that they believe to be mistaken, but that they must nonetheless uphold. The Court of Appeals in this case substituted its judgment for that of a California jury on the question whether the prosecution’s or the defense’s expert witnesses more persuasively explained the cause of a death. For this reason, certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
⅜* ⅜ ⅜
This case concerns the death of 7-week-old Etzel Glass. On November 29,1996, Etzel’s mother, Tomeka, put Etzel to sleep on a sofa before going to sleep herself in another room. Respondent Shirley Ree Smith — Tomeka’s mother — slept on the floor next to Etzel. Several hours later, Smith ran into Tomeka’s room, holding Etzel, who was limp, and told her that “ [something [was] wrong with Etzel.” Tr. 416. By the time emergency officials arrived, Etzel was not breathing and had no heartbeat. Smith reported that she thought Etzel had fallen off the sofa. The officials’ efforts to resuscitate Etzel failed.
Doctors initially attributed Etzel’s death to sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS), the customary diagnosis when an infant shows no outward signs of trauma. But after an autopsy, the coroner concluded that the cause of death was instead shaken baby syndrome (SBS). When a social worker informed Smith of that finding, Smith told her that Etzel had not responded to her touch while sleeping, so she had picked him up and given him “a little shake, a jostle” to wake him. Id., at 842. According to the social worker, Smith then said something to the effect of, “Oh, my God. Did I do it? Did I do it? Oh, my God.” Id., at 847 (internal quotation marks omitted). In an interview with the police a few days later, Smith said that she had shaken Etzel, but then she corrected herself and said that she had twisted him to try to elicit a reaction. Smith was arrested and charged with assault on a child resulting in death. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 273ab (West 2008) (“Any person who, having the care or custody of a child who is under eight years of age, assaults the child by means of force that to a reasonable person would be likely to produce great bodily injury, resulting in the child’s death, shall be punished by imprisonment. . . ”).
At trial, the jury heard seven days of expert medical testimony on the cause of Etzel’s death. The prosecution offered three experts, each of whom attested that Etzel’s death was the result of SBS — not SIDS, as the defense contended. The first expert, Dr. Eugene Carpenter, was the medical examiner for the Los Angeles County coroner who had supervised Etzel’s autopsy. Dr. Carpenter is board certified in forensic, anatomic, and clinical pathology. He testified that Etzel’s autopsy revealed recent hemorrhages in the brain, and he opined that the bleeding and other features of Etzel’s pathology, including a bruise and abrasion on the lower back of the baby’s head, were consistent with violent shaking. Dr. Carpenter identified two means by which shaking can result in a baby’s death: The first is that the shaking causes blood vessels in the brain to tear, creating a pool of blood that pushes the brain downward into the spinal canal, resulting in death but little direct damage to the brain. The second is that the shaking itself is sufficiently severe that the brain directly tears in vital areas, causing death with very little bleeding. Dr. Carpenter testified that Etzel’s injuries were consistent with the latter pathology. He also explained that the injuries could not be attributed to either a fall from the sofa or the administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Nor, according to Dr. Carpenter, was it possible that Etzel perished from SIDS, given the signs of internal trauma. Dr. Carpenter did testify, however, that while SBS victims often suffer retinal hemorrhaging, Etzel’s autopsy revealed no such injury.
The prosecution’s second expert, Dr. Stephanie Erlich, was the associate deputy medical examiner who actually performed Etzel’s autopsy. She is board certified in anatomic pathology and neuropathology. She corroborated Dr. Carpenter’s testimony about the autopsy findings, and added that a followup neuropathologieal examination of Etzel’s brain confirmed the existence of recent hemorrhaging. Noting only a minimal amount of new blood in Etzel’s brain, she testified that the cause of death was direct trauma to the brainstem. On cross-examination, she agreed with defense counsel that retinal hemorrhaging (absent in Etzel’s case) is present in 75 to 80 percent of SBS cases.
The third prosecution expert, Dr. David Chadwick, is board certified in pediatrics and the author of articles on childhood death by abusive trauma. He testified that Et-zel’s injuries were consistent with SBS and that old trauma could not have been the cause of the child’s death.
The defense called two experts to dispute these conclusions. The first, pathologist Dr. Richard Siegler, testified that Etzel died from brain trauma, but that it was not the result of SBS, given the lack of retinal hemorrhaging. He admitted on cross-examination, however, that an absence of retinal hemorrhaging does not exclude a finding of SBS. He also acknowledged that he did not believe the cause of Etzel’s death was SIDS. According to Dr. Siegler, Etzel died from old trauma, an opinion he reached on the basis of studying photographs of the neuropathological examination.
The other defense expert, pediatric neurologist Dr. William Goldie, testified that Etzel’s death was due to SIDS. He noted that Etzel was born with jaundice, a heart murmur, and low birth weight — making him more susceptible to SIDS. Dr. Goldie testified that pathologists had not been able to determine the cause of Etzel’s death and that the bleeding could be attributed to the resuscitation efforts.
The jury found Smith guilty. Concluding that the jury “carefully weighed” the “tremendous amount of evidence” supporting the verdict, Tr. 1649, the trial judge denied Smith’s motion for a new trial and sentenced her to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison.
On direct review, Smith contended that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that Etzel died from SBS. After thoroughly reviewing the competing medical testimony, the California Court of Appeal rejected this claim, concluding:
“The expert opinion evidence we have summarized was conflicting. It was for the jury to resolve the conflicts. The credited evidence was substantial and sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Etzel died from shaken baby syndrome. The conviction is supported by substantial evidence.” People v. Smith, No. B118869 (Feb. 10, 2000), App. K to Pet. for Cert. 86.
The California Supreme Court denied review. App. J, id., at 74.
Smith then filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the Central District of California, renewing her claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Etzel died of SBS. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, that court had no power to afford relief unless Smith could show either that the California Court of Appeal’s decision affirming the conviction “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,” clearly established federal law as reflected in the holdings of this Court’s cases, 28 U. S. C. § 2264(d)(1), or that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the state court record, § 2254(d)(2). Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 100 (2011).
The Magistrate Judge to whom the case was assigned issued a report acknowledging that “[t]his is not the typical shaken baby case” and that the evidence against Smith “raises many questions.” App. I to Pet. for Cert. 65. But the Magistrate Judge nevertheless concluded that the evidence was “clearly sufficient to support a conviction.” Ibid. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and denied the petition. App. G, id., at 52.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed with instructions to grant the writ. Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F. 3d 884 (2006). Despite the plenitude of expert testimony in the trial record concluding that sudden shearing or tearing of the brainstem was the cause of Etzel’s death, the Ninth Circuit determined that there was “no evidence to permit an expert conclusion one way or the other” on that question because there was “no physical evidence of... tearing or shearing, and no other evidence supporting death by violent shaking.” Id., at 890. The court said that the State’s experts “reached [their] conclusion because there was no evidence in the brain itself of the cause of death.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). The court concluded that because “[a]bsence of evidence cannot constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” ibid., the California Court of Appeal had “unreasonably applied” this Court’s opinion in Jackson v. Virginia in upholding Smith’s conviction, 437 F. 3d, at 890.
That conclusion was plainly wrong. Jackson says that evidence is sufficient to support a conviction so long as “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U. S., at 319. It also unambiguously instructs that a reviewing court “faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact, resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id., at 326. When the deference to state court decisions required by § 2254(d) is applied to the state court’s already deferential review, see Renico, 559 U. S., at 778, there can be no doubt of the Ninth Circuit’s error below.
The jury was presented with competing views of how Etzel died. It was made aware of the various experts’ qualifications and their familiarity with both the subject of SBS and the physical condition of Etzel’s body. It observed the attorneys for each party cross-examine the experts and elicit concessions from them. The State’s experts, whom the jury was entitled to believe, opined that the physical evidence was consistent with, and best explained by, death from sudden tearing of the brainstem caused by shaking. The Ninth Circuit’s assertion that these experts “reached [their] conclusion because there was no evidence in the brain itself of the cause of death” is simply false. There was “evidence in the brain itself.” The autopsy revealed indications of recent trauma to Etzel’s brain, such as subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhaging, hemorrhaging around the optic nerves, and the presence of a blood clot between the brain’s hemispheres. The autopsy also revealed a bruise and abrasion on the lower back of EtzeTs head. These affirmative indications of trauma formed the basis of the experts’ opinion that Etzel died from shaking so severe that his brainstem tore.
Defense counsel made certain that the jury understood that the prosecution’s experts were unable to identify the precise point of tearing itself. But as Judge Bea noted in his dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, the experts explained why the location of the tear was undetectable: “Etzel’s death happened so quickly that the effects of the trauma did not have time to develop.” Smith v. Mitchell, 453 F. 3d 1203, 1207 (2006). According to the prosecutions’ experts, there was simply no opportunity for swelling to occur around the brainstem before Etzel died.
In light of the evidence presented at trial, the Ninth Circuit plainly erred in concluding that the jury’s verdict was irrational, let alone that it was unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to think otherwise. See § 2254(d). Doubts about whether Smith is in fact guilty are understandable. But it is not the job of this Court, and was not that of the Ninth Circuit, to decide whether the State’s theory was correct. The jury decided that question, and its decision is supported by the record.
It is said that Smith, who already has served years in prison, has been punished enough, and that she poses no danger to society. These or other considerations perhaps would be grounds to seek clemency, a prerogative granted to executive authorities to help ensure that justice is tempered by mercy. It is not clear to the Court whether this process has been invoked, or, if so, what its course has been. It is not for the Judicial Branch to determine the standards for this discretion. If the clemency power is exercised in either too generous or too stingy a way, that calls for political correctives, not judicial intervention.
The decision below cannot be allowed to stand. This Court vacated and remanded this judgment twice before, calling the panel’s attention to this Court’s opinions highlighting the necessity of deference to state courts in § 2254(d) habeas cases. Each time the panel persisted in its course, reinstating its judgment without seriously confronting the significance of the cases called to its attention. See Patrick v. Smith, 550 U. S. 915 (vacating and remanding in light of Carey v. Musladin, 549 U. S. 70 (2006)), reinstated on remand, 508 F. 3d 1256 (2007) (per curiam); 558 U. S. 1143 (2010) (vacating and remanding in light of McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U. S. 120 (2010) (per curiam)), reinstated on remand sub nom. Smith v. Mitchell, 624 F. 3d 1235 (2010) (per curiam). Its refusal to do so necessitates this Court’s action today.
The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the ease is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The dissent’s review of the evidence presented to the jury over seven days is precisely the sort of reweighing of facts that is precluded by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 324 (1979), and precisely the sort of second-guessing of a state court decision applying Jackson that is precluded by AEDPA, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). The dissent’s views on how “adamantly” experts would testify today as opposed to at the time of trial, post, at 14 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.), are of course pure speculation, as would be any views on how a jury would react to less adamant testimony.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A public figure may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood without clear and convincing proof that the false “statement was made with ‘actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280 (1964). See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 162 (1967) (opinion of Warren, C. J.). In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485 (1984), we held that judges in such cases have a constitutional duty to “exercise independent judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity. ” Id., at 514. In this case the Court of Appeals affirmed a libel judgment against a newspaper without attempting to make an independent evaluation of the credibility of conflicting oral testimony concerning the subsidiary facts underlying the jury’s finding of actual malice. We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals’ analysis was consistent with our holding in Bose. 488 U. S. 907 (1988).
I
Respondent, Daniel Connaughton, was the unsuccessful candidate for the office of Municipal Judge of Hamilton, Ohio, in an election conducted on November 8, 1983. Petitioner is the publisher of the Journal News, a local newspaper that supported the reelection of the incumbent, James Dolan. A little over a month before the election, the incumbent’s Director of Court Services resigned and was arrested on bribery charges. A grand jury investigation of those charges was in progress on November 1, 1983. On that date, the Journal News ran a front-page story quoting Alicé Thompson, a grand jury witness, as stating that Connaughton had used “dirty tricks” and offered her and her sister jobs and a trip to Florida “in appreciation” for their help in the investigation.
Invoking the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, Con-naughton filed an action for damages, alleging that the article was false, that it had damaged his personal and professional reputation, and that it had been published with actual malice. After discovery, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment relying in part on an argument that even if Thompson’s statements were false, the First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of serious charges against a public figure. The District Court denied the motion, noting that the evidence raised an issue of fact as to the newspaper’s interest in objective reporting and that the “neutral reportage doctrine” did not apply to Thompson’s statements. The case accordingly proceeded to trial.
After listening to six days of testimony and three taped interviews — one conducted by Connaughton and two by Journal News reporters — and reviewing the contents of 56 exhibits, the jury was given succinct instructions accurately defining the elements of public figure libel and directed to answer three special verdicts. It unanimously found by a preponderance of the evidence that the November 1 story was defamatory and that it was false. It also found by clear and convincing proof that the story was published with actual malice. After a separate hearing on damages, the jury awarded Connaughton $5,000 in compensatory damages and $195,000 in punitive damages. Thereafter, the District Court denied a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a, and petitioner appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 842 F. 2d 825 (CA6 1988). In a lengthy opinion, the majority detailed why its “independent examination of the entire record” had demonstrated that “the judgment does not pose a forbidden intrusion into the First Amendment rights of free expression.” Id., at 828. The opinion identified the “core issue” as “simply one of credibility to be attached to the witnesses appearing on behalf of the respective parties and the reasonableness and probability assigned to their testimony.” Id., at 839-840. It separately considered the evidence supporting each of the jury’s special verdicts, concluding that neither the finding that the article was defamatory nor the finding that it was false was clearly erroneous.
The Court of Appeals’ review of the actual malice determination involved four steps. It first noted the wide disparity between the respective parties’ versions of the critical evidence, pointing out that if the jury had credited petitioner’s evidence it “could have easily concluded that Thompson’s charges were true and/or that the Journal’s conduct in determining Thompson’s credibility was not a highly unreasonable departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by reasonable publishers.” Id., at 840. Second, it inferred from the jury’s answers to the three special interrogatories that “it obviously elected to assign greater credibility to the plaintiff’s witnesses and proof [and that] the jury simply did not believe the defendants’ witnesses, its evidentiary presentations or its arguments.” Ibid. Third, having considered what it regarded as the “subsidiary or operative facts” that constituted the plaintiff’s theory of the case, it concluded that the jury’s findings concerning those operative facts were not clearly erroneous. Id., at 843-844. Fourth, “in the exercise of its independent judgment” based on its evaluation of the “cumulative impact of the subsidiary facts,” the court concluded that “Connaugh-ton proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Journal demonstrated its actual malice when it published the November 1, 1983, article despite the existence of serious doubt which attached to Thompson’s veracity and the accuracy of her reports.” Id., at 846.
Judge Guy dissented. In his opinion the admissions made by Connaughton in his interview with Journal News reporters the day before the story was published sufficiently corroborated Thompson’s charges to preclude a finding of actual malice. Id., at 853-854. He was satisfied, as a matter of law, that respondent had failed to prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, regardless of whether determinations of credibility made by the jury are subject to a de novo standard of review. Id., at 855.
H HH
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals made two basic errors. First, while correctly stating the actual malice standard announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), the court actually applied a less severe standard that merely required a showing of “ ‘highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.’” 842 F. 2d, at 845 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S., at 155 (opinion of Harlan, J.)). Second, the court failed to make an independent de novo review of the entire record and therefore incorrectly relied on subsidiary facts implicitly established by the jury’s verdict instead of drawing its own inferences from the evidence.
There is language in the Court of Appeals’ opinion that supports petitioner’s first contention. For example, the Court of Appeals did expressly state that the Journal News’ decision to publish Alice Thompson’s allegations constituted an extreme departure from professional standards. Moreover, the opinion attributes considerable weight to the evidence that the Journal News was motivated by its interest in the reelection of the candidate it supported and its economic interest in gaining a competitive advantage over the Cincinnati Enquirer, its bitter rival in the local market. Petitioner is plainly correct in recognizing that a public figure plaintiff must prove more than an extreme departure from professional standards and that a newspaper’s motive in publishing a story — whether to promote an opponent’s candidacy or to increase its circulation — cannot provide a sufficient basis for finding actual malice.
The language in the Court of Appeals’ opinion discussing professional standards is taken from Justice Harlan’s plurality opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, at 155. In that case, Justice Harlan had opined that the New York Times actual malice standard should be reserved for cases brought by public officials. The New York Times decision, in his view, was primarily driven by the repugnance of seditious libel and a concern that public official libel “lay close” to this universally renounced, and long-defunct, doctrine. 388 U. S., at 153. In place of the actual malice standard, Justice Harlan suggested that a public figure need only make “a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.” Id., at 155. This proposed standard, however, was emphatically rejected by a majority of the Court in favor of the stricter New York Times actual malice rule. See 388 U. S., at 162 (opinion of Warren, C. J.); id., at 170 (Black, J., dissenting); id., at 172 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, just four years later, Justice Harlan acquiesced in application of the actual malice standard in public figure cases, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29, 69-70 (1971) (dissenting opinion), and by the time of the Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974), the Court was apparently unanimously of this view. Today, there is no question that public figure libel cases are controlled by the New York Times standard and not by the professional standards rule, which never commanded a majority of this Court.
It also is worth emphasizing that the actual malice standard is not satisfied merely through a showing of ill will or “malice” in the ordinary sense of the term. See Beck ley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81 (1967) (per curiam); Henry v. Collins, 380 U. S. 356 (1965) (per curiam). Indeed, just last Term we unanimously held that a public figure “may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress... without showing... that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made... with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.” Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 56 (1988). Nor can the fact that the defendant published the defamatory material in order to increase its profits suffice to prove actual malice. The allegedly defamatory statements at issue in the New York Times case were themselves published as part of a paid advertisement. 376 U. S., at 265-266. If a profit motive could somehow strip communications of the otherwise available constitutional protection, our cases from New York Times to Hustler Magazine would be little more than empty vessels. Actual malice, instead, requires at a minimum that the statements were made with a reckless disregard for the truth. And although the concept of “reckless disregard” “cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition,” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 730 (1968), we have made clear that the defendant must have made the false publication with a “high degree of awareness of... probable falsity,” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74 (1964), or must have “entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication,” St. Amant, supra, at 731.
Certain statements in the Court of Appeals’ opinion, when read in isolation, appear to indicate that the court at times substituted the professional standards rule for the actual malice requirement and at other times inferred actual malice from the newspaper’s motive in publishing Thompson’s story. Nevertheless, when the opinion is read as a whole, it is clear that the conclusion concerning the newspaper’s departure from accepted standards and the evidence of motive were merely supportive of the court’s ultimate conclusion that the record “demonstrated a reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of Thompson’s allegations and thus provided clear and convincing proof of ‘actual malice’ as found by the jury.” 842 F. 2d, at 847. Although courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant’s state of mind through circumstantial 'evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 160 (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U. S. App. D. C. 39, 66, 817 F. 2d 762, 789 (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 870 (1987), and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry. Thus, we are satisfied that the Court of Appeals judged the case by the correct substantive standard.
The question whether the Court of Appeals gave undue weight to the jury’s findings — whether it failed to conduct the kind of independent review mandated by our opinion in Bose — requires more careful consideration. A proper answer to that question must be prefaced by additional comment on some of the important conflicts in the evidence.
HH b — 4
The most important witness to the bribery charges against the Director of Court Services was Patsy Stephens, Alice Thompson’s older sister. In a tape-recorded interview conducted in Connaughton’s home between 12:30 and 4:30 a.m. on September 17, 1983, Stephens explained how, on 40 or 50 occasions, she had visited with the Court Administrator, Billy Joe New, in his office and made cash payments to dispose of “DUI” and other minor criminal charges against her former husband and various other relatives and acquaintances. On September 22, pursuant to an arrangement made by Connaughton at the suggestion of the county prosecutor, Stephens took a lie detector test. After learning that she had passed the test, Connaughton filed a written complaint against New. In due course, New was arrested, indicted, and convicted.
Alice Thompson was one of the eight persons present at the tape-recorded interview on September 17. One of the cases Patsy Stephens described was a shoplifting charge against her sister. Thompson volunteered some comments about the incident, but otherwise had little to say during the long interview with Stephens. Thompson was also present on the 22d, when Stephens took the polygraph test, but Thompson declined to submit to such a test. App. 301. On that day, the two sisters spent several hours in the company of Connaughton, his wife, and two of his supporters. They discussed a number of subjects, including the fact that Billy Joe New had just resigned, the question whether there was reason to be concerned about the safety of the two sisters, the fact that Martha Connaughton might open an ice cream parlor sometime in the future, the possibility that the two sisters might be employed there as waitresses, and a vacation in Florida planned by the Connaughtons for after the election.
Late in October, New’s lawyer, Henry Masana, met with Jim Blount, the editorial director of the Journal News, and Joe Cocozzo, the newspaper’s publisher, to arrange a meeting with Alice Thompson. Masana explained that Thompson wanted to be interviewed about the “dirty tricks” Connaugh-ton was using in his campaign. Thereafter, on October 27, Blount and Pam Long, a Journal News reporter, met with Thompson in the lawyer’s office and tape-recorded the first of the two interviews that provided the basis for the story that Long wrote and the Journal News published on November 1.
The tape of Alice Thompson’s interview is 1 hour and 20 minutes long. Significant portions of it are inaudible or incoherent. It is clear, however, that Thompson made these specific charges:
—that Connaughton had stated that his purpose in taping the interview with Patsy Stephens was to get evidence with which he could confront New and Judge Dolan and “scare them into resigning” without making any public use of the tapes;
—that he would pay the expenses for a 3-week vacation in Florida for the two sisters;
—that he would buy a restaurant for the two sisters’ parents to operate;
—that he would provide jobs for both Patsy Stephens and Alice Thompson;
—that he would take them out to a victory dinner at an expensive French restaurant after the election; and
—that Connaughton would not allow knowledge of the sisters’ involvement to become public.
During the course of the interview, Thompson indicated that she had told her story to the Cincinnati Enquirer, which declined to print it, id., at 284, and that the local police, likewise, were not interested, id., at 310. Thompson indicated that she was “against” Connaughton becoming a judge. Id., at 311. She also asserted that since Connaughton had made public that she and her sister had provided evidence against New, friends had accused her “of being a snitch and a rat” — epithets to which she took great offense — and that one reason she came to the Journal News was “to get that cleared up.” In her description of the interview in Connaughton’s home on September 17, Thompson stated that Connaughton had frequently turned off the tape recorder, that his voice would not be heard on the tape, and, somewhat inconsistently (and in response to a leading question), that most other comments had been made in response to leading questions by Connaughton.
Toward the end of the interview, Blount made two significant comments. He announced that “Pam will, of course, write the story,” id., at 314, and he asked “[wjhat would happen if we called your sister,” id., at 316. In response to the first comment, Thompson volunteered a somewhat improbable explanation for her motivation in seeking the interview, and in response to the second she gave an equivocal answer, even though she had previously assured Blount that Stephens would confirm everything she had said.
On Sunday, October 30, an editorial appeared in the Journal News under the headline “Municipal Court Race will have More than One Loser.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a. In the column, Blount observed that the campaign “battle has been all it was expected to be and more,” and predicted that “[a] lot could still happen in the next eight to nine days.” Ibid. He went on to discuss the charges pending against New, stating that the “array of charges and counter charges probably has taken some votes from Dolan.” Ibid. He cautioned, however, that the race was still wide open and quoted an unidentified voter as saying, “I resent voting for a person who I later find has been deceitful or dishonest in campaigning.” Id., at 46a. Significantly, this unidentified person did not express indignation at dishonesty in the administration of the Municipal Court — a concern one would think the arrest of New might have prompted — but rather, a distaste for dishonesty in campaigning — a concern that the then-uninvestigated and unwritten November 1 story would soon engender. After questioning the Cincinnati Enquirer’s coverage of a story critical of Dolan and suggesting that “the Connaughton forces have a wealthy, influential link to Enquirer decisionmakers,” the column indicated that the Journal News had not yet decided which candidate it favored, but implied that an endorsement was forthcoming. Id., at 48a.
On October 31, a reporter for the Journal News telephoned Connaughton and asked him to attend a meeting with Jim Blount, stating “that the endorsement may hang in the balance.” Tr. 457 (Aug. 9, 1985). Connaughton met with the reporter, Blount, and Cocozzo that afternoon and discussed a variety of subjects. One of the subjects was the rumor that Connaughton had an influential link to the Cincinnati Enquirer. Connaughton asserted that he had “no extraordinary pull or any inside track to anybody down there,” and that any rumor to the contrary was “a lie.” Id., at 458. Another subject was Connaughton’s participation in the investigation of Billy Joe New. Connaughton provided a chronology of the events that led to his filing of the complaint against New and explained that he believed that he had an obligation “as an attorney and officer of the court to report [New’s] crimes.” Id., at 458-459. No mention was made of Thompson’s interview or her charges against Connaughton. Id., at 460. After about an hour, Jim Blount received a telephone call and then told Connaughton that a reporter wanted to interview him. Id., at 462.
Connaughton then went to another office where Blount and Long advised him that they had interviewed Alice Thompson and were “trying to find out... how much of her statement was true.” App. 256. The ensuing tape-recorded interview lasted 55 minutes. Connaughton acknowledged that the meetings that Thompson described had taken place and that there had been some speculative discussion about each of the subjects that Thompson mentioned. He stated, however, that Thompson’s account of their meetings was “obviously shaded and bizarre,” id,., at 276, and that there was “absolutely” no “quid pro quo for information.”
Thus, while categorically denying that he intended to confront New and Judge Dolan with the tape of the Stephens interview to scare them into resigning, Connaughton admitted that he might well have speculated about what they would say or do if they heard the tapes. Similarly, while denying that he had promised Stephens and Thompson anonymity, he agreed that he had told them that he had hoped that they could remain anonymous. He also categorically denied that he had promised Thompson a job as a waitress, promised Stephens a job at the Municipal Court, or promised to set their parents up in a restaurant, although he did acknowledge a general conversation in which his wife had discussed the possibility that if her dream of opening “a gourmet ice cream shop” should materialize, the sisters might work there. There were similar acknowledgments of references to a possible Florida trip and postelection victory dinner, but denials of any promises. At the end of the interview, Long went back — stressing that Thompson’s charge was a “hefty” one — and asked for a second time whether Connaughton had promised Stephens a job at the Municipal Court if he was elected. He once again unequivocally denied the allegation.
The following day the lead story in the Journal News — under the headline “Bribery case witness claims jobs, trip offered” — reported that “[a] woman called to testify before the... Grand Jury in the Billy Joe New bribery case claims Dan Connaughton, candidate for Hamilton Municipal Judge, offered her and her sister jobs and a trip to Florida ‘in appreciation’ for their help.” Id., at 329. The article, which carried Pam Long’s byline, stated that Thompson accused Connaughton of using “ ‘dirty tricks’ ” to gain her cooperation in investigating New and that Connaughton, although admitting that he did meet with Thompson, “denied any wrongdoing.” Ibid. Each of Thompson’s allegations was accurately reported, including her claims that Connaughton had promised to “protect her anonymity,” id., at 330, that he had promised Stephens “a municipal court job” and Thompson some other sort of work, that he had invited both sisters on “a post-election trip to Florida,” and that he had offered “to set up Thompson’s parents... in the restaurant business,” id., at 333. The article conveyed Thompson’s allegation that “the tapes were turned off and on during a session [that] lasted until 5:30 a.m.,” and that these promises were made “[w]hen the tape was turned off.” Ibid. In addition, Long wrote, “Thompson claimed Connaughton had told her the tapes he made of her... statement... were to be presented to Dolan” with the hope that Dolan might resign, thereby allowing Connaughton to assume the municipal judgeship. Id., at 335. Connaughton’s contrary version of the events was also accurately reported.
As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, there was evidence in the record — both in the Thompson tape and in the Connaughton tape — that would have supported the conclusion that Thompson was telling the truth and that Connaugh-ton was dissembling. See 842 F. 2d, at 840. On the other hand, notwithstanding the partial confirmation of Thompson’s charges in the Connaughton tape, there remained a sharp conflict between their respective versions of the critical events. There was unquestionably ample evidence in the record to support a finding that Thompson’s principal charges were false, either because she misinterpreted remarks by Connaughton and his wife, or because Thompson was deliberately lying.
The jury listened to the tape recordings of the two conflicting interviews and also observed the demeanor of the two witnesses as they testified in open court. They found that Connaughton was telling the truth and that Thompson’s charges were false. The fact that an impartial jury unanimously reached that conclusion does not, however, demonstrate that the Journal News acted with actual malice. Unlike a newspaper, a jury is often required to decide which of two plausible stories is correct. Difference of opinion as to the truth of a matter — even a difference of 11 to 1 — does not alone constitute clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with a knowledge of falsity or with a “high degree of awareness of... probable falsity,” Garrison, 379 U. S., at 74. The jury’s verdict in this case, however, derived additional support from several critical pieces of information that strongly support the inference that the Journal News acted with actual malice in printing Thompson’s false and defamatory statements.
IV
On October 27, after the interview with Alice Thompson, the managing editor of the Journal News assembled a group of reporters and instructed them to interview all of the witnesses to the conversation between Connaughton and Thompson with one exception — Patsy Stephens. No one was asked to interview her and no one made any attempt to do so. See App. 56-57, 61, 83-85. This omission is hard to explain in light of Blount’s and Long’s repeated questions during the Connaughton and Thompson interviews concerning whether Stephens would confirm Thompson’s allegations. See id., at 277, 313, 316. It is utterly bewildering in light of the fact that the Journal News committed substantial resources to investigating Thompson’s claims, yet chose not to interview the one witness who was most likely to confirm Thompson’s account of the events. However, if the Journal News had serious doubts concerning the truth of Thompson’s remarks, but was committed to running the story, there was good reason not to interview Stephens — while denials coming from Connaughton’s supporters might be explained as motivated by a desire to assist Connaughton, a denial coming from Stephens would quickly put an end to the story.
The remaining six witnesses, including Connaughton, were all interviewed separately on October 31. Each of them denied Alice Thompson’s charges and corroborated Connaugh-ton’s version of the events. Thus, one Journal News reporter testified at trial that Jeanette and Ernest Barnes denied that any promises, offers, or inducements were made and that he had known the Barneses for several years and considered them both credible. Id., at 89-90. Another reporter testified that she interviewed Dave Berry and that Berry stated that absolutely no promises or offers were made. Id., at 91-92. By the time the November 1 story appeared, six witnesses had consistently and categorically denied Thompson’s allegations, yet the newspaper chose not to interview the one witness that both Thompson and Con-naughton claimed would verify their conflicting accounts of the relevant events.
The newspaper’s decision not to listen to the tapes of the Stephens interview in Connaughton’s home also supports the finding of actual malice. During the Connaughton interview, Long and Blount asked if they could hear the tapes. Id., at 259. Connaughton agreed, ibid., and later made the tapes available, id., at 48, 142. Much of what Thompson had said about the interview could easily have been verified or disproved by listening to the tapes. Listening to the tapes, for example, would have revealed whether Thompson accurately reported that the tape recorders were selectively turned on and off and that Connaughton was careful not to speak while the recorders were running. Similarly, the tapes presented a simple means of determining whether Stephens and Thompson had been asked leading questions, as Thompson claimed. Furthermore, if Blount was truly in equipoise about the question whether to endorse the incumbent judge for reelection — as he indicated in the column that he published on Sunday, October 30 — it is difficult to understand his lack of interest in a detailed description of the corrupt disposition of 40 to 50 cases in Judge Dolan’s court. Even though he may have correctly assumed that the account did not reflect on the integrity of the judge himself, surely the question whether administrative shortcomings might be revealed by the tapes would be a matter in which an editor in the process of determining which candidate to endorse would normally have an interest. Although simply one piece of evidence in a much larger picture, one might reasonably infer in light of this broader context that the decision not to listen to the tapes was motivated by a concern that they would raise additional doubts concerning Thompson’s veracity.
Moreover, although also just a small part of the larger picture, Blount’s October 30 editorial can be read to set the stage for the November 1 article. Significantly, this editorial appeared before Connaughton or any of the other witnesses were interviewed. Its prediction that further information concerning the integrity of the candidates might surface in the last few days of the campaign can be taken to indicate that Blount had already decided to publish Thompson’s allegations, regardless of how the evidence developed and regardless of whether or not Thompson’s story was credible upon ultimate reflection.
Finally, discrepancies in the testimony of Journal News witnesses may have given the jury the impression that the failure to conduct a complete investigation involved a deliberate effort to avoid the truth. Thus, for example, Blount’s superiors testified that they understood that Blount had directed reporter Tom Grant to ask the police whether Thompson had repeated her charges against Connaughton to them and whether they considered her a credible witness. Id., at 86-87 (Walker), 95 (Cocozzo). Blount also so testified. Id., at 37-38. Grant, however, denied that he had been given such an assignment. Id., at 88. Similarly, at the early stages of the proceeding, there was testimony that on October 31 Pam Long had tried to arrange a meeting with Patsy Stephens over the telephone, id., at 94, that Blount was standing at her desk during the conversation and overheard Long talking to Stephens, id., at 36-37, and that Connaugh-ton had volunteered that he would have Stephens get in touch with them, id., at 57. Connaughton categorically denied that the issue of getting in touch with Stephens was even discussed, id., at 142, and ultimately Blount and Long agreed that there was no contact — and no attempt to make contact — with Stephens on the 31st or at any other time before the story was published, id., at 48-49 (Blount), 56-57 (Long).
V
The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S., at 510-511. This rule is not simply premised on common-law tradition, but on the unique character of the interest protected by the actual malice standard. Our profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment, demands that the law of libel carve out an area of “ ‘breathing space’ ” so that protected speech is not discouraged. Gertz, 418 U. S., at 342 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963)); New York Times Co., 376 U. S., at 272 (same). The meaning of terms such as “actual malice” — and, more particularly, “reckless disregard” — however, is not readily captured in “one infallible definition.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S., at 730. Rather, only through the course of case-by-case adjudication can we give content to these otherwise elusive constitutional standards. Bose, supra, at 503. Moreover, such elucidation is particularly important in the area of free speech for precisely the same reason that the actual malice standard is itself necessary. Uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional protection can only dissuade protected speech — the more elusive the standard, the less protection it affords. Most fundamentally, the rule is premised on the recognition that “[jjudges, as expositors of the Constitution,” have a duty to “independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of ‘actual malice.’” Bose, supra, at 511.
There is little doubt that “public discussion of the qualifications of a candidate for elective office presents what is probably the strongest possible case for application of the New York Times rule,” Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U. S. 295, 300 (1971), and the strongest possible case for independent review. As Madison observed in 1800, just nine years after ratification of the First Amendment:
“Let it be recollected, lastly, that the right of electing the members of the government constitutes more particularly the essence of a free and responsible government. The value and efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust, and on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and demerits of the candidates respectively.” 4 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 575 (1861).
This value must be protected with special vigilance. When a candidate enters the political arena, he or she “must expect that the debate will sometimes be rough and personal,” Oilman v. Evans, 242 U. S. App. D. C. 301, 333, 750 F. 2d 970, 1002 (1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1127 (1985), and cannot “‘cry Foul!’ when an opponent or an industrious reporter attempts to demonstrate” that he or she lacks the “sterling integrity” trumpeted in campaign literature and speeches, Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 274 (1971). Vigorous reportage of political campaigns is necessary for the optimal functioning of democratic institutions and central to our history of individual liberty.
We have not gone so far, however, as to accord the press absolute immunity in its coverage of public figures or elections. If a false and defamatory statement is published with knowledge of falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth, the public figure may prevail. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S., at 162 (opinion of Warren, C. J.). A “reckless disregard” for the truth, however, requires more than a departure from reasonably prudent conduct. “There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” St. Amant, 390 U. S., at 731. The standard is a subjective one — there must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant actually had a “high degree of
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In cases arising under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, most trial judges refuse to allow the jury to receive evidence or instruction concerning the impact of federal income taxes on the amount of damages to be awarded. Because the prevailing practice developed at a time when federal taxes were relatively insignificant, and because some courts are now •following a different practice, we decided to answer the two questions presented by the certiorari petition in this wrongful-death action: (1) whether it was error to exclude evidence of the income taxes payable on the decedent’s past and estimated future earnings; and (2) whether it was error for the trial judge to refuse to instruct the jury that the award of damages would not be subject to income taxation.
In 1973, a fireman employed by petitioner suffered fatal injuries in a collision caused by petitioner’s negligence. Respondent, as administratrix of the fireman’s estate, brought suit under the FELA to recover the damages that his survivors suffered as a result of his death. In 1976, after a full trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, the jury awarded respondent $775,000. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that it was “not error to refuse to instruct a jury as to the nontaxability of an award” and also that it was “not error to exclude evidence of the effect of income taxes on future earnings of the decedent.” 62 Ill. App. 3d 653, 669, 378 N. E. 2d 1232, 1245 (1978). The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
The evidence supporting the damages award included biographical data about the decedent and his family and the expert testimony of an economist. The decedent, a 37-year-old man, was living with his second wife and two young children and was contributing to the support of two older children by his first marriage. His gross earnings in the 11 months prior to his death on November 22, 1973, amounted to $11,988. Assuming continued employment, those earnings would have amounted to $16,828.26 in 1977.
The expert estimated that the decedent’s earnings would have increased at a rate of approximately five percent per year, which would have amounted to $51,600 in the year 2000, the year of his expected retirement. The gross amount of those earnings, plus the value of the services he would have performed for his family, less the amounts the decedent would have spent upon himself, produced a total which, when discounted to present value at the time of trial, amounted to $302,000.
Petitioner objected to the use of gross earnings, without any deduction for income taxes, in respondent’s expert’s testimony and offered to prove through the testimony of its own expert, an actuary, that decedent’s federal income taxes during the years 1973 through 2000 would have amounted to about $57,000. Taking that figure into account, and making different assumptions about the rate of future increases in salary and the calculation of the present value of future earnings, petitioner’s expert computed the net pecuniary loss at $138,327. As already noted, the jury returned a verdict of $775,000.
Petitioner argues that the jury must have assumed that its award was subject to federal income taxation; otherwise, it is argued, the verdict would not have exceeded respondent’s expert’s opinion by such a large amount. For that reason, petitioner contends that it was prejudiced by the trial judge’s refusal to instruct the jury that “your award will not be subject to any income taxes, and you should not consider such taxes in fixing the amount of your award.”
Whether it was error to refuse that instruction, as well as the question whether evidence concerning the federal taxes on the decedent’s earnings was properly excluded, is a matter governed by federal law. It has long been settled that questions concerning the measure of damages in an FELA action are federal in character. See, e. g., Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59. This is true even if the action is brought in state court. See, e. g., Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 485, 491. In this case the Appellate Court of Illinois recognized that the practice then being followed in Illinois was subject; to change when this Court addresses the issue. We do so now, first considering the evidence question and then the proposed instruction.
I
In a wrongful-death action under the FELA, the measure of recovery is “the damages . . . [that] flow from the deprivation of the pecuniary benefits which the beneficiaries might have reasonably received. . . .” Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, supra, at 70. The amount of money that a wage earner is able to contribute to the support of his family is unquestionably affected by the amount of the tax he must pay to the Federal Government. It is his after-tax income, rather than his gross income before taxes, that provides the only realistic measure of his ability to support his family. It follows inexorably that the wage earner’s income tax is a relevant factor in calculating the monetary loss suffered by his dependents when he dies.
Although federal courts have consistently received evidence of the amount of the decedent’s personal expenditures, see, e. g., Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Leslie, 238 U. S. 599, 604, and have required that the estimate of future earnings be reduced by "taking account of the earning power of the money that is presently to be awarded,” Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Kelly, supra, at 489, they have generally not considered the payment of income taxes as tantamount to a personal expenditure and have regarded the future prediction of tax consequences as too speculative and complex for a jury’s deliberations. See, e. g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F. 2d 234, 236-237 (CA5 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 839.
Admittedly there are many variables that may affect the amount of a wage earner’s future income-tax liability. The law may change, his family may increase or decrease in size, his spouse’s earnings may affect his tax bracket, and extra income or unforeseen deductions may become available. But future employment itself, future health, future personal expenditures, future interest rates, and future inflation are also matters of estimate and prediction. Any one of these issues might provide the basis for protracted expert testimony and debate. But the practical wisdom of the trial bar and the trial bench has developed effective methods of presenting the essential elements of an expert calculation in a form that is understandable by juries that are increasingly familiar with the complexities of modern life. We therefore reject the notion that the introduction of evidence describing a decedent’s estimated after-tax earnings is too speculative or complex for a jury.
Respondent argues that if this door is opened, other equally relevant evidence must also be received. For example, she points out that in discounting the estimate of future earnings to its present value, the tax on the income to be earned by the damages award is now omitted. Logically, it would certainly seem correct that this amount, like future, wages, should be estimated on an after-tax basis. But the fact that such an after-tax estimate, if offered in proper form, would also be admissible does not persuade us that it is wrong to use after-tax figures instead of gross earnings in projecting what the decedent’s financial contributions to his survivors would have been had this tragic accident not occurred.
Respondent also argues that evidence concerning costs of litigation, including her attorney’s fees, is equally pertinent to a determination of what amount will actually compensate the survivors for their monetary loss. In a sense this is, of course, true. But the argument that attorney’s fees must be added to a plaintiff’s recovery if the award is truly to make him whole is contrary to the generally applicable “Ameriican Rule.” See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247. The FELA, however, unlike a number of other federal statutes, does not authorize recovery of attorney’s fees by the successful litigant. Only if the Congress were to provide for such a recovery would it be proper to consider them. In any event, it surely is not proper for the Judiciary to ignore the demonstrably relevant factor of income tax in measuring damages in order to offset what may be perceived as an undesirable or unfair rule regarding attorney’s fees.
II
Section 104 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 104 (a)(2), provides that the amount of any damages received on account of personal injuries is not taxable income. The section is construed to apply to wrongful-death awards; they are not taxable income to the recipient.
Although the law is perfectly clear, it is entirely possible that the members of the jury may assume that a plaintiff’s recovery in a case of this kind will be subject to federal taxation, and that the award should be increased substantially in order to be sure that the injured party is fully compensated. The Missouri Supreme Court expressed the opinion that “it is reasonable to assume the average juror would believe [that its verdict will] be subject to such taxes.” Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 S. W. 2d 42, 45 (1952). And Judge Aldisert, writing for the Third Circuit, agreed:
“We take judicial notice of the Tax consciousness’ of the American public. Yet, we also recognize, as did the court in Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S. W. 2d 42 (1952), that few members of the general public are aware of the special statutory exception for personal injury awards contained in the Internal Revenue Code.
“ ‘[T]here is always danger that today’s tax-conscious juries may assume (mistakenly of course) that the judgment will be taxable and therefore make their verdict big enough so that plaintiff would get what they think he deserves after the imaginary tax is taken out of it.’
“II Harper & James, The Law of Torts § 25.12, at 1327-28 (1956).” (Footnote omitted.) Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 443 F. 2d 1245, 1251 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 883.
A number of other commentators have also identified that risk.
In this case the respondent’s expert witness computed the amount of pecuniary loss at $302,000, plus the value of the care and training that decedent would have provided to his young children; the jury awarded damages of $775,000. It is surely not fanciful to suppose that the jury erroneously believed that a large portion of the award would be payable to the Federal Government in taxes, and that therefore it improperly inflated the recovery. Whether or not this speculation is accurate, we agree with petitioner that, as Judge Ely wrote for the Ninth Circuit,
“[t]o put the matter simply, giving the instruction can do no harm, and it can certainly help by preventing the jury from inflating the award and thus overcompensating the plaintiff on the basis of an erroneous assumption that the judgment will be taxable.” Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F. 2d 284, 297 (1975).
We hold that it was error to refuse the requested instruction in this case. That instruction was brief and could be easily understood. It would not complicate the trial by making additional qualifying or supplemental instructions necessary. It would not be prejudicial to either party, but would merely eliminate an area of doubt or speculation that might have an improper impact on the computation of the amount of damages.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Appellate Court of Illinois for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq.
The issue of liability was vigorously contested at the trial and was the subject of extensive consideration by the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District. See 62 Ill. App. 3d 653, 378 N. E. 2d 1232 (1978). No aspect of that issue, however, is now before us.
App. to Pet. for Cert. A27-A28.
Respondent argues that the excess is adequately explained by the jury’s estimate of the pecuniary value of the guidance, instruction, and training that the decedent would have provided to his children.
One of the purposes of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act was to “create uniformity throughout the Union” with respect to railroads’ financial responsibility for injuries to their employees. H. R. Rep. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1908). See also Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 362; Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U. S. 476, 479; Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions—The Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 Ohio St. L. J. 384 (1956).
“The Supreme Court of the United States has not spoken on this issue. Absent an authoritative pronouncement by that court we will follow the decisions of our own supreme court in Raines v. New York Central R. R. Co. (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 428, 430, 283 N. E. 2d 230, cert. denied (1972), 409 U. S. 983, . . . and Hall v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 135, 149-52, 125 N. E. 2d 77. . . .” 62 Ill. App. 3d, at 668-669, 378 N. E. 2d, at 1245.
This is not to say, however, that introduction of such evidence must be permitted in every case. If the impact of future income tax in calculating the award would be de minimis, introduction of the evidence may cause more confusion than it is worth. Cf. Fed. Rule Evid. 403.
See McWeeney v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 282 F. 2d 34, 37 (CA2 1960), cert. denied, 364 U. S. 870.
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. VII, §706 (k), 78 Stat. 261, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (k); Clayton Act, § 4, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 15; and numerous others collected in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S., at 260-261, n. 33.
The dissent takes the position that § 104 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code, see nn. 11, 12, infra, which makes personal injury awards nontaxable, “appropriates for the tortfeasor a benefit intended to be conferred on the victim or his survivors.” Post, at 498-499. But we see nothing in the language and are aware of nothing in the legislative history of § 104 (a) (2) to suggest that it has any impact whatsoever on the proper measure of damages in a wrongful-death action. Moreover, netting out the taxes that the decedent would have paid does not confer a benefit on the tortfeasor any more than netting out the decedent’s personal expenditures. Both subtractions are required in order to determine “the pecuniary benefits which the beneficiaries might have reasonably received. . . .” Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 70.
The statute contains an exception for the reimbursement of medical expenses that have been taken as a deduction. The section provides in relevant part:
“Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under Section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include—
(2), the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness. . . .”
See Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 179.
See, e. g., Burns, A Compensation Award for Personal Injury or Wrongful Death Is Tax-Exempt: Should We Tell the Jury?, 14 DePaul L. Rev. 320 (1965); Feldman, Personal Injury Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Status Be Ignored?, 7 Ariz. L. Rev. 272 (1966); Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 Ohio St. L. J. 212 (1958).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
PER CURIAM.
The trial of Esteban Martinez was set to begin on May 17, 2010. His counsel was ready; the State was not. When the court swore in the jury and invited the State to present its first witness, the State declined to present any evidence. So Martinez moved for a directed not-guilty verdict, and the court granted it. The State appealed, arguing that the trial court should have granted its motion for a continuance. The question is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the State's attempt to appeal in the hope of subjecting Martinez to a new trial.
The Illinois Supreme Court manifestly erred in allowing the State's appeal, on the theory that jeopardy never attached because Martinez "was never at risk of conviction."
2013 IL 113475, ¶ 39, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d 215, 224. Our cases have repeatedly stated the bright-line rule that "jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn." Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978); see infra, at 2074. There is simply no doubt that Martinez was subjected to jeopardy. And because the trial court found the State's evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction, there is equally no doubt that Martinez may not be retried.
We therefore grant Martinez's petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court.
I
A
The State of Illinois indicted Martinez in August 2006 on charges of aggravated battery and mob action against Avery Binion and Demarco Scott. But Martinez's trial date did not arrive for nearly four years.1
The story picks up for present purposes on July 20, 2009, when the State moved to continue an August 3 trial date because it had not located the complaining witnesses, Binion and Scott. The State subpoenaed both men four days later, and the court rescheduled Martinez's trial to September 28. But the State sought another continuance, shortly before that date, because it still had not found Binion and Scott. The court rescheduled the trial to November 9, and the State reissued subpoenas. But November 9 came and went (the court continued the case when Martinez showed up late) and the trial was eventually delayed to the following March 29. In early February, the State yet again subpoenaed Binion and Scott. When March 29 arrived, the trial court granted the State another continuance. It reset the trial date for May 17 and ordered Binion and Scott to appear in court on May 10. And the State once more issued subpoenas. 2
On the morning of May 17, however, Binion and Scott were again nowhere to be found. At 8:30, when the trial was set to begin, the State asked for a brief continuance. The court offered to delay swearing the jurors until a complete jury had been empaneled and told the State that it could at that point either have the jury sworn or move to dismiss its case. When Binion and Scott still had not shown up after the jury was chosen, the court offered to call the other cases on its docket so as to delay swearing the jury a bit longer. But when all these delays had run out, Binion and Scott were still nowhere in sight. The State filed a written motion for a continuance, arguing that it was "unable to proceed" without Binion and Scott. Tr. 7. The court denied that motion:
"The case before the Court began on July 7, 2006. In two months we will then be embarking upon half a decade of pending a Class 3 felony. Avery Binion, Jr., and Demarco [Scott] are well known in Elgin, both are convicted felons. One would believe that the Elgin Police Department would know their whereabouts. They were ordered to be in court today. The Court will issue body writs for both of these gentlemen.
"In addition, the State's list of witnesses indicates twelve witnesses. Excluding Mr. Scott and Mr. Binion, that's ten witnesses. The Court would anticipate it would take every bit of today and most of tomorrow to get through ten witnesses. By then the People may have had a chance to execute the arrest warrant body writs for these two gentlemen.
"The Court will deny the motion for continuance. I will swear the jury in in 15, 20 minutes. Perhaps you might want to send the police out to find these two gentlemen." Id., at 8-9.
After a brief recess, the court offered to delay the start of the trial for several more hours if the continuance would "be of any help" to the State. Id., at 9. But when the State made clear that Binion and Scott's "whereabouts" remained "unknown," the court concluded that the delay "would be a further waste of time." Id., at 10. The following colloquy ensued:
"THE COURT: .... It's a quarter to eleven and [Binion and Scott] have not appeared on their own will, so I'm going to bring the jury in now then to swear them.
"[The Prosecutor]: Okay. Your Honor, may I approach briefly?
"THE COURT: Yes.
"[The Prosecutor]: Your Honor, just so your Honor is aware, I know that it's the process to bring them in and swear them in; however, the State will not be participating in the trial. I wanted to let you know that.
"THE COURT: Very well. We'll see how that works." Id., at 10-11.
The jury was then sworn. After instructing the jury, the court directed the State to proceed with its opening statement. The prosecutor demurred: "Your Honor, respectfully, the State is not participating in this case." Id., at 20. After the defense waived its opening statement, the court directed the State to call its first witness. Again, the prosecutor demurred: "Respectfully, your Honor, the State is not participating in this matter." Ibid. The defense then moved for a judgment of acquittal:
"[Defense Counsel]: Judge, the jury has been sworn. The State has not presented any evidence. I believe they've indicated their intention not to present any evidence or witnesses.
"Based on that, Judge, I would ask the Court to enter directed findings of not guilty to both counts, aggravated battery and mob action.
"THE COURT: Do the People wish to reply?
"[The Prosecutor]: No, your Honor. Respectfully, the State is not participating.
"THE COURT: The Court will grant the motion for a directed finding and dismiss the charges." Id., at 21.
B
The State appealed, arguing that the trial court should have granted a continuance. Martinez responded that the State's appeal was improper because he had been acquitted. The Illinois Appellate Court sided with the State, holding that jeopardy had never attached and that the trial court had erred in failing to grant a continuance. 2011 IL App (2d) 100498, ¶¶ 46, 53-56, 360 Ill.Dec. 795, 969 N.E.2d 840, 854, 856-858.
The Illinois Supreme Court granted review on the jeopardy issue and affirmed. 2013 IL 113475, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d 215. It began by recognizing that "[g]enerally, in cases of a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled and sworn, as that is the point when the defendant is ' "put to trial before the trier of the facts." ' " Id., ¶ 23, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d, at 222 (quoting Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 394, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975)). But it reasoned that under this Court's precedents, " ' "rigid, mechanical" rules' " should not govern the inquiry into whether jeopardy has attached.
2013 IL 113475, ¶ 24, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d, at 222 (quoting Serfass,supra, at 390, 95 S.Ct. 1055). Rather, it opined, the relevant question is whether a defendant "was ' "subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction." ' " 2013 IL 113475, ¶ 24, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d, at 222 (quoting Serfass,supra, at 391, 95 S.Ct. 1055).
Here, the court concluded, Martinez "was never at risk of conviction"-and jeopardy therefore did not attach-because "[t]he State indicated it would not participate prior to the jury being sworn." 2013 IL 113475, ¶ 39, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d, at 224. And because Martinez "was not placed in jeopardy," the court held, the trial "court's entry of directed verdicts of not guilty did not constitute true acquittals." Id., ¶ 40, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d, at 225. Indeed, the court remarked, the trial court "repeatedly referred to its action as a 'dismissal' rather than an acquittal." Ibid.
Justice Burke dissented, writing that the majority's conclusion "that impaneling and swearing the jury had no legal significance" ran "contrary to well-established principles regarding double jeopardy." Id., ¶ 57, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d, at 227. Moreover, she argued, its assertion that Martinez was not in danger of conviction was "belied by the actions of the court and the prosecutor." Id., ¶ 63, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d, at 229. She explained that under the majority's holding, the State could "unilaterally render a trial a 'sham' simply by refusing to call witnesses after a jury has been selected." Id., ¶ 64, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d, at 229.
II
This case presents two issues. First, did jeopardy attach to Martinez? Second, if so, did the proceeding end in such a manner that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars his retrial? Our precedents clearly dictate an affirmative answer to each question.
A
There are few if any rules of criminal procedure clearer than the rule that "jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn." Crist, 437 U.S., at 35, 98 S.Ct. 2156; see also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977); Serfass,supra, at 388, 95 S.Ct. 1055; 6 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 25.1(d) (3d ed. 2007).
Our clearest exposition of this rule came in Crist, which addressed the constitutionality of a Montana statute providing that jeopardy did not attach until the swearing of the first witness. As Crist explains, "the precise point at which jeopardy [attaches] in a jury trial might have been open to argument before this Court's decision in Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 [83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963) ]," in which "the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented a second prosecution of a defendant whose first trial had ended just after the jury had been sworn and before any testimony had been taken." 437 U.S., at 35, 98 S.Ct. 2156. But Downum put any such argument to rest: Its holding "necessarily pinpointed the stage in a jury trial when jeopardy attaches, and [it] has since been understood as explicit authority for the proposition that jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn." Crist, supra, at 35, 98 S.Ct. 2156.
The Illinois Supreme Court misread our precedents in suggesting that the swearing of the jury is anything other than a bright line at which jeopardy attaches. It relied on Serfass, understanding that case to mean "that in assessing whether and when jeopardy attaches, ' "rigid, mechanical" rules' should not be applied." 2013 IL 113475, ¶ 24, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d, at 222. Under Serfass, the court reasoned, the relevant question is whether a defendant was as a functional matter " ' "subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction." ' " 2013 IL 113475, ¶ 24, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d, at 222.
But Serfass does not apply a functional approach to the determination of when jeopardy has attached. As to that question, it states the same bright-line rule as every other case: Jeopardy attaches when "a defendant is 'put to trial,' " and in a jury trial, that is "when a jury is empaneled and sworn." 420 U.S., at 388, 95 S.Ct. 1055. Indeed, Serfass explicitly rejects a functional approach to the question whether jeopardy has attached. See id., at 390, 95 S.Ct. 1055 (refuting the defendant's argument that " 'constructiv[e] jeopardy had attached' " upon the pretrial grant of a motion to dismiss the indictment, which the defendant characterized as "the 'functional equivalent of an acquittal on the merits' "). The Serfass Court acknowledged "that we have disparaged 'rigid, mechanical' rules in the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Ibid. But it was referring to the case of Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973), in which we declined to apply "rigid, mechanical" reasoning in answering a very different question: not whether jeopardy had attached, but whether the manner in which it terminated (by mistrial) barred the defendant's retrial. Id., at 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066. By contrast, Serfass explains, the rule that jeopardy attaches at the start of a trial is "by no means a mere technicality, nor is it a 'rigid, mechanical' rule." 420 U.S., at 391, 95 S.Ct. 1055. And contrary to the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation, Serfass creates not the slightest doubt about when a "trial" begins.
The Illinois Supreme Court's error was consequential, for it introduced confusion into what we have consistently treated as a bright-line rule: A jury trial begins, and jeopardy attaches, when the jury is sworn. We have never suggested the exception perceived by the Illinois Supreme Court-that jeopardy may not have attached where, under the circumstances of a particular case, the defendant was not genuinely at risk of conviction.3 Martinez was subjected to jeopardy because the jury in his case was sworn.
B
" '[T]he conclusion that jeopardy has attached,' " however, " 'begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial.' " Id., at 390, 95 S.Ct. 1055. The remaining question is whether the jeopardy ended in such a manner that the defendant may not be retried. See 6 LaFave § 25.1(g) (surveying circumstances in which retrial is and is not allowed). Here, there is no doubt that Martinez's jeopardy ended in a manner that bars his retrial: The trial court acquitted him of the charged offenses. "Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that '[a] verdict of acquittal ... could not be reviewed ...
without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.' " Martin Linen, supra, at 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349
"[O]ur cases have defined an acquittal to encompass any ruling that the prosecution's proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense." Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1069, 1074-1075, 185 L.Ed.2d 124 (2013). And the trial court clearly made such a ruling here. After the State declined to present evidence against Martinez, his counsel moved for "directed findings of not guilty to both counts," and the court "grant[ed] the motion for a directed finding." Tr. 21. That is a textbook acquittal: a finding that the State's evidence cannot support a conviction.
The Illinois Supreme Court thought otherwise. It first opined that "[b]ecause [Martinez] was not placed in jeopardy, the [trial] court's entry of directed verdicts of not guilty did not constitute true acquittals." 2013 IL 113475, ¶ 40, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d, at 225. But the premise of that argument is incorrect: Martinez was in jeopardy, for the reasons given above. The court went on to "note that, in directing findings of not guilty," the trial court "referred to its action as a 'dismissal' rather than an acquittal." Ibid. Under our precedents, however, that is immaterial: "[W]e have emphasized that what constitutes an 'acquittal' is not to be controlled by the form of the judge's action"; it turns on "whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution ... of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." Martin Linen, 430 U.S., at 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349; see also Evans, supra, at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1078 ("Our decision turns not on the form of the trial court's action, but rather whether it 'serve[s]' substantive 'purposes' or procedural ones"); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) ("We have previously noted that 'the trial judge's characterization of his own action cannot control the classification of the action' ").
Here, as in Evans and Martin Linen, the trial court's action was an acquittal because the court "acted on its view that the prosecution had failed to prove its case." Evans, supra, at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1078; see Martin Linen, supra, at 572, 97 S.Ct. 1349 ("[T]he District Court in this case evaluated the Government's evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction"). And because Martinez was acquitted, the State cannot retry him.4
III
The functional rule adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court is not necessary to avoid unfairness to prosecutors or to the public. On the day of trial, the court was acutely aware of the significance of swearing a jury. It repeatedly delayed that act to give the State additional time to find its witnesses. It had previously granted the State a number of continuances for the same purpose. See supra, at 2072. And, critically, the court told the State on the day of trial that it could "move to dismiss [its] case" before the jury was sworn. Tr. 3. Had the State accepted that invitation, the Double Jeopardy Clause would not have barred it from recharging Martinez. Instead, the State participated in the selection of jurors and did not ask for dismissal before the jury was sworn. When the State declined to dismiss its case, it " 'took a chance[,] ... enter[ing] upon the trial of the case without sufficient evidence to convict.' " Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963). Here, the State knew, or should have known, that an acquittal forever bars the retrial of the defendant when it occurs after jeopardy has attached. The Illinois Supreme Court's holding is understandable, given the significant consequence of the State's mistake, but it runs directly counter to our precedents and to the protection conferred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
* * *
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Much of that delay was due to Martinez and his counsel. See 2013 IL 113475, ¶ 4, n. 1, 371 Ill.Dec. 315, 990 N.E.2d 215, 216, n. 1 (summarizing the lengthy procedural history).
These facts are set forth in the opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court. 2011 IL App (2d) 100498, ¶¶ 5-7, 360 Ill.Dec. 795, 969 N.E.2d 840, 842-843.
Some commentators have suggested that there may be limited exceptions to this rule- e.g., where the trial court lacks jurisdiction or where a defendant obtains an acquittal by fraud or corruption. See 6 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 25.1(d) (3d ed. 2007). The scope of any such exceptions is not presented here. Nor need we reach a situation where the prosecutor had no opportunity to dismiss the charges to avoid the consequences of empaneling the jury. Cf. People v. Deems, 81 Ill.2d 384, 387-389, 43 Ill.Dec. 8, 410 N.E.2d 8, 10-11 (1980).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether the Internal Revenue Service has statutory authority to issue a “John Doe" summons to a bank or other depository to discover the identity of a person who has had bank transactions suggesting the possibility of liability for unpaid taxes.
I
On November 6 and 16, 1970, the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro, Ky., made two separate deposits with the Cincinnati Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, each of which included $20,000 in $100 bills. The evidence is undisputed that the $100 bills were “paper thin” and showed signs of severe disintegration which could have been caused by a long period of storage under abnormal conditions. As a result the bills were no longer suitable for circulation and they were destroyed by the Federal Reserve in accord with established procedures. Also in accord with regular Federal Reserve procedures, the Cincinnati Branch reported these facts to the Internal Revenue Service.
It is not disputed that a deposit of such a large amount of high denomination currency was out of the ordinary for the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro; for example, in the 11 months preceding the two $20,000 deposits in $100 bills, the Federal Reserve had received only 218 $100 bills from that bank. This fact, together with the uniformly unusual state of deterioration of the $40,000 in $100 bills, caused the Internal Revenue Service to suspect that the transactions relating to those deposits may not have been reported for tax purposes. An agent was therefore assigned to investigate the matter.
After interviewing some of the bank’s employees, none of whom could provide him with information regarding the two $20,000 deposits, the agent issued a “John Doe” summons directed to respondent, an executive vice president of the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro. The summons called for production of “[t]hose books and records which will provide information as to the person(s) or firm(s) which deposited, redeemed or otherwise gave to the Commercial Bank $100 bills U. S. Currency which the Commercial Bank sent in two shipments of (200) two hundred each $100 bills to the Cincinnati Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank on or about November 6, 1970 and November 16, 1970.” This, of course, was simply the initial step in an investigation which might lead to nothing or might have revealed that there had been a failure to report money on which federal estate, gift, or income taxes were due. Respondent, however, refused to comply with the summons even though he has not seriously argued that compliance would be unduly burdensome.
In due course, proceedings were commenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky to enforce the summons. That court narrowed its scope to require production only of deposit slips showing cash deposits in the amount of $20,000 and deposit slips showing cash deposits of $5,000 or more which involved $100 bills, and restricted it to the period between October 16, 1970, and November 16, 1970. Respondent was ordered to comply with the summons as modified.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 7602, pursuant to which the summons had been issued, “presupposes that the [Internal Revenue Service] has already identified the person in whom it is interested as a taxpayer before proceeding.” 486 F. 2d 706, 710. We disagree, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
The statutory framework for this case consists of §§ 7601 and 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provide:
“Section 7601. Canvass of districts for taxable persons and objects.
“(a) General rule.
“The Secretary or his delegate shall, to the extent he deems it practicable, cause officers or employees of the Treasury Department to proceed, from time to time, through each internal revenue district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax, and all persons owning or having the care and management of any objects with respect to which any tax is imposed.
“Section 7602. Examination of books and witnesses.
“For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax ... or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized—
“(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
“(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to'appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
“(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.”
We begin examination of these sections against the familiar background that our tax structure is based on a system of self-reporting. There is legal compulsion, to be sure, but basically the Government depends upon the good faith and integrity of each potential taxpayer to disclose honestly all information relevant to tax liability. Nonetheless, it would be naive to ignore the reality that some persons attempt to outwit the system, and tax evaders are not readily identifiable. Thus, § 7601 gives the Internal Revenue Service a broad mandate to investigate and audit “persons who may be liable” for taxes and § 7602 provides the power to “examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant . . . [and to summon] any person having possession ... of books of account . . . relevant or material to such inquiry.” Of necessity, the investigative authority so provided is not limited to situations in which there is probable cause, in the traditional sense, to believe that a violation of the tax laws exists. United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 (1964). The purpose of the statutes is not to accuse, but to inquire. Although such investigations unquestionably involve some invasion of privacy, they are essential to our self-reporting system, and the alternatives could well involve far less agreeable invasions of house, business, and records.
We recognize that the authority vested in tax collectors may be abused, as all power is subject to abuse. However, the solution is not to restrict that authority so as to undermine the efficacy of the federal tax system, which seeks to assure that taxpayers pay what Congress has mandated and to prevent dishonest persons from escaping taxation thus shifting heavier burdens to honest taxpayers. Substantial protection is afforded by the provision that an Internal Revenue Service summons can be enforced only by the courts. 26 U. S. C. § 7604 (b); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440 (1964). Once a summons is challenged it must be scrutinized by a court to determine whether it seeks information relevant to a legitimate investigative purpose and is not meant “to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation.” United States v. Powell, supra, at 58. The cases show that the federal courts have taken seriously their obligation to apply this standard to fit particular situations, either by refusing enforcement or narrowing the scope of the summons. See, e. g., United States v. Matras, 487 F. 2d 1271 (CA8 1973); United States v. Theodore, 479 F. 2d 749, 755 (CA4 1973); United States v. Pritchard, 438 F. 2d 969 (CA5 1971); United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F. 2d 129 (CA3 1967). Indeed, the District Judge in this case viewed the demands of the summons as too broad and carefully narrowed them.
Finally, we note that the power to summon and inquire in cases such as the instant one is not unprecedented. For example, had respondent been brought before a grand jury under identical circumstances there can be little doubt that he would have been required to testify and produce records or be held in contempt. In Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273 (1919), petitioners were summoned to appear before a grand jury. They refused to testify on the ground that the investigation exceeded the authority of the court and grand jury, despite the fact that it was not directed at them. Their subsequent contempt convictions were affirmed by this Court:
“[The witness] is not entitled to set limits to the investigation that the grand jury may conduct. . . . It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime. As has been said before, the identity of the offender, and the precise nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are developed at the conclusion of the grand jury’s labors, not at the beginning.” Id., at 282.
The holding of Blair is not insignificant for our resolution of this case. In United States v. Powell, supra, Mr. Justice Harlan reviewed this Court’s cases dealing with the subpoena power of federal enforcement agencies, and observed:
“[T]he Federal Trade Commission . . . ‘has a power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, which is not derived from the judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.’ While the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue derives from a different body of statutes, we do not think the analogies to other agency situations are without force when the scope of the Commissioner’s power is called in question.” 379 U. S., at 57, quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 642-643 (1950).
Ill
Against this background, we turn to the question whether the summons issued to respondent, as modified by the District Court, was authorized by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Of course, the mere fact that the summons was styled “In the matter of the tax liability of John Doe” is not sufficient ground for denying enforcement. The use of such fictitious names is common in indictments, see, e. g., Baker v. United States, 115 F. 2d 533 (CA8 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 692 (1941), and other types of compulsory process. Indeed, the Courts of Appeals have regularly enforced Internal Revenue Service summonses which did not name a specific taxpayer who was under investigation. E. g., United States v. Carter, 489 F. 2d 413 (CA5 1973); United States v. Turner, 480 F. 2d 272, 279 (CA7 1973); Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F. 2d 515 (CA7), cert. denied, 379 U. S. 913 (1964). Respondent undertakes to distinguish these cases on the ground that they involved situations in which either a taxpayer was identified or a tax liability was known to exist as to an unidentified taxpayer. However, while they serve to suggest the almost infinite variety of factual situations in which a “John Doe” summons may be necessary, it does not follow that these cases define the limits of the Internal Revenue Service’s power to inquire concerning tax liability.
The first question is whether the words of the statute require the restrictive reading given them by the Court of Appeals. Section 7601 permits the Internal Revenue Service to investigate and inquire after “all persons . . . who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax . . . .” To aid in this investigative function, § 7602 authorizes the summoning of “any . . . person” for the taking of testimony and examination of books which may be relevant for “ascertaining the correctness of any return, . . . determining the liability of any person ... or collecting any such liability . . . .” Plainly, this language is inconsistent with an interpretation that would limit the issuance of summonses to investigations which have already focused upon a particular return, a particular named person, or a particular potential tax liability.
Moreover, such a reading of the Internal Revenue Service’s summons power ignores the fact that it has a legitimate interest in large or unusual financial transactions, especially those involving cash. The reasons for that interest are too numerous and too obvious to catalog. Indeed, Congress has recently determined that information regarding transactions with foreign financial institutions and transactions which involve large amounts of money is so likely to be useful to persons responsible for enforcing the tax laws that it must be reported by banks. See generally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 26-40 (1974).
It would seem elementary that no meaningful investigation of such events could be conducted if the identity of the persons involved must first be ascertained, and that is not always an easy task. Fiduciaries and other agents are understandably reluctant to disclose information regarding their principals, as respondent was in this case. Moreover, if criminal activity is afoot the persons involved may well have used aliases or taken other measures to cover their tracks. Thus, if the Internal Revenue Service is unable to issue a summons to determine the identity of such persons, the broad inquiry authorized by § 7601 will be frustrated in this class of cases. Settled principles of statutory interpretation require that we avoid such a result absent unambiguous directions from Congress. See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U. S. 282, 288 (1957); United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 542-544 (1940). No such congressional purpose is discernible in this case.
We hold that the Internal Revenue Service was acting within its statutory authority in issuing a summons to respondent for the purpose of identifying the person or persons who deposited 400 decrepit $100 bills with the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro within the space of a*’ few weeks. Further investigation may well reveal that such person or persons have a perfectly innocent explanation for the transactions. It is not unknown for taxpayers to hide large amounts of currency in odd places out of a fear of banks. But on this record the deposits were extraordinary, and no meaningful inquiry can be made until respondent complies with the summons as modified by the District Court.
We do not mean to suggest by this holding that respondent’s fears that the § 7602 summons power could be used to conduct “fishing expeditions” into the private affairs of bank depositors are trivial. However, as we have observed in a similar context:
“ ‘That the power may be abused, is no ground for denying its existence. It is a limited power, and should be kept within its proper bounds; and, when these are exceeded, a jurisdictional question is presented which is cognizable in the courts.’ ” McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 166 (1927), quoting People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N. Y. 463, 482 (1885).
So here, Congress has provided protection from arbitrary or capricious action by placing the federal courts between the Government and the person summoned. The District Court in this case conscientiously discharged its duty to see that a legitimate investigation was being conducted and that the summons was no broader than necessary to achieve its purpose.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to it with directions to affirm the order of the District Court.
It is so ordered.
The Internal Revenue Service agent testified:
“Q. What possible tax effect could this have on the taxpayer if he is determined?
“A. Well, it could be anything from nothing at all, a simple explanation, or it could be that this is money that has been secreted away for a period of time as a means of avoiding the tax.
“Q. Then you really have not reached first base yet, is that correct?
“A. That’s correct.”
Respondent also argues that, even if the summons issued in this case was authorized by statute, it violates the Fourth Amendment. This contention was not passed upon by the Court of Appeals. In any event, as narrowed by the District Court the summons is at least as specific as the reporting requirements which were upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge by banks in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 63-70 (1974).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | L | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for certiorari, certiorari is denied.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
An employee, as part of a termination agreement, signed a release of all claims against her-employer. In eonsider-ation, she received severance pay in installments. The release, however, did not comply with specific federal statutory requirements for a release of claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. After receiving the last payment, the employee brought suit under the ADEA. The employer claims the employee ratified and validated the nonconforming release by retaining the moneys paid to secure it. The employer also insists the release bars the action unless, as a precondition to filing suit, the employee tenders back the moneys received. We disagree and rule that, as the release did not comply with the statute, it cannot bar the ADEA claim.
I
Petitioner Dolores Oubre worked as a scheduler at a power plant in Killona, Louisiana, run by her employer, respondent Entergy Operations, Inc. In 1994, she received a poor performance rating. Oubre’s supervisor met with her on January 17,1995, and gave her the option of either improving her performance during the coming year or accepting a voluntary arrangement for her severance. She received a packet of information about the severance agreement and had 14 days to consider her options, during which she consulted with attorneys. On January 31, Oubre decided to accept. She signed a release, in which she “agree[d] to waive, settle, release, and discharge any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, or causes of action ... that I may have against En-tergy _” App. 61. In exchange, she received six installment payments over the next four months, totaling $6,258.
The Older Workers poses specific requirements for releases covering ADEA claims. OWBPA, § 201,104 Stat. 983,29 U. S. C. §§ 626(f)(1) (B), (F), (G). In procuring the release, Entergy did not comply with the OWBPA in at least three respects: (1) Entergy did not give Oubre enough time to consider her options. (2) Entergy did not give Oubre seven days after she signed the release to change her mind. And (3) the release made no specific reference to claims under the ADEA.
Oubre filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which dismissed her charge on the merits but issued a right-to-sue letter. She filed this suit against Entergy in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging constructive discharge on the basis of her age in violation of the ADEA and state law. Oubre has not offered or tried to return the $6,258 to Entergy, nor is it clear she has the means to do so. Entergy moved for summary judgment, claiming Oubre had ratified the defective release by failing to return or offer to return the moneys she had received. The District Court agreed and entered summary judgment for Entergy. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 112 F. 3d 787 (CA5 1996) (per curiam), and we granted certiorari, 520 U. S. 1185 (1997).
II
The employer rests its case upon general principles of state contract jurisprudence. As the employer recites the rule, contracts tainted by mistake, duress, or even fraud are voidable at the option of the innocent party. See 1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 7, and Comment b (1979); e. g., Ellerin v. Fairfax Sav. Assn., 78 Md. App. 92, 108-109, 552 A. 2d 918, 926-927 (Md. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 316 Md. 210, 557 A. 2d 1336 (1989). The employer maintains, however, that before the innocent party can elect avoidance, she must first tender back any benefits received under the contract. See, e. g., Dreiling v. Home State Life Ins. Co., 213 Kan. 137, 147-148, 515 P. 2d 757, 766-767 (1973). If she fails to do so within a reasonable time after learning of her rights, the employer contends, she ratifies the contract and so makes it binding. 1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, § 7, Comments d, e; see, e. g., Jobe v. Texas Util. Elec. Co., No. 05-94-01368-CV, 1995 WL 479645, *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Aug. 14, 1995) (unpublished). The employer also invokes the doctrine of equitable estoppel. As a rule, equitable estoppel bars a party from shirking the burdens of a voidable transaction for as long as she retains the benefits received under it. See, e. g., Buffum v. Peter Barceloux Co., 289 U. S. 227, 284 (1933) (citing state ease law from Indiana and New York). Applying these principles, the employer claims the employee ratified the ineffective release (or faces estoppel) by retaining all the sums paid in consideration of it. The employer, then, relies not upon the execution of the release but upon a later, distinct ratification of its terms.
These general rules may not be as as asserts. See generally Annot., 76 A. L. R. 344 (1932) (collecting cases supporting and contradicting these rules); Annot., 134 A. L. R. 6 (1941) (same). And in equity, a person suing to rescind a contract, as a rule, is not required to restore the consideration at the very outset of the litigation. See 3 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, § 384, and Comment b; Restatement of Restitution § 65, Comment d (1936); D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.8, p. 294 (1973). Even if the employer’s statement of the general rule requiring tender back before one files suit were correct, it would be unavailing. The rule cited is based simply on the course of negotiation of the parties and the alleged later ratification. The authorities cited dp not consider the question raised by statutory standards for releases and a statutory declaration making nonconforming releases ineffective. It is the latter question we confront here.
In 1990, Congress amended the ADEA by passing the OWBPA. The OWBPA provides: “An individual may not waive any right or claim under [the ADEA] unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary.... [A] waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum” it satisfies certain enumerated requirements, including the three listed above. 29 U. S. C. § 626(f)(1).
The statutory command is clear: An employee “may not waive” an ADEA claim unless the waiver or release satisfies the OWBPA’s requirements. The policy of the OWBPA is likewise clear from its title: It is designed to protect the rights and benefits of older workers. The OWBPA implements Congress’ policy via a strict, unqualified statutory stricture on waivers, and we are bound to take Congress at its word. Congress imposed specific duties on employers who seek releases of certain claims created by statute. Congress delineated these duties with precision and without qualification: An employee "may not waive” an ADEA claim unless the employer complies with the statute. Courts cannot with ease presume ratification of that which Congress forbids.
The OWBPA sets up its own regime for assessing the effect of ADEA waivers, separate and apart from contract law. The statute creates a series of prerequisites for knowing and voluntary waivers and imposes affirmative duties of disclosure and waiting periods. The OWBPA governs the effect under federal law of waivers or releases on ADEA claims and incorporates no exceptions or qualifications. The text of the OWBPA forecloses the employer’s defense, notwithstanding how general contract principles would apply to non-ADEA claims.
The rule proposed by the employer would frustrate the statute’s practical operation as well as its formal command. In many instances a discharged employee likely will have spent the moneys received and will lack the means to tender their return. These realities might tempt employers to risk noneomplianee with the OWBPA’s waiver provisions, knowing it will be difficult to repay the moneys and relying on ratification. We ought not to open the door to an evasion of the statute by this device.
Oubre’s cause of action arises under the ADEA, and the release can have no effect on her ADEA claim unless it complies with the OWBPA. In this case, both sides concede the release the employee signed did not comply with the requirements of the OWBPA. Since Oubre’s release did not comply with the OWBPA’s stringent safeguards, it is unenforceable against her insofar as it purports to waive or release her ADEA claim. As a statutory matter, the release cannot bar her ADEA suit, irrespective of the validity of the contract as to other claims.
In further proceedings in this or other cases, courts may need to inquire whether the employer has claims for restitution, recoupment, or setoff against the employee, and these questions may be complex where a release is effective as to some claims but not as to ADEA claims. We need not decide those issues here, however. It suffices to hold that the release cannot bar the ADEA claim because it does not conform to the statute. Nor did the employee’s mere retention of moneys amount to a ratification equivalent to a valid release of her ADEA claims, since the retention did not comply with the OWBPA any more than the original release did. The statute governs the effect of the release on ADEA claims, and the employer cannot invoke the employee’s failure to tender back as a way of excusing its own failure to comply.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered!
APPENDIX TO OPINION OP THE COURT
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, § 201, 104 Stat. 983, 29 U. S. C. § 626(f):
(f) Waiver
(1) An individual may not waive any right or claim under this Act unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Except as provided in paragraph (2), a waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless 'at a minimum—
(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the employer that is written in a manner ealcu-lated to be understood by such individual, or by the average individual eligible to participate;
(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this Act;
(C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is executed;
(D) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled;
(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the agreement;
(F)(i) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider the agreement; or
(ii) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the individual is given a period of at least 45 days within which to consider the agreement;
(G) the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days following the execution of such agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become effective or enforceable until the revocation period has expired;
(H) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the employer (at the commencement of the period specified in subparagraph (F)) informs the individual in writing in a manner calculated to be understood by the average individual eligible to participate, as to—
(i) any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program, any eligibility factors for such program, and any time limits applicable to such program; and
(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected for the program.
(2) A waiver in settlement of a charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or an action filed in court by the individual or the individual’s representative, alleging age discrimination of a kind prohibited under section 4 or 15 may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum—
(A) subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph (1) have been met; and
(B) the individual is given a reasonable period of time within which to consider the settlement agreement.
(3) In any dispute that may arise over whether any of the requirements, conditions, and circumstances set forth in sub-paragraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), CP), (G), or (H) of paragraph (1), or subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2), have been met, the party asserting the validity of a waiver shall have the burden of proving in a court of competent jurisdiction that a waiver was knowing and voluntary pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) No waiver agreement may affect the Commission’s rights and responsibilities to enforce this Act. No waiver may be used to justify interfering with the protected right of an employee to file a charge or participate in an investigation or proceeding conducted by the Commission.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The duty to bargain collectively, imposed upon an employer by § 8 (a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, includes a duty to provide relevant information needed by a labor union for the proper performance of its duties as the employees’ bargaining representative. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U. S. 149; NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U. S. 432. In this case an employer was brought before the National Labor Relations Board to answer a complaint that it had violated this statutory duty when it refused to disclose certain information about employee aptitude tests requested by a union in order to prepare for arbitration of a grievance. The employer supplied the union with much of the information requested, but refused to disclose three items: the actual test questions, the actual employee answer sheets, and the scores linked with the names of the employees who received them. The Board, concluding that all the items requested were relevant to the grievance and would be useful to the union in processing it, ordered the employer to turn over all of the materials directly to the union, subject to certain restrictions on the union's use of the information. 218 N. L. R. B. 1024 (1975). A divided Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered enforcement of the Board's order without modification. 560 F. 2d 722 (1977).
We granted certiorari to consider an important question of federal labor law. 435 U. S. 941. This is apparently the first case in which the Board has held that an employer’s duty to provide relevant information to the employees’ bargaining representative includes the duty to disclose tests and test scores achieved by named employees in a statistically validated psychological aptitude testing program administered by the employer. Psychological aptitude testing is a widely used employee selection and promotion device in both private industry and government. Test secrecy is concededly critical to the validity of any such program, and confidentiality of scores is undeniably important to the examinees. The underlying question is whether the Board’s order, enforced without modification by the Court of Appeals, adequately accommodated these concerns.
I
The petitioner, Detroit Edison Co. (hereinafter Company), is a public utility engaged in the generation and distribution of electric power in Michigan. Since about 1943, the Utility Workers Union of America, Local 223, AFL-CIO (Union) has represented certain of the Company’s employees. At the time of the hearing in this case, one of the units represented by the Union was a unit of operating and maintenance employees at the Company’s plant in Monroe, Mich. The Union was certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for employees in that unit in 1971, and it was agreed that these employees would be covered by a pre-existing collective-bargaining agreement, one of the provisions of which specified that promotions within a given unit were to be based on seniority “whenever reasonable qualifications and abilities of the employees being considered are not significantly different.” Management decisions to bypass employees with greater seniority were subject to the collective agreement’s grievance machinery, including ultimate arbitration, whenever a claim was made that the bypass had been arbitrary or discriminatory.
The aptitude tests at issue were used by the Company to screen applicants for the job classification of “Instrument Man B.” An Instrument Man is responsible for installing, maintaining, repairing, calibrating, testing, and adjusting the powerplant instrumentation. The position of Instrument Man B, although at the lowest starting grade under the contract and usually requiring on-the-job training, was regarded by the Company as a critical job because it involved activities vital to the operation of the plant.
The Company has used aptitude tests as a means of predicting job performance since the late 1920’s or early 1930’s. In the late 1950’s, the Company first began to use a set of standardized tests (test battery) as a predictor of performance on the Instrument Man B job. The battery, which had been “validated” for this job classification, consisted of the Wonderlic Personnel Test, the Minnesota Paper Form Board (MPFB), and portions of the Engineering and Physical Science Aptitude Test (EPSAT). All employees who applied for acceptance into the Instrument Man classification were required to take this battery. Three adjective scores were possible: “not recommended,” “acceptable,” and “recommended.”
In the late 1960’s, the technical engineers responsible for the Company’s instrumentation department complained that the test battery was not an accurate screening device. The Company’s industrial psychologists, accordingly, performed a revalidation study of the tests. As a result, the Personnel Test was dropped, and the scoring system was changed. Instead of the former three-tier system, two scores were possible under the revised battery: “not recommended” and “acceptable.” The gross test score required for an “acceptable” rating was raised to 10.3, a figure somewhat lower than the former score required for a “recommended” but higher than the “acceptable” score used previously.
The Company administered the tests to applicants with the express commitment that each applicant’s test score would remain confidential. Tests and test scores were kept in the offices of the Company’s industrial psychologists who, as members of the American Psychological Association, deemed themselves ethically bound not to disclose test information to unauthorized persons. Under this policy, the Company’s psychologists did not reveal the tests or report actual test numerical scores to management or to employee representatives. The psychologists would, however, if an individual examinee so requested, review the test questions and answers with that individual.
The present dispute had its beginnings in 1971 when the Company invited bids from employees to fill six Instrument Man B openings at the Monroe plant. Ten Monroe unit employees applied. None received a score designated as “acceptable,” and all were on that basis rejected. The jobs were eventually filled by applicants from outside the Monroe plant bargaining unit.
The Union filed a grievance on behalf of the Monroe applicants, claiming that the new testing procedure was unfair and that the Company had bypassed senior employees in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. The grievance was rejected by the Company at all levels, and the Union took it to arbitration. In preparation for the arbitration, the Union requested the Company to turn over various materials related to the Instrument Man B testing program. The Company furnished the Union with copies of test-validation studies performed by its industrial psychologists and with a report by an outside consultant on the Company’s entire testing program. It refused, however, to release the actual test battery, the applicants’ test papers, and their scores, maintaining that complete confidentiality of these materials was necessary in order to insure the future integrity of the tests and to protect the privacy interests of the examinees.
The Union then filed with the Board the unfair labor practice charge involved in this case. The charge alleged that the information withheld by the Company was relevant and necessary to the arbitration of the grievance, “including the ascertainment of promotion criteria, the veracity of the scoring and grading of the examination and the testing procedures, and the job relatedness of the test(s) to the Instrument Man B classification.”
After filing the unfair labor practice charge, the Union asked the arbitrator to order the Company to furnish the materials at issue. He declined on the ground that he was without authority to do so. In view of the pendency of the charges before the Board, the parties proceeded with the arbitration on the express understanding that the Union could reopen the case should it ultimately prevail in its claims. During the course of the arbitration, however, the Company did disclose the raw scores of those who had taken the test, with the names of the examinees deleted. In addition, it provided the Union with sample questions indicative of the types of questions appearing on the test battery and with detailed information about its scoring procedures. It also offered to turn over the scores of any employee who would sign a waiver releasing the Company psychologist from his pledge of confidentiality. The Union declined to seek such releases.
The arbitrator’s decision found that the Company was free under the collective agreement to establish minimum reasonable qualifications for the job of Instrument Man and to use aptitude tests as a measure of those qualifications; that the Instrument Man B test battery was a reliable and fair test in the sense that its administration and scoring had been standardized; and that the test had a “high degree of validity” as a predictor of performance in the job classification for which it was developed. He concluded that the 10.3 score created a “presumption of significant difference under the contract.” He also expressed the view that the Union's position in the arbitration had not been impaired because of lack of access to the actual test battery.
Several months later the Board issued a complaint based on the Union’s unfair labor practice charge. At the outset of the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, the Company offered to turn over the test battery and answer sheets to an industrial psychologist selected by the Union for an independent evaluation, stating that disclosure to an intermediary obligated to preserve test secrecy would satisfy its concern that direct disclosure to the Union would inevitably result in dissemination of the questions. The Union rejected this compromise.
The Administrative Law Judge found that notwithstanding the conceded statistical validity of the test battery, the tests and scores would be of probable relevant help to the Union in the performance of its duties as collective-bargaining agent. He reasoned that the Union, having had no access to the tests, had been “deprived of any occasion to check the tests for built-in bias, or discriminatory tendency, or any opportunity to argue that the tests or the test questions are not well suited to protect the employees’ rights, or to check the accuracy of the scoring.” The Company’s claim that employees’ privacy might be abused by disclosure to the Union of the scores he rejected as insubstantial. Accordingly, he recommended that the Company be ordered to turn over the test scores directly to the Union. He did, however, accept the Company’s suggestion that the test battery and answer sheets be disclosed to an expert intermediary. Disclosure of these materials to lay Union representatives, he reasoned, would not be likely to produce constructive results, since the tests could be properly analyzed only by professionals. The Union was to be given “the right to see and study the tests,” and to use the information therein “to the extent necessary to process and arbitrate the grievances,” but not to disclose the information to third parties other than the arbitrator.
The Company specifically requested the Board “to adopt that part of the order which requires that tests be turned over to a qualified psychologist,” but excepted to the requirement that the employee-linked scores be given to the Union. It contended that the only reason asserted by the Union in support of its request for the scores — to check their arithmetical accuracy — was not sufficient to overcome the principle of confidentiality that underlay its psychological testing program. The Union filed a cross exception to the requirement that it select a psychologist, arguing that it should not be forced to “employ an outsider for what is normal grievance and Labor-Management work.”
The Board, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in its decision enforcing the Board’s order, ordered the Company to turn over all the material directly to the Union. They concluded that the Union should be able to determine for itself whether it needed a psychologist to interpret the test battery and answer sheets. Both recognized the Company’s interest in maintaining the security of the tests, but both reasoned that appropriate restrictions on the Union’s use of the materials would protect this interest. Neither was receptive to the Company’s claim that employee privacy and the professional obligations of the Company’s industrial psychologists should outweigh the Union request for the employee-linked scores.
II
Because of the procedural posture of this case, the questions that have been preserved for our review are relatively narrow. The Company has presented a lengthy argument designed to demonstrate that the Board and the Court of Appeals misunderstood the premises of its aptitude testing program and thus erred in concluding that the information requested by the Union would be of any actual or potential relevance to the performance of its duties. This basic challenge, insofar as it concerns the test battery and answer sheets, is foreclosed, however, by § 10 (e) of the Act because of the Company’s failure to raise it before the Board.
Two issues, then, are presented on this record. The first concerns the Board’s choice of a remedy for the Company’s failure to disclose copies of the test battery and answer sheets. The second, and related, question concerns the propriety of the Board’s conclusion that the Company committed an unfair labor practice when it refused to disclose, without a written consent from the individual employees, the test scores linked with the employee names.
A
We turn first to the question whether the Board abused its remedial discretion when it ordered the Company to deliver directly to the Union the copies of the test battery and answer sheets. The Company’s position, stripped of the argument that it had no duty at all to disclose these materials, is as follows: It urges that disclosure directly to the Union would carry with it a substantial risk that the test questions would be disseminated. Since it spent considerable time and money validating the Instrument Man B tests and since its tests depend for reliability upon the examinee’s lack of advance preparation, it contends that the harm of dissemination would not be trivial. The future validity of the tests is tied to secrecy, and disclosure to employees would not only threaten the Company’s investment but would also leave the Company with no valid means of measuring employee aptitude. The Company also maintains that its interest in preserving the security of its tests is consistent with the federal policy favoring the use of validated, standardized, and nondiscriminatory employee selection procedures reflected in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In his brief on behalf of the Board, the Solicitor General has acknowledged the existence of a strong public policy against disclosure of employment aptitude tests and, at least in the context of civil service testing, has conceded that “[g]overnmental recruitment would be seriously disputed and public confidence eroded if the integrity of . . . tests were compromised.” Indeed, he has also acknowledged that the United States Civil Service Commission “has been zealous to guard against undue disclosure and has successfully contended for protective orders which limit exposure of the tests to attorneys and professional psychologists with restrictions on copying or disseminating test materials.” He urges, however, that the Board’s order can be justified on the grounds that the Union’s institutional interests militate against improper disclosure, and that the specific protective provisions in the Board’s order will safeguard the integrity of the tests. He emphasizes the deference generally accorded to “the considered judgment of the Board, charged by Congress with special responsibility for effectuating labor policy.” We do not find these justifications persuasive.
A union’s bare assertion that it needs information to process a grievance does not automatically oblige the employer to supply all the information in the manner • requested. The duty to supply information under § 8 (a) (5) turns upon “the circumstances of the particular case,” NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U. S., at 153, and much the same may be said for the type of disclosure that will satisfy that duty. See, e. g., American Cyanamid Co., 129 N. L. R. B. 683, 684 (1960). Throughout this proceeding, the reasonableness of the Company’s concern for test secrecy has been essentially conceded. The finding by the Board that this concern did not outweigh the Union’s interest in exploring the fairness of the Company’s criteria for promotion did not carry with it any suggestion that the concern itself was not legitimate and substantial. Indeed, on this record — which has established the Company’s freedom under the collective contract to use aptitude tests as a criterion for promotion, the empirical validity of the tests, and the relationship between secrecy and test validity — the strength of the Company’s concern has been abundantly demonstrated. The Board has cited no principle of national labor policy to warrant a remedy that would unnecessarily disserve this interest, and we are unable to identify one.
It is obvious that the remedy selected by the Board does not adequately protect the security of the tests. The restrictions barring the Union from taking any action that might cause the tests to fall into the hands of employees who have taken or are likely to take them are only as effective as the sanctions available to enforce them. In this instance, there is substantial doubt whether the Union would be subject to a contempt citation were it to ignore the restrictions. It was not a party to the enforcement proceeding in the Court of Appeals, and the scope of an enforcement order under § 10 (e) is limited by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 66 (d) making an injunction binding only “upon the parties to the action . . . and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them . . . See Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 9, 14. The Union, of course, did participate actively in the Board proceedings, but it is debatable whether that would be enough to satisfy the requirement of the Rule. Further, the Board’s regulations contemplate a contempt sanction only against a respondent, 29 CFR §§ 101.9, 101.14-101.15 (1978), and the initiation of contempt proceedings is entirely within the discretion of the Board’s General Counsel. Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U. S. 261, 269. Effective sanctions at the Board level are similarly problematic. To be sure, the Board’s General Counsel could theoretically bring a separate unfair labor practice charge against the Union, but he could also in his unreviewable discretion refuse to issue such a complaint. See 29 U. S. C.. § 153 (d); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 182. Moreover, the Union clearly would not be accountable in either contempt or unfair labor practice proceedings for the most realistic vice inherent in the Board’s remedy — the danger of inadvertent leaks.
We are mindful that the Board is granted broad discretion in devising remedies to undo the effects of violations of the Act, NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344, 346; Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203, 216, and of the principle that in the area of federal labor law “the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194. Nonetheless, the rule of deference to the Board’s choice of remedy does not constitute a blank check for arbitrary action. The role that Congress in § 10 (e) has entrusted to the courts in reviewing the Board’s petitions for enforcement of its orders is not that of passive conduit. See Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 216. The Board in this case having identified no justification for a remedy granting such scant protection to the Company’s undisputed and important interests in test secrecy, we hold that the Board abused its discretion in ordering the Company to turn over the test battery and answer sheets directly to the Union.
B
The dispute over Union access to the actual scores received by named employees is in a somewhat different procedural posture, since the Company did on this issue preserve its objections to the basic finding that it had violated its duty under § 8 (a)(5) when it refused disclosure. The Company argues that even if the scores were relevant to the Union’s grievance (which it vigorously disputes), the Union’s need for the information was not sufficiently weighty to require breach of the promise of confidentiality to the examinees, breach of its industrial psychologists’ code of professional ethics, and potential embarrassment and harassment of at least some of the examinees. The Board responds that this information does satisfy the appropriate standard of “relevance,” see NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U. S. 432, and that the Company, having “unilaterally” chosen to make a promise of confidentiality to the examinees, cannot rely on that promise to defend against a request for relevant information. The professional obligations of the Company’s psychologists, it argues, must give way to paramount federal law. Finally, it dismisses as speculative the contention that employees with low scores might be embarrassed or harassed.
We may accept for the sake of this discussion the finding that the employee scores were of potential relevance to the Union’s grievance, as well as the position of the Board that the federal statutory duty to disclose relevant information cannot be defeated by the ethical standards of a private group. Cf. Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, 389 U. S. 235, 239. Nevertheless we agree with the Company that its willingness to disclose these scores only upon receipt of consents from the examinees satisfied its statutory obligations under §8 (a)(5).
The Board’s position appears to rest on the proposition that union interests in arguably relevant information must always predominate over all other interests, however legitimate. But such an absolute rule has never been established, and we decline to adopt such a rule here. There are situations in which an employer’s conditional offer to disclose may be warranted. This we believe is one.
The sensitivity of any human being to disclosure of information that may be taken to bear on his or her basic competence is sufficiently well known to be an appropriate subject of judicial notice. There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Company promised the examinees that their scores would remain confidential in order to further parochial concerns or to frustrate subsequent Union attempts to process employee grievances. And it has not been suggested at any point in this proceeding that the Company’s unilateral promise of confidentiality was in itself violative of the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. Indeed, the Company presented evidence that disclosure of individual scores had in the past resulted in the harassment of some lower scoring examinees who had, as a result, left the Company.
Under these circumstances, any possible impairment of the function of the Union in processing the grievances of employees is more than justified by the interests served in conditioning the disclosure of the test scores upon the consent of the very employees whose grievance is being processed. The burden on the Union in this instance is minimal. The Company’s interest in preserving employee confidence in the testing program is well founded.
In light of the sensitive nature of testing information, the minimal burden that compliance with the Company’s offer would have placed on the Union, and the total absence of evidence that the Company had fabricated concern for employee confidentiality only to frustrate the Union in the discharge of its responsibilities, we are unable to sustain the Board in its conclusion that the Company, in resisting an unconsented-to disclosure of individual test results, violated the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U. S. 149. Accordingly, we hold that the order requiring the Company unconditionally to disclose the employee scores to the Union was erroneous.
The judgment is vacated, and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
29 U. S. C. §§151-158.
The arbitration was subsequently held without the benefit of this information, subject to the stipulation that the union could reopen the award if a court ordered disclosure of these materials. See infra, at 308.
Aptitude tests are not designed to measure current knowledge and skills relevant to a job, but, instead, to measure the examinee’s ability to acquire such knowledge and skills.
The Company used the empirical method of establishing validity; that is, it analyzed the requirements of the Instrument Man B job and developed objective measures by which supervisors were to rate the performance of employees in this job classification. Incumbents were given the preselected tests, and their scores were then compared with the supervisory ratings. A statistically significant correlation between the scores and the ratings was demonstrated.
Both the Company and the Union were named defendants in a lawsuit in which various Company employment practices, including aptitude tests used for other job classifications, were found to violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. See Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 118-119 (ED Mich. 1973), rev’d as to remedy, EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F. 2d 301 (CA6 1975), vacated and remanded, Detroit Edison v. EEOC, 431 U. S. 951 (1977), superseding order entered, EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 17 E. P. D. ¶ 8583 (ED Mich. 1978), notice of appeal filed, Aug. 24, 1978. The issues in the present unfair labor practice litigation are distinct, and nothing in this opinion, particularly use of such words as “valid” or “validate,” is to be understood as bearing in any way on possible Title VII questions. Cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 425-436.
During the decade or so that this test battery was in use, only one grievance involving it was filed. In that instance, a senior employee who had received an “acceptable" score was bypassed for acceptance in favor of a junior employee who had received a higher “recommended” score. The grievance was upheld.
See American Psychological Assn., Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests (1974). Standard J-2 prohibits disclosure of aptitude tests and test scores to unauthorized individuals. See also Ethical Standards of Psychologists (1977 rev.). Principle 5 of the Ethical Standards imposes an obligation on the psychologist to safeguard “information about an individual that has been obtained ... in the course of . . . teaching, practice, or investigation.” Subsection (b) of the Principle permits the psychologist to discuss evaluative data concerning employees but only if the “data [is] germane to the purposes of the evaluation” and “every effort” has been made to “avoid undue invasion of privacy.”
The arbitrator did conclude, however, that the 10.3 cutoff score was too high because it eliminated some applicants who would probably succeed in the Instrument Man job. Based on the Company’s validation statistics, he concluded that seniority would be undermined unless those applicants who had received scores of between 9.3 and 10.3 were given an opportunity to demonstrate that they had other qualifications that might offset their somewhat lower scores. Three applicants were in this group. As a result of the evaluation ordered by the arbitrator, one was promoted.
The Company had consistently maintained that disclosure to the Union would serve no purpose. It contended that the validity of the tests depended upon a statistical determination that they were accurate predictors of future job performance. Lay examination of the questions, it asserted, could only determine whether the questions were on their face related to the job.
The Board, although it ordered the Company to supply the tests and answer sheets directly to the Union, incorporated by reference the Administrative Law Judge’s restrictions on the Union’s use of the materials. Under those restrictions, the Union was given the right “to use the tests and the information contained therein to the extent necessary to process and arbitrate the grievances, but not to copy the tests, or otherwise use them for the purpose of disclosing the tests or the questions to employees who have in the past, or who may in the future take these tests, or to anyone (other than the arbitrator) who may advise the employees of the contents of the tests.”
After the conclusion of the arbitration, the Union was required to return “all copies of the battery of tests” to the Company. The Court of Appeals, in enforcing the Board’s order, stated that the “restrictions on use of the materials and obligation to return them to Detroit Edison are part of the decision and order which we enforce.” 560 F. 2d 722, 726.
29 U. S. C. § 160 (e). Section 10 (e) precludes a reviewing court from considering an objection that has not been urged before the Board, “unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” The Board enforces a similar procedural limitation through a rule providing that any exception to a finding of the Administrative Law Judge not specifically urged before the Board “shall be deemed to have been waived.” 29 CFR § 102.46 (b) (1978). The rule serves a sound purpose, and unless a party’s neglect to press an exception before the Board is excused by the statutory “extraordinary circumstances” exception or unless the Board determination at issue is patently in excess of its authority, we are bound by it. See, e. g., NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U. S. 318, 322.
The Company has justified its failure to object on the ground that it had “no practical reason” to challenge the portion of the Administrative Law Judge’s recommendation adopting its suggestion that the tests and answer sheets be disclosed to an intermediary. If this ground were accepted as an “extraordinary circumstance,” however, little would be left of the statutory exception. In any case, the Company’s “practical” reason disappeared when it again failed to challenge the finding of relevance after the Union had filed a cross exception urging that direct disclosure be ordered.
Moreover, much of the Company’s challenge to relevancy is based upon the arbitrator’s findings and conclusion that examination of these materials would prove little. We do not question the arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective agreement. Nonetheless, the parties agreed not to be bound by the arbitrator’s determination of relevance, the arbitrator accepted this condition, and the Board concluded that the Union could properly invoke its jurisdiction on these terms. This is not to say that the arbitral award itself is irrelevant to this controversy. The arbitration record and award were before the Administrative Law Judge, and we do not understand the Board to have disturbed the arbitrator’s resolution of the contract issues peculiarly within his competence. Cf. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U. S. 432, 436-437.
42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. The Company places particular emphasis on § 703 (h) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(h), and the agency guidelines promulgated thereunder. Indeed, it has argued that the guidelines are violated by the Board’s order directing disclosure to the employee representative. With this we cannot agree. Section 703 (h) permits an employer to “give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended, or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” Pursuant to §703 (h), specific guidelines on employee testing programs have been issued. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 CFR § 1607.1 et seq. (1977). The guidelines state that “properly validated and standardized employee selection procedures can significantly contribute to the implementation of non-discriminatory personnel policies.” § 1607.1 (a). In another section of the guidelines, it is stated that evidence of test validity must be based on “studies employing generally accepted procedures for determining criterion-related validity, such as those described in the ‘Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals’ published by the American Psychological Association.” § 1607.5. The guidelines further provide that “[t]ests must be administered and scored under controlled and standardized conditions, with proper safeguards to protect the security of tests scores.” § 1607.5 (b)(2). Contrary to the Company’s assertion, these provisions, although they do recognize the relationship between test security and test validity, do not insulate testing materials from the employer’s duty under the Act to disclose relevant information. At most, they provide evidence of the employer’s interest in maintaining the security of properly validated tests.
See n. 9, supra.
The Board limited discussion of its reasons for eliminating the intermediary requirement to the statement that “it is reasonable to assume that, having requested the papers, the Union intends effectively to utilize them.” Consequently, it said, it “would not condition the Union’s access to the information on the retention of a psychologist but rather would have [the Company] submit the information directly to the Union and let the Union decide whether the assistance or expertise of a psychologist is required.”
See Emeryville Research Center, Shell Development Co. v. NLRB, 441 F. 2d 880 (CA9 1971) (refusal to supply relevant salary information in precise form demanded did not constitute violation of § 8 (a) (5) when company’s proposed alternatives were responsive to union’s need); Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 457 F. 2d 615 (CA9 1975) (refusal to supply employee names without employee consent not unlawful when company had well-founded fear that nonstriking employees would be harassed); cf. Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 399 F. 2d 455 (CA6 1968) (no disclosure of operating ratio data when, under circumstances, interests of employer predominated); United Aircraft Corp., 192 N. L. R. B. 382, 390 (1971) (employer acted reasonably in refusing to honor generalized request for employee medical records without employee’s permission), modified on other grounds, Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F. 2d 422 (CA2 1975).
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759, relied upon by the Solicitor General, is not to the contrary. The interests at stake and the legal issues involved in that case, in which the Board ordered the company to disclose the names and addresses of employees to a union in the process of an organizing campaign, were far different from those involved here.
A person’s interest in preserving the confidentiality of sensitive information contained in his personnel files has been given forceful recognition in both federal and state legislation governing the recordkeeping activities of public employers and agencies. See, e. g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U. S. C. § 552a (written consent required before information in individual records may be disclosed, unless the request falls within an explicit statutory exception); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-204 (3) (a) (1973) (regulating disclosure of medical, psychological, and scholastic achievement data in public records); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 68A.7 (10)-(11) (West 1973) (regulating disclosure of personal information in public employee records); N. Y. Pub. Off. Law §§ 89 (2) (b) (i)-(c) (ii) (McKinney Supp. 1978) (disapproving unconsented-to release of employment and medical information in public records). See also IT. S. Privacy Protection Study Comm’n, Personal Privacy in an Information Society (1977) (recommending that all employers should be under a duty to safeguard the confidentiality of employee records). Cf. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U. S. C. § 1232g (explicitly recognizing, in the context of education, the interest of the individual in maintaining the confidentiality of test scores). Indeed, the federal Privacy Act ban on unconsented-to disclosure of employee records without written consent has been construed to provide a valid defense to a union request for certain employee personnel data made pursuant to the terms of a public employee collective-bargaining agreement. See American Federation of Oovt. Employees v. Defense General Supply Center, 423 F. Supp. 481 (ED Va. 1976), aff’d per curiam, 573 F. 2d 184 (CA4 1978).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | G | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the state-action doctrine of immunity from actions under the Sherman Act applies to the grading of bar examinations by the Committee appointed by, and according to the Rules of, the Arizona Supreme Court.
I
Respondent Ronwin was an unsuccessful candidate for admission to the Bar of Arizona in 1974. Petitioners were four members of the Arizona Supreme Court’s Committee on Examinations and Admissions (Committee). The Arizona Constitution vests authority in the court to determine who should be admitted to practice law in the State. Hunt v. Maricopa County Employees Merit System Comm’n, 127 Ariz. 259, 261-262, 619 P. 2d 1036, 1038-1039 (1980); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §32-275 (1976). Pursuant to that authority, the Arizona Supreme Court established the Committee to examine and recommend applicants for admission to the Arizona Bar. The Arizona Supreme Court Rules, adopted by the court and in effect in 1974, delegated certain responsibilities to the Committee while reserving to the court the ultimate authority to grant or deny admission. The Rules provided that the Committee “shall examine applicants” on subjects enumerated in the Rules and “recommend to th[e] court for admission to practice” applicants found to have the requisite qualifications. Rule 28(a) (1978). They also authorized the Committee to “utilize such grading or scoring system as the Committee deems appropriate in its discretion,” and to use the Multi-State Bar Examination. Rule 28(c) VII A (1973), as amended, 110 Ariz. xxvii, xxxii (1974). Even with respect to “grading or scoring,” the court did not delegate final authority to the Committee. The Rules directed the Committee to file the formula it intended to use in grading the examination with the court 30 days prior to giving the examination. Also, after grading the examination and compiling the list of those applicants whom it considered qualified to practice law in the State, the Committee was directed to submit its recommendations to the court for final action. Rule 28(a). Under the Rules and Arizona case law, only the court had authority to admit or deny admission. Finally, a rejected applicant was entitled to seek individualized review of an adverse recommendation of the Committee by filing a petition directly with the court. The Rules required the Committee to file a response to such a petition and called for a prompt and fair decision on the applicant’s claims by the Arizona Supreme Court.
Ronwin took the Arizona bar examination in February 1974. He failed to pass, the Committee recommended to the Arizona Supreme Court that it deny him admission to the Bar, and the court accepted the recommendation. Ronwin petitioned the court to review the manner in which the Committee conducted and graded the examination. In particular, he alleged that the Committee had failed to provide him with model answers to the examination, had failed to file its grading formula with the court within the time period specified in the Rules, had applied a “draconian” pass-fail process, had used a grading formula that measured group, rather than individual, performance, had failed to test applicants on an area of the law on which the Rules required testing, and had conducted the examination in a “pressure-cooker atmosphere.” He further alleged that the Committee’s conduct constituted an abuse of discretion, deprived him of due process and equal protection, and violated the Sherman Act. The court denied his petition and two subsequent petitions for rehearing. Ronwin then sought review of the Arizona Supreme Court’s action in this Court. We denied his petition for certiorari. 419 U. S. 967 (1974).
Some four years later, in March 1978, Ronwin filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Petitioners were named as defendants in the suit in their capacity as individual members of the Committee. Ronwin renewed his complaint that petitioners had conspired to restrain trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1, by “artificially reducing the numbers of competing attorneys in the State of Arizona.” The gist of Ronwin’s argument is that the Committee of which petitioners constituted a majority had set the grading scale on the February examination with reference to the number of new attorneys they thought desirable, rather than with reference to some “suitable” level of competence. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In particular, petitioners alleged that, acting as a Committee, they were immune from antitrust liability under Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Petitioners also argued that Ronwin suffered no damage from the conduct of which he complained and that the Committee's conduct had not affected interstate commerce. The District Court granted petitioners' motion after finding that the complaint failed to state a justiciable claim, that the court had no jurisdiction, and that Ronwin lacked standing.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint. Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F. 2d 692 (1982). The Court of Appeals read the District Court’s ruling that Ronwin had failed to state a claim as a holding that bar examination grading procedures are immune from federal antitrust laws under Parker v. Brown. It reasoned that, although petitioners ultimately might be able to show that they are entitled to state-action immunity, the District Court should not have decided this issue on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See 686 F. 2d, at 698. The court stated that under Parker and its progeny, the mere fact that petitioners were state officials appointed by the Arizona Supreme Court was insufficient to confer state-action immunity on them. 686 F. 2d, at 697. Relying on its reading of several recent opinions of this Court, the Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners might be able to invoke the state-action doctrine, but reasoned that they first must show that they were acting pursuant to a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed... state policy.” Id., at 696. Therefore, dismissal for failure to state a claim was improper. The court also held that Ronwin had standing to bring this action. The case was remanded to the District Court for further action.
We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ application of the state-action doctrine. 461 U. S. 926 (1983). We now reverse.
II
The starting point in any analysis involving the state-action doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, the Court considered the antitrust implications of the California Agriculture Prorate Act — a state statute that restricted competition among food producers in California. Relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the Court declined to construe the Sherman Act as prohibiting the anti-competitive actions of a State acting through its legislature:
“We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.” 317 U. S., at 350-351.
Thus, under the Court’s rationale in Parker, when a state legislature adopts legislation, its actions constitute those of the State, see id., at 351, and ipso facto are exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws.
In the years since the decision in Parker, the Court has had occasion in several cases to determine the scope of the state-action doctrine. It has never departed, however, from Parker’s basic reasoning. Applying the Parker doctrine in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 360 (1977), the Court held that a state supreme court, when acting in a legislative capacity, occupies the same position as that of a state legislature. Therefore, a decision of a state supreme court, acting legislatively rather than judicially, is exempt from Sherman Act liability as state action. See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 790 (1975). Closer analysis is required when the activity at issue is not directly that of the legislature or supreme court, but is carried out by others pursuant to state authorization. See, e. g., Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982) (municipal regulation of cable television industry); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980) (private price-fixing arrangement authorized by State); New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978) (new franchises controlled by state administrative board). In such cases, it becomes important to ensure that the anti-competitive conduct of the State’s representative was contemplated by the State. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 413-415 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.); see New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F. 2d 363, 369-370 (CA9 1974). If the replacing of entirely free competition with some form of regulation or restraint was not authorized or approved by the State then the rationale of Parker is inapposite. As a result, in cases involving the anticompetitive conduct of a nonsovereign state representative the Court has required a showing that the conduct is pursuant to a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy” to replace competition with regulation. Boulder, supra, at 54. The Court also has found the degree to which the state legislature or supreme court supervises its representative to be relevant to the inquiry. See Midcal Aluminum, supra, at 105; Goldfarb, supra, at 791. When the conduct is that of the sovereign itself, on the other hand, the danger of unauthorized restraint of trade does not arise. Where the conduct at issue is in fact that of the state legislature or supreme court, we need not address the issues of “clear articulation” and “active supervision.”
Pursuant to the State Constitution, the Arizona Supreme Court has plenary authority to determine admissions to the Bar. Therefore, the first critical step in our analysis must be to determine whether the conduct challenged here is that of the court. If so, the Parker doctrine applies and Ronwin has no cause of action under the Sherman Act.
HH H-1 t — I
At issue here is the Arizona plan of determining admissions to the bar, and petitioners’ use thereunder of a grading formula. Ronwin has alleged that petitioners conspired to use that formula to restrain competition among lawyers. His argument is that, although petitioners qualified as state officials in their capacity as members of the Committee, they acted independently of the Arizona Supreme Court. As a result, the argument continues, the Committee's actions are those of a Supreme Court representative, rather than those of the court itself, and therefore are not entitled to immunity.
We cannot agree that the actions of the Committee can be divorced from the Supreme Court’s exercise of its sovereign powers. The Court’s opinion in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S., at 360, is directly pertinent. In Bates, two attorneys were suspended temporarily from the practice of law in Arizona for violating a disciplinary rule of the American Bar Association (ABA) that prohibited most lawyer advertising. The Arizona Supreme Court had incorporated the ABA’s advertising prohibition into the local Supreme Court Rules. Those Rules also provided that the Board of Governors of the Arizona State Bar Association, acting on the recommendation of a local Bar disciplinary committee, could recommend the censure or suspension of a member of the Bar for violating the advertising ban. Under the Rules, the Board of Governor’s recommendation automatically would become effective if the aggrieved party did not object to the recommendation within 10 days. If the party objected, he was entitled to have the Arizona Supreme Court review the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors and the local committee. The plaintiffs challenged the Rule on Sherman Act and First Amendment grounds. This Court ultimately concluded that the ABA Rule violated the First Amendment, but it first held that the State Bar Association was immune from Sherman Act liability because its enforcement of the disciplinary Rules was state action. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that, although only the State Bar was named as a defendant in the suit, the suspended attorneys’ complaint was with the State. The Court stated:
“[T]he appellants’ claims are against the State. The Arizona Supreme Court is the real party in interest; it adopted the rules, and it is the ultimate trier of fact and law in the enforcement process. In re Wilson, 106 Ariz. 34, 470 P. 2d 441 (1970). Although the State Bar plays a part in the enforcement of the rules, its role is completely defined by the court; the [State Bar] acts as the agent of the court under its continuous supervision.” Id., at 361.
The opinion and holding in Bates with respect to the state-action doctrine were unanimous.
The logic of the Court’s holding in Bates applies with greater force to the Committee and its actions. The petitioners here were each members of an official body selected and appointed by the Arizona Supreme Court. Indeed, it is conceded that they were state officers. The court gave the members of the Committee discretion in compiling and grading the bar examination, but retained strict supervisory powers and ultimate full authority over its actions. The Supreme Court Rules specified the subjects to be tested, and the general qualifications required of applicants for the Bar. With respect to the specific conduct of which Ronwin complained — establishment of an examination grading formula— the Rules were explicit. Rule 28(c) VII A authorized the Committee to determine an appropriate “grading or scoring system” and Rule 28(c) VII B required the Committee to submit its grading formula to the Supreme Court at least 30 days prior to the examination. After giving and grading the examination, the Committee’s authority was limited to making recommendations to the Supreme Court. The court itself made the final decision to grant or deny admission to practice. Finally, Rule 28(c) XII F provided for a detailed mandatory review procedure by which an aggrieved candidate could challenge the Committee’s grading formula. In light of these provisions and the Court’s holding and reasoning in Bates, we conclude that, although the Arizona Supreme Court necessarily delegated the administration of the admissions process to the Committee, the court itself approved the particular grading formula and retained the sole authority to determine who should be admitted to the practice of law in Arizona. Thus, the conduct that Ronwin challenges was in reality that of the Arizona Supreme Court. See Bates, 433 U. S., at 361. It therefore is exempt from Sherman Act liability under the state-action doctrine of Parker v. Brown.
At oral argument, Ronwin suggested that we should not attribute to the Arizona Supreme Court an intent to approve the anticompetitive activity of petitioners in the absence of proof that the court was aware that petitioners had devised a grading formula the purpose of which was to limit the number of lawyers in the State. This argument misconceives the basis of the state-action doctrine. The reason that state action is immune from Sherman Act liability is not that the State has chosen to act in an anticompetitive fashion, but that the State itself has chosen to act. “There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the [Sherman] Act’s legislative history.” Parker, 317 U. S., at 351. The Court did not suggest in Parker, nor has it suggested since, that a state action is exempt from antitrust liability only if the sovereign acted wisely after full disclosure from its subordinate officers. The only requirement is that the action be that of “the State acting as a sovereign.” Bates, supra, at 360. The action at issue here, whether anticompetitive or not, clearly was that of the Arizona Supreme Court.
> HH
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens would, if it were adopted, alter dramatically the doctrine of state-action immunity. We therefore reply directly. The dissent concedes, as it must, that “the Arizona Supreme Court exercises sovereign power with respect to admission to the Arizona Bar,” and “if the challenged conduct were that of the court, it would be immune under Parker. ” Post, at 588. It also is conceded that the members of the court’s Commitee on Examinations and Admissions — petitioners here — are state officers. These concessions are compelled by the Court’s decision in Bates, and we think they dispose of Ronwin’s contentions.
In its effort to distinguish Bates, the dissent notes that the Arizona Supreme Court “is not a petitioner [in this case], nor was it named as a defendant in respondent’s complaint,” and “because respondent is not challenging the conduct of the Arizona Supreme Court, Parker [v. Brown] is simply inapplicable.” Post, at 588, 589. The dissent fails to recognize that this is precisely the situation that existed in Bates. In that case, the Supreme Court of Arizona was not a party in this Court, nor was it named as a defendant by the complaining lawyers. Yet, in our unanimous opinion, we concluded that the claims by appellants in Bates were “against the State,” and that the “Arizona Supreme Court [was] the real party in interest; it adopted the rules, and it [was] the ultimate trier of fact and law in the enforcement process.” Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, at 361; see supra, at 571.
The core argument of the dissent is that Ronwin has challenged only the action of the Committee and not that of the Arizona Supreme Court. It states that “there is no claim that the court directed [the Committee] to artificially reduce the number of lawyers in Arizona,” and therefore the Committee cannot assert the sovereign’s antitrust immunity. Post, at 592 (emphasis in original). The dissent does not acknowledge that, conspire as they might, the Committee could not reduce the number of lawyers in Arizona. Only the Arizona Supreme Court had the authority to grant or deny admission to practice in the State. As in Bates “[t]he Arizona Supreme Court is the real party in interest.” 433 U. S., at 361.
The dissent largely ignores the Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court. A summary of the court’s commands suggests why the dissent apparently prefers not to address them. The Arizona Supreme Court established the Committee for the sole purpose of examining and recommending applicants for admission to the Bar. Rule 28(a). Its Rules provided: “The examination and admission of applicants... shall conform to this Rule.... The committee shall examine applicants and recommend [qualified applicants] to this court.... Two examinations will be held each year....” Ibid.; Rule 28(c) VI (1973), as amended, 110 Ariz. xxxii (1974) (emphasis added). The Rules also specified the subjects to be tested and required the Committee to submit its grading formula to the court in advance of each examination. Rule 28(c) VII (1973), as amended, 110 Ariz. xxxii (1974).
As a further safeguard, a disappointed applicant was accorded the right to seek individualized review by filing a petition directly with the court — as Ronwin did unsuccessfully. Pursuant to Rule 28(c) XII F, Ronwin filed a complaint with the court that contained a plethora of charges including the substance of the complaint in this case. The court denied his petition as well as two petitions for rehearing. See supra, at 564. Thus, again there was state action by the court itself explicitly rejecting Ronwin’s claim. Finally, the case law, as well as the Rules, makes clear that the Arizona Supreme Court made the final decision on each applicant. See n. 6, supra. Unlike the actions of the Virginia State Bar in Goldfarb, the actions of the Committee are governed by the court’s Rules. Those Rules carefully reserve to the court the authority to make the decision to admit or deny, and that decision is the critical state action here. See Bates, 433 U. S., at 359-361. Our opinion, therefore, also is wholly consistent with the Court’s reasoning in Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978) and Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982).
Our holding is derived directly from the reasoning of Parker and Bates. Those cases unmistakably hold that, where the action complained of — here the failure to admit Ronwin to the Bar — was that of the State itself, the action is exempt from antitrust liability regardless of the State’s motives in taking the action. Application of that standard to the facts of this case requires that we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The reasoning adopted by the dissent would allow Sherman Act plaintiffs to look behind the actions of state sovereigns and base their claims on perceived conspiracies to restrain trade among the committees, commissions, or others who necessarily must advise the sovereign. Such a holding would emasculate the Parker v. Brown doctrine. For example, if a state legislature enacted a law based on studies performed, or advice given, by an advisory committee, the dissent would find the State exempt from Sherman Act liability but not the committee. A party dissatisfied with the new law could circumvent the state-action doctrine by alleging that the committee’s advice reflected an undisclosed collective desire to restrain trade without the knowledge of the legislature. The plaintiff certainly would survive a motion to dismiss — or even summary judgment — despite the fact that the suit falls squarely within the class of cases found exempt from Sherman Act liability in Parker.
In summary, this case turns on a narrow and specific issue: who denied Ronwin admission to the Arizona Bar? The dissent argues, in effect, that since there is no court order in the record, the denial must have been the action of the Committee. This argument ignores the incontrovertible fact that under the law of Arizona only the State Supreme Court had authority to admit or deny admission to practice law:
“[It] is not the function of the committee to grant or deny admission to the bar. That power rests solely in the Supreme Court....” Application of Burke, 87 Ariz. 336, 338, 351 P. 2d 169, 171 (1960) (see n. 30, supra).
Thus, if the dissent’s argument were accepted all decisions made with respect to admissions and denials of those who took the examination in February 1974 are void. Ronwin did not allege that he alone was a victim: his complaint avers that he “was among those artificially prevented from entering into competition as an attorney in the state of Arizona ” by the Committee’s action with respect to the February 1974 examination. We are unwilling to assume that the Arizona Supreme Court failed to comply with state law, and allowed the Committee alone to make the decisions with respect to the February 1974 examination. In any event, the record is explicit that Ronwin’s postexamination petition complaining about his denial was rejected by an order of the Arizona Supreme Court. That there was state action at least as to Ronwin could not be clearer.
V
We conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Ronwin’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision of this case. Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Although petitioners represent only four of the seven members of the Committee at the time of the February 1974 bar examination, Ronwin named all seven members in his original complaint. Apparently, three of the original defendants to this action did not join, for reasons not apparent, the petition for certiorari in this Court. There is no claim that these members of the Committee failed to participate in or dissented from the actions of the Committee.
The procedure in Arizona is not unique to that State. In recent years, the burgeoning number of candidates for admission to practice law and the increased complexity of the subjects that must be tested have combined to make grading and administration of bar examinations a burdensome task. As a result, although the highest court in each State retains ultimate authority for granting or denying admission to the bar, each of those courts has delegated to a subordinate committee responsibility for preparing, grading, and administering the examination. See F. Klein, S. Leleiko, & J. Mavity, Bar Admission Rules and Student Practice Rules 30-33 (1978).
The parties disagree on the wording of the Rules at the time Ronwin took the bar examination. The disagreement centers around the effective date of some amendments promulgated in 1974. Petitioners contend that the amendments took effect before Ronwin took the February 1974 bar examination; Ronwin submits that they became effective in March 1974. Ronwin concedes that the Supreme Court order amending the Rules provided that the amendments would become effective in January 1974. Notwithstanding this directive, he argues that Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-109 (1982) provided that amendments to the Supreme Court’s Rules may not become effective until 60 days after publication and distribution. Since the Supreme Court released the amendments on January 11, Ronwin submits that the earliest possible effective date was March 12.
Ronwin has misread § 12-109. That section only applied to Rules that regulated pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial proceedings in state courts. By its terms, the statute did not limit the jurisdiction of the Arizona Supreme Court to establish the terms of admission to practice law in the State. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-275 (1976).
Rule 28(a) provided:
“Examination and Admission.... The examination and admission of applicants for membership in the State Bar of Arizona shall conform to this Rule. For such purpose, a committee on examinations and admissions consisting of seven active members of the state bar shall be appointed by this court.... The committee shall examine applicants and recommend to this court for admission to practice applicants who are found by the committee to have the necessary qualifications and to fulfill the requirements prescribed by the rules of the board of governors as approved by this court respecting examinations and admissions.... The court will then consider the recommendations and either grant or deny admission.”
According to Ronwin’s complaint, the Committee announced before the February examination that the passing grade on the test would be 70, but it assigned grades using a scaled scoring system. Under this system, the examinations were graded first without reference to any grading scale. Thus, each examination was assigned a “raw score” based on the number of correct answers. The Committee then converted the raw score into a score on a scale of zero to 100 by establishing the raw score that would be deemed the equivalent of “seventy.” See n. 19, infra.
Rule 28(c) VII B provided:
“The Committee on Examinations and Admissions will file with the Supreme Court thirty (30) days before each examination the formula upon which the Multi-State Bar Examination results will be applied with the other portions of the total examination results. In addition the Committee will file with the Court thirty (30) days before each examination the proposed formula for grading the entire examination.” 110 Ariz., at xxxii.
See n. 4, supra; Application of Courtney, 83 Ariz. 231, 233, 319 P. 2d 991, 993 (1957) (“[T]his court may in the exercise of its inherent powers, admit to the practice of law with or without favorable action by the Committee”); Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F. 2d 499, 501 (CA9) (“[W]e find the power to grant or deny admission is vested solely in the Arizona Supreme Court”), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 960 (1966). See also Application of Burke, 87 Ariz. 336, 351 P. 2d 169 (1960).
Rule 28(c) XII F provided:
“1. An applicant aggrieved by any decision of the Committee
“(A) Refusing permission to take an examination upon the record;
“(B) Refusing permission to take an examination after hearing;
“(C) For any substantial cause other than with respect to a claimed failure to award a satisfactory grade upon an examination;
“may within 20 days after such occurrence file a verified petition with this Court for a review....
“2. A copy of said petition shall be promptly served upon the chairman or some member of the Committee and the Committee shall within 15 days of such service transmit said applicant’s file and a response to the petition fully advising this Court as to the Committee’s reasons for its decision and admitting or contesting any assertions made by applicant in said petition. Thereupon this Court shall consider the papers so filed together with the petition and response and make such order, hold such hearings and give such directions as it may in its discretion deem best adapted to a prompt and fair decision as to the rights and obligations of applicant judged in the light of the Committee’s and this Court’s obligation to the public to see that only qualified applicants are admitted to practice as attorneys at law.” 110 Ariz., at xxxv-xxxvi.
Under Rule 28(c) XII G, an applicant who wished to challenge the grading of an answer to a particular question first had to submit his claim to the Committee for review. The applicant was entitled to request Arizona Supreme Court review only if three members of the Committee agreed with the applicant that his answer had not received the grade it deserved. The Rule also provided that the court could grant or deny such a request in its discretion. Id., at xxxvi-xxxvii.
The Arizona Supreme Court Rules instructed the Committee to give two examinations each year — one in July and one in February. Id., at xxxii.
He also alleged that the Committee had violated his constitutional rights by refusing, after the grades had been released, to provide him with the questions and answers to the Multi-State portion of the examination.
Rule 28(c) XII F 2 provides, with respect to the petition of an aggrieved applicant, that the Arizona Supreme Court “shall consider” the petition and response, and “hold such hearings and give such directions as it may in its discretion deem best adapted to a prompt and fair decision.” 110 Ariz., at xxxvi. Ronwin makes no claim that the court failed to comply with its Rules, although — of course — he disagrees with the court’s judgment denying his petition. Thus, the court’s denial of his petition must be construed as a consideration and rejection of the arguments made in the petition — including Ronwin’s claim that the Sherman Act was violated.
Also named as defendants were petitioners’ spouses and the Arizona State Bar. The District Court dismissed the suit as to these defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F. 2d 692, 694, n. 1 (CA91981). Ronwin challenged this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ opinion in a conditional cross-petition for certiorari. We denied the cross-petition. Ronwin v. Hoover, 461 U. S. 938 (1983).
The averment of a Sherman Act violation in Ronwin’s complaint is as follows:
“The aforesaid conduct [the “scoring system or formula,” see n. 4, supra], which the Defendants entered into as a conspiracy or combination, was intended to and did result in a restraint of trade and commerce among the Several States by artificially reducing the numbers of competing attorneys in the State of Arizona; and, in further consequence of said conduct, Plaintiff was among those artificially prevented from entering into competition as an attorney in the State of Arizona and thereby further deprived of the right to compete as an attorney for the legal business deriving from or involving the Several States of the United States, including Arizona.” App. 10-11.
The adequacy of these conclusory averments of intent is far from certain. The Court of Appeals, however, found the complaint sufficient. Accordingly, we address the “state action” issue.
The District Court also denied Ronwin’s motion requesting the trial judge to recuse himself. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had not abused its discretion in denying the motion. 686 F. 2d., at 701. We declined to review that finding. Ronwin v. Hoover, supra.
Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978).
The Court of Appeals also held that the District Court should give Ronwin the opportunity to show that petitioners’ actions sufficiently affected interstate commerce to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. Petitioners did not seek review of this holding.
This case does not present the issue whether the Governor of a State stands in the same position as the state legislature and supreme court for purposes of the state-action doctrine.
Ronwin does not dispute that regulation of the bar is a sovereign function of the Arizona Supreme Court. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 361 (1977), the Court noted that “the regulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the State’s power to protect the public.” Likewise, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 792 (1975), the Court stated: “The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been ‘officers of the courts.’” See also In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 722-723 (1973). Few other professions are as close to “the core of the State’s power to protect the public.” Nor is any trade or other profession as “essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice.”
Ronwin’s complaint, see supra, at 565, focuses on the grading formula as the means used to “restrain competition.” He describes it as follows: “The Defendants did not grade on a Zero to One Hundred (0 to 100) scale; rather they used a “raw score” system. After the raw scores were known, the Defendants picked a particular raw score value as equal to the passing grade of Seventy (70). Thereby the number of Bar applicants who would receive a passing grade depended upon the exact raw score value chosen as equal to Seventy (70); rather than achievement by each Bar applicant of a pre-set standard.” App. 10.
Apparently Ronwin was trying to describe a “procedure commonly known as test standardization” or “sealed scoring.” See Brief for State Bar of California as Amicus Curiae 7. This method of scoring, viewed as the fairest by the Educational Testing Service (ETS) for the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE), see S. Duhl, The Bar Examiners’ Handbook 61-62 (2d ed. 1980), published by The National Conference of Bar Examiners, is described as follows:
“In addition to the ‘raw’ scores (number of correct answers), ETS reports a ‘scaled’ score for each applicant. In a series of tests, such as the MBE, which are intended to measure levels of competence, it is important to have a standardized score which represents the same level of competence from test to
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) has determined that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is not a “political committee” as defined by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA or Act), 86 Stat. 11, as amended, 2 U. S. C. §481(4), and, for that reason, the FEC has refused to require AIPAC to make disclosures regarding its membership, contributions, and expenditures that FECA would otherwise require. We hold that respondents, a group of voters, have standing to challenge the Commission’s determination in court, and we remand this ease for further proceedings.
I
In light of our disposition of this ease, we believe it necessary to describe its procedural background in some detail. As commonly understood, the FECA seeks to remedy any actual or perceived corruption of the political process in several important ways. The Act imposes limits upon the amounts that individuals, corporations, “political committees” (including political action committees), and political parties can contribute to a candidate for federal political office. §§441a(a), 441a(b), 441b. The Act also imposes limits on the amount these individuals or entities can spend in coordination with a candidate. (It treats these expenditures' as “contributions to” a candidate for purposes of the Act.) §441a(a)(7)(B)(i). As originally written, the Act set limits upon the total amount that a candidate could spend of his own money, and upon the amounts that other individuals, corporations, and “political committees” could spend independent of a candidate—though the Court found that certain of these last-mentioned limitations violated the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 39-59 (1976) (per curiam); Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 497 (1985); cf. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 613-619 (1996) (opinion of Breyer, J.).
This case concerns requirements in the Act that extend beyond these better-known contribution and expenditure limitations. In particular, the Act imposes extensive rec-ordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon groups that fall within the Act’s definition of a “political committee.” Those groups must register with the FEC, appoint a treasurer, keep names and addresses of contributors, track the amount and purpose of disbursements, and file complex FEC reports that include lists of donors giving in excess of $200 per year (often, these donors may be the group’s members), contributions, expenditures, and any other disbursements irrespective of their purposes. §§ 432-434.
The Act’s use of the word “political committee” calls to mind the term “political action committee,” or “PAC,” a term that normally refers to organizations that corporations or trade unions might establish for the purpose of making contributions or expenditures that the Act would otherwise prohibit. See §§431(4)(B), 441b. But, in fact, the Act’s term “political committee” has a much broader scope. The Act states that a “political committee” includes “any committee, club, association or other group of persons which receives” more than $1,000 in “contributions” or “which makes” more than $1,000 in “expenditures” in any given year. § 431(4)(A) (emphasis added).
This broad definition, however, is less universally encompassing than at first it may seem, for later definitional subsections limit its scope. The Act defines the key terms “contribution” and “expenditure” as covering only those contributions and expenditures that are made “for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” §§431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i). Moreover, the Act sets forth detailed categories of disbursements, loans, and assistance-in-kind that do not count as a “contribution” or an “expenditure,” even when made for election-related purposes. §§ 431(8)(B), (9)(B). In particular, assistance given to help a candidate will not count toward the $1,000 “expenditure” ceiling that qualifies an organization as a “political committee” if it takes the form of a “communication” by an organization “to its members” — as long as the organization at issue is a “membership organization or corporation” and it is not “organized primarily for the purpose of influencing the nomination ... or eleetiofn] of any individual.” §431(9)(B)(iii).
This case arises out of an effort by respondents, a group of voters with views often opposed to those of AIPAC, to persuade the FEC to treat AIPAC as a “political committee.” Respondents filed a complaint with the FEC, stating that AIPAC had made more than $1,000 in qualifying “expenditures” per year, and thereby became a “political committee.” 1 Record, Exh. B, p. 4. They added that AIPAC had violated the FEC provisions requiring “political committee[s]” to register and to make public the information about members, contributions, and expenditures to which we have just referred. Id., at 2, 9-17. Respondents also claimed that AIPAC had violated § 441b of FECA, which prohibits corporate campaign “contribution[s]” and “expenditure^].” Id., at 2, 16-17. They asked the FEC to find that AIPAC had violated the Act, and, among other things, to order AIPAC to make public the information that FECA demands of a “political committee.” Id., at 33-34.
AIPAC asked the FEC to dismiss the complaint. AIPAC described itself as an issue-oriented organization that seeks to maintain friendship and promote goodwill between the United States and Israel. App. 120; see also Brief for AIPAC as Amicus Curiae (AIPAC Brief) 1,3. AIPAC conceded that it lobbies elected officials and disseminates information about candidates for public office. App. 43,120; see also AIPAC Brief 6. But in responding to the § 441b charge, AIPAC denied that it had made the kinds of “expenditures” that matter for FECA purposes (i e., the kinds of election-related expenditures that corporations cannot make, and which count as the kind of expenditures that, when they exceed $1,000, qualify a group as a “political committee”).
To put the matter more specifically: AIPAC focused on certain “expenditures” that respondents had claimed were election related, such as the costs of meetings with candidates, the introduction of AIPAC members to candidates, and the distribution of candidate position papers. AIPAC said that its spending on such activities, even if election related, fell within a relevant exception. They amounted, said AIPAC, to communications by a membership organization with its members, App. 164-166, which the Act exempts from its definition of “expenditures,” § 481(9)(B)(iii). In AIPAC’s view, these communications therefore did not violate §441b’s corporate expenditure prohibition. 2 Record, Doc. No. 19, pp. 2-6. (And, if AIPAC was right, those expenditures would not count toward the $1,000 ceiling on “expenditures” that might transform an ordinary issue-related group into a “political committee.” §431(4).)
The FEC’s General Counsel concluded that, between 1983 and 1988, AIPAC had indeed funded communications of the sort described. The General Counsel said that those expenditures were campaign related, in that they amounted to advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates. App. 106-108. He added that these expenditures were “likely to have crossed the $1,000 threshold.” Id., at 146. At the same time, the FEC closed the door to AIPAC’s invocation of the “communications” exception. The FEC said that, although it was a “close question,” these expenditures were not membership communications, because that exception applies to a membership organization’s communications with its members, and most of the persons who belonged to AIPAC did not qualify as “members” for purposes of the Act. App. to Pet. for Cert. 97a-98a; see also App. 170-173. Still, given the closeness of the issue, the FEC exercised its discretion and decided not to proceed further with respect to the claimed “corporate contribution” violation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a. ■
The FEC’s determination that many of the persons who belonged to AIPAC were not “members” effectively foreclosed any claim that AIPAC’s communications did not count as “expenditures” for purposes of determining whether it was a “political committee.” Since AIPAC’s activities fell outside the “membership communications” exception, AIPAC could not invoke that exception as a way of escaping the scope of the Act’s term “political committee” and the Act’s disclosure provisions, which that definition triggers.
The FEC nonetheless held that AIPAC was not subject to the disclosure requirements, but for a different reason. In the FEC’s view, the Act’s definition of “political committee” includes only those organizations that have as a “major purpose” the nomination or election of candidates. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 79. AIPAC, it added, was fundamentally an issue-oriented lobbying organization, not a campaign-related organization, and hence AIPAC fell outside the definition of a “political committee” regardless. App. 146. The FEC consequently dismissed respondents’ complaint.
Respondents filed a petition in Federal District Court seeking review of the FEC’s determination dismissing their complaint. See §§487g(a)(8)(A), 437g(a)(8)(C). The District Court granted summary judgment for the FEC, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. 66 F. 3d 348 (CADC 1995). The en bane Court of Appeals reversed, however, on the ground that the FEC’s “major purpose” test improperly interpreted the Act’s definition of a “political committee.” 101 F. 3d 731 (CADC 1997). We granted the FEC’s petition for certiorari, which contained the following two questions:
“1. Whether respondents had standing to challenge the Federal Election Commission’s decision not to bring an enforcement action in this case.
“2. Whether an organization that spends more than $1,000 on contributions or coordinated expenditures in a calendar year, but is neither controlled by a candidate nor has its major purpose the nomination or election of candidates, is a ‘political committee’ within the meaning of the [Act].” Brief for Petitioner I..
We shall answer the first of these questions, but not the second.
II
The Solicitor General argues that respondents lack standing to challenge the FEC’s decision not to proceed against AIPAC. He claims that they have failed to satisfy the “prudential” standing requirements upon which this Court has insisted. See, e. g., National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U. S. 479, 488 (1998) (NCUA); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 153 (1970) (Data Processing). He adds that respondents have not shown that they “suffe[r] injury in fact,” that them injury is “fairly traceable” to the FEC’s decision, or that a judicial decision in their favor would “redres[s]” the injury. E.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 162 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560-561 (1992). In his view, respondents’ District Court petition consequently failed to meet Article Ill’s demand for a “case” or “controversy.”
We do not agree with the FEC’s “prudential standing” claim. Congress has specifically provided in FECA that “[a]ny person who believes a violation of this Act . . . has occurred, may file a complaint with the Commission.” § 437g(a)(l). It has added that “[a]ny party aggrieved by an order of the Commission dismissing a complaint filed by such party... may file a petition” in district court seeking review of that dismissal. § 437g(a)(8)(A). History associates the word “aggrieved” with a congressional intent to east the standing net broadly — beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which “prudential” standing traditionally rested. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470 (1940); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F. 2d 994 (CADC 1966) (Burger, J.); Associated Industries of New York State v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694 (CA2 1943) (Frank, J.). Cf. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §702 (stating that those “suffering legal wrong” or “adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the meaning of a relevant statute” may seek judicial review of agency action).
Moreover, prudential standing is satisfied when the injury asserted by a plaintiff “ ‘arguably [falls] within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question.' ” NCUA, supra, at 488 (quoting Data Processing, supra, at 153). The injury of which respondents complain— their failure to obtain relevant information — is injury of a kind that FECA seeks to address. Buckley, supra, at 66-67 (“political committees” must disclose contributors and disbursements to help voters understand who provides which candidates with financial support). We have found nothing in the Act that suggests Congress intended to exclude voters from the benefits of these provisions, or otherwise to restrict standing, say, to political parties, candidates, or their committees.
Given the language of the statute and the nature of the injury, we conclude that Congress, intending to protect voters such as respondents from suffering the kind of injury here at issue, intended to authorize this kind of suit. Consequently, respondents satisfy “prudential” standing requirements. Cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 820, n. 3 (1997) (explicit grant of authority to bring suit “eliminates any prudential standing limitations and significantly lessens the risk of unwanted conflict with the Legislative Branch").
Nor do we agree with the FEC or the dissent that Congress lacks the constitutional power to authorize federal courts to adjudicate this lawsuit. Article III, of course, limits Congress' grant of judicial power to “cases" or “controversies." That limitation means that respondents must show, among other things, an “injury in fact” — a requirement that helps assure that courts will not “pass upon . . . abstract, intellectual problems,” but adjudicate “concrete, living contests] between adversaries.” Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Bennett, supra, at 167; Lujan, supra, at 560-561. In our view, respondents here have suffered a genuine “injury in fact.”
The “injury in fact” that respondents have suffered consists of their inability to obtain information — lists of AIPAC donors (who are, according to AIPAC, its members), and campaign-related contributions and expenditures — that, on respondents’ view of the law, the statute requires that AIPAC make public. There is no reason to doubt their claim that the information would help them (and others to whom they would communicate it) to evaluate candidates for public office, especially candidates who received assistance from AIPAC, and to evaluate the role that AIPAC’s financial assistance might play in a specific election. Respondents’ injury consequently seems concrete and particular. Indeed, this Court has previously held that a plaintiff suffers an “injury in fact” when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute. Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 449 (1989) (failure to obtain information subject to disclosure under Federal Advisory Committee Aet “constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue”). See also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363, 373-374 (1982) (deprivation of information about housing availability constitutes “specific injury” permitting standing).
The dissent refers to United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974), a case in which a plaintiff sought information (details of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) expenditures) to which, he said, the Constitution’s Accounts Clause, Art. I, §9, cl. 7, entitled him. The Court held that the plaintiff there lacked Article III standing. 418 U. S., at 179-180. The dissent says that Richardson and this ease are “indistinguishable.” Post, at 34. But as the parties’ briefs suggest — for they do. not mention Richardson — that ease does not control the outcome here.
Richardson’s plaintiff claimed that a statute permitting the CIA to keep its expenditures nonpublic violated the Accounts Clause, which requires that “a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.” 418 U. S., at 167-169. The Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing because there was “no ‘logical nexus’ between the [plaintiff’s] asserted status of taxpayer and the claimed failure of the Congress to require the Executive to supply a more detailed report of the [CIA’s] expenditures.” Id., at 175; see also id., at 174 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 102 (1968), for the proposition that in “taxpayer standing” cases, there must be “‘a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated’”).
In this ease, however, the “logical nexus” inquiry is not relevant. Here, there is no constitutional provision requiring the demonstration of the “nexus” the Court believed must be shown in Richardson and Flast. Rather, there is a statute which, as we previously pointed out, supra, at 19-20, does seek to protect individuals such as respondents from the kind of harm they say they have suffered, i. e., failing to receive particular information about campaign-related activities. Cf. Richardson, 418 U. S., at 178, n. 11.
The fact that the Court in Richardson focused upon taxpayer standing, id., at 171-178, not voter standing, places that case at still a greater distance from the case before us. We are not suggesting, as the dissent implies, post, at 32-34, that Richardson would have come out differently if only the plaintiff had asserted his standing to sue as a voter, rather than as a taxpayer. Faced with such an assertion, the Richardson Court would simply have had to consider whether “the Framers . . . ever imagined that general directives [of the Constitution]... would be subject to enforcement by an individual citizen.” 418 U. S., at 178, n. 11 (emphasis added). But since that answer (like the answer to whether there was taxpayer standing in Richardson) would have rested in significant part upon the Court’s view of the Accounts Clause, it still would not control our answer in this case. All this is to say that the legal logic which critically determined Richardson’s outcome is beside the point here.
The FEC’s strongest argument is its contention that this lawsuit involves only a “generalized grievance.” (Indeed, if Richardson is relevant at all, it is because of its broad discussion of this matter, see id., at 176-178, not its basic rationale.) The FEC points out that respondents’ asserted harm (their failure to obtain information) is one which is “ ‘shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.’ ” Brief for Petitioner 28 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975)). This Court, the FEC adds, has often said that “generalized grievanee[s]” are not the kinds of harms that confer standing. Brief for Petitioner 28; see also Lujan, 504 U. S., at 573-574; Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 755-756 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 475-479 (1982); Richardson, supra, at 176-178; Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 487 (1923); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam). Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance. Warth, supra, at 500; Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 222 (1974); Richardson, 418 U. S., at 179; id., at 188-189 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Flast, supra, at 131 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The kind of judicial language to which the FEC points, however, invariably appears in eases where the harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and indefinite nature — for example, harm to the “common concern for obedience to law.” L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311 U. S. 295, 303 (1940); see also Allen, supra, at 754; Schlesinger, supra, at 217. Cf. Lujan, supra, at 572-578 (injury to interest in seeing that certain procedures are followed not normally sufficient by itself to confer standing); Frothingham, supra, at 488 (party may not merely assert that “he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally”); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 125 (1940) (plaintiffs lack standing because they have failed to show injury to “a particular right of their own, as distinguished from the public’s interest in the administration of the law”). The abstract nature of the harm — for example, injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed — deprives the case of the concrete specificity that characterized those controversies which were “the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster,” Coleman, 307 U. S., at 460 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); and which today prevents a plaintiff from obtaining what would, in effect, amount to an advisory opinion. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937).
Often the fact that an interest is abstract and the fact that it is widely shared go hand in hand. But their association is not invariable, and where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found “injury in fact.” See Public Citizen, 491 U. S., at 449-450 (“The fact that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the same complaint after unsuccessfully demanding disclosure . . . does not lessen [their] asserted injury”). Thus the fact that a political forum may be more readily available where an injury is widely shared (while counseling against, say, interpreting a statute as conferring standing) does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes. Such an interest, where sufficiently concrete, may count as an “injury in fact.” This conclusion seems particularly obvious where (to use a hypothetical example) large numbers of individuals suffer the same common-law injury (say, a widespread mass tort), or where large numbers of voters suffer interference with voting rights conferred by law. Cf. Lujan, supra, at 572; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899, 905 (1996). We conclude that, similarly, the informational injury at issue here, direetly related to voting, the most basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific such that the fact that it is widely shared does not deprive Congress of constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the federal courts.
Respondents have also satisfied the remaining two constitutional standing requirements. The harm asserted is “fairly traceable” to the FEC’s decision about which respondents complain. Of course, as the FEC points out, Brief for Petitioner 29-31, it is possible that even had the FEC agreed with respondents’ view of the law, it would still have decided in the exercise of its discretion not to require AIPAC to produce the information. Cf. App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a (deciding to exercise prosecutorial discretion, see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821 (1985), and “take no further action” on §441b allegation against AIPAC). But that fact does not destroy Article III “causation,” for we cannot know that the FEC would have exercised its proseeutorial discretion in this way. Agencies often have discretion about whether or not to take a particular action. Yet those adversely affected by a discretionary agency decision generally have standing to complain that the agency based its decision upon an improper legal ground. See, e. g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967) (discussing presumption of review-ability of agency action); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971). If a reviewing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted the law, it will set aside the agency’s action and remand the case — even though the agency (like a new jury after a mistrial) might later, in the exercise of its lawffil discretion, reach the same result for a different reason. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943). Thus respondents’ “injury in fact” is “fairly traceable” to the FEC’s decision not to issue its complaint, even though the FEC might reach the same result exercising its discretionary powers lawfully. For similar reasons, the courts in this case can “redress” respondents’ “injury in fact.”
Finally, the FEC argues that we should deny respondents standing because this case involves an agency’s decision not to undertake an enforcement action — an area generally not subject to judicial review. Brief for Petitioner 23, 29. In Heckler, this Court noted that agency enforcement decisions “ha[ve] traditionally been ‘committed to agency discretion,’ ” and concluded that Congress did not intend to alter that tradition in enacting the APA. 470 U. S., at 832; cf. 5 U. S. C. § 701(a) (courts will not review agency actions where “statutes preclude judicial review,” or where the “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law”). We deal here with a statute that explicitly indicates the contrary.
In sum, respondents, as voters, have satisfied both prudential and constitutional standing requirements. They may bring this petition for a declaration that the FEC’s dismissal of their complaint was unlawful. See 2 U. S. C. §437g(a)(8)(A).
Ill
The second question presented in the FEC’s petition for certiorari is whether an organization that otherwise satisfies the Act’s definition of a “political committee,” and thus is subject to its disclosure requirements, nonetheless falls outside that definition because “its major purpose” is not “the nomination or election of candidates.” The question arises because this Court, in Buckley, said:
“To fulfill the purposes of the Act [the term ‘political committee’] need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate.” 424 U. S., at 79.
The Court reiterated in Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 252, n. 6 (1986):
“[A]n entity subject to regulation as a ‘political committee’ under the Act is one that is either ‘under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate.’”
The FEC here interpreted this language as narrowing the scope of the statutory term “political committee,” wherever applied. And, as we have said, the FEC’s General Counsel found that AIPAC fell outside that definition because the nomination or election of a candidate was not AIPAC’s “major purpose.” App. 146.
The en banc Court of Appeals disagreed with the FEC. It read this Court’s narrowing construction of the term “political committee” as turning on the First Amendment problems presented by regulation of “independent expenditures” (•i. e., “an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate,” § 431(17)). 101 F. 3d, at 741. The Court of Appeals concluded that the language in this Court’s prior decisions narrowing the definition of “political committee” did not apply where the special First Amendment “independent expenditure” problem did not exist. Id., at 742-743.
The Solicitor General argues that this Court’s narrowing definition of “political committee” applies not simply in the context of independent expenditures, but across the board. We cannot squarely address that matter, however, because of the unusual and complex circumstances in which this case arises. As we previously mentioned, supra, at 16-17, the FEC considered a related question, namely, whether AIPAC was exempt from §441b’s prohibition of corporate campaign expenditures, on the grounds that the so-called “expenditures” involved only AIPAC’s communications with its members. The FEC held that the statute’s exception to the “expenditure” definition for communications by a “membership organization” did not apply because many of the persons who belonged to AIPAC were not “members” as defined by FEC regulation. The FEC acknowledged, however, that this was a “close question.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a; see also App. 144-146, 170-171. In particular, the FEC thought that many of the persons who belonged to AIPAC lacked sufficient control of the organization’s policies to qualify as “members” for purposes of the Act.
A few months later, however, the Court of Appeals overturned the FEC’s regulations defining “members,” in part because that court thought the regulations defined membership organizations too narrowly in light of an organization’s “First Amendment right to communicate with its ‘members.’” Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Election Comm’n, 69 F. 3d 600, 605 (CADC 1995). The FEC has subsequently issued proposed rules redefining “members.” Under these rules, it is quite possible that many of the persons who belong to AIPAC would be considered “members.” If so, the communications here at issue apparently would not count as the kind of “expenditures” that can turn an organization into a “political committee,” and AIPAC would fall outside the definition for that reason, rather than because of the “major purpose” test. 62 Fed. Reg. 66832 (1997) (proposed 11 CFR pts. 100 and 114).
The consequence for our consideration of Question Two now is that the FEC’s new rules defining “membership organization” could significantly affect the interpretive issue presented by this question. If the Court of Appeals is right in saying that this Court’s narrowing interpretation of “political committee” in Buckley reflected First Amendment concerns, 101 F. 3d, at 741, then whether the “membership communications” exception is interpreted broadly or narrowly could affect our evaluation of the Court of Appeals’ claim that there is no constitutionally driven need to apply Buckley’s, narrowing interpretation in this context. The scope of the “membership communications” exception could also affect our evaluation of the Solicitor General’s related argument that First Amendment concerns (reflected in Buckley’s narrowing interpretation) are present whenever the Act requires disclosure. In any event, it is difficult to decide the basic issue that Question Two presents without considering the special' eonnnunicative nature of the “expenditures” here at issue, cf. United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 121 (1948) (describing relation between membership communications and constitutionally protected rights of association). And, a considered determination of the scope of the statutory exemption that Congress enacted to address membership communications would helpfully inform our consideration of the “major purpose” test.
The upshot, in our view, is that we should permit the FEC to address, in the first instance, the issue presented by Question Two. We can thereby take advantage of the relevant agency’s expertise, by allowing it to develop a more precise rule that may dispose of this case, or at a minimum, will aid the Court in reaching a more informed conclusion. In our view, the FEC should proceed to determine whether or not AIPAC’s expenditures qualify as “membership communications,” and thereby fall outside the scope of “expenditures” that could qualify it as a “political committee.” If the FEC decides that despite its new rules, the communications here do not qualify for this exception, then the lower courts, in reconsidering respondents’ arguments, can still evaluate the significance of the communicative context in which the case arises. If, on the other hand, the FEC decides that AIPAC’s activities fall within the “membership communications” exception, the matter will become moot.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
PER CURIAM.
Under federal law, a court has discretion to "allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee" in a civil rights lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (per curiam ), this Court interpreted § 1988 to permit a prevailing defendant in such a suit to recover fees only if "the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Id., at 14, 101 S.Ct. 173 (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In the decision below, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that it was not bound by this Court's interpretation of § 1988 in Hughes . According to that court, "[a]lthough the Supreme Court may have the authority to limit the discretion of lower federal courts, it does not have the authority to limit the discretion of state courts where such limitation is not contained in the statute." 158 Idaho 713, 734, 351 P.3d 1171, 1192 (2015). The court then proceeded to award attorney's fees under § 1988 to a prevailing defendant without first determining that "the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." The court's fee award rested solely on its interpretation of federal law; the court explicitly refused to award fees under state law. Id., at 734-735, 351 P.3d, at 1192-1193. We grant certiorari, and now reverse.
Section 1988 is a federal statute. "It is this Court's responsibility to say what a [federal] statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law." Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 500, 503, 184 L.Ed.2d 328 (2012) (per curiam ) (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). And for good reason. As Justice Story explained 200 years ago, if state courts were permitted to disregard this Court's rulings on federal law, "the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public mischiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 348, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816).
The Idaho Supreme Court, like any other state or federal court, is bound by this Court's interpretation of federal law. The state court erred in concluding otherwise. The judgment of the Idaho Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | F | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Article II of the Constitution requires that the President obtain "the Advice and Consent of the Senate" before appointing "Officers of the United States." § 2, cl. 2. Given this provision, the responsibilities of an office requiring Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation-known as a "PAS" office-may go unperformed if a vacancy arises and the President and Senate cannot promptly agree on a replacement. Congress has long accounted for this reality by authorizing the President to direct certain officials to temporarily carry out the duties of a vacant PAS office in an acting capacity, without Senate confirmation.
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), 5 U.S.C. § 3345 et seq., is the latest version of that authorization. Section 3345(a) of the FVRA authorizes three classes of Government officials to become acting officers. The general rule is that the first assistant to a vacant office shall become the acting officer. The President may override that default rule by directing either a person serving in a different PAS office or a senior employee within the relevant agency to become the acting officer instead.
The FVRA, however, prohibits certain persons from serving as acting officers if the President has nominated them to fill the vacant office permanently. The question presented is whether that limitation applies only to first assistants who have automatically assumed acting duties, or whether it also applies to PAS officers and senior employees serving as acting officers at the President's behest. We hold that it applies to all three categories of acting officers.
I
A
The Senate's advice and consent power is a critical "structural safeguard [ ] of the constitutional scheme." Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659, 117 S.Ct. 1573, 137 L.Ed.2d 917 (1997). The Framers envisioned it as "an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President" and a guard against "the appointment of unfit characters... from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity." The Federalist No. 76, p. 457 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). The constitutional process of Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, however, can take time: The President may not promptly settle on a nominee to fill an office; the Senate may be unable, or unwilling, to speedily confirm the nominee once submitted. Yet neither may desire to see the duties of the vacant office go unperformed in the interim.
Since President Washington's first term, Congress has given the President limited authority to appoint acting officials to temporarily perform the functions of a vacant PAS office without first obtaining Senate approval. The earliest statutes authorized the appointment of "any person or persons" to fill specific vacancies in the Departments of State, Treasury, and War. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 37, § 8, 1 Stat. 281. Congress at first allowed acting officers to serve until the permanent officeholder could resume his duties or a successor was appointed, ibid., but soon imposed a six-month limit on acting service, Act of Feb. 13, 1795, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 415.
Congress revisited the issue in the 1860s, ultimately passing the Vacancies Act of 1868. The Vacancies Act expanded the number of PAS offices that the President could fill with acting officers. Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168; see also Act of Feb. 20, 1863, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 656. With that expansion came new constraints. The authority to appoint "any person or persons" as an acting officer gave way to a default rule that the "first or sole assistant... shall" perform that function, with an exception allowing the President to instead fill the post with a person already serving in a PAS office. 15 Stat. 168. And rather than six months of acting service, the Vacancies Act generally authorized only ten days. Ibid. That narrow window of acting service was later lengthened to 30 days. Act of Feb. 6, 1891, ch. 113, 26 Stat. 733.
During the 1970s and 1980s, interbranch conflict arose over the Vacancies Act. The Department of Justice took the position that, in many instances, the head of an executive agency had independent authority apart from the Vacancies Act to temporarily fill vacant offices. The Comptroller General disagreed, arguing that the Act was the exclusive authority for temporarily filling vacancies in executive agencies. See M. Rosenberg, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, The New Vacancies Act: Congress Acts to Protect the Senate's Confirmation Prerogative 2-4 (1998) (Rosenberg). Congress then amended the Vacancies Act to clarify that it applies to such agencies, while at the same time lengthening the term of permissible acting service to 120 days, with a tolling period while a nomination is pending. Id., at 3; see Presidential Transitions Effectiveness Act, § 7, 102 Stat. 988.
But tensions did not ease. By 1998, approximately 20 percent of PAS offices in executive agencies were occupied by "temporary designees, most of whom had served beyond the 120-day limitation period... without presidential submissions of nominations." Rosenberg 1. These acting officers filled high-level positions, sometimes in obvious contravention of the Senate's wishes. One, for instance, was brought in from outside Government to serve as Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, immediately after the Senate refused to confirm him for that very office. Ibid. ; see M. Rosenberg, Congressional Research Service, Validity of Designation of Bill Lann Lee as Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights 1-3 (1998). Perceiving a threat to the Senate's advice and consent power, see Rosenberg 6, Congress acted again. In 1998, it replaced the Vacancies Act with the FVRA.
Section 3345(a) of the FVRA permits three categories of Government officials to perform acting service in a vacant PAS office. Subsection (a)(1) prescribes a general rule: If a person serving in a PAS office dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform his duties, the first assistant to that office "shall perform" the office's "functions and duties... temporarily in an acting capacity."
The next two paragraphs of § 3345(a) identify alternatives. Subsection (a)(2) provides that "notwithstanding paragraph (1)," the President "may direct a person" who already serves in a PAS office to "perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity." Subsection (a)(3) adds that "notwithstanding paragraph (1)," the President "may direct" a person to perform acting duties if the person served in a senior position in the relevant agency for at least 90 days in the 365-day period preceding the vacancy.
Section 3345 also makes certain individuals ineligible for acting service. Subsection (b)(1) states: "Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), a person may not serve as an acting officer for an office under this section" if the President nominates him for the vacant PAS office and, during the 365-day period preceding the vacancy, the individual "did not serve in the position of first assistant" to that office or "served in [that] position... for less than 90 days." Subsection (b)(2) creates an exception to this prohibition, providing that "[p]aragraph (1) shall not apply to any person" serving in a first assistant position that itself requires the Senate's advice and consent.
Other sections of the FVRA establish time limits on acting service and penalties for noncompliance. In most cases, the statute permits acting service for "210 days beginning on the date the vacancy occurs"; tolls that time limit while a nomination is pending; and starts a new 210-day clock if the nomination is "rejected, withdrawn, or returned." §§ 3346(a)-(b)(1). Upon a second nomination, the time limit tolls once more, and an acting officer can serve an additional 210 days if the second nomination proves unsuccessful.
§ 3346(b)(2). The FVRA ensures compliance by providing that, in general, "any function or duty of a vacant office" performed by a person not properly serving under the statute "shall have no force or effect." § 3348(d).
B
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) is charged with administering the National Labor Relations Act. By statute, its general counsel must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d).
In June 2010, the NLRB's general counsel-who had been serving with Senate confirmation-resigned. The President directed Lafe Solomon to serve temporarily as the NLRB's acting general counsel, citing the FVRA as the basis for the appointment. See Memorandum from President Barack Obama to L. Solomon (June 18, 2010). Solomon satisfied the requirements for acting service under subsection (a)(3) of the FVRA because he had spent the previous ten years in the senior position of Director of the NLRB's Office of Representation Appeals.
The President had bigger plans for Solomon than acting service. On January 5, 2011, he nominated Solomon to serve as the NLRB's general counsel on a permanent basis. The Senate had other ideas. That body did not act upon the nomination during the 112th Congress, so it was returned to the President when the legislative session expired. 159 Cong. Rec. S17 (Jan. 3, 2013). The President resubmitted Solomon's name for consideration in the spring of 2013, id., at S3884 (May 23, 2013), but to no avail. The President ultimately withdrew Solomon's nomination and put forward a new candidate, whom the Senate confirmed on October 29, 2013. Id., at S7635. Throughout this entire period, Solomon served as the NLRB's acting general counsel.
Solomon's responsibilities included exercising "final authority" to issue complaints alleging unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(d), 160(b). In January 2013, an NLRB Regional Director, exercising authority on Solomon's behalf, issued a complaint alleging that respondent SW General, Inc.-a company that provides ambulance services-had improperly failed to pay certain bonuses to long-term employees. An Administrative Law Judge concluded that SW General had committed unfair labor practices, and the NLRB agreed. 360 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (2014).
SW General filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. It argued that the unfair labor practices complaint was invalid because, under subsection (b)(1) of the FVRA, Solomon could not legally perform the duties of general counsel after having been nominated to fill that position. The NLRB defended Solomon's actions. It contended that subsection (b)(1) applies only to first assistants who automatically assume acting duties under subsection (a)(1), not to acting officers who, like Solomon, serve under (a)(2) or (a)(3).
The Court of Appeals granted SW General's petition for review and vacated the Board's order. It reasoned that "the text of subsection (b)(1) squarely supports" the conclusion that the provision's restriction on nominees serving as acting officers "applies to all acting officers, no matter whether they serve pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3)." 796 F.3d 67, 78 (C.A.D.C.2015). As a result, Solomon became "ineligible to serve as Acting General Counsel once the President nominated him to be General Counsel." Id., at 72. We granted certiorari, 579 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2489, 195 L.Ed.2d 822 (2016), and now affirm.
II
Subsection (b)(1) of the FVRA prevents a person who has been nominated for a vacant PAS office from performing the duties of that office in an acting capacity. In full, it states:
"(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), a person may not serve as an acting officer for an office under this section, if-
(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of the death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve, such person-
(i) did not serve in the position of first assistant to the office of such officer; or
(ii) served in the position of first assistant to the office of such officer for less than 90 days; and
(B) the President submits a nomination of such person to the Senate for appointment to such office."
Subsection (b)(2) adds that "[p]aragraph (1) shall not apply" to a person serving in a first assistant position that itself requires the advice and consent of the Senate.
We conclude that the prohibition in subsection (b)(1) applies to anyone performing acting service under the FVRA. It is not, as the Board contends, limited to first assistants performing acting service under subsection (a)(1). The text of the prohibition extends to any "person" who serves "as an acting officer... under this section," not just to "first assistants" serving under subsection (a)(1). The phrase "[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1)" does not limit the reach of (b)(1), but instead clarifies that the prohibition applies even when it conflicts with the default rule that first assistants shall perform acting duties.
A
1
Our analysis of subsection (b)(1) begins with its text. Subsection (b)(1) applies to any "person" and prohibits service "as an acting officer for an office under this section." The key words are "person" and "section." They clearly indicate that (b)(1) applies to all acting officers under § 3345, regardless of the means of appointment.
Start with "person." The word has a naturally expansive meaning that can encompass anyone who performs acting duties under the FVRA. See Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312, 98 S.Ct. 584, 54 L.Ed.2d 563 (1978). Important as they may be, first assistants are not the only "person [s]" of the bunch.
Now add "under this section." The language clarifies that subsection (b)(1) applies to all persons serving under § 3345. Congress often drafts statutes with hierarchical schemes-section, subsection, paragraph, and on down the line. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60-61, 125 S.Ct. 460, 160 L.Ed.2d 389 (2004) ; L. Filson, The Legislative Drafter's Desk Reference 222 (1992). Congress used that structure in the FVRA and relied on it to make precise cross-references. When Congress wanted to refer only to a particular subsection or paragraph, it said so. See, e.g., § 3346(a)(2) ( "subsection (b)"); § 3346(b)(2) ("paragraph (1)"). But in (b)(1) Congress referred to the entire section- § 3345 -which subsumes all of the ways a person may become an acting officer.
The rest of the FVRA uses the pairing of "person" and "section" the same way. Section 3346, for example, specifies how long "the person serving as an acting officer as described under section 3345 may serve in the office." (Emphasis added.) And § 3348(d)(1) describes the consequences of noncompliance with the FVRA by referring to the actions "taken by any person who is not acting under section 3345, 3346, or 3347." (Emphasis added.) No one disputes that both provisions apply to anyone serving as an acting officer under the FVRA, not just first assistants serving under subsection (a)(1).
Had Congress intended subsection (b)(1) to apply only to first assistants acting under (a)(1), it could easily have chosen clearer language. Replacing "person" with "first assistant" would have done the trick. So too would replacing "under this section" with "under subsection (a)(1)." "The fact that [Congress] did not adopt [either] readily available and apparent alternative strongly supports" the conclusion that subsection (b)(1) applies to any acting officer appointed under any provision within § 3345. Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181, 188, 128 S.Ct. 782, 169 L.Ed.2d 652 (2008).
The dependent clause at the beginning of subsection (b)(1)-"[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1)"-confirms that the prohibition on acting service applies even when it conflicts with the default rule that the first assistant shall perform acting duties. The ordinary meaning of "notwithstanding" is "in spite of," or "without prevention or obstruction from or by." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1545 (1986); Black's Law Dictionary 1091 (7th ed. 1999) ("Despite; in spite of"). In statutes, the word "shows which provision prevails in the event of a clash." A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 126-127 (2012). Subsection (a)(1) sets the rule that first assistants "shall perform" the vacant office's "functions and duties... in an acting capacity." But the "notwithstanding" clause in subsection (b)(1) means that, even if a first assistant is serving as an acting officer under this statutory mandate, he must cease that service if the President nominates him to fill the vacant PAS office. That subsection (b)(1) also applies to acting officers serving at the President's behest is already clear from the broad text of the independent clause-they are all "person[s]" serving "under this section."
2
The Board takes a different view of the phrase "[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1)." It begins by noting that § 3345(a) uses three different subsections to "create three separate paths for becoming an acting official." Reply Brief 2. The prohibition in subsection (b)(1), the Board continues, "applies '[n]otwithstanding' only one of these subsections-'subsection (a)(1).' " Ibid. In the Board's view, singling out subsection (a)(1) carries a negative implication: that "Congress did not intend Subsection (b)(1) to override the alternative mechanisms for acting service in Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3)." Id., at 3.
We disagree. The Board relies on the "interpretive canon, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 'expressing one item of [an] associated group or series excludes another left unmentioned.' " Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80, 122 S.Ct. 2045, 153 L.Ed.2d 82 (2002) (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002) ). If a sign at the entrance to a zoo says "come see the elephant, lion, hippo, and giraffe," and a temporary sign is added saying "the giraffe is sick," you would reasonably assume that the others are in good health.
"The force of any negative implication, however, depends on context." Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1166, 1175, 185 L.Ed.2d 242 (2013). The expressio unius canon applies only when "circumstances support[ ] a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded." Echazabal, 536 U.S., at 81, 122 S.Ct. 2045. A "notwithstanding" clause does not naturally give rise to such an inference; it just shows which of two or more provisions prevails in the event of a conflict. Such a clause confirms rather than constrains breadth. Singling out one potential conflict might suggest that Congress thought the conflict was particularly difficult to resolve, or was quite likely to arise. But doing so generally does not imply anything about other, unaddressed conflicts, much less that they should be resolved in the opposite manner.
Suppose a radio station announces: "We play your favorite hits from the '60s, '70s, and '80s. Notwithstanding the fact that we play hits from the '60s, we do not play music by British bands." You would not tune in expecting to hear the 1970s British band "The Clash" any more than the 1960s "Beatles." The station, after all, has announced that "we do not play music by British bands." The "notwithstanding" clause just establishes that this applies even to music from the '60s, when British bands were prominently featured on the charts. No one, however, would think the station singled out the '60s to convey implicitly that its categorical statement "we do not play music by British bands" actually did not apply to the '70s and '80s.
Drawing a negative inference from the "notwithstanding" clause in subsection (b)(1) is similarly inapt. Without that clause, subsection (b)(1) plainly would apply to all persons serving as acting officers under § 3345(a). Adding "notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)" makes sense because (a)(1) conflicts with (b)(1) in a unique manner. The former is mandatory and self-executing: The first assistant "shall perform" acting duties. The latter, by contrast, speaks to who "may not" be an acting officer. So if a vacancy arises and the President nominates the first assistant to fill the position, (a)(1) says the first assistant "shall perform" the duties of that office in an acting capacity while the nomination is pending, and (b)(1) says he "may not." The "notwithstanding" clause clarifies that the language of (a)(1) does not prevail if that conflict occurs.
Compare the mandatory language of subsection (a)(1) to (a)(2) and (a)(3). People appointed under those provisions are just as much acting officers as first assistants who assume the role. But there is no freestanding directive that they perform acting duties; subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) just say that the President "may direct" them to do so. The natural inference, then, is that Congress left these provisions out of the "notwithstanding" clause because they are different from subsection (a)(1), not to exempt from the broad prohibition in subsection (b)(1) those officers serving under (a)(2) and (a)(3).
Indeed, "notwithstanding" is used the same way in other parts of § 3345. Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) are each preceded by the phrase "notwithstanding paragraph (1)." The phrase recognizes that subsection (a)(1) is unique, and resolves the potential conflict between the mandatory "shall perform" in that provision and the permissive "may direct" in (a)(2) and (a)(3). But it implies nothing about other potential conflicts that may arise in the statutory scheme. In subsection (b)(1), it works the same way: The "notwithstanding" clause simply shows that (b)(1) overrides (a)(1), and nothing more.
Step back from the Board's focus on "notwithstanding" and another problem appears: Its interpretation of subsection (b)(1) makes a mess of (b)(2). Subsection (b)(2) specifies that (b)(1) "shall not apply to any person" if (A) that person "is serving as the first assistant"; (B) the first assistant position is itself a PAS office; and (C) "the Senate has approved the appointment of such person" to that office.
The Board's interpretation makes the first requirement superfluous, a result we typically try to avoid. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) ("It is... a cardinal principle of statutory construction that we must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." (internal quotation marks omitted)). If subsection (b)(1) applied only to first assistants, there would be no need to state the requirement in (b)(2)(A) that "such person is serving as the first assistant." The Board proposes that Congress did so for clarity, but the same could be said of most superfluous language.
The Board and the dissent counter that applying the prohibition in subsection (b)(1) to anyone performing acting service under § 3345(a) has its own problem: Doing so would also require applying it to § 3345(c)(1), which "would nullify" that provision. Reply Brief 9. The dissent deems this "no way to read a statute." Post, at 952.
We agree, and it is not the way we read it. Under our reading, subsection (b)(1) has no effect on (c)(1). Subsection (b)(1) addresses nominations generally, prohibiting any person who has been nominated to fill any vacant office from performing that office's duties in an acting capacity. Subsection (c)(1) speaks to a specific nomination scenario: When a person is "nominated by the President for reappointment for an additional term to the same office... without a break in service." In this particular situation, the FVRA authorizes the nominee "to continue to serve in that office." § 3345(c). "[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general." RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645, 132 S.Ct. 2065, 182 L.Ed.2d 967 (2012). The general prohibition on acting service by nominees yields to the more specific authorization allowing officers up for reappointment to remain at their posts. Applying subsection (b)(1) to § 3345(a) hardly compels a different result.
The text of subsection (b)(1) is clear: Subject to one narrow exception, it prohibits anyone who has been nominated to fill a vacant PAS office from performing the duties of that office in an acting capacity, regardless of whether the acting officer was appointed under subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3). It is not limited to first assistants who automatically assume acting duties under (a)(1).
B
The Board contends that legislative history, purpose, and post-enactment practice uniformly show that subsection (b)(1) applies only to first assistants. The text is clear, so we need not consider this extra-textual evidence. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 580 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 436, 196 L.Ed.2d 340 (2016). In any event, the Board's evidence is not compelling.
The Board argues that subsection (b)(1) was designed to serve a specific purpose: preventing the President from having his nominee serve as an acting officer by making him first assistant after (or right before) a vacancy arises. Brief for Petitioner 38. The original draft of the FVRA authorized first assistants and PAS officers to perform acting service. Subsection (b) of that draft provided that if a first assistant was nominated to fill the vacant office, he could not perform that office's duties in an acting capacity unless he had been the first assistant for at least 180 days before the vacancy. Several Senators thought the FVRA too restrictive. They asked to add senior agency officials to the list of potential acting officers and to shorten the 180-day length-of-service requirement in subsection (b). Their requests, the Board says, were granted; the final version of the FVRA included subsection (a)(3) for senior employees and shortened the length-of-service requirement to 90 days. There was no intent to extend the prohibition in subsection (b) beyond first assistants. Id., at 45-46.
The glitch in this argument is of course the text of subsection (b)(1). Congress did amend the statute to allow senior employees to become acting officers under subsection (a)(3). The only substantive change that was requested in (b) was to reduce the length-of-service requirement. Congress could have done that with a few tweaks to the original version of subsection (b). Instead, Congress went further: It also removed language that expressly limited subsection (b) to first assistants. And it added a provision-subsection (b)(2)-that makes sense only if (b)(1) applies to all acting officers. In short, Congress took a provision that explicitly applied only to first assistants and turned it into one that applies to all acting officers.
The Board protests that Congress would not have expanded the prohibition on nominees serving as acting officers after Senators asked to give the President more flexibility. See Brief for Petitioner 45-46. That certain Senators made specific demands, however, does not mean that they got exactly what they wanted. Passing a law often requires compromise, where even the most firm public demands bend to competing interests. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 93-94, 122 S.Ct. 1155, 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002). What Congress ultimately agrees on is the text that it enacts, not the preferences expressed by certain legislators. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) ("[I]t is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.").
Compromise is precisely what happened here: "[A] period of intense negotiations" took place after Senators demanded changes to the original draft of the FVRA, and the final bill was "a compromise measure." Rosenberg 9. The legislation as passed did expand the pool of individuals the President could appoint as acting officers, by adding senior employees in subsection (a)(3). But it also expanded the scope of the limitation on acting service in (b)(1), by dropping the language making (b)(1) applicable only to first assistants.
The Board contends that this compromise must not have happened because Senator Thompson, one of the sponsors of the FVRA, said that subsection (b)(1) "applies only when the acting officer is the first assistant, and not when the acting officer is designated by the President pursuant to §§ 3345(a)(2) or 3345(a)(3)." 144 Cong. Rec. 27496 (1998). But Senator Byrd-the very next speaker-offered a contradictory account: A nominee may not "serve as an acting officer" if "he is not the first assistant" or "has been the first assistant for less than 90... days, and has not been confirmed for the position." Id., at 27498. This is a good example of why floor statements by individual legislators rank among the least illuminating forms of legislative history. See Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572, 131 S.Ct. 1259, 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) ("Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text. We will not take the opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.").
Finally, the Board supports its interpretation with post-enactment practice. It notes that the Office of Legal Counsel and the Government Accountability Office have issued guidance construing subsection (b)(1) to apply only to first assistants. And three Presidents have, without congressional objection, submitted the nominations of 112 individuals who were serving as acting officers under subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3). The Board contends that this "historical practice" is entitled to "significant weight" because the FVRA "concern[s] the allocation of power between two elected branches of Government." Brief for Petitioner 49 (quoting NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 2559, 189 L.Ed.2d 538 (2014) ; internal quotation marks omitted).
"[H]istorical practice" is too grand a title for the Board's evidence. The FVRA was not enacted until 1998, and the 112 nominations that the Board cites make up less than two percent of the thousands of nominations to positions in executive agencies that the Senate has considered in the years since its passage. Even the guidance documents the Board cites paid the matter little attention; both made conclusory statements about subsection (b)(1), with no analysis.
In this context, Congress's failure to speak up does not fairly imply that it has acquiesced in the Board's interpretation. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185, n. 21, 90 S.Ct. 314, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969) ; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). The Senate may not have noticed that certain nominees were serving as acting officers in violation of the FVRA, or it may have chosen not to reject a qualified candidate just to make a point about compliance with the statute. Either is at least as plausible as the theory that the Legislature's inaction reflects considered acceptance of the Executive's practice.
Our decision in Noel Canning -the chief opinion on which the Board relies-is a sharp contrast. That case dealt with the President's constitutional authority under the Recess Appointments Clause, an issue that has attracted intense attention and written analysis from Presidents, Attorneys General, and the Senate. 573 U.S., at ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2567-2573. The voluminous historical record dated back to "the beginning of the Republic," and included "thousands of intra-session recess appointments." Id., at ----, ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2560, 2562. That the chronicle of the Recess Appointments Clause weighed heavily in Noel Canning offers no support to the Board here.
III
Applying the FVRA to this case is straightforward. Solomon was appointed as acting general counsel under subsection (a)(3). Once the President submitted his nomination to fill that position in a permanent capacity, subsection (b)(1) prohibited him from continuing his acting service. This does not mean that the duties of general counsel to the NLRB needed to go unperformed; the President could have appointed another person to serve as the acting officer in Solomon's place. And he had a wide array of individuals to choose from: any one of the approximately 250 senior NLRB employees or the hundreds of individuals in PAS positions throughout the Government. The President, however, did not do so, and Solomon's continued service violated the FVRA. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX
Section 3345 of the FVRA
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | M | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether 18 U. S. C. § 660 (1964 ed.), which prohibits certain embezzlements by employees of “any firm, association, or corporation engaged in commerce as a common carrier,” applies to the conduct of an employee of an individual doing business as a common carrier. The indictment in this case charged that, while riding on his employer’s truck, appellee, “a truck driver for Tolbert Hawkins, an individual engaged in commerce as a common carrier,” embezzled approximately $200 from funds of his employer accruing from an interstate shipment of bananas. Holding that the indictment failed to charge an offense within § 660 because it charged that appellee acted as an employee of “an individual” while § 660 forbids the proscribed acts only when committed by employees of a “firm, association, or corporation,” the District Court dismissed the indictment. Accord, Schmokey v. United States, 182 F. 2d 937 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1950). The United States brought a direct appeal pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (1964 ed.), and we noted probable jurisdiction, 382 U. S. 953.
Section 660 punishes embezzlements from a common carrier by either (1) “a president, director, officer, or manager of any firm, association, or corporation engaged in commerce as a common carrier,” or (2) “an employee of such common carrier riding in or upon any . . . vehicle of such carrier moving in interstate commerce.” The present form of the statute dates from the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code. Prior to that time, the separate groups — named executives, and employees riding in vehicles in commerce — were the subject of distinct criminal provisions. 18 U. S. C. §412 (1946 ed.), like the present § 660, applied to named executives of “any firm, association, or corporation engaged in commerce as a common carrier.” 18 U. S. C. § 409 (a)(5) (1946 ed.) applied to employees of “any carrier,” with no express limitation relating to the form of the employer’s ownership. The legislative history — including a 1946 revision expanding the coverage of the section to all modes of transportation — and the prevalent usage of the expression “any carrier” in statutes regulating commerce convincingly establish that § 409 (a)(5) embraced employees of individual proprietorships. As this much is conceded by appellee, we need not detail that legislative history and common usage here. Appellee urges, however, that the phrase “firm, association, or corporation” absorbed into § 660 from the earlier executive provision, § 412, is not sufficiently broad to include individual proprietors; that the revision in 1948 therefore narrowed the coverage of the employee provision; and that this result is compelled by the general canon of construction that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. The United States counters that the choice of the language used in the predecessor executive provision, rather than that in the predecessor employee provision, was merely a stylistic preference not evidencing any intent to narrow coverage of employee offenders and that a “firm” may be any business organization, whether individually owned or otherwise.
We think the position of the United States is sound and we reverse the District Court. There is no doubt that the 1946 statute covered employees of individuals and in our view it was not intended by adopting the 1948 revision of the Code to make any substantive change in the law by excluding from its coverage the employees of any class of carrier who had been previously covered. The general purpose of the new Code was to “codify and revise .... The original intent of Congress is preserved,” S. Rep. No. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1, and with respect to the new § 660, the reviser’s note, while noting the consolidation of a portion of § 409 and § 412 and stating that “[c]hanges were made in phraseology,” disclosed no intention of making any change in the substantive content or the coverage of the law. See legislative history note following 18 U. S. C. § 660 (1964 ed.). To us the congressional intent to reach the employees of any carrier, whatever the form of business organization, seems reasonably clear.
Appellee relies principally upon the abandonment of the words “employee of any carrier” and the substitution of the present language of § 660 which does not expressly include the employees of “any person” or “any individual” doing business as a common carrier. But the term “firm” is certainly broad enough in common usage to embrace individuals acting as common carriers; and in those instances where Congress has explicitly-indicated its understanding of the term, the definition of “firm” has included individual proprietorships. 19 U. S. C. § 1806 (3) (1964 ed.); 19 U. S. C. § 2022(0(3) (1964 ed., Supp. I).
Nor has any plausible reason been advanced for drawing a distinction between employees of individuals and employees of partnership or corporate common carriers. The possible burden to interstate commerce or the need for federal jurisdiction to supplement state jurisdiction — in view of the frequent difficulty of showing in what State the crime occurred- — does not vary with the form of business organization. On the other hand, since a large portion of common carriers are individually owned proprietorships, acceptance of appellee’s interpretation of § 660 would exclude a substantial segment of the industry from the coverage of the Act — a result that should not be inferred from the 1948 “changes ... in phraseology” without some specific indication that Congress had receded from the intention it clearly expressed in 1946 of expanding coverage of the Act to all carriers. See S. Rep. No. 1632, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
We are mindful of the maxim that penal statutes should be strictly construed. But that canon “is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose,” United States v. Brown, 333 U. S. 18, 25, and does not “require that the act be given the ‘narrowest meaning.’ It is sufficient if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the evident intent of Congress.” United States v. Raynor, 302 U. S. 540, 552; see also United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503; United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U. S. 121; United States v. Shirey, 359 U. S. 255. In this case the fair meaning of the term in dispute — as evidenced by common usage and its statutory meaning in other contexts — and the manifest intention of Congress in using it here lead us to conclude that § 660 encompasses embezzlements by employees of individual proprietorships.
Reversed.
“Whoever, being a president, director, officer, or manager of any firm, association, or corporation engaged in commerce as a common carrier, or whoever, being an employee of such common carrier riding in or upon any railroad car, motortruck, steamboat, vessel, aircraft or other vehicle of such carrier moving in interstate commerce, embezzles, steals, abstracts, or willfully misapplies, or willfully permits to be misapplied, any of the moneys, funds, credits, securities, property, or assets of such firm, association, or corporation arising or accruing from, or used in, such commerce, in whole or in part, or willfully or knowingly converts the same to his own use or to the use of another, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” 18 U. S. C. § 660 (1964 ed.).
See n. 1, supra.
“Every president, director, officer, or manager of any firm, assocition, or corporation engaged in commerce as a common carrier, who embezzles, steals, abstracts, or willfully misapplies, or willfully permits to be misapplied, any of the moneys, funds, credits, securities, property, or assets of such firm, association, or corporation arising or accruing from, or used in', such commerce, in whole or in part, or willfully or knowingly converts the same to his own use or to the use of another, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be fined not less than $500, or confined in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than ten years, or both, in the discretion of the court.” Act of Oct. 15, 1914, § 9, 38 Stat. 733, 18 U. S. C. §412 (1946 ed.).
“(a) Whoever shall—
“(5) being an employee of any carrier riding in, on or upon any railroad car, motortruck, steamboat, vessel, aircraft, or other vehicle of such carrier transporting passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce and having in his custody funds arising out of or accruing from such transportation, embezzle or unlawfully convert to his own use any such funds; shall in each case be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” Act of Feb. 13, 1913, 37 Stat. 670, as amended, 18 U. S. C. §409 (a)(5) (1946 ed.).
Some sources define “firm” as “[t]he persons composing a partnership, taken collectively.” II Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 1232 (1914); see also Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 507 (2d ed. 1948); Black’s Law Dictionary 761-762 (4th ed. 1951); Crowell’s Dictionary of Business and Finance 225 (rev. ed. 1930); Encyclopedia of Banking and Finance 238 (Garcia, 5th ed. 1949). But other dictionaries, while recognizing that narrow definition, also state that the word has a broader meaning in popular usage, connoting any business entity, including individual proprietorships. For example, the standard American reference defines “firm” both as “a partnership of two or more persons not recognized as a legal person distinct from the members composing it” and as any “business unit or enterprise.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary — Unabridged 856 (1961). Accord, Clark & Gottfried, Dictionary of Business and Finance 152 (1957) (“Strictly, an unincorporated business carried on by more than one person, jointly; a partnership. ... In popular usage, any business, company, or concern, incorporated or not.”); Dictionary of Business and Industry 218 (Schwartz ed. 1954) (“A business partnership; any business house or organization, no matter what its legal form . . .”); Dictionary of English Law 807 (1959) (“the style or title under which one or several persons carry on business”); Dictionary of Foreign Trade 308 (Henius, 2d ed. 1947) (“The name or title under which one or more persons do business”).
While numerous decisions of state courts have enunciated a restrictive definition of “firm” — and in turn have influenced the definition given in law dictionaries, see the citation to Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Webb, 207 Ark. 820, 182 S. W. 2d 941 (1944), in Black’s Law Dictionary, supra — such decisions have not involved the issue of whether an individual proprietorship may be deemed a “firm.” Typically the question has been wiiether two or more persons holding themselves out as a firm should be held to constitute a partnership for various purposes of partnership law such as liability on a partnership note, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Webb, supra, imputation of knowledge from partners to the partnership, McCosker v. Banks, 84 Md. 292, 35 A. 935 (1896), or liability of one partner for the acts of another, Bufton v. Hoseley, 236 Ore. 12, 386 P. 2d 471 (1963).
The two provisions are identical and read as follows:
“The tema 'firm' includes an individual proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, association, corporation (including a development corporation), business trust, cooperative, trastees in bankruptcy, and receivers under decree of any court. . . .”
A random sampling of 1,500 of 11,700 ICC-certifieated Class III motor carriers of property (i. e., those with an annual revenue of less than $200,000) showed that at the end of 1964 almost 40% were individually owned and operated. About 1% operated in partnership form, and the remainder operated as corporations. Brief of United States 13, n. 8.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires our further consideration of the family partnership problem. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that the entire income from-a partnership allegedly entered into by respondent and his four sons must be taxed to respondent, and the Tax Court sustained that determination. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 168 F. 2d 979. We granted certiorari, 335 U. S. 883, to consider the Commissioner’s claim that thq. principles of Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946), and Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U. S. 293 (1946), have been departed from in this and other courts of appeals decisions.
Respondent taxpayer is a rancher. From 1915 until October 1939, he had operated a cattle business in partnership with R. S. Coon. Coon, who had numerous business interests in the Southwest and had largely financed the partnership, was 79 years old in 1939 and desired to dissolve the partnership because of ill health. To that end, the bulk of the partnership herd was sold until, in October of that year, only about 1,500 head remained. These cattle were all registered Herefords, the brood or foundation herd. Culbertson wished to keep these cattle and approached Coon with an. ffer of $65 a head. Coon agreed to sell at that price, Dut only upon condition that Culbertson would sell an undivided one-half interest in the herd to his four sons at the same price. His reasons for imposing this condition were his intense interest in maintaining the Hereford strain which he and Culbertson had developed, his conviction that Culbertson was too old to carry on the work alone, and his personal interest in the Culbertson boys. Culbertson’s sons were enthusiastic about the proposition, so respondent thereupon bought the remaining cattle from the Coon and Culbertson partnership for $99,440. Two days later. Culbertson sold an undivided one-half interest to the four boys, and the following day they gave their father a note for $49,720 at 4 per cent interest due one year from date. Several months later a new note for $57,674 was executed by the boys to replace the earlier note. The increase in amount covered the purchase by Culbertson and his sons of other properties formerly owned by Coon and Culbertson. This note was paid by the boys in the following manner:
Credit for overcharge................. $5,930
Gifts from respondent................ 21,744
One-half of a loan procured by Culbertson & Sons partnership...........:.. 30,000
The loan was repaid from the proceeds from operation of the ranch.
The partnership agreement between taxpayer ánd his sons was oral. The local paper announced ,the dissolution of the Coon and Culbertson partnership and the continuation of the business by respondent and his boys under the name of Culbertson &.Sons. A bank.account was opened in this name, upon which taxpayer, his four sons and a bookkeeper could check. At the time of formation of the new partnérship, Culbertson’s oldest son was 24 years old, married, and living on the ranch, of which he had for two years been foreman under the Coon and Culbertson partnership. He was a college graduate and received $100 a month plus board and lodging for himself and his wife both before and after formation-of Culbertson & Sons and until entering the Army. The second son was 22 years old, was married and finished college in 1940, the first year'during which the new part-, nership operated. He went directly into the Army following graduation and rendered no services to the partnership. The two younger sons, who were 18 and Í6 years old respectively in 1940, went to school during the winter and worked on the ranch during the summer.
The tax years here involved are 1940 and 1941. A partnership return was filed for both years indicating a division of income approximating the capital attributed to each partner. It is the disallowance of this division of the income from the ranch that brings this case into the courts.
First. The Tax Court read our decisions in Commissioner v. Tower, supra, and Lusthaus v. Commissioner, supra, as setting out two essential tests of partnership for income-tax purposes: that each partner contribute to the partnership either vital services or capital originating with him. Its decision was based upon a finding that none of respondent’s sons had satisfied those requirements during the tax years in question. Sanction for the use of these “tests” of partnership is sought in this paragraph from our opinion in the Tower case:
“There can be no question that a wife and a husband may, under certain circumstances, become partners for tax, as for other, purposes. If she either invests capital originating with hér or substantially contributes to the control and management of the business, or otherwise performs vital additional services, or does all of these things she may be a partner as contemplated by 26 U. S. C. §§ 181, 182. The Tax Court has recognized that under such circumstances the income belongs to the wife. A wife may become a general or a limited partner with her husband. But when she does not share in the management and control of the business, contributes no vital additional service,, and where the husband purports in some way to have given her a partnership interest, the Tax Court may properly take these circumstances into consideration in determining whether the partnership is real within the meaning of the federal revenue laws.” 327 U. S. at 290.
It is the Commissioner’s contention that the Tax Court’s decision can and should be reinstated upon the mere reaffirmation of the quoted paragraph.
The Court of Appeals; on the other hand, was of the opinion that a family partnership entered into without thought of tax avoidance should be given recognition tax-wise whether or not it ¿was intended that some of the partners contribute either capital or services during the tax year and whether or not they actually made such-contributions, since, it was formed “with the full expectation and purpose that the boys would, in the future, contribute their , time and services to the partnership.” We must consider, therefore, whether an intention to contribute capital or services sometime in the future is sufficient to satisfy ordinary concepts of partnership, as required by the Tower case. The sections of the Internal Revenue Code involved are §§ 181 and 182, which set out the method of taxing partnership income, and §§11 and 22 (a), which relate to the taxation of individual incomes.
In the Tower case we held that, despite the claimed partnership, the evidence fully justified the Tax Court’s holding that the husband, through his ownership of the capital and his management of the business, actually created the right to receive and enjoy the benefit of the income and was thus taxable upon that entire income under §§ 11 and 22 (a). In such case, other members of the partnership cannot be considered “Individuals carrying on business in partnership” and thus “liable for income tax ... in their individual capacity” within the meaning of § 181. If it is conceded that some of the partners contributed neither capital nor services to the partnership during the tax years in question, as the Court of Appeals was apparently willing to do in the present case, it can hardly be contended that they are in any way responsible for the production of income during those years. - The partnership sections of the Code are, of course, geared to the sections relating to taxation of individual income, since no tax is imposed upon partnership income as such. To hold that “Individuals carrying on business in partnership” includes persons who contribute nothing during the tax period would viola té the first principle of income taxation: that income must be taxed to him who earns it. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940); National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U. S. 422 (1949).
Furthermore, our decision in Commissioner v. Tower, supra, clearly indicates the importance of participation in the business by the partners during the tax year. We there said that a partnership is created “when persons join together their money, goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying oñ a trade, profession, or business and when there is community of interest in the' profits and-losses.” Id. at 286. This is, after all, but the application of an often iterated definition of income — the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined — to a particular form of business organization. A partnership is, in other words, an organization for the production of income to which each partner contributes one or both of the ingredients of income — capital or services. Ward v. Thompson, 22 How. 330, 334 (1859). The intent to provide money, goods, labor, or skill sometime in the future- cannot meet the demands of §§11 and 22 (a) of the Code that he who- presently earns the income through his own labor and skill and the utilization of his own capital, be taxed therefor. The vagaries of human experience preclude reliance upon even good faith intent as to future conduct as a basis for the present taxation of income.
Second. We turn next to a consideration of the Tax Court’s approach to the family partnership problem. It treated as essential to membership in a family partnership for tax purposes the contribution of either “vital services” or “original capital.” Use of these “tests” of partnership indicates, at best, an error in emphasis. It ignores what we said is the ultimate question for decision, namely ^“whether the partnership is real within the meaning of the federal revenue laws” and makes decisive what we described as “circumstances [to be taken] into consideration” in making that determination.
The Tower case thus provides no support for such an approach. We there said that the question whether the family partnership is real for income-tax purposes depends upon
“whether the partners really and truly intended to join together for the purpose of carrying on business and sharing in the profits or losses or both. And their intention in this respect is a question of fact, to be determined from testimony disclosed by their ‘agreement, considered as a whole, and by their conduct in execution of its provisions.’ Drennen v. London Assurance Co., 113 U. S. 51, 56; Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 268. We see no reason why this general rule should not apply in tax cases where the Government challenges the existence of a partnership for tax purposes.” 327 U. S. at 287.
The question is not whether the services or capital contributed by a partner are of sufficient importance to meet some objective standard supposedly established by the Tower, case, but whether, considering all the facts — the agreement, the conduct of the parties in execution of its provisions, their statements, the testimony of disinterested persons, the relationship of the parties, their respective abilities and capital contributions, the actual control of income and the purposes for which it is used, and any other facts throwing light on their true intent — the parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise. There is nothing new or particularly difficult about such a test. Triers of fact are constantly called upon to determine the intent with which a person acted. The Tax Court, for example, must make such a determination in every estate tax case in which it is contended that a transfer was made in contemplation of death, for “The question, necessarily, is as to the state of mind of the donor.” United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 117 (1931). See Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 326 U. S. 630 (1946). Whether the parties really intended to carry on business as partners is not, we' think, any more difficult of determination or the manifestations of such intent any less perceptible than is ordinarily true of inquiries into the subjective.
But the Tax Court did not view the question as one concerning the-bona fide intent of the parties to join together as partners. Not once in its opinion is there even an oblique reference to any lack of intent on the part of respondent and his sons to combine their capital and services “for the purpose of .arrying on the business.” Instead, the court, focusing entirely upon concepts of “vital services” and “original capital,” simply decided that the alleged partners had not satisfied those tests when the facts were compared with those in the Tower case. The court’s opinion is replete with such statements as “we discern nothing constituting what we think is a requisite contribution to a real partnership,” “we find no son adding ‘vital additional service’ which would take the place of capital contributed because of formation of a partnership,” and “the sons made no capital contribution, within the sense of the Tower case.” 6 CCH TCM 698, 699.
• Unquestionably a court’s determination that the services cpntribiited by a partner are not “vital” and that he has not participated in “managemént and control of the business” or contributed “original capital” has the effect of placing a heavy burden on the taxpayer to show the bona fide intent of the parties to join together as partners. But such a determination is not conclusive, and that is the vice in the “tests” adopted by the Tax Court. It assumes that there is no room for an honest difference of opinion as to whether the services or capital furnished by the alleged partner are of sufficient importance to justify his inclusion in the partnership. If, upon a consideration of all the facts, it is found that the partners joined together in good faith to conduct a business, having agreed that the services or capital to. be contributed presently by each is of such value to the partnership that the contributor should participate in the distribution of profits, that is sufficient. The Tower case did not purport to authorize the Tax Court to substitute its judgment for that of the parties; it simply furnished some guides to the determination of their true intent. Even though it was admitted in the Tower case that the wife contributed no original capital, management of the business, or other vital services, this Court did not say as a matter of law that there was no valid partnership. We said, instead, that “There was, thus, more than ample evidence to support the Tax Court’s finding that no genuine union for partnership business purposes was ever intended and that the husband earned the income.” 327 U. S. at 292. (Italics added.)
Third. The Tax Court’s isolation op “original capital” as an essential of membership in- a family partnership also indicates an erroneous reading of the Tower opinion. We did not say that the donee of an intra-family gift could never become a partner through investment of the capital in the family partnership, any more than we said that all family trusts are invalid for tax purposes in Helvering v. Clifford, supra. The facts may indicate, on the contrary, that the amount thus contributed and the income therefrom should be considered the property of the donee for tax, as well as general law, purposes/' In the Tower and Lusthaus cases this Court, applying the principles of Lucas v. Earl, supra; Helvering v. Clifford, supra; and Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, found that the purported gift, whether or not technically complete, had made no substantial change in the economic relation of members of the family to' the income. In'each case the husband continued to manage and control the business as before, and income from the property given to the wife and invested by her in the. partnership continued to be used in the. business or expended for family purposes. . We characterized the results of the transactions entered into between Jiusband and wife as “a mere paper reallocation of income among the family members,” noting that “The actualities of their relation to the income did not change.” 327 U. S. at 292. This, we thought, provided' ample grounds for the finding that no true partnership was intended; that the husband was still the true earner of the income
But application of the Clifford-Horst principle does not follow automatically upon a gift to a member of one’s family, followed by its investment in the family partnership. If it did, it would be necessary to define “family” and to set precise limits of membership therein. We have not done so for the obvious reason thát existence' of the family relationship does not create a status which itself determines tax questions, but is simply a warning that things may not be what they seem. It is frequently stated that transactions between members of a family will be carefully scrutinized. But, more particularly, the family relationship often makes it possible for one to shift tax incidence by surface changes of ownership without disturbing in the least his dominion and control over the subject of the gift or the purposes for which the income from the property is used. He is able, in other words, to retain “the substance of full enjoyment of all the rights which previously he had in the property.” Helvering v. Clifford, supra, at 336.
The fact that transfers to members of the family group may be mere camouflage does not, however, mean that they invariably are. The Tower case recognized that one’s participation in control and management of, the business is a circumstance indicating an intent to be a bona fide partner despite the fact that the capital contributed originated elsewhere in the family. If the donee of property who then invests it in the family partnership exercises dominion and control over that property — and through that control influences the conduct of the partnership and the disposition of its' income— he may well be a true partner. Whether he is free to, and does, enjoy the fruits of the partnership is strongly indicative of the reality of his participation in the enterprise. In the Tower and Lusthaus cases we distinguished between active participation in the affairs of "the business by a donee of a share in the partnership on the one hand, attd his passive acquiescence to the will of the donor on the other. This distinction is of obvious importance to a determination of the true intent of the parties. It is meaningless if “original capital” is an essential test of membership in a ■family partnership.
The cause must therefore be remanded to the Tax Court for a decision as to which,' if any, of respondent’s sons were partners with him in the operation of the ranch during 1940 and 1941. As to which of them, in other words, was there a bona fide intent that they be partners in the conduct of the cattle business, either because of services to be performed during those years, or because' of contributions of capital of which they were the true owners, as we have defined that term in the Clifford, Horst, and Tower cases? No question as to the allocation of income between capital and services is presented in this case, and we intimate no opinion on that subject.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is revt.sed with directions to remand the cause' to the Tax Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Rutledge think that the Tax Court properly applied the principles of the Tower and LiCsthaus decisions. (327 U. S. 280, id., 293) in this case. However, they consider it of paramount importance in this case to have a court interpretation of the applicable taxing statute, for guidance in its application. Accordingly, they acquiesce in the Court’s opinion and judgment.
Gladys Culbertson, the wife of W. 0. Culbertson, Sr., is joined as a party because of her community of interest in the property án4 income of her husband under Texas law.
A daughter was also made a member of the partnership some time after its formation upon the gift by respondent of one-quarter of his one-half interest in the partnership. Respondent did not contend before the Tax Court that she was a partner for tax purposes.
168 F. 2d 979 at 982. The court further said: “Neither statute, common sensé, nor impelling precedent requires the holding, that a partner must contribute capital or render services to the partnership prior to the time that he is taken into it. These tests are equally effective whether the capital and the services are presently contributed and'rendered or are later to be contributed or to be rendered.” Id. at 983. See Note, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 595.
26 U. S. C. §§181, 182.
26 U. S. C. §§11, 22 (a).
Of course one who has been a bona fide partner does not lose that status when he is called into military or government service, and the Commissioner has not so contended. On the other hand, one hardly becomes a partner1"in the conventional sense merely because he might have, done so had- ne not been called.
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207 (1920); Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, 519 (1921). See Treas. Reg.. 101, Art. 22 (a)-1. See 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, 159 et seq.
The reductio ad absurdum of -the theory that children may be-partners With their parents before they are capable of being entrusted with the disposition of partnership funds or of contributing súbstantial services occurred in Tinkoff v. Commissioner, 120 F. 2d 564, where a taxpayer made his son a partner in his accounting firm the. day the son was born.
While the Tax Court went on to consider other factors, it is clear from its opinion that a contribution of either “vital services” or “original capital” was considered essential to membership in the partnership. After finding that none of respondent’s sons had, in the court’s opinion, contributed either, the court continued: “In addition to the above inquiry as to the presence of those elements deemed by the Tower case essential to partnerships recognizable for Federal tax purposes, . . . .” 6 CCH TCM 692, 699. Again, the court commented:
“Though the petitioner urges that many cattle businesses are composed of fathers and sons, and that the nature of the industry so requires, we think the sarnie is probably equally true of other industries where men wish to take children, into business with them. Nevertheless, we think that fact does not override the many decisions to the general effect that partners must contribute capital originating with them, or vital services.” Id. at 700.
See Mannheimer and Mook, A Taxwise Evaluation of Family Partnerships, 32 Iowa L. Rev. 436,447-48.
This is not, as we understand it, contrary to the approach taken by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in its most recent statement of policy. I. T. 3845,1947 Cum. Bull. 66, states at p. 67 :•
“Where persons who are closely related by blood or marriage enter into an agreement purporting to create a so-called family partnership or other arrangement with respect to the operation of a business or income-producing venture, under which agreement all of the parties are accorded substantially the same treatment and consideration with respect to their designated interests and prescribed responsibilities in the business as if they were strangers dealing at arm’s length; where the actions of the parties as legally responsible persons evidence an intent to carry on a business in a partnership relation; and where the terms of such agreement are substantially followed in the operation of’'the business or venture, as well as in the dealings of the partners or. members with each other, it is the policy of the Bureau to disregard the close family relationship existing between the parties and to recognize, for Federal income tax purposes, the division of profits as prescribed by such agreement. However, where the instrument purporting to create the family partnership expressly .provides that the wife or child or other member of the family shall not be required, to participate in the management of the business, or is merely silent on that point, the- extent and nature of the services of such individual in the actual conduct of the business will be given appropriate evidentiary weight as to the question of intent to carry on the business as partners.”
Nearly three-quarters of a century ago, Bowen, L. J., made the classic statement that “the state of a man’s mind is as much a fact. as the state of his digestion.” Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 L. R. Ch. Div. 459, 483. State of mind has always been determinative 'of the question whether a partnership has been formed as between' the parties. See, e. g., Drennen v. London Assurance Co., 113 U. S. 51, 56 (1885); Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611, 621 (1892); Barker v. Kraft, 259 Mich. 70, 242 N. W. 841 (1932); Zuback v. Bakmaz, 346 Pa. 279, 29 A. 2d 473 (1943); Kennedy v. Mullins, 155 Va. 166, 154 S. E. 568 (1930).
In the Tower case the taxpayer argued that he had a right to reduce his taxes by any legal means, to which this Court agreed. We said, however, that existence of a tax avoidance motive gives some indication that there was no bona fide intent to carry on business as a partnership. If Tower had set ud objective requirements of membership in, a family partnership, such as “vital services” and “original .caffital,” the motives behind adoption of the partnership form would have been irrelevant.
Although “management and control of the business” was one of the circumstances emphasized by the Tower case, along with “vital services” and “original capital,” the- Tax Court did not consider it an alternative “test” of partnership. See discussion, infra, at part Third, and note 17.
Except, of course, when Congress defines “family” and attaches tax consequences thereto. See, e. g. 26 U. S. C. §503 (a) (2).
It is not enough to say in this case, as we did in the Clifford case, that “If is hard to imagine that respondent felt himself the poorer after this [partnership agreement]- had been executed or, if he did, that it had any rational foundation in fact.” 309 U. S. at 336. Culbertson’s interest in his partnership with Coon was worth about $50,000 immediately prior to dissolution of the partnership. In order to sustain the Tax Court, we would have to conclude that he felt himself worth approximately twice that much upon his purchase of Coon’s interest, even though he had agreed to sell that interest to his sons at the same price.
As noted above (note 13), participation in control and management of the business, although given equal prominence with contributions of “vital services” and “original capital” as circumstances indicating an intent to enter into a partnership relation, .was discarded by the Tax Court as a “test” of partnership. This indicates a basic and erroneous assumption that one can never make a gift to a member of one’s family without retaining the essentials of ownership, if the gift is then invested in a family partnership.- We included participation in management and control of the business as a circumstance indicative of intent to carry on business' as a partner to cover the situation in which active dominion and control of the subject of the gift had actually passed to the donee. It is a circumstance of prime importance.'
There is testimony in the record as to the participation by respondent’s sons in the management of the ranch. ■ Since such evidence did not fall within either of th$ “tests” adopted by the Tax Court, it failed to consider this testimony. Without intimating any opinion as to its probative value, we think that it is clearly relevant evidence of the intent to carry on business as partners.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | L | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Bankruptcy Code excludes from the bankruptcy estate property of the debtor that is subject to a restriction on transfer enforceable under “applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U. S. C. § 541(c)(2). We must decide in this case whether an antialienation provision contained in an ERISA-qualified pension plan constitutes a restriction on transfer enforceable under “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” and whether, accordingly, a debtor may exclude his interest in such a plan from the property of the bankruptcy estate.
HH
Respondent Joseph B. Shumate, Jr., was employed for over 30 years by Coleman Furniture Corporation, where he ultimately attained the position of president and chairman of the board of directors. Shumate and approximately 400 other employees were participants in the Coleman Furniture Corporation Pension Plan (Plan). The Plan satisfied all applicable requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and qualified for favorable tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code. In particular, Article 16.1 of the Plan contained the antialienation provision required for qualification under § 206(d)(1) of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(1) (“Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated”). App. 342. Shumate’s interest in the Plan was valued at $250,000. Id., at 93-94.
In 1982, Coleman Furniture filed a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding, and a trustee, Roy V. Creasy, was appointed. Shumate himself encountered financial difficulties and filed a petition for bankruptcy in 1984. His case, too, was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding, and petitioner John R. Patterson was appointed trustee.
Creasy terminated and liquidated the Plan, providing full distributions to all participants except Shumate. Patterson then filed an adversary proceeding against Creasy in the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia to recover Shumate’s interest in the Plan for the benefit of Shumate’s bankruptcy estate. Shumate in turn asked the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, which already had jurisdiction over a related proceeding, to compel Creasy to pay Shumate’s interest in the Plan directly to him. The bankruptcy proceeding subsequently was consolidated with the District Court action. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a-54a.
The District Court rejected Shumate’s contention that his interest in the Plan should be excluded from his bankruptcy estate. The court held that §541(c)(2)’s reference to “non-bankruptcy law” embraced only state law, not federal law such as ERISA. Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 83 B. R. 404, 406 (1988). Applying Virginia law, the court held that Shumate’s interest in the Plan did not qualify for protection as a spendthrift trust. Id., at 406-409. The District Court also rejected Shumate’s alternative argument that even if his interest in the Plan could not be excluded from the bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2), he was entitled to an exemption under 11 U. S. C. § 522(b)(2)(A), which allows a debtor to exempt from property of the estate “any property that is exempt under Federal law.” 83 B. R., at 409-410. The District Court ordered Creasy to pay Shumate’s interest in the Plan over to his bankruptcy estate. App. to Pet. for Cert. 54a-55a.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. 943 F. 2d 362 (1991). The court relied on its earlier decision in In re Moore, 907 F. 2d 1476 (1990), in which another Fourth Circuit panel was described as holding, subsequent to the District Court’s decision in the instant case, that “ERISA-qualified plans, which by definition have a non-alienation provision, constitute ‘applicable nonbankruptcy law’ and contain enforceable restrictions on the transfer of pension interests.” 943 F. 2d, at 365. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that Shumate’s interest in the Plan should be excluded from the bankruptcy estate under § 541(c)(2). Ibid. The court then declined to consider Shumate’s alternative argument that his interest in the Plan qualified for exemption under § 522(b). Id., at 365-366.
We granted certiorari, 502 U. S. 1057 (1992), to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether an antialienation provision in an ERISA-qualified pension plan constitutes a restriction on transfer enforceable under “applicable nonbankruptcy law” for purposes of the § 541(c)(2) exclusion of property from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.
B
>
In our view, the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA is our determinant. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U. S. 157, 160 (1991). Section 541(c)(2) provides the following exclusion from the otherwise broad definition of “property of the estate” contained in § 541(a)(1) of the Code:
“A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.” (Emphasis added.)
The natural reading of the provision entitles a debtor to exclude from property of the estate any interest in a plan or trust that contains a transfer restriction enforceable under any relevant nonbankruptcy law. Nothing in § 541 suggests that the phrase “applicable nonbankruptcy law” refers, as petitioner contends, exclusively to state law. The text contains no limitation on “applicable nonbankruptcy law” relating to the source of the law.
Reading the term “applicable nonbankruptcy law” in § 541(c)(2) to include federal as well as state law comports with other references in the Bankruptcy Code to sources of law. The Code reveals, significantly, that Congress, when it desired to do so, knew how to restrict the scope of applicable law to “state law” and did so with some frequency. See, e. g., 11 U. S. C. § 109(c)(2) (entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 if authorized “by State law”); § 522(b)(1) (election of exemptions controlled by “the State law that is applicable to the debtor”); § 523(a)(5) (a debt for alimony, maintenance, or support determined “in accordance with State or territorial law” is not dischargeable); § 903(1) (“[A] State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness” of municipalities is not binding on nonconsenting creditors); see also §§362(b)(12) and 1145(a). Congress’ decision to use the broader phrase “applicable nonbankruptcy law” in § 541(c)(2) strongly suggests that it did not intend to restrict the provision in the manner that petitioner contends.
The text of § 541(c)(2) does not support petitioner’s contention that “applicable nonbankruptcy law” is limited to state law. Plainly read, the provision encompasses any relevant nonbankruptcy law, including federal law such as ERISA. We must enforce the statute according to its terms. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241 (1989).
B
Having concluded that “applicable nonbankruptcy law” is not limited to state law, we next determine whether the anti-alienation provision contained in the ERISA-qualified Plan at issue here satisfies the literal terms of § 541(c)(2).
Section 206(d)(1) of ERISA, which states that “[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated,” 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(1), clearly imposes a “restriction on the transfer” of a debtor’s “beneficial interest” in the trust. The coordinate section of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. §401(a)(13), states as a general rule that “[a] trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated,” and thus contains similar restrictions. She also 26 CFR § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1991).
Coleman Furniture’s pension plan complied with these requirements. Article 16.1 of the Plan specifically stated: “No benefit, right'or interest” of any participant “shall be subject to anticipation, alienation, sale, transfer, assignment, pledge, encumbrance or charge, seizure, attachment or other legal, equitable or other process.” App. 342.
Moreover, these transfer restrictions are “enforceable,” as required by § 541(c)(2). Plan trustees or fiduciaries are required under ERISA to discharge their duties “in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan.” 29 U. S. C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). A plan participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor may file a civil action to “enjoin any act or practice” which violates ERISA or the terms of the plan. §§ 1132(a)(3) and (5). Indeed, this Court itself vigorously has enforced ERISA’s prohibition on the assignment or alienation of pension benefits, declining to recognize any implied exceptions to the broad statutory bar. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund, 493 U. S. 365 (1990).
The antialienation provision required for ERISA qualification and contained in the Plan at issue in this case thus constitutes an enforceable transfer restriction for purposes of §541(c)(2)’s exclusion of property from the bankruptcy estate.
Ill
Petitioner raises several challenges to this conclusion. Given the clarity of the statutory text, however, he bears an “exceptionally heavy” burden of persuading us that Congress intended to limit the § 541(c)(2) exclusion to restrictions on transfer that are enforceable only under state spendthrift trust law. Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U. S. 151, 155-156 (1991).
A
Petitioner first contends that contemporaneous legislative materials demonstrate that §541(c)(2)’s exclusion of property from the bankruptcy estate should not extend to a debtor’s interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan. Although courts “appropriately may refer to a statute’s legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguity,” Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U. S., at 162, the clarity of the statutory language at issue in this case obviates the need for any such inquiry. See ibid.; United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S., at 241; Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809, n. 3 (1989).
Even were we to consider the legislative materials to which petitioner refers, however, we could discern no “clearly expressed legislative intention” contrary to the result reached above. See Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980). In his brief, petitioner quotes from House and Senate Reports accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 that purportedly reflect “unmistakable” congressional intent to limit §541(c)(2)’s exclusion to pension plans that qualify under state law as spendthrift trusts. Brief for Petitioner 38. Those reports contain only the briefest of discussions addressing § 541(c)(2). The House Report states: “Paragraph (2) of subsection (c) . . . preserves restrictions on transfer of a spendthrift trust to the extent that the restriction is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 369 (1977); see also S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 83 (1978) (§ 541(c)(2) “preserves restrictions on a transfer of a spendthrift trust”). A general introductory section to the House Report contains the additional statement that the new law “continues over the exclusion from property of the estate of the debtor’s interest in a spendthrift trust to the extent the trust is protected from creditors under applicable State law.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 176. These meager excerpts reflect at best congressional intent to include state spendthrift trust law within the meaning of “applicable non-bankruptcy law.” By no means do they provide a sufficient basis for concluding, in derogation of the statute’s clear language, that Congress intended to exclude other state and federal law from the provision’s scope.
B
Petitioner next contends that our construction of § 541(c)(2), pursuant to which a debtor may exclude his interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan from the bankruptcy estate, renders § 522(d)(10)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code superfluous. Brief for Petitioner 24-33. Under § 522(d)(10)(E), a debtor who elects the federal exemptions set forth in § 522(d) may exempt from the bankruptcy estate his right to receive “a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract... , to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.” If a debtor’s interest in a pension plan could be excluded in full from the bankruptcy estate, the argument goes, then there would have been no reason for Congress to create a limited exemption for such interests elsewhere in the statute.
Petitioner’s surplusage argument fails, however, for the reason that § 522(d)(10)(E) exempts from the bankruptcy estate a much broader category of interests than § 541(c)(2) excludes. For example, pension plans established by governmental entities and churchés need not comply with Subchapter I of ERISA, including the antialienation requirement of § 206(d)(1). See 29 U. S. C. §§ 1003(b)(1) and (2); 26 CFR § 1.401(a)-13(a) (1991). So, too, pension plans that qualify for preferential tax treatment under 26 U. S. C. § 408 (individual retirement accounts) are specifically excepted from ERISA’s antialienation requirement. See 29 U. S. C. § 1051(6). Although a debtor’s interest in these plans could not be excluded under § 541(c)(2) because the plans lack transfer restrictions enforceable under “applicable nonbank-ruptcy law,” that interest nevertheless could be exempted under § 522(d)(10)(E). Once petitioner concedes that § 522(d)(10)(E)’s exemption applies to more than ERISA-qualified plans containing antialienation provisions, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 10-11; Brief for Petitioner 31, his argument that our reading-of § 541(c)(2) renders the exemption provision superfluous must collapse.
C
Finally, petitioner contends that our holding frustrates the Bankruptcy Code’s policy of ensuring a broad inclusion of assets in the bankruptcy estate. See id., at 37; 11 U. S. C. § 541(a)(1) (estate composed of “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”). As an initial matter, we think that petitioner mistakes an admittedly broad definition of includable property for a “policy” underlying the Code as a whole. In any event, to the extent that policy considerations are even relevant where the language of the statute is so clear, we believe that our construction of § 541(c)(2) is preferable to the one petitioner urges upon us.
First, our decision today ensures that the treatment of pension benefits will not vary based on the beneficiary’s bankruptcy status. See Butner v. United States, 440 U. S. 48, 55 (1979) (observing that “[u]niform treatment of property interests” prevents “a party from receiving ‘a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy,’ ” quoting Lewis v. Manufacturers National Bank, 364 U. S. 603, 609 (1961)). We previously have declined to recognize any exceptions to ERISA’s antialienation provision outside the bankruptcy context. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund, 493 U. S. 365 (1990) (labor union may not impose constructive trust on pension benefits of union official who breached fiduciary duties and embezzled funds). Declining to recognize any exceptions to that provision within the bankruptcy context minimizes the possibility that creditors will engage in strategic manipulation of the bankruptcy laws in order to gain access to otherwise inaccessible funds. See Seiden, Chapter 7 Cases: Do ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code Conflict as to Whether a Debtor’s Interest in or Rights Under a Qualified Plan Can be Used to Pay Claims?, 61 Am. Bankr. L. J. 301, 317 (1987) (noting inconsistency if “a creditor could not reach a debtor-participant’s plan right or interest in a garnishment or other collection action outside of a bankruptcy case but indirectly could reach the plan right or interest by filing a petition ... to place the debtor in bankruptcy involuntarily”).
Our holding also gives full and appropriate effect to ERISA’s goal of protecting pension benefits. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 1001(b) and (c). This Court has described that goal as one of ensuring that “if a worker has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement — and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit— he actually will receive it.” Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U. S. 359, 375 (1980). In furtherance of these principles, we recently declined in Guidry, notwithstanding strong equitable considerations to the contrary, to recognize an implied exception to ERISA’s antialienation provision that would have allowed a labor union to impose a constructive trust on the pension benefits of a corrupt union official. We explained:
“Section 206(d) reflects a considered congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, and perhaps usually are, blameless), even if that decision prevents others from securing relief for the wrongs done them. If exceptions to this policy are to be made, it is for Congress to undertake that task.” 493 U. S., at 376.
These considerations apply with equal, if not greater, force in the present context.
Finally, our holding furthers another important policy underlying ERISA: uniform national treatment of pension benefits. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1, 9 (1987). Construing “applicable nonbankruptcy law” to include federal law ensures that the security of a debtor’s pension benefits will be governed by ERISA, not left to the vagaries of state spendthrift trust law.
<1
In light of our conclusion that a debtor’s interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan may be excluded from the property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 541(c)(2), we need not reach respondent’s alternative argument that his interest in the Plan qualifies for exemption under § 522(b)(2)(A).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Compare In re Harline, 960 F. 2d 669 (CA10 1991) (ERISA anti-alienation provision constitutes “applicable nonbankruptcy law”), cert. pending, No. 91-1412; Veils v. Kardanis, 949 F. 2d 78 (CA3 1991) (same); Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F 2d 362 (CA4 1991) (this case; same); In re Lucas, 924 F. 2d 597 (CA6) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Forbes v. Holiday Corp. Savings and Retirement Plan, 600 U. S. 959 (1991); and In re Moore, 907 F 2d 1476 (CA4 1990) (same), with In re Dyke, 943 F 2d 1435 (CA5 1991) (ERISA antialienation provision does not constitute “applicable non-bankruptcy law”); In re Daniel, 771 F 2d 1352 (CA9 1985) (same), cert. denied, 475 U. S. 1016 (1986); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F 2d 1488 (CA11 1985) (same); In re Graham, 726 F. 2d 1268 (CA8 1984) (same); and In re Goff, 706 F 2d 574 (CA5 1983) (same).
The phrase “applicable nonbankruptcy law” appears elsewhere in the Code, and courts have construed those references to include federal law. See, e. g., 11 U. S. C. § 1125(d) (adequacy of disclosure statement not governed by any “otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law”); In re Stanley Hotel, Inc., 13 B. R. 926, 931 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Colo. 1981) (§ 1125(d) includes federal securities law); 11 U. S. C. § 108(a) (referring to statute of limitations fixed by “applicable nonbankruptcy law”); In re Ahead By a Length, Inc., 100 B. R. 157, 162-163 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SDNY 1989) (§ 108(a) includes Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Motor Carrier Audit & Collection Co. v. Lighting Products, Inc., 113 B. R. 424, 425-426 (ND Ill. 1989) (§ 108(a) includes Interstate Commerce Act); 11 U. S. C. § 108(b) (referring to time for filing pleadings, notices, etc., fixed by “applicable nonbankruptcy law”); Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. United States, 290 U. S. App. D. C. 307, 321-322, 937 F. 2d 625, 639-640 (1991) (§ 108(b) includes Federal] Tort Claims Act). Although we express no view on the correctness of these decisions, we note that our construction of § 641(c)(2)’s reference to “applicable nonbankruptcy law” as including federal law accords with prevailing interpretations of that phrase as it appears elsewhere in the Code. See Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 461 U. S. 624, 633 (1983) (recognizing principle “that a word is presumed to have the same meaning in all subsections of the same statute”).
The Internal Revenue Service at least on occasion has espoused the view that the transfer of a beneficiary’s interest in a pension plan to a bankruptcy trustee would disqualify the plan from taking advantage of the preferential tax treatment available under ERISA. See McLean v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 762 F. 2d 1204, 1206 (CA4 1985); see also In re Moore, 907 F. 2d, at 1481.
Those Courts of Appeals that have limited “applicable nonbankruptcy law” to state spendthrift trust law by ignoring the plain language of § 541(c)(2) and relying on isolated excerpts from the legislative history thus have misconceived the appropriate analytical task. See, e. g., In re Daniel, 771 F. 2d, at 1359-1360; In re Lichstrahl, 750 F. 2d, at 1490; In re Graham, 726 F. 2d, at 1271-1272; In re Goff, 706 F. 2d, at 581-582.
We express no opinion on the separate question whether § 522(d)(10)(E) applies only to distributions from a pension plan that a debtor has an immediate and present right to receive, or to the entire undistributed corpus of a pension trust. See, e. g., In re Harline, 950 F. 2d, at 675; Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F. 2d, at 81-82. See also Arnopol, Including Retirement Benefits in a Debtor’s Bankruptcy Estate: A Proposal for Harmonizing ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code, 56 Mo. L. Rev. 491, 535-636 (1991).
Even those courts that would have limited § 641(c)(2) to state law acknowledge the breadth of the § 522(d)(10)(E) exemption. See In re Goff, 706 F. 2d, at 587 (noting that § 522(d)(10)(E) “reaches a broad array of employment benefits, and exempts both qualified and unqualified pension plans”) (footnote omitted); In re Graham, 726 F. 2d, at 1272 (observing that “the § 522(d)(10)(E) exemption would apply to non-ERISA plans as well as to qualified ERISA plans”). See also Arnopol, 56 Mo. L. Rev., at 525-526, 552-553; Seiden, Chapter 7 Cases: Do ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code Conflict as'to Whether a Debtor’s Interest in or Rights Under a Qualified Plan Can be Used to Pay Claims?, 61 Am. Bankr. L. J. 301, 318 (1987).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III-B.
The Census Bureau (Bureau) has announced a plan to use two forms of statistical sampling in the 2000 Decennial Census to address a chronic and apparently growing problem of “undercounting” certain identifiable groups of individuals. Two sets of plaintiffs filed separate suits challenging the legality and constitutionality of the Bureau’s plan. Convened as three-judge courts, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and the District Court for the District of Columbia each held that the Bureau’s plan for the 2000 census violates the Census Act, 13 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., and both courts permanently enjoined the Bureau’s planned use of statistical sampling to determine the population for purposes of congressional apportionment. 19 F. Supp. 2d 543 (ED Va. 1998); 11F. Supp. 2d 76 (DC 1998). We noted probable jurisdiction in both cases, 524 U. S. 978 (1998); 525 U. S. 924 (1998), and consolidated the cases for oral argument, 525 U. S. 924 (1998). We now affirm the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and we dismiss the appeal from the District Court for the District of Columbia.
I
A
Article I, §2, el. 3, of the United States Constitution states that "Representatives... shall be apportioned among the several States... according to their respective Numbers.” It further requires that “[t]he actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.” Ibid. Finally, §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.”
Pursuant to this constitutional authority to direct the manner in which the "actual Enumeration” of the population shall be made, Congress enacted the Census Act (hereinafter Census Act or Act), 13 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., delegating to the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) authority to conduct the decennial census. § 4. The Act provides that the Secretary "shall, in the year 1980 and every 10 years thereafter, take a decennial census of population as of the first day of April of such year.” § 141(a). It further requires that “[t]he tabulation of total population by States... as required for the apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States shall be completed within 9 months after the census date and reported by the Secretary to the President of the United States.” § 141(b). Using this information, the President must then “transmit to the Congress a statement showing the whole number of persons in eaeh State... and the number of Representatives to which each State would be entitled.” 2 U. S. C. §2a(a). Within 15 days thereafter, the Clerk of the House of Representatives must “send to the executive of each State a certificate of the number of Representatives to which such State is entitled.” 2 U. S. C. §2a(b) (1994 ed., Supp. III).
The instant dispute centers on the problem of “under-count” in the decennial census. For the last few decades, the Bureau has sent census forms to every household, which it asked residents to complete and return. The Bureau followed up on the mailing by sending enumerators to personally visit all households that did not respond by mail. Despite this comprehensive effort to reach every household, the Bureau has always failed to reach — and has thus failed to count — a portion of the population. This shortfall has been labeled the census “undereount.”
The Bureau has been measuring the census undercount rate since 1940, and undercount has been the subject of public debate at least since the early 1970’s. See M. Anderson, The American Census: A Social History 221-222 (1988). It has been measured in one of two ways. Under one method, known as “demographic analysis,” the Bureau develops an independent estimate of the population using birth, death, immigration, and emigration records. U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Report to Congress: The Plan for Census 2000, p. 2, and n. 1 (Aug. 1997) (hereinafter Census 2000 Report). A second method, first used in 1990, involves a large sample survey, called the “Post-Enumeration Survey,” that is conducted in conjunction with the decennial census. The Bureau compares the information gathered during the survey with the information obtained in the census and uses the comparison to estimate the number of unenumerated people in the census. See National Research Council, Modernizing the U. S. Census 30-31 (B. Edmon-ston & C. Sehultze eds. 1995).
Some identifiable groups — including certain minorities, children, and renters — have historically had substantially higher undereount rates than the population as a whole. See Census 2000 Report 3-4. Accordingly, in previous censuses, the Bureau sought to increase the number of persons from whom it obtained information. In 1990, for instance, the Bureau attempted to reach out to traditionally under-counted groups by promoting awareness of the census and its importance, providing access to Spanish language forms, and offering a toll free number for those who had questions about the forms. Id., at 4. Indeed, the 1990 census was “better designed and executed than any previous census.” Id., at 2. Nonetheless, it was less accurate than its predecessor for the first time since the Bureau began measuring the undereount rate in 1940. Ibid.
In a further effort to address growing concerns about un-dereount in the census, Congress passed the Decennial Census Improvement Act of 1991, which instructed the Secretary to contract with the National Academy of Sciences (Academy) to study the “means by which the Government could achieve the most accurate population count possible.” § 2(a)(1), 105 Stat. 635, note following 18 U.S.C. §141. Among the issues the Academy was directed to consider was “the appropriateness of using sampling methods, in combination with basic data-colleetion techniques or otherwise, in the acquisition or refinement of population data.” Ibid. Two of the three panels established by the Academy pursuant to this Act concluded that “[differential undereount cannot be reduced to acceptable levels at acceptable costs without the use of integrated coverage measurement,” a statistical sampling procedure that adjusts census results to account for undereount in the initial enumeration, Census 2000 Report 7-8, and all three panels recommended including integrated coverage measurement in the 2000 census, id., at 29. See National Research Council, Preparing for the 2000 Census: Interim Report II (A. White & K. Rust eds. 1997) (report of Panel to Evaluate Alternative Census Methodologies); Modernizing the U. S. Census, supra (report of Panel on Census Requirements in the Year 2000 and Beyond); U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Operational Plan (1997).
In light of these studies and other research, the Bureau formulated a plan for the 2000 census that uses statistical sampling to supplement data obtained through traditional census methods. The Bureau plan provides for two types of sampling that are the subject of the instant challenge. First, appellees challenge the proposed use of sampling in the Nonresponse Followup program (NRFU). Under this program, the Bureau would continue to send census forms to all households, as well as make forms available in post offices and in other public places. The Bureau expects that 67 percent of households will return the forms. See Census 2000 Report 26. The Bureau then plans to divide the population into census tracts of approximately 4,000 people that have “homogenous population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions.” Id., at 27. The Bureau would then visit a randomly selected sample of nonresponding housing units, which would be “statistically representative of all housing units in [a] nonresponding tract.” Id., at 28. The rate of nonresponse followup in a tract would vary with the mail response rate to ensure that the Bureau obtains census data from at least 90 percent of the housing units in each census tract. Ibid. For instance, if a census tract had 1,000 housing units and 800 units responded by mail, the Bureau would survey 100 out of the 200 nonresponding units to obtain information about 90 percent of the housing units. However, if only 400 of the 1,000 housing units responded by mail, the Bureau would visit 500 of the 600 nonresponding units to achieve the same result. Id., at 29. The information gathered from the nonresponding housing units surveyed by the Bureau would then be used to estimate the size and characteristics of the nonresponding housing units that the Bureau did not visit. Thus, continuing with the first example, the Bureau would use information about the 100 non-responding units it visits to estimate the characteristics of the remaining 100 nonresponding units on which the Bureau has no information. See ibid.
The second challenged sampling procedure — which would be implemented after the first is completed — is known as Integrated Coverage Measurement (ICM). ICM employs the statistical technique called Dual System Estimation (DSE) to adjust the census results to account for undercount in the initial enumeration. The plan requires the Bureau to begin by classifying each of the country’s 7 million blocks into “strata,” which are defined by the characteristics of each block, including state, racial, and ethnic composition, and the proportion of homeowners to renters, as revealed in the 1990 census. Id., at 30. The Bureau then plans to select blocks at random from each stratum, for a total of 25,000 blocks, or an estimated 750,000 housing units. Ibid. Enumerators would then conduct interviews at each of those 750,000 units, and if discrepancies were detected between the pre-ICM response and ICM response, a followup interview would be conducted to determine the “true” situation in the home. Ibid. The information gathered during this stage would be used to assign each person to a poststratum — a group of people who have similar chances of being counted in the initial data collection — which would be defined by state geographic subdivision (e. g., rural or urban), owner or renter, age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin. Id., at 31.
In the final stage of the census, the Bureau plans to use DSE to obtain the final count and characteristics of the population. The census plan calls for the Bureau to compare the dual systems of information — that is, the data gathered on the sample blocks during the ICM and the data gathered on those same blocks through the initial phase of the census— to produce an estimation factor for each poststratum. The estimation factors would account for the differences between the ICM numbers and the initial enumeration and would be applied to the initial enumeration to estimate the total population and housing units in each poststratum. Id., at 31-32. The totals for the poststrata would then be summed to determine state and national population totals. Id., at 32.
The Bureau’s announcement of its plan to use statistical sampling in the 2000 census led to a flurry of legislative activity. Congress amended the Census Act to provide that, “[njotwithstanding any other provision of law, no sampling or any other statistical procedure, including any statistical adjustment, may be used in any determination of population for purposes of the apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States,” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-119, p. 67 (1997), but President Clinton vetoed the bill, see Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Legislation, 33 Weekly Comp, of Pres. Doc. 846, 847 (1997). Congress then passed, and the President signed, a bill providing for the creation of a “comprehensive and detailed plan outlining [the Bureau’s] proposed methodologies for conducting the 2000 Decennial Census and available methods to conduct an actual enumeration of the population,” including an explanation of any statistical methodologies that may be used. 1997 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery From Natural Disasters, and for Overseas Peacekeeping Efforts, Including Those in Bosnia, Tit. VIII, 111 Stat. 217. Pursuant to this directive, the Commerce Department issued the Census 2000 Report. After receiving the Report, Congress passed the 1998 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, §209, 111 Stat. 2482, which provides that the Census 2000 Report and the Bureau’s Census 2000 Operational Plan “shall be deemed to constitute final agency action regarding the use of statistical methods in the 2000 decennial census.” The Act also permits any person aggrieved by the plan to use statistical sampling in the decennial census to bring a legal action and requires that any action brought under the Act be heard by a three-judge district court. Ibid. It further provides for review by appeal directly to this Court. Ibid.
B
The publication of the Bureau’s plan for the 2000 census occasioned two separate legal challenges. The first suit, styled Clinton v. Glavin, was filed on February 12,1998, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia by four counties (Cobb County, Georgia; Bucks County, Pennsylvania; Delaware County, Pennsylvania; and DuPage County, Illinois) and residents of 13 States (Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin), who claimed that the Bureau’s planned use of statistical sampling to apportion Representatives among the States violates the Census Act and the Census Clause of the Constitution. They sought a declaration that the Bureau’s plan is unlawful and/or unconstitutional and an injunction barring use of the NRFU and ICM sampling procedures in the 2000 census.
The District Court held that the case was ripe for review, that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for Article III standing, and that the Census Act prohibited use of the challenged sampling procedures to apportion Representatives. 19 F. Supp. 2d, at 547, 548-550, 553. The District Court concluded that, because the statute was clear on its face, the court did not need to reach the constitutional questions presented. Id., at 553. It thus denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and permanently enjoined the use of the challenged sampling procedures to determine the population for purposes of congressional apportionment. Id., at 545, 553. We noted probable jurisdiction on October 9,1998. 525 U. S. 924.
The second challenge was filed by the United States House of Representatives on February 20, 1998, in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The House sought a declaration that the Bureau’s proposed use of sampling to determine the population for purposes of apportioning Members of the House of Representatives among the several States violates the Census Act and the Constitution. The House also sought a permanent injunction barring use of the challenged sampling procedures in the apportionment aspect of the 2000 census.
The District Court held that the House had Article III standing, the suit was ripe for review, equitable concerns did not warrant dismissal, the suit did not violate separation of powers principles, and the Census Act does not permit the use of the challenged sampling procedures in counting the population for apportionment. 11 F. Supp. 2d, at 93, 95, 97, 104. Because it held that the Census Act does not allow for the challenged sampling procedures, it declined to reach the House’s constitutional challenge under the Census Clause. Id., at 104. The District Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and issued an injunction preventing defendants from using the challenged sampling methods in the apportionment aspect of the 2000 census. Id., at 79, 104. The defendants appealed to this Court and we noted probable jurisdiction on September 10,1998,524 U. S. 978, and consolidated this case with Clinton v. Glavin, No. 98-564, for oral argument, 525 U. S. 924 (1998).
W-i 1 — f
We turn our attention first to the issues presented by Clinton v. Glavin, No. 98-564, and we begin our analysis with the threshold issue of justiciability. Congress has eliminated any prudential concerns in this case by providing that “[a]ny person aggrieved by the use- of any statistical method in violation of the Constitution or any provision of law (other than this Act), in connection with the 2000 census or any later decennial census, to determine the population for purposes of the apportionment or redistrieting of Members in Congress, may in a civil action obtain declaratory, injunctive, and any other appropriate relief against the use of such method.” § 209(b), 111 Stat. 2481. In addition, the District Court below correctly found that the ease is ripe for review, and that determination is not challenged here. 19 F. Supp. 2d, at 547; see Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149 (1967). Thus, the only open justiciability question in this case is whether appellees satisfy the requirements of Article III standing.
We have repeatedly noted that in order to establish Article III standing, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984). See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560-561 (1992); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 472 (1982). To prevail on a Federal Rule of Givil Procedure 56 motion for summary judgment — as opposed to a motion to dismiss — however, mere allegations of injury are insufficient. Rather, a plaintiff must establish that there exists no genuine issue of material fact as to justiciability or the merits. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 884 (1990). See also id., at 902 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Here, the District Court, considering a Rule 56 motion, held that the plaintiffs-appellees, residents from 13 States, had established Article III standing to bring suit challenging the proposed method for conducting the 2000 census because they had made “[gleneral factual allegations of injury resulting from Defendant’s conduct.” 19 F. Supp., at 548-550. The court did not, however, consider whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to standing.
Nonetheless, because the record before us amply supports the conclusion that several of the appellees have met their burden of proof regarding their standing to bring this suit, we affirm the District Court’s holding. See Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297, 303-305 (1983) (holding that presence of one party with standing assures that controversy before Court is justiciable); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 264, and n. 9 (1977) (same). In support of their motion for summary judgment, appellees submitted the affidavit of Dr. Ronald F. Weber, a professor of government at the University of Wisconsin, which demonstrates that Indiana resident Gary A. Hofmeister has standing to challenge the proposed census 2000 plan. Affidavit of Dr. Ronald F. Weber, App. in No. 98-564, pp. 56-79 (hereinafter Weber Affidavit). Utilizing data published by the Bureau, Dr. Weber projected year 2000 populations and net undercount rates for all States under the 1990 method of enumeration and under the Department’s proposed plan for the 2000 census. See id., at 62-63. He then determined on the basis of these projections how many Representatives would be apportioned to each State under each method and concluded that “it is a virtual certainty that Indiana will lose a seat... under the Department’s Plan.” Id., at 65.
Appellants have failed to set forth any specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of standing for trial. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proe. 56(e). Appellants have submitted two affidavits that detail various deficiencies in the statistical analysis performed by Dr. Weber. See Declaration of Signe I. Wetrogan, Assistant Division Chief for Population Estimates and Projections, United States Bureau of the Census, App. in No. 98-564, pp. 92-99 (hereinafter Wetrogan Declaration); Declaration of John H. Thompson, Associate Director for the Decennial Census, United States Bureau of the Census, id., at 100-110 (hereinafter Thompson Declaration). Appellants’ experts do not, however, demonstrate that any alleged flaw in Dr. Weber’s analysis calls into question his ultimate conclusion that Indiana is virtually certain to lose a seat. One expert, for example, claims that Dr. Weber’s statement that Indiana is virtually certain to lose a seat is “of dubious credibility,” but she fails to provide any specific factual support for this assertion. Wetrogan Declaration 97. She claims that Dr. Weber used outdated population numbers, but she does not demonstrate the impact that using more recent population data would have on Dr. Weber’s ultimate conclusion about Indiana. Id., at 97-98. Neither of the appellants’ experts reestimates the populations of the States using more “accurate” or “up-to-date” data to show that this data would produce different results. Indeed, the Associate Director for the Decennial Census specifically admits in his declaration that Dr. Weber used precisely the same data that the Bureau uses “to help it estimate expected error rates for Census 2000.” Thompson Declaration 106. Appellants have therefore failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding Indiana’s loss of a Representative.
Appellee Hofmeister’s expected loss of a Representative to the United States Congress undoubtedly satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing. In the context of apportionment, we have held that voters have standing to challenge an apportionment statute because “[t]hey are asserting ‘a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.’” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 208 (1962) (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 438 (1939)). The same distinct interest is at issue here: With one fewer Representative, Indiana residents’ votes will be diluted. Moreover, the threat of vote dilution through the use of sampling is “concrete” and “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990). It is clear that if the Bureau is going to alter its plan to use sampling in the 2000 census, it must begin doing so by March 1999. See Oversight of the 2000 Census: Putting the Dress Rehearsals in Perspective, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Census of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 84 (1998) (statement of James P. Holmes, Acting Director of the Bureau) (“I must caution that by this time next year [i <?., March 1999] the train for census 2000 has to be on one track. If the uncertainty continues, if our staff continues to have to do two jobs,... [the census] will truly be imperiled”). See also § 209, 111 Stat. 2480 (providing that the Bureau’s plan to use statistical sampling in the 2000 census constitutes “final agency action”). And it is certainly not necessary for this Court to wait until the census has been conducted to consider the issues presented here, because such a pause would result in extreme — possibly irremediable — hardship. In addition, as Dr. Weber’s affidavit demonstrates, Hofmeister meets the second and third requirements of Article III standing. There is undoubtedly a “traceable” connection between the use of sampling in the decennial census and Indiana’s expected loss of a Representative, and there is a substantial likelihood that the requested relief — a permanent injunction against the proposed uses of sampling in the census — will redress the alleged injury.
Appellees have also established standing on the basis of the expected effects of the use of sampling in the 2000 census on intrastate redistricting. Dr. Weber indicated in his affidavit that “[i]t is substantially likely that voters in Mari-copa County, Arizona, Bergen County, New Jersey, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, LaSalle County, Illinois, Orange County, California, St. Johns County, Florida, Galla-tin County, Montana, Forsyth County, Georgia, and Loudoun County, Virginia, will suffer vote dilution in state and local elections as a result of the [Bureau’s] Plan.” Weber Affidavit 77-78. Several of the appellees reside in these counties, and several of the States in which these counties are located require use of federal decennial census population numbers for their state legislative redistricting. The New Jersey Constitution, for instance, requires that state senators be apportioned among Senate districts “as nearly as may be according to the number of their inhabitants as reported in the last preceding decennial census of the United States.” Art. IV, §1, ¶1. Similarly, the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that “[i]n each year following the year of the Federal decennial census, a Legislative Reapportionment Commission shall be constituted for the purpose of reapportioning the Commonwealth.” Art. 2, § 17(a). Several of the other States cited by Dr. Weber have comparable laws. Moreover, States use the population numbers generated by the federal decennial census for federal congressional redistricting. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 738 (1983) (“[Bjecause the census count represents the ‘best population data available,’... it is the only basis for good-faith attempts to achieve population equality” (citation omitted». Thus, the appellees who live in the aforementioned counties have a strong claim that they will be injured by the Bureau’s plan because their votes will be diluted vis-á-vis residents of counties with larger “undercount” rates. Neither of appellants’ experts specifically contested Dr. Weber’s conclusion that the nine counties were substantially likely to lose population if statistical sampling were used in the 2000 census. See Wetrogan Declaration 92-99; Thompson Declaration 100-110. The experts’ general assertions regarding Dr. Weber’s methodology and data are again insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. For the reasons discussed above, see supra, at 332-333 and this page, this expected intrastate vote dilution satisfies the injury-in-fact, causation, and redressibility requirements. Accordingly, ap-pellees have again carried their burden under Rule 56 and have established standing to pursue this case.
Ill
We accordingly arrive at the dispute over the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Census Act. The District Court below examined the plain text and legislative history of the Act and concluded that the proposed use of statistical sampling to determine population for purposes of apportioning congressional seats among the States violates the Act. We agree.
A
An understanding of the historical background of the decennial census and the Act that governs it is essential to a proper interpretation of the Act’s present text. From the very first census, the census of 1790, Congress has prohibited the use of statistical sampling in calculating the population for purposes of apportionment. The First Congress enacted legislation requiring census enumerators to swear an oath to make “a just and perfect enumeration” of every person within the division to which they were assigned. Act of Mar. 1,1790, § 1,1 Stat. 101. Each enumerator was required to compile a schedule of information for his district, listing by family name the number of persons in each family that fell into each of five specified categories. See id., at 101-102. Congress modified this provision in 1810, adding an express statement that “the said enumeration shall be made by an actual inquiry at every dwelling-house, or of the head of every family within each district, and not otherwise,” and expanding the number of specifications in the schedule of information. Act of Mar. 26, 1810, § 1, 2 Stat. 565-566. The requirement that census enumerators visit each home in person appeared in statutes governing the next 14 censuses.
The current Census Act was enacted into positive law in 1954. It contained substantially the same language as did its predecessor statutes, requiring enumerators to “visit personally each dwelling house in his subdivision” in order to obtain “every item of information and all particulars required for any census or survey” conducted in connection with the census. Act of Aug. 31,1954, § 25(e), 68 Stat. 1012, 1015. Indeed, the first departure from the requirement that the enumerators collect all census information through personal visits to every household in the Nation came in 1957 at the behest of the Secretary. The Secretary asked Congress to amend the Act to permit the Bureau to use statistical sampling in gathering some of the census information. See Amendment of Title 13, United States Code, Relating to Census: Hearing on H. R. 7911 before the House Committee on the Post Office and Civil Service, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-8 (1957) (hereinafter 1957 Hearing). In response, Congress enacted § 195, whieh provided that, “[e]xcept for the determination of population for apportionment purposes, the Secretary may, where he deems it appropriate, authorize the use of the statistical method known as ‘sampling’ in carrying out the provisions of this title.” 13 U. S. C. § 195 (1970 ed.). This provision allowed the Secretary to authorize the use of sampling procedures in gathering supplemental, nonappor-tionment census information regarding population, unemployment, housing, and other matters collected in conjunction with the decennial census — much of which is now collected through what is known as the “long form” — but it did not authorize the use of sampling procedures in connection with apportionment of Representatives. See also 1957 Hearing 7-8 (“Experience has shown that some of the information which is desired in connection with a census could be secured efficiently through a sample survey which is conducted concurrently with the complete enumeration of other items”).
In 1964, Congress repealed former § 25(c) of the Census Act, see Act of Aug. 31, 1964, 78 Stat. 737, which had required that each enumerator obtain “every item of information” by personal visit to each household, 68 Stat. 1015. The repeal of this section permitted the Bureau to replace the personal visit of the enumerator with a form delivered and returned via the Postal Service. Pursuant to this new authority, census officials conducted approximately 60 percent of the census through a new “mailout-mailback” system for the first time in 1970. See M. Anderson, The American Census: A Social History 210-211 (1988). The Bureau then conducted followup visits to homes that failed to return census forms. Thus, although the legislation permitted the Bureau to conduct a portion of the census through the mail, there was no suggestion from any quarter that this change altered the prohibition in § 195 on the use of statistical sampling in determining the population for apportionment purposes.
In 1976, the provisions of the Census Act at issue in this case took their present form. Congress revised § 141 of the Census Act, which is now entitled “Population and other census information.” It amended subsection (a) to authorize the Secretary to “take a decennial census of population as of the first day of April of such year, which date shall be known as the ‘decennial census date’, in such form and content as he may determine, including the use of sampling procedures and special surveys.” IB U. S. C. § 141(a). Congress also added several subsections to § 141, among them a provision specifying that the term “census of population,” as used in § 141, “means a census of population, housing, and matters relating to population and housing.” § 141(g). Together, these revisions provided a broad statement that in collecting a range of demographic information during the decennial census, the Bureau would be permitted to use sampling procedures and special surveys.
This broad grant of authority given in § 141(a) is informed, however, by the narrower and more specific § 195, which is revealingly entitled, “Use of Sampling.” See Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 524 (1989). The § 141 authorization to use sampling techniques in the decennial census is not necessarily an authorization to use these techniques in collecting all of the information that is gathered during the decennial census. We look to the remainder of the law to determine what portions of the decennial census the authorization covers. When we do, we discover that, as discussed above, § 195 directly prohibits the use of sampling in the determination of population for purposes of apportionment.
When Congress amended § 195 in 1976, it did not in doing so alter the longstanding prohibition on the use of sampling in matters relating to apportionment. Congress modified the section by changing “apportionment purposes” to “purposes of apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States” and changing the phrase “may, where he deems it appropriate” to “shall, if he considers it feasible.” 90 Stat. 2464. The amended section thus reads: “Except for the determination of population for purposes of apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States, the Secretary shall, if he considers it feasible, authorize the use of the statistical method known as'sampling* in carrying out the provisions of this title.” 13 U. S. C. § 195. As amended, the section now requires the Secretary to use statistical sampling in assembling the myriad demographic data that are collected in connection with the decennial census. But the section maintains its prohibition on the use of statistical sampling in calculating population for purposes of apportionment.
Absent any historical context, the language in the amended § 195 might reasonably be read as either permissive or prohibitive with regard to the use of sampling for apportionment purposes. Indeed, appellees and appellants eaeh cite numerous examples of the “except/shall” sentence structure that support their respective interpretations of the statute. See, e. g., Brief for Appellee Glavin et al. in No. 98-564, p. 36, n. 36 (citing §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “when the right to vote... is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State... except for participation in • rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | M | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1942, Congress enacted what is popularly known as the Freight Forwarder Act. This legislation, which appears as Part IV of the Interstate Commerce Act, was designed to define freight forwarders, to prescribe certain regulations governing forwarder operations, and to bring this essential transportation business within the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The legislative and judicial history culminating in the Act need not now be detailed. See United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U. S. 344 (1940); Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 968, aff’d 309 U. S. 638 (1940).
Freight forwarders consolidate less-than-carload freight into carloads for shipment by rail, truck, or water. Their charges approximate rail less-than-carload rates; their expenses and profits are derived from the spread between the carload and 1. c. 1. rates. Forwarders are utilized by 1. c. 1. shippers because of the speed and efficiency with which they handle shipments, the unity of responsibility obtained, and certain services which forwarders make available.
Forwarders are required by § 413 of the Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1013, to issue bills of lading to their customers, covering the individual package shipment from time of receipt until delivery to the ultimate consignee. When the freight is consolidated into carloads, the railroad gives the forwarder its bill of lading in which the forwarder is designated as both consignor and consignee. The contents are noted as “one carload of mixed merchandise” and usually move under an “all-commodity” carload rate. The destination set out in the railroad bill of lading is the forwarder's break-bulk point. At that point the carload is broken up; some shipments may be distributed locally, some sent by truck to off-line destinations, and some consolidated into carloads for reshipment to further break-bulk points. The railroad has no knowledge of the contents of the car, the identity of the individual shippers, or the ultimate destinations of the consignments. The forwarder has an unqualified right to select the carrier and route for the transportation of the freight.
The forwarder thus has some of the characteristics of both carrier and shipper. In its relations with its customers, a forwarder is subjected by the Act to many of the requirements and regulations applicable to common carriers under Parts I, II, and III of the Act. In its relations with these carriers, however, the status of the forwarder is still that of shipper. It is this duality of character that raises the question in this case.
Section 1013 provides that the Carmack Amendment, 34 Stat. 593, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 20 (11) and (12), shall apply to freight forwarders “in the case of service subject to this chapter” (Part IV), and that the freight forwarder shall be deemed both the receiving and delivering transportation company for the purposes of such § 20 (11) and (12). Incorporation of the Car-mack Amendment requires, as has been noted, that the forwarder issue bills of lading to its shippers, covering transportation of the individual shipments to their ultimate destinations. There can be no question but that under § 20 (11), the forwarder is liable to its shipper for loss or damage to the freight exactly as if it were an initial carrier subject to Parts I, II, and III. We are now asked to decide whether the right-over given by § 20 (12) to an initial carrier against its connecting carriers applies in the case of forwarders who have paid loss and damage claims to their shippers and seek recompense from the carrier responsible for the loss.
In this action, respondent freight forwarder sought a declaratory judgment that it is not bound by the nine-month limitation period provided in the railroad bill of lading for the filing of loss or damage claims. If § 1013, by its incorporation of § 20 (11) and (12), makes the forwarder an initial carrier with a right-over against the carrier responsible for the loss or damage, the nine-month period is not applicable. If, however, the forwarder is still a shipper vis-á-vis the railroads, it must file its claims within the period specified in the railroad bill of lading. The District Court held, on an agreed statement of facts, that the forwarder must file its claims within the nine-month period. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that for the purposes of § 1013 alone forwarders are to be considered carriers and as such are entitled to the right-over given by § 20 (12). 166 F. 2d 778. We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, 335 U. S. 807, to resolve this important question under Part IV of the Interstate Commerce Act.
First. The railroads contend that Part IV of the Act was not intended to change the shipper-carrier relationship that had for many years existed between forwarder and railroad. Their position is that while the previously prevailing duties and responsibilities owed by the forwarder to the public were changed by the Act, the language of the Act and its legislative history negative the forwarder’s claim to carrier status. They read the language of § 1013, that “the provisions of section 20 (11) and (12) of this title... shall apply with respect to freight forwarders, in the case of service subject to this chapter...,” to mean that, while the forwarder is liable to its shippers under § 20 (11) for loss or damage no matter whose the ultimate responsibility, its right-over under § 20 (12) is limited to losses or damage occurring in "service subject to this chapter” — i. e., in the business of forwarding freight. Thus limited, the right-over would apply as against other freight forwarders with whom joint loading agreements authorized by § 1004 (d) were in effect, and against motor carriers who are permitted by § 1013 to issue bills of lading on behalf of the forwarders. The right-over would not, however, apply against railroads, water carriers, and line-haul motor carriers.
“Service subject to this chapter” is defined in § 1002 as “any or all of the service in connection with the transportation in interstate commerce which any person undertakes to perform or provide as a freight forwarder....” While use of the word, “provide,” lends some support to respondent’s thesis that the definition should be read broadly to include the service performed by common carriers for the forwarders, the House Committee report indicates the contrary. It defines “service subject to this chapter” as:
“the term used throughout part IV when referring to the business or operations of freight forwarders which it is proposed to regulate. The definition is intended to be broad enough to cover everything the freight forwarder does, in connection with forwarding by surface facilities, in the course of carrying out his undertaking to the shipper whom he serves. On the other hand, it is not broad enough, of course, to bring under regulation, under part IV, the service performed by the carriers whose services the freight forwarder utilizes in performing his undertaking.” (Italics added.)
The emphasis supplied by the phrase is emphasis on the freight forwarder’s activities, not upon the service performed by underlying carriers. Since the forwarder contracts with its shipper to deliver the shipment safely to its ultimate destination, its undertaking is obviously part of the “service subject to this chapter.” But inclusion of that phrase in § 1013 indicates a limitation of applicability of the right-over under § 20 (12) to the forwarder’s business, which, we are told by the House Report, does not include “the service performed by the carriers whose services the freight forwarder utilizes in performing his undertaking.”
The importance of the phrase, “service subject to this chapter,” in the Freight Forwarder Act is accentuated by a contemporaneous amendment to Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, which pertains to motor carriers. The Motor Carrier Act had made § 20 (11) applicable to motor carriers but had omitted § 20 (12). As a part of the Freight Forwarder legislation, Congress amended § 219 of the Interstate Commerce Act to make § 20 (12) applicable to motor carriers. It did so without including the qualifying phrase. The amendment reads simply:
“Sec. 219. The provisions of section 20 (11) and (12) of this Act, together with such other provisions of such part (including penalties) as may be necessary for the enforcement of such provisions, shall apply with respect to common carriers by motor vehicle with like force and effect as in the case of those persons to which such provisions are specifically applicable.” 56 Stat. 300.
Unless we are to assume that Congress, in enacting § 1013, included the phrase, “in the case of service subject to this chapter,” for no purpose whatsoever, while at the same time approving a similar section which did not include the qualifying phrase, we must give it the effect contended for by petitioners. Respondent suggests no other.
That meaning is supported by the explanation of § 1013 given by Representative Wolverton, a member of the committee which drafted the section. However, doubt is cast upon the correctness of this interpretation by a contrary statement in the House Committee report. This report states flatly that “in case the loss of or damage to the property transported occurs on the line of a carrier whose service the freight forwarder utilizes, the freight forwarder will have the right of subrogation against the carrier under section 20 (12).”
We are warned, however, that the report is to be discounted in some particulars. Representative Wolverton prefaced his section-by-section analysis of the bill with this significant statement:
“In some respects the report which accompanies this bill is not as complete as it might be. Due to limitations of time the report was not submitted to the members of the committee or subcommittee, and therefore it may not be out of place to include in these remarks some further explanations which may be helpful to the Members in their consideration of the measure. In a few instances, which will be mentioned later, the report may not be so phrased as to convey fully the sense of what was intended.”
That he had § 1013 specifically in mind is clearly shown by his remarks explaining that section:
“In its explanation of section 413 [§ 1013], the report which accompanied the bill is not strictly accurate in interpreting the intended legal effect of making section 20 (11) and (12) of part I applicable to freight forwarders. It should be understood that, insofar as a given service to its shipper is covered by the published rate of a freight forwarder, the latter is the only person to which such shipper is entitled to look for recovery of damages, and it is in this sense that the forwarder is to ‘be deemed both the receiving and delivering transportation company.’ If damage to a shipment occurs on the line of a common carrier whose services are being utilized by the forwarder, the forwarder has no right of subrogation under section 20 (12), since its own shipper never had any right of action against such carrier. The forwarder’s recovery against the carrier would be upon the bill of lading issued to it by such carrier and under the provisions of law applicable thereto. The reference to paragraph (12) of section 20 was included in section 413 [§1013] to cover a combination of services performed directly for the owner of the goods, such as would occur where the services of two or more forwarders were involved.”
In weighing the relative importance of this statement and the committee report, a number of additional facts assume importance. The bill under consideration was reported unanimously by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Congressman Wolverton, who was the ranking minority member of the committee, spoke in behalf of the bill and presented the only extended exposition of its provisions. His explanation of its meaning was not challenged or contradicted by any member of the committee. On the contrary, his part in its drafting was recognized by the chairman of the committee, and his remarks have been quoted as authority by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In this posture of events, the committee report can be given little weight. A report not previously submitted to members of the committee and expressly contradicted without challenge on the floor of the House by a ranking member of the committee can hardly be considered authoritative. The Committee of Conference, of which Representative Wolverton was a member, adopted § 1013 exactly as it appeared in the House amendment. It bore, at that time, the gloss placed upon it on the floor of the House. Under those circumstances, we cannot construe the statute to give forwarders the right-over against underlying carriers under § 20 (12).
Second. Such a construction would, moreover, be out of harmony with the previously existing relationship between forwarders and carriers regulated by Parts I, II, and III of the Interstate Commerce Act, a relationship which Part IV unquestionably accepted and continued. Prior to the enactment of the Forwarder Act, this Court held in a number of cases that forwarders are shippers insofar as carriers are concerned, and that the latter cannot discriminate in favor of or against forwarders, nor enter into joint or proportional rates with them absent legislative authority. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235 (1911); Great Northern R. Co. v. O’Connor, 232 U. S. 508 (1914); Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 444 (1917); United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., supra; Acme Fast Freight v. United States, supra.
It is clear that this relationship was not altered by the enactment of Part IV. Nowhere in the Act are freight forwarders referred to as carriers. Congress defined the term “freight forwarder” in § 1002 (5) to mean any person which “otherwise than as a carrier subject to” Part I, II, or III of this title consolidates goods for shipment, etc. In one section where, by inadvertence, forwarders were referred to as carriers, an amendment was passed less than two months later striking out “carrier” and substituting “freight forwarder.” The statements by committee members on the floor of the House leave no doubt that it was not the intent of Congress to alter the forwarders’ status as shippers vis-á-vis carriers by rail, highway, and water.
The fact that Congress studiously avoided characterizing forwarders as carriers, while at the same time subjecting them to many of the duties and responsibilities of such carriers, serves to emphasize the distinction drawn by the Act. The reason for this distinction has already been suggested. In their relations with shippers, forwarders unquestionably perform functions and have duties similar to the functions and duties of common carriers. Their activities are not essentially different from those of express companies, which are common carriers by definition, under § 1 (3) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (3). Nevertheless, Congress recognized that forwarders occupy a different position in their dealings with the carriers whose services they utilize. For that reason, they refused to sanction the joint rates that forwarders had established with certain motor carriers. See Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. United States, supra. According to Representative Wolver ton’s statement on the floor of the House, “it would be illogical and anomalous to permit the making of so-called joint rates in such a situation. The maintenance of a joint rate by a carrier and a shipper would be an absurdity. If nevertheless permitted, it would enable such shipper to receive rebates through the medium of divisions of the joint rate.” Carriers subject to Parts I, II, and III were permitted by § 1008 to establish so-called “assembling and distribution” rates, which were designed to give the forwarder the benefit of rates lower than those available to other shippers, because of savings to the carriers effected by some services performed by the forwarder. This was thought to be consistent with the position of the forwarder as shipper, however, and such rates could not be lowered beyond an amount which would reflect the savings. It is significant, too, that these rates were not applicable to line-haul or carload freight, but only to the services performed by carriers in bringing less-than-carload shipments from off-line points to the forwarder’s concentration point and from break-bulk point to final destination. It is therefore clear beyond argument that Congress intended to preserve the existing shipper-carrier relationship between forwarders and those carriers regulated by Parts I, II, and III of the Act.
Third. The Court of Appeals, while conceding that forwarders are still shippers vis-a-vis carriers under the Act, held that for the purposes of § 1013 alone, they are to be regarded as initial carriers, while the railroads, motor vehicles, and boats whose services are utilized by forwarders are to be considered connecting carriers. Respondent goes farther. It contends not only that the liability provisions of the uniform rail bill of lading issued to the forwarder for his carload shipment may be disregarded, but that the railroad need not issue its bill of lading at all. In its view, Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. Ward, 244 U. S. 383 (1917), which struck down conditions in the bill of lading issued without consideration by a connecting carrier, is decisive of the invalidity of the conditions imposed by the rail bill of lading here in controversy.
We do not agree, nor can we believe that the contention is seriously made. The underlying carrier’s haul involves a different shipment, a different consideration, a different origin, a different destination, and a different consignor and consignee than are involved in the forwarder’s undertaking. Furthermore, respondent’s contention leads to the conclusion that railroads, whose bills of lading have long been prescribed by the I. C. C. and filed with rail tariffs, must transport freight on bills of lading subject to change at will by the forwarder and possibly different in many respects from the uniform rail bill. See e. g., Chain Deliveries Express, Inc., 260 I. C. C. 149, 151 (1943). That certainly has not been the position taken by the I. C. C. since enactment of Part IV, nor was the contention accepted by either of the courts below in this case.
The real issue is whether, granting that both forwarder and underlying carrier must issue bills of lading, the liability provisions of bills issued by the latter are to be considered null and void when forwarder freight is being hauled. We think that the whole scheme of the Act, its language and history, negative that proposition. As has been noted, the forwarder remains a shipper in its relations with underlying carriers under the Act. It is a shipper to whom carriers are forbidden to give any undue or unreasonable preference in any respect whatsoever, under the specific provisions of the Act. § 1004 (c). On the other hand, forwarders, like other shippers, may discriminate as they choose between carriers. § 1004 (b).
If the liability provisions of the carrier bill of lading are inapplicable, other difficulties are presented. Since they are not bound to use the uniform bill of lading, forwarders may adopt a limitation period for the submission of claims longer than nine months, the minimum period permitted by § 20 (11). Since the rail bill of lading, which prescribes a nine-month period, would apply to all shippers other than shippers by freight forwarder, the former would thus be discriminated against contrary to § 1004 (c).
Similarly, a shipper by freight forwarder might wish to contract for common-law liability by paying the higher tariff to the forwarder, as he must be permitted to do under § 20 (11). Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319 (1916). The forwarder, on the other hand, pays the lower declared value rate to the railroad for the carload shipment. If the shipment were lost or damaged, the shipper could undoubtedly recover its actual value from the forwarder, but under ordinary circumstances the latter would be confined to recovery from the railroad of a proportional part of the declared value of the carload shipment. Section 20 (12) provides, however, that the right-over is in the amount of the loss, damage, or injury as may be evidenced by any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof. Under respondent’s theory, its bill of lading would be controlling, and the forwarder would be entitled to full recovery despite the fact that it had contracted with the carrier at the reduced rate. This result is clearly contrary to Great Northern R. Co. v. O’Connor, supra, which was relied on by the Court of Appeals in the present case.
In addition, the factors which Congress felt made the original Carmack Amendment workable are totally absent in the case of freight forwarders. Congressman Richardson, in explaining its purpose to the House, said:
“The reasons inducing us to do that [make the initial carrier liable for loss or damage] was that the initial carrier has a through-route connection with the secondary carrier, on whose route the loss occurred, and a settlement between them will be an easy matter, while the shipper would be at heavy expense in the institution of a suit. If a judgment is obtained against the initial carrier, no doubt exists but the secondary carrier would pay it at once. Why? Because the arrangement, the concert, the cooperation, the through-route courtesies between them would be broken up if prompt payment was not made. We have done that in conference.” See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. 186, 201 (1911).
The railroads have done exactly as was suggested. Elaborate freight-claim rules have been established covering the investigation, settlement, and defense of claims and the allocation of liability between carriers when, as is frequently the case, responsibility for loss or damage cannot be precisely ascertained. Arbitration boards settle disputes arising between carriers under the rules. As a practical matter, the right-over given by § 20 (12) is very little used by carriers, and indeed it is of no value when responsibility cannot definitely be placed upon any one carrier.
The considerations that made § 20 (12) workable as applied to railroads are not, however, applicable to freight forwarders. They enter into no “arrangements,” “concerts,” “cooperation,” or “through-route courtesies” with railroads. As shippers they are forbidden by law to do so. Furthermore, the forwarder will always be in the position of a receiving or delivering carrier seeking the right-over against “connecting” carriers, never in the position of a carrier against whom the right-over is asserted. A railroad against which a claim has been filed as receiving or delivering carrier will ordinarily represent the connecting carrier as if no right-over existed, since it must depend in other cases upon similar representation by other roads. Details of such representation are, in fact, prescribed by the Freight Claim Rules, which are subscribed to by nearly all railroads. But the forwarder is always its own representative, and as between its customer, the shipper, and an underlying carrier allegedly responsible for loss or damage, the forwarder’s tendency would naturally be to placate the former at the expense of the latter if the right-over existed and was applicable. These facts are, we feel, persuasive that Congress meant the right-over given in § 1013 to extend no farther than to actions against those with whom forwarders are permitted to enter into cooperative arrangements — i. e., against those to whom the forwarder does not bear the relation of shipper.
Fourth. Two arguments are made as to the inequity that will result from requiring forwarders to comply with the requirements of § 20 (11) without giving them the rights of initial carriers under § 20 (12). It is said that Congress could not have intended to make the forwarder an insurer of freight while requiring at the same time that it file and prove claims against carriers as if it were an ordinary shipper. Secondly, it is argued that the forwarder must, under § 20 (11), allow at least nine months for the filing of claims by shippers, and if the forwarder is subject to a similar limitation period, there will necessarily be some claims filed by shippers at the end of the period which the forwarder will not be able to refile against the carrier in time.
The first contention is the result of a serious misconception as to the liability of freight forwarders prior to enactment of Part IV. This misconception is based on a failure to distinguish between two very different kinds of “forwarders.” The term was originally applied to persons who arrange for the transportation by common carrier of the shipper’s goods. The forwarder did not necessarily consolidate the individual consignments into carload lots, and its duties, as agent of the shipper, went no farther than procuring transportation by carrier and handling the details of shipment. Forwarders of this type charged fees for their services, which the shipper paid in addition to the freight charges of the carrier utilized for the actual transportation.
Later, a different type of forwarding service was offered. This forwarder picked up the less-than-carload shipment at the shipper’s place of business and engaged to deliver it safely at its ultimate destination. The freight forwarder charged a rate covering the entire transportation and made its profit by consolidating the shipment with others in carload quantities to take advantage of the spread between carload and 1. c. 1. rates. It held itself out not merely to arrange with common carriers for the transportation of the goods, but rather to deliver them safely to the consignee. The shipper seldom if ever knew which carrier would be utilized in the carriage of his shipment.
This difference in function was recognized very early by the courts, and differing standards of liability were imposed. When goods handled by an agent-forwarder were lost or damaged, it was liable to the shipper only for its own negligence, including negligence in selecting a carrier. If, on the other hand, the shipment had been entrusted to a forwarder of the second type — i. e., one who contracted to deliver the goods to the consignee at rates set by itself — the forwarder was subjected to common carrier liability for loss or damage whether it or an underlying carrier had been at fault. The fact that the forwarder did not own the carriers whose services it utilized was held to be immaterial. Its undertaking was to deliver the shipment safely at the destination. Common carrier liability was the penalty for failure of fulfilment of that undertaking.
The Freight Forwarder Act encompasses only the second type of forwarder described above. Section 1002 (a) (5) defines “freight forwarder” as
“Any person which... holds itself out to the general public to transport or provide transportation of property... and which, in the ordinary and usual course of its undertaking, (A) assembles and consolidates or provides for assembling and consolidating shipments of such property, and performs or provides for the performance of break-bulk and distributing operations with respect to such consolidated shipments, and (B) assumes responsibility for the transportation of such property from point of receipt to point of destination, and (C) utilizes, for the whole or any part of the transportation of such shipments, the services of a carrier or carriers subject to chapters 1, 8, or 12 of this title.” (Italics added.)
As to this group, as has been pointed out, the liability of common carrier to its shippers has always been the rule. By making § 20 (11) applicable to these forwarders, Congress did two things: (1) required forwarders to issue bills of lading; and (2) made a matter of federal law what had been uniformly adopted by the states as the rule of liability for loss or damage. As applied to railroads, the Carmack Amendment made a significant change, since it prevented the initial carrier from exercising the right given by decision in a majority of states to limit its liability to loss or damage occurring on its own lines. But that right had never been granted to forwarders of the type regulated by Part IY. Their liability has, from the beginning, been extended to loss or damage to the consignment occurring at any time between pick-up at the point of origin and delivery at destination. As shippers, they have, of course, always had a right of action against the underlying carrier at fault. The defense that the goods are not those of the forwarder is not open to the carrier, since, as we have held, the carrier is not concerned with questions of ownership, but must treat the forwarder as shipper. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., supra.
The Act thus leaves the freight forwarder in substantially the same position it had previously held with respect to its liability to shippers and its rights against underlying carriers. The hearings, committee reports and debates are bare of any suggestion that forwarders needed relief from the requirement that they file their claims against carriers like other shippers. They have done so for over a century. They have continued to do so since enactment of the Freight Forwarder Act. See, e. g., Merchant Shippers Assn. v. Kellogg Express efe Draying Co., 28 Cal. 2d 594, 170 P. 2d 923 (1946); J. R. Kelly Freight Forwarder Application, 260 I. C. C. 315, 318 (1944); Hugh F. Gannon, Inc., Freight Forwarder Application, 260 I. C. C. 219, 220 (1944). We would require a much clearer showing than has been made to find that Congress intended, without increasing the liabilities of forwarders regulated by the Act, to give them a right-over against railroads, ship lines, and line-haul motor carriers as initial carriers under § 20 (12).
It is true that under the provisions of § 20 (11) forwarders are now forbidden to limit the period within which claims must be filed by shippers to less than nine months. If forwarders must, in turn, file claims with carriers within nine months, respondent contends that in the case of claims filed against a forwarder during the last day or two of the period, it will not have enough time to refile the claim with the proper carrier and will thus have no recourse after having paid the claim. This objection obviously applies to an insignificant proportion of the total claims. Furthermore, if the Interstate Commerce Commission considers the matter to be of sufficient importance, it has the experience and authority to prescribe the proper corrective. In any event, this single inconsistency is hardly sufficient to justify the contention that Congress intended that § 1013 be interpreted to make the forwarder an initial carrier with right-over against common carriers who must treat the forwarder as a shipper for all purposes.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Rutledge would affirm the judgment for reasons stated by Judge Frank, writing for the Court of Appeals. See 166 F. 2d 778.
56 Stat. 284, 49 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.
For a full description of freight forwarder practices, see United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U. S. 344 (1940); Freight Forwarding Investigation, 229 I. C. C. 201; Bills of Lading of Freight Forwarders, 259 I. C. C. 277.
“§ 1013. Bills of lading and delivery of property. The provisions of section 20 (11) and (12) of this title, together with such other provisions of chapter 1 of this title (including penalties) as may be necessary for the enforcement of such provisions, shall apply with respect to freight forwarders, in the case of service subject to this chapter, with like force and effect as in the case of those persons to which such provisions are specifically applicable, and the freight forwarder shall be deemed both the receiving and delivering transportation company for the purposes of section 20 (11) and (12) of this title. When the services of a common carrier by motor vehicle subject to chapter 8 of this title are utilized by a freight forwarder for the receiving of property from a consignor in service subject to this chapter, such carrier may, with the consent of the freight forwarder, execute the bill of lading or shipping receipt for the freight forwarder. When the services of a common carrier by motor vehicle subject to chapter 8 of this title are utilized by a freight forwarder for the delivery of property to the consignee named in the freight forwarder’s bill of lading, shipping receipt, or freight bill, the property may, with the consent of the freight forwarder, be delivered on the freight bill, and receipted for on the delivery receipt, of the freight forwarder.”
So far as pertinent here, §20(11) provides: “Liability of initial and delivering carrier for loss; limitation of liability; notice and filing of claim. Any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company subject to the provisions of this chapter receiving property for transportation... shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused fey it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass within the United States or within an adjacent foreign country when transported on a through bill of lading,... and any such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company so receiving property for transj portation... shall be liable to the lawful holder of said receipt or bill of lading or to any party entitled to recover thereon, whether such receipt or bill of lading has been issued or not...: Provided further, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under the existing law..."
Section 20 (12) provides: “Recovery by initial or delivering carrier from connecting carrier. The common carrier, railroad, or transportation company issuing such receipt or bill of lading, or delivering such property so received and transported shall be entitled to recover from the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company on whose line the loss, damage, or injury shall have been sustained, the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be required to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof.”
Petitioners also make the contention that even assuming the forwarder is an initial carrier with right-over under § 20 (12), the limitation period provided in § 2 (b) of the railroad bill of lading is effective to modify that right. They point to numerous modifications of the right-over in the Freight Claims Rules applicable to railroads inter se. And see Article I (a) of Principles and Practices for the Investigation and Disposition of Freight Claims. Under the view we take of the case, it is unnecessary to reach that question.
H. R. Rep. No. 1172, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6.
Id. at 15.
87 Cong. Rec. 8216.
87 Cong. Rec. 8220.
It should be noted that, although the debate technically concerned a bill already passed by the Senate (S. 210), the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce had struck everything following the enacting clause, so the measure actually under consideration was a House amendment. This amendment was made the basis of the bill reported by the conference, and § 1013 was carried over intact from the House amendment. The conference report was adopted by both houses with little debate.
“Mr. LEA.... The gentleman
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The ultimate issue in this case is the applicability of the doctrine of marshaling of assets. The Government urges that it be applied to effect the collection of its junior income tax lien on the cash surrender value of certain life insurance policies. The senior lien is secured by the entire proceeds of the policies and absorbs practically all of their cash surrender value. The proceeds of the policies are exempt from levy by creditors of the insured under state law.
In 1943 the deceased, Peter Meyer, pledged his insurance policies to a bank as collateral security for a loan, giving the bank the right to satisfy its claim out of the “net proceeds of the policy when it becomes a claim by death.” When Mr. Meyer died, the insurance company paid the amount of the loan to the bank and the balance to the petitioner, Mr. Meyer’s widow and beneficiary. The Commissioner claims, however, that the insurance proceeds must be marshaled, that the Government’s admittedly junior tax lien must be paid from the cash surrender value of the policies and the bank from the remaining proceeds. The District Court agreed, 202 F. Supp. 606, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 309 F. 2d 131. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question in the administration of the income tax laws. 372 U. S. 934. We disagree with both courts and reverse the judgment.
I.
Peter Meyer owned four life insurance policies which named the petitioner, his wife, as beneficiary. Their face amount was $50,000 and their cash surrender value at his death was $27,285.87. He had retained the usual powers under such policies, namely, to change the beneficiaries, demand the cash surrender value and assign the policies. In 1943, long before the tax assessments in this suit, he assigned the policies as collateral security for the repayment of a loan from the Huntington National Bank of Columbus, Ohio. The bank was given the right, in the event of death, to satisfy its claim out of the “net proceeds of the policy when it becomes a claim by death.” At the time of Meyer’s death, $26,844.66 was due on this loan.
It is not disputed that the Commissioner assessed deficiencies covering income taxes due by Mr. Meyer for the years 1945 and 1946, with a balance of $6,159.09 plus interest due at his death, and that notice of lien was filed in 1955. Meyer died on December 28, 1955, and petitioner was named executrix of his estate. After the insurance company paid the full amount of the loan to the bank and the balance remaining due on the policies to the petitioner, this suit was begun against petitioner, individually and as executrix, for the recovery of the full amount of the taxes due. Petitioner tendered the sum of $441.21, the difference between the cash surrender value and the amount paid to the bank, but claimed the remainder as exempt under New York Insurance Law § 166. The District Court, however, granted summary judgment for the Government on the theory that the tax lien could be satisfied out of that portion of the proceeds that represented the cash surrender value by marshaling the funds and paying the bank’s claim from the remainder of the proceeds. It followed the holding of the Second Circuit in United States v. Behrens, 230 F. 2d 504. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same basis. We cannot agree.
II.
This Court has held and the parties do not dispute that: absent a lien, recovery of unpaid federal income taxes from a beneficiary of insurance can be had only to the extent that applicable state law permits such recovery by other creditors of the insured, Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U. S. 39, 46-47 (1958); the insured taxpayer’s “property and rights to property” under § 3670 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 are measured by the policy contract as enforced by applicable state law, United States v. Bess, 357 U. S. 51, 55-56 (1958); the cash surrender value of an insurance policy, where subject to the control of the insured, is “property and rights to property” under the section, id., at 59; finally, the priority of liens is determined by the principle “first in time, first in right,” United States v. New Britain, 347 U. S. 81 (1954). Applying New York law, this results in the bank’s lien being the senior one on the entire proceeds of the policies with the tax lien only attaching to the cash surrender value subject to the bank’s claim. The narrow question remaining is whether in such a situation the doctrine of marshaling ,of assets is compelled.
III.
This Court has said that “[t]he equitable doctrine of marshalling [sic] rests upon the principle that a creditor having two funds to satisfy his debt, may not by his application of them to his demand, defeat another creditor, who may resort to only one of the funds.” Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 268 U. S. 449, 456-457 (1925). The Courts of Appeals of two Circuits have applied the doctrine, despite state law, to the collection of federal tax liens. United States v. Behrens, supra, and United States v. Wintner, 200 F. Supp. 157, aff’d 312 F. 2d 749 (C. A. 6th Cir.). We note, however, that Behrens antedates our Stern and Bess opinions as well as those in Aquilino v. United States, 363 U. S. 509 (1960), and United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U. S. 522 (1960). These latter two cases held that competing liens of the Government for taxes and of subcontractors for labor and materials to a fund due the taxpayer under a general construction contract were controlled by applicable state law. This Court has never applied the doctrine of marshaling to federal income tax liens although it did deny the petition for certiorari filed in the Behrens case, supra, 351 U. S. 919. Nor has the Congress seen fit to lay down any rules with reference to the application of the doctrine, apparently leaving the problem to this Court.
IV.
In considering the relevance of the doctrine here it is well to remember that marshaling is not bottomed on the law of contracts or liens. It is founded instead in equity, being designed to promote fair dealing and justice. Its purpose is to prevent the arbitrary action of a senior lienor from destroying the rights of a junior lienor or a creditor having less security. It deals with the rights of all who have an interest in the property involved and is applied only when it can be equitably fashioned as to all of the parties. Thus, state courts have refused to apply it where state-created homestead exemptions would be destroyed, Sims v. McFadden, 217 Ark. 810, 233 S. W. 2d 375; or where the rights of insurance beneficiaries would be adversely affected, Bruns v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 250 App. Div. 370, 295 N. Y. Supp. 412; or where the rights of third parties having equal equity would be prejudiced, Barbin v. Moore, 85 N. H. 362, 159 A. 409; or where the “head of the household” exemption was involved, Westgrove Savings Bank v. Dunlavy, 190 Iowa 1054, 181 N. W. 404, and Pugh v. Whitsitt & Guerry, 161 S. W. 953 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.). Federal courts have likewise accepted this principle of the nonapplicability of the doctrine where, as here, one of the funds is exempt under state law. See In re Bailey, 176 F. 990, where a state legislative homestead exemption was held to be a superior equity in the hands of a bankrupt, preventing the marshaling of assets to his disadvantage; Robert Moody & Son v. Century Savings Bank, 239 U. S. 374, 378 (1915), where Iowa’s requirement that a homestead, even when validly mortgaged, may be sold only for a deficiency remaining after exhausting all other property was declared available to a junior mortgagee to prevent a marshaling of assets; and Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U. S. 294, 300-301 (1903), where a waiver of state exemption statutes was held to have no effect in bankruptcy since the title to the exempted property remained in the bankrupt and never reached the trustee’s hands. It, therefore, seems clear that the courts have considered state exemption statutes when weighing the equities between parties to determine the applicability of the marshaling doctrine. This is in line with that deference to state law of our recent cases, discussed above, holding that state law controls the determination of what is included within the “property or right to property” covered by § 3670 and upon which the federal tax lien could attach. In addition, this Court in United States v. Brosnan, 363 U. S. 237 (1960), when faced with a comparable problem involving collection of federal taxes, found
“it desirable to adopt as federal law state law governing divestiture of federal tax liens, except to the extent that Congress may have entered the field. It is true that such liens form part of the machinery for the collection of federal taxes .... However, when Congress resorted to the use of liens, it came into an area of complex property relationships long since settled and regulated by state law. . . . We think it more harmonious with the tenets of our federal system and more consistent with what Congress has already done in this area, not to inject ourselves into the network of competing private property interests, by displacing well-established state procedures governing their enforcement, or superimposing on them a new federal rule.” At 241-242.
Congress has not seen fit to change the rules this Court fashioned in these cases. Indeed, it has not only permitted them to stand but, as was said in Holden v. Stratton, 198 U. S. 202, 213-214 (1905), “It has always been the policy of Congress, both in general legislation and in bankrupt acts, to recognize and give effect to the state exemption laws.” There are many examples, among which is the incorporation in the bankruptcy law of the exemptions made available by the State of a bankrupt’s domicile. See 52 Stat. 847, 11 U. S. C. § 24. This includes the exemption of life insurance proceeds. See Holden v. Stratton, supra, at 212-213. In addition, other exemptions have been added from time to time, such as the exclusion from taxation of the benefits from life insurance policies, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 101 (a), and the exception of life insurance benefits in which the surviving spouse has exclusive power of appointment from the rule that terminal interests may not qualify for the marital deduction, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §2056 (b)(6).
We cannot overlook this long-established policy. In the absence of a definitive statutory rule to the contrary we therefore adopt the state rule and refuse to extend the equitable doctrine of marshaling assets to this situation. New York has a specific statute which exempts insurance benefits of a widow from the claim of creditors of her husband’s estate and its courts have refused to marshal assets where to do so will diminish those rights. Bruns v. First Trust & Deposit Co., supra. To apply marshaling in this case would overturn New York’s beneficent policy and, in addition, would enlarge the federal tax lien that the Congress has provided in § 3670. This we will not do. The judgment is therefore
Reversed.
“1. If any policy of insurance has been or shall be effected by any person on his own life in favor of a third person beneficiary, or made payable, by assignment, change of beneficiary or otherwise, to a third person, such third person beneficiary, assignee or payee shall be entitled to the proceeds and avails of such policy as against the creditors, personal representatives, trustees in bankruptcy and receivers in state and federal courts of the person effecting the insurance.” New York Insurance Law § 166.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | L | sc_issuearea |
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Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether federal courts may craft an exception to the full faith and credit statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1738, for claims brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Petitioners, who own and operate a hotel in San Francisco, California (hereinafter City), initiated this litigation in response to the application of a city ordinance that required them to pay a $567,000 “conversion fee” in 1996. After the California courts rejected petitioners’ various state-law takings claims, they advanced in the Federal District Court a series of federal takings claims that depended on issues identical to those that had previously been resolved in the state-court action. In order to avoid the bar of issue preclusion, petitioners asked the District Court to exempt from § 1738’s reach claims brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Petitioners’ argument is predicated on Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985), which held that takings claims are not ripe until a State fails “to provide adequate compensation for the taking.” Id., at 195. Unless courts disregard § 1738 in takings cases, petitioners argue, plaintiffs will be forced to litigate their claims in state court without any realistic possibility of ever obtaining review in a federal forum. The Ninth Circuit’s rejection of this argument conflicted with the Second Circuit’s decision in Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Serv., 342 F. 3d 118 (2003). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 543 U. S. 1032 (2004), and now affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
I
The San Remo Hotel is a three-story, 62-unit hotel in the Fisherman’s Wharf neighborhood in San Francisco. In December 1906, shortly after the great earthquake and fire destroyed most of the City, the hotel — then called the “New California Hotel” — opened its doors to house dislocated individuals, immigrants, artists, and laborers. The City officially licensed the facility to operate as a hotel and restaurant in 1916, and in 1922 the hotel was given its current name. When the hotel fell into financial difficulties and a “dilapidated condition” in the early 1970’s, Robert and Thomas Field purchased the facility, restored it, and began to operate it as a bed and breakfast inn. See San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 5 (Cal. App. 2000) (officially depublished).
In 1979, San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors responded to “a severe shortage” of affordable rental housing for elderly, disabled, and low-income persons by instituting a moratorium on the conversion of residential hotel units into tourist units. San Francisco Residential Hotel Unit Conversion and Demolition Ordinance (hereinafter Hotel Conversion Ordinance or HCO) §§41.3(aHg), App. to Pet. for Cert. 195a-197a. Two years later, the City enacted the first version of the Hotel Conversion Ordinance to regulate all future conversions. San Francisco Ordinance No. 330-81, codified in §41.1 et seq. Under the 1981 version of the HCO, a hotel owner could convert residential units into tourist units only by obtaining a conversion permit. And those permits could be obtained only by constructing new residential units, rehabilitating old ones, or paying an “in lieu” fee into the City’s Residential Hotel Preservation Fund Account. See §§41.12-41.13, App. to Pet. for Cert. 224a-231a. The City substantially strengthened the HCO in 1990 by eliminating several exceptions that had existed in the 1981 version and increasing the size of the “in lieu” fee hotel owners must pay when converting residential units. See 145 F. 3d 1095,1099 (CA9 1998).
The genesis of this protracted dispute lies in the 1981 HCO’s requirement that each hotel “file an initial unit usage report containing” the “number of residential and tourist units in the hotel[s] as of September 23,1979.” § 41.6(b)(1), App. to Pet. for Cert. 206a. Jean Iribarren was operating the San Remo Hotel, pursuant to a lease from petitioners, when this requirement came into effect. Iribarren filed the initial usage report for the hotel, which erroneously reported that all of the rooms in the hotel were “residential” units. The consequence of that initial classification was that the City zoned the San Remo Hotel as “residential hotel” — in other words, a hotel that consisted entirely of residential units. And that zoning determination ultimately meant that, despite the fact that the San Remo Hotel had operated in practice as a tourist hotel for many years, 145 F. 3d, at 1100, petitioners were required to apply for a conditional use permit to do business officially as a “tourist hotel,” San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 27 Cal. 4th 643, 654, 41 P. 3d 87, 94 (2002).
After the HCO was revised in 1990, petitioners applied to convert all of the rooms in the San Remo Hotel into tourist use rooms under the relevant HCO provisions and requested a conditional use permit under the applicable zoning laws. In 1993, the City Planning Commission granted petitioners’ requested conversion and conditional use permit, but only after imposing several conditions, one of which included the requirement that petitioners pay a $567,000 “in lieu” fee. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the HCO requirement was unconstitutional and otherwise improperly applied to their hotel. See id., at 656, 41 P. 3d, at 95. The City Board of Supervisors rejected petitioners’ appeal on April 19,1993.
In March 1993, petitioners filed for a writ of administrative mandamus in California Superior Court. That action lay dormant for several years, and the parties ultimately agreed to stay that action after petitioners filed for relief in Federal District Court.
Petitioners filed in federal court for the first time on May 4, 1993. Petitioners’ first amended complaint alleged four counts of due process (substantive and procedural) and takings (facial and as-applied) violations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, one count seeking damages under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, for those violations, and one pendent state-law claim. The District Court granted respondents summary judgment. As relevant to this action, the court found that petitioners’ facial takings claim was untimely under the applicable statute of limitations, and that the as-applied takings claim was unripe under Williamson County, 473 U. S. 172.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, petitioners took the unusual position that the court should not decide their federal claims, but instead should abstain under Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941), because a return to state court could conceivably moot the remaining federal questions. See App. 67-68; see also 145 F. 3d, at 1101. The Court of Appeals obliged petitioners’ request with respect to the facial challenge, a request that respondents apparently viewed as an “outrageous act of chutzpah.” Id., at 1105. That claim, the court reasoned, was “ripe the instant the 1990 ECO was enacted,” id., at 1102, and appropriate for Pullman abstention principally because petitioners’ “entire case” hinged on the propriety of the planning commission’s zoning designation — the precise subject of the pending state mandamus action, 145 E 3d, at 1105. The court, however, affirmed the District Court’s determination that petitioners’ as-applied takings claim — the claim that the application of the HCO to the San Remo Hotel violated the Takings Clause — was unripe. Because petitioners had failed to pursue an inverse condemnation action in state court, they had not yet been denied just compensation as contemplated by Williamson County. 145 F. 3d, at 1105.
At the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the court appended a footnote stating that petitioners would be free to raise their federal takings claims in the California courts. If, however, they wanted to “retain [their] right to return to federal court for adjudication of [their] federal claim, [they] must make an appropriate reservation in state court.” Id., at 1106, n. 7. That is precisely what petitioners attempted to do when they reactivated the dormant California case. Yet petitioners advanced more than just the claims on which the federal court had abstained, and phrased their state claims in language that sounded in the rules and standards established and refined by this Court’s takings jurisprudence. Petitioners claimed, for instance, that “imposition of the fee ‘fails to substantially advance a legitimate government interest’ and that ‘[t]he amount of the fee imposed is not roughly proportional to the impact’ of the proposed tourist use of the San Remo Hotel.” 27 Cal. 4th, at 656, 41 P. 3d, at 95 (quoting petitioners’ second amended state complaint). The state trial court dismissed petitioners’ amended complaint, but the intermediate appellate court reversed. The court held that petitioners’ claim that the payment of the “in lieu” fee effected a taking should have been evaluated under heightened scrutiny. Under more exacting scrutiny, the fee failed this Court’s “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests because, inter alia, it was based on the original flawed designation that the San Remo Hotel was an entirely “residential use” facility. See id., at 657-658, 41 P. 3d, at 96-97 (summarizing appellate court opinion (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The California Supreme Court reversed over the partial dissent of three justices. The court initially noted that petitioners had reserved their federal causes of action and had sought no relief for any violation of the Federal Constitution. Id., at 649, n. 1, 41 P. 3d, at 91, n. I. In the portion of its opinion discussing the Takings Clause of the California Constitution, however, the court noted that “we appear to have construed the clauses congruently.” Id., at 664, 41 P. 3d, at 100-101 (citing cases). Accordingly, despite the fact that petitioners sought relief only under California law, the state court decided to “analyze their takings claim under the relevant decisions of both this court and the United States Supreme Court.” Ibid., 41 P. 3d, at 101.
The principal constitutional issue debated by the parties was whether a heightened level of scrutiny applied to the claim that the housing replacement fee “ ‘does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.’” Ibid, (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1016 (1992)). In resolving that debate the court focused on our opinions in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994). Rejecting petitioners’ argument that heightened scrutiny should apply, the court emphasized the distinction between discretionary exactions imposed by executive officials on an ad hoc basis and “‘generally applicable zoning regulations’” involving “‘legislative determinations.’” 27 Cal. 4th, at 666-668, 41 P. 3d, at 102-104 (quoting, e.g., Dolan, 512 U. S., at 385, 391, n. 8). The court situated the HCO within the latter category, reasoning that the ordinance relied upon fixed fees computed under a formula that is generally applicable to broad classes of property owners. The court concluded that the less demanding “reasonable relationship” test should apply to the HCO’s monetary assessments, 27 Cal. 4th, at 671, 41 P. 3d, at 105.
Applying the “reasonable relationship” test, the court upheld the HCO on its face and as applied to petitioners. As to the facial challenge, the court concluded that the HCO’s mandated conversion fees “bear a reasonable relationship to loss of housing... in the generality or great majority of cases....” Id., at 673, 41 P. 3d, at 107. With respect to petitioners’ as-applied challenge, the court concluded that the conversion fee was reasonably based on the number of units designated for conversion, which itself was based on petitioners’ own estimate that had been provided to the City in 1981 and had remained unchallenged for years. Id., at 678, and n. 17, 41 P. 3d, at 110-111, and n. 17. The court therefore reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court’s order dismissing petitioners’ complaint.
Petitioners did not seek a writ of certiorari from the California Supreme Court’s decision in this Court. Instead, they returned to Federal District Court by filing an amended complaint based on the complaint that they had filed prior to invoking Pullman abstention. The District Court held that petitioners’ facial attack on the HCO was not only barred by the statute of limitations, but also by the general rule of issue preclusion. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 85a-86a. The District Court reasoned that 28 U. S. C. § 1738 requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to any state-court judgment that would have preclusive effect under the laws of the State in which the judgment was rendered. Because California courts had interpreted the relevant substantive state takings law coextensively with federal law, petitioners’ federal claims constituted the same claims that had already been resolved in state court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court rejected petitioners’ contention that general preclusion principles should be cast aside whenever plaintiffs “must litigate in state court pursuant to Pullman and/or Williamson County.” 364 F. 3d 1088, 1096 (CA9 2004). Relying on unambiguous Circuit precedent and the absence of any clearly contradictory decisions from this Court, the Court of Appeals found itself bound to apply general issue preclusion doctrine. Given that general issue preclusion principles governed, the only remaining question was whether the District Court properly applied that doctrine; the court concluded that it did. The court expressly rejected petitioners’ contention “that California takings law is not coextensive with federal takings law,” ibid., and held that the state court’s application of the “reasonable relationship” test was an “ ‘equivalent determination’ of such claims under the federal takings clause,” id., at 1098. We granted certiorari and now affirm.
II
Article IV, § 1, of the United States Constitution demands that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” In 1790, Congress responded to the Constitution’s invitation by enacting the first version of the full faith and credit statute. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. The modern version of the statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1788, provides that “judicial proceedings... shall have the same fifil faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State....” This statute has long been understood to encompass the doctrines of res judicata, or “claim preclusion,” and collateral estoppel, or “issue preclusion.” See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 94-96 (1980).
The general rule implemented by the full faith and credit statute — that parties should not be permitted to relitigate issues that have been resolved by courts of competent jurisdiction — predates the Republic. It “has found its way into every system of jurisprudence, not only from its obvious fitness and propriety, but because without it, an end could never be put to litigation.” Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, 114 (1821). This Court has explained that the rule
“is demanded by the very object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for, the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property, if, as between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put in issue and actually determined by them.” Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, 49 (1897).
As this case is presented to us, under our limited grant of certiorari, we have only one narrow question to decide: whether we should create an exception to the full faith and credit statute, and the ancient rule on which it is based, in order to provide a federal forum for litigants who seek to advance federal takings claims that are not ripe until the entry of a final state judgment denying just compensation. See Williamson County, 473 U. S. 172.
The essence of petitioners’ argument is as follows: because no claim that a state agency has violated the federal Takings Clause can be heard in federal court until the property owner has “been denied just compensation” through an available state compensation procedure, id., at 195, “federal courts [should be] required to disregard the decision of the state court” in order to ensure that federal takings claims can be “considered on the merits in... federal court,” Brief for Petitioners 8, 14. Therefore, the argument goes, whenever plaintiffs reserve their claims under England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964), federal courts should review the reserved federal claims de novo, regardless of what issues the state court may have decided or how it may have decided them.
We reject petitioners’ contention. Although petitioners were certainly entitled to reserve some of their federal claims, as we shall explain, England does not support their erroneous expectation that their reservation would fully negate the preclusive effect of the state-court judgment with respect to any and all federal issues that might arise in the future federal litigation. Federal courts, moreover, are not free to disregard 28 U. S. C. § 1738 simply to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can have their day in federal court. We turn first to England.
Ill
England involved a group of plaintiffs who had graduated from chiropractic school, but sought to practice in Louisiana without complying with the educational requirements of the State’s Medical Practice Act. 375 U. S., at 412. They filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the Act. The District Court invoked Pullman abstention and stayed the proceedings to enable the Louisiana courts to decide a preliminary and essential question of state law— namely, whether the state statute applied at all to chiropractors. 375 U. S., at 413. The state court, however, reached beyond the state-law question and held not only that the statute applied to the plaintiffs but also that its application was consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The Federal District Court then dismissed the federal action without addressing the merits of the federal claim.
On appeal, we held that when a federal court abstains from deciding a federal constitutional issue to enable the state courts to address an antecedent state-law issue, the plaintiff may reserve his right to return to federal court for the disposition of his federal claims. Id., at 419. In that case, the antecedent state issue requiring abstention was distinct from the reserved federal issue. See id., at 418-419. Our discussion of the “typical case” in which reservations of federal issues are appropriate makes clear that our holding was limited to cases that are fundamentally distinct from petitioners’. “Typical” England cases generally involve federal constitutional challenges to a state statute that can be avoided if a state court construes the statute in a particular manner. In such cases, the purpose of abstention is not to afford state courts an opportunity to adjudicate an issue that is functionally identical to the federal question. To the contrary, the purpose of Pullman abstention in such cases is to avoid resolving the federal question by encouraging a state-law determination that may moot the federal controversy. See 375 U. S., at 416-417, and n. 7. Additionally, our opinion made it perfectly clear that the effective reservation of a federal claim was dependent on the condition that plaintiffs take no action to broaden the scope of the state court’s review beyond decision of the antecedent state-law issue.
Our holding in England does not support petitioners’ attempt to relitigate issues resolved by the California courts. With respect to petitioners’ facial takings claims, the Court of Appeals invoked Pullman abstention after determining that a ripe federal question existed — namely, “the facial takings challenge to the 1990 HCO.” 145 F. 3d, at 1105. It did so because “ ‘land use planning is a sensitive area of social policy’” and because petitioners’ pending state mandamus action had the potential of mooting their facial challenge to the HCO by overturning the City’s original classification of the San Remo Hotel as a “residential” property. Ibid. Thus, petitioners were entitled to insulate from preclusive effect one federal issue — their facial constitutional challenge to the HCO — while they returned to state court to resolve their petition for writ of mandate.
Petitioners, however, chose to advance broader issues than the limited issues contained within their state petition for writ of administrative mandamus on which the Ninth Circuit relied when it invoked Pullman abstention. In their state action, petitioners advanced not only their request for a writ of administrative mandate, 27 Cal. 4th, at 653, 41 P. 3d, at 93, but also their various claims that the HCO was unconstitutional on its face and as applied for (1) its failure to substantially advance a legitimate interest, (2) its lack of a nexus between the required fees and the ultimate objectives sought to be achieved via the ordinance, and (3) its imposition of an undue economic burden on individual property owners. Id., at 672-676, 41 P. 3d, at 106-109. By broadening their state action beyond the mandamus petition to include their “substantially advances” claims, petitioners effectively asked the state court to resolve the same federal issues they asked it to reserve. England does not support the exercise of any such right.
Petitioners’ as-applied takings claims fare no better. As an initial matter, the Court of Appeals did not abstain with respect to those claims. Instead, the court found that they were unripe under Williamson County. The court therefore affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of those claims. 145 F. 3d, at 1106. Unlike their “substantially advances” claims, petitioners’ as-applied claims were never properly before the District Court, and there was no reason to expect that they could be relitigated in full if advanced in the state proceedings. See Allen, 449 U. S., at 101, n. 17. In short, our opinion in England does not support petitioners’ attempt to circumvent § 1738.
IV
Petitioners’ ultimate submission, however, does not rely on England alone. Rather, they argue that federal courts simply should not apply ordinary preclusion rules to state-court judgments when a case is forced into state court by the ripeness rule of Williamson County. For support, petitioners rely on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in Santini, 342 F. 3d, at 130.
In Santini, the Second Circuit held that parties “who litigate state-law takings claims in state court involuntarily” pursuant to Williamson County cannot be precluded from having those very claims resolved “by a federal court.” 342 F. 3d, at 130. The court did not rest its decision on any provision of the federal full faith and credit statute or our cases construing that law. Instead, the court reasoned that “[i]t would be both ironic and unfair if the very procedure that the Supreme Court required [plaintiffs] to follow before bringing a Fifth Amendment takings claim... also precluded [them] from ever bringing a Fifth Amendment takings claim.” Ibid. We find this reasoning unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, both petitioners and Santini ultimately depend on an assumption that plaintiffs have a right to vindicate their federal claims in a federal forum. We have repeatedly held, to the contrary, that issues actually decided in valid state-court judgments may well deprive plaintiffs of the “right” to have their federal claims relitigated in federal court. See, e. g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U. S. 75, 84 (1984); Allen, 449 U. S., at 103-104. This is so even when the plaintiff would have preferred not to litigate in state court, but was required to do so by statute or prudential rules. See id., at 104. The relevant question in such cases is not whether the plaintiff has been afforded access to a federal forum; rather, the question is whether the state court actually decided an issue of fact or law that was necessary to its judgment.
In Allen, the plaintiff, Willie McCurry, invoked the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in an unsuccessful attempt to suppress evidence in a state criminal trial. After he was convicted, he sought to remedy his alleged constitutional violation by bringing a suit for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 against the officers who had entered his home. Relying on “ ‘the special role of federal courts in protecting civil rights’ ” and the fact that § 1983 provided the “only route to a federal forum,” the Court of Appeals held that McCurry was entitled to a federal trial unencumbered by collateral estoppel. 449 U. S., at 93. We rejected that argument emphatically.
“The actual basis of the Court of Appeals’ holding appears to be a generally framed principle that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court, regardless of the legal posture in which the federal claim arises. But the authority for this principle is difficult to discern. It cannot lie in the Constitution, which makes no such guarantee, but leaves the scope of the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to the wisdom of Congress. And no such authority is to be found in §1983 itself.... There is, in short, no reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a person claiming a federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he would rather not have been engaged at all.” Id., at 103-104 (footnote omitted).
As in Allen, we are presently concerned only with issues actually decided by the state court that are dispositive of federal claims raised under § 1983. And, also as in Allen, it is clear that petitioners would have preferred not to have been forced to have their federal claims resolved by issues decided in state court. Unfortunately for petitioners, it is entirely unclear why their preference for a federal forum should matter for constitutional or statutory purposes.
The only distinction between this case and Allen that is possibly relevant is the fact that petitioners here originally invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court, which abstained on Pullman grounds while petitioners returned to state court. But petitioners’ as-applied takings claims were never properly before the District Court because they were unripe. And, as we have already explained, the Court of Appeals invoked Pullman abstention only with respect to petitioners’ “substantially advances” takings challenge, which petitioners then gratuitously presented to the state court. At a bare minimum, with respect to the facial takings claim, petitioners were “in an offensive posture in [their] state-court proceeding, and could have proceeded first in federal court had [they] wanted to litigate [their ‘substantially advances’] federal claim in a federal forum.” Migra, 465 U. S., at 85, n. 7. Thus, the only distinction between this case and Allen is a distinction of no relevant significance.
The second reason we find petitioners’ argument unpersuasive is that it assumes that courts may simply create exceptions to 28 U. S. C. § 1738 wherever courts deem them appropriate. Even conceding, arguendo, the laudable policy goal of making federal forums available to deserving litigants, we have expressly rejected petitioners’ view. “Such a fundamental departure from traditional rules of preclusion, enacted into federal law, can be justified only if plainly stated by Congress.” Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 485 (1982). Our cases have therefore made plain that “an exception to § 1738 will not be recognized unless a later statute contains an express or implied partial repeal.” Id., at 468 (citing Allen, 449 U. S., at 99). Even when the plaintiff’s resort to state court is involuntary and the federal interest in denying finality is robust, we have held that Congress “must ‘clearly manifest’ its intent to depart from § 1738.” 456 U. S., at 477.
The same concerns animate our decision here. Congress has not expressed any intent to exempt from the full faith and credit statute federal takings claims. Consequently, we apply our normal assumption that the weighty interests in finality and comity trump the interest in giving losing litigants access to an additional appellate tribunal. As we explained in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U. S. 394 (1981):
“[W]e do not see the grave injustice which would be done by the application of accepted principles of res judi-cata. ‘Simple justice’ is achieved when a complex body of law developed over a period of years is evenhandedly applied. The doctrine of res judicata serves vital public interests beyond any individual judge’s ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case. There is simply ‘no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata.'" Id., at 401 (quoting Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U. S. 726, 733 (1946)).
Third, petitioners have overstated the reach of Williamson County throughout this litigation. Petitioners were never required to ripen the heart of their complaint — the claim that the HCO was facially invalid because it failed to substantially advance a legitimate state interest — in state court. See Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534 (1992). Petitioners therefore could have raised most of their facial takings challenges, which by their nature requested relief distinct from the provision of “just compensation,” directly in federal court. Alternatively, petitioners had the option of reserving their facial claims while pursuing their as-applied claims along with their petition for writ of administrative mandamus. Petitioners did not have the right, however, to seek state review of the same substantive issues they sought to reserve. The purpose of the England reservation is not to grant plaintiffs a second bite at the apple in their forum of choice.
With respect to those federal claims that did require ripening, we reject petitioners’ contention that Williamson County prohibits plaintiffs from advancing their federal claims in state courts. The requirement that aggrieved property owners must seek “compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so,” 473 U. S., at 194, does not preclude state courts from hearing simultaneously a plaintiff’s request for compensation under state law and the claim that, in the alternative, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Reading Williamson County to preclude plaintiffs from raising such claims in the alternative would erroneously interpret our cases as requiring property owners to “resort to piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures.” MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U. S. 340, 350, n. 7 (1986).
It is hardly a radical notion to recognize that, as a practical matter, a significant number of plaintiffs will necessarily litigate their federal takings claims in state courts. It was settled well before Williamson County that “a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” 473 U. S., at 186. As a consequence, there is scant precedent for the litigation in federal district court of claims that a state agency has taken property in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. To the contrary, most of the cases in our takings jurisprudence, including nearly all of the cases on which petitioners rely, came to us on writs of eertiorari from state courts of last resort.
Moreover, this is not the only area of law in which we have recognized limits to plaintiffs’ ability to press their federal claims in federal courts. See, e. g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 116 (1981) (holding that taxpayers are “barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts”). State courts are fully competent to adjudicate constitutional challenges to local land-use decisions. Indeed, state courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal courts do in resolving the complex factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and land-use regulations.
At base, petitioners’ claim amounts to little more than the concern that it is unfair to give preclusive effect to state-court proceedings that are not chosen, but are instead required in order to ripen federal takings claims. Whatever the merits of that concern may be, we are not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve the availability of a federal forum. The Court of Appeals was correct to decline petitioners’ invitation to ignore the requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 1738. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered
Although petitioners asked this Court to review two separate questions, our grant of certiorari was limited exclusively to the question whether “a Fifth Amendment Takings claim [is] barred by issue preclusion based on a judgment denying compensation solely under state law, which was rendered in a state court proceeding that was required to ripen the federal Takings claim?” Pet. for Cert. i. Thus, we have no occasion to reach petitioners’ claim that, under California law, the substantive state takings law decision of the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | D | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent, a federal officer, was charged in Arizona with the commission of a state crime. On the officer’s motion, the case was removed from state court and tried in federal court. The issue presented is whether a federal appellate court has jurisdiction to entertain Arizona’s appeal from the District Court’s judgment of acquittal entered after a jury verdict of guilty.
I
A
Respondent William Dale Manypenny had been employed for six years as a Border Patrol Agent in the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). On the moonlit evening of March 15, 1976, he and fellow Agent Gerald Wayne Hjelle were assigned to patrol the Sweetwater Pass, located on federal land in Pima County, Ariz., approximately 10 miles from the Mexican border. INS officials knew that the Pass was frequently traveled by aliens illegally entering the United States. While patrolling the Pass, respondent and his colleague were expected to stop and question any person suspected of being an alien and to arrest that person if he could not produce a lawful entry permit. Both agents wore plain clothes, as was customary for patrol work in that rugged desert area. Tr. 248-249, 293.
Three Mexican males were traveling north along the trail when respondent’s electronic sensor system signaled their approach. Following standard procedure, Agent Hjelle stationed himself near where the path emerged from the canyon onto higher ground. Respondent took a position some 100 yards to the south, on a bluff overlooking but out of sight of the path. The plan called for Hjelle to stop any suspected illegal alien, identify himself, and conduct a brief inquiry to determine the suspect’s status, while respondent approached from behind.
The three men emerged from the canyon and saw Hjelle, who ordered them to stop. Id., at 16-17, 283-284. Before Hjelle could begin his questioning, one of the men turned and ran back south toward the border. Respondent shouted after him to halt. Id., at 174. When the fleeing man failed to stop, respondent fired three shotgun blasts in his direction. One hit the fugitive in the buttocks, causing multiple wounds. Id., at 105-106. Another struck him in the upper spine, severing the cord and leaving him a quadriplegic. Id., at 87-88, 93.
B
Respondent was indicted in the Superior Court of Pima County, Ariz., for assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-249 A and B (Supp. 1973). Because the charge arose from an act committed while on duty for the INS, respondent, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1442 (a)(1), removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The case was tried before a jury, and a verdict of guilty was returned. Respondent then timely moved for arrest of judgment or, alternatively, for a new trial. See Fed. Rules Grim. Proc. 33 and 34. The District Court granted respondent’s motion to arrest judgment and dismissed the indictment; it did so on the ground that the State could not assert its criminal jurisdiction over federal lands. 7 Record 7-8. The State immediately moved for reconsideration; the District Court also granted the State’s motion and took the matter under advisement. App. 36-38.
Nine months later, the District Court vacated its previous order arresting judgment. 445 F. Supp. 1123 (1977). The court on reconsideration held that Arizona retained criminal jurisdiction over all land within its exterior boundaries. Having determined that it properly could exercise jurisdiction over Arizona’s claim, the District Court then proceeded sua sponte to construe respondent’s motion under Rule 34 as a motion for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (c). Although an immunity defense had not been raised at trial, and the State had not introduced any evidence designed to overcome that defense, the court concluded that it had erred in failing to instruct the jury on such a defense. Relying on principles enunciated in In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 75 (1890), and Clifton v. Cox, 549 F. 2d 722 (CA9 1977), the District Court reasoned that respondent would be immune from prosecution on a state criminal charge if he acted under color of federal law and in the honest belief that his actions were necessary and proper for the execution of his federal duties. 445 P. Supp., at 1126-1127. The court applied this standard to the evidence adduced at trial, and concluded that a reasonable jury could not have found respondent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 1128. The presumed motion for acquittal was granted and the jury verdict was set aside.
Claiming that the trial court had exceeded its authority, the State filed a timely notice of appeal from the acquittal. It invoked the appellate court’s jurisdiction under 18 II. S. C. § 3731. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by a brief per curiam opinion citing Sanabria v. United States, 437 U. S. 54 (1978), initially dismissed the appeal on double jeopardy grounds. Upon timely petition for rehearing, however, the Court of Appeals withdrew the opinion, App. to Pet. for Cert, 1a, and substituted another in its place. This time, by a divided vote, the court dismissed Arizona’s appeal on the ground that jurisdiction was lacking. 608 F. 2d 1197 (1979). It noted that under settled precedent of this Court, the Government may take an appeal from an adverse decision in a criminal case only if expressly authorized by statute to do so. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 568 (1977); United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 336 (1975); United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 312, 318-323 (1892). Emphasizing the language of 18 U. S. C. § 3731, the court held that the statute authorizes an appeal only when the United States is the prosecutor, not when a state prosecution has been removed to federal court.
The Court of Appeals declined to consider whether state law provided Arizona with a right to appeal in this case. Instead, the court reasoned that a criminal proceeding removed to federal court under 28 U. S. C. § 1442 (a)(1) arises under federal law, and accordingly is to be controlled by that law rather than state law. The court concluded that “only Congress can authorize an appeal by a state in a § 1442 (a)(1) criminal prosecution,” and Congress had not done so. 608 F. 2d, at 1200.- The Court of Appeals also rejected the suggestion that the general appeals statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1291, provided authorization for Arizona's appeal. 608 F. 2d, at 1199, n. 3.
The dissenting judge discerned separate bases for appellate jurisdiction in 18 U. S. C. § 3731 and 28 U. S. C. § 1291. 608 F. 2d, at 1200-1202.
We granted certiorari in order to resolve a problem of appellate jurisdiction created by the federal removal statute. 445 U. S. 960 (1980). Because it is an issue that carries significance for federal-state relations, we pay close attention to both state and federal law bearing on its resolution.
II
We begin by noting that had respondent’s trial occurred in state rather than federal court, Arizona’s statutes, as construed and applied by the courts of that State, would enable the State to obtain the appellate review it seeks. Under Arizona law, the prosecution is authorized to seek review, by certiorari, when its claim is that the lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has abused its discretion. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2001 (1956). The State’s petition for review has been routinely granted in numerous instances exactly like this case, where the prosecution seeks review of a judgment of acquittal following a guilty verdict. See, e. g., State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court (Clifton, Real Party in Interest), 128 Ariz. 216, 624 P. 2d 1264 (1981); State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court (Moya, Real Party in Interest), 124 Ariz. 560, 606 P. 2d 411 (1980); State ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 123, 538 P. 2d 397 (1975). See also State v. Allen, 27 Ariz. App. 577, 557 P. 2d 176 (1976); State v. Lopez, 26 Ariz. App. 559, 550 P. 2d 113 (1976); State v. Gradillas, 25 Ariz. App. 510, 512, 544 P. 2d 1111, 1113 (1976).
Thus, the sole question posed here is whether respondent’s removal of the state prosecution to federal court for trial alters, the nature of the State’s otherwise well-established right, under state law, to seek review of the instant judgment of acquittal. We consider this question first by reviewing the legal effect of and the policies served by removal for trial under § 1442 (a)(1). We then examine respondent’s argument that the federal law governing federal appellate jurisdiction not only does not permit but also, in fact, bars the State’s criminal appeal in federal court.
A
The Court of Appeals concluded that the fact of removal substantially alters the State’s right to seek review. Reasoning that a case brought pursuant to § 1442 (a)(1) arises under federal law, the court held that state enabling statutes retain no significance. But a state criminal proceeding against a federal officer that is removed to federal court does not “arise under federal law” in this pre-empting sense. Rather, the federal court conducts the trial under federal rules of procedure while applying the criminal law of the State. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 271-272 (1880). See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 54(b)(1), Advisory Committee Notes, 18 U. S. C. App., pp. 1480-1481.
This principle is entirely consistent with the purpose underlying the removal of proceedings commenced in state court against a federal officer. Historically, removal under § 1442 (a)(1) and its predecessor statutes was meant to ensure a federal forum in any case where a federal official is entitled to raise a defense arising out of his official duties. The act of removal permits a trial upon the merits of the state-law question free from local interests or prejudice. See Colorado v. Symes, 286 U. S. 610, 617-518 (1932); Maryland v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9, 32 (1926). It also enables the defendant to have the validity of his immunity defense adjudicated in a federal forum. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U. S. 402, 407 (1969). For these reasons, this Court has held that the right of removal is absolute for conduct performed under color of federal office, and has insisted that the policy favoring removal “should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging interpretation of § 1442 (a)(1).” Ibid.
“[The Federal Government] can act only through its officers and agents, and they must act within the States. If, when thus acting, and within the scope of their authority, those officers can be arrested and brought to trial in a State court, for an alleged offense against the law of the State, yet warranted by the Federal authority they possess, and if the general government is powerless to interfere at once for their protection, — if their protection must be left to the action of the State court, — the operations of the general government may at any time be arrested at the will of one of its members.” Id., at 263.
At the same time, the invocation of removal jurisdiction by a federal officer does not revise or alter the underlying law to be applied. In this respect, it is a purely derivative form of jurisdiction, neither enlarging nor contracting the rights of the parties. Federal involvement is necessary in order to insure a federal forum, but it is limited to assuring that an impartial setting is provided in which the federal defense of immunity can be considered during prosecution under state law. Thus, while giving full effect to the purpose of removal, this Court retains the highest regard for a State's right to make and enforce its own criminal laws. Colorado v. Symes, 286 II S., at 517-618.
Under our federal system, “[i]t goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government.” Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 201 (1977). Because the regulation of crime is pre-eminently a matter for the States, we have identified “a strong judicial policy against federal interference with state criminal proceedings.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592, 600 (1975). A State's interest in enforcing its criminal laws merits comparable judicial respect when pursued in the federal courts. Cf. Colorado v. Symes, 286 U. S., at 518.
Respondent here, by obtaining a federal forum, has fully vindicated the federal policies supporting removal. The plainest evidence of this vindication is the District Court's application of the immunity defense. No further purpose of the removal statute would be served by denying the State a right to seek review when that very right is available under applicable state law. On the contrary, it would be anomalous to conclude that the State’s appellate rights were diminished solely because of the removal. The statutory goal of ensuring fair and impartial adjudication is not advanced when the State in effect can be penalized by the defendant's decision to remove a criminal prosecution. Absent any indication that the removal statute was intended to derogate from the State’s interest in evenhanded enforcement of its laws, we see no justification for providing an unintended benefit to a defendant who happens to be a federal officer.
B
Although the purposes of the removal statute do not support denial of a State’s customary right to seek appellate review, we do not suggest that this alone establishes the State’s right to appeal in federal court. Authorization to seek review under Arizona law is not a grant of federal appellate jurisdiction. Nor, when added to the conclusion that removal itself fails to diminish Arizona’s appellate rights, does this authorization amount to a grant of equivalent federal jurisdiction at the appellate level. Because the criminal removal statute does not confer federal appellate jurisdiction, some independent federal basis is required if a State is to perfect its appeal. Petitioner contends in part that such authorization derives from 28 U. S. C. § 1291, the general statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction. Brief for Petitioner 49-58. Respondent argues, however, that § 1291 cannot support Arizona’s appeal because it has been found inadequate, standing alone, to support a criminal appeal by the Federal Government. Brief for Respondent 32-40. This argument deserves close attention, for it draws on the important tradition disfavoring criminal appeals by the sovereign.
Under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, any litigant armed with a final judgment from a lower federal court is entitled to take an appeal. By its terms, the statute addresses neither the identity of particular parties nor the nature of the prior legal proceedings. But while it is settled that a civil appeal, or an appeal by the defendant in a criminal case, may be taken from any final decision of a District Court, this Court has observed on. prior occasions that, “ 'in the federal jurisprudence, at least, appeals by the Government in criminal cases are something unusual, exceptional, not favored.’ ” Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 96 (1967), quoting from Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, 400 (1957). This federal policy has deep roots in the common law, for it was generally understood, at least in this country, that the sovereign had no right to appeal an adverse criminal judgment unless expressly authorized by statute to do so. Accordingly, from the early days of the Republic, most state courts refused to consider appeals by prosecutors who lacked the requisite statutory authority,
Both prudential and constitutional interests contributed to this tradition. The need to restrict appeals by the prosecutor reflected a prudential concern that individuals should be free from the harassment and vexation of unbounded litigation by the sovereign. See, e. g., State v. Jones, 7 Ga. 422, 425-426 (1849); People v. Corning, 2 N. Y. 9, 16 (1848). This concern also underlies the constitutional ban against double jeopardy, which bars an appeal by the prosecutor following a jury verdict of acquittal. See, e. g., People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467, 476-480 (1869); State v. Burris, 3 Tex. 118 (1848) ; State v. Hand, 6 Ark. 169, 171 (1845). See also Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 16 (1978); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141, 143 (1962). See generally United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, 129-130 (1980). In general, both concerns translate into the presumption that the prosecution lacks appellate authority absent express legislative authorization to the contrary.
This presumption was first announced as a rule of federal law in United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (1892). There, the Court held that no appellate right by the Federal Government exists in the absence of express enabling legislation from Congress. The Court also concluded that the general grant of appellate jurisdiction contained in the Judiciary Act of 1891 did not satisfy this requirement. In subsequent decisions, the Court has reaffirmed that the Federal Government enjoys no inherent right to appeal a criminal judgment, and that the grant of general appellate jurisdiction, now contained in 28 U. S. C. § 1291, does not authorize such a federal appeal. DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S. 121, 130 (1962); Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, 400-403 (1957). See Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 96-97 (1967); United States v. Burroughs, 289 U. S. 159, 161 (1933).
Respondent contends that Sanges and its progeny must be read to foreclose a criminal appeal in federal court by any governmental entity unless the appellate right derives from an express federal statute. We do not believe that Sanges is to be so broadly construed. Sanges holds simply that the federal sovereign may not subject one of its citizens to continued federal prosecution in its own courts where it has not been expressly permitted to do so under federal law. 144 U. S., at 323. Our continuing refusal to assume that the United States possesses any inherent right to appeal reflects an abiding concern to check the Federal Government’s possible misuse of its enormous prosecutorial powers. By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice when extending to the Executive a right to expand criminal prosecutions, Sanges and its subsequent applications have placed the responsibility for such assertions of authority over citizens in the democratically elected Legislature where it belongs. Congress has properly assumed this responsibility by first defining, and then broadening and clarifying, the Federal Government’s right to appeal an adverse criminal judgment.
The concern to restrict prosecuting authority to express congressional grants, however, does not justify a requirement of express authorization by Congress when the sovereign seeking to appeal is a State rather than the Federal Government. Nothing in the language or logic of the Sanges opinion contains any suggestion of that kind. Nor should such an intimation be read into the Court’s subsequent decisions adhering to Sanges’ principle. For the purposes of congressional restriction of prosecution by the sovereign, the Federal Executive, not the State, is the relevant sovereign. The decision to limit or extend a State’s appellate authority is a matter of state law within constitutional constraints. If a State wishes to empower its prosecutors to pursue a criminal appeal under certain conditions, it is free so to provide, limited only by the guarantees afforded the criminal defendant under the Constitution. Requiring Congress also to address explicitly the State’s authority contributes nothing to the policy concerns that prompt the requirement of express sovereign action. There is, in short, no basis for concluding that Congress’ neglect specifically to authorize a state appeal in a removed criminal proceeding impairs the appellate rights of the state prosecutor acting to enforce his separate body of criminal law.
In sum, the Court’s prior decisions restricting the availability of § 1291 in a criminal context flow from a tradition of requiring that a prosecutorial appeal be affirmatively sanctioned by the same sovereign that sponsors the prosecution. The intention to restrict sovereign power in this area is adequately addressed when the legislature responsible for that power has spoken in express terms, or when a legislative enactment has been authoritatively construed by the sovereign’s highest court. We conclude that § 1291 neither compels nor forecloses appellate jurisdiction in an appeal taken by a State as prosecutor. Instead, the provision permits a State to appeal if it is authorized to do so by state law. Petitioner Arizona can rely on § 1291 combined with appellate authorization from the Arizona Legislature. In the circumstances of this case, no more is required.
Ill
We hold that in a criminal proceeding removed to federal court, a State may appeal under § 1291 from an adverse judgment if statutory authority to seek such review is conferred by state law. Because Arizona law conferred such authority here, and because removal does not alter the nature of the authority conferred, the State must be allowed to appeal from the post-guilty-verdict judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Sweetwater Pass is located about 29 miles southeast of Ajo, Ariz. The Pass is bounded on the west by the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, and on the east by the Papago Indian Reservation. It is undisputed that the events in question occurred on land owned by the Federal Government.
Under 8 U. S. C. § 1325, an alien not previously convicted of illegal entry who enters the United States at an improper time or place is guilty of a misdemeanor.
According to testimony at trial, the Mexicans were unarmed and were seeking employment in this country. Tr. 15, 23.
The statute then read in pertinent part:
“A. A person who commits assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument... shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than one nor more than ten years, by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or both.
“B. A crime as prescribed by the terms of subsection A, committed by a person armed with a gun or other deadly weapon, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, for the first offense, for not less than five years... and in no case... shall the person convicted be eligible for suspension or commutation of sentence, probation, pardon or parole until such person has served the minimum sentence imposed.”
Section 13-249 was repealed by 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 142, §4, effective Oct. 1, 1978, and replaced by other legislation. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1204 (1978).
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1442 (a) (1) provides:
“(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any one of the following persons may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
“(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person acting under him, for any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.”
In his motion in arrest of judgment under Rule 34, respondent maintained that the State of Arizona, and therefore the United States District Court on removal, had no criminal jurisdiction over the federal land where the shooting occurred. Respondent further contended that any attempt to prosecute him under a state statute unlawfully interfered with the exclusively federal interest in regulating immigration.
The court further concluded that the federal interest in enforcement of the immigration laws did not pre-empt the applicability of state criminal law in this instance. 445 F. Supp., at 1125-1127.
Arizona argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to act on a Rule 29 (e) motion 11 months after a guilty verdict, in violation of the Rule’s 7-day requirement. Brief for Appellant in No. 77-3453 (CA9), pp. 8-11. The State also contended that the District Court had misapplied relevant immunity law and that the evidence was more than sufficient to sustain the jury verdict. Id., at 17-24.
Section 3731 provides in pertinent part:
“In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie tó a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.”
The court reasoned that even if, in a removed criminal prosecution, the State of Arizona had the same right of appeal under 18 U. S. C. § 3731 as is accorded the United States in a federal prosecution, the judgment of acquittal nonetheless was unreviewable on double jeopardy grounds. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a-40a.
Title 28 U. S. C. §1291 provides:
“The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”
Having found jurisdiction, the dissent concluded on the merits that the judgment of acquittal should be reversed. 608 F. 2d, at 1205. The Court of Appeals’ majority, however, did not reach the merits. In view of the posture of the case, we also intimate no view on the merits. Neither do we have any occasion now to decide whether the instant appeal would be barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 793-796 (1969). That question was not decided by the Court of Appeals, and the parties have not raised it before this Court. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Section 12-2001 reads:
“The writ of certiorari may be granted by the supreme and superior courts or by any judge thereof, in all cases when an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.”
A writ of certiorari may be obtained by filing a petition for special action, pursuant to Rule 4, Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973). The certiorari provision itself speaks of review to determine whether the lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction, but as consistently construed by the Arizona Supreme Court, the statute also authorizes review for abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Ryder v. Superior Court (Clifton, Real Party in Interest), 128 Ariz. 216, 222, 624 P. 2d 1264, 1270 (1981); State ex rel. Dawson v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 123, 538 P. 2d 397 (1975); State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court, 95 Ariz. 319, 322, 390 P. 2d 109, 111 (1964); State ex rel. Mahoney v. Stevens, 79 Ariz. 298, 300, 288 P. 2d 1077, 1078 (1955). See Rule 3, Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, vol. 17A, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1973).
The dissent maintains that this longstanding application of the statute, never questioned by the Arizona Legislature, is an insufficiently clear expression of state law. But it is obvious that in the precise circumstances of this case, the Arizona Legislature and the Arizona Supreme Court have authorized the appellate review requested by the State. The absence of a statutory formula providing for automatic appeal by the State in every criminal prosecution does not alter this fact.
A separate Arizona statute permits the State to appeal from an “order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the state.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4032.5 (1978), formerly § 13-1712.5. Although there is little case law interpreting this provision, it may furnish an additional basis for appellate review here. See generally State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court (Clifton, Real Party in Interest), 128 Ariz., at 220, 624 P. 2d, at 1268; State v. Wynn, 114 Ariz. 561, 563, 562 P. 2d 734, 736 (App. 1977).
In concluding that federal law controls all aspects of a case before the federal court under § 1442 (a) (1), the Court of Appeals relied on several decisions, none of which involved proceedings removed from state to federal court. See D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U. S. 447 (1942); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190 (1940); Board of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U. S. 343 (1939); United States v. Crain, 589 E. 2d 996 (CA9 1979). Moreover, in each of these eases federal law was deemed controlling because the rights that the complainant sought to protect or enforce were created by federal statutes. In contrast, petitioner here seeks to enforce a state statute.
This Court elsewhere has reviewed the “long history” of the federal-officer removal statute. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U. S. 402, 405-406 (1969). It has been 100 years since the Court in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 (1880), first emphasized the need to safeguard the exercise of legitimate federal authority:
In the area of general civil removals, it is well settled that if the state court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, the federal court acquires none upon removal, even though the federal court would have had jurisdiction if the suit had originated there. Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U. S. 448, 449 (1943); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 389 (1939); Lambert Bun Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258 U. S. 377, 382 (1922). This principle of derivative jurisdiction is instructive where, as here, relevant state-court jurisdiction is found to exist and the question is whether the federal court in effect loses such jurisdiction as a result of removal. Of course, because appellate rather than original jurisdiction is at issue, the analogy is not perfect. See Sub-part B, injra.
By enacting the current version of 18 U. S. C. § 3731, see 84 Stat. 1890, Congress manifested an intent to remove all statutory barriers to a criminal appeal taken by the Federal Government. United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 337 (1975). Petitioner argues that this intent should inform our deliberations concerning a state prosecution’s appellate rights upon removal to federal court. A proper respect for the State’s interest in enforcing its own criminal laws, however, counsels against that conclusion. While the policy announced in § 3731 might perhaps be viewed as indicative of congressional support for any prosecutor’s appeal in federal court, the statute does not speak in such terms. Moreover, if § 3731 is construed to extend broad appellate rights to a State that does not authorize comparable rights under state law, one result might be to inhibit the exercise of the removal right, contrary to established federal policy. In light of these uncertainties, and our resolution of the case on other grounds, we do not reach the question whether § 3731 applies to the States.
Congress from the very beginning provided that final civil judgments were reviewable as a matter of statutory right. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 22, 1 Stat. 84. Later, when the growing volume of appellate business threatened to overwhelm this Court’s docket, Congress acted to establish circuit courts of appeals. Judiciary Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1295, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1890) ; 21 Cong. Ree. 10220-10222 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Evarts). While preserving, under § 5 of the 1891 Act, 26 Stat. 827, several designated categories of eases under this Court’s direct appellate jurisdiction; the Act, in § 6, conferred on the new intermediate appellate court the power to review and revise final judgments in all other eases, civil and criminal, “unless otherwise provided by law.” 26 Stat. 828. Through a succession of recodifications and technical amendments,- § 6 of the 1891 Act has been carried forward as 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
There is disagreement among scholars as to whether, at common law in England, the prosecution could appeal. See R. Moreland,- Modem Criminal Procedure 273 (1959); L. Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 57 (1939); Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 Yale L. J. 486, 491 (1927); Note, Criminal Procedure — Right of State to Appeal, 45 Ky. L. J. 628, 629 (1957). See generally United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 312 (1892).
See United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S., at 313-318, and cases cited therein. See also L. Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 58 (1939); Comment, State Appeals in Criminal Cases, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 449, 450-451 (1965).
In Sanges, the Government sought review of a lower court judgment quashing the federal indictment. The Court determined that
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case, in which the District Court for the District of Colorado granted preliminary in-junctive relief, is whether a “home rule” municipality, granted by the state constitution extensive powers of self-government in local and municipal matters, enjoys the “state action” exemption from Sherman Act liability announced in Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943).
I
Respondent city of Boulder is organized as a “home rule” municipality under the Constitution of the State of Colorado. The city is thus entitled to exercise “the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters,” and with respect to such matters the City Charter and ordinances supersede the laws of the State. Under that Charter, all municipal legislative powers are exercised by an elected City Council. In 1964 the City Council enacted an ordinance granting to Colorado Televents, Inc., a 20-year, revocable, nonexclusive permit to conduct a cable television business within the city limits. This permit was assigned to petitioner in 1966, and since that time petitioner has provided cable television service to the University Hill area of Boulder, an area where some 20% of the city’s population lives, and where, for geographical reasons, broadcast television signals cannot be received.
From 1966 until February 1980, due to the limited service that could be provided with the technology then available, petitioner’s service consisted essentially of retransmissions of programming broadcast from Denver and Cheyenne, Wyo. Petitioner’s market was therefore confined to the University Hill area. However, markedly improved technology became available in the late 1970’s, enabling petitioner to offer many more channels of entertainment than could be provided by local broadcast television. Thus presented with an opportunity to expand its business into other areas of the city, petitioner in May 1979 informed the City Council that it planned such an expansion. But the new technology offered opportunities to potential competitors, as well, and in July 1979 one of them, the newly formed Boulder Communications Co. (BCC), also wrote to the City Council, expressing its interest in obtaining a permit to provide competing cable television service throughout the city.
The City Council’s response, after reviewing its cable television policy, was the enactment of an “emergency” ordinance prohibiting petitioner from expanding its business into other areas of the city for a period of three months. The City Council announced that during this moratorium it planned to draft a model cable television ordinance and to invite new businesses to enter the Boulder market under its terms, but that the moratorium was necessary because petitioner’s continued expansion during the drafting of the model ordinance would discourage potential competitors from entering the market.
Petitioner filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, and sought, inter alia, a preliminary injunction to prevent the city from restricting petitioner’s proposed business expansion, alleging that such a restriction would violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. The city responded that its moratorium ordinance could not be violative of the antitrust laws, either because that ordinance constituted an exercise of the city’s police powers, or because Boulder enjoyed antitrust immunity under the Parker doctrine. The District Court considered the city’s status as a home rule municipality, but determined that that status gave autonomy to the city only in matters of local concern, and that the operations of cable television embrace “wider concerns, including interstate commerce . . . [and] the First Amendment rights of communicators.” 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1038-1039 (1980). Then, assuming, arguendo, that the ordinance was within the city’s authority as a home rule municipality, the District Court considered City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978), and concluded that the Parker exemption was “wholly inapplicable,” and that the city was therefore subject to antitrust liability. 485 F. Supp., at 1039. Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction was accordingly granted.
On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. 630 F. 2d 704 (1980). The majority, after examining Colorado law, rejected the District Court’s conclusion that regulation of the cable television business was beyond the home rule authority of the city. Id., at 707. The majority then addressed the question of the city’s claimed Parker exemption. It distinguished the present case from City of Lafayette on the ground that, in contrast to the municipally operated revenue-producing utility companies at issue there, “no proprietary interest of the City is here involved.” 630 F. 2d, at 708. After noting that the city’s regulation “was the only control or active supervision exercised by state or local government, and . . . represented the only expression of policy as to the subject matter,” id., at 707, the majority held that the city’s actions therefore satisfied the criteria for a Parker exemption, 630 F. 2d, at 708. We granted certiorari, 450 U. S. 1039 (1981). We reverse.
II
A
Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), addressed the question whether the federal antitrust laws prohibited a State, in the exercise of its sovereign powers, from imposing certain anticompetitive restraints. These took the form of a “marketing program” adopted by the State of California for the 1940 raisin crop; that program prevented appellee from freely marketing his crop in interstate commerce. Parker noted that California’s program “derived its authority . . . from the legislative command of the state,” id., at 350, and went on to hold that the program was therefore exempt, by virtue of the Sherman Act’s own limitations, from antitrust attack:
“We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.” Id., at 350-351.
The availability of this exemption to a State’s municipalities was the question presented in City of Lafayette, swpra. In that case, petitioners were Louisiana cities empowered to own and operate electric utility systems both within and beyond their municipal limits. Respondent brought suit against petitioners under the Sherman Act, alleging that they had committed various antitrust offenses in the conduct of their utility systems, to the injury of respondent. Petitioners invoked the Parker doctrine as entitling them to dismissal of the suit. The District Court accepted this argument and dismissed. But the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that a “subordinate state governmental body is not ipso facto exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws,” City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F. 2d 431, 434 (1976) (footnote omitted), and directing the District Court on remand to examine “whether the state legislature contemplated a certain type of anti-competitive restraint,” ibid.
This Court affirmed. In doing so, a majority rejected at the outset petitioners’ claim that, quite apart from Parker, “Congress never intended to subject local governments to the antitrust laws.” 435 U. S., at 394. A plurality opinion for four Justices then addressed petitioners’ argument that Parker, properly construed, extended to “all governmental entities, whether state agencies or subdivisions of a State, . . . simply by reason of their status as such.” 435 U. S., at 408. The plurality opinion rejected this argument, after a discussion of Parker, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977). These precedents were construed as holding that the Parker exemption reflects the federalism principle that we are a Nation of States, a principle that makes no accommodation for sovereign subdivisions of States. The plurality opinion said:
“Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal deference of the States that create them. Parser’s limitation of the exemption to ‘official action directed by a state,’ is consistent with the fact that the States’ subdivisions generally have not been treated as equivalents of the States themselves. In light of the serious economic dislocation which could result if cities were free to place their own parochial interests above the Nation’s economic goals reflected in the antitrust laws, we are especially unwilling to presume that Congress intended to exclude anticompetitive municipal action from their reach.” 435 U. S., at 412-413 (footnote and citations omitted).
The opinion emphasized, however, that the State as sovereign might sanction anticompetitive municipal activities and thereby immunize municipalities from antitrust liability. Under the plurality’s standard, the Parker doctrine would shield from antitrust liability municipal conduct engaged in “pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.” 435 U. S., at 413. This was simply a recognition that a State may frequently choose to effect its policies through the instrumentality of its cities and towns. It was stressed, however, that the “state policy” relied upon would have to be “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed.” Id., at 410. This standard has since been adopted by a majority of the Court. New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97, 105 (1980).
B
Our precedents thus reveal that Boulder’s moratorium ordinance cannot be exempt from antitrust scrutiny unless it constitutes the action of the State of Colorado itself in its sovereign capacity, see Parker, or unless it constitutes municipal action in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy, see City of Lafayette, Orrin W. Fox Co., and Midcal. Boulder argues that these criteria are met by the direct delegation of powers to municipalities through the Home Rule Amendment to the Colorado Constitution. It contends that this delegation satisfies both the Parker and the City of Lafayette standards. We take up these arguments in turn.
(1)
Respondent city’s Parker argument emphasizes that through the Home Rule Amendment the people of the State of Colorado have vested in the city of Boulder “ ‘every power theretofore possessed by the legislature ... in local and municipal affairs.’” The power thus possessed by Boulder’s City Council assertedly embraces the regulation of cable television, which is claimed to pose essentially local problems. Thus, it is suggested, the city’s cable television moratorium ordinance is an “act of government” performed by the city acting as the State in local matters, which meets the “state action” criterion of Parker.
We reject this argument: it both misstates the letter of the law and misunderstands its spirit. The Parker state-action exemption reflects Congress’ intention to embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States possess a significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution. But this principle contains its own limitation: Ours is a “dual system of government,” Parker, 317 U. S., at 351 (emphasis added), which has no place for sovereign cities. As this Court stated long ago, all sovereign authority “within the geographical limits of the United States” resides either with
“the Government of the United States, or [with] the States of the Union. There exist within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two. There may be cities, counties, and other organized bodies with limited legislative functions, but they are all derived from, or exist in, subordination to one or the other of these.” United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 379 (1886) (emphasis added).
The dissent in the Court of Appeals correctly discerned this limitation upon the federalism principle: “We are a nation not of ‘city-states’ but of States.” 630 F. 2d, at 717. Parker itself took this view. When Parker examined Congress’ intentions in enacting the antitrust laws, the opinion, as previously indicated, noted: “[NJothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history . . . suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. . . . [And] an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.” 317 U. S., at 350-351 (emphasis added). Thus Parker recognized Congress’ intention to limit the state-action exemption based upon the federalism principle of limited state sovereignty. City of Lafayette, Orrin W. Fox Co., and Midcal reaffirmed both the vitality and the intrinsic limits of the Parker state-action doctrine. It was expressly recognized by the plurality opinion in City of Lafayette that municipalities “are not themselves sovereign," 435 U. S., at 412, and that accordingly they could partake of the Parker exemption only to the extent that they acted pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy, 435 U. S., at 413. The Court adopted this view in Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S., at 109, and Midcal, 445 U. S., at 105. We turn then to Boulder’s contention that its actions were undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.
(2)
Boulder first argues that the requirement of “clear articulation and affirmative expression” is fulfilled by the Colorado Home Rule Amendment’s “guarantee of local autonomy.” It contends, quoting from City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at. 394, 415, that by this means Colorado has “comprehended within the powers granted” to Boulder the power to enact the challenged ordinance, and that Colorado has thereby “contemplated” Boulder’s enactment of an anticompetitive regulatory program. Further, Boulder contends that it may be inferred, “from the authority given” to Boulder “to operate in a particular area” — here, the asserted home rule authority to regulate cable television — “that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of.” (Emphasis supplied.) Boulder therefore concludes that the “adequate state mandate” required by City of Lafayette, supra, at 415, is present here.
But plainly the requirement of “clear articulation and affirmative expression” is not satisfied when the State’s position is one of mere neutrality respecting the municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive. A State that allows its municipalities to do as they please can hardly be said to have “contemplated” the specific anticompetitive actions for which municipal liability is sought. Nor can those actions be truly described as “comprehended within the powers granted,” since the term, “granted,” necessarily implies an affirmative addressing of the subject by the State. The State did not do so here: The relationship of the State of Colorado to Boulder’s moratorium ordinance is one of precise neutrality. As the majority in the Court of Appeals below acknowledged: “[W]e are here concerned with City action in the absence of any regulation whatever by the State of Colorado. Under these circumstances there is no interaction of state and local regulation. We have only the action or exercise of authority by the City.” 630 F. 2d, at 707. Indeed, Boulder argues that as to local matters regulated by a home rule city, the Colorado General Assembly is without power to act. Cf. City of Lafayette, supra, at 414, and n. 44. Thus in Boulder’s view, it can pursue its course of regulating cable television competition, while another home rule city can choose to prescribe monopoly service, while still another can elect free-market competition: and all of these policies are equally “contemplated,” and “comprehended within the powers granted.” Acceptance of such a proposition — that the general grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific anticompetitive ordinances — would wholly eviscerate the concepts of “clear articulation and affirmative expression” that our precedents require.
HH HH
Respondents argue that denial of the Parker exemption m the present ease will have serious adverse consequences for cities, and will unduly burden the federal courts. But this argument is simply an attack upon the wisdom of the longstanding congressional commitment to the policy of free markets and open competition embodied in the antitrust laws. Those laws, like other federal laws imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon “persons,” of course apply to municipalities as well as to other corporate entities. Moreover, judicial enforcement of Congress’ will regarding the state-action exemption renders a State “no less able to allocate governmental power between itself and its political subdivisions. It means only that when the State itself has not directed or authorized an anticompetitive practice, the State’s subdivisions in exercising their delegated power must obey the antitrust laws.” City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 416. As was observed in that case:
“Today’s decision does not threaten the legitimate exercise of governmental power, nor does it preclude municipal government from providing services on a monopoly basis. Parker and its progeny make clear that a State properly may . . . direct or authorize its instru-mentalities to act in a way which, if it did not reflect state policy, would be inconsistent with the antitrust laws. . . . [Assuming that the municipality is authorized to provide a service on a monopoly basis, these limitations on municipal action will not hobble the execution of legitimate governmental programs.” Id., at 416-417 (footnote omitted).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the action is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The Colorado Home Rule Amendment, Colo. Const., Art. XX, § 6, provides in pertinent part:
“The people of each city or town of this state, having a population of two thousand inhabitants ... , are hereby vested with, and they shall always have, power to make, amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.
“Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith.
“It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of all municipalities coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters ....
“The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue to apply to such cities and towns, except insofar as superseded by the charters of such cities and towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.”
Boulder, Colo., Charter §11 (1965 rev. ed.).
The District Court below noted:
“Up to late 1975, cable television throughout the country was concerned primarily with retransmission of television signals to areas which did not have normal reception, with some special local weather and news services originated by the cable operators. During the late 1970’s however, satellite technology impacted the industry and prompted a rapid, almost geometric rise in its growth. As earth stations became less expensive, and ‘Home Box Office’ companies developed, the public response to cable television greatly increased the market demand for such expanded services.
“The ‘state of the art’ presently allows for more than 35 channels, including movies, sports, FM radio, and educational, children’s, and religious programming. The institutional uses for cable television are fast increasing, with technology for two-way service capability. Future potential for cable television is referred to as ‘blue sky’, indicating that virtually unlimited technological improvements are still expected.” 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1036-1037 (1980).
BCC was a defendant below, and is a respondent here.
Regarding this letter, the District Court noted that “BCC outlined a proposal for a new system, acknowledging the presence of [petitioner] in Boulder but stating that ‘(w)hatever action the City takes in regard to [petitioner], it is the plan of BCC to begin building its system as soon as feasible after the City grants BCC its permit.’” Id., at 1037.
“The . . . City Council . . . initialed] a' review and reconsideration of cable television in view of the many changes in the industry since . . . 1964.... Accordingly, they hired a consultant,. . . and held a number of study meetings to develop a governmental response to these changes. The primary thrust of [the consultant’s] advice was that the City should be concerned about the tendency of a cable system to become a natural monopoly. Much discussion in the City Council centered around a supposed unfair advantage that [petitioner] had because it was already operating in Boulder. Members of the Council, and the City Manager, expressed fears that [petitioner might] not be the best cable operator for Boulder, but would nonetheless be the only operator because of its head start in the area. The Council wanted to create a situation in which other cable companies could make offers and not be hampered by the possibility that [petitioner] would build out the whole area before they even arrived.” Ibid.
The preamble to this ordinance offered the following declarations as justification for its enactment:
“[C]able television companies have within recent months displayed interest in serving the community and have requested the City Council to grant [them] permission to use the public right-of-way in providing that service; and
“ . . . the present permittee, [petitioner], has indicated that it intends to extend its services in the near future . . . ; and
“ . . . the City Council finds that such an extension . . . would result in hindering the ability of other companies to compete in the Boulder market; and
“ . . . the City Council intends to adopt a model cable television permit ordinance, solicit applications from interested cable television companies, evaluate such applications, and determine whether or not to grant additional permits . . . [within] 3 months, and finds that an extension of service by [petitioner] would result in a disruption of this application and evaluation process; and
“ . . . the City Council finds that placing temporary geographical limitations upon the operations of [petitioner] would not impair the present services offered by [it] to City of Boulder residents, and would not impair [its] ability ... to improve those services within the area presently served by it.” Boulder, Colo., Ordinance No. 4473 (1979).
The Council reached this conclusion despite BCC’s statement to the contrary, see n. 5, supra.
26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part that “[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ... , is declared to be illegal.”
Petitioner also alleged, mter alia, that the city and BCC were engaged in a conspiracy to restrict competition by substituting BCC for petitioner. The District Court noted that although petitioner had gathered some circumstantial evidence that might indicate such a conspiracy, the evidence was insufficient to establish a probability that petitioner would prevail on this claim. 485 F. Supp., at 1038.
The District Court also held that no per se antitrust violation appeared on the record before it, and that petitioner was not protected by the First Amendment from all regulation attempted by the city. Id., at 1039-1040.
The majority cited California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), as support for its reading of City of Lafayette, and concluded “that City of Lafayette is not applicable to a situation wherein the governmental entity is asserting a governmental rather than proprietary interest, and that instead the Parker-Midcal doctrine is applicable to exempt the City from antitrust liability.” 630 F. 2d, at 708.
The dissent urged affirmance, agreeing with the District Court’s analysis of the antitrust exemption issue. Id., at 715-718 (Markey, C. J., United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation, dissenting). The dissent also considered the city’s actions to violate “[c]om-mon principles of contract law and equity,” id., at 715, as well as the First Amendment rights of petitioner and its customers, both actual and potential, id., at 710-714. The petition for certiorari did not present the First Amendment question, and we do not address it in this opinion.
The Court of Appeals described the applicable standard as follows:
" [lit is not necessary to point to an express statutory mandate for each act which is alleged to violate the antitrust laws. It will suffice if the chai-lenged activity was clearly within the legislative intent. Thus, a trial judge may ascertain, from the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of. On the other hand, the connection between a legislative grant of power and the subordinate entity’s asserted use of that power may be too tenuous to permit the conclusion that the entity’s intended scope of activity encompassed such conduct. ... A district judge’s inquiry on this point should be broad enough to include all evidence which might show the scope of legislative intent.” 532 F. 2d, at 434-435 (footnote and citation omitted).
The Chief Justice, in a concurring opinion, focused on the nature of the challenged activity rather than the identity of the parties to the suit. 435 U. S., at 420. He distinguished between “the proprietary enterprises of municipalities,” id., at 422 (footnote omitted), and their “traditional government functions,” id., at 424, and viewed the Parker exemption as extending to municipalities only when they engaged in the latter.
In Midcal we held that a California resale price maintenance system, affecting all wine producers and wholesalers within the State, was not entitled to exemption from the antitrust laws. In so holding, we explicitly adopted the principle, expressed in the plurality opinion in City of Lafayette, that anticompetitive restraints engaged in by state municipalities or subdivisions must be “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy” in order to gain an antitrust exemption. Midcal, 445 U. S., at 105. The price maintenance system at issue in Midcal was denied such an exemption because it failed to satisfy the “active state supervision” criterion described in City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 410, as underlying our decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977). Because we conclude in the present case that Boulder’s moratorium ordinance does not satisfy the “clear articulation and affirmative expression” criterion, we do not reach the question whether that ordinance must or could satisfy the “active state supervision” test focused upon in Midcal.
Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, 618 P. 2d 1374, 1381 (1980), quoting Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement District v. Board of County Comm’rs, 149 Colo. 284, 294, 369 P. 2d 67, 72 (1962) (emphasis in original). The Byrne court went on to state that “by virtue of Article XX, a home rule city is not inferior to the General Assembly concerning its local and municipal affairs.” 618 P. 2d, at 1381. Petitioner strongly disputes respondent city’s premise and its construction of Byrne, citing City and County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 48, 329 P. 2d 441, 445 (1958), City and County of Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212, 219-220, 235 P. 777, 780-781 (1925), and 2 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 9.08a, p. 638 (1979), as contrary authority. But it is not for us to determine the correct view on this issue as a matter of state law. Parker affords an exemption from federal antitrust laws, based upon Congress’ intentions respecting the scope of those laws. Thus the availability of the Parker exemption is and must be a matter of federal law.
Boulder cites the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in Manor Vail Condominium Assn. v. Vail, 199 Colo. 62, 66-67, 604 P. 2d 1168, 1171-1172 (1980), as authority for the proposition that the regulation of cable television is a local matter. Petitioner disputes this proposition and Boulder’s reading of Manor Vail, citing in rebuttal United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157, 168-169 (1968), holding that cable television systems are engaged in interstate communication. In this contention, petitioner is joined by the State of Colorado, which filed an amicus brief in support of petitioner. For the purposes of this decision we will assume, without deciding, that respondent city’s enactment of the moratorium ordinance under challenge here did fall within the scope of the power delegated to the city by virtue of the Colorado Home Rule Amendment.
Respondent city urges that the only distinction between the present case and Parker is that here the “act of government” is imposed by a home rule city rather than by the state legislature. Under Parker and Colorado law, the argument continues, this is a distinction without a difference, since in the sphere of local affairs home rule cities in Colorado possess every power once held by the state legislature.
Boulder also contends that its moratorium ordinance qualifies for antitrust immunity under the test set forth by The Chief Justice in his City of Lafayette concurrence, see n. 13, supra, because the challenged activity is clearly a “traditional government function,” rather than a “proprietary enterprise.”
“Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete — to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.” United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972).
See City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 394-397.
We hold today only that the Parker v. Brown exemption was no bar to the District Court’s grant of injunctive relief. This case’s preliminary posture makes it unnecessary for us to consider other issues regarding the applicability of the antitrust laws in the context of suits by private litigants against government defendants. As we said in City of Lafayette, “[i]t may be that certain activities which might appear anticompetitive when engaged in by private parties, take on a different complexion when adopted by a local government.” 435 U. S., at 417, n. 48. Compare, e. g., National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 687-692 (1978) (considering the validity of anticompetitive restraint imposed by private agreement), with Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117, 133 (1978) (holding that anticompetitive effect is an insufficient basis for invalidating a state law). Moreover, as in City of Lafayette, supra, at 401-402, we do not confront the issue of remedies appropriate against municipal officials.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
On March 4, 1966, the Attorney General petitioned the Subversive Activities Control Board for an order, after appropriate hearings, requiring the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America to register with the Attorney General as a Communist-front organization. On April 26, 1966, before hearings were held, appellants attempted to bypass the Board by suing in the District Court. Appellants' complaint in the District Court alleged that the Communist-front registration provisions of the Act were unconstitutional. The complaint also alleged that the “very pendency of these administrative proceedings . . . has resulted and will continue to result . . . in immediate and irreparable injury to fundamental constitutional rights . . . .” Appellants asked the District Court for an order declaring the Communist-front registration provisions unconstitutional and also for an order enjoining the Attorney General and the SACB from enforcing them. A three-judge District Court, convened on appellants’ motion, dismissed the complaint because appellants had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. This appeal followed.
Before there may be proceedings to punish appellants for failure to register with the Attorney General, the SACB must first find that the DuBois Clubs is a Communist-front organization and issue an order to that effect. The Act provides for a full evidentiary hearing which is to be held in public. Appellants may be represented by counsel, offer oral or documentary evidence, submit rebuttal evidence, and conduct cross-examination. The SACB must make a written report and state its finding of fact. If appellants are aggrieved by the Board’s order, they may obtain review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which may set aside the order if it is not “supported by the preponderance of the evidence.” Upon motion of a party, the Court of Appeals may order the Board to take additional evidence. Of course, if the Board and the Court of Appeals find that the Act does cover appellants, they may challenge its constitutionality either as applied or on its face. Judgments of the Court of Appeals are reviewable by this Court on certiorari.
It is evident that Congress has provided a way for appellants to raise their constitutional claims. But appellants, denying that they are within the coverage of the Act, wish to litigate these claims in an injunctive proceeding in the District Court. The effect would be that important and difficult constitutional issues would be decided devoid of factual context and before it was clear that appellants were covered by the Act. We have previously refused to decide the constitutionality of the very provisions involved here because it was not clear that the Act would be applied to the objecting parties. American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 380 U. S. 503, Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 380 U. S. 513. Similarly, the District Court should not be forced to decide these constitutional questions in a vacuum.
Appellants rely on Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965), to support their contention that the usual rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies should not apply in this case. In Dombrowski, however, the constitutional issues were presented in a factual context. Upon a record demonstrating a history of harassment of appellants in connection with their exercise of First Amendment rights, the Court ordered a federal district court to issue an injunction against pending criminal prosecutions under state statutes. This Court held the statutes “void on their face,” and it concluded that, in the circumstances of that case, if appellants were required to submit to a criminal prosecution, the injury to First Amendment freedoms which had already taken place would be compounded. Accordingly, the Court allowed appellants to assert their claims in an equitable proceeding.
In this case, the complaint and .the affidavits constitute no more than conclusory allegations that the purpose of the threatened enforcement of the Act was to “harass” appellants and that harassment was the intended result of the Attorney General’s announcement that he had filed a petition with the SACB. Further, appellants are not being forced to assert their claims in a criminal prosecution. As the court below made clear, “Congress has made careful provision that no tangible sanctions can come into play until the facts have been explored in open hearing [before the Board] and the courts have scrutinized what they show, both in their adequacy to support a registration order and in their constitutional impact upon the statute itself.” In the context of this case, we decline to require the court below to permit substitution of an injunctive proceeding for the civil proceeding which Congress has specifically provided.
The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed. Affirmed.
The term “Communist-front organization” is defined in § 3 (4) of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 989, 50 U. S. C. § 782 (4). Communist-front organizations are required to register with the Attorney General. 50 U. S. C. § 786. When a Communist-front organization does not register, the Attorney General may petition the SACB for an order requiring registration. 50 U. S. C. §792.
On April 27, 1966, appellants also filed with the Board a motion to dismiss the Attorney General’s petition. The Board denied this motion and, subsequently, on August 18, 1966, appellants filed an answer to the Attorney General’s petition. According to the District Court, the DuBois Clubs “(1) denied generally that it was a Communist-front organization within the meaning of the Act, and (2) denied various allegations of fact made by the Attorney General in the petition.”
Appellants attacked the provisions, 50 U. S. C. §§ 786 (b), (c), and (d), “on their face and as applied” as violations of Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, Art. Ill, and the First, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Although the Communist-front provisions have been upheld by the District of Columbia Circuit, American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 117 U. S. App. D. C. 393, 401, 331 F. 2d 53, 61 (1963), reversed on other grounds, 380 U. S. 503 (1965); Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 117 U. S. App. D. C. 404, 413, 331 F. 2d 64, 73 (1963), reversed on other grounds, 380 U. S. 513 (1965); Weinstock v. SACB, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 331 F. 2d 75 (1963); Jefferson School of Social Science v. SACB, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 2, 331 F. 2d 76 (1963), their constitutionality has not been specifically determined by this Court, American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 380 U. S. 503 (1965); Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 380 U. S. 513 (1965). Cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964).
However, the District Court did stay further Board proceedings pending this Court’s disposition of the case.
50 U. S. C. §794 (a).
See National Council of American-Soviet Friendship v. SACB, 116 U. S. App. D. C. 162, 322 F. 2d 375 (1963).
See 50 U. S. C. §§792 (d), (g), 793 (a).
Cf. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568-585 (1947).
See, e. g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50-51 (1938); Macauley v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 327 U. S. 540, 543-545 (1946); Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 771-774 (1947); Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U. S. 535, 553 (1954); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U. S. 473, 481-482 (1964).
See 50 U. S. C. §§793 (b), 794.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IY, and an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Thomas join.
This case involves a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior interpreting § 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 87 Stat. 892, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1586, in such fashion as to render it applicable only to actions within the United States or on the high seas. The preliminary issue, and the only one we reach, is whether respondents here, plaintiffs below, have standing to seek judicial review of the rule.
I
The ESA, 87 Stat. 884, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq., seeks to protect species of animals against threats to their continuing existence caused by man. See generally TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 (1978). The ESA instructs the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate by regulation a list of those species which are either endangered or threatened under enumerated criteria, and to define the critical habitat of these species. 16 U. S. C. §§ 1533, 1536. Section 7(a)(2) of the Act then provides, in pertinent part:
“Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior], insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modifica-. tion of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical.” 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2).
In 1978, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior, and the Secretary of Commerce respectively, promulgated a joint regulation stating that the obligations imposed by § 7(a)(2) extend to actions taken in foreign nations. 43 Fed. Reg. 874 (1978). The next year, however, the Interior Department began to reexamine its position. Letter from Leo Kuliz, Solicitor, Department of the Interior, to Assistant Secretary, Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Aug. 8, 1979. A revised joint regulation, reinterpreting § 7(a)(2) to require consultation only for actions taken in the United States or on the high seas, was proposed in 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 29990, and promulgated in 1986, 61 Fed. Reg. 19926; 50 CFR 402.01 (1991).
Shortly thereafter, respondents, organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation and other environmental causes, filed this action against the Secretary of the Interior, seeking a declaratory judgment that the new regulation is in error as to the geographic scope of § 7(a)(2) and an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation restoring the initial interpretation. The District Court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43, 47-48 (Minn. 1987). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed by a divided vote. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F. 2d 1035 (1988). On remand, the Secretary moved for summary judgment on the standing issue, and respondents moved for summary judgment on the merits. The District Court denied the Secretary’s motion, on the ground that the Eighth Circuit had already determined the standing question in this case; it granted respondents’ merits motion, and ordered the Secretary to publish a revised regulation. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (Minn. 1989). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 911 F. 2d 117 (1990). We granted certiorari, 500 U. S. 915 (1991).
II
While the Constitution of the United States divides all power conferred upon the Federal Government into “legislative Powers,” Art. I, § 1, “[t]he executive Power,” Art. II, § 1, and “[t]he judicial Power,” Art. Ill, § 1, it does not attempt to define those terms. To be sure, it limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies,” but an executive inquiry can bear the name “case” (the Hoffa case) and a legislative dispute can bear the name “controversy” (the Smoot-Hawley controversy). Obviously, then, the Constitution’s central mechanism of separation of powers depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts. In The Federalist No. 48, Madison expressed the view that “[i]t is not infrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies whether the operation of a particular measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere,” whereas “the executive power [is] restrained within a narrower compass and... more simple in its nature,” and “the judiciary [is] described by landmarks still less uncertain.” The Federalist No. 48, p. 256 (Carey and McClellan eds. 1990). One of those landmarks, setting apart the “Cases” and “Controversies” that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III — “serving] to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process,” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990) — is the doctrine of standing. Though some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government, the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. See, e. g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984).
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, see id., at 756; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740-741, n. 16 (1972); and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’” Whitmore, supra, at 155 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 102 (1983)). Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be “fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976). Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Id., at 38, 43.
The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990); Warth, supra, at 508. Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i. e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 883-889 (1990); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 114-115, and n. 31 (1979); Simon, supra, at 45, n. 25; Warth, supra, at 527, and n. 6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we “presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” National Wildlife Federation, supra, at 889. In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such “mere allegations,” but must “set forth” by affidavit or other evidence “specific facts,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be “supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.” Gladstone, supra, at 115, n. 31.
When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) or proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it. When, however, as in this case, a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed. In that circumstance, causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction — and perhaps on the response of others as well. The existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing “depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict,” ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 615 (1989) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see also Simon, supra, at 41-42; and it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury. E. g., Warth, supra, at 505. Thus, when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily “substantially more difficult” to establish. Allen, supra, at 758; Simon, supra, at 44-45; Warth, supra, at 505.
Ill
We think the Court of Appeals failed to apply the foregoing principles in denying the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment. Respondents had not made the requisite demonstration of (at least) injury and redressability.
A
Respondents’ claim to injury is that the lack of consultation with respect to certain funded activities abroad “increases] the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species.” Complaint ¶ 5, App. 13. Of course, the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing. See, e. g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 734. “But the ‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.” Id., at 734-735. To survive the Secretary’s summary judgment motion, respondents had to submit affidavits or other evidence showing, through specific facts, not only that listed species were in fact being threatened by funded activities abroad, but also that one or more of respondents’ members would thereby be “directly” affected apart from their “ ‘special interest’ in th[e] subject.” Id., at 735, 739. See generally Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 343 (1977).
With respect to this aspect of the case, the Court of Appeals focused on the affidavits of two Defenders’ members— Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred. Ms. Kelly stated that she traveled to Egypt in 1986 and “observed the traditional habitat of the endangered nile crocodile there and intend[s] to do so again, and hope[s] to observe the crocodile directly,” and that she “will suffer harm in fact as the result of [the] American... role... in overseeing the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile... and [in] developing]... Egypt’s... Master Water Plan.” App. 101. Ms. Skilbred averred that she traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981 and “observed th[e] habitat” of “endangered species such as the Asian elephant and the leopard” at what is now the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the Agency for International Development (AID), although she “was unable to see any of the endangered species”; “this development project,” she continued, “will seriously reduce endangered, threatened, and endemic species habitat including areas that I visited... [, which] may severely shorten the future of these species”; that threat, she concluded, harmed her because she “intend[s] to return to Sri Lanka in the future and hope[s] to be more fortunate in spotting at least the endangered elephant and leopard.” Id., at 145-146. When Ms. Skilbred was asked at a subsequent deposition if and when she had any plans to return to Sri Lanka, she reiterated that “I intend to go back to Sri Lanka,” but confessed that she had no current plans: “I don’t know [when]. There is a civil war going on right now. I don’t know. Not next year, I will say. In the future.” Id., at 318.
We shall assume for the sake of argument that these affidavits contain facts showing that certain agency-funded projects threaten listed species — though that is questionable. They plainly contain no facts, however, showing how damage to the species will produce “imminent” injury to Mses. Kelly and Skilbred. That the women “had visited” the areas of the projects before the projects commenced proves nothing. As we have said in a related context, “‘Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.’ ” Lyons, 461 U. S., at 102 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 495-496 (1974)). And the affiants’ profession of an “inten[t]” to return to the places they had visited before — where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered species — is simply not enough. Such “some day” intentions — without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be — do not support a finding of the “actual or imminent” injury that our cases require. See supra, at 560.
Besides relying upon the Kelly and Skilbred affidavits, respondents propose a series of novel standing theories. The first, inelegantly styled “ecosystem nexus,” proposes that any person who uses any part of a “contiguous ecosystem” adversely affected by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is located a great distance away. This approach, as the Court of Appeals correctly observed, is inconsistent with our opinion in National Wildlife Federation, which held that a plaintiff claiming injury from environmental damage must use the area affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly “in the vicinity” of it. 497 U. S., at 887-889; see also Sierra Club, 405 U. S., at 735. It makes no difference that the general-purpose section of the ESA states that the Act was intended in part “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved,” 16 U. S. C. § 1531(b). To say that the Act protects ecosystems is not to say that the Act creates (if it were possible) rights of action in persons who have not been injured in fact, that is, persons who use portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly affected by the unlawful action in question.
Respondents’ other theories are called, alas, the “animal nexus” approach, whereby anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing the endangered animals anywhere on the globe has standing; and the “vocational nexus” approach, under which anyone with a professional interest in such animals can sue. Under these theories, anyone who goes to see Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, and anyone who is a keeper of Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, has standing to sue because the Director of the Agency for International Development (AID) did not consult with the Secretary regarding the AID-funded project in Sri Lanka. This is beyond all reason. Standing is not “an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable,” United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U. S. 669, 688 (1973), but as we have said requires, at the summary judgment stage, a factual showing of perceptible harm. It is clear that the person who observes or works with a particular animal threatened by a federal decision is facing perceptible harm, since the very subject of his interest will no longer exist. It is even plausible — though it goes to the outermost limit of plausibility — to think that a person who observes or works with animals of a particular species in the very area of the world where that species is threatened by a federal decision is facing such harm, since some animals that might have been the subject of his interest will no longer exist, see Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U. S. 221, 281, n. 4 (1986). It goes beyond the limit, however, and into pure speculation and fantasy, to say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered species, anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single project affecting some portion of that species with which he has no more specific connection.
B
Besides failing to show injury, respondents failed to demonstrate redressability. Instead of attacking the separate decisions to fund particular projects allegedly causing them harm, respondents chose to challenge a more generalized level of Government action (rules regarding consultation), the invalidation of which would affect all overseas projects. This programmatic approach has obvious practical advantages, but also obvious difficulties insofar as proof of causation or redressability is concerned. As we have said in another context, “suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations... [are], even when premised on allegations of several instances of violations of law,... rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication.” Allen, 468 U. S., at 759-760.
The most obvious problem in the present case is redress-ability. Since the agencies funding the projects were not parties to the case, the District Court could accord relief only against the Secretary: He could be ordered to revise his regulation to require consultation for foreign projects. But this would not remedy respondents’ alleged injury unless the funding agencies were bound by the Secretary’s regulation, which is very much an open question. Whereas in other contexts the ESA is quite explicit as to the Secretary’s controlling authority, see, e. g., 16 U. S. C. § 1533(a)(1) (“The Secretary shall” promulgate regulations determining endangered species); § 1535(d)(1) (“The Secretary is authorized to provide financial assistance to any State”), with respect to consultation the initiative, and hence arguably the initial responsibility for determining statutory necessity, lies with the agencies, see § 1536(a)(2) (“Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any” funded action is not likely to jeopardize endangered or threatened species) (emphasis added). When the Secretary promulgated the regulation at issue here, he thought it was binding on the agencies, see 51 Fed. Reg. 19928 (1986). The Solicitor General, however, has repudiated that position here, and the agencies themselves apparently deny the Secretary’s authority. (During the period when the Secretary took the view that § 7(a)(2) did apply abroad, AID and FWS engaged in a running controversy over whether consultation was required with respect to the Mahaweli project, AID insisting that consultation applied only to domestic actions.)
Respondents assert that this legal uncertainty did not affect redressability (and hence standing) because the District Court itself could resolve the issue of the Secretary’s authority as a necessary part of its standing inquiry. Assuming that it is appropriate to resolve an issue of law such as this in connection with a threshold standing inquiry, resolution by the District Court would not have remedied respondents’ alleged injury anyway, because it would not have been binding upon the agencies. They were not parties to the suit, and there is no reason they should be obliged to honor an incidental legal determination the suit produced. The Court of Appeals tried to finesse this problem by simply proclaiming that “[w]e are satisfied that an injunction requiring the Secretary to publish [respondents’ desired] regulatio[n]... would result in consultation.” Defenders of Wildlife, 851 F. 2d, at 1042, 1043-1044. We do not know what would justify that confidence, particularly when the Justice Department (presumably after consultation with the agencies) has taken the position that the regulation is not binding. The short of the matter is that redress of the only injury in fact respondents complain of requires action (termination of funding until consultation) by the individual funding agencies; and any relief the District Court could have provided in this suit against the Secretary was not likely to produce that action.
A further impediment to redressability is the fact that the agencies generally supply only a fraction of the funding for a foreign project. AID, for example, has provided less than 10% of the funding for the Mahaweli project. Respondents have produced nothing to indicate that the projects they have named will either be suspended, or do less harm to listed species, if that fraction is eliminated. As in Simon, 426 U. S., at 43-44, it is entirely conjectural whether the non-agency activity that affects respondents will be altered or affected by the agency activity they seek to achieve. There is no standing.
IV
The Court of Appeals found that respondents had standing for an additional reason: because they had suffered a “procedural injury.” The so-called “citizen-suit” provision of the ESA provides, in pertinent part, that “any person may com-menee a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter.” 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g). The court held that, because § 7(a)(2) requires interagency consultation, the citizen-suit provision creates a “procedural righ[t]” to consultation in all “persons” — so that anyone can file suit in federal court to challenge the Secretary’s (or presumably any other official’s) failure to follow the assertedly correct consultative procedure, notwithstanding his or her inability to allege any discrete injury flowing from that failure. 911 F. 2d, at 121-122. To understand the remarkable nature of this holding one must be clear about what it does not rest upon: This is not a case where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs (e. g., the procedural requirement for a hearing prior to denial of their license application, or the procedural requirement for an environmental impact statement before a federal facility is constructed next door to them). Nor is it simply a case where concrete injury has been suffered by many persons, as in mass fraud or mass tort situations. Nor, finally, is it the unusual case in which Congress has created a concrete private interest in the outcome of a suit against a private party for the Government’s benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the victorious plaintiff. Rather, the court held that the injury-in-fact requirement had been satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental “right” to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law. We reject this view.
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government — claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large — does not state an Article III case or controversy. For example, in Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, 129-130 (1922), we dismissed a suit challenging the propriety of the process by which the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. Justice Brandéis wrote for the Court:
“[This is] not a case within the meaning of... Article III.... Plaintiff has [asserted] only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted. Obviously this general right does not entitle a private citizen to institute in the federal courts a suit....” Ibid.
In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923), we dismissed for lack of Article III standing a taxpayer suit challenging the propriety of certain federal expenditures. We said:
“The party who invokes the power [of judicial review] must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.... Here the parties plaintiff have no such case.... [T]heir complaint... is merely that officials of the executive department of the government are executing and will execute an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to prevent. To do so would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and coequal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess.” Id., at 488-489.
In Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U. S. 633 (1937), we dismissed a suit contending that Justice Black’s appointment to this Court violated the Ineligibility Clause, Art. I, §6, cl. 2. “It is an established principle,” we said, “that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.” 302 U. S., at 634. See also Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U. S. 429, 433-434 (1952) (dismissing taxpayer action on the basis of Mellon).
More recent cases are to the same effect. In United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974), we dismissed for lack of standing a taxpayer suit challenging the Government’s failure to disclose the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency, in alleged violation of the constitutional requirement, Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, that “a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.” We held that such a suit rested upon an impermissible “generalized grievance,” and was inconsistent with “the framework of Article III” because “the impact on [plaintiff] is plainly undifferentiated and ‘common to all members of the public.’ ” Richardson, supra, at 171, 176-177. And in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974), we dismissed for the same reasons a citizen-taxpayer suit contending that it was a violation of the Incompatibility Clause, Art. I, §6, cl. 2, for Members of Congress to hold commissions in the military Reserves. We said that the challenged action, “standing alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance.... We reaffirm Lévitt in holding that standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of th[is] kind....” Schlesinger, supra, at 217, 220. Since Schlesinger we have on two occasions held that an injury amounting only to the alleged violation of a right to have, the Government act in accordance with law was not judicially cognizable because “‘assertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. Ill without draining those requirements of meaning.’” Allen, 468 U. S., at 754; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 483 (1982). And only two Terms ago, we rejected the notion that Article III permits a citizen suit to prevent a condemned criminal’s execution on the basis of “ ‘the public interest protections of the Eighth Amendment’ once again, “[t]his allegation raise[d] only the ‘generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance’... and [was] an inadequate basis on which to grant... standing.” Whitmore, 495 U. S., at 160.
To be sure, our generalized-grievance cases have typically involved Government violation of procedures assertedly ordained by the Constitution rather than the Congress. But there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right. Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch — one of the essential elements that identifies those “Cases” and “Controversies” that are the business of the courts rather than of the political branches. “The province of the court,” as Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803), “is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.” Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive. The question presented here is whether the public interest in proper administration of the laws (specifically, in agencies’ observance of a particular, statutorily prescribed procedure) can be converted into an individual right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens (or, for that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to sue. If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-of-powers significance we have always said, the answer must be obvious: To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an “individual right” vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” Art. II, § 3. It would enable the courts, with the permission of Congress, “to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department,” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S., at 489, and to become “ ‘virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.’” Allen, supra, at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 15 (1972)). We have always rejected that vision of our role:
“When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry on governmental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted. This permits the courts to participate in law enforcement entrusted to administrative bodies only to the extent necessary to protect justiciable individual rights against administrative action fairly beyond the granted powers.... This is very far from assuming that the courts are charged more than administrators or legislators with the protection of the rights of the people. Congress and the Executive supervise the acts of administrative agents.... But under Article III, Congress established courts to adjudicate cases and controversies as to claims of infringement of individual rights whether by unlawful action of private persons or by the exertion of unauthorized administrative power.” Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309-310 (1944) (footnote omitted).
“Individual rights,” within the meaning of this passage, do not mean public rights that have been legislatively-pronounced to belong to each individual who forms part of the public. See also Sierra Club, 405 U. S., at 740-741, n. 16.
Nothing in this contradicts the principle that “[t]he... injury required by Art. Ill may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’ ” Warth, 422 U. S., at 500 (quoting Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617, n. 3 (1973)). Both of the cases used by Linda R. S. as an illustration of that principle involved Congress’ elevating to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, defacto injuries that were previously inadequate in law (namely, injury to an individual’s personal interest in living in a racially integrated community, see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 208-212 (1972), and injury to a company’s interest in marketing its product free from competition, see Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U. S. 1, 6 (1968)). As we said in Sierra Club, “[Statutory] broadening [of] the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.” 405 U. S., at 738. Whether or not the principle set forth in Warth can be extended beyond that distinction, it is clear that in suits against the Government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain.
* * *
We hold that respondents lack standing to bring this action and that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the summary judgment motion filed by the United States. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
By particularized, we mean that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.
The dissent acknowledges the settled requirement that the injury complained of be, if not actual, then at least imminent, but it contends that respondents could get past summary judgment because “a reasonable finder of fact could conclude... that... Kelly or Skilbred will soon return to the project sites.” Post, at 691. This analysis suffers either from a factual or from a legal defect, depending on what the “soon” is supposed to mean. If “soon” refers to the standard mandated by
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The police in this case made a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a house where respondent Robert Olson was an overnight guest and arrested him. The issue is whether the arrest violated Olson’s Fourth Amendment rights. We hold that it did.
I
Shortly before 6 a.m. on Saturday, July 18, 1987, a lone gunman robbed an Amoco gasoline station in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and fatally shot the station manager. A police officer heard the police dispatcher report and suspected Joseph Ecker. The officer and his partner drove immediately to Ecker’s home, arriving at about the same time that an Oldsmobile arrived. The driver of the Oldsmobile took evasive action, and the car spun out of control and came to a stop. Two men fled the car on foot. Ecker, who was later identified as the gunman, was captured shortly thereafter inside his home. The second man escaped.
Inside the abandoned Oldsmobile, police found a sack of money and the murder weapon. They also found a title certificate with the name Rob Olson crossed out as a secured party, a letter addressed to a Roger R. Olson of 3151 Johnson Street, and a videotape rental receipt made out to Rob Olson and dated two days earlier. The police verified that a Robert Olson lived at 3151 Johnson Street.
The next morning, Sunday, July 19, a woman identifying herself as Dianna Murphy called the police and said that a man by the name of Rob drove the car in which the gas station killer left the scene and that Rob was planning to leave town by bus. About noon, the same woman called again, gave her address and phone number, and said that a man named Rob had told a Maria and two other women, Louanne and Julie, that he was the driver in the Amoco robbery. The caller stated that Louanne was Julie’s mother and that the two women lived at 2406 Fillmore Northeast. The detective-in-charge who took the second phone call sent police officers to 2406 Fillmore to check out Louanne and Julie. When police arrived they determined that the dwelling was a duplex and that Louanne Bergstrom and her daughter Julie lived in the upper unit but were not home. Police spoke to Louanne’s mother, Helen Niederhoffer, who lived in the lower unit. She confirmed that a Rob Olson had been staying upstairs but was not then in the unit. She promised to call the police when Olson returned. At 2 p.m., a pickup order, or “probable cause arrest bulletin,” was issued for Olson’s arrest. The police were instructed to stay away from the duplex.
At approximately 2:45 p.m., Niederhoffer called police and said Olson had returned. The detective-in-charge instructed police officers to go to the house and surround it. He then telephoned Julie from headquarters and told her Rob should come out of the house. The detective heard a male voice say, “tell them I left.” Julie stated that Rob had left, whereupon at 3 p.m. the detective ordered the police to enter the house. Without seeking permission and with weapons drawn, the police entered the upper unit and found respondent hiding in a closet. Less than an hour after his arrest, respondent made an inculpatory statement at police headquarters.
The Hennepin County trial court held a hearing and denied respondent’s motion to suppress his statement. App. 3-13. The statement was admitted into evidence at Olson’s trial, and he was convicted on one count of first-degree murder, three counts of armed robbery, and three counts of second-degree assault. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. 436 N. W. 2d 92 (1989). The court ruled that respondent had a sufficient interest in the Bergstrom home to challenge the legality of his warrantless arrest there, that the arrest was illegal because there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry, and that respondent’s statement was tainted by that illegality and should have been suppressed. Because the admission of the statement was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt, the court reversed Olson’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.
We granted the State’s petition for certiorari, 493 U. S. 806 (1989), and now affirm.
II
It was held in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), that a suspect should not be arrested in his house without an arrest warrant, even though there is probable cause to arrest him. The purpose of the decision was not to protect the person of the suspect but to protect his home from entry in the absence of a magistrate’s finding of probable cause. In this case, the court below held that Olson’s warrantless arrest was illegal because he had a sufficient connection with the premises to be treated like a householder. The State challenges that conclusion.
Since the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), it has been the law that “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143 (1978). A subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is “ ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable,”’” id., at 143-144, n. 12, quoting Katz, supra, at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
The State argues that Olson’s relationship to the premises does not satisfy the 12 factors which in its view determine whether a dwelling is a “home.” Aside from the fact that it is based on the mistaken premise that a place must be one’s “home” in order for one to have a legitimate expectation of privacy there, the State’s proposed test is needlessly complex. We need go no farther than to conclude, as we do, that Olson’s status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
As recognized by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the facts of this case are similar to those in Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960). In Jones, the defendant was arrested in a friend’s apartment during the execution of a search warrant and sought to challenge the warrant as not supported by probable cause.
“[Jones] testified that the apartment belonged to a friend, Evans, who had given him the use of it, and a key, with which [Jones] had admitted himself on the day of the arrest. On cross-examination [Jones] testified that he had a suit and shirt at the apartment, that his home was elsewhere, that he paid nothing for the use of the apartment, that Evans had let him use it ‘as a friend,’ that he had slept there ‘maybe a night,’ and that at the time of the search Evans had been away in Philadelphia for about five days.” Id., at 259.
The Court ruled that Jones could challenge the search of the apartment because he was “legitimately on [the] premises,” id., at 267. Although the “legitimately on [the] premises” standard was rejected in Rakas as too broad, 439 U. S., at 142-148, the Rakas Court explicitly reaffirmed the factual holding in Jones:
“We do not question the conclusion in Jones that the defendant in that case suffered a violation of his personal Fourth Amendment rights if the search in question was unlawful. . . .
“We think that Jones on its facts merely stands for the unremarkable proposition that a person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place.” 439 U. S., at 141-142.
Rakas thus recognized that, as an overnight guest, Jones was much more than just legitimately on the premises.
The distinctions relied on by the State between this case and Jones are not legally determinative. The State emphasizes that in this case Olson was never left alone in the duplex or given a key, whereas in Jones the owner of the apartment was away and Jones had a key with which he could come and go and admit and exclude others. These differences are crucial, it is argued, because in not disturbing the holding in Jones, the Court pointed out that while his host was away, Jones had complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it. Rakas, 439 U. S., at 149. We do not understand Rakas, however, to hold that an overnight guest can never have a legitimate expectation of privacy except when his host is away and he has a key, or that only when those facts are present may an overnight guest assert the “unremarkable proposition,” id., at 142, that a person may have a sufficient interest in a place other than his home to enable him to be free in that place from unreasonable searches and seizures.
To hold that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s home merely recognizes the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share. Staying overnight in another’s home is a longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society. We stay in others’ homes when we travel to a strange city for business or pleasure, when we visit our parents, children, or more distant relatives out of town, when we are in between jobs or homes, or when we house-sit for a friend. We will all be hosts and we will all be guests many times in our lives. From either perspective, we think that society recognizes that a houseguest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s home.
From the overnight guest’s perspective, he seeks shelter in another’s home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside. We are at our most vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings. It is for this reason that, although we may spend all day in public places, when we cannot sleep in our own home we seek out another private place to sleep, whether it be a hotel room, or the home of a friend. Society expects at least as much privacy in these places as in a telephone booth — “a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable,” Katz, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
That the guest has a host who has ultimate control of the house is not inconsistent with the guest having a legitimate expectation of privacy. The houseguest is there with the permission of his host, who is willing to share his house and his privacy with his guest. It is unlikely that the guest will be confined to a restricted area of the house; and when the host is away or asleep, the guest will have a measure of control over the premises. The host may admit or exclude from the house as he prefers, but it is unlikely that he will admit someone who wants to see or meet with the guest over the objection of the guest. On the other hand, few houseguests will invite others to visit them while they are guests without consulting their hosts; but the latter, who have the authority to exclude despite the wishes of the guest, will often be accommodating. The point is that hosts will more likely than not respect the privacy interests of their guests, who are entitled to a legitimate expectation of privacy despite the fact that they have no legal interest in the premises and do not have the legal authority to determine who may or may not enter the household. If the untrammeled power to admit and exclude were essential to Fourth Amendment protection, an adult daughter temporarily living in the home of her parents would have no legitimate expectation of privacy because her right to admit or exclude would be subject to her parents’ veto.
Because respondent’s expectation of privacy in the Bergstrom home was rooted in “understandings that are recognized and permitted by society,” Rakas, supra, at 144, n. 12, it was legitimate, and respondent can claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
III
In Payton v. New York, the Court had no occasion to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as ‘exigent circumstances,’ that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search,” 445 U. S., at 583. This case requires us to determine whether the Minnesota Supreme Court was correct in holding that there were no exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless entry into the house to make the arrest.
The Minnesota Supreme Court applied essentially the correct standard in determining whether exigent circumstances existed. The court observed that “a warrantless intrusion may be justified by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, Welsh [v. Wisconsin], 466 U. S. 740 [(1984)], or the need to prevent a suspect’s escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling.” 436 N. W. 2d, at 97. The court also apparently thought that in the absence of hot pursuit there must be at least probable cause to believe that one or more of the other factors justifying the entry were present and that in assessing the risk of danger, the gravity of the crime and likelihood that the suspect is armed should be considered. Applying this standard, the state court determined that exigent circumstances did not exist.
We are not inclined to disagree with this fact-specific application of the proper legal standard. The court pointed out that although a grave crime was involved, respondent “was known not to be the murderer but thought to be the driver of the getaway car,” ibid., and that the police had already recovered the murder weapon, ibid. “The police knew that Louanne and Julie were with the suspect in the upstairs duplex with no suggestion of danger to them. Three or four Minneapolis police squads surrounded the house. The time was 3 p.m., Sunday.... It was evident the suspect was going nowhere. If he came out of the house he would have been promptly apprehended.” Ibid. We do not disturb the state court’s judgment that these facts do not add up to exigent circumstances.
IV
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun dissent.
Because the absence of a warrant made respondent’s arrest illegal, the court did not review the trial court’s determination that the police had probable cause for the arrest. 436 N. W. 2d, at 95. Hence, we judge the case on the assumption that there was probable cause.
The State had not argued that, if the arrest was illegal, respondent’s statement was nevertheless not tainted by the illegality. Id., at 98. Likewise, at oral argument before this Court, counsel for the State expressly disavowed any claim that the statement was not a fruit of the arrest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. We will therefore not raise sua sponte the applicability of New York v. Harris, ante, p. 14, to the facts of this case.
The court left for the trial court on remand respondent’s claims that other evidence — statements by persons present at 2406 Fillmore at the time of the arrest and a statement by Ecker obtained after the police showed him respondent’s statement — should also have been suppressed as fruit of the illegal arrest.
The 12 factors are:
(1) the visitor has some property rights in the dwelling;
(2) the visitor is related by blood or marriage to the owner or lessor of the dwelling;
(3) the visitor receives mail at the dwelling or has his name on the door;
(4) the visitor has a key to the dwelling;
(5) the visitor maintains a regular or continuous presence in the dwelling, especially sleeping there regularly;
(6) the visitor contributes to the upkeep of the dwelling, either monetarily or otherwise;
(7) the visitor has been present at the dwelling for a substantial length of time prior to the arrest;
(8) the visitor stores his clothes or other possessions in the dwelling;
(9) the visitor has been granted by the owner exclusive use of a particular area of the dwelling;
(10) the visitor has the right to exclude other persons from the dwelling;
(11) the visitor is allowed to remain in the dwelling when the owner is absent; and
(12) the visitor has taken precautions to develop and maintain his privacy in the dwelling. Brief for Petitioner 21.
Of course, 2406 Fillmore need not be respondent’s “home,” temporary or otherwise, in order for him to enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy there. “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967), and provides sanctuary for citizens wherever they have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Id., at 359. Mr. Katz could complain because he had such an expectation in a telephone booth, not because it was his “home” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Similarly, if Olson had a reasonable expectation of privacy as a one-night guest, his warrantless seizure was unreasonable whether or not the upper unit at 2406 Fillmore was his home.
Olson, who had been staying at Eeker’s home for several days before the robbery, spent the night of the robbery on the floor of the Bergstroms’ home, with their permission. He had a change of clothes with him at the duplex.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Sotomayor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A federal court generally “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c). Congress has provided an exception to that rule “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(2). In those circumstances, § 3582(c)(2) authorizes a court to reduce the term of imprisonment “if such a reduction is consistent with” applicable Commission policy statements. The policy statement governing § 3582(c)(2) proceedings instructs courts not to reduce a term of imprisonment below the minimum of an amended sentencing range except to the extent the original term of imprisonment was below the range then applicable. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § lB1.10(b)(2) (Nov. 2009) (USSG). This case presents the question whether our decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 (2005), which rendered the Guidelines advisory to remedy the Sixth Amendment problems associated with a mandatory sentencing regime, requires treating § lB1.10(b) as nonbinding. We conclude that Booker does not demand that result.
I
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA or Act), 98 Stat. 1987, established the Sentencing Commission and authorized it to promulgate Sentencing Guidelines and to issue policy statements regarding the Guidelines' application. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 991, 994(a). The Act also charged the Commission with periodically reviewing and revising the Guidelines. See § 994(o). When a revision reduces the Guidelines range for a given offense, the Commission must determine “in what circumstances and by what amount the sentences of prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for the offense may be reduced. ” § 994(u).
As enacted, the SRA made the Sentencing Guidelines binding. See Booker, 543 U. S., at 233-234. Except in limited circumstances, district courts lacked discretion to depart from the Guidelines range. See Burns v. United States, 501 U. S. 129, 133 (1991). Under that regime, facts found by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence often increased the mandatory Guidelines range and permitted the judge to impose a sentence greater than that supported by the facts established by the jury verdict or guilty plea. See Booker, 543 U. S., at 235. We held in Booker that treating the Guidelines as mandatory in these circumstances violated the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to be tried by a jury and to have every element of an offense proved by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 243-244.
To remedy the constitutional problem, we rendered the Guidelines advisory by invalidating two provisions of the SRA: 18 U. S. C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), which generally required a sentencing court to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range, and § 3742(e) (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), which prescribed the standard of review on appeal, including de novo review of Guidelines departures. 543 U. S., at 259. 'With these two sections excised (and statutory cross-references to the two sections consequently invalidated),” we held that “the remainder of the Act satisfies the Court’s constitutional requirements.” Ibid. Booker thus left intact other provisions of the SRA, including those giving the Commission authority to revise the Guidelines, 28 U. S. C. § 994(o) (2006 ed.), and to determine when and to what extent a revision will be retroactive, § 994(u).
With respect to drug-trafficking offenses, the Sentencing Guidelines establish a defendant’s base offense level according to the type and weight of the drug. See USSG §§2Dl.l(a), (c). When the Commission first promulgated the Guidelines in 1987, it adopted the 100-to-l ratio selected by Congress in setting mandatory minimum sentences in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3207. Under that framework, the Commission “treated every gram of crack cocaine as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine.” Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U. S. 85, 96 (2007). The Commission later sought to alleviate the disparity produced by this ratio. After several failed attempts at reform, see id., at 99, the Commission in 2007 amended the Guidelines to reduce by two levels the base offense level associated with each quantity of crack cocaine. See USSG Supp. App. C, Arndt. 706 (effective Nov. 1, 2007). In 2008, the Commission made that amendment retroactive. See id., Arndt. 713 (effective Mar. 3, 2008).
When the Commission makes a Guidelines amendment retroactive, 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(2) authorizes a district court to reduce an otherwise final sentence that is based on the amended provision. Any reduction must be consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. The relevant policy statement, USSG § 1B1.10, instructs courts proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) to substitute the amended Guidelines range while “leav[ing] all other guideline application decisions unaffected.” § 1B1.10(b)(1). Under § 3582(c)(2), a court may then grant a reduction within the amended Guidelines range if it determines that one is warranted “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.”* Except in limited circumstances, however, § lB1.10(b)(2)(A) forecloses a court acting under § 3582(c)(2) from reducing a sentence “to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.”
II
A jury convicted petitioner Percy Dillon in 1993 of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute more than 500 grams of powder cocaine and more than 50 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846, possession with the intent to distribute more than 500 grams of powder cocaine in violation of § 841(a)(1), and use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking offense in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). Dillon’s convictions exposed him to a statutory sentencing range of 10 years to life for the conspiracy, 5 to 40 years for cocaine possession, and a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years for the firearm offense, to be served consecutively to the sentence for the drug offenses.
At sentencing, the District Court made additional findings of fact and concluded that Dillon was responsible for 1.5 kilograms of crack and 1.6 kilograms of powder cocaine. Under USSG § 2D1.1, those drug quantities produced a base offense level of 38. After offsetting adjustments for acceptance of responsibility, §3E1.1, and reckless endangerment during flight, § 3C1.2, Dillon’s total offense level remained 38. Coupled with a criminal-history category of II, that offense level produced a then-mandatory Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment for the drug counts.
The court sentenced Dillon at the bottom of the Guidelines range for those counts, followed by a mandatory 60-month sentence for the firearm count, for a total sentence of 322 months’ imprisonment. At Dillon’s sentencing, the court described the term of imprisonment as “entirely too high for the crime [Dillon] committed.” App. 13. Perceiving no basis for departing from the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, the District Court felt constrained to impose a sentence within the prescribed range. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Dillon’s convictions and sentence on appeal. See 100 F. 3d 949 (1996).
After the Sentencing Commission made the amendment to the crack-cocaine Guidelines retroactive in 2008, Dillon filed a pro se motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). In the motion, Dillon asked the court to grant not just the two-level reduction authorized by the amendment but also a further reduction consistent with the sentencing factors found in § 3553(a). Based largely on his post-sentencing conduct, including his determined pursuit of educational and community-outreach opportunities, Dillon contended that a variance from the amended Guidelines range was warranted in his case. He further urged that, after Booker, the court was authorized to grant such a variance because the amended Guidelines range was advisory notwithstanding any contrary statement in § 1B1.10.
The District Court reduced Dillon’s sentence to 270 months — the term at the bottom of the revised Guidelines range. But the court declined to go further. Concluding that the sentencing proceedings at issue in Booker are readily distinguishable from those under § 3582(c)(2), the court found Booker’s holdings inapplicable to the instant proceeding and accordingly held that it lacked authority to impose a sentence inconsistent with § IB 1.10.
The Third Circuit affirmed. 572 F. 3d 146, 150 (2009). The court noted that § 3582(c)(2) is codified in a different section than the provisions invalidated in Booker and contains no cross-reference to those provisions. Finding no other indication that Booker “obviate[d] the congressional directive in § 3582(c)(2) that a sentence reduction pursuant to that section be consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements,” 572 F. 3d, at 149, the Third Circuit held that § IB 1.10 is binding. It therefore agreed that the District Court lacked authority to reduce Dillon’s sentence below the amended Guidelines range.
We granted certiorari to consider Booker’s applicability to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. 558 U. S. 1076 (2009).
Ill
A
“[A] judgment of conviction that includes [a sentence of imprisonment] constitutes a final judgment” and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances. § 3582(b). Section 3582(c)(2) establishes an exception to the general rule of finality “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 994(o)” and made retroactive pursuant to § 994(u). In such cases, Congress has authorized courts to “reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(2).
Characterizing proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) as “resen-tencing” proceedings, Dillon contends that “[t]here is no practical or functional difference between a resentencing pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) and any other resentencing.” Brief for Petitioner 18. Accordingly, Dillon urges, the same principles that govern other sentencing proceedings likewise govern § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, and courts have authority under § 3582(c)(2) to vary from the revised Guidelines range consistent with § 3553(a), see Kimbrough, 552 U. S., at 101. Dillon cites as support for this view § 3582(c)(2)’s instruction to consider the factors in § 3553(a) in determining whether a sentence reduction is warranted. Under Dillon’s approach, Booker would preclude the Commission from issuing a policy statement that generally forecloses below-Guidelines sentences at § 3582(e)(2) proceedings, as USSG § 1B1.10 purports to do. Dillon thus asks us to excise the mandatory language of § IB 1.10(b)(2)(A) and treat that provision as advisory, just as we did the offending statutory provisions in Booker.
The language of § 3582(c)(2) belies Dillon’s characterization of proceedings under that section. By its terms, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a sentencing or resentencing proceeding. Instead, it provides for the “modif[ication of] a term of imprisonment” by giving courts the power to “reduce” an otherwise final sentence in circumstances specified by the Commission. Compare 28 U. S. C. § 994(a)(2)(C) (referring to §3582(c)(2) as a “sentence modification provisio[n]”) with 18 U. S. C. § 3742(f) (authorizing courts of appeals to remand “for further sentencing” upon a finding of error) and § 3742(g) (establishing the terms of “sentencing upon remand” and describing the proceeding as a “resentenc[ing]” (capitalization omitted)). It is also notable that the provision applies only to a limited class of prisoners — namely, those whose sentence was based on a sentencing range subsequently lowered by the Commission. Section 3582(c)(2)’s text, together with its narrow scope, shows that Congress intended to authorize only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding.
The substantial role Congress gave the Commission with respect to sentence-modification proceedings further supports this conclusion. The SRA charges the Commission both with deciding whether to amend the Guidelines, § 994(o), and with determining whether and to what extent an amendment will be retroactive, § 994(u). A court’s power under § 3582(c)(2) thus depends in the first instance on the Commission’s decision not just to amend the Guidelines but to make the amendment retroactive. The court is also constrained by the Commission’s statements dictating “by what amount” the sentence of a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment affected by the amendment “may be reduced.” §994(u); see also Braxton v. United States, 500 U. S. 344, 348 (1991) (noting that the Commission implemented that power through § 1B1.10).
Read in this context, § 3582(c)(2)’s reference to § 3553(a) does not undermine our narrow view of proceedings under the former provision. Section 3582(c)(2) instructs a district court to “conside[r] the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,” but it authorizes a reduction on that basis only “if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission” — namely, §1B1.10. The statute thus establishes a two-step inquiry. A court must first determine that a reduction is consistent with § 1B1.10 before it may consider whether the authorized reduction is warranted, either in whole or in part, according to the factors set forth in § 3553(a).
Following this two-step approach, a district court proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) does not impose a new sentence in the usual sense. At step one, § 3582(c)(2) requires the court to follow the Commission’s instructions in § 1B1.1Q to determine the prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent of the reduction authorized. Specifically, § IB 1.10(b)(1) requires the court to begin by “determin[ing] the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant” had the relevant amendment been in effect at the time of the initial sentencing. “In making such determination, the court shall substitute only the amendments listed in subsection (c) for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.” § IB 1.10(b)(1).
Consistent with the limited nature of § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, § IB 1.10(b)(2) also confines the extent of the reduction authorized. Courts generally may “not reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(2). . . to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range” produced by the substitution. § lB1.10(b) (2)(A). Only if the sentencing court originally imposed a term of imprisonment below the Guidelines range does §1B1.10 authorize a court proceeding under § 3582(e)(2) to impose a term “comparably” below the amended range. § lB1.10(b)(2)(B).
At step two of the inquiry, § 3582(c)(2) instructs a court to consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by reference to the policies relevant at step one is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case. Because reference to § 3553(a) is appropriate only at the second step of this circumscribed inquiry, it cannot serve to transform the proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) into plenary resentencing proceedings.
This understanding of § 3582(c)(2) as a narrow exception to the rule of finality finds further support outside the statute. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 requires that a defendant be present at “sentencing,” see Rule 43(a)(3), but it excludes from that requirement proceedings that “involvfe] the correction or reduction of sentence under Rule 35 or 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c),” Rule 43(b)(4). Like § 3582(c)(2), Rule 35 delineates a limited set of circumstances in which a sentence may be corrected or reduced. Specifically, it authorizes a court to “correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” within 14 days after sentencing, Rule 35(a), and it authorizes a reduction for substantial assistance on the Government’s motion, Rule 35(b). Rule 43 therefore sets the proceedings authorized by § 3582(c)(2) and Rule 35 apart from other sentencing proceedings.
B
Given the limited scope and purpose of § 3582(c)(2), we conclude that proceedings under that section do not implicate the interests identified in Booker. Notably, the sentence-modification proceedings authorized by § 3582(c)(2) are not constitutionally compelled. We are aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment to the benefit of subsequent Guidelines amendments. Rather, § 3582(c)(2) represents a congressional act of lenity intended to give prisoners the benefit of later enacted adjustments to the judgments reflected in the Guidelines.
Viewed that way, proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) do not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to have essential facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Taking the original sentence as given, any facts found by a judge at a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding do not serve to increase the prescribed range of punishment; instead, they affect only the judge’s exercise of discretion within that range. “[Jjudges in this country have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within [established] limits in the individual ease,” and the exercise of such discretion does not contravene the Sixth Amendment even if it is informed by judge-found facts. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 481 (2000) (emphasis in original). Because § 3582(e)(2) proceedings give judges no more than this circumscribed discretion, “[tjhere is no encroachment here by the judge upon facts historically found by the jury, nor any threat to the jury’s domain as a bulwark at trial between the State and the accused.” Oregon v. Ice, 555 U. S. 160, 169 (2009). Accordingly, Dillon’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by the District Court’s adherence to the instruction in § IB 1.10 to consider a reduction only within the amended Guidelines range.
Dillon contends that, even if § 3582(c)(2) does not implicate the constitutional rights vindicated in Booker — something the dissent appears to concede — the remedial aspect of the Court’s decision applies to proceedings under that section and requires that the Guidelines be treated as advisory in such proceedings just as they are in other sentencing proceedings. In support of his position, Dillon invokes the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Hicks, 472 F. 3d 1167, 1170 (2007). Relying on our rejection in Booker of a remedy that would have made the Guidelines advisory only in certain cases — namely, when treating them as binding would run afoul of the Sixth Amendment, see 543 U. S., at 265-267 — the Ninth Circuit held that Booker precludes treating the Guidelines as mandatory for purposes of § 3582(c)(2) and advisory in other contexts, see Hicks, 472 F. 3d, at 1171-1172.
This argument is unpersuasive. The incomplete remedy we rejected in Booker would have required courts to treat the Guidelines differently in similar proceedings, leading potentially to unfair results and considerable administrative challenges. See 543 U. S., at 266. As already explained,. the sentence-modification proceedings authorized by § 3582(c)(2) are readily distinguishable from other sentencing proceedings. Given the substantially different purpose of § 3582(c)(2) and the circumscribed nature of proceedings under that section, requiring courts to honor § lB1.10(b)(2)’s instruction not to depart from the amended Guidelines range at such proceedings will create none of the confusion or unfairness that led us in Booker to reject the Government’s argument for a partial fix.
The dissent’s contrary conclusion rests on two erroneous premises. First, the dissent ignores the fundamental differences between sentencing and sentence-modification proceedings and asserts without explanation that “[njothing turns on” the distinction between them. Post, at 841. For the reasons stated above, the statutory differences between the proceedings are highly significant.
Second, the dissent gives short shrift to the fact that, after Booker, the Commission retains at least some authority to bind the courts. Through §994(u), Congress charged the Commission with determining “in what circumstances and by what amount” the sentences of prisoners affected by Guidelines amendments “may be reduced.” No one disputes that the Commission’s retroactivity determinations made pursuant to the first part of that authorization are binding. See post, at 846-847, and n. 8. This aspect of the Commission’s power emphatically undermines the dissent’s insistence that the Guidelines after Booker are “completely advisory.” Post, at 839. Moreover, while the dissent criticizes our approach for leaving the Commission with only “the tiniest sliver of lawmaking power,” post, at 841, the dissent would leave the Commission with an even smaller and less explicable sliver by dissecting the authority granted by § 994(u).
For all of these reasons, we conclude that neither Booker’s constitutional nor remedial holding requires the result that Dillon urges.
IV
Dillon additionally contends that the District Court erred in failing to correct two mistakes in his original sentence. Under his view of § 3582(c)(2), a district court is required to recalculate a defendant’s sentence. Thus, any mistakes committed at the initial sentencing are imposed anew if they are not corrected. According to Dillon, the District Court in the instant proceeding should have corrected the Booker error that resulted from the initial sentencing court’s treatment of the Guidelines as mandatory, and it should have adjusted his criminal-history category, which he now contends was erroneously inflated.
Dillon’s arguments in this regard are premised on the same misunderstanding of the scope of § 3582(c)(2) proceedings dispelled above. As noted, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a resentencing. Instead, it permits a sentence reduction within the narrow bounds established by the Commission. The relevant policy statement instructs that a court proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) “shall substitute” the amended Guidelines range for the initial range “and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.” § lB1.10(b)(l). Because the aspects of his sentence that Dillon seeks to correct were not affected by the Commission’s amendment to §2D1.1, they are outside the scope of the proceeding authorized by § 3582(c)(2), and the District Court properly declined to address them.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.
The Sentencing Commission substantially revised § 1B1.10 in March 2008, see USSG Supp. App. C, Amdt. 712 (Nov. 2009) (effective Mar. 3, 2008), roughly three months before the District Court’s decision in this case. Because the current version of the relevant Guidelines provisions is not meaningfully different from the version in effect at the time of the District Court’s decision, references in this opinion are to the current, 2009 edition of the Guidelines.
Section 3553(a) provides that a “court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection,” and it enumerates several factors a court “shall consider” in determining an appropriate sentence, including “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(1).
The probation office based Dillon’s criminal-history assessment on two prior misdemeanor convictions, one for possession of marijuana and one for resisting arrest. Dillon did not object to that calculation of his criminal-history seore.
The revised sentence reflects a 210-month term of imprisonment for the narcotics offenses and a mandatory, consecutive 60-month term for the firearm offense.
We do not respond to the dissent’s separatton-of-powers discussion, see post, at 841-846 (opinion of Stevens, J.), as that issue is not fairly encompassed within the questions presented and was not briefed by the parties.
The Ninth Circuit subsequently agreed to consider en banc Booker’s applicability to § 3582(e)(2) proceedings. See United States v. Fox, 583 F. 3d 596 (2009). The matter was stayed pending our decision in this case. No. 08-30445 (CA9, Dee. 8,2009).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are called upon in this case to examine for the first time § 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which excludes from a taxpayer’s gross income amounts received as “scholarships” and “fellowships.” The question before us concerns the tax treatment of payments received by the respondents from their employer, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, while they were on “educational leave” from their jobs with Westinghouse.
During the period here in question the respondents held engineering positions at the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, which Westinghouse operates under a “cost-plus” contract with the Atomic Energy Commission. Their employment status enabled them to participate in what is known as the Westinghouse Bettis Fellowship and Doctoral Program. That program, designed both to attract new employees seeking further education and to give advanced training to persons already employed at Bettis, offers a two-phase schedule of subsidized postgraduate study in engineering, physics, or mathematics.
Under the first, or “work-study,” phase, a participating employee holds a regular job with Westinghouse and in addition pursues a course of study at either the University of Pittsburgh or Carnegie-Mellon University. The employee is paid for a 40-hour work week, but may receive up to eight hours of “release time” per week for the purpose of attending classes. “Tuition remuneration,” as well as reimbursement for various incidental academic expenses, is provided by the company.
When an employee has completed all preliminary requirements for his doctorate, he may apply for an educational leave of absence, which constitutes the second phase of the Fellowship Program. He must submit a proposed dissertation topic for approval by Westinghouse and the AEC. Approval is based, inter alia, on a determination that the topic has at least some general relevance to the work done at Bettis. If the leave of absence is secured, the employee devotes his full attention, for a period of at least several months, to fulfilling his dissertation requirement. During this period he receives a “stipend” from Westinghouse, in an amount based on a specified percentage (ranging from 70% to 90%) of his prior salary plus “adders,” depending upon the size of his family. He also retains his seniority status and receives all employee benefits, such as insurance and stock option privileges. In return he not only must submit periodic progress reports, but under the written agreement that all participants in the program must sign, also is obligated to return to the employ of Westinghouse for a period of at least two years following completion of his leave. Upon return he is, according to the agreement, to “assume . . . duties commensurate with his education and experience,” at a salary “commensurate with the duties assigned.”
The respondents all took leaves under the Fellowship Program at varying times during the period 1960-1962, and eventually received their doctoral degrees in engineering. Respondents Johnson and Pomerantz took leaves of nine months and were paid $5,670 each, representing 80% of their prior salaries at Westinghouse. Respondent Wolfe, whose leave lasted for a year, received $9,698.90, or 90% of his previous salary. Each returned to Westinghouse for the required period of time following his educational leave.
Westinghouse, which under its own accounting system listed the amounts paid to the respondents as “indirect labor” expenses, withheld federal income tax from those amounts. The respondents filed claims for refund, contending that the payments they had received were “scholarships,” and hence were excludable from income under § 117 of the Code, which provides in pertinent part:
“(a) General rule.
“In the case of an individual, gross income does not include—
“(1) any amount received—
“(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in section 151 (e)(4)), or
“(B) as a fellowship grant . . . .”
When those claims were rejected, the respondents instituted this suit in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, against the District Director of Internal Revenue. After the basically undisputed evidence regarding the Bettis Program had been presented, the trial judge instructed the jury in accordance with Treas. Reg. on Income Tax (1954 Code) § 1.117-4 (c), 26 CFR § 1.117-4 (c), which provides that amounts representing “compensation for past, present, or future employment services,” and amounts “paid . . . to . . . an individual to enable him to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the grantor,” are not excludable as scholarships. The jury found that the amounts received by the respondents were taxable income. Respondents then sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and that court reversed, holding that the Regulation referred to was invalid, that the jury instructions were therefore improper, and that on the essentially undisputed facts it was clear as a matter of law that the amounts received by the respondents were “scholarships” excludable under § 117. 396 F. 2d 258.
The holding of the Court of Appeals with respect to Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (c) was contrary to the decisions of several other circuits — most notably, that of the Fifth Circuit in Ussery v. United States, 296 F. 2d 582, which explicitly sustained the Regulation against attack and held amounts received under an arrangement quite similar to the Bettis Program to be taxable income. Accordingly, upon the District Director’s petition, we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict and to determine the proper scope of § 117 and Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (c) with respect to payments such as those involved here. 393 U. S. 949.
In holding invalid the Regulation that limits the definitions of “scholarship” and “fellowship” so as to exclude amounts received as “compensation,” the Court of Appeals emphasized that the statute itself expressly adverts to certain situations in which funds received by students may be thought of as remuneration. After the basic rule excluding scholarship funds from gross income is set out in § 117 (a), for instance, subsection (b)(1) stipulates:
“In the case of an individual who is a candidate for a degree at an educational institution . . . , subsection (a) shall not apply to that portion of any amount received which represents payment for teaching, research, or other services in the nature of part-time employment required as a condition to receiving the scholarship or the fellowship grant.”
In addition, subsection (b) (2) limits the exclusion from income with regard to nondegree candidates in two respects: first, the grantor must be a governmental agency, an international organization, or an organization exempt from tax under §§ 501 (a), (c) (3) of the Code; and second, the maximum exclusion from income available to a nondegree candidate is $300 per month for not more than 36 months. Since these exceptions are expressly set out in the statute, the Court of Appeals, relying on the canon of construction that expressio unius est exclusio alterius, concluded that no additional restrictions may be put on the basic exclusion from income granted by subsection (a) — a conclusion forcefully pressed upon us by the respondents.
Congress’ express reference to the limitations just referred to concededly lends some support to the respondents’ position. The difficulty with that position, however, lies in its implicit assumption that those limitations are limitations on an exclusion of all funds received by students to support them during the course of their education. Section 117 provides, however, only that amounts received as “scholarships” or “fellowships” shall be excludable. And Congress never defined what it meant by the quoted terms. As the Tax Court has observed:
“[A] proper reading of the statute requires that before the exclusion comes into play there must be a determination that the payment sought to be excluded has the normal characteristics associated with the term ‘scholarship.’ ” Reese v. Commissioner, 45 T. C. 407, 413, aff’d, 373 F. 2d 742.
The regulation here in question represents an effort by the Commissioner to supply the definitions that Congress omitted. And it is fundamental, of course, that as “contemporaneous constructions by those charged with administration of” the Code, the Regulations “must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes,” and “should not be overruled except for weighty reasons.” Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U. S. 496, 501. In this respect our statement last Term in United States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299, bears emphasis:
“[W]e do not sit as a committee of revision to perfect the administration of the tax laws. Congress has delegated to the Commissioner, not to the courts, the task of prescribing 'all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement’ of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U. S. C. § 7805 (a). In this area of limitless factual variations, 'it is the province of Congress and the Commissioner, not the courts, to make the appropriate adjustments.’ ” Id., at 306-307.
Here, the definitions supplied by the Regulation clearly are prima facie proper, comporting as they do with the ordinary understanding of “scholarships” and “fellowships” as relatively disinterested, “no-strings” educational grants, with no requirement of any substantial quid pro quo from the recipients.
The implication of the respondents’ expressio unius reasoning is that any amount paid for the purpose of supporting one pursuing a program of study or scholarly research should be excludable from gross income as a “scholarship” so long as it does not fall within the specific limitations of § 117 (b). Pay received by a $30,000 per year engineer or executive on a leave of absence would, according to that reasoning, be excludable as long as the leave was granted so that the individual could perform work required for a doctoral degree. This result presumably would not be altered by the fact that the employee might be performing, in satisfaction of his degree requirements, precisely the same work which he was doing for his employer prior to his leave and which he would be doing after his return to “employment” — or by the fact that the fruits of that work were made directly available to and exploited by the employer. Such a result would be anomalous indeed, especially in view of the fact that under § 117 the comparatively modest sums received by part-time teaching assistants are clearly subject to taxation. Particularly in light of the principle that exemptions from taxation are to be construed narrowly, we decline to assume that Congress intended to sanction — indeed, as the respondents would have it, to compel — such an inequitable situation.
The legislative history underlying § 117 is, as the Court of Appeals recognized, “far from clear.” We do not believe, however, that it precludes, as “plainly inconsistent” with the statute, a definition of “scholarship” that excludes from the reach of that term amounts received as compensation for services performed. The 1939 Internal Revenue Code, like predecessor Codes, contained no specific provision dealing with scholarship grants. Whether such grants were includable in gross income depended simply upon whether they fell within the broad provision excluding from income amounts received as “gifts.” Thus case-by-case determinations regarding grantors’ motives were necessary. The cases decided under this approach prior to 1954 generally involved two types of financial assistance: grants to research or teaching assistants — graduate students who perform research or teaching services in return for their stipends — and foundation grants to post-doctoral researchers. In cases decided shortly before the 1954 Code was enacted, the Tax Court, relying on the “gift” approach to scholarships and fellowships, held that amounts received by a research assistant were taxable income, but reached divergent results in situations involving grants to post-doctoral researchers.
In enacting § 117 of the 1954 Code, Congress indicated that it wished to eliminate the necessity for reliance on “case-by-case” determinations with respect to whether “scholarships” and “fellowships” were excludable as “gifts.” Upon this premise the respondents hinge their argument that Congress laid down a standard under which all case-by-case determinations — such as those that may be made under Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (c) — are unnecessary and improper. We have already indicated, however, our reluctance to believe that § 117 was designed to exclude from taxation all amounts, no matter how large or from what source, that are given for the support of one who happens to be a student. The sounder inference is that Congress was merely “recogni[zing] that scholarships and fellowships are sufficiently unique . . . to merit [tax] treatment separate from that accorded gifts,” and attempting to provide that grants falling within those categories should be treated consistently— as in some instances, under the generic provisions of the 1939 Code, they arguably had not been. Delineation of the precise contours of those categories was left to the Commissioner.
Furthermore, a congressional intention that not all grants received by students were necessarily to be “scholarships” may reasonably be inferred from the legislative history. In explaining the basis for its version of § 117 (b)(2), the House Ways and Means Committee stated that its purpose was to “tax those grants which are in effect merely payments of a salary during a period while the recipient is on leave from his regular job.” This comment related, it is true, to a specific exception to the exclusion from income set out in subsection (a). But, in view of the fact that the statute left open the definitions of “scholarship” and “fellowship,” it is not unreasonable to conclude that in adding subsection (b) to the statute Congress was merely dealing explicitly with those problems that had come explicitly to its attention — viz., those involving research and teaching assistantships and post-doctoral research grants — without intending to forbid application to similar situations of the general principle underlying its treatment of those problems. One may justifiably suppose that the Congress that taxed funds received by “part-time” teaching assistants, presumably on the ground that the amounts received by such persons really represented compensation for services performed, would also deem proper a definition of “scholarship” under which comparable sorts of compensation- — -which often, as in the present case, are significantly greater in amount- — are likewise taxable. In providing such a definition, the Commissioner has permissibly implemented an underlying congressional concern. We cannot say that the provision of Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (c) that taxes amounts received as “compensation” is “unreasonable or plainly inconsistent with the . . . statut[e].”
Under that provision, as set out in the trial court’s instructions, the jury here properly found that the amounts received by the respondents were taxable “compensation” rather than excludable “scholarships.” The employer-employee relationship involved is immediately suggestive, of course, as is the close relation between the respondents’ prior salaries and the amount of their “stipends.” In addition, employee benefits were continued. Topics were required to relate at least generally to the work of the Bettis Laboratory. Periodic work reports were to be submitted. And, most importantly, Westinghouse unquestionably extracted a quid pro quo. The respondents not only were required to hold positions with Westinghouse throughout the “work-study” phase of the program, but also were obligated to return to Westinghouse’s employ for a substantial period of time after completion of their leave. The thrust of the provision dealing with compensation is that bargained-for payments, given only as a “quo” in return for the quid of services rendered — whether past, present, or future — should not be excludable from income as “scholarship” funds. That provision clearly covers this case.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the District Court reinstated.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas would affirm the judgment for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals in 396 F. 2d 258.
We refer only to respondents Richard E. Johnson, Richard A. Wolfe, and Martin L. Pomerantz; their wives are parties to this action solely because joint tax returns were filed for the years in question.
Formerly Carnegie Institute of Technology.
A maximum of 156 hours of release time per year is allowed.
The Fellowship Program is funded jointly by Westinghouse and the AEC, but the amounts paid to participating employees are channeled through the company’s payroll office.
The ordinary leave period is nine months.
Maximum monthly limits are placed on the amounts paid.
Respondent Wolfe began his leave at a time when Westinghouse did not require agreement in writing to the two-year “return” commitment. He was formally advised before he went on leave, however, that he was “expected” to return to Westinghouse for a period of time equal to the duration of his leave, and he in fact honored that obligation.
Respondent Wolfe was on leave from March 1, 1960, to February 28,1961; respondent Johnson from October 1,1960, to June 30, 1961; and respondent Pomerantz from November 1, 1961, to July 31, 1962.
Tuition and incidental fees were also paid by Westinghouse, but no withholding was made from those payments, and their tax status is not at issue in this case. Although conceptually includable in income, such sums presumably would be offset by educational expense deductions. See Treas. Reg. on Income Tax (1954 Code) § 1.162-5, 26 CFR § 1.162-5.
The entire section reads as follows:
Ҥ 117. Scholarships and fellowship grants.
“(a) General rule.
“In the case of an individual, gross income does not include—
“(1) any amount received—
“(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in section 151 (e)(4)), or
“(B) as a fellowship grant, including the value of contributed services and accommodations; and
“(2) any amount received to cover expenses for—
“(A) travel,
“(B) research,
“(C) clerical help, or “(D) equipment,
“which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but only to the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
“(b) Limitations.
“(1) Individuals who are candidates for degrees.
“In the case of an individual who is a candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as defined in section 151 (e)(4)), subsection (a) shall not apply to that portion of any amount received which represents payment for teaching, research, or other services in the nature of part-time employment required as a condition to receiving the scholarship or the fellowship grant. If teaching, research, or other services are required of all candidates (whether or not recipients of scholarships or fellowship grants) for a particular degree as a condition to receiving such degree, such teaching, research, or other services shall not be regarded as part-time employment within the meaning of this paragraph.
“(2) Individuals who are not candidates for degrees.
“In the case of an individual who is not a candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as defined in section 151(e)(4)), subsection (a) shall apply only if the condition in subparagraph (A) is satisfied and then only within the limitations provided in subparagraph (B).
“(A) Conditions for exclusion.
“The grantor of the scholarship or fellowship grant is—
“(i) an organization described in section 501(c)(3) which is exempt from tax under section 501 (a),
“(ii) a foreign government,
“(iii) an international organization, or a binational or multinational education and cultural foundation or commission created or continued pursuant to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, or
“(iv) the United States, or an instrumentality or agency thereof, or a State, a territory, or a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia.
“(B) Extent of exclusion.
“The amount of the scholarship or fellowship grant excluded under subsection (a) (1) in any taxable year shall be limited to an amount equal to $300 times the number of months for which the recipient received amounts under the scholarship or fellowship grant during such taxable year, except that no exclusion shall be allowed under subsection (a) after the recipient has been entitled to exclude under this section for a period of 36 months (whether or not consecutive) amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship grant while not a candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as defined in section 151 (e) (4)).”
Ҥ 1.117-4. Items not considered as scholarships or fellowship grants.
“The following payments or allowances shall not be considered to be amounts received as a scholarship or a fellowship grant for the purpose of section 117:
“(e) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for the benefit of the grantor. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (a) of § 1.117-2, any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies or research, if such amount represents either compensation for past, present, or future employment services or represents payment for services which are subject to the direction or supervision of the grantor.
“ (2) Any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the grantor.
“However, amounts paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies or research are considered to be amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship grant for the purpose of section 117 if the primary purpose of the studies or research is to further the education and training of the recipient in his individual capacity and the amount provided by the grantor for such purpose does not represent compensation or payment for the services described in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph. Neither the fact that the recipient is required to furnish reports of his progress to the grantor, nor the fact that the results of his studies or research may be of some incidental benefit to the grantor shall, of itself, be considered to destroy the essential character of such amount as a scholarship or fellowship grant.”
Generally in accord with Ussery are Reese v. Commissioner, 373 F. 2d 742 (C. A. 4th Cir.); Stewart v. United States, 363 F. 2d 355 (C. A. 6th Cir.); and Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F. 2d 721 (C. A. 10th Cir.). See also Reiffen v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 296, 376 F. 2d 883.
Subsection (b) goes on to except from that limitation situations in which “teaching, research, or other services are required of all candidates (whether or not recipients of scholarships or fellowship grants) for a particular degree as a condition to receiving such degree ...” In those situations, scholarship or fellowship funds received for such services are nontaxable. See n. 10, supra.
See also Treas. Reg. on Income Tax (1954 Code) §§ 1.117-3 (a), (c), 26 CFR §§ 1.117-3 (a), (c), which set out the “normal characteristics” associated with scholarships and fellowships:
Ҥ 1.117-Definitions.
“ (a) Scholarship. A scholarship generally means an amount paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of, a student, whether an undergraduate or a graduate, to aid such individual in pursuing his studies. The term includes the value of contributed services and accommodations (see paragraph (d) of this section) and the amount of tuition, matriculation, and other fees which are furnished or remitted to a student to aid him in pursuing his studies. The term also includes any amount received in the nature of a family allowance as a part of a scholarship. However, the term does not include any amount provided by an individual to aid a relative, friend, or other individual in pursuing his studies where the grantor is motivated by family or philanthropic considerations. If an educational institution maintains or participates in a plan whereby the tuition of a child of a faculty member of such institution is remitted by any other participating educational institution attended by such child, the amount of the tuition so remitted shall be considered to be an amount received as a scholarship.
“(c) Fellowship grant. A fellowship grant generally means an amount paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of, an individual to aid him in the pursuit of study or research. The term includes the value of contributed services and accommodations (see paragraph (d) of this section) and the amount of tuition, matriculation, and other fees which are furnished or remitted to an individual to aid him in the pursuit of study or research. The term also includes any amount received in the nature of a family allowance as a part of a fellowship grant. However, the term does not include any amount provided by an individual to aid a relative, friend, or other individual in the pursuit of study or research where the grantor is motivated by family or philanthropic considerations.”
We are not concerned in this case with distinctions between the terms “scholarship” and “fellowship.”
Cf. 1 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 7.42, p. 110 (P. Zimet & W. Oliver rev. ed. 1962).
See Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U. S. 28, 48-49; Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 311 U. S. 46, 49.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals reiterates that the stipends received by the respondents were “reasonable.” Those payments approximated, of course, the respondents’ previous engineering salaries. In any event, given the court’s expressio unius reasoning, the source of a limitation based on the “reasonableness” of amounts granted to bona fide students is difficult to identify.
396 F. 2d, at 263.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, c. 1, §22 (b)(3), 53 Stat. 10; see Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 102.
See, e. g., Banks v. Commissioner, 17 T. C. 1386.
Compare Ti Li Loo v. Commissioner, 22 T. C. 220 (university grant for National Health Service research held taxable), with Stone v. Commissioner, 23 T. C. 254 (foundation grant held nontaxable).
Gordon, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants as Income: A Search for Treasury Policy, 1960 Wash. U. L. Q. 144, 151.
That version provided for the exclusion only of grants that, together with compensation received from the recipient’s former employer, were less than 75% of his salary for the preceding year. Noting that the House bill would have taxed many modest grants simply because the recipient had no substantial earned income in the previous year, the Senate rejected that formulation and substituted the present $300 per month, 36-month provision of §117 (b)(2). See H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 17; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 18.
H. R. Rep. No. 1337, supra, n. 23, at 17.
The House version of § 117 (b) (1) taxed only amounts received as payment for teaching and research services. The Senate amended the provision, however, to include payments for “other services” as well. See S. Rep. No. 1622, supra, n. 23, at 18.
In connection with the question of what Congress may have intended to denote by the terms “scholarship” and “fellowship,” it is noteworthy that the House Report stated, “Such grants generally are of small amount and are usually received by individuals who would have little or no tax liability in any case.” H. R. Rep. No. 1337, supra, n. 23, at 17.
The Court of Appeals viewed the “primary purpose” of § 117 as the “encourage [ment of] financial aid to education through tax relief.” 396 F. 2d, at 262. But while some desire to aid scholarship students no doubt underlay enactment of the statute, that desire must be reconciled with an apparent congressional intent — manifested in the limitations set out in subsection (b) — to tax amounts that represent compensation for services performed. As the text makes clear, we cannot view the Commissioner’s attempt to achieve that reconciliation as improper.
The Court of Appeals seems to have recognized that in some circumstances the Commissioner’s approach is justified. Its opinion stated:
“A significant commitment by the student in return for a grant would, of course, place that grant outside the category 'scholarship,’ at least to the extent of the value of that commitment. For if the grantee had to barter for his stipend, giving full value for it, this arrangement would hardly serve the primary purpose of the § 117 exclusion: to encourage financial aid to education through tax relief.” 396 F. 2d, at 262.
It is not clear how this position can be squared with the Court of Appeals’ holding that Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (c) is invalid. In any event, as we suggest infra, we cannot agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the grants received by the respondents were not “bartered for.”
The instructions included, inter alia, the following passage:
“You are . . . instructed that, one, any amount of money paid to an individual to enable him to pursue studies or research, if such amount represents either compensation for past, present or future employment services, or represents payment for services which are subject to the direction or supervision of the grantor, ... is not a scholarship or fellowship under the tax laws.
“Two, any amount of money paid to an individual to enable him to pursue studies or research which studies or research are primarily for the benefit of the grantor is not a scholarship under the tax laws.”
We thus endorse the decisions of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits in Ussery v. United States, 296 F. 2d 582, and Stewart v. United States, 363 F. 2d 355. In Ussery, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit specifically upheld Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (c) and held taxable monthly payments received by an employee of the Mississippi Department of Public Welfare who had been given leave to secure a master’s degree in social work. The taxpayer there received employee benefits while on leave, and was obligated to return to the department following completion of his studies. Stewart involved a similar arrangement under which an employee of the Tennessee Department of Public Welfare received monthly stipends and other benefits during an educational leave of absence but was required to return thereafter to her previous position. See Reese v. Commissioner, 373 F. 2d 742 (C. A. 4th Cir.), affirming 45 T. C. 407 (student-teacher); Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F. 2d 721 (C. A. 10th Cir.) (resident physician; obligated to remain following part-time participation in training program); cf. Reiffen v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 296, 376 F. 2d 883 (relying solely on characterization of payments as “primarily for benefit of grantor”). Several Tax Court decisions point in the same direction, although treatment of various factual situations under § 117 has not been marked by a great deal of consistency. See generally Tabac, Scholarships and Fellowship Grants: An Administrative Merry-Go-Round, 46 Taxes 485 (1968).
The Commissioner has acquiesced in Evans v. Commissioner, 34 T. C. 720 (see 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 4), which allowed exclusion where, although the taxpayer was obligated to work for the grantor following completion of her studies, there had been no previous employment relationship. See Rev. Rul. 65-146, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 66. We are informed by the Solicitor General, however, that the Evans acquiescence will be modified. See also Broniwitz v. Com missioner, P-H 1968 TC Mem. Dec. ¶68,221 (Sept. 30, 1968) (requirement of summer employment with grantor; held excludable).
The contract’s provision that employees who avail themselves of educational leave will be assigned duties “commensurate with [their] education and experience,” and compensated at rates “commensurate with” those duties, is hardly sufficient to avoid the clear inference that their grants are fully bargained for and in the nature of compensation. The program is featured in Westinghouse’s recruiting efforts as a benefit attractive to many potential employees. Moreover, as suggested in the text, participation in the program undeniably means giving up the right to take more remunerative employment elsewhere for a considerable period of time. Had the company modified its program so that the amounts of the “fellowship” grants were spread over the years preceding and following the educational leave — as increments to the respondents’ salary, set aside in a company-administered “educational fund”' — there could be little doubt that those amounts would have represented compensation. We see no persuasive reason why a different tax result should be reached under Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (e) on the actual facts involved here. There is no merit in the respondents’ oblique suggestion that payment for present services is somehow different, with respect to the question before us, from deferred or anticipatory payments.
We accept the suggestion in the Government’s brief that the second paragraph of Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (c) — which excepts from the definition of “scholarship” any payments that are paid to an individual “to enable him to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the grantor” — is merely an adjunct to the initial “compensation” provision:
“By this paragraph, the Treasury has supplemented the first in order to impose tax on bargained-for arrangements that do not create an employer-employee relation, as, for example, in the case of an independent contractor. But the general idea is the same: ‘scholarship’ or ‘fellowship’ does not include arrangements where the recipient receives money and in return provides a quid pro quo.” Brief for Petitioner 22.
The respondents point out that the Internal Revenue Service is considering possible revisions of the Regulations under § 117. The Solicitor General informs us, however, that although revisions might “conform the Regulations to the results reached” in such cases as Wells v. Commissioner, 40 T. C. 40, no changes are contemplated with respect to situations such as that involved here. Reply Brief for Petitioner in support of certiorari 3, n. 2; see Rev. Rul. 65-59, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 67.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | L | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance, enacted by appellant city of Renton, Washington, that prohibits adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. Appellees, Playtime Theatres, Inc., and Sea-First Properties, Inc., filed an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington seeking a declaratory judgment that the Renton ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and a permanent injunction against its enforcement. The District Court ruled in favor of Renton and denied the permanent injunction, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for reconsideration. 748 F. 2d 527 (1984). We noted probable jurisdiction, 471 U. S. 1013 (1985), and now reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
In May 1980, the Mayor of Renton, a city of approximately 32,000 people located just south of Seattle, suggested to the Renton City Council that it consider the advisability of enacting zoning legislation dealing with adult entertainment uses. No such uses existed in the city at that time. Upon the Mayor’s suggestion, the City Council referred the matter to the city’s Planning and Development Committee. The Committee held public hearings, reviewed the experiences of Seattle and other cities, and received a report from the City Attorney’s Office advising as to developments in other cities. The City Council, meanwhile, adopted Resolution No. 2368, which imposed a moratorium on the licensing of “any business . . . which . . . has as its primary purpose the selling, renting or showing of sexually explicit materials.” App. 43. The resolution contained a clause explaining that such businesses “would have a severe impact upon surrounding businesses and residences.” Id., at 42.
In April 1981, acting on the basis of the Planning and Development Committee’s recommendation, the City Council enacted Ordinance No. 3526. The ordinance prohibited any “adult motion picture theater” from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any school. App. to Juris. Statement 79a. The term “adult motion picture theater” was defined as “[a]n enclosed building used for presenting motion picture films, video cassettes, cable television, or any other such visual media, distinguished or characterized] by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to ‘specified sexual activities’ or ‘specified anatomical areas’. . . for observation by patrons therein.” Id., at 78a.
In early 1982, respondents acquired two existing theaters in downtown Renton, with the intention of using them to exhibit feature-length adult films. The theaters were located within the area proscribed by Ordinance No. 3526. At about the same time, respondents filed the previously mentioned lawsuit challenging the ordinance on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. While the federal action was pending, the City Council amended the ordinance in several respects, adding a statement of reasons for its enactment and reducing the minimum distance from any school to 1,000 feet.
In November 1982, the Federal Magistrate to whom respondents’ action had been referred recommended the entry of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Renton ordinance and the denial of Renton’s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The District Court adopted the Magistrate’s recommendations and entered the preliminary injunction, and respondents began showing adult films at their two theaters in Renton. Shortly thereafter, the parties agreed to submit the case for a final decision on whether a permanent injunction should issue on the basis of the record as already developed.
The District Court then vacated the preliminary injunction, denied respondents’ requested permanent injunction, and entered summary judgment in favor of Renton. The court found that the Renton ordinance did not substantially restrict First Amendment interests, that Renton was not required to show specific adverse impact on Renton from the operation of adult theaters but could rely on the experiences of other cities, that the purposes of the ordinance were unrelated to the suppression of speech, and that the restrictions on speech imposed by the ordinance were no greater than necessary to further the governmental interests involved. Relying on Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50 (1976), and United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), the court held that the Renton ordinance did not violate the First Amendment.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals first concluded, contrary to the finding of the District Court, that the Renton ordinance constituted a substantial restriction on First Amendment interests. Then, using the standards set forth in United States v. O’Brien, supra, the Court of Appeals held that Renton had improperly relied on the experiences of other cities in lieu of evidence about the effects of adult theaters on Renton, that Renton had thus failed to establish adequately the existence of a substantial governmental interest in support of its ordinance, and that in any event Renton’s asserted interests had not been shown to be unrelated to the suppression of expression. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for reconsideration of Renton’s asserted interests.
In our view, the resolution of this case is largely dictated by our decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., supra. There, although five Members of the Court did not agree on a single rationale for the decision, we held that the city of Detroit’s zoning ordinance, which prohibited locating an adult theater within 1,000 feet of any two other “regulated uses” or within 500 feet of any residential zone, did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id., at 72-73 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and White and Rehnquist, JJ.); id., at 84 (Powell, J., concurring). The Renton ordinance, like the one in American Mini Theatres, does not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely provides that such theaters may not be located within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. The ordinance is therefore properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation. Id., at 63, and n. 18; id., at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
Describing the ordinance as a time, place, and manner regulation is, of course, only the first step in our inquiry. This Court has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 462-463, and n. 7 (1980); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95, 98-99 (1972). On the other hand, so-called “content-neutral” time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 807 (1984); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 647-648 (1981).
At first glance, the Renton ordinance, like the ordinance in American Mini Theatres, does not appear to fit neatly into either the “content-based” or the “content-neutral” category. To be sure, the ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of theaters. Nevertheless, as the District Court concluded, the Renton ordinance is aimed not at the content of the films shown at “adult motion picture theatres,” but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community. The District Court found that the City Council’s “predominate concerns” were with the secondary effects of adult theaters, and not with the content of adult films themselves. App. to Juris. Statement 31a (emphasis added). But the Court of Appeals, relying on its decision in Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F. 2d 1260, 1266 (CA9 1983), held that this was not enough to sustain the ordinance. According to the Court of Appeals, if “a motivating factor” in enacting the ordinance was to restrict respondents’ exercise of First Amendment rights the ordinance would be invalid, apparently no matter how small a part this motivating factor may have played in the City Council’s decision. 748 F. 2d, at 537 (emphasis in original). This view of the law was rejected in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S., at 382-386, the very case that the Court of Appeals said it was applying:
“It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit, legislative motive. . . .
. . What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.” Id., at 383-384.
The District Court’s finding as to “predominate” intent, left undisturbed by the Court of Appeals, is more than adequate to establish that the city’s pursuit of its zoning interests here was unrelated to the suppression of free expression. The ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and generally “protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city’s] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life,” not to suppress the expression of unpopular views. See App. to Juris. Statement 90a. As Justice Powell observed in American Mini Theatres, “[i]f [the city] had been concerned with restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to close them or restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice as to location.” 427 U. S., at 82, n. 4.
In short, the Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our definition of “content-neutral” speech regulations as those that “are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976) (emphasis added); Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 293; International Society for Krishna Consciousness, supra, at 648. The ordinance does not contravene the fundamental principle that underlies our concern about “content-based” speech regulations: that “government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.” Mosley, supra, at 95-96.
It was with this understanding in mind that, in American Mini Theatres, a majority of this Court decided that, at least with respect to businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials, zoning ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of such businesses are to be reviewed under the standards applicable to “content-neutral” time, place, and manner regulations. Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, concluded that the city of Detroit was entitled to draw a distinction between adult theaters and other kinds of theaters “without violating the government’s paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication,” 427 U. S., at 70, noting that “[i]t is th[e] secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of ‘offensive’ speech,” id., at 71, n. 34. Justice Powell, in concurrence, elaborated:
“[The] dissent misconceives the issue in this case by insisting that it involves an impermissible time, place, and manner restriction based on the content of expression. It involves nothing of the kind. We have here merely a decision by the city to treat certain movie theaters differently because they have markedly different effects upon their surroundings. . . . Moreover, even if this were a case involving a special governmental response to the content of one type of movie, it is possible that the result would be supported by a line of cases recognizing that the government can tailor its reaction to different types of speech according to the degree to which its special and overriding interests are implicated. See, e. g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 509-511 (1969); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413-414 (1974); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 842-844 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); cf. CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973).” Id., at 82, n. 6.
The appropriate inquiry in this case, then, is whether the Renton ordinance is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication. See Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S., at 293; International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U. S., at 649, 654. It is clear that the ordinance meets such a standard. As a majority of this Court recognized in American Mini Theatres, a city’s “interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect.” 427 U. S., at 71 (plurality opinion); see id., at 80 (Powell, J., concurring) (“Nor is there doubt that the interests furthered by this ordinance are both important and substantial”). Exactly the same vital governmental interests are at stake here.
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that because the Renton ordinance was enacted without the benefit of studies specifically relating to “the particular problems or needs of Renton,” the city’s justifications for the ordinance were “con-clusory and speculative.” 748 F. 2d, at 537. We think the Court of Appeals imposed on the city an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof. The record in this case reveals that Renton relied heavily on the experience of, and studies produced by, the city of Seattle. In Seattle, as in Renton, the adult theater zoning ordinance was aimed at preventing the secondary effects caused by the presence of even one such theater in a given neighborhood. See Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P. 2d 1153 (1978). The opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington in Northend Cinema, which was before the Renton City Council when it enacted the ordinance in question here, described Seattle’s experience as follows:
“The amendments to the City’s zoning code which are at issue here are the culmination of a long period of study and discussion of the problems of adult movie theaters in residential areas of the City. . . . [T]he City’s Department of Community Development made a study of the need for zoning controls of adult theaters .... The study analyzed the City’s zoning scheme, comprehensive plan, and land uses around existing adult motion picture theaters. . . .” Id., at 711, 585 P. 2d, at 1155.
“[T]he [trial] court heard extensive testimony regarding the history and purpose of these ordinances. It heard expert testimony on the adverse effects of the presence of adult motion picture theaters on neighborhood children and community improvement efforts. The court’s detailed findings, which include a finding that the location of adult theaters has a harmful effect on the area and contribute to neighborhood blight, are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id., at 713, 585 P. 2d, at 1156.
“The record is replete with testimony regarding the effects of adult movie theater locations on residential neighborhoods.” Id., at 719, 585 P. 2d, at 1159.
We hold that Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences of Seattle and other cities, and in particular on the “detailed findings” summarized in the Washington Supreme Court’s Northend Cinema opinion, in enacting its adult theater zoning ordinance. The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses. That was the case here. Nor is our holding affected by the fact that Seattle ultimately chose a different method of adult theater zoning than that chosen by Renton, since Seattle’s choice of a different remedy to combat the secondary effects of adult theaters does not call into question either Seattle’s identification of those secondary effects or the relevance of Seattle’s experience to Renton.
We also find no constitutional defect in the method chosen by Renton to further its substantial interests. Cities may regulate adult theaters by dispersing them, as in Detroit, or by effectively concentrating them, as in Renton. “It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of [the city’s] decision to require adult theaters to be separated rather than concentrated in the same areas. . . . [T]he city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.” American Mini Theatres, 427 U. S., at 71 (plurality opinion). Moreover, the Renton ordinance is “narrowly tailored” to affect only that category of theaters shown to produce the unwanted secondary effects, thus avoiding the flaw that proved fatal to the regulations in Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S. 61 (1981), and Erznoznik, v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205 (1975).
Respondents contend that the Renton ordinance is “under-inclusive,” in that it fails to regulate other kinds of adult businesses that are likely to produce secondary effects similar to those produced by adult theaters. On this record the contention must fail. There is no evidence that, at the time the Renton ordinance was enacted, any other adult business was located in, or was contemplating moving into, Renton. In fact, Resolution No. 2368, enacted in October 1980, states that “the City of Renton does not, at the present time, have any business whose primary purpose is the sale, rental, or showing of sexually explicit materials.” App. 42. That Renton chose first to address the potential problems created by one particular kind of adult business in no way suggests that the city has “singled out” adult theaters for discriminatory treatment. We simply have no basis on this record for assuming that Renton will not, in the future, amend its ordinance to include other kinds of adult businesses that have been shown to produce the same kinds of secondary effects as adult theaters. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488-489 (1955).
Finally, turning to the question whether the Renton ordinance allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication, we note that the ordinance leaves some 520 acres, or more than five percent of the entire land area of Renton, open to use as adult theater sites. The District Court found, and the Court of Appeals did not dispute the finding, that the 520 acres of land consists of “[a]mple, accessible real estate,” including “acreage in all stages of development from raw land to developed, industrial, warehouse, office, and shopping space that is criss-crossed by freeways, highways, and roads.” App. to Juris. Statement 28a.
Respondents argue, however, that some of the land in question is already occupied by existing businesses, that “practically none” of the undeveloped land is currently for sale or lease, and that in general there are no “commercially viable” adult theater sites within the 520 acres left open by the Renton ordinance. Brief for Appellees 34-37. The Court of Appeals accepted these arguments, concluded that the 520 acres was not truly “available” land, and therefore held that the Renton ordinance “would result in a substantial restriction” on speech. 748 F. 2d, at 534.
We disagree with both the reasoning and the conclusion of the Court of Appeals. That respondents must fend for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees, does not give rise to a First Amendment violation. And although we have cautioned against the enactment of zoning regulations that have “the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech,” American Mini Theatres, 427 U. S., at 71, n. 35 (plurality opinion), we have never suggested that the First Amendment compels the Government to ensure that adult theaters, or any other kinds of speech-related businesses for that matter, will be able to obtain sites at bargain prices. See id., at 78 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The inquiry for First Amendment purposes is not concerned with economic impact”). In our view, the First Amendment requires only that Renton refrain from effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the city, and the ordinance before us easily meets this requirement.
In sum, we find that the Renton ordinance represents a valid governmental response to the “admittedly serious problems” created by adult theaters. See id., at 71 (plurality opinion). Renton has not used “the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing expression,” id., at 84 (Powell, J., concurring), but rather has sought to make some areas available for adult theaters and their patrons, while at the same time preserving the quality of life in the community at large by preventing those theaters from locating in other areas. This, after all, is the essence of zoning. Here, as in American Mini Theatres, the city has enacted a zoning ordinance that meets these goals while also satisfying the dictates of the First Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
Justice Blackmun concurs in the result.
This appeal was taken under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2), which provides this Court with appellate jurisdiction at the behest of a party relying on a state statute or local ordinance held unconstitutional by a court of appeals. As we have previously noted, there is some question whether jurisdiction under § 1254(2) is available to review a nonfinal judgment. See South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Flemming, 351 U. S. 901 (1956); Slaker v. O’Connor, 278 U. S. 188 (1929). But see Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77, 82-83 (1958).
The present appeal seeks review of a judgment remanding the case to the District Court. We need not resolve whether this appeal is proper under § 1254(2), however, because in any event we have certiorari jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 2103. As we have previously done in equivalent situations, see El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S. 497, 502-503 (1965); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 927 (1975), we dismiss the appeal and, treating the papers as a petition for certiorari, grant the writ of cer-tiorari. Henceforth, we shall refer to the parties as “petitioners” and “respondents.”
See American Mini Theatres, 427 U. S., at 70 (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate . . .”).
The Court of Appeals’ rejection of the District Court’s findings on this issue may have stemmed in part from the belief, expressed elsewhere in the Court of Appeals’ opinion, that, under Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485 (1984), appellate courts have a duty to review de novo all mixed findings of law and fact relevant to the application of First Amendment principles. See 748 F. 2d 527, 535 (1984). We need not review the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Bose Corp., since we determine that, under any standard of review, the District Court’s findings should not have been disturbed.
Respondents argue, as an “alternative basis” for affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, that the Renton ordinance violates their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As should be apparent from our preceding discussion, respondents can fare no better under the Equal Protection Clause than under the First Amendment itself. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S., at 63-73.
Respondents also argue that the Renton ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. More particularly, respondents challenge the ordinance’s application to buildings “used” for presenting sexually explicit films, where the term “used” describes “a continuing course of conduct of exhibiting [sexually explicit films] in a manner which appeals to a prurient interest. ” App. to Juris. Statement 96a. We reject respondents’ “vagueness” argument for the Same reasons that led us to reject a similar challenge in American Mini Theatres, supra. There, the Detroit ordinance applied to theaters “used to present material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on [sexually explicit matter].” Id., at 53. We held that “even if there may be some uncertainty about the effect of the ordinances on other litigants, they are unquestionably applicable to these respondents.” Id., at 58-59. We also held that the Detroit ordinance created no “significant deterrent effect” that might justify invocation of the First Amendment “over-breadth” doctrine. Id., at 59-61.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of Montana imposes a one percent gross receipts tax upon contractors of public, but not private, construction projects. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §84-3505 (Supp. 1977). A public contractor may credit against the gross receipts tax its payments of personal property, corporate income, and individual income taxes. Any remaining gross receipts liability is customarily passed on in the form of increased construction costs to the governmental unit financing the project. At issue in this appeal is whether a prior judgment by the Montana Supreme Court upholding the tax precludes the United States from contesting its constitutionality and if not, whether the tax discriminates against the Federal Government in violation of the Supremacy Clause.
I
In 1971, Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., the contractor on a federal dam project in Montana, brought suit in state court contending that the Montana gross receipts tax unconstitutionally discriminated against the United States and the companies with which it dealt. The litigation was directed and financed by the United States. Less than a month after the state suit was filed, the Government initiated this challenge to the constitutionality of the tax in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. On stipulation by the parties, the instant case was continued pending resolution of the state-court litigation.
That litigation concluded in a unanimous decision by the Montana Supreme Court sustaining the tax. Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 161 Mont. 140, 505 P. 2d 102 (1973) (Kiewit I). The court found the distinction between public and private contractors consistent with the mandates of the Supremacy and Equal Protection Clauses. Id., at 149-154, 505 P. 2d, at 108-110. The contractor subsequently filed a notice of appeal to this Court, but abandoned its request for review at the direction of the Solicitor General. App. to Juris. Statement 86-87. It then instituted a second action in state court seeking a refund for certain tax payments different from those involved in Kiewit I. On determining that the contractor’s second legal claim was, in all material respects, identical to its first, the Montana Supreme Court invoked the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata to affirm the dismissal of the complaint. Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. Department of Revenue, 166 Mont. 260, 531 P. 2d 1327 (1975) (Kiewit II).
After the decision in Kiewit II, a three-judge District Court heard the instant case on the merits. In a divided opinion, the court concluded that the United States was not bound by the Kiewit I decision, and struck down the tax as viola-tive of the Supremacy Clause. 437 F. Supp. 354 (1977). The majority began with the premise that the Supremacy Clause immunizes the Federal Government not only from direct taxation by the States, but also from indirect taxation that operates to discriminate against the Government or those with whom it transacts business. Id., at 359. See United States v. Detroit, 355 U. S. 466, 473 (1958); Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U. S. 376, 387 (1960). Because no private contractors were subject to the Montana gross receipts tax, the court reasoned that the statute impermissibly singled out the Federal Government and those with whom it dealt for disparate treatment. That the tax applied to state and municipal as well as federal contractors did not, in the majority’s view, negate the statute’s discriminatory character. For although contractors on state projects might pass on the amount of their tax liability to the State in the form of higher construction costs, Montana would recoup its additional expenditure through the revenue that the tax generated. By contrast, when federal contractors shifted the burden of their increased costs to the United States, it would receive no such offsetting revenues. Accordingly, the court concluded that the statute encroached upon the immunity from discriminatory taxation enjoyed by the Federal Government under the Supremacy Clause. 437 F. Supp., at 358-359. One judge argued in dissent both that the United States was estopped from challenging the constitutionality of the tax and that the statutory scheme, because it encompassed receipts of municipal and state as well as federal contractors, was not discriminatory within the meaning of Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., supra. 437 F. Supp., at 365-366 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
We noted probable jurisdiction. 436 U. S. 916 (1978). Because we find that the constitutional question presented by this appeal was determined adversely to the United States in a prior state proceeding, we reverse on grounds of collateral estoppel without reaching the merits.
II
A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that a “right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies . . . Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, 48-49 (1897). Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352 (1877); Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U. S. 322, 326 (1955); 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.405 [1], pp. 621-624 (2d ed. 1974) (hereinafter IB Moore); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 47 (Tent. Draft No. 1, Mar. 28, 1973) (merger) ; id., §48 (bar). Under collateral estoppel, once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 326 n. 5 (1979); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1942); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, Apr. 15, 1977) (issue preclusion) . Application of both doctrines is central to the purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdictions. Southern Pacific R. Co., supra, at 49; Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U. S. 294, 299 (1917). To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.
These interests are similarly implicated when nonparties assume control over litigation in which they have a direct financial or proprietary interest and then seek to redetermine issues previously resolved. As this Court observed in Souf-front v. Compagine des Sucreries, 217 U. S. 475, 486-487 (1910), the persons for whose benefit and at whose direction a cause of action is litigated cannot be said to be “strangers to the cause. ... [0]ne who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of another to establish and protect his own right, or who assists in the prosecution or defense of an action in aid of some interest of his own ... is as much bound ... as he would be if he had been a party to the record.” See Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U. S. 260, 262 n. 4 (1961); cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U. S. 100, 111 (1969). Preclusion of such nonparties falls under the rubric of collateral estoppel rather than res judicata because the latter doctrine presupposes identity between causes of action. And the cause of action which a nonparty has vicariously asserted differs by definition from that which he subsequently seeks to litigate in his own right. See G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U. S. 22, 29 (1916); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83, Comment b, p. 51 (Tent. Draft No. 2, Apr. 15, 1975); IB Moore ¶ 0.411 [6], pp. 1553-1554; Note, Developments in the Law — Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 862 (1952).
That the United States exercised control over the Kiewit I litigation is not in dispute. The Government has stipulated that it:
(1) required the Kiewit I lawsuit to be filed;
(2) reviewed and approved the complaint;
(3) paid the attorneys’ fees and costs;
(4) directed the appeal from State District Court to the Montana Supreme Court;
(5) appeared and submitted a brief as amicus in the Montana Supreme Court;
(6) directed the filing of a notice of appeal to this Court; and
(7) effectuated Kiewit’s abandonment of that appeal on advice of the Solicitor General. App. to Juris. Statement 86-87.
Thus, although not a party, the United States plainly had a sufficient “laboring oar” in the conduct of the state-court litigation to actuate principles of estoppel. Drummond v. United States, 324 U. S. 316, 318 (1945). See Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., supra, at 262 n. 4; Souffront v. Compagnie des Sucreries, supra, at 486-487; Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N. Y. 2d 270, 277-278, 265 N. E. 2d 739, 743-744 (1970).
Ill
To determine the appropriate application of collateral es-toppel in the instant case necessitates three further inquiries: first, whether the issues presented by this litigation are in substance the same as those resolved against the; United States in Kiewit I; second, whether controlling facts or legal principles have changed significantly since the state-court judgment; and finally, whether other special circumstances warrant an exception to the normal rules of preclusion.
A
A review of the record in Kiewit I dispels any doubt that the plaintiff there raised and the Montana Supreme Court there decided the precise constitutional claim that the United States advances here. In its complaint in Kiewit I, the contractor alleged that the gross receipts tax and accompanying regulations were unconstitutional because they, inter alia:
“(a) illegally discriminate against the Plaintiff, the United States, and its agencies and instrumentalities, and those with whom the United States does business, and deny them due process of law and the equal protection of the laws;
“(b) illegally impose a tax on Plaintiff which is not uniform upon the same class of subjects;
“(c) illegally and improperly interfere with the Federal Government’s power to select contractors and schedule construction and . . . conflict with Federal law and policy regulating Federal procurement;
“(d) illegally violate the immunity of the Federal Government and its instruments (including Plaintiff) from state control in the performance of their functions; [and]
“(f) illegally frustrate the Federal policy of selecting the lowest possible bidder . . . App. 37.
The Montana Court rejected those contentions on the theory that:
“The federal government is being treated in the same manner as the state of Montana treats itself and its subdivisions or municipalities. The only discrimination the federal government can claim is that private contractors are not paying the same tax as public contractors. However, according to [Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U. S. 376 (1960), and Moses Lake Homes v. Grant County, 365 U. S. 744 (1961),] ... all [that is] required is that the state does not give itself special treatment oyer that received by the federal government. The Act involved here treats the federal government in the same manner as it treats those who deal with any part of the state government.” Kiewit I, 161 Mont., at 152, 505 P. 2d, at 109.
No different constitutional challenge is at issue in this litigation. Indeed, the United States' amended complaint tracks almost verbatim the language of the plaintiff’s in Kiewit I in alleging that the Montana tax provisions:
“(1) illegally discriminate against the plaintiff, United States, and its agencies and instrumentalities, and those with whom the United States does business in violation of the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2, and the Fourteenth Amendment;
“(2) illegally impose a tax on plaintiff’s contractors and subcontractors which is not uniform upon the same class of subjects in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;
“(3) illegally force the United States of America to pay more for its construction than does a private party or corporation in violation of the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, Cl. 2; [and]
“(5) . . . illegally interfere] with the Federal Government’s free choice to choose its contractors and frustrate] the policy of choosing the lowest bidder in violation of federal procurement law and the Supremacy Clause, Art. IV [sic], Cl. 2.” App.67.
Thus, the “question expressly and definitely presented in this suit is the same as that definitely and actually litigated and adjudged” adversely to the Government in state court. United States v. Moser, 266 U. S. 236, 242 (1924). Absent significant changes in controlling facts or legal principles since Kiewit I, or other special circumstances, the Montana Supreme Court’s resolution of these issues is conclusive here.
B
Relying on Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591 (1948), the United States argues that collateral estoppel extends only to contexts in which “the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain unchanged. Id., at 600. In the Government’s view, factual stasis is missing here because the contract at issue in Kiewit I contained a critical provision which the contracts involved in the instant litigation do not.
Under its contract with the Army Corps of Engineers, Kiewit was unable to take advantage of the credit provisions of the gross receipts tax. In 1971, however, the United States altered its policy and has since required Montana contractors to seek all available refunds and credits. See 437 F. Supp., at 358; App. 91. As the Government reads the Kiewit I decision, the Montana Supreme Court proceeded on the assumption that if Kiewit had been able to avail itself of the offsetting income and property tax credits, there might have been a “total washout” of its gross receipts tax liability. 161 Mont., at 145, 505 P. 2d, at 106. Thus, according to the Government, the holding of Kiewit I was that the Montana statute did not discriminate against the United States under circumstances where, but for the Federal Government’s own contractual arrangement, the tax might have had no financial impact. Brief for United States 35-36. Because the uncon-troverted evidence in this case establishes that after taking all credits available, federal contractors are still subject to a gross revenue tax of one-half of one percent, App. to Juris. Statement 90, the Government submits that the factual premise of the Kiewit I holding is absent here.
We disagree. It is, of course, true that changes in facts essential to a judgment will render collateral estoppel inapplicable in a subsequent action raising the same issues. See, e. g., United States v. Certain Land at Irving Place & 16th Street, 415 F. 2d 265, 269 (CA2 1969); Metcalf v. Commissioner, 343 F. 2d 66, 67-68 (CA1 1965); Alexander v. Commissioner, 224 F. 2d 788, 792-793 (CA5 1955); IB Moore ¶ 0.448, pp. 4232-4233, ¶ 0.422 [4], pp. 3412-3413. But we do not construe the opinion in Kiewit I as predicated on the factual assumption that the gross receipts tax would cancel out if public contractors took all available refunds and credits.
The Montana Supreme Court adverted to the washout possibility when discussing the origin of the gross receipts tax as a revenue-enforcing rather than revenue-generating measure. Prior to the enactment of the statute, certain public contractors had evaded assessment of local property taxes by shifting equipment from one construction site to another, and by filing corporate or personal income tax returns that did not fairly reflect the amount of profit attributable to construction projects within the State. 161 Mont., at 143-145, 505 P. 2d, at 104-105. In establishing a flat percentage tax on gross receipts, with credits available for income and property tax payments, the Montana Legislature sought to remove any incentive for contractors to dissemble about the location of taxable equipment and the source of taxable revenues. Under the statutory scheme, a contractor who paid a substantial amount of property or income taxes might, by claiming those payments as credits, effectively cancel out his gross receipts tax liability. Id., at 145, 505 P. 2d, at 105. In practice, the court noted in Kiewit I, the statute had not resulted in a total offset of the 1% gross receipts payments, in part because of provisions such as those in federal contracts. Ibid., 505 P. 2d, at 106. Significantly, however, the court did not rely on the potential absence of tax liability in its analysis of Kiewit’s constitutional challenge. Indeed, it did not even allude to the washout potential in the course of that discussion. Id., at 147-154, 505 P. 2d, at 106-110. It focused rather on the rationality of the classification between public and private contractors, and on the parity of treatment between the United States and other public contractors. Ibid.
Our conclusion that the washout potential of the tax was not of controlling significance in Kiewit I is further reinforced by the Montana Supreme Court’s holding in Kiewit II. There, the contractor alleged that its gross receipts tax liability had exceeded its property and income tax credits, and argued that “the only basis” for the decision in Kiewit I was that “if the Act were properly enforced it would result in a ‘washout.’ ” Kiewit II, 166 Mont., at 262, 531 P. 2d, at 1328. The Montana Supreme Court rejected that reading of Kiewit I as “much too narro[w].” 166 Mont., at 263, 531 P. 2d, at 1329. That the offset possibility had not materialized for Kiewit was, in the court’s view, a fact too “inconsequential” to warrant relitigation of the statute’s constitutionality. Id., at 264, 531 P. 2d, at 1329. So too here, we cannot view the absence of a total washout as altering facts essential to the judgment in Kiewit I.
Thus, unless there have been major changes in the law governing intergovernmental tax immunity since Kiewit I, the Government’s reliance on Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591 (1948), is misplaced. Sunnen involved the tax status of certain income generated by a license agreement during a particular tax period. Although previous litigation had settled the status of income from the same agreement during earlier tax years, the Court declined to give collateral estoppel effect to the prior judgment because there had been a significant “change in the legal climate.” Id., at 606: Underlying the Sunnen decision was a concern that modifications in “controlling legal principles,” id., at 599, could render a previous determination inconsistent with prevailing doctrine, and that
“[i]f such a determination is then perpetuated each succeeding year as to the taxpayer involved in the original litigation, he is accorded a tax treatment different from that given to other taxpayers of the same class. As a result, there are inequalities in the administration of the revenue laws, discriminatory distinctions in tax liability, and a fertile basis for litigious confusion. [Collateral estoppel] is not meant to create vested rights in decisions that have become obsolete or erroneous with time, thereby causing inequities among taxpayers.” Ibid, (citations omitted).
No such considerations obtain here. The Government does not contend and the District Court did not find that a change in controlling legal principles had occurred between Kiewit I and the instant suit. That the Government’s amended complaint in this action replicates in substance the legal argument advanced by the contractor’s complaint in Kiewit I further suggests the absence of any major doctrinal shifts since the Montana Supreme Court’s decision.
Because the factual and legal context in which the issues of this case arise has not materially altered since Kiewit I, normal rules of preclusion should operate to relieve the parties of “redundant litigation [over] the identical question of the statute’s application to the taxpayer’s status.” Tait v. Western Maryland R. Co., 289 U. S. 620, 624 (1933). See United States v. Russel Mfg. Co., 349 F. 2d 13, 18-19 (CA2 1965).
C
The sole remaining question is whether the particular circumstances of this case justify an exception to general principles of estoppel. Of possible relevance is the exception which obtains for “unmixed questions of law” in successive actions involving substantially unrelated claims. United States v. Moser, 266 U. S. 236, 242 (1924). As we recognized in Moser:
“Where, for example, a court in deciding a case has enunciated a rule of law, the parties in a subsequent action upon a different demand are not estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise, merely because the parties are the same in both cases. But a fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law.” Ibid, (emphasis added).
Thus, when issues of law arise in successive actions involving unrelated subject matter, preclusion may be inappropriate. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 68.1, Reporter’s Note, pp. 43-44 (Tent. Draft No. 4, Apr. 15, 1977); IB Moore ¶ 0.448, p. 4235; Scott, 56 Harv. L. Rev., at 10. This exception is of particular importance in constitutional adjudication. Unreflective invocation of collateral estoppel against parties with an ongoing interest in constitutional issues could freeze doctrine in areas of the law where responsiveness to changing patterns of conduct or social mores is critical. To be sure, the scope of the Moser exception may be difficult to delineate, particularly where there is partial congruence in the subject matter of successive disputes. But the instant case poses no such conceptual difficulties. Rather, as the preceding discussion indicates, the legal “demands” of this litigation are closely aligned in time and subject matter to those in Kiewit I.
Nor does this case implicate the right of a litigant who has “properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal constitutional claims,” and who is then “compelled, without his consent ... , to accept a state court’s determination of those claims.” England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 415 (1964) (footnote omitted). As we held in England, abstention doctrine may not serve as a vehicle for depriving individuals of an otherwise cognizable right to have federal courts make factual determinations essential to the resolution of federal questions. Id., at 417. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 427 (1963). However, here, as in England, a party has “freely and without reservation submit [ted] his federal claims for decision by the state courts . . . and ha[d] them decided there . . . .” England v. Medical Examiners, supra, at 419. Considerations of comity as well as repose militate against redetermination of issues in a federal forum at the behest of a plaintiff who has chosen to litigate them in state court.
Finally, the Government has not alleged unfairness or inadequacy in the state procedures to which it voluntarily submitted. We must conclude therefore that it had a full and fair opportunity to press its constitutional challenges in Kiewit I. Accordingly, the Government is estopped from seeking a contrary resolution of those issues here.
The judgment of the District Court is
Reversed.
Section 84-3505 (5), Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (Supp. 1977), provides in part:
“each public contractor shall pay to the state an additional license fee in a sum equal to one per cent (1%) of the gross receipts from public contracts during the income year for which the license is issued . . .
The Act defines public contractors to include:
“(1) . . . any person who submits a proposal to or enters into a contract for performing all public construction work in the state with the federal government, state of Montana, or with any board, commission, or department thereof or with any board of county commissioners or with any city or town council ... or with any other public board, body, commission, or agency authorized to let or award contracts for any public work when the contract cost, value, or price thereof exceeds the sum of $1,000.
“(2) . . . subcontractors undertaking to perform the work covered by the original contract or any part thereof, the contract cost, value, or price of which exceeds the sum of $1,000.” §84-3501 (Supp. 1977).
Gross receipts encompass:
“all receipts from sources within the state, whether in the form of money, credits, or other valuable consideration, received from, engaging in, or conducting a business, without deduction on account of the cost of the property sold, the cost of the materials used, labor or service cost, interest paid, taxes, losses, or any other expense whatsoever. However, 'gross receipts’ shall not include cash discounts allowed and taken on sales and sales refunds, either in cash or by credit, uncollectible accounts written off from time to time, or payments received in final liquidation of accounts included in the gross receipts of any previous return made by the person.” § 84-3501 (3).
See §§ 84-3513 and 84-3514 (Supp. 1977).
See App. 98-108, 112-117, 164.
See Hazard, Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1036, 1042-1043 (1971); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 Geo. L. J. 857, 858 (1966); Note, Developments in the Law — Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 820 (1952).
Although the term “privies” has been used on occasion to denominate nonparties who control litigation, see, e. g., G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield. 241 U. S. 22, 27 (1916); Restatement of Judgments §83, Comment a (1942), this usage has been criticized as conclusory and analytically unsound. IB Moore ¶0.411 [6], p. 1553; cf. Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev., at 856. The nomenclature has been abandoned in the applicable section of the Second Edition of the Restatement. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83 (Tent. Draft No. 2, Apr. 15, 1975).
Clause 58 of the contract enumerated the credit provisions of the Montana statute and provided that “[t]he Contractor, and, in turn, the subcontractors will not take advantage of these credits.” Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 161 Mont. 140, 145-146, 505 P. 2d 102, 106 (1973) (Kiewit I).
The record does not reflect the reason for the Government’s policy. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35.
A threshold difficulty with the Government’s argument is that the record does not support its assertion that contractual provisions barring contractors from taking credits are “no longer applicable in the contracts involved in this litigation.” Brief for United States 14. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. The Montana gross receipts statute was enacted in 1967, and the Government has not limited its request for relief to gross receipts taxes paid after 1971 when the contractual provisions involved in Kiewit I were discontinued. See supra, at 158. To the contrary, the Government’s amended complaint in the instant case seeks a refund of all tax payments, less credits, made under the Montana statute. App. 68-69. Thus, the Government’s contention concerning factual changes does not justify the District Court’s refusal to invoke estoppel with respect to the pre-1971 claims.
Apparently the problem had not arisen to any appreciable extent with private contractors. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6.
See supra, at 156-157.
The Government seeks to distinguish England on the ground that the court below did not technically abstain, but rather, at the parties’ request, continued the action “pending the resolution in the state courts of Montana.” App. to Juris. Statement 49-50. Further, in the Government’s view, the rule of England arises only when a -party freely submits his federal claims to adjudication in state courts. Because the United States was not a party in Kiewit I, the Government submits that it is not bound by the judgment in that case. Brief for United States 34.
We agree that the District Court’s action is properly characterized as a continuance and that res judicata, the doctrine involved in England, is inapplicable to nonparties. See supra, at 154-155. But neither point is availing here since we dispose of the case on grounds of collateral estoppel, which does apply to nonparties, see ibid., and invoke England simply to dispel any inference that the same result would obtain if the Federal Government had been forced into state court and had reserved its federal claim.
Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 68.1 (c) (Tent. Draft No. 4, Apr. 15, 1977); Note, The Preclusive Effect of State Judgements on Subsequent 1983 Actions, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 610, 640-653 (1978). Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564 (1973); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434, 469-470, and n. 15 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The judgment is affirmed. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 100; Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Alabama’s domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§27-4-4 and 27-4-5 (1975), that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
Since 1955, the State of Alabama has granted a preference to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-state (foreign) companies. Under the current statutory provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on their gross premiums received from business conducted in Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a) (1975). All domestic insurance companies, in contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. § 27-4-5(a). As a result, a foreign insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its domestic competitor.
Alabama’s domestic preference tax statute does provide that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. §27-4-4(b). By investing 10 percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from 3 to 2 percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent. Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of smaller percentages of a company’s assets. Ibid. Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company places in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic companies. These are entitled to the one-percent tax rate even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the investment provision permits foreign insurance companies to reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in the domestic preference tax statute.
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting two claims as lead cases to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. Relying on this Court’s opinion in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California, 451 U. S. 648 (1981), the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it served “at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth in the statute.” App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. ‘The court also found that the distinction the statute created between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related to those two purposes and that the Alabama Legislature reasonably could have believed that the classification would have promoted those purposes. Id., at 21a.
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the Circuit Court’s rulings as to the existence of the two legitimate state purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of rational relationship, concluding that summary judgment was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was in conflict. 437 So. 2d 535 (1983). Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the statute’s classification bore a rational relationship to the two purposes found by the Circuit Court to be legitimate, and they requested a final determination of the legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered for the State and the intervenors. 447 So. 2d 142 (1983). This appeal followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 466 U. S. 935 (1984). We now reverse.
h-H h-H h-H
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California, supra, the jurisprudence of the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), held that so-called “privilege” taxes, required to be paid by a foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business within a State, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the Court’s prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation imposed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117 (1968); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 (1949).
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business within the State, when the home States of those companies imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than “a surprising throwback” to the days before enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the longstanding but “anachronis[tic]” rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits upon a State’s power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders. 451 U. S., at 667. We held that “[w]e consider it now established that, whatever the extent of a State’s authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose.” Id., at 667-668.
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relation, to the two purposes upheld by the Circuit Court, the only question before us is whether those purposes are legitimate.
A
(1)
The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a legitimate reason for the statute’s classification between foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. The State, agreeing with the Court of Civil Appeals, contends that this Court has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including 'Western & Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263 (1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553 (1906).
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State’s contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis. Rather, we held that California’s purpose in enacting the retaliatory tax — to promote the interstate business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes — was a legitimate one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other States in order to enhance its domestic companies’ ability to operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve its domestic insurers’ ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the fact that Alabama’s aim to promote domestic industry is purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. Alabama’s purpose, contrary to California’s, constitutes the very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959), this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by burdening “the residents of other state members of our federation.” Id., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the “home team” an advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to do business within the State, no matter what they or their States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by a long line of this Court’s cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on business, “the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be classified with domestic corporations of the same kind.” 272 U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within the State. In relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western & Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by grossly discriminating against foreign competitors.
The State contends that Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The State contends that this case shows that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.
We disagree with the State’s interpretation of Allied Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other cases on which we rely. We agree with the holding of Allied Stores that a State’s goal of bringing in new business is legitimate and often admirable. Allied Stores does not, however, hold that promotion of domestic business by discriminating against foreign corporations is legitimate. The case involves instead a statute that encourages nonresidents— who are not competitors of residents — to build warehouses within the State. The discriminatory tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders; rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic companies involved were not competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did not even directly affect adversely the domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic business within a State, by discriminating against foreign corporations that wish to compete by doing business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (Brennan, J., concurring).
(2)
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than “Commerce Clause rhetoric in equal protection clothing.” Brief for Appellee Ward 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in the insurance context.
Moreover, the State’s view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and the consequent different purposes those two constitutional provisions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the State’s interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the equal protection context, however, if the State’s purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See Western & Southern, 451 U. S., at 674 (if purpose is legitimate, equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the question of rational relationship is “ ‘at least debatable’ ” (quoting United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 154 (1938)).
The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State’s power — one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons from unconstitutional discrimination by the States. See Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection restraints are applicable even though the effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no reason now for reassessing that view.
In whatever light the State’s position is cast, acceptance of its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. A State’s natural inclination frequently would be to prefer domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State’s view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose— as benefiting one group or as harming another. This is a distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last Term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S., at 273. See n. 6, supra. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by discriminating against nonresident competitors is not a legitimate state purpose.
B
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpose when furthered by discrimination. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher gross premiums tax than domestic companies. The State’s investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but reaffirms, the statute’s impermissible classification based solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory manner serves no legitimate state purpose.
IV
We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and addressed by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see supra, at 873, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause to justify the imposition of the discriminatory tax at issue here. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The origins of Alabama’s domestic preference tax statute date back to 1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing business in the State was limited to companies not chartered by the State. Act No. 1, 1849 Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality •in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court’s decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). Act No. 156, 1945 Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, Act No. 77, 1955 Ala. Acts 193 (2d Spec. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in effect until the present.
For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code § 27-4-1(3) (1975). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is characterized as a foreign insurer. § 27-4-1(2).
There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code §27-4-4(a) (1975), and for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, § 27-4-6(a).
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., a New York corporation, was chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property and Casualty Co., a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the nonlife claimants. See App. 314-315.
The State and the intervenors advanced some 15 additional purposes in support of the Alabama statute. As neither the Circuit Court nor the Court of Civil Appeals ruled on the legitimacy of those purposes, that question is not before us, and we express no view as to it. On remand, the State will be free to advance again its arguments relating to the legitimacy of those purposes.
As the dissent finds our failure to resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect its tax “baffling,” post, at 887, we reemphasize the procedural posture of the case: it arose on a motion for summary judgment. The Court of Civil Appeals upheld the Circuit Court’s ruling that the two purposes identified by it were legitimate, but the appellate court remanded on the issue of rational relationship as to those purposes because it found the evidence in conflict. In order to obtain an expedited ruling, appellants waived their right to an evidentiary hearing only as to the purposes “which the lower courts have determined to be legitimate.” 447 So. 2d 142, 143 (Ala. 1983). Thus, for this Court to resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect the tax, it would have to decide de novo whether any of the other purposes was legitimate, and also whether the statute’s classification bore a rational relationship to any of these purposes — all this, on a record that the Court of Civil Appeals deemed inadequate.
We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite, to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned with whether a state purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis.' See infra, at 880-881.
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State’s ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that “a State may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and effect of encouraging domestic industry,” 468 U. S., at 271, we held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., at 272-273. Accord, Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 642 (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state statute promoting a legitimate local interest must “regulat[e] evenhandedly.” 397 U. S., at 142.
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State’s ability to regulate matters relating to probate. Bowers is the only one of the State’s cases that involves the validity under the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State’s contention that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents — who are not competitors of residents — to build warehouses within the State. See infra, at 879-880.
Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose advanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such as those at issue there.
In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress’ response only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944), and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this Court’s decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on a State’s ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655, n. 6.
It is well established that a corporation is a “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, 451 U. S., at 660, n. 12.
Indeed, under the State’s analysis, any discrimination subject to the rational relation level of scrutiny could be justified simply on the ground that it favored one group at the expense of another. This case does not involve or question, as the dissent suggests, post, at 900-901, the broad authority of a State to promote and regulate its own economy. We hold only that such regulation may not be accomplished by imposing dis-criminatorily higher taxes on nonresident corporations solely because they are nonresidents.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1956 two informations were filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio charging the petitioner with having robbed banks in Waterville, Ohio, and Forest, Ohio. Represented by-counsel of his own choice, the petitioner waived indictment and pleaded guilty to both charges. Sentence was deferred pending a presentence investigation, and in the interim petitioner appeared as a defense witness at the jury trial of Marvin Breaton, charged with participation in the Waterville bank robbery. At that trial the petitioner testified that he had robbed the Waterville bank, but denied that Breaton had been with him. Breaton was convicted by the jury. Three weeks later the petitioner appeared with counsel before the District Judge for sentencing. During the course of the proceedings the judge inquired if counsel had any statement to make, but did not direct any similar inquiry to the petitioner personally. The court imposed sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment on the first information and fifteen years on the second, the sentences to run consecutively.
In 1959 the petitioner instituted the present litigation by filing in the sentencing court a motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, to vacate and set aside the sentence he was serving. The motion alleged three grounds upon which it was claimed relief should be granted: that the petitioner’s pleas of guilty had not been voluntary, but had been induced by promises made by the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the prosecution; that in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the court had accepted the guilty pleas without first determining that they had been made voluntarily; and that in violation of Rule 32 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the court had not inquired if the defendant wished to speak in his own behalf before sentence was imposed. The motion was denied by the District Court without a hearing, 184 F. Supp. 881. The Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam, 280 F. 2d 379. We granted certiorari to consider seemingly significant questions as to the scope of relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. 365 U. S. 842.
I.
For the reasons stated in Hill v. United States, ante, p. 424, we hold that the failure of the District Court specifically to inquire at the time of sentencing whether the petitioner personally wished to make a statement in his own behalf is not of itself an error that can be raised by motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 or Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
II.
In support of his claim that his pleas of guilty had been involuntarily made, the petitioner’s motion and supporting affidavit set out detailed factual allegations. Specifically, the motion and affidavit alleged that on three separate occasions, identified as to time and place, an Assistant United States Attorney had promised the petitioner that he would receive a total prison sentence of not more than twenty years if he pleaded guilty to both infor-mations. These promises were said to have been made upon the authority of the United States Attorney and to be agreeable to the District Judge. It was alleged that the petitioner had been cautioned not to tell his own lawyer about the conversations. It was further alleged that when the petitioner threatened to advise his lawyer and the court of what had transpired, the Assistant United States Attorney had told him that if he “insisted in making a scene,” certain unsettled matters concerning two other robberies would be added to the petitioner’s difficulties. Finally, the motion and affidavit alleged that the petitioner had written two letters to the sentencing court and two letters to the Attorney General of the United States “relative to the misrepresentations” by the Assistant United States Attorney, to which he had received no reply.
The Government filed a memorandum in opposition to the petitioner’s motion, attaching an affidavit of the Assistant United States Attorney. The affidavit emphatically denied any promises or coercion with respect to the petitioner’s pleas of guilty, but did admit that the Assistant United States Attorney had had a conversation with the petitioner in the county jail the day before Breaton’s trial, at which time the petitioner was told he was about to be given his last opportunity to tell the truth and that the court, in sentencing, might well take into consideration the petitioner’s refusal to talk.
Without a hearing the District Judge determined that the petitioner’s allegations as to an agreement with the Assistant United States Attorney were false. The court noted that it had never received either of the two letters referred to by the petitioner, but had received a letter purportedly from him six months after sentencing, which did not mention any agreement, but simply requested that the sentences be made concurrent, rather than consecutive. The court further noted that the petitioner had not complained when no request for a reduction of sentence was made by the United States Attorney within sixty days after sentencing, and that instead, the petitioner had waited almost two and a half years to file the present motion.
There can be no doubt that, if the allegations contained in the petitioner’s motion and affidavit are true, he is entitled to have his sentence vacated. A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void. A conviction based upon such a plea is open to collateral attack. See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101; Shelton v. United States, 356 U. S. 26, reversing, 246 F. 2d 571. “A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence. Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences.” Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220, 223.
The District Court recognized that the “charges of an agreement between a former Assistant United States Attorney and the defendant are serious,” and stated that if “this Court had any doubt as to their falsity it would require a hearing.” The court determined, however, that the combination of factual inferences already mentioned “conclusively indicates the falsity of the defendant’s allegations.” 184 F. Supp., at 883.
We think the District Court did not proceed in conformity with the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2255, when it made findings on controverted issues of fact without notice to the petitioner and without a hearing. United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 220. The statute requires a District Court to “grant a prompt hearing” when such a motion is filed, and to “determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto” unless “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to-no relief.” This was not a case where the issues raised by the motion were conclusively determined either by the motion itself or by the “files and records” in the trial court. The factual allegations contained in the petitioner’s motion and affidavit, and put in issue by the affidavit filed with the Government’s response, related primarily to purported occurrences outside the courtroom and upon which the record could, therefore, cast no real light. Nor were the circumstances alleged of a kind that the District Judge could completely resolve by drawing upon his own personal knowledge or recollection.
We cannot agree with the Government that a hearing in this case would be futile because of the apparent lack of any eyewitnesses to the occurrences alleged, other than the petitioner himself and the Assistant United States Attorney. The petitioner’s motion and affidavit contain charges which are detailed and specific. It is not unreasonable to suppose that many of the material allegations can either be corroborated or disproved by the visitors’ records of the county jail where the petitioner was confined, the mail records of the penitentiary to which he was sent, and other such sources. “Not by the pleadings and the affidavits, but by the whole of the testimony, must it be determined whether the petitioner has carried his burden of proof and shown his right to a discharge. The Government’s contention that his allegations are improbable and unbelievable cannot serve to deny him an opportunity to support them by evidence. On this record it is his right to be heard.” Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275, at 287.
What has been said is not to imply that a movant must always be allowed to appear in a district court for a full hearing if the record does not conclusively and expressly belie his claim, no matter how vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible his allegations may be. The language of the statute does not strip the district courts of all discretion to exercise their common sense. Indeed, the statute itself recognizes that there are times when allegations of facts outside the record can be fully investigated without requiring the personal presence of the prisoner. Whether the petition in the present case can appropriately be disposed of without the presence of the petitioner at the hearing is a question to be resolved in the further proceedings in the District Court.
There will always be marginal cases, and this case is not far from the line. But the specific and detailed factual assertions of the petitioner, while improbable, cannot at this juncture be said to be incredible. If the allegations are true, the petitioner is clearly entitled to relief. Accordingly, we think the function of 28 U. S. C. § 2255 can be served in this case only by affording the hearing which its provisions require.
Vacated and remanded.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan concur in the Court’s judgment and opinion except as to Part I, from which they dissent for the reasons set out in their dissent in Hill v. United States, ante, p. 430.
The affidavit filed with the petitioner’s motion was as follows:
“John Machibroda, having been duly sworn according to law deposes and says that he is the petitioner in an action filed in this Court entitled 'Motion To Vacate sentence’ and this affidavit is made in support thereof:
“1. That affiant was interviewed in the County Jail on or about February 21, 1956, by one Clarence M. Condon who represented himself to be as Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the prosecution of alleged bank robberies committed at the Waterville and Forest Banks. (Later designated as Cases 10345 and 10348). The County Jail where the interview took place is situated in Toledo, Ohio.
“2. That the said Clarence M. Condon represented to the Affiant that he had the authority to speak for the United States Attorney and the United States District Judge in the matter of the amount of sentence that would be imposed in Cases Nos. 10345 and 10348.
“3. That the said Clarence M. Condon represented to the Affiant that if the Affiant would waive indictment in case no. 10348 and plead guilty in cases Nos. 10345 and 10348 the Court would not impose a sentence in the excess of twenty (20) years in Case No. 10345 and that any sentence imposed in Case No. 10348 would not be in the excess of ten (10) years and would be ordered served concurrently with the term imposed in case No. 10345.
“4. That on the assurance of the said Clarence M. Condon that the sentences would be imposed as heretofore set out in paragraph 3, above, the Affiant agreed to waive indictment in case no. 10348 and plead guilty to both cases* (This interview was held on or about February 21, 1956.)
“ *At that time the Affiant had already waived indictment in case No. 10345.
“5. That the said Clarence M. Condon instructed the Affiant to advise his Attorney, John Schuchmann, that he would waive indictment in case no. 10348 and plead guilty to both eases.
“6. That the said Clarence M. Condon cautioned the Affiant to refrain from advising the said John Schuchmann of his interviews with Mr. Condon and that an agreement had been reached between the government as represented by Mr. Condon, and the Affiant in the matter of waiver, pleas and sentences.
“7. That on February 24, 1956, Affiant acting on the promises and representations of the said Clarence M. Condon waived indictment in case no. 10348.
“8. That on February 24, 1956, the Affiant acting on the promises and representations of the said Clarence M. Condon pleaded guilty in Cases Nos. 10345 and 10348.
“9. That on or about May 22, 1956, the said Clarence M. Condon again interviewed the Affiant at the County Jail and informed Affiant that because of Affiant’s unfavorable testimony at the trial of a co-defendant the Court was vexed and there might be some difficulty in regards to the promised twenty (20) year sentence.
“10. That the said Clarence M. Condon admonished the Affiant that he had tried to warn him during the trial of the co-defendant that Affiant would shortly appear before this Court for sentence*
“ *The exact words Mr. Condon used to warn the Affiant are to be found in the transcript of the trial of Marvin Ferris Breaton.
“11. That at no time did the Affiant ever represent to Mr. Condon or anyone else that he would testify one way or the other at the trial of the co-defendant. The promise of the maximum sentence of twenty (20) years was predicated solely on the Affiant’s agreement to waive indictment and plead guilty to both informations.
“12. That the Affiant immediately became agitated and hotly informed Mr. Condon that he was going to tell his Attorney the whole story and demand that the Court be informed of the agreement.
"13. That the said Clarence M. Condon assured the Affiant that in the event a sentence in the excess of twenty (20) years was imposed the United States Attorney, himself, would move within sixty (60) days for a reduction of the portion of the sentence in excess of twenty (20) years; that the Affiant had nothing to worry about if he kept his mouth shut; that on the other hand, if Affiant insisted in making a scene in a matter of his own making, there were the unsettled matters of the robberies of the Trotwood and Canal Fulton Banks which would be added to the Affiant’s present difficulties.
“14. That on May 23, 1956, the Affiant was sentenced by the Honorable Frank L. Kloeb to twenty-five (25) years in Case No. 10345 and fifteen (15) years in case no. 10348.
“15. That immediately after sentence in an interview with the said Clarence M. Condon, the Affiant was informed he had no reason to worry for as soon as the Judge ‘cooled off’ the United States Attorney would have the sentence reduced to twenty (20) years as had been promised.
“16. That within a few hours after sentence, the Affiant was on his way to the Federal Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas.
“17. That the sentence was not reduced in sixty (60) days and has not been reduced to date.
“18. That the petitioner wrote two (2) letters to the Honorable Frank L. Kloeb and two (2) letters to the Attorney General of the United States relative to the misrepresentations by the said Clarence M. Condon. These letters were posted in the official prisoner’s mail box and the Affiant has failed to receive a reply to any of them.
“19. That the Affiant’s previous experience with Court officials has been with the authorities representing the Canadian Government and he found them to honor their commitments. He had no reason to believe that the officials of the United States Courts would do otherwise. His naivete has cost him an extra twenty (20) years in prison.”
See also Daniel v. United States, 107 U. S. App. D. C. 110, 274 F. 2d 768; Teller v. United States, 263 F. 2d 871; Watson v. United States, 104 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 262 F. 2d 33; Euziere v. United States, 249 F. 2d 293; Motley v. United States, 230 F. 2d 110; United States v. Paglia, 190 F. 2d 445.
Section 2255 of Title 28, United States Code, provides in part: “Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.”
Section 2255 of Title 28, United States Code, also provides, in part: “A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question raised here is who bears the burden of proof on a tax claim in bankruptcy court when the substantive law creating the tax obligation puts the burden on the taxpayer (in this ease, the trustee in bankruptcy). We hold that bankruptcy does not alter the burden imposed by the substantive law.
I
The issue of state tax liability in question had its genesis in the purchase of an airplane by Chandler Enterprises, Inc., a now-defunct Illinois company. William J. Stoeeker, for whom petitioner Raleigh is the trustee in bankruptcy, was president of Chandler in 1988, when Chandler entered into a lease-purchase agreement for the plane, moved it to Illinois, and ultimately took title under the agreement. See In re Stoecker, 179 F. 3d 546, 548 (CA7 1999).
According to respondent State Department of Revenue, the transaction was subject to the Illinois use tax, a sales-tax substitute imposed on Illinois residents such as Chandler who buy out of State. If the seller does not remit the tax, the buyer must, and, when buying a plane, must file a return and pay the tax within 30 days after the aircraft enters the State. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, §105/10 (1999). Chandler failed to do this.
When the State discovers a failure to file and pay taxes, its Department of Revenue (the respondent here) determines the amount of tax due and issues a Notice of Tax Liability to the taxpayer. §§ 105/12,120/4. Unless the taxpayer protests within the time provided, the assessment becomes final, though still subject to judicial review in the Illinois circuit court. §§120/4, 12.
Illinois law also provides that any corporate officer “who has the control, supervision or responsibility of filing returns and making payment of the amount of any ... tax ... who wilfully fails to file the return or make the payment . . . shall be personally liable for a penalty equal to the total amount of tax unpaid by the [corporation].” § 735/3-7. The department determines the amount, and its determination is “prima facie evidence of a penalty due,” ibid., though a Notice of Penalty Liability issued under this provision is open to challenge much like the antecedent Notice of Tax Liability.
By the time the department discovered the unpaid tax in this case, Chandler was defunct and Stoecker was in bankruptcy. The department issued both a Notice of Tax Liability against Chandler and a Notice of Penalty Liability against Stoecker. See 179 F. 3d, at 549.
The record evidence about Chandler’s operations is minimal. A person named Pluhar acted as its financial officer. There is no evidence directly addressing Stoeeker’s role in the filing of Chandler’s tax returns or the payment of any taxes, and so no affirmative proof that he either was responsible for or willfully evaded the payment of the use tax, see id., at 550. This evidentiary dearth is not necessarily dispositive, however, due to the provision of Illinois law shifting the burden of proof, on both production and persuasion, to the responsible officer once a Notice of Penalty Liability is issued, see Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 256-261, 659 N. E. 2d 961, 966-968 (1995). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit accordingly ruled for the Department of Revenue. 179 F. 3d, at 550.
The Court of Appeals thought the trustee may have satisfied his burden of production by identifying Pluhar as the financial officer but, in any event, had not satisfied his burden of persuasion. Because Stoecker was the president and, as far as the record showed, he and Pluhar were the only officers, each would have been involved in Chandler’s tax affairs. Ibid. While it is true that failure to pay must be willful (at least grossly negligent) to justify the penalty under Illinois law, see Branson, supra, at 254-255, 659 N. E. 2d, at 965, and true that Chandler had an opinion letter from a reputable lawyer that no tax was due because of certain details of the lease-purchase agreement, there was no evidence that Stoecker ever saw the letter or relied on it, and nothing else bearing on the issue of willfulness. See 179 F. 3d, at 550-551.
Obviously, the burden of proof was critical to the resolution of the case, which the Department of Revenue won because the Court of Appeals held that the burden remained on the trustee, just as it would have been on the taxpayer had the proceedings taken place outside of bankruptcy. The Courts of Appeals are divided on this point: the Seventh Circuit joined the Third and Fourth Circuits in leaving the burden on the taxpayer. See Resyn Corp. v. United States, 851 F. 2d 660, 663 (CA3 1988); In re Landbank Equity Corp., 973 F. 2d 265, 270-271 (CA4 1992). The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have come out the other way. See In re Placid Oil Co., 988 F. 2d 554, 557 (CA5 1993); In re Brown, 82 F. 3d 801, 804-805 (CA8 1996); In re Macfarlane, 83 F. 3d 1041, 1044-1045 (CA91996), cert. denied, 520 U. S. 1115 (1997); In re Fullmer, 962 F. 2d 1468, 1466 (CA10 1992). We granted certiorari to resolve the issue, 528 U. S. 1068 (2000), and now affirm.
II
Creditors’ entitlements in bankruptcy arise in the first instance from the underlying substantive law creating the debtor’s obligation, subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See Butner v. United States, 440 U. S. 48, 55 (1979); Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U. S. 156, 161-162 (1946). The “basic federal rule” in bankruptcy is that state law governs the substance of claims, Butner, supra, at 57, Congress having “generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law,” 440 U. S., at 54 (footnote omitted). “Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why [the state] interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.” Id., at 55. In this case, the bankruptcy estate’s obligation to the Illinois Department of Revenue is established by that State’s tax code, which puts the burden of proof on the responsible officer of the taxpayer, see Branson, supra, at 260-262, 659 N. E. 2d, at 968.
The scope of the obligation is the issue here. Do the State’s right and the taxpayer’s obligation include the burden of proof? Our eases point to an affirmative answer. Given its importance to the outcome of eases, we have long held the burden of proof to be a “substantive” aspect of a claim. See, e. g., Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U. S. 267, 271 (1994); Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 437, 446 (1959); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 249 (1942). That is, the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself; one who asserts a claim is entitled to the burden of proof that normally comes with it.
Tax law is no candidate for exception from this general rule, for the very faet that the burden of proof has often been placed on the taxpayer indicates how critical the burden rule is, and reflects several compelling rationales: the vital interest of the government in acquiring its lifeblood, revenue, see Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Central Ark., 520 U. S. 821, 826 (1997); the taxpayer’s readier access to the relevant information, see United States v. Rexach, 482 F. 2d 10, 16 (CA1), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1039 (1973); and the importance of encouraging voluntary compliance by giving taxpayers incentives to self-report and to keep adequate records in case of dispute, see United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U. S. 141, 145 (1975). These are powerful justifications not to be disregarded lightly.
Congress of course may do what it likes with entitlements in bankruptcy, but there is no sign that Congress meant to alter the burdens of production and persuasion on tax claims. The Code in several places, to be sure, establishes particular burdens of proof. See, e. g., 11 U. S. C. § 362(g) (relief from automatic stay), § 363(o) (adequate protection for creditors), § 364(d)(2) (same), § 547(g) (avoidability of preferential transfer), § 1129(d) (confirmation of plan for purpose of avoiding taxes). But the Code makes no provision for altering the burden on a tax claim, and its silence says that no change was intended.
Ill
The trustee looks for an advantage in the very silence of the Code, however, first by arguing that actual, historical practice favored trustees under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and various pre-Code revisions up to the current Code’s enactment in 1978. He says that courts operating in the days of the Bankruptcy Act, which was silent on the burden to prove the validity of claims, almost uniformly placed the burden on those seeking a share of the bankruptcy estate. Because the Code generally incorporates pre-Code practice in the absence of explicit revision, the argument goes, and because the Code is silent here, we should follow the pre-Code practice even when this would reverse the burden imposed outside bankruptcy. This tradition makes sense, petitioner urges, because in bankruptcy tax authorities are no longer opposed to the original taxpayer, and the choice is no longer merely whether the tax claim is paid but whether other innocent creditors must share the bankruptcy estate with the taxing government.
We, however, find history less availing to the trustee than he says. While some pre-Code cases put the burden of proof on taxing authorities, others put it on the trustee, and still others eannot he fathomed. This state of things is the end of the argument, for without the weight of solid authority on the trustee’s side, we cannot treat the Code as predicated on an alteration of the substantive law of obligations once a taxpayer enters bankruptcy. Cf. United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 865, 381-382 (1988) (“The at best divided [pre-Code] authority... removes all cause for wonder that the alleged departure from it should not have been commented upon in the legislative history”).
The trustee makes a different appeal to Code silence in pointing to language in Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U. S. 156 (1946), suggesting that “allowance” of claims is a federal matter. But “allowance” referred to the ordering of valid claims when that case was decided, see id., at 162-163, and Vanston, in fact, concerned distribution of assets, not the validity of claims in the first instance, see In re Highland Superstores, Inc., 154 F. 3d 573, 578 (CA6 1998); Fahs v. Martin, 224 F. 2d 387, 394-395 (CA5 1955). The burden of proof rule in question here bears only on validity, and as to that the Vanston opinion specifically states that “[wjhat claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations ... is to be determined by reference to state law.” 329 U. S., at 161 (footnote omitted). Nor is the trustee helped by City of New York v. Saper, 336 U. S. 328, 332 (1949), which mentions “proving]” government claims in the same manner as other debts; the reference was to the procedure by which proof of claim was submitted and not to the validity of the claim. While it is true that federal law has generally evolved to impose the same procedural requirements for claim submission on tax authorities as on other creditors, ibid., nothing in that evolution has touched the underlying laws on the elements sufficient to prove a valid state claim.
Finally, the trustee argues that the Code-mandated priority enjoyed by taxing authorities over other creditors, see 11 U. S. C. §§ 507(a), 503(b)(1)(B), requires a compensating equality of treatment when it comes to demonstrating validity of claims. But we think his argument distorts the legitimate powers of a bankruptcy court and begs the question about the relevant principle of equality.
Bankruptcy courts do indeed have some equitable powers to adjust rights between creditors. See, e. g., § 510(c) (equitable subordination). That is, within the limits of the Code, courts may reorder distributions from the bankruptcy estate, in whole or in part, for the sake of treating legitimate claimants to the estate equitably. But the scope of a bankruptcy court’s equitable power must be understood in the light of the principle of bankruptcy law discussed already, that the validity of a claim is generally a function of underlying substantive law. Bankruptcy courts are not authorized in the name of equity to make wholesale substitution of underlying law controlling the validity of creditors’ entitlements, but are limited to what the Bankruptcy Code itself provides. See United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U. S. 213, 228-229 (1996); United States v. Noland, 517 U. S. 535, 543 (1996).
Moreover, even on the assumption that a bankruptcy court were to have a free hand, the ease for a rule placing the burden of proof uniformly on all bankruptcy creditors is not self-evidently justified by the trustee’s invocation of equality. Certainly the trustee has not shown that equal treatment of all bankruptcy creditors in proving debts is more compelling than equal treatment of comparable creditors in and out of bankruptcy. The latter sort of equality can be provided by a bankruptcy court as a matter of course, whereas the trustee’s notion of equality could not be uniformly observed consistently with other bankruptcy principles. Consider the ease when tax litigation is pending at the time the taxpayer files for bankruptcy. The tax litigation will be subject to an automatic stay, but the stay can be lifted by the bankruptcy court for cause, see 11 U. S. C. § 362(d)(1), which could well include, among other things, a lack of good faith in attempting to avoid tax proceedings, or in attempting to favor private creditors who might escape the disadvantage of a priority tax claim under the trustee’s proposed rule. See generally 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 362.07[6][a], pp. 362-101 to 362-102 (rev. 15th ed. 2000) (noting that bad faith commencement of ease justifies lifting stay); Internal Revenue Service v. Bacha, 166 B. R. 611, 612 (Bkrtey. Ct. Md. 1993) (lifting automatic stay when bankruptcy filing was attempt to avoid tax proceedings). If the bankruptcy court exercises its discretion to lift the stay, the burden of proof will be on the taxpayer in the pre-existing tax litigation, and a tax liability determination will be final. See 11 U. S. C. § 505(a)(2)(A). We see no reason that Congress would have intended the burden of proof (and consequent vindication of this trustee’s vision of equality) to depend on whether tax authorities have initiated proceedings against a debtor before a bankruptcy filing. Thus, the uncertainty and increased complexity that would be generated by the trustee’s position is another reason to stick with the simpler rule, that in the absence of modification expressed in the Bankruptcy Code the burden of proof on a tax claim in bankruptcy remains where the substantive tax law puts it.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
It is true that a trustee may have less access to the facts than a taxpayer with personal knowledge, but the trustee takes custody of the taxpayer’s records, see 11 U.S. C. §521(4), and may have greater access to the taxpayer than a creditor. Even if the trustee’s advantage is somewhat less than the original taxpayer’s, the difference hardly overcomes the compelling justifications for shifting the burden of proof! The government, of course, is in no better position than it ever was, and remains without access to sources of proof when the taxpayer has not kept sufficient documentation.
The legislative history indicates that the burden of proof on the issue of establishing claims was left to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 62 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 352 (1977). The Bankruptcy Rules are silent on the burden of proof for claims; while Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(f) provides that a proof of claim (the name for the proper form for filing a claim against a debtor) is “prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim,” this rule does not address the burden of proof when a trustee disputes a claim. The Rules thus provide no additional guidance.
See, e. g., United, States v. Sampsell, 224 F. 2d 721,722-723 (GA91955); In re Avien, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1335, 1341-1342 (EDNY 1975), aff’d, 532 F. 2d 273 (CA2 1976); In re Gorgeous Blouse Co., 106 F. Supp. 465 (SDNY 1952); see also In re Highway Constr. Co., 105 F. 2d 863, 866 (CA6 1939) (apparently accepting lower court’s placement of burden of proof on tax authority).
See, e. g., In re Uneco, Inc., 532 F. 2d 1204, 1207 (CA8 1976); Paschal v. Blieden, 127 F. 2d 398, 401-402 (CA8 1942); In re Lang Body Co., 92 F. 2d 338, 341 (CA6 1937), cert. denied sub nom. Hipp v. Boyle, 303 U. S. 637 (1938); United States v. Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., 83 F. 2d 423, 425 (CA9), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 573 (1936). Some of these cases, such as Paschal and Lang Body Co., appear to confuse the burden of production (which ceases to be relevant upon presentation of a trustee’s case) with the burden of persuasion, under tax statutes that shift the entire burden of proof to the taxpayer. Whatever we make of their reasoning, these cases do not follow the rule whose pedigree petitioner wishes to establish.
See, e. g., Fiori v. Rothensies, 99 F. 2d 922 (CA3 1938) (per curiam) (discussing prima facie value of tax authority’s claim, but failing to discuss burden of proof); Dickinson v. Riley, 86 F. 2d 385 (CA8 1936) (resolving claim without reference to burden of proof); In re Clayton Magazines, Inc., 77 F. 2d 852 (CA2 1935) (same).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case was argued with Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, ante, р. 526, which affirmed the judgment of a three-judge District Court declaring invalid Missouri’s 1967 congressional districting statute. Before us here is a judgment of a three-judge District Court for the Southern District of New York which sustained the validity of New York’s 1968 congressional districting statute, N. Y. Laws 1968, с. 8. 281 F. Supp. 821 (1968). In 1967 that court had struck down an earlier districting statute apportioning New York’s 41 congressional seats and had retained jurisdiction of the case pending action by the New York Legislature to redress the plan’s deficiencies. The court recognized that a thorough revision of district lines might not be possible in time for the upcoming 1968 congressional election but concluded nevertheless that “[t]here are enough changes which can be superimposed on the present districts to cure the most flagrant inequalities.” 273 F. Supp. 984, 992, aff’d, 389 U. S. 421 (1967).
On February 28, 1968, a month and a half after the New York Legislature reconvened, the districting statute presently under attack was enacted. After a hearing, the three-judge court, on March 20, 1968, sustained the statute, stating that the districting plan afforded New York voters “an opportunity to vote in the 1968 and 1970 elections on a basis of population equality within reasonably comparable districts.” 281 F. Supp., at 826. We noted probable jurisdiction. 393 U. S. 819 (1968). We reverse insofar as the judgment of the District Court sustains the plan for use in the 1970 congressional election.
Appellant levels two constitutional attacks against the statute: (1) that the statute violates the equal-population principle of Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964), and (2) that the statute represents a systematic and intentional partisan gerrymander violating Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. We do not reach, and intimate no view upon the merits of, the attack upon the statute as a constitutionally impermissible gerrymander. We hold that reversal of the District Court’s judgment is compelled by our decision today in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra, which elucidates the command of Wesberry that congressional districting meet the standard of equal representation for equal numbers of people as nearly as is practicable.
The District Court correctly held in its 1967 opinion that “there is a burden on the proponent of any dis-tricting plan to justify deviations from equality.” 273 F. Supp., at 987. The District Court took no testimony on the question of justification at the hearing held to consider the 1968 statute. Recognizing that the statute, which was enacted with virtually no debate on its merits in either house of the New York Legislature, was the work of a Joint Legislative Committee, the court’s 1968 opinion refers to the Report of the Joint Committee as the source of the justifications relied upon as sufficient to sustain the population disparities created by the plan. 281 F. Supp., at 823-824. We have been referred to the same source.
The Report recites that the Committee “gave priority to the population totals in the several districts” as they appeared in the 1960 decennial census and that “very limited” consideration was given to population shifts within the State since 1960. The Report recites further that “[o]ther considerations were the geographical conformation of the area to be districted, the maintenance of county integrity, the facility by which the various Boards of Elections can ‘tool up’ for the forthcoming [1968] primary election, equality of population within the region, and equality of population throughout the state.” Interim Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment of N. Y. State Legislature (1968).
The heart of the scheme, however, lay in the decision to treat seven sections of the State as homogeneous regions and to divide each region into congressional districts of virtually identical population. Thirty-one of New York’s 41 congressional districts were constructed on that principle. The remaining 10 districts were composed of groupings of whole counties. A chart showing the population of each district under the 1968 statute appears in the Appendix to this opinion. The seven regions are: (a) Suffolk and Nassau Counties on Long Island with five districts having an average population of 393,391 and a maximum deviation from that average of 208; (b) Queens County with four districts having an average population of 434,672 and a maximum deviation from that average of 120; (c) Kings County plus a district made up of part of Kings and part of Queens, and a district made up of Richmond County and part of Kings, with seven districts having an average population of 417,171 and a maximum deviation from that average of 307; (d) New York and Bronx Counties with eight districts having an average population of 390,415 and a maximum deviation from that average of 496; (e) Westchester and Putnam Counties with two districts having an average population of 420,307 and a maximum deviation from that average of 161; (f) Wayne plus part of Monroe and the remainder of Monroe plus four other counties with two districts having an average population of 410,688 and a maximum deviation from that average of 256; and (g) Erie and Niagara Counties with three districts having an average population of 435,652 and a maximum deviation from that average of 228. The 10 remaining “North country” districts were composed of groupings of whole counties.
It is clear that our decision in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra, compels the conclusion that this scheme is unconstitutional. We there held, at 531, that “the command of Art. I, § 2, that States create congressional districts which provide equal representation for equal numbers of people permits only the limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.” The general command, of course, is to equalize population in all the districts of the State and is not satisfied by equalizing population only within defined sub-states. New York could not and does not claim that the legislature made a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality among its 41 congressional districts. Rather, New York tries to justify its scheme of constructing equal districts only within each of seven sub-states as a means to keep regions with distinct interests intact. But we made clear in Kirkpatrick that “to accept population variances, large or small, in order to create districts with specific interest orientations is antithetical to the basic premise of the constitutional command to provide equal representation for equal numbers of people.” To accept a scheme such as New York's would permit groups of districts with defined interest orientations to be overrepresented at the expense of districts with different interest orientations. Equality of population among districts in a sub-state is not a justification for inequality among all the districts in the State.
Nor are the variations in the “North country” districts justified by the fact that these districts are constructed of entire counties. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra.
We appreciate that the decision of the District Court did not rest entirely on an appraisal of the merits of the New York plan. As noted earlier, when the three-judge District Court in 1967 held the then-existing districting plan unconstitutional, it recognized that the imminence of the 1968 election made redistricting an unrealistic possibility and therefore said only that “[tjhere are enough changes which can be superimposed on the present districts to cure the most flagrant inequalities.” 273 F. Supp., at 992. On February 26, 1968, the New York Legislature enacted the plan before us. On March 20, 1968, the District Court approved the plan for both the 1968 and 1970 congressional elections. Since the 1968 primary election was only three months away on March 20, we cannot say that there was error in permitting the 1968 election to proceed under the plan despite its constitutional infirmities. See Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U. S. 120, 121 (1967); Martin v. Bush, 376 U. S. 222, 223 (1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 390 U. S. 939 (1968). But ample time remains to promulgate a plan meeting constitutional standards before the election machinery must be set in motion for the 1970 election. We therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar as it approved the plan for use in the 1970 election and remand the case for the entry of a new judgment consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
Population of New York’s Congressional Districts Under 1968 Plan.
C.D. Dev. % Description.
1 393,585 - 3.845 Part of Suffolk.
2 393,465 — 3.874 Part of Suffolk, Part of Nassau.
3 393,434 - 3.882 Part of Nassau.
4 393,183 — 3.943 Part of Nassau.
5 393,288 — 3.918 Part of Nassau.
6 434,615 + 6.178 Part of Queens.
7 434,750 + 6.212 Part of Queens.
8 434.552 + 6.163 Part of Queens.
9 434,770 + 6.217 Part of Queens.
10 417.122 + 1.905 Part of Queens, Part of Kings.
11 417,090 + 1.897 Part of Kings.
12 417,298 + 1.948 Part of Kings.
13 417,040 + 1.885 Part of Kings.
14 417,080 + 1.895 Part of Kings.
15 417,090 + 1.898 Part of Kings.
16 417,478 + 1.992 Richmond, Part of Kings.
17 390,742 — 4.540 Part of New York.
18 390,861 — 4.511 Part of New York.
19 390,023 — 4.715 Part of New York.
20 390,363 - 4.632 Part of New York.
21 390.552 — 4.586 Part of New York, Part of Bronx.
22 390,492 — 4.601 Part of Bronx.
23 390,228 — 4.665 Part of Bronx.
24 390,057 — 4.707 Part of Bronx.
25 420,146 + 2.644 Putnam, Part of Westchester.
26 420,467 + 2.722 Part of Westchester.
27 409,349 Rockland, Orange, Sullivan, Delaware.
28 396.122 — 3.225 Dutchess, Ulster, Columbia, Greene, Schoharie.
29 425,822 + 4.031 Albany, Schenectady.
30 415,030 + 1.394 Rensselaer, Saratoga, Washington, Warren, Fulton, Hamilton, Essex.
31 Clinton, St. Lawrence, Jefferson, Lewis, Franklin, Oswego. 425,905 + 4.051
32 385,406 — 5.843 Oneida, Madison, Herkimer.
33 415,333 + 1.468 Chemung, Broome, Tioga, Tompkins.
34 423,028 + 3.348 Onondaga.
35 386,148 — 5.662 Ontario, Yates, Seneca, Cayuga, Cortland, Chenango, Otsego, M’gomery.
410,943 + 0.396 Part of Monroe, Wayne. CO CO
410,432 + 0.271 Part of Monroe, Orleans, Genesee, Wyoming, Livingston. CO
Chautauqua, Cattaraugus, Allegany, Steuben, Schuyler. 382,277 - 6.608 00 OO
435,393 + 6.369 Part of Erie.
435,684 + 6.440 Part of Erie, Niagara.
435,880 + 6.488 Part of Erie.
State Mean. 409,324
Largest District (41st C. D.). 435,880
Smallest District (38th C. D.). 382,277
Citizen Population Variance (largest district population divided by the smallest district population). 1.139 to 1
Maximum Deviation above State Mean. 6.488%
Maximum Deviation below State Mean. 6.608%
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
On July 2, 1968, respondent Rice was arrested for driving while intoxicated on a North Carolina state highway. He was tried in the General County Court of Buncombe County, convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment for nine months with sentence suspended upon payment of $100 fine and costs. On appeal he was tried de novo in the Superior Court, found guilty, and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. State post-conviction procedures were unavailing. On appeal from denial of federal habeas corpus, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that under North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969), “the more drastic sentence on the second trial [was] a denial of Federal due process, in that by discouragement it impinges upon the State-given appeal.” 434 F. 2d 297, 300 (1970). Although “[h]e was completely discharged by North Carolina on January 24, 1970 . . . this did not moot the case on habeas corpus” because injurious consequences from the conviction might still obtain. Ibid. The judgment was that Rice' was entitled to have the record of his conviction expunged. The State’s petition for writ of certiorari was granted. 401 U. S. 1008 (1971).
The State claims that Pearce does not apply to a situation where the more severe sentence is imposed after a trial de novo in its Superior Court. We do not reach that question, however, since the threshold issue of mootness was improperly disposed of by the Court of Appeals. Although neither party has urged that this case is moot, resolution of the question is essential if federal courts are to function within their constitutional sphere of authority. Early in its history, this Court held that it had no power to issue advisory opinions, Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), as interpreted in Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 351-353 (1911), and it has frequently repeated that federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them. Oil Workers Unions v. Missouri, 361 U. S. 363, 367 (1960). To be cognizable in a federal court, a suit “must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. ... It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be .upon a hypothetical state of facts.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). However, “[m]oot questions require no answer.” Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. Ferris, 179 U. S. 602, 606 (1900). Mootness is a jurisdictional question because the Court “is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions,” United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920), quoting California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 314 (1893); our impotence “to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.” Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U. S. 301, 306 n. 3 (1964). See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496 n. 7 (1969). Even in cases arising in the state courts, the question of mootness is a federal one which a federal court must resolve before it assumes jurisdiction. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 447 (1965). Liner v. Jafco, Inc., supra, at 304.
The Court of Appeals held that the case was not moot because it assumed that Pearce mandated expunction of Rice’s conviction and because the conviction, unex-punged, would have collateral consequences entitling Rice to challenge it. A number of disabilities may attach to a convicted defendant even after he has left prison, and the Court has recognized the standing of such persons to challenge the legality of their convictions even when their sentences have been served. It could not be clearer, however, that Pearce does not invalidate the conviction that resulted from Rice’s second trial; Pearce went no further than to affirm the judgment of a federal court ordering Pearce’s release “[u]pon the failure of the state court to resentence Pearce within 60 days . . . .” 395 U. S., at 714. (Emphasis added.) Pearce, in short, requires only resentencing; the conviction is not ipso facto set aside and a new trial required. Even if the higher sentence imposed after Rice’s trial de novo was vulnerable under Pearce, Rice was entitled neither to have his conviction erased nor to avoid the collateral consequences flowing from that conviction and a proper sentence.
Respondent’s sole claim under Pearce thus related to the sentence he had completely served when he came before the Court of Appeals. A different question of mootness is therefore presented than the Court of Appeals considered. Nullification of a conviction may have important benefits for a defendant, as outlined above, but urging in a habeas corpus proceeding the correction of a sentence already served is another matter. Respondent was first sentenced to nine months, suspended upon payment of a $100 fine; after trial de novo he was sentenced to two years. In some jurisdictions, if a defendant is adjudicated guilty, either by conviction or plea, and then is placed on probation, not sentenced, or given a suspended sentence, statutes imposing disabilities for criminal convictions have no application. Elsewhere, however, the sentencing that follows adjudication of guilt is irrelevant for purposes of disability statutes. Since the present record deals with the mootness question only from the standpoint of conviction vel non and is otherwise unilluminating as to whether there may be benefits to respondent under North Carolina law in having his sentence reduced after he has served that sentence, it would be inappropriate for us to deal with this issue as it has now emerged. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for reconsideration of the question of mootness.
7 So ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas would affirm the judgment below on the opinion of the Court of Appeals in 434 F. 2d 297.
A convicted criminal may be disenfranchised, cf., e. g., Mont. Const., Art. IX, § 2; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 23-302 (1967); Okla. Const., Art. III, § 1; Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, § 93.1 (Supp. 1971-1972); lose the right to hold federal or state office, cf., e. g., Del. Const., Art. 2, §21; 18 U. S. C. §204; be barred from entering certain professions, 7 U. S. C. § 12a (2) (B); D. C. Code Ann. §§ 47-2301 to 47-2350 (1967); be subject to impeachment when testifying as a witness, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-605 (1962); Ore. Rev. Stat. §44.020 (1963); be disqualified from serving as a juror, Idaho Const., Art. 6, § 3, Idaho Code § 2-202 (1948); Nev. Const., Art. 4, §27, Nev. Rev. Stat. §6.010 (1967); and may be subject to divorce, W. Va. Code Ann. §48-2-4 (Supp. 1971). See generally Comment, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 Va. L. Rev. 403 (1967) ; Note, The Effect of Expungement on a Criminal Conviction, 40 S. Cal. L. Rev. 127 (1967).
Pollard v. United States, 352 U. S. 354, 358 (1957); United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502, 512-513 (1954); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211, 222 (1946); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234, 237-240 (1968).
See Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929, 954 n. 97 (1970).
Ibid.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are tenants of a New York apartment house. Their landlords applied for a certificate from the New York Area Rent Director authorizing eviction proceedings in the State courts. Section 6 of the Rent Regulations for New York City, issued by the Price Administrator under authority of § 2 of the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 23, 58 Stat. 632, 50 U. S. C. App. Supp. V, § 902, prohibits landlords from instituting such proceedings except under certain specific conditions not here relevant, or when a special certificate authorizing eviction is issued by the Area Rent Director upon his finding, for example, that failure to authorize eviction would impose “substantial hardship” upon the landlords.
In this case the Area Rent Director refused to issue the requested certificate after extensive hearings at which both the landlords and the tenants presented evidence. Denial was based on a finding that the landlords had wholly failed to meet the regulation’s conditions; that their request was part of a concerted plan to evade the Price Control Act; and that a fraud had been perpetrated against the OPA. The Regional Rent Director affirmed this ruling. On protest by the landlords, the Price Administrator reversed the ruling of the Area Director and ordered that the certificate be issued. Petitioners thereupon filed a protest of their own with the Administrator. When the Administrator dismissed this protest, they sought relief in the Emergency Court of Appeals, complaining that the Administrator’s order was “not in accordance with law” and was “arbitrary and capricious.” On motion of the Administrator, that action was dismissed on the ground that petitioners were not “subject to” the Administrator’s order and therefore had no right to protest or have judicial review of the dismissal of their protest. Parker v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 830. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue raised. 328 U. S. 828.
Section 204 (a) of the Emergency Price Control Act provides that “Any person who is aggrieved by the denial ... of his protest” against an order of the Price Administrator issued under § 2 of the Act may, upon complaint to the Emergency Court of Appeals, secure a judicial review of the Administrator’s denial of such “protest.” Under § 204 (b) that Court can enjoin or set aside the protested “order” in whole or in part only if it is satisfied that the order “is not in accordance with law, or is arbitrary or capricious.” But § 203 (a) denies the right to make a “protest” upon which review may be had to all but persons who are “subject to any provision of such . . . order.” The Emergency Court of Appeals did not question that the petitioners were “aggrieved” within the meaning of § 204 (b) by the Administrator’s special order authorizing their landlord to institute legal proceedings to evict them from their apartments. See Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 476, 477. Review was denied solely on the ground that they were not “subject to” that order within the meaning of § 203 (a).
In deciding a case concerning review of the Administrator’s order granting a special exception to one of his general regulations, we are mindful that the legislative history of the Price Control Act strongly indicates that judicial review of the Administrator’s general regulations and orders was intended by Congress to be limited to relatively few of the millions of people who would be more or less affected by them. Congress did not provide for protest and judicial review of general price orders by the great mass of consumers because of an apprehension that this might cause delay and difficulty in administering the Price Control Act with the efficiency and expedition deemed necessary to accomplish its broad purpose. Only a few categories of persons whom the Act affected and whose protests, if reviewed, would not have these consequences, were specifically permitted by the Act to protest and have general price orders affecting them judicially reviewed. The Administrator and the courts have adhered to this congressional policy. See e. g. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503.
Procedural Regulation No. 1 of the Office of Price Administration, 7 Fed. Reg. 971, defined a person as “subject to” a general price regulation or order, and therefore entitled to protest and obtain judicial review of it, only wheat such regulation or order “prohibits or requires action by him.” The Emergency Court of Appeals sustained the regulation which contained this definition. Buka Coal Co. v. Brown, 133 F. 2d 949, 952. But in other special situations not directly involving general price-fixing orders the words “subject to” have beeia construed more broadly by the Administrator and the Emergency Court of Appeals.
Revised Procedural Regulation No. 1, 7 F. R. 8961, promulgated by the Administrator, provides that agricultural producers may protest an order which denies them a subsidy granted by Congress as one of the mechanisms of the price control program, the regulation stating that such a producer “shall be considered to be subject to a maximum price regulation.” And in Illinois Packing Co. v. Snyder, 151 F. 2d 337, the Emergency Court of Appeals held that meat packers, denied such a subsidy under regulations of the Defense Supplies Corporation promulgated under the same authority on which Office of Price Administration orders were based, were subject to and could protest against such regulations. The court there said that:
“If anybody could be ‘subject to’ a provision of the subsidy regulation, complainant certainly would meet this requirement, since it claims to be excluded from the subsidy by a discriminatory and unlawful condition inserted in the subsidy regulation by Amendment No. 2. Since section 204 (d) confers upon this court 'jurisdiction to determine the validity of any regulation or order issued under section 2,’ and since Amendment No. 2 is such a regulation or order, it is inadmissible to put upon the phrase 'any person subject to any provision’ of a regulation under section 2 an interpretation which would make it impossible for anyone to invoke our jurisdiction in this type of case, especially one who, like complainant, is most immediately and directly prejudiced by the challenged provision of the subsidy regulation.” Illinois Packing Co. v. Snyder, supra, at 338-339.
Thus it appears that the Administrator and the Emergency Court of Appeals have determined that the question of whether a person is “subject to” an order is dependent to some extent upon whether the order immediately, substantially and adversely affects him, as well as whether the order requires or prohibits action by him. Under these standards we think the tenants here were “subject to” the order.
Whether the regulations gave the tenants a “vested right” to remain in possession is not decisive of their right to protest or obtain judicial review. However that may be, general regulations prohibited these landlords from evicting the tenants unless the Administrator granted a certificate. The Emergency Price Control Act was intended in part to prevent excessive rents in the public interest, and the very anti-eviction regulations under which the Administrator granted the eviction certificate here were specifically designed to prevent manipulative renting practices which would result in excessive rents. Those regulations have been held valid by the Emergency Court of Appeals, Taylor v. Brown, 137 F. 2d 654, 662-663, and their validity is not here challenged. If these tenants cannot “protest” this order issued under these regulations, no one can; and if they cannot challenge it in the Emergency Court of Appeals, they cannot effectively challenge it at all.
We cannot say that tenants who are about to be evicted from their apartments on account of the order are not “subject to” it. We are persuaded that these tenants would be required to act by the issuance of the certificate. They would either have to move themselves and their possessions to another abode, which might be difficult or impossible to obtain, or undertake defense of eviction proceedings in the State courts, which proceedings, but for the certificate, would have been barred by the regulation promulgated under the Act. For the same reason, it seems apparent that they would be immediately, substantially, and adversely affected by the order.
This situation is altogether different, in terms of administrative complications and the impact of the order on the individual, from one in which a consumer member of the public wishes to attack a general price-fixing regulation which will require him to pay higher prices, or even a tenant to pay higher rent. For this reason, the legislative history relied on by the Administrator, thought to indicate a purpose not to make such general price-fixing orders open to widespread challenge, has no relevancy here. While the scope of judicial review authorized by the Act is a limited one, Illinois Packing Co. v. Snyder, supra at 339, we think that these tenants were entitled to have their protest considered by the Administrator and that the Emergency Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of their complaint.
Reversed.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Burton dissent.
The landlords here claimed to be purchasers of stock in a co-operative apartment corporation which stock holding entitled each of them to possession of an apartment under a proprietary lease.
Section 6 (a) of the Rent Regulations for New York City Defense Area, 8 Fed. Reg. 13914, as amended, provides that “no tenant shall be removed from any housing accommodations, by action to evict . . . unless:” (1) The tenant has refused to renew his lease; (2) The tenant has unreasonably refused the landlord access to the premises; (3) The tenant has violated an obligation of tenancy or is committing a nuisance; (4) Subtenants occupy the premises at the time of the expiration of the prime tenant’s lease; (5) The landlord “has an immediate compelling necessity to recover possession ... for use and occupancy as a dwelling for himself.”
Section 6 (b) (3) “applies to the issuance of a certificate for occupancy of housing accommodations in a structure or premises owned or leased by a cooperative corporation . . . by a purchaser of stock . . . in such cooperative who is entitled by reason of ownership of such stock to possession of such housing accommodations by virtue of a proprietary lease or otherwise.” The part of § 6 (b) (3) ii pertinent here provides that where the co-operative was organized after February 17, 1945, or the effective date of the regulation, “no certificate shall be issued, unless on such date the cooperative was in the process of organization and the Administrator finds that substantial hardship would result from the failure to issue a certificate . . .”
The original respondent here was Paul A. Porter, Price Administrator. The functions of his office have been assumed by Philip B. Fleming, Temporary Controls Administrator, who has been substituted as respondent.
The congressional purpose in this regard has been summarized in our previous decisions in Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 423, 431-433, 439, 441 and Bowles v. Willingham., 321 U. S. 503, 513, 520-521.
Section 4 (a) of the Act lists the classes of persons to be punished for disobedience of the provisions of a regulation or order and therefore ipso facto "subject to” it as sellers of commodities, buyers of commodities in the course of business and landlords.
Among other provisions showing that such was the purpose of the Act, § 2 (d) provides in part that the Administrator may promulgate regulations or orders to “prohibit speculative or manipulative practices ... or renting or leasing practices (including practices relating to recovery of the possession) . . . which in his judgment are equivalent to or are likely to result in price or rent increases . . .” 58 Stat. 634.
The landlords here claimed to be recent purchasers of stock in a cooperative ownership arrangement. Regulation 6 (b), here involved, was promulgated, according to the Administrator, for the following, among other, stated reasons:
“In recent months the problem of evictions and potential evictions in connection with the sale of stock in cooperative housing corporations has reached serious proportions. Apartment houses and other multiple-unit premises are being sold to cooperative corporations. These corporations in turn sell stock in the corporation which entitles the purchaser to a ‘proprietary lease’ of a dwelling unit in the structure. In selling stock in the cooperative, tenants usually are first approached. They are under heavy pressure to purchase stock because the alternative is likely to be eviction in favor of the ultimate purchaser of the stock. If the stock is not purchased by a tenant, it is then sold to another person who obtains a proprietary lease of the tenant’s dwelling unit and seeks possession of that unit for personal occupancy.
“In the past cooperative housing corporations were virtually unknown in most defense-rental areas. Since rent control there has been a tendency to make more frequent use of the device and there is every indication that this will accelerate.
“. . . During recent months, as the housing shortage has become more acute, the cooperative corporations or other owners of this stock have begun to sell it to purchasers who become entitled to proprietary leases.” Statement of Reasons Accompanying Amendment 17 to the Rent Regulation for Housing for the New York City Defense-Rental Area.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, here on certiorari to the Court of Claims, presents the question whether a provision in a government contract for “liquidated damages,” as construed and applied, should be denied enforcement on the ground that it constitutes a “penalty.”
Shortly after the enactment of the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, 55 Stat. 31, 22 U. S. C. (Supp. V, 1946), § 411 et seq., the United States acting through agencies of the Department of Agriculture embarked on a program of purchasing dried eggs for shipment to England and Russia. Petitioner agreed to furnish a quantity of dried eggs under that program to the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation (FSCC). The contract called for “May 18 [1942] delivery” which date, according to the contract, “shall be the first day of a 10-day period within which the FSCC will accept delivery, the particular day within the period being at the FSCC’s option.” Petitioner was also required to have the eggs inspected, delivery to be accompanied by inspection and weight certificates.
The contract contained two provisions respecting “liquidated damages.” One, contained in paragraph 9, was applicable to delays in delivery. It has no application here, for as we shall see, deliveries were timely. The provision for “liquidated damages” with which we are concerned is contained in paragraph 7 and is applicable to a totally different situation. It provides, with exceptions not material here, that “failure to have specified quantities of dried egg products inspected and ready for delivery by the date specified in the offer” will be cause for payment of “liquidated damages.”
On May 18, 1942, petitioner had not made delivery nor had the eggs been inspected. Inspection was, however, completed and certificates issued by May 22, which was prior to the time when FSCC asked for delivery. For it was not until May 26 that FSCC gave the first of several written notices for the shipment of eggs involved in this litigation. Petitioner made timely shipments pursuant to those instructions. Subsequently FSCC ascertained that petitioner’s inspection certificates had been issued after May 18 and accordingly deducted from the price 10 cents per pound on the theory that the failure to have the eggs inspected and ready for delivery by May 18 was a default which put into operation the “liquidated damages” provision of the contract.
Petitioner brought this suit in the Court of Claims to recover the amounts withheld plus interest. The Court of Claims, being of the view that there had been a breach of contract for which the United States was entitled to “liquidated damages,” dismissed the petition. 106 Ct. Cl. 789, 65 F. Supp. 457.
We construe the contract to mean that the time for delivery by petitioner was not May 18, 1942 but the time or times chosen by the FSCC within the ten-day period which began on May 18. That is to say, performance by petitioner was not due until request was made and instructions given for delivery. That interpretation is in accord with the uncontested finding of the Court of Claims that petitioner promised delivery “within a ten-day period commencing May 18, the precise date to be selected” by the FSCC.
The contract was drawn, however, to make the “liquidated damages” provisions include so-called defaults of petitioner which antedated the time when delivery was due but which in no way interfered with or caused delay in that performance. As noted, “liquidated damages” became payable on “failure to have specified quantities of dried egg products inspected and ready for delivery by the date specified in the offer,” viz. by May 18, 1942. The Court of Claims held this provision enforceable even though petitioner had made prompt delivery of the eggs, because it felt that the provision enabled respondent to carry on its dried-egg program “with assurance that it could count on the dried-egg products being ready on the specified date.” That position is amplified by respondent. The argument in short is that liability to pay “liquidated damages” for failure to have goods ready for delivery even prior to the time when delivery is due gives assurance against tardy deliveries; that a prompt timetable of shipments was important here because of war conditions and the necessity of having goods ready for loading whenever shipping space was available; that delay in deliveries would cause unmeasurable damage; and that even though no damage were apparent in a particular case, the “liquidated damages” provision should be enforced as a deterrent of tardy deliveries in the whole class of contracts relating to this procurement program.
It is customary, where Congress has not adopted a different standard, to apply to the construction of government contracts the principles of general contract law. United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U. S. 106, 111, and cases cited. That has been done in other cases where the Court has considered the enforceability of “liquidated damages” provisions in government contracts. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U. S. 105, 120-121; Wise v. United States, 249 U. S. 361, 365-366. We adhere to those decisions and follow the same course here.
Today the law does not look with disfavor upon “liquidated damages” provisions in contracts. When they are fair and reasonable attempts to fix just compensation for anticipated loss caused by breach of contract, they are enforced. Wise v. United States, supra, p. 365; Sun Printing & Pub. Assn. v. Moore, 183 U. S. 642, 672-674; Restatement, Contracts § 339; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage & M. Co., [1915] A. C. 79. And see Kothe v. Taylor Trust, 280 U. S. 224, 226. They serve a particularly useful function when damages are uncertain in nature or amount or are unmeasurable, as is the case in many government contracts. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., supra, p. 121; Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co. v. Castaneda, [1905] A. C. 6, 11-13, 20; United States v. Walkof, 144 F. 2d 75, 77. And the fact that the damages suffered are shown to be less than the damages contracted for is not fatal. These provisions are to be judged as of the time of making the contract. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., supra, p. 121.
Judged by these standards, the provision in question may not be sustained as an agreement for “liquidated damages.” It does not cover delays in deliveries. It can apply only where there was prompt performance when delivery was requested but where prompt delivery could not have been made, due to the absence of the certificates, had the request come on the first day when delivery could have been asked. A different situation might be presented had the contract provided for notice to the Government when the certificates were ready. Then we might possibly infer that promptness in obtaining them served an important function in the preparation of timetables for overseas shipments. But the contract contains no such provision; and it is shown that FSCC had no knowledge that the certificates were not ready on May 18 until long after deliveries had been made. So, it is apparent that the certificates were only an essential of proper delivery under this contract.
It likewise is apparent that the only thing which could possibly injure the government would be failure to get prompt performance when delivery was due. We have no doubt of the validity of the provision for “liquidated damages” when applied under those circumstances. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., supra; Wise v. United States, supra. And see Maryland Dredging Co. v. United States, 241 U. S. 184; Robinson v. United States, 261 U. S. 486. But under this procurement program delays of the contractors which did not interfere with prompt deliveries plainly would not occasion damage. That was as certain when the contract was made as it later proved to be. Yet that was the only situation to which the provision in question could ever apply. Under these circumstances this provision for “liquidated damages” could not possibly be a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the damage caused by a breach of contract. It might, as respondent suggests, have an in terrorem effect of encouraging prompt preparation for delivery. But the argument is a tacit admission that the provision was included not to make a fair estimate of damages to be suffered but to serve only as an added spur to performance. It is well-settled contract law that courts do not give their imprimatur to such arrangements. See Kothe v. Taylor Trust, supra; Restatement, Contracts § 339. All provisions for damages are, of course, deterrents of default. But an exaction of punishment for a breach which could produce no possible damage has long been deemed oppressive and unjust. See Salmond & Williams on Contracts (2d ed. 1945) § 202.
It is said, however, that a different rule should obtain here because of the broad procurement powers involved under the Lend-Lease Act. We are pointed, however, to no provision by which the Congress authorized the imposition of penalties as sanctions to that program; nor do we find any. We cannot infer such a power. The power to purchase on appropriate terms and conditions is, of course, inferred from every power to purchase. But if that is the source of congressional authority to impose penalties, then any procurement officer, in war or in peace, could impose them. That is contrary to the premise underlying all our decisions on this question which involve government contracts. The rule which they announce has been applied both to the exigencies of war (United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., supra) and of peace (Wise v. United States, supra). The other view is such a radical break with the past and so counter to the whole development of the law as to indicate that the congressional purpose should be plain before we take the step.
Reversed.
That provision of the contract provided:
“Inasmuch as the failure of the vendor to deliver the quantity of the commodity or commodities specified in the contract in accordance with the terms of this announcement will, because of the urgent need for the commodity by the purchaser arising from the present emergent conditions, cause serious and substantial damages to the purchaser, and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove the amount of such damages, the vendor agrees to pay to the FSCC liquidated damages as stated in this paragraph. The sum is agreed upon as liquidated damages and not as a penalty and shall be in the amount set forth below for each pound of dried egg product undelivered in accordance with the terms of this announcement. . . . The parties have computed, estimated, and agreed upon this sum as an attempt to make a reasonable forecast of probable actual loss because of the difficulty of estimating with exactness the damages which result.”
The “liquidated damages” ranged from 10 to 30 cents per pound dependent upon the elapsed time between the acceptance date and May 18,1942.
The measure of “liquidated damages” in this situation was the same as that for delays in delivery set forth in note 1, supra.
They are covered, as we have already noted, by the provision set forth in note 1, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether the application of a Texas statute, which was passed after respondent’s crime and which allowed the reformation of an improper jury verdict in respondent’s case, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of Art. I, § 10. We hold that it does not.
Respondent Carroll Youngblood was convicted in a Texas court of aggravated sexual abuse. The jury imposed punishment of life imprisonment and a fine of $10,000. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Youngblood applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the State District Court. He argued that the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure did not authorize a fine in addition to a term of imprisonment for his offense, and, thus, under the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Bogany v. State, 661 S. W. 2d 957 (1983), the judgment and sentence were void, and he was entitled to a new trial. In April 1985, the District Court, feeling bound by Bogany, recommended that the writ be granted.
Before the habeas application was considered by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which has the exclusive power under Texas law to grant writs of habeas corpus, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 11.07 (Vernon 1977 and Supp. 1990), a new Texas statute designed to modify the Bogany decision became effective. Article 37.10(b), as of June 11, 1985, allows an appellate court to reform an improper verdict that assesses a punishment not authorized by law. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.10(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990); see Ex parte Johnson, 697 S. W. 2d 605 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Relying on that statute, the Court of Criminal Appeals reformed the verdict in Youngblood’s case by ordering deletion of the $10,000 fine and denied his request for a new trial.
Youngblood then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, arguing that the retroactive application of Art. 37.10(b) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of Art. I, § 10, of the Federal Constitution. The District Court concluded that since Youngblood’s “punishment . . . was not increased (but actually decreased), and the elements of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt were not changed,” there was no ex post facto violation. App. to Pet. for Cert. C-6.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Youngblood v. Lynaugh, 882 F. 2d 956 (CA5 1989). It relied on the statement in this Court’s decision in Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (1898), that retroactive procedural statutes violate the Ex Post Facto Clause unless they ‘“leave untouched all the substantial-protections with which existing law surrounds the person accused of crime,’” Lynaugh, supra, at 959 (quoting 170 U. S., at 352). It held that Youngblood’s right to a new trial under the Bogany decision was such a “substantial protection,” and therefore ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued. We granted certiorari. 493 U. S. 1001 (1989).
Because respondent is before us on collateral review, we are faced with a threshold question whether the relief sought by Youngblood would constitute a “new rule,” which would not apply retroactively under our decisions in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), and Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407 (1990). Generally speaking, “[rjetroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.” Teague, supra, at 300. The State of Texas, however, did not address retroactivity in its petition for certiorari or its briefs on the merits, and when asked about the issue at oral argument, counsel answered that the State had chosen not to rely on Teague. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. Although the Teague rule is grounded in important considerations of federal-state relations, we think it is not “jurisdictional” in the sense that this Court, despite a limited grant of certiorari, must raise and decide the issue sua sponte. Cf. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 515, n. 19 (1982) (Eleventh Amendment defense need not be raised and decided by the Court on its own motion). We granted certiorari to consider the merits of respondent’s ex post facto claim, and we proceed to do so.
Although the Latin phrase “ex post facto” literally encompasses any law passed “after the fact,” it has long been recognized by this Court that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390-392 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.); id., at 396 (opinion of Paterson, J.); id., at 400 (opinion of Iredell, J.). See Miller v. Florida, 482 U. S. 423, 430 (1987). As early opinions in this Court explained, “ex post facto law” was a term of art with an established meaning at the time of the framing of the Constitution. Calder, 3 Dall., at 391 (opinion of Chase, J.); id., at 396 (opinion of Paterson, J.). Justice Chase’s now familiar opinion in Calder expounded those legislative Acts which in his view implicated the core concern of the Ex Post Facto Clause:
“1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.” Id., at 390 (emphasis in original).
Early opinions of the Court portrayed this as an exclusive definition of ex post facto laws. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138 (1810); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325-326 (1867); id., at 391 (Miller, J., dissenting) (“This exposition of the nature of ex post facto laws has never been denied, nor has any court or any commentator on the Constitution added to the classes of laws here set forth, as coming within that clause”); Gut v. State, 9 Wall. 35, 38 (1870). So well accepted were these principles that the Court in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167 (1925), was able to confidently summarize the meaning of the Clause as follows:
“It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their citation may be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto. ” Id., at 169-170.
See also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 292 (1977).
The Beazell formulation is faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause: Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts. Several early State Constitutions employed this definition of the term, and they appear to have been a basis for the Framers’ understanding of the provision. See The Federalist No. 44, p. 301 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison); 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 376 (1911); Calder, 3 Dall., at 391-392 (opinion of Chase, J.); id., at 396-397 (opinion of Paterson, J.). The Constitutions of Maryland and North Carolina, for example, declared that “retrospective laws, punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust, and incompatible with liberty; wherefore no ex post facto law ought to be made.” See Constitution of Maryland, Declaration of Rights, Art. XV (1776); Constitution of North Carolina, Declaration of Rights, Art. XXIV (1776). Other State Constitutions, though not using the phrase “ex post facto,” included similar articles. See Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State § 11 (1776); Constitution or Form of Government for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Declaration of Rights, Art. XXIV (1780).
Another historical reference, Blackstone’s Commentaries, which was discussed by the Framers during debates on the Ex Post Facto Clause, see 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 448-449 (1911), and deemed an authoritative source of the technical meaning of the term in Calder, see 3 Dall., at 391 (opinion of Chase, J.); id., at 396 (opinion of Paterson, J.), buttresses this understanding. According to Blackstone, a law is ex post facto “when after an action (indifferent in itself) is committed, the legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it.” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries * 46. Although increased punishments are not mentioned explicitly in the historical sources, the Court has never questioned their prohibition, apparently on the theory that “[t]he enhancement of a crime, or penalty, seems to come within the same mischief as the creation of a crime or penalty.” Calder, supra, at 397 (opinion of Paterson, J.). The Beazell definition, then, is faithful to the use of the term “ex post facto law” at the time the Constitution was adopted.
Respondent concedes that Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.10(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990), does not fall within any of the Beazell categories and, under that definition, would not constitute an ex post facto law as applied to him. The new statute is a procedural change that allows reformation of improper verdicts. It does not alter the definition of the crime of aggravated sexual abuse, of which Youngblood was convicted, nor does it increase the punishment for which he is eligible as a result of that conviction. Nevertheless, respondent maintains that this Court’s decisions have not limited the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the finite Beazell categories, but have stated more broadly that retroactive legislation contravenes Art. I, § 10, if it deprives an accused of a “substantial protection” under law existing at the time of the crime. He argues that the new trial guaranteed him by former Texas law.is such a protection.
Several of our cases have described as “procedural” those changes which, even though they work to the disadvantage of the accused, do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Dobbert v. Florida, supra, at 292-293, and n. 6; Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S., at 171; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589, 597 (1901). While these cases do not explicitly define what they mean by the word “procedural,” it is logical to think that the term refers to changes in the procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated, as opposed to changes in the substantive law of crimes. Respondent correctly notes, however, that we have said that a procedural change may constitute an ex post facto violation if it “affect[s] matters of substance,” Beazell, supra, at 171, by depriving a defendant of “substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime,” Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 382-383 (1894), or arbitrarily infringing upon “substantial personal rights.” Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U. S. 180, 183 (1915); Beazell, supra, at 171.
We think this language from the cases cited has imported confusion into the interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The origin of the rather amorphous phrase, “substantial protections,” appears to lie in a 19th-century treatise on constitutional law by Professor Thomas Cooley. T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations * 272. According to Cooley, who notably assumed the Calder construction of the Ex Post Facto Clause to be correct, Constitutional Limitations * 265, a legislature “may prescribe altogether different modes of procedure in its discretion, though it cannot lawfully, we think, in so doing, dispense with any of those substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime.” Id., at *272.
This Court’s decision in Duncan v. Missouri, supra, subsequently adopted that phraseology:
“[A]n ex post facto law is one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or an additional punishment to that then prescribed; or changes the rules of evidence by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required; or, in short, in relation to the offence or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage; but the prescribing of different modes or procedure and the abolition of courts and creation of new ones, leaving untouched all the substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime, are not considered within the constitutional inhibition. Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 329.” Id., at 382-383 (other citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Later, in Malloy v. South Carolina, supra, we stated that even with regard to procedural changes, the Ex Post Facto Clause was “intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislative action.” Id., at 183. We repeated that recognition in Beazell itself, while also emphasizing that the provision was “not to limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance.” Beazell, supra, at 171.
We think the best way to make sense out of this discussion in the cases is to say that by simply labeling a law “procedural,” a legislature does not thereby immunize it from scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 590 (1896). Subtle ex post facto violations are no more permissible than overt ones. In Beazell, supra, we said that the constitutional prohibition is addressed to laws, “whatever their form,” which make innocent acts criminal, alter the nature of the offense, or increase the punishment. Id., at 170. But the prohibition which may not be evaded is the one defined by the Calder categories. See Duncan, supra, at 382; Malloy, supra, at 183-184. The references in Duncan and Malloy to “substantial protections” and “personal rights” should not be read to adopt without explanation an undefined enlargement of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Two decisions of this Court, relied upon by respondent, do not fit into this analytical framework. In Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221 (1883), the Court said “it is not to be supposed that the opinion in [Calder v. Bull] undertook to define, by way of exclusion, all the cases to which the constitutional provision would be applicable.” Id., at 228. It defined an ex post facto law, inter alia, as one which, “ ‘in relation to the offence or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.”’ Id., at 228-229 (quoting United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 84, 86 (No. 15,285) (D Pa. 1809)) (emphasis deleted). And in Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (1898), the Court held that a change in Utah law reducing the size of juries in criminal cases from 12 persons to 8 deprived Thompson of “a substantial right involved in his liberty” and violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id., at 352.
Neither of these decisions, in our view, is consistent with the understanding of the term “ex post facto law” at the time the Constitution was adopted. Nor has their reasoning been followed by this Court since Thompson was decided in 1898. These cases have caused confusion in state and lower federal courts about the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause, as exemplified by the opinions of the District Court and Court of Appeals in this case. See also Murphy v. Kentucky, 465 U. S. 1072, 1073 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certio-rari) (noting “the evident confusion among lower courts concerning the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to changes in rules of evidence and procedure”); United States v. Kowal, 596 F. Supp. 375, 377 (Conn. 1984) (Supreme Court jurisprudence applying ex post facto prohibition to retroactive procedural changes “is not all of one piece”); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 638 (2d ed. 1988) (procedural changes upheld by the Court “can hardly be distinguished in any functional way from those invalidated”).
The earlier decision, Kring v. Missouri, was a capital case with a lengthy procedural history. Kring was charged with first-degree murder, but pursuant to a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. The plea was accepted by the prosecutor and the trial court, and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison. He appealed the judgment, however, on the ground that his plea agreement provided for a sentence of no more than 10 years. The State Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. In the trial court, Kring refused to withdraw his guilty plea to second-degree murder and refused to renew his plea of not guilty to first-degree murder, insisting instead that the acceptance of his earlier plea constituted an acquittal on the greater charge. The trial court, over Kring’s objection, directed a general plea of not guilty to be entered, and upon retrial, he was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.
At the time the crime was committed, Missouri law provided that a defendant’s plea of guilty to second-degree murder, if accepted by the prosecutor and the court, served as an acquittal of the charge of first-degree murder. After the crime, but before Kring made his plea, a new Missouri Constitution abrogated that rule. The State was thus free, as a matter of Missouri law, to retry Kring for first-degree murder after his conviction and the 25-year sentence for second-degree murder were vacated. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the new law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, because it effected only a change in criminal procedure.
This Court reversed by a vote of 5 to 4. As support for the view that Calder did not define an exclusive list of legislative Acts falling within the constitutional prohibition, Justice Miller’s opinion for the Court quoted a jury charge given by Justice Washington sitting in the District Court: “‘[A]n ex post facto law is one which, in its operation, makes that criminal which was not so at the time the action was performed; or which increases the punishment, or, in short, which, in relation to the offence or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.’ ” Kring, supra, at 228-229 (quoting United States v. Hall, supra, at 86) (emphasis in original). Applying that test, the Court concluded that because the new Missouri Constitution denied Kring the benefit of an implied acquittal which the previous law provided, it “altered the situation to his disadvantage,” and his conviction for first-degree murder was void. Kring, supra, at 235-236.
The Court’s departure from Calder’s explanation of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause was, we think, unjustified. The language in the Hall case, heavily relied upon in Kring and repeated in other decisions thereafter, does not support a more expansive definition of ex post facto laws.
In Hall, a vessel owner was sued by the United States for forfeiture of an embargo bond obliging him to deliver certain cargo to Portland, Me. As a legal excuse, the defendant argued that a severe storm had disabled his vessel and forced him to land in Puerto Rico, where he was forced by the Puerto Rican government to sell the cargo. In dicta, Justice Washington hypothesized that, according to the law in effect at the time Hall forfeited the cargo, an “unavoidable accident” was an affirmative defense to a charge of failing to deliver cargo. His jury instruction then explained that a subsequent law imposing an additional requirement for the affirmative defense— that the vessel or cargo actually be lost at sea as a result of the unavoidable accident — would deprive Hall of a defense of his actions available at the time he sold the cargo and thus be an invalid ex post facto law.
This analysis is consistent with the Beazell framework. A law that abolishes an affirmative defense of justification or excuse contravenes Art. I, § 10, because it expands the scope of a criminal prohibition after the act is done. It appears, therefore, that Justice Washington’s reference to laws “relating] to the offence or its consequences,” was simply shorthand for legal changes altering the definition of an offense or increasing a punishment. His jury charge should not be read to mean that the Constitution prohibits retrospective laws, other than those encompassed by the Calder categories, which “alte[r] the situation of a party to his disadvantage.” Nothing in the Hall case supports the broad construction of the ex post facto provision given by the Court in Kring.
It is possible to reconcile Kring with the numerous cases which have held that “procedural” changes do not result in ex post facto violations by saying that the change in Missouri law did take away a “defense” available to the defendant under the old procedure. But this use of the word “defense” carries a meaning quite different from that which appears in the quoted language from Beazell, where the term was linked to the prohibition on alterations in “the legal definition of the offense” or “the nature or amount of the punishment imposed for its commission.” Beazell, 269 U. S., at 169-170. The “defense” available to Kring under earlier Missouri law was not one related to the definition of the crime, but was based on the law regulating the effect of guilty pleas. Missouri had not changed any of the elements of the crime of murder, or the matters which might be pleaded as an excuse or justification for the conduct underlying such a charge; it had changed its law respecting the effect of a guilty plea to a lesser included offense. The holding in Kring can only be justified if the Ex Post Facto Clause is thought to include not merely the Calder categories, but any change which “alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.” We think such a reading of the Clause departs from the meaning of the Clause as it was understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and is not supported by later cases. We accordingly overrule Kring.
The second case, Thompson v. Utah, must be viewed in historical context. Thompson was initially charged with his crime — grand larceny committed by stealing a calf — in 1895, when Utah was a Territory. He was tried by a jury of 12 persons and convicted. A new trial was subsequently granted, however, and in the meantime Utah was admitted into the Union as a State. The Constitution of the State of Utah provided that juries in noncapital cases would consist of 8 persons, not 12, and Thompson was retried and convicted by a panel of 8.
This Court reversed the conviction. It reasoned first that while Utah was a Territory, the Sixth Amendment applied to actions of the territorial government and guaranteed Thompson a right to a 12-person jury. 170 U. S., at 349-350. The Court then held that “the State did not acquire upon its admission into the Union the power to provide, in respect of felonies committed within its limits while it was a Territory, that they should be tried otherwise than by a jury such as is provided by the Constitution of the United States.” Id., at 350-351. Because the State Constitution “deprive[d] him of a substantial right involved in his liberty” and “materially altered] the situation to his disadvantage,” the Court concluded that Thompson’s conviction was prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id., at 352-353.
The result in Thompson v. Utah foreshadowed our decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), which held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury — then believed to mean a jury of 12, see, e. g., Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 288-289 (1930) — was incorporated and made applicable by the Fourteenth Amendment against the States. The Court held that since Utah was a Territory when Thompson’s crime was committed, and therefore obligated to provide a 12-person jury by the Sixth Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause prevented the State from taking away that substantial right from him when it became a State and was no longer bound by the Sixth Amendment as then interpreted. The right to jury trial provided by the Sixth Amendment is obviously a “substantial” one, but it is not a right that has anything to do with the definition of crimes, defenses, or punishments, which is the concern of the Ex Post Facto Clause. To the extent that Thompson v. Utah rested on the Ex Post Facto Clause and not the Sixth Amendment, we overrule it.
The Texas statute allowing reformation of improper verdicts does not punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; nor make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor deprive one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed. Its application to respondent therefore is not prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause of Art. I, § 10.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
In Bogany, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a jury verdict which included a punishment unauthorized by law was void at its inception and had to be set aside. It concluded that Texas law at that time did not give appellate courts authority to reform such verdicts.
Although there has been some debate within the Court about the accuracy of the historical discussion in Calder v. Bull, see Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380, 381 (1829) (note by Johnson, J.), the Court has consistently adhered to the view expressed by Justices Chase, Paterson, and Iredell in Calder that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to penal statutes.
The Beazell definition omits the reference by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798), to alterations in the “legal rules of evidence.” See also Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 590 (1884) (approving procedural changes “leaving untouched the nature of the crime and the amount or degree of proof essential to conviction”). As cases subsequent to Calder make clear, this language was not intended to prohibit the application of new evidentiary rules in trials for crimes committed before the changes. Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 386-387 (1898) (rejecting e.r post facto challenge to retroactive application of statute making admissible handwritten documents as handwriting exemplars): Hopt, supra, at 588-590 (upholding retroactive application of statute making felons competent to testify).
The Court’s holding in Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (1898), that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury panel of 12 persons is also obsolete. Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers gives a prisoner incarcerated in one State the right to demand the speedy disposition of “any untried indictment, information or complaint” that is the basis of a detainer lodged against him by another State. These cases present the issue whether Art. Ill applies to detainers based on probation-violation charges.
I
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement) is a compact among 48 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the United States. The Agreement was drafted in 1956 by the Council of State Governments and was adopted in 1958 by the State of New Jersey, where it is now codified as N. J. Stat. Ann. §2A:159A-1 et seq. (West 1971). The Agreement is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §10, cl. 3, and thus is a federal law subject to federal construction. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 438-442 (1981).
A detainer is a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent. See id., at 436, n. 3 (citing and quoting H. R. Rep. No. 91-1018, p. 2 (1970), and S. Rep. No. 91-1356, p. 2 (1970)); United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S. 340, 359 (1978); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78, 80-81, n. 2 (1976); Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957, p. 74 (1956). Detainers generally are based on outstanding criminal charges, outstanding parole- or probation-violation charges, or additional sentences already imposed against the prisoner. See Dauber, Reforming the Detainer System: A Case Study, 7 Crim. L. Bull. 669, 676 (1971). See generally L. Abramson, Criminal Detainers (1979).
The Agreement is based on a legislative finding that “charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.” Art. I. As has been explained:
“The inmate who has a detainer against him is filled with anxiety and apprehension and frequently does not respond to a training program. He often must be kept in close custody, which bars him from treatment such as trusty ships, moderations of custody and opportunity for transfer to farms and work camps. In many jurisdictions he is not eligible for parole; there is little hope for his release after an optimum period of training and treatment, when he is ready for return to society with an excellent possibility that he will not offend again. Instead, he often becomes embittered with continued institutionalization and the objective of the correctional system is defeated.” Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957, p. 74 (1956).
See also Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S., at 449; United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S., at 353, 356, 359-360. Accordingly, the purpose of the Agreement is “to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding] charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints.” Art. I.
To achieve this purpose, Art. Ill of the Agreement establishes a procedure by which a prisoner incarcerated in one party State (the sending State) may demand the speedy disposition of “any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner” by another party State (the receiving State). Specifically, Art. Ill requires the warden to inform the prisoner that a detainer has been lodged against him and that he may request final disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint upon which the detainer is based. If the prisoner makes such a request, the warden must forward it, together with a certificate providing certain information about the prisoner’s terms of confinement, to the appropriate prosecuting official and court of the receiving State. The authorities in the receiving State then must bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days, absent good cause shown, or the court must dismiss the indictment, information, or complaint with prejudice, and the detainer will cease to be of any force or effect.
II
On June 21, 1976, respondent Richard Nash, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, pleaded guilty to charges of breaking and entering with intent to rape, and of assault with intent to rape. On October 29, the Superior Court sentenced respondent to 18 months in prison on each count, with the sentences to run consecutively. The court suspended two years of the sentences and imposed a 2-year term of probation to follow respondent’s imprisonment. On June 13, 1978, while on probation, respondent was arrested in Montgomery County, Pa., and charged with burglary, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and loitering. Respondent was tried and convicted on the Pennsylvania charges on March 14, 1979, and was sentenced on July 13 of that year.
While respondent was awaiting trial in Pennsylvania, the Mercer County Probation Department, on June 21, 1978, notified the Superior Court that respondent had violated his probation by committing offenses in Pennsylvania. At the Department’s request, the Superior Court issued a bench warrant for respondent’s arrest. The warrant was lodged as a detainer with the appropriate corrections officials in Pennsylvania.
Beginning on April 13, 1979, respondent sent a series of letters to New Jersey officials requesting final disposition of the probation-violation charge. The State of New Jersey failed to bring respondent “to trial” on the probation-violation charge within 180 days after Art. Ill was invoked.
On March 6, 1980, respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania seeking dismissal of the probation-violation charge on the basis of the State’s noncompliance with Art. III. The case was transferred, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1406(a), to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 84-776, p. 101. That court stayed respondent’s federal action pending exhaustion of state-court remedies. Id., at 81.
Respondent then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in New Jersey Superior Court. The Superior Court denied respondent’s motion to dismiss the probation-violation charge, ruled that respondent’s Pennsylvania convictions constituted a probation violation, and ordered respondent to serve the two consecutive 18-month sentences on his New Jersey convictions, with credit for 249 days respondent had served in 1976 and 1977. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment, id., at 44, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification. Id., at 43.
Respondent then returned to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. On March 21, 1983, the District Court granted the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, vacated respondent’s probation revocation, and ordered his release from state custody. 558 F. Supp. 641 (1983). Petitioner Philip S. Carchman, the Mercer County prosecutor, took an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Petitioner State of New Jersey, Department of Corrections, at this point sought to intervene because the District Court’s decision invalidated its policy that parole- and probation-violation detainers do not fall within Art. Ill of the Agreement. Its motion to intervene was granted by the Court of Appeals. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 84-776, p. 18.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that an outstanding probation-violation charge is an “untried indictment, information or complaint” within the meaning of Art. Ill of the Agreement. Nash v. Jeffes, 739 F. 2d 878 (1984). In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals “decline[d] to adopt a technical interpretation of the relevant language of Article III,” id., at 883, and instead relied on “the broader purposes of the legislation.” Id., at 882. The court reasoned that a principal purpose of Art. Ill is to enable prisoners to obtain prompt disposition of the charges underlying detainers in order to protect them from the adverse consequences that detainers have on their treatment and rehabilitation, and that this purpose would be furthered by applying Art. Ill to detainers based on probation-violation charges. The Court of Appeals completed its “policy analysis,” id., at 883, n. 9, by concluding that the benefit to prisoners of applying Art. Ill to probation-violation detainers would outweigh the administrative burdens, including additional paperwork and the cost of transporting prisoners in order to provide them with probation-revocation hearings.
In view of the conflict, see n. 3, supra, we granted certio-rari. 469 U. S. 1157 (1985).
Ill
A
We begin by considering the language of the Agreement. Article III by its terms applies to detainers based on “any untried indictment, information or complaint.” The most natural interpretation of the words “indictment,” “information,” and “complaint” is that they refer to documents charging an individual with having committed a criminal offense. See Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (complaint) and 7 (indictment and information). This interpretation is reinforced by the adjective “untried,” which would seem to refer to matters that can be brought to full trial, and by Art. Ill's requirement that a prisoner who requests final disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint “shall be brought to trial within 180 days.” (Emphasis added.)
The language of Art. V also indicates that Art. Ill should be interpreted to apply solely to criminal charges. Article V(a) provides: “In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate authority in a sending State shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the State where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had.” (Emphasis added.) Article V(c) provides that “in the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, Art. V(d) provides: “The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in 1 or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction.” (Emphasis added.)
The language of the Agreement therefore makes clear that the phrase “untried indictment, information or complaint” in Art. Ill refers to criminal charges pending against a prisoner. A probation-violation charge, which does not accuse an individual with having committed a criminal offense in the sense of initiating a prosecution, thus does not come within the terms of Art. III. Although the probation-violation charge might be based on the commission of a criminal offense, it does not result in the probationer’s being “prosecuted” or “brought to trial” for that offense. Indeed, in the context of the Agreement, the probation-violation charge generally will be based on the criminal offense for which the probationer already was tried and convicted and is serving his sentence in the sending State.
Nor, of course, will the probationer be “prosecuted” or “brought to trial” on the criminal offense for which he initially was sentenced to probation, since he already will have been tried and convicted for that offense. Instead, the probation-violation charge results in a probation-revocation hearing, a proceeding to determine whether the conditions of probation should be modified or the probationer should be re-sentenced, at which the probationer is entitled to less than the full panoply of due process rights accorded a defendant at a criminal trial. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973). Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972) (parole-revocation hearing).
Respondent contends that Art. Ill applies to more than just criminal charges, relying principally on the language of Art. I, which provides: “The party States find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.” (Emphasis added.) According to respondent, this language indicates that the drafters intended the Agreement to apply, literally, to all “charges outstanding against a prisoner,” including a probation-violation charge. However, when this language, which appears in the legislative declaration of purpose, is read in the context of the operative language of Arts. Ill and V discussed above, it is clear that the drafters meant the term “charges” to refer to criminal charges.
We therefore conclude from the language of the Agreement that a detainer based on a probation-violation charge is not a detainer based on “any untried indictment, information or complaint,” within the meaning of Art. III.
B
The legislative history of the Agreement does not persuade us to depart from what appears to be the plain language of the Agreement. Respondent relies principally on the following passage from comments made by the Council of State Governments, which drafted the Agreement:
“A detainer may be defined as a warrant filed against a person already in custody with the purpose of insuring that he will be available to the authority which has placed the detainer. Wardens of institutions holding men who have detainers on them invariably recognize these warrants and notify the authorities placing them of the impending release of the prisoner. Such detainers may be placed by various authorities under varying conditions, for example, when an escaped prisoner or a parolee commits a new crime and is imprisoned in another state; or where a man not previously imprisoned commits a series of crimes in different jurisdictions.” Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957, p. 74 (emphasis added).
This passage is the introductory paragraph of the Council’s discussion of the suggested legislation. It was intended to provide a general definition of detainers and a brief description of how they might arise. The italicized passage suggests that some detainers arise from parole-violation charges, a fact not in dispute here. By its terms, however, Art. Ill does not apply to all detainers, but only to those based on “any untried indictment, information or complaint.” The above passage does not illuminate, or purport to illuminate, the scope of this phrase.
Indeed, if the above passage were interpreted to define the scope of Art. Ill, it would lead to the conclusion that Art. Ill applies to paro le- violation detainers. This conclusion is difficult to reconcile with the procedures established by the Agreement. In particular, the prisoner invokes Art. Ill by “caus[ing] to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint.” (Emphasis added.) This notification mechanism is efficacious in the case of criminal-charge detainers, but not in the case of parole-violation detainers, because prosecutors and judges generally are not involved in parole-revocation proceedings. If the drafters of the Agreement had intended Art. Ill to apply to parole-violation de-tainers, they likely would have devised a more appropriate notification mechanism. Furthermore, Art. 111(d) provides that if the prisoner is returned to the original place of imprisonment without being tried on any indictment, information, or complaint, “the court shall enter an order dismissing the [indictment, information, or complaint] with prejudice.” Similarly, Art. V(c) provides that if the prisoner is not brought to trial within the period provided in Art. Ill, “the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.” (Emphasis added.) It is difficult to understand how these provisions would apply in the context of parole-violation charges, which generally are issued and adjudicated by a parole board or similar administrative agency, and are not “pending” in any court.
We therefore conclude that the reference to parolees in the comments of the Council of State Governments does not support the inference that in drafting the Agreement the Council intended the scope of Art. Ill to include detainers based on parole- or probation-violation charges.
In contrast to the legislative history created by the Council of State Governments, which does not directly address the precise issue in this case, the congressional legislative history indicates that Congress, which adopted the Agreement in 1970, see Pub. L. 91-538, 84 Stat. 1397, considered the Agreement to apply only to detainers based on untried criminal charges. The Court noted in United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S., at 359, and in Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S., at 436, n. 3, that the House and Senate Reports on the Agreement explain: “A detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-1018, p. 2 (1970); S. Rep. No. 91-1356, p. 2 (1970) (emphasis added). The congressional Reports also contain references to the prisoner’s being “convicted on the new charges.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-1018, at 2; S. Rep. No. 91-1356, at 2. In addition, Senator Hruska stated in the congressional debates on the Agreement: “At the heart of this measure is the proposition that a person should be entitled to have criminal charges pending against him determined in expeditious fashion.” 116 Cong. Rec. 38840 (1970) (emphasis added).
C
As noted, the Court of Appeals said its decision was based not on “a technical interpretation of the relevant language of Art. Ill,” 739 F. 2d, at 883, nor on any statements in the legislative history addressing the specific issue in this case, but rather on “the broader purposes of the legislation,” id., at 882. We do not find that these purposes compel the conclusion that, contrary to the plain language of the Agreement, Art. Ill was intended to apply to probation-violation detainers.
Adoption of the Agreement was motivated in part by a practice of filing detainers based on untried criminal charges that had little basis. These detainers often would be withdrawn shortly before the prisoner was released. Even though unsubstantiated, the detainers would have a detrimental effect on the prisoner’s treatment. Article III enables a prisoner to require the State lodging the detainer either to drop the charge and resulting detainer or to bring the prisoner to trial. In this way, the prisoner can clear his record of detainers based on unsubstantiated charges.
A probation-violation detainer, however, generally, as in the present case, will be based on the prisoner’s commission of the crimes that resulted in his conviction and incarceration in the sending State. Because the convictions conclusively establish the probation violation, see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S., at 490 (parole revocation hearing), the probation-violation charge will not be unsubstantiated. Thus, the abuses that in part motivated adoption of the Agreement generally do not occur in the context of probation-violation detainers.
The Agreement generally seeks “to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding] charges,” as well as the prompt “determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, infor-mations or complaints,” in order to eliminate “uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.” Art. I. The uncertainties associated with probation-violation detainers, however, are less severe than the uncertainties associated with criminal-charge detainers. See Dauber, Reforming the Detainer System: A Case Study, 7 Crim. L. Bull. 669, 680 (1971) (parole- and probation-violation detainers involve less uncertainty than criminal-charge de-tainers). As noted above, in general the factual issue of guilt of the probation violation is conclusively established by the convictions leading to incarceration in the sending State. Disposition of the probation-violation charge underlying a de-tainer therefore often will result in probation being revoked and in the probationer’s being resentenced to imprisonment in the receiving State. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S., at 89 (parole violation); L. Abramson, Criminal Detainers 64-65, 81 (1979). The ultimate consequence is that the detainer based on the probation-violation charge merely will be replaced by a detainer based on the reimposed sentence, with similar adverse effects on the prisoner’s treatment and rehabilitation. See Dauber, swpra, at 678-679. Since the probation revocation is based on commission of a crime serious enough to warrant incarceration in the sending State, the probationer no doubt often, as in the present case, will be sentenced to serve the full term of his suspended sentence. Thus, the uncertainties in the underlying charge, in the likelihood of the prisoner’s receiving an additional sentence, and in the length of incarceration generally are less in the case of probation-violation detainers than in the case of criminal-charge detainers. Moreover, because the prisoner may not relitigate the factual issue of guilt of the probation-violation charge when it is established by a conviction in the sending State, see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S., at 490, the “most serious,” see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 532 (1972), of the interests of the accused in obtaining a speedy disposition of outstanding criminal charges —the interest in “ ‘limiting] the possibilities that long delay will impair [his] ability ... to defend himself/” Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374, 378 (1969), quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 120 (1966)—is unlikely to be strongly implicated in the probation-violation detainer context.
Indeed, it often may be desirable to delay rather than to expedite disposition of the probation-violation charge. As the Court explained in Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78 (1976), in the context of parole violations:
“[I]n cases such as this, in which the parolee admits or has been convicted of an offense plainly constituting a parole violation, the only remaining inquiry is whether continued release is justified notwithstanding the violation. This is uniquely a ‘prediction as to the ability of the individual to live in society without committing antisocial acts.’ Morrissey, supra, at 480. In making this prophecy, a parolee’s institutional record can be perhaps one of the most significant factors. Forcing decision immediately after imprisonment would not only deprive the parole authority of this vital information, but since the other most salient factor would be the parolee’s recent convictions, ... a decision to revoke parole would often be foreordained. Given the predictive nature of the hearing, it is appropriate that such hearing be held at the time at which prediction is both most relevant and most accurate — at the expiration of the parolee’s intervening sentence.” Id., at 89.
Of course, the decision whether to request expeditious disposition lies with the prisoner, and there are circumstances under which the prisoner may have a legitimate interest in obtaining prompt disposition of a probation-violation charge underlying a detainer. For example, the prisoner may believe that he can present mitigating evidence that will lead to a decision not to revoke probation. Alternatively, he may hope for the imposition of a concurrent sentence. Finally, he simply may prefer the certainty of a known sentence to the relative uncertainty of a pending probation-violation charge.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, the purposes of the Agreement are significantly less advanced by application of Art. Ill to probation-violation detainers than by application of Art. Ill to criminal-charge detainers. Whether those purposes would be advanced sufficiently by application of Art. Ill to probation-violation detainers to outweigh the administrative costs, and, more generally, whether the procedures of Art. Ill are the most appropriate means of disposing of probation-violation detainers, are questions of legislative judgment that we must leave to the parties to the Agreement. Given the plain language of the Agreement and the relevant legislative history, we cannot conclude on the basis of the stated purposes of the Agreement alone that the parties to the Agreement intended Art. Ill to apply to probation-violation detainers. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Article 111(a) provides in pertinent part:
“Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party State, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party State any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint: provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.”
The District Court ruled that respondent’s letters requesting disposition of the detainer were sufficient to invoke Art. Ill, even though they did not strictly comply with Art. Ill’s request procedures. The Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling. We assume, without deciding, that this ruling on the issue whether respondent complied with the procedures of Art. Ill is correct.
This holding conflicts with rulings of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and of four state courts of last resort. See United States v. Roach, 745 F. 2d 1252 (CA9 1984); Padilla v. State, 279 Ark. 100, 648 S. W. 2d 797 (1983); Suggs v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 242, 215 S. E. 2d 246 (1975); Clipper v. State, 295 Md. 303, 455 A. 2d 973 (1983); State v. Knowles, 275 S. C. 312, 270 S. E. 2d 133 (1980). It also conflicts with rulings of several intermediate state appellate courts. See, e. g., People v. Jackson, 626 P. 2d 723 (Colo. App. 1981); People ex rel. Capalongo v. Howard, 87 App. Div. 2d 242, 453 N. Y. S. 2d 45 (1982); Blackwell v. State, 546 S. W. 2d 828 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976). See Nash v. Jeffes, 739 F. 2d 878, 881, n. 4 (CA3 1984) (citing cases involving parole- and probation-violation detainers).
Even if the term “charges” in Art. I were interpreted to refer to all charges, under normal rules of statutory construction the specific language of Art. Ill would control over the general language of Art. I.
For example, Art. Ill clearly does not apply to a detainer based on an additional sentence already imposed against the prisoner.
One commentator has noted:
“Since the legal basis for a detainer is rarely examined, a prisoner can suffer loss of privileges and parole because of a charge for which there is not sufficient proof to obtain an indictment. Undoubtedly, detainers are sometimes used by prosecutors to exact punishment without having to try a charge which they feel would not result in a conviction.” Note, Detain-ers and the Correctional Process, 1966 Wash. U. L. Q. 417, 423 (footnote omitted).
See also United States v. Mauro, 436 U. S. 340, 358, and n. 25 (1978) (noting that, because of the informality of the detainer system, detainers may be filed groundlessly or even in bad faith). The congressional Reports note that the Agreement provides the prisoner “with a procedure for bringing about a prompt test of the substantiality of detainers placed against him by other jurisdictions.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-1018, p. 2 (1970); S. Rep. No. 91-1356, p. 2 (1970).
According to the congressional Reports, “a majority of detainers filed by States are withdrawn near the conclusion of the Federal sentence.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-1018, at 3; S. Rep. No. 91-1356, at 3.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has described these effects as follows:
“[T]he inmate is (1) deprived of an opportunity to obtain a sentence to run concurrently with the sentence being served at the time the detainer is filed; (2) classified as a maximum or close custody risk; (3) ineligible for initial assignments to less than maximum security prisons (i. e., honor farms or forestry camp work); (4) ineligible for trustee [sic] status; (5) not allowed to live in preferred living quarters such as dormitories; (6) ineligible for study-release programs or work-release programs; (7) ineligible to be transferred to preferred medium or minimum custody institutions within the correctional system, which includes the removal of any possibility of transfer to an institution more appropriate for youthful offenders; (8) not entitled to preferred prison jobs which carry higher wages and entitle [him] to additional good time credits against [his] sentence; (9) inhibited by the denial of possibility of parole or any commutation of his sentence; (10) caused anxiety and thus hindered in the overall rehabilitation process since he cannot take maximum advantage of his institutional opportunities.” Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F. 2d 308, 314, n. 10 (1973).
See Brief for University of Virginia School of Law Post-Conviction Assistance Project as Amicus Curiae 30-31 (“[I]n most eases the conviction for which the prisoner is serving a sentence will be conclusive proof of the violation”). Although a probation-violation detainer initially might be based on an arrest, the probationer cannot invoke Art. Ill until he “has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party State” — that is, until he has been convicted of the offense in the sending State and commenced to serve his sentence there.
The Court of Appeals suggested that the Agreement serves “to vindicate a prisoner’s constitutional right to a speedy trial,” 739 F. 2d, at 883, but noted that this purpose is “not usually relevant when probation violations are involved.” Id., at 882. Some 13 years after the Agreement was drafted, this Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial entitles a prisoner in a federal penitentiary who is subject to pending state criminal charges to have the State, upon demand, make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him to trial within a reasonable time. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374 (1969). The congressional Reports discuss Smith v. Hooey and explain that enactment of the Agreement by Congress “would afford defendants in criminal cases the right to a speedy trial and diminish the possibility of convictions being vacated or reversed because of a denial of this right.” S. Rep. No. 91-1356, at 2. See also H. R. Rep. No. 91-1018, at 1-2; 116 Cong. Rec. 14000 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff); id., at 38840 (remarks of Sen. Hruska). Thus, Congress, at least, enacted the Agreement in part to vindicate a prisoner’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. This Court has never held, however, that a prisoner subject to a probation-violation .detainer has a constitutional right to a speedy probation-revocation hearing. Cf. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78 (1976) (a prisoner in a federal penitentiary who is subject to a federal parole-violation detainer is not constitutionally entitled to a prompt parole-revocation hearing). Thus, as the Court of Appeals suggested, it is not clear that the purpose of vindicating a prisoner’s constitutional right to a speedy trial is applicable at all in the context of probation-violation detainers.
We note that some commentators have recommended, in light of the differences between probation-violation charges and criminal charges, that procedures different from those of Art. Ill be adopted for resolving probation-violation charges underlying detainers. See, e. g., L. Abramson, Criminal Detainers 81-83 (1979); Dauber, Reforming the Detainer System: A Case Study, 7 Crim. L. Bull. 669, 704-706 (1971).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The Court of Appeals of Franklin County, Ohio, in an unreported opinion, affirmed appellant’s conviction of violating Columbus City Code § 2327.03, which provides: “No person shall abuse another by using menacing, insulting, slanderous, or profane language.” The Ohio Supreme Court, in an unreported order, sua sponte dismissed appellant’s appeal to that court “for the reason that no substantial constitutional question exists herein.” We grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and reverse.
On December 11, 1972, we held that Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972), required the reversal of a previous action of the Ohio Supreme Court that dismissed an appeal from a conviction under § 2327.03. Cason v. City of Columbus, 409 U. S. 1053. Section 2327.03 punishes only spoken words and, as construed by the Ohio courts, is facially unconstitutional because not limited in application “to punish only unprotected speech” but is “susceptible of application to protected expression.” Gooding v. Wilson, supra, at 522. In that circumstance, the Ohio Supreme Court erred when it found no constitutional infirmity in the holding of the Court of Appeals of Franklin County that the ordinance might constitutionally reach appellant’s conduct because “the words as used by the [appellant] are in the nature of ‘fighting words’ and thereby fall within that limit of conduct proscribed by the ordinance . . . For “ ‘[although [the ordinance] may be neither vague, overbroad, nor otherwise invalid as applied to the conduct charged against a particular defendant, he is permitted to raise its vagueness or unconstitutional over-breadth as applied to others. And if the law is found deficient in one of these respects, it may not be applied to him either, until and unless a satisfactory limiting construction is placed on the [ordinance]. The [ordinance], in effect, is stricken down on its face. . . .’” Id., at 521.
Reversed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | C | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for further consideration in light of Johnson v. Jones, ante, p. 304.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice SCALIAdelivered the opinion of the Court.
The Clean Air Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants from power plants if the Agency finds regulation "appropriate and necessary." We must decide whether it was reasonable for EPA to refuse to consider cost when making this finding.
I
The Clean Air Act establishes a series of regulatory programs to control air pollution from stationary sources (such as refineries and factories) and moving sources (such as cars and airplanes). 69 Stat. 322, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q. One of these is the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Program-the hazardous-air-pollutants program, for short. Established in its current form by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 104 Stat. 2531, this program targets for regulation stationary-source emissions of more than 180 specified "hazardous air pollutants." § 7412(b).
For stationary sources in general, the applicability of the program depends in part on how much pollution the source emits. A source that emits more than 10 tons of a single pollutant or more than 25 tons of a combination of pollutants per year is called a major source. § 7412(a)(1). EPA is required to regulate all major sources under the program. § 7412(c)(1)-(2). A source whose emissions do not cross the just-mentioned thresholds is called an area source. § 7412(a)(2). The Agency is required to regulate an area source under the program if it "presents a threat of adverse effects to human health or the environment ... warranting regulation." § 7412(c)(3).
At the same time, Congress established a unique procedure to determine the applicability of the program to fossil-fuel-fired power plants. The Act refers to these plants as electric utility steam generating units, but we will simply call them power plants. Quite apart from the hazardous-air-pollutants program, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 subjected power plants to various regulatory requirements. The parties agree that these requirements were expected to have the collateral effect of reducing power plants' emissions of hazardous air pollutants, although the extent of the reduction was unclear. Congress directed the Agency to "perform a study of the hazards to public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by [power plants] of [hazardous air pollutants] after imposition of the requirements of this chapter." § 7412(n)(1)(A). If the Agency "finds ... regulation is appropriate and necessary after considering the results of the study," it "shall regulate [power plants] under [§ 7412]." Ibid.EPA has interpreted the Act to mean that power plants become subject to regulation on the same terms as ordinary major and area sources, see 77 Fed.Reg. 9330 (2012), and we assume without deciding that it was correct to do so.
And what are those terms? EPA must first divide sources covered by the program into categories and subcategories in accordance with statutory criteria. § 7412(c)(1). For each category or subcategory, the Agency must promulgate certain minimum emission regulations, known as floor standards. § 7412(d)(1), (3). The statute generally calibrates the floor standards to reflect the emissions limitations already achieved by the best-performing 12% of sources within the category or subcategory. § 7412(d)(3). In some circumstances, the Agency may also impose more stringent emission regulations, known as beyond-the-floor standards. The statute expressly requires the Agency to consider cost (alongside other specified factors) when imposing beyond-the-floor standards. § 7412(d)(2).
EPA completed the study required by § 7412(n)(1)(A)in 1998, 65 Fed.Reg. 79826 (2000), and concluded that regulation of coal- and oil-fired power plants was "appropriate and necessary" in 2000, id.,at 79830. In 2012, it reaffirmed the appropriate-and-necessary finding, divided power plants into subcategories, and promulgated floor standards. The Agency found regulation "appropriate" because (1) power plants' emissions of mercury and other hazardous air pollutants posed risks to human health and the environment and (2) controls were available to reduce these emissions. 77 Fed.Reg. 9363. It found regulation "necessary" because the imposition of the Act's other requirements did not eliminate these risks. Ibid.EPA concluded that "costs should not be considered" when deciding whether power plants should be regulated under § 7412. Id.,at 9326.
In accordance with Executive Order, the Agency issued a "Regulatory Impact Analysis" alongside its regulation. This analysis estimated that the regulation would force power plants to bear costs of $9.6 billion per year. Id.,at 9306. The Agency could not fully quantify the benefits of reducing power plants' emissions of hazardous air pollutants; to the extent it could, it estimated that these benefits were worth $4 to $6 million per year.Ibid.The costs to power plants were thus between 1,600 and 2,400 times as great as the quantifiable benefits from reduced emissions of hazardous air pollutants. The Agency continued that its regulations would have ancillary benefits-including cutting power plants' emissions of particulate matter and sulfur dioxide, substances that are not covered by the hazardous-air-pollutants program. Although the Agency's appropriate-and-necessary finding did not rest on these ancillary effects, id.,at 9320, the regulatory impact analysis took them into account, increasing the Agency's estimate of the quantifiable benefits of its regulation to $37 to $90 billion per year, id.,at 9306. EPA concedes that the regulatory impact analysis "played no role" in its appropriate-and-necessary finding. Brief for Federal Respondents 14.
Petitioners (who include 23 States) sought review of EPA's rule in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. As relevant here, they challenged the Agency's refusal to consider cost when deciding whether to regulate power plants. The Court of Appeals upheld the Agency's decision not to consider cost, with Judge Kavanaugh concurring in part and dissenting in part. White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA,748 F.3d 1222 (2014)(per curiam). We granted certiorari. 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 702, 703, 190 L.Ed.2d 434 (2014).
II
Federal administrative agencies are required to engage in "reasoned decisionmaking." Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB,522 U.S. 359, 374, 118 S.Ct. 818, 139 L.Ed.2d 797 (1998)(internal quotation marks omitted). "Not only must an agency's decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the process by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational." Ibid.It follows that agency action is lawful only if it rests "on a consideration of the relevant factors." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)(internal quotation marks omitted).
EPA's decision to regulate power plants under § 7412allowed the Agency to reduce power plants' emissions of hazardous air pollutants and thus to improve public health and the environment. But the decision also ultimately cost power plants, according to the Agency's own estimate, nearly $10 billion a year. EPA refused to consider whether the costs of its decision outweighed the benefits. The Agency gave cost no thought at all,because it considered cost irrelevant to its initial decision to regulate.
EPA's disregard of cost rested on its interpretation of § 7412(n)(1)(A), which, to repeat, directs the Agency to regulate power plants if it "finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary." The Agency accepts that it couldhave interpreted this provision to mean that cost is relevant to the decision to add power plants to the program. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. But it chose to read the statute to mean that cost makes no difference to the initial decision to regulate. See 76 Fed.Reg. 24988 (2011)("We further interpret the term 'appropriate' to not allow for the consideration of costs"); 77 Fed.Reg. 9327("Cost does not have to be read into the definition of 'appropriate' ").
We review this interpretation under the standard set out in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Chevrondirects courts to accept an agency's reasonable resolution of an ambiguity in a statute that the agency administers.Id.,at 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Even under this deferential standard, however, "agencies must operate within the bounds of reasonable interpretation." Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 2442, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014)(internal quotation marks omitted). EPA strayed far beyond those bounds when it read § 7412(n)(1)to mean that it could ignore cost when deciding whether to regulate power plants.
A
The Clean Air Act treats power plants differently from other sources for purposes of the hazardous-air-pollutants program. Elsewhere in § 7412, Congress established cabined criteria for EPA to apply when deciding whether to include sources in the program. It required the Agency to regulate sources whose emissions exceed specified numerical thresholds (major sources). It also required the Agency to regulate sources whose emissions fall short of these thresholds (area sources) if they "presen[t] a threat of adverse effects to human health or the environment ... warranting regulation." § 7412(c)(3). In stark contrast, Congress instructed EPA to add power plants to the program if (but only if) the Agency finds regulation "appropriate and necessary." § 7412(n)(1)(A). One does not need to open up a dictionary in order to realize the capaciousness of this phrase. In particular, "appropriate" is "the classic broad and all-encompassing term that naturally and traditionally includes consideration of all the relevant factors." 748 F.3d, at 1266(opinion of Kavanaugh, J.). Although this term leaves agencies with flexibility, an agency may not "entirely fai[l] to consider an important aspect of the problem" when deciding whether regulation is appropriate. State Farm, supra,at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856.
Read naturally in the present context, the phrase "appropriate and necessary" requires at least some attention to cost. One would not say that it is even rational, never mind "appropriate," to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits. In addition, "cost" includes more than the expense of complying with regulations; any disadvantage could be termed a cost. EPA's interpretation precludes the Agency from considering anytype of cost-including, for instance, harms that regulation might do to human health or the environment. The Government concedes that if the Agency were to find that emissions from power plants do damage to human health, but that the technologies needed to eliminate these emissions do even more damage to human health, it would stilldeem regulation appropriate. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 70. No regulation is "appropriate" if it does significantly more harm than good.
There are undoubtedly settings in which the phrase "appropriate and necessary" does not encompass cost. But this is not one of them. Section 7412(n)(1)(A)directs EPA to determine whether "regulationis appropriate and necessary." (Emphasis added.) Agencies have long treated cost as a centrally relevant factor when deciding whether to regulate. Consideration of cost reflects the understanding that reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the advantages andthe disadvantages of agency decisions. It also reflects the reality that "too much wasteful expenditure devoted to one problem may well mean considerably fewer resources available to deal effectively with other (perhaps more serious) problems." Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,556 U.S. 208, 233, 129 S.Ct. 1498, 173 L.Ed.2d 369 (2009)(BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Against the backdrop of this established administrative practice, it is unreasonable to read an instruction to an administrative agency to determine whether "regulation is appropriate and necessary" as an invitation to ignore cost.
Statutory context reinforces the relevance of cost. The procedures governing power plants that we consider today appear in § 7412(n)(1), which bears the caption "Electric utility steam generating units." In subparagraph (A), the part of the law that has occupied our attention so far, Congress required EPA to study the hazards to public health posed by power plants and to determine whether regulation is appropriate and necessary. But in subparagraphs (B) and (C), Congress called for two additional studies. One of them, a study into mercury emissions from power plants and other sources, must consider "the health and environmental effects of such emissions, technologies which are available to control such emissions, and the costs of such technologies." § 7412(n)(1)(B)(emphasis added). This directive to EPA to study cost is a further indication of the relevance of cost to the decision to regulate.
In an effort to minimize this express reference to cost, EPA now argues that § 7412(n)(1)(A)requires it to consider only the study mandated by that provision, not the separate mercury study, before deciding whether to regulate power plants. But when adopting the regulations before us, the Agency insisted that the provisions concerning all three studies "provide a framework for [EPA's] determination of whether to regulate [power plants]." 76 Fed.Reg. 24987. It therefore decided "to interpret the scope of the appropriate and necessary finding in the context of all three studies." 77 Fed.Reg. 9325(emphasis added). For example:
• EPA considered environmental effects relevant to the appropriate-and-necessary finding. It deemed the mercury study's reference to this factor "direct evidence that Congress was concerned with environmental effects." 76 Fed.Reg. 24987.
• EPA considered availability of controls relevant to the appropriate-and-necessary finding. It thought that doing so was "consistent with" the mercury study's reference to availability of controls. Id., at 24989.
• EPA concluded that regulation of power plants would be appropriate and necessary even if a single pollutant emitted by them posed a hazard to health or the environment. It believed that "Congress' focus" on a single pollutant in the mercury study "support[ed]" this interpretation. Ibid.
EPA has not explained why § 7412(n)(1)(B)'s reference to "environmental effects ... and ... costs" provides "direct evidence that Congress was concerned with environmental effects," but not "direct evidence" that it was concerned with cost. Chevronallows agencies to choose among competing reasonable interpretations of a statute; it does not license interpretive gerrymanders under which an agency keeps parts of statutory context it likes while throwing away parts it does not.
B
EPA identifies a handful of reasons to interpret § 7412(n)(1)(A)to mean that cost is irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate. We find those reasons unpersuasive.
EPA points out that other parts of the Clean Air Act expressly mention cost, while § 7412(n)(1)(A)does not. But this observation shows only that § 7412(n)(1)(A)'s broad reference to appropriateness encompasses multiple relevant factors (which include but are not limited to cost); other provisions' specific references to cost encompass just cost. It is unreasonable to infer that, by expressly making cost relevant to other decisions, the Act implicitly makes cost irrelevant to the appropriateness of regulating power plants. (By way of analogy, the Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Clause requires searches to be "[r]easonable," while its Warrant Clause requires warrants to be supported by "probable cause." Nobody would argue that, by expressly making level of suspicion relevant to the validity of a warrant, the Fourth Amendment implicitly makes level of suspicion categorically irrelevantto the reasonableness of a search. To the contrary, all would agree that the expansive word "reasonable" encompasses degree of suspicion alongside other relevant circumstances.) Other parts of the Clean Air Act also expressly mention environmental effects, while § 7412(n)(1)(A)does not. Yet that did not stop EPA from deeming environmental effects relevant to the appropriateness of regulating power plants.
Along similar lines, EPA seeks support in this Court's decision in Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.,531 U.S. 457, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001). There, the Court addressed a provision of the Clean Air Act requiring EPA to set ambient air quality standards at levels "requisite to protect the public health" with an "adequate margin of safety." 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b). Read naturally, that discrete criterion does not encompass cost; it encompasses health and safety. The Court refused to read that provision as carrying with it an implicit authorization to consider cost, in part because authority to consider cost had "elsewhere, and so often, been expressly granted." 531 U.S., at 467, 121 S.Ct. 903. American Truckingthus establishes the modest principle that where the Clean Air Act expressly directs EPA to regulate on the basis of a factor that on its face does not include cost, the Act normally should not be read as implicitly allowing the Agency to consider cost anyway. That principle has no application here. "Appropriate and necessary" is a far more comprehensive criterion than "requisite to protect the public health"; read fairly and in context, as we have explained, the term plainly subsumes consideration of cost.
Turning to the mechanics of the hazardous-air-pollutants program, EPA argues that it need not consider cost when first deciding whetherto regulate power plants because it can consider cost later when deciding how muchto regulate them. The question before us, however, is the meaning of the "appropriate and necessary" standard that governs the initial decision to regulate. And as we have discussed, context establishes that this expansive standard encompasses cost. Cost may become relevant again at a later stage of the regulatory process, but that possibility does not establish its irrelevance at thisstage. In addition, once the Agency decides to regulate power plants, it must promulgate certain minimum or floor standards no matter the cost (here, nearly $10 billion a year); the Agency may consider cost only when imposing regulations beyondthese minimum standards. By EPA's logic, someone could decide whether it is "appropriate" to buy a Ferrari without thinking about cost, because he plans to think about cost later when deciding whether to upgrade the sound system.
EPA argues that the Clean Air Act makes cost irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate sources other than power plants. The Agency claims that it is reasonable to interpret § 7412(n)(1)(A)in a way that "harmonizes" the program's treatment of power plants with its treatment of other sources. This line of reasoning overlooks the whole point of having a separate provision about power plants: treating power plants differentlyfrom other stationary sources. Congress crafted narrow standards for EPA to apply when deciding whether to regulate other sources; in general, these standards concern the volume of pollution emitted by the source, § 7412(c)(1), and the threat posed by the source "to human health or the environment," § 7412(c)(3). But Congress wrote the provision before us more expansively, directing the Agency to regulate power plants if "appropriate and necessary." "That congressional election settles this case. [The Agency's] preference for symmetry cannot trump an asymmetrical statute." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue,562 U.S. 277, 296, 131 S.Ct. 1101, 179 L.Ed.2d 37 (2011).
EPA persists that Congress treated power plants differently from other sources because of uncertainty about whether regulation of power plants would still be needed after the application of the rest of the Act's requirements. That is undoubtedly oneof the reasons Congress treated power plants differently; hence § 7412(n)(1)(A)'s requirement to study hazards posed by power plants' emissions "after imposition of the requirements of [the rest of the Act]." But if uncertainty about the need for regulation were the onlyreason to treat power plants differently, Congress would have required the Agency to decide only whether regulation remains "necessary," not whether regulation is "appropriate andnecessary." In any event, EPA stated when it adopted the rule that "Congress did not limit [the] appropriate and necessary inquiry to [the study mentioned in § 7412(n)(1)(A)]." 77 Fed.Reg. 9325. The Agency instead decided that the appropriate-and-necessary finding should be understood in light of all three studies required by § 7412(n)(1), and as we have discussed, one of those three studies reflects concern about cost.
C
The dissent does not embrace EPA's far-reaching claim that Congress made costs altogether irrelevant to the decision to regulate power plants. Instead, it maintains that EPA need not "explicitly analyze costs" before deeming regulation appropriate, because other features of the regulatory program will on their own ensure the cost-effectiveness of regulation. Post, at 2714 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). This line of reasoning contradicts the foundational principle of administrative law that a court may uphold agency action only on the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action. SEC v. Chenery Corp.,318 U.S. 80, 87, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943). When it deemed regulation of power plants appropriate, EPA said that cost was irrelevantto that determination-not that cost-benefit analysis would be deferred until later. Much less did it say (what the dissent now concludes) that the consideration of cost at subsequent stages will ensure that the costs are not disproportionate to the benefits. What it said is that cost is irrelevant to the decision to regulate.
That is enough to decide these cases. But for what it is worth, the dissent vastly overstates the influence of cost at later stages of the regulatory process. For example, the dissent claims that the floor standards-which the Act calibrates to reflect emissions limitations already achieved by the best-performing sources in the industry-reflect cost considerations, because the best-performing power plants "must have considered costs in arriving at their emissions outputs."Post, at 2719. EPA did not rely on this argument, and it is not obvious that it is correct. Because power plants are regulated under other federal and state laws, the best-performing power plants' emissions limitations might reflect cost-blind regulation rather than cost-conscious decisions. Similarly, the dissent suggests that EPA may consider cost when dividing sources into categories and subcategories. Post, at 2720. Yet according to EPA, "it is notappropriate to premise subcategorization on costs." 77 Fed.Reg. 9395(emphasis added). That statement presumably explains the dissent's carefully worded observation that EPA considered "technological, geographic, and other factors" when drawing categories, post, at 2720, n. 4, which factors were in turn "related to costs" in some way, post, at 2719. Attenuated connections such as these hardly support the assertion that EPA's regulatory process featured "exhaustive consideration of costs," post,at 2714.
All in all, the dissent has at most shown that some elements of the regulatory scheme mitigate cost in limited ways; it has not shown that these elements ensure cost-effectiveness. If (to take a hypothetical example) regulating power plants would yield $5 million in benefits, the prospect of mitigating cost from $11 billion to $10 billion at later stages of the program would not by itself make regulation appropriate. In all events, we need not pursue these points, because EPA did not say that the parts of the regulatory program mentioned by the dissent prevent the imposition of costs far in excess of benefits. "[EPA's] action must be measured by what [it] did, not by what it might have done." Chenery, supra,at 93-94, 63 S.Ct. 454.
D
Our reasoning so far establishes that it was unreasonable for EPA to read § 7412(n)(1)(A)to mean that cost is irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate power plants. The Agency must consider cost-including, most importantly, cost of compliance-before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary. We need not and do not hold that the law unambiguously required the Agency, when making this preliminary estimate, to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis in which each advantage and disadvantage is assigned a monetary value. It will be up to the Agency to decide (as always, within the limits of reasonable interpretation) how to account for cost.
Some of the respondents supporting EPA ask us to uphold EPA's action because the accompanying regulatory impact analysis shows that, once the rule's ancillary benefits are considered, benefits plainly outweigh costs. The dissent similarly relies on these ancillary benefits when insisting that "the outcome here [was] a rule whose benefits exceed its costs." Post, at 2722. As we have just explained, however, we may uphold agency action only upon the grounds on which the agency acted. Even if the Agency couldhave considered ancillary benefits when deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary-a point we need not address-it plainly did not do so here. In the Agency's own words, the administrative record "utterly refutes [the] assertion that [ancillary benefits] form the basis for the appropriate and necessary finding." 77 Fed.Reg. 9323. The Government concedes, moreover, that "EPA did not rely on the [regulatory impact analysis] when deciding to regulate power plants," and that "[e]ven if EPA had considered costs, it would not necessarily have adopted ... the approach set forth in [that analysis]." Brief for Federal Respondents 53-54.
* * *
We hold that EPA interpreted § 7412(n)(1)(A)unreasonably when it deemed cost irrelevant to the decision to regulate power plants. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1829 this Court decided in Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, that obligations of the Federal Government are immune from state taxation. This rule, aimed at protecting the borrowing power of the United States from state encroachment, was derived from the “Borrowing” and “Supremacy” Clauses of the Constitution, and the constitutional doctrines announced in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). It was subsequently embodied in a succession of federal statutes, the existing statute being R. S. § 3701, 31 U. S. C. § 742. The rule has been carried forward to embrace indirect taxation of such obligations through their inclusion in a tax imposed on all the property of a taxpayer. It is quite immaterial that the state tax does not discriminate against the federal obligations. New York ex rel. Bank of Commerce v. Commissioners of Taxes, 2 Black 620 (1863); Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200 (1865); Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516 (1914); New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U. S. 665 (1950).
The two cases now before us involve the application of that rule, in a somewhat novel situation. Society for Savings in the City of Cleveland and First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Warren, two mutual savings banks having no capital stock or shareholders, and located in Ohio, attack the validity of an Ohio property tax, as assessed against them, on the ground that they were required to include in the property values upon which the tax was computed United States bonds held in their security portfolios. Had these bonds been excluded, the entire tax would have been wiped out in both instances. The Ohio Tax Commissioner thought these government bonds were not excludible. The Ohio Board of Tax Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court of Ohio sustained the Commissioner in each instance. The two banks are here by appeal from the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court in each case. The cases were argued together, and are so treated in this opinion.
The tax in question was assessed in the names of these banks under §§ 5408, 5412 and 5638-1 of the Ohio General Code, upon the book value of their “capital employed, or the property representing it” (§ 5408) “at the aggregate amount of the capital, the surplus or reserve fund and the undivided profits” (§ 5412). The tax was at the rate of two mills on the dollar (§ 5638-1). No claim is made that the taxes constituted a franchise tax or some other kind of privilege tax. Cf. Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379 (1931).
The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that this tax, based as it was upon the inclusion of federal obligations, would have to fall if directed against the banks. New York ex rel. Bank of Commerce v. Commissioners of Taxes, supra; Bank Tax Case, supra. This tax, though, was not considered to be against the banks. Holding that the depositors of a mutual savings bank have an interest similar to that of shareholders of other banks, the Ohio court found instead that the tax was imposed upon the “intangible property interests” of the depositors as the owners of each bank. The banks’ capital, surplus fund and undivided profits, which we will refer to as their surplus, were regarded as not themselves the subject matter of the tax, but as simply the measure of the tax against the depositors, and the banks were treated as tax-collecting agents rather than as taxpayers.
In so deciding the Ohio court relied upon a gloss on the rule of immunity stated above. It has been held that a state may impose a tax upon the stockholders’ interests in a corporation, measured by corporate asset values, without making any deduction on account of United States securities held by the corporation. This doctrine had its origin in cases involving national bank stock. There, congressional consent to state taxation of the stock of national banks, upon certain conditions, was held, over strong dissent, to permit such taxes to be assessed without the exclusion of federal obligations owned by the banks. Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573 (1866); National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353 (1870); Des Moines National Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U. S. 103 (1923). This result was reached in part on the theory that the stockholders’ interests in a corporation represent a separate property interest from the corporation’s ownership of its assets, so that a tax on the stockholders’ interests is not a tax on the federal obligations which are included in the corporate property. This rationale has been carried over to cases involving stock of state-created banks, and thus a tax on their shareholders, though measured by corporate assets which include federal obligations, is held not to offend the rule immunizing such obligations from state taxation. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 184 U. S. 111 (1902). Further, in levying a tax on shareholders, a state may require its payment by the corporation, as a collecting agent. Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466 (1905). The result is that when, as is usually the case, the shareholder tax is measured solely by corporate asset values, such a tax is difficult to distinguish from a tax imposed upon the corporation itself, so far as the practical impact of the two types of taxes upon corporate-owned federal obligations is concerned. Nevertheless, this exception to the general rule of immunity is firmly embedded in the law.
The focal point of these appeals is thus whether we are to regard this tax as imposed on the banks or, as the Ohio court held the legislature intended, on their depositors. Were we free to construe Ohio’s statute de novo we might have difficulty in reaching the conclusion which the Ohio court did. Suffice it to say at this point: The statute is barren of any language expressly imposing this tax on the depositors, and contains no provision giving the bank any right to recover the tax from the depositors, as might be expected if the bank had been regarded as a mere tax-collecting agent. By contrast, the taxes laid by the Ohio General Code on (a) the shares of incorporated financial institutions whose capital is divided into shares, (b) the shares of unincorporated institutions whose capital is divided into shares, and (c) deposits, are imposed on the shares “of the stockholders” (§ 5408) and on the deposits “as taxable property of its depositors” (§5673-2) In the case of those taxes, not here involved, the bank is given full rights of reimbursement from the stockholders or depositors, as the case may be, and it is clear that the institution in paying such taxes is acting only as a collection agent. Ohio Gen. Code §§ 5672, 5673, 5673-1, 5673-2.
And beyond these considerations, one might not have expected the legislature to tax the ownership interests of the depositors of these banks on the same basis as stockholders are taxed. The asserted interest of the depositors is in the surplus of the bank, which is primarily a reserve against losses and secondarily a repository of undivided earnings. So long as the bank remains solvent, depositors receive a return on this fund only as an element of the interest paid on their deposits. To maintain their intangible ownership interest, they must maintain their deposits. If a depositor withdraws from the bank, he receives only his deposits and interest. If he continues, his only chance of getting anything more would be in the unlikely event of a solvent liquidation, a possibility that hardly rises to the level of an expectancy. It stretches the imagination very far to attribute any real value to such a remote contingency, and when coupled with the fact that it represents nothing which the depositor can readily transfer, any theoretical value reduces almost to the vanishing point. Cf. Collett v. Springfield Savings Society, 13 Ohio Cir. Ct. Repts. 131, aff’d 56 Ohio St. 776, 49 N. E. 1109 (1897).
The Ohio court, however, has held that this tax is imposed on the depositors. But that does not end the matter for us. We must judge the true nature of this tax in terms of the rights and liabilities which the statute, as construed, creates. In assessing the validity of the tax under federal law, we are not bound by the state’s conclusion that the tax is imposed on the depositors, even though we would be bound by the state court’s decision as to what rights and liabilities this statute establishes under state law. The court’s mere conclusion that the tax is imposed on the depositors is no more than a characterization of the tax. “Where a-federal right is concerned we are not bound by the characterization given to a state tax by state courts or legislatures, or relieved by it from the duty of considering the real nature of the tax and its effect upon the federal right asserted.” Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367 (1930). See also New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, supra, at 674; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, supra, at 387. “Neither ingenuity in calculation nor form of words in state enactments can deprive the owner of the tax exemption established for the benefit of the United States.” Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U. S. 313, 321 (1930). Therefore, we proceed -to examine what rights and liabilities the statute-creates.
We note, first, that should the bank be unable to pay the tax, after it has been assessed, there is no provision entitling the State of Ohio to collect it from the depositors. A tax against the depositors which is recoverable only from the bank looks like a tax against the bank. And if the tax is in fact against the bank, it does not matter whether the ultimate economic impact is passed on to the depositors. Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 519 (1907).
Next, it appears that the statute does not relieve the bank from having to pay the tax on the “intangible property interest” of a depositor who had an account with the bank on the assessment date of the tax, but has withdrawn his account before the collection date. And if the bank is required to pay on the former depositor’s account, there is no provision entitling the bank to reimbursement from him. It should be observed that in the case of the deposit tax the statute does contain provisions protecting the bank in such a situation. §§ 5412, 5673-1, 5673-2.
Finally, and perhaps most important, if this tax is on the depositors, we must find somewhere a right in the bank to make itself whole from the depositors for the taxes paid on their account. In all the cases upholding state taxes against shareholders, without the exclusion of federal obligations owned by the corporation, an express or implied right of reimbursement was presupposed. See Van Allen and other cases at p. 147, supra. As already observed, in the case of the Ohio taxes on shares and deposits the statute contains such a right (§§ 5673, 5673-2) , In the present cases we can find no such right. It may be true that where the tax paid by the bank is less than the interest which the bank contemplates paying the depositors, no such right of reimbursement is necessary. If, for example, a bank has $100,000 of undivided profits, intends to pay its depositors $75,000 interest on their deposits, and has an obligation for this tax of $10,000, it perhaps makes no difference whether the bank pays $65,000 to its depositors, without recovering anything back from them, or pays them $75,000, but later recovers back the $10,000 tax paid for their account. Under either method the bank comes out whole, and the depositors receive the same net interest payment. But if the bank has declared the $75,000 interest payment before the tax is due, we can find nothing in the statute which would give the bank the right either to deduct the $10,000 tax from the interest payment, or to recover it back from the depositors. And conceivably the tax might exceed the interest payable to the depositors, in which event the bank would be left short, absent a right to recover the excess from the depositors.
The Ohio court thought that in charging the tax to surplus, the bank in reality would be reducing the depositors’ interest in the surplus, which it described as being “owned” by them, and that therefore in no circumstance was a right of reimbursement necessary. But there are difficulties with this proposition. If this means that the corporate fiction should be disregarded, the result would be that the government bonds would have to be excluded, since on this hypothesis such securities should then be treated as the property of the depositors. On the other hand, if the Ohio court was referring to the depositors' equitable interest in the surplus, as seems more likely, then without a right of recoupment the bank as well as the depositors bears the impact of the tax.
Without provisions protecting the bank against the burdens of the tax, we cannot assume that the statute’s operation will not infringe on the immunity of the federal obligations held by the banks. It is not adequate merely to suggest that a bank may be entitled to make itself whole from the depositors under Ohio common law. For no such common-law right has been called to our attention. Rather, the Ohio court’s opinion indicates that the bank may be left without any right of reimbursement.
We conclude that this tax is on the depositors in name only, and that for federal purposes it must be held to be on the banks themselves. Accordingly, the judgments in both cases are
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Burton took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Art.I, § 8, cl. 2; Art. VI, cl. 2.
“Except as otherwise provided by law, all stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority.”
Society for Savings was incorporated under Ohio law, and First Federal under the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, as amended, 48 Stat. 128, 12 U. S. C. § 1461 et seq. Nothing turns here on the difference in their origins.
In the view we take of this case, it is unnecessary to consider the taxable status of certain Federal Home Loan Bank stock owned by First Federal, which is also claimed to be exempt.
161 Ohio St. 122, 118 N. E. 2d 651 (1954); 161 Ohio St. 149, 118 N. E. 2d 667. We noted probable jurisdiction, 348 U. S. 807.
“Sec. 5408. ... All the shares of the stockholders in a financial institution, located in this state, incorporated or organized under the laws of the state or of the United States, the capital stock of which is divided into shares, excepting such as are defined as ‘deposits’ in section 5324 of the General Code, and all the shares of the stockholders in an unincorporated financial institution, located • in this state, the capital stock of which is divided into shares held by the owners of such financial institution, and the capital employed, or the property representing it, in a financial institution the capital of which is not divided into shares, or which has no capital stock, located in this state, shall be listed and assessed at the book value thereof, and taxed in the manner provided in this chapter.”
“Sec. 5412. . . . Upon receiving such report the tax commissioner shall ascertain and assess all the taxable shares of such financial institution, or the value of the property representing the capital employed by such financial institution, not divided into shares, at the aggregate amount of the capital, the surplus or reserve fund and the undivided profits as shown in such report, and the amount of taxable deposits of such institution in each county in which the institution maintained an office or offices for the receipt of deposits. Such amounts shall be assessed in the name of such financial institution excepting that the amounts of the taxable deposits wholly withdrawn from each such institution within the times mentioned in section 5411-2 of the General Code and separately set forth.in such report shall be subtracted from the amount of taxable deposits so assessed and separately assessed in the names of such respective depositors. In the case of an incorporated financial institution all of whose shares constitute deposits as defined in section 5324 of the General Code such assessment of shares shall exclude the capital stock thereof as so shown but shall include the surplus or reserve and undivided profits so shown.”
“Sec. 5638-1. . . . Annual taxes are hereby levied on the kinds and classes of intangible property, hereinafter enumerated, on the intangible property tax list in the office of the auditor of state and duplicate thereof in the office of treasurer of state at the following rates, to wit: . . . deposits, two mills on the dollar; shares in and capital employed by financial institutions, two mills on the dollar; . . . .”
See note 8, pp. 149-150, infra.
“Sec. 5672. . . . Taxes assessed on non-withdrawable shares of stock, of a financial institution, shall be a lien on such shares from the first day of January in each year until they are paid.
“It shall be the duty of every financial institution to collect the taxes due upon its shares of stock from the several owners of such shares, and to pay the same to the treasurer of state and any financial institution failing to pay the said taxes as herein provided, shall be liable by way of penalty for the gross amount of the taxes due from all the owners of the shares of stock, and for an additional amount of one hundred dollars for every day of delay in the payment of said taxes.
“Sec. 5673. . . . Such financial institution paying to the treasurer of state the taxes assessed upon its shares, in the hands of its shareholders respectively, as provided in the next preceding section, may deduct the amount thereof from dividends that are due or thereafter become due on such shares, and shall have a lien upon the shares of stock and on all funds in its possession belonging to such shareholders, or which may at any time come into its possession, for reimbursement of the taxes so paid on account of the several shareholders, with legal interest; and such lien may be enforced in any appropriate manner.
“Sec. 5673-1. . . . Taxes assessed on deposits in a financial institution in this state shall be a lien on the deposit of each person as of the day fixed by the tax commission of Ohio for the listing of such deposits. Taxes assessed on the shares of stock of such an institution, all of whose shares are withdrawable and defined as deposits in chapter four of this title, shall be a lien on such shares so defined as deposits as of the day so fixed. It shall be the duty of every financial institution to pay the taxes on the amount of such deposits and/or with-drawable shares assessed in its name to the treasurer of state and any such institution failing to pay such taxes as herein provided shall be liable by way of penalty for the gross amount of the taxes due on and with respect to all its deposits and withdrawable shares assessed in its name and for an additional amount of one hundred dollars for every day of delay in the payment of such taxes.
“Sec. 5673-2. ... A financial institution so required to pay to the treasurer of state the taxes assessed upon its deposit accounts, as taxable property of its depositors, and/or upon its withdrawable shares as taxable property of its shareholders respectively, as provided in the next preceding section, may, upon receipt of notice of the day fixed for the listing of such deposits, charge the amount thereof to and deduct the same from the deposit of each depositor, or from the interest that is due or thereafter becomes due thereon, or from the dividends that are due or thereafter become due thereon, as the case may be, and shall have a lien upon such deposit, interest and/or dividends and on all funds in its possession belonging to such depositor or shareholder, or which may at any time come into its possession, for reimbursement of the taxes so payable, with legal interest. Such lien may be enforced in any appropriate manner at any time within six months after the payment of the taxes to the treasurer.”
As construed by the state court, the “intangible property tax” on depositors applied to different property than did the “deposit” tax also imposed on them, involving, as we see it, no question of duplication or overlapping between the two taxes.
Section 5412 provides in part: “Upon receiving such report the tax commissioner shall ascertain and assess . . . the amount of taxable deposits of such institution in each county in which the institution maintained an office or offices for the receipt of deposits. Such amounts shall be assessed in the name of such financial institution excepting that the amounts of the taxable deposits wholly withdrawn from each such institution within the times mentioned in section 5411-2 of the General Code [that is, between the date of assessment and the bank’s receipt of the notice of such date, or if no notice is received, the next January 1] and separately set forth in such report shall be subtracted from the amount of taxable deposits so assessed and separately assessed in the names of such respective depositors.”
For §§ 5673-1 and 5673-2, see note 8, pp. 149-150, supra.
See note 8, pp. 149-150, supra.
Even so, if a comparable situation arose in connection with the tax on shareholders, the bank would have a right of reimbursement under the provisions of the Ohio statute. See note 8, pp. 149-150, supra.
The Ohio court stated: “In our opinion, such a provision [an express right of reimbursement] is not necessary to enable such a financial institution to secure such reimbursement.” 161 Ohio St., at 136, 118 N. E. 2d, at 659. It is clear that by this statement the court did not mean that an implied right of reimbursement existed under Ohio law, for it then went on to hold that “the financial institution, which pays the tax on [the depositors’] property interests in the corporation, will always be able to reimburse itself by reducing the ultimate value of the property interests of those who are the only ones who can have any claim to benefit from the ownership interests taxed.” 161 Ohio St., at 137, 118 N. E. 2d, at 659-660. This is of course not reimbursement in any proper sense of the term.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner, an inmate of the Illinois State Penitentiary, asks us to review an order dismissing his civil rights action against the respondent corrections officers and directing him to pay counsel fees of $400 for services rendered by the Attorney General of Illinois in representing the respondents in that action.
After granting a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a constitutional violation, the District Court ordered petitioner to show cause why fees of $400 should not be taxed against him under 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Because he did not respond to that order, the fee award was entered. A motion to reconsider was later denied on the ground that petitioner’s suit was “meritless.” The Court of Appeals disposed of the novel question presented by petitioner by affirming the fee award in an unpublished order. We now grant the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
On September 20, 1977, petitioner was charged with a violation of prison regulations and placed in segregation. At a disciplinary hearing two days later, petitioner admitted that he and two other inmates had consumed a homemade alcoholic beverage; his punishment was confinement to segregation for 10 days, demotion to C-grade, and loss of 30 days’ statutory good time.
Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies and then filed a complaint under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on the form used by prisoners who are not represented by counsel. The facts stated on the form raised two federal questions of arguable merit: (1) the decision to place petitioner in a segregation cell on September 20, 1977, was not preceded by a hearing and was not justified by any emergency or other necessity; (2) two of the officers who conducted the disciplinary hearing after petitioner had been in segregation for two days were biased against him. Respondents, represented by the State Attorney General’s Office, moved to dismiss the complaint, but filed no affidavits denying or explaining the facts alleged by petitioner. After allowing petitioner to file various amendments and additional papers, the District Court dismissed the complaint without taking any evidence. Thereafter the fee award was made.
In its order affirming the action of the District Court, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords a prisoner certain minimum procedural safeguards before disciplinary action may be taken against him. Because the record did not reveal a violation of those safeguards at the hearing on September 22, the Court of Appeals concluded that the complaint had been properly dismissed. However, the Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked the fact, clearly stated in petitioner's brief on appeal, that the disciplinary hearing did not take place until two days after petitioner was placed in segregation on September 20. Nothing in the papers filed on behalf of the respondents purports to justify or explain the segregation of petitioner for two days in advance of the disciplinary hearing.
II
Petitioner's complaint, like most prisoner complaints filed in the Northern District of Illinois, was not prepared by counsel. It is settled law that the allegations of such a complaint, “however inartfully pleaded'' are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers ....'' Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519, 520 (1972). See also Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F. 2d 83, 86 (CA7 1980); French v. Heyne, 547 F. 2d 994, 996 (CA7 1976). Such a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines, supra, at 520-521. And, of course, the allegations of the complaint are generally taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 322 (1972).
Applying these principles to petitioner’s amended complaint, we conclude that all but one of its allegations were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. Petitioner’s allegations of bias and procedural irregularities in the September 22 hearing, unequal treatment, and cruel and unusual punishment, even when liberally construed, were insufficient to require any further proceedings in the District Court. We therefore affirm the dismissal of these claims.
Petitioner’s allegation that he had been confined unnecessarily to segregation is of a different character. It can be construed as a contention that his confinement to segregation violated due process because it took place without a prior hearing. It is clear from the facts alleged in the amended complaint that petitioner was confined in segregation for two days before a hearing was held. Indeed, petitioner expressly stated this claim in procedural due process terms in his response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
Segregation of a prisoner without a prior hearing may violate due process if the postponement of procedural protections is not justified by apprehended emergency conditions. See Hayes v. Walker, 555 F. 2d 625, 633 (CA7), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 959 (1977). The amended complaint alleged that segregation was unnecessary in petitioner’s case because his offense did not involve violence and he did not present a “clear and present danger.” There is no suggestion in the record that immediate segregation was necessitated by emergency conditions. Defendants did make the unsworn assertion that petitioner was placed in segregation on “temporary investigative status,” but the significance of this designation is unclear and it does not, without more, dispose of petitioner’s procedural due process claim. The District Court, in dismissing the amended complaint, merely concluded that temporary segregation pending investigation was not actionable. The court cited an Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation which authorized segregation of prisoners pending investigation of disciplinary matters, where required “in the interest of institutional security and safety.” In the absence of any showing that concern for institutional security and safety was the basis for immediate segregation of petitioner without a prior hearing, this regulation does not justify dismissal of petitioner’s suit for failure to state a claim.
Our discussion of this claim is not intended to express any view on its merits. We conclude merely that the amended complaint was adequate at least to require some response from the defendants, by way of affidavit or otherwise, to petitioner’s claim that he was unjustifiably placed in segregation without a prior hearing. Although petitioner’s pleadings are prolix and lacking in stylistic precision, this is not a case like Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976), in which a pro se litigant’s detailed recitation of the facts reveals on its face the insufficiency of the complaint. We cannot say with assurance that petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S., at 521. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should have reversed the dismissal of this claim and remanded for further proceedings.
Ill
The award of attorney’s fees entered against petitioner must be vacated.
In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978), we held that the defendant in an action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may recover attorney’s fees from the plaintiff only if the District Court finds “that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Id., at 421. Although arguably a different standard might be applied in a civil rights action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, we can perceive no reason for applying a less stringent standard. The plaintiff’s action must be meritless in the sense that it is groundless or without foundation. The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient justification for the assessment of fees. As we stated in Christiansburg:
“To take the further step of assessing attorney’s fees against plaintiffs simply because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII. Hence, a plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” 434 U. S., at 422.
No such finding supported the fee award in this case.
These limitations apply with special force in actions initiated by uncounseled prisoners. Faithful adherence to the principles of Haines v. Kerner dictates that attorney’s fees should rarely be awarded against such plaintiffs. The fact that a prisoner’s complaint, even when liberally construed, cannot survive a motion to dismiss does not, without more, entitle the defendant to attorney’s fees. An unrepresented litigant should not be punished for his failure to recognize subtle factual or legal deficiencies in his claims. As the Court noted in Christiansburg, even if the law or the facts are somewhat questionable or unfavorable at the outset of litigation, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit. 434 U. S., at 422.
Despite the lower court’s conclusion to the contrary, the allegations of petitioner’s amended complaint are definitely not meritless in the Christiansburg sense. Even those allegations that were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim deserved and received the careful consideration of both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. Allegations that, upon careful examination, prove legally insufficient to require a trial are not, for that reason alone, “groundless” or “without foundation” as required by Christiansburg.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It %s so ordered.
The Chief Justice would grant the petition and set the case for oral argument.
Justice Stewakt would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint. He substantially agrees, however, with what is said in Part III of the Court’s per curiam opinion, and for those reasons would reverse the judgment insofar as it affirmed the award of attorney’s fees entered against the petitioner.
The order entered by District Judge McMillen on October 18, 1978, reads as follows:
“On August 7, 1978, we ordered plaintiff to show cause within twenty (20) days thereof why defendants’ attorneys’ fees in the amount of $400 should not be taxed against plaintiff under 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Because plaintiff has not complied with or otherwise responded to that order, we hereby tax defendants’ fees in the amount of $400 against him pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988.”
On December 5, 1978, Judge McMillen entered the following order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration:
“On October 18, 1978, we ordered that the defendants’ attorneys fees in the amount of $400 should be taxed against the plaintiff pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Plaintiff has filed a motion to reconsider said action. Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider is denied and attorneys fees in the amount of $400 will be taxed against the plaintiff, as the suit was meritless.”
Rule 35 (c)(1) of the Circuit Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit identifies those decisions warranting publication:
“A published opinion will be filed when the decision
“(i) establishes a new, or changes an existing, rule of law;
“(ii) involves an issue of continuing public interest;
“(in) criticizes or questions existing law;
“(iv) constitutes a significant and nonduplieative contribution to legal literature
“(A) by a historical review of law,
“(B) by describing legislative history, or
“(C) by resolving or creating a conflict in the law;
“(v) reverses a judgment or denies enforcement of an order when the lower court or agency has published an opinion supporting the judgment or order; or
“(vi) is pursuant to an order of remand from the Supreme Court and is not rendered merely in ministerial obedienee to specific directions of that Court.”
When a decision does not satisfy these criteria, it is to be filed as an unpublished order. Circuit Rule 35 (e)(2). Unpublished orders may not be cited as precedent in any federal court within the Seventh Circuit. Circuit Rule 35 (b) (2) (iv).
Although petitioner’s appeal was decided in an unpublished order purportedly having no precedential significance, three members of the Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Fairchild and Judges Swygert and Bauer, nonetheless voted to rehear the case en banc. Judge Swygert filed a written dissent from the order denying the petition for rehearing en banc.
It is unclear from the record whether this sentence included the two days petitioner spent in segregation prior to the disciplinary hearing, or whether he was sentenced to 10 days’ segregation in addition to the time already served. There apparently is also some confusion with respect to the exact sentence imposed on petitioner at the hearing. The District Court’s order dismissing the complaint indicates that petitioner was sentenced to 30 days in segregation. The Court of Appeals’ order, on the other hand, states that he was sentenced to 10 days in segregation. The petition for writ of certiorari and respondents’ brief in opposition filed in this Court are similarly inconsistent on this point. The record seems to indicate that petitioner was sentenced to 10 days in segregation. The uncertainty with respect to petitioner’s posthearing segregation is not, however, material to our decision in this case.
Petitioner also alleged that respondents violated their own procedural regulations, and that it was a denial of equal protection of the laws and cruel and unusual punishment to impose a more severe sentence on him than on the other two inmates involved in the incident, since he had confessed to drinking and they had not.
As the Court of Appeals noted:
“The Supreme Court has delineated the standard to be applied in determining whether a prisoner has been afforded his minimum due process rights. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 . . . (1974). The prisoner is entitled to (1) advance written notice of the charges against him or her; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided that to do so will not jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals, before a sufficiently impartial hearing board; (3) a written statement by the fact finder of ‘the evidence relied upon and reasons for the disciplinary action taken.’ ”
The Court reaffirmed the principles of Haines in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 106 (1976):
“As the Court unanimously held in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972), a pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded/ must be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers’ and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears ‘“beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” ’ Id., at 520-521, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957).”
In a document entitled, “Response to: Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment/& Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment,” petitioner alleged:
“Placement in Segregation: Plaintiff was placed in Segregation on September 20, 1977, with no hearing what-so-ever. No reasons provided him as to why it was necessary to place him in segregation. No Resident Information Report issued him, stating he was being placed in segregation, under investigation status.” Response, at 2 (emphasis in original).
Petitioner thereafter asserted that “[classification to segregation must comply with procedural due process.” Id., at 4, 7. Petitioner went on to assert that his placement in segregation on September 20 was “completely unnecessary, because plaintiff posed no immediate threat to the safety and security of the institution. . . .” Id., at 8. Later in the response, petitioner discussed his due process claim in detail. Id., at 15-16.
In their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, respondents asserted:
“Plaintiff's placement in segregation cellhouse on September 20, 1977 on temporary investigative status pending hearing of the resident information reports on September 22, 1977 does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. No disciplinary sanctions constituting a grievous loss were imposed prior to a disciplinary hearing. The transfer of a resident from one cell to another does not trigger due process protections. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 .. . (1976).”
The District Court’s order dismissing petitioner’s complaint stated:
“Plaintiff complains that his placement in segregation between the evening of September 20 and his hearing on September 22 was ‘unnecessary’ because no violence was involved in the incident. We find that his temporary placement in segregation pending the hearing, which was brought within the required 72 hour period, is not actionable. See A. R. 804 (G), effective December 1, 1976.”
This regulation, Administrative Regulation § 804 (II) (G), provides, in pertinent part:
“It is recognized that incidents occur which, in the interest of institutional security and safety, require that a resident be removed from the general population and placed in a holding unit pending the completion of an investigation. As the holding unit functions in the same manner as a segregation unit (except that single celling is not required in the holding unit), a resident must be provided with the same procedural safeguards and services as are required by this regulation relative to placements, conditions and services in a segregation unit.”
The dissenting opinion rests on the alternative and somewhat inconsistent grounds that prehearing solitary confinement was (a) proper punishment for an offense that was already adequately proved, (b) necessary in order to forestall the development of a contrived defense, and (c) harmless because petitioner subsequently received a fair hearing. The record reveals that these grounds are not sufficient to justify the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.
On the basis of petitioner’s admission that he had been drinking, plus unsworn allegations in the reports of the corrections officers, the dissent concludes that petitioner was intoxicated on September 20 and that he posed a threat to prison security and safety sufficiently serious to warrant immediate segregation.
There is little doubt that some intoxicated prisoners may pose a threat to prison security justifying segregation without a hearing. The problem in this case is that the record does not establish, and the District Court did not find, that petitioner was in fact intoxicated or that his condition presented a threat to institutional security. Indeed, at no point in this litigation have the respondents asserted, by affidavit or otherwise, that petitioner was placed in segregation on September 20 because of such security concerns.
The dissent also speculates that inmates suspected of violations of prison regulations, if allowed to remain in the general prison population pending disciplinary proceedings, will fabricate alibi defenses and intimidate potential witnesses. Post, at 22. This danger would apparently justify automatic investigative segregation of all inmate suspects. Ironically, however, even the Administrative Regulation cited by the District Court, see n. 11, supra, does not purport to justify such blanket segregation. Moreover, automatic investigative segregation is particularly inappropriate for an inmate, like petitioner, who has already admitted guilt; fabrication of alibis or intimidation of witnesses seems unlikely in such a case. While investigative concerns might, in particular cases, justify prehearing segregation, nothing in the present record suggests that these concerns were at work in this case.
Either the institutional security or the investigative justification postulated by the dissent might well be dispositive had the District Court made appropriate findings. The respondents did not, however, present these justifications to the District Court and the District Court accordingly made no such findings. The record is entirely consistent with the possibility that an inmate who admittedly had been drinking posed no threat at all to prison security and had no intent to deny the facts, but did want an opportunity to establish mitigating circumstances before being placed in solitary confinement. The dissent’s emphasis upon petitioner’s admission confuses the distinction, previously recognized by this Court, between the question of guilt and the question of appropriate punishment. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 483-484 (1972).
Finally, even if the subsequent hearing accorded petitioner minimized or eliminated any compensable harm resulting from the initial denial of procedural safeguards, his constitutional claim is nonetheless actionable. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 266-267 (1978). “Because the right to procedural due process is 'absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed . . . the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.” Id., at 266 (footnote omitted).
As Judge Swygert noted in his dissent from the order denying rehearing en banc, see n. 3, supra, the District Court dismissed petitioner’s claims only after detailed consideration resulting in a seven-page opinion. According to Judge Swygert:
“It is quite evident from the detailed treatment given by the district court to the issues raised by plaintiff’s complaint that the suit was not groundless or meritless. That fact is corroborated by this court’s treatment of the same issues on appeal.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | F | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1959 the appellant Southern Railway Company filed a petition with the North Carolina Utilities Commission for an order permitting it to discontinue operation of two intrastate passenger trains between Greensboro and Goldsboro, North Carolina, a distance of about 130 miles. The trains in question are No. 16, which operates eastbound in the morning from Greensboro to Goldsboro, and No. 13, consisting of the same equipment, which operates westbound in the late afternoon. Since 1958 these two trains have provided the last remaining railway passenger service between the two communities. The State Commission denied the petition, and its decision was upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court. State of North Carolina v. Southern Railway Co., 254 N. C. 73, 118 S. E. 2d 21 (1961).
Thereafter the railway company filed a petition with the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to § 13a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, seeking authority to discontinue operation of the trains. After a hearing at which several protestants, including the State of North Carolina, appeared, the examiner recommended that the petition be granted. Division 3 of the Commission agreed with the examiner and ordered discontinuance of the trains. The Division issued a report in which it found, inter alia, that the trains, which in 1948 had carried 56,739 passengers, carried only 14,776 passengers in 1960, the last full year for which figures were available; that the direct expenses of operating the trains during the latter year were over three times their total revenue ; that discontinuance of the trains would result in savings of at least $90,689 per year; that the need shown for these trains was relatively insubstantial when viewed in light of the density of the population of the area served; that existing alternate transportation service by rail, bus, airline, and other means was reasonably adequate; and that the discontinuance of the passenger train service would not seriously affect the industrial growth of the area. Against the backgound of these findings, the examiner and Commission considered, but gave “little or no weight” to the overall prosperity of the carrier. The Commission’s basic conclusions were summed up as follows:
“that the public will not be materially inconvenienced by the discontinuance of the service here involved; that the savings to be realized by the carrier outweigh the inconvenience to which the public may be subjected by such discontinuance; that such savings will enable the carrier more efficiently to provide transportation service to the public which remains in substantial demand; and that the continued operation of trains Nos. 13 and 16 would constitute a wasteful service and would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.” 317 I. C. C. 265, 260.
After a petition for reconsideration by the entire Commission had been denied, the protestants instituted an action in a three-judge District Court seeking to set aside the order of the Commission. The court held, first, that it was erroneous as a matter of law for the Commission to order discontinuance of passenger trains under the provisions of § 13a (2) without first determining whether, once the profits from freight operations on the same line were taken into account, “the particular segment of the railway involved is contributing its fair share to the over-all company operations . . . .” 210 F. Supp. 675, 688. The court also proceeded to find, inter alia, that “Taking into account total operation of this line, there is a profit not a loss, a benefit, not a burden,” 210 F. Supp., at 688; that passenger traffic had slightly increased during the first five months of 1961; that the carrier had done little to promote the use of the passenger trains; that continued existence of the alternative of railway passenger service might be considered a necessity under such circumstances as airline strikes or bad weather; and that, in light of the overall prosperity of the Southern Railway Company, “[t]he effect of the losses of the Greensboro-Goldsboro passenger service on the financial structure of the railroad is inconsequential.” 210 F. Supp., at 688. On this basis, although it explicitly refused to set aside any of the subsidiary findings of fact on which the Commission’s order was based, 210 F. Supp., at 689, 690, the court held that “the ultimate conclusions of the Interstate Commerce Commission that the service in question constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce and that the present or future public convenience and necessity permits such discontinuance . . . are arbitrary and capricious because . . . not supported by substantial evidence,” 210 F. Supp., at 689. The court itself then concluded that discontinuance was not warranted. It therefore set aside the Commission’s order, and perpetually enjoined the carrier from discontinuing the Greensboro-Goldsboro passenger trains. The United States, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the carrier all appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases for argument. 373 U. S. 907.
The District Court’s action in setting aside the Commission’s conclusions as to public convenience and necessity and undue burden on interstate commerce was explicitly based upon the court’s view that the Commission had applied erroneous legal standards in reaching those conclusions. The court did not question that the Commission’s subsidiary findings of fact were supported by a substantial evidentiary foundation. It simply disagreed with the Commission as to the kind of evidence required to support an order permitting discontinuance of an intrastate passenger train under § 13a (2).
The court reached its conclusion that the Commission had erred in not taking into account profits from freight operations along the Greensboro-Goldsboro line primarily in reliance upon this Court’s decisions in Public Service Comm’n of Utah v. United States, 356 U. S. 421, and Chicago, M., St. P. P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 355 U. S. 300. Both those cases dealt with § 13 (4), which requires the Commission to change intrastate rates wherever such rates are found to discriminate against interstate commerce. This Court held in those cases that the Commission could not authorize higher intrastate rates either for passenger or freight operations without first taking into account the revenues derived by the carrier from the totality of intrastate operations. In 1958, the year in which § 13a (2) was enacted, § 13 (4) was amended to permit the Commission to act “without a separation of interstate and intrastate property, revenues, and expenses, and without considering in totality the operations or results thereof of any carrier . . . wholly within any State.” The District Court’s holding that the same kind of data should be considered in § 13a (2) proceedings was premised upon the fact that no language similar to that of the § 13 (4) amendment was included in § 13a (2), and that proceedings under the latter provision, which permits discontinuance of given operations, have a far more serious impact upon intrastate passengers than proceedings under the former, which provides only for an increase in the rates to be charged.
But when § 13 (4) was amended in 1958 as a result of the two decisions relied on by the District Court, Congress was simply reaffirming what it conceived as the original intent of the section. There is therefore no reason to assume that Congress regarded the new language as embodying a standard which had to bé specifically incorporated into every statutory provision to which it was intended to apply.
The legislative history clearly indicates that Congress in enacting § 13a (2) was addressing itself to a problem quite distinct from that reflected by overall unprofitable operation of an entire segment of railroad line. The Commission already had authority prior to 1958, under §§ 1 (18) — (20), to authorize discontinuance of all services on any given intrastate line where continuance of such services would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153. However, the Commission totally lacked power to discontinue particular trains or services while leaving the remaining services in operation. It was precisely this gap which § 13a (2) was intended to fill. New Jersey v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 372 U. S. 1, 5-6. As both the House and Senate Committee Reports on the legislation which became § 13a (2) make clear, Congress was primarily concerned with the problems posed by passenger services for which significant public demand no longer existed and which were consistently deficit-producing, thus forcing the carriers to subsidize their operation out of freight profits. Far from permitting the carrier’s need for discontinuance of passenger services to be balanced against profits from other operations conducted along the same line, the bill as originally reported by the Senate Committee would have required the Commission to permit discontinuance, even if there was great public need for the service, so long as the continued operation of a particular service would result in a net loss to the carrier. Senator Javits unsuccessfully attempted to amend the bill on the floor of the Senate to delete the net loss standard and to substitute a requirement that the Commission balance the public need for the service against the deficit resulting from it. Such an amendment, proposed by Chairman Harris of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, was adopted by the House, and accepted by the Senate in conference. The deletion of the net loss standard, however, by no means implied that freight profits along a given line could be offset against deficits incurred by passenger services for purposes of determining whether the latter constituted an undue burden on interstate operations or commerce. As Congressman Harris made clear after his amendment had been accepted, the situation “we are trying to get at” is that in which “the [freight] shippers of this country are making up a deficit every year ... in losses in passenger service.”
The bill as originally reported by the Senate Committee would have applied the net loss standard to both interstate and intrastate operations, the Committee Report having concluded that state regulatory bodies required “the maintenance of uneconomic and unnecessary services and facilities.” The bill was amended on the Senate floor to limit the Commission’s discontinuance authority to interstate trains, and the House version of the bill was similarly limited. In conference, however, the Commission’s authority over intrastate trains was restored and, except for differences in the procedures prerequisite to a hearing in the case of a wholly intrastate train, the Commission was required to apply the same standard to interstate and intrastate operations in determining whether discontinuance of a train or service is justified. Contrary to the suggestion of the District Court that its interpretation of § 13a (2) must be accepted to avoid “requiring] the intrastate operations to bear more than their share,” 210 F. Supp., at 680, the statutory scheme which Congress has embodied in § 13a thus prescribes precisely the same substantive standard to govern discontinuance of either interstate or intrastate operations.
All that need properly be considered under this standard, as both the language and history of § 13a (2) thus make abundantly clear, is what effect the discontinuance of the specific train or service in question will have upon the public convenience and necessity and upon interstate operations or commerce. As the Commission has correctly summed up the matter in another case:
“The burden [upon the carrier’s interstate operations or upon interstate commerce, as expressed in section 13a (2)] ... is to be measured by the injurious effect that the continued operation of the train proposed for discontinuance would have upon interstate commerce. As is indicated by its legislative history, the purpose of section 13a (2) is to permit the discontinuance of the operation of services that 'no longer pay their way and for which there is no longer sufficient public need to justify the heavy financial losses involved.’ (S. Rep. 1647, 85th Cong.). Nowhere in section. 13a (2) or elsewhere in the law is there any requirement that the prosperity of the intrastate operations of the carrier as a whole, or any particular segment thereof, must be given effect in determining whether the operation of an individual intrastate train imposes an unjust and undue burden on interstate commerce. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the apparent intent of the Congress.” Southern Pac. Co., Partial Discontinuance, 312 I. C. C. 631, 633-634 (1961).
This Court has long recognized that the Commission may properly give varying weights to the overall prosperity of the carrier in differing situations. Thus, in Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153, which also involved a situation in which the Commission was required to balance public convenience and necessity against undue burdens on interstate commerce, it was specifically noted that “In many cases, it is clear that the extent of the whole traffic, the degree of dependence of the communities directly affected upon the particular means of transportation, and other attendant conditions, are such that the carrier may not justly be required to continue to bear the financial loss necessarily entailed by operation. In some cases . . . the question is whether abandonment may justly be permitted, in view of the fact that it would subject the communities directly affected to serious injury while continued operation would impose a relatively light burden upon a prosperous carrier.” 271 U. S., at 168-169. In cases falling within the latter category, such as those involving vital commuter services in large metropolitan areas where the demands of public convenience and necessity are large, it is of course obvious that the Commission would err if it did not give great weight to the ability of the carrier to absorb even large deficits resulting from such services. But where, as here, the Commission’s findings make clear that the demands of public convenience and necessity are slight and that the situation is, therefore, one falling within the first category delineated in Colorado, it is equally proper for the Commission, in determining the existence of the burden on interstate commerce, to give little weight to the factor of the carrier’s overall prosperity.
Whatever room there may be for differing views as to the wisdom of the policy reflected in § 13a (2), it is the duty of the Commission to effectuate the statutory scheme. We cannot agree with the District Court that the Commission departed in any respect from that duty here. We therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand with instructions to reinstate the report and order of the Commission.
Reversed.
Section 13a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 13a (2), provides in pertinent part:
“Where the discontinuance or change, in whole or in part, by a carrier or carriers subject to this chapter, of the operation or service of any train or ferry operated wholly within the boundaries of a single State is prohibited by the constitution or statutes of any State or where the State authority having jurisdiction thereof shall have denied an application or petition duly filed with it by said carrier or carriers for authority to discontinue or change, in whole or in part, the operation or service of any such train or ferry or shall not have acted finally on such an application or petition within one hundred and twenty days from the presentation thereof, such carrier or carriers may petition the Commission for authority to effect such discontinuance or change. The Commission may grant such authority only after full hearing and upon findings by it that (a) the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such discontinuance or change, in whole or in part, of the operation or service of such train or ferry, and (b) the continued operation or service of such train or ferry without discontinuance or change, in whole or in part, will constitute an unjust and undue burden upon the interstate operations of such carrier or carriers or upon interstate commerce. When any petition shall be filed with the Commission under the provisions of this paragraph the Commission shall notify the Governor of the State in which such train or ferry is operated at least thirty days in advance of the hearing provided for in this paragraph, and such hearing shall be held by the Commission in the State in which such train or ferry is operated; and the Commission is authorized to avail itself of the cooperation, services, records and facilities of the authorities in such State in the performance of its functions under this paragraph.”
It should be noted, in connection with the findings made by the District Court, that the Commission had noted that the increase in passenger traffic during 1961 was largely due to group movements of school children; that, as to Southern’s failure to seek passengers, “prospective patrons who must be coaxed to use a service have no urgent need for it”; and that, after a broad study and investigation in 1959, the Commission had concluded that “public convenience and necessity” does not require the maintenance of deficit passenger services as a standby service for travelers who customarily travel by highway or by air. Railroad Passenger Train Deficit, 306 I. C. C. 417, 482.
49 U. S. C. § 13 (4), as so amended, provides in pertinent part:
“Whenever in any such investigation the Commission, after full hearing, finds that any such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice causes any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against, or undue burden on, interstate or foreign commerce (which the Commission may find without a separation of interstate and intrastate property, revenues, and expenses, and without considering in totality the operations or results thereof of any carrier, or group or groups of carriers wholly within any State), which is hereby forbidden and declared to be unlawful, it shall prescribe the rate, fare, or charge, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, thereafter to be charged, and the classification, regulation, or practice thereafter to be observed, in such manner as, in its judgment, will remove such advantage, preference, prejudice, discrimination, or burden . . . .”
“[I]t is the possible interpretation of these recent court decisions that would create a change in the present regulatory scheme.” H. R. Rep. No. 2274, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12.
49 U. S. C. § 1 (18) provides in pertinent part:
“No carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall undertake the extension of its line of railroad, or the construction of a new line of railroad, or shall acquire or operate any line of railroad, or extension thereof, or shall engage in transportation under this chapter over or by means of such additional or extended line of railroad, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will require the construction, or operation, or construction and operation, of such additional or extended line of railroad, and no carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall abandon all or any portion of a line of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment.”
49 U. S. C. § 1 (19) provides in pertinent part:
“The application for and issuance of any such certificate shall be under such rules and regulations as to hearings and other matters as the Commission may from time to time prescribe, and the provisions of this chapter shall apply to all such proceedings.”
49 TJ. S. C. § 1 (20) provides in pertinent part:
“The Commission shall have power to issue such certificate as prayed for, or to refuse to issue it, or to issue it for a portion or portions of a line of railroad, or extension thereof, described in the application, or for the partial exercise only of such right or privilege, and may attach to the issuance of the certificate such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may require.”
“A major cause of the worsening railroad situation is the unsatisfactory passenger situation. Not only is the passenger end of the business not making money — it is losing a substantial portion of that produced by freight operations.
“It is obvious that in very great measure these passenger losses are attributable to commuter service. ... It is unreasonable to expect that such service should continue to be subsidized by the freight shippers throughout the country.
“There are substantial losses, howéver, occurring in passenger service beyond those attributable solely to commuter service. Where this passenger service . . . cannot be made to pay its own way because of lack of patronage at reasonable rates, abandonment seems called for.” H. R. Rep. No. 1922, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 11-12.
“A most serious problem for the railroads is the difficulty and delay they often encounter when they seek to discontinue or change the operation of services or facilities that no longer pay their way and for which there is no longer sufficient public need to justify the heavy financial losses entailed. The subcommittee believes that the maintenance and operation of such outmoded services and facilities constitutes a heavy burden on interstate commerce.” S. Rep. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 21.
S. 3778, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 6. See also the remarks of Senator Smathers, Chairman of the Surface Transportation Subcommittee, who made it clear that the net loss standard did not refer to all operations on a line or all operations within a State but rather to “the loss from the particular operation the railroad is rendering.” 104 Cong. Rec. 10849.
See 104 Cong. Rec. 10846-10849. See also pp. 10838-10839.
104 Cong. Rec. 12547-12548.
104 Cong. Rec. 12551.
S. Rep. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 22.
104 Cong. Rec. 10862, 10864.
H. R. 12832, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 10.
Under § 13a (2), which applies solely to intrastate trains, the Commission may not authorize discontinuance until after the appropriate state regulatory agency has been given an opportunity to act and has failed or refused to authorize discontinuance. See New Jersey v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 372 U. S. 1, 4.
See 49 U. S. C. § 13a (1), (2).
The fact that Congress intended the same substantive standards to be applied both to intrastate and interstate discontinuances wholly vitiates appellees’ argument that the Commission is required to take into account, wherever presented, the profitability of intrastate operations as a whole or any segment thereof whenever an intrastate service is sought to be discontinued. Thus, consideration of the overall prosperity of the carrier is necessarily relevant to a determination of the degree to which a deficit resulting from a given service constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce. But neither the profitability of such freight operations as are fortuitously conducted on the same line as a given passenger service nor the profitability of all operations within any given State bears any practical relationship either to the public’s need for the service in question or to the burden which the deficit imposes on interstate commerce.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is a federal crime under 18 U. S. C. § 1001 to make any false or fraudulent statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. To establish a violation of §1001, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity. This case presents the question whether the Government also must prove that the false statement was made with actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction.
HH
Respondent E small Yermian was convicted m the District Court of Central California on three counts of making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, in violation of § 1001. The convictions were based on false statements respondent supplied his employer in connection with a Department of Defense security questionnaire. Respondent was hired in 1979 by Guitón Industries, a defense contractor. Because respondent was to have access to classified material in the course of his employment, he was required to obtain a Department of Defense Security Clearance. To this end, Gulton’s security officer asked respondent to fill out a “Worksheet For Preparation of Personnel Security Questionnaire.”
In response to a question on the worksheet asking whether he had ever been charged with any violation of law, respondent failed to disclose that in 1978 he had been convicted of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1341. In describing his employment history, respondent falsely stated that he had been employed by two companies that had in fact never employed him. The Guitón security officer typed these false representations onto a form entitled “Department of Defense Personnel Security Questionnaire.” Respondent reviewed the typed document for errors and signed a certification stating that his answers were “true, complete, and correct to the best of [his] knowledge” and that he understood “that any misrepresentation or false statement . . . may subject [him] to prosecution under section 1001 of the United States Criminal Code.” App. 33.
After witnessing respondent’s signature, Gulton’s security officer mailed the typed form to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office for processing. Government investigators subsequently discovered that respondent had submitted false statements on the security questionnaire. Confronted with this discovery, respondent acknowledged that he had responded falsely to questions regarding his criminal record and employment history. On the basis of these false statements, respondent was charged with three counts in violation of § 1001.
At trial, respondent admitted to having actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements he had submitted in response to the Department of Defense security questionnaire. He explained that he had made the false statements so that information on the security questionnaire would be consistent with similar fabrications he had submitted to Guitón in his employment application. Respondent’s sole defense at trial was that he had no actual knowledge that his false statements would be transmitted to a federal agency.
Consistent with this defense, respondent requested a jury instruction requiring the Government to prove not only that he had actual knowledge that his statements were false at the time they were made, but also that he had actual knowledge that those statements were made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. The District Court rejected that request and instead instructed the jury that the Government must prove that respondent “knew or should have known that the information was to be submitted to a government agency.” Respondent’s objection to this instruction was overruled, and the jury returned convictions on all three counts charged in the indictment.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the District Court had erred in failing to give respondent’s requested instruction. 708 F. 2d 365 (1983). The Court of Appeals read the statutory terms “knowingly and willfully” to modify both the conduct of making false statements and the circumstance that they be made “in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency].” The court therefore concluded that “as an essential element of a section 1001 violation, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew at the time he made the false statement that it was made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.” Id., at 371 (footnotes omitted). The Court of Appeals rejected the Government’s argument that the “reasonably foreseeable” standard provided by the District Court’s jury instructions satisfied any element of intent possibly associated with the requirement that false statements be made within federal agency jurisdiction. Id., at 371-372.
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit conflicts with decisions by the three other Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue. United States v. Baker, 626 F. 2d 512 (CA5 1980); United States v. Lewis, 587 F. 2d 854 (CA6 1978) (per curiam); United States v. Stanford, 589 F. 2d 285 (CA7 1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 983 (1979). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 464 U. S. 991 (1983), and now reverse.
II
The only issue presented in this case is whether Congress intended the terms “knowingly and willfully” in § 1001 to modify the statute’s jurisdictional language, thereby requiring the Government to prove that false statements were made with actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction. The issue thus presented is one of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, we turn first to the language of the statute.
A
The relevant language of § 1001 provides:
“Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, . . . shall be fined . . . .”
The statutory language requiring that knowingly false statements be made “in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States” is a jurisdictional requirement. Its primary purpose is to identify the factor that makes the false statement an appropriate subject for federal concern. Jurisdictional language need not contain the same culpability requirement as other elements of the offense. Indeed, we have held that “the existence of the fact that confers federal jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act made criminal by the federal statute.” United States v. Feola, 420 U. S. 671, 676-677, n. 9 (1975). Certainly in this case, the statutory language makes clear that Congress did not intend the terms “knowingly and willfully” to establish the standard of culpability for the jurisdictional element of § 1001. The jurisdictional language appears in a phrase separate from the prohibited conduct modified by the terms “knowingly and willfully.” Any natural reading of § 1001, therefore, establishes that the terms “knowingly and willfully” modify only the making of “false, fictitious or fraudulent statements,” and not the predicate circumstance that those statements be made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. Once this is clear, there is no basis for requiring proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction. The statute contains no language suggesting any additional element of intent, such as a requirement that false statements be “knowingly made in a matter within federal agency jurisdiction,” or “with the intent to deceive the Federal Government.” On its face, therefore, § 1001 requires that the Government prove that false statements were made knowingly and willfully, and it unambiguously dispenses with any requirement that the Government also prove that those statements were made with actual knowledge -of federal agency jurisdiction. Respondent’s argument that the legislative history of the statute supports a contrary interpretation is unpersuasive.
B
The first federal criminal statute prohibiting the making of a false statement in matters within the jurisdiction of any federal agency was the Act of October 23, 1918 (1918 Act), ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015. That Act provided in pertinent part:
“[Wjhoever, ... for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States, or any department thereof, . . . shall knowingly and willfully . . . make . . . any false or fraudulent statements or representations . . . shall be fined . . . .”
Interpreting that provision in United States v. Cohn, 270 U. S. 339 (1926), this Court held that only false statements made with intent to cause “pecuniary or property loss” to the Federal Government were prohibited. Id., at 346-347. The Court rejected the Government’s argument that the terms “with the intent of . . . defrauding” the Federal Government “should be construed as being used not merely in its primary sense of cheating the Government out of property or money, but also in the secondary sense of interfering with or obstructing one of its lawful governmental functions by deceitful and fraudulent means.” Id., at 346. The Court reasoned that if Congress had intended to prohibit all intentional deceit of the Federal Government, it would have used the broad language then employed in § 37 of the Penal Code, which “by its specific terms, extends broadly to every conspiracy ‘to defraud the United States in any manner and for any purpose,’ with no words of limitation whatsoever.” Ibid.
Concerned that the 1918 Act, as thus narrowly construed, was insufficient to protect the authorized functions of federal agencies from a variety of deceptive practices, Congress undertook to amend the federal false-statements statute in 1934. The 1934 provision finally enacted, however, rejected the language suggested in Cohn, and evidenced a conscious choice not to limit the prohibition to false statements made with specific intent to deceive the Federal Government.
The first attempt to amend the false-statements statute was unsuccessful. After debates in both Houses, Congress passed H. R. 8046. That bill provided in pertinent part:
“[E]very person who with the intent to defraud the United States knowingly or willfully makes . . . any false or fraudulent . . . statement, . . . concerning or pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of any department, establishment, administration, agency, office, board, or commission of the United States, . . . shall be punished by . . . fine ... or by imprisonment... , or by both . . . 78 Cong. Rec. 3724 (1934) (emphasis added).
President Roosevelt, however, vetoed the bill because it prohibited only those offenses already covered by the 1918 Act, while reducing the penalties. This was hardly the measure needed to increase the protection of federal agencies from the variety of deceptive practices plaguing the New Deal administration.
To remedy the President’s concerns, Congress quickly passed a second bill that broadened the scope of the federal false-statements statute by omitting the specific-intent language of the prior bill. The 1934 provision finally enacted into law provided in pertinent part:
“[WJhoever shall knowingly .and willfully falsify or conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or make . . . any false or fraudulent statements or representations, ... in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . . shall be fined . . . Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996.
Noticeably lacking from this enactment is any requirement that the prohibited conduct be undertaken with specific intent to deceive the Federal Government, or with actual knowledge that false statements were made in a matter within federal agency jurisdiction. If Congress had intended to impose either requirement, it would have modified the prior bill by replacing the phrase “with intent to defraud the United States” with the phrase “with intent to deceive the United States,” or by inserting the phrase “knowing such statements to be in any matter within the jurisdiction of any federal agency.” That Congress did not include such language, either in the 1934 enactment or in the 1948 revision, provides convincing evidence that the statute does not require actual knowledge of federal involvement.
Finally, there is no support in the legislative history for respondent’s argument that the terms “knowingly and willfully” modify the phrase “in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency].” The terms “knowingly and willfully” appeared in the 1918 Act, but the phrase “in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency]” did not. It is clear, therefore, that in the 1918 Act the terms “knowingly and willfully” did not require proof of actual knowledge of federal involvement. Nor does the legislative history suggest that by adding the jurisdictional prerequisite to the current provision Congress intended to extend the scope of those two terms. The jurisdictional language was added to the current provision solely to limit the reach of the false-statements statute to matters of federal interest.
By requiring proof of specific intent to defraud the United States, Congress limited the 1918 prohibition to matters pertaining to federal concern. There was no reason, therefore, to include the phrase “in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency].” Once the specific-intent language of the 1918 Act was eliminated, however, the current jurisdictional phrase was necessary to ensure that application of the federal prohibition remained limited to issues of federal concern. There is no indication that the addition of this phrase was intended also to change the meaning of the terms “knowingly and willfully” to require proof of actual knowledge of federal involvement. As this Court observed in United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503 (1955), the 1934 enactment “deleted all words as to purpose,” and inserted the phrase “in any matter within the jurisdiction” of a federal agency “simply to compensate for the deleted language as to purpose — to indicate that not all falsifications but only those made to government organs were reached.” Id., at 506, 507-508.
Ill
Respondent argues that absent proof of actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction, § 1001 becomes a “trap for the unwary,” imposing criminal sanctions on “wholly innocent conduct.” Whether or not respondent fairly may characterize the intentional and deliberate lies prohibited by the statute (and manifest in this case) as “wholly innocent conduct,” this argument is not sufficient to overcome the express statutory language of §1001. Respondent does not argue that Congress lacks the power to impose criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to a federal agency, regardless of whether the person who made such statements actually knew that they were being submitted to the Federal Government. Cf. Feola, 420 U. S., at 676, n. 9. That is precisely what Congress has done here. ' In the unlikely event that § 1001 could be the basis for imposing an unduly harsh result on those who intentionally make false statements to the Federal Government, it is for Congress and not this Court to amend the criminal statute.
I — I <3
Both the plain language and the legislative history establish that proof of actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction is not required under § 1001. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals to the contrary.
It is so ordered.
That section provides in full:
“Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
Respondent maintained this defense despite the fact that both the worksheet and the questionnaire made reference to the Department of Defense, and the security questionnaire signed by respondent was captioned “Defense Department.” The latter document also contained a reference to the “Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office,” stated that respondent’s work would require access to “secret” material, and informed respondent that his signature would grant “permission to the Department of Defense to obtain and review copies of [his] medical and institutional records.” App. 29, 32. Nevertheless, respondent testified that he had not read the form carefully before signing it and thus had not noticed either the words “Department of Defense” on the first page or the certification printed above the signature block.
Respondent’s proposed instruction would have informed the jury:
“Unless you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant knew his statements were being made to the United States Department of Defense, you must acquit.” Defendant’s Proposed Instruction No. 9, App. 49.
The jury instructions concerning the essential elements of a §1001 violation read in full:
“Three essential elements are required to be proved in order to establish the offense charged in the indictment:
“FIRST: That the defendant made and used, or caused to be made and used, a false writing or document in relation to a matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States, as charged;
“SECOND: That he did such act or acts with knowledge of the accused that the writing or document was false or fictitious and fraudulent in some material particular, as alleged;
“THIRD: That the defendant knew or should have known that the information was to be submitted to a government agency;
“FOURTH: That he did such act or acts knowingly and willfully.” Id., at 25.
The Government never objected to the District Court’s instruction requiring proof that respondent reasonably should have known that his false statements were made within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. Thus, in this case the Government was required to prove that federal agency jurisdiction was reasonably foreseeable. See n. 14, infra.
The structure of the statutory language found in the 1934 predecessor to § 1001 made the issue equally clear. The jurisdictional language of that provision appeared as a separate phrase at the end of the description of the prohibited conduct and provided in pertinent part:
“[Wjhoever shall knowingly and willfully. . . make. . . any false or fraudulent statements or representations, ... in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . . shall be fined.” Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996.
The most natural reading of this version of the statute also establishes that “knowingly and willfully” applies only to the making of false or fraudulent statements and not to the predicate facts for federal jurisdiction.
Because the statutory language unambiguously dispenses with an actual knowledge requirement, we have no occasion to apply the principle of lenity urged by the dissent. See McElroy v. United States, 455 U. S. 642, 658 (1982); United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503, 509-510 (1955) (although “criminal statutes are to be construed strictly . . . , this does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature”).
The earliest predecessor of the 1918 Act limited its criminal sanctions to false claims made by military personnel and presented to “any person or officer in the civil or military service of the United States.” Act of Mar. 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696. The Act was extended in 1873 to cover “every person” — not merely military personnel — who presented a false claim to an officer or agent of the United States. Act of Dec. 1,1873, approved June 22, 1874. In 1908 and 1909, the penalties of the Act were changed, and the statutory provision was redesignated as § 35. Act of May 30, 1908, 35 Stat. 555; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1088. The 1918 Act revised § 35 and added the false-statements provision relevant here. 40 Stat. 1015.
See H. R. Rep. No. 829, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 3724 (1934).
The Senate initially had proposed a similar bill (S. 2686), but that bill omitted the essential element of specific intent to defraud the United States. The Senate bill provided in relevant part:
“[E]very person who knowingly or willfully makes . . . any false or fraudulent. . . writing . . . pertaining to any . . . matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the Federal Government. . . shall be punished . . . 78 Cong. Rec., at 2858-2859.
The Senate later withdrew its bill in favor of H. R. 8046, and the latter was passed by both Houses of Congress. Id., at 5746.
The President’s veto message read in part as follows:
“This bill [H. R. 8046], in effect, seeks to punish every person who, with intent to defraud the United States, knowingly or willfully makes . . . any false representation concerning any matter within the jurisdiction of any agency of the United States ....
“These offenses are already covered by existing law, which provides for more severe punishment than that proposed by the bill. [The 1918 Act] . . . provides for the punishment of all persons who, for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States . . . knowingly and willfully. . . make[s]. . . any false or fraudulent statement or representation ....
“The bill is objectionable in that its result would be to reduce the punishment for certain frauds against the United States.” Id., at 6778-6779.
See United States v. Godwin, 666 F. 2d 975, 976 (CA5 1978) (“Intent to deceive and intent to defraud are not synonymous. Deceive is to cause to believe the false or to mislead. Defraud is to deprive of some right, interest or property by deceit”). Accord, United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F. 2d 1272 (CA5), cert. denied, 447 U. S. 907 (1980).
The dissent suggests that when Congress eliminated the phrase “with intent to defraud the United States,” it really meant only to eliminate the word “defraud,” but to retain the element of intent with respect to the United States. See post, at 81-82. If that had been the intention of Congress, it simply would have replaced the word “defraud” with the word “deceive” and retained the express-intent requirement. Congress did not do so, and this Court should not rewrite the statute in a way that Congress did not intend.
In the context of this case, respondent’s argument that § 1001 is a “trap for the unwary” is particularly misplaced. It is worth noting that the jury was instructed, without objection from the prosecution, that the Government must prove that respondent “knew or should have known” that his false statements were made within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.
As the Government did not object to the reasonable-foreseeability instruction, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether that instruction erroneously read a culpability requirement into the jurisdictional phrase. Moreover, the only question presented in this case is whether the Government must prove that the false statement was made with actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction. The jury’s finding that federal agency jurisdiction was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, combined with the requirement that the defendant had actual knowledge of the falsity of those statements, precludes the possibility that criminal penalties were imposed on the basis of innocent conduct.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 2014, the Federal Government indicted former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell and his wife, Maureen McDonnell, on bribery charges. The charges related to the acceptance by the McDonnells of $175,000 in loans, gifts, and other benefits from Virginia businessman Jonnie Williams, while Governor McDonnell was in office. Williams was the chief executive officer of Star Scientific, a Virginia-based company that had developed a nutritional supplement made from anatabine, a compound found in tobacco. Star Scientific hoped that Virginia's public universities would perform research studies on anatabine, and Williams wanted Governor McDonnell's assistance in obtaining those studies.
To convict the McDonnells of bribery, the Government was required to show that Governor McDonnell committed (or agreed to commit) an "official act" in exchange for the loans and gifts. The parties did not agree, however, on what counts as an "official act." The Government alleged in the indictment, and maintains on appeal, that Governor McDonnell committed at least five "official acts." Those acts included "arranging meetings" for Williams with other Virginia officials to discuss Star Scientific's product, "hosting" events for Star Scientific at the Governor's Mansion, and "contacting other government officials" concerning studies of anatabine. Supp. App. 47-48. The Government also argued more broadly that these activities constituted "official action" because they related to Virginia business development, a priority of Governor McDonnell's administration. Governor McDonnell contends that merely setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or contacting an official-without more-does not count as an "official act."
At trial, the District Court instructed the jury according to the Government's broad understanding of what constitutes an "official act," and the jury convicted both Governor and Mrs. McDonnell on the bribery charges. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Governor McDonnell's conviction, and we granted review to clarify the meaning of "official act."
I
A
On November 3, 2009, petitioner Robert McDonnell was elected the 71st Governor of Virginia. His campaign slogan was "Bob's for Jobs," and his focus in office was on promoting business in Virginia. As Governor, McDonnell spoke about economic development in Virginia "on a daily basis" and attended numerous "events, ribbon cuttings," and "plant facility openings." App. 4093, 5241. He also referred thousands of constituents to meetings with members of his staff and other government officials. According to longtime staffers, Governor McDonnell likely had more events at the Virginia Governor's Mansion to promote Virginia business than had occurred in "any other administration." Id., at 4093.
This case concerns Governor McDonnell's interactions with one of his constituents, Virginia businessman Jonnie Williams. Williams was the CEO of Star Scientific, a Virginia-based company that developed and marketed Anatabloc, a nutritional supplement made from anatabine, a compound found in tobacco. Star Scientific hoped to obtain Food and Drug Administration approval of Anatabloc as an anti-inflammatory drug. An important step in securing that approval was initiating independent research studies on the health benefits of anatabine. Star Scientific hoped Virginia's public universities would undertake such studies, pursuant to a grant from Virginia's Tobacco Commission.
Governor McDonnell first met Williams in 2009, when Williams offered McDonnell transportation on his private airplane to assist with McDonnell's election campaign. Shortly after the election, Williams had dinner with Governor and Mrs. McDonnell at a restaurant in New York. The conversation turned to Mrs. McDonnell's search for a dress for the inauguration, which led Williams to offer to purchase a gown for her. Governor McDonnell's counsel later instructed Williams not to buy the dress, and Mrs. McDonnell told Williams that she would take a rain check. Id., at 2203-2209.
In October 2010, Governor McDonnell and Williams met again on Williams's plane. During the flight, Williams told Governor McDonnell that he "needed his help" moving forward on the research studies at Virginia's public universities, and he asked to be introduced to the person that he "needed to talk to." Id., at 2210-2211. Governor McDonnell agreed to introduce Williams to Dr. William Hazel, Virginia's Secretary of Health and Human Resources. Williams met with Dr. Hazel the following month, but the meeting was unfruitful; Dr. Hazel was skeptical of the science behind Anatabloc and did not assist Williams in obtaining the studies. Id., at 2211-2217, 3738-3749.
Six months later, Governor McDonnell's wife, Maureen McDonnell, offered to seat Williams next to the Governor at a political rally. Shortly before the event, Williams took Mrs. McDonnell on a shopping trip and bought her $20,000 worth of designer clothing. The McDonnells later had Williams over for dinner at the Governor's Mansion, where they discussed research studies on Anatabloc. Id., at 6560.
Two days after that dinner, Williams had an article about Star Scientific's research e-mailed to Mrs. McDonnell, which she forwarded to her husband. Less than an hour later, Governor McDonnell texted his sister to discuss the financial situation of certain rental properties they owned in Virginia Beach. Governor McDonnell also e-mailed his daughter to ask about expenses for her upcoming wedding.
The next day, Williams returned to the Governor's Mansion for a meeting with Mrs. McDonnell. At the meeting, Mrs. McDonnell described the family's financial problems, including their struggling rental properties in Virginia Beach and their daughter's wedding expenses. Mrs. McDonnell, who had experience selling nutritional supplements, told Williams that she had a background in the area and could help him with Anatabloc. According to Williams, she explained that the "Governor says it's okay for me to help you and-but I need you to help me. I need you to help me with this financial situation." Id., at 2231. Mrs. McDonnell then asked Williams for a $50,000 loan, in addition to a $15,000 gift to help pay for her daughter's wedding, and Williams agreed.
Williams testified that he called Governor McDonnell after the meeting and said, "I understand the financial problems and I'm willing to help. I just wanted to make sure that you knew about this." Id., at 2233. According to Williams, Governor McDonnell thanked him for his help. Ibid. Governor McDonnell testified, in contrast, that he did not know about the loan at the time, and that when he learned of it he was upset that Mrs. McDonnell had requested the loan from Williams. Id., at 6095-6096. Three days after the meeting between Williams and Mrs. McDonnell, Governor McDonnell directed his assistant to forward the article on Star Scientific to Dr. Hazel.
In June 2011, Williams sent Mrs. McDonnell's chief of staff a letter containing a proposed research protocol for the Anatabloc studies. The letter was addressed to Governor McDonnell, and it suggested that the Governor "use the attached protocol to initiate the 'Virginia Study' of Anatabloc at the Medical College of Virginia and the University of Virginia School of Medicine." Id., at 2254. Governor McDonnell gave the letter to Dr. Hazel. Id., at 6121-6122. Williams testified at trial that he did not "recall any response" to the letter. Id., at 2256.
In July 2011, the McDonnell family visited Williams's vacation home for the weekend, and Governor McDonnell borrowed Williams's Ferrari while there. Shortly thereafter, Governor McDonnell asked Dr. Hazel to send an aide to a meeting with Williams and Mrs. McDonnell to discuss research studies on Anatabloc. The aide later testified that she did not feel pressured by Governor or Mrs. McDonnell to do "anything other than have the meeting," and that Williams did not ask anything of her at the meeting. Id., at 3075. After the meeting, the aide sent Williams a "polite blow-off" e-mail. Id., at 3081.
At a subsequent meeting at the Governor's Mansion, Mrs. McDonnell admired Williams's Rolex and mentioned that she wanted to get one for Governor McDonnell. Williams asked if Mrs. McDonnell wanted him to purchase a Rolex for the Governor, and Mrs. McDonnell responded, "Yes, that would be nice." Id., at 2274. Williams did so, and Mrs. McDonnell later gave the Rolex to Governor McDonnell as a Christmas present.
In August 2011, the McDonnells hosted a lunch event for Star Scientific at the Governor's Mansion. According to Williams, the purpose of the event was to launch Anatabloc. See id., at 2278. According to Governor McDonnell's gubernatorial counsel, however, it was just lunch. See id., at 3229-3231.
The guest list for the event included researchers at the University of Virginia and Virginia Commonwealth University. During the event, Star Scientific distributed free samples of Anatabloc, in addition to eight $25,000 checks that researchers could use in preparing grant proposals for studying Anatabloc. Governor McDonnell asked researchers at the event whether they thought "there was some scientific validity" to Anatabloc and "whether or not there was any reason to explore this further." Id., at 3344. He also asked whether this could "be something good for the Commonwealth, particularly as it relates to economy or job creation." Ibid. When Williams asked Governor McDonnell whether he would support funding for the research studies, Governor McDonnell "very politely" replied, "I have limited decision-making power in this area." Id., at 3927.
In January 2012, Mrs. McDonnell asked Williams for an additional loan for the Virginia Beach rental properties, and Williams agreed. On February 3, Governor McDonnell followed up on that conversation by calling Williams to discuss a $50,000 loan.
Several days later, Williams complained to Mrs. McDonnell that the Virginia universities were not returning Star Scientific's calls. She passed Williams's complaint on to the Governor. While Mrs. McDonnell was driving with Governor McDonnell, she also e-mailed Governor McDonnell's counsel, stating that the Governor "wants to know why nothing has developed" with the research studies after Williams had provided the eight $25,000 checks for preparing grant proposals, and that the Governor "wants to get this going" at the universities. Id., at 3214, 4931. According to Governor McDonnell, however, Mrs. McDonnell acted without his knowledge or permission, and he never made the statements she attributed to him. Id., at 6306-6308.
On February 16, Governor McDonnell e-mailed Williams to check on the status of documents related to the $50,000 loan. A few minutes later, Governor McDonnell e-mailed his counsel stating, "Please see me about Anatabloc issues at VCU and UVA. Thanks." Id., at 3217. Governor McDonnell's counsel replied, "Will do. We need to be careful with this issue." Ibid. The next day, Governor McDonnell's counsel called Star Scientific's lobbyist in order to "change the expectations" of Star Scientific regarding the involvement of the Governor's Office in the studies. Id., at 3219.
At the end of February, Governor McDonnell hosted a healthcare industry reception at the Governor's Mansion, which Williams attended. Mrs. McDonnell also invited a number of guests recommended by Williams, including researchers at the Virginia universities. Governor McDonnell was present, but did not mention Star Scientific, Williams, or Anatabloc during the event. Id., at 3671-3672. That same day, Governor McDonnell and Williams spoke about the $50,000 loan, and Williams loaned the money to the McDonnells shortly thereafter. Id., at 2306, 2353.
In March 2012, Governor McDonnell met with Lisa Hicks-Thomas, the Virginia Secretary of Administration, and Sara Wilson, the Director of the Virginia Department of Human Resource Management. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Virginia's health plan for state employees. At that time, Governor McDonnell was taking Anatabloc several times a day. He took a pill during the meeting, and told Hicks-Thomas and Wilson that the pills "were working well for him" and "would be good for" state employees. Id., at 4227. Hicks-Thomas recalled Governor McDonnell asking them to meet with a representative from Star Scientific; Wilson had no such recollection. Id., at 4219, 4227. After the discussion with Governor McDonnell, Hicks-Thomas and Wilson looked up Anatabloc on the Internet, but they did not set up a meeting with Star Scientific or conduct any other follow-up. Id., at 4220, 4230. It is undisputed that Virginia's health plan for state employees does not cover nutritional supplements such as Anatabloc.
In May 2012, Governor McDonnell requested an additional $20,000 loan, which Williams provided. Throughout this period, Williams also paid for several rounds of golf for Governor McDonnell and his children, took the McDonnells on a weekend trip, and gave $10,000 as a wedding gift to one of the McDonnells' daughters. In total, Williams gave the McDonnells over $175,000 in gifts and loans.
B
In January 2014, Governor McDonnell was indicted for accepting payments, loans, gifts, and other things of value from Williams and Star Scientific in exchange for "performing official actions on an as-needed basis, as opportunities arose, to legitimize, promote, and obtain research studies for Star Scientific's products." Supp. App. 46. The charges against him comprised one count of conspiracy to commit honest services fraud, three counts of honest services fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion, six counts of Hobbs Act extortion, and two counts of making a false statement. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349 (honest services fraud); § 1951(a) (Hobbs Act extortion); § 1014 (false statement). Mrs. McDonnell was indicted on similar charges, plus obstructing official proceedings, based on her alleged involvement in the scheme. See § 1512(c)(2) (obstruction).
The theory underlying both the honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion charges was that Governor McDonnell had accepted bribes from Williams. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 404, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (construing honest services fraud to forbid "fraudulent schemes to deprive another of honest services through bribes or kickbacks"); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260, 269, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992) (construing Hobbs Act extortion to include " 'taking a bribe' ").
The parties agreed that they would define honest services fraud with reference to the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. That statute makes it a crime for "a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly" to demand, seek, receive, accept, or agree "to receive or accept anything of value" in return for being "influenced in the performance of any official act." § 201(b)(2). An "official act" is defined as "any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit." § 201(a)(3).
The parties also agreed that obtaining a "thing of value... knowing that the thing of value was given in return for official action" was an element of Hobbs Act extortion, and that they would use the definition of "official act" found in the federal bribery statute to define "official action" under the Hobbs Act. 792 F.3d 478, 505 (C.A.4 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As a result of all this, the Government was required to prove that Governor McDonnell committed or agreed to commit an "official act" in exchange for the loans and gifts from Williams. See Evans, 504 U.S., at 268, 112 S.Ct. 1881 ("the offense is completed at the time when the public official receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an element of the offense").
The Government alleged that Governor McDonnell had committed at least five "official acts":
(1) "arranging meetings for [Williams] with Virginia government officials, who were subordinates of the Governor, to discuss and promote Anatabloc";
(2) "hosting, and... attending, events at the Governor's Mansion designed to encourage Virginia university researchers to initiate studies of anatabine and to promote Star Scientific's products to doctors for referral to their patients";
(3) "contacting other government officials in the [Governor's Office] as part of an effort to encourage Virginia state research universities to initiate studies of anatabine";
(4) "promoting Star Scientific's products and facilitating its relationships with Virginia government officials by allowing [Williams] to invite individuals important to Star Scientific's business to exclusive events at the Governor's Mansion"; and
(5) "recommending that senior government officials in the [Governor's Office] meet with Star Scientific executives to discuss ways that the company's products could lower healthcare costs." Supp. App. 47-48 (indictment).
The case proceeded to a jury trial, which lasted five weeks. Pursuant to an immunity agreement, Williams testified that he had given the gifts and loans to the McDonnells to obtain the Governor's "help with the testing" of Anatabloc at Virginia's medical schools. App. 2234. Governor McDonnell acknowledged that he had requested loans and accepted gifts from Williams. He testified, however, that setting up meetings with government officials was something he did "literally thousands of times" as Governor, and that he did not expect his staff "to do anything other than to meet" with Williams. Id., at 6042.
Several state officials testified that they had discussed Anatabloc with Williams or Governor McDonnell, but had not taken any action to further the research studies. Id., at 3739-3750 (Dr. Hazel), 3075-3077 (aide to Dr. Hazel), 4218-4220 (Sara Wilson), 4230-4231 (Lisa Hicks-Thomas). A UVA employee in the university research office, who had never spoken with the Governor about Anatabloc, testified that she wrote a pro/con list concerning research studies on Anatabloc. The first "pro" was the "[p]erception to Governor that UVA would like to work with local companies," and the first "con" was the "[p]olitical pressure from Governor and impact on future UVA requests from the Governor." Id., at 4321, 4323 (Sharon Krueger).
Following closing arguments, the District Court instructed the jury that to convict Governor McDonnell it must find that he agreed "to accept a thing of value in exchange for official action." Supp. App. 68. The court described the five alleged "official acts" set forth in the indictment, which involved arranging meetings, hosting events, and contacting other government officials. The court then quoted the statutory definition of "official act," and-as the Government had requested-advised the jury that the term encompassed "acts that a public official customarily performs," including acts "in furtherance of longer-term goals" or "in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end." Id., at 69-70.
Governor McDonnell had requested the court to further instruct the jury that the "fact that an activity is a routine activity, or a'settled practice,' of an office-holder does not alone make it an 'official act,' " and that "merely arranging a meeting, attending an event, hosting a reception, or making a speech are not, standing alone, 'official acts,' even if they are settled practices of the official," because they "are not decisions on matters pending before the government." 792 F.3d, at 513 (internal quotation marks omitted). He also asked the court to explain to the jury that an "official act" must intend to or "in fact influence a specific official decision the government actually makes-such as awarding a contract, hiring a government employee, issuing a license, passing a law, or implementing a regulation." App. to Pet. for Cert. 147a. The District Court declined to give Governor McDonnell's proposed instruction to the jury.
The jury convicted Governor McDonnell on the honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion charges, but acquitted him on the false statement charges. Mrs. McDonnell was also convicted on most of the charges against her. Although the Government requested a sentence of at least ten years for Governor McDonnell, the District Court sentenced him to two years in prison. Mrs. McDonnell received a one-year sentence.
Following the verdict, Governor McDonnell moved to vacate his convictions on the ground that the jury instructions "were legally erroneous because they (i) allowed the jury to convict [him] on an erroneous understanding of 'official act,' and (ii) allowed a conviction on the theory that [he] accepted things of value that were given for future unspecified action." 64 F.Supp.3d 783, 787 (E.D.Va.2014). The District Court denied the motion. Id., at 802. In addition, Governor McDonnell moved for acquittal on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, and that the Hobbs Act and honest services statute were unconstitutionally vague. Crim. No. 3:14-CR-12 (ED Va., Dec. 1, 2014), Supp. App. 80, 82-92. That motion was also denied. See id., at 92-94. (He also raised other challenges to his convictions, which are not at issue here.)
Governor McDonnell appealed his convictions to the Fourth Circuit, challenging the definition of "official action" in the jury instructions on the ground that it deemed "virtually all of a public servant's activities 'official,' no matter how minor or innocuous." 792 F.3d, at 506. He also reiterated his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the constitutionality of the statutes under which he was convicted. Id., at 509, n. 19, 515.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, and we granted certiorari. 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 891, 193 L.Ed.2d 784 (2016). Mrs. McDonnell's separate appeal remains pending before the Court of Appeals.
II
The issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the term "official act." Section 201(a)(3) defines an "official act" as "any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit."
According to the Government, "Congress used intentionally broad language" in § 201(a)(3) to embrace "any decision or action, on any question or matter, that may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity." Brief for United States 20-21 (Government's emphasis; alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). The Government concludes that the term "official act" therefore encompasses nearly any activity by a public official. In the Government's view, "official act" specifically includes arranging a meeting, contacting another public official, or hosting an event-without more-concerning any subject, including a broad policy issue such as Virginia economic development. Id., at 47-49; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-30.
Governor McDonnell, in contrast, contends that statutory context compels a more circumscribed reading, limiting "official acts" to those acts that "direct [ ] a particular resolution of a specific governmental decision," or that pressure another official to do so. Brief for Petitioner 44, 51. He also claims that "vague corruption laws" such as § 201 implicate serious constitutional concerns, militating "in favor of a narrow, cautious reading of these criminal statutes." Id., at 21.
Taking into account the text of the statute, the precedent of this Court, and the constitutional concerns raised by Governor McDonnell, we reject the Government's reading of § 201(a)(3) and adopt a more bounded interpretation of "official act." Under that interpretation, setting up a meeting, calling another public official, or hosting an event does not, standing alone, qualify as an "official act."
A
The text of § 201(a)(3) sets forth two requirements for an "official act": First, the Government must identify a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" that "may at any time be pending" or "may by law be brought" before a public official. Second, the Government must prove that the public official made a decision or took an action "on" that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, or agreed to do so. The issue here is whether arranging a meeting, contacting another official, or hosting an event-without more-can be a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy," and if not, whether it can be a decision or action on a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy."
The first inquiry is whether a typical meeting, call, or event is itself a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy." The Government argues that nearly any activity by a public official qualifies as a question or matter-from workaday functions, such as the typical call, meeting, or event, to the broadest issues the government confronts, such as fostering economic development. We conclude, however, that the terms "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" do not sweep so broadly.
The last four words in that list-"cause," "suit," "proceeding," and "controversy"-connote a formal exercise of governmental power, such as a lawsuit, hearing, or administrative determination. See, e.g., Crimes Act of 1790, § 21, 1 Stat. 117 (using "cause," "suit," and "controversy" in a related statutory context to refer to judicial proceedings); Black's Law Dictionary 278-279, 400, 1602-1603 (4th ed. 1951) (defining "cause," "suit," and "controversy" as judicial proceedings); 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3) (using "proceeding" to refer to trials, hearings, or the like "before any court, any committee of either House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency, commission, or officer"). Although it may be difficult to define the precise reach of those terms, it seems clear that a typical meeting, telephone call, or event arranged by a public official does not qualify as a "cause, suit, proceeding or controversy."
But what about a "question" or "matter"? A "question" could mean any "subject or aspect that is in dispute, open for discussion, or to be inquired into," and a "matter" any "subject" of "interest or relevance." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1394, 1863 (1961). If those meanings were adopted, a typical meeting, call, or event would qualify as a "question" or "matter." A "question" may also be interpreted more narrowly, however, as "a subject or point of debate or a proposition being or to be voted on in a meeting," such as a question "before the senate." Id., at 1863. Similarly, a "matter" may be limited to "a topic under active and usually serious or practical consideration," such as a matter that "will come before the committee." Id., at 1394.
To choose between those competing definitions, we look to the context in which the words appear. Under the familiar interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, "a word is known by the company it keeps." Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961). While "not an inescapable rule," this canon "is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress." Ibid. For example, in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995), a statute defined the word "prospectus" as a "prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication." Id., at 573-574, 115 S.Ct. 1061 (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that although the word "communication" could in the abstract mean any type of communication, "it is apparent that the list refers to documents of wide dissemination," and that inclusion "of the term 'communication' in that list suggests that it too refers to a public communication." Id., at 575, 115 S.Ct. 1061.
Applying that same approach here, we conclude that a "question" or "matter" must be similar in nature to a "cause, suit, proceeding or controversy." Because a typical meeting, call, or event arranged by a public official is not of the same stripe as a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee, it does not qualify as a "question" or "matter" under § 201(a)(3).
That more limited reading also comports with the presumption "that statutory language is not superfluous." Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 299, n. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2455, 165 L.Ed.2d 526 (2006). If "question" and "matter" were as unlimited in scope as the Government argues, the terms "cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" would serve no role in the statute-every "cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" would also be a "question" or "matter." Under a more confined interpretation, however, "question" and "matter" may be understood to refer to a formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a "cause, suit, proceeding or controversy," but that does not necessarily fall into one of those prescribed categories.
Because a typical meeting, call, or event is not itself a question or matter, the next step is to determine whether arranging a meeting, contacting another official, or hosting an event may qualify as a "decision or action" on a different question or matter. That requires us to first establish what counts as a question or matter in this case.
In addition to the requirements we have described, § 201(a)(3) states that the question or matter must be "pending" or "may by law be brought" before "any public official." "Pending" and "may by law be brought" suggest something that is relatively circumscribed-the kind of thing that can be put on an agenda, tracked for progress, and then checked off as complete. In particular, "may by law be brought" conveys something within the specific duties of an official's position-the function conferred by the authority of his office. The word "any" conveys that the matter may be pending either before the public official who is performing the official act, or before another public official.
The District Court, however, determined that the relevant matter in this case could be considered at a much higher level of generality as "Virginia business and economic development," or-as it was often put to the jury-"Bob's for Jobs." Supp. App. 88; see, e.g., App. 1775, 2858, 2912, 3733. Economic development is not naturally described as a matter "pending" before a public official-or something that may be brought "by law" before him-any more than "justice" is pending or may be brought by law before a judge, or "national security" is pending or may be brought by law before an officer of the Armed Forces. Under § 201(a)(3), the pertinent "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" must be more focused and concrete.
For its part, the Fourth Circuit found at least three questions or matters at issue in this case: (1) "whether researchers at any of Virginia's state universities would initiate a study of Anatabloc"; (2) "whether the state-created Tobacco Indemnification and Community Revitalization Commission" would "allocate grant money for the study of anatabine"; and (3) "whether the health insurance plan for state employees in Virginia would include Anatabloc as a covered drug." 792 F.3d, at 515-516. We agree that those qualify as questions or matters under § 201(a)(3). Each is focused and concrete, and each involves a formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit, administrative determination, or hearing.
The question remains whether-as the Government argues-merely setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling another official qualifies as a decision or action on any of those three questions or matters. Although the word "decision," and especially the word "action," could be read expansively to support the Government's view, our opinion in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 119 S.Ct. 1402, 143 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999), rejects that interpretation.
In Sun-Diamond, the Court stated that it was not an "official act" under § 201 for the President to host a championship sports team at the White House, the Secretary of Education to visit a high school, or the Secretary of Agriculture to deliver a speech to "farmers concerning various matters of USDA policy." Id., at 407, 119 S.Ct. 1402. We recognized that "the Secretary of Agriculture always has before him or in prospect matters that affect farmers, just as the President always has before him or in prospect matters that affect college and professional sports, and the Secretary of Education matters that affect high schools." Ibid. But we concluded that the existence of such pending matters was not enough to find that any action related to them constituted an "official act." Ibid. It was possible to avoid the "absurdities" of convicting individuals on corruption charges for engaging in such conduct, we explained, "through the definition of that term, " i.e., by adopting a more limited definition of "official acts." Id., at 408, 119 S.Ct. 1402.
It is apparent from Sun-Diamond that hosting an event, meeting with other officials, or speaking with interested parties is not, standing alone, a "decision or action" within the meaning of § 201(a)(3), even if the event, meeting, or speech is related to a pending question or matter. Instead, something more is required: § 201(a)(3) specifies that the public official must make a decision or take an action on that question or matter, or agree to do so.
For example, a decision or action to initiate a research study-or a decision or action on a qualifying step, such as narrowing down the list of potential research topics-would qualify as an "official act." A public official may also make a decision or take an action on a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1954 a jury in a Federal District Court found the petitioner guilty of transporting a kidnapped person in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1201, and of transporting a stolen automobile in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2312. The petitioner was represented by court-appointed counsel at his trial. When, with counsel, he appeared before the District Judge for sentencing, the petitioner was not asked whether he wished to make a statement in his own behalf. The District Judge, after noting his familiarity with the petitioner’s character and history, imposed consecutive prison sentences of twenty years and three years for the two offenses of which the jury had found the petitioner guilty. There was no appeal.
The present litigation began in 1959 with the filing of a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. Among various grounds for relief asserted, the motion alleged that the petitioner at the time of sentencing had been “denied the right under Rule 32 (a) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title 18 U. S. C. to have the opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.” The District Court denied the motion without explicitly discussing the Rule 32 (a) claim. 186 F. Supp. 441. The Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam, 282 F. 2d 352. We granted certiorari “limited to the question of whether petitioner may raise his claim under Federal Criminal Rule 32 (a) in the proceeding which he has now brought.” 365 U. S. 841.
Rule 32 (a) in pertinent part provides: “Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.” The meaning of this Rule was before the Court last Term in Green v. United States, 365 U. S. 301. Although there was no Court opinion in the Green case, eight members of the Court concurred in the view that Rule 32 (a) requires a district judge before imposing sentence to afford every convicted defendant an opportunity personally to speak in his own behalf. There thus remains no doubt as to what the Rule commands. Moreover, the present record makes clear that this petitioner was not given an express opportunity to make a personal statement at the time he was sentenced. This case, therefore, is totally unembarrassed by any such factual controversy as divided the Court in Green. The only issue presented is whether a district court’s failure explicitly to afford a defendant an opportunity to make a statement at the time of sentencing furnishes, without more, grounds for a successful collateral attack upon the judgment and sentence. We hold that the failure to follow the formal requirements of Rule 32 (a) is not of itself an error that can be raised by collateral attack, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Section 2255 of Title 28, U. S. C., provides that a prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court may file a motion in the “court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” The statute states four grounds upon which such relief may be claimed: (1) “that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States;” (2) “that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence;” (3) “that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law;” and (4) that the sentence “is otherwise subject to collateral attack.”
The circumstances which led Congress in 1948 to enact this legislation were reviewed in detail by Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Court in United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205. It is unnecessary to review again here this legislative history, with which Chief Justice Vinson, as Chairman of the Judicial Conference of the United States, was particularly familiar. Suffice it to say that it conclusively appears from the historic context in which § 2255 was enacted that the legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined. See Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415, 421 (concurring opinion).
“[A] review of the history of Section 2255 shows that it was passed at the instance of the Judicial Conference to meet practical difficulties that had arisen in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon their convictions. On the contrary, the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum.” United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S., at 219. (Emphasis added.)
The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether he has anything to say before sentence is imposed is not of itself an error of the character or magnitude cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus. It is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. It does not present “exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.” Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 27. See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101.
In Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, the Court held that the remedy of habeas corpus was unavailable in circumstances far more compelling than are presented here. There the petitioners at their criminal trial had been denied an opportunity to present a defense which subsequent decisions of this Court had held should clearly have been available to them. What was said in that case is apposite here :
“We are dealing here with a problem which has radiations far beyond the present cases. The courts which tried the defendants had jurisdiction over their persons and over the offense. They committed an error of law .... That error did not go to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Congress, moreover, has provided a regular, orderly method for correction of all such errors by granting an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals and by vesting us with certiorari jurisdiction. It is not uncommon after a trial is ended and the time for appeal has passed to discover that a shift in the law or the impact of a new decision has given increased relevance to a point made at the trial but not pursued on appeal. ... If in such circumstances, habeas corpus could be used to correct the error, the writ would become a delayed motion for a new trial, renewed from time to time as the legal climate changed. Error which was not deemed sufficiently adequate to warrant an appeal would acquire new implications. . . . Wise judicial administration of the federal courts counsels against such course, at least where the error does not trench on any constitutional rights of defendants nor involve the jurisdiction of the trial court.” 332 U. S., at 181-182.
It is to be noted that we are not dealing here with a case where the defendant was affirmatively denied an opportunity to speak during the hearing at which his sentence was imposed. Nor is it suggested that in imposing the sentence the District Judge was either misinformed or uninformed as to any relevant circumstances. Indeed, there is no claim that the defendant would have had anything at all to say if he had been formally invited to speak. Whether § 2255 relief would be available if a violation of Rule 32 (a) occurred in the context of other aggravating circumstances is a question we therefore do not consider. We decide only that such collateral relief is not available when all that is shown is a failure to comply with the formal requirements of the Rule.
It is suggested that although the petitioner denominated his motion as one brought under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, we may consider it as a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This is correct. Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415, 418, 422. But, as the Rule’s language and history make clear, the narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction at any time of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence. The sentence in this case was not illegal. The punishment meted out was not in excess of that prescribed by the relevant statutes, multiple terms were not imposed for the same offense, nor were the terms of the sentence itself legally or constitutionally invalid in any other respect.
Affirmed.
In an earlier motion filed under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 the petitioner claimed that he had been prevented by government agents from appealing the judgment of conviction. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals set aside the District Court’s order and directed that a hearing be had on the motion. 256 F. 2d 957. After a hearing before a different district judge, the motion was again denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 268 F. 2d 203.
The majority of the Court in the Green case did not decide whether the issue of a Rule 32 (a) violation could be raised on collateral attack, or whether such a violation “would constitute an error per se rendering the sentence illegal.” 365 U. S., at 303.
“A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” 28 U. S. C. § 2255.
See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F. R. D. 171.
The Courts of Appeals, at least since the Hayman decision, appear to have consistently understood the substantive scope of § 2255 to be the same as that of habeas corpus. See, e. g., Larson v. United States, 275 F. 2d 673 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Black v. United States, 269 F. 2d 38 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Taylor v. United States, 229 F. 2d 826, 832 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Kreuter v. United States, 201 F. 2d 33, 35 (C. A. 10th Cir.).
See Van Hook v. United States, 365 U. S. 609, for the relief afforded on direct appeal in a case where the sentencing judge disregarded the mandate of Rule 32 (a).
Rule 35 provides in pertinent part: “The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.”
As has been pointed out, Rule 35 “was a codification of existing law and was intended to remove any doubt created by the decision in United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 67, as to the jurisdiction of a District Court to correct an illegal sentence after the expiration of the term at which it was entered.” Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S., at 422 (concurring opinion).
Compare Heflin v. United States, supra. In that case Rule 35 was invoked in a situation where we unanimously recognized that the only issue was whether “the sentence imposed was illegal on its face.” 358 U. S., at 418 (Court opinion), 422 (concurring opinion). Heflin involved the imposition of separate consecutive sentences for a single offense.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | A | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A Wisconsin statute provides that before suit may be brought in state court against a state or local governmental entity or officer, the plaintiff must notify the governmental defendant of the circumstances giving rise to the claim, the amount of the claim, and his or her intent to hold the named defendant liable. The statute further requires that, in order to afford the defendant an opportunity to consider the requested relief, the claimant must refrain from filing suit for 120 days after providing such notice. Failure to comply with these requirements constitutes grounds for dismissal of the action. In the present case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that this notice-of-claim statute applies to federal civil rights actions brought in state court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Because we conclude that these requirements are pre-empted as inconsistent with federal law, we reverse.
W
On July 4, 1981, Milwaukee police officers stopped petitioner Bobby Felder for questioning while searching his neighborhood for an armed suspect. The interrogation proved to be hostile and apparently loud, attracting the attention of petitioner’s family and neighbors, who succeeded in convincing the police that petitioner was not the man they sought. According to police reports, the officers then directed petitioner to return home, but he continued to argue and allegedly pushed one of them, thereby precipitating his arrest for disorderly conduct. Petitioner alleges that in the course of this arrest the officers beat him about the head and face with batons, dragged him across the ground, and threw him, partially unconscious, into the back of a paddy wagon face first, all in full view of his family and neighbors. Shortly afterwards, in response to complaints from these neighbors, a local city alderman and members of the Milwaukee Police Department arrived on the scene and began interviewing witnesses to the arrest. Three days later, the local alderman wrote directly to the chief of police requesting a full investigation into the incident. Petitioner, who is black, alleges that various members of the Police Department responded to this request by conspiring to cover up the misconduct of the arresting officers, all of whom are white. The Department took no disciplinary action against any of the officers, and the city attorney subsequently dropped the disorderly conduct charge against petitioner.
Nine months after the incident, petitioner filed this action in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court against the city of Milwaukee and certain of its police officers, alleging that the beating and arrest were unprovoked and racially motivated, and violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He sought redress under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, as well as attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988. The officers moved to dismiss the suit based on petitioner’s failure to comply with the State’s notice-of-claim statute. That statute provides that no action may be brought or maintained against any state governmental subdivision, agency, or officer unless the claimant either provides written notice of the claim within 120 days of the alleged injury, or demonstrates that the relevant subdivision, agency, or officer had actual notice of the claim and was not prejudiced by the lack of written notice. Wis. Stat. §893.80(l)(a) (1983 and Supp. 1987). The statute further provides that the party seeking redress must also submit an itemized statement of the relief sought to the governmental subdivision or agency, which then has 120 days to grant or disallow the requested relief. §893.80(l)(b). Finally, claimants must bring suit within six months of receiving notice that their claim has been disallowed. Ibid.
The trial court granted the officers’ motion as to all state-law causes of action but denied the motion as to petitioner’s remaining federal claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of its earlier decisions holding the notice-of-claim statute inapplicable to federal civil rights actions brought in state court. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, reversed. 139 Wis. 2d 614, 408 N. W. 2d 19 (1987). Passing on the question for the first time, the court reasoned that while Congress may establish the procedural framework under which claims are heard in federal courts, States retain the authority under the Constitution to prescribe the rules and procedures that govern actions in their own tribunals. Accordingly, a party who chooses to vindicate a congressionally created right in state court must abide by the State’s procedures. Requiring compliance with the notice-of-claim statute, the court determined, does not frustrate the remedial and deterrent purposes of the federal civil rights laws because the statute neither limits the amount a plaintiff may recover for violation of his or her civil rights, nor precludes the possibility of such recovery altogether. Rather, the court reasoned, the notice requirement advances the State’s legitimate interests in protecting against stale or fraudulent claims, facilitating prompt settlement of valid claims, and identifying and correcting inappropriate conduct by governmental employees and officials. Turning to the question of compliance in this case, the court concluded that the complaints lodged with the local police by petitioner’s neighbors and the letter submitted to the police chief by the local aider-man failed to satisfy the statute’s actual notice standard, because these communications neither recited the facts giving rise to the alleged injuries nor revealed petitioner’s intent to hold the defendants responsible for those injuries.
We granted certiorari, 484 U. S. 942 (1987), and now reverse.
II
No one disputes the general and unassailable proposition relied upon by the Wisconsin Supreme Court below that States may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts. By the same token, however, where state courts entertain a federally created cause of action, the “federal right cannot be defeated by the.forms of local practice.” Brown v. Western R. Co. of Alabama, 338 U. S. 294, 296 (1949). The question before us today, therefore, is essentially one of pre-emption: is the application of the State’s notice-of-claim provision to § 1983. actions brought in state courts consistent with the goals of the federal civil rights laws, or does the enforcement of such a requirement instead “‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress’”? Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 649 (1971) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941)). Under the.Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution, “[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict, with a valid federal law,” for “any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.” Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663, 666 (1962). Because the notice-of-claim statute at issue here conflicts in both its purpose and effects with the remedial objectives of § 1983, and because its enforcement in such actions will frequently and predictably produce different outcomes in § 1983 litigation based solely on whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court, we conclude that the state law is pre-empted when the § 1983 action is brought in a state court.
A
Section 1983 creates a species of liability in favor of persons deprived of their federal civil rights by those wielding state authority. As we have repeatedly emphasized, “the central objective of the Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes... is to ensure that individuals whose federal constitutional or statutory rights are abridged may recover damages or secure injunctive relief.” Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U. S. 42, 55 (1984). Thus, §1983 provides “a uniquely federal remedy against incursions... upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation,” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 239 (1972), and is to be accorded “a sweep as broad as its language.” United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 801 (1966).
Any assessment of the applicability of a state law to federal civil rights litigation, therefore, must be made in light of the purpose and nature of the federal right. This is so whether the question of state-law applicability arises in §1983 litigation brought in state courts, which possess concurrent jurisdiction over such actions, see Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496, 506-507 (1982), or in federal-court litigation, where, because the federal civil rights laws fail to provide certain rules of decision thought essential to the orderly adjudication of rights, courts are occasionally called upon to borrow state law. See 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Accordingly, we have held that a state law that immunizes government conduct otherwise subject to suit under § 1983 is preempted, even where the federal civil rights litigation takes place in state court, because the application of the state immunity law would thwart the congressional remedy, see Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, 284 (1980), which of course already provides certain immunities for state officials. See e. g., Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183 (1984); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976). Similarly, in actions brought in federal courts, we have disapproved the adoption of state statutes of limitation that provide only a truncated period of timé within which to file suit, because such statutes inadequately accommodate the complexities of federal civil rights litigation and are thus inconsistent with Congress’ compensatory aims. Burnett, supra, at 50-55. And we have directed the lower federal courts in § 1983 cases to borrow the state-law limitations period for personal injury claims because it is “most unlikely that the period of limitations applicable, to such claims ever was, or ever would be, fixed [by the forum State] in a way that would discriminate against federal claims, or be inconsistent with federal law in any respect.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 279 (1985).
Although we have never passed on the question, the lower federal courts have all, with but one exception, concluded that notice-of-claim provisions are inapplicable to § 1983 actions brought in federal court. See Brown v. United States, 239 U. S. App. D. C. 345, 356, n. 6, 742 F. 2d 1498, 1509, n. 6 (1984) (en banc) (collecting cases); but see Cardo v. Lakeland Central School Dist., 592 F. Supp. 765, 772-773 (SDNY 1984). These courts have reasoned that, unlike the lack of statutes of limitations in the federal civil rights laws, the absence of any notice-of-claim provision is not a deficiency requiring the importation of such statutes into the federal civil rights scheme. Because statutes of limitation are among the universally familiar aspects of litigation considered indispensable to any scheme of justice, it is entirely reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to create a right enforceable in perpetuity. Notice-of-claim provisions, by contrast, are neither universally familiar nor in any sense indispensable prerequisites to litigation, and there is thus no reason to suppose that Congress intended federal courts to apply such rules, which “significantly inhibit the ability to bring federal actions.” 239 U. S. App. D. C., at 354, 742 F. 2d, at 1507.
While we fully agree with this near-unanimous conclusion of the federal courts, that judgment is not dispositive here, where the question is not one of adoption but of pre-emption. Nevertheless, this determination that notice-of-claim statutes are inapplicable to federal-court § 1983 litigation informs our analysis in two crucial respects. First, it demonstrates that the application of the notice requirement burdens the exercise of the federal right by forcing civil rights victims who seek redress in state courts to comply with a requirement that is entirely absent from civil rights litigation in federal courts. This burden, as we explain below, is inconsistent in both design and effect with the compensatory aims of the federal civil rights laws. Second, it reveals that the enforcement of such statutes in § 1983 actions brought in state court will frequently and predictably produce different outcomes in federal civil rights litigation based solely on whether that litigation takes place in state or federal court. States may not apply such an outcome-determinative law when entertaining substantive federal rights in their courts.
B
As we noted above, the central purpose of the Reconstruction-Era laws is to provide compensatory relief to those deprived of their federal rights by state actors. Section 1983 accomplishes this goal by creating a form of liability that, by its very nature, runs only against a specific class of defendants: government bodies and their officials. Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute undermines this “uniquely federal remedy,” Mitchum v. Foster, supra, at 239, in several interrelated ways. First, it conditions the right of recovery that Congress has authorized, and does so for a reason manifestly inconsistent with the purposes of the federal statute:- to minimize governmental liability. Nor is this condition a neutral and uniformly applicable rule of procedure; rather, it is a substantive burden imposed only upon those who seek redress for injuries resulting from the use or misuse of governmental authority. Second, the notice provision discriminates against the federal right. While the State affords the victim of an intentional tort two years to. recognize the com-pensable nature of his or her injury, the civil rights victim is given only four months to appreciate that he or she has been deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Finally, the notice provision operates, in part, as an exhaustion requirement, in that it forces claimants to seek satisfaction in the first instance from the governmental defendant. We think it plain that Congress never intended that those injured by governmental wrongdoers could be required, as a condition of recovery, to submit their claims to the government responsible for their injuries.
(1)
Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute is part of a broader legislative scheme governing the rights of citizens to sue the State’s subdivisions. The statute, both in its earliest and current forms, provides a circumscribed waiver of local governmental immunity that limits the amount recoverable in suits against local governments and imposes the notice requirements at issue here. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the statutory limits on recovery are preempted in federal civil rights actions, Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 340 N. W. 2d 704 (1983), and thus recognizes that partial immunities inconsistent with § 1983 must yield to the federal right, it concluded in the present case that the notice and exhaustion conditions attached to the waiver of such immunities may nevertheless be enforced in federal actions. The purposes of these conditions, however, mirror those of the judicial immunity the statute replaced. Such statutes “are enacted primarily for the benefit of governmental defendants,” Civil Actions, at 564, and enable those defendants to “investigate early, prepare a stronger case, and perhaps reach an early settlement.” Brown v. United States, supra, at 353, 742 F. 2d, at 1506. Moreover, where the defendant is unable to obtain a satisfactory settlement, the Wisconsin statute forces claimants to bring suit within a relatively short period after the local governing body disallows the claim, in order to “assure prompt initiation of litigation.” Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 22, 308 N. W. 2d 403, 413 (1981). To be sure, the notice requirement serves the additional purpose of notifying the proper public officials of dangerous physical conditions or inappropriate and unlawful governmental conduct, which allows for prompt corrective measures. See Nielsen v. Town of Silver Cliff, 112 Wis. 2d 574, 580, 334 N. W. 2d 242, 245 (1983); Binder v. Madison, 72 Wis. 2d 613, 623, 241 N. W. 2d 613, 618 (1976). This interest, however, is clearly not the predominant objective of the statute. Indeed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has emphasized that the requisite notice must spell out both the amount of damages the claimant seeks and his or her intent to hold the governing body responsible for those damages precisely because these requirements further the State’s interest in minimizing liability and the expenses associated with it. See Gutter, supra, at 10-11, 308 N. W. 2d, at 407 (statute’s purpose cannot be served unless the claim demands a specific sum of money); Pattermann v. Whitewater, 32 Wis. 2d 350, 355-359, 145 N. W. 2d 705, 708-709 (1966) (distinguishing notice-of-injury from notice-of-claim requirement)..
In sum, as respondents explain, the State has chosen to expose its subdivisions to large liability and defense costs, and, in light of that choice, has made the concomitant decision to impose conditions that “assis[t] municipalities in controlling those costs.” Brief for Respondents 12. The decision to subject state subdivisions to liability for violations of federal rights, however, was a choice that Congress, not the Wisconsin Legislature, made, and it is a decision that the State has no authority to override. Thus, however understandable or laudable the State’s interest in controlling liability expenses might otherwise be, it is patently incompatible with the compensatory goals of the federal legislation, as are the means the State has chosen to effectuate it.
This incompatibility is revealed by the design of the notice-of-claim statute itself, which operates as a condition precedent to recovery in all actions brought in staté court against governmental entities or officers. Sambs v. Nowak, 47 Wis. 2d 158, 167, 177 N. W. 2d 144, 149 (1970). “Congress,” we have previously noted, “surely did not intend to assign to state courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action.” Wilson, 471 U. S., at 269. Yet that is precisely the consequence of what Wisconsin has done here: although a party bringing suit against a local governmental unit need not allege compliance with the notice statute as part of his or her complaint, Nielsen, supra, at 580, 334 N. W. 2d, at 245, the statute confers on governmental defendants an affirmative defense that obligates the plaintiff to demonstrate compliance with the notice requirement before he or she may recover at all, a showing altogether unnecessary when such an action is brought in federal court. States, however, may no more condition the federal right to recover for violations of civil rights than bar that right altogether, particularly where those conditions grow out of a waiver of immunity which, however necessary to the assertion of state-created rights against local governments, is entirely irrelevant insofar as the assertion of the federal right is concerned, see Martinez, 444 U. S., at 284, and where the purpose and effect of those conditions, when applied in § 1983 actions, is to control the expense associated with the very litigation Congress has authorized.
This burdening of a federal right, moreover, is not the natural or permissible consequence of an otherwise neutral, uniformly applicable state rule. Although it is true that the notice-of-claim statute does not discriminate between state and-federal causes of action against local governments, the fact remains that the law’s protection extends only to governmental defendants and thus conditions the right to bring suit against the very persons and entities Congress intended to subject to liability. We therefore cannot accept the suggestion that this requirement is simply part of “the vast body of procedural rules, rooted in policies unrelated to the definition of any particular substantive cause of action, that forms no essential part of ‘the cause of action’ as applied to any given plaintiff.” Brief for International City Management Association et al. as Amici Curiae 22 (Brief for Amici Curiae). On the contrary, the notice-of-claim provision is imposed only upon a specific class of plaintiffs — those who sue governmental defendants — and, as we have seen, is firmly rooted in policies very much related to, and to a large extent directly contrary to, the substantive cause of action provided those plaintiffs. This defendant-specific focus of the notice requirement serves to distinguish it, rather starkly, from rules uniformly applicable to all suits, such as rules governing service of process or substitution of parties, which respondents cite as examples of procedural requirements that penalize noncompliance through dismissal. That state courts will hear the entire § 1983 cause of action once a plaintiff complies with the notice-of-claim statute, therefore, in no way alters the fact that the statute discriminates against the precise type of claim Congress has created.
(2)
While respondents and amici suggest that prompt investigation of claims inures to the benefit of claimants and local governments alike, by providing both with an accurate factual picture of the incident, such statutes “are enacted primarily for the benefit of governmental defendants,” and are intended to afford such defendants an opportunity to prepare a stronger case. Civil Actions, at 564 (emphasis added); see also Brown v. United States, 239 U. S. App. D. C., at 354, 742 F. 2d, at 1506. Sound notions of public administration may support the prompt notice requirement, but those policies necessarily clash with the remedial purposes of the federal civil rights laws. In Wilson,, we held that, for purposes of choosing a limitations period for § 1983 actions, federal courts must apply the state statute of limitations governing personal injury claims because it is highly unlikely that States would ever fix the limitations period applicable to such claims in a manner that would discriminate against the federal right. Here, the notice-of-claim provision most emphatically does discriminate in a manner detrimental to the federal right: only those persons who wish to sue governmental defendants are required to provide notice within such an abbreviated time period. Many civil rights victims, however, will fail to appreciate the compensable nature of their injuries within the 4-month window provided by the notice-of-claim provision, and will thus be barred from asserting their federal right to recovery in state court unless they can show that the defendant had actual notice of the injury, the circumstances giving rise to it, and the claimant’s intent to hold the defendant responsible — a showing which, as the facts of this case vividly demonstrate, is not easily made in Wisconsin.
(3)
Finally, the notice provision imposes an exhaustion requirement on persons who choose to assert their federal right in state courts, inasmuch as the § 1983 plaintiff must provide the requisite notice of injury within 120 days of the civil rights violation, then wait an additional 120 days while the governmental defendant investigates the claim and attempts to settle it. In Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496 (1982), we held that plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies before instituting § 1983 suits in federal court. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, deemed that decision inapplicable to this state-court suit on the theory that States retain the authority to prescribe the rules and procedures governing suits in their courts. 139 Wis. 2d, at 623, 408 N. W. 2d, at 23. As we have just explained, however, that authority does not extend so far as to permit States to place conditions on the vindication of a federal right. Moreover, as we noted in Patsy, Congress enacted § 1983 in response to the widespread deprivations of civil rights in the Southern States and the inability or unwillingness of authorities in those States to protect those rights or punish wrongdoers. Patsy, supra, at 503-505; see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S., at 276-277, 279. Although it is true that the principal remedy Congress chose to provide injured persons was immediate access to fede?'al courts, Patsy, supra, at 503-504, it did not leave the protection of such rights exclusively in the hands of the federal judiciary, and instead conferred concurrent jurisdiction on state courts as well. 457 U. S., at 506-507. Given the evil at which the federal civil rights legislation was aimed, there is simply no reason to suppose that Congress meant “to provide these individuals immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding any provision of state law to the contrary,” id., at 504, yet contemplated that those who sought to vindicate their federal rights in state courts could be required to seek redress in the first instance from the very state officials whose hostility to those rights precipitated their injuries.
Respondents nevertheless argue that any exhaustion requirement imposed by the notice-of-claim statute is essentially de minimis because the statutory settlement period entails none of the additional expense or undue delay typically associated with administrative remedies, and indeed does not alter a claimant’s right to seek full compensation through suit. This argument fails for two reasons. First, it ignores our prior assessment of “the dominant characteristic of civil rights actions: they belong in court.” Burnett, 468 U. S., at 50 (emphasis added). “These causes of action,” we have explained, “exist independent of any other legal or administrative relief that may be available as a matter of federal or state law. They are judicially enforceable in the first instance.” Ibid, (emphasis added). The dominant characteristic of a § 1983 action, of course, does not vary depending upon whether it is litigated in state or federal court, and States therefore may not adulterate or dilute the predominant feature of the federal right by imposing mandatory settlement periods, no matter how reasonable the administrative waiting period or the interests it is designed to serve may appear.
Second, our decision in Patsy rested not only on the legislative history of § 1983 itself, but also on the facts that in the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 353, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e, Congress established an exhaustion requirement for a specific class of § 1983 actions — those brought by adult prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement — and that, in so doing, Congress expressly recognized that it was working a change in the law. Accordingly, we refused to engraft an exhaustion requirement onto another type of § 1983 action where Congress had not provided for one, not only because the judicial imposition of such a requirement would be inconsistent with Congress’ recognition that § 1983 plaintiffs normally need not exhaust administrative remedies, 457 U. S., at 508-512, but also because decisions concerning both the desirability and the scope and design of any exhaustion requirement turn on a host of policy considerations which “do not invariably point in one direction,” and which, for that very reason, are best left to “Congress’ superior institutional competence.” Id., at 513. “[P]olicy considerations alone,” we concluded, “cannot justify judicially imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is consistent with congressional intent.” Ibid. While the exhaustion required by Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute does not involve lengthy or expensive administrative proceedings, it forces injured persons to seek satisfaction from those alleged to have caused the injury in the first place. Such a dispute resolution system may have much to commend it, but that is a judgment the current Congress must make, for we think it plain that the Congress which enacted § 1983 over 100 years ago would have rejected as utterly inconsistent with the remedial purposes of its broad statute the notion that a State could require civil rights victims to seek compensation from offending state officials before they could assert a federal action in state court.
Finally, to the extent the exhaustion requirement is designed to sift out “specious claims” from the stream of complaints that can inundate local governments in the absence of immunity, see Nielsen, 112 Wis. 2d, at 580, 334 N. W. 2d, at 245, we have rejected such a policy as inconsistent with the aims of the federal legislation. In Burnett, state officials urged the adoption of a 6-month limitations period in a § 1983 action in order that they might enjoy “some reasonable protection from the seemingly endless stream of unfounded, and often stale, lawsuits brought against them. ” 468 U. S., at 54 (internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted). Such a contention, we noted, “reflects in part a judgment that factors such as minimizing the diversion of state officials’ attention from their duties outweigh the interest in providing [claimants] ready access to a forum to resolve valid claims.” Id., at 55. As we explained there, and reaffirm today, “[t]hat policy is manifestly inconsistent with.the central objective of the Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes.” Ibid.
C
Respondents and their supporting amici urge that we approve the application of the notice-of-claim statute to § 1983 actions brought in state court as a matter of equitable federalism. They note that “ ‘[t]he general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.’” Brief for Amici Curiae 8 (quoting Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 508 (1954)). Litigants who choose to bring their civil rights actions in state courts presumably do so in order to obtain the benefit of certain procedural advantages in those courts, or to draw their juries from urban populations. Having availed themselves of these benefits, civil rights litigants must comply as well with those state rules they find less to their liking.
However equitable this bitter-with-the-sweet argument may appear in the abstract, it has no place under our Supremacy Clause analysis. Federal law takes state, courts as it finds them only insofar as those courts employ rules that do not “impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal laws.” Brown v. Western R. Co. of Alabama, 338 U. S., at 298-299; see also Monessen Southwestern R. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U. S. 330, 336 (1988) (state rule designed to encourage settlement cannot limit recovery in federally created action). States may make the litigation of federal rights as congenial as they see fit — not as a quid pro quo for compliance with other, uncongenial rules, but because such congeniality does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’ goals. As we have seen, enforcement of the notice-of-claim statute in §1983 actions brought in state court so interferes with and frustrates the substantive right Congress created that, under the Supremacy Clause, it must yield to the federal interest. This interference, however, is not the only consequence of the statute that renders its application in § 1983 cases invalid. In a State that demands compliance with such a statute before a § 1983 action may be brought or maintained in its courts, the outcome of federal civil rights litigation will frequently and predictably depend on whether it is brought in state or federal court. Thus, the very notions of federalism upon which respondents rely dictate that the State’s outcome-determinative law must give way when a party asserts a federal right in state court.
Under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), when a federal court exercises diversity or pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims, “the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 109 (1945). Accordingly, federal courts entertaining state-law claims against Wisconsin municipalities are obligated to apply the notice-of-claim provision. See Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., 757 F. 2d 909, 911 (CA7 1985). Just as federal courts are constitutionally obligated to apply state law to state claims, see Erie, supra, at 78-79, so too the Supremacy Clause imposes on state courts a constitutional duty “to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rights of the parties under controlling federal law [áre] protected,” Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 245 (1942).
Civil rights victims often do not appreciate the constitutional nature of their injuries, see Burnett, 468 U. S., at 50, and thus will fail to file a notice of injury or claim within the requisite time period, see n. 3, supra, which in Wisconsin is a mere four months. Unless such claimants can prove that the governmental defendant had actual notice of the claim, which, as we have already noted, is by no means a simple task in Wisconsin, and unless they also file an itemized claim for damages, they must bring their § 1983 suits in federal court or not at all. Wisconsin, however, may not alter the outcome of federal claims it chooses to entertain in its courts by demanding compliance with outcome-determinative rules that are inapplicable when such claims are brought in federal court, for “ ‘[w]hatever springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.’” Brown v. Western R. Co. of Alabama, supra, at 298-299 (quoting Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 22, 24 (1923)). The state notice-of-claim statute is more than a mere rule of procedure: as we discussed above, the statute is a substantive condition on the right to sue governmental officials and entities, and the federal courts have therefore correctly recognized that the notice statute governs the adjudication of state-law claims in diversity actions. Orthmann, supra, at 911. In Guaranty Trust, supra, we held that, in order to give effect to a State’s statute of limitations, a federal court could not hear a state-law action that a state court would deem time barred. Conversely, a state court may not decline to hear an otherwise properly presented federal claim because that claim would be barred under a state law requiring timely filing of notice. State courts simply are not free to vindicate the substantive interests underlying a state rule of decision at the expense of the federal right.
Finally, in Wilson, we characterized § 1983 suits as claims for personal injuries because such an approach ensured that the same limitations period would govern all § 1983 actions brought in any given State, and thus comported with Congress’ desire that the federal civil rights laws be given a uniform application within each State. 471 U. S., at 274-275. A law that predictably alters the outcome of § 1983 claims depending solely on whether they are brought in state or federal court within the same State is obviously inconsistent with this federal interest in intrastate uniformity.
III
In enacting § 1983, Congress entitled those deprived of their civil rights to recover full compensation from the governmental officials responsible for those deprivations. A state law that conditions that right of recovery upon compliance with a rule designed to minimize governmental liability, and that directs injured persons to seek redress in the first instance from the very targets of the federal legislation, is inconsistent in both purpose and effect with the remedial objectives of the federal civil rights law. Principles of federalism, as well as the Supremacy Clause, dictate that such a state law must give way to vindication of the federal right when that right is asserted in state court.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is reversed, and
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | J | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the State of Texas, in the person of petitioner, the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, successfully rebutted respondent prisoner’s prima facie showing of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in the state grand jury selection process. In his brief, petitioner, in claiming effective rebuttal, asserts:
“This list [of the grand jurors that indicted respondent] indicates that 50 percent of the names appearing thereon were Spanish. The record indicates that 3 of the 5 jury commissioners, 5 of the grand jurors who returned the indictment, 7 of the petit jurors, the judge presiding at the trial, and the Sheriff who served notice on the grand jurors to appear had Spanish surnames.” Brief for Petitioner 6.
I
This Court on prior occasions has considered the workings of the Texas system of grand jury selection. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1945); Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940). Texas employs the “key man” system, which relies on jury commissioners to select prospective grand jurors from the community at large. The procedure begins with the state district judge’s appointment of from three to five persons to serve as jury commissioners. Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 19.01 (1966). The commissioners then “shall select not less than 15 nor more than 20 persons from the citizens of different portions of the county” to compose the list from which the actual grand jury will be drawn. Art. 19.06 (Supp. 1976-1977). When at least 12 of the persons on the list appear in court pursuant to summons, the district judge proceeds to “test their qualifications.” Art. 19.21. The qualifications themselves are set out in Art. 19.08: A grand juror must be a citizen of Texas and of the county, be a qualified voter in the county, be “of sound mind and good moral character,” be literate, have no prior felony conviction, and be under no pending indictment “or other legal accusation for theft or of any felony.” Interrogation under oath is the method specified for testing the prospective juror’s qualifications. Art. 19.22. The precise questions to be asked are set out in Art. 19.23, which, for the most part, tracks the language of Art. 19.08. After the court finds 12 jurors who meet the statutory qualifications, they are impaneled as the grand jury. Art. 19.26.
Respondent, Rodrigo Partida, was indicted in March 1972 by the grand jury of the 92d District Court of Hidalgo County for the crime of burglary of a private residence at night with intent to rape. Hidalgo is one of the border counties of southern Texas. After a trial before a petit jury, respondent was convicted and sentenced to eight years in the custody of the Texas Department of Corrections. He first raised his claim of discrimination in the grand jury selection process on a motion for new trial in the State District Court. In support of his motion, respondent testified about the general existence of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in that area of Texas and introduced statistics from the 1970 census and the Hidalgo County grand jury records. The census figures show that in 1970, the population of Hidalgo County was 181,535. United States Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, Characteristics of the Population, vol. 1, pt. 45, § 1, Table 119, p. 914. Persons of Spanish language or Spanish surname totaled 143,611. Ibid., and id., Table 129, p. 1092. On the assumption that all the persons of Spanish language or Spanish surname were Mexican-Americans, these figures show that 79.1% of the county’s population was Mexican-American.
Respondent’s data compiled from the Hidalgo County grand jury records from 1962 to 1972 showed that over that period, the average percentage of Spanish-surnamed grand jurors was 39%. In the 2½-year period during which the District Judge who impaneled the jury that indicted respondent was in charge, the average percentage was 45.5%. On the list from which the grand jury that indicted respondent was selected, 50% were Spanish surnamed. The last set of data that respondent introduced, again from the 1970 census, illustrated a number of ways in which Mexican-Americans tend to be underprivileged, including poverty-level incomes, less desirable jobs, substandard housing, and lower levels of education. The State offered no evidence at all either attacking respondent’s allegations of discrimination or demonstrating that his statistics were unreliable in any way.
The State District Court, nevertheless, denied the motion for a new trial.
On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. Partida v. State, 506 S. W. 2d 209 (1974). Reaching the merits of the claim of grand jury discrimination, the court held that respondent had failed to make out a prima facie case. In the court’s view, he should have shown how many of the females who served on the grand juries were Mexican-Americans married to men with Anglo-American surnames, how many Mexican-Americans were excused for reasons of age or health, or other legal reasons, and how many of those listed by the census would not have met the statutory qualifications of citizenship, literacy, sound mind, moral character, and lack of criminal record or accusation. Id., at 210—211. Quite beyond the uncertainties in the statistics, the court found it impossible to believe that discrimination could have been directed against a Mexican-American, in light of the many elective positions held by Mexican-Americans in the county and the substantial representation of Mexican-Americans on recent grand juries. Id., at 211. In essence, the court refused to presume that Mexican-Americans would discriminate against their own kind.
After exhausting his state remedies, respondent filed his petition for habeas corpus in the Federal District Court, alleging a denial of due process and equal protection, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, because of gross underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on the Hidalgo County grand juries. At a hearing at which the state transcript was introduced, petitioner presented the testimony of the state judge who selected the jury commissioners who had compiled the list from which respondent's grand jury was taken. The judge first reviewed the State’s grand jury selection process. In selecting the jury commissioners, the judge stated that he tried to appoint a greater number of Mexican-Americans than members of other ethnic groups. He testified that he instructed the commissioners about the qualifications of a grand juror and the exemptions provided by law. The record is silent, however, with regard to instructions dealing with the potential problem of discrimination directed against any identifiable group. The judge admitted that the actual results of the selection process had not produced grand jury lists that were “representative of the ethnic balance in the community.” App. 84. The jury commissioners themselves, who were the only ones in a position to explain the apparent substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans and to provide information on the actual operation of the selection process, were never called.
On the basis of the evidence before it, the court concluded that respondent had made out a “bare prima facie case” of invidious discrimination with his proof of “a long continued disproportion in the composition of the grand juries in Hidalgo County.” 384 F. Supp. 79, 90 (SD Tex. 1974) (emphasis in original). Based on an examination of the reliability of the statistics offered by respondent, however, despite the lack of evidence in the record justifying such an inquiry, the court stated that the prima facie case was weak. The court believed that the census statistics did not reflect the true situation accurately, because of recent changes in the Hidalgo County area and the court’s own impression of the demographic characteristics of the Mexican-American community. On the other hand, the court recognized that the Texas key-man system of grand jury selection was highly subjective, and was “archaic and inefficient,” id., at 91, and that this was a factor arguing for less tolerance in the percentage differences. On balance, the court’s doubts about the reliability of the statistics, coupled with its opinion that Mexican-Americans constituted a “governing majority” in the county, caused it to conclude that the prima facie case was rebutted. The “governing majority” theory distinguished respondent’s case from all preceding cases involving similar disparities. On the basis of those findings, the court dismissed the petition.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 524 F. 2d 481 (1975). It agreed with the District Court that respondent had succeeded in making out a prima facie case. It found, however, that the State had failed to rebut that showing. The “governing majority” theory contributed little to the State’s case in the absence of specific proof to explain the disparity. In light of the State’s abdication of its responsibility to introduce controverting evidence, the court held that respondent was entitled to prevail.
We granted certiorari to consider whether the existence of a “governing majority” in itself can rebut a prima facie case of discrimination in grand jury selection, and, if not, whether the State otherwise met its burden of proof. 426 U. S. 934 (1976).
III
A. This Court has long recognized that “it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws to try a defendant of a particular race or color under an indictment issued by a grand jury... from which all persons of his race or color have, solely because of that race or color, been excluded by the State....” Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 477. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 628 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U. S. 320, 330 (1970). See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493, 497 (1972) (plurality opinion); id., at 507 (dissenting opinion). While the earlier cases involved absolute exclusion of an identifiable group, later cases established the principle that substantial underrepresentation of the group constitutes a constitutional violation as well, if it results from purposeful discrimination. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970); Carter v. Jury Comm’n, supra; Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545, 552 (1967); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950). Recent cases have established the fact that an official act is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976) ; see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 264-265 (1977). Nevertheless, as the Court recognized in Arlington Heights, “[s]ometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face.” Id., at 266. In Washington v. Davis, the application of these principles to the jury cases was considered:
“It is also clear from the cases dealing with racial discrimination in the selection of juries that the systematic exclusion of Negroes is itself such an 'unequal application of the law... as to show intentional discrimination.’... A prima facie case of discriminatory purpose may be proved as well by the absence of Negroes on a particular jury combined with the failure of the jury commissioners to be informed of eligible Negro jurors in a community,... or with racially non-neutral selection procedures.... With a prima facie case made out, ‘the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.’ Alexander [v. Louisiana, 405 U. S.,] at 632.” 426 U. S., at 241.
See Arlington Heights, supra, at 266 n. 13.
Thus, in order to show that an equal protection violation has occurred in the context of grand jury selection, the defendant must show that the procedure employed resulted in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs. The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 478-479. Next, the degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time. Id., at 480. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935). This method of proof, sometimes called the “rule of exclusion,” has been held to be available as a method of proving discrimination in jury selection against a delineated class. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 480. Finally, as noted above, a selection procedure that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral supports the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 241; Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 630. Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepresentation of his group, he has made out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the burden then shifts to the State to rebut that case.
B. In this case, it is no longer open to dispute that Mexican-Americans are a clearly identifiable class. See, e. g., Hernandez v. Texas, supra. Cf. White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 767 (1973). The statistics introduced by respondent from the 1970 census illustrate disadvantages to which the group has been subject. Additionally, as in Alexander v. Louisiana, the selection procedure is not racially neutral with respect to Mexican-Americans; Spanish surnames are just as easily identifiable as race was from the questionnaires in Alexander or the notations and card colors in Whitus v. Georgia, supra, and in Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953).
The disparity proved by the 1970 census statistics showed that the population of the county was 79.1% Mexican-American, but that, over an 11-year period, only 39% of the persons summoned for grand jury service were Mexican-American. This difference of 40% is greater than that found significant in Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970) (60% Negroes in the general population, 37% on the grand jury lists). Since the State presented no evidence showing why the 11-year period was not reliable, we take it as the relevant base for comparison. The mathematical disparities that have been accepted by this Court as adequate for a prima facie case have all been within the range presented here. For example, in Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967), the number of Negroes listed on the tax digest amounted to 27.1% of the taxpayers, but only 9.1% of those on the grand jury venire. The disparity was held to be sufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404 (1967) (24.4% of tax lists, 4.7% of grand jury lists); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24 (1967) (19.7% of tax lists, 5% of jury list). We agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the proof in this case was enough to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against the Mexican-Americans in the Hidalgo County grand jury selection.
Supporting this conclusion is the fact that the Texas system of selecting grand jurors is highly subjective. The facial constitutionality of the key-man system, of course, has been accepted by this Court. See, e. g., Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U. S. 320 (1970); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1945) ; Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940). Nevertheless, the Court has noted that the system is susceptible of abuse as applied. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 479. Additionally, as noted, persons with Spanish surnames are readily identifiable.
The showing made by respondent therefore shifted the burden of proof to the State to dispel the inference of intentional discrimination. Inexplicably, the State introduced practically no evidence. The testimony of the State District Judge dealt principally with the selection of the jury commissioners and the instructions given to them. The commissioners themselves were not called to testify. A case such as Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S., at 207 n. 4, 209, illustrates the potential usefulness of such testimony, when it sets out in detail the procedures followed by the commissioners. The opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is particularly revealing as to the lack of rebuttal evidence in the record:
“How many of those listed in the census figures with Mexican-American names were not citizens of the state, but were so-called ‘wet-backs’ from the south side of the Rio Grande; how many were migrant workers and not residents of Hidalgo County; how many were illiterate and could not read and write; how many were not of sound mind and good moral character; how many had been convicted of a felony or were under indictment or legal accusation for theft or a felony; none of these facts appear in the record.” 506 S. W. 2d, at 211 (emphasis added).
In fact, the census figures showed that only a small part of the population reported for Hidalgo County was not native born. See n. 6, supra. Without some testimony from the grand jury commissioners about the method by which they determined the other qualifications for grand jurors prior to the statutory time for testing qualifications, it is impossible to draw any inference about literacy, sound mind and moral character, and criminal record from the statistics about the population as a whole. See n. 8, supra. These are questions of disputed fact that present problems not amenable to resolution by an appellate court. We emphasize, however, that we are not saying that the statistical disparities proved here could never be explained in another case; we are simply saying that the State did not do so in this case. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S., at 361.
C. In light of our holding that respondent proved a prima facie case of discrimination that was not rebutted by any of the evidence presently in the record, we have only to consider whether the District Court’s “governing majority” theory filled the evidentiary gap. In our view, it did not dispel the presumption of purposeful discrimination in the circumstances of this case. Because of the many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of their group. Indeed, even the dissent of Mr. Justice Powell does not suggest that such a presumption would be appropriate. See post, at 514-516, n. 6, 516 n. 7. The problem is a complex one, about which widely differing views can be held, and, as such, it would be somewhat precipitate to take judicial notice of one view over another on the basis of a record as barren as this.
Furthermore, the relevance of a governing majority of elected officials to the grand jury selection process is questionable. The fact that certain elected officials are Mexican-American demonstrates nothing about the motivations and methods of the grand jury commissioners who select persons for grand jury lists. The only arguably relevant fact in this record on the issue is that three of the five jury commissioners in respondent’s case were Mexican-American. Knowing only this, we would be forced to rely on the reasoning that we have rejected—that human beings would not discriminate against their own kind—in order to find that the presumption of purposeful discrimination was rebutted. Without the benefit of this simple behavioral presumption, discriminatory intent can be rebutted only with evidence in the record about the way in which the commissioners operated and their reasons for doing so. It was the State’s burden to supply such evidence, once respondent established his prima facie case. The State’s failure in this regard leaves unchallenged respondent’s proof of purposeful discrimination.
Finally, even if a “governing majority” theory has general applicability in cases of this kind, the inadequacy of the record in this case does not permit such an approach. Among the evidentiary deficiencies are the lack of any indication of how long the Mexican-Americans have enjoyed “governing majority” status, the absence of information about the relative power inherent in the elective offices held by Mexican-Americans, and the uncertain relevance of the general political power to the specific issue in this case. Even for the most recent time period, when presumably the political power of Mexican-Americans was at its greatest, the discrepancy between the number of Mexican-Americans in the total population and the number on the grand jury lists was substantial. Thus, under the facts presented in this case, the “governing majority” theory is not developed fully enough to satisfy the State’s burden of rebuttal.
IV
Rather than relying on an approach to the jury discrimination question that is as faintly defined as the “governing majority” theory is on this record, we prefer to look at all the facts that bear on the issue, such as the statistical disparities, the method of selection, and any other relevant testimony as to the manner in which the selection process was implemented. Under this standard, the proof offered by respondent was sufficient to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination in grand jury selection. Since the State failed to rebut the presumption of purposeful discrimination by competent testimony, despite two opportunities to do so, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding of a denial of equal protection of the law in the grand jury selection process in respondent’s case.
It is so ordered.
The other principal state mode of juror selection is a random method similar to that used in the federal system. See 28 U. S. C. § 1864. See generally Sperlich & Jaspovice, Grand Juries, Grand Jurors and the Constitution, 1 Hastings Const. L. Q. 63, 68 (1974).
During the time period covered by this case, the statute was amended to omit the requirement that the commissioners be freeholders in the county. 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws, c. 131, § 1. That change has no bearing on the issues before us.
Prior to 1965, the law directed the commissioners to select “sixteen men.” The legislature amended the statute that year to substitute the words “twenty persons” for “sixteen men.” 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, c. 722, p. 317. In 1967, the law was amended again to provide the present range of from 15 to 20 persons. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, c. 515, § 1. These changes in the number of persons required to be on the list account for the jump from 16 to 20 in the grand jury list statistics set forth in n. 7, infra.
In the state courts and in the federal courts on habeas, the State argued that respondent’s challenge was not timely raised as a matter of state procedure, and therefore that he waived any complaint of this kind that he might have. Since the Texas courts considered the claim on its merits, however, we are free to do so here. See Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 129 (1964); cf. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536, 542 n. 5 (1976). Furthermore, petitioner abandoned the waiver point in his petition for certiorari.
For our purposes, the terms “Spanish-surnamed” and “Mexican-American” are used as synonyms for the census designation “Persons of Spanish Language or Spanish Surname.” Persons of Spanish language include both those whose mother tongue is Spanish and all other persons in families in which the head of the household or spouse reported Spanish as the mother tongue. Persons of Spanish surname, as the census uses that term, are determined by reference to a list of 8,000 Spanish surnames compiled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. For Texas, social and economic characteristics are presented for persons of Spanish language combined with all other persons of Spanish surname in the census reports. United States Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, Characteristics of the Population, vol. 1, pt. 45, § 2, App. B.
At oral argument, counsel for petitioner appears to have suggested that the presence of illegal aliens who have Spanish surnames might inflate the percentage of Mexican-Americans in the county’s population. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10-12. We cannot agree that the presence of noncitizens makes any practical difference. Table 119 of the census breaks down the 181,535 people who composed the total county population into three groups: native of native parentage, native of foreign parentage, and foreign born. The only persons as to whom the assumption of noncitizenship would be logically sustainable are the foreign born. Even for them, it is probable that some were naturalized citizens. Furthermore, only 22,845 persons were in the “foreign born” category. If those persons are excluded from the population of the county, the total becomes 158,690. Assuming that every foreign-born person was counted as a Spanish-surnamed person (an assumption that favors the State), the total number of Mexican-Americans is reduced from 143,611 to 120,766. Using these adjusted figures, Mexican-Americans constitute 76.1% of the county’s population, a figure only 3%, and thus negligibly, smaller than the one used throughout this litigation. For consistency, we shall continue to refer to the population figures for the entire county, particularly since the State has not shown why those figures are unreliable.
The statistics for grand jury composition can be organized as follows:
Year No. persons on grand jury list Av. No. Spanish surnamed per list Percentage Spanish surnamed
1962 16 6 37.5%
1963 16 5.75 35.9%
1964 16 4.75 29.7%
1965 16.2 5 30.9%
1966 20 7.5 37.5%
1967 20.25 7.25 35.8%
1968 20 6.6 33%
1969 20 10 50%
1970 20 8 40%
1971 20 9.4 47%
1972 20 10.5 52.5%
Of the 870 persons who were summoned to serve as grand jurors over the 11-year period, 339, or 39%, were Spanish surnamed. See table showing Hidalgo County grand jury panels from 1962 to 1972, App. 17-18.
At oral argument, counsel for petitioner suggested that the date regarding educational background explained the discrepancy between the percentage of Mexican-Americans in the total population and the percentage on the grand jury lists. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. For a variety of reasons, we cannot accept that suggestion. First, under the Texas method of selecting grand jurors, qualifications are not tested until the persons on the list appear in the District Court. Prior to that time, assuming an unbiased selection procedure, persons of all educational characteristics should appear on the list. If the jury commissioners actually exercised some means of winnowing those who lacked the ability to read and write, it was incumbent on the State to call the commissioners and to have them explain how this was done. In the absence of any evidence in the record to this effect, we shall not assume that the only people excluded from grand jury service were the illiterate.
Second, it is difficult to draw valid inferences from the raw census data, since the data are incomplete in some places and the definition of “literacy” would undoubtedly be the subject of some dispute in any event. The State’s failure to discuss the literacy problem at any point prior to oral argument compounds the difficulties. One gap in the data occurs with respect to the younger persons in the jury pool. The census reports for educational background cover only those who are 25 years of age and above. Yet the only age limitation on eligibility for grand jury service is qualification to vote. Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 19.08 (Supp. 1976-1977). During the period to which the census figures apply, a person became qualified to vote at age 21. Tex. Elec. Code, Art. 5.01 (1967). (In 1975, Art. 5.01 was amended to give the franchise to all persons 18 and over. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, c. 682, § 3.) It is not improbable that the educational characteristics of persons in the younger age group would prove to be favorable to Mexican-Americans.
Finally, even assuming that the statistics for persons age 25 and over are sufficiently representative to be useful, a significant discrepancy still exists between the number of Spanish-surnamed people and the level of representation on grand jury lists. Table 83 of the 1970 census shows that of a total of 80,049 persons in that age group, 13,205 have no schooling. (Data for McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. This SMSA is identical to Hidalgo County.) Table 97 shows that of the 55,949 Spanish-surnamed persons in the group, 12,817 have no schooling. This means that of the 24,100 persons of all other races and ethnic groups, 388 have no schooling. Translated into percentages, 22.9% of the Spanish-surnamed persons have no schooling, and 1.6% of the others have no schooling. This means that 43,132 of the Spanish-surnamed persons have some schooling and 23,712 of the others have some schooling. The Spanish-surnamed persons thus represent 65% of the 66,844 with some schooling, and the others 35%. The 65% figure still creates a significant disparity when compared to the 39% representation on grand juries shown over the 11-year period involved here.
The suggestion is made in the dissenting opinion of The Chief Justice, post, at 504-506, that reliance on eligible population figures and allowance for literacy would defeat respondent’s prima facie showing of discrimination. But the 65% to 39% disparity between Mexican-Americans over the age of 25 who have some schooling and Mexican-Americans represented on the grand jury venires takes both of The Chief Justice’s concerns into account. Statistical analysis, which is described in more detail in n. 17, infra, indicates that the discrepancy is significant. If one assumes that Mexican-Americans constitute only 65% of the jury pool, then a detailed calculation reveals that the likelihood that so substantial a discrepancy would occur by chance is less than 1 in 1050.
We prefer not to rely on the 65% to 39% disparity, however, since there are so many implicit assumptions in this analysis, and we consider it inappropriate for us, as an appellate tribunal, to undertake this kind of inquiry without a record below in which those assumptions were tested. We rest, instead, on the fact that the record does not show any way by which the educational characteristics are taken into account in the compilation of the grand jury lists, since the procedure established by the State provides that literacy is tested only after the group of 20 are summoned.
The court noted that the foreman of the grand jury that indicted respondent was Mexican-American, and that 10 of the 20 summoned to serve had Spanish surnames. Seven of the 12 members of the petit jury that convicted him were Mexican-American. In addition, the state judge who presided over the trial was Mexican-American, as were a number of other elected officials in the county.
The Federal District Judge observed, during the state judge’s testimony, that the selection process for grand jurors in Hidalgo County typically resulted in a progressive reduction of the number of Mexican-Americans involved at each stage. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 (1972). For example, said the court, if 60% of the jury commissioners were Mexican-American, the jury panel might be only 55%, and the actual grand jury only 43%. The court speculated that the reason for this might be cultural. App. 84-85.
The court suggested that the actual discrimination operating might be economic. The jury commissioners were from the higher socio-economic classes, and they tended to select prospective jurors from among their peers. Consequently, the number of Mexican-Americans was disproportionately low, since they were concentrated at the lower end of the economic scale. We find it unnecessary to decide whether a showing of simple economic discrimination would be enough to make out a prima facie case in the absence of other evidence, since that case is not before us. Cf. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217 (1946).
Cases in this Court holding unconstitutional discriminatory selection procedures in the grand jury context include Alexander v. Louisiana, supra; Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584 (1958); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85 (1955); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939) ; Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900); and Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110 (1883).
The idea behind the rule of exclusion is not at all complex. If a disparity is sufficiently large, then it is unlikely that it is due solely to chance or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, one must conclude that racial or other class-related factors entered into the selection process. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 n. 13 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 241 (1976); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S., at 587; Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S., at 131. Cf. n. 17, infra.
The dissenters argue that the subjectivity of the system cuts in favor of the State where those who control the selection process are members of the same class as the person claiming discrimination. The fact remains, however, that the class to which respondent belongs was substantially underrepresented on the grand jury lists of Hidalgo County. The dissenters’ argument here is another aspect of the “governing majority” theory, see Part III-C, infra; under the circumstances presented in this case, that theory does not dispel the presumption of purposeful discrimination created by the combined force of the statistical showing and the highly subjective method of selection.
Since
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | B | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this action we are required to reconcile two somewhat intermittent and conflicting lines of authority as to whether a damages action may be brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 to redress the allegedly unconstitutional administration of a state tax system. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that such suits were barred by both 28 U. S. C. § 1841 (Tax Injunction Act) and the principle of comity, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed by an equally divided court sitting en banc. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals, 450 U. S. 1039, and we now affirm. Before setting forth the facts, we think that a description of the past and at times divergent decisions of this Court may shed light upon the proper disposition of this case.
I
This Court, even before the enactment of §1983, recognized the important and sensitive nature of state tax systems and the need for federal-court restraint when deciding cases that affect such systems. As Justice Field wrote for the Court shortly before the enactment of § 1983:
“It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public.” Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110 (1871).
After this Court conclusively decided that federal courts may enjoin state officers from enforcing an unconstitutional state law, Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), Congress also recognized that the autonomy and fiscal stability of the States survive best when state tax systems are not subject to scrutiny in federal courts. Thus, in 1937 Congress provided:
“The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U. S. C. § 1341 (hereinafter § 1341 or Act).
This legislation, and the decisions of this Court which preceded it, reflect the fundamental principle of comity between federal courts and state governments that is essential to “Our Federalism,” particularly in the area of state taxation. See, e. g., Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481 (1913); Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276 (1909). Even after enactment of § 1341 it was upon this comity that we relied in holding that federal courts, in exercising the discretion that attends requests for equitable relief, may not even render declaratory judgments as to the constitutionality of state tax laws. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943).
Contrasted with this statute and line of cases are our holdings with respect to 42 U. S. C. §1983. In 1871, shortly after Justice Field wrote of the vital and vulnerable nature of state tax systems, Congress enacted § 1983 with its familiar language:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
Obviously § 1983 cut a broad swath. By its terms it gave a federal cause of action to prisoners, taxpayers, or anyone else who was able to prove that his constitutional or federal rights had been denied by any State. In addition, the statute made no mention of any requirement that state remedies be exhausted before resort to the federal courts could be had under 28 U. S. C. § 1343. The combined effect of this newly created federal cause of action and the absence of an express exhaustion requirement was not immediately realized. It was not until our decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), that § 1983 was held to authorize immediate resort to a federal court whenever state actions allegedly infringed constitutional rights:
“Although the legislation was enacted because of the conditions that existed in the South at that time, it is cast in general language and is as applicable to Illinois as it is to the States whose names were mentioned over and again in the debates. It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.” 365 U. S., at 183.
The immediacy of federal relief under § 1983 was reemphasized in McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 (1963), where the Court stated: “It is immaterial whether [the state official’s] conduct is legal or illegal as a matter of state law. Such claims are entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts.” Id., at 674 (citation and footnote omitted). And in the unargued per curiam opinion of Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249 (1971), the Court concluded that “[petitioners were . . . entitled to have their actions treated as claims for relief under the Civil Rights Acts, not subject . . . to exhaustion requirements.” Id., at 251. See also Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 472-473 (1974).
Thus, we have two divergent lines of authority respecting access to federal courts for adjudication of the constitutionality of state laws. Both cannot govern this case. On one hand, § 1341, with its antecedent basis in the comity principle of Matthews v. Rodgers, supra, and Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, supra, bars at least federal injunctive challenges to state tax laws. Added to this authority is our decision in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, supra, holding that declaratory judgments are barred on the basis of comity. On the other hand is the doctrine originating in Monroe v. Pape, supra, that comity does not apply where § 1983 is involved, and that a litigant challenging the constitutionality of any state action may proceed directly to federal court. With this divergence of views in mind, we turn now to the facts of this case, a § 1983 challenge to the administration of state tax laws which implicates both lines of authority. We hold that at least as to such actions, which is all we need decide here, the principle of comity controls.
I — » HH
Petitioner Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association is a nonprofit corporation formed by taxpayers in St. Louis County (County) to promote equitable enforcement of property tax laws in Missouri. Petitioners J. David and Lynn F. Cassilly own real property with recent improvements in the County. Petitioners filed suit under § 1983 alleging that respondents, the County’s Tax Assessors, Supervisors, and Director of Revenue, and three members of the Missouri State Tax Commission, had deprived them of equal protection and due process of law by unequal taxation of real property.
The complaint focuses on two specific practices by respondents. First, petitioners allege that County properties with new improvements are assessed at approximately 3354% of their current market value, while properties without new improvements are assessed at approximately 22% of their current market value. This disparity allegedly results from respondents’ failure to reassess old property on a regular basis, the last general reassessment having occurred in 1960. Second, petitioners allege that property owners who successfully appeal their property assessments, as did the Cassillys in 1977, are specifically targeted for reassessment the next year.
Petitioners have previously sought some relief from respondents’ assessments in state proceedings. In 1975, petitioner David Cassilly and others brought an action in which the State Circuit Court ordered respondent Antonio to reassess all real property in the County. On direct appeal, however, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the State Tax Commission, not the Circuit Court, should supervise the reassessment process. State ex rel. Cassilly v. Riney, 576 S. W. 2d 325 (1979) (en banc). In 1977, the Cassillys appealed the tax assessed on their home to the County Board of Equalization and received a reduction in assessed value from 3314% to 29%. When their home was again assessed at 3314% in 1978, the Cassillys once more appealed to the Board of Equalization. That appeal was pending at the commencement of this litigation.
The Cassillys brought this §1983 action in federal court seeking actual damages in the amount of overassessments from 1975 to 1979, and punitive damages of $75,000 from each respondent. Petitioner Fair Assessment sought actual damages in the amount of expenses incurred in efforts to obtain equitable property assessments for its members. As in all other § 1983 actions, the award of such damages would first require a federal-court declaration that respondents, in administering the state tax, violated petitioners’ constitutional rights.
Ill
As indicated by our discussion in Part I, § 1341 and our comity cases have thus far barred federal courts from granting injunctive and declaratory relief in state tax cases. Because we decide today that the principle of comity bars federal courts from granting damages relief in such cases, we do not decide whether that Act, standing alone, would require such a result. The correctness of the result in this case is demonstrated by an examination of the pre-Act decisions of this Court, the legislative history of the Act, our post-Act decision in the Great Lakes case, and more recent recognition of the principles of federalism.
A
Prior to enactment of § 1341, virtually all federal cases challenging state taxation sought equitable relief. Consequently, federal-court restraint in state tax matters was based upon the traditional doctrine that courts of equity will stay their hand when remedies at law are plain, adequate, and complete. See, e. g., Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481 (1913); Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276 (1909). Even with this basis in equity law, these cases recognized that the doctrine of equitable restraint was of “notable application,” Boise Artesian Water Co., supra, at 281, and carried “peculiar force,” Matthews, supra, at 525, in suits challenging the constitutionality of state tax laws. Such restraint was particularly appropriate because of the delicate balance between the federal authority and state governments, and the concomitant respect that should be accorded state tax laws in federal court. As the Court in Matthews explained:
“The reason for this guiding principle [of equitable restraint] is of peculiar force in cases where the suit, like the present one, is brought to enjoin the collection of a state tax in courts of a different, though paramount sovereignty. The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations, require that such relief should be denied in every case where the asserted federal right may be preserved without it.” 284 U. S., at 525.
Thus, in 1909 we could state that “[a]n examination of the decisions of this court shows that a proper reluctance to interfere by prevention with the fiscal operations of the state governments has caused it to refrain from so doing in all cases where the Federal rights of the persons could otherwise be preserved unimpaired.” Boise Artesian Water Co., supra, at 282.
B
This policy of equitable restraint based on notions of comity did not completely clear the federal courts of state tax cases. Indeed, the Senate Report on the bill that was to become § 1341 referred to “[t]he existing practice of the Federal courts in entertaining tax-injunction suits against State officers . . . .” S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). An examination of the cases of that era demonstrates, however, that this practice resulted not from a repudiation of the principle of comity, but from federal-court determinations that available state remedies did not adequately protect the federal rights asserted. See, e. g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 242 (1936); Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. 2d 145 (CA5), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 688 (1936). See also Note, Federal Court Interference with the Assessment and Collection of State Taxes, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 783, n. 13 (1946); Note, The Tax Injunction Act and Suits for Monetary Relief, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 736, 744, and nn. 40, 41 (1979).
Congress’ response to this practice of the federal courts— enactment of § 1341 — was motivated in large part by comity concerns. As we said of the Act just last Term:
“The statute ‘has its roots in equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal operations.’ Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. [68,] 73 [(1976)]. This last consideration was the principal motivating force behind the Act: this legislation was first and foremost a vehicle to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes. 81 Cong. Rec. 1415 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone) . . . .” Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U. S. 503, 522 (1981) (footnote omitted).
Neither the legislative history of the Act nor that of its precursor, 28 U. S. C. § 1342, suggests that Congress intended that federal-court deference in state tax matters be limited to the actions enumerated in those sections. See H. R. Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937); 81 Cong. Rec. 1415 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone). Thus, the principle of comity which predated the Act was not restricted by its passage.
C
The post-Act vitality of the comity principle is perhaps best demonstrated by our decision in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943). Several Louisiana taxpayers brought an action in Federal District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the state tax law as applied to them was unconstitutional and void. Although § 1341 was raised as a possible bar to the suit, as it has been raised in this case, “we [found] it unnecessary to inquire whether the words of the statute may be so construed as to prohibit a declaration by federal courts concerning the invalidity of a state tax.” 319 U. S., at 299. Instead, “we [were] of the opinion that those considerations which have led federal courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes, save in exceptional cases, require[d] a like restraint in the use of the declaratory judgment procedure.” Ibid. Those considerations were, of course, principles of federalism:
“ ‘The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations, require that such relief should be denied in every case where the asserted federal right may be preserved without it.’ ... Interference with state internal economy and administration is inseparable from assaults in the federal courts on the validity of state taxation, and necessarily attends injunctions, interlocutory or final, restraining collection of state taxes. These are the considerations of moment which have persuaded federal courts of equity to deny relief to the taxpayer . . . .” Id., at 298 (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S., at 525).
The Court’s reliance in Great Lakes upon the necessity of federal-court respect for state taxing schemes demonstrates not only the post-Act vitality of the comity principle, but also its applicability to actions seeking a remedy other than in-junctive relief. The focus was not on the specific form of relief requested, but on the fact that “in every practical sense [it] operate[d] to suspend collection of the state taxes until the litigation [was] ended.” 319 U. S., at 299. As will be seen below, the relief sought in this case would have a similarly disruptive effect.
D
The principle of comity has been recognized and relied upon by this Court in several recent cases dealing with matters other than state taxes. Its fullest articulation was given in the now familiar language of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), a case in which we held that traditional principles of equitable restraint bar federal courts from enjoining pending state criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary circumstances:
“Th[e] underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in separate ways. . . . [T]he concept [represents] a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, ‘Our Federalism,’ born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation’s history and its future.” Id., at 44-45.
The principles of federalism recognized in Younger have not been limited to federal-court interference in state criminal proceedings, but have been extended to some state civil actions. E. g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975). Although these modern expressions of comity have been limited in their application to federal cases which seek to enjoin state judicial proceedings, a limitation which we do not abandon here, they illustrate the principles that bar petitioners’ suit under § 1983. As we said in Rosewell, swpra, “the reasons supporting federal noninterference [with state taxation] are just as compelling today as they were in 1937.” 450 U. S., at 527. As will be seen in the next part, petitioners’ § 1983 action would be no less disruptive of Missouri’s tax system than would the historic equitable efforts to enjoin the collection of taxes, efforts which were early held barred by considerations of comity.
IV
In arguments primarily addressed to the applicability of the Act, petitioners contend that damages actions are inherently less disruptive of state tax systems than injunctions or declaratory judgments, and therefore should not be barred by prior decisions of this Court. Petitioners emphasize that their § 1983 claim seeks recovery from individual state officers, not from state coffers, and that the doctrine of qualified immunity will protect such officers’ good-faith actions and will thus avoid chilling their administration of the Missouri tax scheme.
We disagree. Petitioners will not recover damages under § 1983 unless a district court first determines that respondents’ administration of the County tax system violated petitioners’ constitutional rights. In effect, the district court must first enter a declaratory judgment like that barred in Great Lakes. We are convinced that such a determination would be fully as intrusive as the equitable actions that are barred by principles of comity. Moreover, the intrusiveness of such §1983 actions would be exacerbated by the nonexhaustion doctrine of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). Taxpayers such as petitioners would be able to invoke federal judgments without first permitting the State to rectify any alleged impropriety.
In addition to the intrusiveness of the judgment, the very maintenance of the suit itself would intrude on the enforcement of the state scheme. As the District Court in this case stated:
“To allow such suits would cause disruption of the states’ revenue collection systems equal to that caused by anticipatory relief. State tax collection officials could be summoned into federal court to defend their assessments against claims for refunds as well as prayers for punitive damages, merely on the assertion that the tax collected was willfully and maliciously discriminatory against a certain type of property. Allowance of such claims would result in this Court being a source of appellate review of all state property tax classifications.” 478 F. Supp. 1231, 1233-1234 (1979).
This intrusion, although undoubtedly present in every § 1983 claim, is particularly highlighted by the facts of this case. Defendants are not one or two isolated administrators, but virtually every key tax official in St. Louis County. They include the County Executive, the Director of Revenue, the Tax Assessor, and three supervising members of the State Tax Commission. In addition, the actions challenged in the complaint — unequal assessment of new and old property and retaliatory assessment of property belonging to those who successfully appeal to the Board of Equalization — may well be the result of policies or practicalities beyond the control of any individual officer. For example, failure annually to reassess old property may well result from a practical allocation of limited resources. In addition, according to respondents’ attorney at oral argument, Missouri law requires that all property, including property which belongs to those who successfully appeal to the Board of Equalization, be assessed at 3314% of market value. Thus, a judicial determination of official liability for the acts complained of, even though necessarily based upon a finding of bad faith, would have an undeniable chilling effect upon the actions of all County officers governed by the same practicalities or required to implement the same policies. There is little doubt that such officials, faced with the prospect of personal liability to numerous taxpayers, not to mention the assessment of attorney’s fees under 42 U. S. C. §1988, would promptly cease the conduct found to have infringed petitioners’ constitutional rights, whether or not those officials were acting in good faith. In short, petitioners’ action would “in every practical sense operate to suspend collection of the state taxes . . . ,” Great Lakes, 319 U. S., at 299, a form of federal-court interference previously rejected by this Court on principles of federalism.
Y
This case is therefore controlled by principles articulated even before enactment of § 1983 and followed in later decisions such as Matthews and Great Lakes. The recovery of damages under the Civil Rights Act first requires a “declaration” or determination of the unconstitutionality of a state tax scheme that would halt its operation. And damages actions, no less than actions for an injunction, would hale state officers into federal court every time a taxpayer alleged the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim. We consider such interference to be contrary to “[t]he scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts.” Matthews, 284 U. S., at 525.
Therefore, despite the ready access to federal courts provided by Monroe and its progeny, we hold that taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts. Such taxpayers must seek protection of their federal rights by state remedies, provided of course that those remedies are plain, adequate, and complete, and may ultimately seek review of the state decisions in this Court. See Huffman v. Pursue, Inc., 420 U. S., at 605; Matthews v. Rodgers, supra, at 526.
The adequacy of available Missouri remedies is not at issue in this case. The District Court expressly found “that [petitioners] have means to rectify what they consider an unjust situation through the state’s own processes,” 478 F. Supp., at 1234, and petitioners do not contest this finding. In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court has expressly held that plaintiffs such as petitioners may assert a § 1983 claim in state court. See, e. g., Stafford v. Muster, 582 S. W. 2d 670, 681 (1979); Shapiro v. Columbia Union National Bank & Trust Co., 576 S. W. 2d 310 (1978).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 478 F. Supp. 1231 (1979), aff’d, 622 F. 2d 415 (1980).
Compare Fulton Market Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F. 2d 1071 (CA7 1978), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1121 (1979), with Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, supra; Ludwin v. City of Cambridge, 592 F. 2d 606 (CA1 1979); and Bland v. McHann, 463 F. 2d 21 (CA5 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 966 (1973).
We held in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600 (1979), that 28 U. S. C. § 1343, the jurisdictional counterpart of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, was narrower in scope than the latter. Because there can be no doubt that a claim of denial of due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, which these petitioners asserted, would come under the narrower construction of § 1343 adopted by the Court in Chapman, supra, it is unnecessary to pursue here the difference between § 1983 and § 1343.
The result we reach today was foreshadowed by our decision last Term in Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U. S. 503 (1981), wherein we stated that “even where the Tax Injunction Act would not bar federal-court interference in state tax administration, principles of federal equity may nevertheless counsel the withholding of relief. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 301 (1943).” Id., at 525-526, n. 33. We need not decide in this case whether the comity spoken of would also bar a claim under § 1983 which requires no scrutiny whatever of state tax assessment practices, such as a facial attack on tax laws colorably claimed to be discriminatory as to race.
Of course, the Court had not yet broadly interpreted the Civil Rights Act to permit federal damages actions for state violations of constitutional rights, brought prior to exhaustion of state remedies. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). The closest pre-Act case to a federal damages action was a suit for refund of state taxes allegedly assessed in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. First National Bank v. Board of County Commissioners, 264 U. S. 450 (1924). Consistent with the federal-court deference for state tax matters of which we speak today, the Court held that the action was barred by the parties’ failure to exhaust their available state remedies. Id., at 456. Although declaratory actions were available before 1937, they were seldom used. See Note, Federal Declaratory Judgments on the Validity of State Taxes, 50 Yale L. J. 927, 929-930, and n. 14 (1941).
Justice BRENNAN has cogently explained the reasons behind federal-court deference for state tax administration:
“The special reasons justifying the policy of federal noninterference with state tax collection are obvious. The procedures for mass assessment and collection of state taxes and for administration and adjudication of taxpayers’ disputes with tax officials are generally complex and necessarily designed to operate according to established rules. State tax agencies are organized to discharge their responsibilities in accordance with the state procedures. If federal declaratory relief were available to test state tax assessments, state tax administration might be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might escape the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by state law. During the pendency of the federal suit the collection of revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed, with consequent damage to the State’s budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the risk of taxpayer insolvency. Moreover, federal constitutional issues are likely to turn on questions of state tax law, which, like issues of state regulatory law, are more properly heard in the state courts.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 128, n. 17 (1971) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
0ther federal courts have reached this same conclusion. For example, in Advertiser Co. v. Wallace, 446 F. Supp. 677, 680 (MD Ala. 1978), the court concluded that “[although perhaps less coercive than anticipatory relief and less intrusive than a refund, the damage award plaintiff seeks, especially its request for punitive damages, still is designed to deter collection of the taxes now being assessed by defendants.” And the court in Evangelical Catholic Communion, Inc. v. Thomas, 373 F. Supp. 1342, 1344 (Vt. 1973), correctly stated:
“It is elementary that constitutional rights must be found to have been abridged in order for damages to be recovered in a civil rights action. Thus the plaintiffs in this action cannot recover damages without a determination by this court that the taxation of their Newbury property was effected in violation of their constitutional rights. If we were to make such a determination, we would, in effect, be issuing a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of the tax levied on the plaintiffs. As the court is prohibited from issuing such a declaratory judgment, . . . the court is also precluded as a matter of law from adjudicating the plaintiffs’ damages claims.”
We discern no significant difference, for purposes of the principles recognized in this case, between remedies which are “plain, adequate, and complete,” as that phrase has been used in articulating the doctrine of equitable restraint, and those which are “plain, speedy and efficient,” within the meaning of §1341. See, e. g., Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. 68, 73-74 (1976); Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 622-623 (1946); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S., at 297-299; Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S., at 525-526. Both phrases refer to the obvious precept that plaintiffs seeking protection of federal rights in federal courts should be remitted to their state remedies if their federal rights will not thereby be lost. Numerous federal decisions have treated the adequacy of state remedies, and it is to that body of law that federal courts should look in seeking to determine the occasions for the comity spoken of today.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The State of Alabama brought suit against appellant MTM in state court under the Alabama nuisance law, Ala. Code, Tit. 7, §§ 1081-1108 (1958), seeking to enjoin the continued operation of a nuisance by MTM. It alleged that because of convictions for violations of local obscenity laws by the Pussycat Adult Theater, an enterprise owned by MTM in Birmingham, Ala., the theater constituted a nuisance under this statute. After a hearing on the complaint, the state court issued a temporary injunction under the nuisance law, closing the theater.
After issuance of the temporary injunction and while action on the request for a permanent injunction was pending in state court, appellant filed this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. It asked the federal court to enjoin enforcement of the state-court temporary injunction and to declare the Alabama nuisance law unconstitutional. Appellant claimed that the challenged statutory provisions and the state-court temporary injunction infringed its First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
A three-judge federal court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 to consider appellant’s complaint. Without resolving the constitutional merits of the complaint, the three-judge court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. In view of the pendency of the state proceedings, the three-judge District Court applied the test enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), and concluded that federal intervention as requested by appellant would be improper.
Appellant has brought the case directly to this Court, asserting that jurisdiction exists under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, and arguing that the requirements of Younger v. Harris, supra, did not preclude relief on these facts. We noted probable jurisdiction over this appeal and set this case for argument in tandem with Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., ante, p. 592. 415 U. S. 974 (1974).
Unless jurisdiction over this direct appeal from the three-judge court decision below is conferred by 28 U. S. C. § 1253, we are without authority to entertain it. Section 1253 provides:
■ “Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.”
Appellant argues that its complaint presented a "suit. . . required ... to be heard” by a three-judge court and that the dismissal of its complaint seeking injunctive relief constituted “an order . . . denying ... an interlocutory or permanent injunction” within the meaning of § 1253.
In Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90 (1974), we recently discussed in some detail the question of what constitutes an order “denying” injunctive relief for purposes of § 1253. There we held that direct appeal to this Court under § 1253 did not lie from the order of a three-judge court dismissing a complaint because of an absence of standing where the three-judge court did not reach the merits of the constitutional claim presented. Although our decision rested at least partially on the ground that a three-judge court was not “required” where the ground for decision below was an absence of standing, 419 U. S., at 100, we also explored the question of whether an order of a three-judge court “denies” an injunction, for purposes of § 1253, where there is no adverse resolution of the constitutional claims presented. Although noting that certain decisions of this Court and a literal reading of § 1253 might be taken to support the notion that a denial of injunctive relief on any basis by a three-judge court is within the purview of § 1253, we concluded that stare decisis is entitled to less than its usual weight in this area, and that “the opaque terms and prolix syntax” of this statute were not capable of literal reading. 419 U. S., at 96-97. In focusing on the question of whether direct review by this Court under § 1253 is available in the absence of a three-judge court decision resting on resolution of the constitutional merits of a complaint, we stated:
“Mercantile argues that § 1253 should be read to limit our direct review of three-judge-court orders denying injunctions to those that rest upon resolution of the constitutional merits of the case. There would be evident virtues to this rule. It would lend symmetry to the Court’s jurisdiction since, in reviewing orders granting injunctions, the Court is necessarily dealing with a resolution of the merits. While issues short of the merits — such as justiciability, subject-matter jurisdiction, equitable jurisdiction, and abstention — are often of more than trivial consequence, that alone does not argue for our reviewing them on direct appeal. Discretionary review in any case would remain available, informed by the mediating wisdom of a court of appeals. Furthermore, the courts of appeals might in many instances give more detailed consideration to these issues than this Court, which disposes of most mandatory appeals in summary fashion.” 419 U. S., at 99.
The conflicting decisions of this Court on the question of whether § 1253 jurisdiction attaches where a three-judge federal court fails to reach the merits of a constitutional claim for injunctive relief do not provide a consistent answer to this question. Compare Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538 (1972), with Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm’n, 393 U. S. 83 (1968); Rosado v. Wyman, 395 U. S. 826 (1969); Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U. S. 427 (1970). See Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, supra, at 95 n. 11; 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 110.03 [3], pp. 76-79 (2d ed. 1973). It is certain that the congressional policy behind the three-judge court and direct-review apparatus-— the saving of state and federal statutes from improvident doom at the hands of a single judge — will not be impaired by a narrow construction of § 1253. A broad construction of the statute, on the other hand, would be at odds with the historic congressional policy of minimizing the mandatory docket of this Court in the interest of sound judicial administration. Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 250-251 (1941); Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, supra, at 98.
In light of these factors, we conclude that a direct appeal will lie to this Court under § 1253 from the order of a three-judge federal court denying interlocutory or permanent injunctive relief only where such order rests upon resolution of the merits of the constitutional claim presented below.
In the instant case, the three-judge court below did not reach the merits of appellant’s constitutional attack on the Alabama statute and instead based its order on the impropriety of federal intervention under our decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). In such circumstances, we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The correctness of the application of Younger on these facts by the District Court is for the Court of Appeals to determine. Accordingly, we vacate the order before us and remand this case to the District Court so that a fresh order may be entered and a timely appeal prosecuted to the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Nuisance is defined in § 1091 of this Act as “any place . . . upon which lewdness, assignation or prostitution is conducted, permitted, continued, or exists, and the personal property and contents used in conducting or maintaining any such place for any such purpose.” The remainder of the law consists of detailed procedural provisions governing the maintenance of a nuisance action.
In addition to MTM, Mobile Bookstore was a plaintiff below and is an appellant in the immediate action. There are no material differences in the facts surrounding Mobile’s participation in this action and those surrounding MTM’s participation. For simplicity, MTM and Mobile are hereinafter referred to collectively as appellant.
Although expedited appeal of the temporary injunction was available in state courts under Ala. Code, Tit. 7, §§ 757, 1057 (1958), appellant initiated no state-court appeal prior to the three-judge court’s decision on the merits. At the request of appellant, hearing on the permanent injunction in state court was deferred pending outcome of the federal suit.
The decision of the three-judge court is reported at 365 F. Supp. 1182.
We, of course, express no view on the correctness of the lower court’s holding.
The question of jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 was not raised in the Jurisdictional Statement, the Motion to Dismiss, or in the initial briefs filed in this case. At oral argument in light of our intervening decision in Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90 (1974), handed down after the filing of briefs in this case and on the day that this case was orally argued, it was suggested from the bench that supplemental briefs addressed to the issue of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 in light of Gonzalez, supra, be submitted. Appellant has submitted a brief attempting to distinguish Gonzalez, supra, which we have considered in resolving this jurisdictional question. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 305-306 (1962). While our normal practice under Rule 16 (6) of this Court has been to postpone notation of probable jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits where jurisdictional problems are presented, our intervening decision in Gonzalez, supra, squarely raised the jurisdictional question encountered here after we had noted probable jurisdiction in the case.
There is no occasion for us to decide in this case the circumstances under which a single judge may dismiss the complaint without convening a three-judge court where the ground for such dismissal rests solely on the impropriety of federal intervention. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 457 n. 7 (1974); Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, supra, at 100.
See Stamler v. Willis, 393 U. S. 407 (1969); Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U. S. 427, 431 (1970).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | I | sc_issuearea |
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Opinion Justice KAGANdelivered the opinion of the Court.
Before a company may sell securities in interstate commerce, it must file a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). If that document either "contain[s] an untrue statement of a material fact" or "omit[s] to state a material fact... necessary to make the statements therein not misleading," a purchaser of the stock may sue for damages. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). This case requires us to decide how each of those phrases applies to statements of opinion.
I
The Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.,protects investors by ensuring that companies issuing securities (known as "issuers") make a "full and fair disclosure of information" relevant to a public offering. Pinter v. Dahl,486 U.S. 622, 646, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 100 L.Ed.2d 658 (1988). The linchpin of the Act is its registration requirement. With limited exceptions not relevant here, an issuer may offer securities to the public only after filing a registration statement. See §§ 77d, 77e. That statement must contain specified information about both the company itself and the security for sale. See §§ 77g, 77aa. Beyond those required disclosures, the issuer may include additional representations of either fact or opinion.
Section 11 of the Act promotes compliance with these disclosure provisions by giving purchasers a right of action against an issuer or designated individuals (directors, partners, underwriters, and so forth) for material misstatements or omissions in registration statements. As relevant here, that section provides:
"In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security... [may] sue." § 77k(a).
Section 11 thus creates two ways to hold issuers liable for the contents of a registration statement-one focusing on what the statement says and the other on what it leaves out. Either way, the buyer need not prove (as he must to establish certain other securities offenses) that the defendant acted with any intent to deceive or defraud. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,459 U.S. 375, 381-382, 103 S.Ct. 683, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983).
This case arises out of a registration statement that petitioner Omnicare filed in connection with a public offering of common stock. Omnicare is the nation's largest provider of pharmacy services for residents of nursing homes. Its registration statement contained (along with all mandated disclosures) analysis of the effects of various federal and state laws on its business model, including its acceptance of rebates from pharmaceutical manufacturers. See, e.g.,App. 88-107, 132-140, 154-166. Of significance here, two sentences in the registration statement expressed Omnicare's view of its compliance with legal requirements:
• "We believe our contract arrangements with other healthcare providers, our pharmaceutical suppliers and our pharmacy practices are in compliance with applicable federal and state laws." Id.,at 95.
• "We believe that our contracts with pharmaceutical manufacturers are legally and economically valid arrangements that bring value to the healthcare system and the patients that we serve." Id.,at 137.
Accompanying those legal opinions were some caveats. On the same page as the first statement above, Omnicare mentioned several state-initiated "enforcement actions against pharmaceutical manufacturers" for offering payments to pharmacies that dispensed their products; it then cautioned that the laws relating to that practice might "be interpreted in the future in a manner inconsistent with our interpretation and application." Id.,at 96. And adjacent to the second statement, Omnicare noted that the Federal Government had expressed "significant concerns" about some manufacturers' rebates to pharmacies and warned that business might suffer "if these price concessions were no longer provided." Id.,at 136-137.
Respondents here, pension funds that purchased Omnicare stock in the public offering (hereinafter Funds), brought suit alleging that the company's two opinion statements about legal compliance give rise to liability under § 11. Citing lawsuits that the Federal Government later pressed against Omnicare, the Funds' complaint maintained that the company's receipt of payments from drug manufacturers violated anti-kickback laws. See id.,at 181-186, 203-226. Accordingly, the complaint asserted, Omnicare made "materially false" representations about legal compliance. Id.,at 274. And so too, the complaint continued, the company "omitted to state [material] facts necessary" to make its representations not misleading. Id.,at 273. The Funds claimed that none of Omnicare's officers and directors "possessed reasonable grounds" for thinking that the opinions offered were truthful and complete. Id.,at 274. Indeed, the complaint noted that one of Omnicare's attorneys had warned that a particular contract "carrie[d] a heightened risk" of liability under anti-kickback laws. Id.,at 225 (emphasis deleted). At the same time, the Funds made clear that in light of § 11's strict liability standard, they chose to "exclude and disclaim any allegation that could be construed as alleging fraud or intentional or reckless misconduct." Id.,at 273.
The District Court granted Omnicare's motion to dismiss. See Civ. No. 2006-26 (ED Ky., Feb. 13, 2012), App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a, 38a-40a, 2012 WL 462551, *4-*5. In the court's view, "statements regarding a company's belief as to its legal compliance are considered'soft' information" and are actionable only if those who made them "knew [they] were untrue at the time." App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a. The court concluded that the Funds' complaint failed to meet that standard because it nowhere claimed that "the company's officers knew they were violating the law." Id.,at 39a. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. See 719 F.3d 498 (2013). It acknowledged that the two statements highlighted in the Funds' complaint expressed Omnicare's "opinion" of legal compliance, rather than "hard facts." Id.,at 504(quoting In re Sofamor Danek Group Inc.,123 F.3d 394, 401-402 (C.A.6 1997)). But even so, the court held, the Funds had to allege only that the stated belief was "objectively false"; they did not need to contend that anyone at Omnicare "disbelieved [the opinion] at the time it was expressed." 719 F.3d, at 506(quoting Fait v. Regions Financial Corp.,655 F.3d 105, 110 (C.A.2 2011)).
We granted certiorari, 571 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 1490, 188 L.Ed.2d 374 (2014), to consider how § 11 pertains to statements of opinion. We do so in two steps, corresponding to the two parts of § 11 and the two theories in the Funds' complaint. We initially address the Funds' claim that Omnicare made "untrue statement[s] of... material fact" in offering its views on legal compliance. § 77k(a);
see App. 273-274. We then take up the Funds' argument that Omnicare "omitted to state a material fact... necessary to make the statements [in its registration filing] not misleading." § 77k(a); see App. 273-274. Unlike both courts below, we see those allegations as presenting different issues.In resolving the first, we discuss when an opinion itself constitutes a factual misstatement. In analyzing the second, we address when an opinion may be rendered misleading by the omission of discrete factual representations. Because we find that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard, we vacate its decision.
II
The Sixth Circuit held, and the Funds now urge, that a statement of opinion that is ultimately found incorrect-even if believed at the time made-may count as an "untrue statement of a material fact." 15 U.S. C § 77k(a); see 719 F.3d, at 505; Brief for Respondents 20-26. As the Funds put the point, a statement of belief may make an implicit assertion about the belief's "subject matter": To say "we believe X is true" is often to indicate that "X is in fact true." Id.,at 23; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. In just that way, the Funds conclude, an issuer's statement that "we believe we are following the law" conveys that "we in fact are following the law"-which is "materially false," no matter what the issuer thinks, if instead it is violating an anti-kickback statute. Brief for Respondents 1.
But that argument wrongly conflates facts and opinions. A fact is "a thing done or existing" or "[a]n actual happening." Webster's New International Dictionary 782 (1927). An opinion is "a belief[,] a view," or a "sentiment which the mind forms of persons or things." Id.,at 1509. Most important, a statement of fact ("the coffee is hot") expresses certainty about a thing, whereas a statement of opinion ("I think the coffee is hot") does not. See ibid.("An opinion, in ordinary usage... does not imply... definiteness... or certainty"); 7 Oxford English Dictionary 151 (1933) (an opinion "rests[s] on grounds insufficient for complete demonstration"). Indeed, that difference between the two is so ingrained in our everyday ways of speaking and thinking as to make resort to old dictionaries seem a mite silly. And Congress effectively incorporated just that distinction in § 11's first part by exposing issuers to liability not for "untrue statement[s]" full stop (which would have included ones of opinion), but only for "untrue statement[s] of... fact." § 77k(a)(emphasis added).
Consider that statutory phrase's application to two hypothetical statements, couched in ways the Funds claim are equivalent. A company's CEO states: "The TVs we manufacture have the highest resolution available on the market." Or, alternatively, the CEO transforms that factual statement into one of opinion: "I believe" (or "I think") "the TVs we manufacture have the highest resolution available on the market." The first version would be an untrue statement of fact if a competitor had introduced a higher resolution TV a month before-even assuming the CEO had not yet learned of the new product. The CEO's assertion, after all, is not mere puffery, but a determinate, verifiable statement about her company's TVs; and the CEO, however innocently, got the facts wrong. But in the same set of circumstances, the second version would remain true. Just as she said, the CEO really did believe, when she made the statement, that her company's TVs had the sharpest picture around. And although a plaintiff could later prove that opinion erroneous, the words "I believe" themselves admitted that possibility, thus precluding liability for an untrue statement of fact. That remains the case if the CEO's opinion, as here, concerned legal compliance. If, for example, she said, "I believe our marketing practices are lawful," and actually did think that, she could not be liable for a false statement of fact-even if she afterward discovered a longtime violation of law. Once again, the statement would have been true, because all she expressed was a view, not a certainty, about legal compliance.
That still leaves some room for § 11's false-statement provision to apply to expressions of opinion. As even Omnicare acknowledges, every such statement explicitly affirms one fact: that the speaker actually holds the stated belief. See Brief for Petitioners 15-16; W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 109, p. 755 (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser and Keeton) ("[A]n expression of opinion is itself always a statement of... the fact of the belief, the existing state of mind, of the one who asserts it"). For that reason, the CEO's statement about product quality ("I believe our TVs have the highest resolution available on the market") would be an untrue statement of fact-namely, the fact of her own belief-if she knew that her company's TVs only placed second. And so too the statement about legal compliance ("I believe our marketing practices are lawful") would falsely describe her own state of mind if she thought her company was breaking the law. In such cases, § 11's first part would subject the issuer to liability (assuming the misrepresentation were material).
In addition, some sentences that begin with opinion words like "I believe" contain embedded statements of fact-as, once again, Omnicare recognizes. See Reply Brief 6. Suppose the CEO in our running hypothetical said: "I believe our TVs have the highest resolution available because we use a patented technology to which our competitors do not have access." That statement may be read to affirm not only the speaker's state of mind, as described above, but also an underlying fact: that the company uses a patented technology. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,501 U.S. 1083, 1109, 111 S.Ct. 2749, 115 L.Ed.2d 929 (1991)(SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (showing that a statement can sometimes be "most fairly read as affirming separately both the fact of the [speaker's] opinion and the accuracy of the facts" given to support or explain it (emphasis deleted)). Accordingly, liability under § 11's false-statement provision would follow (once again, assuming materiality) not only if the speaker did not hold the belief she professed but also if the supporting fact she supplied were untrue.
But the Funds cannot avail themselves of either of those ways of demonstrating liability. The two sentences to which the Funds object are pure statements of opinion: To simplify their content only a bit, Omnicare said in each that "we believe we are obeying the law." And the Funds do not contest that Omnicare's opinion was honestly held. Recall that their complaint explicitly "exclude[s] and disclaim[s]" any allegation sounding in fraud or deception. App. 273. What the Funds instead claim is that Omnicare's belief turned out to be wrong-that whatever the company thought, it was in fact violating anti-kickback laws. But that allegation alone will not give rise to liability under § 11's first clause because, as we have shown, a sincere statement of pure opinion is not an "untrue statement of material fact," regardless whether an investor can ultimately prove the belief wrong. That clause, limited as it is to factual statements, does not allow investors to second-guess inherently subjective and uncertain assessments. In other words, the provision is not, as the Court of Appeals and the Funds would have it, an invitation to Monday morning quarterback an issuer's opinions.
III
A
That conclusion, however, does not end this case because the Funds also rely on § 11's omissions provision, alleging that Omnicare "omitted to state facts necessary" to make its opinion on legal compliance "not misleading." App. 273; see § 77k(a).As all parties accept, whether a statement is "misleading" depends on the perspective of a reasonable investor: The inquiry (like the one into materiality) is objective. Cf. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,426 U.S. 438, 445, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976)(noting that the securities laws care only about the "significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor"). We therefore must consider when, if ever, the omission of a fact can make a statement of opinion like Omnicare's, even if literally accurate, misleading to an ordinary investor.
Omnicare claims that is just not possible. On its view, no reasonable person, in any context, can understand a pure statement of opinion to convey anything more than the speaker's own mindset. See Reply Brief 5-6. As long as an opinion is sincerely held, Omnicare argues, it cannot mislead as to any matter, regardless what related facts the speaker has omitted. Such statements of belief (concludes Omnicare) are thus immune from liability under § 11's second part, just as they are under its first.
That claim has more than a kernel of truth. A reasonable person understands, and takes into account, the difference we have discussed above between a statement of fact and one of opinion. See supra,at 1325 - 1326. She recognizes the import of words like "I think" or "I believe," and grasps that they convey some lack of certainty as to the statement's content. See, e.g.,Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 168, Comment a,p. 456 (1979) (noting that a statement of opinion "implies that [the speaker]... is not certain enough of what he says" to do without the qualifying language). And that may be especially so when the phrases appear in a registration statement, which the reasonable investor expects has been carefully wordsmithed to comply with the law. When reading such a document, the investor thus distinguishes between the sentences "we believe X is true" and "X is true." And because she does so, the omission of a fact that merely rebuts the latter statement fails to render the former misleading. In other words, a statement of opinion is not misleading just because external facts show the opinion to be incorrect. Reasonable investors do not understand such statements as guarantees, and § 11's omissions clause therefore does not treat them that way.
But Omnicare takes its point too far, because a reasonable investor may, depending on the circumstances, understand an opinion statement to convey facts about how the speaker has formed the opinion-or, otherwise put, about the speaker's basis for holding that view. And if the real facts are otherwise, but not provided, the opinion statement will mislead its audience. Consider an unadorned statement of opinion about legal compliance: "We believe our conduct is lawful." If the issuer makes that statement without having consulted a lawyer, it could be misleadingly incomplete. In the context of the securities market, an investor, though recognizing that legal opinions can prove wrong in the end, still likely expects such an assertion to rest on some meaningful legal inquiry-rather than, say, on mere intuition, however sincere.Similarly, if the issuer made the statement in the face of its lawyers' contrary advice, or with knowledge that the Federal Government was taking the opposite view, the investor again has cause to complain: He expects not just that the issuer believes the opinion (however irrationally), but that it fairly aligns with the information in the issuer's possession at the time.Thus, if a registration statement omits material facts about the issuer's inquiry into or knowledge concerning a statement of opinion, and if those facts conflict with what a reasonable investor would take from the statement itself, then § 11's omissions clause creates liability.
An opinion statement, however, is not necessarily misleading when an issuer knows, but fails to disclose, some fact cutting the other way. Reasonable investors understand that opinions sometimes rest on a weighing of competing facts; indeed, the presence of such facts is one reason why an issuer may frame a statement as an opinion, thus conveying uncertainty. See supra,at 1325 - 1326, 1328. Suppose, for example, that in stating an opinion about legal compliance, the issuer did not disclose that a single junior attorney expressed doubts about a practice's legality, when six of his more senior colleagues gave a stamp of approval. That omission would not make the statement of opinion misleading, even if the minority position ultimately proved correct: A reasonable investor does not expect that everyfact known to an issuer supports its opinion statement.
Moreover, whether an omission makes an expression of opinion misleading always depends on context. Registration statements as a class are formal documents, filed with the SEC as a legal prerequisite for selling securities to the public. Investors do not, and are right not to, expect opinions contained in those statements to reflect baseless, off-the-cuff judgments, of the kind that an individual might communicate in daily life. At the same time, an investor reads each statement within such a document, whether of fact or of opinion, in light of all its surrounding text, including hedges, disclaimers, and apparently conflicting information. And the investor takes into account the customs and practices of the relevant industry. So an omission that renders misleading a statement of opinion when viewed in a vacuum may not do so once that statement is considered, as is appropriate, in a broader frame. The reasonable investor understands a statement of opinion in its full context, and § 11 creates liability only for the omission of material facts that cannot be squared with such a fair reading.
These principles are not unique to § 11: They inhere, too, in much common law respecting the tort of misrepresentation.The Restatement of Torts, for example, recognizes that "[a] statement of opinion as to facts not disclosed and not otherwise known to the recipient may" in some circumstances reasonably "be interpreted by him as an implied statement" that the speaker "knows facts sufficient to justify him in forming" the opinion, or that he at least knows no facts "incompatible with [the] opinion." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 539, p. 85 (1976).When that is so, the Restatement explains, liability may result from omission of facts-for example, the fact that the speaker failed to conduct any investigation-that rebut the recipient's predictable inference. See id., Comment a,at 86; id.,Comment b,at 87. Similarly, the leading treatise in the area explains that "it has been recognized very often that the expression of an opinion may carry with it an implied assertion, not only that the speaker knows no facts which would preclude such an opinion, but that he does know facts which justify it." Prosser and Keeton § 109, at 760. That is especially (and traditionally) the case, the treatise continues, where-as in a registration statement-a speaker "holds himself out or is understood as having special knowledge of the matter which is not available to the plaintiff." Id.,at 760-761 (footnote omitted); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 539, Comment b,at 86 (noting that omissions relating to an opinion's basis are "particularly" likely to give rise to liability when the speaker has "special knowledge of facts unknown to the recipient"); Smith v. Land and House Property Corp., [1884] 28 Ch. D. 7, 15 (App. Cas.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (opinion of Bowen, L.J.) (When "the facts are not equally known to both sides, then a statement of opinion by the one who knows the facts best... impliedly states that [the speaker] knows facts which justify his opinion").
And the purpose of § 11 supports this understanding of how the omissions clause maps onto opinion statements. Congress adopted § 11 to ensure that issuers "tell[ ] the whole truth" to investors. H.R.Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1933) (quoting President Roosevelt's message to Congress). For that reason, literal accuracy is not enough: An issuer must as well desist from misleading investors by saying one thing and holding back another. Omnicare would ify that statutory requirement for all sentences starting with the phrases "we believe" or "we think." But those magic words can preface nearly any conclusion, and the resulting statements, as we have shown, remain perfectly capable of misleading investors. See supra,at 1328 - 1329. Thus, Omnicare's view would punch a hole in the statute for half-truths in the form of opinion statements. And the difficulty of showing that such statements are literally false-which requires proving an issuer did not believe them, see supra,at 1326 - 1327-would make that opening yet more consequential: Were Omnicare right, companies would have virtual carte blancheto assert opinions in registration statements free from worry about § 11. That outcome would ill-fit Congress's decision to establish a strict liability offense promoting "full and fair disclosure" of material information. Pinter,486 U.S., at 646, 108 S.Ct. 2063; see supra,at 1323.
Omnicare argues, in response, that applying § 11's omissions clause in the way we have described would have "adverse policy consequences." Reply Brief 17 (capitalization omitted). According to Omnicare, any inquiry into the issuer's basis for holding an opinion is "hopelessly amorphous," threatening "unpredictable" and possibly "massive" liability. Id.,at 2; Brief for Petitioners 34, 36. And because that is so, Omnicare claims, many issuers will choose not to disclose opinions at all, thus "depriving [investors] of potentially helpful information." Reply Brief 19; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 59-61.
But first, that claim is, just as Omnicare labels it, one of "policy"; and Congress gets to make policy, not the courts. The decision Congress made, for the reasons we have indicated, was to extend § 11 liability to all statements rendered misleading by omission. In doing so, Congress no doubt made § 11 less cut-and-dry than a law prohibiting only false factual statements. Section 11's omissions clause, as applied to statements of both opinion and fact, necessarily brings the reasonable person into the analysis, and asks what she would naturally understand a statement to convey beyond its literal meaning. And for expressions of opinion, that means considering the foundation she would expect an issuer to have before making the statement. See supra,at 1328 - 1329. All that, however, is a feature, not a bug, of the omissions provision.
Moreover, Omnicare way overstates both the looseness of the inquiry Congress has mandated and the breadth of liability that approach threatens. As we have explained, an investor cannot state a claim by alleging only that an opinion was wrong; the complaint must as well call into question the issuer's basis for offering the opinion. See supra,at 1328 - 1329. And to do so, the investor cannot just say that the issuer failed to reveal its basis. Section 11's omissions clause, after all, is not a general disclosure requirement; it affords a cause of action only when an issuer's failure to include a material fact has rendered a published statement misleading. To press such a claim, an investor must allege that kind of omission-and not merely by means of conclusory assertions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice"). To be specific: The investor must identify particular (and material) facts going to the basis for the issuer's opinion-facts about the inquiry the issuer did or did not conduct or the knowledge it did or did not have-whose omission makes the opinion statement at issue misleading to a reasonable person reading the statement fairly and in context. See supra,at 1328 - 1330. That is no small task for an investor.
Nor does the inquiry such a complaint triggers ask anything unusual of courts. Numerous legal rules hinge on what a reasonable person would think or expect. In requiring courts to view statements of opinion from an ordinary investor's perspective, § 11's omissions clause demands nothing more complicated or unmanageable. Indeed, courts have for decades engaged in just that inquiry, with no apparent trouble, in applying the common law of misrepresentation. See supra,at 1330 - 1331.
Finally, we see no reason to think that liability for misleading opinions will chill disclosures useful to investors. Nothing indicates that § 11's application to misleading factual assertions in registration statements has caused such a problem. And likewise, common-law doctrines of opinion liability have not, so far as anyone knows, deterred merchants in ordinary commercial transactions from asserting helpful opinions about their products. That absence of fallout is unsurprising. Sellers (whether of stock or other items) have strong economic incentives to... well, sell (i.e., hawk or peddle). Those market-based forces push back against any inclination to underdisclose. And to avoid exposure for omissions under § 11, an issuer need only divulge an opinion's basis, or else make clear the real tentativeness of its belief. Such ways of conveying opinions so that they do not mislead will keep valuable information flowing. And that is the only kind of information investors need. To the extent our decision today chills misleadingopinions, that is all to the good: In enacting § 11, Congress worked to ensure better, not just more, information.
B
Our analysis on this score counsels in favor of sending the case back to the lower courts for decision. Neither court below considered the Funds' omissions theory with the right standard in mind-or indeed, even recognized the distinct statutory questions that theory raises. See supra,at 1324 - 1325. We therefore follow our ordinary practice of remanding for a determination of whether the Funds have stated a viable omissions claim (or, if not, whether they should have a chance to replead).
In doing so, however, we reemphasize a few crucial points pertinent to the inquiry on remand. Initially, as we have said, the Funds cannot proceed without identifying one or more facts left out of Omnicare's registration statement. See supra,at 1331 - 1332. The Funds' recitation of the statutory language-that Omnicare "omitted to state facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading"-is not sufficient; neither is the Funds' conclusory allegation that Omnicare lacked "reasonable grounds for the belief" it stated respecting legal compliance. App. 273-274. At oral argument, however, the Funds highlighted another, more specific allegation in their complaint: that an attorney had warned Omnicare that a particular contract "carrie[d] a heightened risk" of legal exposure under anti-kickback laws. Id.,at 225 (emphasis omitted); see Tr. of Oral Arg. 42, 49; supra,at 1324. On remand, the court must review the Funds' complaint to determine whether it adequately alleged that Omnicare had omitted that (purported) fact, or any other like it, from the registration statement. And if so, the court must determine whether the omitted fact would have been material to a reasonable investor-i.e., whether "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable [investor] would consider it important." TSC Industries,426 U.S., at 449, 96 S.Ct. 2126.
Assuming the Funds clear those hurdles, the court must ask whether the alleged omission rendered Omnicare's legal compliance opinions misleading in the way described earlier-i.e., because the excluded fact shows that Omnicare lacked the basis for making those statements that a reasonable investor would expect. See supra,at 1328 - 1329. Insofar as the omitted fact at issue is the attorney's warning, that inquiry entails consideration of such matters as the attorney's status and expertise and other legal information available to Omnicare at the time. See supra,at 1329. Further, the analysis of whether Omnicare's opinion is misleading must address the statement's context. See supra,at 1330. That means the court must take account of whatever facts Omnicare didprovide about legal compliance, as well as any other hedges, disclaimers, or qualifications it included in its registration statement. The court should consider, for example, the information Omnicare offered that States had initiated enforcement actions against drug manufacturers for giving rebates to pharmacies, that the Federal Government had expressed concerns about the practice, and that the relevant laws "could "be interpreted in the future in a manner" that would harm Omnicare's business. See App. 95-96, 136-137; supra,at 1323 - 1324.
* * *
With these instructions and for the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Justice SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability where a registration statement "contain[s] an untrue statement of a material fact" or "omit[s] to state a material fact necessary to make the statements therein not misleading." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). I agree with the Court's discussion of what it means for an expression of opinion to state an untrue material fact. But an expression of opinion implies facts (beyond the fact that the speaker believes his opinion) only where a reasonable listener would understand it to do so. And it is only when expressions of opinion doimply these other facts that they can be "misleading" without the addition of other "material facts." The Court's view would count far more expressions of opinion to convey collateral facts than I-or the common law-would, and I therefore concur only in part.
The common law recognized that most listeners hear "I believe," "in my estimation," and other related phrases as disclaimingthe assertion of a fact. Hence the (somewhat overbroad) common-law rule that a plaintiff cannot establish a misrepresentation claim "for misstatements of opinion, as distinguished from those of fact." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 109, p. 755 (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser & Keeton). A fraudulent misrepresentation claim based on an expression of opinion could lie for the one fact the opinion reliably conveyed: that the speaker in fact held the stated opinion. Restatement of Torts § 525, Comment c,p. 60 (1938). And, in some circumstances, the common law acknowledged that an expression of opinion reasonably implied "that the maker knows of no fact incompatible with his opinion." Id.§ 539(1), at 91. The no-facts-incompatible-with-the-opinion standard was a demanding one; it meant that a speaker's judgment had to "var[y] so far from the truth that no reasonable man in his position could have such an opinion." Restatement of Contracts § 474(b), p. 902, and Comment b(1932). But without more, a listener could only reasonably interpret expressions of opinion as conveying this limited assurance of a speaker's understanding of facts.
In a few areas, the common law recognized the possibility that a listener could reasonably infer from an expression of opinion not only (1) that the speaker sincerely held it, and (2) that the speaker knew of no facts incompatible with the opinion, but also (3) that the speaker had a reasonable basis for holding the opinion. This exceptional recognition occurred only where it was "very reasonable or probable" that a listener should place special confidence in a speaker's opinion. Prosser & Keeton § 109, at 760-761. This included two main categories, both of which were carve-outs from the general rule that "the ordinary man has a reasonable competence to form his own opinion," and "is not justified
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
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L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer: | H | sc_issuearea |
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